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Beyond "Fortress Pacific"

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Title:
Beyond "Fortress Pacific" exploring sustainable mobilization in Guam
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Elmore, Sarah ( author )
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Denver, CO
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University of Colorado Denver
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Master's ( Master of Arts)
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University of Colorado Denver
Degree Divisions:
Department of Political Science, CU Denver
Degree Disciplines:
Political science

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Subjects / Keywords:
Military bases, American -- Guam ( lcsh )
Military policy -- United States ( lcsh )
Armed Forces -- United States -- Guam ( lcsh )
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bibliography ( marcgt )
theses ( marcgt )
non-fiction ( marcgt )

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Abstract:
In 2005, Washington announced plans for the relocation of 8000 Marines form Okinawa to the U.S. colony of Guan by 2014. Many of Guam's elite - political officers, businesses, and main media outlets - claim that realignment will reap several benefits, including economic revival, new employment opportunities, renovated infrastructure, increased security, and a more productive relationship with the United States. However, by increasing the population approximately 45%, the move has raised concerns of environmental and cultural risks, especially among the islands' indigenous community, the Chamoru. Despite these implications anti-expansion resistance is present but not popular. In seeking to answer why resistance has not led to sustainable mobilization, this thesis will employ political process theory, finding that although the anti-expansion movement (AEM) is present, it has not galvanized sustainable mobilization because of the intersection of Guam's structural (political ambiguity and economy) and cultural (the Liberation narrative) conditions.
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Political science
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Department of Political Science
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by sarah Elmore.

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|University of Colorado Denver
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|Auraria Library
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891659501 ( OCLC )
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Full Text
BEYOND FORTRESS PACIFIC
EXPLORING SUSTAINABLE MOBLIZATION IN GUAM
by
SARAH ELMORE
B.A., University of Colorado Denver, 2011
A thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Colorado Denver in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Political Science Program
2013


This thesis for the Master of Arts degree by Sarah Gail Elmore has been approved for the Political Science Program by
Lucy W. McGuffey, Chair Betcy Jose Glenn Morriss
November 29, 2013


Elmore, Sarah Gail (M.A., Political Science)
Beyond Fortress Pacific: Exploring Social Movement in Guam Thesis directed by Senior Instructor Lucy Ware McGuffey
ABSTRACT
In 2005, Washington announced plans for the relocation of 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to the U.S. colony of Guam by 2014. Many of Guams elitepolitical officers, businesses, and main media outletsclaim that realignment will reap several benefits, including economic revival, new employment opportunities, renovated infrastructure, increased security, and a more productive relationship with the United States. However, by increasing the population approximately 45%, the move has raised concerns of environmental and cultural risks, especially among the islands indigenous community, the Chamoru. Despite these implications, anti-expansion resistance is present but not popular. In seeking to answer why resistance has not led to sustainable mobilization, this thesis will employ political process theory, finding that although the anti-expansion movement (AEM) is present, it has not galvanized sustainable mobilization because of the intersection of Guams structural (political ambiguity and economy) and cultural (the Liberation narrative) conditions.
The form and content of this abstract are approved. I recommend its publication.
m
Approved: Lucy Ware McGuffey


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
It is an honor to bestow acknowledgment to my entire thesis committee: Dr. Lucy McGuffey, Dr. Betcy Jose, and Professor Glenn Morris. This thesis would not have been possible without your gracious guidance throughout this journey. I would like to express my gratefulness to my thesis chair, Dr. Lucy McGuffey, whose constant encouragement and counsel was an immeasurable aid to my research and writing. I am also indebted to the professors and faculty in the CU Denver Political Science Department for providing a program that encourages independent thought and for instilling within me a deep hunger for social justice. In addition, I would like to acknowledge the efforts of Guams Chamoru scholars, whose works offered a foundation from which I was able to develop my thesis.
Finally, I owe my deepest gratitude to my family who has never failed to support me in my academic career. To my sisters, thank you for always believing in my abilities. And to my mother and father, thank you for loving me, teaching me, and challenging me to look beyond myself, so that I may humbly yet boldly speak the truth.
IV


TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER
I. INTRODUCTION.................................................1
II. WHY GUAM?..................................................3
History of Colonialism.......................................3
A Military Colony............................................6
The Announcement for Realignment.............................9
III. CONCERNS ABOUT THE BUILD-UP.................................12
Funding.....................................................12
Displacement................................................15
Land........................................................16
Security....................................................19
Environment.................................................20
International Law...........................................22
Economy.....................................................24
Reasons for Resistance......................................26
IV. ANTI-EXPANSION RESISTANCE: PRESENT BUT NOT
PROMINENT...................................................27
Meaningful Mobilization.....................................27
Failure to Galvanize Sustainable Mobilization...............29
V. EXPLANATIONS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORIES....................37
Political Process Theory....................................37
Comparison to Other Social Movement Theories................39
v


VI. STRUCTURES THAT SUPPRESS.....................................42
Political Ambiguity..........................................42
Poor Economic Structure......................................45
Limitations of Structural Explanations.......................47
VII. CONSEQUENCES OF A COLONIAL CULTURE...........................49
The Liberation Narrative.....................................50
Effects on the Anti-Expansion Movement.......................56
VIII. OPPORTUNITIES FOR A MORE SUSTAINABLE MOVEMENT................59
Frame Alignment..............................................59
Beyond Fortress Pacific....................................69
BIBLIOGRAPHY..........................................................71
vi


CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In the middle of Micronesia lies Fortress Pacific, an island of microscopic proportions (Bohane 2007). Yet despite its size, the island of Guam, as it is more commonly known, poses great significance to the United States by serving as the most strategic U.S. military installation as well as one of the largest nuclear weapons depots in the Pacific Ocean (Rogers 1988, 51). However, what many would consider a term of the past is an ongoing reality for the people of Guam: Guam is a colony of the United States (Naiman 2010, par. 1-2, 5). As a colony, the island is subject to dramatic changes within the U.S. military base network (Davis 2011).
One of those dramatic changes occurred in 2005, when Washington announced plans for the relocation of 8,000 Marines in Okinawa to Guam by 2014 (Naiman 2010). Many of Guams elite1main media outlets, political officials, and businessesclaim that realignment will reap several benefits, including economic revival, new employment opportunities, renovated infrastructure, increased security, and a productive relationship with the United States (Viemes 2009, 106). However, by increasing the population approximately 45%, the move has raised economic, ecological, and cultural concerns, especially among the islands indigenous community, the Chamoru2 (Naiman 2010, par.
6, 8). Despite these implications, anti-expansion resistance is present but not popular. In
1 The term elite is not employed as a pejorative term, but rather, according to social movement literature, refers to people/institutions that hold influential positions.
2 Since 1994, the Chamorro Language Commission refer to the Chamorro as Chamoru (Alexander 2011b, 2). Both terms apply to the indigenous peoples of Guam. However, within this paper, Chamoru will be used unless the original author specifically uses the term Chamorro.
1


seeking to answer why resistance has not led to sustainable mobilization, this thesis will employ political process theory, finding that although the anti-expansion movement (AEM)3 is present, it has not galvanized sustainable mobilization because of the intersection of Guams structural (political ambiguity and economy) and cultural (the Liberation narrative) conditions.
3 Although more eloquent names for the indigenous resistance movement in Guam exist, the term anti-expansion movement is specifically used for this thesis.
2


CHAPTER II
WHY GUAM?4
The island of Guam is the southernmost and largest island of the Mariana Island Chain, a string of islands in the middle of Micronesia (Aguon 2006b, 20). Hosting U.S. military installations such as Anderson Air Force Base, a U.S. naval base, and 35,000 military personnel and their dependents (Alexander 2011a, 7 and 2011b, 3-4), Guam has been deemed by the Pentagon as the tip of the spear (Paik 2010), a supposed accolade for providing a distinct U.S. military presence within the reach of China and North Korea. However, such depictions of the island ignore the fact that Guam is not simply a floating military base in the middle of the Pacific (Davis 2011, 7).
Still, the islands political and social landscape beyond its military distinction is rarely discussed by political leaders in Washington. Insufficient discourse and research about Guam is not peculiar in scholarly analysis. Alexander (2011b, 19) argues that today military bases have become normalized and the outside world remains conveniently uncurious as to what takes place on small and distant islands. But as Bevacqua (2010) eloquently noted: Guam is important precisely because its political existence evades the sharpest critical eyes (33). Therefore, within this recent announcement for expansion are opportunities for inquiry today. What is the history of Guam, who are its people, and what are the implications behind the announcement for the U.S. military expansion?
4 Yoshida 2010
3


History of Colonialism
Before delving into the anti-expansion movement, it is critical to examine the historical context within which the movement developed. To provide this context, a brief discussion on Guam colonial history is necessary.
Table 1: Guams Seven Historical Eras
Time Period Historical Era
2000 BC-1668 Ancient Guam Era
1668-1898 Spanish Era
1898-1941 U.S. Naval Era
1941-1944 World War IEJapanese Era
1944-1950 Post-War Era
1950-1970 Guamanian Era
1970- Present Contemporary Era
(Guampedia 2012)
Prior to becoming a U.S. territory, Guam was a Spanish colony for 200 years.5 Spanish rule was characterized by oppression, involuntary assimilation to Spanish customs and the Jesuit mission, and near eradication of the Chamoru people from European diseases (Quimby 2012, par. 3, under warm welcome turns into sporadic
5 The time period of Spanish colonization is contested. According to Shuster (2010), Guam was under the rule of Spain for 217 years (par. 7, Spanish take Charge). However, other scholars argue that Spanish rule had begun long before 1668, noting that Magellan first invaded the island in 1521.
4


resistance). Alexander (2011b) explains that the Chamorus put up strong resistance to colonization and forced baptism, but by the end of the 17th century, the combination of war and disease had decimated the population by between 80% and 90% (Troutman 1998, 332 in 2011b, 11).
In 1898, after the Spanish-American War, Guam, along with Puerto Rico and the Philippines, was placed under the control of the U.S. naval administration (Alexander 2011b, 2-3). Like the Spanish who had colonized the island before them, the U.S. Navy acknowledged that obedience from the Chamoru could be potently enforced through what it believed to be benevolent but nonetheless involuntary assimilation. Therefore, according to Bevacqua (2010), educating the Chamoru was essential for the success of the U.S. colonial project because:
The idea that Education is important, forces an informing of absence, such as the prohibition, and thus lack, of Chamorro language in schools, the lack of anything Chamorro related in curriculum.. .lessons of Chamorro incompleteness, inadequacy, dirtiness, impossibility, invisibility, and nakedness (42).
In other words, U.S. naval education served to enforce the idea that the Chamoru were inadequate, inferior, and deficient. By inflicting a sense of inadequacy upon the Chamoru people, the U.S. Navy could fulfill its desire to create a new people in the Chamoru, a people who would be productive, disciplined, educated, and sanitary (Hattori 1995a, 1 in Alexander 2011b, 13). According to Anghie (2005), this type of education in colonial projects is crucial because it is linked intimately with the task of normalization, of creating the universe against which the native will be found wanting and that will lead ultimately to reform desired by the native herself (187).
However, it should be noted that subversive tactics were not uncommon during the naval administration as cases of early indigenous activism were evident almost
6


immediately after Guam became a U.S. possession (Hattorri 1995a in Viernes 2009). Recognizing these efforts is important to the study of Guams colonial history because these efforts present a stark contrast to the view that Chamorros are weak and have complied with the US colonial project in Guam (Viernes 2009, 106). Resistance against the U.S. naval administration consisted mainly of Scotts peasant resistance tactics, such as foot dragging, dissimulation, desertion, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, [and] sabotage (Scott 1985, xvi in Viernes 2009, 105).
Eventually, these peasant resistance tactics evolved into more conventional modes of political activism. From 1901 to 1950, the people of Guam drafted petitions calling for the formation of a civilian government to replace the naval government (Hattori 1996, 58 in Viernes 2009, 105-106). However, both Congress and the U.S. Navy consistently disputed the petitions (Hattori 1996, 58 in Viernes 2009, 106). To legitimize their rule, the U.S. naval administration argued that it was its duty and obligation to shape the Chamorro into devoted Americans and attempted to expunge any component of Chamorro identity that did not align with the U.S. colonial agenda (Diaz 2001, 165; Hattori 1995a, 13 in Viernes 2009, 104-105). As a result, public life was restricted within the confines of Navy-interpreted American patriotism (Underwood in Diaz 2001, 165).
A Military Colony
Although the island is no longer ruled by the U.S. naval administration, Guams colonial status is not a condition of the past. Currently, the island is a U.S. unincorporated territory. As an unincorporated territory to the United States, Guams political and legal
6


status is in neocolonial limbo (Rogers 1988). In other words, the island has neither complete sovereignty nor complete dependence in relation to the United States (Alexander 2011b, 8). Though the residents possess U.S. citizenship, the Constitution is not fully applicable to them, as they cannot vote in presidential elections nor do they have a voting representative in Congress (Bevacqua 2010 in Lai 2011, 12-13).
According to scholars, this politically ambiguous status works in the U.S. militarys favor, as the U.S. territory allows for military training and operations that would otherwise be challenged in host countries (Zielinski 2009, 3 in Davis 2011, 7). Lutz (2010) argues that Guam, objectively, has the highest ratio of U.S. military spending and military hardware and land takings from indigenous populations of any place on earth (Lutz 2010, par. 2 under conclusion). However, this status did not come about by accident. Due to the decolonization movements of the 50s and 60s, the U.S. Navy implemented a plan of action for island bases as a way to relieve concerns over the future of their continental bases (Vine 2009 in Lutz 2010, par. 1 under conclusion). As a result, bases in Puerto Rico, Diego Garcia, Hawaii, and Guam were of strategic importance (Lutz 2010, par. 1 under conclusion).
Because bases are becoming problematic in politically sovereign locations and due to the success of anti-base protests in island base site such as Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and Okinawa, the U.S. military has been forced to transfer its activity to alternative places, such as Guam that not only give global coverage, but also give the ability for operational unilateralism, a term which Davis (2011) describes as the ability of the military to strike quickly without any need for consultation with anyoneeven the government of the territory from which they are launching the strike (1-2 and 6-9). Thus, the
7


announcement for military expansion reveals that, due to Guams neocolonial status, the U.S. militarys intentions for the island, benevolent or not, remain basically unchallenged (Davis 2011, 7).
Currently, U.S. military presence on Guam mainly consists of the U.S. Naval Base on the eastern coast of the island (Apra Harbor) and Andersen Air Force Base in the northern coast (Yigo) (Figure 1). However, as Figure 1 demonstrates, the U.S. military occupies almost 30% of the island due to additional military facilities (Alexander 2011a, 7 and 2011b, 3-4; Lutz 2010; Yoshida 2010). In fact, all of the military facilities in Figure 1 remain on the island with the exception of the U.S. Naval Air Station in Agana, which was shut down in 1995 based on the decision of a BRAC commission (Pike 2011).
8


Likewise, many Chamoru serve in the military or have family members who serve (Kirk and Natividad 2010, par.3 under Political and Economic Status). According to Kirk and Natividad (2010), there are three JROTC programs in the islands public high schools, as well as an ROTC program at the University of Guam (par.3 under Political and Economic Status). Guam also holds one of the highest per capita enlistment rates in the US army (Bevacqua 2010).
The Announcement for Realignment
With such a distinct military presence already on the island, the question that then arises is: why the expansion? According to Yoshida (2010), Guams political and economic leaders had been calling on Washington to send back the military due to a deep slump in the 1990s and the 2000s as a result of sluggish tourism and the post-cold war closure of a number of bases (par. 2 under Guam Opinions). Furthermore, since 2002, the U.S. and Japan have deliberated the relocation of U.S. forces in Japan through the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), which eventually paved the way for the Alliance Transformation and Realignment Agreement (ATARA) in 2005 (Draft ElS in Yoshida 2010, par. 25). The point of these discussions was to ameliorate longstanding frustrations among the local population [in Okinawa] and improve the local political support for the stable and enduring presence of the remaining U.S. forces (Draft EIS in Yoshida 2010, par. 25. Brackets not in original quote).
However, Yoshida (2010) argues that the United States had planned to enhance the U.S. military presence in Guam long before it ever made arrangements with Japan (par. 22). Maintaining U.S. military presence in the Pacific has been crucial since the closure
9


of the U.S. naval base at Subic Bay, Philippines in 1992 (Yoshida 2010, par. 22). Brooke (2004) notes that the Philippine Senate refused to extend the lease, and American memories of that remain sharp (par. 8). Therefore, the ideal location for the U.S. military would be a place in which they are not only accepted, but more importantly, not easily removed (Brooke 2004, par. 8). However, the emphasis on an ideal location does not indicate that the U.S. military is intent on expanding in Guam simply because it has the power to do so:
The militarys goal is to locate forces where those forces are wanted and welcomed by the host country. Because these countries within the region [the Philippines, Australia, Korea, Singapore, and Thailand] have indicated their unwillingness and inability to host more U.S. forces on their lands, the U.S. military has shifted its focus to basing on U.S. sovereign soil. (DraftEIS in Yoshida 2010, par. 2 under Why Guam? Brackets not in original quote. Emphasis added).
In other words, the U.S. military is operating on the belief that the people of Guam openly welcome the expansion.
Nonetheless, since 2004, there has been increasing pressure from Okinawans to relocate U.S. forces due to various concerns stemming from pollution, noise, aircraft accidents, and crime within the Okinawan military base community (Yoshida 2010, par. 2). Therefore, in order to maintain deterrence and capabilities while reducing burdens of local communities, Japan and the United States made arrangements for the relocation of 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam by 2014 (Naiman 2010; Yoshida 2010, par. 2-4).
According to the Guam Integrated Military Development Plan and the Guam Joint Military Master Plan, several conditions were put forth regarding what would be considered an ideal location for realignment (Yoshida 2010, par. 3 under Why Guam?). According to the Draft EIS, all of these conditions were fulfilled through Guam, making
10


it the only location for the realignment of forces (Yoshida 2010, par. 3 under Why
Guam?):
Position U.S. forces to defend the homeland including the U.S. Pacific territories
Location within a timely response range
Maintain regional stability, peace and security
Maintain flexibility to respond to regional threats
Provide powerful U.S. presence in the Pacific region
Increase aircraft carrier presence in the Western Pacific
Defend U.S., Japan, and other allies interests
Provide capabilities that enhance global mobility to meet contingencies around the world
Have a strong local command and control structure
These conditions demonstrate the meticulous maintenance and planning behind the
announcement for realignment. However, despite Guam fulfilling these requirements, the possibility of U.S. military expansion has raised both questions and concerns within the island. Such concerns have provided a platform for the anti-expansion movement in Guam.
11


CHAPTER III
CONCERNS ABOUT THE BUILD-UP
The announcement for expansion warrants analysis of the ways U.S. military bases
impact the local community (Lutz 2010). This analysis is significant because, in addition to many positive attributes such as defense and economic support, U.S. military bases can produce substantially negative political, ecological, and cultural consequences (Yeo 2006, 36). Some of these effects include high rates of out-migration, land degradation, water depletion, road damage, rape and gender violence, in addition to the rejection of sovereignty, self-determination, and human rights (Alexander 2011a, 10-11 and 2011b, 3; Lutz 2010, par. 1, under the externalized costs of bases).
As a way of gauging the possible hazards of the expansion, there has been extensive research performed by the people of Guam, U.S. agencies, and the U.S. Navy (Lutz 2010, par. 1, under the externalized costs of bases). Although there are several concerns circulating around the expansion, this chapter will focus on the most cited concerns: funding, displacement, security, land, environment, international law, and the economy. Although not all anti-expansion activists stand behind each of these concerns, together these questions and concerns compose the platform of anti-expansion resistance on Guam.
Funding
For military expansion to occur, Guam will need considerable funding. The main concern with funding is the way in which it is broadcast to the people of Guam.
Advocates of the expansion argue that increased federal funding will lead to improved infrastructure.. .and expansions to water and power systems and roadways (Viernes
12


