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The influence of resources and opposition on environmental justice organizations' game strategies

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The influence of resources and opposition on environmental justice organizations' game strategies an application of the ecology of games framework
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Huss, Sheila M. ( author )
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Denver, CO
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University of Colorado Denver
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Green movement ( lcsh )
Game theory ( lcsh )
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theses ( marcgt )
non-fiction ( marcgt )

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This research applies the ecology of games framework and resource mobilization theory to an analysis of the effects of organizational resources, community resources, and oppositional presence on the odds that environmental justice organizations will utilize various strategies. Environmental justice organizations are game players in the environmental justice game, and an examination of the strategies they use and the factors that influence them is relevant to determine how they play the game, which is part of a larger ecology. Resource mobilization theory provides theoretical empirical guidance with respect to the types of resources organizations draw on and how they might relate to groups' activity. Date were gathered from a number of sources to obtain information on organizational resources, community resources, opposition, and the control of variables of area of social differentiation (e.g., race), substantive focus (e.g., dumping, siting, climate justice, etc.), geographic focus (local or broad), and group age. The findings demonstrated minimal support for the hypotheses.
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Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Colorado Denver. Public affairs
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Includes bibliographic references.
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School of Public Affairs
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by Sheila M. Huss.

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|University of Colorado Denver
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|Auraria Library
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891592267 ( OCLC )
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Full Text
THE INFLUENCE OF RESOURCES AND OPPOSITION ON ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE ORGANIZATIONS GAME STRATEGIES: AN APPLICATION OF THE
ECOLOGY OF GAMES FRAMEWORK
By
SHEILA M. HUSS
B.A., The Pennsylvania State University, 1998
M. A., The University of South Florida, 2003
A thesis submitted to the
Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Colorado in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
School of Public Affairs
2013


2013
SHEILA M. HUSS
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED


This thesis for the Doctor of Philosophy degree by
Sheila M. Huss
has been approved for the
School of Public Affairs
by
Paul Stretesky, Chair
Lloyd Burton
Chris Weible
Don Grant
September 16, 2013


Huss, Sheila M. (Ph.D., Public Affairs)
The Influence of Resources and Opposition on Environmental Justice Organizations
Game Strategies: An Application of the Ecology of Games Framework
Thesis directed by Professor Paul B. Stretesky
ABSTRACT
This research applies the ecology of games framework and resource mobilization
theory to an analysis of the effects of organizational resources, community resources, and
oppositional presence on the odds that environmental justice organizations will utilize
various strategies. Environmental justice organizations are game players in the
environmental justice game, and an examination of the strategies they use and the factors
that influence them is relevant to determine how they play the game, which is part of a
larger ecology. Resource mobilization theory provides theoretical empirical guidance
with respect to the types of resources organizations draw on and how they might relate to
groups activities. Data were gathered from a number of sources to obtain information on
organizational resources, community resources, opposition, and the control variables of
area of social differentiation (e.g., race), substantive focus (e.g., dumping, siting, climate
justice, etc.), geographic focus (local or broad), and group age. The findings
demonstrated minimal support for the hypotheses.
The form and content of this abstract are approved. I recommend its publication.
m
Approved: Paul Stretesky


DEDICATION
This dissertation is dedicated to my husband, John, and my daughter, Araina.
Your support has made the journey to earn my Ph.D and especially the completion of my
dissertation so fulfilling and meaningful. I am incredibly grateful for the disruptions that
kept me laughing and sane, for the words of encouragement and advice, for the bond
between the two of you that enabled me to work when I needed to, and for helping me to
keep this passage in perspectivereminding me that it was a big deal and a worthwhile
pursuit, but one that took place among other important journeys and relationships. I love
you both so much, and I cannot wait to pursue our future endeavors together.
IV


ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
A huge thank you to my committee chair, Paul Stresky! I really appreciate the
time and effort you took to help me through this process. As important as I came to
realize it was for me to own my dissertation, that independence was the end stage of a
process characterized by extensive guidance and collaboration. Thank you for sharing
your expertise, giving me suggestions, and offering much-needed reassurance along the
way. Thank you, too, for being so flexible and easy to work with.
Thank you to my committee members, Lloyd Burton, Chris, Weible, and Don
Grant. Dr. Burton, I think the final product really benefitted from the fact-finding I did
once my quantitative analyses were complete. I appreciate the suggestion and the time
you took to meet with me, so I could implement it effectively. I, too, have found that in
life the unexpected can yield some pretty cool outcomesthank you for showing me that
my dissertation was not so different from other life experiences. Dr. Weible, thank you
for your detailed constructive criticism. It really enhanced the quality of my final
product. Attention to detail became challenging toward the end of the processI am
grateful for your encouraging reminders to give it my best effort through the final review
of the final draft. Dr. Grant, thank you for agreeing to serve on my committee and for
asking thought-provoking questions throughout the processquestions that improved
both the quality of literature review, as well as the methodological direction of the
research.
I also would like to acknowledge my friends and colleagues in my cohort for all
of your input and encouragement and for the laughs along the way. Special thanks to Liz
Tomsich for commiserating with me when the going got tough.
v


Finally, thank you so very much to my mom and dad, to Tori, and to my mother-
in-law, father-in-law, Heather, Sean, and Miafor taking good care of Araina, for giving
me opportunities (especially to run and attend meetings) that made the completion of my
dissertation so much easier, for providing great meals and a place to unwind, and for
listening to and asking about how my progress was going.
vi


TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER
I INTRODUCTION.........................................................1
II ECOLOGY 01 GAMES....................................................9
Historical Context...................................................9
Scope and Assumptions of the Ecology of Games Framework.............10
Defining and Measuring Games........................................20
Causal processes and Empirical Applications in the Ecology of Games Framework .. 26
Propositions in the Ecology of Games Framework....................38
III SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORIES..........................................43
Introduction........................................................43
Resource Mobilization Theory........................................44
Oppositional Forces.................................................63
IV THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT................................70
Introduction........................................................70
History and Development.............................................71
The Environmental Justice Movement and its Organizations............82
V RESESARCII METHODS................................................89
Research Design.....................................................89
Sampling Strategy and Sample........................................89
vii


Variable Measurement and Archival Data Sources
94
Analytic Strategy..............................................114
VI QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS........................................116
Descriptive Statistics.........................................116
Bivariate Relationships........................................126
Multivariate Analyses..........................................139
Supplementary Analyses.........................................148
VII DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION....................................160
REFERENCES.......................................................167
APPENDIX A PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE...................179
APPENDIX B CODEBOOK..............................................182
APPENDIX C MULTIPLE IMPUTATION...................................185
viii


CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Environmental burdens, such as hazardous waste sites, air and water pollution,
manufacturing and energy production, and lead toxicity, are distributed inequitably across
the United States, with lower income regions and areas with a disproportionate number of
nonwhites being more encumbered than wealthier and whiter areas (Cole and Foster,
2001). Citizens organized themselves to varying degrees to fight injustices in their
communities. Consequently, people became increasingly aware of environmental justice
issues. Over time, their collective action efforts diffused from location to location, and
environmental justice organizations were established all over the United States. These
organizations constitute a large part of the environmental justice movement, the purpose
of which is to minimize or eliminate the disparate impact of environmental threats.
Given the role of the governmenteven the Environmental Protection Agency
and the private sector in creating and in failing to prevent environmental hazards,
particularly in poor and non-white communities (Bullard, 1993), the efficacy of the
environmental justice movement is paramount, as it may be one of a few, or possibly the
only, avenue for minimizing the effects of environmental injustices, which are costly in
terms of money, health, suffering, and lives. To the extent that environmental justice is
caused and perpetuated by societal institutions, one may argue that it constitutes a form
of structural violence. Embedded problems of this nature are difficult to overcome, and
they raise questions about whether and how citizens and organizations can challenge
larger and more powerful institutions. The environmental justice movement has
influenced environmental policy and perhaps more importantly, provided an avenue for
1


marginalized communities to participate in efforts that illuminate their
disenfranchisement. It reflects the scope and magnitude of environmental justice issues,
as well as the nature of the solutions.
The environmental justice movement has been studied from a number of
perspectives: historical (Bullard, 1993; McGurty, 1997; 2000; Taylor, 2000); framing
(Benford, 1997; Johnson, 2006; Mohai, 1990; Snow & Benford, 1988; Taylor, 2000);
case studies on organizational successes and failures (Agyeman & Evans, 2004; Brown et
al., 2003; Rast, 2006; Shepard, Northridge Prakash, & Stover, 2002); governance
structures (Brulle & Essoka, 2005; Faber & McCarthy, 2001; Schlosberg, 1999); and
through various theoretical lenses, including resource mobilization (McCarthy & Zald,
1973; 1977), political opportunity (Almeida & Stearns, 1998; Meyer & Minkoff, 2004),
and organizational ecology (Stretesky, Huss, Lynch, Zahran, & Childs, 2011). Yet, in
spite of the broad body of literature in this area, there is no evidence anyone has
systematically examined the connection between organizations resources and the
presence of opposition in their communities and their strategies.
The ecology of games framework provides a theoretical perspective from which
organizational strategies may be understood and analyzed, including how strategies may
be influenced by various resources and the presence of opposition. In short, games are
domains that involve competition and/or cooperation; include actors, roles, goals,
strategies, and tactics; and are structured by assumptions and rules (Long, 1958). In the
present study, games are defined as arenas or topical sub-systems comprised of
interactions involving cooperation and competition, organized by rules and assumptions
about strategies used to accomplish goals and constituted by rules, strategies, players,
2


their roles and goals, and a grammar for describing a system of action. Scholars have
understood and measured the concept of games differently, but other concepts within the
framework, including game players strategies, which are germane to games, the ecology
in which games are situated, and outcomes, have been theoretically and empirically
neglected. As noted by Long nearly 60 years ago, players participate in games to achieve
an objective or a set of goals (Long, 1958). I argue in this work the strategies
environmental justice organizations use to play their games differ based on resources at
their disposal, as well as barriers they face, and their decisions regarding strategies to use
in the environmental justice game have global implications in the larger ecology of
games. For example, an environmental justice organization (an actor in the
environmental justice game) might attempt to prevent the siting of a hazardous waste
facility (a goal) by engaging in a direct action activity (strategy) like a protest (tactic)1.
The choice of a direct action strategy likely is a function of an organization having
certain resources (e.g., motivated people, the expertise to organize a protest, etc.) and/or
lacking others (e.g., money, political capital, technological ability, etc.) Analogous
arguments could be made for strategies in generalthe use of different strategies is
facilitated by possessing or lacking certain types of resources. The ecology of games
framework situates organizational strategies and the players that use them within the
context of a game, which is part of a larger ecology that influences global outcomes. In
the case of environmental justice, the ecology of games framework shows that
environmental justice is an outcome sought by many players who use different strategies
and tactics, which are chosen based on a number of factors. Looking at how a few of
these factors (resources and opposition, both of which have theoretical roots in the social
1 These terms will be defined in Chapter 2.
3


movement literature) influence the strategies of one group of game players
(environmental justice organizations) is indicative of the utility of the ecology of games
framework when it draws on other, better-developed theories.
To summarize, both community and organizational resources and the presence of
opposition will influence groups use of strategies. Acquiring a better understanding of
the influences on game strategies within the environmental justice movement is
worthwhile, as it illustrates how the movement is operating within and redefining itself
with respect to playing the environmental justice gamea game that includes actors
beyond the social movement, but of which the movement is an integral part. Since its
inception, the environmental justice movement has affected environmental research,
policy, and activism by using a variety of strategies, including education, legal activism,
direct action, grant provision, technological support, and community advocacy (Dorsey,
1998); however, specific questions of what factors shape organizational strategies, which
may advance or inhibit groups ability to accomplish environmental justice missions
remain unanswered, as does uncertainty over the current state of the movement, which is
indicative of its capacity to influence future environmental justice goals (Pellow and
Brulle, 2005).
These issues have been the focus of some recent case study research (Benford,
2005), but an empirical assessment of the movements organizational strategiesone that
examines organizations actual activitieshas not been undertaken. In the midst of
economic, social, political, and environmental crises, many of which are interdependent,
causes that aim for justice signify both the depths of existing problems and
simultaneously the vigor of demands for a civil and honorable society. Players in games
4


that involve justice-oriented goals may benefit from insight on how others are playing the
same game. Environmental justice organizations and others with a stake in the work of
these groups might like to know how resources and opposition are affecting the ways
they attempt to save human beings from the disproportionate effect of environmental
poisons, as these missions involve not only conceptual-level goals like justice, but quality
of life and life and death issues, themselves. With more information on how groups are
playing the environmental justice game with their existing resources and in the face of
varying degrees of opposition, organizations possibly can make better informed decisions
about what they like and/or do not like about how they have defined what the movement
as a whole looks like and perhaps make changes that will facilitate the accomplishment of
their missions.
The link between resources and outcomes is theoretically well-established and
empirically founded, as well; however, there may be other factors that affect the
strategies that environmental justice organizations utilize. Environmental justice involves
inherent conflicts that encompass incentives and inhibitions to cooperate and compete.
The substance of these conflicts and the strategies that are used to resolve them are
affected by the histories of the participants, interactions between players, the construction
of goals, and the capacity to act and react. Existing theory fails to illuminate the
complexities of these dynamics, and there are little data to analyze them. Assimilating
the ecology of games framework with resource mobilization theory is an important first
step in bringing together the dynamics of the players and outcomes within the
environmental justice game theoretically and testing a so-far underexplored relationship
within these dynamics empirically.
5


This research analyzes the strategies environmental justice organizations employ,
specifically the effects of resources and oppositional presence on game strategies. In
Chapter 2,1 review, update, and analyze the ecology of games framework (Long, 1958).
Concepts within the ecology of games framework are somewhat esoteric. By drawing on
concepts from other theories (e.g., resource mobilization), however, concepts within the
ecology of games are measurable and demonstrate how the framework can be applied
empirically to substantive areas, such as environmental justice. Chapter 3 delves into the
literature on community and organizational resources and counter-mobilization, including
resource mobilization theory, to contextualize both community demographics and the
assets and vulnerabilities that organizations possess that might affect the strategies they
choose to use. It illuminates how concepts from the social movement literature in general
and resource mobilization theory in particular can be used to advance the ecology of
games framework.
Chapter 4 discusses the environmental justice movement: its context within
broader social movements and its effort to influence policy as a social movement, its
history and development, and its current state (e.g., organizational goals, frames,
governance structures, and funding sources). This chapter sets the stage for
understanding the substantive relevance of one group of game players in the
environmental justice gamein other words, why the environmental justice movement
matters in the larger game of environmental justice. Chapter 5 outlines the research
methods: research design, sample, survey data collection procedures, variable
measurement and archival data sources, analytic strategy, and strengths and weaknesses.
Data on environmental justice organizations were gathered from groups websites and
6


990 tax forms, directories of social movement organizations, and environmental and
census demographic data from their geographic locations. Chapter 6 is comprised of the
analyses of the following research question:
How do organizational and community resources and the prevalence of counter-
mobilization affect the strategies that environmental justice organizations use?
I expected that the more of certain types of resources environmental justice
organizations had, the more likely they would be to employ certain strategies. For
example, the more money groups had, the more likely they would be to use strategies that
required money, such as legal strategies, enforcement strategies, and support services).
The findings are somewhat inconsistent, showing that only for a few strategies do
resources and counter-mobilization matter, and even for those strategies, only a few
resource and counter-mobilization measures were significant. Finally, Chapter 7
concludes with a summary and discussion of the findings and suggestions for future
research. The results make evident the complexities of the ecology of games, even at its
most microscopic level: strategies among one type of game player within a single game,
which exists in a larger ecology, which ultimately shapes outcomes.
This research is relevant for environmental justice policy, as stakeholders in
environmental justice issues can assess how well resources are being mobilized to meet
their objectives and how to improve community participation in and increase knowledge
on issues surrounding environmental equity. Environmental governance also is
significantif it is the case that the environmental justice movement has become more
formalized and the way groups use resources to play the environmental justice game
reflects a more bureaucratic structure (e.g., if groups only make provisions for online,
7


donation-only members and then use the money for legal strategies), it may be necessary
for other organizations or institutions to become involved to ensure that non-white and/or
impoverished community members who are disproportionately affected by environmental
hazards are informed of these hazards and provided with opportunities to participate in
the prevention, mitigation, and responses to these hazards.
8


CHAPTER II
ECOLOGY OF GAMES
Historical Context
Taken from the field of economics, rational choice theory was adapted by social
scientists and especially political scientists attempting to illuminate political behavior and
arrangements. Rational choice scholars argued that individuals acted as deliberately as
they could to achieve their goals, given their situations, knowledge, and resources. Many
scholars supported variants of the rational choice approach, including decision theory and
game theory, while others criticized the framework for both substantive and
methodological reasons, the latter of which stemmed from a reliance on mathematical
models, which precluded detailed narratives and rich descriptions, both of which
arguably were necessary in attempting to explain human behavior. Material criticisms
ranged from the failure of rational choice to explain political behavior under a variety of
circumstances to the assumptions the theory makes about individuals (e.g., that they are
fully informed to make rational choices).
Critics tended to endorse behavioral theories, an area of research that also was
contentious in the 1950s and 60s (Mitchell, 1999). To varying degrees, critics of rational
choice theories eschewed the logical calculus component of peoples actions, arguing that
they are as much influenced by psychological or socialization factors or organizational
norms as they are an economic-oriented reasoning process. Some of this research
focused on individual behavior or peoples behavior in group settings (Herzberg,
Mausner, and Snyderman, 1959; Herzberg, 1964; Maslow, 1943; 1954; Mayo, 1949;
McGregor, 1960). Some scholarship looked at organizational behavior (Kornhauser,
9


1959; Olson, 1965), and some investigations during this time focused on the debate over
power structures within communities, a dispute that mirrored whether communities
reflected a Marxist structure of a power elite and the ruled or a more pluralist
arrangement (Agger, 1956; Agger, Goldrich, and Swanson, 1964; Dahl, 1961; Hunter,
1953; Mills, 1956).
It was within this academic context that Norton Long put forth his theory of the
Ecology of Games. His original article was published in 1958 in thq American Journal of
Sociology. Long (1958) criticized rational choice assumptions and ascertained that
communities and their happenings were not a product of a ruling class intentionally
controlling the less powerful. The ecology of games framework has been interpreted,
adapted, and applied both conceptually and empirically, suggesting it is compelling
enough to stand on its own two theoretical feet.
Scope and Assumptions of the Ecology of Games Framework
Longs (1958) overarching thesis was that local communities are comprised of a
number of interacting institutions, which cannot be broken down into single unitsin
other words, the operations and outcomes that occur within a community are not the
result of a set of organized institutions coming together and planning them. Rather,
much of what occurs seems to just happen with accidental trends becoming cumulative
over time and producing results intended by nobody (Long, 1958, p. 252). Long (1958)
limited his framework to local geographical territoriescommunitiesand stated, It is
the contention of this paper that the structured group activities that coexist in a particular
territorial system can be looked at as games. These games provide the players with a set
of goals that give them a sense of success or failure. They provide them determinate
10


roles and calculable strategies and tactics (p. 252). He neither defined games more
clearly than this statement, nor did he provide empirical guidance for scholars desiring to
test his assertions. In Longs discussion of how the ecology of games operates, he used
examples of a newspaper game, a banking game, and other similar games based on
activities that occur within a community to illustrate how the ecology of games
accomplishes the outcomes necessary to keep the community functional and effective.
Together, the institutions and their actors within a community represent the ecology of
games. Hence, if one institution or group is missing, the ecology substantively may
change. The ecology of games framework seeks to explain how institutions within a
community come together to produce functional processes and outcomes. Figure 1
illustrates Longs framework. It is located in the back of this document, behind the
appendices.
Long (1958) did not explicitly state the assumptions associated with the Ecology
of Games framework, but five are implied. First, Longs ecology relies on a fixed
(geographically bound) spatial arrangement to structure institutional interactions.
Although certain communities are geographically bounded, others are unified by a
substantive issue, and their actors, roles, strategies, and goals are somewhat unique given
the nature of their union; and in a similar vein, the regional boundary of certain ecologies
may be much larger than a neighborhood or city. To illustrate, just as Long focused on
the games that are played (and driven by) a communitys geographical boundaries that
produce outcomes within that geographical space, on a larger scale, there are games that
are played nationally (the United States comprises the area) and internationally (the Earth
is the geographical space) that are driven as much or more by substantive issues (e.g.,
11


global economy, environmental justice, human rights, etc.) as they are by region.
Likewise, with respect to telecommunications, Dutton and Makinen (1987, p. 262)
pointed out:
The boundary of this ecology of games appears to have been the
boundaries of the U.S. It was a national rather than a local or
regional game in that the players, whether shopping for cable
systems or deciding whether to invest in microwave systems, were
considering the nation as a whole. Clearly, the boundaries of the
games that shaped this telecommunications network were not confined
to any local community or state, even though state and local government
regulations, such as cable franchising procedures were relevant to the
outcome.
It is the case with games within communities and on a more global scale that their roles,
objectives, and strategies do not operate in a vacuum, but rather are affected by and
influence other actors and institutions (who may be focused on other primary games).
Although some scholars have examined games within an ecology, a more microscopic
look at the composition of games (e.g., strategies that players use) and the factors that
influence how games are played has not been undertaken. The ecology of games
framework provides an opportunity to analyze not only how games within an ecology
produce outcomes, but to dissect what factors influence how individual games are
playedthat is, what strategies players use, the roles that their actors assume, and the
goals that are defined within the games. Notably, even at a micro (within-game) level,
there are implications for the ecology of games, as within the ecology, much of the
12


interaction occurs within games, not between them (Firestone, 1989). Each game and the
actors and goals that constitute it are an integral part of the ecology without which the
nature of the ecology would change.
Second, Long assumed that games are the primary source of structuring
interactions within a community. Although the ecology of games is a viable lens through
which decision-making in a community can be examined, there are alternative viewpoints
that should be considered. For example, in the public policy literature, the legal-
institutional perspective emphasizes the role of laws, court rulings, and regulations in
shaping actors in various contexts (Dutton and Makinen, 1987). The elite and pluralist
points of view look at decision-making as a product of the allocation of power and the
structures that manufacture these distributions, with the latter incorporating politicians
accountable to the publicrather than just economic and corporate elite, as influential in
decision-making (Dutton and Makinen, 1987). Shields (2006) pointed out in his critique
of Duttons theory-building within the ecology of games perspective that the role of
power is perilously ignored. Dutton (2006) responded to the criticisms; however,
Shieldss message should not be lost on researchers applying this framework: ecology of
games applications should consider the role of powerit might be that actors, their goals,
and their strategies within games, which likely are shaped by assets, the presence of other
actors (who also possess resources, which reflect the element of competition within
games), and other factors, structure power dynamics that have implications in the larger
ecology.
Although the concept of power largely was absent from Longs formulation of the
ecology of games, it is consistent with his theory to look at the roles, tactics, strategies,
13


and goals within individual games. Indeed, games, themselves, have constituted a
theoretical black box until now. Long and subsequent ecology of games scholars have
acknowledged the importance of what occurs within games, but failed to explore these
dynamics, what influences them, and how they influence the larger ecology. Within the
field of aviation, a black box (which actually is orange) is comprised of a flight data
recorder and a cockpit voice recorder. It is extremely durable, a necessary feature, given
that its purpose is to provide extensive insight as to what occurs on a flight, which is
necessary in determining the events and factors that led up to and contributed to disasters.
Black boxes are particularly important in cases where little is known about a disaster.
Similarly, a theoretical black box should be analyzed, so that the causal or explanatory
story may be told with precise detail, minimizing problems of oversight and ambiguity.
A better understanding of how actors play particular games (e.g., the strategies they use
and what shapes them) will reveal not only what occurs within that game, but also will
address how games contribute to the larger ecology, which consequently shape outcomes
in the community, country, or world.
Third, the ecology of games framework supposes a consensus perspective, where
individuals and institutions operate in a fair system and their interactions have the
cumulative effect of maintaining the status quo, a desirable end. It largely neglects actors
and institutions that do not assimilate into the mainstream, and in doing so, disregards
social change and efforts toward more unconventional ends. The ecology of games
framework, on one hand, minimizes the agency of individuals by situating them in roles.
Yet, on the other hand, the theory simultaneously pays little attention to more macro-
level social structures that contribute to economic, social, and political dynamics that
14


shape community affairs. In a global context where the outcomes of games are massive
in scope and magnitude, and include results like species survival; natural resource
allocation; and the distribution of food and health care, educational opportunities, and
environmental burdens, it is critical to challenge the presumption that the outcomes are
largely accidental. Longs (1958) concept of games is solid in that it provides a bounded,
analyzable structure through which people, organizations, and institutions; their decision-
making; and their goals can be analyzed (both independently and as part of a larger
ecological system that has consequences ranging from feeding a city to producing clean
and accessible wateror failing to do these things). However, applications of the theory
should not take for granted that outcomes are functionalin contesting this assumption,
the strengths of the theory will be more prominent as it is exploited in a greater variety of
contexts, tested empirically, and explored on multiple levels.
Also, insofar as the ecology of games framework explains outcomes in a
community with respect to the purposes they serve, it is tautological, which presents both
epistemological and methodological problems. Specifically, Long did not clearly
separate the structure and functions of actors and institutions within an ecology of games
that are antecedent to the outcomes in a community and the outcome, itself, which
consists of those same actors and institutions. Applications of the ecology of games
perspective should adapt the measures of concepts to mitigate this issue, facilitating a
Durkheimian resolution of analyzing the effect of an original cause on subsequent
functional patterns. Put differently, in The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, Pierre
Maurice Marie Duhem argued that hypotheses are the result of progressive evolution.
His work provided a sophisticated and contentious viewpoint within the philosophy of
15


science, a debate that is beyond the context of this paper, but is informative in that it
lends credibility to the notion that theories and their concepts, as well as the predictions
that develop from them, evolve over time. Applying the ecology of games framework to
new territories (e.g., social or political issues) and at different levels (e.g., looking within
games at their actors and strategies, rather than at the ecology and its outcomes) are
indicative of its evolution and will make possible the use of empirical methodologies
(analogous to Duhems instruments in physical experiments), but for this progress to
occur, the theoretical constructsresources, strategies, games, etc.must be defined and
measured independently from one another and in a way that facilitates the establishment
of temporal order, enabling the use of statistical techniques.
Fourth, although Long acknowledged that players may participate in more than
one game, he stated that they primarily focus on one game. Similarly, he presumed that
players do not change games and hence, the theory neglects the possible motivations for
and effect of players situating themselves in certain games, playing in more than one
game at a time, and changing games. Many scholars who have applied the ecology of
games framework downplayed Longs thesis, even explicitly countering it with the
assumption that actors are involved in multiple games, without necessarily concentrating
on one (Dutton and Makinen, 1987; Smaldino and Lubell, 2011).
Finally, Long (1958) assumed that organized individuals who comprise
institutions within a community do not act intentionally to further desirable outcomes,
such as feeding a large city, even though these outcomes often are in their best interest.
Indeed, Long (1958, p. 252) stated, much of what occurs seems to just happen with
accidental trends becoming cumulative over time and producing results intended by
16


nobody. Although games shape outcomes within a community, some of which may be
more by accident than by design, it also may be the case that actors, strategies, and goals
are shaped by their social, political, and economic environments, including resources and
other actors, and constitute certain games, which structure both accidental and designed
outcomes. For example, in the case of a global community, there are games, such as
environmental justice, economics, transportation, land use planning, and politics. These
games are comprised of actors (e.g., social movement and nonprofit organizations,
researchers, politicians, political institutions, planning commissions, etc.) who employ
strategies (e.g., protest, lobbying, educational advocacy, voting, propaganda, etc.) to
achieve their goals (e.g., clean air and water, just distribution of food or health care,
passage or blockage of a law, the establishment of a public transit system, etc.). The
interaction between game players produces outcomes that were promoted through the
design of the game, as well as unintended consequences, such as diminished exposure to
the outdoors (e.g., through technological developments, such as computers and video
games systems).
The example of the environmental justice social movement game in the national
community will be used to better illustrate this point. The environmental justice social
movement is a game in that it is an arena of cooperation and competitioncooperation in
that individuals and organizations work directly and indirectly together to accomplish
missions, such as the passage of federal legislation mandating explicit consideration of
environmental justice objectives; competition in that environmental justice interests may
be challenged by institutions promoting large-scale economic growth that would be
inhibited by environmental justice considerations. It is organized by many types of rules
17


and assumptions about the strategies participants employ to accomplish their objectives.
For example, environmental justice organizations have boundary rules (Polski and
Ostrom, 1999) that specify how individuals enter and exit administrative roles (e.g.,
board member, officer) within organizations. Groups also have scope rules (Polski and
Ostrom, 1999) that determine, for example, how funding and technical assistance will be
used to achieve outcomes, such as the rectification of failing water and sewage systems
on American Indian tribal land. Finally, games are defined by the fact that their rules,
strategies, and players offer a grammar for describing the system of action
shaping... change in the overall ecology (Dutton, 1995, p. 2; see also Altheide and
Michalowski, 1998; Bromley, 1991; and MacMartin, 1999 for discussions of the
importance of discourse in the construction of various types of reports as social
constructions). Environmental justice organizations, players in the environmental justice
social movement game, provide statements directed to policymakers and others laying
out changes that must be made (e.g., passing legislation that makes the human right to
water a statewide priority by making provisions for disadvantaged communities). The
larger ecology (e.g., the economics game, the political game, and the land use planning
game) also is affected by this language.
Games also contain strategies and tactics (Long, 1958). Unfortunately, social
movement scholars have used the terms strategies and tactics interchangeably, providing
little guidance for distinguishing between them (see, for example, Rohlinger, 2006;
Zietsma and Winn, 2008). However, according to the United States Department of
Defense Dictionary of Military Terms, the tactical level is defined as, the level of war at
which battles.. .are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives... .Activities
18


at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in
relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. Strategies are
broader than tactics, as they constitute the overall plan versus the actual means of
carrying out the plan. For example, the environmental justice game may include an
objective of building healthy communities. A strategy developed to achieve this goal
might be to educate citizens about environmental issues affecting their health, and tactics
could include workshops or organizing citizens to testify at local hearings to provide
information about an environmental justice public health issue.
Actors (environmental justice organizations), strategies, and tactics comprise
games; however, what is missing from Longs framework is what shapes players
strategies (and hence, their tactics), other than goals, a question that has implications for
the entire ecology and its outcomes. Because Long (1958) stopped short of addressing
the interplay of components within games, scholars should draw on other literatures, such
as resource mobilization in the field of sociology, inform this question. For now, suffice
it to say that within a national and global context, it is important to look at outcomes
within the framework of an ecology of games, but broaden the ecological analysis to
include a more in-depth examination of the component parts of games, including their
goals, strategies, and tactics. Arguably, strategies may be the most theoretically sensible
component to begin with, as they are derived from goals, but are easier to measure than
tactics, as tactics are so specific and may involve a process, which makes empirical
analysis challenging. 2
2 Scholars looking at organizational tactics would conduct a case study. For example, Szu, Prakash, and
McIntyre (2005) conducted a case study of an environmental justice organization, WE ACT, examining the
political, social, and geographic contexts of two of the groups youth programs improved the lives of the
programs participants.
19


Long (1958) recognized the importance of how multiple interacting dynamics
people and institutions, arenas or areas of focus (e.g., banking, politics), strategies, and
goalscome together in unintentional, unstructured ways to produce functional
outcomes. In doing so, he identified the importance of games, but failed to acknowledge
the often intentional formation of game players (both rigid and loosely structured) and
how they employ various strategies to effectively play their games in order to achieve
their objectives. Even a seemingly simple outcome like residents in a community having
meals disguises issues of food justice that reveal dysfunctions in a communitynot
everyone is fed, and among people who are able to eat, they do not have access to the
same types of food that may be consequential for health and well-being, performance at
work or in school, and overall quality of life. These issues and their implications are not
bound by geographical space. Hence, modifications of the ecology of games framework
should not take the theorys assumptions for granted or abandon its conceptual priorities,
but should consider games in their larger social, political, and economic contexts by
looking at their constitutive parts. Also, they should include a more encompassing
conceptualization of community beyond the communitys local, geographical/spatial
environment, including online communities, issue communities, and institutional
communities that operate in a national, international, and global context.
Defining and Measuring Games
Relatively few scholars have measured empirically the concept of games or
explicitly defined it. Dutton (1995, p. 381) defined games as, arenas of competition and
cooperation structured by a set of rules and assumptions about how to act in order to
achieve a particular set of objectives. Many subsequent studies adopted Duttons
20


definition. Lubell, Henry, and McCoy (2010, p. 288) argued that policy games are
synonymous with policy institutions and venues, all of which .refer to interactions
among actors guided by rules (e.g., consensus versus voting, which actors can participate)
about how collective decisions are made. The present study synthesizes other scholars
definitions of games, while maintaining the spirit of Longs characterization of the
concepthere, games are defined as: arenas or topical sub-systems comprised of
interactions involving cooperation and competition, organized by rules and assumptions
about strategies used to accomplish goals and constituted by rules, strategies, players,
their roles and goals, and a grammar for describing a system of action. The main
implication of not having a clear definition of games is that developing useful theoretical
measures is challenging and hinders empirical testing of the theory and replications.
In spite of little conceptual guidance, a handful of attempts have been made to
measure games in applications of the ecology of games framework. Lubell et al. (2010)
operationalized gamesthe independent variable in their researchas six planning
processes: environmental review processes, transportation planning, city/county planning,
city council/county board meetings, local planning commissions, and natural resources
planning. Their first independent variable was a participation scale based on the sum of
eleven possible planning activities associated with collaborative institutions in various
regions (e.g., attending meetings, speaking to representatives, reviewing documents, etc.)
The second independent variable was participation frequency, ranging from one (never)
to six (daily) for each of the six policy games. Lubell et al. (2010) looked at the effect of
games and collaborative institutions on cooperative attitudes and actions, specifically
collaborative policy implementation, perceived policy fairness, and policy approval.
21


Lubell et al. (2010) undertook one of the only efforts to empirically test the ecology of
games framework. Most other research on this theory involves case study methodologies
and descriptive analyses. Even so, it provides useful theoretical interpretations when it
comes to applying the framework and measuring its concepts.
Cornwell, Curry, and Schwirian (2003) conducted a case study, applying the
ecology of games framework to the construction of the Paul Brown Stadium in
Cincinnati, Ohio. They connected the actors, games, and issues involved in this issue
through network techniques. Specifically, they operationalized actors as the key players
or entities involved in the stadiums construction (e.g., Mike Brown, the Bengals General
Manager; Cincinnati City Council; the general public; etc.) They measured games based
on policy arenas, including the politics game (goal of passing a partisan agenda), the
sports franchise game, territorial game (land ownership), business competition game, and
budgetary game (who is going to pay and how). Finally, Cornwell et al. (2003) defined
issues surrounding the stadium construction, including: the prospect of new facilities for
the Bengals, possible stadium renovations, bringing the stadium tax referendum to a vote,
passing this referendum, figuring out where to construct the stadium, changing the terms
of the preliminary site arrangement, developing the terms of the site deal, delaying the
land transfer, and finally, coming to an agreement on the land transfer.
The measure of games in this study was consistent with others descriptions of
games, which came from an assumption that the issues and goals, which provided the
catalyst for the games, were geographically bounded within a community. Cornwell et
al. (2003) assumed that .. .actors goals provide their motivations to participate in given
games... (p. 123), but they distinguished between goals and games. Specifically,
22


although goals are indicators of games, they are not one in the same, because games
include elements of competition and reoccurring engagement (p. 124) that goals do not.
The distinction between games and goals is relevant to empirical applications of the
ecology of games framework, as Long (1958) provided little systematic guidance for
identifying games, and subsequent scholarship has tended to use games as a metaphor,
rather than a measurable concept. The conceptualization of games determines how goals,
roles, strategies, tactics, and rules are defined. Revisiting the environmental justice
example, by establishing the environmental justice game, one derives environmental
justice goals, strategies, tactics, players and their roles, and rules of the game.
Dutton (2010) applied the ecology of games framework in a somewhat
unconventional territory, the internet. He identified six types of games: economic
development, developing countries, communitarian, telecommunication regulation,
broadband suppliers, and content provision. As was the case with Cornwell et al. (2003),
Duttons measure of games was inductive, driven by the area he was studying. For each
game, he defined main players and goals and pointed out the importance of their
cumulative interactions in shaping internet development. He did not address tactics or
strategies that game players participate in or how they came about. Dutton (2010)
paralleled Longs original conceptual argument, specifying that technological
developments (e.g., the internet) are products of actors decisions in various games, rather
than calculated technical choices. However, an exploration of how actors played their
games may have revealed that certain technological developments were planned.
Furthermore, looking at the role of resources, opportunities, opposition, and other factors
in shaping game strategies may not only demonstrate that outcomes were deliberate, but
23


also illuminate why certain outcomes prevailed. This research illuminates one of the
ways that the ecology of games perspective can inform empirical inquiries.
Mendel (2003) conducted a case study of the Union Miles Community Coalition,
a community non-profit organization in Cleveland, Ohio. He contended that because
non-profit organizations are uniquely positioned to provide services to a group of
constituents (e.g., on behalf of the government), they served as an institutional, mediating
mechanism between government and individuals. Mendels primary contribution was
theoretical in nature; he found that an ecology of games that involves both public and
private officials may produce a partnership that serves as a mediating structure. The
organizations that entered into partnerships were affected by their new relationships,
which influenced the way they participated in the ecology of games. Mendel (2003)
called little attention to a significant, albeit possibly tautological, development in the
ecology of games framework. He gave game players an empirical roleone that he
analyzed (theoretically) with respect to how the ecology of games could change players
roles and also be changed by the nature of various network connections. Mendels
(2003) case study did not involve any statistical analysis, leaving prospective researchers
to determine how to untangle measurement issues; however, he hinted at the importance
of examining games as both an independent and a dependent variable.
The limited number of empirical studies and the general disregard of the ecology
of games framework likely are a result of the lack of conceptual and empirical guidance
from Longs original article. Lubell, Robins, and Wang (2011) pointed out that, even
when taken out of the context of the community (e.g., and into a more substantive arena
like watersheds), there is still some indeterminancy in measuring the concept of games.
24


Indeed, operationalizing games is challenging, because .in principle any organization
consists of a set of actors making collective decisions within the constraints of formal and
informal institutional rules. The indeterminacy occurs because of the multi-scale nature
of actors and institutionsindividual people are embedded in organizations and then
organizations are embedded in policy processes (Lubell et al., 2011, p. 19). Such
empirical stumbling blocks have been dealt with (e.g., by modifying measures to fit the
nature of the research and by using other theoretical approaches in conjunction with the
ecology of games perspective), and have the potential to provide more systematic tests of
this framework and illuminate other empirical contexts to which this framework can be
applied.
Although Long (1958) did not address specific determinants of games or how the
elements of games are related, these aspects of the theory should be developed. For
example, to understand what strategies contemporary environmental justice organizations
are using to eradicate racial and class-based injustices, one may employ a resource
mobilization approach or look at the effect of political opportunities; however, these
approaches do not look past the meso-level picture of organizational strategies. The
ecology of games framework situates strategies (measured empirically) in a macro-level
context, illustrating how (and to an extent, why) a group of players (environmental justice
organizations) play the environmental justice game. Theoretically and practically, the
relationships between factors like resources and barriers and game strategies are
important, as they likely are driven by the players visions and have implications for
community participation and social change. On a more global level, as we better
understand strategies and what influences them, we are able to ask better questions about
25


the connections between game players within a game, positive and negative ties within an
ecology, and how positive structural social changes involving equity and justice can take
place, particularly when they involve challenges by marginalized populations.
Causal processes and Empirical Applications in the Ecology of Games Framework
Games, in their original context (Long, 1958), constituted part of a local ecology
which, cumulatively and interactively, explained community orderthe achievement of
outcomes (e.g., provision of food, banks, transportation, communication, etc.) Long
(1958) focused on the nature of games and how, as each group of game players sought
rational ends based on its collective goals, it interacted with other game players doing the
same thing, thereby forming a larger system (ecology) that produced unintended, yet
functional, outcomes beyond the scope of any single game playing groups missions.
Longs (1958) discussion of games and their role in producing various outcomes
epitomizes a type of knowledge that Collier (2011) labeled a conceptual framework.
Specifically, scholars rely on various types of evidence as they attempt to untangle causal
order processes, one of which is a conceptual framework, or sets of interrelated
concepts, often accompanied by general ideas of how the concepts can be
operationalized. These frameworks thereby identify and link the topics seen as meriting
analytic attention (p. 824). Basing his progression of knowledge accumulation, which
leads to a determination of causal processes, off of Waltz (1979), Collier (2011)
summarized three other types of knowledge that followed from a conceptual framework:
empirical regularities (established patterns in relationships between two variables);
theory-1 (better linking relationships into a particular occurrence or experience); and
theory-II (a set of propositions explaining why the observed relationships occur). Long
26


(1958) left it to future researchers to establish patterned associations between games and
their outcomes, and he was virtually silent on determinants of games.
Causal processes depend on careful description (Collier, 2011; George and
Bennett, 2005). Of the relatively little research that has employed the ecology of games
framework, most of it has been descriptive in nature, using the ecology as a metaphor.
For example, Firestone (1989) applied the ecology of games metaphor to educational
policy. As Long (1958) pointed out that community operations involved a number of
interacting areas. Firestone (1989) similarly called attention to the cross-cutting nature of
policy, thereby making a case of the ecology of games metaphor in educational policy.
Firestone (1989, p. 19) specified possible substantive links between the games, enhancing
description within the framework and setting the stage for future empirical tests: Linking
educational policy games are the flows between them: The downward flow of resources
and regulation from legislature to classroom and the upward flow of demands from
educators as well as the general public. To boost the richness of his description,
Firestone (1989) limited his analysis to only two games (state legislature and school
districts). Consistent with Longs (1958) recommendation, he used historical analysis of
the games and their players to assess their interactions and implications. Firestones
primary theoretical insight was that the interdependencies and discontinuities that connect
games define the nature of the flow of resources and demands between them. Indeed,
.. .games closer to the point of service delivery rely on resources from those that are
farther away, but these resources often come with restraints that create complications in
the specific situation (Firestone, 1989, p. 21). Conversely, ...games that are farther
27


from the point of service delivery are driven in part by demands that come from games
that are closer (Firestone, 1989, p. 21).
With respect to causal processes, Firestones analysis underscores the
complexities in determining and measuring the games, their players, roles, goals,
strategies, and tactics. Also, Firestone (1989) mirrored an essential argument in this
analysisthat games and the ecology of games are influenced by resources. Specifically,
he reasoned that inputs like textbooks, the testing program, and guidance through the
curriculum constitute the teaching game, particularly as it is played with children.
Arguably, the substantive link between resources and games is not between games within
the ecology, but rather within each game through the utilization of various strategies,
which shape specific tactics and have implications for games and the ecology of games.
Brandon (1994), Dutton and Makinen (1987), and Dutton (2010) applied the
ecology of games framework (respectively) to science and technology, generally, and the
internet and telecommunications, specifically. Brandon (1994) took an inductive
approach, looking at the contribution of several major actors to the ecology of games that
shaped long-term science and technology goals. He examined the roles and interactions
of a number of players (e.g., executive branch of government, Congress, the courts,
academic institutions, private industry, non-governmental organizations, and the general
public), focusing specifically on their responsibilities and involvements in long-term
science and technology games. Brandons (1994) research was less metaphorical than
the previous case studiesit illustrated the benefits of identifying the relevant players in
an ecology of games and then looking at their roles, goals, and interactions with respect
to a type of policy. The primary drawback of his research was that it was generalthe
28


players Brandon (1994) identified were universal types who, if broken down into more
specific groups, may play science and technology games very differently. Likewise,
science and technology goals were identified as a unitary set of goals, which again, may
disguise more nuanced, substantive conflicts if they were looked at more particularly.
Dutton and Makinen (1987) were the first to explicitly identify alternative
perspectives to the ecology of games framework on decision-making processes. Other
than the ecology of games perspective, they recognized the legal-institutional perspective,
the elite perspective, and the pluralist perspective. Although Long (1958) indirectly
acknowledged other viewpoints, even he did not systematically review them or explicate
why the ecology of games framework was superior. As Collier (2011) stated, this
exercise is part of acquiring theoretical knowledge upon which discovering causal
processes is dependent. Similar to other case studies, Dutton and Makinen (1987)
employed a historical analysis, likening theirs to a form of process tracing (George and
Bennett, 2005). They identified several games that affected telecommunications, but did
not aim to facilitate development in the field, including ... a regulatory policy game,
anti-trust enforcement game, an economic development game, a real estate game, a land
development game, a cable franchise game, a rate regulation game, and so on..(Dutton
and Makinen, 1987, p. 258). They did not reveal how they came up with this list of
games, nor did they evaluate these games and their players in the context of their case
study, the development of a microwave communications network. They reviewed the
history of the Times Mirror Microwave Communications Company and then analyzed the
emergent patterns, which included the purpose of various games in the larger ecology.
For example, Dutton and Makinen (1987, p. 262) ascertained, It is unlikely that any
29


actor involved in this business made the decision or wrote the plan to build the long
distance network. Actors made decisions about other things, such as whether to purchase
a cable system; whether to sell or lease an under-utilized microwave facility; and whether
to focus on the core business of the company.
This study constituted the first piece of research to expand the geographic
boundary of the ecology of games framework beyond the local communitythe games
involved in the development of this telecommunications network were national in scope.
In a similar vein and perhaps related to the different scope of the games, this research was
more of a substantive leap from Longs original focus than many of the other case
studies, demonstrating the far-reaching potential applications of the framework. Dutton
and Makinen (1987) did not systematically analyze games and their rules but concluded
that rules of the game were essential to the outcomes. They drew on a few examples to
illustrate this conclusion.
As was the case with the telecommunications case study, Dutton (2010) applied
the ecology of games framework to a substantively far-reaching (within the context of the
original formulation of the theory) and geographically broad issue, the internet. He
identified six games and, for each, their main players and goals and objectives. The six
games that affected information and communication technologies (specifically, the
development of the internet) were economic development, developing country,
communitarian, telecommunication regulation, broadband suppliers, and content
provision. He did not specify how he pinpointed these games. As with the case studies
before it, Dutton (2010) used games to illustrate the complex interplay and unintentional
effects that the ecology of games had on an outcome (internet governance). Although
30


