! UNAUTHORIZED IDENTITIES : THE LEGAL BARRIERS TO WORKERS COMPENSATION AMONG UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANTS by CASEY K COLE B.A Fort L ewis College, Anthropology A thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Colorado in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Anthropology 2014
ii This thesis for the Master of Arts degree by Casey K Cole has been approved for the Anthropology Program by Sarah Horton, Chair Marty OtaÂ–ez John Brett May 2, 2014
! iii Cole, Casey, K. (M.A. Anthropology) Identity Loan Barriers to Workers' Compensation: An Anthropological Perspective Thesis directed by Assistant Professor Sarah Horton. ABSTRACT This study examines the legal barriers of those engaged in identity l oan face when filing for workers' compensation. Farm workers are among the most marginalized groups of unauthorized migrants laborers. Those workers engaged in identity loan are further exploited because of their precarious employment status. Identity loan is a when a worker borrows another persons Social Security Number in order to be employed. When that individual is injured on the job they do not file a workers' compensation claim because fear of employer retaliation, exposure to the government and misin formation. Everyone in California has a right to workers' compensation no matter his or her legal or employment status. Workers' compensation attorneys were interviewed to understand the obstructions farm workers' using identity loan are up against when fi ling for workers' compensation. Proof of identity and misinformation are among the most substantial barriers to successfully filing a workers' compensation claim. The form and content of this abstract are approved. I recommend its publication. Approve d: Sarah Horton
! iv DEDICATION I dedicate this work to the Migrant Farmworker s in California, Hilary Morris, King Cole, Martha and Glen Erickson, and Clay Cole.
v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank the workers' compensation attorneys who participated in the study, Tyler Lundy who provided valuable interviews, my fellow Anthropology Graduate students, Connie Turner, Dr. Sarah Horton, Dr. Marty Otanez and Dr. John Brett.
vi TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION: THE NEED TO WO RK OTHER PEOPLE'S PAPERS ................. 1 II. LITERATURE REVIEW: HOW MIGRANT ILLEGALITY AND IDENTITY LOAN AFFECTS WORKERS' COMPENSATION CLAIMS MAKING ................................ .... 7 III RESEARCH METHODS AND ATTORNEY INTERVIEW FINDINGS ................ 15 I V. DISCUSSION: CLAIMS DENIAL PART OF MIGRANT VULNERABILITY ..... 26 REFERENCES ................................ ................................ ................................ ................. 31
! vii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement IRCA Immigration Reform Control Act NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement SSN Social Security Numb er
! 1 !"#$%&' (( ) ( INTRODUCTION: THE NEED TO WORK OTHER PEOPLE'S PAPERS Humans have been farming for thousands of yea rs. But the advances of modern society have n ot changed the place of farmworkers in the labor hierarchy; they are still at the bottom. The corporatization of US agriculture and deregulated global food markets squeeze farm owners and farm contractors such that they cannot imagine increasing the pay of farm workers or improving wretched labor camps without bankrupting the farm (Holmes 2006:1789). Unauthorized m igrant 1 farm workers are a tractable labor force with few rights and reparations. I njured unauthorized migrant farm workers can fall through the cracks and not receive proper workers' compensation, especially those who are in the US without proper documentation. Workers' compensation is one of the few benefits unauthorized migrant farmworkers are eligible for in California. Ethnographic work among farm workers in the California's Central Valley by Sarah Horton has revealed that those who engage in identity loan that is, present the work authorization documents of a legal resident or citizen in order to obtain employment are the most vulnerable b ecause they believe that they are not eligible for workers' compensation when they are injured on the job (Horton n.d.). This paper examine s the knowledge of workers' compensation attorneys in California about the practice of identity loan among migrant f armworkers. While migrant farm workers in the Central Valley of California have verified that they are being misinformed about their ineligibility for worker's compensation benefits by their employers (Horton n.d.), there is a dearth of information about t he workers' compensation attorney's perspective on how migrant farm workers !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!! I follow De Genova (2002 ) in using the term "migrant" as opposed to "immigrant"
! 2 engaged in identity loan are able to navigate the legal system and receive worker's compensation benefits. Moreover, there is little knowledge about how employers attempt to manip ulate additional factors related to migrants' "illegality" (De Genova 2002, 2005) to depress workers' compensation claims. Nicholas De Genova defines "illegality" a s a socio political condition produced by the ability of the law to categorize people as cri minals or law abiding citizens (2002:424). The purpose of this study is to identify and analyze findings from interviews with workers' compensation attorneys in central California about the barriers that identity loan and "illegality" pose to farmworkers w hen filing worker's compensation claims. Background: Migrant s' Occupational Vulnerability Despite US restrictions on immigration, the Latino population in the US has swelled from 35.3 million in 2000 to 50.5 million in 2010 a 15 million person increase (En nis et al. 2011:3). This increase accounted for 43% of the population growth in the United State s over that time period (ibid.) The western US has a higher percentage of Latino residents. Specifically California has the largest concentration of the US Lati no population with 14 million (28 % ) residents (Ennis et al 2011:5). In 2012 there were 164,310 farm workers employed in California (US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2013). Data from the National Agriculture Worker's Survey provides basic demographics of the n ational farm worker population. In 2009, 68% of farm workers in the US were from Mexico (Carroll et al. 2011). Roughly 50% of all farm workers are unauthorized (ibid). California's agricultural industry is reliant on foreign born workers 85 % of agricultura l workers are migrant Latinos (Schenker 2010:3). These statistics demonstrate that the average farm worker in California is a migrant Latino who is most likely unauthorized.