2009, 110). However, closer analysis reveals that most of the funding coming from the U.S. and Japan will be relegated to the military bases on Guam.
In 2006, the U.S. and Japan came to a decision that approximately $10.3 billion would be necessary for facilities and infrastructure development costs (Japan Ministry of Defense in Yoshida 2010, par. 9). Due to increasing pressure from Okinawans that relocation be realized rapidly, Japan committed to fund $6.09 billion, or more than 60% of the expansion (Yoshida 2010, par. 9). However, despite what advocates broadcast, Japan and the U.S. military do not actually claim to deliver on any civilian projects (Aguon 2008, 126).
According to Yoshida (2010), Japans contribution is being spent not only to design and build Marine Corps facilities but to subsidize infrastructure improvement at Andersen Air Force base and at a Naval base (Ministry of Defense in Yoshida 2010, par. 4). The budget included a new fire station, military police station, barracks, restaurant, and gymnasium at Finegayan as well as a medical clinic and new facilities for the port operation unit headquarters at Apra Harbor (Yoshida 2010, par. 3 under Guam Budget). Therefore, as Japans Ministry of Defense claimed, funding is relegated to the military.
The original U.S. contribution of $4.18 billion was confined to the military as well. According to the FY2009 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress approved $180 million for developing military projects on Guam (Yoshida 2010, par. 1 and 3 under Guam Budget). In 2010, $734 million was approved to begin a series of expansion support (Yoshida 2010, par. 1 under Guam Budget). Finally, in 2011, approximately $566 million was proposed to Congress within the National Defense Authorization Act (Yoshida 2010,
13


par. 2 under Guam Budget). According to Yoshida (2010), the breakdown of funding
within the proposal is clear.
FUNDING FROM NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
Navy
Naval Hospital
Anderson Air Force Base Guam Army National Guard
(Cagurangan 2010 in Yoshida 2010, par. 2 under Guam Budget)
Figure 2. Funding from National Defense Authorization Act
As Figure 2 demonstrates, 75% of funding, or $426.8 million of the $566 million, will be allocated to the Navy for marine aviation ramp improvements, Apra Harbor improvements and defense access road improvements. Approximately, 12%, or $70 million, will be allocated for the Naval Hospital. The National Defense Act also authorized $50 million, or 9% of the budget for Guam Strike Group operations and ramp upgrades, combat communications facilities, Red Horse engineering facilities and commando warrior barracks at Anderson Air Force Base. Finally, the remaining 4%
($20 million) of the $566 million would go toward the Guam Army National Guard for the combined support maintenance ship and the readiness center (Cagurangan 2010 in Yoshida 2010, par. 2 under Guam Budget). Thus, although local officials may possess good intentions for supporting the build-up, it appears that most of the money will go toward improving Guams military bases (Aguon 2008, 126).
14


Displacement
In addition, the introduction of additional military, their dependents, and foreign workers to Guam is a significant concern because of the potential for further displacement of the indigenous community. According to the 2010 U.S. Census Bureau, only 37% of Guams population is Chamoru. In other words, the indigenous community of Guam makes up less than half of the islands 170,000 people.6
This low representation of the Chamoru is a result of centuries of colonization. During Spanish rule, the introduction of European diseases greatly diminished the Chamoru population of 40,000 to fewer than 4,000 in less than 50 years (1668-1704) (Quimby 2012, par. 3 under warm welcome turns into sporadic resistance). Likewise, through a national security clearance program that remained effective until 1962, the U.S. military held exclusive control over who came in and out of Guam (Aguon 2006a, 20). Furthermore, military deployment became typical in the 1950s after the Chamoru were granted citizenship, creating further displacement of the native population (Tanji 2012, 103). Therefore, according to Quimby (2012), the present Chamoru population is an amalgamation, a mixture of those who had incorporated culture from Spain, the Philippines, and America into their lives through accommodation by appropriation
(par. 6 under earlier encounters shaped by trade, not by conquest).
6 Roughly 25% of Guams population is Filipino, 10% are Caucasian, and the remaining percentage are comprised of Korean, Japanese, and Chinese. Therefore, when referencing the people of Guam, Guamanians, or the residents of Guam who support or resist the buildup, scholars are referring to the total population on the island, not just the Chamoru people.
15


Aguon (2006b) argues that such displacement not only weakened the Chamorro populace, but also left a harmful impact upon their identity by complicating the process of self-determination (49). This complication is manifested in the constant debate surrounding who qualifies as a Chamoru and who, therefore, is able to participate in self-determination plebiscites. Critics of Chamoru self-determination often emphasize the Chamoru peoples impure lineage as a way to delegitimize the indigenous community (Monnig 2007, 407 in Alexander 2011b, 12 and 15). Therefore, in order to deserve self-determination, the Chamoru are often called upon to prove their authenticity, an act that, according to Monnig (2007), has shaped their abilities to work through issues of importance such as language, land, immigration, and political status (in Alexander 2011b, 15). Thus, although the Chamoru are already outnumbered, the possible increase in additional military members has raised concerns about the way an altered population will affect future politics.
Land
In addition to concerns of cultural displacement, the concern regarding the appropriation of more land plays a prominent role in discourse of the anti-expansion movement. Early announcements for the military expansion required an additional 2,000 acres of forest and recovery habitat for housing... and 1,090 acres of government and privately owned land for the construction of a firing range complex (We are Pagat 2012). Currently, military installations occupy almost 30% of the islands land for bases and other military facilities (Alexander 201 la, 7 and 2011b, 3-4).
Therefore, acquiring additional land on an island of only 212 square miles becomes increasingly problematic to to anti-expansion expansionists. Military appropriation of
16


land is nothing new to the people of Guam. After World War II, significant portions of land were used for the U.S. military (Kirk and Natividad 2010, under Political and Economic Status, par. 2). Aguon (2006a) argues that by the end of it [World War II], the U.S. had illegally taken control of 2/3 of our total real estate under the all-too-familiar guise of national security (Aguon 2006a, 31).
(Joint Guam Program Office in Yoshida 2010) Figure 3. Map of Proposed Build-up
However, analysis of military land appropriation on Guam demonstrates that indigenous land was not always taken for national security purposes, but sometimes for the explicit purpose of recreational use, such as parks and rec centers, for the military and their dependents (Hattori 1995b, 60 in Aguon 2006a, 32). This controversy is further complicated by U.S. claims that all land taken for military purposes has already been
17


compensated. However, Aguon (2006a) argues that just compensation exists only in the empty imaginings of people who have yet to be seasoned by the realities of historical record (32).
In other words, rhetoric involving just compensation, such as that found in the law of eminent domain, are simply irrelevant principles to Guam (Aguon 2006a, 32). According to Aguon (2006a), at the time that the United States took over substantial portions of Guams land, the people of Guam were not even citizens of the State and, therefore, could not be guaranteed reimbursement (32). Therefore, the law was inapplicable to the colonized Chamorro people after World War II, making the argument for eminent domain inapplicable to Guam as well (Aguon 2006a, 32). Such discussion of eminent domain is not used to argue that the U.S. military has never compensated for land taken, but rather to point out that the process of compensation is much more complex than often realized.
In addition to concerns regarding the amount of land taken, there has also been controversy regarding specific portions of land. Anti-expansion activists were extremely vocal about the militarys intentions to use Pagat, an ancient village and important site for the indigenous community in the northeast of Guam (Alexander 2011b, 5; Kirk and Natividad 2010, under Draft Environmental Impact Statement, par. 4; Davis 2011, 8). As Hattori noted, for the Chamoru people, land is wealth.. .its always been very key about who you are, whats your clan, where you live (Warheit 2010). Therefore, for many members within the indigenous community, the meaning attached to their land goes beyond discussion of just compensation.
18