Dutton (2010) did not provide empirical support for his contentions, he underscored the
theorys practical importance in the relationship between games and outcomes, in this
case technological advances:
.. .the growth of the Internet from an experimental network within
an ecology of defense, public policy, and technical innovation
games to become todays worldwide phenomenon did not happen
just because a few people turned bright ideas into practical systems.
It resulted from a huge number of players in intertwined academic,
commercial, technical, industrial, and other games making
decisions about how specific aspects of the Internet should be
designed, developed, used, or governed. Each decision met
goals and made sense within different arenas, and the inter-
action between choices in each game combined to create the
21st Century phenomenon represented by the Internet... (p. 248)
Similar to Firestone (1989), Brandon (1994), Dutton and Makinen (1987), and
Dutton (2010), Mendel (2003) applied the ecology of games metaphor to a substantive
area, in this case the establishment of a non-profit organization. Mendel (2003) did not
focus on a policy as a game, but rather an organization as a game player in the ecology.
Specifically, he analyzed how a non-profit organization, the Union Miles Community
Coalition, was established to serve a mediating purpose during a time when a
communitys ecology of games was shifting. Mendel (2003) ascertained that the loss of
steel jobs and resources in Cleveland led to not only an economic decline, but a decline in
other opportunities and overall quality of life. When undesirable social changes occurred
31


a number of groups formed the Union Miles Community Coalition, a non-profit
organization that would, .articulate the concerns of residents and businesses to local
government and agencies and then to the powerful Cleveland corporate community
(Mendel, 2003, p. 233). This group and another similar organization, the Union Miles
Development Corporation, were responsible for a number of community initiatives that
contributed to positive changes in the community with respect to safety, trash clean-up,
painting, fixing older homes, and establishing new housing. These findings speak to the
importance of social, political, and economic context in shaping the elements of games
players, strategies, rules, roles, and goals. Mendel (2003) pointed out that the creation of
non-profit organizations as mediators should be considered in light of their primary,
secondary, and tertiary constituencies (the most to third-level important people being
served). Also, he suggested that better attention should be paid to how non-profit
organizations fit into the larger context of the communities in which they operate. This
suggestion is consistent with the earlier argument that, among other factors, communities
in which organizations are situated in are relevant to games, strategies, and missions that
they pursue. Whereas Long contextualized the community as a giventhe cumulative
effect of functional outcomes resulting from the ecology of gamesthe role of
community demographics and resources in how actors play games should be treated as an
empirical question.
For the most part, the existing research on the ecology of games framework has
involved a case study approach, applying the framework to a substantive area. Case
study research has demonstrated the utility of the ecology of games framework,
demonstrating that outcomes are not a result of planned activities by a centralized source,
32


but rather the consequence of multiple games, each of which is constituted by players,
roles, rules, strategies, and goals, and together are connected (e.g., via people, resources,
demands). Notably, games may not be targeted toward the outcome, making the result an
unintentional product of interactions in the ecology of games. This case study research
cumulatively has led to a rich description of various theoretical elements within the
framework (e.g., games, actors, roles, and connections between games in an ecology).
What has been largely neglected are empirical applications of the framework, which
would be a logical next step in untangling the causal processes involved in game creation,
game playing, the larger ecology, and its outcomes.
Cornwell et al. (2003) took an orderly approach to their ecology of games analysis
of the construction of the Paul Brown Stadium in Cincinnati, Ohio. They identified the
games involved in the stadiums construction (again, providing little guidance for
measuring the concept beyond anecdotal induction), the players in each game, and the
issues associated with the games and their players. Their network analysis facilitated the
discovery of elements that were responsible for keeping an ecological system together
(e.g., by removing a certain player from the network, the density of the network was
substantially diminished). This finding also reflected a degree of empirical support for
ecology of gamesif a single player or game is removed from the network, the ecology
changes. Although Cornwell et al. (2003) did not take the community out of its
ecological context, they pointed out that the ecology of games framework could be
applied to any territory that contains actors, in which issues are raised, and where two or
more games are played, indicating the theorys widespread potential. Cornwell et als
(2003) research signified theoretic and methodological advances, as they employed
33


network analysis, which was the first quantitative analysis of the framework; however, it
did little to address the causal processes within the theory. Similar to other applications,
the outcome was pre-determined and the role of the ecology of games was analyzed in
hindsight, with the outcome already in mind.
Lubell et al. (2010) made (arguably) what have been the largest methodological
and theoretical leaps in the ecology of games framework. They looked at the effect of
participation in collaborative institutions on individual-level cooperative attitudes and
behaviors. They examined competing hypotheses from ecology of games and the
institutional rational choice perspective, the latter of which neglects to consider
transaction costs (externalities) which may inhibit the capacity of policy games to
produce cooperation, to determine the marginal effect of collaborative institutions for
improving cooperative attitudes and behaviors. Although Lubell et al. (2010) did not
measure transaction costs, they mentioned possible examples as fragmentation,
inefficient outcomes, and conflict.
Lubell et als (2010) adaptation of the ecology of games framework included four
concepts: policy issues, policy games, policy actors, and policy arenas, which constitute a
theoretical link to the policy process literature and how games may affect outcomes. The
collective action problem represented the policy issue (e.g., pollution, traffic congestion).
Similar to previous research, Lubell et al. (2010) argued that games constitute arenas of
cooperation and competition structured by rules (see also Dutton, 1995); they provided
opportunities for actors to both acquire resources and achieve policy goals. Based on this
definition of policy games, Lubell et al. (2010) operationalized the concept as
participation (dummy coded) in eleven planning activities, including attending meetings,
34


writing plan alternatives, talking to representatives, reading documents, etc. Further,
recall that they identified six policy games: city/county planning, environmental review
procedures, natural resources planning, transportation planning, city council or county
board meetings, and local planning. They coded participation in each of these activities
on a scale of one (never) to six (daily). Perhaps unintentionally, they overcame what
could be a weakness in the framework exposed by Brandon (1994), that when games are
measured too broadly (particularly in issue or institutional communities) and without
consideration of strategy, important substantive conflicts are lost, which diminishes the
explanatory power of the relationshipshow games affect outcomes and how they are
influenced by various internal factors, such as strategies.
Lubell et al. (2010) provided an explicit link between the ecology of games
framework and governance, putting forth that games, together with collaborative
institutions, comprise a set of governance institutions in a region. They found that both
of their measures of games were positively associated with their dependent variables,
cooperative implementation (sum of yes responses to a list of seven implementation
activities, such as information sharing, sharing personnel, and joining an interagency task
force), perceived policy fairness (three item scale asking stakeholders to assess fairness
of regional policies), and policy satisfaction (measured with a three-item scale asking
whether current policies will solve regional problems, whether there is effective
leadership, and innovative solutions). The empirical findings supported their contention
of the importance of an ecology of (multiple) games over the ... sanguine view of
collaborative institutions provided by Institutional Rational Choice (Lubell et al., 2010,
p. 298). Lubell et al. (2010) concluded that questions of governance must include the
35


evolution of cooperation across the entire ecology of games, rather than just a single
institution. The issues of whether and how governance among game players affects the
games in which groups participate (e.g., through strategies) remain uncertain. The
association between games and governance is germane from both a theoretic and
substantive perspective.
Another piece of recent research (Smaldino and Lubell, 2011) examined the
ecology of games in the context of cooperation among social actors. Specifically,
Smaldino and Lubell (2011) developed a model for an ecology of public goods games,
characterized by situations where individual contributions benefit the group, but not the
individualthe individual is better off free riding. Consistent with Long (1958),
Smaldino and Lubell (2011) contended that games structure interactions; however, they
depart from Longs original thesis that individuals primarily play one game and look at
how the ecology changes when individuals join and abandon games or play in multiple
games. They assumed fixed resources among the players, but looked at budget
constraints (which limit the number of games in which an individual can play) and
capacity constraints (which restrict the number of individuals that can participate in each
game).
They found that budget constraints made little difference in the payoff between
cooperators and defectors: Severe budget constraints allowed cooperators to do slightly
better than in the unconstrained model due to defectors inability to invade all games, but
cooperators still dramatically underperformed relative to defectors (Smaldino and
Lubell, p. 3). Capacity restraints, on the other hand were advantageous to cooperation,
although the benefits diminished as the maximum group size increased. Indeed,
36


limitations on a games capacity produce a positive assortment where cooperators
remain in games with other cooperators and exit games that contain too many defectors.
One ramification of this model is the inherent conflict between the values of democracy
and inclusiveness contained in many social and political processes and the finding that
cooperation relies on exclusion. Beyond the importance of each game, Smaldino and
Lubells research has other implications. First, the ecology of games framework is useful
in moving forward our understanding of social and political processesthey utilized a
model of public goods games, but pointed out its theoretical utility outside of this context.
Second, this research did not look at exogenous mechanisms that affect the ecology of
games. Institutional mechanisms like budget and capacity restraints provide a good start,
and the researchers correctly ascertain that future scholarship should focus on the
complexities within an ecology of games (of which resources may be one) and apply the
framework to different settings. One way to pursue this recommendation would be to
look at the relationship between resources (which Smaldino and Lubell assumed were
fixed among the actors) and game playing strategies.
There is little consistent empirical evidence (simply because there are so few
studies) that supports or rejects the ecology of games perspective. The research that has
been conducted illustrates the potential of the ecology of games frameworkit has been
applied using a few methodological strategies (e.g., quantitative, case studies) and in
varying substantive capacities. Further, its applications have yielded descriptions and
insights that have advanced the ecology of games framework, positioning it for more
systematic empirical analyses and consequently, better developed theoretical
propositions.
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Propositions in the Ecology of Games Framework
Longs ecology of games provides a nice frameworkit underscores the
importance of institutional actors within the context of their institutions, and institutions
within the broader context of the ecology in which they operate. Further, it links the
ecology of games, which are comprised of these organizations and their individual goals,
to various political and economic outcomes. Longs exposition did not seem to be
constructed with a research methods mindset, though. He very loosely laid out a theory
insofar as the ecology of games contains concepts and cause-and-effect relationships,
both direct and implied. However, Long (1958) did not identify clearly all of the relevant
concepts, let alone empirically (or even conceptually, in some cases) define them.
Moreover, he did not put forth an organized set of statements that could be translated into
testable hypotheses. To the extent that scholars have tested hypotheses from the
framework (e.g., Lubell et al., 2010) they have relied on substantive-specific scholarship
to inform them. For example, one of Lubell et als (2010) ecology of games hypotheses
was: Participation in a collaborative institution reduces the capacity of other existing
institutions to produce cooperative attitudes and behaviors (p. 290). That said, the
ecology of games contains propositions from which its concepts can be developed and
testable hypotheses can be generated, particularly if the framework is advanced by more
well-developed theories. Chapter 3 will focus on resource mobilization theory, focusing
on how it advances the ecology of games framework to answer the question of how
resources and opposition affect environmental justice organizational strategies. Because
the ecology of games framework is abstruse in its suppositions and its explanatory
connections, it is valuable to lay out concisely propositions that are derivable from the
38


framework. Indeed, these propositions then can guide the application of resource
mobilization theory and the derivation of empirical measures of the concepts.
Propositions are declarative statements believed and/or accepted to be true. The
propositions contained in the ecology of games framework include:
1. In geographic (or substantive) areas, individuals participate in games. In this
context, people are role players and their behavior is affected by their roles.
2. People use different strategies and tactics in their game playing.
3. Individuals are both game players and game creators.
4. Individuals focus on one game, but may participate in more than one.
5. Games involve cooperation, competition, and score-keeping, much of which is
transparent in nature.
6. Games that actors play depend on other players and their games.
7. Games that actors play depend on the community in which the actors are situated.
8. The network of games in an area constitutes its ecology.
9. There may be conflict between game players and their goals, but the ecology of
games results in unintended functional outcomes.
Long said very little about what determined which games were playedor more
importantly on which strategies were used. He focused on a single community, and
without addressing spatial variation, there was little need to differentiate whether and
why different games would be played in different places or arenas. Similarly, he did not
offer general categories for types of games, only specific examples of games that were
played in a local community, presenting a challenge for researchers wishing to establish
empirical patterns about determinants and effects of games and their parts. Perhaps Long
39


(1958) did not intend to write a theory, in which case it is inappropriate to label the
challenges of the ecology of games framework (from a theory-testing standpoint) failings.
The empirical difficulties with which the framework challenges researchers present
opportunities to develop the theory and its concepts and to empirically test relational
statements derived from it. Overcoming these challenges requires making some
theoretical and methodological leaps, while relying on other bodies of literature to inform
the context to which ecology of games is applied.
The current version of the ecology of games adapts the framework to facilitate its
application to the study of social movements and specifically environmental justice
organizations. The environmental justice movement, theoretically speaking, is a game
and comprised of a number of individuals, grassroots organizations, and more formal
organizations, which constitute game playing actors. The present study focuses on the
formal organizations that comprise the movement. Although it does not capture other
important actors within the movement, analyzing the formal organizations is theoretically
and substantively relevant. Indeed, formal organizations are an integral part of the
movements strategies; represent many of the movements actors, rules, and goals; and
lend themselves to an analysis that will advance the ecology of games framework by
examining how resources and opposition affect their strategies, which are indicative of
how they play the environmental justice gameand more broadly speaking, how they
participate in this game, which as part of a larger ecology, influences global outcomes.
The environmental justice movement, like other social movements, involves people
defined by their collective action frames (e.g., health, quality of life)staking a claim in
the production and distribution of environmental benefits and burdens that otherwise
40


would be left to public and private authorities. The power of environmental justice
organizations is derived from the collective action of otherwise ordinary citizens. As a
political entity, social movements in general and the environmental justice movement in
particular, are a relatively recent area of scholarship. Embedded in both normative and
empirical discussions of the environmental justice movement are questions of values,
governance, democracy, power, resources, strategies, credibility, and politics. Scholars
have taken on these deliberations, weaving together a number of threads, while leaving
others hanging.
Relatively few empirical examinations of organizations within the movement
have been conducted in the area of environmental justice (Brulle and Pellow, 2006;
Essoka, 2010; Kreig, 1996; Stretesky et al., 2010; Stretesky and Lynch, 1999). The
ecology of games framework, which based on recent research that has applied it to other
policy areas, lends itself well to the study of political interactions and has not been
applied formally to the social movement literature. The environmental justice movement
is concerned with the production and distribution of environmental hazards in various
forms, which independently and together underscore a number of undesirable
ramifications, including a lack of social consciousness and civility in this country;
unnecessarily high rates of diseases, illnesses, injuries, and deaths; diminished quality of
life; and the potentially egregious effects of institutions that create and perpetuate
opportunities for power abuses.
Acquiring a more sophisticated understanding of the ecology of games among
environmental justice organizations is a worthwhile pursuit both theoretically and
substantively. Theoretically, this research adapts the ecology of games framework in
41


such a way that it may advance the empirical formulation of games and the factors that
influence strategy choices within games. Specifically, it will facilitate an understanding
of why organizations operate in specific ways within a game to advocate for
environmental justice. Unlike other variations and applications of the ecology of games
framework, this research considers the influence of exogenous factors that are not
constant, such as resources, competitive influences, and group composition.
Substantively and with respect to broader social contributions, this research can offer
insights into how environmental justice organizations as participants in the environmental
justice game mobilize to accomplish their missions when they are disempowered by the
government and have minimal formal channels to remedy wrongdoings that, at best, are
socially and politically unjust and, at worst, are life-ending.
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CHAPTER III
SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORIES
Introduction
Existing theories in the social movement literature focus on the factors that
influence or inhibit mobilization, including community and organizational resources,
political opportunities, and competition (Allen, 1992; Buechler, 2010; Jenkins, Jacobs,
and Agnone, 2003; Kane, 2003; Konefal, 2010; Meyer and Minkoff, 2004; Peckham,
1998; Vidomus, 2011; Williams and Lee, 2012; Zald and McCarthy, 2002). The ecology
of games framework illuminates the relationship between these factors and organizations
social and political activities. By fusing the ecology of games framework with the factors
identified in social movement theories that are associated with mobilization, one can
analyze a more specific dimension of mobilizationthe factors that determine strategies
that environmental justice organizations use to accomplish their objectives. Put
differently, the synthesis of the ecology of games framework and social movement
theories like resource mobilization facilitates an empirical analysis of how different
resources and opposition affect environmental justice organizations strategies, which
reflect the frame through which they interpret their plight (e.g., production of
environmental burdens, fairness of the political processes that distribute these burdens).
Where the ecology of games framework leaves a wide open door for the examination of
possible influences on game strategies, the social movement literature provides focused
guidance, illustrating the important role of opposition, resources, and political
opportunities in shaping organizational strategies.
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The use of strategy implies an element of competition, which most certainly is
present in cases of collective action, including the mobilization of environmental justice
groups. The presence of opposition and the acquisition of resources (e.g., volunteers, a
Board of Directors, funding, the presence of a well-educated and/or motivated
community) likely shape specific mobilization strategies. Resource mobilization theory
illuminates the significance of resources in shaping the strategies organizational actors
like environmental justice groups use within their games, which constitute a larger
ecology that shapes more global outcomes. The counter-mobilization literature informs
the role of oppositional presence by specifying the types of competition that may exist in
locations environmental justice groups operate. Potential oppositional entities may affect
how environmental justice organizations mobilize (the strategies they use within their
games). Resource mobilization theory is discussed, followed by a review and analysis of
the counter-mobilization literature within the scope of the ecology of games framework.
Resource Mobilization Theory
Research on social movement organizations has paid attention to the importance
of resources, and generally speaking, resource mobilization theory explains both the
formation of social movement organizations (why people organize around a grievance)
(Barkan, 1979; Bamshaw, 2005; McAdam, 1982; McCarthy and Zald, 1977), as well as
mobilization once an organization has formed (Jenkins and Perrow, 1977; Morris, 1981).
Although resource mobilization theory has been criticized for a number of reasons,
including its emphasis on the instrumental aspects of mobilization at the expense of
fundamental reasons for collective action (e.g., shared beliefs) and it seems to have had
its heyday a few decades ago (Tilly, 1998), the theorys role in the evolution of social
44


movement theories is not entirely historical. Indeed, scholars still use the theory, often in
conjunction with other theories (Davis-Delano and Crosset, 2008; Fisher, 2007; Kane,
2003), to advance research on social movements and their organizations.
The present research uses resource mobilization theory to help advance the
ecology of games framework. Ecology of games scholars have neglected to look at the
role of resources in game participation in general and strategy selection in particular.
This study synthesizes the two theoretical perspectives, and in doing so, develops a
convergent theory of mobilization that addresses the relationship between resources,
opposition, and strategies within games. Once an environmental justice organization has
formed, its internal and external resources, as well as the presence of oppositional
entities, are important determinants in the strategies they use. The interconnectedness of
these strategies comprises the game, which together with other games, constitutes the
ecology of games. Resources as an antecedent to game strategies have not been explored
theoretically or empirically, and the concept of mobilization within the context of
organizational strategies also has been under-explored. Characteristics of formal
environmental justice groups as coordinated and sustained groups that engage in
contentious collective action....with elites, authorities, and opponents (Tarrow, 1994,
pp. 1 and 2) facilitate the integration of the ecology of games framework and resource
mobilization theory. This chapter now turns to a discussion of the historical context of
resource mobilization theory to illustrate how the theory will be used to advance the
ecology of games work within the context of social movements.
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Historical Context
Although resource mobilization theory was not formally established until the
1970s, its roots are traceable to the early 20th Century. Tarrow (1998) contextualized the
history of resource mobilization in terms of how scholars and activists conceptualized
problems of collective action, specifically with respect to grievances, frames, politics,
and resources. Karl Marx was perhaps the first well-known conflict theorist, framing
class conflict and the accompanying challenger (proletariat) authority (bourgeouise)
clash as typical, rather than anomalous, the way collective action tended to be viewed.
Marx undertook questions of collective action, addressing questions related to the
structural barriers of revolutionswhy members of a group who should revolt often
fail to do so (Tarrow, 1998, p. 11). Marx (Marx and Engels, 1848) put forth the
necessary condition of class consciousness for workers to revolt against the capitalist elite
who were the source of their oppression, yet as the economic system of capitalism
developed and incorporated elements of democracy and safeguards favorable to the
working class, it became evident that complex conditions beyond class consciousness
would need to come together to create a revolutionary climate. Marxs theory left largely
unexamined questions of political opportunities and barriers and resources like
leadership.
Lenin, a self-identified Marxist, adopted many of Marxs philosophies, but made
historically-specific adaptations, as much of his thinking was a response to political and
economic circumstances in Russia. Specifically, Lenin (1902) proposed the
establishment of a vanguard, who would act on behalf of workers interests.
Presumably, workers only would act on behalf of specific (union) interests and needed an
46


organizing mechanism to create revolutionary change. In this way, he amended Marxs
theory, as Marx did not focus on specific vehicles for systematic collective action
(Tarrow, 1998). Lenin (1902) emphasized the importance of leadership through the
vanguard, and in doing so, planted an important seed that would later be sowed in
resource mobilization theory; however, his discussion of politics was confined to
Communism, rather than placed in a broader context of political opportunities and
obstacles.
Following in the traditions of Marx and Lenin, Gramsci, an Italian theorist, added
other dimensions to his predecessors theories of collective action. Gramsci underscored
the role of culture, ascertaining that cultural hegemony was a vehicle through which the
capitalist state was maintained. For collective action to be effective, Gramsci argued that
the workers needed to come to consensus; operate within the structures established by the
elite while enhancing their capacity for independent action and forming connections
between themselves and other institutions, the latter of which should facilitate their
ability to evangelize their message to other groups and to manage social institutions like
the church. He built on Lenins notion of the vanguard, but distinguished between
traditional intellectuals and organic intellectuals. Traditional intellectuals are people who
articulate (in this case, Marxist) beliefs on behalf of a group, while organic intellectuals
are people whose intelligence is tied to membership in the group and more easily
translated into social actionorganic intellectuals are more enmeshed into the groups
culture. Summarily, Gramscis theory focused on the importance of creating consensus
in collective action efforts.
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Marx and subsequent generations of Marxist theorists set the stage for other
collective action theories, including resource mobilization theory. Marx expounded on
what later social movement scholars labeled grievancesconditions of capitalism that
contributed to a climate ripe for mobilization. Although the perception of a grievance or
injustice is a defining feature of social movements, it is whether those individuals holding
grievances mobilize for collective action that transforms the grievance into a social
movement (Tilly, 1978). Lenin added the organizational component, which he argued
was necessary for a large-scale collective action effort to materializehis adaptation
most directly translated into what later scholars developed as resource mobilization
theory. Finally, Gramsci emphasized the need for exploited workers to form a group
identity, which later became the basis for social movement framing theory.
Early sociological theories of social movements analyzed collective behavior in
its entirety, rather than in more specific substantive contexts (e.g., class struggles of
workers). They generally did not incorporate a political analysis into their explanations,
and they largely failed to specify the mobilization process (Tarrow, 1998). When social
movement activism became more prominent in the 1960s, many collective behavior
theories were abandoned, and resource mobilization theory was born (Tarrow, 1998).
A number of factors, particularly dissatisfaction with current collective behavior
scholarship, the more positive construction of activism that emerged during the 1960s,
and the rise of economics in academics, coalesced to create a different perspective on
collective action, which was centered around the question of, .. .how collective action is
even possible among individuals guided by narrow self-interest (Tarrow, 1998, p. 15).
In other words, even with a common cause, why is mobilization so challenging? Mancur
48


Olson was the most well-known scholar to address this question. Olson (1965) pointed
out that contentious activism was fairly unusual, largely because in groups, individuals
prefer to free ride from people who are motivated by their stronger interest in the
outcome, and that a relatively small group of people will assume a leadership role in
collective action situations (analogous to Lenins notion of vanguard). Olson focused on
individual motivation in collective action situations, positing that to be effective, a
maximum number of people should be motivated to act on behalf of the groups interest.
Simultaneously, to deal with the problem of potential free riders, leaders must either
provide members with incentives to participate or impose conditions on group
membership (Olson, 1965). Olsons theory was confined to explaining collective action
dilemmas with incentives at the individual level.
Olsons work provided the impetus for subsequent scholars to provide
organizational answers to collective action problems. McCarthy and Zald (1973; 1977),
using a similar economic framework as Olsons, developed the theory of resource
mobilization. As was the case with Mancur Olsons theory, resource mobilization theory
constructed one of the main collective action problems as free riders; however, McCarthy
and Zald (1973) contended that resources, including personal material effects,
formalization, and grant support and other financial assistance facilitated an
organizational-level solution to the free rider problemsocial movement organizations.
As Mancur Olson was a proximate influence on the establishment of resource
mobilization theory, McCarthy and Zalds (1973) work also was a response to classical
social movement theory, which postulated that collective action was an irrational
response to strain. Although the activism of the 1960s had shifted the construction of
49


social movements from negative to positive and social movement scholarship had begun
to reflect this shift, the classical theories that framed collective activism as abnormal
remained alive, albeit anemic. Resource mobilization theory represented a paradigmatic
shift in the study of social movements, using the social movement organization to
structure its more rational choice tenets (McCarthy and Zald, 1977).
Resource mobilization emphasized that collective action is rational (Jenkins,
1983). Further, it proposed that the most connected peoplenot the most alienatedare
the most likely to participate in social movement organizations (Taylor, 2000). While
this theory was transformative in the study of social movements, it simultaneously has
been criticized for its rational choice-based assumptions (Fitzgerald and Rogers, 2000)
and, relatedly, its use of economic terminology, which excluded ideological values and
fights against injustices (Tarrow, 1998).
The juxtaposition of resource mobilization theory with the ecology of games
framework is a theoretically worthwhile endeavor. As researchers often set up theories to
see which provides a better explanation of a phenomenon, it is equally or more valuable
to analyze how seemingly contrasting theories work together to explain or predict
outcomes. To an extent, social movement scholars have moved on from resource
mobilization theory, but perhaps prematurely, particularly when the theorys utility may
be maximized within the context of other theories or frameworks. Larger and more
formal organizations within the environmental justice movementgroups with many
members and more formalized structuresare perhaps the most flexible, prominent, and
enduring form of social movements and even collective action. They are one example of
50


how resource mobilization theory can be revitalized as it is used to advance the ecology
of games framework.
Specifically, well-organized and persistent social movement organizations choose
game strategies in response to internal and external resources. Internal factors include
resources like funding and office space and equipment, group size, and leadership
(Pichardo, 1988), and external factors include societal repression and sympathizers
outside of the organization (McCarthy and Zald, 1973; 1977; Morris, 1981; 1984;
Oberschall, 1973; 1978; Pichardo, 1988; Tilly, 1978). With respect to internal resources,
it may be the case that larger organizations, groups with a more formal leadership
structure (e.g., a Board of Directors, paid staff, etc.), and groups that have more money
are more likely to employ strategies that are perceived as less threatening (e.g.,
education) and politically institutionalized (e.g., lobbying) than smaller groups,
organizations that are more informally structured, and groups that have less money (and
likely fewer material resources). Conversely, smaller, more informal, and more under-
resourced groups may be more inclined to use grassroots strategies (e.g., direct action) to
play environmental justice games. External resources will be addressed in more depth in
the counter-mobilization literature and in a later discussion of community resources.
Scope and Assumptions of Resource Mobilization Theory
Even with grievances and political opportunities, mobilization often does not
occur. McCarthy and Zald (1973; 1977) took on the more micro-level question of how
people become motivated to organize into mobilization groups when it flies in the face of
their individual interests to do so, either because there are more personal interests that
they should be more motivated to pursue, or because there are more motivated others
51


who will act on their behalf, enabling them to free ridereap the benefits of the work of
others. They believed the answer to this question lied in mobilization structures at the
organizational level. McCarthy et al. (2008, p. 141) defined mobilizing structures as,
.. .those agreed upon ways of engaging in collective action which include particular
tactical repertoires, particular social movement organizational forms, and modular
social movement repertoires He also included more tangential, non-movement sources
of mobilization, like family and friendship structures, features of the state, work units,
and voluntary groups.
Resource mobilization theory assumes a rational actor approach; in other words,
that people conduct cost-benefit analysis of the risks and rewards associated with, in this
case, collective action, and behave accordingly. This assumption of resource
mobilization theory was one of the tenets on which it was founded, as it was established
largely in response to existing collective action theories that contextualized social
movements as abnormal. In accordance with a rational actor approach, resource
mobilization theory proceeded to argue that a combination of a political opening (e.g.,
that would enable the prospect of a challenge as a worthwhile consideration) and
resources to take advantage of an apparent weakness in the political system justify the
pursuit of a challenge, as success would seem like a legitimate possibility produced the
formation of social movement organizations and their decisions to mobilize. More
specifically and within the context of the ecology of games framework, organizations
need to allocate their resources strategically to achieve their goals and how they do this is
a neither random nor arbitrary, but rather by design and an issue that should be addressed
empirically. Although resource mobilization theory has been criticized for its rational
52


actor underpinnings, this assumption is one of the foundations of the theory. Rather than
abandon it, to the extent that its rational choice assumption is inaccurate, scholars should
consider the theory in a broader context and/or test it in conjunction with other theoretical
approaches that do not share its rational choice supposition. Revisiting the theorys
political roots (by looking at resources external to the organizations, such as communities
in which groups are situated and the presence of opposition), in conjunction with
combining the theorys predictions with tenets from the ecology of games framework (by
looking at mobilization outcomes in terms of the strategies environmental justice
organizations use) does not negate criticisms of either theory, but minimizes many of
their independent weaknesses.
McCarthy and Zald (1977) and other resource mobilization theorists viewed
formal social movement organizations as the vehicles through which social movements
mobilize resources. Although resource mobilization theory does not eschew the
importance of grass roots mobilization efforts, the formulation of the theory came at a
time when organizational form was shifting toward the bureaucraticgroups often were
funded by grants and had officers, Boards of Directors, staff, and more highly structured
activitiesand hence, its foundations and propositions more comprehensively
incorporate this type of organization than the smaller, less structured grass roots groups.
Using resource mobilization theory to examine the role of resources (which are reflected
in organizational form) in shaping strategy is particularly important in light of the
assumption that larger, more well-funded, and bureaucratic groups have abandoned
grassroots strategies like direct action. Resource mobilization theory ascertains that, in
order to create social change (which is what they strategize to do), groups must draw on
53


resources from within and outside the group, and those resources may include money and
financial assets, material property (e.g., computers, meeting space, etc.), human resources
(e.g., volunteers), and social capital (e.g., networking ability) (Jenkins, 1983; McCarthy
and Wolfson, 1996), as well as political opportunities (e.g., politicians who allot
substantial grant money to the movements goals).
Some scholars have contended that political opportunities constitute a resource.
Tarrow (1996), Canel (1997), and others have argued that political opportunities are a
resource in that they provide prospects for organizations to obtain resources.
Presumably, more democratic political leadership facilitates the provision of more
resources. In a different vein, although political opportunity theory is distinguishable
from resource mobilization theory, it may be argued that a more (but not entirely) open
political structure constitutes an external resource to social movement organizations
(Lipsky, 1968). According to Tarrow (1998, p. 77), Compared with theorists of
resource mobilization.. .writers in the political opportunity tradition emphasize the
mobilization of resources external to the group.
Although much of the political process literature looks at dimensions other than
political openness, taking the political opportunity piece of this theoretical pie affords
resource mobilization theorists the ability to answer mobilization questions in a
theoretically appropriate manner, remaining true to the theorys political roots, while
looking at resources external to the organization. Similarly, while many scholars have
treated resource mobilization and political opportunity theories as entirely distinct,
maintaining that political structures shape the landscape that facilitate or constrain the
likelihood of mobilization, Tarrow (1998) came to the conclusion that the previous notion
54


of political structure should be re-conceptualized as perceived political opportunities and
constraints, which are more situational than they are structured. To this extent, one may
argue that political opportunities and constraints, while external to the organizations,
themselves, are not entirely divorced from organizational resources. In fact, within the
context of resource mobilization theory, a number of scholars have defined political
features, such as polity group number and strength and societal repression as external
organizational resources (Gamson, 1975; 1980; McCarthy and Zald, 1973; 1977; Morris,
1981; 1984; Oberschall, 1973; 1978; Pichardo, 1988; Tilly, 1978). As well, it likely is
the case that the local and, to a lesser extent, state and national political context in which
groups operate are reflected in community characteristics like median income, racial
composition, and education level.
Within the context of the ecology of games framework, groups that are located in
wealthier, more formally educated, and white communities may be more likely to use
strategies that play out in a political arena (e.g., lobbying, legal strategies, the media) and
are non-threatening to political connections, funding sources, and the public audience
(e.g., research, education, etc.). By looking at the effect of both internal and external
resources on games as a form of mobilization, resource mobilization theory advances the
ecology of games by placing it in a more political context. Even if Long (1958) was
correct that the ecology of games produces unintended and functional outcomes, the
structure of games and the participants and strategies within them are neither accidental,
nor apolitical. Resource mobilization theory informs this antecedent aspect of the
ecology of games.
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Summarily, resource mobilization theory was established partly in response to
existing collective action theories that viewed social movements as deviant. It argued
that social movement organizations were formed for the rational purpose of challenging
the status quo or influencing social change. McCarthy and Zalds original formulation of
the theory had economic foundations and focused on the acquisition and importance of
resources within organizations (e.g., money, access to the media, etc.) Other adaptations
of the theory augmented it with a political dimension, demonstrating the theorys
potential to explain mobilization outcomes when it considered not only grievances and
internal resources, but the political situation, which includes external resources (e.g.,
demographics, socioeconomic factors, and political party influence that could affect the
provision of organizational resources like funding), as well as organizational interactions,
including how groups network with other organization and how they deal with potential
and actual oppositional entities.
Defining and Measuring Resources
Social movement organizations draw on a variety of resources, which scholars
have categorized in a number of different ways. For example, Edwards and McCarthy
(2004) described moral, cultural, organizational, human, and material resources.
McCarthy and Wolfson (1996) focused on the importance of people, money, and
legitimacy in social movements. Wolfson (1995) contended that resources may be
related to social movement organization effectiveness through media coverage and
legitimacy. Diani (1997) and Andrews (1997) discussed social network ties as a form of
social capital. Brulle and Jenkins (2005) found evidence that foundation support was
integral to environmental organizational success in that it provided access to formal
56


resources, likely through a legitimating effect; Tarrow (1998) also argued for the
importance of foundation funding (along with money, free time, expertise, and the
media). Taylor (2000) illustrated how environmental justice organizations mobilized
legal resources, scientific and technical resources, decision-makers, human resources,
money, and time in order to grow and survive.
Although only minimal research has treated frames or political opportunities as
resources empirically, Tarrow (1998) made an effective argument for their inclusion. A
third type of resource he argued should be considered is mobilizing structures, which
includes networks, as well as institutions like the Black church (which which was an
integral part of the development of the civil rights movement). Arguably, the way social
movement groups network is not so much a resource as it is a feature of their
organization. In a similar vein, an equally important organizational feature is groups
rivals and their interaction with various sources of opposition (e.g., other organizations,
political rivals, businesses, etc.). The effect of this dimension of organizations on
outcomes is under-explored, particularly in quantitative applications of resource
mobilization theory.
There is little agreement over which types of resources are the most significant in
predicting social movement organization formation and outcomes. Mostperhaps all
research in this area includes money as a resource, but beyond that, there is extensive
variation in how to define and categorize resources. Also, most resource mobilization
analysts simply list assets in their measures of resources (Cress and Snow, 1996; Jenkins,
1983). Cress and Snow (1996) improved upon this approach in their qualitative
comparative analysis of 15 homeless social movement organizations. Specifically, they
57


employed an inductive, grounded theory design, enabling them to tie various resources
and resource combinations to viability. They found that a number of different resources
and resource combinations mattered to viability (which was defined as homeless
organizations that existed for more than one year, met at least twice a month, and planned
and carried out protest campaigns). Moral support enhanced viability by providing
legitimacy and giving organizations the sense that others supported them. Certain
material resources were important (supplies, meeting space, and office space), and all
three types of information resources were essential to viabilitystrategic support,
technical support, and referrals. All of the viable social movement organizations had
strong leaders, which were one of three human resources. The leaders were both a source
of information and continuity to their organizations. Cress and Snow (1996) found that
three-fourths of organizational resources came from an external source. Importantly,
they pointed out that temporal order presents an issue in much resource mobilization
theory researchit might be that successful, viable organizations attract more resources;
however, even if this is the case, it also remains that the relationship works in the
hypothesized direction (that resources affect outcomes).
Resources both internal and external to social movement organizations should be
considered. The level and type of resources available in and to a community should
shape the arenas in which its organizations operate. Likewise, whatever material and
non-material assets an organization possesses should determine the strategies that are
available and desirable to that group. Whether or not a social movement emerges and is
successful depends largely on the ability of its organizations to mobilize resources
through the strategies they employ. It is outside the context of this research to examine
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organizations emergence or their effectiveness; however, analyzing the effect of
different types of resources on organizations strategy choices is an important step in
utilizing the strengths of resource mobilization theory to advance the ecology of games
framework, and in the process, illuminating the role of both resources and mobilization
strategies in shaping the formal sector of the environmental justice movement, which is
an important part of the environmental justice game.
Propositions in Resource Mobilization Theory
The establishment and evolution of resource mobilization theory (Gamson 1975;
McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977; Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978) provide for a number of
theoretical propositions. First, social movements form as a rational response to political
inequality (Gamson, 1975). Social movement organizations form and mobilize (or do not
come together) based on a cost-benefit analysis of whether collective action is in their
best interest. This decision is made based on whether there is a perception of weakness
in the extant political structure that will facilitate organizational success and whether a
prospective group will have sufficient resources to carry out its mission in light of the
obstacles it will face. While Gamson (1975) focused as much on the political aspect as
the economic cost-benefit analysis, McCarthy and Zald (1973; 1977) and others (Fireman
and Gamson, 1979; Kerbo, 1982) assumed the presence of a grievance, rooted in a
political challenge, and focused more on the economic element and internal
organizational forces.
Second, resource mobilization theory proposes that social movement
organizational forms have shifted from smaller, decentralized, grassroots arrangements to
larger, more formal and bureaucratic structures. This transformation occurred largely as
59