! 3 There is strong evidence that migrant workers face abnormally high rates of workp lace injuries when compared to US born workers (Smith 2012; Orrenius and Zavodny 2009 ; Schenker 2010 ). Marc Schenker, a leading authority on the occupational health of Latino migrant s explains the relationship between migration and increased rates of occu pational mortality and injury among migrant workers in the US. The overall rate of occupational fatalities in the US has decreased 25% over the past 20 years while during this same time period the number of occupational fatalities among Latino workers has nearly doubled (Schenker 2010:3). Non fatal injuries and il lnesses are also higher among migrant workers. Migrants are concentrated among the three occupational groups with the highest rates of occupational fatalities (transportation, construction and agr iculture) (Schenker 2010). Schenker points out that migrants' concentration in occupations with the highest rates of morbidity and mortality does not entirely account for their higher rates of workplace injuries (2010) Instead, there are several reasons why foreign born workers might hold riskier jobs and have higher occupational injury rates than US citizens Migrants' lower levels of education social capital, and English speaking abilities result in them having less information about job risks. Employ ers who hire migrant workers could understate the job risks and avoid safety training Precarious job status is a common factor associated with increased occupational injury and fatality among migrant workers. Workers in low skill and low wage jobs are of ten compensated "under the table" and where there is little to no government agency regulation. Those who lack formal job contracts are less likely to question safety hazards because of employer retaliation. The lack of a formal labor contract may result i n the increased likelihood of abusive labor
! 4 practices (Schenker 2010). The economic need for migrants to work and sense of "machismo" means that they are also less likely to stop working in unsafe conditions (Schenker 2010) Workers feel like there is litt le choice but to accept the risks. Lack of knowledge about the Occupational Safety a nd Health Administration (OSHA), other government regulatory agencies and the medical system also contributes to increased occupational vulnerability. Unauthorized migrant s choose to work risk y jobs because they have few alternatives Ethnographic findings by Seth Holmes (2006 ; 2011 ; 2013 ) demonstrate how symbolic violence naturalizes migrant farmworkers low positions i n the farm labor hierarchy reproducing this system o f inequality Symbolic violence is an invisible force that enforces the way those who are harmed and constrained come to accept their station in life as natural (Quesada 2011 :403 ). Latino unauthorized migrants internalize outside societies xenophobic judgm ents about their worthiness. H olmes reveals how the farm working and housing conditions are hierarchically organized by ethnicity and citizenship (Holmes 2006). This hierarchy defines health inequalities, with unauthorized indigenous Mexicans having the wo rst health (Holmes 2006). The unauthorized migrant farm workers in California constitute a vulnerable population and are exposed to a wide variety of occupational risks and hazards. Farm work is detrimental to the body because it requires heavy lifting, be nding, working on the knees, and exposure to the elements. Occupational health problems that result from working in the fields include pesticide related illnesses, musculoskeletal and soft tissue disorders, dermatitis, respiratory conditions and communicab le diseases (Mobed et al. 1992:367). If a farm worker is injured on the job and cannot continue to work, his or her last resort is filing for worker's
! 5 compensation. Workers' compensation covers an injured worker's medical rehabilitation and provides remune ration for lost wages and vocational rehabilitation. However, few migrant farm workers are aware of their eligibility for worker's compensation (Villarejo et al. 2010), and there is evidence of employer retaliation in response to filed claims in many othe r occupational fields (Quinlan and Mayhew 1999; Scherzer et al 2005). The labor hierarchy of the farm system is culpable to workers' compensation claim suppression. Farm contractors are hired by the farm owner /growers as subcontractors to harvest the crops quickly. As a subcontractor, the farm contractor, not the grower, is legally responsible to provide workers compensation insurance for the farm workers. Suppressing workers' compensation claims maintains low insurance rates, and lower operation costs. Thu s f arm contractors use identity loan to suppress claims ( Horton n.d.). Identity Loan Unauthorized migrants are eligible for worker's compensation in California, but additional problems arise when such workers are engaged in "identity loan". "Identity lo an" is when a worker with authorized status voluntarily loans his or her social security card to an unauthorized worker so that the latter can supply the required work authorization documents to his/her employer (Horton n.d.). A n ethnographic study by Sara h Horton suggests that the exchange of social security numbers is part of a moral economy, a form of reciprocal gift giving that establishes and solidifies social ties in an informal economy (Bourgois and Schonberg 2009:6; Horton n.d.). Those with authoriz ed status often initiate this voluntary and consensual exchange of documents because it benefits them financially through augmented retirement and unemployment earnings. Yet
! 6 those who are unauthorized are saddled with the repercussions when they are injure d. Unauthorized workers engaged in "identity loan" are vulnerable because Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) often views this practice although consensual and voluntary as a form of "identity fraud." Engaging in "identity loan" thus contributes to unauthorized workers' "deportability" and existence as a tractable labor force. Horton has shown that farm labor contractors deliberately misinform farm workers engaged in identity loan that they are ineligible for worker's compensation benefits in order to suppress claims (n.d.). This work builds upon Horton's research in order to gain information about what obstacles "identity loan" poses when undocumented workers are injured and attempt to file for workers' compensation benefits. What obstacles do wor kers' compensation attorneys face in attempting to help their clients obtain workers' compensation benefits? And what other barriers do workers' compensation attorneys face in securing benefits for injured unauthorized workers in general? ( ( ( (
! 7 !"#$%&'( )) ( LITERATURE REVIEW: HOW MIGRANT ILLEGALITY AND IDENTITY LOAN AFFECTS WORKERS' COMPENSATION CLAIMS MAKING This research on "identity loan" is based on two different sets of literature: the occupational health literature on barriers to employees' use of wo rkers' compensation insurance and the anthropological literature on migrant "illegality". This study is interdisciplinary because it speaks to both the applied literature on what prevents workers from filing workers' compensation claims and to the social s cientific literature on how employers may manipulate migrant "illegality" to extract surplus value On the one hand this study contribute s to the literature on farmworker occupational health because little work has been done examining the specific factors that depress workers compensation claims among unauthorized farmworkers (Higert 2012; Villarejo et al. 2010; Schenker 1996; Schenker 2010; Smith 2012), and no prior research examines how those using loaned identities affect workers' compensation claims m aking ability On the other hand, e xamining workers' compensation attorneys' legal knowledge will unpac k the complexities of a legal system that both supports and works against farm workers' "superexploitation" (Heyman 1998). "Superexploitation", as defin ed by Josiah Heyman, is the process of exploitation where unauthorized migrants work faster and harder for the same pay than regular workers, and struggle to avoid or limit workplace authority less often (Heyman 1998:2). The "superexploitation" of unauthor ized migrants "illegality" (define illegality again) is a concrete example of unauthorized migrant laborers' structural vulnerability (Quesada et al. 2011).
! 8 International migration has a dramatic impact on human health. After arriving in the United States the Latino unauthorized migrant population face s xenophobia, political exclusion, ba nned from receiving governmental services and occupies the lowest economic rungs. One of the hidden costs of migration is the occupational health burden of migrants wh o work in low skilled, hazardous jobs, often without protection (Schenker 2010:1). Agricultural work is one the most hazardous jobs in the nation. In 2012 agriculture had the highest fatality rate of all job sectors, with 21.2 per 100,000 workers (Bureau o f Labor Statistics 2012). Given the high percentage of migrants in the agricultural sector, this population suffers more mortality in agriculture than other populations. It is not known exactly how many migrant workers go without filing for workers' compen sation after suffering an on the job injury but given their occupational vulnerability and evidence of employer claim suppression (Horton n.d.), I estimate that 80% of claims go unfiled (Ahonen 2007; Smith 2012). However, it is clear that m igrant workers face the same barriers to filing for workers' compensation as other workers, including lack of knowledge about their rights, lack of union representation, and employer pressures to refrain from filing (Smith 2012). More importantly, unauthorized migrants f ace real retaliation in the form of reports to immigration authorities. Fear of retaliation limits their drive to change their employ ment situation. Barriers to Filing Workers' Compensation The workers' compensation system in the US has seen e normous chang es since the 1990's. These reforms pushed by employ ers and the insurance industry have meant benefit cuts, reduced coverage, lower quality medical care and stigmatization of injured workers (Ellenberger 1999:24). Despite these changes in the workers'
