BEYOND FORTRESS PACIFIC EXPLORING SUSTAINABLE MOBLIZATION IN GUAM by SARAH ELMORE B.A., University of Colorado Denver, 2011 A thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Colorado Denver in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Political Science Program 2013
ii This thesis for the Master of Arts degree by Sarah Gail Elmore has been approved for the Political Science Program by Lucy W. McGuffey, Chair Betcy Jose Glenn Morriss November 29, 2013
iii Elmore, Sarah Gail (M.A., Political Science) Beyond Fortress Pacific: Exploring Social Movement in Guam Thesis directed by Senior Instructor Lucy Ware McGuffey ABSTRACT In 2005, Washington announced plans for the relocation of 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to the U.S. colony of Guam p olitical officers, businesses, and main m edia outlets c laim that realignment will reap several benefits, including economic revival, new employment opportunities, renovated infrastructure, increased security, and a more productive relationship with the United States. However, by increasing the population approximately 45%, the move has raised concerns of digenous community, the Chamoru. D espite these implications, anti expansion resistance is present but not popular. In seekin g to a nswer why re sistance has not led to sustainable mobilization, this thesis will employ political process theory, finding that although the anti expansion movement (AEM) is present, it has not galvanized sustainable mobilization because of the intersec and economy ) and cultural (the Liberation narrative) conditions. The form and content of this abstract are approved. I recommend its publication. Approved: Lucy Ware McGuffey
iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS It is an honor to bestow acknowledgment to my entire thesis committee : Dr. Lucy McGuffey, Dr. Betcy Jose, and Professor Glenn Morris. This thesis would not have been possible without your gracious guidance throughout this journey I would like to express my gratefulness to my thesis chair, Dr. Lucy McGuffey, who se constant encouragement and counsel was an immeasurable aid to my research and writing. I am also indebted to the professors and faculty in the CU Denver Political Science Department for providing a program that encourag es independent thought and for instilling within me a deep hunger for social justice. In addition, I would like to acknowledge the efforts of Chamoru scholars, whose works offered a foundation from which I was able to develop my thesis. Finally, I owe my deepest gratitude to my family who has never failed to support me in my academic career. To my sisters thank you for always believ ing in my abilities And t o my mother and father, thank you for loving me teaching me, and challenging me to look beyond myself, so that I may humbly yet boldly speak the truth.
v TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER I. .. .1 II. WHY GUAM ? ........... 3 .. ............ 6 III. CONCERNS ABOUT THE BUILD UP .. 1 2 .. ...16 Security... 20 International 22 Econo Reasons for R IV. ANTI EXPANSION RESISTANCE: PRESENT BUT NOT 7 Meaningful Mob Failure to Galvanize Sustainable Mobilization ... ... .......................................... 29 V. EXPLANATION S IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORIES Comparison to Other Social
vi VI. STRUCTURES 2 Political Ambiguity... 2 Poor 5 Limit VII. CONSEQUEN CES OF A COLONIAL CULTURE.. The Liberation Effects on the Anti Expa VIII. OPPORTUNITIES FOR A Beyond Fortress Pacific BIBLIOGRAP 71
1 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION In the middle of Micronesia lies Fortress Pacific, an island of microscopic proportions (Bohane 2007). Yet despite its size, the island of Guam, as it is more commonly known, poses great significance to the United States by serving as the most strateg i c U.S. military installation as well as one of the largest nuclear weapons depots in the Pacific Ocean (Rogers 1988, 51). However, what many would consider a term of the past is an ongoing reality for the people of Guam: Guam is a colony of the United Sta tes (Naiman 2010, par.1 2, 5). As a colony, the island is subject to dramatic changes within the U.S. military base network (Davis 2011). One of those d ramatic changes occurred in 2005 when Washington announced plans for the relocation of 8,000 Mari nes in Okinawa to Guam by 2014 (Naiman 2 010). Many 1 main m edia outlets, political officials, and businesses claim that realignment will reap several benefits, including economic revival, new employment opportunities, renovated infrastructure, increased security, and a productive relationship with the United States (Viernes 2009, 106). However, by increasing the population approximately 45%, the move has raised economic, ecological, and cultural concerns, especially among the isl digenous community, the Chamoru 2 (Naiman 2010, par. 6, 8). D espite these im plication s, anti expansion resistance is present but not popular In 1 The term elite is not employed as a pejorative term, but rather, according to social movement literature, refers to people/institutions that hold influential positions. 2 Since 1994, the Chamorro Language Commission refer to the Chamorro as Chamoru (Alexander 2011b, 2). Both terms apply to the indigenous peoples of Guam However, within this paper, Chamoru will be used unless the original author specifically uses the term C hamorro
2 seeking to a nswer why resi stance has not led to sustainable mobilization this thesis will employ political process theory, finding that although the anti expansion movement (AEM) 3 is present, it has not galvanized sustainable mobilization because of the intersection of str uctural (political ambiguity and economy ) and cultural (the Liberation narrative) conditions. 3 Although more eloquent names for the indigenous resistance movement in Guam exist, the term anti expansion movement is specifically used for this thesis.
3 CHAPTER I I WHY GUAM? 4 T he island of Guam is the southernmost and largest island of the Maria na Island Chain, a string of islands in the middle of Micronesia (Aguon 2006b, 20) Ho sting U.S. military installations such as Anderson Air Force Base, a U.S. naval base, and 35,000 military personnel and their dependents (Alexander 2011a, 7 and 2011b, 3 4) Guam has been deemed by the Pentagon as (Paik 2010), a sup posed a ccolade for providing a distinct U.S military presence within the reach of China and North Kore a. However, s uch depictions of the island ignore th e fact that Guam is not simply a floating military base in the middle of the Pacific (Davis 2011, 7) Still the island political and social landscape beyond its military distinction is rarely discussed by political leaders in Washington Insufficient discourse and re search about Guam is not peculiar in scholarly analysis. Alexander (2011b, 19) argues that today military bases have become normalized and the outside world remains conveniently But a s Bevacqua (2010) because its political existence evades the Therefore, within this recent announcement for expansion a re opportunities for inquiry today. What is the history of Guam who are its people, and what are the implications behind the announcement for the U.S. military expansion ? 4 Yoshida 2010
4 History of Colonialism Before delving into the anti expansion movement, it is critical to examine the historical context within which the movement developed. To provide this context, a brief Table 1: Time Period Historical Era _____________________________________________ ___________________________ 2000 BC 1668 1668 1898 1 898 1941 1941 1944 1944 1950 1950 1970 1970 Present Ancient Guam Era Spanish Era U.S. Naval Era World War II/Japanese Era Post War Era Guamanian Era Contemporary Era (Guampedia 2012) Prior to becoming a U.S. territ ory, Guam was a Spanish colony for 200 years. 5 Spanish rule was characterized by oppression, involuntary a ssimilation to Spanish customs and the Jesuit mission, and near eradication of the Chamoru people from 5 The time period of Spanish colonization is contested. According to Shuster (2010), Guam was under the rule of Spain for 217 years (par 7, Spanish take Charge). However, other scholars argue that Spanish rule ha d begun long before 1668, noting that Magellan first invaded the island in 1521.
6 resistance ). resistance to colonization and forced baptism, but by the end of the 17th century, the combination of 1998, 332 in 2011b, 11). In 1898, after the Spanish American War, Gu am, along with Puerto Rico and the Philippines, was placed under the control of the U.S. naval admini stration (Alexander 2011b, 2 3). Like the Spanish who had colonized the island before them the U S Navy acknowledged that obedience from the Chamoru coul d be pote ntly enforced through what it believed to be benevolent but nonet heless involuntary assimilation Therefore, according to Bevacqua (2010), educating the Chamoru was essential for the success of the U.S. colonial project because : The idea that the prohibition, and thus lack, of Chamorro language in schools, the lack of inadequacy, dirtiness, impossibility, invisibility, and nakedness (42). In other words, U.S. naval education served to enforce the idea that the Chamoru were inadequate, inferior, and deficient. By inflicting a sense of inadequacy upon the Chamoru people, the U.S. Navy could fulfill its desire to create the Cha moru a a 1 in Alexander 2011b, 13). According to Anghie (2005), this type of education in colonial linked intimately with the t ask of normalization, of creating the universe against which the native will be found wanting and that will lead ultimately to reform desir ). However, it should be noted that subversive tactics were not uncommon d uring the naval administration as cases of early indigenous activism were evident almost
6 immediately after Guam became a U.S. possession ( Hattorri 1995a in Viernes 2009). e stark contrast to the view that Chamorros are weak and have complied with the US c 106). R esistance against the U.S. naval administration cs, such Eventually, these peasant resistance tactics evolved into more conventio na l modes of political activism. From 1901 to 1950 the people of Guam drafted petitions calling for the formation of a civilian government to replace the naval government (Hattori 1996, 58 in Viernes 2009, 105 106). However, both Congress and the U.S. N av y consistently disputed the petitions (Hattori 1996, 58 in Viernes 2009, 106). To legitimize their rule, the U.S. naval adminis tration argued that it was its duty and obligation to shape the C hamorro into devoted Americans and attempted to expunge any component of Chamorro identity that did not align with the U.S. colonial agenda (Diaz 2001, 165 ; Hattori 1995 a 13 in Viernes 2009, 104 105). A s a result public life was restricted interpreted American patrio tism Underwood in Diaz 2001, 165) A Military Colony Although the island is no longer ruled by the U.S. naval administration, colonial status is not a condition of the past Currently, the island is a U.S. unincorporated territory.