a result of the industrial revolution. Indeed, with the growth of cities, more centralized
politics, and more national/international markets, smaller, more grassroots collective
action efforts became less competitive, as they had comparatively fewer resources and
opportunities than their opponents, who often were arms of the state and corporations.
To become competitive in the markets of equitable distributions of public goods (e.g.,
social, environmental, and economic benefits and burdens), social movement
organizations had to expand in size and change in form to reflect the more structured,
authoritarian features of their competition (Calhoun, 1982; Tilly, 1978). Descriptions of
the transition in social movement organizations structures and strategies have been
grounded in history, theory, and case studies, but it has not been assessed empirically.
The question of how resources and opposition affect organizational strategies should be
researched quantitatively, as statistical analyses facilitate conclusions that are, at least
relatively speaking, valid and generalizable, relevant to a movement, rather than a single
organization or a few groups.
Gamson (1975) most explicitly dealt with the reasons behind the nationalization of
social movements. To compete with counter-mobilization forces with strong
mechanisms of internal control, social movement organizations also must adopt
arrangements that centralize power and formalize their structure. Centralization of power
prevented disputes over control, and a formal organizational structure, characterized by
written goals and levels of internal organizational classification, created roles that
increased the certainty of member participation. The effects of industrialization included
both a model for organizations to follow, as well as a concentration of resources,
including money, communication mechanisms, and organized labor (Freeman, 1979).
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Although the notion of diffusiontransferring of frames or tacticsis not part of
resource mobilization theory, it is quite possible that the effects of industrialization both
directly and indirectly, through diffusion, contributed to the nationalization of social
movements. Although grassroots efforts remain a vital part of social movement
activities, much research on these groups is case studies of a single organization or an
examination of protest events, neither of which lend themselves to quantitative tests of
resource mobilization theory. Testing this theory, using more formalized social
movement organizations, is consistent with the theorys tenets.
Third, resource mobilization theory presumes that in collective action situations,
particularly those that involve many people, the problem of free riders will emerge. That
is, people will opt not to participate in collective action when they perceive that others
will put forth the effort and assume the risks, while they can free ride and still reap the
benefits, if the effort is successful. When the stakes involve public goodsbenefits that,
by definition, are shared among everyone and are not diminished when others use them
it is possible to free ride and still receive the gains acquired by the efforts of others
(Olson, 1965).
There are several ways that social movement organizations may overcome the free
rider problem. First, in some cases, groups may have mechanisms in place to force
member participation directly (e.g., unions) (Olson, 1965) or indirectly (e.g., paying staff
to recruit members or organize an event). Second, some organizations may provide
concrete benefits to their members (e.g., insurance, career benefits) (Olson, 1965). Third,
in more egalitarian social movement organizations, members receive non-material
benefits, such as ideological reinforcement, a sense of belonging to a group of similar
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others who are united based on a common goal (solidarity), and interpersonal bonds, as
well as more freedom with respect to available mobilization strategies (Gerlach and Hine,
1970). While early theoretical writings integrated the free rider problem, later
applications of the theory seem to have assumed that social movement organizations
overcame the free rider problem, as they did not address this aspect of the theory.
Fourth, resource mobilization theory predicts that organizations compete with one
another for scarce resources, and to minimize this competition, they specialize (McCarthy
and Zald, 1977; Zald and McCarthy, 1980). This proposition emerged from an economic
rationale that firms in the same market would avoid competing with one another by
developing a narrower niche that would give them access to a distinct market. With
respect to social movement organizations, the more groups there are in a movement, the
more likely they are to specialize (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). Likewise, when there are
scarce resources within the communities in which social movement groups operate,
organizations are more likely to specialize (McCarthy and Zald, 1977).
Finally, resource mobilization theory ascertains that only when political conditions
are advantageous and the resources are in place to exploit them will organizations form
and mobilize. Ideal political conditions include a mix of open and closed factors, as a
totally open political system would render collective action unnecessary, and a
completely closed system would make mobilization not worth the effort and risk. The
political climate that best facilitates collective action is one that is sufficiently oppressive
to generate a challenge, but open enough to reveal weaknesses for challenges to take
advantage of. Beyond this level of analysis, most discussion of political processes as
they relate to social movements was confined to political opportunity theory.
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Resource mobilization theory is at the organizational level, its propositions limited
to the role of resources and what happens to individual organizations under circumstances
of resource competition. Conversely, the ecology of games framework looks at the larger
context of multiple games involving multiple actors (organizations). While resource
mobilization theory has rational actor underpinnings, the ecology of games framework
ascertains that multiple games, which are comprised by strategies, goals, and actors,
produce outcomes in unintentional, unplanned ways. Together, the theories provide an
opportunity to look at the effect of resources on organizational strategies within a game,
which bear on the larger ecology and perhaps affect how the nature of the ecology might
change should a single game be removed.
Resource mobilization theory addresses the larger political environment, but does
not translate political opportunities and constraints to the organizational level. One
possible constraint at the organizational level is the presence of oppositional entities that
challenge social movement organizations. Just as political structures shape the
environment that facilitates or inhibits social movement organization formation and
mobilization, potential competition that groups will encounter in their collective action
strategies should influence outcomes like groups formation, framing of organizational
missions, and strategies the groups employ.
Oppositional Forces
The cause-effect relationship between social movement organizations and their
competition is not well-understood beyond isolated contexts. Examples of these include
health advocates and the National Smokers Alliance (Givel, 2007); cooperatives in the
grain, dairy, and fire insurance industries (Schneiberg, King, and Smith, 2008); white
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counter-mobilization with respect to voter participation and partisan voting (Carmines,
Huckfeldt, and McCurley, 1995); elite oppositional responses to the labor movement
(Haydu, 1999); and health policy lobbying (Lowery, Gray, Wolak, Godwin, and Kilbum,
2005). A few theories of counter-mobilization have been put forth, but they are neither
well-developed, nor well-tested. Key (1949) provided one of the earliest pieces of
evidence that counter-mobilization may occur as a result of the mere presence of a
perceived enemy. He found that whites tended to mobilize in counties with a large
number of Blacks, even though there was virtually no political participation among
Blacks in these counties. White mobilization seemed to be a consequence of a perceived
threatbecause Blacks were present (and in large numbers), they had the potential to
band together and become an actual threat to their political hegemony. Alt (1994) found
that whites in counties with higher Black populations were more likely to be registered to
vote than whites in counties with lower Black populations, suggesting a similar
phenomenon.
A second conceptualization of oppositional forces to social movements is that
they form in direct response to collective action of the opposing side (Berry, 1997;
Carmines et al., 1995). The common-sense causal mechanism for this relationship is that
the presence of one interest will spark opposition to mobilize in order to prevent its
contrary interest from being realized. Berry (1997) also pointed out that as an interest
organizes, it raises awareness among opponents about what they are doing. Notably, this
connection can be empirically tested by looking at the effect of oppositional presence on 3
3 There has been extensive work done on the relationship between organizations mobilizing to minimize the
effects of climate change and groups that deny that climate change is occurring (or that it is having any
adverse effects); however, to the extent that this work includes counter-mobilization theory, it primarily is
inductive, demonstrating how oppositional efforts frame their adversarial discourse (see, for example,
Knight and Greenberg, 2011).
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game strategies, because the organizations perception of its oppositionthe oppositions
perceived power, resources, strategies, goals, etc.likely will influence how the
organization mobilizes (i.e., what strategy or strategies it employs). For example, the
perception of a strong oppositional presence may be the catalyst for organizations to use
strategies that gamer a lot of attention (e.g., media) or that involve more political power
(e.g., lobbying). One illustration of this formulation of counter-movements is when
health groups mobilized in the early 1990s against the tobacco industry, warning citizens
of the dangers of smoking and lobbying for higher taxes on cigarettes and more smoking
regulations. The tobacco industry responded by creating the National Smokers Alliance,
a powerful counter-mobilization group designed specifically to engineer public opinion
and lobby against higher taxes and regulations (Givel, 2007). In a similar vein, Carmines
et al. (1995) found that in presidential elections after 1964, as Blacks participation in
electoral politics increased, they voted overwhelmingly for democrat candidates and
consequently, whites, particularly whites in counties with high concentrations of Blacks,
abandoned the Democrat party, voting more for republican candidates.
A third explanation for the formation of oppositional efforts is that the dichotomy
between movement or action and counter-mobilization is inaccurate and opposing efforts
unite conjointly (Carmines et al., 1995). Carmines et al. (1995) pointed out that counter-
mobilization is not simply a matter of showing up (e.g., voter turn-out). Rather, there
must be a political meaning or message behind the activity that reflects an oppositional
effort. Schneiber et al. (2008) extended this line of argument, positing that opportunity,
mobilization and counter mobilizationthe dynamics of contention... can produce
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historical, path-dependent trajectories and a sequence over time of different movement
effects (p. 657)
Just as there are a number of processes that may shape the emergence of
movement opposition, the efforts of counter-mobilizers may have a number of effects on
social movements. Specifically, they may diminish or even reverse the impact of
whomever they are challenging; they may limit prospects; cause cultural frames to shift;
or prompt existing entities to change their venues or tactics (Haydu, 1999; Schneiber et
al., 2008). On a structural level, Stryker (2007) illustrated one effect of a form of
counter-mobilization on the labor movement. Conceptualizing law as a political resource
to be strategically mobilized and counter-mobilized, Stryker (2007) ascertained that a
number of anti-uni on court decisions in the 19th Century, combined with the labor
movements near inability to achieve legislative victories in spite of its efforts, caused the
movement to become less radical and more focused in its efforts. Strykers (2007)
illustration of the labor movement illuminates the larger point that the mobilization of
resources and counter-mobilization efforts, together, affect social movements, both in
terms of their ability to accomplish their missions and their operations, including the
game strategies they use.
Dudas (2005) provided one causal mechanism through which the influence of
opposition on certain types of existing social movements may occur. Specifically, he
argued that marginalized groups incite a politics of resentment, where entities that are
threatened by the potential power of the once oppressed groups create a language and
political environment that frame the efforts of the group as demanding special rights.
In constructing a politics of resentment, counter-mobilization efforts not only diminish
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the effectiveness of the marginalized groups, but affect more large-scale national
discourse and policy on similar issues. Within the context of certain types of social
movements then (e.g., treaty-rights, civil rights, etc.), oppositional groups operate
through a politics of resentment that has both instrumental and ideological effects within
and well beyond individual group or even movement goals (Dudas, 2005).
The causes and effects of counter-mobilization not only present theoretical
challenges, they also contain methodological challenges. According to Lowery et al.
(2005, p. 100), counter-mobilization is a term routinely used by political scientists, but
one that has only quite weak theoretical and empirical foundations. Indeed, obtaining
valid measures of opposition is challenging, as it may be difficult to identify who
opposing forces are, how they are mobilizing, and what effects they are having,
particularly when the context is a social movement or a broader unit than an individual
group. Schneiber et al. (2008) measured anti-corporate counter-mobilization by the
strength of the democratic-populist vote in the 1892 presidential election and anti-
corporate counter-mobilization political effectiveness by whether states had passed a
Granger Railroad regulation, an anti-trust regulation, or an insurance anti-compact law,
admittedly, crude proxies (p. 656).
Existing case studies and theoretical discussions involving counter-mobilization
have structured the concept within the context of the movement or cause being studied.
This approach is instructive, particularly when counter-movements are easily identified.
In other cases (e.g., Schneiber et al., 2008), when counter-mobilization is difficult to
identify or impossible to measure empirically, it may be necessary to develop proxy
indicators. Regardless, social movement researchers will be well-served to further
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develop the concept of counter-mobilization theoretically and empirically, as it likely
influences the way that their frames, their political opportunities, and their resources
affect outcomes, including strategies and games. The concept of counter-mobilization
fits well within resource mobilization and ecology of games analyses, as it may influence
the strategies social movement (in this case, environmental justice) organizations employ.
Hence, it constitutes a potentially large explanatory factor of game strategies that should
be explored empirically and in conjunction with other theoretically relevant influences
taken from resource mobilization theory, and to a lesser extent, political opportunity
theory.
Different types and levels of resources may affect organizational strategies in
distinctive ways, as can organizational constraints, particularly in the form of
oppositional presence. For example, perhaps money is unimportant to the strategies of
more radical social movement organizations, while it is fundamental to the strategies of
more conventional groups that may be trying to change a policy (Fitzgerald and Rodgers,
2000). Likewise, it may be the case that the presence of rivalrous entities causes
organizations to utilize political strategies like law and policy. One purpose of this study
is to examine the significance of different types of capital and restraints (opposition) to
the strategies in which environmental justice organizations engage. This purpose will be
fulfilled through statistical analysis. Recall that this relationship, as it is explored in the
present study is unique, because theoretically, strategies are considered as a small part of
a larger game (environmental justice) in which there are many players, including but not
limited to, environmental justice organizations. The ecology of games perspective
contextualizes the scope of the relationship between resources and opposition and
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strategies, placing it in a broader, more global context, and in doing so, illustrating the
importance of environmental justice beyond the social movement. Before discussing
how this research methodologically addresses these purposes, it is necessary to establish
what the environmental justice movement is, what its organizations stand for, and how it
evolved, as these discussions will inform the substantive application of the ecology of
games framework and resource mobilization theory. It is to these matters that this work
now turns.
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CHAPTER IV
THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT
Introduction
The purpose of this study is to apply the ecology of games framework to the
environmental justice movement game and the strategies employed within this game.
Because the ecology of games framework was not formulated as a theory with deducible
concepts and hypotheses, and because the framework has not been applied in ways that
can be replicated, as measures have been adapted using an inductive approach, this work
integrates resource mobilization within the ecology of games framework. Resource
mobilization theory is fitting for the present study, as it was developed to explain
mobilization outcomes, which from an ecology of games standpoint are affected by
strategies used by game players. Resource mobilization theory is a meso-level theory
that fails to situate organizations within the larger sphere in which they operate.
Theoretically and substantively, this weakness is problematic, as organizations like
environmental justice groups employ strategies to influence larger outcomesoutcomes
that other players in this game also are trying to accomplish. Although a single piece of
research cannot address the multiple levels at which players and their strategies play
games, which constitute a larger ecology that influences outcomes, individual studies
offer the benefit of beginning to piece together the workings of the larger ecology. In
light of the era of globalization in which we are operating, it is particularly important to
not lose sight of the more macro level picture of the ecology of games and its outcomes.
To better understand this macro level picture, it is necessary to look at micro level
happenings, an examination of which resource mobilization theory facilitates.
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The previous chapters have set the theoretical stage for the analysis that follows.
The purpose of the present chapter is to provide the historical background of and the
social, political, and organizational contexts surrounding the environmental justice
movement, particularly as they relate to strategies the organizations within the movement
utilize and to the environmental justice game as a whole. Accordingly, the chapter begins
by discussing the history and development of the movement, including the milestone
events that propelled its evolution both in terms of the diffusion of strategies within the
movement and prominence outside the movement within communities, regions, states,
and the nation. It then discusses organizations within the movement, illustrating how
their mobilization strategies are shaped by the communities in which they are located,
and emphasizing the importance of the formal sector of the movement.
History and Development
In 1978, 30,000 gallons of polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB)-contaminated liquid
was dumped onto almost 240 miles of soil alongside state roads, in violation of the Toxic
Substance Control Act (Bullard, 1990). This spill constituted the largest in United
States history. Employees of a trucking company rigged their vehicle to dump the liquid
to avoid out-of-state expenses associated with its legal disposal; consequently, three truck
operators were charged and served prison time (Bullard, 1990). North Carolina
Governor, James Hunt, ordered that affected crops be destroyed and prohibited farmers
from grazing their animals near the contaminated areas (Burwell and Cole, 2010).
The State Department of Environment and Natural Resources quickly identified
approximately 100 potential sites in 13 North Carolina counties in which to dispose the
hazardous waste. The sites were inspected and narrowed down to eleven. After the
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eleven sites underwent soil testing, six were designated as possible hazardous waste sites,
including the small, predominantly Black, town of Afton (Burwell and Cole, 2010). For
political and public health reasons, the state had to find a hazardous waste landfill site
quickly, and Afton, which was located in the poorest county in North Carolina (according
to the 1980 Census), Warren County, was selected (McGurty, 1997; 2000).
As soon as Afton was named as a potential site, at the time of which 15 or 20
other sites remained possibilities, three members of the community began to organize
meetings for residents (Burwell and Cole, 2010). Dollie Burwell had been active in the
civil rights movement, fighting to desegregate schools, integrate lunch counters, and
educate voters. Burwell had attended civil rights rallies and served on the Board of the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference, through her work, was connected to some
national movement leaders in the area (Burwell and Cole, 2010). Debra and Ken
Ferruccio were a white couple who had been environmentalists in Boston before moving
to North Carolina. Burwell and the Ferruccios had little trouble motivating residents to
attend meetingsmembers of the community had seen men in white suits working in the
contaminated areas, and the media had portrayed the dangers of PCBs as extreme and
potentially immediate. The people had little knowledge of PCBs, so their perception that
the toxins could cause immediate suffering (from cancer) and death was frightening and
provided sufficient incentive for mobilization. Also, many residents of Afton owned
little homes on small pieces of land. They were financially poor, and their homes and
properties were sentimental, in that they often had been handed down from generation to
generation, and the only assets they had (Burwell and Cole, 2010). Indirectly, the
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influence of resources on both the decision to create an environmental justice game and
to use specific strategies within the game can be seen.
Toward the end of 1978, Governor Hunt announced that the hazardous waste site
would be Afton; however, it was not until several months later that an in-depth analysis
revealed that the proposed site did not meet federal standards for toxic waste disposal
(Burwell and Cole, 2010). The Environmental Protection Agency granted North Carolina
waivers and approved the site in 1979. Community members who had begun meeting
months earlier named themselves Warren County Concerned Citizens Against PCBs, and
by this time, they had earned money (e.g., through bake sales), some of which they used
to pay a scientist for a technical assessment, again demonstrating a connection between
available resources (motivated individuals, money) and strategy selection (use of science
and technology). Although a seemingly small detail in the scheme of events occurring in
Warren County, the decision to raise money (an internal resource) to gain access to using
a strategy to play a game effectively is theoretically important, as it demonstrates that
certain strategies make sense within the ecological context of the community, as well as
in light of available resources. The scientists results revealed that the site was not
suitable to be a landfill, which further concerned Warren County residents.
Between the time the citizens gatherings were first arranged and the time Warren
County was chosen as the hazardous waste site, meeting attendance increased from 40 to
50 people to 400 to 500 people (Burwell and Cole, 2010), reflecting the importance of
both community and resources on games and strategies, which in the context of the
environmental justice movement include education, direct action, use of science and
technology, lobbying, etc. Surprising even to the residents, composition of the meetings
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included a racially demographic mixwhites, Blacks, and American Indians. Afton was
a predominantly Black town (85%), but Blacks held almost no powereconomically,
socially, or politically. Dollie Burwell realized that, to improve their political clout,
Black residents would need to vote, and so she and others, some of whom were involved
in the NAACP, campaigned to encourage Blacks in the area to register to vote (Burwell
and Cole, 2010).
As arrangements were made to finalize and prepare the site, there was talk among
the residents of using violence to prevent its construction and operation. Burwell, who
until then had organized meetings in the local courthouse, believed that the only way to
prevent violence was to involve people of faith. Accordingly, she moved the meetings to
a large Black church, about a mile and a half from where the site would be located. For
the first time in its history, the Black church in Warren County had a mixture of Blacks,
whites, and American Indians in it, and although the gatherings involved discussions,
they ended up having a lot of singing and praying. Burwell and others knew from their
experience in the civil rights movement that civil disobedience would be a more effective
strategy than violence for both framing their mobilization and having a successful
outcome (Burwell and Cole, 2010).
When Warren County residents became aware of an existing hazardous waste site
in Emelle, Alabama, they fought the construction of the landfill based on a not in my
back yard (NIMBY) frame (McGurty, 2000). At around the same time (late 1981),
county commissioners filed a lawsuit against the State of North Carolina. They lost in
federal district court and took their case to the Fourth Circuit, an appeal they later
dropped in exchange for the State deeding to Warren County a 123-acre buffer zone
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around the hazardous waste site (Burwell and Cole, 2010). The Coley Springs Baptist
Church (located within a few miles of the site), a local chapter of the NAACP, and 26
residents filed a second lawsuit, contending that state and federal laws were violated and
the location of the site was racist. Consistent with the argument made by many scholars
in the ecology of games tradition, it is apparent that this environmental justice
organization used multiple strategies (technical, direct action, legal). The same federal
judge who had ruled against the county commissioners also refused to issue an injunction
stopping the construction of the hazardous waste site (Burwell and Cole, 2010).
Out of legal options, residents began to more definitively plan their direct action
strategy (i.e., the specific tactics they would use), even rehearsing the march to the site
and blockade procedures to prevent the trucks from entering, and going as far as figuring
out who would be arrested and who would not. Notably, the group shifted from using a
legal strategy to employing a more confrontational direct action strategy, and in doing so,
changed their frame from preventing hazardous waste (an environmental, but not
environmental justice concern) to a larger civil rights issue of the location of hazardous
waste sites in disproportionately Black and poor communities (an environmental justice
issue). Governor Hunt announced that waste hauling would begin on September 15,
1982, and the citizens were ready. Early on, there were arrests, including Dollie Burwell,
a few other leaders, and even children. Unexpectedly, a few protestors jumped in front of
trucks and were hit. The protests, planned and carried out the way civil rights protests
had been, were effective in that they drew extensive media attention. When Dollie
Burwell was arrested, her daughter Kim was seen crying. Reporter Dan Rather
approached her and asked her why she was crying, if she was afraid of being arrested.
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She responded no, that she was not afraid of going to jailshe was afraid that her parents
and others in the community were going to die from cancer. Her interview made national
news and sparked other protests (Burwell and Cole, 2010). Media, because of its
inherent purpose of spreading news and garnering attention for issues constructed as
important, may be the most powerful strategy an organization can use in terms of having
far-reaching effects.
The protests continued for weeks, with press releases being issued detailing the
civil disobedience that would occur. When the governor accused outside agitators of
fueling the civil disobedience, Burwell organized outside agitator day, bringing in
hundreds of people from nearby states and even Washington DCs delegate to Congress
and Chair of the Congressional Black Caucus, Walter Fauntroy. Protestors were taught
how to make themselves limp when they were arrestedthe way protestors during the
civil rights demonstrations had done, as up until that point, they willingly went in the
paddywagons. At Burwells urging, Fauntroy blocked a bus with his body and was
arrested. He spent the day in jail, missing his flight and a full day in Congress. He was
so angered by his experience in Warren County that when he returned to DC, he
requested that the Government Accounting Office conduct a study of hazardous waste
sites. The study revealed that approximately three-fourths of landfills were located in
predominantly Black communities and all of them were in poor areas (Burwell and Cole,
2010).
When the number of protestors arrested reached over 500, Governor Hunt agreed
to meet with the residents (until then, he had refused). He made a few substantial
concessions to their demands, including agreeing to detoxify the soil in the landfill when
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it was technically feasible, to support legislation that banned future landfills in Warren
County, and to monitor residential wells within three miles of the landfill (Burwell and
Cole, 2010). Ultimately, the protest events in the fall of 1982 were unsuccessful in
preventing the landfill, but Burwell and Cole (2010, p. 20) pointed out that they were
effective in other important ways: People were never really discouraged even though the
landfill was built and the soil was sent there. People had by that time had got so
empowered by just being involved that they did not feel defeated. Thats part of the
feeling that many people in the community hadthat feeling is what gave us the
importance to hold the Governor to his promise to detoxify the land. Because people
didnt feel defeated.
Also, in the next election, probably due in large part to the voter registration
efforts of Burwell, the local political landscape in Warren County underwent a major
shift. For the first time, Blacks comprised the majority of the county commissioners, and
the County Board of Education consisted of a majority of non-whites (two Blacks and
one American Indian). Also for the first time, a Black sheriff was elected, and an African
American was elected to the North Carolina Assembly. Within a short period of time, the
political compositional change was reflected in policy, as legislation was enacted
preventing the construction of a toxic waste site within a 25-mile radius of the PCB
landfill in Warren County. Legislation also was passed that would detoxify the landfill
once technology and funds were available. The latter piece of legislation passed with the
support of the Governor. Because of the political pressure he faced from the Warren
County protests, he wrote an open letter supporting the detoxification of the landfill, so
when the Black member of the North Carolina Assembly, Frank Ballance, drafted
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legislation requiring detoxification, the Governor essentially had to support it (Burwell
and Cole, 2010). The broader ecology of games (e.g., political game involving the
governor, the environmental justice game) is evident, as is the importance of considering
the ecology within the context of specific games, and each game as being constituted by
players, strategies, and goals.
Consistent with the predictions of many critics of the landfill, in 1994, water was
discovered to be leaking into the landfill, threatening to tear its liner. Initially, the States
resolution was to dispose of the water in Alabama. Burwell and others who met with the
Governors representative warned her that without the backing of a movement, over 500
people ended up in the Warren County Jail and that more than ten years later, with the
establishment of the environmental justice movement, there likely would be 5,000
citizens crowding the county jail. Residents insisted that Governor Hunt, who had been
out of office in 1984, but re-elected in 1992, honor his promise to detoxify the landfill,
and after some early resistance from a few republican politicians, a search for appropriate
detoxification technology began. Governor Hunt set up a task force, the majority of who
were Warren County citizens. The task force met in Warren County and participated
extensively in the detoxification of the landfill, doing everything from choosing the
technology and approving the contractors (ensuring some were local) to influencing
policies like the prohibition of a fence around the area once it was cleaned up. Residents
insisted that the soil was to be cleaned to a higher standard than it was before it was
dumped into the landfill. Finally, in 2004, the Warren County landfill was detoxified,
and plans were made to build a park there and dedicate it to the environmental justice
movement (Burwell and Cole, 2010). Ultimately, the events in Warren County did not
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end when over 7,000 tons of PCB-contaminated soil was dumped in the local landfill, but
rather transpired for decades after that, culminating in a number of victories politically
and environmentally, and changing the larger-scale national discourse on environmental
justice.
Beyond the importance of the Warren County protests to the Afton community,
the connection between civil rights and environmental hazards was transformative in
creating the environmental justice movement (McGurty, 2000). In the mid 1980s,
environmental racism, a term coined by Reverend Benjamin Chavis who was essential in
the Warren County protests, became integrated into the anti-toxic movement
(Freudenberg and Steinsapir, 1991). The term singlehandedly represented the formal
connection between the environmental justice and civil rights movements (Lazarus,
2000). Although others, including citizens in communities affected by hazardous waste,
had contended that the siting disproportionately burdened poor and minority areas both
environmentally and economically, Chavis was the first to make an overt organized
statement that encompassed accusations of racism. Almost immediately, Chaviss claim
that environmental laws that were supposed to help poor minority areas were racist in
their application and implementation affected environmental legal scholarship. Indeed,
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, environmental law and environmental legal scholarship
(textbooks, law review articles, conferences, clinics, etc.) did not recognize
environmental justice claims (Lazarus, 2000). In the 1990s, following Chaviss claim,
almost every case law book began to devote attention to environmental justice matters, as
did numerous law review articles, law school clinics, and symposia (Lazarus, 2000).
Lazarus (2000) contended that Chaviss influence extended to environmental law, itself,
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including facility siting, public participation, standard setting, and enforcement policy.
He stated: .Chavis's assertion and the broader social movement that it represents can
fairly be placed alongside the contributions of Coase, Hardin, Leopold, and Dales as one
of the most influential ideas affecting modern environmental law's evolution. No other
single idea has so transformed environmental law during the 1990s.
In 1983, the General Accounting Office (GAO) conducted the first major piece of
research on waste facility siting (at the request of Walter Fauntroy), which was followed
by more investigations with a similar focus on distributive justice and hazardous waste
sites. The GAO study revealed an association between both race and income and the
location of hazardous waste sites in communities in eight southeastern states. Another
well-publicized study conducted by the United Church of Christ was even more telling
it found a more definitive causal relationship between race and the likelihood of living
near a hazardous waste site, with race being the strongest predictor. These studies were
the catalyst for similar research, most of which documented a trend of environmental
injustices in poor and minority areas, and given the roots and progression of the
movement, they were contextualized as revelations of political injustice.
Another transformative event in the environmental justice movement occurred in
1991 when environmental justice organizations and environmental justice activists held
the First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit in Michigan. The
Summit resulted in the development of the 17 Principles of Environmental Justice, which
are recognized as the basic tenets of the environmental justice movement (Cole and
Foster, 2001; McGurty, 2000; Stretesky et al., 2010). Appendix A provides a list of the
Principles of Environmental Justice. Throughout the 1990s, and arguably at least in part
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due to the Michigan conference, the number of environmental justice organizations
doubled (Stretesky et al., 2010).
In 1994, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12898, Federal Actions To
Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations,
the first major federal policy initiative to explicitly address environmental justice. Unlike
other major federal environmental legislation (e.g., Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act,
National Environmental Protection Act, etc.), which do not include environmental justice
provisions, Clintons Order explicitly addressed environmental inequities. Indeed,
Executive Order 12898 required federal agencies to review existing laws and policies,
answering specific questions about the distribution of environmental benefits and
burdens, with the purpose of making legal and social progress through systematic
analysis (Rhodes, 2003). On a more proactive level, federal agencies were ordered to
identify strategies for including environmental justice interests into existing policies and
procedures, a requirement that led to the establishment of an interagency working group
and the publication of statements of commitment to environmental justice principles.
The Environmental Protection Agency went beyond written and verbal commitments and
actually incorporated environmental justice concerns into its regulatory reform processes
(Rhodes, 2003). Whether it went far enough in resolving environmental justice concerns
(e.g., it did not require a specific method of analyzing effects of environmental laws and
policies on racial and ethnic sub-groups of the population) is a matter of debate, but what
is evident is that the environmental justice movements influence had expanded into
formal legal and political territory, an area previously unconscious of environmental
justice concerns. Theoretically, the role of scientific knowledge, previous social
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movement strategies, and the establishment of laws and policies related to environmental
justice is interesting, as it illustrates that many resources are politically charged and that
the context in which games are situated (particularly within issue communities), such as a
predominantly Black community with experienced social movement leaders or a
progressive legal climate, may facilitate or foreclose participation in certain games, as
well as the use of various strategies.
Although the environmental justice movement was the result of a number of local
struggles (Cole and Foster, 2001), the Warren County protests in 1982 marked the central
events in the environmental justice movement (McGurty, 2000). Importantly, the
protests linked civil rights and environmental discursive frames, creating a distinct frame
of environmental racism, which has been broadened to include environmental inequities
based on class, gender, age, and other factors, as well. These frames are consequential in
defining environmental justice organizations goals and successes and for understanding
the relationships between environmental justice organizations in the environmental
justice movement game. As will become evident in the following section, environmental
justice frames form the foundation for much of the existing research.
The Environmental Justice Movement and its Organizations
Specific definitions of environmental justice vary, but there are consistencies
across definitions, which facilitate its ability to be understood as a social movement,
which Tarrow (1994) defined as organized and sustained groups that employ
contentious collective action (p.2) with elites, authorities, and opponents (p.l). For
example, Bullard (1990) defined environmental justice as people and communities being
entitled to equal protection of environmental laws. He later went on to point out that the
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environmental justice movement expanded the scope of the concept to include not only
the physical or natural world, but also the places where people live, work, play, attend
school, and pray. The Environmental Protection Agency defines environmental justice
as, the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color,
national origin, or income with respect to the development, implementation, and
enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies (EPA, n.d.). Others
similarly have emphasized the importance of equitable treatment (e.g., of different races
and classes) with respect to the distribution of environmental hazards and the
development, enforcement, and implementation of environmental laws in conceptualizing
environmental justice (Pellow, 2000; Rhodes, 2003).
Although environmental justice is understood to be a social movement (McGurty,
2000; Stretesky et al., 2010), the organizations that comprise this movement remain
under-explored. For example, the importance of organizational strategies has been given
much lip service, but little systematic attention. The environmental justice movement
encompasses multiple intersections of environmental hazards, multiple forms of
discrimination (race, ethnicity, class, gender, and age to name a handful), and public
health. Each of these issues independently from the others possesses inherent scholarly
and practical importancethe ways that they interact to produce environmental justice
concerns underscore a number of undesirable ramifications, including a lack of social
consciousness and civility in this country, unnecessarily high rates of diseases, illnesses,
injuries, and deaths, diminished quality of life, and the potentially egregious effects of
institutions that create and perpetuate opportunities for power abuses. A more
sophisticated understanding of how environmental justice organizations work together
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within the environmental justice game and the factors that contribute to the strategies
they use reflect important scholarly priorities. Indeed, this line of research can offer
insights into how organizations and social movements can accomplish their missions
when they are disempowered by the government and have minimal formal channels to
remedy a perceived wrongdoing.
Framing is the conscious process of constructing and defining understandings of
the world through the control of the agenda and vocabulary; framing is done to motivate
and justify collective action (Rohlinger, 2002; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1996;
Miceli, 2005). More specifically, Brulle (n.d.) defined discursive frames as .. .the set of
cultural viewpoints that informs the practices of a community of social movement
organizations. Frames serve a number of functions, including providing a definition of
issues and boundaries surrounding a debate, demonstrating how a situation is
problematic, identifying responsible parties, putting forth potential solutions, and calling
people to action (Benford and Snow, 2000; Rohlinger, 2002). For social movements to
convince people that their cause is legitimate, they should connect their frames with
larger cultural values and themes, because in doing so, the frames become identifiable to
a larger audience (Miceli, 2005).
Brulle (n.d.) identified eleven major discursive frames that comprise the
environmental movement in the United States (wildlife management, conservation,
preservation, reform environmentalism, deep ecology, environmental justice,
environmental health, eco-feminism, eco-spiritualism, animal rights, and anti-
globalization/greens). Benford (2005) engaged in a similar systematic undertaking for
the environmental justice movement, arguing that its most innovative frame,
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environmental racism, was bom as a result of the Warren County protests.
Environmental racism was effective, first because it resonated well, particularly among
racial and ethnic minorities, and second, because it defined problems (socially and
racially differentiated environmental benefits and burdens) and placed blame with
industry and government policies (Benford, 2005). Environmental racism, combined
with the more general and positive sounding frame, environmental justice, led
individuals and groups to focus on both rights and justice and to target their efforts
toward people (both as victims and offenders), rather than the environment. Although the
environmental justice frame was less radical than environmental racism, it was effective
insofar as it incited many types of people to participate.
Hundreds of organizations developed in response to specific community-level
injustices, as well as for more general intentions of eradicating broader-scale
environmental justices, all directly and indirectly utilizing the frames that originated with
environmental racism. The organizations used a variety of strategies and have achieved
some local victories (e.g., winning settlements against large corporations), inspired and
participated in a number of research projects, sponsored conferences, and affected policy
(Benford, 2005). Yet, in spite of its progress, some have argued that the movement and
its organizations have become stale, losing some of its mobilizing power, not making
much progress in the Bush years when political opportunities were limited and generally
failing to acquire a broad political audience (Essoka and Brulle, 2002). Benford (2005)
contended that the environmental justice frame has become all-encompassing (he
identified over 50 concerns that environmental justice organizations address, ranging
from air pollution to homelessness, war, and police brutality), making it impossible for
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the movement to effectively carry out more narrowly constructed missions. Although a
systematic analysis of the effect of frames on games is beyond the scope of this research,
the potential cumulative effect of the movements frame shift (to a movement of
everything) on games, their strategies, and goals should be given due consideration,
particularly within the context of the more formalized sector of the environmental justice
movement, as it is likely that these organizations were more susceptible to the frame
shift.
Although no research on the effectiveness of environmental justice organizations
has been discovered to date, some scholars have devoted attention to successes in other
movements, the findings of which are relevant to environmental justice organizations.
For example, Burstein and Linton (2002) predicted that political organizations should
have a substantial direct impact on policy change. They looked at 53 scholarly articles in
leading sociology and political science and found that their core hypothesis was not
supportedmost scholars did not find a statistically significant effect of organizations on
policy change. They pointed out that researchers tended to focus on specific
organizations that were highly visible, issues that were narrow in focus, and on an
outcome that was only a small part of the policy process. In this vein, they argued that
future research in this area should develop better designs to understand when, how, and
under what conditions organizations influence public policy. Without looking at specific
measures of effectiveness like influence on public policy, the synthesis of resource
mobilization theory and the ecology of games framework illuminates how (via strategies
used in games) and under what conditions (the political context of community and
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organizational resources, and the presence of opposition) certain outcomes may be likely
to occur.
A few studies have examined the effectiveness of specific environmental and
environmental justice organizations. Mohai, Pellow, and Roberts (2009) pointed out that
studies of the environmental protest movement tend to focus on cases that garner a high
degree of media publicity and instances in which organizations are successful, which
makes it difficult to determine what factors lead both to mobilization and to a groups
success in fighting an unwanted land use. Also with respect to environmental justice
group effectiveness, Walsh, Warland, and Smith (1997) concluded that it was more
difficult for communities to close existing hazardous waste facilities than it was to stop
new ones from being constructed. Their research illustrates the potential importance of
the type of outcome, which may influence or be determined by both game participation
and strategies, in determining an organizations ability to achieve a desired goal. One
other factor that has been associated with environmental justice organizational success is
whether a group had secured legal representation from a public law clinic like
Earthjustice, rather than retaining a private injury tort lawyer (Toffolon-Weiss and
Roberts, 2004). Although she did not directly examine environmental justice
organizational effectiveness, Rohlinger (2002) pointed out the potential importance of
organizational structure and identity on an organizations ability to garner media
attention, which (depending on an organizations objectives) may be desirable or even
necessary to achieve its missions. Within the context of the ecology of games, using the
media constitutes a strategy, which is theoretically informed by available resources, one
of which is organizational structure.
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Studies of the substantive aspects of the environmental justice movement have
focused on the movements history, definitions of relevant frames, specific organizational
contributions, connections to social movement theories, and to a lesser extent, its
structure and effectiveness. What is missing is a systematic analysis of the organizations
that comprise the movement, including their missions, their resources, their structure, and
the strategies they use within their game to carry out their missions. Environmental
justice organizations have facilitated the construction of the environmental policy agenda
to include environmental justice. Moreover, they have influenced business practices,
changed communities, and exposed myths about minorities attitudes toward the
environment (Rhodes, 2003). To the extent that they have inspired and shaped positive
changes and fallen short of their missions, one of the missing links between organizations
and their outcomes that deserves systematic attention is the strategies they use to play
their game. Strategies not only are inherently important to organizations, but since
strategies comprise games that constitute a larger ecology, they are indicative of the
larger movement. The present study examines the link (the effect of) organizational
elements, specifically resources and opposition on the strategies organizations use. The
objective of this research is to determine the extent to which these links are present, as
well as to assess the environmental justice game as a substantive whole.
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CHAPTER V
RESESARCH METHODS
Research Design
This study employed a quantitative design, utilizing statistical techniques to
assess the research questions. Specifically, it utilized primary archival data about
environmental justice organizations gathered from a number of sources, including the
National Center for Charitable Statistics, the United States Census, organizational
websites, and other websites. Recall that the research question is:
How do organizational and community resources and the prevalence of counter-
mobilization affect the strategies environmental justice organizations use?
Sampling Strategy and Sample
There are multiple perspectives on the definition of environmental justice and
what this social movement stands for (e.g., Bullard, 1993; Lynch and Stretesky, 2003;
Taylor, 2000), and there are several studies involving environmental justice organizations
(e.g., Park and Pellow, 1995; Shah, 2008; Sze et al., 2005), yet there is no clear-cut
definition of what constitutes an environmental justice organization. Rhodes (2003)
provided one of the more clear characterizations of environmental justice groups in the
context of the broader social movement and its efforts to put environmental justice issues
on the policy agenda. He ascertained that environmental justice organizations form in
response to a perceived problem. Organizations are comprised of a group of people
covering a narrow to broad range of issues; they may be formal or informal and may
operate at a local, regional, national, or international level. In the environmental justice
movement, organizations first focused on ...correcting immediate local problems of
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location, removal, or correction of hazardous facilities (Rhodes, 2003, p. 62), but often
embraced these causes in the context of broader objectives (e.g., environmental, racial
discrimination, social justice). The structure of environmental justice groups in the early
years of the movement (i.e., connecting environmental justice goals to larger social
justice causes) may have enhanced the movements legitimacy, enabling its organizations
to narrow their emphasis more strictly to environmental justice causes (Rhodes, 2003).
As the movement has grown, it arguably has become less exclusively environmental
justice and more of a movement of everything (Benford, 2005). Environmental justice
organizations, then, could be defined narrowly or broadly, but should include
organizations that, at the very least, have part of their mission connected to the unequal
distribution of environmental justices or injustices according to a disenfranchised social
status, such as race, class, gender, or age.
In the fall of 2009 and spring of 2010,1 compiled a list of the population of
environmental justice organizations in the United States. First, I identified a list of
potential directories that contained Environmental justice organizations, including
Bullards (2000) People of Color Environmental Groups Directories, Encyclopedia of
Associations, Conservation Directory, Active Cause, The National Center for Charitable
Statistics, and a number of one-time directories. Supplementary searches included a
Lexis Nexis search of newspaper articles that identified names of Environmental justice
organizations, a google search online, scholarly articles, and examining lists of
environmental justice conference attendees. Finally, Robert Brulle made available a list
of national environmental groups he had compiled (Brulle, Turner, Carmichael, and
Jenkins, 2007), from which I extracted primary environmental justice organizations. The
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primary search terms, which came from organizational mission statements or from the
name of the group, that were used to derive a list of environmental justice organizations
included: environmental justice, environmental injustice, environmental racism,
environmental equality, environmental inequality, environmental equity and
environmental inequity. The list of environmental justice groups that I generated
included 1,342 organizations.4
The organizations that comprised the original sampling frame were highly diverse
with respect to their goals and the priority that they gave to environmental justice
missions. In fact, many groups websites reflected an emphasis on social justice or
economic justice with no reference to environmental justice objectives. A systematic
examination of organizational mission statements demonstrated that a very small
percentage (161 organizations) were primary environmental justice organizations. In
other words, only these groups purposes explicitly contained the terms environmental
justice, environmental equity, environmental inequality, or environmental racism,
or described their activities as involving a struggle against the unequal distribution of
environmental hazards across race, ethnicity, class, gender, or age. Although the
environmental justice movement is, ... a political response to the deterioration of the
conditions of everyday life as society reinforces existing social inequalities while
4 The process of identifying and obtaining these directories and then going through each organization in
them took several weeks, with approximately 20 to 30 hours per week of research. The supplementary
searches occurred simultaneously as I obtained information on existing organizations. Obtaining additional
information on each of the 1,342 organizations entailed visiting their websites and conducting google
searches. Extensive data were gathered on these organizations, including their environmental justice focus
(e.g., race, class, gender, etc.), their substantive focus (e.g., air pollution, water pollution, dumping, siting,
public health/toxics, etc.), their strategy (e.g., lobbying, aesthetic, moral/spiritual, community advocacy,
media, etc.), the year they were founded, whether they were incorporated, their contact information
(address, phone number, e-mail addresses), etc. In total, approximately 250 hours or more of research went
into compiling the original list of organizations, documenting the directories or searches in which they were
a part, and obtaining information on the groups.
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Full Text

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THE INFLUENCE OF RESOURCES AND OPPOSITION ON ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ORGANIZATIONS GAME STRATEGIES : A N APPLICATION OF THE ECOLOGY OF GAMES FRAMEWORK By SHEILA M. HUSS B.A., The Pennsylvania State University, 1998 M.A., The University of South Florida, 2003 A thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Colorado in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy School of Public Affairs 2013

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2013 SHEILA M. HUSS ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

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ii This thesis for the Doctor of Philosophy degree by Sheila M. Huss has been approved for the School of Public Affairs by Paul Stretesky Chair Lloyd Burton Chris Weible Don Grant September 16, 2013

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iii Huss, Sheila M. (Ph.D., Public Affairs) The Influence of Resources and Opposition on Environmental Justice Organizations Game Strategies: An Application of the Ecology of Games Framework Thesis directed by Professor Paul B. Stretesky A BSTRACT This research applies the ecology of games framework and resource mobilization theory to an analysis of the effects of organizational resources, community resources, and oppositional presence on the odds that environmental justice organizations will utilize various strategies. Environmental justice organizations are game players in the environme ntal justice game, and an examination of the strategies they use and the factors that influence them is relevant to determine how they play the game, which is part of a larger ecology. Resource mobilization theory provides theoretical empirical guidance w ith respect to the types of resources organizations draw on and how they might relate to groups activities. Data were gathered from a number of sources to obtain information on organizational resources, community resources, opposition, and the control va riables of area of social differentiation (e.g., race ), substantive focus (e.g., dumping siting climate justice etc.), geographic focus (local or broad), and group age. The findings demonstrate d minimal support for the hypotheses. The form and conte nt of this abstract are approved. I recommend its publication. Approved: Paul Stretesky

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iv DEDICATION This dissertation is dedicated to my husband, John, and my daughter, Araina. Your support has made the journey to earn my Ph.D and especially the completion of my dissertation so fulfilling and meaningful. I am incredibly grateful for the disruptions that kept me laughing and sane, for the words of encouragement and advice, for the bond between the two of you that enabled me to work when I needed to, and for helping me to keep this passage in perspective reminding me that it was a big deal and a worthwhile pursuit, but one that took place among other important journeys and relationships. I love you both so much, and I ca nnot wait to pursue our future endeavors together.

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v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS A huge thank you to my committee chair, Paul Stresky! I really appreciate the time and effort you took to help me through this process. As important as I came to realize it was for me to own my dissertation, that independence was the end stage of a process characterized by extensive guidance and collaboration. Thank you for sharing your expertise, giving me suggestions, and offering muchneeded reassurance along the way. Thank you, too, for being so flexible and easy to work with. Thank you to my committee members, Lloyd Burton, Chris, Weible, and Don Grant. Dr. Burton, I think the final product really benefitted from the fact finding I did once my quantitative analyses were complete. I appreciate the suggestion and the time you took to meet with me, so I could implement it effectively. I, too, have found that in life the unexpected can yield some pretty cool outcomes thank you for showing me that my dissertation was not so differe nt from other life experiences. Dr. Weible, thank you for your detailed constructive criticism. It really enhanced the quality of my final product. Attention to detail became challenging toward the end of the process I am grateful for your encouraging reminders to give it my best effort through the final review of the final draft. Dr. Grant, thank you for agreeing to serve on my committee and for asking thought provoking questions throughout the process questions that improved both the quality of litera ture review, as well as the methodological direction of the research. I also would like to acknowledge my friends and colleagues in my cohort for all of your input and encouragement and for the laughs along the way. Special thanks to Liz Tomsich for commi serating with me when the going got tough.

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vi Finally, thank you so very much to my mom and dad, to Tori, and to my mother in law, father in law, Heather, Sean, and Mia for taking good care of Araina, for giving me opportunities (especially to run and attend meetings) that made the completion of my dissertation so much easier, for providing great meals and a place to unwind, and for listening to and asking ab out how my progress was going.

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vii TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 1 II ECOLOGY OF GAMES ................................................................................................ 9 Historical Context ........................................................................................................... 9 Scope and Assumptions of the Ecology of Games Framework .................................... 10 Defining and Measuring Games .................................................................................... 20 Causal processes and Empirical Applications in the Ecology of Games Framework .. 26 Propositions in the Ecology of Games Framework ....................................................... 38 III SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORIES ........................................................................... 43 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 43 Resource Mobilization Theory ...................................................................................... 44 Oppositional Forces ....................................................................................................... 63 IV THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT ................................................. 70 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 70 History and Development .............................................................................................. 71 The Environmental Justice Movement and its Organizations ....................................... 82 V RESESARCH METHODS ........................................................................................... 89 Research Design ............................................................................................................ 89 Sampling Strategy and Sample ..................................................................................... 89

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viii Variable Measurement and Archival Data Sources ...................................................... 94 Analytic Strategy ......................................................................................................... 114 VI QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS ................................................................................. 116 Descriptive Statistics ................................................................................................... 116 Biva riate Relationships ............................................................................................... 126 Multivariate Analyses ................................................................................................. 139 Supplementary Analyses ............................................................................................. 148 VII DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION ..................................................................... 160 REFERENCES ............................................................................................................... 167 APPENDIX A PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ............................... 179 APPENDIX B CODEBOOK .......................................................................................... 182 APPENDIX C MULTIPLE IMPUTATION .................................................................. 185

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1 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Environmental burdens, such as hazardous waste sites, air and water pollution, manufacturing and energy production, and lead toxicity, are distributed inequitably across the United States with lower income regions and areas with a disproportionate number of nonwhites being more encumbered than wealthier and whiter areas (Cole and Foster, 2001). Citizens organized themselves to varying degrees to fight injustices in their communities. Consequently, people became increasingly aware of environmental justice issues. Over time, their collective action efforts diffused from location to location, and environmental justice organizations were established all over the United States. These organizations constitute a large part of the environmental justice movement, the purpose of which is to minimize or eliminate the disparate impact of environmental threats. Given the role of the government even the Environmental Protection Agency and the private sector in creating and in failing to prevent environmental hazards, particularly in poor and nonwhite communities ( Bullard, 1993), the efficacy of the environmental justice movement is paramount, as it may be one of a few, or possibly the only, avenue for minimizing the effects of environmental injustices, which are costly in terms of money, health, suffering, and lives. To the extent that environmental justice is caused and perpetuated by societal institutions, one may argue that it constitutes a form of structural violence. Embedded probl ems of this nature are difficult to overcome, and they raise questions about whether and how citizens and organizations can challenge larger and more powerful institutions. The environmental justice movement has influenced environmental policy and perhaps more importantly, provided an avenue for

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2 marginalized communities to participate in efforts that illuminate their disenfranchisement. It reflects the scope and magnitude of environmental justice issues, as well as the nature of the solutions. The envir onmental justice movement has been studied from a number of perspectives: historical (Bullard, 1993; McGurty, 1997; 2000; Taylor, 2000); framing (Benford, 1997; Johnson, 2006; Mohai, 1990; Snow & Benford, 1988; Taylor, 2000); case studies on organizational successes and failures (Agyeman & Evans, 2004; Brown et al., 2003; Rast, 2006; Shepard, Northridge Prakash, & Stover, 2002); governance structures (Brulle & Essoka, 2005; Faber & McCarthy, 2001; Schlosberg, 1999); and through various theoretical lenses, including resource mobilization (McCarthy & Zald, 1973; 1977), political opportunity (Almeida & Stearns, 1998; Meyer & Minkoff, 2004), and organizational ecology (Stretesky, Huss, Lynch, Zahran, & Childs, 2011). Yet, in spite of the broad body of literat ure in this area, there is no evidence anyone has systematically examined the connection between organizations resources and the presence of opposition in their com munities and their strategies. The ecology of games framework provide s a theoretical persp ective from which organizational strategies may be understood and analyzed, including how strategies may be influenced by various resources and the presence of opposition. In short, games are domains that involve competition and/or cooperation; include ac tors, roles, goals, strategies, and tactics; and are structured by assumptions and rules (Long, 1958). In the present study, games are defined as arenas or topical sub systems comprised of interactions involving cooperation and competition, organized by rules and assumptions about strategies used to accomplish goals and constituted by rules, strategies, players,

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3 their roles and goals, and a grammar for describing a system of action. Scholars have understood and measured the concept of games differently, but other concepts within the framework, including game players strategies, which are germane to games, the ecology in which games are situated, and outcomes, have been theoretically and empi rically neglected. As noted by Long nearly 60 years ago, players participate in games to achieve an objective or a set of goals (Long, 1958) I argue in this work the strategies environmental justice organizations use to play their games differ based on resources at their disposal, as well as barriers they face, and their decisions regarding strategies to use in the environmental justice game have global implications in the larger ecology of games For example, an environmental justice organization (an a ctor in the environmental justice game) might attempt to prevent the siting of a hazardous waste facility (a goal) by engaging in a direct action activity (strategy) like a protest (tactic)1. The choice of a direct action strategy likely is a function of an organization having certain resources (e.g., motivated people, the expertise to organize a protest, etc.) and/or lacking others (e.g., money, political capital, technological ability, etc.) Analogous arguments could be made for strategies in general th e use of different strategies is facilitated by possessing or lacking certain types of resources. The ecology of games framework situates organizational strategies and the players that use them within the context of a game, which is part of a larger ecolo gy that influences global outcomes. In the case of environmental justice, the ecology of games framework shows that environmental justice is an outcome sought by many players who use different strategies and tactics, which are chosen based on a number of factors. Looking at how a few of these factors (resources and opposition, both of which have theoretical roots in the social 1 These terms will be defined in Chapter 2.

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4 movement literature) influence the strategies of one group of game players (environmental justice organizations) is indicative of the utility of the ecology of games framework when it draws on other, better developed theories. To summarize, both community and organizational resources and the presence of opposition will influence groups use of strategies Acquiring a better understanding of the influences on game strategies within the environmental justice movement is worthwhile, as it illustrates how the movement is operating within and redefining itself with respect to playing the environmental justice gamea game that includes actors beyond the social movement, but of which the movement is an integral part. S ince its inception, the environmental justice movement has affected environmental research, policy, and activism by using a variety of strategies including education, legal activism, direct action, grant provision, technological support, and community advocacy (Dorsey, 1998) ; however, specific questions of what factors shape organizational strategies, which may advance or inhibit groups ability t o accomplish environmental justice missions remain unanswered, as does uncertainty over the current state of the movement, which is indicative of its capacity to influence future environmental justice goals (Pellow and Brulle, 2005). These issues have been the focus of some recent case study research (Benford, 2005), but an empirical assessment of the movements organizational strategies one that examines organizations actual act ivities has not been undertaken. In the midst of economic, social, political and environmental crises, many of which are interdependent, causes that aim for justice signify both the depths of existing problems and simultaneously the vigor of demands for a civil and honorable society. Players in games

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5 that involve justice oriente d goals may benefit from insight on how others are playing the same game. Environmental justice organizations and others with a stake in the work of these groups might like to know how resources and opposition are affecting the ways they attempt to save h uman beings from the disproportionate effect of environmental poisons, as these missions involve not only conceptual level goals like justice, but quality of life and life and death issues, themselves. With more information on how groups are playing the e nvironmental justice game with their existing resources and in the face of varying degrees of opposition, organizations possibly can make better informed decisions about what they like and/or do not like about how they have defined what the movement as a w hole looks like and perhaps make changes that will facilitate the accomplishment of their missions. The link between resources and outcomes is theoretically well established and empirically founded, as well; however, there may be other factors that affect the strategies that environmental justice organizations utilize. Environmental justice involves inherent conflicts that encompass incentives and inhibitions to cooperate and compete. The substance of these conflicts and the strategies that are used to resolve them are affected by the histories of the participants, interactions between players, the construction of goals, and the capacity to act and react. Existing theory fails to illuminate the complexities of these dynamics, and there are little data to analyze them. Assimilating the ecology of games framework with resource mobilization theory is an important first step in bringing together the dynamics of the players and outcomes within the environmental justice game theoretically and testing a so far u nderexplored relationship within these dynamics empirically.