! 9 compe nsation system, this insurance remains the accepted method for taking care of those who suffer illness, injury or death from circumstances arising out of, and in the course of employment (Ellenberger 1999:25). W orkers face several barriers while trying to file a claim if they are injured on the job. One of the biggest barriers among all industries is fear of employer retaliation and job termination. Employers want injured workers to avoid filing a claim because it will raise their insurance premiums, while charging the injury to ordinary coverage usually does not (Azaroff et al. 2002:1423). As a result s ome employers warn their employees to not tell the doctor that they were hurt at work, or pressure them to not file a claim. Some employers will hire medica l professionals to be on staff, or train staff to treat injured employees and cover the costs (Azaroff et al. 2002). Navigating the confusing workers' compensation bureaucracy also discourages employers and workers from filing claims (The Committee o n Educ ation and Labor 2008:12). Long waiting periods, insufficient wage replacement and fights over the work relatedness of an injury all dissuade workers' from filing claims (The Committee on Education and Labor 2008:12) A study by Scherzer et al. (2005) found that o nly 20% of injured hotel workers actually filed worker's compensation claims after an on the job injury. Re asons for not reporting include lack of knowledge, discouragement due to "the hassle," and fear of being fired (Scherzer et al 2005). Among l ow wage worker s migrants are at particular disadvantage when it comes to filing workers' compensation claims. Some migrant workers may not be aware that they are eligible for benefits (whether or not they are practicing identity loan ) Cultural and langua ge differences among Latino migrants create further obstacles to filing a
! 10 workers' compensation claim. They often lack sufficient knowledge of their workplace rights and how the legal and medical system operates in the US (Gleeson 2008; Hoffman 2006 ). Fear of employment termination among those in precarious employment such as seasonal and temporary labor is an additional reason for not filing for worker's compensation (Quinlan and Mayhew 1999; Horton n.d.). Farmworkers, who lack job security as a temporary and seasonal workforce, are especially vulnerable and reluctant to make a claim if injured on the job in fear of being fired. Gleeson (2008) argues that un autho r ize d immigrants' hesitancy to make a workers' compensation claim is shaped by their un authoriz e d status. Those who are unauthorized likely have a fervent desire to remain undiscovered by the US legal system, and thus will avoid making a claim if it rev eals their unauthorized status. Gleeson suggest s that even if an unauthorized migrant has the know ledge and resources to file a claim, their unauthorized status will prevent them from doing s o. As a result, a migrants legal status and "illegality" may be the biggest obstacle to filing a claim. Villarejo et al. (2010) found a significant relationship between work authorization status and knowledge of the worker's compensation system; those who said they were unauthorized were less likely to know about workers' compensation benefits (Villarejo et al. 2010:395). Unauthorized workers were also associated with a higher prevalence of occupational and behavioral risks to health (Villarejo et al 2010:395). This study build s up on the occupational health literature on workers' compensation because it illuminate s a unique form of "employer retaliation" that is u sed specifically against workers engaged in identity loan. In addition, by interviewing workers' compensation attorneys about their experience with barriers to unauthorized migrants' receipt of workers' compensation, it
! 11 may help to illuminate the reasons w hy unauthorized migrants were less likely to know about workers' compensation benefits. Migrant I llegality and Superexploitation While the occupational health literature raises the question of through what mechanisms agricultural employers retaliate again st unauthorized workers, the literature on "illegality" helps contextualize these forms of retaliation. The literature on the anthropology of "illegality" is based on two related theories: Josiah Heyman's theory of migrant "superexploitation" (1998) and N icholas De Genova's concept of the legal production of "illegality" and "deportability" among unauthorized Hispanic immigrants (2002). De Genova shows how state policy has progressively "illegalized" Mexican migration, and both authors explain the effect o f Mexican migrants' unauthorized status on their occupational health and labor exploitation. De Genova argues that US immigration policy has changed since 1965 to increasingly classify this labor migration as "illegal." The law defines the parameters of i ts operations, creating the possibility for "legal" and "illegal" practices (De Genova 2002:424). Labeling Mexican migrants in the US as "legal" or "illegal" is used to stigmatize and regulate the population. Moreover, once labeled as such, migrant "illeg ality" is produced as an effect of law (De Genova 2002:431). That is, once a group is classified as "illegal," that effect is produced and reproduced in all domains of social life. De Genova goes on to argue that the threat of "deportability" creates a t ractable and docile labor force that i s easily exploited (2002:438). "Illegality" is the means by which "deportability" is used to subdue and discipline unauthorized migrants. It would be
! 12 impossible for Homeland Security or ICE to deport every unauthorize d migrant in the United States, but the fear of deportation controls th e unauthorized population. While De Genova shows that "illegality" disciplines the unauthorized population, Heyman takes a Marxist approach to explore the exploitation of the unauthor ized as one segment of the US proletariat. People migrate to the US from Mexico for employment, but US foreign policy makes it deliberately difficult for them to legally migrate into the US. While the US aggressively deports unauthorized migrants back to Mexico, other unauthorized migrants fill competitive and poorly paid job sectors of the US economy (Heyman 1998:157). Unauthorized migrants are treated worse than authorized migrants working the same jobs. He yman defines this as "superexploi tation" (1998: 158 ) or that u nauthorized migrant's work harder and longer than their authorized counterparts for the same or lower pay. "Superexploitation" serves to keep wages low and prevents unauthorized migrants from complaining about unjust or unsafe work condition s. They often don't seek the remuneration they are due including workers' compensation benefits to avoid attracting the attention of the US authorities. Enforcement of immigration laws by the US government keeps the unauthorized docile and exploitable beca use they do not want to get deported. "Superexploitation" is the direct result of unauthorized migrants' deportability and the creation of a tractable labor force. "Superexploitation" dovetails with De Genova's theory of "illegality" and "deportability". Both theories are based on how the state and the law act to stigmatize and discipline the migrant labor force. De Genova suggests that unauthorized migrations are driven by economic reasons and are preeminently labor migrations (2002:23). Labor moves less fluidly than commodities do. While NAFTA has authorized unrestricted
! 13 movement of commodities across the US Mexico border, US immigration policy has halted the same movement of labor. Unauthorized migrations are not self generating and random; they are pro duced and patterned (De Genova 2002:424). Mexican migration into the US is not a recent phenomenon. From 1942 to 1964, the US's Bracero Program legally imported more than 4.6 million Mexican migrant men to work in US agriculture and on the railroads (Horto n n.d.). After the Bracero Program's end in 1965 the US' Immigration and Nationality Act imposed migration quotas from the Western Hemisphere for the first time in US history (Horton n.d ; Massey et al. 2002:40 ). Whereas roughly 200,000 Mexican laborers h ad migrated legally each year through the Bracero Program, there were only 120,000 legal VISA's apportioned to the Western Hemisphere (Horton n.d. ; Massey et al. 2002 ). The Immigration and Nationality Act converted a legal migrant channel to a predominantl y "illegal" one (Horton n.d.; De Genova 2002). Recent NAFTA and global neoliberal economic reforms have exacerbated the need to migrate. As Mexican markets were opened up to compete with US companies after NAFTA, prices for agricultural commodities in Mexi co plummeted. Mexican farmers have little to no other options but to migrate throughout Mexico and then into the US for better work (Holmes 2013) Seth Holme s ethnography of Triqui migrant farmworkers describes migrating to the US a s absolutely necessary f or their survival (2013:17). Migrants have a dire need to move in order to create a better life for themselves and their families. However, despite their best intentions, unauthorized migrants are tangled up in the web of "illegality", "deportability" and "superexpl oi tation" when they arrive in the US in search of a job.
! 14 The Immigration and Reform Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 fortified a connection bet ween unauthorized migrants and "illegality" by making the procurement of fraudulent work authorization docu ments necessary for them to work (Horton n.d.). IRCA requires that employees present documents to employers confirming their identity and right to work in the US while the employers fill out and I 9 which records the legal documents such as a Social Securi ty Card (Massey et al. 2002). IRCA was intended to regulate the hiring of unauthorized laborers in the US workforce. However the passage of IRCA is a case of "good int entions gone awry"(Martin 1994). It was suggested that IRCA would create a largely legal US farm work force while increasing wages and improving work conditions (Martin 1994). Instead IRCA has not had these hoped for effects; the majority of farm workers are still unauthorized and wages have not increased. IRCA created a switch from undocument ed workers to falsely documented workers (Martin 1994). IRCA imposed sanctions against employers who knowingly hired unauthorized migrants and increased the Department of Labor's budget to increase inspections (Massey et al. 2002). As long as an employer i nspected and some reasonable looking documents and filled out an I 9 they had satisfied their duties under the law. An employer was under no obligation to verify the authenticity of the documents (Massey et al. 2002:119). If a work site was raided by ICE a nd the status of an employee was found to be unauthorized, as long as an employer had filled out and kept an I 9 form they were not liable for prosecution under IRCA (Massey et al. 2002: 119). The need to fill out an I 9 created a black market for false do cuments, and in turn identity loan. IRCA is central to the creation identity loan and unauthorized migrants as a tractable labor force.