7 status is in neocolo nial limbo he island has neither complete sovereignty nor complete dependence in relation to the United States (Alexander 2011b, 8). Though the residents possess U.S. citizenship, the Constitution is not fully applicable t o them, as they cannot vote in p residential elections nor do they have a voting repre sentative in Congress (Bevacqua 2010 in Lai 2011, 12 13). Accordi ng to scholars, this political ly ambiguous status works in favor, as the U.S. territory allows for military training and operations tha t would otherwise be challenged in host countries (Zielinski 2009, 3 in Davis 2011, 7). Lutz (2010) argues that Guam, objectively, has the highest ratio of U S military spending and military hardware and land takings from indigenous po acc ident. Due to the decolonization movements of the 50s and 60s, the U.S. Navy implemented a plan of action for island bases as a way to relieve concerns over the future lt, bases in Puerto Rico, Diego Garcia, Hawaii, and Guam were of strategic importance Be cause bases are becoming problematic in politically sovereign locations and due to the success of anti base protests in is land base site such as Puerto Rico, Hawaii and Okinawa, the U S military h as been forced to transfer its activity to alternative places, such as Guam hat not only give global coverage, but also give the ability for operational strike quickly without any ne ed for consultation with anyone even the government of 2 and 6 9). Thus, the
8 announcement for military e xpansion reveals that, due neo colonial status, the (Davis 2011, 7). Currently, U.S. military presence on Guam mainly consists of the U.S. Naval Base on the eastern coast of the island (Apra Harbor) and Andersen Air Force Base in the northern coast (Yigo) ( F igure 1 ). However, as Figure 1 demonstrates, the U.S. military occupies almost 3 0% of the island due to additional military facilities (Alexander 2011a, 7 and 2011b, 3 4 ; Lutz 2010; Yoshida 2010). In fact, a ll of the m ilitary facilities in F igure 1 remain on the island with the exception of the U.S. Na val Air Station in Agana, which was shut down i n 1995 based on the decision of a BRAC commission (Pike 2011). (Lutz 2010) Figur e 1: U.S. Military Presence (1991)
9 Likewise, many Chamoru serve in the military or have family members who serve Kirk and Nat schools, as well as an ROTC program at the University of Guam also holds one of the highest per capita enlistment rate s in the US army (Bevacqua 2010) The Announcement for Realignment With such a distinct military presence already on the island, the question that then arises i s : why the expansion? economic leaders had been calling on Washin deep slump in the 1990s and the 2000s as a result of sluggish tourism and the post cold war closure of a number of bases ince 2002, the U.S. and Japan have deliberated the relocation of U.S. forces in Japan through the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), which eventually paved the way for the Alliance Transformation and Realignment Agreement (ATARA) in 2005 ( Draft EIS in Yoshida 2010, par. 25). The ameliorate longstanding frustrations among the local population [in Okinawa] and improve the local political support for the stable and enduring presen ce of the remaining U.S. forces ( Draft EIS in Yoshida 2010, par. 25 Brackets not in original quote ). However, Yoshida (2010) argues that the United States had planned to enhance the U.S. military presence in Guam long before it ever made arrangements with Japan (par. 22). Maintaining U.S. military presence in the Pac ific has been crucial since the closure
10 of the U.S. naval base at Subic Bay, P hilippines in 1992 (Yoshida 2010, par. 22). Brooke the Philippine Senate refused to extend the lease, and American memories of that re refore, the ideal location for the U.S. military would be a place in which they are not only accepted, but more importantly, not easil y removed (Brooke 2004, par. 8). However, the emphasis on an ideal location does not indicate that the U.S. military is in tent on expanding in Guam simply because it has the power to do so : welcomed by the host country Because these countries within the region [the Philippines, Australia, Korea, Singapore, and Thailand] have indicated their unwillingness and inability to host more U.S. forces on their lands, the U.S. military has shifted its focus to basing on U.S. sovereign soil. ( Draft EIS in Emphasis added ). In other words, the U.S. military is operating on the belief that the people of Guam openly welcome the expansion Nonetheless, s ince 2004, there has been increasing pressure from Okinawans to relocate U.S. forces due to various concerns stemming from pollution, noise, aircraft accidents, and crime within the Okinawan military base community (Yoshida 2010, par. 2). Therefore, in order to e and capabilities while reduci ng burdens of local communities, Japan and the United States made arrangements for the relocation of 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam by 2014 (Naiman 2010; Yoshida 2010, par. 2 4). According to the Guam Joint Military Master Plan, several conditions were put forth regarding what would be According to the Draft EIS all of these conditions were fulfilled through Guam, making
11 it These conditions demonstrate the meticulous ma intenance and planning behind the announcement for realignment However, d espite Guam fulfilling these requirements the possibility of U.S. military expansion has raised both questions and concerns within the island Such concerns have provided a platform for the anti expansion movement in Guam.
12 CHAPTER II I CONCERNS ABOUT THE BUILD UP The announcement for expansion warrants a nalysis of the ways U.S. military bases impact the local community (Lutz 2010). This analysis is significant because, in addition to many positive attributes such as defense and economic support U.S. military bases can produce substantially negative political, ecological, and cultural consequences (Yeo 2006, 36). Some of these effects include high rates of out migration, land degradation, water depletion, road damage, rape and gender violence, in addition to the rejection of sovereignty, self determination, and human rights (Alexan der 2011a, 10 11 and 2011b, 3; Lu As a way of gauging the possible hazards of the expansion, there has been extensive research performed by the people of Guam, U.S. agencies and the U.S. Navy (Lutz 2010, Although there are several concerns circulating around the expansion, t his chapter will focus on the most cited concerns : funding, displacement security, land, envir onment, international law a nd the economy Although not all anti expansion activists stand behind each of these concerns, together these que stions and concerns compose the platform of anti expansion resistance on Guam. Funding For military expansion to occur, Guam will need considerable funding. The main concern with funding is the way in which it is broadcast to the people of Guam A infrastructure
13 2009, 110) However, closer a nalysis reveals that most of the funding coming from the U.S. and Japan will be relegated to the military bases on Guam. In 2006, t he U.S. and Japan came to a decision that approximately $10.3 billion would be necessary for facilities and in Defense in Yoshida 2010, par. 9). Due to increasing pressure from Okinawans that relocation b e realized rapidly, Japan committed to fund $ 6.09 billion, or more than 60% of the expansion ( Yoshida 2010, par. 9 ). However, despite what advocates broadcast, Japan and the U.S. military do not actually claim to deliver on any civilian projects (Aguon 2008, 126). and build Marine Corps facilities but to subsidize infrastructure improvement at Andersen Air Fo hida 2010, par. 4). The budget included a new fire station, military police station, barracks, restaurant, and gymnasium at Finegayan as well as a medical clinic and new facilities for the port operation unit headquarter s at Apra Harbor (Yoshida 2010, par. military. The original U.S. contribution of $4.18 billion was confined to the military as well. According to the FY2009 Nation al Defense Auth oriza tion Act, Congress approved $180 million for developing military projects on Guam (Yoshida 2010, par. 1 and 3 under Guam Budget). In 2010, $734 million was approved to begin a series of expansion support (Yoshida 2010, par. 1 under Guam Budget) Final ly, in 2011, approximately $566 million was proposed to Congress within the Nati onal Defense Authorization Act (Yoshida 2010,
14 (2010), the breakdown of fundin g within the proposal is clear. Figure 2 Funding from National Defense Authorization Act As Figure 2 demonstrates, 75% of funding, or $426.8 million of the $566 million will be allocated to the improvements and defense access road improvements Approximately, 12%, or $70 million, will be allocated for the Naval Hospital. The Nation al Defense Act also authorized $50 mil lion, or 9% of th for Guam Strike Group operations and ramp upgrades, combat communications facilities, Red Horse engineering facilities and Finally, the remaining 4% ($20 million) of the $566 million would go toward the Guam Army National Guard for Cagurangan 2010 in Yoshida 2010, par. 2 under Guam Budget ) T hus, al though local officials may possess good intentions for supporting the build up, it appears that most of the money will go 75% 12% 9% 4% FUNDING FROM NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT Navy Naval Hospital Anderson Air Force Base Guam Army National Guard
15 Displacement In addition, t he introduction of additional military, the ir dependents, and foreign workers to Guam is a significant concern because of the potential for further displacement of the indigenous community According to the 2010 U.S. Census Bureau, enous community 6 This low representation of the Chamoru is a result of centuries of colonization. During Spanish rule, the introduction of European diseases greatly diminished the Chamoru population of 40,000 to fewer than 4,000 in less than 50 years (1668 1704) (Quimby 2012, a national security clearance program that remained effective until 1962, the U.S. military Furtherm ore, military deployment became typical in the 1950s after the Chamoru were granted citizenship, creating further displacement of the native population (Tanji 2012, 103). Therefore, according to Quimby (2012), the present Chamoru population is an amalgamat ion, a mixture of those who had incorporated culture from Spain, the 6 R Filipino, 10% are Caucasian, and the remaining percentage are comprised of Korean, Japanese, and Chinese. Therefore, w hen referencing st the buildup, scholars are referring to the total population on the isla nd, not just the Chamoru people.