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6 This research analyzes the strategies environmental justice organizations employ, specifically the effects of resources and oppositional presence on game strategies. In Chapter 2, I r eview, update, and analyze the ecology of g ames framework (Long, 1958). Concepts within the ecology of games framework are somewhat esoteric. B y drawing on concepts from other theories (e.g., resource mobilization), however, concepts within the ecology of games are measurable and demonstrate how the framework can be applied empirically to substantive areas such as environmental justice Chapter 3 delves into the literature on community and organizational resources and counter mobilization, including resource mo bilization theory, to contextualize both community demographics and the assets and vulnerabilities that organizations possess that might affect the strategies they choose to use. It illuminates how concepts from the social movement literature in general a nd resource mobilization theory in particular can be used to advance the ecology of games framework. Chapter 4 discusses the environmental justice movement: its context within broader social movements and its effort to influence policy as a social movemen t, its history and development, and its current state (e.g., organizational goals, frames, governance structures, and funding sources). This chapter sets the stage for understanding the substantive relevance of one group of game players in the environment al justice game in other words, why the environmental justice movement matters in the larger game of environmental justice. Chapter 5 outlines the research methods: research design, sample, survey data collection procedures, variable measurement and archi val data sources, analytic strategy, and strengths and weaknesses. Data on environmental justice organizations were gathered from groups websites and

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7 990 tax forms, directories of social movement organizations, and environmental and census demographic da ta from their geographic locations. Chapter 6 is comprised of the analyses of the following research question: How do organizational and community resources and the prevalence of counter mobilization affect the strategies that environmental justice organi zations use ? I expected that the more of certain types of resources envi ronmental justice organizations had, the more likely they would be to employ certain strategies. For example, the more money groups had, the more likely they would be to use strategie s that required money, such as legal strategies, enforcement strategies, and support services). The findings are somewhat inconsistent, showing that only for a few strategies do resources and counter mobilization matter, and even for those strategies, onl y a few resource and counter mobilization measures were significant. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes with a summary and discussion of the findings and suggestions for future research. The results make evident the complexities of the ecology of games, even at its most microscopic level: strategies among one type of game player within a single game, which exists in a larger ecology, which ultimately shapes outcomes. This research is relevant for environmental justice policy, as stakeholders in environmental justice issues can assess how well resources are being mobilized to meet their objectives and how to improve community participation in and increase knowledge on i ssues surrounding environmental equity. Environmental governance also is significantif it is the case that the environmental justice movement has become more formalized and the way groups use resources to play the environmental justice game reflects a mo re bureaucratic structure (e.g., if groups only make provisions for online,

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8 donationonly members and then use the money for legal strategies) it may be necessary for other organizations or institutions to become involved to ensure that non white and/or i mpoverished community members who are disproportionately affected by environmental hazards are informed of these hazards and provided with opportunities to participate in the prevention, mitigation, and responses to these hazards.

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9 CHAPTER II ECOLOGY O F GAMES Historical Context T aken from the field of economics, rational choice theory was adapted by social scientists and especially political scientists attempting to illuminate political behavior and arrangements Rational choice scholars argued that i ndividuals acted as deliberately as they could to achieve their goals, given their situations, knowledge, and resources. Many scholars supported variants of the rational choice approach, including decision theory and game theory, while others criticized the framework for both substantive and methodological reasons, the latter of which stemmed from a reliance on mathematical models, which precluded detailed narratives and rich descriptions, both of which arguably were necessary in attempting to explain human behavior. Material criticisms ranged from the failure of rational choice to explain political behavior under a variety of circumstances to the assumptions the theory makes about individuals (e.g., that they are fully informed to make rational choices). Critics tended to endorse behavioral theories, an area of research that also was contentious in the 1950s and 60s (Mitchell, 1999). To varying degrees, critics of rational choice theories eschewed the logical calculus component of peoples actions, arguin g that they are as much influenced by psychological or socialization factors or organizational norms as they are an economic oriented reasoning process. Some of this research focused on individual behavior or peoples behavior in group settings (Herzberg, Mausner, and Snyderman, 1959; Herzberg, 1964; Maslow, 1943; 1954; Mayo, 1949; McGregor, 1960). Some scholarship looked at organizational behavior (Kornhauser,

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10 1959; Olson, 1965), and some investigations during this time focused on the debate over power s tructures within communities, a dispute that mirrored whether communities reflected a Marxist structure of a power elite and the ruled or a more pluralist arrangement (Agger, 1956; Agger, Goldrich, and Swanson, 1964; Dahl, 1961; Hunter, 1953; Mills, 1956). It was within this academic context that Norton Long put forth his theory of the Ecology of Games. His original article was published in 1958 in the American Journal of Sociology Long (1958) criticized rational choice assumptions and ascertained that communities and their happenings were not a product of a ruling class intentionally controlling the less powerful. The e co logy of g ames framework has been interpreted, adapted, and applied both conceptually and empirically, suggesting it is compelling enough to stand on its own two theoretical feet. Scope and Assumptions of the Ecology of Games Framework Longs (1958) overarching thesis was that local communities are comprised of a number of interacting institutions, which cannot be broken down into single units in other words, the operations and outcomes that occur within a community are not the result of a set of organized institutions coming together and planning them. Rather, m uch of what occurs seems to just happen with accidental trends becoming cumulative over time and producing results intended by nobody (Long, 1958, p. 252). Long (1958) limited his framework to local geographical territories communities and stated, It is the contention of this paper that the structured group activities that coexist in a particular territorial system can be looked at as games. These games provide the players with a set of goals that give them a sense of success or failure. They provide t hem determinate

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11 roles and calculable strategies and tactics (p. 252). He neither defined games more clearly than this statement, nor did he provide empirical guidance for scholars desiring to test his assertions. In Longs discussion of how the ecology of games operates, he used examples of a newspaper game, a banking game, and other similar games based on activities that occur within a community to illustrate how the ecology of games accomplishes the outcomes necessary to keep the community functional a nd effective. Together, the institutions and their actors within a community represent the ecology of games. Hence, if one institution or group is missing, the ecology substantively may change. The ecology of g ames framework seeks to explain how institu tions within a community come together to produce functional processes and outcomes. Figure 1 illustrates Longs framework. It is located in the back of this document, behind the appendices. Long (1958) did not explicitly state the assumptions associated with the Ecology of Games framework, but five are implied. First, Longs ecology relies on a fixed (geographically bound) spatial arrangement to structure institutional interactions. Although certain communities are geographically bounded, others are unified by a substantive issue, and their actors, roles, strategies, and goals are somewhat unique given the nature of their union; and in a similar vein, the regional boundary of certain ecologies may be much larger than a neighborhood or city. To illustra te, just as Long focused on the games that are played (and driven by) a communitys geographical boundaries that produce outcomes within that geographical space, on a larger scale, there are games that are played nationally (the United States comprises the area) and internationally (the Earth is the geographical space) that are driven as much or more by substantive issues (e.g.,

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12 global economy, environmental justice, human rights, etc.) as they are by region. Likewise, with respect to telecommunications, Du tton and Makinen (1987, p. 262) pointed out: The boundary of this ecology of games appears to have been the boundaries of the U.S. It was a national rather than a local or regional game in that the players, whether shopping for cable systems or deciding whether to invest in microwave systems, were considering the nation as a whole. Clearly, the boundaries of the games that shaped this telecommunications network were not confined to any local community or state, even though state and local g overnment regulations, such as cable franchising procedures were relevant to the outcome. It is the case with games within communities and on a more global scale that their roles, objectives, and strategies do not operate in a vacuum, but rather are affe cted by and influence other actors and institutions (who may be focused on other primary games). Although some scholars have examined games within an ecology, a more microscopic look at the composition of games (e.g., strategies that players use) and the f actors that influence how games are played has not been undertaken. The ecology of games framework provides an opportunity to analyze not only how games within an ecology produce outcomes, but to dissect what factors influence how individual games are pla yed that is, what strategies players use, the roles that their actors assume, and the goals that are defined within the games. Notably, even at a micro (withingame) level, there are implications for the ecology of games, as within the ecology, much of the

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13 interaction occurs within games, not between them (Firestone, 1989). Each game and the actors and goals that constitute it are an integral part of the ecology without which the nature of the ecology would change. Second, Long assumed that games are th e primary source of structuring interactions within a community. Although the ecology of games is a viable lens through which decisionmaking in a community can be examined, there are alternative viewpoints that should be considered. For example, in the public policy literature, the legalinstitutional perspective emphasizes the role of laws, court rulings, and regulations in shaping actors in various contexts (Dutton and Makinen, 1987). The elite and pluralist points of view look at decisionmaking as a pr oduct of the allocation of power and the structures that manufacture these distributions, with the latter incorporating politicians accountable to the public rather than just economic and corporate elite, as influential in decision making (Dutton and Makinen, 1987). Shields (2006) pointed out in his critique of Duttons theory building within the e cology of g ames perspective that the role of power is perilously ignored. Dutton (2006) responded to the criticisms; however, Shieldss message should not be los t on resear chers applying this framework: ecology of g ames applications should consider the role of power it might be that actors, their goals, and their strategies within games, which likely are shaped by assets, the presence of other actors (who also pos sess resources, which reflect the element of competition within games), and other factors, structure power dynamics that have implications in the larger ecology. Although the concept of power largely was absent from Longs formulation of the ecology of g ames, it is consistent with his theory to look at the roles, tactics, strategies,

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14 and goals within individual games. Indeed, games, themselves, have constituted a theoretical black box until now. Long and subsequent ecology of games scholars have acknowl edged the importance of what occurs within games, but failed to explore these dynamics, what influences them, and how they influence the larger ecology. Within the field of aviation, a black box (which actually is orange) is comprised of a flight data recorder and a cockpit voice recorder. It is extremely durable, a necessary feature, given that its purpose is to provide extensive insight as to what occurs on a flight, which is necessary in determining the events and factors that led up to and contributed to disasters. Black boxes are particularly important in cases where little is known about a disaster. Similarly, a theoretical black box should be analyzed, so that the causal or explanatory story may be told with precise detail, minimizing problems of oversight and ambiguity. A better understanding of how actors play particular games (e.g., the strategies they use and what shapes them) will reveal not only what occurs within that game, but also will address how games contribute to the larger ecology, w hich consequently shape outcomes in the community, country, or world. Third, the ecology of games framework supposes a consensus perspective, where individuals and institutions operate in a fair system and their interactions have the cumulative effect of m aintaining the status quo, a desirable end. It largely neglects actors and institutions that do not assimilate into the mainstream, and in doing so, disregards social change and efforts toward more unconventional ends. The ecology of games framework on one hand, minimizes the agency of individuals by situating them in roles. Yet, on the other hand, the theory simultaneously pays little attention to more macrolevel social structures that contribute to economic, social, and political dynamics that

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15 shape community affairs. In a global context where the outcomes of games are massive in scope and magnitude, and include results like species survival; natural resource allocation; and the distribution of food and health care, educational opportunities, and envi ronmental burdens, it is critical to challenge the presumption that the outcomes are largely accidental. Longs (1958) concept of games is solid in that it provides a bounded, analyzable structure through which people, organizations, and institutions; the ir decision making; and their goals can be analyzed (both independently and as part of a larger ecological system that has consequences ranging from feeding a city to producing clean and accessible water or failing to do these things). However, applications of the theory should not take for granted that outcomes are functional in contesting this assumption, the strengths of the theory will be more prominent as it is exploited in a greater variety of contexts, tested empirically, and explored on multiple le vels. Also, insofar as the ecology of games framework explains outcomes in a community with respect to the purposes they serve, it is tautological, which presents both epistemological and methodological problems. Specifically, Long did not clearly separat e the structure and functions of actors and institutions within an ecology of games that are antecedent to the outcomes in a community and the outcome, itself, which consists of those same actors and institutions. Applications of the ecology of games pers pective should adapt the measures of concepts to mitigate this issue, facilitating a Durkheimian resolution of analyzing the effect of an original cause on subsequent functional patterns. Put differently, in The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory Pierre Maurice Marie Duhem argued that hypotheses are the result of progressive evolution. His work provided a sophisticated and contentious viewpoint within the philosophy of

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16 science, a debate that is beyond the context of this paper, but is informative in that it lends credibility to the notion that theories and their concepts, as well as the predictions that develop from them, evolve over time. Applying the ecology of games framework to new territories (e.g., social or political issues) and at different levels (e.g., looking within games at their actors and strategies, rather than at the ecology and its outcomes) are indicative of its evolution and will mak e possible the use of empirical methodologies (analogous to Duhems instruments in physical experiments), but for this progress to occur, the theoretical constructs resources, strategies, games, etc. must be defined and measured independently from one another and in a way that facilitates the establishment of temporal order, enabling the use of statistical techniques. Fourth, although Long acknowledged that players may participate in more than one game, he stated that they primarily focus on one game. Similarly, he presumed that players do not change games and hence, the theory neglects the possible motivations for and effect of players situating themselves in certain games, playing in more than one game at a time, and changing games. Many scholars who have applied the ecology of games framework downplayed Longs thesis, even explicitly countering it with the assumption that actors are involved in multiple games, without necessarily concentrating on one (Dutton and Makinen, 1987; Smaldino and Lubell, 2011). Finally, Long (1958) assumed that organized individuals who comprise institutions within a community do not act intentionally to further desirable outcomes, such as feeding a large city, even though these outcomes often are in their best interest. Indeed, Long (1958, p. 252) stated, much of what occurs seems to just happen with accidental trends becoming cumulative over time and producing results intended by

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17 nobody. Although games shape outcomes within a community, some of which may be more by ac cident than by design, it also may be the case that actors, strategies, and goals are shaped by their social, political, and economic environments, including resources and other actors, and constitute certain games, which structure both accidental and desi gned outcomes. For example, in the case of a global community, there are games, such as environmental justice, economics, transportation, land use planning, and politics. These games are comprised of actors (e.g., social movement and nonprofit organizati ons, researchers, politicians, political institutions, planning commissions, etc.) who employ strategies (e.g., protest, lobbying, educational advocacy, voting, propaganda, etc.) to achieve their goals (e.g., clean air and water, just distribution of food or health care, passage or blockage of a law, the establishment of a public transit system, etc.). The interaction between game players produces outcomes that were promoted through the design of the game, as well as unintended consequences, such as dimini shed exposure to the outdoors (e.g., through technological developments, such as computers and video games systems). The example of the environmental justice social movement game in the national community will be used to better illustrate this point. The environmental justice social movement is a game in that it is an arena of cooperation and competition cooperation in that individuals and organizations work directly and indirectly together to accomplish missions, such as the passage of federal legislation mandating explicit consideration of environmental justice objectives; competition in that environmental justice interests may be challenged by institutions promoting large scale economic growth that would be inhibited by environmental justice considerations. It is organized by many types of rules

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18 and assumptions about the strategies participants employ to accomplish their objectives. For example, environmental justice organizations have boundary rules (Polski and Ostrom, 1999) that specify how individual s enter and exit administrative roles (e.g., board member, officer) within organizations. Groups also have scope rules (Polski and Ostrom, 1999) that determine, for example, how funding and technical assistance will be used to achieve outcomes, such as the rectification of failing water and sewage systems on American Indian tribal land. Finally, games are defined by the fact that their rules, strategies, and players offer a grammar for describing the system of action shapingchange in the overall ecolo gy ( Dutton, 1995, p. 2; see also Altheide and Michalowski, 1998; Bromley, 1991; and MacMartin, 1999 for discussions of the importance of discourse in the construction of various types of reports as social constructions). Environmental justice organizations, players in the environmental justice social movement game, provide statements directed to policymakers and others laying out changes that must be made (e.g., passing legislation that makes the human right to water a statewide priority by mak ing provisions for disadvantaged communities). The larger ecology (e.g., the economics game, the political game, and the land use planning game) also is affected by this language. Games also contain strategies and tactics (Long, 1958). Unfortunately, soc ial movement scholars have used the terms strategies and tactics interchangeably, providing little guidance for distinguishing between them (see, for example, Rohlinger, 2006; Zietsma and Winn, 2008). However, according to the United States Department of Defense Dictionary of Military Terms, the tactical level is defined as, the level of war at which battlesare planned and executed to accomplish military objectives.Activities

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19 at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. Strategies are broader than tactics, as they constitute the overall plan versus the actual means of carrying out the plan. For example, the environmental justice game may include an objective of building healthy communities. A strategy developed to achieve this goal might be to educate citizens about environmental issues affecting their health, and tactics could include workshops or organizing citizens to testify at local hearings to provide information about an environmental justice public health issue. Actors (environmental justice organizations), strategies, and tactics comprise games; however, what is missing from Longs framework is what shapes players strategies (and hence, their tactics), other than goals, a question that has implications for the entire ecology and its outcomes. Because Long (1958) stopped short of addressing the interplay of components within games, scholars should draw on other literatures, such as reso urce mobilization in the field of sociology, inform this question. For now, suffice it to say that within a national and global context, it is important to look at outcomes within the framework of an ecology of games, but broaden the ecological analysis t o include a more in depth examination of the component parts of games, including their goals, strategies, and tactics. Arguably, strategies may be the most theoretically sensible component to begin with, as they are derived from goals, but are easier to m easure than tactics, as tactics are so specific and may involve a process, which makes empirical analysis challenging.2 2 Scholars looking at organizational tactics would conduct a case study. For example, Szu, Prakash, and McIntyre (2005) conducted a case study of an environm ental justice organization, WE ACT, examining the political, social, and geographic contexts of two of the groups youth programs improved the lives of the programs participants.

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20 Long (1958) recognized the importance of how multiple interacting dynamics people and institutions, arenas or areas of focus (e.g., banking, politics), strategies, and goals come together in unintentional, unstructured ways to produce functional outcomes. In doing so, he identified the importance of games, but failed to acknowledge the often intentional formation of game players (both rig id and loosely structured) and how they employ various strategies to effectively play their games in order to achieve their objectives. Even a seemingly simple outcome like residents in a community having meals disguises issues of food justice that reveal dysfunctions in a community not everyone is fed, and among people who are able to eat, they do not have access to the same types of food that may be consequential for health and well being, performance at work or in school, and overall quality of life. T hese issues and their implications are not bound by geographical space. Hence, modifications of the ecology of games framework should not take the theorys assumptions for granted or abandon its conceptual priorities, but should consider games in their la rger social, political, and economic contexts by looking at their constitutive parts. Also, they should include a more encompassing conceptualization of community beyond the communitys local, geographical/spatial environment, including online communities issue communities, and institutional communities that operate in a national, international, and global context. Defining and Measuring Games Relatively few scholars have measured empirically the concept of games or explicitly defined it. Dutton (1995, p. 381) defined games as, arenas of competition and cooperation structured by a set of rules and assumptions about how to act in order to achieve a particular set of objectives. Many subsequent studies adopt ed Duttons

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21 definition. Lubell, Henry, and Mc Coy (2010, p. 288) argued that policy games are synonymous with policy institutions and venues, all of which refer to interactions among actors guided by rules (e.g., consensus versus voting, which actors can participate) about how collective decisions a re made. The present study synthesizes other scholars definitions of games, while maintaining the spirit of Longs characterization of the concept here, games are defined as: arenas or topical sub systems comprised of interactions involving cooperation and competition, organized by rules and assumptions about strategies used to accomplish goals and constituted by rules, strategies, players, their roles and goals, and a grammar for describing a system of action. The main implication of not having a clear definition of games is that developing useful theoretical measures is challenging and hinders empirical testing of the theory and replications. In spite of little conceptual guidance, a handful of attempts have been made to measure games in applications o f the ecology of games framework. Lubell et al. (2010) operationalized games the independent variable in their research as six planning processes: environmental review processes, transportation planning, city/county planning, city council/county board meetings, local planning commissions, and natural resources planning. Their first independent variable was a participation scale based on the sum of eleven possible planning activities associated with collaborative institutions in various regions (e.g., atte nding meetings, speaking to representatives, reviewing documents, etc.) The second independent variable was participation frequency, ranging from one (never) to six (daily) for each of the six policy games. Lubell et al. (2010) looked at the effect of ga mes and collaborative institutions on cooperative attitudes and actions, specifically collaborative policy implementation, perceived policy fairness, and policy approval.

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22 Lubell et al. (2010) undertook one of the only efforts to empirically test the ecolog y of games framework. Most other research on this theory involves case study methodologies and descriptive analyses. Even so, it provides useful theoretical interpretations when it comes to applying the framework and measuring its concepts. Cornwell, Cur ry, and Schwirian (2003) conducted a case study, applying the ecology of games framework to the construction of the Paul Brown Stadium in Cincinnati, Ohio. They connected the actors, games, and issues involved in this issue through network techniques. Specifically, they operationalized actors as the key players or entities involved in the stadiums construction (e.g., Mike Brown, the Bengals General Manager; Cincinnati City Council; the general public; etc.) They measured games based on policy arenas, in cluding the politics game (goal of passing a partisan agenda), the sports franchise game, territorial game (land ownership), business competition game, and budgetary game (who is going to pay and how). Finally, Cornwell et al. (2003) defined issues surrou nding the stadium construction, including: the prospect of new facilities for the Bengals, possible stadium renovations, bringing the stadium tax referendum to a vote, passing this referendum, figuring out where to construct the stadium, changing the terms of the preliminary site arrangement, developing the terms of the site deal, delaying the land transfer, and finally, coming to an agreement on the land transfer. The measure of games in this study was consistent with others descriptions of games, which came from an assumption that the issues and goals, which provided the catalyst for the games, were geographically bounded within a community. Cornwell et al. (2003) assumed that actors goals provide their motivations to participate in given games (p 123), but they distinguished between goals and games. Specifically,

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23 although goals are indicators of games, they are not one in the same, because games include elements of competition and reoccurring engagement (p. 124) that goals do not. The distin ction between games and goals is relevant to empirical applications of the ecology of games framework, as Long (1958) provided little systematic guidance for identifying games, and subsequent scholarship has tended to use games as a metaphor, rather than a measurable concept. The conceptualization of games determines how goals, roles, strategies, tactics, and rules are defined. Revisiting the environmental justice example, by establishing the environmental justice game, one derives environmental justice g oals, strategies, tactics, players and their roles, and rules of the game. Dutton (2010) applied the ecology of games framework in a somewhat unconventional territory, the internet. He identified six types of games: economic development, developing countries, communitarian, telecommunication regulation, broadband suppliers, and content provision. As was the case with Cornwell et al. (2003), Dutto ns measure of games was inductive, driven by the area he was studying. For each game, he defined main play ers and goals and pointed out the importance of their cumulative interactions in shaping internet development. He did not address tactics or strategies that game players participate in or how they came about. Dutton (2010) paralleled Longs original conc eptual argument, specifying that technological developments (e.g., the internet) are products of actors decisions in various games, rather than calculated technical choices. However, an exploration of how actors play ed their games may have revealed that certain technological developments were planned. Furthermore, looking at the role of resources, opportunities, opposition, and other factors in shaping game strategies may not only demonstrate that outcomes were deliberate, but

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24 also illuminate why certain outcomes prevailed. This resear ch illuminates one of the ways that the ecology of games perspective can inform empirical inquiries. Mendel (2003) conducted a case study of the Union Miles Community Coalition, a community nonprofit organization in Cleveland, Ohio. He contended that because nonprofit organizations are uniquely positioned to provide services to a group of constituents (e.g., on behalf of the government), they serve d as an institutional, mediating mechanism between government and individuals. Mendels primary contribution was theoretical in nature; he found that an ecology of games that involves both public and private officials may produce a partnership that serves as a mediating structure. The organizations that enter ed into partnerships we re affected by their new relationships, which influence d the way they participate d in the ecology of games. Mendel (2003) called little attention to a significant, albeit possibly tautological, development in the ecology of games framework. He gave game players an empirical roleone that he analyzed (theoretically) with respect to how the ecology of games could change players roles and also be changed by the nature of various network connections. Mendels (2003) case study did not involve any statistical analysis, leaving prospective researchers to determine how to untangle measurement issues; however, he hinted at the importance of examining games as both an independent and a dependent variable. The limited number of empirical studies and the general disregard of the ecology of games framework likely are a result of the lack of conceptual and empirical guidance from Longs original article. Lubell, Robins, and Wang (2011) pointed out that, even w hen taken out of the context of the community (e.g., and into a more substantive arena like watersheds), there is still some indeterminancy in measuring the concept of games.

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25 Indeed, operationalizing games is challenging, because in principle any orga nization consists of a set of actors making collective decisions within the constraints of formal and informal institutional rules. The indeterminacy occurs because of the multi scale nature of actors and institutions individual people are embedded in orga nizations and then organizations are embedded in policy processes (Lubell et al., 2011, p. 19). Such empirical stumbling blocks have been dealt with (e.g., by modifying measures to fit the nature of the research and by using other theoretical approaches in conjunction with the ecology of games perspective), and have the potential to provide more systematic tests of this framework and illuminate other empirical contexts to which this framework can be applied. Although Long (1958) did not address specific determinants of games or how the elements of games are related, these aspect s of the theory should be developed. For example, to understand what strategies contemporary environmental justice organizations are using to eradicate racial and class based inj ustices, one may employ a resource mobilization approach or look at the effect of political opportunities; however, these approaches do not look past the mesolevel picture of organizational strategies. The ecology of games framework situates strategies ( measured empirically) in a macro level context, illustrating how (and to an extent, why) a group of players (environmental justice organizations) play the environmental justice game. Theoretically and practically, the relationships between factors like res ources and barriers and game strategies are important, as they likely are driven by the players visions and have implications for community participation and social change. On a more global level, as we better understand strategies and what influences th em, we are able to ask better questions about

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26 the connections between game players within a game, positive and negative ties within an e cology, and how positive structural social changes involving equity and justice can take place, particularly when they i nvolve challenges by marginalized populations. Causal processes and Empirical Applications in the Ecology of Games Framework Games, in their original context (Long, 1958), constituted part of a local ecology which, cumulatively and interactively, explai ned community order the achievement of outcomes (e.g., provision of food, banks, transportation, communication, etc.) Long (1958) focused on the nature of games and how, as each group of game players sought rational ends based on its collective goals, it i nteracted with other game players doing the same thing, thereby forming a larger system (ecology) that produced unintended, yet functional, outcomes beyond the scope of any single game playing groups missions. Longs (1958) discussion of games and their role in producing various outcomes epitomizes a type of knowledge that Collier (2011) labeled a conceptual framework. Specifically, scholars rely on various types of evidence as they attempt to untangle causal order processes, one of which is a conceptual framework, or sets of interrelated concepts, often accompanied by general ideas of how the concepts can be operationalized. These frameworks thereby identify and link the topics seen as meriting analytic attention (p. 824). Basing his progression of knowledge accumulation, which leads to a determination of causal processes, off of Waltz (1979), Collier (2011) summarized three other types of knowledge that followed from a conceptual framework: empirical regularities (established patterns in relationships between two variables); theory I (better linking relationships into a particular occurrence or experience); and theory II (a set of propositions explaining why the observed relationships occur). Long

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27 (1958) left it to future researchers to establish pat terned associations between games and their outcomes, and he was virtually silent on determinants of games. Causal processes depend on careful description (Collier, 2011; George and Bennett, 2005). Of the relatively little research that has employed the ecology of games framework, most of it has been descriptive in nature, using the ecology as a metaphor. For example, Firestone (1989) applied the ecology of games metaphor to educational policy. As Long (1958) pointed out that community operations involved a number of interacting areas. Firestone (1989) similarly called attention to the cross cutting nature of policy, thereby making a case of the ecology of games metaphor in educational policy. Firestone (1989, p. 19) specified possible substantive links between the games, enhancing description within the framework and setting the stage for future empirical tests: Linking educational policy games are the flows between them: The downward flow of resources and regulation from legislature to classroom and t he upward flow of demands from educators as well as the general public. To boost the richness of his description, Firestone (1989) limited his analysis to only two games (state legislature and school districts). Consistent with Longs (1958) recommendati on, he used historical analysis of the games and their players to assess their interactions and implications. Firestones primary theoretical insight was that the interdependencies and discontinuities that connect games define the nature of the flow of resources and demands between them. Indeed, games closer to the point of service delivery rely on resources from those that are farther away, but these resources often come with restraints that create complications in the specific situation (Firestone, 1 989, p. 21). Conversely, games that are farther

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28 from the point of service delivery are driven in part by demands that come from games that are closer (Firestone, 1989, p. 21). With respect to causal processes, Firestones analysis underscores the com plexities in determining and measuring the games, their players, roles, goals, strategies, and tactics. Also, Firestone (1989) mirrored an essential argument in this analysis that games and the ecology of games are influenced by resources. Specifically, he reasoned that inputs like textbooks, the testing program, and guidance through the curriculum constitute the teaching game, particularly as it is played with children. Arguably, the substantive link between resources and games is not between games within the ecology, but rather within each game through the utilization of various strategies, which shape specific tactics and have implications for games and the ecology of games. Brandon (1994), Dutton and Makinen (1987) and Dutton (2010) applied the ecol ogy of games framework (respectively) to science and technology, generally, and the internet and telecommunications, specifically. Brandon (1994) took an inductive approach, looking at the contribution of several major actors to the ecology of games that shaped long term science and technology goals. He examined the roles and interactions of a number of players (e.g., executive branch of government, Congress, the courts, academic institutions, private industry, non governmental organizations, and the gene ral public), focusing specifically on their responsibilities and involvements in long term science and technology games. Brandons (1994) research was less metaphorical than the previous case studies it illustrated the benefits of identifying the relevant players in an ecology of games and then looking at their roles, goals, and interactions with respect to a type of policy. The primary drawback of his research was that it was general the

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29 players Brandon (1994) identified were universal types who, if broke n down into more specific groups, may play science and technology games very differently. Likewise, science and technology goals were identified as a unitary set of goals, which again, may disguise more nuanced, substantive conflicts if they were looked a t more particularly. Dutton and Makinen (1987) were the first to explicitly identify alternative perspectives to the ecology of games framework on decision making processes. Other than the ecology of games perspective, they recognized the legal institu tional perspective, the elite perspective, and the pluralist perspective. Although Long (1958) indirectly acknowledged other viewpoints, even he did not systematically review them or explicate why the ecology of games framework was superior. As Collier ( 2011) stated, this exercise is part of acquiring theoretical knowledge upon which discovering causal processes is dependent. Similar to other case studies, Dutton and Makinen (1987) employed a historical analysis, likening theirs to a form of process trac ing (George and Bennett, 2005). They identified several games that affected telecommunications, but did not aim to facilitate development in the field, including a regulatory policy game, anti trust enforcement game, an economic development game, a real estate game, a land development game, a cable franchise game, a rate regulation game, and so on (Dutton and Makinen, 1987, p. 258). They did not reveal how they came up with this list of games, nor did they evaluate these games and their players in the context of their case study, the development of a microwave communications network. They reviewed the history of the Times Mirror Microwave Communications Company and then analyzed the emergent patterns, which included the purpose of various games in the larger ecology For example, Dutton and Makinen (1987, p. 262) ascertained, It is unlikely that any

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30 actor involved in this business made the decision or wrote the plan to build the long distance network. Actors made decisions about other things, such a s whether to purchase a cable system; whether to sell or lease an under utilized microwave facility; and whether to focus on the core business of the company. This study constituted the first piece of research to expand the geographic boundary of the ec ology of games framework beyond the local community the games involved in the development of this telecommunications network were national in scope. In a similar vein and perhaps related to the different scope of the games, this research was more of a substantive leap from Longs original focus than many of the other case studies, demonstrating the far reaching potential applications of the framework. Dutton and Makinen (1987) did not systematically analyze games and their rules but concluded that rules o f the game were essential to the outcomes. They drew on a few examples to illustrate this conclusion. As was the case with the telecommunications case study, Dutton (2010) applied the ecology of games framework to a substantively far reaching (within th e context of the original formulation of the theory) and geographically broad issue, the internet. He identified six games and, for each, their main players and goals and objectives. The six games that affected information and communication technologies (specifically, the development of the internet) were economic development, developing country, communitarian, telecommunication regulation, broadband suppliers, and content provision. He did not specify how he pinpointed these games. As with the case studies before it, Dutton (2010) used games to illustrate the complex interplay and unintentional effects that the ecology of games had on an outcome (internet governance). Although

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31 Dutton (2010) did not provide empirical support for his contentions, he unde rscored the theorys practical importance in the relationship between games and outcomes, in this case technological advances: the growth of the Internet from an experimental network within an ecology of defense, public policy, and technical innovation games to become todays worldwide phenomenon did not happen just because a few people turned bright ideas into practical systems. It resulted from a huge number of players in intertwined academic, commercial, technical, industrial, and other games making decisions about how specific aspects of the Internet should be designed, developed, used, or governed. Each decision met goals and made sense within different arenas, and the inter action between choices in each game combined to create the 21st Ce ntury phenomenon represented by the Internet (p. 248) Similar to Firestone (1989), Brandon (1994), Dutton and Makinen (1987), and Dutton (2010), Mendel (2003) applied the ecology of games metaphor to a substantive area, in this case the establishment of a nonprofit organization. Mendel (2003) did not focus on a policy as a game, but rather an organization as a game player in the ecology. Specifically, he analyzed how a non profit organization, the Union Miles Community Coalition, was established to serve a mediating purpose during a time when a communitys ecology of games was shifting. Mendel (2003) ascertained that the loss of steel jobs and resources in Cleveland led to not only an economic decline, but a decline in other opportunities and overall quality of life. When undesirable social changes occurred

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32 a number of groups formed the Union Miles Community Coalition, a nonprofit organization that would, articulate the concerns of residents and businesses to local government and agencies and then to the powerful Cleveland corporate community (Mendel, 2003, p. 233). This group and another similar organization, the Union Miles Development Corporation, were responsible for a number of community initiatives that contributed to positive changes in the c ommunity with respect to safety, trash clean up, painting, fixing older homes, and establishing new housing. These findings speak to the importance of social, political, and economic context in shaping the elements of games players, strategies, rules, rol es, and goals. Mendel (2003) pointed out that the creation of nonprofit organizations as mediators should be considered in light of their primary, secondary, and tertiary constituencies (the most to third level important people being served) Also, he suggested that better attention should be paid to how nonprofit organizations fit into the larger context of the communities in which they operate. This suggestion is consistent with the earlier argument that, among other factors, communities in which or ganizations are situated in are relevant to games, strategies, and missions that they pursue. Whereas Long contextualized the community as a giventhe cumulative effect of functional outcomes resulting from the ecology of games the role of community demog raphics and resources in how actors play games should be treated as an empirical question. For the most part, the existing research on the ecology of games framework has involved a case study approach, applying the framework to a substantive area. Case st udy research has demonstrated the utility of the ecology of games framework, demonstrating that outcomes are not a result of planned activities by a centralized source,

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33 but rather the consequence of multiple games, each of which is constituted by players, roles, rules, strategies, and goals, and together are connected (e.g., via people, resources, demands). Notably, games may not be targeted toward the outcome, making the result an unintentional product of interactions in the ecology of games. This case s tudy research cumulatively has led to a rich description of various theoretical elements within the framework (e.g., games, actors, roles, and connections between games in an ecology). What has been largely neglected are empirical applications of the fram ework, which would be a logical next step in untangling the causal processes involved in game creation, game playing, the larger ecology, and its outcomes. Cornwell et al. (2003) took an orderly approach to their ecology of games analysis of the construct ion of the Paul Brown Stadium in Cincinnati, Ohio. They identified the games involved in the stadiums construction (again, providing little guidance for measuring the concept beyond anecdotal induction), the players in each game, and the issues associate d with the games and their players. Their network analysis facilitated the discovery of elements that were responsible for keeping an ecological system together (e.g., by removing a certain player from the network, the density of the network was substanti ally diminished). This finding also reflected a degree of empirical support for ecology of games if a single player or game is removed from the network, the ecology changes. Although Cornwell et al. (2003) did not take the community out of its ecological context, they pointed out that the ecology of games framework could be applied to any territory that contains actors, in which issues are raised, and where two or more games are played, indicating the theorys widespread potential. Cornwell et als (2003) research signified theoretic and methodological advances, as they employed

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34 network analysis, which was the first quantitative analysis of the framework; however, it did little to address the causal processes within the theory. Similar to other applications, the outcome was pre determined and the role of the ecology of games was analyzed in hindsight, with the outcome already in mind. Lubell et al. (2010) made (arguably) what have been the largest methodological and theoretical leaps in the ecology of g ames framework. They looked at the effect of participation in collaborative institutions on individual level cooperative attitudes and behaviors. They examined competing hypotheses from ecology of games and the institutional rational choice perspective, the latter of which neglects to consider transaction costs (externalities) which may inhibit the capacity of policy games to produce cooperation, to determine the marginal effect of collaborative institutions for improving cooperative attitudes and behaviors. Although Lubell et al. (2010) did not measure transaction costs, they mentioned possible examples as fragmentation, inefficient outcomes, and conflict. Lubell et als (2010) adaptation of the ecology of games framework included four concepts: policy i ssues, policy games, policy actors, and policy arenas, which constitute a theoretical link to the policy process literature and how games may affect outcomes. The collective action problem represented the policy issue (e.g., pollution, traffic congestion) Similar to previous research, Lubell et al. (2010) argued that games constitute arenas of cooperation and competition structured by rules (see also Dutton, 1995); they provided opportunities for actors to both acquire resources and achieve policy goals. Based on this definition of policy games, Lubell et al. (2010) operationalized the concept as participation (dummy coded) in eleven planning activities, including attending meetings,

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35 writing plan alternatives, talking to representatives, reading document s, etc. Further, recall that they identified six policy games: city/county planning, environmental review procedures, natural resources planning, transportation planning, city council or county board meetings, and local planning. They coded participation in each of these activities on a scale of one (never) to six (daily). Perhaps unintentionally, they overcame what could be a weakness in the framework exposed by Brandon (1994), that when games are measured too broadly (particularly in issue or instituti onal communities) and without consideration of strategy, important substantive conflicts are lost, which diminishes the explanatory power of the relationships how games affect outcomes and how they are influenced by various internal factors, such as strate gies. Lubell et al. (2010) provided an explicit link between the ecology of games framework and governance, putting forth that games, together with collaborative institutions, comprise a set of governance institutions in a region. They found that both of their measures of games were positively associated with their dependent variables, cooperative implementation (sum of yes responses to a list of seven implementation activities, such as information sharing, sharing personnel, and joining an interagency task force), perceived policy fairness (three item scale asking stakeholders to assess fairness of regional policies), and policy satisfaction (measured with a three item scale asking whether current policies will solve regional problems, whether there is effective leadership, and innovative solutions). The empirical findings supported their contention of the importance of an ecology of (multiple) games over the sanguine view of collaborative institutions provided by Institutional Rational Choice (Lube ll et al., 2010, p. 298). Lubell et al. (2010) concluded that questions of governance must include the

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36 evolution of cooperation across the entire ecology of games, rather than just a single institution. The issues of whether and how governance among game players affects the games in which groups participate (e.g., through strategies) remain uncertain. The association between games and governance is germane from both a theoretic and substantive perspective. Another piece of recent research (Smaldino and Lubell, 2011) examined the ecology of games in the context of cooperation among social actors. Specifically, Smaldino and Lubell (2011) developed a model for an ecology of public goods games, characterized by situations where individual contributions bene fit the group, but not the individual the individual is better off free riding. Consistent with Long (1958), Smaldino and Lubell (2011) contended that games structure interactions; however, they depart from Longs original thesis that individuals primaril y play one game and look at how the ecology changes when individuals join and abandon games or play in multiple games. They assumed fixed resources among the players, but looked at budget constraints (which limit the number of games in which an individual can play) and capacity constraints (which restrict the number of individuals that can participate in each game). They found that budget constraints made little difference in the payoff between cooperators and defectors: Severe budget constraints allowe d cooperators to do slightly better than in the unconstrained model due to defectors inability to invade all games, but cooperators still dramatically underperformed relative to defectors (Smaldino and Lubell, p. 3). Capacity restraints, on the other ha nd were advantageous to cooperation, although the benefits diminished as the maximum group size increased. Indeed,

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37 limitations on a games capacity produce a positive assortment where cooperators remain in games with other cooperators and exit games tha t contain too many defectors. One ramification of this model is the inherent conflict between the values of democracy and inclusiveness contained in many social and political processes and the finding that cooperation relies on exclusion. Beyond the importance of each game, Smaldino and Lubells research has other implications. First, the ecology of games framework is useful in moving forward our understanding of social and political processes they utilized a model of public goods games, but pointed out its theoretical utility outside of this context. Second, this research did not look at exogenous mechanisms that affect the ecology of games. Institutional mechanisms like budget and capacity restraints provide a good start, and the researchers correctly ascertain that future scholarship should focus on the complexities within an ecology of games (of which resources may be one) and apply the framework to different settings. One way to pursue this recommendation would be to look at the relationship betwee n resources (which Smaldino and Lubell assumed were fixed among the actors) and game playing strategies. There is little consistent empirical evidence (simply because there are so few studies) that supports or rejects the ecology of games perspective. T he research that has been conducted illustrates the potential of the ecology of games framework it has been applied using a few methodological strategies (e.g., quantitative, case studies) and in varying substantive capacities. Further, its applications have yielded descriptions and insights that have advanced the ecology of games framework, positioning it for more systematic empirical analyses and consequently, better developed theoretical propositions.

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38 Propositions in the Ecology of Games Framework Longs ecology of games provides a nice framework it underscores the importance of institutional actors within the context of their institutions, and institutions within the broader context of the ecology in which they operate. Further, it links the ecolo gy of games, which are comprised of these organizations and their individual goals, to various political and economic outcomes. Longs exposition did not seem to be constructed with a research methods mindset, though. He very loosely laid out a theory in sofar as the ecology of games contains concepts and cause and effect relationships, both direct and implied. However, Long (1958) did not identify clearly all of the relevant concepts, let alone empirically (or even conceptually, in some cases) define them. Moreover, he did not put forth an organized set of statements that could be translated into testable hypotheses. To the extent that scholars have tested hypotheses from the framework (e.g., Lubell et al., 2010) they have relied on substantive specific scholarship to inform them. For example, one of Lubell et als (2010) ecology of games hypotheses was: Participation in a collaborative institution reduces the capacity of other existing institutions to produce cooperative attitudes and behaviors (p. 290). That said, the ecology of games contains propositions from which its concepts can be developed and testable hypotheses can be generated, particularly if the framework is advanced by more well developed theories. Chapter 3 will focus on resource mobil ization theory, focusing on how it advances the ecology of games framework to answer the question of how resources and opposition affect environmental justice organizational strategies. Because the ecology of games framework is abstruse in its suppositions and its explanatory connections it is valuable to lay out concisely propositions that are derivable from the

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39 framework. Indeed, these propositions then can guide the application of resource mobilization theory and the derivation of empirical measures of the concepts. Propositions are declarative statements believed and/or accepted to be true. The propositions contained in the ecology of games framework include: 1. In geographic (or substantive) areas, individuals participate in games. In this context, people are role players and their behavior is affected by their roles. 2. People use different strategies and tactics in their game playing. 3. Individuals are both game players and game creators. 4. Individuals focus on one game, but may participate in more than one. 5. Games involve cooperation, competition, and score keeping, much of which is transparent in nature. 6. Games that actors play depend on other players and their games. 7. Games that actors play depend on the community in which the actors are situated. 8. The netwo rk of games in an area constitutes its ecology. 9. There may be conflict between game players and their goals, but the ecology of games results in unintended functional outcomes. Long said very little about what determined which games were played or more impo rtantly on which strategies were used. H e focused on a single community, and without addressing spatial variation, there was little need to differentiate whether and why different games would be played in different places or arenas. Similarly, he did not offer general categories for types of games, only specific examples of games that were played in a local community, presenting a challenge for researchers wishing to establish empirical patterns about determinants and effects of games and their parts. Pe rhaps Long

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40 (1958) did not intend to write a theory, in which case it is inappropriate to label the challenges of the ecology of games framework (from a theory testing standpoint) failings. The empirical difficulties with which the framework challenges res earchers present opportunities to develop the theory and its concepts and to empirically test relational statements derived from it. Overcoming these challenges requires making some theoretical and methodological leaps, while relying on other bodies of li terature to inform the context to which ecology of games is applied. The current version of the ecology of games adapts the framework to facilitate its application to the study of social movements and specifically environmental justice organizations. The environmental justice movement, theoretically speaking is a game and comprised of a number of individuals, grassroots organizations, and more formal organizations, which constitute game playing actors. The present study focuses on the formal organizations that comprise the movement. Although it does not capture other important actors within the movement, analyzing the formal organizations is theoretically and substantively relevant. Indeed, formal organizations are an integral part of the movements s trategies; represent many of the movements actors, rules, and goals; and lend themselves to an analysis that will advance the ecology of games framework by examining how resources and opposition affect their strategies, which are indicative of how they pl ay the environmental justice game and more broadly speaking, how they participate in this game, which as part of a larger ecology, influences global outcomes. The environmental justice movement, like other social movements, involves people defined by thei r collective action frames (e.g., health, quality of life) staking a claim in the production and distribution of environmental benefits and burdens that otherwise

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41 would be left to public and private authorities. The power of environmental justice organiza tions is derived from the collective action of otherwise ordinary citizens. As a political entity, social movements in general and the environmental justice movement in particular, are a relatively recent area of scholarship. Embedded in both normative a nd empirical discussions of the environmental justice movement are questions of values, governance, democracy, power, resources, strategies, credibility, and politics. Scholars have taken on these deliberations, weaving together a number of threads, while leaving others hanging. Relatively few empirical examinations of organizations within the movement have been conducted in the area of environmental justice ( Brulle and Pellow, 2006; Essoka, 2010; Kreig, 1996; Stretesky et al., 2010; Stretesky and Lynch, 1999). The ecology of games framework, which based on recent research that has applied it to other policy areas, lends itself well to the study of political interactions and has not been applied formally to the social movement literature. The environmental justice movement is concerned with the production and distribution of environmental hazards in various forms, which independently and together underscore a number of undesirable ramifications, including a lack of social consciousness and civility in this country; unnecessarily high rates of diseases, illnesses, injuries, and deaths; diminished quality of life; and the potentially egregious effects of institutions that create and perpetuate opportunities for power abuses. Acquiring a more sophisticated understanding of the ecology of games among environmental justice organizations is a worthwhile pursuit both theoretically and substantively. Theoretically, this research adapts the ecology of games framework in

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42 such a way that it may advance the empirical formulation of games and the factors that influence strategy choices within games. Specifically, it will facilitate an understanding of why organizations operate in specific ways within a game to advocate for environmental justice. Unlike other variatio ns and applications of the ecology of games framework, this research considers the influence of exogenous factors that are not constant, such as resources, competitive influences, and group composition. Substantively and with respect to broader social contributions, this research can offer insights into how environmental justice organizations as participants in the environmental justice game mobilize to accomplish their missions when they are disempowered by the government and have minimal formal channels to remedy wrongdoings that, at best, are socially and politically unjust and, at worst, are life ending.