! 15 !"#$%&'( ))) ( RESEARCH METHODS AND ATTORNEY INTERVIEW FINDINGS This paper is based on the analysis of phone interviews conducted by a team of three researchers 2 with eight workers' compensation attorneys who represent farmworkers in prominent agricultural areas of central California. Interviewees practiced with different law firms, in Fresno (five attorneys), Visalia (one attorney) and Salinas/Watsonville (two attorneys). Attorneys were recruited through snowball sampling, and consent was obtained verbally over the phone. Interviews ranged in length from 30 minutes to one and one half hours; in three cases, repeat intervie ws were conducted. Where possible, interviews were recorded and all interviews were transcribed. Semi structured interviews covered the attorney's demographic information, legal experience with farmworkers engaged in identity loan, and knowledge of employ ers' claim suppression patterns. The interviews were coded and the resulting data was organized and placed in analytic charts. The codes were taken from the interview questions and previous research conducted (deductive codes) and new codes were created t o encompass emerging patterns (inductive codes). E xamined themes included: general patterns of identity loan observed, legal barriers to workers' compensation for the unauthorized, legal barriers to workers' compensation specifically for those engaged in i dentity loan, employers' patterns of suppression of worker's compensation claims, California workers' compensation law, how attorneys navigate the legal challenges posed by identity loan, examples of worker superexploitation and farmworkers' awareness o f !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!! # $%&!'%(&& ) *&(+,-!.-'&(/.&0!'&12!3(,2!'%&!4-./&(+.'5!,3!6,7,(18,!9&-/&(! :,-+.+ '&8!,3!;1+'&(<+!='>8&-'+!61+&5!6,7&!1-8!$57&(!?>-85!1-8!@(,3&++,(!9(A!=1(1%! B,(',-A!
! 16 their right to workers' compensation. Below, the data is analyzed by highlighting the patterns and inconsistencies about attorneys' experience with migrant farmworkers Results The attorney's were all from different law firms. One attorney was a female while the rest were male. Age and ethnicity were not collected in the demographic information. Basic demographic information shows that these attorneys are very experienced. Interviewees had practiced as worker's compensation attorneys for an average of 28 .5 years, and had an average of 27.25 years of experience working with farmworkers. The average proportion of the interviewee's clientele that are farmworkers is 62%. Farmworkers comprise the majority of five attorneys' clientele. Three reported that 90% o f their clients were farmworkers, while only two attorneys reported that 20 25% of their clientele consisted of farmworkers. One of those attorneys had been representing farmworkers for only 15 years, which is the least amount of experience among attorneys in my sample. Typology of Identity Loans The first code is designed to create a typology of identity loan that is, to analyze the patterns of identity loan that attorneys observed. Attorneys reported that there are several ways that a farmworker can get the "papers" that IRCA requires him or her to present a potential employer in order to find work. Seven of eight attorneys said that farm workers most frequently invent a social security number to use on the I 9 form IRCA requires of employers. Four att orneys stated that their clients buy a social security number, although it is unclear whether they purchased social security numbers are in fact real or invented. They reported that papers may be purchased from places like a flea
! 17 market, swap meet, or a lo cal notary public. According to these attorneys, buying or creating a SSN is the most common way farmworkers procure their SSN's. For example Attorney King explains his knowledge of fake identity documents, C&1%D!,-&!'%1'!'%&5!%1/&!:%,+&-!,>'!,3!'%.-!1.(!, (!E,''&-D!1%D!3(,2!+,2&!F! 8,-<'!G-,0!.3!5,>!0,>78!:177!.'!1!H71:G!21(G&'!'5*&!,3!*(,8>:'.,-!0%&(&!'%&5! *(,8>:&!177!,3!'%&!-&:&++1(5!8,:>2&-'+!3,(!5,>!',!E,!',!'%&!&2*7,5&(!1-8! *(,8>:&!5,>(!==I!:1(8!'%1'!%1+!25!-12&!1-8!1!->2H&(!0%&'%&(!.'!.+!1! 21->31:'>(&8 ->2H&(!,(!0%1'!5,>!:177&8!1!7,1-&8!->2H&(!0.'%,>'!'%&! 1:'>17!*&(+,-!G-,0.-E!.'!.+!H&.-E!>+&8A Six attorneys mentioned "identity loan" the consensual borrowing of a third party's work authorization documents as an alternative means by which workers pr ocure their papers. Attorney's Gomez 3 and Jordan did not specifically confirm or refute identity loan as a practice among their clients; it appears that they conflated the practice with buying or creating papers. According to the six attorneys who discussed the practice, SSNs may be borrowed from friends or family members such as parents, siblings, or uncles who have a valid SSN. This works for the family because the name and card number match up. Examples that the attorneys provided included a son using the pap ers of a father who had returned to Mexico or a sister who can't work because she is pregnant providing her SSN to a family member. Those who loan out their SSNs profit because they collect social security and unemployment benefits without actually working Profiting from loaning out SSNs leads to the third variation: that of labor intermediaries supplying their workers with "papers." Farmers typically rely on labor intermediaries such as contractors and field bosses, or mayordomos in order to insulate themselves from the risks of hiring an unauthorized labor force. According to the sample t he loan of "papers" by labor intermediari es happens the least frequently Only !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!! J F-!,(8&(!',!21.-'1.-!:,-3.8&-'.17.'5!'%&!1'',(-&5<+!-12&+!1(&!*+&>8,-52+A!