16 Aguon (2006b) argues that such displacement not only weakened the Chamorro populace, but also left a harmful impact upon their identity by complicating the process of self determination (49). This complication is manifested in the constant debate surrounding who qualifies as a Chamoru and who therefore, is able to participate in self determination plebiscite s Critics of Chamoru self determination often emphasize t he (Monnig 2007, 407 in Alexander 2011b 12 and 15 deserve self determination the Chamoru are often called upon to an act has shaped their abilities to work through issues of importance such as language, land, immigration, and political st in Alexander 2011b, 15). Thus, a lthough the Chamoru are already outnumbered, the possible increase in additional military members has raised concerns about the way an altered population will affect future politics. Land In addition to concerns of cultural displacement, the concern regarding the appropriation of more land plays a prominent role in discourse of the anti expansion acr 2012). Currently, milita ry installations occupy almost 3 an d other military facilities (Alexander 2011a, 7 and 2011b, 3 4). Therefore acquiring additional land on an island of only 212 square miles b ecomes increasingly problematic to to anti expansion expansionists. Military appropriation of
17 land is nothing new to the people of Guam. After World War II, significant portions of land were used for the U.S. military ( and the U.S. had illegally taken control of 2/3 of our total real estate under the all too familiar However, analysis of military land appropriation on Guam demonstrates that indigenous land was not always taken for national security purposes, but sometimes for an d their dependents (Hattori 1995b, 60 in Aguon 2006a, 32). This controversy is further complicated by U.S. claims that all land taken for military purposes has already been (Joint Guam Program Office in Yoshida 2010 ) Figure 3. Map of Proposed Build up
18 the empty imaginings of people who have yet to be seasoned by the realities of historical eminent domain, are simply irrelevant principl es to Guam (Aguon 2006a, 32). According to Aguon (2006a), at the time that the United States took over substantial portions of could not be guaranteed reimbursement (32). Therefore, the law was inapplicable to the colonized Chamorro people after World War II, making the argument for eminent domain inapplicable to Guam as well (Aguon 2006a, 32). Such discussion of eminent domain is not used to argue that the U.S. military has never co mpensated for land taken, but rather to point out that the process of compensation is much more complex than often realized. In addition to concerns regarding the amount of land taken, there has also been controversy regarding specific portions of land. A nti expansion activists were extremely Pagat, an ancient village and important site for the indigenous community in the northeast of Guam (Alexander 2011b, 5; Kirk and ment As Hattori about who you are, w (Warheit 2010). Therefore, for many members within the indigenous com munity, the meaning attached to their land
19 Security Another significant concern for anti expansion be noted that the expansion concer ns more than the transfer of 8,000 Marines. According to Yoshida (2010) and Aguon (2008), in addition to the Marine transfer, Guam would have to accommodate six addition al nuclear aircraft carriers, a Ballistic Missile Defense station, and a Global Strike Force (Yoshida 2010, par. 1 u 2008, 125). Activists such as Aguon (2006b) are worried that continuing to militarize the island through expansion will only exacerbate U.S. China and U.S. North Korea relations causing China and North Korea to further m ilitariz e in retaliation (69). Therefore b we will all be in m ore danger than (69) In addition, the expansion does not just involve concerns over tradition al security, but human security as well. T he pot ential for a rise in crime plays a significant role in acti up Analyzing other foreign military bases, Aguon (2006b) Korean civilians in a s hort span of twenty years (1967 Based on the National Campaign to Eradicate Crime by U.S. Troops in Korea, many of these crimes involved rape and murder (Aguon 2006b, 88). Furthermore, the source of these incoming military personnel contributes to the concerns with crime. When looking specifically at Okinawa, ore than 4,790 criminal charges have been brought against US military personnel during the 34 years since Okinawa reverted to Japan in 197 2 ( Aguon 2006b, 71) the same troubles harassing the people of Okinawa will be a reality for the people of Guam,
20 Aguon (2006b) questions why local officials welco me troops from the very base where reports of rape, assault, insobriety, and environmental contamination have been concerns for the people of Okinawa (31 32 ) Environment Studies reveal that t he re has already been significant impact upon the en vironment of Guam due to a history of U.S. military presence In 1952, 5,000 d rums of Agent Purple were stored on the island for the Korean War ( Aguon 2006b, 26) In the 1960s, alarming levels of toxins were found at Anderson Air force Base ( Aguon 2006b, 26) According to Aguon (2006b), Guam experienced nuclear fallout f rom more than ten of the bombs released onto Enewetak during nuclear testing of the Marshall Islands, located 1200 miles east of Guam ( 25). Aguon (2006a) argues that Guam has yet to receive just compensation for these offenses (33). According to the Assessment of the Scientific Information for the Radiation Exposure Sc reening and Education Program of T he National Research Council of the National Academies of Science : Guam did receive measurable fallout from the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons i n the Pacific. Residents of Guam during that period should be eligible for compensation under RECA in a way similar to that of perso ns considered to be downwinders ( footnote 35, in Aguon 2006a, 34 ). Despite these reports scholars claim that Gua m has not been compensated (Aguon 2006a, 34). Furthermore, despite the Guam Environmental Protection Agency finding carcinogenic substances infecting the water and the fish in Apra Harbor and Cocos Lagoon the areas have not been decontaminated ( Agu on 2006b, 25). B ased on
21 these cases of past negligence, activists such as Aguon have very little faith in the U.S. Soon after the news of the expansion arrived, the Draft Environmental Impact Statement / Overseas Environmental Impact Statement: Gua m and CNMI Military Relocation Relocating Marines from Okinawa, Visiting Aircraft Carrier Berthing, and Army Air and Missile Defense Task Force (Draft EIS) was published by the Joint Guam Program Offi ce of the Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Pacific in November 2009. According to Yoshida (2010), the 8,000 to 10,000 page document discusses the environmental hazards the expansion could possibly bring upon the island (Yoshida Many of these negative effects resonate with concerns over the expansion. Furthermore, an evaluation released by the E nvironmental Protection Agency stated that ts to dad 2010, Because most of the supplies for and, water and othe r resources al ; Davis 2011, 8 ).
22 International Law The argument exhaus tively used to deny the Chamoru the right to self determination is that they are too incompetent to self govern (Aguon 2006a, 29 ). This criticism is often derived from cases of inefficiency within the local government of Guam. According to a "Risk Assessment Report for United States Attorney's Offices District of Guam and District of the Northern Mariana Islands conducted in 2001 2002, many local officials who had serv ed during the administration of Governor Gutierrez were foun d guilty in federal court for cases of public corruption, involving nepotism, drug smuggling, and abuse of federal funding (Meissner 2002). A d vocates of expansion often declare that thes e highly scandalized cases are just a few of many cases of corru ption reveal ing inability to self govern. Although local corruption represents an indictment on the local government of Guam, anti expansion scholars question whether enhanced military presence is truly the solution to accountable governance, and wh ether further reliance on federal funding will breed more inefficiency within the local government. More importantly, according to Aguon (2006a), t he fact that the United States is disregarding international law is rarely considered a significant hindrance to true self governance ( 29). Yet, as this section demonstrates, international law plays a significant role in discourse over the military expansion (Lutz Guam is one of sixteen rema ining non self governing territories in the world According to UN Resolution 1514 of 1960: immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non Self Governing Territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers
23 to the peoples of thos e territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their fr eely expressed will and desire ( in Aguon 2006b, 48). self governing territory signifies that the United a signatory of the United Nations Charter, the conditions necessary for true self government for the people of Guam (Aguon 2006a, 26 and 2006b, 48). Furthermore, UN Resolution 1514, also notes that self determination is a right, not a pri right to fre ely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, s has never been exercised by the Chamoru. citizenship, expansion, in the end, Guam remains a colony and will continue to remain so as long as people have not historically chosen their most powerful leaders and have been told to background their own national identity in favor of that of the power which has ultimate As a result, scholars argue that enhancing the U.S. military presence contradicts the very principles that the U.S. military claims to protect ( Davis 2011; Lutz 2010, par. 6 ). However, this serious concern is not at the forefront of discussion regarding the expansion. Rather, as the next section will explai n much more discourse is dedicated to the effect the expansion will have on the ec onomy. Economy De spite all of these questions Lutz (2010) notes that the central concern does not necessarily circulate around social or environmental risks of the expansion, but around
24 economy is the most disc usse frame t he expansion as an This framing is particularly potent whe population lives on food stamps and a quarter lives below the U.S. poverty level ( par.3 ). After the announcement, m any claim ed that great eco nomic opportunity w ill accompany the build up (Viernes 2009, 109 110). From j ob growth to an improved real estate market, several benefits of expansion have been broadcast to the people of Guam. However, a breakdown of these advantages, often touted by supporters of the expansio n, reveals that the increase in jobs is either relegated to the mil itary sector or primarily short According to a 2007 Guam Employment Report, w hile employment in manufacturing, transporta tion and public utilities and retail trade decreased, increases were seen for jobs in the service sector and public sector; with the construction sector experiencing the largest increase, that is 1,450 jobs, or 35 per cent for the year (Lutz 2010, par. 4 experienced the largest increase raises concerns. Examining whether plans for hile the influx of military personnel and their dependents will most certainly infrastructure, local firms and local workers may not necessarily be hired to take on those
25 from foreign countries will be employed instead (110). Furthermore, according to the report, jobs that would prevail the temporary upswing are more likely to cente r on the lower wage industry of retail, which, according to Lutz (2010), would only contribute to the already harsh disparities betwee n locals and the military ( With such concerns, indigenous activists are q uestioning whether this short term growth is truly beneficial, as it is often portrayed, or is rather a temporary solution to ( Aguon 2006b, 32). In fact, according to anti expansion activists, part of the proble m with the expansion is that it does not necessarily serve to cultivate a sustainable economy on Guam, but rather to preserve its dependence on the United States ( Aguon 2006b, 42). Reasons for Resistance As questions and concerns regarding the build up are raised expansion activists attempt to analyze who the true recipients of the expansion will be ( Aguon ). Although not all anti expansion activists stand b ehind each of these concerns, these issues are nonethele ss the mos t cited points raised. B y shedding light on the substantially negative political, e cological, and cultural effects expansion could have on the island, discourse of these concerns have provide d a platform for anti expansion movement in Guam.