Security
Another significant concern for anti-expansion activists is Guams security. It should be noted that the expansion concerns more than the transfer of 8,000 Marines. According to Yoshida (2010) and Aguon (2008), in addition to the Marine transfer, Guam would have to accommodate six additional nuclear aircraft carriers, a Ballistic Missile Defense station, and a Global Strike Force (Yoshida 2010, par. 1 under Why Guam? and Aguon 2008, 125). Activists such as Aguon (2006b) are worried that continuing to militarize the island through expansion will only exacerbate U.S.-China and U.S.-North Korea relations, causing China and North Korea to further militarize in retaliation (69). Therefore by expanding, Aguon (2006b) argues that we will all be in more danger than we were before (69).
In addition, the expansion does not just involve concerns over traditional security, but human security as well. The potential for a rise in crime plays a significant role in activists issues with the build-up. Analyzing other foreign military bases, Aguon (2006b) argues that more than 30,000 crimes were committed by U.S. military personnel against Korean civilians in a short span of twenty years (1967-1987) (88). Based on the National Campaign to Eradicate Crime by U.S. Troops in Korea, many of these crimes involved rape and murder (Aguon 2006b, 88).
Furthermore, the source of these incoming military personnel contributes to the concerns with crime. When looking specifically at Okinawa, more than 4,790 criminal charges have been brought against US military personnel during the 34 years since Okinawa reverted to Japan in 1972 (Aguon 2006b, 71). Wondering whether the same troubles harassing the people of Okinawa will be a reality for the people of Guam,
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Aguon (2006b) questions why local officials welcome troops from the very base where reports of rape, assault, insobriety, and environmental contamination have been concerns for the people of Okinawa (31-32).
Environment
Studies reveal that there has already been significant impact upon the environment of Guam due to a history of U.S. military presence. In 1952, 5,000 drums of Agent Purple were stored on the island for the Korean War (Aguon 2006b, 26). In the 1960s, alarming levels of toxins were found at Anderson Air force Base (Aguon 2006b, 26). According to Aguon (2006b), Guam experienced nuclear fallout from more than ten of the bombs released onto Enewetak during nuclear testing of the Marshall Islands, located 1200 miles east of Guam (25).
Aguon (2006a) argues that Guam has yet to receive just compensation for these offenses (33). According to the Assessment of the Scientific Information for the Radiation Exposure Screening and Education Program of The National Research Council of the National Academies of Science:
Guam did receive measurable fallout from the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons in the Pacific. Residents of Guam during that period should be eligible for compensation under RECA in a way similar to that of persons considered to be downwinders (footnote 35, in Aguon 2006a, 34).
Despite these reports, scholars claim that Guam has not been compensated (Aguon 2006a, 34). Furthermore, despite the Guam Environmental Protection Agency finding carcinogenic substances infecting the water and the fish in Guams Apra Harbor and Cocos Lagoon, the areas have not been decontaminated (Aguon 2006b, 25). Based on
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these cases of past negligence, activists such as Aguon have very little faith in the U.S. militarys environmental stewardship for future expansion.
Soon after the news of the expansion arrived, the Draft Environmental Impact Statement / Overseas Environmental Impact Statement: Guam and CNMI Military Relocation Relocating Marines from Okinawa, Visiting Aircraft Carrier Berthing, and Army Air and Missile Defense Task Force (Draft EIS) was published by the Joint Guam Program Office of the Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Pacific in November
2009. According to Yoshida (2010), the 8,000-to-10,000-page document discusses the environmental hazards the expansion could possibly bring upon the island (Yoshida
2010, par. 1 under Why Guam?). Many of these negative effects resonate with concerns over the expansion.
Furthermore, an evaluation released by the Environmental Protection Agency stated that the population increase from the expansion will result in unsatisfactory impacts to Guams existing substandard drinking water and wastewater infrastructure which may result in significant adverse public health impacts as well as unacceptable impacts to 71 acres of high quality coral reef ecosystem in Apra Harbor (Kirk and Natividad 2010, under Shift in Leadership Stance, par. 8). Because most of the supplies for redevelopment will have to be imported due to Guams inadequate industry, local residents could lose even more significant portions of the islands land, water and other resources (Alexander 2011b, 5; Kirk and Natividad 2010, under Draft Environmental Impact Statement, par. 4; Davis 2011, 8).
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International Law
The argument exhaustively used to deny the Chamoru the right to self-determination is that they are too incompetent to self-govern (Aguon 2006a, 29). This criticism is often derived from cases of inefficiency within the local government of Guam. According to a "Risk Assessment Report for United States Attorney's Offices District of Guam and District of the Northern Mariana Islands" conducted in 2001-2002, many local officials who had served during the administration of Governor Gutierrez were found guilty in federal court for cases of public corruption, involving nepotism, drug smuggling, and abuse of federal funding (Meissner 2002).
Advocates of expansion often declare that these highly-scandalized cases are just a few of many cases of corruption revealing Guams inability to self-govern. Although local corruption represents an indictment on the local government of Guam, antiexpansion scholars question whether enhanced military presence is truly the solution to accountable governance, and whether further reliance on federal funding will breed more inefficiency within the local government. More importantly, according to Aguon (2006a), the fact that the United States is disregarding international law is rarely considered a significant hindrance to true self-governance (29). Yet, as this section demonstrates, international law plays a significant role in discourse over the military expansion (Lutz 2010, par. 1 under conclusion).
Guam is one of sixteen remaining non-self-governing territories in the world. According to UN Resolution 1514 of 1960:
immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Goveming Territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers
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to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire (in Aguon 2006b, 48).
Therefore, Guams status as a non-self-governing territory signifies that the United States, as a signatory of the United Nations Charter, is obligated to promote and foster the conditions necessary for true self-government for the people of Guam (Aguon 2006a, 26 and 2006b, 48). Furthermore, UN Resolution 1514, also notes that self-determination is a right, not a principle (Aguon 2006a, 27). This right to freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development has never been exercised by the Chamoru. Therefore, regardless of the people of Guams U.S. citizenship, faithful military service, or activists consistent attempts to resist further expansion, in the end, Guam remains a colony and will continue to remain so as long as the people have not historically chosen their most powerful leaders and have been told to background their own national identity in favor of that of the power which has ultimate rule (Lutz 2010, par. 6).
As a result, scholars argue that enhancing the U.S. military presence contradicts the very principles that the U.S. military claims to protect (Davis 2011; Lutz 2010, par. 6). However, this serious concern is not at the forefront of discussion regarding the expansion. Rather, as the next section will explain, much more discourse is dedicated to the effect the expansion will have on the economy.
Economy
Despite all of these questions, Lutz (2010) notes that the central concern does not necessarily circulate around social or environmental risks of the expansion, but around the economy (par. 2, under the externalized cost of bases). Lutz (2010) argues that the
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economy is the most discussed factor because Guams elites frame the expansion as an economic godsend (par. 2, under the externalized cost of bases). This framing is particularly potent when scholars consider the islands present economic structure. Currently, a third of Guams population lives on food stamps and a quarter lives below the U.S. poverty level (Kirk and Natividad 2010, under Political and Economic Status, par.3).
After the announcement, many of Guams elite claimed that great economic opportunity will accompany the build-up (Viernes 2009, 109-110). From job growth to an improved real estate market, several benefits of expansion have been broadcast to the people of Guam. However, a breakdown of these advantages, often touted by supporters of the expansion, reveals that the increase in jobs is either relegated to the military sector or primarily short-term (Lutz 2010, par. 4 under externalized cost of bases).
According to a 2007 Guam Employment Report, while employment in manufacturing, transportation and public utilities and retail trade decreased, increases were seen for jobs in the service sector and public sector; with the construction sector experiencing the largest increase, that is, 1,450 jobs, or 35 per cent for the year (Lutz 2010, par. 4 under externalized cost of bases). However, even the sector that experienced the largest increase raises concerns. Examining whether plans for development will trickle down to the ordinary people of Guam, Viernes (2009) argues that while the influx of military personnel and their dependents will most certainly require the construction of new facilities and the improvement of Guams dilapidated infrastructure, local firms and local workers may not necessarily be hired to take on those projects (110). Thus, Viernes (2009) argues that if history is any indicator, cheaper labor
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from foreign countries will be employed instead (110). Furthermore, according to the report, jobs that would prevail the temporary upswing are more likely to center on the lower-wage industry of retail, which, according to Lutz (2010), would only contribute to the already harsh disparities between locals and the military (par. 4 under externalized cost of bases).
With such concerns, indigenous activists are questioning whether this short-term growth is truly beneficial, as it is often portrayed, or is rather a temporary solution to Guams inadequate economy and infrastructure (Aguon 2006b, 32). In fact, according to anti-expansion activists, part of the problem with the expansion is that it does not necessarily serve to cultivate a sustainable economy on Guam, but rather to preserve its dependence on the United States (Aguon 2006b, 42).
Reasons for Resistance
As questions and concerns regarding the build-up are raised, Guams anti-expansion activists attempt to analyze who the true recipients of the expansion will be (Aguon 2006b, 45; Lutz 2010 par. 4 under externalized cost of bases). Although not all antiexpansion activists stand behind each of these concerns, these issues are nonetheless the most cited points raised. By shedding light on the substantially negative political, ecological, and cultural effects expansion could have on the island, discourse of these concerns have provided a platform for anti-expansion movement in Guam.
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CHAPTER IV
ANTI-EXPANSION MOVEMENT: PRESENT BUT NOT PROMINENT
After the Draft Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) assessment of the environmental hazards the military expansion could have on the island, resistance against the expansion began to take shape (Alexander 2011a, 16; Davis 2011, 8). The EISs inclusion of Pagat for the military build-up gained particular attention, creating controversy over the acquisition of more land and serving as a reminder of the extensive amount of indigenous land that had already been taken. Thus, once the results of the EIS were thrust toward the public, a protest movement against the buildup surged (Davis 2011, 8).
This surge of resistance was demonstrated through the presence of mobilization structures (Alexander 2011a, 16; Viernes 2009, 112-114). According to Johnston (2011), mobilization structures are the organizational means by which people step outside of their daily routines and enter the streets to protest (54). As a result, mobilization structures are comprised of civil society associations and organizations, as well as the resources necessary to sustain them (Johnston 2011, 52-54).
Meaningful Mobilization Structures
Guams current mobilization structures display both local and international levels of interaction. Local alternative media, such as the weekly public radio program, Beyond the Fence hosted by University of Guam students allowed for candid conversations and pushback regarding the military build-up (Alexander 2011a, 16). Protests occurred along Marine Corps Drive (Viernes 2009, 112). Organizations founded in Guam, such as the
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Chamoru Cultural Development and Research Institute, and Naison Chamoru consistently asserted the injustices of the expansion (Viemes 2009). In addition, the Chamoru have taken their resistance beyond the island and engaged in international discourse, such as at the 2006 UN Special Political and Decolonization Committee (Viemes 2009, 113-114). The Guahan Indigenous Collective launched the online Peace and Justice for Guam Petition, which acquired signatures from on and off the island. Through International Peoples Coalition against Military Pollution, the National Asian Pacific American Womens Forum, and Women against Militarism, trans-national alliances with anti-base activists in Puerto Rico, Hawaii, Okinawa, and South Korea have also played a role in the resistance (Alexander 2011a, 16; Davis 2011, 8; Viernes 2009, 114).
Such transnational alliances are significant because Guams experiences are often only comparable to other island bases, such as Puerto Rico (Vieques), Hawaii (Kahoolawe, Makua Valley), Okinawa, and Diego Garcia (Lutz 2010, par. 1 under conclusion). Davis (2011) argues that, due to the success of anti-base protests on these island bases, the U.S. military has been forced to transfer their activity to alternative places, such as Guam (Davis 2011, 1-2 and 7-9). As a result, Guam stands as one of the last remaining military sites in the Asia-Pacific region (Davis 2011, 1-2). Due to this shift, local activists in Guam began forming alliances with anti-base activists in other island base sites (Davis 2011, 8). As a result, these alliances not only created opportunities for sharing tactics, strategies, and support, but also expanded the audience to which Guams activists could articulate their struggles (Alexander 2011a, 16; Davis 2011, 8-9). By sharing tactics and generating greater awareness, transnational alliances allowed members to defend each
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others interests, which Johnston (2011) argues should sustain movement mobilization (Davis 2011, 8-9; Johnston 2011).
Failure to Galvanize Sustainable Mobilization
This analysis reveals that Guams meaningful mobilization structures are providing avenues for activists on Guam to articulate their opposition against the military expansion. More importantly, the structures indicate that anti-expansion resistance clearly resides on the island of Guam (Alexander 2011a, 16 and 2011b, 5; Viernes 2009, 112-114). However, despite the presence of these structures, the movement has not galvanized sufficient support to effect substantive change. In other words, the anti-expansion movement has not catalyzed sustainable mobilization.
Mobilization is often defined as an interest-based challenge to the state (Johnston 2011, 51-52). According to Johnston (2011), these challenges can encompass both institutional and non-institutional plans of action (51). Institutional plans of action involve political activities such as lobbying, petitioning, court contestation, party mobilization, pressure groups, recalls, and referenda (Johnston 2011, 51-52). In contrast, non-institutional plans of action deal specifically with protest campaigns, or politics on the street, characterized by special kinds of performances such as marches, demonstrations, petitions (16). Analysis of Guams mobilization structures reveals that both institutional and non-institutional plans of action characterize the anti-expansion movement.
However, in order for a movement to have sustainable mobilization, there must be sufficient support of these plans of action to effect substantive change. Yet when
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examining the anti-expansion movement in Guam, scholars note that there is not sufficient support, and, as a result, there has not been substantive change. This thesis seeks to answer why such is the case, but first, it is necessary to clearly delineate sufficient support and substantive change.
Sufficient Support
When referring to sufficient support, this thesis is referring to not only the number of supporters (in proportion to the population), but also the type of supporters (institutional actors/elite) (Johnston 2011, 15). The anti-expansion movement in Guam is characterized by both an insufficient number of supporters and a lack of elite allies.
Number of Supporters
When analyzing the number of supporters factor, a majority of the population of Guam do not support the anti-expansion resistance (Davis 2011, Lutz 2010, Robertson 2011, Aguon 2006). This lack of support could be based on the widespread notion that a majority of the population of Guam actually approve of the expansion. According to Robertson (2011), those in the anti-expansion resistance are the vocal minority while the majority who support the expansion are referred to as the silent majority or those who see a great boost to the local economy as a direct result of the military buildup (74). Thus, there are no hard data demonstrating the ratio of expansion advocates to expansion opponents. Regardless of whether a majority of the people of Guam actually approve of the expansion, both anti-expansion activists and expansion advocates acknowledge that the anti-expansion movement lacks sufficient support.
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Elite Allies
The second factor that demonstrates a lack of sufficient support is based on the lack of support from institutional actors/ elites. According to Viemes (2009), based on their influence on the island, Guams elite can be categorized into three roles: the media, businesses, and political officials. As discussed earlier, Guams elite openly state that realignment is beneficial to the island by claiming that it would usher in economic revival, new employment opportunities, better infrastructure, increased security, and a productive relationship with the United States (Viemes 2009, 106). It should be noted that Guams elite can merely be responding to what they perceive as the true desires of the people of Guam. Although not every form of media, successful business, or political official is or should be considered a threat to the anti-expansion movement, these three types have been the most vocal and will, therefore, be critiqued as unsupportive of the anti-expansion movement.
Media. In Guam, the dominant newspaper is the Pacific Daily News, which is owned by the U.S. publishing company Gannett Co. Inc. (Viernes 2009, 107). Therefore, due to its relationship with Gannett, it is possible that EZW is more likely to reflect a pro-expansion attitude by constantly headlining approval of U.S. policies, such as the military expansion (Viemes 2009, 104, 107). According to Viemes (2009, 107), such headlines include: Relocation of Marines to Guam Could be a Good thing (7 November 2005); Lets Follow Okinawas Example and Flourish with Marine Build-up (15 August 2006); and Military Buildup, Relocations Will Change Island, Hopefully for Better (4 December 2006).
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Likewise, PDNs media bias was particularly problematic in the use of surveys. In
2006, PDN commissioned two surveys soliciting whether voters found the expansion
beneficial or not (Viemes 2009, 107-109). The question in the survey read:
There's been talk lately of Guam's population expanding by 30,000 people as a result of the military expansion plan for Guam. Do you think this will be a good thing for Guam, a bad thing for Guam, or haven't you thought much about this?"
The findings of the first survey revealed that 61% found the expansion a good thing,
while 15% found it a bad thing (Dumat 01 Daleno 2006a in Viemes 2009). The second
survey reveals a slight increase in support with 69% voting a good thing, and 10% a
bad thing (Dumat 01 Daleno 2006b in Viernes 2009). Aside from the reductionist
approval/disapproval format of the surveys, Viernes (2009) discusses how these polls that
PDN conducted involved a small sample (less than 1%) of the islands registered voters
(109).7 Considering the fact that there were 55,311 registered voters in Guam in 2006,
PDN headlines were misleading readers by boasting these seemingly conclusive
findings (Viernes 2009, 109).
Businesses. Main media outlets are not the only ones commissioning surveys in Guam. According to a survey conducted in 2008 and financed by Guams Chamber of Commerce:
71 per cent of Guam residents supported an increase in the United States military presence, with nearly 80 per cent of the view that the increasing military presence would result in additional jobs and tax revenue; according to the poll, 60 per cent felt the additional Marines on the island would have a positive effect and would ultimately improve the islands quality of life (Lutz 2010, par. 3 under the externalized cost of bases).
7 Only 502 people were polled for the first survey (Viemes 2009, 109). During the second survey, only 500 people were polled (Viernes 2009, 109).
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Support for the expansion is also demonstrated by institutions such as the First Hawaiian Bank, one of Guams leading financial institutions (Laney 2006, 4). Analyzing Guams major external driverstourism, the military, real estate, and constructionFirst Hawaiian Banks Economic Forecast (2006-2007) ambitiously broadcast that an average of $1.5 billion per year will be pumped into the Guam Economy (Laney 2006-2007, 9). However, even Dr. Laney, First Hawaiian Banks economic consultant and author of the forecast, acknowledged that many of the positive figures associated with the build-up are based on assumptionswhether that be the amount of funding actually provided to Guam, inflation, off-island labor, or Guams inadequate infrastructure (Laney 2006, 12). Still, the forecast concludes that the expansion will benefit the islands employment rates, real estate, and residents (Laney 2006, 12).
Political officials. Finally, Guams political leaders play a substantial role in the antiexpansion movement. Vi ernes (2009, 109) discusses how some of the most important political officials voiced their view of the possible expansion, shortly after the announcement. For example, former Governor Felix P. Camacho, who had served during the time of the announcement, declared within his State of the Island Address that the expansion would be the greatest economic boom our island has yet seen(Limtiaco 2006 in Viemes 2009, 107).
Likewise, Guam Representative Bordallo proclaimed that the increase in spending on Guam and the benefits associated with having more military personnel and their families promises to breathe new life and renewed strength into our economy (Bordallo 2006 in Viernes 2009 (107). Mark Forbes, Speaker of the Twenty Eighth Guam Legislature, declared that Guam remains enthusiastic, as it always has been, to do its
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part to promote the National Defense and ensure the safety and security of all our people at the regional hearing for the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (Limtiaco 2006a in Viernes 2009, 107).
Such vocal support for the expansion is significant because these political officials speak on behalf of the entire island (Viernes 2009, 108). However, it is important to note that not all of Guams elected officials, forms of media, and businesses have been unsupportive. Despite his support for the expansion, current Governor Calvo has, nonetheless, helped create opportunities for the anti-expansion movement by reconvening the Commission on Decolonization (Shuster 2010, par. 1 under status questions unresolved). As a result, two UN regional seminars and three Decolonization plenary sessions had representatives from Guams Commission on Decolonization not only present, but also testifying (Shuster 2010, par. 1 under status questions resolved).
Again, it can be argued that Guams elite are merely responding to what they perceive as the true desires of the people of Guam. However, whether the elite have persuaded the public to be supportive of the expansion, or the majority in Guam have persuaded the elite that the expansion is beneficial is not the point in this particular analysis. Clearly the two mutually reinforce each other. The point is that there is no large number of antiexpansion activists and a lack of elite allies. Therefore, the movement has not galvanized sufficient support.
Substantive Change
When referring to substantive change, this thesis is referring to the primary goal of the anti-expansion movement: preventing the expansion from taking place on the island. The U.S. has been responsive on some of the aspects concerning the expansion. In 2012, for
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example, a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement was conducted in response to some of the concerns of the original Draft Environmental Impact Statement. After the DEIS of 2009 discussed the environmental hazards the expansion could possibly bring upon the island (Yoshida 2010, par. 1 under Why Guam?), the Joint Guam Program Office (JGPO), which serves as a liaison between the U.S. Department of Defense and Guams local officials (Louis Berger Group, Inc. 2013), discussed how the SEIS would examine "the best operational, least environmentally damaging options for the buildup (Carrera 2012, par. 4 under fresh look needed).
Some of the changes included the U.S. Navy analyzing alternative methods to conduct live-fire training in a manner that would not impact access to Pagat, an ancient village and important site for the indigenous community (SEIS 2012, par. 1 under FAQ About the Project). Furthermore, according to the SEIS, the number of Marines to be relocated has been reduced from the originally planned 8,600 Marines and 9,000 family members, to a force of approximately 5,000 Marines and 1,300 family members on Guam (SEIS 2012, par. 2 under FAQ About the Project). The SEIS also noted that approximately two-thirds of the Marines relocated to Guam will be rotational with the remaining one-third permanent (SEIS 2012, par. 2 under FAQ About the Project).
However, the supplemental study and reduction in servicemen has not completely alleviated concerns among the anti-expansion community. Although JGPO appears to be responsive to the environmental concerns of the buildup, Joe Ludovici, Executive Director of JGPO made it a point to ensure the public knew that the military buildup is moving forward (Carrera 2012, par. 1 under No Pause). The U.S. response after the
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announcement for expansion is clear: despite the economic, environmental, and political concerns of the expansion that have been circulated in Guam, expansion will continue.
Therefore, the SIES demonstrates that the anti-expansion movement has not galvanized sufficient support to effect substantive change, and therefore lacks sustainable mobilization. This scenario of present but not prominent resistance has led scholars to explore the reasons for such an enigma. Do these low-levels of resistance signify that the majority of the people on Guam truly embrace military expansion? Or could there be a deeper explanation for the failure to galvanize?
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CHAPTER V
EXPLANATIONS THROUGH SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORIES
Social movement literature might provide an answer to these critical questions. According to Pastor and Ortiz (2009), social movement theories are designed to connect people, organizations, and social change into one unified understanding of the principal factors that lead to mobilization. One predominant social movement theory is the political process model (Pastor and Ortiz 2009, 10-11).
Political Process Theory
According to political process theory, political opportunities lead to social movement by shifting the cost-benefit ratio (Pastor and Ortiz 2009, 11). Political opportunities include a range of factors that can either propagate or inhibit an issue, such as elite connection to the issue, freedom of the media to discuss the issue, or the amount of external pressures from global regimes to support the issue (see Figure 4). Johnston (2011) argues that the first set of political opportunities/threatsintensity of social control and the presence or absence of elite connection, elite reinforcement, and elite sympathyis a reflection of the type of government within the state, and therefore, depend on how the state is constituted (Johnston 2011, 51-52). The second set of political opportunities/threats is based upon the level of policy implementation, freedom in the media, countermovement activity, and pressures from global regimes (Johnston 2011, 51-52). Therefore, these sets of political opportunities/threats are technically structures because they are institutional arrangements
According to Johnston (2011), structural explanation for social movements refer to hard institutional arrangementsmeaning opportunities that compel action
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straightforwardly and threats that constrain automaticallyboth requiring little interpretative creativity (49). On the other hand, political process theory understands that political opportunities often undergo collective interpretation by movement members (Johnston 46-47). In other words, to understand the reason for protest mobilization, the analyst must delve into collective processes of meaning making, culture, and discursive production (Johnston 2011, 47).
Therefore, although these sets of political opportunities/threats are technically structures because they are institutional arrangements, all elements of opportunities and threat need to be perceived as such (Johnston 2011, 53). What makes political opportunities and threats cultural factors is the fact that political opportunities and threats must go through a framing process by which they are perceived as actual opportunities or threats (Johnston 2011, 53). This perception takes place through the process of collective action framing. According to Johnston (2011), the combination of these two elements can make for an exhaustive but nonetheless thorough examination of the causes of social movement mobilization (47). Thus, the advantage of political process theory is its consideration of both structural (hard) and cultural (soft) causes of social movement mobilization.
Because, unlike the contending theories, political process theory integrates state-centered and structuralist perspectives with interpretative and cultural practices to include elements of perception (Johnston 2011, 50-51 and 53), political process theory is often regarded as the predominant theory for the study of social movement mobilization (Caren 2007 and Johnston 2011, 50-51, 53, and 58). However, predominance in the field of political sociology does not necessarily grant political process theorys applicability to all
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cases. Therefore, it is essential to discuss why political process theory would provide a more thorough explanation for the anti-expansion movements failure to galvanize sustainable mobilization.
Comparison to Other Social Movement Theories
In comparison to other social movement theories, political process theorys synthesis
of structural and cultural explanations is particularly useful in Guams case, where there is already a presence of elements that should stimulate the anti-expansion movement. For example, according to deprivation and economic theory, poor economic conditions, such as those found in Guam should foster resistance. An analysis of Industrial Workers movements (Piven and Cloward 1979) as well as social movements in the 1960s reveals that these movements often operated and were formed in response to a similar backdrop of poor economic conditions. Therefore, according to this logic, the high unemployment rate, lack of economic opportunity, and class stratification in Guam should provide a pathway to successful mobilization. Yet, the presence of these economic conditions are not catalyzing sufficient support.
New social movement theory and framing theory would argue that, after the DEIS, the issue-focused communities founded upon a common identity against the expansion would provide opportunities for social movement. However, despite the presence of prominent issue focused communities, such as Women against Militarism, Guahan Indigenous Collective, or National Asian Pacific American Womens Forum, Guam is not gamering enough support to effect substantive change.
Likewise, resource mobilization theory offers an insufficient explanation for why the anti-expansion movement lacks sufficient support. The presence of Guams mobilization
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structures should fuel the movement based on the logic that they increase the capacity of a movement to promote its message and have it heard (Johnston 2011, 57). Although resource mobilization theory would argue that it is only the structures with resources that possess a greater likelihood for success, the theory still lacks an explanation for how mobilization structures are framed in the first place8 (Snow et. al 1986, 445 in Yeo 2006, 39).
Therefore, the problem with contending theories is that they rely too heavily on one issue to explain the failure to galvanize support. According to political process theory, in order to attain a complete analysis of social movement mobilization, it is necessary to examine cultural factors in addition to structural (Johnston 2011, 49). It is important to note that in the study of social movements, no precise partition exists between structural and cultural conditions (Johnston 2011, 49). Johnston (2011) accurately points out that there is disagreement among structuralists over how far one must go regarding culture and interpretation, and among culturalists over whether thinking about social structures in objective terms is warranted at all (49). Nonetheless, what political process theory demonstrates is that the answer to Guams lack of sustainable mobilization is multi-causal.
8 According to Snow (et.al 1986), resource mobilization theory presupposes the ubiquity and constancy of mobilization grievances, sidestepping the way members interpret or frame injustices (in Yeo 2006, 39). Particularly in the case of the transnational organizations and alliances, framing is essential to translate a particular grievance in a manner understood by actors not immediately affected by local base issues (Yeo 2006, 38-39). If framing is not that important to resource mobilization theory, then how can the expansion be interpreted as an injustice in the first place?
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Figure 4. Political Process Model
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According to this logic, if there is to be sufficient support to effect substantive change, the interplay of structural and cultural factors must make conditions more beneficial than costly to change the issue. From this perspective, this paper argues that the AEMhasyet to galvanize sufficient support to effect substantive change because of the interplay of structural and cultural conditions in Guam.
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CHAPTER VI
STRUCTURES THAT SUPPRESS
According to political process theory, shifts in the states political structure determine whether it is more beneficial or costly to resist political power based on how venerable or vulnerable the political structure is to change (Pastor and Ortiz 2009, 11-12). Based on this logic, one of the reasons the anti-expansion movement lacks sufficient support to effect substantive change is because Guams structures make it more costly then beneficial to resist the state (Johnston 2011, 51-52). As Chapter V noted, according to structural examinations of social movements, interests and threats presented by the state are quite straightforward, and can be analytically treated as such (Johnston 2011, 46).
In other words, structural factors are hard; they do not necessarily undergo the process of interpretation and framing that cultural factors do. They either compel action straightforwardly if beneficial or constrain automatically if too costly (Johnston 2011, 49). Therefore, for movement members, structural analysis involves less interpretation than cultural analysis when determining whether the cost-benefit ratio is in their favor. The following analysis demonstrates that Guams ambiguous political status and poor economic structure are key structural factors that straightforwardly prevent sustainable mobilization against the expansion.
Political Ambiguity
Before discussing the structural obstacles to sustainable mobilization, it is critical to note that many of Guams current political structures do create opportunities to galvanize sufficient support. According to Tilly (2006), unlike repressive regimes, democracies are
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designed to be more open and receptive to the public (Breed 2013, 80; Johnston 2011). In Guam, the local government is a representative democracy, allowing opportunities for the public to persuade Guams decision-makers. However, what prevents sustainable mobilization is the islands politically ambiguous status. As an unincorporated territory to the United States, Guams political and legal status is in neocolonial limbo (Rogers 1988). This status means that since 1898, the island has neither complete sovereignty nor complete dependence in relation to the United States (Alexander 2011b, 8). Such a status was created for the Insular Cases, a series of U.S. Supreme Court Cases that govern U.S. territories.
According to Burnett and Marshall (2001), the Insular Cases.. .invented and developed the idea of unincorporated territorial status in order to enable the United States to acquire and govern its new possessions without promising them either statehood or independence. (Burnett and Marshall 2001 in Lai, 4-5). As a result, though the residents of Guam possess U.S. citizenship, the Constitution is not fully applicable to them, as they cannot vote in presidential elections nor do they have a voting representative in Congress (Bevacqua 2010 in Lai 2011, 12-13). Furthermore, for this particular case, due to Guams colonial status, the U.S. militarys intentions for the island, benevolent or not, remain basically unchallenged (Davis 2011, 7).
Attempts to Change Ambiguity
According to Hattori, Guam possesses a history of political activism that sought to challenge the islands political ambiguity (Aguon 2006a, 28, footnote 18). In 1980, 1987, and 1997, the people of Guam sought to change the islands political status, exercise self-
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determination, and decolonize, respectively9 (Bradley 2000, 45-47). However, all attempts were rejected by Congress. Thus, change for the island seemed futile as more than a decade of unsuccessful discussion with an uncooperative federal government killed drafts proposing a Commonwealth status for Guam (Aguon 2006a, footnote 18, 28; Bradley 2000).10
Limited Institutional Infrastructure
These efforts to challenge Guams political ambiguity are significant to discourse on the anti-expansion movement for two reasons. First, these efforts demonstrate that it was always the Chamoru people who originated change for political autonomy: the U.S. merely responded (Aguon 2006a, 30). However, although Chamoru activists have actively resisted and, therefore, gained certain concessions from the U.S. government, their efforts also demonstrate the limited institutional infrastructure Guam possesses to challenge their status if significant political decisions must be approved by the very power that wishes to preserve the status quo (Alexander 2011b, 8). The failure of the Commonwealth Act of 1987 and 1997 is a testament to these limitations. Therefore, true
9 The Commonwealth Act was prepared in 1987 (Aguon 2006a). It was then brought before Congressman Blaz in 1988, where it was subsequently neglected. When Underwood served as Congressman in 1993, the act was put forth again, this time with the significant tab of HR. 1521, in reference to the year Magellan first came to the island, signaling Chamorro colonization (Diaz 2001, 168).
10 In 1997, during a hearing for the Guam Commonwealth Act and the Guam Judicial Empowerment Act, Deputy Secretary of the Department of Interior, John Garamendi, although stating his admiration for the initiative, objected to the conditions that Guam administer its own immigration and labor laws and that the indigenous people decide their own political status (Shuster 2010, par. 4 under Ford approves Commonwealth but plan shelved).
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self-government cannot be attained as long as Guam is bound by its politically ambiguous status, a status perpetuated by U.S. federal departments (Aguon 2006b, 48).
Despite attempts to challenge the structure, Guams political ambiguity has remained an obstacle to the Chamorus efforts to realize self-determination. Unlike in former U.S. possessions turned sovereign states, unrestrained military activity is easier in Guam because its current status as an unincorporated territory presents no institutionalized political ways to resist it (Lai 2011, 3). In other words, sovereign states like The Philippines can say no, but colonized Guam has no such option (Davis 2011, 8). As a result, Guams ambiguous political status remains a key structural factor that prevents sustainable mobilization within the anti-expansion movement today.
Poor Economic Structure