! 18 two attorneys reported hearing of a contractor actually providing a work er with false documentation. A ttorney Jordan said that a contractor might provide a real SSN, allowing the donor to benefit from collecting unemployment after the season ends as well as to benefit from inflated tax returns. However, four informants said that they had n o t heard of a contractor directly providing papers or that it rarely happens. While labor intermediaries such as farm contractors and mayordomos may infrequently supply workers with the documents that IRCA requires, attorneys reported that they are fairly relaxed about checking wo rkers' documentation. Attorney Morris with thirty four years of experience working with farmworkers mentioned that during the busy harvest season some farm contractors do not have time to check the entire crews' papers thoroughly suggesting that documentation is checked thoroughly otherwise. In contrast, three attorneys explained that farm contractors routinely condone the use of false docume ntation. For example, Attorney Erickson with 36 years of experience mentioned that he hea rd of a mayordomo who told an employee who did not have papers to "not worry about it, he will take care of it." This example confirms the findings from previous research (see Horton n.d.) that some labor intermediaries such as mayordomos are not only awar e of but in fact encourage the use of false papers for employment. These attorneys suggest that the demand for a readily available farm labor force especially during periods of peak production creates an environment in which the use of false documentation is common. Barriers Identity Loan Poses to Receiving Workers' Compensation Insurance The above typology of how a farmworker claimant received their papers relates directly to the barriers workers face to receiving worker's compensation benefits. Identity
! 19 l oan in particular causes special problems for unauthorized workers claiming worker's compensation benefits. Seven attorneys reported that proving the claimant's identity and earnings are the first and foremost barriers to their clients' collecting benefits Attorneys often resolve this dilemma by having the claimant provide records and pay stubs from his employment or testifying that he assumed a particular identity in court. However, interviewees reported that even after an attorney has proved the claimant 's identity, insurance companies often find other excuses to deny a claim. For example p ayments can stop if there is a match in the records under an assumed SSN. Insurance companies routinely do background checks on the SSN the worker used to find out abou t past claims to attempt to discredit the claimant's argument that his injury is work related. If the client was using a loaned ID, then prior claims filed by the ID's rightful owner sometimes emerge. The insurance company often denies benefits/medical co verage if there is a history on the assumed SSN that suggest that the injury preceded the worker's hire. Attorneys often attempt to fix the double identity problem in cour t through client testimony. As Attorney Erickson explained, I had a case where a wom an had filed a claim and the issue was whether the condition had preceded her injury at work. And she was asked: "Were you ever previously treated for that condition?" And she said: "No, I've had no stomach problems before." And the defense attorney produc es some evidence and lo and behold, it turns out that a few years before, she had been in the hospital for a stomach problem. Well it turns out that her sister had used her social security number to go to the hospital and get treatment. So now we have to g o back in and explain why this person with this name and this birthdate and this social security number was not the one at the hospital. The attorney's job is to explain to the court that his client assumed the SSN and that the prior record of illness was of the SSN's rightful owner. In short, the identity swap requires him to show that the hospitalization revealed through the insurance company's
! 20 investigat ion did not involve his client. Attorney Hill also explains how he proves his clients identity in cour t after a claims match, Yeah, and I'm trying to explain the situation to the DA without incriminating my client for document fraud or identity theft or something, telling him there are two people using this name or this identity one of them is my client and one of th em is the father of this child I think they have databases they look at to see if there have been other insurance claims under that identity or that SSN and sometimes it will scoop up similar names. So in deposition they will ask you, have yo u ever worked under any other names?' And you tell the truth. And when they scoop up other names, sometimes things come up like: Were you ever in a car accident in Colorado in 1984?' You know, no' So that creates some confusion. Sometimes it will be cle ar that it's a different person because of the age, but sometimes it's not so clear. When there is a claims match sometimes the only way to prove the client's identity is through testimony. Similarly, state disability claims may be denied if earnings are s till coming in under an SS N after a claim is filed. As A ttorney Gomez put it: If Juan Doe took John Doe's name and social security number and Juan gets hurt and tries to collect state disability while John continues to work, the Employment Development De partment is going to have noticed that, hey this guy is still earning. You're not entitled to state disability if you are out earning wages for working because state disability is paid to you for not being able to work. So obviously would raise a red flag This is also the case for claims of disability under an invented number that another individual may be working simultaneously. Farm workers using identity loan are also susceptible to those who keep working their assumed ID. Denial of claims because of m atched identities is a pitfall of identity loan. According to the attorneys, California law is clear that legal status including the use of false or loaned SSNs does not invalidate an injured worker's claim to compensation. Questioning a person's immigrat ion status is inadmissible in worker's compensation court. Although the law is clear, attorneys reported that there are several other ways an unauthorized farmworker or identity borrower may not get benefits.
! 21 Attorneys stated that employers and insurance c ompanies often used claimants' immigration status to den y ancillary benefits such as disability and vocational rehabilitation as well as to retaliate by refusing to rehire them. Hiring unauthorized laborers is illegal under federal law in accordance to I RCA While employers likely know they are hiring unauthorized migrants at the moment of hire, attorneys reported that they often use their former employees' unauthorized status to their advantage once it is revealed in court. Unauthorized status prevents a person from receiving vocational rehabilitation or being rehired once the injury is healed. Attorney Alcott bluntly explains how employers can use federal law to their advantage : Because there is a federal law that makes it a crime to hire an undocumented So once the employer knows, and they put "knows" in quotes, because they already know that this person is undocumented, but once it's on paper, on record, that this person is undocumented then they are not going to rehire them because they would be viola ting federal law. So this gives them a lawful way to discriminate. Once the employer "knows" that the claimant is unauthorized t hey cannot legally rehire them because it would be an overt violation of the law. The farm contractors also have to avoid the l egal ramifications of hiring an unauthorized worker. According to California law, employers cannot discriminate against injured workers, workers with disabilities, or those who have filed workers' compensation claims. Attorney Alcott explained that under t he American Disab ilities Act an employee couldn't lose his or her job if they are injured and file a workers' compensation claim; the employer has to try to rehire them. But this law does not apply to the unauthorized because, again, under IRCA the employe r cannot legally rehire an unauthorized laborer. This is how employers avoid rehiring a healed and unauthorized worker and leads to the unauthorized migrants' superexploitation
! 22 In addition, five attorneys explained how insurance companies then use this ruse to avoid paying temporary disability benefits to workers. Workers' compensation includes both medical treatment and time limited monetary compensation for the worker's lost income during his rehabilitation. Because temporary disability benefits are b ased upon the premise of wage loss, insurance adjustors sometimes use unauthorized workers' legal ineligibility to work to deny tha t wage loss has occurred. As A ttorney Jordan put it: I have the issue come up with a person who's unable to work. The docto r says you can go back to modified work. And the company says: "oh yes, we have a light job' wa sh ing cars that the person can do. Oh sure." But then the company says, "we can't hire a person back because oops! -we just found out they're undocumented." Now if a person is offered a valid modified position and they decide they don't want to or can't do it, the insurance company can deny benefits. So if the company says we can't give you position because you're undocumented, the insurance company says we don't have to pay you. It has to be a "good faith offer" of modified work; if the employee can't do it, then it's not the company's fault In short, both employers and insurance companies use the pretext of their farm worker employee's newly discove red unauthorized status to stop compen sating them for their injuries. Knowingly hiring unauthorized workers is a serious offense. On the other hand the farm contractors are required follow the law and not hire unauthorized workers. This is an example of the co ntinuum of structural violence in farm work. Finally, two attorneys stated that employers use a similar logic to argue that workers merit reduced permanent disability payments. Permanent disability is a workers' compensation benefit available to those wo rkers who have reached maximum medical improvement yet are still disabled; the rate is calculated based on an employee's disability, age, occupation, and "future earning capacity." Some employers argue that
! 23 because workers are unauthorized, their legal ine ligibility for work diminishes their potential earnings in the future and therefore they should receive a reduced benefit. For example, one attorney recalled that one employer attempted to argue that his client who had been earning $15 17 an hour should r eceive the minimum permanent disability rate merely due to his unauthorized status. According to attorneys, employers also use unauthorized workers' "legal ineligibility for work" to shirk paying permanently disabled workers their due. Employer Intimidatio n Patterns Worker's compensation claims are often suppressed even before an injury happens. According to five attorneys, fear of the authorities and deportation is the largest contributor to claim suppression. Employers will use their employees' unauthoriz ed status to dissuade injured workers from even filing claims for worker's compensation. Subtle intimidation and misinformation sup presses claims. For example, A ttorney Morris reported that a contractor might hint at calling ICE if a worker asserts his rig hts. In other cases, attorneys reported that mayordomos explicitly misinformed injured workers that they were not eligible for benefit s because of their legal status Attorney Erickson explains farm contractor claim suppression tactics, They scare th em. Th ey say, I f you're undocumented, you can't get benefits. We're not even gonna rep ort it.' Or the supervisor says, D on't tell the doc you got hurt at work, tell them you got hurt at home.' And then if you do file a claim for workers' compensation, they' ll discredit it. They'll say it i s fraud because you weren't hurt on the job. Farm contractors use several different claim suppression tactics to stop their employees from filing workers' compensation claims. Attorney Jones reported that employers sometimes u se the threat of collateral damage that is, they threaten to fire a family
