An examination of Khrushchev and Brezhnev's relationship with the KGB

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An examination of Khrushchev and Brezhnev's relationship with the KGB
Born, Gerilyn A
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Denver, CO
University of Colorado Denver
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vi, 157 leaves : ; 29 cm


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Politics and government -- Soviet Union -- 1953-1985 ( lcsh )
bibliography ( marcgt )
theses ( marcgt )
non-fiction ( marcgt )


Includes bibliographical references (leaves 145-157).
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree, Master of Arts, Department of Political Science
Statement of Responsibility:
by Gerilyn A. Born.

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University of Colorado Denver
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22874146 ( OCLC )
LD1190.L64 1990 .B675 ( lcc )


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AN EXAMINATION OF KHRUSHCHEV AND BREZHNEV'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE KGB by Gerilyn A. Born B.A., University of Colorado, 1988 A thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Colorado in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Department of Political Science 1990


This thesis for the Master of Arts degree by Gerilyn A. Born has been approved for the Department of Political Science by Dr. ephen Thomas Date


Born, Gerilyn A. (M.A., Political Science) An Examination of Khrushchev and Brezhnev's Relationship with the KGB Thesis directed by Professor Joel c. Edelstein The security apparatus of the Soviet Union has been one of the most closely secrets of the USSR. Western experts have done little to delve into the relationship of the organization to the Soviet leaders after Stalin. The relationship of both Khrushchev and Brezhnev to the KGB was impacted by the political environment of the time as well as their respective personal leadership styles. Each incorporated broad changes in the KGB politically, organizationally, and legally. In certain respects Khrushchev and Brezhnev had similar relationships to the KGB. Both recognized the importance of the KGB for maintaining stability in the domestic realm. Also, both tried to establish a positive working relationship with the organization by placing their own political allies in the organization for support. They also had notable differences in dealing with the KGB. Khrushchev was in power in a period during which massive reforms were necessary in the security apparatus; by carrying out these reforms he alienated


the organization. On the other hand, Brezhnev entered during a period of complete instability. In order to utilize the KGB to control this instability, he had to redelegate back to the KGB some authority which had been taken away under Khrushchev. The evidence supports the notion that the KGB did have a significant relationship with both Khrushchev and Brezhnev. This relationship between these two leaders and the KGB was important because it had a substantive impact. on the policies and political agenda of the Soviet government during their reign. The form and content of this abstract are approved. I recommend its publication. iv


CONTENTS CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION ................................. 1 CHAPTER 2. HISTORY OF THE RUSSIAN SECURITY SERVICES ....... 6 1563-1917 ...................................... 6 The Security Service under Lenin and Stalin ... 9 Khrushchev's Ascendance to Power ....... 21 Notes .......................................... 2 3 CHAPTER 3. POLITICAL INFLUENCE ....................... 24 De-Stalinization ............................... 24 Building Support in the KGB ................ 28 Notes ........................... 38 CHAPTER 4. ORGANIZATION ................................. 3 9 The Security Service Under Khrushchev's Tenure.39 Notes .......................................... 43 CHAPTER 5 LEGALITY ....................... 4 4 Reforms ......... 4 4 Increased Power for the KGB .............. 48 CHAPTER 6. KHRUSHCHEV'S DOWNFALL ........................ 51 Notes ............................... 59 CHAPTER 7. BREZHNEV'S ACQUISITION OF POWER .............. 60 curtailment of Opposition ....... 62 Andropovs Appointment ............. 64 Notes ...................... 68


CHAPTER 8. POLITICAL INFLUENCE ........................ 69 Installation of the Dnepropetrovosk Mafia ..... 69 Expansion of Brezhnev's Personal Power Position ....................................... 78 Courtship of the KGB .............. 81 Increased Status of the KGB under Brezhnev .. 87 The Ascendance of KGB Personnel .......... aa Notes .................................... 99 CHAPTER 9. ORGANIZATION ......................... 100 Organizational Growth ......................... 100 Expansion of Operations ....................... 102 CHAPTER 10. LEGALITY ....................................... 109 Dissent ....................................... 111 112 The Official Party Line Explanation ........ ll3 Practical/Functional Implications ......... 116 ......................................... 119 CHAPTER 11. ANDROPOV Is RISE ........... 12 0 Notes .......... 13 0 CHAPTER 12. CONCLUSION .................................... 131 APPENDIX: Milestones in the KGB's Ascendance ......... 139 BIBLIOGRA.PHY .................................... 14 5 Books 14 5 PeriodicalsjJournals .................. 151 Newspapers ........................ 154 Government Documents ...................... 156