Another structure of Guam that presents an obstacle to sustainable mobilization is its current economic structure. Currently, a third of Guams population lives on food stamps and a quarter lives below the U.S. poverty level (Kirk and Natividad 2010, under Political and Economic Status, par.3). Furthermore, Guams agricultural sector is extremely limited, due to the islands coral reef composition as well as the loss of cultivable land and fishing grounds used for military bases and installations (Kirk and Natividad 2010, under Political and Economic Status, par. 2). As a result, the island rarely exports any products, but rather imports almost 90% of the islands food (Kirk and Natividad 2010, under Political and Economic Status, par. 2).
According to Kirk and Natividad (2010), infrastructure is in dire circumstances as well (par. 6 under Political and Economic Status). The Guam Memorial Hospital, the only
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public hospital on the island, only operates at 100% capacity three weeks out of the month while deficient water supply and disposal areas also plague the island (Kirk and Natividad 2010, par. 6 under Political and Economic Status). Likewise, Guams schools often have difficulties meeting payroll (Kirk and Natividad 2010, par. 6 under Political and Economic Status). Finally, Kirk and Natividad (2010) note that many government of Guam departments have been placed under federal receivership, meaning that the federal government has hired an independent entity to take over certain functions of these agencies due to substandard conditions (Kirk and Natividad 2010, par. 6 under Political and Economic Status). Therefore, Guams economy and infrastructure, although certainly not the most poverty-stricken in the Pacific, are in poor circumstances and significantly depend on Ei.S. federal funding.
However, Guam was not always so economically dependent on the United States.
Kirk and Natividad (2010) argue that prior to WWII, Guam was self-sufficient in agriculture, fishing, hunting, and husbandry. Nearly every family grew vegetables and produced meat; some specialized in fishing; and there was a viable copra industry
(under Political and Economic Status, par. 2). It was not until after the Second World War that approximately half of the islands cultivable land and fishing grounds were used for military bases and installations (Kirk and Natividad 2010, under Political and Economic Status, par. 2). Additionally, before 1962, the Department of Defense established a national security clearance policy, a program that Aguon (2006a) argues created a black hole of lost economic opportunities by placing Guams migration under the administration of the US military, and therefore, deepening Guams reliance upon the United States (Aguon 2006a, 20).
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Understanding the economic conditions of Guam is significant as increased dependence on the United States has left the island without a self-sustaining economy. As a result, the U.S. military has become a significant source of employment and resources for the people of Guam (Kirk and Natividad 2010, under Political and Economic Status, par.3). Kirk and Natividad (2010) note that the military is by far the major employer, with most families connected to someone serving in the military or employed to support military operations (par. 3 under Political and Economic Status).
Furthermore, military employment remains high as a way to obtain the amenities offered to those already in U.S. military service (Kirk and Natividad 2010, par. 3 under Political and Economic Status). The authors report:
Military personnel have higher earning power than members of local communities; the military hospital and on-base schools have better facilities than the civilian hospital and public schools; water use by a larger military population is likely to result in shortages for local people; private military beaches deny local community access to their ancestral heritage (Kirk and Natividad 2010, under One Guam, Two Guams, par. 1-3).
As a result, young Chamorro soldiers view military services as a guaranteed ticket off the island or a way to provide for their loved ones (Aguon 2008, 136; Dodge 1991 in Camacho and Monnig 163).
Limitations of Structural Explanation
These structural constraints offer illumination as to why it appears more costly than beneficial to mobilize against the expansion. Many residents depend upon the U.S. military for their livelihood. Resisting the U.S. expansion would be resisting their provision. Likewise, despite consistent attempts to change the political structure, Guam still remains an unincorporated territory.
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However, alone, these structural factors are still insufficient explanation. According to other social movement theories, such as deprivation and economic theory, poor economic conditions found in Guam should foster resistance as many successful social movements were set against a backdrop of poverty. Therefore, according to this logic, the high unemployment rate, lack of economic opportunity, and class stratification in Guam should provide a pathway to successful mobilization. Yet, the presence of these economic conditions are not catalyzing sufficient support. Furthermore, the question remains regarding what sustains Guams political ambiguity. Therefore, as Johnston (2011) notes, there is another deeper, more cultural factor that is preventing the spread of resistance.
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CHAPTER VII
CONSEQUENCES OF A COLONIAL CULTURE
According to Johnston (2011), in addition to structure, cultural conditions must offer more benefit than cost if there is to be sustainable mobilization. When discussing cultural factors, this thesis is referring to soft arrangements that require interpretation and framing by members of a movement (Johnston 2011, 44). The interpretation of these arrangements are often influenced by cultural patterns. Johnston (2011) explains: in broad terms, these can be thought of as favorable cultural environments and trends intellectual, legal, or popularwhich movements may draw upon and link with to enhance their support (44). To demonstrate this argument, Johnston (2011) notes how Martin Luther King Jr. used Biblical passages of Christian love and justice to inform and enhance support for the civil rights movement (45). Therefore, King was able to frame the movement according to narratives familiar to Christian culture.
This framing process expands McAdams idea of cognitive liberation by emphasizing how broad cultural influences play a role in shaping what movement ideas will have the greatest impact on public opinion (Johnston 2011, 53). Thus, although movement leaders certainly have agency and can actively frame a movement, the main argument within collective action framing is that the communitys current culture strongly contribute to the framing of these opportunities or threats (Johnston 2011, 53). Framing then becomes collective action framing when the community is able to envision a better future because it no longer perceives the current structure as acceptable (Johnston 2011, 53).
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Political process theorys emphasis on collective action framing is a significant component of the cultural conditions necessary for sustainable mobilization, shedding light on why Guam has not effectively mobilized against the expansion. The people of Guam view the expansion as acceptable. In order for the people to view the expansion as unacceptable, they have to view it as a grievance or an injustice.
The Liberation Narrative
However, close analysis reveals that a deeper cultural factor prevents the expansion from being viewed as an injustice: the Liberation narrative. The Liberation narrative refers to the framing of Liberation Day, when the U.S. reclaimed the island of Guam from the Japanese during World War II. Therefore, there is a difference between the day and the narrative. Liberation Day is an event in Guams history. The Liberation narrative is the claim that the Chamoru nation is indebted to the United States because of the event (Souder 1989 in Diaz 2001, 161; Tanji 2012, 99). In other words, because the U.S. liberated Guam from Japanese occupation, the U.S. military has the right to expand on the island. Therefore, the expansion is not viewed as an injustice but as an exercise of the U.S. militarys right, a right that should be supported by truly grateful Chamoru.
At first, it might be questionable that a single event could be such a potent force against the anti-expansion movement. However, as Johnston (2011) demonstrates with the political process model, the cultural interpretation of events significantly impacts the way movements get framed (44). If the cultural climate does not align with a particular movement, it can be exceedingly difficult for movement leaders to harness support. Therefore, before discussing the effects the Liberation narrative has on the anti-expansion movement, it is important to discuss its evolution. This section will provide a brief
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background on the events surrounding Liberation Day, how the event has been framed, and how it has justified greater militarization in postwar Guam and the announcement for expansion today.
The U.S. Return: An Answer to Prayer
In 1941, during World War II, Guam, along with other Micronesian islands in the Pacific, was invaded by Japan. Accounts of the occupation reveal bloodshed, starvation, and rape, among much of the suffering the Chamoru endured (Diaz 2001, 160).
According to Diaz (2001), these acts of brutality, inflicted upon the Chamoru, only intensified by the time the U.S. prepared to attack Japanese forces (Diaz 2001, 160). Finally, on July 21st of 1944, after three years of brutal Japanese occupation, Guam was reunited with the United States. The U.S. return to the island was an act of significance in Guams history (Alexander 2011b, 13). According to historian Paul Carano (1973), the American return was the answer to the Guamanians prayers . . (in Diaz 2001, 160).
U.S. return was also accompanied with U.S. k-rations like spam, corned beef, cheese, pork and beans . medicine, clothes . shelters, necessities that the Chamoru had been deprived of during their wartime experience (Souder 1989, 2 in Diaz 2001,
162). As a result, the coming of American forces was deeply venerated by Chamoru survivors (Souder 1989 in Diaz 2001, 160). With the haunting memories of the brutal Japanese occupation still fresh in their minds, survivors did not merely revere their liberation, they deified it (Souder in Diaz 2001, 161). Therefore, the treatment of Liberation Day stems from the claim that the identity of the Chamorro nation is intertwined with their liberation (Souder in Diaz 2001, 161; Tanji 2012, 99). In other words, survival became synonymous with American Military Forces (Souder in Diaz
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2001, 161; Tanji 2012, 99). As a result, the tale of Guams liberation provided the construction necessary not only to instill American values, but also to bolster the backdrop of collective identity among the Chamorro (Tanji 2012, 102).
A Convenient Framing
After World War II, the survival of the Chamorro people during occupation was politicized and reframed as a U.S. value of patriotism in an attempt to make the Chamorro appear more American than the Americans (Diaz 2001, 166). However, the Liberation narrative was not entirely a U.S. construction. Arguing that at the time, it was the only political language available to the Chamorros that could be heard and understood by the Americans, many Chamoru activists actively embraced the narrative and employed devotion as a political tool in order to attain civil rights immediately following the war (Diaz 2001, 165):
While the war was laid to rest, the experience was put to other uses. In their search for political rights, the Chamorros hit upon an irrefutable argument for civil government. The Chamorros were patriotic. They survived the ordeal. They proved their loyalty. In fact, the Chamorros not only deserved political rights, the U.S. owed it to them. The war experience soon became a hammer to obtain political rights, and subsequently, to obtain federal funds (Underwood in Diaz 2001, 166).
An analysis of Chamoru activism directly following the war reveals that heralding the Liberation narrative was effective in granting the people political concessions, specifically citizenship and civil government to replace the naval administration, two cherished institutions for which the Chamorro leadership aspired since the turn of the century (Diaz 2001, 165). In 1949, the Chamorro protested in what became known as the Guam Congress Walkout (Aguon 2006a, 30). Due to these efforts, the Organic Act, which was signed in 1950, permitting limited home rule and U.S. citizenship to the
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islands residents (Aguon 2006a, 30 and Alexander 201b, 2). In 1970, two decades after the Organic Act, Guam finally elected its first governor (Aguon 2006a, 30).
Therefore, by operating within the logic of the narrative, the Chamoru were granted political concessions. According to the narrative, it was not the endurance of the Chamorro people that granted their citizenship and self-government, but rather their faithfulness to the American flag during occupation that helped them attain political progress (Diaz 2001, 165). However, this use of the narrative eventually came with a price. As Carano (1973) notes, Liberation Day became the glorious event whose price in lives lost had purchased freedom and later American claims of exclusive rights to the region (in Diaz 2001, 161) In other words, since then, the United States has rationalized increased militarization in Guam through the argument of entitlement: we fought there so we deserve to occupy that territory (Alexander 2011a, 8).
Militarization Justified
Ironically, the Liberation narrative, therefore, paved the pathway for increased militarization on the island. According to feminist scholar Cynthia Enloe, militarization is defined as
a step-by-step process by which a person or a thing gradually comes to be controlled by the military or comes to depend for its well-being on militaristic ideas. The more militarization transforms an individual or a society, the more that individual or society comes to imagine military needs and militaristic presumptions to be not only valuable but also normal (Enloe 2000, 3, as cited by Lai 2011, 12).
As Enloe (2000) notes, militarization is not merely the presence of military bases in ones community; it is the communitys complete social and economic dependence on the military. It is the idea that the military should take priority over other elements of society.
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Upon analyzing the island, Lutz (2010) notes that today Guams militarization is objectively more extreme in its concentration than that found virtually anywhere else on earth (par. 1 under conclusion). This militarization is demonstrated by the significant portions of land used for the U.S. military after World War II (Kirk and Natividad 2010, under Political and Economic Status, par. 2). Aguon (2006a) argues that by the end of it [World War II], the U.S. had illegally taken control of 2/3 of our total real estate under the all-too-familiar guise of national security (Aguon 2006a, 31 brackets not in original quote).
According to the logic of the Liberation narrative, the U.S. is entitled to claim indigenous land because it liberated the land in the first place. As a result, the preferences of the U.S. military on the island are justified and normalized. As Robert Underwood asserts, although Guams military fences prevent public access to indigenous land, the fences in Guam are seen as normal, not invasive (Camacho and Monnig 2010, 159 in Verschoor 2011, 49). As a result, because of the fences design to ward off residents, many Chamorro men wish they could enlist in the military to enter those spaces (Camacho and Monnig 2010, 159 in Verschoor 2011, 49). Such a perspective is a testament to the power of the Liberation narrative.
Understanding the Liberation narrative within Guam is crucial as it sheds light on why Guam currently lacks a deeper, more developed nationalistic culture found in spaces with similar experiences, such as the foreign military bases of Japan or South Korea. According to Tanji (2012), in Guam, in a society where the boundaries between the occupier (military) and the occupied (people) are inextricable blurred, crimes against the local population such as rape or gender violence are treated as mundane social issues:
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they are not at the forefront of Chamorro concerns related to the US military buildup
(111-112). These issues are not necessarily at the forefront because they not politicized in a way that overwrites the dominant narrative of patriotic support of the US military and its war activities (Tanji 2012, 111-112).
The Liberation narrative also sheds light on Chamorro military enlistment following the war. According to Souder (1989), after the Liberation, there was an overwhelming desire to show gratitude. . Chamorros were willing to pay whatever price was asked (Souder 1989 in Diaz, 161). Underwood argues that this rabid patriotism was shaped by an intensive prewar naval rule that permitted Chamorro identity and peoplehood to be expressed only in terms favorable to America (in Diaz 2001, 164). However, according to Camacho and Monnig (2010), there was no promise of respect or economic benefit for the Chamorro before the war (157). In fact, the highest, and only, status attained for a Chamorro serviceman was that of a mess attendant (Camacho and Monnig 2010, 157). It was, therefore, after the experiences of Liberation Day that more Chamorro men enlisted.
This military enlistment stems from the obligation to give chenchule, for what the United States has done for the people of Guam (2010, 157 in Tanji 2012, 104). According to Camacho and Monnig (2010), chenchule is a form of labor based on reciprocal relations (157). Therefore, chenchule is not merely grounded in the principles of gratitude and reverence; it is an exchange, an offering to recompense. Thus, this culture of reciprocity, of military service as an expression of patriotic loyalty to Uncle Sam, sheds light on Chamorro service following World War II (Camacho and Monnig 2010, 157 in Tanji 2012, 104; Diaz 2001). Although there is more of an economic motivation for joining the military today, Camacho and Monnigs (2010) explanation for military
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enlistment continues in the present despite the fact that very few survivors of the occupation are living today.
Effects on the Anti-Expansion Movement
The Liberation narrative justifies the military expansion the same way it has justified postwar militarization on the island. In a sense, the U.S. military expansion on Guam is nothing new. It is merely an extension of previous militarization efforts. Nonetheless, the narrative is vigorously maintained (Diaz 2001). Today, Guams political leaders such as Representative Bordallo and former Speaker of Guam Legislature Mark Forbes refer to the 1944 U.S. liberation of Guam when discussing future military expansion to elicit Chamorro patriotism and promote the image of the U.S. as protector (Viernes 2009, 108). Viernes (2009) argues that such references are strategic in that they link the expansion with what is expected from the Chamoru: patriotic devotion (108).
As a result, anti-expansion efforts are interpreted and framed as unpatriotic, ungrateful, and radical. As Alexander (2011b) argues, successful mobilization is challenging then because
opposing the proposed military build-up entails serious questioning about the meaning of citizenship on, and for, Guam.. .Opposing militarization and the buildup thus requires people to question who they are, what their life choices have meant, and how they remember themselves to be (19).
How the Chamoru people remember themselves is therefore an important part of the anti-expansion movement. According to Viernes (2009), younger generations of Chamorros who are disconnected from the occupation experience and who have been exposed to university courses where colonialism, globalization, and self-determination are common themes of critical discussion are increasingly ambivalent about their role as
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Uncle Sams patriots (114). However, Liberation Day has been canonized in the politics of public commemoration -from the annual celebration of parades, carnivals, barbeques, and days off from school to the annual printing of survivors wartime experiences in the Pacific Daily News (Diaz 2001, 158). Despite the fact that there is a steadily decreasing number of survivors of the occupation, Diaz (2001) notes that the memories of Liberation Day are just as fresh in the minds of contemporary Chamorro society due to the deliberate depictions of the occupation and the Liberation experience by political officials and the media (Diaz 2001, 155-156 and 176).
Scholars disagree to the extent of Americas benevolence in returning to the island. Some, such as Diaz (2001), argue that there is overwhelming evidence that Americas return had more to do with military strategy than some altruistic desire to free the Chamorros from enemy occupation (Diaz 2001, 157). Others note that the brutality of the Japanese occupation accentuates the U.S. return as an act of benevolence in and of itself. However, regardless of whether Americas return was well-intentioned or purely strategic, it is important for scholars to note that the acknowledgment of Guams liberation is not what necessarily hinders sustainable mobilization against the expansion.
Rather, what hinders sustainable mobilization is employment of the event as a justification for the military buildup. Therefore, the celebration of Americas return is not inherently problematic. Disregarding the racist and paternalistic rule of the U.S. naval administration prior to Japanese occupation is problematic. The fact that Guam was never truly free prior to occupation or during post-war rule is problematic. The immediate military take-over of more indigenous land after World War II is problematic. Therefore,
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the Liberation narrative is problematic not for what it celebrates, but for what it ignores in Guams past and what it implies for Guams future.
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CHAPTER VIII
OPPORTUNITIES FOR A MORE SUSTAINABLE MOVEMENT
Although the case of Guam illustrates that indigenous resistance has always and continues to exist, political process theory reveals that structural and cultural conditions have prevented sustainable mobilization against the expansion. However, a mere analysis of these conditions is ultimately ineffective if no alternative solutions are provided. The references to Guams indigenous activists throughout this analysis demonstrate that they clearly understand the structural and cultural obstacles facing them.
However, political process theory offers more than a mere reinforcement of the challenges anti-expansion activists are facing. It analyzes why these challenges are present and how the perception of structural and cultural conditions perpetuate them. By demonstrating why these structural and cultural factors have persisted in Guam, political process theory moves beyond mere identification of resistance challenges and offers a pathway to cultivate alternative solutions for a more sustainable economy and livelihood. Unlike hard structural arrangements, cultural conditions depend upon the interpretation of the community. If the expansion is framed as an injustice, the opportunities for a more sustainable movement increase. The predicament is getting the majority of the people of Guam to frame the expansion as an injustice as well.
Frame Alignment
Frame alignment provides useful insight into possible solutions for this predicament. According to Johnston (2011), frame alignment is often employed by movements to make their frames more attractive and persuasive (80). This section will focus on two particular types of frame alignment that can be applied to Guams anti-expansion
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movement: frame amplification and frame bridging. Frame amplification is defined as "the clarification and invigoration of an interpretive frame that bears on a particular issue, problem, or set of events" (Snow et. al 1986, 469 in Yeo 2006, 40). In other words, it is a reframing or re-appropriating of significant events. Similarly, frame bridging is the linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue (Snow et. al 1986, 467 in Yeo 2006, 39). Deeper analysis of these two types reveal that frame amplification would be beneficial in bringing unity to the Chamoru people while frame bridging can help unify the islands anti-expansion movement.
Frame Amplification
Frame amplification can help unify the Chamoru by reanalyzing and reframing important historical events. As Chapter VII discusses, one of the most significant events in Guams history is Liberation Day. However, the Liberation Narrative has been used as a tool by build-up supporters to delegitimize the voices of anti-expansion activists by deeming them ungrateful and unpatriotic. More importantly, by focusing on the U.Ss. return, the Liberation Narrative de-emphasizes the agency of Chamorro survivors during World War IF However, just as Martin Luther King, Jr. re-appropriated Biblical passages of Christian love and justice that were once used as an argument for slavery, the Chamorro people can reframe the Liberation Narrative.
Diazs (2001) work reveals that the Chamorro have already attempted to do so by reframing the way Liberation Day is celebrated on the island. Under Governor Ricardo Bordallos term in the 1970s and 80s, the celebration of Liberation Day was changed to Fiestan Guam. According to Diaz (2001), this relabeling was done to celebrate
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Chamorro survival and triumph over hardship, instead of Chamorro indebtedness to the U.S., which liberation implied (162). Likewise, in 1993, during Governor Joseph Adas administration, Liberation Day was themed as Commonwealth is Liberation (Diaz 2001, 168). Thus, some Chamorro activists have attempted to reframe the annual holiday by emphasizing Chamoru agency and arguing that there were unexpressed intentions behind the American return: that the US coming back to Guam was an act of defending a strategic location, not necessarily benevolent deliverance (Diaz 2001, 157-162). However, these attempts have remained in what Diaz (2001) refers to as the subaltern because they are drowned out by the elites carefully constructed commemoration of the holiday each year.
Nonetheless, this reframing is imperative for uniting the declining number of Chamoru people because it reiterates Chamoru endurance in a war for which they were not even responsible (Underwood in Diaz 2001, 166). By focusing and honoring Chamoru experiences, World War II becomes less about the United States versus Japan, and more about the Chamorus courage, perseverance, and fortitude (Underwood in Diaz 2001, 166). Guam and the United States have always been affiliated through war: introduced through the Spanish American War and reunited through World War II (Diaz 2001, Notes 1: 176). The Liberation narrative only serves to reinforce this affiliation. Furthermore, the very dates that signify the beginning and end of World War II for the people of Guam are based upon the Japanese attack and Japanese surrender (Tanji 2012, 176). These dates attempt to separate the enemy from the hero (Tanji 2012, 176).
However, by reframing Liberation Day, the focus on Chamorro agency eradicates the enemy/ savior dichotomy. If these dichotomies are deemphasized and the persistence of
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the Chamorro people given more priority, then much of the indebtedness and obligation attached to July 21st is deemphasized as well, making it easier for expansion to be viewed as an injustice rather than an act of devotion. Therefore, frame amplification can be a useful tool for sustainable mobilization against the expansion in Guam.
Frame Bridging
The second type of frame alignment anti-expansion activists should utilize is frame bridging. Examining the anti-base movements in South Korea provides particularly useful insight. In Yeos (2006) analysis, both locally-concentrated and nationally-concentrated anti-base campaigns were taking place throughout the 90s and early millennium. Whereas local campaigns analyzed the effects of bases on local farmers land and wellbeing, national campaigns framed their grievances on the bases denial of abstract principles such as sovereignty and peace (Yeo 2006, 37-39).
According to Yeo (2006), this disunity in purpose was creating tension for movement activists. Yeos (2006) argument was that, effective mobilization in [South Koreas] anti-base movements requires striking a balance between the movements focus on local and national issues regarding U.S. military bases (35). In other words, to be a sustainable movement, it was necessary for the two campaigns to bridge their injustice frames.
Therefore, in South Korea, movement leaders bridged or combined local and national grievances into one coherent frame by connecting the abstract concept of peace with the local residents livelihood (Yeo 2006, 40).Yeo (2006) argued that frame bridging was necessary because both campaigns needed each other to continue. National or more
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abstract frames have the ability to draw in more supporters because under a frame like sovereignty or peace, theoretically all citizens have a stake (39). At the same time, Yeo (2006) notes that national campaigns are usually less effective in mobilizing the unorganized who may not find any personal stake in investing time and resources toward an abstract cause (39). Therefore, local campaigns, which tend to be more focused on concrete issue directly affecting the community are needed to ground the anti-base movement. As a result, frame bridging created solidarity in South Koreas divided movement.
Based on this thesiss research, there are two identifiable types of anti-expansion activists, depending upon their framing of injustices. One is anti-base, in which advocacy for complete military withdrawal in Guam stems from a negative view of militarism, association with the United States, or both (Aguon 2006a, 2006b). The other is pro-base, in which opposition to the expansion does not necessarily translate as seeking a complete removal of the U.S. military from the island (Tanji 2012). Nonetheless, this section will discuss both types of anti-expansion activists to see how they are shaping resistance efforts.
Anti-Base
In Guam, there is a presence of indigenous activists that call for the complete removal of the U.S. military from the island. For example. Aguon (2006b) argues that in order to truly persevere as a people, the Chamoru Nation must actively encourage the withdrawal of the exaggerated US military presence from allnot someof our communities (27). This advocacy for complete withdrawal stems from the claim that Guams colonial status is directly tied to the U.S. military presence (Tanji 2012). Furthermore, associating with
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and assimilating to the United States debases Chamorro pride and integrity (Aguon 2006b, 101).
Therefore, activists such as Aguon (2006b) and Bevacqua (2010), do not believe that identifying with the American way of life is the path to true self-government and self-determination (114-115). The glorification of consumerism, globalization, and individualism in American culture prevents the Chamorro from truly developing as a people (Aguon 2006b, 114-115). As a result, American ideology must be actively contested (Aguon 2006b, 114-115). Still, these activists note the difference between the Chamorro struggle for self-determination and anti-American propaganda, arguing that it is not America that is to be considered the enemy, but rather, its insatiable, imperial appetiteits military industrial complex endangering the entire planet (Aguon 2006b, 114-115).
By building solidarity with other anti-base activists through transnational organizations such as the National Asian Pacific American Womens Forum, Women against Militarism, and the International Peoples Coalition against Military Pollution, anti-base activists in Guam frame their injustices at the national level. In other words, their grievances are targeted at more abstract concepts such as peace and security (Yeo 2006, 39). At the same time, the focus of the anti-base movement is local as it also analyzes the harmful consequences (discussed in Chapter III) that the expansion could potentially inflict upon the local community (Yeo 2006). Therefore, the complete removal of military bases on Guam stems from past consequences and future effects that U.S. military presence has incurred on the Chamoru peoples environment, economy, and security.
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Pro-Base
The other type of activist is pro-base. According to these activists, to critique the military presence in Guam is not to completely negate it. Rather, pro-base activists note that negative consequences can accompany military bases and seek to have these consequences fairly mitigated. In Guams case, the most substantial consequence is the denial of the indigenous communitys right to self-determination.
A prominent example of this type of activist is the Chamorro Warrior for decolonization, defined as a man who has served or continues to serve in the military yet openly engages in indigenous activism (Tanji 2012, 104). According to Tanji (2012), the goal of Chamoru activism, couched in the language of warrior masculinity, is no particular challenge to US militarism in general, but emphasizes, rather, the Chamorro peoples control and right to determine their terms of engagement with it (105). Thus, although the Chamorro Warrior for decolonization is more discerning and analytical than one who unabashedly devotes himself to the U.S., he is not necessarily against the military uniform itself (Tanji 2012, 105). Furthermore, the Chamorro Warrior that resists the buildup views the anti-expansion movement as an opportunity for the acknowledgment of Chamoru rights (Tanji 2012, 111).
According to Tanji (2012), the Chamorro Warrior feels no personal contradiction because his military experiences directly inform and qualify his activism (104-105). ).
For example, Benevente, who had served in the U.S. Army yet is also an indigenous rights activist argues that he could never be confused about these two positions but rather finds the two harmonious (Camacho and Monnig 2010, 147). Upon serving overseas, Chamoru soldiers realized that the country they served so faithfully to help
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advance ideals of democracy was the same country that colonized and continues to colonize their homeland (Camacho and Monnig 2010, 164 and 167).
This convoluted, but not contradictory phenomenon sheds light on how Chamoru nationalism can be constructed from both a devotion to and opposition against the United States (Tanji 2012, 113). These activists are fighting for self-determination based upon the rights they believe they hold as Americans (Camacho and Monnig, 164). Therefore, for these activists, the focus on their anti-expansion movement is not necessarily local injustices but more nationalist or abstract issues: the fact that the United States is disregarding the voice of its own U.S. citizens (Yeo 2006, 39). Although pro-base activists may acknowledge local grievances against military bases, ultimately their movement is framed within the context of attaining American rights and liberties. To them, Chamorro resistance completely aligns with American ideals, for the quest for Chamorro determination is not about being anti-American.. .it is American to dissent, it is part of being American (Camacho and Monnig 2010, 168 in Tanji 2012, 105).
Therefore, anti-base activists argue that the anti-expansion movement should signify the withdrawal of the U.S. military presence, and possibly, the withdrawal of association with the United States. Pro-base activists view that the expansion infringes upon the Chamoru right to self-determination, but do not feel that service in the U.S. military contradicts their resistance. Acknowledgment of both campaigns does not mean that there are solid boundaries between the two as these two types of activists do not necessarily view each other as threats. Both are against the expansion. However, each campaign holds a different response.
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As political process theory demonstrated, in addition to structural constraints, part of the explanation for the lack of sustainable mobilization is that the expansion is not framed as an injustice. Lack of mobilization, however, is compounded within the anti-expansion movement because the injustice frames vary according to the two campaigns. By building solidarity with other anti-base activists through transnational organizations such as the National Asian Pacific American Womens Forum, Women against Militarism, and the International Peoples Coalition against Military Pollution, anti-military activists in Guam frame their injustices at the national level. In other words, their grievances are targeted at more abstract concepts such as peace and security (Yeo 2006, 39).
At the same time, the focus of the anti-base movement is local as it also analyzes the harmful consequences (discussed in Chapter I) that the expansion could potentially inflict upon the local community (Yeo 2006). Therefore, the complete removal of military bases on Guam stems from past consequences and future effects that U.S. military presence has incurred and will incur on Guams environment, land, and economy. On the other hand, although pro-base activists may acknowledge local grievances against military bases, ultimately their movement is framed within the context of attaining American rights and liberties.
Following the example of anti-base activists in South Korea could be a useful tool for the anti-expansion resistance in Guam. Both campaigns already agree that the expansion is an injustice. The one factor linking their otherwise unconnected frames is the view that the expansion blatantly denies the Chamorro peoples right to self-determination. Therefore, the common factor between the two is the realization that a U.S. military increasingly dependent on territories reveals a painfully obvious political irony: The
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U.S. is using territories denied basic rights of freedom and self-determination to use military force that, ostensibly, is being used to promote these same values (Davis 2011, 7). In other words, the military can expand freely without the consent of the islands indigenous community. As a result, the anti-expansion movement should be framed with a focus on the Chamoru peoples right to self-determination.
Although many anti-base scholars would argue that it is precisely Guams deeply militaristic culture that prevents residents from viewing the expansion as an injustice in the first place, as this thesis discusses, there is clearly a presence of pro-military activists who speak out against further militarization without the indigenous communitys consent. Therefore, the problem in Guams lack of mobilization is not necessarily the military.
The problem is the framing of the military as ultimate priority, a problem stemming from the Liberation narrative.
It is undoubtedly essential for anti-expansion activists to critique the U.S. military for its often overlooked effects on the environment, land, and security. However, attempts to generalize an entire population of military servicemen and women as attack dogs.. .trained at any instant to unleash aggression (Aguon 2006b, 74) disregards an entire group of Guams activists (pro-base activists). Furthermore, it generates discourse that is divisive and harmful for fostering healthy relations between activists in Guam. Chamoru military members are being denied the right to self-determination as well.
Likewise, rather than frame their struggle within the context of American rights, antiexpansion activists should instead frame their struggle through the international rights discourse of self-determination (Diaz 2001, 167). It is essential that the resistance acknowledge that having autonomy and being less dependent on federal funding will
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ultimately yield to a more sustainable economy and future for all residents in Guam. If agency, visibility, and voice (Bevacqua 2010) can only be attained through military service, as is often demonstrated in Guam, then what hope is there for future generations on the island? There must be other options for empowerment outside the U.S. military.
Beyond Fortress Pacific
By bridging the rather abstract concept of self-determination with a local emphasis on the livelihood of local residents, the anti-expansion movement could potentially move beyond a binary of anti-base/pro-base. As Aguon (2006b) acknowledges, our disunity is our truer transgression (Aguon 2006b, 114-115). Pragmatically, abroad-based coalition is necessary for the success of the movement. With such a small population, it is important that the people of Guam be united in the anti-expansion movement. As Audre Lorde (1984) stated so eloquently without community there is no liberation, (in Aguon 2006b). If anti-expansion activists are united, they can more adequately address hard or more structural arrangements.
As Aguon (2006b) states, being right is not enough to bring about social change
(37). Therefore, if Chamoru resistance is to be truly redemptive, it must be focused on the principles of nonviolence, humility, and kindness (Aguon 2006a, 55 and 73).
For the Chamoru people,
True freedom will come to us when our destiny is fully in our hands. Since the beginning of governmental systems of Guahan, the people of the land have never been allowed to decide the fate of their land. This right is recognized in all of the surrounding islands, but when we stand up for our rights as Chamorros, we are frequently derided. We believe that the right of Guams destiny belongs to those who have been historically denied their political status and rights here. Until the Chamorro right to self-determination on Guahan is recognized and practiced,
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there is no full freedom Organization of People for Indigenous Rights (Diaz 2001, 169)
Thus, scholars in the mainland United States and the international community should be made aware that Fortress Pacific is not simply an anchored aircraft carrier, devoid of cultural history, human rights, and indigenous agency (Davis 2011, 7). It is occupied by human beings with their own community, culture, and political aspirations. The Chamoru are not just waiting for their self-determination: they are actively pursuing it.
By embracing this message, anti-expansion activists can challenge the structural and cultural restraints placed against them and, slowly but steadily, build a more empowering, sustainable future beyond Fortress Pacific.
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Full Text