! 24 member to discourage claims. "If there are relatives working there they say, well if you report a claim then we are going to get rid of your uncle or brother. You know, both of you guys are going to lose your jobs, he said. Attorney Jones goes on to mention witnessing a person being black listed after filing a worker's compensation claim. In small farming towns, contractors sometimes share information about workers who filed claims ; if "Juan" filed a claim, then nobody will hire "Juan" again. Foremen may also suppress claims immediately after the injury. Three attorneys stated that clients reported that labor foremen attempted to avoid taking injured clients to a licensed doctor c ontracted with the company's insurance a necessary step in having the workers' injuries evaluated for medical benefit. The foremen instead offered minimal first aid and suggested visiting an informal "masseuse," or sobador(a) As A ttorney Hill put it: I h ave foremen that say: oh, you got hurt? I'm gonna take you to a s obadora They take a person in pain to get a massage and hands on treatment. And then the person can't file a claim because they didn't report it. And when it gets worse because the sobadora cracked a rib yes, I had that happen then the person and the foreman are really up the creek. And then they get the testimony that the foreman took the person to a sobadora, and he knew he was not supposed to. But getting the D istrict A ttorney to follow up on it is next to impossible. Similarly, Attorney Alcott said that labor intermediaries might suggest that the injured worker should take the day off and return the next day, but that the followi ng day, the farm contractor will fire the injured person ins tead. A ttorneys Erickson and King reported that some foremen offer immediate cash as an incentive to discourage the filing of claims. "And when [workers] get hurt [foremen] give them $500 and say, cuidate, adios'" ("Take car e of yourself, goodbye.") Att orney
! 25 Gomez reported that employers do sometimes pay in regular installments for a period of time, yet those payments would rarely compensate th e severity of the injury. As Attorney Gomez put it: "And then they stop paying. We have a gentleman lost an arm he can't use anymore and they stopped paying him." Again, labor supervisors use fear, misinformation, and pressure to stop injured workers from even seeking legal assistance to gain worker's compensation benefits. When claims are filed, farm foremen ofte n suppress them throu gh intimidation and threats. A ttorney Hill reported that supervisors tell workers to inform the doctor that they were in fact injured at home, and therefore would qualify for state disability insurance rather than workers' compensation insurance. "And then if you do file a claim for workers' compensation, they'll discredit it. They'll say it's fraud because you weren't hurt on the job, Attorney Hill exclaimed In fact, some attorneys reported that employers seize upon the possibility o f charging unauthorized workers with workers' compensation fraud, as fraud is a felony in California. Because unauthorized workers convicted of felonies are deported, the threat of being charged with workers' compensation fraud is particularly threatening. A ttorney Jordan for example, reported that the insurance company had used this threat to force a client to drop his claim. In the case at hand, the company suggested his client had committed fraud because he was filmed washing his car while he claimed he had injured his back at work. Rather than risk conviction of a felony, his client pled to a misdemeanor without probation, and relinquished his claim to workers' compensation benefits. Unauthorized workers are thus especially vulnerable to this legal mane uver to suppress workers' compensation claims.
! 26 !"#$%&'( )* ( DISCUSSION : CLAIMS DENIAL PART OF MIGRANT VULNERABILITY The only previous knowledge about "identity loan" practice only came from migrant workers and labor supervisors (Horton n.d.). Interviews wit h workers' compensation attorney show another perspective on the commonality of common identity loan. Unauthorized migrant farm workers most often invent or buy a number to work with. The attorneys' knowledge of their clients use of false documents to farm work confirm s Horton's identi ty loan typology. The interviews confirmed that identity loan creates a liminal economy in which both partners in identity loan benefit. Identity loan users are the most vulnerable among farmworkers because their workers' comp ensation benefits can be denied if there is a claims match, or the SSN continues to be worked after the claim is filed. Interviews with workers' compensation attorneys h elp reveal concrete ways in which employers use unauthorized workers' legal status to suppress claims and evade paying workers' compensation benefits. Farm contractors are hired as subcontractors by the farm owners to pick the crop. This insulates the farm owner from liability and paying in surance. The farm contractor is legally responsibl e, not the grower, to pay workers' compensation insurance. Suppressing workers' compensation claims benefits the contractor because it keeps the insurance rates low Remember that profit margins for farm owners and contractors are slim; they will use any a vailable strategy in order maintain a positive profit margin. Farm contractors are also vulnerable to the structural forces of the globalized agriculture market.
! 27 The attorneys' experiences shed light on the interaction between unauthorized migrant farm wo rkers and California's workers' compensation system. This is an example of how anthropology of "illegality" demonstrates how specific polices and institutions affect an individual's health. California's workers' compensation system both supports and denies unauthorized migrants rights to benefits. I will discuss how the described barriers to workers' compensation benefits interact with the theories of "illegality" and "superexploitation". The denial of clai ms reifies the identity loan user's structural vul nerability. First, t he attorney sample pool made it very clear that immigration status does not affect legal eligibility for workers' compensation coverage. The clients' unauthorized status is not a barrier to their workers' compensation benefits. Several attorneys stated that they inform their clients of this during the first meeting in order to ease the client's fear of being discovered by ICE and deported. Immigration status is inadmissible in court, unauthorized migrants cannot be denied insurance and workers' compensation benefits because they ar e in the US illegally. This is important when trying to prove the identity of a client who used false documents to work. Attorney s will not allow their clients to incriminate themselves with identity fraud in c ourt A s Attorney Gomez stated, We never let our clients testify that this is the case (using a false identity to work) when being interrogated by the opposing counsel we just stipulate off the record that the worker was working under X's name or Y's Soci al Security Card. We're not going to let them incriminate themselves. In this case a migrant farm worker' s "illegality" does not bar the farm worker from rece iving compensation or cause the farm worker to be deported after the court learns of the migrants unauthorized presence. However there are other ways a farmworker's "illegality" makes them ineligible for benefits. Unauthorized workers cannot receive
! 28 vocational rehabilitation or be rehired once they are healed directly because of thei r legal ineligibili ty to work. Attorney Gomez explained how the farm contract plays the system, What I've seen sometimes is that workers are hired illegally that is, the employer knows they're illegal and then when they're injured, the employers pla y the system. The employer says, W e can't offer a return to work because you're not entitled to work.' They try to gyp them out of their temporary disability. Prosecuting attorneys successfully use this circular argument ; every informant reported they have seen t his ploy defeat claims. Employers effectively hide behind IRCA which grants them a lawful way to discriminate against injured unauthorized migrants. "Superexploitation" is at work here because employers use the "illegality" of their employees to avoid rehiring them and paying benefits. Denial of rehiring is a way the legal system reifies their structural vulnerability. Employer suppression of workers' compensation claims is another way that unauthorized migrant' "illegality" leads to their "superexploitation". Workers' compensation claims are defeated before they are filed through employer misinformation. Mayordomos will tell their workers, "You're undocumented, you have no rights". Attorney Morris explained that some mayordomos would subtly threat en that if a claim is made, ICE might be coming around. Subtle intimidation and misinformation is a powerful tool to suppress claims and the assertion of farmworker rights. Creating an omnipresent threat of deportation is a way to subdue and control the migrant workforce. Emplo yer intimidation to suppress claims may help explain why Villarejo has found that unauthorized workers were less aware of the workers' compensation program and their eligibility for it (2010) This is an e xample of the symbolic violence facing unauthorized migrant farm workers. Effective suppression of claims because of employer
! 29 misinformation naturalizes the migrant farmworkers' lack of rights to health care access and workers' compensation. This work has demonstrated that employers deliberately use migra nts' "illegality" to maximize their extraction of labor value from the workers. Because suppression of claims lowers insurance premiums, farm contractors suppress claims for their economic benefits. The slim profit margins of farm work create an environmen t, which farm contractors will use any strategy to stay ahead, and this means actively suppressing workers' compensation claims. Misinformation is an effective tool to suppress claims, however, according to the attorneys; farmworker's knowledge of their r ights to workers' compensation benefits increasing. By the time an injured worker gets to the attorney he already know s he has the right to workers compensation. Injured farmworkers are showing agency by seeking legal help against the structural and symbo lic violence of claim suppression. Workers spend extended time in the US because of heightened border security ; they are no longer travelling back and forth seasonally. It is easy to keep in communication with relatives through cell phones and the I nternet So the captive populations of migrant workers are learning about their rights because they are in the US for extended periods. Attorney 4 specifically mentioned that he talks on the radio to inform farmworkers about their eligibility for the insurance A dvertisements for attorneys also help to dispel misinformation about workers' compensation right s Misinformation is becoming less effective tactic because of the Latino migrant farm worker population is becoming more educated about their worker's compensa tion rights.