26 CHAPTER IV ANTI EXPANSION MOVEMENT : PRESENT BUT NOT PROMINENT After the Draft ( EIS ) assessment of the environmental hazards the military expans ion could have on the island, resistance against the expansion began to take shape (Alexander 2011a, 16 ; Davis 2011, 8). The EIS inclusion of Pagat for the military build up gained particular attention, creating controversy over the acquisition of more l and and serving as a reminder of the extensive amount of indigenous lan d that had already been taken. Thus, o nce the results of the EIS (Davis 2011, 8) This surge of resistance was demonstrated through the presence of m obilization structures (Alexander 2011a, 16; Viernes 2009, 112 114 ). According to Johnston (2011), their daily rou As a resu lt, mobilization structures are comprised of civil society associations and organization s, as well as the resources necessary to sustain them (Johnston 2011, 5 2 54 ). Meaningful Mobilization Structures mob ilization structures display both local and international levels of interaction. Local iversity of Guam students allowed for candid conversations and pushback regarding the military build up (Alexander 2011a, 16). Protests occurred along Marine Corps Drive (Viernes 2009, 112). O rganizations founded in Guam, such as the
27 Ch amoru Cultural Development and Research Institute and Naison Chamoru consistently asserted the injustices of the expansion (Viernes 2009). In addition, t he Chamoru have taken thei r resistance beyond the island and eng aged in international discourse, such as at the 2006 UN Special Political and D ecolonization Committ ee ( Viernes 2009, 113 114). The Guhan Indigenous Collective launched the online Peace and Justice for Guam Petition, which acquired signatures from on and off the island. T hrough against Military Pollution, the National Asian Pacific Am trans national alliances with anti base activists in Puerto Rico, Hawaii, Okinawa, a nd South Korea have also played a role in the resistance (Alexander 20 11a, 16; Davis 2011, 8 ; Viernes 2009, 114 ). Such transnational alliances are significant because Makua Valley), Okinawa, and Diego Garcia (Lutz 2010, p Davis (2011) argues that, due to the success of anti ba se protests o n these island bases, the U.S. military has been forced to transfer their activity to alternative places, such as Guam (Davis 2011, 1 2 and 7 9). As a result, Guam stands as one of the last remaining military sites in the Asia Pacific region ( Davis 2011, 1 2). Due to this shift, local activists in Guam beg an forming alliances with anti base activists in other island base sites (Davis 2011, 8). As a result t hese alliances not only created strategies, and supp ed the audience to which articulate their struggles (Alexander 2011a, 16; Davis 2011, 8 9). By sharing tactics and gen erating greater awareness, transnational alliances allow ed members to defend each
28 rests which Johnston (2011) argues should sustain movement mobilization (D avis 2011, 8 9; Johnston 2011). Failure to Galvanize Sustainable Mobilization This analysis reveals that meaningful mobili zation structures are providing avenues for activists on Guam to articulate their opposition against the military expansion. More importantly, the structures i ndicate that anti expansion resistance clearly resides on the island of Guam (Alexander 2011a, 16 and 2011b, 5; Viernes 2009, 112 114 ). However, despite the presence of these structures, the movement has not galvanized sufficient support to effect substantive change. In other words the anti expansion movement has not catalyzed sustainable mobilization Mobilization is often defined as an i nterest based challenge to the state (Johnston 2011, 51 52). According to Johnston (2011), these challenges can encompass both institutional and non institutional plans of action (51). Institutional plans of action involve political ac tivities such as lobbying, petitioning, court contestation, party mobilization, pressure groups recalls, and referenda (Johnston 2011, 51 52). In contrast, non institutional plans of action deal specifically with protest campaigns, or politics on the stre A nalysis of Guam both institutional and non institutional plans of action characterize the anti expansion movement. However, in order for a movement to have sustainable mobilization t here must be sufficient support of these plans of action to effect substantive change. Yet w hen
29 examining the anti expansion movement in Guam, scholars note that there is not sufficient support, and, as a result, there has no t been substantive change. This thesis seeks to answer why such is the case, but first, it is necessary to clearly delineate sufficient support and substantive change Sufficient Support When referring to s ufficient suppor t, this thesis is referring to not only the number of supporters (in proportion to the population) but also the type of supporters (institutional actors/elite) (Johnston 2011, 15). The anti expansion movement in Guam is characterized b y both an insufficient number of supporters a nd a lack of elite allies Number of Supporters When analyzing the number of supporters a majority of the population of Guam do not support the anti expansion resistance (Davis 2011, Lutz 2010, Robertson 2 011, Aguon 2006). This lack of support could be based on the widespread notion that a majority of the population of Guam actually approve of the expansion. According to Robertson (2011), those in the anti (74). Th us, there are no hard data demonstrating the ratio of expansion advocates to expansion opponents. Regardless of whether a majority of the people of Guam actually approve of the expansion, both anti expansion activists and expansion advocates acknowledge th at the anti expansion movement lacks sufficient support.
30 Elite Allies The second factor that demonstrates a lack of sufficient support is based on the lack of support from institutional actors/ elites. According to Viernes (2009), based on their the media, businesses, and political officials As discussed earlier, elite openly state that realignment is beneficial to the island by claiming that it would usher in econo mic revival, new employment opportunities, better infrastructure, increased security, and a productive relationship with the United States (Viernes 2009, 106). It should be noted merely be responding to what they perceive as the true desires of the people of Guam. Although not every form of media, successful business, or political official is or should be considered a threat to the anti expansion movement, these three types have been the mos t vocal and will, th erefore, be critiqued as unsupportive of the anti expansion movement Media In Guam, the dominant newspaper is t he Pacific Daily News which is owned by the U.S. publishing company Gannett Co. Inc. (Viernes 2009, 107). Therefore, due to its relationship with Gannett, it is possible that PDN is more likely to reflect a pro expansion attitude by constantly headlining approval of U.S. policies, such as the military expansion (Viernes 2009, 104, 107). According to Viernes (2009, 107), such headlines include: 2006).
31 Likewise, media bias was particularly problematic in the use of surveys. In 2006, PDN commissioned two surveys soliciting whether voters found the expansion beneficial or not (Viernes 200 9, 107 109). The question in the survey read: There's been talk lately of Guam's population expanding by 30,000 people as a result of the military expansion plan for Guam. Do you think this will be a good thing for Guam, a bad thing for Guam, or haven't y ou thought much about this?" survey reveals a slight increase in support with approval/disapproval format of the surveys, Viernes (2009) discusses how these polls that PDN conducted involved a small sample (less tha n 1%) of the isl (109). 7 Considering the fact that there were 55, 311 registered voters in Guam in 2006, PDN headlines were misleading readers by ( Viernes 2009, 109). Businesses Main media outlets are not the only ones commissioning surveys in Guam. Commerce: 71 per cent of Guam residents supported an increase in the United States military presence, with nearly 8 0 per cent of the view that the increasing military presence would result in additional jobs and tax revenue; according to the poll, 60 per cent felt the additional Marines on the island would have a positive effect and would ultimately impro s quality of life externalized cost of bases). 7 Only 502 people were polled for the first survey (Viernes 2009, 109). During the second survey, only 500 people were polled (Viernes 2009, 109).