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43 CHAPTER III SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORIES Introduction Existing theories in the social movement literature focus on the factors that influence or inhibit mobilization, including community and organizational resources, political opportunities, and competition (Allen, 1992; Buechler, 2010; Jenkins, Jacobs, and A gnone, 2003; Kane, 2003; Konefal, 2010; Meyer and Minkoff, 2004; Peckham, 1998; Vidomus, 2011; Williams and Lee, 2012; Zald and McCarthy, 2002). The ecology of games framework illuminates the relationship between these factors and organizations social an d political activities. By fusing the ecology of games framework with the factors identified in social movement theories that are associated with mobilization, one can analyze a more specific dimension of mobilization the factors that determine strategies that environmental justice organizations use to accomplish their objectives Put differently, the synthesis of the ecology of games framework and social movement theories like resource mobilization facilitate s an empirical analysis of how different resou rces and opposition affect environmental justice organizations strategies, which reflect the frame through which they interpret their plight (e.g., production of environmental burdens, fairness of the political processes that distribute these burdens). W here the ecology of games framework leaves a wide open door for the examination of possible influences on game strategies, the social movement literature provides focused guidance, illustrating the important role of opposition, resources, and political opportunities in shaping organizational strategies.

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44 The use of strategy implies an element of competition, which most certainly is present in cases of collective action, including the mobilization of environmental justice groups. The presence of opposition and the acquisition of resources (e.g., volunteers, a Board of Directors, funding, the presence of a well educated and/or motivated community) likely shape specific mobilization strategies. Resource mobilization theory illuminates the significance of reso urces in shaping the strategies organizational actors like environmental justice groups use within their games, which constitute a larger ecology that shapes more global outcomes. The counter mobilization literature informs the role of oppositional presence by specifying the types of competition that may exist in locations environmental justice groups operate. Potential oppositional entities may affect how environmental justice organizations mobilize (the strategies they use within their games). Resource mobilization theory is discussed, followed by a review and analysis of the counter mobilization literature within the scope of the ecology of games framework. Resource Mobilization Theory Research on social movement organizations has paid attention to the importance of resources, and generally speaking, resource mobilization theory explains both the formation of social movement organizations (why people organize around a grievance) (Barkan, 1979; Barnshaw, 2005; McAdam, 1982; McCarthy and Zald, 1977), as well as mobilization once an organization has formed (Jenkins and Perrow, 1977; Morris, 1981). Although resource mobilization theory has been criticized for a number of reasons, including its emphasis on the instrumental aspects of mobilization at the expense of fundamental reasons for collective action (e.g., shared beliefs) and it seems to have had its heyday a few decades ago (Tilly, 1998), the theorys role in the evolution of social

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45 movement theories is not entirely historical. Indeed, scholars still use the theory, often in conjunction with other theories (Davis Delano and Crosset, 2008; Fisher, 2007; Kane, 2003), to advance research on social movements and their organizations. The present research uses resource mobilization theory to help advance the ecology of games framework. Ecology of games scholars have neglected to look at the role of resources in game participation in general and strategy selection in particular. This study synthesizes the two theoretical perspectives, and in doing so, develops a convergent theory of mobilization that addresses the relationship between resources, opposition, and strategies within games. Once an environmental justice organization has formed, its internal and external resources, as well as the presence of oppositional entities, are important determinants in the strategies they use. The interconnectedness of these strategies comprises the game, which together with other games, constitutes the ecology of games. Resources as an antecedent to game strategi es have not been explored theoretically or empirically, and the concept of mobilization within the context of organizational strategies also has been under explored. Characteristics of formal environmental justice groups as coordinated and sustained groups that engage in contentious collective action.with elites, authorities, and opponents (Tarrow, 1994, pp. 1 and 2) facilitate the integration of the ecology of games framework and resource mobilization theory. This chapter now turns to a discussion of the historical context of resource mobilization theory to illustrate how the theory will be used to advance the ecology of games work within the context of social movements.

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46 Historical Context Although resource mobilization theory was not formally established until the 1970s, its roots are traceable to the early 20th Century. Tarrow (1998) contextualized the history of resource mobilization in terms of how scholars and activists conceptualized problems of collective action, specifically with respec t to grievances, frames, politics, and resources. Karl Marx was perhaps the first well known conflict theorist, framing class conflict and the accompanying challenger (proletariat) authority (bourgeouise) clash as typical, rather than anomalous, the way collective action tended to be viewed. Marx undertook questions of collective action, addressing questions related to the structural barriers of revolutions why members of a group who should revolt often fail to do so (Tarrow, 1998, p. 11). Marx (Ma rx and Engels, 1848) put forth the necessary condition of class consciousness for workers to revolt against the capitalist elite who were the source of their oppression, yet as the economic system of capitalism developed and incorporated elements of democr acy and safeguards favorable to the working class, it became evident that complex conditions beyond class consciousness would need to come together to create a revolutionary climate. Marxs theory left largely unexamined questions of political opportuniti es and barriers and resources like leadership. Lenin, a self identified Marxist, adopted many of Marxs philosophies, but made historically specific adaptations, as much of his thinking was a response to political and economic circumstances in Russia. Sp ecifically, Lenin (1902) proposed the establishment of a vanguard, who would act on behalf of workers interests. Presumably, workers only would act on behalf of specific (union) interests and needed an

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47 organizing mechanism to create revolutionary chang e. In this way, he amended Marxs theory, as Marx did not focus on specific vehicles for systematic collective action (Tarrow, 1998). Lenin (1902) emphasized the importance of leadership through the vanguard, and in doing so, planted an important seed that would later be sowed in resource mobilization theory; however, his discussion of politics was confined to Communism, rather than placed in a broader context of political opportunities and obstacles. Following in the traditions of Marx and Lenin, Gram sci, an Italian theorist, added other dimensions to his predecessors theories of colle ctive action. Gramsci underscored the role of culture, ascertaining that cultural hegemony was a vehicle through which the capitalist state was maintained. For collect ive action to be effective, Gramsci argued that the workers needed to come to consensus; operate within the structures established by the elite while enhancing their capacity for independent action and forming connections between themselves and other insti tutions, the latter of which should facilitate their ability to evangelize their message to other groups and to manage social institutions like the church. He built on Lenins notion of the vanguard, but distinguished between traditional intellectuals and organic intellectuals. Traditional intellectuals are people who articulate (in this case, Marxist) beliefs on behalf of a group, while organic intellectuals are people whose intelligence is tied to membership in the group and more easily translated into social action organic intellectuals are more enmeshed into the groups culture. Summarily, Gramscis theory focused on the importance of creating consensus in collective action efforts.

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48 Marx and subsequent generations of Marxist theorists set the stage f or other collective action theories, including resource mobilization theory. Marx expounded on what later social movement scholars labeled grievances conditions of capitalism that contributed to a climate ripe for mobilization. Although the perception of a grievance or injustice is a defining feature of social movements, it is whether those individuals holding grievances mobilize for collective action that transforms the grievance into a social movement (Tilly, 1978). Lenin added the organizational component, which he argued was necessary for a large scale collective action effort to materialize his adaptation most directly translated into what later scholars developed as resource mobilization theory. Finally, Gramsci emphasized the need for exploited workers to form a group identity, which later became the basis for social movement framing theory. Early sociological theories of social movements analyzed collective behavior in its entirety, rather than in more specific substantive contexts (e.g., class struggles of workers). They generally did not incorporate a political analysis into their explanations, and they largely failed to specify the mobilization process (Tarrow, 1998). When social movement activism became more prominent in the 1960s, many collective behavior theories were abandoned, and resource mobilization theory was born (Tarrow, 1998) A number of factors, particularly dissatisfaction with current collective behavior scholarship, the more positive construction of activism that emerged during the 1960s, and the rise of economics in academics, coalesced to create a different perspective on collective action, which was centered around the question of, how collective action is even possible among individuals guided by narrow self interest (Tarrow, 1998, p. 15). In other words, even with a common cause, why is mobilization so challenging? Mancur

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49 Olson was the most wellknown scholar to address this question. Olson (1965) pointed out that c ontentious activism was fairly unusual, largely because in groups, individuals prefer to free ride from people who are motivated by their stronger interest in the outcome, and that a relatively small group of people will assume a leadership role in collect ive action situations (analogous to Lenins notion of vanguard). Olson focused on individual motivation in collective action situations, positing that to be effective, a maximum number of people should be motivated to act on behalf of the groups interest Simultaneously, to deal with the problem of potential free riders, leaders must either provide members with incentives to participate or impose conditions on group membership (Olson, 1965). Olsons theory was confined to explaining collective action di lemmas with incentives at the individual level. Olsons work provided the impetus for subsequent scholars to provide organizational answers to collective action problems. McCarthy and Zald (1973; 1977), using a similar economic framework as Olsons, devel oped the theory of resource mobilization. As was the case with Mancur Olsons theory, resource mobilization theory constructed one of the main collective action problems as free riders; however, McCarthy and Zald (1973) contended that resources, including personal material effects, formalization, and grant support and other financial assistance facilitated an organizational level solution to the free rider problem social movement organizations. As Mancur Olson was a proximate influence on the establishment of resource mobilization theory, McCarthy and Zalds (1973) work also was a response to classical social movement theory, which postulated that collective action was an irrational response to strain. Although the activism of the 1960s had shifted the construction of

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50 social movements from negative to positive and social movement scholarship had begun to reflect this shift, the classical theories that framed collective activism as abnormal remained alive, albeit anemic. Resource mobilization theory repr esented a paradigmatic shift in the study of social movements, using the social movement organization to structure its more rational choice tenets (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). Resource mobilization emphasized that collective action is rational (Jenkins, 1983). Further, it proposed that the most connected people not the most alienated are the most likely to participate in social movement organizations (Taylor, 2000). While this theory was transformative in the study of social movements, it simultaneously has been criticized for its rational choice based assumptions (Fitzgerald and Rogers, 2000) and, relatedly, its use of economic terminology, which excluded ideological values and fights against injustices (Tarrow, 1998). The juxtaposition of resource mobili zation theory with the ecology of games framework is a theoretically worthwhile endeavor. As researchers often set up theories to see which provides a better explanation of a phenomenon, it is equally or more valuable to analyze how seemingly contrasting theories work together to explain or predict outcomes. To an extent, social movement scholars have moved on from resource mobilization theory, but perhaps prematurely, particularly when the theorys utility may be maximized within the context of other t heories or frameworks. Larger and more formal organizations within the environmental justice movement groups with many members and more formalized structures are perhaps the most flexible, prominent, and enduring form of social movements and even collecti ve action. They are one example of

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51 how resource mobilization theory can be revitalized as it is used to advance the ecology of games framework. Specifically, well organized and persistent social movement organizations choose game strategies in response to internal and external resources. Internal factors include resources like funding and office space and equipment, group size, and leadership (Pichardo, 1988), and external factors include societal repression and sympathizers outside of the organization (McCarthy and Zald, 1973; 1977; Morris, 1981; 1984; Oberschall, 1973; 1978; Pichardo, 1988; Tilly, 1978). With respect to internal resources, it may be the case that larger organizations, groups with a more formal leadership structure (e.g., a Board of Di rectors, paid staff, etc.), and groups that have more money are more likely to employ strategies that are perceived as less threatening (e.g., education) and politically institutionalized (e.g., lobbying) than smaller groups, organizations that are more in formally structured, and groups that have less money (and likely fewer material resources). Conversely, smaller, more informal, and more under resourced groups may be more inclined to use grassroots strategies (e.g., direct action) to play environmental j ustice games. External resources will be addressed in more depth in the counter mobilization literature and in a later discussion of community resources. Scope and Assumptions of Resource Mobilization Theory Even with grievances and political opportunitie s, mobilization often does not occur. McCarthy and Zald (1973; 1977) took on the more microlevel question of how people become motivated to organize into mobilization groups when it flies in the face of their individual interests to do so, either because there are more personal interests that they should be more motivated to pursue, or because there are more motivated others

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52 who will act on their behalf, enabling them to free ride reap the benefits of the work of others. They believed the answer to this question lied in mobilization structures at the organizational level. McCarthy et al. (2008, p. 141) defined mobilizing structures as, those agreed upon ways of engaging in collective action which include particular tactical repertoires, particular s ocial movement organizational forms, and modular social movement repertoires He also included more tangential, non movement sources of mobilization, like family and friendship structures, features of the state, work units, and voluntary groups. Resour ce mobilization theory assumes a rational actor approach; in other words, that people conduct cost benefit analysis of the risks and rewards associated with, in this case, collective action, and behave accordingly. This assumption of resource mobilization theory was one of the tenets on which it was founded, as it was established largely in response to existing collective action theories that contextualized social movements as abnormal. In accordance with a rational actor approach, resource mobilization theory proceeded to argue that a combination of a political opening (e.g., that would enable the prospect of a challenge as a worthwhile consideration) and resources to take advantage of an apparent weakness in the political system justify the pursuit of a challenge, as success would seem like a legitimate possibility produced the formation of social movement organizations and their decisions to mobilize. More specifically and within the context of the ecology of games framework, organizations need to alloc ate their resources strategically to achieve their goals and how they do this is a neither random nor arbitrary, but rather by design and an issue that should be addressed empirically. Although resource mobilization theory has been criticized for its rational

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53 actor underpinnings, this assumption is one of the foundations of the theory. Rather than abandon it, to the extent that its rational choice assumption is inaccurate, scholars should consider the theory in a broader context and/or test it in conjunct ion with other theoretical approaches that do not share its rational choice supposition. Revisiting the theorys political roots (by looking at resources external to the organizations, such as communities in which groups are situated and the presence of o pposition), in conjunction with combining the theorys predictions with tenets from the ecology of games framework (by looking at mobilization outcomes in terms of the strategies environmental justice organizations use) does not negate criticisms of either theory, but minimizes many of their independent weaknesses. McCarthy and Zald (1977) and other resource mobilization theorists viewed formal social movement organizations as the vehicles through which social movements mobilize resources. Although resource mobilization theory does not eschew the importance of grass roots mobilization efforts, the formulation of the theory came at a time when organizational form was shifting toward the bureaucratic groups often were funded by grants and had officers, Boar ds of Directors, staff, and more highly structured activities and hence, its foundations and propositions more comprehensively incorporate this type of organization than the smaller, less structured grass roots groups. Using resource mobilization theory t o examine the role of resources (which are reflected in organizational form) in shaping strategy is particularly important in light of the assumption that larger, more well funded, and bureaucratic groups have abandoned grassroots strategies like direct ac tion. Resource mobilization theory ascertains that, in order to create social change (which is what they strategize to do), groups must draw on

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54 resources from within and outside the group, and those resources may include money and financial assets, materi al property (e.g., computers, meeting space, etc.), human resources (e.g., volunteers), and social capital (e.g., networking ability) (Jenkins, 1983; McCarthy and Wolfson, 1996), as well as political opportunities (e.g., politicians who allot substantial g rant money to the movements goals). Some scholars have contended that political opportunities constitute a resource. Tarrow (1996), Canel (1997), and others have argued that political opportunities are a resource in that they provide prospects for organizations to obtain resources. Presumably, more democratic political leadership facilitates the provision of more resources. In a different vein, although political opportunity theory is distinguishable from resource mobilization theory, it may be argued that a more (but not entirely) open political structure constitutes an external resource to social movement organizations (Lipsky, 1968). According to Tarrow (1998, p. 77), Compared with theorists of resource mobilizationwriters in the political opportu nity tradition emphasize the mobilization of resources external to the group. Although much of the political process literature looks at dimensions other than political openness, taking the political opportunity piece of this theoretical pie affords resou rce mobilization theorists the ability to answer mobilization questions in a theoretically appropriate manner, remaining true to the theorys political roots, while looking at resources external to the organization. Similarly, while many scholars have tre ated resource mobilization and political opportunity theories as entirely distinct, maintaining that political structures shape the landscape that facilitate or constrain the likelihood of mobilization, Tarrow (1998) came to the conclusion that the previous notion

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55 of political structure should be re conceptualized as perceived political opportunities and constraints, which are more situational than they are structured. To this extent, one may argue that political opportunities and constraints, while external to the organizations, themselves, are not entirely divorced from organizational resources. In fact, within the context of resource mobilization theory, a number of scholars have defined political features, such as polity group number and strength and s ocietal repression as external organizational resources (Gamson, 1975; 1980; McCarthy and Zald, 1973; 1977; Morris, 1981; 1984; Oberschall, 1973; 1978; Pichardo, 1988; Tilly, 1978). As well, it likely is the case that the local and, to a lesser extent, st ate and national political context in which groups operate are reflected in community characteristics like median income, racial composition, and education level. Within the context of the ecology of games framework, groups that are located in wealthier, more formally educated, and white communities may be more likely to use strategies that play out in a political arena (e.g., lobbying, legal strategies, the media) and are non threatening to political connections, funding sources, and the public audience (e.g., research, education, etc.). By looking at the effect of both internal and external resources on games as a form of mobilization, resource mobilization theory advances the ecology of games by placing it in a more political context. Even if Long (19 58) was correct that the ecology of games produces unintended and functional outcomes, the structure of games and the participants and strategies within them are neither accidental, nor apolitical. Resource mobilization theory informs this antecedent aspe ct of the ecology of games.

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56 Summarily, resource mobilization theory was established partly in response to existing collective action theories that viewed social movements as deviant. It argued that social movement organizations were formed for the rationa l purpose of challenging the status quo or influencing social change. McCarthy and Zalds original formulation of the theory had economic foundations and focused on the acquisition and importance of resources within organizations (e.g., money, access to t he media, etc.) Other adaptations of the theory augmented it with a political dimension, demonstrating the theorys potential to explain mobilization outcomes when it considered not only grievances and internal resources, but the political situation, whic h includes external resources (e.g., demographics, socioeconomic factors, and political party influence that could affect the provision of organizational resources like funding), as well as organizational interactions, including how groups network with other organization and how they deal with potential and actual oppositional entities. Defining and Measuring Resources Social movement organizations draw on a variety of resources, which scholars have categorized in a number of different ways. For example Edwards and McCarthy (2004) described moral, cultural, organizational, human, and material resources. McCarthy and Wolfson (1996) focused on the importance of people, money, and legitimacy in social movements. Wolfson (1995) contended that resources ma y be related to social movement organization effectiveness through media coverage and legitimacy. Diani (1997) and Andrews (1997) discussed social network ties as a form of social capital. Brulle and Jenkins (2005) found evidence that foundation support was integral to environmental organizational success in that it provided access to formal

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57 resources, likely through a legitimating effect; Tarrow (1998) also argued for the importance of foundation funding (along with money, free time, expertise, and the m edia). Taylor (2000) illustrated how environmental justice organizations mobilized legal resources, scientific and technical resources, decision makers, human resources, money, and time in order to grow and survive. Although only minimal research has tr eated frames or political opportunities as resources empirically, Tarrow (1998) made an effective argument for their inclusion. A third type of resource he argued should be considered is mobilizing structures, which includes networks, as well as institutions like the Black church (which which was an integral part of the development of the civil rights movement). Arguably, the way social movement groups network is not so much a resource as it is a feature of their organization. In a similar vein, an equal ly important organizational feature is groups rivals and their interaction with various sources of opposition (e.g., other organizations, political rivals, businesses, etc.). The effect of this dimension of organizations on outcomes is under explored, pa rticularly in quantitative applications of resource mobilization theory. There is little agreement over which types of resources are the most significant in predicting social movement organization formation and outcomes. Most perhaps all research in this area includes money as a resource, but beyond that, there is extensive variation in how to define and categorize resources. Also, most resource mobilization analysts simply list assets in their measures of resources (Cress and Snow, 1996; Jenkins, 1983). Cress and Snow (1996) improved upon this approach in their qualitative comparative analysis of 15 homeless social movement organizations. Specifically, they

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58 employed an inductive, grounded theory design, enabling them to tie various resources and resourc e combinations to viability. They found that a number of different resources and resource combinations mattered to viability (which was defined as homeless organizations that existed for more than one year, met at least twice a month, and planned and carr ied out protest campaigns). Moral support enhanced viability by providing legitimacy and giving organizations the sense that others supported them. Certain material resources were important (supplies, meeting space, and office space), and all three types of information resources were essential to viability strategic support, technical support, and referrals. All of the viable social movement organizations had strong leaders, which were one of three human resources. The leaders were both a source of info rmation and continuity to their organizations. Cress and Snow (1996) found that threefourths of organizational resources came from an external source. Importantly, they pointed out that temporal order presents an issue in much resource mobilization theo ry research it might be that successful, viable organizations attract more resources; however, even if this is the case, it also remains that the relationship works in the hypothesized direction (that resources affect outcomes). Resources both internal a nd external to social movement organizations should be considered. The level and type of resources available in and to a community should shape the arenas in which its organizations operate. Likewise, whatever material and nonmaterial assets an organization possesses should determine the strategies that are available and desirable to that group. Whether or not a social movement emerges and is successful depends largely on the ability of its organizations to mobilize resources through the strategies they employ. It is outside the context of this research to examine

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59 organizations emergence or their effectiveness; however, analyzing the effect of different types of resources on organizations strategy choices is an important step in utilizing the strengths of resource mobilization theory to advance the ecology of games framework, and in the process, illuminating the role of both resources and mobilization strategies in shaping the formal sector of the environmental justice movement, which is an important pa rt of the environmental justice game. Propositions in Resource Mobilization Theory The establishment and evolution of resource mobilization theory (Gamson 1975; McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977; Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978) provide for a number of theoretical propositions. First, social movements form as a rational response to political inequality (Gamson, 1975). Social movement organizations form and mobilize (or do not come together) based on a cost ben efit analysis of whether collective action is in their best interest. This decision is made based on whether there is a perception of weakness in the extant political structure that will facilitate organizational success and whether a prospective group wi ll have sufficient resources to carry out its mission in light of the obstacles it will face. While Gamson (1975) focused as much on the political aspect as the economic cost benefit analysis, McCarthy and Zald (1973; 1977) and others ( Fireman and Gamson, 1979; Kerbo, 1982) assumed the presence of a grievance, rooted in a political challenge, and focused more on the economic element and internal organizational forces. Second, resource mobilization theory proposes that social movement organizational forms have shifted from smaller, decentralized, grassroots arrangements to larger, more formal and bureaucratic structures. This transformation occurred largely as

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60 a result of the industrial revolution. Indeed, with the growth of cities, more centralized politics, and more national/international markets, smaller, more grassroots collective action efforts became less competitive, as they had comparatively fewer resources and opportunities than their opponents, who often were arms of the state and corporations. T o become competitive in the markets of equitable distributions of public goods (e.g., social, environmental, and economic benefits and burdens), social movement organizations had to expand in size and change in form to reflect the more structured, authorit arian features of their competition (Calhoun, 1982; Tilly, 1978). Descriptions of the transition in social movement organizations structures and strategies have been grounded in history, theory, and case studies, but it has not been assessed empirically. The question of how resources and opposition affect organizational strategies should be researched quantitatively, as statistical analyses facilitate conclusions that are, at least relatively speaking, valid and generalizable, relevant to a movement, rat her than a single organization or a few groups. Gamson (1975) most explicitly dealt with the reasons behind the nationalization of social movements. To compete with counter mobilization forces with strong mechanisms of internal control, social movement or ganizations also must adopt arrangements that centralize power and formalize their structure. Centralization of power prevented disputes over control, and a formal organizational structure, characterized by written goals and levels of internal organizatio nal classification, created roles that increased the certainty of member participation. The effects of industrialization included both a model for organizations to follow, as well as a concentration of resources, including money, communication mechanisms, and organized labor (Freeman, 1979).

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61 Although the notion of diffusiontransferring of frames or tactics is not part of resource mobilization theory, it is quite possible that the effects of industrialization both directly and indirectly, through diffusion, contributed to the nationalization of social movements. Although grassroots efforts remain a vital part of social movement activities, much research on these groups is case studies of a single organization or an examination of protest events, neither of which lend themselves to quantitative tests of resource mobilization theory. Testing this theory, using more formalized social movement organizations, is consistent with the theorys tenets. Third, resource mobilization theory presumes that in collectiv e action situations, particularly those that involve many people, the problem of free riders will emerge. That is, people will opt not to participate in collective action when they perceive that others will put forth the effort and assume the risks, while they can free ride and still reap the benefits, if the effort is successful. When the stakes involve public goods benefits that, by definition, are shared among everyone and are not diminished when others use them it is possible to free ride and still re ceive the gains acquired by the efforts of others (Olson, 1965). There are several ways that social movement organizations may overcome the free rider problem. First, in some cases, groups may have mechanisms in place to force member participation direc tly (e.g., unions) (Olson, 1965) or indirectly (e.g., paying staff to recruit members or organize an event). Second, some organizations may provide concrete benefits to their members (e.g., insurance, career benefits) (Olson, 1965). Third, in more egalitarian social movement organizations, members receive non material benefits, such as ideological reinforcement, a sense of belonging to a group of similar

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62 others who are united based on a common goal (solidarity), and interpersonal bonds, as well as more fr eedom with respect to available mobilization strategies (Gerlach and Hine, 1970). While early theoretical writings integrated the free rider problem, later applications of the theory seem to have assumed that social movement organizations overcame the free rider problem, as they did not address this aspect of the theory. Fourth, resource mobilization theory predicts that organizations compete with one another for scarce resources, and to minimize this competition, they specialize (McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Zald and McCarthy, 1980). This proposition emerged from an economic rationale that firms in the same market would avoid competing with one another by developing a narrower niche that would give them access to a distinct market. With respect to social mov ement organizations, the more groups there are in a movement, the more likely they are to specialize (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). Likewise, when there are scarce resources within the communities in which social movement groups operate, organizations are mor e likely to specialize (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). Finally, resource mobilization theory ascertains that only when political conditions are advantageous and the resources are in place to exploit them will organizations form and mobilize. Ideal political co nditions include a mix of open and closed factors, as a totally open political system would render collective action unnecessary, and a completely closed system would make mobilization not worth the effort and risk. The political climate that best facilitates collective action is one that is sufficiently oppressive to generate a challenge, but open enough to reveal weaknesses for challenges to take advantage of. Beyond this level of analysis, most discussion of political processes as they relate to social movements was confined to political opportunity theory.

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63 Resource mobilization theory is at the organizational level, its propositions limited to the role of resources and what happens to individual organizations under circumstances of resource competition Conversely, the ecology of games framework looks at the larger context of multiple games involving multiple actors (organizations). While resource mobilization theory has rational actor underpinnings, the ecology of games framework ascertains that multiple games, which are comprised by strategies, goals, and actors, produce outcomes in unintentional, unplanned ways. Together, the theories provide an opportunity to look at the effect of resources on organizational strategies within a game, which bear on t he larger ecology and perhaps affect how the nature of the ecology might change should a single game be removed. Resource mobilization theory addresses the larger political environment, but does not translate political opportunities and constraints to th e organizational level. One possible constraint at the organizational level is the presence of oppositional entities that challenge social movement organizations. Just as political structures shape the environment that facilitates or inhibits social move ment organization formation and mobilization, potential competition that groups will encounter in their collective action strategies should influence outcomes like groups formation, framing of organizational missions, and strategies the groups employ. Opp ositional Forces The causeeffect relationship between social movement organizations and their competition is not wellunderstood beyond isolated contexts. Examples of these include health advocates and the National Smokers Alliance (Givel, 2007); coope ratives in the grain, dairy, and fire insurance industries (Schneiberg, King, and Smith, 2008); white

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64 counter mobilization with respect to voter participation and partisan voting (Carmines, Huckfeldt, and McCurley, 1995); elite oppositional responses to the labor movement (Haydu, 1999); and health policy lobbying (Lowery, Gray, Wolak, Godwin, and Kilburn, 2005). A few theories of counter mobilization have been put forth, but they are neither well developed, nor well tested.3 Key (1949) provided one of the earliest pieces of evidence that counter mobilization may occur as a result of the mere presence of a perceived enemy. He found that whites tended to mobilize in counties with a large number of Blacks, even though there was virtually no political parti cipation among Blacks in these counties. White mobilization seemed to be a consequence of a perceived threat because Blacks were present (and in large numbers), they had the potential to band together and become an actual threat to their political hegemon y. Alt (1994) found that whites in counties with higher Black populations were more likely to be registered to vote than whites in counties with lower Black populations, suggesting a similar phenomenon. A second conceptualization of oppositional forces t o social movements is that they form in direct response to collective action of the opposing side (Berry, 1997; Carmines et al., 1995). The commonsense causal mechanism for this relationship is that the presence of one interest will spark opposition to m obilize in order to prevent its contrary interest from being realized. Berry (1997) also pointed out that as an interest organizes, it raises awareness among opponents about what they are doing. Notably, this connection can be empirically tested by looki ng at the effect of oppositional presence on 3 There has been extensive work done on the relationship between organizations mobilizing to minimize the effects of climate change and groups that deny that climate change is occurring (or that it is having any adverse effects); however, to the extent that this work includes counter mobilization theory, it primarily is inductive, demonstrating how oppositional efforts frame their adversarial discourse (see, for example, Knight and Greenberg, 2011).

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65 game strategies, because the organizations perception of its opposition the oppositions perceived power, resources, strategies, goals, etc. likely will influence how the organization mobilizes (i.e., what stra tegy or strategies it employs). For example, the perception of a strong oppositional presence may be the catalyst for organizations to use strategies that garner a lot of attention (e.g., media) or that involve more political power (e.g., lobbying). One illustration of this formulation of counter movements is when health groups mobilized in the early 1990s against the tobacco industry, warning citizens of the dangers of smoking and lobbying for higher taxes on cigarettes and more smoking regulations. The tobacco industry responded by creating the National Smokers Alliance, a powerful counter mobilization group designed specifically to engineer public opinion and lobby against higher taxes and regulations (Givel, 2007). In a similar vein, Carmines et al (1995) found that in presidential elections after 1964, as Blacks participation in electoral politics increased, they voted overwhelmingly for democrat candidates and consequently, whites, particularly whites in counties with high concentrations of Blac ks, abandoned the Democrat party, voting more for republican candidates. A third explanation for the formation of oppositional efforts is that the dichotomy between movement or action and counter mobilization is inaccurate and opposing efforts unite conjointly (Carmines et al., 1995). Carmines et al. (1995) pointed out that counter mobilization is not simply a matter of showing up (e.g., voter turn out). Rather, there must be a political meaning or message behind the activity that reflects an oppositio nal effort. Schneiber et al. (2008) extended this line of argument, positing that opportunity, mobilization and counter mobilization the dynamics of contentioncan produce

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66 historical, path dependent trajectories and a sequence over time of different m ovement effects (p. 657) Just as there are a number of processes that may shape the emergence of movement opposition, the efforts of counter mobilizers may have a number of effects on social movements. Specifically, they may diminish or even reverse the impact of whomever they are challenging; they may limit prospects; cause cultural frames to shift; or prompt existing entities to change their venues or tactics (Haydu, 1999; Schneiber et al., 2008). On a structural level, Stryker (2007) illustrated one effect of a form of counter mobilization on the labor movement. Conceptualizing law as a political resource to be strategically mobilized and counter mobilized, Stryker (2007) ascertained that a number of anti union court decisions in the 19th Century, combined with the labor movements near inability to achieve legislative victories in spite of its efforts, caused the movement to become less radical and more focused in its efforts. Strykers (2007) illustration of the labor movement illuminates the large r point that the mobilization of resources and counter mobilization efforts, together, affect social movements, both in terms of their ability to accomplish their missions and their operations, including the game strategies they use. Dudas (2005) provided one causal mechanism through which the influence of opposition on certain types of existing social movements may occur. Specifically, he argued that marginalized groups incite a politics of resentment, where entities that are threatened by the potential power of the once oppressed groups create a language and political environment that frame the efforts of the group as demanding special rights. In constructing a politics of resentment, counter mobilization efforts not only diminish

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67 the effectiveness of the marginalized groups, but affect more large scale national discourse and policy on similar issues. Within the context of certain types of social movements then (e.g., treaty rights, civil rights, etc.), oppositional groups operate through a politics of resentment that has both instrumental and ideological effects within and well beyond individual group or even movement goals (Dudas, 2005). The causes and effects of counter mobilization not only present theoretical challenges, they also contain meth odological challenges. According to Lowery et al. (2005, p. 100), counter mobilization is a term routinely used by political scientists, but one that has only quite weak theoretical and empirical foundations. Indeed, obtaining valid measures of opposit ion is challenging, as it may be difficult to identify who opposing forces are, how they are mobilizing, and what effects they are having, particularly when the context is a social movement or a broader unit than an individual group. Schneiber et al. (2008) measured anti corporate counter mobilization by the strength of the democratic populist vote in the 1892 presidential election and anti corporate counter mobilization political effectiveness by whether states had passed a Granger Railroad regulation, an anti trust regulation, or an insurance anti compact law, admittedly, crude proxies (p. 656). Existing case studies and theoretical discussions involving counter mobilization have structured the concept within the context of the movement or cause being studied. This approach is instructive, particularly when counter movements are easily identified. In other cases (e.g., Schneiber et al., 2008), when counter mobilization is difficult to identify or impossible to measure empirically, it may be necessary to develop proxy indicators. Regardless, social movement researchers will be well served to further

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68 develop the concept of counter mobilization theoretically and empirically, as it likely influences the way that their frames, their political opportunities and their resources affect outcomes, including strategies and games. The concept of counter mobilization fits well within resource mobilization and ecology of games analyses, as it may influence the strategies social movement (in this case, environmenta l justice) organizations employ. Hence, it constitutes a potentially large explanatory factor of game strategies that should be explored empirically and in conjunction with other theoretically relevant influences taken from resource mobilization theory, a nd to a lesser extent, political opportunity theory. Different types and levels of resources may affect organizational strategies in distinctive ways, as can organizational constraints, particularly in the form of oppositional presence. For example, perhaps money is unimportant to the strategies of more radical social movement organizations, while it is fundamental to the strategies of more conventional groups that may be trying to change a policy (Fitzgerald and Rodgers, 2000). Likewise, it may be the c ase that the presence of rivalrous entities causes organizations to utilize political strategies like law and policy. One purpose of this study is to examine the significance of different types of capital and restraints (opposition) to the strategies in w hich environmental justice organizations engage. This purpose will be fulfilled through statistical analysis. Recall that this relationship, as it is explored in the present study is unique, because theoretically, strategies are considered as a small par t of a larger game (environmental justice) in which there are many players, including but not limited to, environmental justice organizations. The ecology of games perspective contextualizes the scope of the relationship between resources and opposition a nd

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69 strategies, placing it in a broader, more global context, and in doing so, illustrating the importance of environmental justice beyond the social movement. Before discussing how this research methodologically addresses these purposes, it is necessary t o establish what the environmental justice movement is, what its organizations stand for, and how it evolved, as these discussions will inform the substantive application of the ecology of games framework and resource mobilization theory. It is to these m atters that this work now turns.

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70 CHAPTER IV THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT Introduction The purpose of this study is to apply the ecology of games framework to the environmental justice movement game and the strategies employed within this game. Be cause the ecology of games framework was not formulated as a theory with deducible concepts and hypotheses, and because the framework has not been applied in ways that can be replicated, as measures have been adapted using an inductive approach, this work integrates resource mobilization within the ecology of games framework. Resource mobilization theory is fitting for the present study, as it was developed to explain mobilization outcomes, which from an ecology of games standpoint are affected by strategies used by game players. Resource m obilization theory is a meso level theory that fails to situate organizations within the larger sphere in which they operate. Theoretically and substantively, this weakness is problematic, as organizations like environm ental justice groups employ strategies to influence larger outcomes outcomes that other players in this game also are trying to accomplish. Although a single piece of research cannot address the multiple levels at which players and their strategies play g ames, which constitute a larger ecology that influences outcomes, individual studies offer the benefit of beginning to piece together the workings of the larger ecology. In light of the era of globalization in which we are operating, it is particularly important to not lose sight of the more macro level picture of the ecology of games and its outcomes. To better understand this macro level picture, it is necessary to look at micro level happenings, an examination of which resource mobilization theory faci litates.

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71 The previous chapters have set the theoretical stage for the analysis that follows. The purpose of the present chapter is to provide the historical background of and the social, political, and organizational contexts surrounding the environmenta l justice movement, particularly as they relate to strategies the organizations within the movement utilize and to the environmental justice game as a whole. Accordingly, the chapter begins by discussing the history and development of the movement, including the milestone events that propelled its evolution both in terms of the diffusion of strategies within the movement and prominence outside the movement within communities, regions, states, and the nation. It then discusses organizations within the move ment, illustrating how their mobilization strategies are shaped by the communities in which they are located, and emphasizing the importance of the formal sector of the movement. History and Development In 1978, 30,000 gallons of polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) contaminated liquid was dumped onto almost 240 miles of soil alongside state roads, in violation of the Toxic Substance Control Act (Bullard, 1990). This spill constituted the largest in United States history. Employees of a trucking company rigg ed their vehicle to dump the liquid to avoid out of state expenses associated with its legal disposal; consequently, three truck operators were charged and served prison time (Bullard, 1990). North Carolina Governor, James Hunt, ordered that affected crops be destroyed and prohibited farmers from grazing their animals near the contaminated areas (Burwell and Cole, 2010). The State Department of Environment and Natural Resources quickly identified approximately 100 potential sites in 13 North Carolina count ies in which to dispose the hazardous waste. The sites were inspected and narrowed down to eleven. After the

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72 eleven sites underwent soil testing, six were designated as possible hazardous waste sites, including the small, predominantly Black, town of Aft on (Burwell and Cole, 2010). For political and public health reasons, the state had to find a hazardous waste landfill site quickly, and Afton, which was located in the poorest county in North Carolina (according to the 1980 Census), Warren County, was se lected (McGurty, 1997; 2000). As soon as Afton was named as a potential site, at the time of which 15 or 20 other sites remained possibilities, three members of the community began to organize meetings for residents (Burwell and Cole, 2010). Dollie Burwe ll had been active in the civil rights movement, fighting to desegregate schools, integrate lunch counters, and educate voters. Burwell had attended civil rights rallies and served on the Board of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, through her work, was connected to some national movement leaders in the area (Burwell and Cole, 2010). Debra and Ken Ferruccio were a white couple who had been environmentalists in Boston before moving to North Carolina. Burwell and the Ferruccios had little trouble motivating residents to attend meetings members of the community had seen men in white suits working in the contaminated areas, and the media had portrayed the dangers of PCBs as extreme and potentially immediate. The people had little knowledge of PCB s, so their perception that the toxins could cause immediate suffering (from cancer) and death was frightening and provided sufficient incentive for mobilization. Also, many residents of Afton owned little homes on small pieces of land. They were financi ally poor, and their homes and properties were sentimental, in that they often had been handed down from generation to generation, and the only assets they had (Burwell and Cole, 2010). Indirectly, the

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73 influence of resources on both the decision to create an environmental justice game and to use specific strategies within the game can be seen. Toward the end of 1978, Governor Hunt announced that the hazardous waste site would be Afton; however, it was not until several months later that an indepth analysi s revealed that the proposed site did not meet federal standards for toxic waste disposal (Burwell and Cole, 2010). The Environmental Protection Agency granted North Carolina waivers and approved the site in 1979. Community members who had begun meeting months earlier named themselves Warren County Concerned Citizens Against PCBs, and by this time, they had earned money (e.g., through bake sales), some of which they used to pay a scientist for a technical assessment, again demonstrating a connection betwe en available resources (motivated individuals, money) and strategy selection (use of science and technology). Although a seemingly small detail in the scheme of events occurring in Warren County, the decision to raise money (an internal resource) to gain access to using a strategy to play a game effectively is theoretically important, as it demonstrates that certain strategies make sense within the ecological context of the community, as well as in light of available resources. The scientists results revealed that the site was not suitable to be a landfill, which further concerned Warren County residents. Between the time the citizens gatherings were first arranged and the time Warren County was chosen as the hazardous waste site, meeting attendance increased from 40 to 50 people to 400 to 500 people (Burwell and Cole, 2010), reflecting the importance of both community and resources on games and strategies, which in the context of the environmental justice movement include education, direct action, use of science and technology, lobbying, etc. Surprising even to the residents, composition of the meetings

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74 included a racially demographic mix whites, Blacks, and American Indians. Afton was a predominantly Black town (85%), but Blacks held almost no power eco nomically, socially, or politically. Dollie Burwell realized that, to improve their political clout, Black residents would need to vote, and so she and others, some of whom were involved in the NAACP, campaigned to encourage Blacks in the area to register to vote (Burwell and Cole, 2010). As arrangements were made to finalize and prepare the site, there was talk among the residents of using violence to prevent its construction and operation. Burwell, who until then had organized meetings in the local cour thouse, believed that the only way to prevent violence was to involve people of faith. Accordingly, she moved the meetings to a large Black church, about a mile and a half from where the site would be located. For the first time in its history, the Black church in Warren County had a mixture of Blacks, whites, and American Indians in it, and although the gatherings involved discussions, they ended up having a lot of singing and praying. Burwell and others knew from their experience in the civil rights mo vement that civil disobedience would be a more effective strategy than violence for both framing their mobilization and having a successful outcome (Burwell and Cole, 2010). When Warren County residents became aware of an existing hazardous waste site in E melle, Alabama, they fought the construction of the landfill based on a not in my back yard (NIMBY) frame (McGurty, 2000). At around the same time (late 1981), county commissioners filed a lawsuit against the State of North Carolina. They lost in feder al district court and took their case to the Fourth Circuit, an appeal they later dropped in exchange for the State deeding to Warren County a 123 acre buffer zone

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75 around the hazardous waste site (Burwell and Cole, 2010). The Coley Springs Baptist Church (located within a few miles of the site), a local chapter of the NAACP, and 26 residents filed a second lawsuit, contending that state and federal laws were violated and the location of the site was racist. Consistent with the argument made by many schola rs in the ecology of games tradition, it is apparent that this environmental justice organization used multiple strategies (technical, direct action, legal). The same federal judge who had ruled against the county commissioners also refused to issue an injunction stopping the construction of the hazardous waste site (Burwell and Cole, 2010). Out of legal options, residents began to more definitively plan their direct action strategy (i.e., the specific tactics they would use), even rehearsing the march t o the site and blockade procedures to prevent the trucks from entering, and going as far as figuring out who would be arrested and who would not. Notably, the group shifted from using a legal strategy to employing a more confrontational direct action stra tegy, and in doing so, changed their frame from preventing hazardous waste (an environmental, but not environmental justice concern) to a larger civil rights issue of the location of hazardous waste sites in disproportionately Black and poor communities (a n environmental justice issue). Governor Hunt announced that waste hauling would begin on September 15, 1982, and the citizens were ready. Early on, there were arrests, including Dollie Burwell, a few other leaders, and even children. Unexpectedly, a fe w protestors jumped in front of trucks and were hit. The protests, planned and carried out the way civil rights protests had been, were effective in that they drew extensive media attention. When Dollie Burwell was arrested, her daughter Kim was seen cry ing. Reporter Dan Rather approached her and asked her why she was crying, if she was afraid of being arrested.