! 30 Conclusion Latino farm workers' poor occupational health and the barriers they face to receiving workers' compensation demands national attention. This research has illuminate d the main barriers farmworkers engaged in identity loan and the ir attorneys must overcome to receive workers' compensation benefits: employer intimidation and misinformation, overcoming the "illegality" and awareness of their rights. Claimants are also denied benefits bec ause of their ma tching identities on paper, cha nce they can be charged with a felony for workers' compensation fraud and denial of ancillary benefits because of their "illegality". Officially, California law is sympathetic to a certain extent to unauthorized migrants who are injured on the job. Howeve r, employers are legally discriminating against injured unauthorized workers by hiding behind IRCA a nd not rehiring them. Attorneys confirmed that farm contractors use migrants' "illegality" to spread misinformation about their rights. Farm contractors are "superexploiting" the unauthorized migrant workforce by subtle intimidation and misinformation as well as avoiding rehire after injury. On a positive note, farmworkers are becoming more aware of their rights. However, the active suppression of claims and employer retaliation reifies the unauthorized migrant farmworker "superexploitation" and positional structural vulnerability. Injured farm workers seek benefits once they are severely injured or permanently disabled. It takes a severe injury for the margin alized farm workers to show agency and seek workers' compensation.
! 31 REFERENCES Ahonen, Emily Q., Fernando G. Benavides and Joan Benach #KKL!!!!F22.E(1-'!@,*>71'.,-+D!M,(G!1-8!B&17'% N O!=5+'&21'.:!?.'&(1'>(&! P&/.&0A!=:1-8.-1/.1-!Q,>(-17!,3!M,(GD!R-/.(,-2&'!S!B&17'%!JJT#UVWX ) "KYA! Azaroff, Lenore S., Charles Levenstein and David H. Wegman. #KK#!!!!Z::>*1'.,-17!F-[>(5!1-8!=>(/&.771-:&V!6,-:&*'>17!\.7'&(+!R]*71.-! 4-8&((&*,('.-EA!O2&(.:1-!Q,>(-17!,-!@>H7.:!B&17'%!W#TWUV"Y#" ) "Y#WA! Bourgois, Philippe and Jeff rey Schonberg #KKW!!!P.E%'&,>+!9,*&3.&-8A!^&(G&7&5V!4-./&(+.'5!,3!617.3,(-.1!@(&++A!! Brown, Marianne P., Alejandra Domenzain and Nelliana Villoria Siegert #KK#!!!_,.:&+!3(,2!'%&!;1(E.-+V!F22.E(1-'!M,(G&(+*1'.,-17! =13&'5!1-8!B&17'%!@(,E(12A!O::&++&8!\&H(>1(5!#` '% #K"Y! %''*Vaa000A7,+%A>:71A&8>a7,+%a(&+&1(:% ) *,7.:5a.22.E(1-' ) 0,(G&(+A%'27 ! Carroll, Daniel, Annie Georges and Russell Saltz #K""!!!!6%1-E.-E!6%1(1:'&(.+'.:+! ,3!4=!\1(2!M,(G&(+V!#"!C&1(+!,3!\.-8.-E+! 3(,2!'%&!I1'.,-17!OE(.:>7'>(17!M,(G&(+!=>(/&5A!@,0&(!@,.-'!*(&+&-'&8!1'!'%&! F22.E(1'.,-!P&3,(2!1-8!OE(.:>7'>(&!6,-3&(&-:&V!F2*7.:1'.,-+!3,(!\1(2&(+D! \1(2!M,(G&(+D!1-8!6,22>-.'.&+D!91/.+D!;15!"#A!!! De Genova, Nicho las 2002 Migrant "Illegality" and Deportability in Everyday Life. Annual Reviews of Anthropology 31:419 447. Ellenberger, James "WWW!!!$%&!^1''7&!Z/&(!M,(G&(+71'.,-!#K"KV!#K"K!6&-+>+!^(.&3+A!4A=A!9&*1('2&-'!,3! 6,22&(:&V!R:,-,2.:!1-8!='1'.+'.:+!O82.-.+'(1'.,-V!4A=A!='1'&8!6&-+>+! ^>(&1>A! Gleeson, Shannon 2009 From Rights to Claims: The Role of Civil Society in Making Rights Real for Vulnerable Workers. Law and Society Review 43(3):669 700. Heyman, Josiah 1998 State Effects on Labor Exploitation: The INS and Undocumented Immigrants at the Mexico United States Border. Critique of Anthropology 18(2):157 180.