32 Support for the expansion is also demonstrated by institutions such as the First Guam tourism, the military, real estate, and construction First of $1.5 billion per year will be pumped into the Guam Economy 2007, 9). H nt and author of the forecast, acknowledged that many of the positive figures associated with the build up are whether that be the amount of funding actually provided to Guam, inflation, off real estate, and residents (Laney 2006, 12). Political o fficials ole in the anti expansion movement. Viernes (2009, 109) discusses how some of the most important political officials voiced their view of the possible expansion, shortly after the announcement. For exam ple, former Governor Felix P. Camacho, who had served during the time of the announcement, declared within his State of the Island Address that the in Viernes 2009, 107). on Guam and the benefits associated with having more military personnel and their 2006 in Viernes 2009 (107). Mark Forbes, Speaker of the Twenty Eighth Guam
33 a t the regional hearing for the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (Limtiaco 2006a in Viernes 2009, 107). Such vocal support for the expansion is significant because these political officials speak on behalf of the entire island (Viernes 2009, 108). However, it is important to note unsupportive. Despite his support for the expansion, current Governor Calvo has, nonetheless, helped create opportunities for th e anti expansion movement by reconvening the Commission on Decolonization on Decolonization not only Again, i as the true desires of the people of Guam. Howeve r, w hether the elite have persuaded the public to be supportive of the expansion, or the majority in Guam have persuaded the elite that the expansion is beneficial is not the poi nt in this particular analysis. Clearly the two mutual ly r einforce each other. The point is that there is no large number of anti expansion activists and a lack of elite allies Therefore, the movement has not galvanized sufficient support. Substantive Change When referring to substantive change, this thesis is referring to the primary goal of the anti expansion movement: preventing the expansion from taking place on the island T he U.S. has been responsive on some of the aspects concerning the expansion. In 2012, for
34 example, a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement was conducted in response to some of the concerns of the original Draft Environmental Impact Statement After the DEIS of 2009 discussed the environmental hazards the expansion could possibly bring upon the island (Yoshida 2010, par. the Joint Guam Program Office (JGPO), which serves as a liaison between the U.S. Department of Defense and SEIS would examine the best operational, to conduct live fire training in a manner that would no t impact access village and important site for the indigenous community (SEIS 2012, par. 1 Furthermore, a cco rding to the SEIS he number of Marines to be relocated has been reduced from the originally planned 8,600 Marines and 9,000 family members, to a force of approximately 5,000 Marines and 1,300 family members on The SEIS also noted that pproximately two thirds of the Marines relocated to Guam will be rotational with the remaining one However, the supplemental study and reduction in servicemen has not completely alleviated concerns among the anti expansion community. Although JGPO appears to be responsive to the environmental concerns of the buildup, Joe Ludovici, Executive Director of JGPO made it a point to ensure the public knew that the mil itary buildup is U.S. respo nse after the
35 announcement for expansion is clear: despite the econom ic, environment al, and political concerns of the expansion that have been circulated in Guam, expansion will continue. The refore, the SIES demonstrates that the anti expansion movement has not galvanized sufficient suppor t to effect substantive change, and therefore lacks sustainable mobilization. This scenario of present but not prominent resistance has led scholars to explore the reasons for such an enigma. Do these low levels of resistance signify that the majority of the people on Guam truly embrace military expansion? Or could there be a deeper explanation f or the failure to galvanize?
36 CHAPTER V EXPLANATIONS THROUGH SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORIES S ocial movement litera ture might provide an answer to these critical questions Accordi ng to Pastor and Ortiz (2009 factors that lead to mobilization. One pred ominant social movement theory is t he political process model (Pastor and Ortiz 2009, 10 11). Political Process Theory According to political process theory, political opportunities lead to social movement by shifting the cost benefit ratio (Pastor and Ortiz 2009, 11). Pol itical opportunities include a range of factors that can either propagate or inhibit an issue, such as elite connection to the issue, freedom of the media to discuss the issue, or the amount of external pressures from global regimes to support the issue (see F igure 4 ). Johnston (2011) argues that t he first set of p olitical opportunities/threats intensity o f social control and the presence or absence of elite connection, elite reinfor cement, and elite sympathy is a reflection of the type of government within the state, and therefore, depend on how the state is constituted (Jo hnston 2011, 51 52). T he second s et of political o pportunities/threats is based upon the level of policy implementation, freedom in the media, countermovement activity, and pressures from global regimes (Johnston 2011, 51 52). Therefore, these sets of political opportunities/threats are t echnically structures because they are institutional arrangements According to Johnston (2011), structural explanation for social movements refer to meaning opportunities that compel action
37 straightforwardly and threats that constrain automatically both requiring little that political opportunities often undergo collective interpretation by movement membe rs (Johnston 46 analyst must delve into collective processes of meaning making, culture, and discursive Therefore, although these sets of po litical opportunities/threats are technically structures because they are institutional arrangements, Johnston 2011, 53). What makes political opportunities and threats cultural facto rs is the fact that political opportunities and threats must go through a framing process by which they are perceived as actual opportunities or threats (Johnston 2011, 53). This perception takes place through the process of collective action framing. Acco rding to Johnston (2011), the combination of these two elements can make for an exhaustive but nonetheless thorough examination of the causes of soci al movement mobilization (47). Thus, the advantage of political process theory is its consideration of both structural (hard) and cultural (soft) causes of social movement mobilization. Because, unlike the contending theories, political process theory integrates state centered and structuralist perspectives with interpretative and cultural practices to inc lude elements of perception (Johnston 2011, 50 51 and 53), political process theory is often regarded as the predominant theory for the study of social movement mobili zation (Caren 2007 and John ston 2011, 50 51, 53, and 58). However, predominance in the fi eld of
38 cases. Therefore, it is essential to discuss why political process theory would provide a more thorough explanation for the anti failure to galvanize sustainable mobilization Comparison to O ther Social Movement Theories synthesis case, where there is already a presenc e of elements that should stimulate the anti expansion movement. For example, a ccording to d eprivation and economic theory poor e conomic conditions, such as those found in Guam should foster resistance An analysis of Industrial Workers movements (Piven and Cloward 1979) as well as so cial movements in the 1960s reveals that these movements often operated and were formed in response to a similar backdrop of poor economic conditions Therefore, according to this logic, the high unemployment rate, lack of economic opportunity, and class stratification in Guam should provide a pathway to successful mobilization. Yet, the presence of these economic conditio ns are not catalyzing sufficient support New s ocial movement theory and framing theory would argue that, after the DEIS the would provide opportunities for social movement. However, despite the presence of Indigeno us Collective, or National Asian Pacific America not garnering enough support to effect substantive change Likewise, resource mobilization theory offers an insu fficient explanation for why the anti expansion movement lacks su fficient support
39 resource mobilization theory would argue that it is only the structures with resources that mobilization structures are framed in the first place 8 (Snow et. al 1986, 445 in Yeo 2006, 39). Therefore, the problem with contending theories is that they rely too heavily on one issue to explain the failure to galvanize support. According to political process theory, in ecessary to examine cultural factors in addition to structural (Johnston 2011, 49). It is important to note that in the study of social movements, no precise partition exists between structural and cultural conditions (Johnston 2011, 49). Johnston (2011) a ccurately points out that and interpretation, and among culturalists over whether thinking about social structures in obje (49). Nonethel ess, what political process theory causal. 8 According to Snow (et.al 1986), resourc frame injustices (in Yeo 2006, 39). Particularly in the case of the transnational organizations and alliances, framing is e 38 39). If framing is not that important to resource mobilization theory, then how can the expansion be interpreted as an injustice in the first place?
40 Structural Factors Cultural Factors (Johnston 2011, 52) Figure 4. Political Process Model Accelerated shifts in politics, economy, social life Political Opportunities/Threats Depend on level of: 1. Social Control 2. Elite Connections 3. Elite Sympathy 4. Elite Reinforcement 5. Policy implementation 6. Freedom in the media 7. Countermovement activity 8. Pressures from global regimes Current Culture; Climate of Opinion Mobilization Structures 1. Civil Society Organizations 2. Associations 3. Resources Framing Process Perception of Political Opportunities/Threats through Collective Action Framing Repertoires of Protest Specific tactics, design, and nature of the protest Contentious Political Mobilization Interest based challenges 1. Non institutional 2. Institutional
41 According to this log ic, if there is to be sufficient support to effect substantive change the interplay of structural and cultural factors must make conditions more beneficial than costly to change the issue. From this perspective, this paper argues that the AEM h as yet to galvanize sufficient support to effect substantive change because of the interplay of structural an d cultural conditions in Guam.