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76 She responded no, that she was not afraid of going to jail she was afraid that her parents and others in the community were going to die from c ancer. Her interview made national news and sparked other protests (Burwell and Cole, 2010). Media, because of its inherent purpose of spreading news and garnering attention for issues constructed as important, may be the most powerful strategy an organi zation can use in terms of having far reaching effects. The protests continued for weeks, with press releases being issued detailing the civil disobedience that would occur. When the governor accused outside agitators of fueling the civil disobedience, Burwell organized outside agitator day, bringing in hundreds of people from nearby states and even Washington DCs delegate to Congress and Chair of the Congressional Black Caucus, Walter Fauntroy. Protestors were taught how to make themselves limp whe n they were arrested the way protestors during the civil rights demonstrations had done, as up until that point, they willingly went in the paddywagons. At Burwells urging, Fauntroy blocked a bus with his body and was arrested. He spent the day in jail, missing his flight and a full day in Congress. He was so angered by his experience in Warren County that when he returned to DC, he requested that the Government Accounting Office conduct a study of hazardous waste sites. The study revealed that approxi mately three fourths of landfills were located in predominantly Black communities and all of them were in poor areas (Burwell and Cole, 2010). When the number of protestors arrested reached over 500, Governor Hunt agreed to meet with the residents (until then, he had refused). He made a few substantial concessions to their demands, including agreeing to detoxify the soil in the landfill when

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77 it was technically feasible, to support legislation that banned future landfills in Warren County, and to monitor residential wells within three miles of the landfill (Burwell and Cole, 2010). Ultimately, the protest events in the fall of 1982 were unsuccessful in preventing the landfill, but Burwell and Cole (2010, p. 20) pointed out that they were effective in othe r important ways: People were never really discouraged even though the landfill was built and the soil was sent there. People had by that time had got so empowered by just being involved that they did not feel defeated. Thats part of the feeling that ma ny people in the community hadthat feeling is what gave us the importance to hold the Governor to his promise to detoxify the land. Because people didnt feel defeated. Also, in the next election, probably due in large part to the voter registration e fforts of Burwell, the local political landscape in Warren County underwent a major shift. For the first time, Blacks comprised the majority of the county commissioners, and the County Board of Education consisted of a majority of non whites (two Blacks a nd one American Indian). Also for the first time, a Black sheriff was elected, and an African American was elected to the North Carolina Assembly. Within a short period of time, the political compositional change was reflected in policy, as legislation w as enacted preventing the construction of a toxic waste site within a 25 mile radius of the PCB landfill in Warren County. Legislation also was passed that would detoxify the landfill once technology and funds were available. The latter piece of legislat ion passed with the support of the Governor. Because of the political pressure he faced from the Warren County protests, he wrote an open letter supporting the detoxification of the landfill, so when the Black member of the North Carolina Assembly, Frank Ballance, drafted

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78 legislation requiring detoxification, the Governor essentially had to support it (Burwell and Cole, 2010). The broader ecology of games (e.g., political game involving the governor, the environmental justice game) is evident, as is the i mportance of considering the ecology within the context of specific games, and each game as being constituted by players, strategies, and goals. Consistent with the predictions of many critics of the landfill, in 1994, water was discovered to be leaking into the landfill, threatening to tear its liner. Initially, the States resolution was to dispose of the water in Alabama. Burwell and others who met with the Governors representative warned her that without the backing of a movement, over 500 people ended up in the Warren County Jail and that more than ten years later, with the establishment of the environmental justice movement, there likely would be 5,000 citizens crowding the county jail. Residents insisted that Governor Hunt, who had been out of off ice in 1984, but re elected in 1992, honor his promise to detoxify the landfill, and after some early resistance from a few republican politicians, a search for appropriate detoxification technology began. Governor Hunt set up a task force, the majority of who were Warren County citizens. The task force met in Warren County and participated extensively in the detoxification of the landfill, doing everything from choosing the technology and approving the contractors (ensuring some were local) to influencing policies like the prohibition of a fence around the area once it was cleaned up. Residents insisted that the soil was to be cleaned to a higher standard than it was before it was dumped into the landfill. Finally, in 2004, the Warren County landfill wa s detoxified, and plans were made to build a park there and dedicate it to the environmental justice movement (Burwell and Cole, 2010). Ultimately, the events in Warren County did not

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79 end when over 7,000 tons of PCB contaminated soil was dumped in the loc al landfill, but rather transpired for decades after that, culminating in a number of victories politically and environmentally, and changing the larger scale national discourse on environmental justice. Beyond the importance of the Warren County protests to the Afton community, the connection between civil rights and environmental hazards was transformative in creating the environmental justice movement (McGurty, 2000). In the mid 1980s, environmental racism, a term coined by Reverend Benjamin Chavis who was essential in the Warren County protests, became integrated into the anti toxic movement (Freudenberg and Steinsapir, 1991). The term singlehandedly represented the formal connection between the environmental justice and civil rights movements (Lazarus 2000). Although others, including citizens in communities affected by hazardous waste, had contended that the siting disproportionately burdened poor and minority areas both environmentally and economically, Chavis was the first to make an overt organiz ed statement that encompassed accusations of racism. Almost immediately, Chaviss claim that environmental laws that were supposed to help poor minority areas were racist in their application and implementation affected environmental legal scholarship. I ndeed, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, environmental law and environmental legal scholarship (textbooks, law review articles, conferences, clinics, etc.) did not recognize environmental justice claims (Lazarus, 2000). In the 1990s, following Chaviss clai m, almost every case law book began to devote attention to environmental justice matters, as did numerous law review articles, law school clinics, and symposia (Lazarus, 2000). Lazarus (2000) contended that Chaviss influence extended to environmental law itself,

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80 including facility siting, public participation, standard setting, and enforcement policy. He stated: Chavis's assertion and the broader social movement that it represents can fairly be placed alongside the contributions of Coase, Hardin, Leopold, and Dales as one of the most influential ideas affecting modern environmental law's evolution. No other single idea has so transformed environmental law during the 1990s. In 1983, the General Accounting Office (GAO) conducted the first major piece of research on waste facility siting (at the request of Walter Fauntroy), which was followed by more investigations with a similar focus on distributive justice and hazardous waste sites. The GAO study revealed an association between both race and income an d the location of hazardous waste sites in communities in eight southeastern states. Another well publicized study conducted by the United Church of Christ was even more telling it found a more definitive causal relationship between race and the likelihood of living near a hazardous waste site, with race being the strongest predictor. These studies were the catalyst for similar research, most of which documented a trend of environmental injustices in poor and minority areas, and given the roots and progre ssion of the movement, they were contextualized as revelations of political injustice. Another transformative event in the environmental justice movement occurred in 1991 when environmental justice organizations and environmental justice activists held th e First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit in Michigan. The Summit resulted in the development of the 17 Principles of Environmental Justice which are recognized as the basic tenets of the environmental justice movement (Cole and Fos ter, 2001; McGurty, 2000; Stretesky et al., 2010). Appendix A provides a list of the Principles of Environmental Justice. Throughout the 1990s, and arguably at least in part

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81 due to the Michigan conference, the number of environmental justice organizations doubled (Stretesky et al., 2010). In 1994, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12898, Federal Actions To Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low Income Populations, the first major federal policy initiative to explicitly ad dress environmental justice. Unlike other major federal environmental legislation (e.g., Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, National Environmental Protection Act, etc.), which do not include environmental justice provisions, Clintons Order explicitly addres sed environmental inequities. Indeed, Executive Order 12898 required federal agencies to review existing laws and policies, answering specific questions about the distribution of environmental benefits and burdens, with the purpose of making legal and soc ial progress through systematic analysis (Rhodes, 2003). On a more proactive level, federal agencies were ordered to identify strategies for including environmental justice interests into existing policies and procedures, a requirement that led to the est ablishment of an interagency working group and the publication of statements of commitment to environmental justice principles. The Environmental Protection Agency went beyond written and verbal commitments and actually incorporated environmental justice concerns into its regulatory reform processes (Rhodes, 2003). Whether it went far enough in resolving environmental justice concerns (e.g., it did not require a specific method of analyzing effects of environmental laws and policies on racial and ethnic su bgroups of the population) is a matter of debate, but what is evident is that the environmental justice movements influence had expanded into formal legal and political territory, an area previously unconscious of environmental justice concerns. Theoret ically, the role of scientific knowledge, previous social

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82 movement strategies, and the establishment of laws and policies related to environmental justice is interesting, as it illustrates that many resources are politically charged and that the context in which games are situated (particularly within issue communities), such as a predominantly Black community with experienced social movement leaders or a progressive legal climate, may facilitate or foreclose participation in certain games, as well as the u se of various strategies. Although the environmental justice movement was the result of a number of local struggles (Cole and Foster, 2001), the Warren County protests in 1982 marked the central events in the environmental justice movement (McGurty, 2000). Importantly, the protests linked civil rights and environmental discursive frames, creating a distinct frame of environmental racism, which has been broadened to include environmental inequities based on class, gender, age, and other factors, as well. These frames are consequential in defining environmental justice organizations goals and successes and for understanding the relationships between environmental justice organizations in the environmental justice movement game. As will become evident in the following section, environmental justice frames form the foundation for much of the existing research. The Environmental Justice Movement and its Organizations Specific definitions of environmental justice vary, but there are consistencies across d efinitions, which facilitate its ability to be understood as a social movement, which Tarrow (1994) defined as organized and sustained groups that employ contentious collective action (p.2) with elites, authorities, and opponents (p.1). For example, B ullard (1990) defined environmental justice as people and communities being entitled to equal protection of environmental laws. He later went on to point out that the

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83 environmental justice movement expanded the scope of the concept to include not only the physical or natural world, but also the places where people live, work, play, attend school, and pray. The Environmental Protection Agency defines environmental justice as, the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies (EPA, n.d.). Others similarly have emphasized the importance of equitable treatment (e.g., of different ra ces and classes) with respect to the distribution of environmental hazards and the development, enforcement, and implementation of environmental laws in conceptualizing environmental justice (Pellow, 2000; Rhodes, 2003). Although environmental justice is understood to be a social movement (McGurty, 2000; Stretesky et al., 2010), the organizations that comprise this movement remain under explored. For example, the importance of organizational strategies has been given much lip service, but little systematic attention. The environmental justice movement encompasses multiple intersections of environmental hazards, multiple forms of discrimination (race, ethnicity, class, gender, and age to name a handful), and public health. Each of these issues independentl y from the others possesses inherent scholarly and practical importance the ways that they interact to produce environmental justice concerns underscore a number of undesirable ramifications, including a lack of social consciousness and civility in this country, unnecessarily high rates of diseases, illnesses, injuries, and deaths, diminished quality of life, and the potentially egregious effects of institutions that create and perpetuate opportunities for power abuses. A more sophisticated understanding of how environmental justice organizations work together

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84 within the environmental justice game and the factors that contribute to the strategies they use reflect important scholarly priorities. Indeed, this line of research can offer insights into how orga nizations and social movements can accomplish their missions when they are disempowered by the government and have minimal formal channels to remedy a perceived wrongdoing. Framing is the conscious process of constructing and defining understandings of th e world through the control of the agenda and vocabulary; framing is done to motivate and justify collective action (Rohlinger, 2002; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1996; Miceli, 2005). More specifically, Brulle (n.d.) defined discursive frames as the set of cultural viewpoints that informs the practices of a community of social movement organizations. Frames serve a number of functions, including providing a definition of issues and boundaries surrounding a debate, demonstrating how a situation is proble matic, identifying responsible parties, putting forth potential solutions, and calling people to action (Benford and Snow, 2000; Rohlinger, 2002). For social movements to convince people that their cause is legitimate, they should connect their frames wit h larger cultural values and themes, because in doing so, the frames become identifiable to a larger audience (Miceli, 2005). Brulle (n.d.) identified eleven major discursive frames that comprise the environmental movement in the United States (wildlife management, conservation, preservation, reform environmentalism, deep ecology, environmental justice, environmental health, ecofeminism, eco spiritualism, animal rights, and antiglobalization/greens). Benford (2005) engaged in a similar systematic under taking for the environmental justice movement, arguing that its most innovative frame,

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85 environmental racism, was born as a result of the Warren County protests. Environmental racism was effective, first because it resonated well, particularly among racial and ethnic minorities, and second, because it defined problems (socially and racially differentiated environmental benefits and burdens) and placed blame with industry and government policies (Benford, 2005). Environmental racism, combined with the more general and positive sounding frame, environmental justice, led individuals and groups to focus on both rights and justice and to target their efforts toward people (both as victims and offenders), rather than the environment. Although the environmental justice frame was less radical than environmental racism, it was effective insofar as it incited many types of people to participate. Hundreds of organizations developed in response to specific community level injustices, as well as for more general inten tions of eradicating broader scale environmental justices, all directly and indirectly utilizing the frames that originated with environmental racism. The organizations used a variety of strategies and have achieved some local victories (e.g., winning set tlements against large corporations), inspired and participated in a number of research projects, sponsored conferences, and affected policy (Benford, 2005). Yet, in spite of its progress, some have argued that the movement and its organizations have become stale, losing some of its mobilizing power, not making much progress in the Bush years when political opportunities were limited and generally failing to acquire a broad political audience (Essoka and Brulle, 2002). Benford (2005) contended that the environmental justice frame has become all encompassing (he identified over 50 concerns that environmental justice organizations address, ranging from air pollution to homelessness, war, and police brutality), making it impossible for

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86 the movement to effecti vely carry out more narrowly constructed missions. Although a systematic analysis of the effect of frames on games is beyond the scope of this research, the potential cumulative effect of the movements frame shift (to a movement of everything) on games their strategies, and goals should be given due consideration, particularly within the context of the more formalized sector of the environmental justice movement, as it is likely that these organizations were more susceptible to the frame shift. Althoug h no research on the effectiveness of environmental justice organizations has been discovered to date, some scholars have devoted attention to successes in other movements, the findings of which are relevant to environmental justice organizations. For exa mple, Burstein and Linton (2002) predicted that political organizations should have a substantial direct impact on policy change. They looked at 53 scholarly articles in leading sociology and political science and found that their core hypothesis was not supportedmost scholars did not find a statistically significant effect of organizations on policy change. They pointed out that researchers tended to focus on specific organizations that were highly visible, issues that were narrow in focus, and on an outcome that was only a small part of the policy process. In this vein, they argued that future research in this area should develop better designs to understand when, how, and under what conditions organizations influence public policy. Without looking at specific measures of effectiveness like influence on public policy, the synthesis of resource mobilization theory and the ecology of games framework illuminates how (via strategies used in games) and under what conditions (the political context of communi ty and

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87 organizational resources, and the presence of opposition) certain outcomes may be likely to occur. A few studies have examined the effectiveness of specific environmental and environmental justice organizations. Mohai Pellow, and Roberts (2009) pointed out that studies of the environmental protest movement tend to focus on cases that garner a high degree of media publicity and instances in which organizations are successful, which makes it difficult to determine what factors lead both to mobilization and to a groups success in fighting an unwanted land use. Also with respect to environmental justice group effectiveness, Walsh, War land, and Smith (1997) concluded that it was more difficult for communities to close existing hazardous waste facilities than it was to stop new ones from being constructed. Their research illustrates the potential importance of the type of outcome, which may influence or be determined by both game participation and strategies, in determining an organizations a bility to achieve a desired goal. One other factor that has been associated with environmental justice organizational success is whether a group had secured legal representation from a public law clinic like Earthjustice, rather than retaining a private injury tort lawyer (ToffolonWeiss and Roberts, 2004). Although she did not directly examine environmental justice organizational effectiveness, Rohlinger (2002) pointed out the potential importance of organizational structure and identity on an organizat ions ability to garner media attention, which (depending on an organizations objectives) may be desirable or even necessary to achieve its missions. Within the context of the ecology of games, using the media constitutes a strategy, which is theoretically informed by available resources, one of which is organizational structure.

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88 Studies of the substantive aspects of the environmental justice movement have focused on the movements history, definitions of relevant frames, specific organizational contribut ions, connections to social movement theories, and to a lesser extent, its structure and effectiveness. What is missing is a systematic analysis of the organizations that comprise the movement, including their missions, their resources, their structure, a nd the strategies they use within their game to carry out their missions. Environmental justice organizations have facilitated the construction of the environmental policy agenda to include environmental justice. Moreover, they have influenced business practices, changed communities, and exposed myths about minorities attitudes toward the environment (Rhodes, 2003). To the extent that they have inspired and shaped positive changes and fallen short of their missions, one of the missing links between organizations and their outcomes that deserves systematic attention is the strategies they use to play their game. Strategies not only are inherently important to organizations, but since strategies comprise games that constitute a larger ecology, they are ind icative of the larger movement. The present study examines the link (the effect of) organizational elements, specifically resources and opposition on the strategies organizations use. The objective of this research is to determine the extent to which the se links are present, as well as to assess the environmental justice game as a substantive whole.

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89 CHAPTER V RESESARCH METHODS Research Design This study employ ed a quantitative design, utilizing statistical techniques to assess the research questions. Specifically, it utilize d primary archival data about environmental justice organizations gathered from a number of sources, including the National Center for Charitable Statistics, the United States Census, organizational websites, and other websites. Re call that the research question is: How do organizational and community resources and the prevalence of counter mobilization affect the strategies environmental justice organizations use? Sampling Strategy and Sample There are multiple perspectives on the definition of environmental justice and what this social movement stands for (e.g., Bullard, 1993; Lynch and Stretesky, 2003; Taylor, 2000), and there are several studies involving environmental justice organizations (e.g., Park and Pellow, 1995; Shah, 2008; Sze et al., 2005), yet there is no clear cut definition of what constitutes an environmental justice organization. Rhodes (2003) provided one of the more clear characterizations of environmental justice groups in the context of the broader social move ment and its efforts to put environmental justice issues on the policy agenda. He ascertained that environmental justice organizations form in response to a perceived problem. Organizations are comprised of a group of people covering a narrow to broad ra nge of issues; they may be formal or informal and may operate at a local, regional, national, or international level. In the environmental justice movement, organizations first focused on correcting immediate local problems of

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90 location, removal, or corr ection of hazardous facilities (Rhodes, 2003, p. 62), but often embraced these causes in the context of broader objectives (e.g., environmental, racial discrimination, social justice). The structure of environmental justice groups in the early years of t he movement (i.e., connecting environmental justice goals to larger social justice causes) may have enhanced the movements legitimacy, enabling its organizations to narrow their emphasis more strictly to environmental justice causes (Rhodes, 2003). As th e movement has grown, it arguably has become less exclusively environmental justice and more of a movement of everything (Benford, 2005). Environmental justice organizations, then, could be defined narrowly or broadly, but should include organizations t hat, at the very least, have part of their mission connected to the unequal distribution of environmental justices or injustices according to a disenfranchised social status, such as race, class, gender, or age. In the fall of 2009 and spring of 2010, I co mpiled a list of the population of environmental justice organizations in the United States. First, I identified a list of potential directories that contained Environmental justice organizations, including Bullards (2000) People of Color Environmental G roups Directories, Encyclopedia of Associations, Conservation Directory, Active Cause, The National Center for Charitable Statistics, and a number of one time directories. Supplementary searches included a Lexis Nexis search of newspaper articles that identified names of Environmental justice organizations, a google search online, scholarly articles, and examining lists of environmental justice conference attendees. Finally, Robert Brulle made available a list of national environmental groups he had compi led (Brulle, Turner, Carmichael, and Jenkins, 2007), from which I extracted primary environmental justice organizations. The

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91 primary search terms, which came from organizational mission statements or from the name of the group, that were used to derive a list of environmental justice organizations included: environmental justice, environmental injustice, environmental racism, environmental equality, environmental inequality, environmental equity and environmental inequity. The list of environmental justice groups that I generated included 1,342 organizations.4 The organizations that comprised the original sampling frame were highly diverse with respect to their goals and the priority that they gave to environmental justice missions. In fact, many groups websites reflected an emphasis on social justice or econo mic justice with no reference to environmental justice objectives. A systematic examination of organizational mission statements demonstrated that a very small percentage (161 organizations) were primary environmental justice organizations. In other words, only these groups purposes explicitly contained the terms environmental justice, environmental equity, environmental inequality, or environmental racism, or described their activities as involving a struggle against the unequal distribution of environmental hazards across race, ethnicity, class, gender, or age. Although the environmental justice movement is, a political response to the deterioration of the conditions of everyday life as society reinforces existing social inequalities while 4 The process of identifying and obtaining these directorie s and then going through each organization in them took several weeks, with approximately 20 to 30 hours per week of research. The supplementary searches occurred simultaneously as I obtained information on existing organizations. Obtaining additional in formation on each of the 1,342 organizations entailed visiting their websites and conducting google searches. Extensive data were gathered on these organizations, including their environmental justice focus (e.g., race, class, gender, etc.), their substan tive focus (e.g., air pollution, water pollution, dumping, siting, public health/toxics, etc.), their strategy (e.g., lobbying, aesthetic, moral/spiritual, community advocacy, media, etc.), the year they were founded, whether they were incorporated, their contact information (address, phone number, e mail addresses), etc. In total, approximately 250 hours or more of research went into compiling the original list of organizations, documenting the directories or searches in which they were a part, and obtaini ng information on the groups.

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92 ex ceeding the limits to growth (Pellow and Brulle, 2005, pp. 23) and contains hundreds and possibly thousands of groups that include activities involving movement related goals, the present research constrains its sample to primary environmental justice or ganizations which explicitly identify environmental justice in their principal missions or activities Indeed, an examination of organizational mission statements and websites revealed that primary environmental justice organizations were qualitatively d ifferent than organizations that included, but did not focus on environmental justice activities the latter group was sympathetic to the causes of the former, but their missions focused more on general environmental, social justice, or economic justice causes. This data set contains groups that focus on environmental justice the secondary and tertiary groups did not focus on environme ntal justice related missions. Including only primary groups in the data set is consistent with Longs framework, as he asc ertained that actors play mainly in one game. Including secondary and tertiary organizations whose primary game is not environmental justice is inconsistent with the ecology of games framework. Once I compiled the list of primary environmental justice org anizations, I gathered additional information on these groups resources, including revenue, percent of revenue that came from grants, number of staff and employees, money paid out to employees in salary and benefits, etc. I also gathered d ata also on res ources within the communities in which the organizations were located, including education level, income, and racial composition, and on potential measures of opposition, including superfund sites, number of toxic release inventory and air pollutant facili ties, and percent employed in certain manufacturing industries. Obtaining information on organizational resources from groups 990 forms was quite time consuming, as the three year averages of each

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93 number had to be manually computed. The additional data gathering also was a time intensive effort, because several sources were utilized (the census website, 990 forms which are not the same for each organization, and the environmental scorecard website). Acquiring the information to complete the data set on primary environmental justice organizations took approximately 100 additional hours. Given the nature of the data sources specifically, their focus on larger, more bureaucratic organizations that receive external funding and possess monetary assets this list of organizations likely exclude s smaller, grass roots organizations. Although grass roots organizations were an integral part of the environmental justice movements history and are quite meaningful to the local communities in which they operate, it ma y be that to the environmental justice movement as a whole and to the larger scale environmental justice game and its outcomes, more informal organizations do not carry the weight they once did earlier in the movements history. According to Jenkins (1983, p. 528), centralized, formally structured movement organizations are more typical of modern social movements and more effective at mobilizing resources and mounting sustained challenges than decentralized, informal movement structures Also, regardle ss of the desirability of obtaining data on these organizations, there is not an available source of information from which a sampling frame could be derived. The list of environmental justice organizations in this sampling frame is not perfect, but it is more comprehensive than any other data source and hence, the best available data. Of the 161 primary environmental justice organizations, data were available on 132 of them. The fina l sample size in this research was 132 environmental justice organizati ons.

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94 Variable Measurement and Archival Data Sources Table 1 includes a list of variables, their measures, and operationalizations. No single archival data source contain ed all of the necessary information to measure the variables; however, to the extent possible, multiple sources of data were exploited to triangulate the information, enhancing its credibility and the validity of the findings. Strategies Strategies are the dependent variable of interest. Ecology of games scholars have not developed a val id measure of strategies, nor have they provided much theoretical guidance on the concept or how it might be operationalized. The social movement literatures treatment of strategies has been in isolated contexts, with scholars focusing on specific strateg ies without defining the concept of strategy. For example, scholars have looked at media strategies (Carroll and Ratner, 1999), legal strategies (Duarte and Martins, 2008), and direct action or extra institutional strategies (protest, civil disobedience ) (Amenta, Caren, Chiarello, and Su, 2010). Only one definition of strategies has been found Fernandez and Antolin Iria (2000) referred to strategies as ways of acting. This conceptualization, along with a laypersons understanding of the term and implicit suggestion from both the social movement literature and the ecology of games framework, contributed to the definition of strategies in the present research. In this study, strategies are defined as activities in which organizations engage to change s ome aspect of society. For example, the Connecticut Coalition for Environmental Justice uses a legal strategy. In the year 2010, the organization helped pass state

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95 Table 1. Variables and Measures VARIABLE MEASURE/OPERATIONALIZATION Dependent Variable Measured in 2011 2012 (websites and 990s) Strategies (Variable names: STRA followed by an abbreviation of the strategy that constitutes the variable e.g., STRA L AW is whether an organization used a legal strategy to carry out any of its environm ental justice objectives Dummy coded (0/1) measures of whether an organization employs each of these strategies (1=yes): legal; educational; community advocacy; enforcement; aesthetic; media; direct action; and provision of support. Note that a few of these strategies involved recoding other strategies into a single strategy in cases where there were thematic consistencies (e.g., legal and lobbying strategies were combined into a single dependent variable, as were educational and research strategies). Independent Variables 5 year estimates (2006 2010); 2010 Census; 2008 election results Community Resources American Fact Finder: 5 year estimates (2006 2010) and U.S. Census 2010 Education (CREDUC) % of college graduates among individuals 25 years and older, 2006 2010 (county level) Income (CRINCMED) Median household income, 2006 2010 (county) Political Access (CRPOLACC) Ratio of democrat to republican votes in the 2008 presidential election (by county); Ratios greater t han 1 indicate more democratic counties. New York Times poll results from website. Race (categorical e.g., CRRACEWH, CRRACEBL) Percent White; Percent Black or African American. 2010, by county Organizational Resources 3 year estimates (2008 2010) Income (ORINCOME) Average total revenue (2008 2010) from 990s Income Source (Stability) (ORINCSRCE) Average percentage of groups total revenue that was comprised of grants and contributions (20082010). From 990s. Number of employees (OREMPLOY) Average number of employees a group had (2008 2010). From 990s Number of volunteers (ORVOLUNT) Average number of volunteers a group had (20082010). From 990s.

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96 Table 1 ( Continued ) Salaries and benefits paid to staff (ORSALARY) 3 year average of salaries, benefits, and other payments to organizational employees and staff. From 990s. Group Structure 1: ORBOARD Whether an organization had a Board of Directors in 20 10 (990) Group Structure 2: ORINDMBR Whether and organization has individual members (websites, 990s) Counter Mobilization 1: Density of air pollution facilities (CMAIRFAC) Number of air pollutant facilities per square mile in the county in which the organizations exist. Taken from scorecard.org Counter Mobilization 2: Density of Toxic Release Inventory facilities (CMTRIFAC) Number of TRI facilities per square mile in the county in which the organizations exist. Taken fro m scorecard.org Counter Mobilization 3: % employed in industries (CMEMPIND) % of people employed in the following industries: agricultural, forestry, fishing and hunting, mining, or manufacturing. Taken from census data Control Variables Geographic Scope (GEOGSCPE) Level at which groups target their EJ missions: 1 = narrow [local/community, city/county]; 0 = broad [state, regional (multi state), national, international]. Substantive Area (e.g., FOCCLIM, FOCSITE, FOCDUMP) EJ area of focus (dummy coded, 0/1): dumping, siting, climate change Discrimination Focus (e.g., FOCRACE, FOCBLACK) Type of discrimination on which groups focus their EJ missions (dummy coded, 0/1): African American or Black, race or ethnicity in general Organizational Age Age of each organization in years (2012 year group was founded)

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97 legislation that developed a new Chemicals Innovations Institute, which helped state businesses and manufacturers use non toxic chemicals in their services and products. The National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) contains data from 1986 to 2011 on organizational activities. Scanned copies of organizations 990s are available on the NCCS website. To obtain information on organizations strategies, I looked at en vironmental justice groups activities. Many groups report their activities on their 990 forms, and most groups that have websites also identify their activities there. These data sources were drawn upon to determine the strategies that environmental jus tice organizations use. Environmental justice groups use a number of strategies to carry out their missions. An inductive coding scheme was used to develop this list. Specifically, every environmental justice organizations website, including groups wi th nonprimary environmental justice objectives, was examined, and a list of the organizations activities was developed. I used m any other sources of information to enhance this list, including directories of environmental justice organizations, scholarl y research articles on organizations strategies and tactics, Lexis Nexis, a google search that yielded online accounts of organizations activities. Once the list was created, two researchers reviewed it, looking for thematic similarities that would faci litate the operationalization of strategies. For example, some organizations supported the passage of legislation or participated in legal cases (e.g., through writing a brief, testifying, or suing) these tactics comprised a legal strategy. The original list of 1,342 organizations contained the following strategies: lobbying, community advocacy, educative strategies, direct action, research, monitoring or enforcement, media, public opinion, moral, aesthetic, grant

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98 provision, support services, use of technology, and legal strategies (legislative and judicial aspects). Strategies were dummy coded nominally (1=strategy was used by the organization). According to Minkoff (1994) and others, social movement organizations engage in more than one strategy. Whe n an organization engaged in multiple strategies, each strategy received a value of 1. Given the number of strategies that were identified, which would require extensive time to analyze statistical models, and the somewhat arbitrary distinction between ma ny of them, it made conceptual and practical sense to recode the strategies into a smaller number of categories. I collapsed the initial set of strategies into eight categories. A copy of the codebook, showing how the variables used in the analysis were named and operationalized is available in Appendix B. Table 2 reports the eight categories, along with definitions of each. I also created an interval ratio level variable of the total number of strategies environmental justice organizations used. This variable was created by adding the eight strategy types (so the range was 0 to 8, although every organization used at least one strategy). Although many strategies that environmental justice organizations use are straightforward and not conceptually diffic ult, illustrations of some of the more obscure strategies may be helpful. For example, a group that uses the monitoring/enforcement strategy is the Silicone Valley Toxics Coalition, which works with the Environmental Protection Agency to establish Superfund sites in an effort to enforce industry accountability for the health problems created by the electronics manufacturing companies in the area. An example of a group that engages in community advocacy is the Deep South Center for Environmental Justice de veloping the communiversity

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99 Table 2. Coding Scheme for and Definition of Strategies Category Strategies within the Category and Definitions of Each Legal Includes lobbying and other activities involving legislation or case law (e.g., party in a lawsuit, writing a brief, etc.) Educational Educational advocacy (e.g., distribution of pamphlets or books, conducting a meeting or seminar, etc.), research activities, conference presentations, etc. Community Advocacy Community advocacy (e.g., facilitating org anization of people within neighborhoods, collaborative programming and projects) and public opinion (e.g., using public opinion to effect change, such as through a letter or petition) Enforcement Strategies that focus on monitoring or enforcement (e.g., of environmental standards in low income communities); strategies that use technology to ensure compliance Media Strategies that rely on media publicity (e.g., press releases) Aesthetic Use of aesthetic strategies (e.g., clean up of a community that has been affected by an environmental injustice) Direct Action Use of public protest, demonstrations, etc. (versus negotiation) Provision of Support Distribution of money (e.g., in the form of grants), provision of technical or other support to carry out an environmental justice mission

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100 model that encourages collaboration between the community and local universities, where they can come together and motivate others to become involved in environmental justice problems in the local communities. Resources In accordance with resource mobilization theory, two primary independent variables that may influence strategies are organizational and community resources. Resource mobilization theory suggests that internal and external resources may affect groups activities, because certain types of resources (e.g., money or political connections) facilitate certain strategies over others (e.g., legal strategies over direct action). For example, communities with more formal education and higher median incomes should be more likely to engage in media strategies (perceived construction as a deserving population, where media publicity likely is a good use of resources) and educative strategies (because there are presumably capable deliverers and a desirable target aud ience) (Schneider and Ingram, 1997) For both theoretical and statistical purposes, organiza tional and community resources we re measured at an earlier point in time than strategies, so the temporal order problems are minimized, thereby enhancing causal val idity Community Resources Community resources we re considered for the county in which the organization is located. Even if a group operates beyond its community, its strategies likely are affected by the area in which it is located. One possible reason for this connection is that recruits may come from the area in which the organization is located. Also, if staff, volunteers, or other members of the organization live in the county in which it is located, these people

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101 likely are familiar with (and will draw on) resources from within their community to carry out their mission, regardless of where the mission is targeted. Community resource variables were measured using census data from 2010; American Factfinder, which is a five year estimate of various demographics based on census data; and the New York Times website that contains 2008 presidential election results by county. Because resources are an indep endent variable, it was necessary to measure them at an earlier point in time than strategies. Sin ce strategies were measured in the years 2011 and 2012, using data from the years 2008 to 2010 preserve d the appropriate temporal order.5 Community resources include d education, income, race, and political access at the county level, as these variables have been associated with environmental justice organizations formation and activities (McAdam, 1982; McGurty, 2000; Stretesky et al., 2011). Also, they may be associated with strengths or barriers that channel organizational goals and strategies, which ar e reflected in their games. R esource mobilization theory predicts that having more of certain types of resources will be associated with specific outcomes, as resources are allocated strategically in accomplishing organizational missions. With respect to education, income, and politi cal access, I hypothesize d that higher levels on these variables would be associated with higher odds of using legal, enforcement, media, and support services strategies. These types of strategies are more formal and institutionalized tha n direct action s trategies Direct action strategies are more likely to be used by organizations with 5 It may be the case that organizational strategies do not change over time and may be shaped by resources much earlier in the groups existence. It also is possible that organizations resources early in their development sha pe strategies, which then bring in more resources, which may then alter the groups strategies. It is not possible to examine these relationships empirically in the present study, but the possibility of their existence is noted. To the extent it is possible, variables in the present study have been measured at different points in time, thereby retaining the integrity of the temporal order, so whatever statistically significant results are found are consistent with the theorys predictions.

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102 fewer community resources, as they require less money and fewer connections, and have higher stakes (e.g., possibility of arrest, negative publicity, violating a policy t hat was attached to funding). Recall that Table 1 reports the community resource variables and their measures. Education was measured as a fiveyear estimate (2006 through 2010, from American Factfinder on the US Census website) of the percentage of col lege graduates among individuals age 25 and older in the counties in which environmental justice groups operate. Income was operationalized as the fiveyear estimate, also taken from American Factfinder, of the median household income in the counties in which environmental justice groups operate. The median is a stronger measure of income at an aggregate level than the mean household income, as the latter is more vulnerable to influence from extreme values. With respect to income, the average likely wil l be pulled up by a small percentage of individuals earning very high salaries. Indeed, this pattern seemed to occur, as the mean household income in all counties in the sample was substantially higher than the median income. Areas with higher levels of affluence (education and income) may provide environmental justice organizations with more opportunities to mobilize that is, employ various strategies to accomplish their missions (McAdam, 1982) .6 Political access was measured as the ratio of d emocrat to republican votes in the 2008 presidential election (Stretesky et al., 2011). Similarly, Minkoff and her colleagues 6 If the mean w as used to measure community affluence, I would expect to see a similar pattern communities with a higher mean income (more people earning very high incomes) should have the potential for more monetary resources, which would facilitate the use of strategies like support services and law.

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103 operationa lized political opportunity as democratic advantage in Congress (the di fference between the number of d emocrats and republicans in the House of Representatives). In the same vein, Brulle and Jenkins (n.d.) argued that when republicans took control of the house in 1994, environmentalists practically vanished from Congressional hearings. Mohai, Pellow, and Roberts (2009) reinforced t his contention, maintaining that the environmental justice movement was hindered for the eight years that George W. Bush was president. In discussions of political access, there seems to be widespread agreement that a perceived or actual political advanta ge (e.g., more democratic political representation) is associated with the ability of environmental justice organizations to mobilize. Since this research is not limited to national organizations, I employ ed a county level measure of political access. At the county level, it is likely that the more democratic the county, the more likely organizations are to use political strategies or strategies that involve political connections (e.g., legal, enforcement, media, and support services) or unconventional st rategies like direct action. The New York Times published county level results of this election, which continue to be available online. The ratio is expressed as a decimal, with values less than one reflecting a county whose residents were more supporti ve of republican candidate John McCain than democratic candidate Barrack Obama. Conversely, values greater than 1 indicate that a countys residents were more supportive of Obama than McCain. The closer to 1 the decimal, the closer the rac e was (i.e., the less strongly d emocrat or republican county residents, as a whole, were). With respect to race, I expect ed organizations located in areas with more whites to be more likely to employ the same strategies (legal, enforcement, media, and support) as

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104 groups with more of other types of community resources income, education, and political access for similar reasons. Race plays a somewhat unique role in environmental justice organizations strategy decisions, a role that will not necessarily be distingui shed empirically, but is a worthwhile theoretical discussion. It may be that communities with a higher non white population are likely to employ noninstitutional strategies like direct action for a number of reasons, including historical connections to c ivil rights, current links between the environmental justice issue and civil rights, or political disenfranchisement of nonwhites that preclude the use of more institutionalized strategies. Recall that in Warren County, when mostly whites were involved i n preventing the landfill, they employed a legal strategy; however, once more Blacks in the community became involved and legal strategies were failing, the group changed its strategy to direct action as had been successful during the civil rights movement (McGurty, 2000). This civil rights approach to environmental justice has been recognized by several environmental justice scholars (Bullard, 1993; Cole and Foster, 2003). I operationalized r ace/ethnicity as percent White, Black or African American, Ameri can Indian and Alaska Native, Asian, Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander, some other race, two or more races, or Hispanic in 2010 (based on 2010 census data obtained on the Census website) for each county in which an environmental justice organization exists. Although there is certainly a correlation between race and income, the two are not the same conceptually or empirically. Indeed, according to the National Poverty Center, racial disparity is a consequence of, as well as a cause of cumulative di sadvantages, including income, education, laws and policies that disproportionately

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105 affect non whites, social services, health, and crime. Communities with higher proportions of nonwhites may bear disproportionate burdens of social, economic, and environm ental problems, but simultaneously lack the power and resources to remedy these issues. Indeed, racially segregated communities often are intertwined with poverty, which imposes disproportionate costs on residents of nonwhite areas, such as gangs, drug p roblems, teen pregnancy, homes with lead based paint, educational and occupational hardships, etc (Adams, 1996; Seitles, 1996). Concentrated poverty and racial segregation and their consequent social harms may disempower residents, occupy them with day to day problems thereby preventing effective collective social action, or offer them too few resources to mitigate any social or environmental harm, all of which would impact their strategy selection. I expect ed to find a statistically significant relation ship between community resources and the strategies environmental justice organizations use, with the odds of an organization using certain strategies increasing, depending on the level of each resource. For example, I predict ed that communities with high er median income w ould have a higher probability of using strategies that involve more money, such as law, support services, enforcement strategies, etc. A number of scholars have argued that grievances, alone, do not explain why social movements mobilize grievances persist across time and space; it is when resources like money and human capital become available that people decide whether to organize and how to mobilize in other words, what strategies to use given their resources and goals (Cornwell et al., 2003; Jenkins, 1983; Jenkins and Perrow, 1977; Oberschall, 1978; Tilly, 1978). Specifically, I hypothesize d that:

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106 1. The more of any single community resource (income, white political access) environmental justice organizations ha d access to, the more they w ould use strategies that require more money and political capital (legal, enforcement, media, and support services) and the less likely they w ould be to use direct action strategies, as these strategies are less institutionalized and more likely to be used in communities lacking resources The exception to this relationship was percent Blacks in the community I expected this to increase the odds that organizations would use a direct action strategy. Within the context of the ecol ogy of games framework, it may be that these organizational players of the environmental justice game have obtained more monetary resources as the movement has evolved and become more legitimate, and in doing so, employ more conventional, less confrontational strategies than their more grassroots predecessors, which had a reputation for engaging in more local struggles using disruptive strategies like direct action. Organizational Resources In accordance with resource mobilization theory, there are many types of organizational resources that might affect social movement groups. First, money may be the biggest resource indicator of social movement outcomes. I obtained data on groups revenue from their 990 forms, submitted to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), available online from National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS). I took the average of t he groups revenue (totaled and divided by three) for the years 2008, 2009, and 2010, as this is prior to the time for which strategies are measured, 2011 to the present) and consistent with the time frame for community resources measures, which minimizes temporal order

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107 issues in the analysis. There were a few instances where organizations on ly had 990 forms for two of the three years, and in these cases, I used a two year averag e Taking a threeyear average offered the advantage of minimizing a single extremely good or bad year for an organization, while keeping the measure in the recent enough past that the influence of organizational resources on games is theoretically feasible. Source of income matters with respect to how resources are mobilized (Arnove, 1982; Bartley, 2007; Haines, 1984; McAdam, 1982; Minkoff, 1994; 1999; Roelofs, 2003) and hence, should affect the games environmental justice groups play. Specifically, charitable foundations may channel social movement activity (e.g., through selection) (Haines, 1984; McAdam, 1982); they may exert a subtle pressure to develop bureaucra tic structure, thereby influencing organizations to neglect grassroots strategies (Bartley, 2007); or they may function as primary actors in the social control of organizations (Arnove, 1982; Roelofs, 2003). Regardless of the specific mechanisms through w hich foundations (or corporations) influence social movement organizations, it seems that charitable institutions tend to fund groups that rely on institutional strategies (rather than disruptive ones) and that are nonmembership based (e.g., governed excl usively by boards of directors) (Brulle and Jenkins, 2005). Ironically, with respect to environmental justice organizations, to the extent that charitable foundation support for this movement is a vehicle of class domination, it flies in the face of what many environmental justice organizations argue is a root cause of unequal distribution of environmental hazards. Brulle (2000) measured foundation grants as a percentage of a groups total income. This research adopted a similar measure of income source The same 990 form that was used to obtain income information was used to acquire this measure. The

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108 information available on 990 forms includes contributions organizations received from g rants, as well as the public. I divided t his number by the groups total revenue fo r the years 2008, 2009, and 2010 and used the average percentage to measure income source. In other words, income source is the percentage of each groups income that comes from foundation and public support. Although it would have be e n more desirable to separate foundation support and measure only this aspect of a groups income, there wa s no way to do this given the structure of the 990 forms. Future research should adopt more indepth and facially valid measures of charitable support I expect ed that organizations with more income and a higher percentage of income that came from foundation support would be more likely to employ strategies that were more costly, such as legal, enforcement, and support services. Groups with less money and foundation support would be more likely to use less costly strategies, including educational, strategies that involve the public, media, moral, and direct action. The number of employees and the number of volunteers environmental justice organizations have constitute some of their human resources. Again, I took the three year average (2008 through 2010) from organizations 990 forms, and used an interval ratio measure for each of these variables To enhance the face validity of organizational human re sources, I used an additional measure: the amount of money an organization spent on salaries, benefits, and other expenses for staff and employees. It should be that organizations that are able to spend more money on their employees are hiring people who are experienced and/or well educated, are employing more people, and presumably are able to keep more employees (less turnover, more organizational stability) than organizations with less or no money to spend on employees, which should affect the

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109 strategie s they use. Conversely, groups that lack this resource, whether it is a result of undesirable struggle or by design, likely w ould end up using different strategies, as they are shut out of certain ones (e.g., legal, support provision, enforcement) by virtue of their lack of resources. I measured t his variable as a threeyear average (2008 through 2010) from groups 990s of how much money they spent on salaries, benefits, and other expenses for their employees and operationalized it at the interval ratio level as a dollar amount, with higher dollars indicating more of this resource. The final organizatio nal resource, group structur e, was measured in two ways. First, I dummy coded whether an organization had a Board of Directors in the year 2010 (1 = yes). The 990 forms available on the NCCS website contained this information, and many organizations websites contain ed information about their staff and Board. Second, membership structure wa s measured by whether the group is comprised of individual mem bers (1 = yes). Organizations we re coded 0 if they are non membership or astroturf groups (Brulle and Jenkins, 2005), or if they w e re comprised of only other orga nizations (e.g., a coalition). I took t his information from organizations websites and their 2010 990 forms (e.g., in descriptions of their activities). Summarily and as was the case with community resources, organizati onal resources should impact environmental justice groups strategies. I predict ed : 2. The more of each organizational resource revenue, contributions, employees, volunteers, formal structure (Board; no members), and salary expenditures environmental justice organizations have, the more likely they would adopt strategies that involve d more money and people (but less membership participation): legal, enforcement, media, and support services.

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110 Conversely, groups with less of these organizational resources would be more inclined to adopt strategies that involve d more membership participation, but less money and fewer connections: educational, community, aesthetic, and direct action. Again, consistent with the ecology of games framework and with the environmental justice literature (e.g., Benford and Snow, 2000), it may be the case that as the structures and institutions surrounding environmental justice have shifted, so have the organizations toward more formal, bureaucratic, nonmembership organizations that use nonparticipatory and socially and politically acceptable strategies. However, some organizations within the movement have retained individual members and have relatively few monetary and political resources, and these organizations should still employ more participatory strategies. Counter Mobilization The influence of counter mobilization on social movement organizations and their missions and strategies is welldocumented both theoretically and in specific empirical contexts (Dudas, 2005; Haydu, 1999; Lowery et al., 2005; Schneiber et al., 2008; Stryker, 2007). In spite of its relevance, much of the social movement scholarship focuses on framing, resource mobilization, or political opportunity theories, and neglects to consider the role of counter mobilization in organizational outcomes, including strategies, goals, and effectiveness. The present study begins to overcome this weakness by looking at both resources and counter mobilization efforts. This research employed three measures of counter mobilization. Recall that existing empirical operationalizations of this concept are contextspecific, and indeed, to

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111 have internally valid measures of counter mobilization within the geo political environment of a certain organization, variation in the forms and substance of the opposition need to be accounted for. With respect to the environmental justice movement, counter mobilization efforts may take a number of forms, and this study captures at least a few dimensions of the concept. Lack of available data precluded stronger, more comprehensive measures, particularly at the organizational level. The measures employed in this research are limited in that they are broadly applicable to all organizations; they do not consider specific opposition to individual groups efforts. Case study research allows for this level of depth, but the benefit of quantitative research is that the results are more applicable to larger contexts, in this case to environmental justice organizations as a whole. First, the number of air pollutant facilities per square mile in the counties in which environmental justice organizations exist was obtained from the website, scorecard.org. Scorecard.org provides comprehensive data on numerous toxic chemi cals, air pollution, water pollution, animal waste (agriculture), health hazards, and environmental policy at a variety of geographic levels. It integrates over 400 scientific and governmental databases to generate its customized profiles of local envir onmental quality and toxic chemicals ( http://scorecard.goodguide.com/about/txt/data.html ). The more polluting facilities that are present given the size of the county, the more likely it is that industries opposing environmental justice organizations missions are present .7 Second, I also obtained the number of toxic release inventory (TRI) facilities per square mile in the counties in which environmental justice groups are present from 7 I recognize that the grievance perspective would ascertain that communities with more polluting facilities would be likely to have more environmental justice organizations form to mobilize against the facilities.

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112 s corecard.org. Similar to the number of air pollutant facilities, this measure is a ratio level measure, and the higher the number, the more TRI facilities there are, indicating a stronger presence of forces likely to oppose environmental justice goals. Th ird, certain industries likely engage in activities and have economic objectives that are contrary to environmental justice missions. Census data from 2010 provide d a measure of the percent of individuals employed in several of these industries, including agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, mining, and manufacturing. The percent of individuals employed in these industries by county is based on the number of people employed in the county. It constitute d the final co unter mobilization measure and w a s operationalized as a p ercent, ranging from 0 to 100. Just as resources affect how environmental justice organizations strategize, oppositional forces also should impact game playing strategies. More specifically, the prevalence of counter mobilizatio n in the same space that environmental justice groups operate could incite the organizations use of certain strategies, particularly more political and high profile ones like legal, public, media, and direct action. With respect to the effect of counter mobilization on organizational strategies, I hypothesize d: 3. The more prevalent any of the forms of counter mobilization, the higher the odds that organizations would use more high profile strategies, including media, and direct action and the less likely t hey would be to use institutionalized strategies like legal and educational. Although the measures used in this stud y are indirect proxies and do not operationalize actual counter mobilization, extant literature on opposition suggests that the perception of an enemy may be sufficient to create mobilization (Alt, 1994; Key, 1949). More

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113 broadly, if a game involves extensive competition, it may be that resources and other factors influence strategies differently than if competition is more minimal. Althou gh an examination of this relationship is beyond the capabilities of this paper given the inability to directly measure opposition to environmental justice, the relationship between counter mobilization measures and resources reflects a good theoretical st arting point. Control Variables The scope of an organization wa s operationalized by the level at which the group target ed its environmental justice missions: local/community; city/county; state; regional (multistate); national; and international. Websites and organizational activities detailed on the groups 990s provide d sources for this information. It wa s desirable to control for this variable, as it may affect organizational strategies (e.g., state or nationallevel goals lend themselves to legal and educational strategies; whereas locallevel missions facilitate more direct action and community oriented strategies). The substantive area within environmental justice on which organizations focus may affect their strategies. I operationalized g roup focus as a series of dummy variables (if the organization focuse d on an area, it is coded 1): water, air, dumping, siting, unequal law enforcement, health, sustainable development, climate change, CO2, toxins/pollution, and other. These categories were inductively developed after reviewing organizations websites, directories, other websites, and 990 forms. Coding organizati ons on these variables based on their websites and other identified sources proved to be fairly easy and clear cut. Although connecting each of these categories to likelihood of using each type of strategy is a somewhat dense exercise, I expect ed that area of focus may be relevant to strategy in that groups with a larger focus (e.g., air pollution) would be more likely to use

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114 more institutionalized strategies (e.g., legal, enforcement). Organizations that f ocused on local struggles that we re on a smaller scale like dumping and siting would be more likely to use strategies like direct action that involve a high level of community presence/involvement. Finally, I control led for the type of discrimination about which environmental justice organizations are co ncerned. These we re dummy variables, coded 1 if a group demonstrate d a perceived discriminatory antagonism based on it. This information primarily came from organizational mission statements, but when I was unable to locate it, I relied on other sources of information as data sources for this variable, including directories, other websites, and descriptions resulting from an online search. Specific categories included: class; African American, Black, or Communities of Color; Hispanic; Native American or American Indian; Asian; Indigenous; gender; age; or no emphasis mentioned. The race/ethnicity categories were collapsed and dummy coded (1=white). I used i nductive reasoning based on organizational mission statements to derive these groups. It might be that groups with a focus on race or class are more grassroots and employ strategies like direct action and use of the general public that are consistent with grassroots purposes. Analytic Strategy First, I obtained frequencies and descriptive statistics for each variable, after which I generated a correlation matrix identifying associations b etween interval ratio variables (Pearsons r) and categorical and interval ratio variables (biserial correlations) Next, I ran bivariate logistic regressions to assess the associations between the independent and control variables and each strategy. Next, I analyzed m ultivariate

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115 models including control variables, and conducted supplementary analyses, including an informal case s tudy to inform the empirical findings

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116 CHAPTER VI QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS I used various statistical techniques to answer the research question of how resources and oppositional presence affect game strategies among environmental justice organizations. The ecology of games framework illustrates that although the outcomes of the entire ecology may be unintended, decisionmaking among game players with respect to strategies, roles, and goals is calculated. The social movement literature, particularly resourc e mobilization theory, provides more specific guidance with respect to how environmental justice organizations might mobilize their resources in other words, what strategies they are more or less likely to employ when they possess or lack certain types of resources and when they are faced with possible opposition in their surrounding communities. The analysis proceed s as follows: first, I discuss the data, including frequency distributions and descriptive statistics of each variable. Second, I examine bivariat e relationships Third I use multivariate logistic regression to assess the varying effects of resources and opposition on game strategies, while controlling for other possible relevant factors. Finally, I carry out supplementary analyses to contextualize and inform the previous analyses. Descriptive Statistics I used t he data analysis software program SPSS to analyze the data. There were 132 primary environmental justice organizations that had information on a sufficient number of variables to statistically analyze; however, the available data varied between organizations, creating some variables with more missing data than others. Mis sing data

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117 can be a large problem in multivariate data analysis, one that, until relatively recently, only has been able to be handled through problematic techniques like listwise deletion (eliminating cases with missing values) or mean substitution (Schafe r and Olsen, 1998). Some research designs allow scholars to anticipate missing data and plan for it in advance, but most do not, and in studies like the present one with a fairly small sample to begin with, missing data presents challenges, not only in potentially biasing the results and even rendering them invalid, but in having enough units to analyze statistically. To deal with the problem of missing data in the present analysis, the technique of multiple imputation was used.8 Table 3 provides a list of all variables used in the analyses and their frequency distributions and means. Although the environmental justice movement has a grassroots reputation, likely a product of its history and connections to other participatory movements like civil rights the strategies that its organizations use in achieving contemporary environmental justice missions within the larger environmental justice game suggest ed that the groups have strayed from their grassroots origins. For example, over half of the groups ( N =84) use d a legal strategy, while fewer than half of the 132 organizations ( N =50) indicated that they engaged in direct action. In a similar vein, educational (99 groups used it, 33 did not) and community advocacy strategies (86 groups used it, 46 did not ), the latter of which often entailed helping members in a community to network with one another and organize (a relatively removed strategy with a more indirect environmental justice goal), were popular strategies among 8Generally, multiple imputation involves incorporating random variation into a model containing the variables to be used in the analysis and then imputing values for the missing data. Appendix C contains a detailed discussion of this technique and the procedures used in the present analysis to impute the missing data.