Interview ......................... 157 vi


CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION There has been a great deal of scholarly attention and analysis devoted to understanding the political leadership of the Soviet Union. Western experts have had a difficult time trying to determine how the political system works and exactly which institutions are involved. Much of the scholarly debate has been focused on the role of Soviet institutions in the political process and on the question of how Soviet leaders get access to power and authority. One faction that plays a role in the Soviet leadership and government is the security service. The security apparatus of the Soviet Union Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (Committee for Security), or as it is more commonly known the KGB, has always been an enigma to Western authorities. Historically it has been difficult to determine the KGB's exact relationship with the Soviet leaders. The KGB has been involved in numerous power struggles mainly because it is the single organization that has enough information to be destructive to the party leadership. No doubt, a


great deal has changed since the days of Stalin and his use of terror, but one thing has remained the same, the KGB has continued to this day to have a strong association with the soviet leaders. To get an idea of the KGB's function in Soviet politics this thesis will examine the relationship between the KGB and two specific leaders, Khrushchev and Brezhnev. In order to understand the role the KGB played in the political process, this thesis will make a comparison of Khrushchev and Brezhnev and their relationship to the KGB. It will also examine how these regimes integrated the security apparatus into the political system and at the same time used this organization for government operations as well as political support. To demonstrate how the KGB was utilized by these two leaders, we must examine Khrushchev's employment of the security apparatus and the changes Brezhnev instituted in the service he inherited. In some ways their relationship with the KGB was similar (i.e., building factional support in the organization) and in other ways different (i.e., the importance of the organization in party politics). Yet, each had a relationship with the organization that was 1) characteristic of his personality and 2) influenced by the period he 2


was living in. Although it is not possible to know completely all of the events that occurred and who the major players were, I will use the available historical evidence to support my hypothesis that Khrushchev and Brezhnev had varying relationships in employing the KGB for political as well as governmental operations. Further, in examining the relationship I will focus on three aspects: 1) political influence, 2) organizational changes, and 3) legal aspects, with the primary focus on the first. The KGB has almost always been noted as an important element of the Kremlin, but rarely has it been examined in a political environment. There have been historical accounts of the earlier policing organizations -the Cheka, OGPU, and NKVD and their role in supporting factional power. Yet, to this day few authors have given attention to the KGB's role in this function. Unfortunately, the Western world has devoted very little energy and effort to examining the role of the KGB as an internal political structure that has an influential role in Kremlin politics. Characteristically, most of the scholarly w0rk done on the KGB has been aimed at the organization's 3


external role of foreign espionage. The few documents that do examine the internal role rarely delve into the KGB's function as an internal actor, viewing the KGB as an agency controlled by the CPSU, with little influence on the party.(See Freemantle, 1982, or Conquest, 1974) One reason for the lack of attention to the internal functions of the KGB in Kremlin leadership policies is the limited data available on Soviet leadership conflicts and the activities of the KGB. I will combine the available sources that discuss the KGB's role internally with scholarly works concerning the political struggles in the USSR. Numerous specific and detailed examples of KGB operations, including both successes and failures, are well documented in books and articles produced concerning this time period. Paramount among these are John Barron's The KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents and subsequent articles which he has written on the subject. Robert Conquest has written numerous commentaries on the Soviet political system and the security structure, but with little emphasis on the relationship of the two. Amy Knight, another wellknown KGB scholar, has published important works on the security apparatus. Her recent detailed book, 4


KGB: Police and Politics in the Soviet Union analyzes the KGB as a source of factional power for the CPSU. She does an outstanding job in focusing on the KGB's internal role, but still falls short of examining the role the KGB has in the political infrastructure. Jeremy Azrael's RAND study: The KGB in Kremlin Politics is particularly thought provoking on Khrushchev and Brezhnev's relationship with the KGB; unfortunately it isn't very thorough. This thesis will also include Western and Soviet journals, newspapers, and texts. In addition to these sources there are a few Soviet emigres that have published valuable information concerning the KGB internally (e.g., Anatoli Granovsky and Ilya Dzhirkvelov). In summary, this thesis will analyze the KGB as a political factor in the Soviet leadership and political system. The most significant assets of the KGB are the combination of domestic security and foreign espionage. KGB cadres have also played important and sometimes decisive roles in the allocation of power and authority in the Kremlin. By examining the different approaches Khrushchev and Brezhnev had for dealing with the KGB we will be able .to see the role that the security apparatus had in their leadership of the Soviet Union. 5


CHAPTER 2 HISTORY OF THE RUSSIAN SECURITY SERVICES In order to understand Khrushchev and Brezhnev's relationship with the KGB, it is essential that we examine the security organizations that existed previously. The security police has a long tradition. in Russian and Soviet history. They have been nume.rous and they have changed according to the ruling personality of the time. We should examine the historical background of the security organiztions that existed previous to Khrushchev and Brezhnevs tenure in order to understand their relationship to the KGB. 1563-1917 Political police in Russian history can be traced to the creation of the Oprichnina by Tsar Ivan IV ("The Terrible") in 1563 in Russia. Like its founder, this organization acquired the reputation for its unprecedented terror and brutality.[!] The Oprichnina operated largely independently and unchecked. It also "murdered individuals, as well as whole classes and the inhabitants of provinces on a scale not to be outdone before the autocracies of