42 CHAPTER VI STRUCTURES THAT SUPPRESS According to political process theory, shift s in polit ical structure determine whether it is more beneficial or costly to resis t political power based on how venerable Pastor and Ortiz 2009, 11 12). Based on this logic one of the reason s the anti expansion movement lacks sufficient support to effect substantive change more costly then beneficial to resist the state (Johnston 2011, 51 52). As Chapter V noted, a ccording to necessarily undergo the 49). Therefore, for movement members, structural analysis involves less interpretation than cultural analysis when determining whether the cost be nefit ratio is in their favor. The following analysis demonstrates that ambiguous political status and poor economic structure are key structural facto r s that straightforwardly prevent sustainable mobilization against the expansion. Political Ambiguity Before discussing the structural obstacles to sustainable mobilization, it is critical to note that m do cr eate opportuni ties to galvanize sufficient support According to Tilly (2006), unlike repressive regimes, democracies are
43 designed to be more open and receptive to the public (Breed 2013, 80; Johnston 2011). In Guam, the local government is a representative democracy, allowing opportunities for the makers. However, what prevents sustainable mobilization is 1988). This status means that s ince 1898, the island has neither complete sove reignty nor complete dependence in relation to the United States (Alexander 2011b, 8). Such a status was created for the Insular Cases a series of U.S. Supreme Court Cases that govern U.S. territories. According to Burnett and Marshall (2001) I nsular Cases developed the idea of unincorporated territorial status in order to enable the United States 2001 in Lai, 4 5). As a result, t hough the residents of Guam possess U.S. citizenship, the Constitution is not fully applicable t o them, as they cannot vote in p residential elections nor do they have a voting repre sentative in Congress (Bevacqu a 2010 in Lai 2011, 12 13). Furthermore, for this particular case due colonial status, the basically unchallenged (Davis 2011, 7). Attempts to Change Ambiguity According to Hattori, Guam pos sesses a history of political activism that sought to (Aguon 2006a, 28, footnote 18). In 1980, 1987,
44 determination, and decolonize, respectively 9 (Bradley 2000, 45 4 7). However, all attempts were rejected by Congress. Thus, change for the island seemed futile as more killed drafts proposing a Commonwealth status for Guam (Aguon 2006a, footnote 18, 28; Bradley 2000). 10 Limited Institutional Infrastructure are significant to discourse on the anti expansion movement for two reasons. First these efforts demonstrate that it was always the Chamoru people who originated change for political autonomy : the U.S. merely responded (Aguon 2006a, 30). However, although Chamoru activists have actively resisted and, therefore, gained certain concessions from the U.S. government, challenge their status if significant political decisions mus t be approved by the very power that wishes to preserve the status quo (Alexander 2011b, 8) T he failure of the Commonwea lth Act of 1987 and 1997 is a testament to these limitations Therefore, true 9 The Commonwealth Act was prepared in 1987 (Aguon 2006a). It was then brought before Congressman Blaz in 1988, where it was subsequently neglected. When Underwood served as Congressman in 1993, the act was put forth again, this time with the significant tab of H.R. 1521, in reference to the year Magellan first came to the island, signaling Chamorro colonization (Diaz 2001, 168). 10 In 1997, during a hearing for the Guam Commonwealth Act and the Guam Judicial Empowerment Act, Deputy Secretary of the Department of Interior, John Garamendi, although stating his admiration for the initiative, objected to the conditions that Guam administer its own immigration and labor laws and that the indigenous people decide th eir own political
45 self government cannot be attained as long as Guam is bou nd by its politically ambiguous status, a status perpetuated by U.S. federal departments (Aguon 2006b, 48). Despite attempts to challenge the structure, has remained an obstacle to efforts to realize self determination U nlike in former U.S. possessions turned sovereign states, unrestrained military activity is easier in Guam because its current status as an unincorporated territory presents no i nstitutionalized political way s to resist it (Lai 2011, 3). As a result, status remains a key structural factor that prevent s sustainable mobilizatio n within the anti expansion movement today. Poor Economic S tructure Another structure of Guam that presents an obstacle to sustainable mobilization is its population lives on food stamps and a quarter lives below the U.S. poverty level ( Kirk and Natividad 2010, under agricultural sector is ext remely limited, due to as well as the loss of cultivable l and and fishing grounds used for military bases and installations (Kirk and As a result, the island Na According to Kirk and Natividad (2010), infrastructure is in dire circumstances as well ( The Guam Memorial H ospital the only
46 public hospital on the island, operates at 100% capacity three weeks out of the mo schools often have (Kirk and Natividad 2010, par. 6 under government of Guam departments have been placed under federal receivership, meaning that the federal government has hired an independent entity to take over certain functions of these agencies due to substandard co although cert ainly not the most poverty stricken in the P acific, are in poor circums tances and significantly depend on U.S. federal funding. However, Guam was not always so economically dependent on the United States. WWII, Guam was self sufficient in agriculture, fishing, hunting, and husbandry. Nearly every family grew vegetables and was not until after the Second World and Additionally, befo re 1962, the Department of Defense established a national security clearance policy, a program that Aguon (2006a) argues the administration of the US military, and ther United States (Aguon 2006a, 20).
47 Understanding the economic conditions of Guam is significant as increased dependence on the United States has left the island without a self sustaining economy. As a result, the U.S. military has become a significant source of employment and resources for the people of Guam he military is by far the major employer, w ith most families connected to someone serving in the military or employed Furthermore, military employment remains high as a way to obta in the amenities offered to those already in U.S. military service (Kirk and Natividad 2010 par. 3 under Military personnel have higher earning power than members of local communities; the military hospital and on base schools have b etter facilities than the civilian hospital and public schools; water use by a larger military population is likely to result in shortages for local people; private military beaches deny local community access to their ancestral heritage ( Kirk and Nativida d 2010, under 3). As a result, Camacho and Monnig 163). Limit ations of Structural Explanation These structural constraints offer illumination as to why it appears more costly than beneficial to mobilize against the expansion. Many residents depend upon the U.S. military for their livelihood. Resisting the U.S. expansion would be resisting their provision. Likewise, despite consistent attempts to change the political structure, Guam still remains an unincorporated territory.
48 However, alone, these structural factors are still insufficient explanation. According to other social movement theories, such as d eprivation and economic theory poor economic conditions found in Guam should foster resistance as many successful social movements were set agai nst a backdrop of poverty Therefore, according to this logic, the high unemployment rate, lack of economic opportunity, and class stratification in Guam should provide a pathway to successful mobilization. Yet, the presence of these economic conditions are not catalyzing sufficie nt support. Furthermo re, the question remains Therefore, as Johnston (2011) notes, there is another deeper, more cultural factor that is preventin g the spread of resistance
49 CHAPTER VII CONSEQUENCES OF A COLONIAL CULTURE According to Johnston (2011), in addition to structure, cultural conditions must offer more benefit than cost if there is to be sustainable mobilization. When discussing cultural factors, this thesis is referring to framing by members of a movement (Johnston 2011, 44). The interpretation of these broad terms, these can be thought of as favorable cultural environments and trends intellectual, legal, or popular which movements may draw upon and link with to Martin Luther King Jr. used Biblical passages and enhance support for the civil rights movement (45). Therefore, King was able to frame the movement according to narratives familiar to Christian culture. This gnitive liberation by emphasizing how broad cultural influences play a role in shaping what movement ideas movement leaders certainly have agency and can actively frame a movement, the main strongly contribute to the framing of these opportunities or threats (Johnston 2011, 53). Framing then becomes collective action framing when the community is able to envision a better future because it no longer perceives the current s tructure as acceptable (Johnston 2011, 53).
50 component of the cultural co nditions necessa ry for sustainable mobilization, shedding light on why Guam has not effectively mobilized against the expansion. The people of Guam view the expansion as acceptable. In order for the people to view the expansion as unacceptable, they have to view it as a g rievance or an injustice The Liberation Narrative However, close analysis reveals that a deeper cultural factor prevents the expansion from being viewed as an injustice: the Liberation narrative. The Liberation narrative refers to the framing of Lib eration Day, when the U.S. reclaimed the island of Guam from the Japanese during World War II. Therefore, there is a difference between the day and the narrative. Liberation Day is an even he Libe ration narrative is the claim event (Souder 1989 in D iaz 2001, 161; Tanji 2012, 99). In other words, because the U.S. from Japanese occupation, the U.S. military has the right to expand on the i sland. Therefore, the expansion is not viewed as an injustice but as an exercise of the ruly gratefu l Chamoru At first, it might be questionable that a single event could be such a potent for ce against the anti expansion movement. However, as Johnston (2011) demonstrates with the political process model, the cultural interpretation of events significantly impacts the way movements get framed (44). If the cultural climate does not align with a particular movement, it can be exceedingly difficult for movement leaders to harness support. Therefore, before discussing the effects the Liberation narrative has on the anti expansion movement, it is important to discuss its evolution This section will provide a brief
51 background on the events surrounding Liberation Day, how the event has been framed, and how it has justified greater militarization in postwar Guam and the ann ouncement for expansion today. In 1941, during World War II, Guam, along with other Micronesian islands in the Pacific, was invaded by Japan. Accounts of the occupation reveal bloodshed, starvation, and rape, among much of the suffering the Chamoru endured (Diaz 2001, 160). Accordin g to Diaz (2001), these acts of brutality, inflicted upon the Chamoru, only intensified by the time the U.S. prepared to attack Japanese forces (Diaz 2001, 160). Finally, on July 21 st of 1944, after three years of brutal Japanese occupation Guam was reuni ted with the United States The U.S. return to the island was a n act of significance in ( Alexander 2011b, 13 ). According to historian Paul Carano (1973), the American return was ( in Diaz 2001, 160) U.S. return was also accompanied with U.S. rations like spam, corned beef, cheese, pork and beans medicin had been deprived of during their wartime experience (Souder 1989, 2 in Diaz 2001, 162). As a result, the coming of American forces was deeply venerated by Chamoru survivors (Souder 1989 in Diaz 2001, 160). With the haunting memories of the brutal Japanese occupation still fresh in their minds, survivors did not merely revere their liberation, they deified it (Souder in Diaz 2001, 161). Therefore, the treatment of Libera tion Day stems from the claim that the identity of the Chamorro nation is (Souder in Diaz 2001, 161 ; Tanji 2012, 99 ) In o ther urvival became synonymou s with American Military Forces (Souder in Diaz
52 2001, 161; Tanji 2012, 99). construction necessary not only to instill American values, but also to bolster the backdrop of collective identity among the Chamorro (Tanji 2012, 102). A Convenient Framing After World War II, the survival of the Chamorro people during occupation was U.S. value of patriotism in an attempt to make the was the only political language available to the Chamorros that could be heard a nd understood employed devotion as a political tool in order to attain civil rights immediately foll owing the war (Diaz 2001, 165) : While the war was laid to rest, the experience was put to other uses. In their search for political rights, the Chamorros hit upon an irrefutable argument for civil government. The Chamorros were patriotic. They survived the ordeal. They proved their loyalty. In fact, the Chamorros not only deserved political rights, the U.S. owed it to them. The war experience soon became a hammer to obtain political rights, and subsequ ently, to obtain federal funds ( Underwood in Diaz 2001, 166). An analysis of Chamoru activism directly following the war reveals that heralding the Liberation narrative was effective in granting the people political concessions specifically citizenship and civil government to replace the naval administration two cherished ins titutions for which the Chamorro leadership aspired since the turn of the In 1949, the Chamorro protested in what became known as the Guam Congress Walkout (Aguon 2006a, 30). Due to these efforts, the Organic Act, which was signed in 1950, permitting ip to the
53 (Aguon 2006a, 30 and Alexander 201b, 2 ). In 1970, two decades after the Organic Act, Guam finally elected its first governor (Aguon 2006a, 30). Therefor e, by operating within the logic of the narrative, the Chamoru were granted political concessions. According to the narrative, it was not the endurance of the Chamorro people that granted their citizenship and self government, but rather their faithfulness cal However, this use of the narrative eventually came with a price. As Carano (1973) notes, Liberation Day became the glorious event price in li ves lost had purchased freedom and later American claims of exclusive rights to fought Militarization Justified Ironically, t he Liberation narrative, therefore, paved the pathway for increased militarization on the island. According to f eminist scholar Cynthia Enloe, militarization is defined as a step by step process by which a person or a thing gradually comes to be controlled by the military or comes to depend for its well being on militaristic ideas. The more militarization transform s an individual or a society, the more that individual or society comes to imagine military needs and militaristic presumptions to be not only valuable but also normal (Enloe 2000, 3, as cited by Lai 2011, 12). As Enloe (2000) notes, militarization is not merely the presence of military bases in military. It is the idea that the military should take priority over other elements of society.