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BEYOND FORTRESS PACIFIC EXPLORING SUSTAINABLE MOBLIZATION IN GUAM by SARAH ELMORE B.A., University of Colorado Denver, 2011 A thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Colorado Denver in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Political Science Program 2013

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ii This thesis for the Master of Arts degree by Sarah Gail Elmore has been approved for the Political Science Program by Lucy W. McGuffey, Chair Betcy Jose Glenn Morriss November 29, 2013

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iii Elmore, Sarah Gail (M.A., Political Science) Beyond Fortress Pacific: Exploring Social Movement in Guam Thesis directed by Senior Instructor Lucy Ware McGuffey ABSTRACT In 2005, Washington announced plans for the relocation of 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to the U.S. colony of Guam p olitical officers, businesses, and main m edia outlets c laim that realignment will reap several benefits, including economic revival, new employment opportunities, renovated infrastructure, increased security, and a more productive relationship with the United States. However, by increasing the population approximately 45%, the move has raised concerns of digenous community, the Chamoru. D espite these implications, anti expansion resistance is present but not popular. In seekin g to a nswer why re sistance has not led to sustainable mobilization, this thesis will employ political process theory, finding that although the anti expansion movement (AEM) is present, it has not galvanized sustainable mobilization because of the intersec and economy ) and cultural (the Liberation narrative) conditions. The form and content of this abstract are approved. I recommend its publication. Approved: Lucy Ware McGuffey

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iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS It is an honor to bestow acknowledgment to my entire thesis committee : Dr. Lucy McGuffey, Dr. Betcy Jose, and Professor Glenn Morris. This thesis would not have been possible without your gracious guidance throughout this journey I would like to express my gratefulness to my thesis chair, Dr. Lucy McGuffey, who se constant encouragement and counsel was an immeasurable aid to my research and writing. I am also indebted to the professors and faculty in the CU Denver Political Science Department for providing a program that encourag es independent thought and for instilling within me a deep hunger for social justice. In addition, I would like to acknowledge the efforts of Chamoru scholars, whose works offered a foundation from which I was able to develop my thesis. Finally, I owe my deepest gratitude to my family who has never failed to support me in my academic career. To my sisters thank you for always believ ing in my abilities And t o my mother and father, thank you for loving me teaching me, and challenging me to look beyond myself, so that I may humbly yet boldly speak the truth.

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v TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER I. .. .1 II. WHY GUAM ? ........... 3 .. ............ 6 III. CONCERNS ABOUT THE BUILD UP .. 1 2 .. ...16 Security... 20 International 22 Econo Reasons for R IV. ANTI EXPANSION RESISTANCE: PRESENT BUT NOT 7 Meaningful Mob Failure to Galvanize Sustainable Mobilization ... ... .......................................... 29 V. EXPLANATION S IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORIES Comparison to Other Social

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vi VI. STRUCTURES 2 Political Ambiguity... 2 Poor 5 Limit VII. CONSEQUEN CES OF A COLONIAL CULTURE.. The Liberation Effects on the Anti Expa VIII. OPPORTUNITIES FOR A Beyond Fortress Pacific BIBLIOGRAP 71

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1 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION In the middle of Micronesia lies Fortress Pacific, an island of microscopic proportions (Bohane 2007). Yet despite its size, the island of Guam, as it is more commonly known, poses great significance to the United States by serving as the most strateg i c U.S. military installation as well as one of the largest nuclear weapons depots in the Pacific Ocean (Rogers 1988, 51). However, what many would consider a term of the past is an ongoing reality for the people of Guam: Guam is a colony of the United Sta tes (Naiman 2010, par.1 2, 5). As a colony, the island is subject to dramatic changes within the U.S. military base network (Davis 2011). One of those d ramatic changes occurred in 2005 when Washington announced plans for the relocation of 8,000 Mari nes in Okinawa to Guam by 2014 (Naiman 2 010). Many 1 main m edia outlets, political officials, and businesses claim that realignment will reap several benefits, including economic revival, new employment opportunities, renovated infrastructure, increased security, and a productive relationship with the United States (Viernes 2009, 106). However, by increasing the population approximately 45%, the move has raised economic, ecological, and cultural concerns, especially among the isl digenous community, the Chamoru 2 (Naiman 2010, par. 6, 8). D espite these im plication s, anti expansion resistance is present but not popular In 1 The term elite is not employed as a pejorative term, but rather, according to social movement literature, refers to people/institutions that hold influential positions. 2 Since 1994, the Chamorro Language Commission refer to the Chamorro as Chamoru (Alexander 2011b, 2). Both terms apply to the indigenous peoples of Guam However, within this paper, Chamoru will be used unless the original author specifically uses the term C hamorro

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2 seeking to a nswer why resi stance has not led to sustainable mobilization this thesis will employ political process theory, finding that although the anti expansion movement (AEM) 3 is present, it has not galvanized sustainable mobilization because of the intersection of str uctural (political ambiguity and economy ) and cultural (the Liberation narrative) conditions. 3 Although more eloquent names for the indigenous resistance movement in Guam exist, the term anti expansion movement is specifically used for this thesis.

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3 CHAPTER I I WHY GUAM? 4 T he island of Guam is the southernmost and largest island of the Maria na Island Chain, a string of islands in the middle of Micronesia (Aguon 2006b, 20) Ho sting U.S. military installations such as Anderson Air Force Base, a U.S. naval base, and 35,000 military personnel and their dependents (Alexander 2011a, 7 and 2011b, 3 4) Guam has been deemed by the Pentagon as (Paik 2010), a sup posed a ccolade for providing a distinct U.S military presence within the reach of China and North Kore a. However, s uch depictions of the island ignore th e fact that Guam is not simply a floating military base in the middle of the Pacific (Davis 2011, 7) Still the island political and social landscape beyond its military distinction is rarely discussed by political leaders in Washington Insufficient discourse and re search about Guam is not peculiar in scholarly analysis. Alexander (2011b, 19) argues that today military bases have become normalized and the outside world remains conveniently But a s Bevacqua (2010) because its political existence evades the Therefore, within this recent announcement for expansion a re opportunities for inquiry today. What is the history of Guam who are its people, and what are the implications behind the announcement for the U.S. military expansion ? 4 Yoshida 2010

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4 History of Colonialism Before delving into the anti expansion movement, it is critical to examine the historical context within which the movement developed. To provide this context, a brief Table 1: Time Period Historical Era _____________________________________________ ___________________________ 2000 BC 1668 1668 1898 1 898 1941 1941 1944 1944 1950 1950 1970 1970 Present Ancient Guam Era Spanish Era U.S. Naval Era World War II/Japanese Era Post War Era Guamanian Era Contemporary Era (Guampedia 2012) Prior to becoming a U.S. territ ory, Guam was a Spanish colony for 200 years. 5 Spanish rule was characterized by oppression, involuntary a ssimilation to Spanish customs and the Jesuit mission, and near eradication of the Chamoru people from 5 The time period of Spanish colonization is contested. According to Shuster (2010), Guam was under the rule of Spain for 217 years (par 7, Spanish take Charge). However, other scholars argue that Spanish rule ha d begun long before 1668, noting that Magellan first invaded the island in 1521.

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6 resistance ). resistance to colonization and forced baptism, but by the end of the 17th century, the combination of 1998, 332 in 2011b, 11). In 1898, after the Spanish American War, Gu am, along with Puerto Rico and the Philippines, was placed under the control of the U.S. naval admini stration (Alexander 2011b, 2 3). Like the Spanish who had colonized the island before them the U S Navy acknowledged that obedience from the Chamoru coul d be pote ntly enforced through what it believed to be benevolent but nonet heless involuntary assimilation Therefore, according to Bevacqua (2010), educating the Chamoru was essential for the success of the U.S. colonial project because : The idea that the prohibition, and thus lack, of Chamorro language in schools, the lack of inadequacy, dirtiness, impossibility, invisibility, and nakedness (42). In other words, U.S. naval education served to enforce the idea that the Chamoru were inadequate, inferior, and deficient. By inflicting a sense of inadequacy upon the Chamoru people, the U.S. Navy could fulfill its desire to create the Cha moru a a 1 in Alexander 2011b, 13). According to Anghie (2005), this type of education in colonial linked intimately with the t ask of normalization, of creating the universe against which the native will be found wanting and that will lead ultimately to reform desir ). However, it should be noted that subversive tactics were not uncommon d uring the naval administration as cases of early indigenous activism were evident almost

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6 immediately after Guam became a U.S. possession ( Hattorri 1995a in Viernes 2009). e stark contrast to the view that Chamorros are weak and have complied with the US c 106). R esistance against the U.S. naval administration cs, such Eventually, these peasant resistance tactics evolved into more conventio na l modes of political activism. From 1901 to 1950 the people of Guam drafted petitions calling for the formation of a civilian government to replace the naval government (Hattori 1996, 58 in Viernes 2009, 105 106). However, both Congress and the U.S. N av y consistently disputed the petitions (Hattori 1996, 58 in Viernes 2009, 106). To legitimize their rule, the U.S. naval adminis tration argued that it was its duty and obligation to shape the C hamorro into devoted Americans and attempted to expunge any component of Chamorro identity that did not align with the U.S. colonial agenda (Diaz 2001, 165 ; Hattori 1995 a 13 in Viernes 2009, 104 105). A s a result public life was restricted interpreted American patrio tism Underwood in Diaz 2001, 165) A Military Colony Although the island is no longer ruled by the U.S. naval administration, colonial status is not a condition of the past Currently, the island is a U.S. unincorporated territory.

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7 status is in neocolo nial limbo he island has neither complete sovereignty nor complete dependence in relation to the United States (Alexander 2011b, 8). Though the residents possess U.S. citizenship, the Constitution is not fully applicable t o them, as they cannot vote in p residential elections nor do they have a voting repre sentative in Congress (Bevacqua 2010 in Lai 2011, 12 13). Accordi ng to scholars, this political ly ambiguous status works in favor, as the U.S. territory allows for military training and operations tha t would otherwise be challenged in host countries (Zielinski 2009, 3 in Davis 2011, 7). Lutz (2010) argues that Guam, objectively, has the highest ratio of U S military spending and military hardware and land takings from indigenous po acc ident. Due to the decolonization movements of the 50s and 60s, the U.S. Navy implemented a plan of action for island bases as a way to relieve concerns over the future lt, bases in Puerto Rico, Diego Garcia, Hawaii, and Guam were of strategic importance Be cause bases are becoming problematic in politically sovereign locations and due to the success of anti base protests in is land base site such as Puerto Rico, Hawaii and Okinawa, the U S military h as been forced to transfer its activity to alternative places, such as Guam hat not only give global coverage, but also give the ability for operational strike quickly without any ne ed for consultation with anyone even the government of 2 and 6 9). Thus, the

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8 announcement for military e xpansion reveals that, due neo colonial status, the (Davis 2011, 7). Currently, U.S. military presence on Guam mainly consists of the U.S. Naval Base on the eastern coast of the island (Apra Harbor) and Andersen Air Force Base in the northern coast (Yigo) ( F igure 1 ). However, as Figure 1 demonstrates, the U.S. military occupies almost 3 0% of the island due to additional military facilities (Alexander 2011a, 7 and 2011b, 3 4 ; Lutz 2010; Yoshida 2010). In fact, a ll of the m ilitary facilities in F igure 1 remain on the island with the exception of the U.S. Na val Air Station in Agana, which was shut down i n 1995 based on the decision of a BRAC commission (Pike 2011). (Lutz 2010) Figur e 1: U.S. Military Presence (1991)

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9 Likewise, many Chamoru serve in the military or have family members who serve Kirk and Nat schools, as well as an ROTC program at the University of Guam also holds one of the highest per capita enlistment rate s in the US army (Bevacqua 2010) The Announcement for Realignment With such a distinct military presence already on the island, the question that then arises i s : why the expansion? economic leaders had been calling on Washin deep slump in the 1990s and the 2000s as a result of sluggish tourism and the post cold war closure of a number of bases ince 2002, the U.S. and Japan have deliberated the relocation of U.S. forces in Japan through the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), which eventually paved the way for the Alliance Transformation and Realignment Agreement (ATARA) in 2005 ( Draft EIS in Yoshida 2010, par. 25). The ameliorate longstanding frustrations among the local population [in Okinawa] and improve the local political support for the stable and enduring presen ce of the remaining U.S. forces ( Draft EIS in Yoshida 2010, par. 25 Brackets not in original quote ). However, Yoshida (2010) argues that the United States had planned to enhance the U.S. military presence in Guam long before it ever made arrangements with Japan (par. 22). Maintaining U.S. military presence in the Pac ific has been crucial since the closure

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10 of the U.S. naval base at Subic Bay, P hilippines in 1992 (Yoshida 2010, par. 22). Brooke the Philippine Senate refused to extend the lease, and American memories of that re refore, the ideal location for the U.S. military would be a place in which they are not only accepted, but more importantly, not easil y removed (Brooke 2004, par. 8). However, the emphasis on an ideal location does not indicate that the U.S. military is in tent on expanding in Guam simply because it has the power to do so : welcomed by the host country Because these countries within the region [the Philippines, Australia, Korea, Singapore, and Thailand] have indicated their unwillingness and inability to host more U.S. forces on their lands, the U.S. military has shifted its focus to basing on U.S. sovereign soil. ( Draft EIS in Emphasis added ). In other words, the U.S. military is operating on the belief that the people of Guam openly welcome the expansion Nonetheless, s ince 2004, there has been increasing pressure from Okinawans to relocate U.S. forces due to various concerns stemming from pollution, noise, aircraft accidents, and crime within the Okinawan military base community (Yoshida 2010, par. 2). Therefore, in order to e and capabilities while reduci ng burdens of local communities, Japan and the United States made arrangements for the relocation of 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam by 2014 (Naiman 2010; Yoshida 2010, par. 2 4). According to the Guam Joint Military Master Plan, several conditions were put forth regarding what would be According to the Draft EIS all of these conditions were fulfilled through Guam, making

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11 it These conditions demonstrate the meticulous ma intenance and planning behind the announcement for realignment However, d espite Guam fulfilling these requirements the possibility of U.S. military expansion has raised both questions and concerns within the island Such concerns have provided a platform for the anti expansion movement in Guam.