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118 Table 3. Frequency Distribution and Descriptive Statistics Variable N (%) Strategies (1=group uses the strategy) Legal 84 (63.64%) Educational 99 (75.00%) Community Advocacy 86 (65.15%) Monitoring/Enforcement 23 (17.42%) Media 70 (53.03%) Aesthetic 24 (18.18%) Direct Action 50 (37.88%) Support Provision 59 (44.70%) Organizational Resources Revenue $544,109.31 % of revenue from grant funding 88.28% Number of employees 13.46 Number of volunteers 102.70 Whether organization has a Board 93 (70.45%) Whether organization has members 58 (43.94%) Community Resources Education (% with Bachelors) 34.61% % White 62.70% Median Income $57,308.95 Political Access (ratio of D emocrats to republicans) 2.80 Oppositional Presence TRI Facilities 0.134 Air Pollutant Facilities 0.951 % employed in potentially oppositional industries 9.63 Control Variables Group Age (years) 18.80 Discrimination Focus Black 67 (50.76%) Other race or ethnicity 88 (66.67%)

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119 Table 3 ( Continued) Variable N (%) Substantive Focus Dumping 25 (18.94%) Siting 68 (51.52%) Climate Justice 39 (29.55%) Geographic Scope (1=narrow; 0=broad) 51 (38.64%) (narrow focus)

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120 environmental justice organizations. Many organizations ( N =70) reported that they used the media to accomplish their environmental justice objectives. While legal, educational, and community oriented strategies were common a mong environmental justice groups, other strategies were less common. Only 23 groups used m onitoring or enforcement tactics. Similarly, only 24 groups used aesthetic advocacy. Fewer than half ( N =59) of the organizations offered support services for env ironmental justice objectives. The way that environmental justice organizations play the environmental justice game seem ed to be complex, suggesting that perhaps what scholars once believed to be fairly straightforward connections (e.g., between res ources, political opportunities, and outcomes) actually are multi faceted and thorny. Although an empirical analysis of environmental justice missions is beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth mentioning that a perusal of groups goals reflected the same complexity as their strategies did. In essence, the way that environmental justice groups play ed their game s with respect to their missions and strategies wa s dense and certainly connected to the larger ecology, specifically to games like social justice, education, and the economy. A number of factors may influence organizational decisions regarding their strategies. The present study looked at organizational resources (i.e., revenue, contributions and grants, e mployees, volunteers, structure ), community resources in the county in which the group is located (i.e., income, racial and ethnic composition, and political openness), and opposition (i.e., employment in industries that likely oppose environmental justice missions and the number of toxic relea se inventory facilities). Acquiring an understanding of the level of resources environmental justice organizations

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121 have at their disposal, both internally and within the community, illustrates the extent to which the movement as a whole has transformed fr om organizations wealthy in human mobilizing power to one comprised of groups with more money and more available ways to use it. This transformation set the stage for a more in depth understanding of the relationship between resources, opposition, and str ategies. More broadly, the ways that social movements like the environmental justice movement have altered their strategies and become more legitimate (but perhaps also more beholden to actors who do not have the same mission or stake in the game that the y do) also speak to their interactions with players within and outside of their game, which have implications for the entire ecology and its outcomes. The average revenue of environmental justic e organizations in this sample wa s $544,109.31, with one org anization (Environmental Justice Network) reporting no revenue and the wealthiest organization, Sustainable Energy and Economic Network, reporting an average revenue between 2008 and 2010 of $3,311,261.67. The data on this variable were positively skewed, indicating that most organizations had an average three year revenue below the mean. On average, over three fourths (88.28%) of organizations revenue came from grants and contributions. Without specific information on funding sources, conditions of mo ney received, and connections between funding and organizati onal missions and survival, it wa s nearly impossible to draw conclusions about the extent to which environmental justice organizations are beholden to foundations and funding agencies, including the government, which could have affect ed their missions, strategies, and other outcom es. Nev ertheless, although it wa s not possible to examine the processes and

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122 relationships that occur within the blackbox of organizational funding, the extent to which organizations revenue what is perhaps their most important resource came from contributions a nd grants may have affect ed the strategies they use d, and whether or not this is the case can be evaluated from existing data. Organizations spent an average of $333,234.82 on salaries, benefits, and other compensation paid to staff and employees. Seven organizations spent no money on employee/staff compensation, while the maximum amount spent per year was $2,064,682.67. Within the context of organizational revenue, it seemed that a substantial portion of org anizations revenue wa s devoted to their staff and employees. Environmental justice organizations had an average of just over 13 employees id not have any employees or volunteers. Greater Newark Conservancy reported having the most emplo yees, on average, between 2008 and 2010, with 60, and the Center for Community Action and Environmental Justice had the most volunteers (an average of 1,233.33 between 2008 and 2010). The modal number of employees an organization had was 0 ( N =11), and sim ilarly, an even greater majority reported, on average, having no volunteers between 2008 and 2010, the latter of which may be indicative of the environmental justice movements apparent shift from participatory organizations and strategies toward more formalized, bureaucratic groups. Organizational structure was measured in two ways, whether a group had a Board of Directors (1=yes) and whether it consisted of individual members who could participate in activities (1=yes). Most organizations, unsurprisingly, we re formal in

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123 structure, w ith 93 of 132 having a Board of Directors and 74 of 132 having no individual members. The first measure of community resources was educational attainment (percent of people age 25 and over who attained a bachelors degree or higher in the county in which each organization is located). On average, about one third of the population (34.61%) in organizations counties earned a bachelors degree or beyond. Counties ranged from a low of 11.9 percent to a high of 70.9 percent, and the data were normally distr ibuted. Second, with respect to median income (in inflatedadjusted dollars) in the counties where environmental justice organizations are located, there was a wide range ($84,695), with one countys median income at $29,714 and anothers at almost four times that amount ($114,409). The average median income was $57,308.95. As expected, mean Because the mean is affected by a relatively small group of people earning a disproportionately high income, subsequent analyses include the median measure, not the mean. Racial and ethnic demographics may be an indicator of a communitys resources in that higher proportions of whites might be indicative of factors that affect environment al justice organizational games, such as political resources and technical and operational opportunities. On average, counties in which organizations were located =15.32%). Locations differed extensively in their racial and ethnic compositionone county had almost all nonwhites (79.2%), while another had almost all whites (96.2%). Although specific counties are demographically diverse with respect to their racial and

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124 ethnic composition, environmental justice groups seem ed to be located in relatively homogenous white areas. The presence of democratic politicians has been a measure of pol itical openness (Minkoff, 1994) and may affect the strategies that environme ntal justice organizations use. In a similar vein, political openness could be a community level resource for these organizations. The present study measure d this concept by the ratio of d emocrat to republican voters in the 2008 presidential election wit hin each county. A ratio of 1 indicate d that the county wa s c omprised of an equal number of democrat and republican voters in the 2008 election. Greater numbers further from one signif ied that the county had a higher number of d emocrat voters, while values further from and less than one reflect ed counties with more republican voters. Consistent with Minkoffs (1994) research, the average ratio of d emocrat to republican voters in the 2008 election was 2.80, illustrating that environmental justice groups tend ed to be located in more liberal, politically open counties. The range was large, with one county having an average ratio of 0.236 and another having an average of 14.200. I operationalized o pposition at the community level in three ways. The first measure was the percent of people (by county) employed in an industry that likely would oppose environmental and environmental justice missions, including agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, or mining and manufacturing. On average, organizations w ere located in communities with less than ten percent of its residents employed in one of these industries, and the highest proportion of individuals within a county who worked in one of these areas was just over one fourth (27.7%). Seemingly, environmental justice

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125 organizations operate d in counties that d id not have a substantial proportion of their residents employed in potentially threatening industries. The average number of air pollutant facilities per square mile in environmental justice organizations counties wa s almost one (0.951), with the fewest number being zero and the highest number being 7.2. Comparatively, counties in which environmental justice groups re sided had fewer toxic ) with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 7.20. I measured four control variables : primary focus of differentiation (e.g., race in general and focus on black discrimination.), substantive emphasis (e.g., dumping, siting, and climate justice ), the geographic scope of the groups missions (broad or local ), and the groups age in years (2012 minus the year the organization was founded). Although the environmental justice movem ent is reputed to be grassroots, centering on local injustices, the distribution of primary groups in this sample we re more evenly distributed with respect to the geographic scope of their missions. In fact, over half (n=67) had broad missions, at the sta te, interstate, national, or international levels, providing at least suggestive evidence that this sector of the environmental justice game has strayed from its grassroots origins and embraced larger scale missions. Not surprisingly, the greatest proport ion of environmental justice organizations focused on discrimination by race, including African Americans or communities of color (50.76%) and other racial or ethnic minorities (66.67%). Although the contemporary environmental justice movement in the United States began with an issue of dumping, the increasing attention to environmental justices has led to groups focusing on a multitude of issues that disproportionately affect groups of people based on their race, ethnicity,

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126 gender, class, and age. Indeed, only about 20 percent (18.94%) of organizations in this sample were concerned about dumping; however, over half (51.52%) were concerned about the siting of a hazardous waste facility. Approximately 30 percent of the groups were concerned about climate j ustice. The distribution of issues on which environmental justice organizations focus suggest that over the course of just a few decades, the movements activities have expanded both in scope from very local to more state level, national, and internationa l levels and in substantive focus, with traditional concerns of dumping and hazardous waste siting remaining part of the movement, but groups also transforming traditional environmental concerns like climate into issues of distributive justice. Within the context of the ecology of games, it might be that as players strategize toward a larger number of missions that constitute a game (in this case, environmental justice), the nature of the ecology shifts, and there is more global recognition of the distribu tion of environmental benefits and burdens beyond traditional concerns like hazardous waste siting. Bivariate Relationships I used Pearsons Product Moment (Pearsons r) correlation analysis to analyze a number of bivariate relationships in this analysis .9 Correlations between variables are useful for gauging the potential for a causal relationship, as covariation is a prerequisite for causation; they also are helpful in identifying independent variables that should not be included in the same model, be cause they are too highly correlated and essentially measuring the same concept. Pearsons r correlation analyses generally are applicable to 9Pearsons r analysis takes the co variation between two variables and divides it by the product of the standard deviations to produce a correlation coefficient between those variables. Correlation coefficients range from 1 to +1, with values closer to /+1 indicating stronger associations and values closer to 0 reflecting weaker relationships.

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127 variables measured at the interval ratio level (i.e., variab les that are non categorical), although the technique can be used to analyze bi serial correlations, which are associations between two variables where one is continuous and the other is categorical (e.g., organizational revenue measured in dollars and the dummy variable of whether a group uses a legal strate gy). In the present study, most measures of organizational and community resources and of opposition (the independent variables) were measured at the interval ratio level and amenable to a Pearsons r analysis. Hence, this analytic technique was useful i n assessin g whether any of the variables were so highly correlated that they should not be included in the same model.10 Table 4 contains the correlation matrix of the Pearsons r (including biserial) analyses. It is located in the back of this document, after the appendices. There were correlations between three sets of variables that indicated a potential problem of multicollinearity, which was minimized by not including the variables in the same model. Giv en the small sample size and the large number of independent and control variables, each model only contained about six variables seven maximum (so they were not over identified ) so not using all of the variables in the model wa s not problematic (i.e., did not sacrifice being able to analyze a full model with all independ ent and control variables that wa s not possible in this analysis, an yway). Variance inflation factors (VIFs) are a well accepted indicator of multicollinearity. The VIFs for the variabl es in this study were consistent with the correlations. With the exceptions of the 10 There is no hard and fast threshold for what constitutes too high of a correlation, but generally correlations over /+0.70 are considered to be high, and for purposes of this research, variables that have a Pearsons r value of /+0.70 or higher (or lowe r on the negative end) will not be included in the same model.

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128 variables identified here as being multicollinear, no variable had a VIF over 4. First, there was a very high correlation between organizations revenue and the salaries/b enefits/compensation they pay employees (r= 0.823, p<.001 ). Second, there wa s a strong association between education level and median income, two of the community resource variables (r=.70 5, p<.001). Finally, the number of air pollutant facilities in counties in w hich organizations are located was positively associated with the number of TRI facilities in these counties (r=.80 2, p<.001). These correlations we re not surprising and ha d little bearing on the multivariate analyses. I included only one of the highly correlated variables in multivariate models. Pearsons r correlation analyses were run for the continuous independent variables and organizational age (none of the other control variables were measured at the interval r atio level) and the dependent variables. They revealed a number of statistically significant associations. First, I expected organizational and community resources (except percent black) to be negatively associated with direct action strategies. This ex pectation was not the case with organizational resources, as three of them (percent of revenue received from funding, amount of compensation given to staff, and number of members) were positively (albeit weakly) related to the odds that a group would use a direct action strategy. One community resource, percent white in the community, was negatively associated with groups likelihood of employing a direct action strategy which was not surprising. Consistent with the third hypothesis, one of the counter m obilization measures (number of air pollution facilities) was positively related to groups likelihood of using a direct action strategy (r=.081, p<.05).

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129 For legal strategies, I predicted the opposite as what I did for direct action strategies that organi zational and community resources would be positively associated with groups likelihood of using them and oppositional measures would be negatively related to these strategies. Preliminary analyses revealed little support for these expectations. Three or ganizational resources were related to the odds that environmental justice organizations would utilize legal strategies, but only two of the three w ere in the expected direction: percent of revenue that came from funding (r=.135, p<.001), amount of compens ation given to staff (r=.078, p<.05), and number of employees an organization had (r= .099, p<.01). Two community resources were associated with the odds of a group using a legal strategy, but both were in the opposite direction as predicted: median incom e (r= .110, p<.01) and political access (r= .154, p<.01). Both percent employed in certain manufacturing industries (r= .118, p<.01) and number of air pollution facilities per square mile (r= .183, p<.001) were related to use of legal strategies in the ex pected direction. I expected community resources and oppositional presence to be negatively associated with educational strategies. There were no relationships between any of the community resources or the measures of oppositional presence and environmental justice organizations use of educational strategies. One organizational resource (percent of revenue from funding) was weakly and positively associated with the odds of groups using an educational strategy (r=.104, p<.01), and two organizational resources were negatively (and weakly) related to this outcome, whether an organization had a board (r= .080, p<.05) and whether an organization had individual members (r= .114, p<.01). These relationships are puzzling, as they are internally inconsistent.

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130 W ith respect to community advocacy strategies, I predicted that community resources would be negative related. Again, the results were internally inconsistent, with the correlation between community advocacy strategies and one community resource, percent w hite supporting the hypothesis (r= .204, p<.001), while the correlations with two other community resources, education level (r=.101, p<.01) and polit ical access (r=.132, p<.001), were positive. The greater the percent of organizations revenue that came from funding, the higher the odds that environmental justice groups would use a community advocacy strategy (r=.139, p<.001). The more organizational and community resources environme ntal justice groups possessed the more likely they should be to use enforcement strategies. Interestingly, four resources were significantly associated with enforcement strategies, but all of the relationships were in the opposite direction of the hypothesis. The more income an organization had, the more money they spent on staff, the higher the education level in the community, and the more political access a group had, the lower the odds it us ed an enforcement strategy. Two oppositional measures, perc ent of people employed in a manufacturing job (r=.143, p<.001) and percent of air pollution facilities (r= .087, p<.05), were associated with likelihood of using an enforcement strategy, but in different directions. I predicted that all three groups of in dependent variables would be positively associated with organizations likelihood of using a media strategy if groups possess ed a lot of resources, or if there wa s extensive counter mobilization in the area in which they operate, they likely would rely on the media to carry out their objectives. Only three factors were related to the odds that a group used the media; two of the three relationships

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131 were in the expected direction, while the third was not. Specifically, the more of their income that came fro m funding, the more likely groups were to employ a media strategy (r= .179, p<.001), while the fewer members a group had, the more likely they were to use a media strategy (r= .082, p<.001). As expected, the more air pollution facilities that were present in an environmental justice organizations area, the higher the odds that the group would use a media strategy (r=.100, p<.01). Notably, all of the correlations were weak. Of the independent variables, I hypothesized that only community resources would predict environmental justice organizations use of aesthetic strategies, and I believed that this relationship would be negative, as aesthetic strategies did not seem to involve a lot of resources. Somewhat surprisingly, nine of the independent variables revealed statistically significant associations with this strategy. Three organizational resources affected the odds that a group would use an aesthetic strategy, two in the positive direction (number of employees and whether a group had individual member s) and one in the negative direction (organizational income). These associations were weak, with the strongest being between number of employees and odds of using an aesthetic strategy (r=.225). Four community resources were related to the odds that envi ronmental justice groups would use an aesthetic strategy. Two of the relationships were in the expected direction: median income (r=.144, p<.001) and percentage of whites (r= .163, p<.001), while two were in the opposite direction than what was predicted: percent black (r=.217, p<.001) and political access (r=.114, p<.01). Percent of people in the community who were employed in a manufacturing career (r= .117, p<.01) and percent of air pollution (r=.216, p<.001) and TRI facilities (r=.333, p<.001) were a ssociated with

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132 the likelihood of a group utilizing an aesthetic strategy. Notably, one of the oppositional measures was negatively related to this strategy, while the other two revealed positive associations. Environmental justice groups with more resources, both community and organizational, should display higher odds of using a support strategy, as support strategies may involve a lot of money, technical expertise, etc. Of the six resources that affected support strategies, four were in the expected direction (although all of the correlations were weak): number of employees (r=.105, p<.01), whether an organization had a Board (r=.101, p<.01), percent black in the community (r=.112, p<.01), and political access (r=.093, p<.05). Two resources were nega tively related to groups likelihood of using a support strategy, findings that were contrary to what I expected: whether organizations had members ( .123, p<.01) and percent white in the community (r= .094, p<.01). Groups that had a higher oppositional presence (measured as percentage of people employed in industry) had lower odds of using support strategies over other strategies (r=.102, p<.01). It is worthwhile to point out that four variables affected the number of strategies environmental justice gr oups used. Of the four, three displayed a negative relationship, which is somewhat surprising, as you would expect more resources to be associated with the use of more strategies. First, the higher organizations income, the fewer strategies they used (r = .160, p<.001). Second, the higher the median income in the county in which the organization existed, the fewer strategies environmental justice organizations employed (r= .080, p<.05). Finally, environmental justice groups in areas with more whites use d fewer strategies than organizations in areas with a lower percentage of whites

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133 (r= .131, p<.001). The only resource that exhibited a positive relationship with total number of strategies used was percent of income that came from fundingthe higher the percentage of revenue that came from funding, the more strategies in which environmental justice organizations engaged (r=.162, p<.001). These correlations provided little preliminary evidence supporting the hypotheses Recall that Pearsons r correlati on analyses are appropriate for non categorical variables and in the case of bi serial correlations, continuous and categorical variables The dependent variables in this resear ch, organizations strategies, we re measured as dummy variables and many of the control variable measures also we re categorical (e.g., geographic scope, substantive focus). Hence, a different statistical technique is required to determine how these variables we re related to the dependent variables Bivariate logistic regression was used to assess the effects of each independent and control variable on each dependent variable. Bivariate logistic regression a nalyses of the continuous independent and each dependent variable were conducted to ensure that the findings w ere consistent with the Pearsons bi serial correlation analy s es. Table 5 reports the results of the bivariate logistic regressions. It is located in the back of the text, after the appendices. Logistic regression is a statistical technique that predicts the odds that subjects in a category of the independent variable will fall into one of two categories in the dependent variable, in this case the odds that environmental justice organizations employ ed or did not utilize each strategy. The did not utilize category contains all of the other strategies for example, if the dependent variable is direct action and the odds are low that groups with a certain type of resource used the direct action strategy, the flip

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134 side of this interpretation is that these org anizations had high odds of using one or more of the other strategies (media, legal, enforcement, etc.). The odds can be converted into probabilities for the ease of interpretation. Logistic regression is used when the dependent variable is measured dichotomously. It makes no assumptions about the distribution of the predictor variables (so a nonnormal distribution will not diminish the validity of the results). Although logistic regression has some similarities with the ordinary least squares regress ion technique, it is different in a few important ways. First, the analysis yields an intercept only (Block 0) model that includes only the effect of the constant (the value of the dependent variable when all of the independent variables are equal to 0) ( for example, the odds that an environmental justice organization will use a legal strategy when it has no revenue, no employees, and no Board of Directors). The interpretation of the constant may or may not be meaningful and generally is not of interest ( for example, an organization would not exist in a community with no median income and with no people over 25 with a Bachelors degree or higher). What is more important is the Block 1 model, which constitutes a test of the null hypothesis that adding one or more independent variables to the model will not significantly enhance our ability to predict subjects likelihood of falling into a certain category of the dependent variable. In more concrete terms, a null hypothesis of no relationship in the pres ent study would be that by adding organizational revenue to the model, the probability that groups use d a certain strategy is unchanged. If my predictions are accurate, then the null hypothesis will be rejected, and the analysis will reveal that adding one or more independent variables (like organizational revenue) to the model

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135 improve s the ability to predict what categories subjects will fall into on the dependent variable based on their values on the independent variable(s). Keeping with the previous example, organizational revenue should increase the likelihood that groups use d certain strategies (e.g., legal). Although logistic regression analysis output produces a few statistics that supposedly are analogous to the R square (R2) statistic in Ordinary Least Squares regression (a statistic that indicates how much of the dependent variable is explained by the independent and control variables in the model), these statistics (Cox & Snell and Nagelkerke R2) are problematic and not good reflections of explained variance, so they were not interpreted in the present study. Instead, in the multivariate models, I report ed the Hosmer Lemeshow goodnes s of fit statistic, which assesses the consistency between the observed and expected events in a subgroup, similar to the Chi Square statistic. The null hypothesis is that there is no difference between the observed and expected values, and if the Hosmer Lemeshow statistic is greater than .05, then we fail to reject the null and conclude that the data fit the model well. This statistic has several weaknesses, one of which is that it does not reveal the extent to which the data fit (or do not fit) the model, only whether they fit; however, it is the best available and a commonly used indicator of goodness of fit in logistic regression. Prior to discussing the results of the bivariate models, it is important to discuss the handling of the p value associated with the coefficient (B) of each inde pendent and control variable Traditionally, researchers establish ed a threshold for what constitutes a statistically significant effectusually, that threshold is p<.05, but sometimes (e.g., if the sample size is sma ll) the threshold is p<.10. Once that threshold is established, it is

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136 interpreted in absolute terms. That is, if p is less than the threshold, the coefficient is statistically significant, and if not, then the relationship is not significant. P values of ten are reported in a way that is consistent with this threshold interpretation (e.g., *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001), with lower pvalues just indicating higher levels of statistical significance (interpreted as lower probability of the observed relationship occurring by chance). This traditional view of p values stems from technological and practical limitations that made calculating the exact value of p impractical for data analysis purposes (Wainer and Robinson, 2003). Mathematically, it was possible to calculate p values, but the calculations were challenging and timeconsuming for most researchers. Further, researchers would gain little for their time and effort, as they could obtain an approximate p value from a critical values table, and this inform ation was sufficient for making a determination of whether or not a relationship was statistically significant. Now, p value calculations are performed by the computer, and it is recommended that researchers report the exact p value (to the third decimal) particularly when it is less than .05 or .10 (American Psychological Association; Cohen, 1994). Reporting very miniscule p values (e.g., p=.00000001234) is somewhat pointless and may not be possible, depending on how many decimal places the output repor ts. For very small p values, it is acceptable to report p is less than .001 or .0001. Arguably, it is better to report exact p values, rather than make a dichotomous accept/reject the hypothesis decision based on a pre established threshold, as p value s exist on a continuum, and readers should use their discretion to determine what constitutes a valid or significant relationship. In this research, u nless the p value was very small (p<.001 or p<.0001), the

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137 exact value was reported. In light of the sma ll sample size and to minimize the risk of excluding relevant factors, independent or control variables with pvalues that are less than .10 were analyzed in multivariate models. Results of the bivariate logistic regression models yielded a number of statistically significant effects. Recall that Table 5 reports the results of these analyses, in cluding the odds ratios [Exp(B)] and pvalues for each of the predictors. The bivariate logistic regressions were consistent with the Pearsons r and biserial correlations. The control variables were associated with higher or lower odds of groups using each of the eight strategies, and several patterns emerged. First organiza tions that were concerned with dumping had higher odds of using a legal strategy [Exp(B)]=4.756], a community advocacy strategy [Exp(B)=1.882], and direct action strategies [Exp(B)=3.759]. Interestingly, while concern with siting displayed a similar patte rn as concern with dumping in the legal [Exp(B)=2.058], community advocacy [Exp(B)=2.265], and direct action [Exp(B)=2.067] models, it also was associated with higher odds of groups using an educational strategy [Exp(B)=2.358], aesthetic [Exp(B)=1.809], and media [Exp(B)=1.973] strategies. Groups that were concerned with siting had significantly lower odds of using a support strategy [Exp(B)=.601]. Organizations that were concerned with climate justice had higher odds of using a legal strategy [Exp(B)=1.627], a community advocacy strategy [Exp(B)=1.555], and a direct action strategy [Exp(B)=2.726], but they had lower odds of using a media strategy [Exp(B)=.435]. Groups that focused on racial discrimination in general or on discrimination of blacks in parti cular had higher odds of using every strategy except media and support. Focus on black discrimination was associated with higher odds that environmental justice

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138 groups would use a legal strategy [Exp(B)=1.470], an educational strategy [Exp(B)=1.457], a community advocacy strategy [Exp(B)=2.428], an enforcement strategy [Exp(B)=1.642], an aesthetic strategy [Exp(B)=1.778], and a direct action strategy [Exp(B)= 2.011]. Notably, the odds of groups using each of these strategies over all others w ere substantia l almost one and a half to over two and a half times greater. Similarly, groups that focused on racial discrimination in general demonstrated higher odds of using an educational strategy [Exp(B)=2.110], a community advocacy strategy [Exp(B)=2.032], an enf orcement strategy [Exp(B)=2.605], an aesthetic strategy [Exp(B)=1.614], and a direct action strategy [Exp(B)=1.828]. Geographic scope was significant in four of the eight bivariate logistic regression models. With one exception, groups that were more loca l in their focus were over twice as likely to employ each strategy: enforcement [Exp(B)=2.921], aesthetic [Exp(B)=2.339], and direct action [Exp(B)=2.068]. Groups with a local focus displayed lower odds of using support strategies over other strategies [E xp(B)=.554]. Finally, organizational age was a significant predictor of three dependent variables, and in all three cases, older organizations were less likely to use the strategy. Specifically, older organizations had lower odds of using enforcement str ategies over other strategies [Exp(B)=.957], of using aesthetic strategies over other strategies [Exp(B)=.963], and of using support strategies over other strategies [Exp(B)=.980]. The relationships between these control variables and organizational strat egies suggest that there may be factors beyond the variables predicted by resource mobilization theory and the social movement literature that predict outcomes like organizational strategies. These relationships illustrate the importance of considering re sources and oppositional presence as two of

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139 many factors involved in game playing that constitutes a larger ecology of games. Multivariate analyses are necessary in order to better determine how the relationships between the independent and control and the dependent variables play out. These preliminary analyses suggested minimal support for the hypotheses that organizational and community resources and the presence of opposition increase d or diminish ed the likelihood that organizations would use aesthetic, legal, community advocacy, monitoring/enforcement, support services, and direct action strategies. The control variables of geographic scope, organizational age, organizations substantive area of focus, and the class of people whose environmental justice the groups targeted seemed to have stronger effects on the probability of environmental justice organizations engag ing in certain strategies than the independent variables of interest ; however, the effects d id not exhibit a pattern that was consistent with resource mobilization theory or the social movement literature in general. Next, I ran multivariate analyses for each dependent variable These analyses determ ine d which variables matter ed whe n other factors simultaneously we re considered minimizing the threat of a spurious relationship. Following the multivariate analyses, supplementary analyses were conducted to inform the findings Multivariate Analyses Because game strate gies, the dependent variables, we re categorical (dummy coded) variables, I used logistic regression to analyze the models T he logistic regression coefficient is denoted as B. The value of B and its associated odds ratio [Exp(B) ], which is the odds of an organization using each strategy a re dependent on the unit of measurement, so to make comparisons among predictors (in multivariate models) the

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140 values of the variables should be standardized. I standardized the independent and control variables, converting their values to z scores, using procedures built into the statistical software package SPSS. I used t he standardized variables in all multivariate logistic regression analyses. Because there were too many independent and co ntrol variables to include in a single model, I ran separate models for each dependent variable using the following pattern. First, I ran a model with just the effects of organizational resources.11 Next, I ran a model with only the effect s of community r esources. Third, I ran a model with only the oppositional independent variables. Fourth, I ran a model with all of the control variables. In the full model, I included any variable that was statistically significant from the previous four models. I als o included variables that were somewhat close to the 0.10 threshold but below it and theoretically relevant (i.e., part of the hypothesis about that particular dependent variable). Table 6 contains nine models, one for each dependent variable, and each of the five submodels is displayed for all of the dependent variables models. Table 6 reports the multivariate logistic regression results for the influences of organizational resources, community resources, opposition, and the control variables on each of the strategies environmental justice organizations may use, as well as on the total number of strategies they use. There wer e nine multivariate models: legal strategies, educational strategies, community advocacy strategies, enforcement strategies, aesthetic 11 In addition to the organizational resources that I discussed previously, I also created a variable, formal organization: if an organization did not have participating members, but did hav e a Board, it was considered formal. Other groups were considered informal. This variable did not significantly affect any of the dependent variables.

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141 strategies, media strategies, direct action strategies, support strategies, and total strategies Table 6 is located in the back of the text, behind the appendices. Environmental justice groups use of direct action and support strategies were not predicted by any of the variables in the model Theoretically, it is difficult to understand why this finding occurred. With respect to the use of direct action strategies, a description on the Ruckus Societys (an environmental justice organization) website provide d some clues. In their discussion of an upcoming protest, the group mentioned a variety of local activists, as well as a number of different organizations that will come together to participate in the activity. It could be that pre existing networks of people and organizations are more important to the use of direct action strategies than any internal or community resources. Also, past behavior may be an important predictor of a groups current decision to use direct action strategies, as many direct action strategies require some procedural know how (e.g., how to acquire permits, how to effectively garner participation, etc.), which one a group has, it can apply repeatedly. In this vein, groups that use direct action strategies may tend to exist in communities that already have experts and institutions in place to facilitate this type of mobilization (e.g., civil rights leaders and organizations). A perusal of some of the organizations websites that use support strategies did not yield any clear cut signs as to why, in accordance with the first two hypotheses, more resources would not be associated with higher odds of using support strategies. Tentatively, I might suggest that organizations that use support strategies might be networked with other people and organizations, and the provision of support services may be connected to these partnerships, rather than a direct function of organizational or

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142 community resources. Also, support services likely vary in the expenses involved, so thi s strategy may be available to groups regardless of their level of resources. Of the remaining six strategies, four of them were affected only by a single control variable. First, groups that focused on dumping had higher odds of employing a legal stra tegy versus other strategies [Exp(B)=1.896, p=.057]. This effect remained when two other variables (income source from funding and political access) were included. These other variables were added to the model to make sure there was not a suppression eff ect, and they were chosen, because in the initial models revealed lower p values than the other independent variables. Groups that focus ed on dumping may be more inclined to adopt a legal strategy than other strategies, because this strategy may facilitate the achievement of the goal, which presumably would be to receive compensation for and/or stop illegal dumping. For example, Earth Justice published an article detailing how a group of African American citizens sued the city of Rochelle, Georgia for a d ecade of dumping raw sewage onto their properties, violating the Clean Water Act. Within the context of resource mobilization theory, what perhaps m ight be the most important resource in predicting strategies that involve political activities activities involving attempts to directly persuade government (Weible, Pierce, and Heikkila, 2013) is access to political officials or the court system in general. Political access is the only political resource included in this study, and its measure is a proxy. Future empirical assessments of resource mobilization theory should better operationalize resources that are more relevant to contemporary social movement activities, including networks and political resources like access to courts and political officials.

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143 Second, hypotheses two and three predicted that organizational resources and counter mobilization (respectively) would reduce the odds that environmental justice organizations engaged in educational strate gies. Groups with more revenue, staff and other organizational resources arguably should opt for strategies that involve more money and more stakeholders (like legal, media, support services, and enforcement), and communities with a high prevalence of counter mobilization should be more inclined to adopt high profile strategies like media or direct action. These predictions did not play out as I expected. Only whether a group focused on siting predicted the odds of it employing an educational strategy: Groups that focused on siting were over 1.5 times more likely to employ an educational strategy than other strategies [Exp(B)=1.558, p=.091]. Only one other variable even came close to the .10 threshold for significance (the organizational resource of whether a group had a Board of Directors), and when I ran a model with this variable and focus on siting, the effect of the siting variable remained robust [Exp(B)=1.626] and statistically significant. Although resource mobilization theory, both alone and within the context of the ecology of games framework, does not address the connection between organizational substantive focus (e.g., dumping, siting, air pollution, etc.) and outcomes the positive relationship between environmental justice organizations focus on siting problems and the odds that they would employ educational strategies makes conceptual sense. The use of educational strategies within communities was prevalent in the civil rights movement, and it was associated with community empowerment. It makes sense then, that the use of these strateg ies carried over to the environmental justice movement, and that they would be used when communities were threatened with the possibility of a hazardous waste site. Also, educational strategies

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144 might be the best available strategies if organizations lack connections to decisionmakers who could protect their interests. I predicted that environmental justice organizations with more community and organizational resources would have higher odds of using enforcement strategies than other strategies. As was t he case with direct action, support strategies, legal strategies, and educational strategies, this prediction was not supported with the data. Environmental justice groups with a more local focus were almost twice as likely [Exp(B)=1.979, p=.041] as organizations with a broader geographic focus to utilize enforcement strategies. E nforcement strategies involved activities like air quality testing, so they may be drawn upon more by organizations with a more community level focus. Because enforcement strategies seem to involve resources (e.g., money, connections to technical experts), it is unclear why hypotheses one and two were not supported. Again, it might be that networks, which are unmeasured in the present study, are an integral part of the environmental justice game, and networks may affect or moderate the effect of other variables (like resources) on the strategies that environmental justice organizations use. For example, it could be that groups that are better connected to other groups (with resources like money and experts) are more likely to employ certain strategies over others; or, it could be the positive effect o f resources on strategy choice is limited to groups that are not well networked, because these groups are more dependent on their ability to mobilize the internal and community resources at their disposal. Without data to empirically analyze, it is diffic ult to explain these findings. All three hypotheses predicted that higher levels of resources (both organizational and community), as well as opposition, would be associated with higher odds of

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145 environmental justice groups utilizing media strategies. Non e of the hypotheses was supported. In fact, only focus on climate affected the odds (lowered them) that groups would use a media strategy [Exp(B)=.603, p=.080 ] but when controls were included in the model (income source and focus on siting, as these were the two variables with the lowest p values, even though they were statistically nonsignificant in their initial models), the effect fell to nonsignificant. Missing variables are a common reason cited for poor models, and as discussed before, it might be that environmental justice organizations networks within the game impact their game playing strategies. Networks may provide groups with resources, or they may constitute a resource (e.g., power in numbers, by enhancing an organizations credibility e tc.) Although one of the independent variables (TRI facilities) increased the odds that environmental justice organizations used an aesthetic strategy, this finding neither supported, nor refuted, a hypothesis. There does not seem to be a theoretical justification in resource mobilization theory or the ecology of games framework that explains why the presence of toxic release inventory facilities is associated with groups using an aesthetic strategy. TRI facilities are a proxy for oppositional presence, but it could be that they also are a proxy for social disorganization. In other words, there may be an association between physical signs of community disorder (e.g., litter, vandalism, abandoned vehicles and buildings, etc.) other signs of disorganizat ion (e.g., crime, poverty, etc.), and pollution (e.g., from TRI facilities) (Fagan and Davies, 2000). Hence, it may be the case that communities with more TRI facilities not only are likely to experience environmental injustices, but also more likely to h ave other indicators of social disorganization, reflecting a need to beautify, perhaps directly from the environmental

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146 injustice, but also from other causes. Notably, the initial organizational resource model revealed that the more employees an organizati on had, the more likely they were to employ an aesthetic strategy [Exp(B)=1.875, p=.032]. This effect fell to nonsignificant when I controlled for geographic scope, organizational age, and number of TRI facilities. With respect to community advocacy str ategies, I expected groups with higher level s of organizational resources to display lower odds of employing these strategies. Again, the findings did not support my hypothesis. One community resource (percent white in the community in which the environm ental justice group was located) affected organizations use of community advocacy strategies. Specifically, organizations that were located in communities with a higher percentage of whites had lower odds of utilizing community advocacy strategies than o ther strategies [Exp(B)=.552, p=.078]. This effect remained significant when income source, whether a group focused on siting, and whether a groups discrimination focus was on Blacks were controlled. Although this argument does not come out of resource mobilization theory, it could be that organizations in predominantly white communities feel or are disenfranchised and hence, less likely to mobilize in their communities. With respect to total strategies, it should be the case that more organizational or community resources (or any type of resources) would be associated with the use of more strategies (Weible et al., 2013). Ironically, the only resource that was associated with total number of strategies groups employed was the community resource perce nt white (b= 0.378, p=.050). Groups that focused on siting used more strategies than groups that did not (b=0.317, p=.034). Both of these effects remained significant when I controlled for income source. More concretely, for every (approximately) two an d a half percent

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147 increase in whites in the community, groups used one fewer strategy. This finding is inconsistent with existing theories and previous research, and it is uncertain why it emerged. Groups that focused on siting may use more strategies bec ause of the nature of this focus. Indeed, if a community is faced with the threat of, or an actual, hazardous waste site, it may opt to educate its citizens, organize meetings within the community, monitor the pollution to which residents are exposed, org anize a protest, or participate in a lawsuit. Other areas of focus may not lend themselves so well to such a wide variety of strategies. Of the multivariate models that were analyzed, there were isolated effects of various independent and control variabl es. There d id not appear to be any patterns or consistencies in these findings, though, and there was virtually no support for any of the hypotheses Strategies are so different and the ways that groups use them may vary extensively, thereby precluding r esearchers from identifying a statistical effect of resources. In other words, several groups may adopt community advocacy strategies, but the specific tactics they use may require different types of resources (e.g., money, people, office space, equipment expertise, institutional access, etc.) and different levels of each. If this is the case, research would not uncover a statistically significant relationship between resources and this strategy. With oppositional presence, the measures in the present s tudy we re proxies and may not have be en valid indicators of the concept. Future research should work on developing better, more direct measures and measures at the organizational level of opposition. As I mentioned several times throughout this section, there may be important variables that affect ed the strategies environmental justice organizations use to

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148 accomplish their missions within the environmental justice game, which are not included in the present study. For example, an examination of groups websites and media coverage of some of their activities suggested, at least anecdotally, that organizations have both formal and informal partnerships with other organizations, individuals, and institutions. It may be that these networks explain strategy choices. Also, some of the concepts measures may lack face validity for example, revenue reported on groups 990s may not reflect actual disposable money that the group is free to apply to mobilization. In a similar vein, the data do not reveal the rol e of money received from grants, foundations, etc. It may be the case that certain funding individuals or agencies attach conditions or prohibitions to the granting of money, which could affect organizational strategies. One other possibility is that the influences of resources and/or opposition on groups strategies are moderated by another factor.12 Supplementa ry Analyses It sometimes is the case in research, particularly theory driven, deductive studies, the researchers suppositions going into the study end up being neither statistically significant, nor practically relevant. Instead, unforeseen discoveries emerge and en d up being the most noteworthy. Using a personal example to illustrate, every spring I look forward to watching a beaver in a local reservoir that I pass on a routine trail run. Last spring, I ran to the reservoir and stopped to look for the beaver. I di d not see it, but when I looked across the water, I saw a bear lumbering up some large rocks in the early 12 I ran a number of sub group analyses, dividing organizations by control variables that seemed, from t he initial analyses, to be relevant, including focus on dumping and siting, whether the organization was formal or not, and geographic focus. The sub group analyses did not yield any findings of statistical or practical significance they did not provide i nsights on possible context specific influences of resources. It is difficult to determine whether the reason for the lack of findings was substantive (the relationships actually do not exist) or statistical, as many of the sub groups contained too few en tities to analyze meaningfully with statistical procedures.

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149 morning twilight. The bear siting was an unexpected surprise and a splendid way to experience that run. In the present study, the role of groups substantive focus, particularly dumping and siting, in predicting the odds that environmental justice organizations used certain types of strategies as well as the lack of support for the hypotheses that were derived from resource mobilization theory, mater ialized as the bear discover ies of this dissertation. These possibilities can be explored in the present study through some preliminary fact finding and post hoc supplementary analyses. First, I analyzed a variable in the data set, percent of Black churches in the counties in which environmental justice groups operate. I added and analyzed this variable specifically for the purpose of carrying out a post hoc analysis to explore the potential impact of Black churches on environmental justice organizational strategies. Although this variable does not have direct theoretical relevance in the context of the present study, it does speak to the potential impor tance of institutions in shaping organizational behavior. It might be that pre existing institutions in organizations communities shape their strategies. Specifically and with respect to Black churches, these institutions were of paramount importance in both the civil rights and later the environmental justice movements. Indeed, McAdam (1982) pointed out that Black churches may provide social movement organizations (and in particular, civil rights groups) with a membership base, space, supplies, and per sonnel. It was worthwhile to explore the possible relationship between this variable13 and environmental justice organizational strategies. I ran numerous models, both bivariate 13 The Black church variable was measured using the Religious Congregations and Membership Study ( RCMS ) obtained from the Association of Religion Data Archives. Data from the 1990 RCMS were used a nd adjusted using information from the 1990 Census of Population and Housing STF 3a files, as the more recent 2000 survey did not include information on African American membership or the number of

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150 and multivariate, to assess the potential effect of the B lack church on envi ronmental justice organizations. At the bivariate level, the percent of Black churches was weakly associated with all of the dependent variables (all correlations were under 0.15). There were no significant effects of this variable at the multivariate le vel, nor were there any significant effects when I ran sub group analyses (e.g., the effect of Black churches on the use of various strategies for formal compared to informal groups or for local compared to nonlocally focused organizations). Nevertheless future research should consider the important role of institutions in shaping collective action. Another purpose of this supplementary analysis wa s to put together inductively some possible explanations for the relationship between focusing on dumping or siting among environmental justice organizations and groups strategy selection. This analysis also informs possible explanations for why the hypotheses in the present study failed to receive support. I approached this inquiry by looking at an environme ntal justice organization that exists in a predominantly Black and lower income community and focused on a local siting issue, using a variety of strategies The organization had extensive information on its website, including contact information (I made an effort to contact the organization via phone and e mail), and there were a number of newspaper articles about the organizations activities, as well. Hence, this organization lent itself well to a preliminary, casestudy analysis. I utilized Freemans (1979) framework on mobilization and strategic decision making to shape the discussion. I also searched for adherents in Black churches (Stretesky et al., 2011). Bla ck churches and more particularly, their adherents are recognized for their role in minimizing social problems that are prevalent in Black communities, such as racism, unemployment, poverty, crime, and environmental issues. Black churches included African Methodist Episcopal, Christian Methodist Episcopal, Church of God in Christ, National Baptist Convention (American and USA), National Missionary Baptist Convention of America, Pentecostal Assemblies of the World, and Progressive National Baptist Conventio n.