54 Upon analyzing the isl and, Lutz (2010) notes that today objectively more extreme in its concentration than that found virtually anywhere else on This militarization is demonstrated by the significant portions of land used for the U.S. military after World War II ( Kirk and Natividad 2010, it [World War II], the U.S. had illegally taken control of 2/3 of our total real estate under the all too (Aguon 2006a, 31 brackets not in original quote). According to the logic of the Liberation narrative, the U.S. is entitled to claim indigenous preferences of th e U.S. military on the island are justified and normalized. As Robert land, t he fences in Guam are seen as normal, not invasive ( Camacho and Monnig 2010, 159 in Verschoor 2011, 49). As a result, because of residents, many Chamorro men wish they could enlist in the military to enter those spaces (Camac ho and Monnig 2010, 159 in Verschoor 2011, 49). Such a perspective is a testament to the power of the Liberation narrative. Understan ding the Liberation narrative within Guam is crucial as it sheds light on why Guam currently lacks a deeper, more dev eloped nationalistic culture found in spaces with similar experiences, such as the foreign military bases of Japan or South Korea. According to Tanji (2012), in Guam, occupier (military) and the occupied (peop
55 (111 112). These issues are not in a way that overwrites the dominant narrative of patriotic support of the US military 112). The Liberation narrative also sheds light on Chamorro mi litary enlistment following the war. According to Souder (1989) here was an overwhelming desire to show gratitude. Chamorros were willing to (Souder 1989 in Diaz, 161) was shaped by an intensive prewar naval rule that permitted Chamorro identity and peoplehood to be expressed onl to Camacho and Monnig ( 2010 ) there was no promise o f respect or economic benefit for the Chamorro before the war (157). In fact, the highest, and only, status attained for a Chamorro serviceman was that of a mess attendant (Camacho and Monnig 2010, 157). It was, therefore, after the experiences of Liberati on Day that more Chamorro men enlisted. chenchule United States has done for the people of Guam (2010 157 in Tanji 2012 104). According to Camacho and Monnig (2010), chenc hule chenchule is not merely grounded in the principles of gratitude and reverence; it is an exchange, an offering to recompense. Thus, this culture of reciprocity, of m ilitary service as an expression of patriotic loyalty to Uncle Sam, sheds light on Chamorro service following World War II ( Camacho and Monnig 2010 157 in Tanji 2012, 104 ; Diaz 2001 ). Although there is more of an economic motivation
56 enlistment continues in the present despite the fact that very few survivors of the occupation are living today. Effect s on the Anti Expansion Movement The Liberation narrative justifies the military expansion the same way it has justified postwar militarization on the island. In a sense, the U.S. military expansion on Guam is nothing new. It is merely an extension of previous militarization efforts. Nonetheless, the narrative is vigorously maintained (Diaz 2001). Today, Representative Bordallo and former Speaker of Guam Legislature Mark Forbes refer to the 1944 U.S. liberation of Guam w hen discussing future military expansion to elicit Chamorro patriotism and promote the image of the U.S. a s protector (Viernes 2009, 108) Viernes (2009) argues that such references are strategic in that they link the expansion with wh at is expected from t he Chamoru: patriotic devotion (108). As a result, anti expansion efforts are interpret ed and framed as unpatriotic, ungrateful and radical As Alexander (2011b) argues, successful mobilization is challenging then because opposing the proposed military build up entails serious questioning about the up thus requires people to question who they are, what their life choices have remember themselves t o be (19). How the Chamoru people remember themselves is therefore an important part of the anti Chamorros who are disconnected from the occupation experience and who have been exposed to university courses where colonialism, globalization, and self determination are common themes of critical discussion are increasingly ambivalent about their role as
57 politics of public commemoration from the annual celebration of parades, carnivals, barbe experiences in the Pacific Daily New s (Diaz 2001, 158). D espite the fact that there is a mem ories of Liberation Day are just as fresh in the minds of contemporary Chamorro society due to the deliberate depictions of the occupation and the Liberation experience by political officials and the media (Diaz 2001, 155 156 and 176). Scholars disagr ence in returning to the island. return had more to do with military strategy than some altruistic desire to free the Chamorros from e the Japanese occupation accentuates the U.S. return as an act of benevolence in and of itself. intention ed or purely strategic, it is important for scholars to note that expansion. Rather, what hinders sustainable mobilization is employment of the event as a justification for the military buildup. inherently problematic. Disregarding the racist and paternalistic rule of the U.S. naval administration prior to Japanese occupation is problemati c. The fact that Guam was never truly war rule is problematic. T he immediate military take over of more indigenous land afte r World War II is problematic. Therefore,
58 the Liberation narrative is problematic not for what it celebrates but for what it ignores in
59 CHAPTER VIII OPPORTUNITIES FOR A MORE SUSTAINABLE MOVEMENT Although the case of Guam illustrates that indigenous resistance has always and continues to exist political process theory reveals that str uctural and cultural conditions have prevented sustainable mobilization against the expansion However, a mere analysis of these conditions is ultimately ineffective i f no alternative solutions are provided. The references to us activists throughout this analysis demonstrate that they clearly understand the structural and cultural obstacles facing them. However, political process theory offers more than a mere reinf orcement of the challenges anti expansion activists are facing. It analyzes why these challenges are present and how th e perception of structural and cultural conditions perpetuate them By demonstrating why these structural and cultural f actors have persisted in Guam political process theory moves beyond mere identification of resistance challenges and offers a pathway to c ultivate alternative solutions for a more sustai nable economy and livelihood. cultural conditions depend upon the interpretation of the community. If the expansion is framed as an injustice, the opportunities for a more sustainable movement increase. The predicament is getting the majority of the people of Guam to frame the expansion as a n injustice as well. Frame Alignment Frame alignment provides useful insight into possible solutions for this predicament. According to Johnston (2011), frame alignment is often employed by movements to This section will focus on two particular expansion
6 0 movement : frame amplification and frame bridging. Frame amplification is defined as "the clarification and invigoration o f an interpretive frame that bears on a particular issue, problem, or set of events" (Snow et. al 1986, 469 in Yeo 2006, 40 ). In other words, it is a reframing or re appropriating of significant events. Similarly, f linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames et. al 1986, 467 in Yeo 2006, 39). Deeper analysis of these two types reveal that frame amplification would be bene ficial in bringing unity to the Chamoru people expansion movement. Frame Amplification Frame amplification can help unify the Chamoru by reanalyzing and reframing important historical events. As Chapter VII discusses, one of the most significant events i the Liberation Narrative has been used as a tool by build up supporters to delegitimize the voice s of ant i expansion activists by deeming them ungratefu l and unpatriotic. More importantly, by focusing on the U.S return, the Liberation Narrative de emphasizes the agency of Chamorro survivors during Wo rld War II However, just as Martin Luther King Jr. re appropriated Biblical passages o Chamorro people can re frame the Liberation Narrative. reframing the way Liberation Day i s celebrated on the island. U nder Governor Ricardo
61 Chamorro survival and triumph over h ardship, instead of Chamorro indebtedness to the U.S., which liberation implied (162) 2001, 168). Thus, some Chamorro activis ts have attempted to reframe the annual holiday by emphasizing Chamoru agency and arguing that there were unexpressed intentions behind the American return: that the US coming back to Guam was an act of defending a strategic location, not necessarily benev olent deliverance (Diaz 2001, 157 162). However because they are drowned out by the e of the holiday each year. Nonetheless this reframing is imperative for uniting the declining number of Chamoru people because it reiterates C hamoru endurance in a war for which th ey were not even responsible ( Underwood in Diaz 2001, 166) B y focusing and honoring Chamoru experiences, World W ar II becomes less about the United States versus Ja pan, and more about the Chamoru 2001, 166). Guam and the United States have always been affiliated through war: introduced through the Spanish Ame rican War and reunited through World War II (Diaz 2001, Notes 1: 176). The Liberation narrative only serves to reinforce this affiliation. Furthermore, the very dates that signify the beginning and end of World War II for the people of Guam are based upon the Japanese attack and Japanese surrender (Tanji 2012, 176). These dates attempt to separate the enemy from the hero (Tanji 2012, 176). However, by reframing Liberation Day, the f ocus on Chamorro agency eradicates the enemy / savior dichotomy If these dichotomies are deemphasized and the persistence of
62 st is deemphasized as well, making it easier for expansion to be viewed as an injust ice rather than an act of devotion Therefore, frame amplification can be a useful tool for sustainable mobilization against the expansion in Guam. Frame Bridging The second type of frame alignment anti expansion activists sho uld utilize is frame bri dging. E xamining the anti base movements in South Korea provi des particularly useful insight. concentrated and nationally concentrated anti base campaigns were taking place throughout the 90s and early millennium. Whereas local campaigns analyzed the effects of land and wellbeing, nati abstract principles such as sovereignty and peace (Yeo 2006, 37 39). sustainable movement, it was necess ary for the two camp aigns to bridge their injustice frames. Therefore, in South Korea, movement leaders bridged or combined local and national was necessary because both campaigns needed each other to continue. National or more