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12 CHAPTER II I CONCERNS ABOUT THE BUILD UP The announcement for expansion warrants a nalysis of the ways U.S. military bases impact the local community (Lutz 2010). This analysis is significant because, in addition to many positive attributes such as defense and economic support U.S. military bases can produce substantially negative political, ecological, and cultural consequences (Yeo 2006, 36). Some of these effects include high rates of out migration, land degradation, water depletion, road damage, rape and gender violence, in addition to the rejection of sovereignty, self determination, and human rights (Alexan der 2011a, 10 11 and 2011b, 3; Lu As a way of gauging the possible hazards of the expansion, there has been extensive research performed by the people of Guam, U.S. agencies and the U.S. Navy (Lutz 2010, Although there are several concerns circulating around the expansion, t his chapter will focus on the most cited concerns : funding, displacement security, land, envir onment, international law a nd the economy Although not all anti expansion activists stand behind each of these concerns, together these que stions and concerns compose the platform of anti expansion resistance on Guam. Funding For military expansion to occur, Guam will need considerable funding. The main concern with funding is the way in which it is broadcast to the people of Guam A infrastructure

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13 2009, 110) However, closer a nalysis reveals that most of the funding coming from the U.S. and Japan will be relegated to the military bases on Guam. In 2006, t he U.S. and Japan came to a decision that approximately $10.3 billion would be necessary for facilities and in Defense in Yoshida 2010, par. 9). Due to increasing pressure from Okinawans that relocation b e realized rapidly, Japan committed to fund $ 6.09 billion, or more than 60% of the expansion ( Yoshida 2010, par. 9 ). However, despite what advocates broadcast, Japan and the U.S. military do not actually claim to deliver on any civilian projects (Aguon 2008, 126). and build Marine Corps facilities but to subsidize infrastructure improvement at Andersen Air Fo hida 2010, par. 4). The budget included a new fire station, military police station, barracks, restaurant, and gymnasium at Finegayan as well as a medical clinic and new facilities for the port operation unit headquarter s at Apra Harbor (Yoshida 2010, par. military. The original U.S. contribution of $4.18 billion was confined to the military as well. According to the FY2009 Nation al Defense Auth oriza tion Act, Congress approved $180 million for developing military projects on Guam (Yoshida 2010, par. 1 and 3 under Guam Budget). In 2010, $734 million was approved to begin a series of expansion support (Yoshida 2010, par. 1 under Guam Budget) Final ly, in 2011, approximately $566 million was proposed to Congress within the Nati onal Defense Authorization Act (Yoshida 2010,

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14 (2010), the breakdown of fundin g within the proposal is clear. Figure 2 Funding from National Defense Authorization Act As Figure 2 demonstrates, 75% of funding, or $426.8 million of the $566 million will be allocated to the improvements and defense access road improvements Approximately, 12%, or $70 million, will be allocated for the Naval Hospital. The Nation al Defense Act also authorized $50 mil lion, or 9% of th for Guam Strike Group operations and ramp upgrades, combat communications facilities, Red Horse engineering facilities and Finally, the remaining 4% ($20 million) of the $566 million would go toward the Guam Army National Guard for Cagurangan 2010 in Yoshida 2010, par. 2 under Guam Budget ) T hus, al though local officials may possess good intentions for supporting the build up, it appears that most of the money will go 75% 12% 9% 4% FUNDING FROM NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT Navy Naval Hospital Anderson Air Force Base Guam Army National Guard

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15 Displacement In addition, t he introduction of additional military, the ir dependents, and foreign workers to Guam is a significant concern because of the potential for further displacement of the indigenous community According to the 2010 U.S. Census Bureau, enous community 6 This low representation of the Chamoru is a result of centuries of colonization. During Spanish rule, the introduction of European diseases greatly diminished the Chamoru population of 40,000 to fewer than 4,000 in less than 50 years (1668 1704) (Quimby 2012, a national security clearance program that remained effective until 1962, the U.S. military Furtherm ore, military deployment became typical in the 1950s after the Chamoru were granted citizenship, creating further displacement of the native population (Tanji 2012, 103). Therefore, according to Quimby (2012), the present Chamoru population is an amalgamat ion, a mixture of those who had incorporated culture from Spain, the 6 R Filipino, 10% are Caucasian, and the remaining percentage are comprised of Korean, Japanese, and Chinese. Therefore, w hen referencing st the buildup, scholars are referring to the total population on the isla nd, not just the Chamoru people.

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16 Aguon (2006b) argues that such displacement not only weakened the Chamorro populace, but also left a harmful impact upon their identity by complicating the process of self determination (49). This complication is manifested in the constant debate surrounding who qualifies as a Chamoru and who therefore, is able to participate in self determination plebiscite s Critics of Chamoru self determination often emphasize t he (Monnig 2007, 407 in Alexander 2011b 12 and 15 deserve self determination the Chamoru are often called upon to an act has shaped their abilities to work through issues of importance such as language, land, immigration, and political st in Alexander 2011b, 15). Thus, a lthough the Chamoru are already outnumbered, the possible increase in additional military members has raised concerns about the way an altered population will affect future politics. Land In addition to concerns of cultural displacement, the concern regarding the appropriation of more land plays a prominent role in discourse of the anti expansion acr 2012). Currently, milita ry installations occupy almost 3 an d other military facilities (Alexander 2011a, 7 and 2011b, 3 4). Therefore acquiring additional land on an island of only 212 square miles b ecomes increasingly problematic to to anti expansion expansionists. Military appropriation of

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17 land is nothing new to the people of Guam. After World War II, significant portions of land were used for the U.S. military ( and the U.S. had illegally taken control of 2/3 of our total real estate under the all too familiar However, analysis of military land appropriation on Guam demonstrates that indigenous land was not always taken for national security purposes, but sometimes for an d their dependents (Hattori 1995b, 60 in Aguon 2006a, 32). This controversy is further complicated by U.S. claims that all land taken for military purposes has already been (Joint Guam Program Office in Yoshida 2010 ) Figure 3. Map of Proposed Build up

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18 the empty imaginings of people who have yet to be seasoned by the realities of historical eminent domain, are simply irrelevant principl es to Guam (Aguon 2006a, 32). According to Aguon (2006a), at the time that the United States took over substantial portions of could not be guaranteed reimbursement (32). Therefore, the law was inapplicable to the colonized Chamorro people after World War II, making the argument for eminent domain inapplicable to Guam as well (Aguon 2006a, 32). Such discussion of eminent domain is not used to argue that the U.S. military has never co mpensated for land taken, but rather to point out that the process of compensation is much more complex than often realized. In addition to concerns regarding the amount of land taken, there has also been controversy regarding specific portions of land. A nti expansion activists were extremely Pagat, an ancient village and important site for the indigenous community in the northeast of Guam (Alexander 2011b, 5; Kirk and ment As Hattori about who you are, w (Warheit 2010). Therefore, for many members within the indigenous com munity, the meaning attached to their land

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19 Security Another significant concern for anti expansion be noted that the expansion concer ns more than the transfer of 8,000 Marines. According to Yoshida (2010) and Aguon (2008), in addition to the Marine transfer, Guam would have to accommodate six addition al nuclear aircraft carriers, a Ballistic Missile Defense station, and a Global Strike Force (Yoshida 2010, par. 1 u 2008, 125). Activists such as Aguon (2006b) are worried that continuing to militarize the island through expansion will only exacerbate U.S. China and U.S. North Korea relations causing China and North Korea to further m ilitariz e in retaliation (69). Therefore b we will all be in m ore danger than (69) In addition, the expansion does not just involve concerns over tradition al security, but human security as well. T he pot ential for a rise in crime plays a significant role in acti up Analyzing other foreign military bases, Aguon (2006b) Korean civilians in a s hort span of twenty years (1967 Based on the National Campaign to Eradicate Crime by U.S. Troops in Korea, many of these crimes involved rape and murder (Aguon 2006b, 88). Furthermore, the source of these incoming military personnel contributes to the concerns with crime. When looking specifically at Okinawa, ore than 4,790 criminal charges have been brought against US military personnel during the 34 years since Okinawa reverted to Japan in 197 2 ( Aguon 2006b, 71) the same troubles harassing the people of Okinawa will be a reality for the people of Guam,

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20 Aguon (2006b) questions why local officials welco me troops from the very base where reports of rape, assault, insobriety, and environmental contamination have been concerns for the people of Okinawa (31 32 ) Environment Studies reveal that t he re has already been significant impact upon the en vironment of Guam due to a history of U.S. military presence In 1952, 5,000 d rums of Agent Purple were stored on the island for the Korean War ( Aguon 2006b, 26) In the 1960s, alarming levels of toxins were found at Anderson Air force Base ( Aguon 2006b, 26) According to Aguon (2006b), Guam experienced nuclear fallout f rom more than ten of the bombs released onto Enewetak during nuclear testing of the Marshall Islands, located 1200 miles east of Guam ( 25). Aguon (2006a) argues that Guam has yet to receive just compensation for these offenses (33). According to the Assessment of the Scientific Information for the Radiation Exposure Sc reening and Education Program of T he National Research Council of the National Academies of Science : Guam did receive measurable fallout from the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons i n the Pacific. Residents of Guam during that period should be eligible for compensation under RECA in a way similar to that of perso ns considered to be downwinders ( footnote 35, in Aguon 2006a, 34 ). Despite these reports scholars claim that Gua m has not been compensated (Aguon 2006a, 34). Furthermore, despite the Guam Environmental Protection Agency finding carcinogenic substances infecting the water and the fish in Apra Harbor and Cocos Lagoon the areas have not been decontaminated ( Agu on 2006b, 25). B ased on

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21 these cases of past negligence, activists such as Aguon have very little faith in the U.S. Soon after the news of the expansion arrived, the Draft Environmental Impact Statement / Overseas Environmental Impact Statement: Gua m and CNMI Military Relocation Relocating Marines from Okinawa, Visiting Aircraft Carrier Berthing, and Army Air and Missile Defense Task Force (Draft EIS) was published by the Joint Guam Program Offi ce of the Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Pacific in November 2009. According to Yoshida (2010), the 8,000 to 10,000 page document discusses the environmental hazards the expansion could possibly bring upon the island (Yoshida Many of these negative effects resonate with concerns over the expansion. Furthermore, an evaluation released by the E nvironmental Protection Agency stated that ts to dad 2010, Because most of the supplies for and, water and othe r resources al ; Davis 2011, 8 ).

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22 International Law The argument exhaus tively used to deny the Chamoru the right to self determination is that they are too incompetent to self govern (Aguon 2006a, 29 ). This criticism is often derived from cases of inefficiency within the local government of Guam. According to a "Risk Assessment Report for United States Attorney's Offices District of Guam and District of the Northern Mariana Islands conducted in 2001 2002, many local officials who had serv ed during the administration of Governor Gutierrez were foun d guilty in federal court for cases of public corruption, involving nepotism, drug smuggling, and abuse of federal funding (Meissner 2002). A d vocates of expansion often declare that thes e highly scandalized cases are just a few of many cases of corru ption reveal ing inability to self govern. Although local corruption represents an indictment on the local government of Guam, anti expansion scholars question whether enhanced military presence is truly the solution to accountable governance, and wh ether further reliance on federal funding will breed more inefficiency within the local government. More importantly, according to Aguon (2006a), t he fact that the United States is disregarding international law is rarely considered a significant hindrance to true self governance ( 29). Yet, as this section demonstrates, international law plays a significant role in discourse over the military expansion (Lutz Guam is one of sixteen rema ining non self governing territories in the world According to UN Resolution 1514 of 1960: immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non Self Governing Territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers

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23 to the peoples of thos e territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their fr eely expressed will and desire ( in Aguon 2006b, 48). self governing territory signifies that the United a signatory of the United Nations Charter, the conditions necessary for true self government for the people of Guam (Aguon 2006a, 26 and 2006b, 48). Furthermore, UN Resolution 1514, also notes that self determination is a right, not a pri right to fre ely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, s has never been exercised by the Chamoru. citizenship, expansion, in the end, Guam remains a colony and will continue to remain so as long as people have not historically chosen their most powerful leaders and have been told to background their own national identity in favor of that of the power which has ultimate As a result, scholars argue that enhancing the U.S. military presence contradicts the very principles that the U.S. military claims to protect ( Davis 2011; Lutz 2010, par. 6 ). However, this serious concern is not at the forefront of discussion regarding the expansion. Rather, as the next section will explai n much more discourse is dedicated to the effect the expansion will have on the ec onomy. Economy De spite all of these questions Lutz (2010) notes that the central concern does not necessarily circulate around social or environmental risks of the expansion, but around

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24 economy is the most disc usse frame t he expansion as an This framing is particularly potent whe population lives on food stamps and a quarter lives below the U.S. poverty level ( par.3 ). After the announcement, m any claim ed that great eco nomic opportunity w ill accompany the build up (Viernes 2009, 109 110). From j ob growth to an improved real estate market, several benefits of expansion have been broadcast to the people of Guam. However, a breakdown of these advantages, often touted by supporters of the expansio n, reveals that the increase in jobs is either relegated to the mil itary sector or primarily short According to a 2007 Guam Employment Report, w hile employment in manufacturing, transporta tion and public utilities and retail trade decreased, increases were seen for jobs in the service sector and public sector; with the construction sector experiencing the largest increase, that is 1,450 jobs, or 35 per cent for the year (Lutz 2010, par. 4 experienced the largest increase raises concerns. Examining whether plans for hile the influx of military personnel and their dependents will most certainly infrastructure, local firms and local workers may not necessarily be hired to take on those

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25 from foreign countries will be employed instead (110). Furthermore, according to the report, jobs that would prevail the temporary upswing are more likely to cente r on the lower wage industry of retail, which, according to Lutz (2010), would only contribute to the already harsh disparities betwee n locals and the military ( With such concerns, indigenous activists are q uestioning whether this short term growth is truly beneficial, as it is often portrayed, or is rather a temporary solution to ( Aguon 2006b, 32). In fact, according to anti expansion activists, part of the proble m with the expansion is that it does not necessarily serve to cultivate a sustainable economy on Guam, but rather to preserve its dependence on the United States ( Aguon 2006b, 42). Reasons for Resistance As questions and concerns regarding the build up are raised expansion activists attempt to analyze who the true recipients of the expansion will be ( Aguon ). Although not all anti expansion activists stand b ehind each of these concerns, these issues are nonethele ss the mos t cited points raised. B y shedding light on the substantially negative political, e cological, and cultural effects expansion could have on the island, discourse of these concerns have provide d a platform for anti expansion movement in Guam.

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26 CHAPTER IV ANTI EXPANSION MOVEMENT : PRESENT BUT NOT PROMINENT After the Draft ( EIS ) assessment of the environmental hazards the military expans ion could have on the island, resistance against the expansion began to take shape (Alexander 2011a, 16 ; Davis 2011, 8). The EIS inclusion of Pagat for the military build up gained particular attention, creating controversy over the acquisition of more l and and serving as a reminder of the extensive amount of indigenous lan d that had already been taken. Thus, o nce the results of the EIS (Davis 2011, 8) This surge of resistance was demonstrated through the presence of m obilization structures (Alexander 2011a, 16; Viernes 2009, 112 114 ). According to Johnston (2011), their daily rou As a resu lt, mobilization structures are comprised of civil society associations and organization s, as well as the resources necessary to sustain them (Johnston 2011, 5 2 54 ). Meaningful Mobilization Structures mob ilization structures display both local and international levels of interaction. Local iversity of Guam students allowed for candid conversations and pushback regarding the military build up (Alexander 2011a, 16). Protests occurred along Marine Corps Drive (Viernes 2009, 112). O rganizations founded in Guam, such as the

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27 Ch amoru Cultural Development and Research Institute and Naison Chamoru consistently asserted the injustices of the expansion (Viernes 2009). In addition, t he Chamoru have taken thei r resistance beyond the island and eng aged in international discourse, such as at the 2006 UN Special Political and D ecolonization Committ ee ( Viernes 2009, 113 114). The Guhan Indigenous Collective launched the online Peace and Justice for Guam Petition, which acquired signatures from on and off the island. T hrough against Military Pollution, the National Asian Pacific Am trans national alliances with anti base activists in Puerto Rico, Hawaii, Okinawa, a nd South Korea have also played a role in the resistance (Alexander 20 11a, 16; Davis 2011, 8 ; Viernes 2009, 114 ). Such transnational alliances are significant because Makua Valley), Okinawa, and Diego Garcia (Lutz 2010, p Davis (2011) argues that, due to the success of anti ba se protests o n these island bases, the U.S. military has been forced to transfer their activity to alternative places, such as Guam (Davis 2011, 1 2 and 7 9). As a result, Guam stands as one of the last remaining military sites in the Asia Pacific region ( Davis 2011, 1 2). Due to this shift, local activists in Guam beg an forming alliances with anti base activists in other island base sites (Davis 2011, 8). As a result t hese alliances not only created strategies, and supp ed the audience to which articulate their struggles (Alexander 2011a, 16; Davis 2011, 8 9). By sharing tactics and gen erating greater awareness, transnational alliances allow ed members to defend each

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28 rests which Johnston (2011) argues should sustain movement mobilization (D avis 2011, 8 9; Johnston 2011). Failure to Galvanize Sustainable Mobilization This analysis reveals that meaningful mobili zation structures are providing avenues for activists on Guam to articulate their opposition against the military expansion. More importantly, the structures i ndicate that anti expansion resistance clearly resides on the island of Guam (Alexander 2011a, 16 and 2011b, 5; Viernes 2009, 112 114 ). However, despite the presence of these structures, the movement has not galvanized sufficient support to effect substantive change. In other words the anti expansion movement has not catalyzed sustainable mobilization Mobilization is often defined as an i nterest based challenge to the state (Johnston 2011, 51 52). According to Johnston (2011), these challenges can encompass both institutional and non institutional plans of action (51). Institutional plans of action involve political ac tivities such as lobbying, petitioning, court contestation, party mobilization, pressure groups recalls, and referenda (Johnston 2011, 51 52). In contrast, non institutional plans of action deal specifically with protest campaigns, or politics on the stre A nalysis of Guam both institutional and non institutional plans of action characterize the anti expansion movement. However, in order for a movement to have sustainable mobilization t here must be sufficient support of these plans of action to effect substantive change. Yet w hen

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29 examining the anti expansion movement in Guam, scholars note that there is not sufficient support, and, as a result, there has no t been substantive change. This thesis seeks to answer why such is the case, but first, it is necessary to clearly delineate sufficient support and substantive change Sufficient Support When referring to s ufficient suppor t, this thesis is referring to not only the number of supporters (in proportion to the population) but also the type of supporters (institutional actors/elite) (Johnston 2011, 15). The anti expansion movement in Guam is characterized b y both an insufficient number of supporters a nd a lack of elite allies Number of Supporters When analyzing the number of supporters a majority of the population of Guam do not support the anti expansion resistance (Davis 2011, Lutz 2010, Robertson 2 011, Aguon 2006). This lack of support could be based on the widespread notion that a majority of the population of Guam actually approve of the expansion. According to Robertson (2011), those in the anti (74). Th us, there are no hard data demonstrating the ratio of expansion advocates to expansion opponents. Regardless of whether a majority of the people of Guam actually approve of the expansion, both anti expansion activists and expansion advocates acknowledge th at the anti expansion movement lacks sufficient support.