! 32 #KKW!!!O!^,(8&(!$% 1'!9./.8&+A!O!^,(8&(!$%1'!Q,.-+A!O-'%(,*,7,E5!I,0!"TJUVLW ) `bA! #K"#!!!61*.'17.+2!1-8!4=!@,7.:5!1'!'%&!;&].:1-!^,(8&(A!9.17&:'.:17! O-'%(,*,7,E5!JXV#XJ ) #LLA! ! B.7E&('D!Q&33(&5!OA! !!!!!!!!!! #K"#!!!^>.78.-E!1!B>21-!P.E%'+!\(12&0,(G!3,(!M,(G&(+(-17!,3! F-8>+'(.17!;&8.:.-&!bbVbKX ) b"`A! ! B,3321-D!^&1'(.] ! !!!!!!!!! #KKX!!!! =52*1'%5!1-8!R]:7>+.,-V!O::&++!',!B&17'%!61(&!3,(!4-8,:>2&-'&8! F22.E(1-'+!.-!'%&!4-.'&8!='1'&+A! !" O!9&1'% P&',78V!Q&+.:1!=1-'.771-D!'%&! ^>-E7&8!$(1-+*71-'D!1-8!@ 1(18,]&+!.-!;&8.:17!6.'.c&-+%.*A d&.'%! M1.7,,D! Q>7.&! ?. /.-E+',-!1-8!@&'&(!e>1(-1::.1D!&8+A!@ *A!#JL ) #bYA!6%1*&7!B.77V! 4-./&(+.'5!,3!I,('%!61(,7.-1!@(&++A ! B,72&+D!=&'%! !!!!!!!!! #KKX!!!!O-!R'%-,E(1*%.: ='>85!,3!'%&!=,:.17!6,-'&]'!,3!;.E(1-'!B&17'%!.-!'%&! 4-.'&8!='1'&+A!@?,=!;&8.:.-&!JT"KUV&YY`A! #KKL!!!!fZ1]1:1-+!?.G&!',!M,(G!^&-'!Z/&(gV!$%&!I1'>(17.c1'.,-!,3!=>33&(.-E! 12,-E!^&((5!\1(2!M,(G&(+A!F-'&(-1'.,-17!;.E(1'.,-!YbTJUVJW ) XXA! #K""!!!!='(>:'>(17!_> 7-&(1H.7.'5!1-8!B.&(1(:%.&+!,3!R'%-.:.'5!1-8!6.'.c&-+%.*!,-! '%&!\1(2A!;&8.:17!O-'%(,*,7,E5V!6(,++!='>8.&+!.-!B&17'%!1-8!F77-&++A! JKTYUVY#b ) YYWA! #K"J!!!!\(&+%!\(>.'D!^(,G&-!^,8.&+A!^&(G&7&5V!4-./&(+.'5!,3!617.3,(-.1!@(&++A! ! B,(',-D!=1(1%! -A8A!!!!!!!F8&-' .'5!?,1-V!$%&!?&E17!@(,8>:'.,-!,3!4-1>'%,(.c&8!;.E(1-'!\1(2! M,(G&(+-:& ) 1H.7.'5gA!4-8&(!P&/.&0A! ! ;1('.-D!@%.7.*!?A! !!!!!!! "WWY!!!!e,,8!F-'&-'.,-+!e,-&!O0(5V!FP6O!1-8!4A=A!OE(.:>7'>(&A!O--17+!,3!'%&! O2&(.:1-!O:18&25!,3!@,7.'.:17!1-8!=,:.17!=:.&-:&! bJY!TYY ) bLUA!! Massey, Douglas S., Jorge Durand, and Nolan J. Malone 2002 Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. ;,H&8D!d&''5D!R77&-!^!e,78!1-8!;1(:!^A!=:%&-G&( !!!!!!! "WW#!!6(,++!6>7'>(17!;&8.:.-&!O!9&:18&!?1'&(V!Z::>*1'.,-17!B&17'%!@(,H7&2+! O2,-E!;.E(1-'!1-8!=&1+,-17!\1(2!M,(G&(+A!$%&!M&+'&(-!Q,>(-17!,3! ;&8.:.-&!"bLTJUVJXL ) JLJA! ! Z((&-.>+D!@.1!;AD!1-8!;18&7.-&!h1/,8-5 !!!!!!! #KKW!!!!9,!F22.E(1-'+!M,(G!.-!P.+G.&(!Q,H+i! 9&2,E(1*%5!YXTJUVbJb ) bb"A!
! 33 ! j>&+181D!Q12&+ !!!!!!! #K""!!!!I,!=,5!M&73(&(,V!4-8,:>2&-'&8!?1'.-,!?1H,(&(+!.-!'%&!6(,++%1.(+!,3! ?&E.'.21'.,-!;1-&>/&(+A!;&8.:17!O-'%(,*,7,E5V!6(,++ ) 6>7'>(17!='>8.&+!.-! B&17'%!1-8!F77-&++A!JKTYUVJ`X ) YK`A! ! j>&+181D!Q12&+D!?1>(. &!d1.-!B1('!1-8!@%.7.**&!^,>(E,.+ !!!!!! #K""!!!!!!='(>:'>(17!_>7-&(1H.7.'5!1-8!B&17'%V!?1'.-,!;.E(1-'!?1H,(&(+!.-!'%&! 4-.'&8!='1'&+A!;&8.:17!O-'%(,*,7,E5V!6(,++ ) 6>7'>(17!='>8.&+!.-!B&17'%!1-8! F77-&++A!JKTYUV JJW ) JX#A! ! j>.-71-D!;.:%1&7!1-8!671.(&!j>.-71! !! !!!!! "WWW!!!@(&:1(.,>+!R2*7,52&-'!1-8!M,(G&(+(-17!,3!?10!1-8!@+5:%.1'(5!##Tb ) XUVYW" ) b#KA! ! =:%&-G&(D!;1(G !!!!!!! "WWX!!!!@(&/&-'./&!;&8.:.-&!1-8!B&17'%!@(,2,'.,-!O(&!Z/&(8>&!.-!'%&! OE(.:>7'>(17!M,(G*71:&A!Q,>(-17!,3!@>H7.:! B&17'%!@,7.:5!"LTJUV#Lb ) JKbA! !!!!!!! #K"K!!!!O!e7,H17!@&(+*&:'./&!,-!;.E(1'.,-!1-8!Z::>*1'.,-17!B&17'%A!O2&(.:1-! Q,>(-17!,3!F-8>+'(.17!;&8.:.-&!bJV!" ) WA! ! =:%&(c&(D!$&(&+1D!P&.-&(!PE>.7&+!1-8!I.G71+!d(1>+& #KKb!!!!M,(G ) (&71'&8!@1.-!1-8!F-[>(5!1-8!^1((.&(+! ',!M,(G&(+(-17!,3!@>H7.:!B&17'%! WbTJUVY`J ) Y``A! ! =2.'%D!QA9A!P&H&::1 #K"#!!!!F22.E(1-'!M,(G&(+!1-8!M,(G&(<+!6,2*&-+1'.,-V!$%&!I&&8!3,(!P&3,(2A! O2&(.:1-!Q,>(-17!,3!F-8>+'(.17!;&8.:.-&!bbVbJL ) bYYA!! ! 4=!^>(&1>!,3!?1H,(!='1'.+'.:+! #K"#!!!!R:,-,2.:!I&0+!P&7&1+&V!6&-+>+!,3!\1'17!Z::>*1'.,-17!F-[>(.&+!=>221(5D! #K"#A!O::&++&8!Z-7.-&!O>E>+'!#"D!#K"#A! %''*Vaa000AH7+AE,/a-&0+A(&7&1+&a:3,.A-(KA%'2 #K"J!!!!Z::>*1'.,-17!R2*7,52&-'!1-8!M1E&+D!;15!#K"#V!Yb ) #KW#!\ 1(20,(G&(+! 1-8!?1H,(&(+D!6(,*D!I>(+&(5!1-8!e(&&-%,>+&A!O::&++&8!Z-7.-&!O>E>+'!#"D! #K"#! %''*Vaa000AH7+AE,/a,&+a:>((&-'a,&+Yb#KW#A%'2k+' !!!!! ! 4=!B,>+&!6,22.''&&!,-!R8>:1'.,-!1-8!?1H,( #KK`!!!B.88&-!$(1E&85V!4-8&((&*,('.-E!,3!M,(G*71:&!F-[>(.&+!1-8!F77-&++&+ A! ;1[,(.'5!='133!P&*,('A!M1+%.-E',-!9A6AV!4=!B,>+&!,3!P&*(&+&-'1'./&+A! ! _.771(&[,D!9,! #KKJ!!!!$%&!B&17'%!,3!4A=A!B.(&8!\1(2!M,(G&(+A!O-->17!P&/.&0!,3!@>H7.:!B&17'%! #YV"Lb ) "WJA!
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