63 abstract frames have the ability to draw in more supporters because under a frame like sovereignty or pea unorganized who may not find any personal stake in investing time and resources toward an abstract concrete issue directly affecting the community are needed to ground the anti base movement. As a result, frame b ridging created solidarity in movement. B there are two identifiable types of anti expansion activists, depending upon their framing of injustices. One is anti base, in which advocacy for complete military withdrawal in Guam stems from a negative view of militarism, association with the United States, or both (Aguon 2006a, 2006b). The other is pro base, in which opposition to the expansion does not necessarily translate as seeking a complete removal of the U.S. military from the island (Tanji 2012). Nonetheless, this section will discuss both types of anti expansion activists to see how they are shaping resistance efforts. Anti Base In Guam, there is a presence of indi genous activists that call for the complete removal of the U.S. military from the island. For ex ample. Aguon (2006b) argues that in order to of the exaggerated US military presence from all not some This advocacy for complete withdrawal s is directly tied to the U.S. military presence (Tanji 2012). Furthermore, associating with
64 and assimilating to the United States debases Chamorro pride and integrity (Aguon 2006b, 101). Therefore, activ ists such as Aguon (2006b) and Bevacqua (2010) do not believe that identifying with the American way of life is the path to true self government and self determination (114 115). The glorification of consumerism, globalization, and individualism in Americ an culture prevents the Chamorro from truly developing as a people (Aguon 2006b, 114 115). As a result, American ideology must be actively contested (Aguon 2006b, 114 115). Still, these activists note the difference between the Chamorro struggle for self d etermination and anti American propaganda, arguing that it insatiable, imperial appetite its Aguon 2006b, 114 115). By bui lding solidarity with other anti base activists through transnational ilitary Pollution, anti base activist s in Guam frame their injustices at the national level. In other words, their grievances are targeted at more abstract concepts such as peace and security (Yeo 2006, 39). At the same time the focus of the anti base movement is local as it also analyzes th e harmful consequences (discussed in Chapter III) that the expansion could potentially inflict upon the local community (Yeo 2006). Therefore, the complete removal of military bases on Guam stems from past consequences and future effects that U.S. military security.
65 Pro Base The other type of activist is pro base According to these activists, t o critique the military presence in Gua m is not to completely negate it. Rather, pro ba se activists note that negative consequences can accompany military bases and seek to have these determination. A prominent e xample of this type of activist defined as a man who has served or continues to serve in the military yet openly engages in indigenous activism (Tanji 2012, 104). According to Tanji (2012), he goal of Chamoru activism, couched in the language of warrior masculinity, is no particular challenge to US militarism in general, but emphasizes, rather, the Chamorro Thus than one who unabashedly devotes himself to the U.S., he is not necessarily against the military uniform itself (Tanji 2012, 105). at resists the buildup views the anti expansion movement as an opportunity fo r the acknowledgment of Chamoru rights (Tanji 2012, 111). because his military experience s directly inform and qualify his activism (104 105). ). For example, Benevente, who had served in the U.S. Army yet is also an indigenous rather finds the two harmoniou s (Camacho and Monnig 2010, 147). Upon serving overseas, Chamoru soldiers realized that the country they served so faithfully to help
66 advance ideals of democracy was the same country that colonized and continues to colonize their homeland (Camacho and Monn ig 2010, 164 and 167). enon sheds light on how Chamoru nationalism can be constructed from both a devotion to and opposition against the United States (Tanji 2012, 113). These activists are fighting for s elf determination based upon the rights they believe they hold as Americans (Camacho and Monnig, 164). Therefore, for these activists, the focus on their anti expansion movement is not necessarily local injustices but more nationalist or abstract issues: t he fact that the United States is disregarding the voice of its own U.S. citizens (Yeo 2006, 39). Although pro base activists may acknowledge local grievances against military bases, ultimately their movement is framed within the context of attaining Ameri can rights and liberties. To 168 in Tanji 2012, 105). Therefore, anti base activists argue that the anti expansion movement should signify the withdrawal of the U.S. military presence, and possibly, the withdrawal of association with the United States. Pro base activists view t hat the expansion infringes upon the Chamoru right to self determination, but do not feel that service in the U.S. militar y contradicts their resistance. Acknowledgment of both campaigns does not mean that there are solid boundaries between the two as thes e two types of activists do not necessarily view each other as threats. Both are against the expansion. However, each campaign holds a different response.
67 As political process theory demonstrated, in addition to structural constraints, part of the ex planation for the lack of sustainable mobilization is that the expansion is not framed as an injustice. Lack of mobilization, however, is compounded within the anti expansion movement because the injustice frames vary according to the two campaigns. By building solidarity with other anti base activists through transnational organizations such as the militar y activists in Guam frame their injustices at the national level. In other words, their grievances are targeted at more abstract concepts such as peace and security (Yeo 2006, 39). At the sa me time, the focus of the anti base movement is local as it also analyzes the harmful consequences (discussed in Chapter I) that the expansion could potentially inflict upon the local community (Yeo 2006). Therefore, the complete removal of military bases on Guam stems from past consequences and future effects that U.S. military presence has incurred and will incur On the other hand, alt hough pro base activists may acknowledge local grievances against military bases, ultimately their movement is framed within the context of attaining American rights and liberties. Following the example of anti base activists in South Korea could be a useful tool for the anti expansion resistance in Guam. B oth campaigns a lready a gree that the expansion is an injustice. The one factor linking their otherwise unconnected frames is the view that determination. Therefore, the common factor between the two is the realization t hat a U.S. military increasingly dependent on te
68 U.S. is using territories denied basic rights of freedom and self determination to use 7). In other word indigenous community. As a result, the anti expansion movement should be framed with a focus on the Chamoru determination. Although many anti base scholars wo uld argue that it is precisely militaristic culture that prevents residents from viewing the expansion as an injustice in the first pl ace as this thesis discusses, there is clearly a pres ence of pro military activists Therefore, the problem is not necessarily the military. The problem is the framing of the military as ultimate priority, a pr oblem stemming from the Liberation narrative It is undoubtedly essential for anti expansion activists to critique the U.S. military for its often overlooked effects on the environment, land, and security. However, attempt s to generalize an entire po pulation of military servicemen and women as disregards an entire group o base activists). Furthermore, it generates discourse that is divisive and harmful for fostering healthy relations between activists in Guam. Chamoru military members are being denied the right to self determination as well. Likewise, r ather than frame their struggle within the context of American rights anti expansion activists should instead frame their struggle through the international rights discourse of self determination (Diaz 2001, 167). It is essential that the resistance acknowledge that having autonomy and being less dependent on federal funding will
69 ultimately yield to a more sustainable economy and future for all residents in Guam. If agency, visibility, and voice (Bevacqua 2010) can only be att ained through military service, as is often demonstrated in Guam, then what hope is there for future gen erations on the island? There must be other options for empowerment outside the U.S. military. Beyond Fortress Pacific By bridging the rather abstract concept of self determination with a local emphasis on the livelihood of local residents, t he anti expansion movement c ould potentially move be yond a binary of anti base/pro base As 115). Pragmatically a broad based coalition is necessary for the success of th e movement. With such a small population, it is important that the peo ple of Guam be united in the anti expansion movement As Audre 2006b). If anti expansion activists are united, they can more adequately address more structural arrangements. A (37). Therefore, if Chamoru the principles of nonviolence, humility, and kindness (Aguon 2006a, 55 and 73). For the Chamoru people True freedom will come to us when our destiny is fully in our hands. Since the beginning of governmental systems of Guahan, the people of the land have never been allowed to decide the fate of their land. This right is recognized i n all of the surrounding islands, but when we stand up for our rights as Chamorros, we are who have been historically denied their political status and rights here. Until the Chamorro right to self determination on Guahan is recognized and pract iced,
70 there is no full freedom Organization of People for Indigenous Rights (Diaz 2001, 169) Thus, scholars in the mainland United States and the international community should be of cultural history, human rights, and in digenous agency (Davis 2011, 7). It is occupied by human beings with their own community, culture, and political aspirations. T he Chamoru are not just waiti ng for their self determination: th ey are actively pursuing it. By embracing this message, a nti expansion a ctivists can challenge the structural and cultural restraints placed against them and, slowly but steadily, build a more empowering, sustainable future beyond Fortress Pacific.
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