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151 newspaper articles (in Lexis Nexis) and other media (via the Google search engine) that would provide other specific illustrations to illuminate broader generalizations that would serve the dual purposes of informing the present research, as well as providing guidance for future research. Freeman (1979) outlined four elements of strategic decisionmaki ng within social movements. These divisions are informative at the organizational level, as well: mobilizable resources, constraints on resources, structure and internal environment, and expectations about the potential targets of the action. The first t wo of these dimensions are the most relevant to this analysis and will be used to frame the discussion. Re sources are tangible (e.g., money, space) and intangible (e.g., people) and can shift from one movement to another. In predominantly Black and low i ncome communities, there already might be mobilizing structures in place, as many of these communities have experienced multiple injustices and consequently have dealt with issues like unemployment, political disempowerment, crime, and transportation injus tice. Pre existing mobilization structures may constitute an important mobilizable resource and be of great consequence in groups strategy choices WE ACT is an environmental justice organization in the West Harlem area of New York City. The community in which it is located is predominantly minority and low income and has dealt with issues of poverty and crime. WE ACT formed in 1988 with the broad purpose of addressing health disparities created by institutionalized racism and soon became involved in a siting conflict when the North River Sewage Treatment Plant was moved from a predominantly white community to West Harlem. Initially, the group relied on community mobilization and worked with local officials to rectify the problem,

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152 but its efforts were not successful. It then partnered with the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and filed a lawsuit against the New York City Department of Environmental Protection. The NRDC had been in existence for almost two decades and had (and still has) a rep utation for being a powerful environmental advocacy group. The group was (and is) headquartered in New York City, constituting an available institutionalized resource for WE ACT. WE ACT also relied on a civil disobedience strategy (consistent with Freema ns claim that resources can be transferred between movements), having a group that became known as the Sewage Seven block traffic. Another illustration of how resource mobilization may play out in unexpected ways that nullify the expected impact of or ganizational and community resources came from a New York Times article published in 2007. Following an unusually high number of murders in New Orleans most of which were Black on Black, approximately 5,000 residents marched on City Hall. Surprisingly, a lmost all of the protesters were white. A local Black pastor was interviewed and stated that there was a lot of hopelessness and fear within the Black community and by stepping out, Blacks would make themselves vulnerable. Also, he pointed out that Bla cks with low paying jobs would not be able to miss work to participate in the demonstration. The lack of Black community members participation demonstrate d that although there was an intangible resource that could be mobilized (in this case, people), the re was not an avenue in place to facilitate the mobilization (in this case, the time, inclination, and/or financial ability). Summarily, it seems that resources, as well as the means to mobilize them may differ in communities based, in part, on pre exist ing institutional arrangements Baumgartner, Berry, Hojnacki, Leech, and Kimball (2009) provided a more detailed discussion of why pre existing

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153 institutional arrangements, particularly past policy decisions, annul the relationship between resources and po litical activities. Freeman (1979) identified three major categories of resources: expertise and access to networks and decision makers; time (e.g., to perform labor, attend meetings, etc.); and commitment (which he distinguis hed from dedication as being the willingness to engage in risks or tolerate being inconvenienced). He also laid out three major sources of resources: the beneficiary constituency, conscience constituencies (sympathizers), and nonconstituency institutions (a lready in place and would exist independent of any organizations or movements existence). These categories of resources and their sources many of which were not measured, might affect organizations choice of strategies. Organizations need resources, but they also need resources to mobilize their resources. For example, an organization might have a paid attorney on its staff, but to use the attorney as a resource, s/he must be paid so money is a resource used to mobilize a legal expert. At the community level, it could be the case that communities that were targeted for dumping or hazardous waste siting have access to different (and perhaps unexpected) resources and the ability to mobilize these resources, resulting from their experiences with multiple sources of oppression and their manifestations. Previous research on hazardous waste sites has demonstrated that targeted communities tend to be minority and/or low income both of which are risk factors for experiencing other forms of injustice. Additional research should explore both resources and venues through which different types of resources are mobilized. These explorations should consider community characteristics and experiences in their entirety.

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154 Before looking at the WE ACT case study exploration of this argument, it is worth mentioning that an article in the Christian Science Monitor discussed how Blacks awareness of the Trayvon Martin killing came from Reverend Al Sharpton and other Black celebrities posting the news on social media websites like Twitter. This online community demonstrated how an institutionalized resource (social media), which is present regardless of whether it is useful as a resource to people or groups, was able to be mobilized because t here were resources in place (well known sympathizers) to do the mobilizing. Also, the role of history cannot be ignored, as Trayvon Martins killer, George Zimmerman, was not initially arrested, and once he was arrested, his culpability in the killing wa s questioned publicly (whether or not the killing was justified as self defense under Floridas stand your ground law when Martin was unarmed ). Ultimately, Zimmerman was acquitted for Martins murder. The killing of Martin, along with the subsequent lega l and social aftermath, remained in the public eye, largely because of institutionalized tendencies, particularly on the part of law enforcement, to devalue the lives of Black citizens. The use of social media in this case as the medium through which the Black community mobilized validates the points that Freeman (1979) made about the intersections between categories and sources of resources and the importance of mediating social institutions. I expected groups that lacked organizational resources (e.g., revenue, employees, volunteers, etc.) to display higher odds of using direct action over other strategies. Further, I anticipated that groups in areas with a high level of oppositional presence would be inclined to use high profile strategies like direct action. It may be that direct action strategies are dependent on a group having previous experience with them (e.g.,

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155 obtaining permissions, garnering participation, knowing how to carry out a protest or related activity, etc.) As Freeman (1979) pointed out, pre existing structures, including a communitys experiences, may be as or more important than the absence or presence of resources as they traditionally are measured. Applying these intersections to the environmental justice organization WE ACT th e group had all three categories of resources: expertise and access to networks and decision makers (the NRDC, the courts, and local political officials, one of whom took up the fight against the siting of the sewage plant); time (on the part of the people who assisted in the lawsuit and who participated in the act of civil disobedience); and commitment (the Sewage Seven who blocked traffic were arrested and hence, willing to assume that risk). The court is an institutionalized resource and one that the g roup only was able to deploy with the co plaintiff, the NRDC. T he NRDC was one of the big ten environmental groups a powerful organization that fought for environmental interests like reducing pollution, but was disconnected from environmental injustice s in poor and minority communities. In the mid to late 1980s, environmental groups like the NRDC came under fire from environmental justice leaders and organizations for ignoring issues of environmental justice and for having predominantly white leaders, employees, and members. It was around this time that the NRDC joined with WE ACT (along with a local daycare and other individuals in West Harlem) to initiate the lawsuit against New York City for the siting and poor management of the North River Sewage T reatment Plant. Again, the role of a mediating structure is important in shaping available resources the ability to mobilize them, and strategy choice.

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156 The second dimension of Freemans (1979) model was constraints on resources. He identified five categories of constraints: values, past experiences, the constituencys reference group, expectations, and relations with target groups. With respect to predominantly Black and low income communities in which environmental justice organizations often operate, past experiences and relations with target groups are the most important. As I mentioned before the previous e xperiences, particularly of minorities, in communities that experience environmental injustices likely involves other social and political threats. Because of these existing threats, institutions other than social movement organizations may be in place and have experience with mobilization effort s. The target group(s) of an organizations efforts varies; however, it is inextricably tied to the groups mobilization efforts. Because the ecology of games framework looks at interactions between game players, it lends itself well to discussions of ta rget populations. Future applications of resource mobilization theory would benefit from investigating the intersections between resources, mobilization, venues, and target populations within the context of games and the ecology in which they are played. The Black church played a fundamental role in the civil rights movement, and as the environmental justice movement grew out of the civil rights movement, it, too, drew upon the church. In fact, Reverend Benjamin Chavis coined the term environmental racis m, and the United Church of Christs Commission for Racial Justice carried out a largescale study on the link between race and pollution. This study produced the first national report on the link between race and the location of hazardous waste faciliti es. Other institutions included wellknown groups like the NAACP that preceded the environmental justice movement, but were familiar with race specific injustices and how

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157 to mobilize against them. For example, the NAACP in 2009 held a rally in Dickson, T ennessee to protest a toxic well that affected a disproportionately Black community. The groups primary mission is not connected to environmental justice, but it has the resources in place and enough of an interest in the issue to mobilize in certain are as and under certain circumstances. Although the role of some institutions (particularly the Black church) may have become more indirect over time (there are a number of media sources that have claimed that the connection between Black churches and activi sm has become more tenuous in recent years), their influence remains present. Also, one can see a path dependent effect of these institutions. Early in the environmental justice movement, civil rights activists, experts from the civil rights movement, th e Black church, and several other entities came together to put environmental justice issues on the radar of local communities, as well as the national political agenda. At around the same time, these individuals and institutions leveled criticisms at the white, upper middle class environmental movement for the nonparticipation of minorities and for ignoring racial and class based environmental injustices. The intersection of these effects resulted in more institutional access to political and legal aven ues for nonwhite communities, the establishment of environmental justice specific departments and objectives within mainstream environmental groups and federal political departments like the Environmental Protection Agency, and heightened public awareness of environmental justice issues. Hence, when predominantly minority communities fought an environmental injustice, they could rely on strategies like direct action (learned from the civil rights movement) or more institutionalized strategies (e.g., legal), rather than community advocacy or educational strategies, which may not be effective in

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158 accomplishing outcomes related to dumping or siting, as these issues tend to require legal intervention (and attention) for the desired social change to occur. With respect to WE ACT, the group claimed that initial efforts to work with politicians to correct the problems (particularly the odor) associated with the sewage treatment plant were not effective. The group did not identify what the constraint was to success ful communications (it could have been that it was newly established and not yet well connected or legitimized) but it is apparent that when they utilized different resources and adopted different strategies (direct action and especially a legal strategy) their efforts were successful. Notably, their efforts were connected with an already organized and legitimate group, the NRDC, as well as a local daycare (also a preexisting institution in the area). The lawsuit resulted in a settlement of over one million dollars, and the group used some of that money to hire staff and expand its efforts. WE ACTs partnership with other people and groups in West Harlem, especially the NRDC, also facilitated their ability to use media strategy, which may have brought in additional resources (e.g., sympathizers). The take away from this part of the case study is that when WE ACT overcame constraints to its resource mobilization efforts its challenges were hugely successful both in terms of the desired outcome (winning the lawsuit) and in legitimizing the group, which has enhanced its success over the past nearly three decades. Future social movement scholars should better operationalize resource constraints and examine them (and resources) within the substantive confli ct in which they are engaged. There is at least suggestive evidence in the findings in the present research that substantive focus (dumping and siting) may be connected to strategy choice. This

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159 relationship should be given more attention within a larger context that includes pre existing institutional arrangements, target populations, and constraints.

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160 CHAPTER VII DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION Hypothesis 1 stated that the more community resources environmental justice organizations have, the higher the probability they would have of using strategies that required more money and political capital, including legal, enforcement, media, and support services. Thi s hypothesis did not receive any support In fact, the percent white in areas in which environme ntal justice organizations were located was significantly associated with lower odds of groups adopting a community advocacy strategy, which was not part of the expectation from resource mobilization theory. Further, groups in areas with a higher percentage of whites used fewer total strategies than groups with a lower percentage of whites, a finding contrary to what was expected. Hypothesis 2 stated that the more organizational resources environmental justice groups have, the higher the odds that they wo uld adopt strategies that involve d more money and people (but less membership participation) including legal, enforcement, media, and support services. Conversely, groups with fewer organizational resources would be more inclined to adopt strategies that involve d more membership participation and less money and fewer connections, such as aesthetic, educational community, and direct action. This hypothesis did not receive any support. The only relationship between an organizational resource and a strateg y was between the number of employees organizations had and aesthetic strategies (groups with more employees had higher odds of adopting aesthetic strategies). When controls were included, this relationship fell to nonsignificant.

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161 Finally, hypothesis 3 stated that the more prevalent the counter mobilization in environmental justice organizations communities, the higher the odds that groups would use high profile strategies (e.g., media and direct action) and the less likely they would be to use institutionalized strategies (e.g., legal, educational) This hypothesis also received no support Only one measure of counter mobilization was statistically significant, and its significance was limited to one model (groups in areas with a higher percentage of TRI facilities were almost twice as likely to use aesthetic strategies as they were to use other types of strategies). This finding was unrelated to the third hypothesis. The unexpected findings with respect to the relationship between organizations concern with dumping and siting and their strategies as well as the complete lack of support for the resource mobilization theory hypotheses, led to additional exploratory research in the form of fact finding (though a Google search and newspaper articles in Lexis Nexis) and a small case study on the WE ACT organization. This supplementary analysis revealed that groups strategy choices could vary across time and space and may be a consequence of a combination of factors, including the local history of oppression not limited to environmental injustices, the existence of institutions and other mobilizing structures already in place in the communities because of already existing threats, and the mechanisms through which organizations particularly in Black or low income communities can (or sometimes cannot) mobilize the resources available to them. Future research should engage in more systematic exploration of these factors and perhaps take a grounded theory approach to modify the tenets of resource mobil ization theory within the context of the ecology of games framework to accommodate social movement organizational efforts in already disenfranchised communities (resource mobilization

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162 theory) and the role of different types of power in games, relationships between game players, and the use of different game strategies and how different forms of power interplay to affect the construction of games, goals, and global outcomes (ecology of games framework) Generally, there d id not seem to be any apparent p atterns in the findings. There are a few possible reasons for the very limited and contextualized results. First, this research operated under the presumption that certain strategies required money, while others relied more heavily on human resources or political connections. It might be the case that strategies are too broad to make these generalizations. For example, an educational strategy could involve holding a seminar in a community building, which would require little or no money, or it could involve paying someone to gather and analyze data and present it at a conference somewhere. The specific activities in which organizations engage within the context of the ecology of games framework are tactics. Future research should attempt to gather data at the tactical level and evaluate empirically the extent to which various tactics involve certain kinds of resources. Such an effort would be a huge undertaking and likely would require indepth qualitative interviews of organizations. In a similar vein, tactics might be the more appropriate dependent variable to measure. Although game playing strategies are important, it might be that the specific tactics groups use are what matters in the ecology. After all, other game players within and outside of the environmental justice game would not necessarily respond to a general plan to use a legal strategy, but would tailor a response to a specific behavior, like an organization filing a law suit. Future scholars in the ecology of games tradition should

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163 be tter operationalize the concept of tactics and examine the role of tactics within a game, as this relationship certainly affects the larger ecology and its outcomes. Second, one resource that is very important, but unmeasured in the present research is net work ties. The relationship between other resources and opposition and the likelihood that environmental justice organizations engage in certain strategies might be contingent upon network ties. Many of the groups websites referenced, and a few even lis ted, partner organizations or groups with which the organizations worked. Resource mobilization scholars, where possible, should attempt to measure network ties among organizations to better understand how that resource mediates or moderates the relations hip between other resources, oppositional presence, and various outcomes. The importance of network ties was evident in the case study of WE ACT. Finally, some of the measures, particularly of oppositional presence and community resources, we re indirect a nd proxies. They we re the best available measures at the time I conducted this research but nevertheless measures that are problematic may have affect ed causal validity, in this case, failing to reveal relationships that could exist. Future research cou ld benefit from more direct indicators of opposition and specifically from organizational level measures. The findings in the present study suggest ed at least to a limited extent, that resources and oppositional presence, as well as the controls of geographic scope, substantive focus, and area of differentiation, do affect organizational strategies. They implied that organizations may be more liberated or constrained in their strategy choices, depending on certain resources and the area around which its missions focus. Future

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164 research also would benefit from replicating this research to determine how reliable it is in other contexts. Theoretically, this research makes several contributions. It is the first empirical study to operationalize the concept of game strategies, which is one of the precursors to the ecology of games. The ecology of games is an important framework, as it demonstrates how people, institutions, organizations, and other entities are enmeshed in various ways and how the inter conne ctions shape outcomes. Looking at how these entities come together and choose different strategies and tactics and how they construct their missions (framing in the social movement literature) are an important piece of the larger ecology. These more micro level decisions and interactions both reflect and have implications for underlying power dynamics, which were missing from Longs original conceptualization of the ecology of games, but should be introduced into the framework. This study is among the few to look at how the ecology of games is informed by another theory. Previous research either looked at the ecology of games framework in an isolated context or offered competing hypotheses from different theories. To the extent that theories and framework s offer an illustration of a piece of reality, they are limited by parsimony and other practical constraints it is not realistic to explain all of any phenomenon with a single theory. Hence, it is beneficial to look at theories together to see what they b ring to one another in attempting to explain outcomes. Ecology of games scholars virtually have ignored the importance of game strategies in shaping the ecology and its outcomes. This issue can be addressed by social movement scholars, as organizational strategies are a significant part of the social movement literature.

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165 T he social movement literature has not benefitted from the ecology of games framework. Environmental justice and other movements have been examined in a narrower context, but rarely as a part of a more global system of game players, games, and outcomes. F uture social movement researchers should continue to advance the ecology of games framework in the field, illustrating different ways that organizations and movements constitute game players, how they (as game players) interact with and are connected to ot her players within the game and the larger ecology, the factors that influence how they choose various strategies and tactics, and how their game influences the ecology of games and its outcomes. Finally, this research has advanced environmental justice. While the importance of resources, both internally and within the surrounding area, cannot be ignored, it may be over stated. Environmental justice groups may mobilize based on other factors, such as network ties, funding requirements or prohibitions, t he presence of organizations or institutions within the community that oppose their efforts, or as a result of other, more historic and pathdependent institutions, such as Black churches As organizations try to change their neighborhoods and areas beyond their communities, as they attempt to influence law and policy, and broadly as they make an effort to create social change, it might benefit them to understand their role as players in a larger game. As players in a broader environmental justice game, t hey are connected to other players within and outside of that game, and their strategies and tactics, their roles and goals, have far reaching effects in a larger ecology. Their decisions and the rationales behind them shape not only their course s of acti on, but the actions of other actors in the ecology. Environmental justice scholars should look at the influence of other relevant resources

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166 like network ties, funding sources, and of the presence of direct opposition not only on organizational strategies, but on specific tactics. The role of social location and the history of minorities in communities affected by environmental justice also should be considered.

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179 APPENDIX A PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL J USTICE PREAMBLE WE, THE PEOPLE OF COLOR gathered together at this multinational People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit, to begin to build a national and international movement of all peoples of color to fight the destruction and taking of our lands and communities, do hereby re establish our spiritual interdependence to the sacredness of our Mother Earth; to respect and celebrate each of our cultures, languages and beliefs about the natural world and our roles in healing ourselves; to insure envir onmental justice; to promote economic alternatives which would contribute to the development of environmentally safe livelihoods; and, to secure our political, economic and cultural liberation that has been denied for over 500 years of colonization and oppression, resulting in the poisoning of our communities and land and the genocide of our peoples, do affirm and adopt these Principles of Environmental Justice: 1) Environmental Justice affirms the sacredness of Mother Earth, ecological unity and the interdependence of all species, and the right to be free from ecological destruction. 2) Environmental Justice demands that public policy be based on mutual respect and justice for all peop les, free from any form of discrimination or bias. 3) Environmental Justice mandates the right to ethical, balanced and responsible uses of land and renewable resources in the interest of a sustainable planet for humans and other living things.

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180 4) Enviro nmental Justice calls for universal protection from nuclear testing, extraction, production and disposal of toxic/hazardous wastes and poisons and nuclear testing that threaten the fundamental right to clean air, land, water, and food. 5) Environmental Ju stice affirms the fundamental right to political, economic, cultural and environmental self determination of all peoples. 6) Environmental Justice demands the cessation of the production of all toxins, hazardous wastes, and radioactive materials, and that all past and current producers be held strictly accountable to the people for detoxification and the containment at the point of production. 7) Environmental Justice demands the right to participate as equal partners at every level of decision making, in cluding needs assessment, planning, implementation, enforcement and evaluation. 8) Environmental Justice affirms the right of all workers to a safe and healthy work environment without being forced to choose between an unsafe livelihood and unemployment. It also affirms the right of those who work at home to be free from environmental hazards. 9) Environmental Justice protects the right of victims of environmental injustice to receive full compensation and reparations for damages as well as quality health care. 10) Environmental Justice considers governmental acts of environmental injustice a violation of international law, the Universal Declaration On Human Rights, and the United Nations Convention on Genocide.

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181 11) Environmental Justice must recognize a special legal and natural relationship of Native Peoples to the U.S. government through treaties, agreements, compacts, and covenants affirming sovereignty and self determination. 12) Environmental Justice affirms the need for urban and rural ecological policies to clean up and rebuild our cities and rural areas in balance with nature, honoring the cultural integrity of all our communities, and provided fair access for all to the full range of resources. 13) Environmental Justice calls for the strict enf orcement of principles of informed consent, and a halt to the testing of experimental reproductive and medical procedures and vaccinations on people of color. 14) Environmental Justice opposes the destructive operations of multi national corporations. 15) Environmental Justice opposes military occupation, repression and exploitation of lands, peoples and cultures, and other life forms. 16) Environmental Justice calls for the education of present and future generations which emphasizes social and environmental issues, based on our experience and an appreciation of our diverse cultural perspectives. 17) Environmental Justice requires that we, as individuals, make personal and consumer choices to consume as little of Mother Earth's resources and to produc e as little waste as possible; and make the conscious decision to challenge and reprioritize our lifestyles to insure the health of the natural world for present and future generations.

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182 APPENDIX B CODEBOOK VARIABLE NAME VARIABLE VALUES ID Identif ication number for the group 0010XX STRALAW Whether the EJO uses a legal 0 = no strategy, such as lobbying 1 = yes STRACOMM Whether the EJO uses a community 0 = No advocacy strategy 1 = Yes STRAEDUC Whether the EJO uses an educational 0 = No advocacy or research strategy 1 = Yes STRAENF Whether the EJO uses a monitoring 0 = No or enforcement strategy 1 = Yes STRAAEST Whether the EJO uses an aesthetic 0 = No strategy (beautification) 1 = Yes STRAMED Whether the EJO uses a mediarelated 0 = No strategy (e.g., press releases) 1 = Yes STRADIRC Whether the EJO plays uses a direct 0 = No action strategy (e.g., protest) 1 = Yes STRASUPP Whether the EJO uses a support services 0 = No strategy 1 = Y es STRATOT Total number of strategies a group us ed Ratio number of strategies ORINCOME Total revenue taken from a 3 year average Revenue in dollars of groups 990s (2008, 2009, 2010) sum of contributions and grants, program service re venue, membership dues, investment income, and other revenue ORINCSRC Percentage of groups income that came from Percentage (0 to 100) contributions and grants; taken from 3 year average (2008, 2009, 2010 990 forms). Divided revenue by contributions and grants to get each years percentage, then took 3 year average OREMPLOY Number of employees an organization has Number of employees (3 year average taken from 990s2008, 09, 10)

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183 ORVOLUNT Number of volunteers an organi zation has Number of volunteers (3 year average taken from 990s2008, 09,10) ORBOARD Whether the organization had a Board of Dummy coded (1 = yes) Directors in 2010 ORINDMBR Whether the organization has individual Dummy coded (1 = yes) members O RSALARY 3year average of salaries, other Amount in dollars compensation, and employee benefits (2008, 2009, 2010 990 forms) CREDUC Percentage of people 25 and over in the Percentage (0 to 100) county who attained a bachelors degree or higher (2010 census) CRINCMED Median household income in the county Income in dollars in 2010 inflationadjusted dollars (2010 census) CRRACEWH Percentage of residents in the county Percentage (0 to 100) who are white (2010 census) CRRACEBL Percentage of residents in the county Percentage (0 to 100) who are Black (2010 census) CRPOLACC Ratio of # of Democrat to Republican voters in Ratio as decimal the 2008 presidential election (<0 = higher proportion voted for McCain; >0 = higher proportion voted for Obama; 0 = 50/50 split) County and state level election results published online in the NY Times on 12/9/08. CMEMPIND Total percent of people employed in one of Percentage (0 to 100) these industries by county: Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, and mining and manufacturing (taken from 2010 Census) Based on total people employed in the county CMAIRFAC Density of pollution sources: number of air Ratio number of pollutant facilities per square mile in the zip facilities code in which the organization exists; taken from scorecard.org CMTRIFAC Density of pollution sources: number of Ratio number of toxic release inventory facilities per square facilities mile in the zip code in which the organization exists; taken from scorecard.org CAREDUMP Whether a group is concerned about dumping Dummy coded (1=yes)

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184 CARESITE Whether a group is concerned about siting Dummy coded (1=yes) CARECLIM Whether a group is concerned about climate Dummy coded (1=yes) justice DIS CBLAK Whether a group focuses on discrimination of Dummy coded (1=yes) Blacks DISCRACE Whether a group focuses on racial Dummy coded (1=yes) discrimination in general GRAGE The age of the group Age in years (2012 minus the year founded) RGEOF OC Geographic focus Dummy coded (1=local) Local=neighborhood, city county community Broad=state, inter state, national, international

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185 APPENDIX C MULTIPLE IMPUTATION Beginning with the development of the EM algorithm in the late 1970s ( Dempster, Laird, and Rubin, 1977), the treatment of missing data shifted from a problem to be done away with to a source of variability to be averaged over (Shafer and Olsen, 1998, p.4, emphasis in original). Specifically, given certain assumptions, observed values give rise to a predictive probability distribution for missing values that should be analyzed and averaged, as averaging the values enhances the estimates, particularly of the standard errors of the estimates (Allison, n.d.). Multiple imputation has become one of the more widely used and most desirable means for obtaining parameter estimates for relationships involving missing data. Multiple imputation was developed in the 1970s (Rubin, 1977), but remained obscure for awhile, because there were few software programs capable of applying the technique. As statistical data analysis software has evolved, so, too, has the use of more sophisticated techniques for analyzing data and managing problems within data sets, like missing data. The primary assumption of multiple imputation is that the data are missing at random that is, missing values are a function of observed variables in the data set. T his assumption is statistically un testable (without extensive technical expertise) and probably violated by many multiple imputation users; however, as Graham (2007; 2012) pointed out, even if the missing at random assumption is violated, the use of multi ple imputation still is far superior to other, more traditional ways of managing missing data. Multiple imputation is not ideal for some statistical techniques (e.g., Analysis of Variance), but works very well for multivariate regression analyses. Sinc e the present

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186 study uses multivariate logistic regression and there did not seem to be a more accurate or efficient way to manage the issue of missing data, particularly in light of the strengths of multiple imputation, multiple imputation was used to obta in values for missing data. Essentially, the technique involves incorporating random variation into a model containing the variables to be used in the analysis and then imputing values for the missing data. Traditional forms of missing value replacement (e.g., mean replacement or using regression models based on only observed values in the data) do not have sufficient variation, creating small standard errors, indicative of overstated confidence in the estimates, and biasing results. By obtaining values from imputations derived from a distribution, the inherent error ensures unbiased and efficient estimates. Prior to imputing data, it is necessary to analyze patterns of missingness among all variables in the dataset. Although the SPSS program defaults t o analyzing missingness among variables with more than ten percent of the observations missing, the researcher can change this number. I changed it to .0001, so that any variables with missing data would be analyzed. Among the variables with missing data the range of missingness varied from one organization (0.8%) (percent of Blacks in organizations county) to 75 organizations (56.8%) (number of employees an organization has). Only this variable and one other one (number of volunteers an organization) had more than half of the observations missing. An analysis of the patterns of missingness revealed no monotonicity (order), meaning that a standard multiple imputation procedure should be used. For data that exhibit monotonicity, a pattern illustrated b y missing observations that all touch one another, a monotone imputation procedure is employed.

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187 Data are imputed m times (m must be greater than one). Three to five imputations generally are sufficient to ensure first rate results (Allison, n.d.; Shafe r and Olsen, 1998; c.f., Graham, 2012). Indeed, Shafter and Olsen (1998) found that, for a variable with 30 percent missing, five imputations resulted in excellent efficiency (94%), while doubling the number of imputations (m=10) only resulted in a three percent efficiency gain (97%). One or two imputations generally are insufficient, unless there are very few missing values. Because multiple imputation is iterative, resulting in slightly different estimates each time, the random number seed must be set prior to imputing the data. After taking this step, I ran five imputations in SPSS. Once the imputations are complete, the original data remain intact, and SPSS generates five data sets, one for each imputation, as well as a pooled data set, which contai ns the average of the previous five imputed values. The values in the pooled data set constitute the data that will be analyzed. Analyses can be run just as if the researcher was working with a complete data set (Allison, n.d.) Notably, SPSS designates analyses that are appropriate for imputed data with a swirly symbol next to the procedure (e.g., logistic regression), and all of the analytic techniques that were appropriate given the variables and their levels of measurement in the present study were us able for imputed data. To be clear, the analyses in this research were based on a pooled data set that included some (previously missing) values that were imputed using the multiple imputation procedure.

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188 Figure 1. Causal Processes in the Ecology of Games Framework Figure 1. B Banking Game News paper Local Govt Feeding NYC The Ecology of Games Community Outcomes Transpo r tation Planning Game

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189 Table 4. Correlation Matrix of Pearsons R and Biserial Relationships. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 1. Org income 1.00 2. % income from funding .014 1.00 3. # employees .301** .004 1.00 4. # volunteers .116** .205** .000 1.00 5. Compensation to staff .823** .297** .320** .174** 1.00 6. Has a Board .032 .121** .066 .045 .079* 1.00 7. Has individual members .030 .093* .191** .033 .029 .054 1.00 8. Education in community .053 .048 .064 .094* .034 .004 .180** 1.00 9. Median income community .013 .003 .031 .069 .009 .022 .253** .705** 1.00 10. % white in community .218** .008 .088* .081* .160** .020 .071 .285** .176**1.00 11. % black in community .138** .006 .050 .003 .142** .019 .134** .063 .277** .569** 1.00 12. Ratio of Dem Republican .180** .002 .171** .138** .130** .188** .042 .486** .152** .528** .433 1.00 13. % employed manufacturing .096** .060 .121** .122** .034 .118** .066 .487** .215** .256** .158** .464** 1.00 14. Air pollution facilitie s .129** .069 .100** .096** .036 .027 .007 .484** .334** .306** .090** .430** .281** 1.00 15. TRI facilities .173** .059 .275** .079* .075* .123** .025 .392** .199** .298** .067 .357** .269** .802 16. Direct action strategy .033 .147** .001 008 .108** .012 .086* .054 .005 .158** .057 .060 .046 .081* 17. Legal strategy .039 .135** .099** .015 .078* .002 .024 .110** .017 .045 .059 .154** .118** .183** 18. Educational strategy .012 .104** .036 .032 .007 .080* .114** .029 .011 .0 11 .035 .036 .068 .008 19. Community strategy .051 .139** .046 .032 .049 .051 .002 .101** .024 .204** .059 .132** .027 .032 20. Enforcement strategy .124** .007 .032 .008 .098** .026 .032 .101** .046 .008** .051 .134** .143** .087* 21. Media strategy .005 .179** .071 .032 .015 .008 .082** .002 .043 .048 .030 .013 .010 .100** 22. Aesthetic strategy .104** .058 .225** .004 .072 .041 .139** .010 .144** .163** .217** .114** .117** .216** 23. Support strategy .009 .039 .105** .047 .059 .101** .123** .026 .046 .094** .112** .093* .102** .040 24. Total strategies used .160** .162** .008 .015 .053 .021 .048 .023 .080 .131** .049 .055 .044 .014 25. Organizations age .201** .140** .230** .179** .289** .025 .06 6 .132** .079* .076* .009 .025 .142** .201** 26. Geographic focus .003 .015 .118** .099** .054 .074 .226** .205** .199** .026 .084* .141** .331** .024 27. Focus on Black discrim. .062 .085* .098** .050 .032 .086* .013 .153** .034 .253** .303** .103** .112** .062 28. Focus on racial discrim. .033 .028 .102** .035 .012 .020 .031 .069 .102** .156** .149** .001 .020 .001

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190 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1. Org income 2. % income from funding 3. # employees 4. # volunteers 5. Compensation to staff 6. Has a Board 7. Has individual members 8. Education in community 9. Median income community 10. % white in community 11. % black in community 12. Ratio of Dem Republican 13. % employed manufacturing 14. Air pollution facilities 15. TR I facilities 16. Direct action strategy .019 1.00 17. Legal strategy .134** .143** 1.00 18. Educational strategy .013 .072* .035 1.00 19. Community strategy .030 .199** .063 .117** 1.00 20. Enforcement strategy .038 .009 .086* .059 .103** 1.00 21. Media strategy .065 .139** .154** .042 .229** .041 1.00 22. Aesthetic strategy .333** .006 .046 .038 .026 .016 .011 1.00 23. Support strategy .056 .003 .016 .052 .192** .129** .122** .108** 1.00 24. Total strategies used .019 .472** .367** .2 59** .404** .338** .419** .234** .408** 1.00 25. Organizations age .141** .010 .014 .007 .054 .159** .061 .144** .107** .157** 1.00 26. Geographic focus .126** .170** .034 .058 .006 .191** .046 .159** .144** .097* .102** 1.00 27. Focus on Black discrim. .105** .166** .093* .080* .206** .091* .025 .109** .032 .291** .015 .245** 1.00 28. Focus on racial discrim. .044 .133** .060 .159** .163** .148** .012 .083* .059 .331** .088* .120** .723** 1.00

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191 Table 5. Bivariate Logistic Regression Analyses Model 1: Legal Strategies Model 2: Educational Strategies Model 3: Community Advocacy Strategies Exp(B) p Exp(B) p Exp(B) p Organizational Resources Revenue 1.000 .293 1.000 .752 1.000 .168 Income source from funding 1.005** .000 1. 004** .005 1.005** .000 Number of employees .980** .009 1.009 .336 .990 .221 Number of volunteers 1.000 .688 1.000 .393 1.000 .393 Organization has Board .989 .949 .649* .031 1.264 .167 Organization has members 1.106 .510 .589** .0 02 1.010 .950 Community Resources Income 1.000 .643 1.000 .761 1.000 .511 Political access .900** .000 1.030 .321 1.120** .000 Percent white 1.005 .216 .999 .758 .976** .000 Percent Black .992 .102 .995 .338 1.008 .105 Opposition TRI facilities .263** .000 .861 .715 .735 .407 % employed in industry 1.053** .001 .969 .059 .989 .454 Controls Geographic scope 1.154 .367 1.326 .128 .975 .877 Organizational age 1.003 .699 998 .884 1.011 .137 Focus on dumping 4.576** .000 1.224 .371 1.882** .003 Focus on siting 2.058** .000 2.358** .000 2.265** .000 Focus on climate change 1.627** .005 .851 .377 1.555* .012 Discrimination Black 1.470* .011 1.457* .026 2.428** .000 Discrimination race in general 1.297 .096 2.110** .000 2.032** .000

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192 Model 4 : Enforcement Strategies Model 5 : Aesthetic Strategies Model 6: Media Strategies Exp(B) p Exp(B) p Exp(B) p Organizational Resources Revenue 1.000** .001 1.000** .006 1.000 .687 Income source from funding 1.000 .846 .997 .120 1.007** .000 Number of employees 1.008 .391 1.052** .000 .986 .061 Number of volunteers 1.000 .824 1.000 .919 1.000 .390 Organization has Board .861 .488 1.279 .262 1.037 .824 Organization has members 1.192 .377 2.065** .000 .718* .025 Community Resources Income 1.000 .200 1.000** .000 1.000 .234 Political access .821** .000 1 .089** .002 1.009 .726 Percent white 1.001 .825 .976** .000 .995 .187 Percent Black 1.008 .161 1.031** .000 1.004 .402 Opposition TRI facilities .587 .297 32.588**.000 1.923 .073 % employed in industry 1.077** .000 935** .001 .996 .772 Controls Geographic scope 2.921** .000 2.339** .000 1.203 .230 Organizational age .957** .000 .963** .000 1.012 .095 Focus on dumping .707 .205 .900 .674 1.429 .062 Focus on siting 1.179 .399 1.809** .002 1.973** .000 Focus on climate change .638 .054 1.407 .090 .435** .000 Discrimination Black 1.642** .012 1.778** .003 1.107 .485 Discrimination race in general 2.605** .000 1.614* .023 1.051 .746

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193 Model 7 : Direct Action Strategies Model 8: Support Strategies Exp(B) p Exp(B) p Organizational Resources Revenue 1.000 .369 1.000 .604 Income source from funding 1.006** .000 1.001 .298 Number of employees 1.000 .986 1. 022** .006 Number of volunteers 1.000 .827 1.000 .212 Organization has Board 1.057 .743 1.578** .006 Organization has members 1.431* .019 .604** .001 Community Resources Income 1.000 .896 1.000 .205 Political a ccess 1.042 .103 1.066* .011 Percent white .982** .000 .990** .009 Percent Black 1.007 .114 1.015** .002 Opposition TRI facilities 1.211 .606 1.741 .122 % employed in industry .980 .205 .958** .005 Controls Ge ographic scope 2.068** .000 .554** .000 Organizational age .998 .792 .980** .004 Focus on dumping 3.759** .000 1.048 .805 Focus on siting 2.067** .000 .601** .001 Focus on climate change 2.726** .000 1.168 .3 34 Discrimination Black 2.011** .000 1.138 .374 Discrimination race in general 1.828** .000 1.284 .105 *p<.05 **p<.01

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194 Table 6. Multivariate Logistic Regression Analyses Model 1: Legal Strategies Exp(B) p Exp(B) p Exp(B) p Exp(B) p Exp(B) p Organizational Resources Revenue .944 .865 Income source from funding 1.358 .285 Number of employees .824 .355 Number of volunteers 1.002 .991 Organization has Board .969 .900 Organization has members 1.132 .576 Hosmer Lemeshow p value=.120 N=132 Community Resources Income .986 .950 Political access .692 .151 Percent white .868 .582 Percent Black .908 .715 Hosmer Lemeshow p value=.428 N=132 Opposition TRI facilities .801 .354 % e mployed in industry 1.226 .394 Hosmer Lemeshow p value=.356 N=132

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195 Controls Geographic scope .992 .972 Organizational age .999 .964 Focus on dumping 1.896* .057 Focus on siting 1.290 .295 Focus on climate cha nge 1.085 .723 Discrimination Black 1.313 .386 Discrimination race in general .778 .405 Hosmer Lemeshow p value=.155 N=132 Full Model Income source from funding 1.366 .220 Political access .688 .101 Focus o n dumping 1.891* .092 Hosmer Lemeshow p value=.572 N=132

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196 Model 2 : Educational Strategies Exp(B) p Exp(B) p Exp(B) p Exp(B) p Exp(B) p Organizational Resources Revenue .929 .768 Income source from funding 1.304 .389 Number of employees 1.132 .617 Number of volunteers 1.237 .478 Organization has Board .775 .283 Organization has members .739 .229 Hosmer Lemeshow p value=.021* N=132 Community Resources Income .931 .808 Po litical access 1.167 .590 Percent white .919 .774 Percent Black .813 .484 Hosmer Lemeshow p value=.361 N=132 Opposition TRI facilities .930 .737 % employed in industry .837 .474 Hosmer Lemeshow p value=.337 N=132 Controls Ge ographic scope 1.066 .808 Organizational age .996 .877 Focus on dumping 1.019 .951

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197 Focus on siting 1.558* .091 Focus on climate change .830 .454 Discrimination Black .495 .236 Discrimination race in ge neral 2.365 .139 Hosmer Lemeshow p value=.452 N=132 Full Model Organization has Board .762 .262 Organization has members .728 .202 Focus on siting 1.626* .083 Hosmer Lemeshow p value=.132 N=132

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198 Model 3 : Commu nity Advocacy Strategies Exp(B) p Exp(B) p Exp(B) p Exp(B) p Exp(B) p Organizational Resources Revenue .912 .713 Income source from funding 1.383 .290 Number of employees .929 .746 Number of volunteers .907 .717 Organization has Board 1.106 .635 Organization has members 1.051 .824 Hosmer Lemeshow p value=.018* N=132 Community Resources Income .864 .513 Political access 1.200 .521 Percent white .552* .078 Percent Black .702 .250 Hosmer Lemeshow p value=.477 N=132 Opposition TRI facilities .930 .728 % employed in industry .915 .652 Hosmer Lemeshow p value=.202 N=132 Controls Geographic scope .777 .273 Organizational age 1.018 .459 Focus on dumping 1.132 .702

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199 Focus on siting 1.433 .112 Focus on climate change 1.198 .517 Discrimination Black 1.554 .165 Discrimination race in general .982 .950 Hosmer Lemeshow p value = .411 N= 132 Full Model Inco me source from funding 1.299 .333 Percent white .668* .066 Focus on siting 1.396 .122 Discrimination Black 1.286 .310 Hosmer Lemeshow p value=.236 N=132

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200 Model 4 : Enforcement Strategies Exp( B) p Exp(B) p Exp(B) p Exp(B) p Exp(B) p Organizational Resources Revenue .681 .155 Income source from funding 1.022 .973 Number of employees 1.137 .641 Number of volunteers 1.157 .585 Organization has Board .911 .822 Organiza tion has members 1.026 .943 Hosmer Lemeshow p value=.218 N=132 Community Resources Income 1.030 .928 Political access .391 .315 Percent white .855 .693 Percent Black 1.313 .487 Hosmer Lemeshow p value=.064 N=132 Opposition TRI facilities 1.007 .984 % employed in industry 1.430 .177 Hosmer Lemeshow p value=.484 N=132 Controls Geographic scope 1.979* .041 Organizational age .933 .138 Focus on dumping .057 .999

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201 Focus on siting 1.037 .926 Focus on climate change .130 .999 Discrimination Black .973 .952 Discrimination race in general 1.610 .275 Hosmer Lemeshow p value=.303 N=132 Full Model Revenue .584 .221 Geographic scope 1.933* .030 Organizational age .945 .243 Hosmer Lemeshow p value=.002* N=132

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202 Model 5 : Aesthetic Strategies Exp(B) p Exp(B) p Exp(B) p Exp(B) p Exp(B) p Organizational Resources Revenue .519 .200 Income source from funding .826 .657 Number of employees 1.875* .032 Number of volunteers 1.116 .636 Organization has Board 1.199 .649 Organization has members 1.303 .469 Hosmer Lemeshow p value=.039* N=132 Community Resources Income .61 1 .278 Political access 1.090 .769 Percent white .685 .314 Percent Black 1.096 .820 Hosmer Lemeshow p value=.059 N=132 Opposition TRI facilities 1.946** .009 % employed in industry .918 .768 Hosmer Lemeshow p value=.104 N=132 Controls Geographic scope 1.472 .176 Organizational age .951 .183 Focus on dumping .987 .966

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203 Focus on siting 1.313 .417 Focus on climate change 1.074 .830 Discrimination Black 1.361 .566 Discrimi nation race in general .832 .700 Hosmer Lemeshow p value=.054 N=132 Full Model Number of employees 1.503 .158 TRI facilities 1.839* .027 Geographic scope 1.481 .202 Organizational age .954 .281 Hosmer Lemeshow p value=.104 N=132

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204 Model 6 : Media Strategies Exp(B) p Exp(B) p Exp(B) p Exp(B) p Exp(B) Organizational Resources Revenue 1.032 .933 Income source from funding 1.445 .394 Number of employees .896 .659 Number of volunteers 1.014 .949 Organization has Board .969 .896 Organization has members .878 .616 Hosmer Lemeshow p value=.063 N=132 Community Resources Income .882 .570 Political access 1.002 .995 Percent white .861 .570 Percent Black .946 .851 Hosmer Lemeshow p value=.245 N=132 Opposition TRI facilities 1.147 .515 % employed in industry 1.014 .944 Hosmer Lemeshow p value=.061 N=132 Controls Geographic scope .975 .914 Organizational age 1.004 .821 Focus on dumping 1.144 .558 Focus on siting 1.447 .117

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205 Focus on climate change .603* .080 Discrimination Black 1.137 .737 Discrimination race in general .871 .706 Hosmer Lemeshow p value=.246 N=13 2 Full Model Income source from funding 1.526 .371 Focus on siting 1.473 .144 Focus on climate change .609 .227 Hosmer Lemeshow p value=.349 N=132

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206 Model 7 : Direct Action Strategies Exp(B) p Exp(B) p Exp(B) p Exp(B) p Exp(B) Organizational Resources Revenue .927 .793 Income source from funding 1.436 .279 Number of employees 1.019 .937 Number of volunteers .790 .332 Organization has Board 1.028 .921 Organization has members 1.289 .35 7 Hosmer Lemeshow p value=.003** N=132 Community Resources Income .882 .618 Political access .969 .896 Percent white .639 .108 Percent Black .865 .593 Hosmer Lemeshow p value=.150 N=132 Opposition TRI facilities 1.016 .937 % employed in industry .913 .659 Hosmer Lemeshow p value=.333 N=132 Controls Geographic scope 1.380 .162 Organizational age 1.001 .965 Focus on dumping 1.518 .113

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207 Focus on siting 1.270 .328 Focus on cli mate change 1.442 .142 Discrimination Black 1.264 .522 Discrimination race in general .885 .744 Hosmer Lemeshow p value=.023* N=132 Full Model Percent white .722 .132 Focus on dumping 1.585 .115 Focus on climate change 1.531 .102 Hosmer Lemeshow p value=.328 N=132

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208 Model 8 : Support Strategies Exp(B) p Exp(B) p Exp(B) p Exp(B) p Exp(B) Organizational Resources Revenue .905 .824 Income source from funding 1.095 .771 Number of employees 1.281 .264 Number of volunteers 1.033 .899 Organization has Board 1.227 .298 Organization has members .739 .181 Hosmer Lemeshow p value=.078 N=132 Community Resources Income .900 .648 Political access 1.146 .555 Percent white .913 .732 Percent Black 1.074 .786 Hosmer Lemeshow p value=.192 N=132 Opposition TRI facilities 1.076 .711 % employed in industry .826 .356 Hosmer Lemeshow p value=.547 N=132 Controls Geographic scope .767 .211 Organizational age .986 .501 Focus on dumping 1.004 .986

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209 Focus on siting .804 .333 Focus on climate change 1.023 .924 Discrimination Black 1.005 .989 Discrimination race in general 1.1 79 .573 Hosmer Lemeshow p value=.106 N=132 Full Model Number of employees 1.319 .178 Organization has Board 1.250 .353 Organization has members .750 .281 Geographic scope .732 .192 Hosmer Lemeshow p value=.035* N=132

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210 Model 9 : Total Strategies (OLS Regression) b p b p b p b p b p Organizational Resources Revenue .212 .287 Income source from funding .327 .160 Number of employees .110 .477 Number of volunteers .020 .905 O rganization has Board .028 .887 Organization has members .020 .917 R2=.024 N=132 Community Resources Income .180 .298 Political access .061 .729 Percent white .378* .050 Percent Black .062 .748 R2=.040 N=132 Opposition TRI facilities .097 .537 % employed in industry .031 .843 R2=.004 N=132 Controls Geographic scope .078 .588 Organizational age .012 .412 Focus on dumping .221 .192

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211 Focus on siting .317* .034 Focus on cl imate change .052 .771 Discrimination Black .178 .452 Discrimination race in general .069 .755 R2=.099 N=132 Full Model Income source from funding .289 .219 Percent white .300* .029 Focus on siting .382* .015 R2=.086 N=132 *p<.10 **p<.01