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30 Elite Allies The second factor that demonstrates a lack of sufficient support is based on the lack of support from institutional actors/ elites. According to Viernes (2009), based on their the media, businesses, and political officials As discussed earlier, elite openly state that realignment is beneficial to the island by claiming that it would usher in econo mic revival, new employment opportunities, better infrastructure, increased security, and a productive relationship with the United States (Viernes 2009, 106). It should be noted merely be responding to what they perceive as the true desires of the people of Guam. Although not every form of media, successful business, or political official is or should be considered a threat to the anti expansion movement, these three types have been the mos t vocal and will, th erefore, be critiqued as unsupportive of the anti expansion movement Media In Guam, the dominant newspaper is t he Pacific Daily News which is owned by the U.S. publishing company Gannett Co. Inc. (Viernes 2009, 107). Therefore, due to its relationship with Gannett, it is possible that PDN is more likely to reflect a pro expansion attitude by constantly headlining approval of U.S. policies, such as the military expansion (Viernes 2009, 104, 107). According to Viernes (2009, 107), such headlines include: 2006).

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31 Likewise, media bias was particularly problematic in the use of surveys. In 2006, PDN commissioned two surveys soliciting whether voters found the expansion beneficial or not (Viernes 200 9, 107 109). The question in the survey read: There's been talk lately of Guam's population expanding by 30,000 people as a result of the military expansion plan for Guam. Do you think this will be a good thing for Guam, a bad thing for Guam, or haven't y ou thought much about this?" survey reveals a slight increase in support with approval/disapproval format of the surveys, Viernes (2009) discusses how these polls that PDN conducted involved a small sample (less tha n 1%) of the isl (109). 7 Considering the fact that there were 55, 311 registered voters in Guam in 2006, PDN headlines were misleading readers by ( Viernes 2009, 109). Businesses Main media outlets are not the only ones commissioning surveys in Guam. Commerce: 71 per cent of Guam residents supported an increase in the United States military presence, with nearly 8 0 per cent of the view that the increasing military presence would result in additional jobs and tax revenue; according to the poll, 60 per cent felt the additional Marines on the island would have a positive effect and would ultimately impro s quality of life externalized cost of bases). 7 Only 502 people were polled for the first survey (Viernes 2009, 109). During the second survey, only 500 people were polled (Viernes 2009, 109).

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32 Support for the expansion is also demonstrated by institutions such as the First Guam tourism, the military, real estate, and construction First of $1.5 billion per year will be pumped into the Guam Economy 2007, 9). H nt and author of the forecast, acknowledged that many of the positive figures associated with the build up are whether that be the amount of funding actually provided to Guam, inflation, off real estate, and residents (Laney 2006, 12). Political o fficials ole in the anti expansion movement. Viernes (2009, 109) discusses how some of the most important political officials voiced their view of the possible expansion, shortly after the announcement. For exam ple, former Governor Felix P. Camacho, who had served during the time of the announcement, declared within his State of the Island Address that the in Viernes 2009, 107). on Guam and the benefits associated with having more military personnel and their 2006 in Viernes 2009 (107). Mark Forbes, Speaker of the Twenty Eighth Guam

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33 a t the regional hearing for the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (Limtiaco 2006a in Viernes 2009, 107). Such vocal support for the expansion is significant because these political officials speak on behalf of the entire island (Viernes 2009, 108). However, it is important to note unsupportive. Despite his support for the expansion, current Governor Calvo has, nonetheless, helped create opportunities for th e anti expansion movement by reconvening the Commission on Decolonization on Decolonization not only Again, i as the true desires of the people of Guam. Howeve r, w hether the elite have persuaded the public to be supportive of the expansion, or the majority in Guam have persuaded the elite that the expansion is beneficial is not the poi nt in this particular analysis. Clearly the two mutual ly r einforce each other. The point is that there is no large number of anti expansion activists and a lack of elite allies Therefore, the movement has not galvanized sufficient support. Substantive Change When referring to substantive change, this thesis is referring to the primary goal of the anti expansion movement: preventing the expansion from taking place on the island T he U.S. has been responsive on some of the aspects concerning the expansion. In 2012, for

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34 example, a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement was conducted in response to some of the concerns of the original Draft Environmental Impact Statement After the DEIS of 2009 discussed the environmental hazards the expansion could possibly bring upon the island (Yoshida 2010, par. the Joint Guam Program Office (JGPO), which serves as a liaison between the U.S. Department of Defense and SEIS would examine the best operational, to conduct live fire training in a manner that would no t impact access village and important site for the indigenous community (SEIS 2012, par. 1 Furthermore, a cco rding to the SEIS he number of Marines to be relocated has been reduced from the originally planned 8,600 Marines and 9,000 family members, to a force of approximately 5,000 Marines and 1,300 family members on The SEIS also noted that pproximately two thirds of the Marines relocated to Guam will be rotational with the remaining one However, the supplemental study and reduction in servicemen has not completely alleviated concerns among the anti expansion community. Although JGPO appears to be responsive to the environmental concerns of the buildup, Joe Ludovici, Executive Director of JGPO made it a point to ensure the public knew that the mil itary buildup is U.S. respo nse after the

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35 announcement for expansion is clear: despite the econom ic, environment al, and political concerns of the expansion that have been circulated in Guam, expansion will continue. The refore, the SIES demonstrates that the anti expansion movement has not galvanized sufficient suppor t to effect substantive change, and therefore lacks sustainable mobilization. This scenario of present but not prominent resistance has led scholars to explore the reasons for such an enigma. Do these low levels of resistance signify that the majority of the people on Guam truly embrace military expansion? Or could there be a deeper explanation f or the failure to galvanize?

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36 CHAPTER V EXPLANATIONS THROUGH SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORIES S ocial movement litera ture might provide an answer to these critical questions Accordi ng to Pastor and Ortiz (2009 factors that lead to mobilization. One pred ominant social movement theory is t he political process model (Pastor and Ortiz 2009, 10 11). Political Process Theory According to political process theory, political opportunities lead to social movement by shifting the cost benefit ratio (Pastor and Ortiz 2009, 11). Pol itical opportunities include a range of factors that can either propagate or inhibit an issue, such as elite connection to the issue, freedom of the media to discuss the issue, or the amount of external pressures from global regimes to support the issue (see F igure 4 ). Johnston (2011) argues that t he first set of p olitical opportunities/threats intensity o f social control and the presence or absence of elite connection, elite reinfor cement, and elite sympathy is a reflection of the type of government within the state, and therefore, depend on how the state is constituted (Jo hnston 2011, 51 52). T he second s et of political o pportunities/threats is based upon the level of policy implementation, freedom in the media, countermovement activity, and pressures from global regimes (Johnston 2011, 51 52). Therefore, these sets of political opportunities/threats are t echnically structures because they are institutional arrangements According to Johnston (2011), structural explanation for social movements refer to meaning opportunities that compel action

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37 straightforwardly and threats that constrain automatically both requiring little that political opportunities often undergo collective interpretation by movement membe rs (Johnston 46 analyst must delve into collective processes of meaning making, culture, and discursive Therefore, although these sets of po litical opportunities/threats are technically structures because they are institutional arrangements, Johnston 2011, 53). What makes political opportunities and threats cultural facto rs is the fact that political opportunities and threats must go through a framing process by which they are perceived as actual opportunities or threats (Johnston 2011, 53). This perception takes place through the process of collective action framing. Acco rding to Johnston (2011), the combination of these two elements can make for an exhaustive but nonetheless thorough examination of the causes of soci al movement mobilization (47). Thus, the advantage of political process theory is its consideration of both structural (hard) and cultural (soft) causes of social movement mobilization. Because, unlike the contending theories, political process theory integrates state centered and structuralist perspectives with interpretative and cultural practices to inc lude elements of perception (Johnston 2011, 50 51 and 53), political process theory is often regarded as the predominant theory for the study of social movement mobili zation (Caren 2007 and John ston 2011, 50 51, 53, and 58). However, predominance in the fi eld of

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38 cases. Therefore, it is essential to discuss why political process theory would provide a more thorough explanation for the anti failure to galvanize sustainable mobilization Comparison to O ther Social Movement Theories synthesis case, where there is already a presenc e of elements that should stimulate the anti expansion movement. For example, a ccording to d eprivation and economic theory poor e conomic conditions, such as those found in Guam should foster resistance An analysis of Industrial Workers movements (Piven and Cloward 1979) as well as so cial movements in the 1960s reveals that these movements often operated and were formed in response to a similar backdrop of poor economic conditions Therefore, according to this logic, the high unemployment rate, lack of economic opportunity, and class stratification in Guam should provide a pathway to successful mobilization. Yet, the presence of these economic conditio ns are not catalyzing sufficient support New s ocial movement theory and framing theory would argue that, after the DEIS the would provide opportunities for social movement. However, despite the presence of Indigeno us Collective, or National Asian Pacific America not garnering enough support to effect substantive change Likewise, resource mobilization theory offers an insu fficient explanation for why the anti expansion movement lacks su fficient support

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39 resource mobilization theory would argue that it is only the structures with resources that mobilization structures are framed in the first place 8 (Snow et. al 1986, 445 in Yeo 2006, 39). Therefore, the problem with contending theories is that they rely too heavily on one issue to explain the failure to galvanize support. According to political process theory, in ecessary to examine cultural factors in addition to structural (Johnston 2011, 49). It is important to note that in the study of social movements, no precise partition exists between structural and cultural conditions (Johnston 2011, 49). Johnston (2011) a ccurately points out that and interpretation, and among culturalists over whether thinking about social structures in obje (49). Nonethel ess, what political process theory causal. 8 According to Snow (et.al 1986), resourc frame injustices (in Yeo 2006, 39). Particularly in the case of the transnational organizations and alliances, framing is e 38 39). If framing is not that important to resource mobilization theory, then how can the expansion be interpreted as an injustice in the first place?

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40 Structural Factors Cultural Factors (Johnston 2011, 52) Figure 4. Political Process Model Accelerated shifts in politics, economy, social life Political Opportunities/Threats Depend on level of: 1. Social Control 2. Elite Connections 3. Elite Sympathy 4. Elite Reinforcement 5. Policy implementation 6. Freedom in the media 7. Countermovement activity 8. Pressures from global regimes Current Culture; Climate of Opinion Mobilization Structures 1. Civil Society Organizations 2. Associations 3. Resources Framing Process Perception of Political Opportunities/Threats through Collective Action Framing Repertoires of Protest Specific tactics, design, and nature of the protest Contentious Political Mobilization Interest based challenges 1. Non institutional 2. Institutional

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41 According to this log ic, if there is to be sufficient support to effect substantive change the interplay of structural and cultural factors must make conditions more beneficial than costly to change the issue. From this perspective, this paper argues that the AEM h as yet to galvanize sufficient support to effect substantive change because of the interplay of structural an d cultural conditions in Guam.

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42 CHAPTER VI STRUCTURES THAT SUPPRESS According to political process theory, shift s in polit ical structure determine whether it is more beneficial or costly to resis t political power based on how venerable Pastor and Ortiz 2009, 11 12). Based on this logic one of the reason s the anti expansion movement lacks sufficient support to effect substantive change more costly then beneficial to resist the state (Johnston 2011, 51 52). As Chapter V noted, a ccording to necessarily undergo the 49). Therefore, for movement members, structural analysis involves less interpretation than cultural analysis when determining whether the cost be nefit ratio is in their favor. The following analysis demonstrates that ambiguous political status and poor economic structure are key structural facto r s that straightforwardly prevent sustainable mobilization against the expansion. Political Ambiguity Before discussing the structural obstacles to sustainable mobilization, it is critical to note that m do cr eate opportuni ties to galvanize sufficient support According to Tilly (2006), unlike repressive regimes, democracies are

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43 designed to be more open and receptive to the public (Breed 2013, 80; Johnston 2011). In Guam, the local government is a representative democracy, allowing opportunities for the makers. However, what prevents sustainable mobilization is 1988). This status means that s ince 1898, the island has neither complete sove reignty nor complete dependence in relation to the United States (Alexander 2011b, 8). Such a status was created for the Insular Cases a series of U.S. Supreme Court Cases that govern U.S. territories. According to Burnett and Marshall (2001) I nsular Cases developed the idea of unincorporated territorial status in order to enable the United States 2001 in Lai, 4 5). As a result, t hough the residents of Guam possess U.S. citizenship, the Constitution is not fully applicable t o them, as they cannot vote in p residential elections nor do they have a voting repre sentative in Congress (Bevacqu a 2010 in Lai 2011, 12 13). Furthermore, for this particular case due colonial status, the basically unchallenged (Davis 2011, 7). Attempts to Change Ambiguity According to Hattori, Guam pos sesses a history of political activism that sought to (Aguon 2006a, 28, footnote 18). In 1980, 1987,

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44 determination, and decolonize, respectively 9 (Bradley 2000, 45 4 7). However, all attempts were rejected by Congress. Thus, change for the island seemed futile as more killed drafts proposing a Commonwealth status for Guam (Aguon 2006a, footnote 18, 28; Bradley 2000). 10 Limited Institutional Infrastructure are significant to discourse on the anti expansion movement for two reasons. First these efforts demonstrate that it was always the Chamoru people who originated change for political autonomy : the U.S. merely responded (Aguon 2006a, 30). However, although Chamoru activists have actively resisted and, therefore, gained certain concessions from the U.S. government, challenge their status if significant political decisions mus t be approved by the very power that wishes to preserve the status quo (Alexander 2011b, 8) T he failure of the Commonwea lth Act of 1987 and 1997 is a testament to these limitations Therefore, true 9 The Commonwealth Act was prepared in 1987 (Aguon 2006a). It was then brought before Congressman Blaz in 1988, where it was subsequently neglected. When Underwood served as Congressman in 1993, the act was put forth again, this time with the significant tab of H.R. 1521, in reference to the year Magellan first came to the island, signaling Chamorro colonization (Diaz 2001, 168). 10 In 1997, during a hearing for the Guam Commonwealth Act and the Guam Judicial Empowerment Act, Deputy Secretary of the Department of Interior, John Garamendi, although stating his admiration for the initiative, objected to the conditions that Guam administer its own immigration and labor laws and that the indigenous people decide th eir own political

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45 self government cannot be attained as long as Guam is bou nd by its politically ambiguous status, a status perpetuated by U.S. federal departments (Aguon 2006b, 48). Despite attempts to challenge the structure, has remained an obstacle to efforts to realize self determination U nlike in former U.S. possessions turned sovereign states, unrestrained military activity is easier in Guam because its current status as an unincorporated territory presents no i nstitutionalized political way s to resist it (Lai 2011, 3). As a result, status remains a key structural factor that prevent s sustainable mobilizatio n within the anti expansion movement today. Poor Economic S tructure Another structure of Guam that presents an obstacle to sustainable mobilization is its population lives on food stamps and a quarter lives below the U.S. poverty level ( Kirk and Natividad 2010, under agricultural sector is ext remely limited, due to as well as the loss of cultivable l and and fishing grounds used for military bases and installations (Kirk and As a result, the island Na According to Kirk and Natividad (2010), infrastructure is in dire circumstances as well ( The Guam Memorial H ospital the only

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46 public hospital on the island, operates at 100% capacity three weeks out of the mo schools often have (Kirk and Natividad 2010, par. 6 under government of Guam departments have been placed under federal receivership, meaning that the federal government has hired an independent entity to take over certain functions of these agencies due to substandard co although cert ainly not the most poverty stricken in the P acific, are in poor circums tances and significantly depend on U.S. federal funding. However, Guam was not always so economically dependent on the United States. WWII, Guam was self sufficient in agriculture, fishing, hunting, and husbandry. Nearly every family grew vegetables and was not until after the Second World and Additionally, befo re 1962, the Department of Defense established a national security clearance policy, a program that Aguon (2006a) argues the administration of the US military, and ther United States (Aguon 2006a, 20).

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47 Understanding the economic conditions of Guam is significant as increased dependence on the United States has left the island without a self sustaining economy. As a result, the U.S. military has become a significant source of employment and resources for the people of Guam he military is by far the major employer, w ith most families connected to someone serving in the military or employed Furthermore, military employment remains high as a way to obta in the amenities offered to those already in U.S. military service (Kirk and Natividad 2010 par. 3 under Military personnel have higher earning power than members of local communities; the military hospital and on base schools have b etter facilities than the civilian hospital and public schools; water use by a larger military population is likely to result in shortages for local people; private military beaches deny local community access to their ancestral heritage ( Kirk and Nativida d 2010, under 3). As a result, Camacho and Monnig 163). Limit ations of Structural Explanation These structural constraints offer illumination as to why it appears more costly than beneficial to mobilize against the expansion. Many residents depend upon the U.S. military for their livelihood. Resisting the U.S. expansion would be resisting their provision. Likewise, despite consistent attempts to change the political structure, Guam still remains an unincorporated territory.

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48 However, alone, these structural factors are still insufficient explanation. According to other social movement theories, such as d eprivation and economic theory poor economic conditions found in Guam should foster resistance as many successful social movements were set agai nst a backdrop of poverty Therefore, according to this logic, the high unemployment rate, lack of economic opportunity, and class stratification in Guam should provide a pathway to successful mobilization. Yet, the presence of these economic conditions are not catalyzing sufficie nt support. Furthermo re, the question remains Therefore, as Johnston (2011) notes, there is another deeper, more cultural factor that is preventin g the spread of resistance

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49 CHAPTER VII CONSEQUENCES OF A COLONIAL CULTURE According to Johnston (2011), in addition to structure, cultural conditions must offer more benefit than cost if there is to be sustainable mobilization. When discussing cultural factors, this thesis is referring to framing by members of a movement (Johnston 2011, 44). The interpretation of these broad terms, these can be thought of as favorable cultural environments and trends intellectual, legal, or popular which movements may draw upon and link with to Martin Luther King Jr. used Biblical passages and enhance support for the civil rights movement (45). Therefore, King was able to frame the movement according to narratives familiar to Christian culture. This gnitive liberation by emphasizing how broad cultural influences play a role in shaping what movement ideas movement leaders certainly have agency and can actively frame a movement, the main strongly contribute to the framing of these opportunities or threats (Johnston 2011, 53). Framing then becomes collective action framing when the community is able to envision a better future because it no longer perceives the current s tructure as acceptable (Johnston 2011, 53).

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50 component of the cultural co nditions necessa ry for sustainable mobilization, shedding light on why Guam has not effectively mobilized against the expansion. The people of Guam view the expansion as acceptable. In order for the people to view the expansion as unacceptable, they have to view it as a g rievance or an injustice The Liberation Narrative However, close analysis reveals that a deeper cultural factor prevents the expansion from being viewed as an injustice: the Liberation narrative. The Liberation narrative refers to the framing of Lib eration Day, when the U.S. reclaimed the island of Guam from the Japanese during World War II. Therefore, there is a difference between the day and the narrative. Liberation Day is an even he Libe ration narrative is the claim event (Souder 1989 in D iaz 2001, 161; Tanji 2012, 99). In other words, because the U.S. from Japanese occupation, the U.S. military has the right to expand on the i sland. Therefore, the expansion is not viewed as an injustice but as an exercise of the ruly gratefu l Chamoru At first, it might be questionable that a single event could be such a potent for ce against the anti expansion movement. However, as Johnston (2011) demonstrates with the political process model, the cultural interpretation of events significantly impacts the way movements get framed (44). If the cultural climate does not align with a particular movement, it can be exceedingly difficult for movement leaders to harness support. Therefore, before discussing the effects the Liberation narrative has on the anti expansion movement, it is important to discuss its evolution This section will provide a brief

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51 background on the events surrounding Liberation Day, how the event has been framed, and how it has justified greater militarization in postwar Guam and the ann ouncement for expansion today. In 1941, during World War II, Guam, along with other Micronesian islands in the Pacific, was invaded by Japan. Accounts of the occupation reveal bloodshed, starvation, and rape, among much of the suffering the Chamoru endured (Diaz 2001, 160). Accordin g to Diaz (2001), these acts of brutality, inflicted upon the Chamoru, only intensified by the time the U.S. prepared to attack Japanese forces (Diaz 2001, 160). Finally, on July 21 st of 1944, after three years of brutal Japanese occupation Guam was reuni ted with the United States The U.S. return to the island was a n act of significance in ( Alexander 2011b, 13 ). According to historian Paul Carano (1973), the American return was ( in Diaz 2001, 160) U.S. return was also accompanied with U.S. rations like spam, corned beef, cheese, pork and beans . medicin had been deprived of during their wartime experience (Souder 1989, 2 in Diaz 2001, 162). As a result, the coming of American forces was deeply venerated by Chamoru survivors (Souder 1989 in Diaz 2001, 160). With the haunting memories of the brutal Japanese occupation still fresh in their minds, survivors did not merely revere their liberation, they deified it (Souder in Diaz 2001, 161). Therefore, the treatment of Libera tion Day stems from the claim that the identity of the Chamorro nation is (Souder in Diaz 2001, 161 ; Tanji 2012, 99 ) In o ther urvival became synonymou s with American Military Forces (Souder in Diaz

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52 2001, 161; Tanji 2012, 99). construction necessary not only to instill American values, but also to bolster the backdrop of collective identity among the Chamorro (Tanji 2012, 102). A Convenient Framing After World War II, the survival of the Chamorro people during occupation was U.S. value of patriotism in an attempt to make the was the only political language available to the Chamorros that could be heard a nd understood employed devotion as a political tool in order to attain civil rights immediately foll owing the war (Diaz 2001, 165) : While the war was laid to rest, the experience was put to other uses. In their search for political rights, the Chamorros hit upon an irrefutable argument for civil government. The Chamorros were patriotic. They survived the ordeal. They proved their loyalty. In fact, the Chamorros not only deserved political rights, the U.S. owed it to them. The war experience soon became a hammer to obtain political rights, and subsequ ently, to obtain federal funds ( Underwood in Diaz 2001, 166). An analysis of Chamoru activism directly following the war reveals that heralding the Liberation narrative was effective in granting the people political concessions specifically citizenship and civil government to replace the naval administration two cherished ins titutions for which the Chamorro leadership aspired since the turn of the In 1949, the Chamorro protested in what became known as the Guam Congress Walkout (Aguon 2006a, 30). Due to these efforts, the Organic Act, which was signed in 1950, permitting ip to the

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53 (Aguon 2006a, 30 and Alexander 201b, 2 ). In 1970, two decades after the Organic Act, Guam finally elected its first governor (Aguon 2006a, 30). Therefor e, by operating within the logic of the narrative, the Chamoru were granted political concessions. According to the narrative, it was not the endurance of the Chamorro people that granted their citizenship and self government, but rather their faithfulness cal However, this use of the narrative eventually came with a price. As Carano (1973) notes, Liberation Day became the glorious event price in li ves lost had purchased freedom and later American claims of exclusive rights to fought Militarization Justified Ironically, t he Liberation narrative, therefore, paved the pathway for increased militarization on the island. According to f eminist scholar Cynthia Enloe, militarization is defined as a step by step process by which a person or a thing gradually comes to be controlled by the military or comes to depend for its well being on militaristic ideas. The more militarization transform s an individual or a society, the more that individual or society comes to imagine military needs and militaristic presumptions to be not only valuable but also normal (Enloe 2000, 3, as cited by Lai 2011, 12). As Enloe (2000) notes, militarization is not merely the presence of military bases in military. It is the idea that the military should take priority over other elements of society.

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54 Upon analyzing the isl and, Lutz (2010) notes that today objectively more extreme in its concentration than that found virtually anywhere else on This militarization is demonstrated by the significant portions of land used for the U.S. military after World War II ( Kirk and Natividad 2010, it [World War II], the U.S. had illegally taken control of 2/3 of our total real estate under the all too (Aguon 2006a, 31 brackets not in original quote). According to the logic of the Liberation narrative, the U.S. is entitled to claim indigenous preferences of th e U.S. military on the island are justified and normalized. As Robert land, t he fences in Guam are seen as normal, not invasive ( Camacho and Monnig 2010, 159 in Verschoor 2011, 49). As a result, because of residents, many Chamorro men wish they could enlist in the military to enter those spaces (Camac ho and Monnig 2010, 159 in Verschoor 2011, 49). Such a perspective is a testament to the power of the Liberation narrative. Understan ding the Liberation narrative within Guam is crucial as it sheds light on why Guam currently lacks a deeper, more dev eloped nationalistic culture found in spaces with similar experiences, such as the foreign military bases of Japan or South Korea. According to Tanji (2012), in Guam, occupier (military) and the occupied (peop

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55 (111 112). These issues are not in a way that overwrites the dominant narrative of patriotic support of the US military 112). The Liberation narrative also sheds light on Chamorro mi litary enlistment following the war. According to Souder (1989) here was an overwhelming desire to show gratitude. . Chamorros were willing to (Souder 1989 in Diaz, 161) was shaped by an intensive prewar naval rule that permitted Chamorro identity and peoplehood to be expressed onl to Camacho and Monnig ( 2010 ) there was no promise o f respect or economic benefit for the Chamorro before the war (157). In fact, the highest, and only, status attained for a Chamorro serviceman was that of a mess attendant (Camacho and Monnig 2010, 157). It was, therefore, after the experiences of Liberati on Day that more Chamorro men enlisted. chenchule United States has done for the people of Guam (2010 157 in Tanji 2012 104). According to Camacho and Monnig (2010), chenc hule chenchule is not merely grounded in the principles of gratitude and reverence; it is an exchange, an offering to recompense. Thus, this culture of reciprocity, of m ilitary service as an expression of patriotic loyalty to Uncle Sam, sheds light on Chamorro service following World War II ( Camacho and Monnig 2010 157 in Tanji 2012, 104 ; Diaz 2001 ). Although there is more of an economic motivation

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56 enlistment continues in the present despite the fact that very few survivors of the occupation are living today. Effect s on the Anti Expansion Movement The Liberation narrative justifies the military expansion the same way it has justified postwar militarization on the island. In a sense, the U.S. military expansion on Guam is nothing new. It is merely an extension of previous militarization efforts. Nonetheless, the narrative is vigorously maintained (Diaz 2001). Today, Representative Bordallo and former Speaker of Guam Legislature Mark Forbes refer to the 1944 U.S. liberation of Guam w hen discussing future military expansion to elicit Chamorro patriotism and promote the image of the U.S. a s protector (Viernes 2009, 108) Viernes (2009) argues that such references are strategic in that they link the expansion with wh at is expected from t he Chamoru: patriotic devotion (108). As a result, anti expansion efforts are interpret ed and framed as unpatriotic, ungrateful and radical As Alexander (2011b) argues, successful mobilization is challenging then because opposing the proposed military build up entails serious questioning about the up thus requires people to question who they are, what their life choices have remember themselves t o be (19). How the Chamoru people remember themselves is therefore an important part of the anti Chamorros who are disconnected from the occupation experience and who have been exposed to university courses where colonialism, globalization, and self determination are common themes of critical discussion are increasingly ambivalent about their role as

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57 politics of public commemoration from the annual celebration of parades, carnivals, barbe experiences in the Pacific Daily New s (Diaz 2001, 158). D espite the fact that there is a mem ories of Liberation Day are just as fresh in the minds of contemporary Chamorro society due to the deliberate depictions of the occupation and the Liberation experience by political officials and the media (Diaz 2001, 155 156 and 176). Scholars disagr ence in returning to the island. return had more to do with military strategy than some altruistic desire to free the Chamorros from e the Japanese occupation accentuates the U.S. return as an act of benevolence in and of itself. intention ed or purely strategic, it is important for scholars to note that expansion. Rather, what hinders sustainable mobilization is employment of the event as a justification for the military buildup. inherently problematic. Disregarding the racist and paternalistic rule of the U.S. naval administration prior to Japanese occupation is problemati c. The fact that Guam was never truly war rule is problematic. T he immediate military take over of more indigenous land afte r World War II is problematic. Therefore,

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58 the Liberation narrative is problematic not for what it celebrates but for what it ignores in

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59 CHAPTER VIII OPPORTUNITIES FOR A MORE SUSTAINABLE MOVEMENT Although the case of Guam illustrates that indigenous resistance has always and continues to exist political process theory reveals that str uctural and cultural conditions have prevented sustainable mobilization against the expansion However, a mere analysis of these conditions is ultimately ineffective i f no alternative solutions are provided. The references to us activists throughout this analysis demonstrate that they clearly understand the structural and cultural obstacles facing them. However, political process theory offers more than a mere reinf orcement of the challenges anti expansion activists are facing. It analyzes why these challenges are present and how th e perception of structural and cultural conditions perpetuate them By demonstrating why these structural and cultural f actors have persisted in Guam political process theory moves beyond mere identification of resistance challenges and offers a pathway to c ultivate alternative solutions for a more sustai nable economy and livelihood. cultural conditions depend upon the interpretation of the community. If the expansion is framed as an injustice, the opportunities for a more sustainable movement increase. The predicament is getting the majority of the people of Guam to frame the expansion as a n injustice as well. Frame Alignment Frame alignment provides useful insight into possible solutions for this predicament. According to Johnston (2011), frame alignment is often employed by movements to This section will focus on two particular expansion

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6 0 movement : frame amplification and frame bridging. Frame amplification is defined as "the clarification and invigoration o f an interpretive frame that bears on a particular issue, problem, or set of events" (Snow et. al 1986, 469 in Yeo 2006, 40 ). In other words, it is a reframing or re appropriating of significant events. Similarly, f linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames et. al 1986, 467 in Yeo 2006, 39). Deeper analysis of these two types reveal that frame amplification would be bene ficial in bringing unity to the Chamoru people expansion movement. Frame Amplification Frame amplification can help unify the Chamoru by reanalyzing and reframing important historical events. As Chapter VII discusses, one of the most significant events i the Liberation Narrative has been used as a tool by build up supporters to delegitimize the voice s of ant i expansion activists by deeming them ungratefu l and unpatriotic. More importantly, by focusing on the U.S return, the Liberation Narrative de emphasizes the agency of Chamorro survivors during Wo rld War II However, just as Martin Luther King Jr. re appropriated Biblical passages o Chamorro people can re frame the Liberation Narrative. reframing the way Liberation Day i s celebrated on the island. U nder Governor Ricardo

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61 Chamorro survival and triumph over h ardship, instead of Chamorro indebtedness to the U.S., which liberation implied (162) 2001, 168). Thus, some Chamorro activis ts have attempted to reframe the annual holiday by emphasizing Chamoru agency and arguing that there were unexpressed intentions behind the American return: that the US coming back to Guam was an act of defending a strategic location, not necessarily benev olent deliverance (Diaz 2001, 157 162). However because they are drowned out by the e of the holiday each year. Nonetheless this reframing is imperative for uniting the declining number of Chamoru people because it reiterates C hamoru endurance in a war for which th ey were not even responsible ( Underwood in Diaz 2001, 166) B y focusing and honoring Chamoru experiences, World W ar II becomes less about the United States versus Ja pan, and more about the Chamoru 2001, 166). Guam and the United States have always been affiliated through war: introduced through the Spanish Ame rican War and reunited through World War II (Diaz 2001, Notes 1: 176). The Liberation narrative only serves to reinforce this affiliation. Furthermore, the very dates that signify the beginning and end of World War II for the people of Guam are based upon the Japanese attack and Japanese surrender (Tanji 2012, 176). These dates attempt to separate the enemy from the hero (Tanji 2012, 176). However, by reframing Liberation Day, the f ocus on Chamorro agency eradicates the enemy / savior dichotomy If these dichotomies are deemphasized and the persistence of

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62 st is deemphasized as well, making it easier for expansion to be viewed as an injust ice rather than an act of devotion Therefore, frame amplification can be a useful tool for sustainable mobilization against the expansion in Guam. Frame Bridging The second type of frame alignment anti expansion activists sho uld utilize is frame bri dging. E xamining the anti base movements in South Korea provi des particularly useful insight. concentrated and nationally concentrated anti base campaigns were taking place throughout the 90s and early millennium. Whereas local campaigns analyzed the effects of land and wellbeing, nati abstract principles such as sovereignty and peace (Yeo 2006, 37 39). sustainable movement, it was necess ary for the two camp aigns to bridge their injustice frames. Therefore, in South Korea, movement leaders bridged or combined local and national was necessary because both campaigns needed each other to continue. National or more

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63 abstract frames have the ability to draw in more supporters because under a frame like sovereignty or pea unorganized who may not find any personal stake in investing time and resources toward an abstract concrete issue directly affecting the community are needed to ground the anti base movement. As a result, frame b ridging created solidarity in movement. B there are two identifiable types of anti expansion activists, depending upon their framing of injustices. One is anti base, in which advocacy for complete military withdrawal in Guam stems from a negative view of militarism, association with the United States, or both (Aguon 2006a, 2006b). The other is pro base, in which opposition to the expansion does not necessarily translate as seeking a complete removal of the U.S. military from the island (Tanji 2012). Nonetheless, this section will discuss both types of anti expansion activists to see how they are shaping resistance efforts. Anti Base In Guam, there is a presence of indi genous activists that call for the complete removal of the U.S. military from the island. For ex ample. Aguon (2006b) argues that in order to of the exaggerated US military presence from all not some This advocacy for complete withdrawal s is directly tied to the U.S. military presence (Tanji 2012). Furthermore, associating with

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64 and assimilating to the United States debases Chamorro pride and integrity (Aguon 2006b, 101). Therefore, activ ists such as Aguon (2006b) and Bevacqua (2010) do not believe that identifying with the American way of life is the path to true self government and self determination (114 115). The glorification of consumerism, globalization, and individualism in Americ an culture prevents the Chamorro from truly developing as a people (Aguon 2006b, 114 115). As a result, American ideology must be actively contested (Aguon 2006b, 114 115). Still, these activists note the difference between the Chamorro struggle for self d etermination and anti American propaganda, arguing that it insatiable, imperial appetite its Aguon 2006b, 114 115). By bui lding solidarity with other anti base activists through transnational ilitary Pollution, anti base activist s in Guam frame their injustices at the national level. In other words, their grievances are targeted at more abstract concepts such as peace and security (Yeo 2006, 39). At the same time the focus of the anti base movement is local as it also analyzes th e harmful consequences (discussed in Chapter III) that the expansion could potentially inflict upon the local community (Yeo 2006). Therefore, the complete removal of military bases on Guam stems from past consequences and future effects that U.S. military security.

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65 Pro Base The other type of activist is pro base According to these activists, t o critique the military presence in Gua m is not to completely negate it. Rather, pro ba se activists note that negative consequences can accompany military bases and seek to have these determination. A prominent e xample of this type of activist defined as a man who has served or continues to serve in the military yet openly engages in indigenous activism (Tanji 2012, 104). According to Tanji (2012), he goal of Chamoru activism, couched in the language of warrior masculinity, is no particular challenge to US militarism in general, but emphasizes, rather, the Chamorro Thus than one who unabashedly devotes himself to the U.S., he is not necessarily against the military uniform itself (Tanji 2012, 105). at resists the buildup views the anti expansion movement as an opportunity fo r the acknowledgment of Chamoru rights (Tanji 2012, 111). because his military experience s directly inform and qualify his activism (104 105). ). For example, Benevente, who had served in the U.S. Army yet is also an indigenous rather finds the two harmoniou s (Camacho and Monnig 2010, 147). Upon serving overseas, Chamoru soldiers realized that the country they served so faithfully to help

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66 advance ideals of democracy was the same country that colonized and continues to colonize their homeland (Camacho and Monn ig 2010, 164 and 167). enon sheds light on how Chamoru nationalism can be constructed from both a devotion to and opposition against the United States (Tanji 2012, 113). These activists are fighting for s elf determination based upon the rights they believe they hold as Americans (Camacho and Monnig, 164). Therefore, for these activists, the focus on their anti expansion movement is not necessarily local injustices but more nationalist or abstract issues: t he fact that the United States is disregarding the voice of its own U.S. citizens (Yeo 2006, 39). Although pro base activists may acknowledge local grievances against military bases, ultimately their movement is framed within the context of attaining Ameri can rights and liberties. To 168 in Tanji 2012, 105). Therefore, anti base activists argue that the anti expansion movement should signify the withdrawal of the U.S. military presence, and possibly, the withdrawal of association with the United States. Pro base activists view t hat the expansion infringes upon the Chamoru right to self determination, but do not feel that service in the U.S. militar y contradicts their resistance. Acknowledgment of both campaigns does not mean that there are solid boundaries between the two as thes e two types of activists do not necessarily view each other as threats. Both are against the expansion. However, each campaign holds a different response.

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67 As political process theory demonstrated, in addition to structural constraints, part of the ex planation for the lack of sustainable mobilization is that the expansion is not framed as an injustice. Lack of mobilization, however, is compounded within the anti expansion movement because the injustice frames vary according to the two campaigns. By building solidarity with other anti base activists through transnational organizations such as the militar y activists in Guam frame their injustices at the national level. In other words, their grievances are targeted at more abstract concepts such as peace and security (Yeo 2006, 39). At the sa me time, the focus of the anti base movement is local as it also analyzes the harmful consequences (discussed in Chapter I) that the expansion could potentially inflict upon the local community (Yeo 2006). Therefore, the complete removal of military bases on Guam stems from past consequences and future effects that U.S. military presence has incurred and will incur On the other hand, alt hough pro base activists may acknowledge local grievances against military bases, ultimately their movement is framed within the context of attaining American rights and liberties. Following the example of anti base activists in South Korea could be a useful tool for the anti expansion resistance in Guam. B oth campaigns a lready a gree that the expansion is an injustice. The one factor linking their otherwise unconnected frames is the view that determination. Therefore, the common factor between the two is the realization t hat a U.S. military increasingly dependent on te

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68 U.S. is using territories denied basic rights of freedom and self determination to use 7). In other word indigenous community. As a result, the anti expansion movement should be framed with a focus on the Chamoru determination. Although many anti base scholars wo uld argue that it is precisely militaristic culture that prevents residents from viewing the expansion as an injustice in the first pl ace as this thesis discusses, there is clearly a pres ence of pro military activists Therefore, the problem is not necessarily the military. The problem is the framing of the military as ultimate priority, a pr oblem stemming from the Liberation narrative It is undoubtedly essential for anti expansion activists to critique the U.S. military for its often overlooked effects on the environment, land, and security. However, attempt s to generalize an entire po pulation of military servicemen and women as disregards an entire group o base activists). Furthermore, it generates discourse that is divisive and harmful for fostering healthy relations between activists in Guam. Chamoru military members are being denied the right to self determination as well. Likewise, r ather than frame their struggle within the context of American rights anti expansion activists should instead frame their struggle through the international rights discourse of self determination (Diaz 2001, 167). It is essential that the resistance acknowledge that having autonomy and being less dependent on federal funding will

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69 ultimately yield to a more sustainable economy and future for all residents in Guam. If agency, visibility, and voice (Bevacqua 2010) can only be att ained through military service, as is often demonstrated in Guam, then what hope is there for future gen erations on the island? There must be other options for empowerment outside the U.S. military. Beyond Fortress Pacific By bridging the rather abstract concept of self determination with a local emphasis on the livelihood of local residents, t he anti expansion movement c ould potentially move be yond a binary of anti base/pro base As 115). Pragmatically a broad based coalition is necessary for the success of th e movement. With such a small population, it is important that the peo ple of Guam be united in the anti expansion movement As Audre 2006b). If anti expansion activists are united, they can more adequately address more structural arrangements. A (37). Therefore, if Chamoru the principles of nonviolence, humility, and kindness (Aguon 2006a, 55 and 73). For the Chamoru people True freedom will come to us when our destiny is fully in our hands. Since the beginning of governmental systems of Guahan, the people of the land have never been allowed to decide the fate of their land. This right is recognized i n all of the surrounding islands, but when we stand up for our rights as Chamorros, we are who have been historically denied their political status and rights here. Until the Chamorro right to self determination on Guahan is recognized and pract iced,

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70 there is no full freedom Organization of People for Indigenous Rights (Diaz 2001, 169) Thus, scholars in the mainland United States and the international community should be of cultural history, human rights, and in digenous agency (Davis 2011, 7). It is occupied by human beings with their own community, culture, and political aspirations. T he Chamoru are not just waiti ng for their self determination: th ey are actively pursuing it. By embracing this message, a nti expansion a ctivists can challenge the structural and cultural restraints placed against them and, slowly but steadily, build a more empowering, sustainable future beyond Fortress Pacific.

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71 BIBLI OGRAPHY Aguon, Julian. 2006 a Just Left of the Setting Sun. Tokyo: Blue Ocean Press. 2006b. The Fire This Time: Essays on Life under U.S. Occupation. Tokyo: Blue Ocean Press. 2008. What We Bury At Night: Disposable Humanity Tokyo: Blue Ocean Press. Base Activism in Guam Guam: Exploring intersections of Bettis, Leland. 1996. "Colonial Immigration in Guam." In The Political Status Education Coordinating Commission, ISSUES IN GUAM'S POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT pp. 102 118. Agana, Guam: The Political Status Edu cation Coordinating Commission. Militarized Currents: Toward a Decoloni zed Future in Asia and the Pacific edited by Setsu Shigematsu and Keith L. Camacho, 33 61. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. No Rest for the Awake/ Minagahet Chamorro : Chamorro Thoughts on Decolonization, Race, Peace, and Art. http://minagahet.blogspot.com/2013/08/fino anghet.html The Diplomat Sept/Oct. http://www.senbenp.com/wordpress/?page_id=293 (July 13, 2013). Euroscepticism in Britain: Social Movement or Contentious Politics? Praxis: Politics in Action. http://clas.ucdenver.edu/polisci/journals/index.php/Praxis/article/v iew/19 Brooke, James. 2004. ready New York Times. Burnett, Christina D. Between the Foreign and the Domestic: The Doctrine of Territorial Incorpo Foreign in a Domestic Sense: Puerto Rico, American Expansion, and the Constitution

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