Lenin and stalin."(Fitzgibbon, 1977: 34) With the death of Ivan, the Oprichnina was abolished in 1572 and for the next 125 years a political police organization did not exist. Peter the Great established in 1697 the Preobrazhensky Office which was authorized to investigate political subversion, along with the aid of the fiscals. [The fiscals were originally designed to be tax collectors and control financial abuses.] This structure was abolished in 1729, and in 17"31 Empress Anne established the Chancellery for Secret Investigations. Anne's successor, Peter the Third, abolished this in 1762 and created what was known as the Secret Bureau. In addition this was succeeded by the regular police under Alexander I; the regular police were divided into two sections to accomplish their task. (Richelson, 1986: 1-4) Alexander's successor, Emperor Nicholas I, set up the Third Section. However, this section concentrated in the larger Russian cities, which didn't allow for it to be extremely effective. This section also included a large service of foreign agents. Nicholas's successor, Alexander II, abolished the section in 1880. He created the final secret police and espionage service during the Tsarist era, 7


the Okhrana (1880-1894). This service was responsible for monitoring and neutralizing dangerous revolutionaries inside, as well as outside, Russia. Included in this responsibility was the surveillance of conspirators abroad, the organization and conduct of foreign espionage, the issue and control of passports, the maintenance of cultural isolation (during a period when industrialization and the import of technology were paramount issues in Russian attempts to survive in a rapidly modernizing world) as well as the provision of personal security for the political "bosses." on paper, the Okhrana was a special segment of the police department, but subordinate to the Interior Ministry. In fact, however, the Okharana exercised extensive control over the Tsars subjects, deriving power from its status as a secret organization and possessing such unchecked rights as entry without warrant, .surveillance of anyone with or without cause, summary deportation to Siberia, and the right to impose the death penalty administratively or without trial in cases which were deemed important. Peter Deriabin in Watchdogs of Terror states that "by the time of its extinction with the abdication of Nicholas II, the Okhrana had 8


become a law unto itself."(Deriabin, 1972: 133) Indeed the use of terror was not a totally unfamiliar aspect of Russian life. The Security Service under Lenin and Stalin Following the Bolshevik Revolution, the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution, Speculation and Sabotage (Cheka) was created on 20 December 1917 as the Communist \ Party's secret political police by the Council of People's Commissars. As the lineal descendant of the Tsarist Okhrana, "the Bolshevik Cheka recruited skilled personnel from the middle levels of the Okhrana under the leadership of an austere and merciless man from an aristocratic Polish family, Feliks Edmundovich Dzerzhinsky."(Osnos, 1980: A1) Under the protocol that directed its establishment, Cheka's task was to conduct preliminary investigations, apprehend saboteurs and counter-revolutionaries, and present such criminals for trial by revolutionary tribunals. The Cheka quickly moved beyond its original charter and operated in the name of protection for the new Bolshevik regime. Within months after its initiation, this new action arm of the party asserted 9


its independence by executing without trials, and by the end of 1918 it was directed to deal swiftly and harshly with any and all opposition.(Freemantle, 1982: 22) These brutal actions have often been referred to as the Red Terror. Its ranks quickly grew and its unchallenged purview rapidly expanded into both the domestic and international Communist Party; emphasis was placed on internal operations, although the external aspects of the trade were not overlooked. By November of 1918, "a Chekist leader named Moroz boasted, 'There is not a sphere of our life where the Cheka does not have its eagle eye.'"(Barron, 1974: 339) By the early 1920's, a foreign department was established to collect intelligence abroad and to harass, discredit, and demoralize anti-communist emigres. The situation remained static through the completion of the Russian civil war; however, with the conclusion of the Communists' consolidation of power, Lenin perceived the need to alter the image of his state security apparatus. On 6 February 1922 a decree abolished the Cheka in lieu of the State Political Directorate (GPU), subordinated to the People' Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD). It appeared on first glance that this was only a minor 10


cosmetic change, but in fact this change was significant in that it marked the first of several attempts to establish an air of legality about the work of the security services. The GPU could no longer officially sentence subjects on its own accord; this function became the purview of the regular constituted courts. Thus, police terrorism temporarily became the exception rather than the rule. The GPU did, however, retain all of its investigative powers as well as the administrative authority to exile people for up to three years. Even though a legal system existed to safeguard the rights of citizens, there was little evidence that it provided more than a cloak of legitimacy. Western analysts have never been able to understand these alterations because of the closed nature of Soviet society. It is difficult to discern what is reality or merely cosmetic in change. [One example is when Lenin abolished the Cheka and created the State Political Directorate (GPU) of the People's Commissariat of the Interior in a move designed to emphasize the importance of preserving a greater measure of legality in political police operations.] Another example occurred in July of 1923, with the adoption of the Constitution of the USSR, the status 11


of the security service was increased as it officially became a regular office of the State Vice and Extraordinary Commission.(Conquest, 1968: 16) Four months thereafter, the service underwent a subsequent alteration in title and emerged as the Unified State Political Directorate (OGPU); a change that occurred in conjunction with the adoption of a new name for the country as a whole --the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). These alterations provided an air of legality and constitutional standing but: .. the transformation of the Cheka into the GPU, and then into the OGPU, left many aspects of political police work unchanged. The organization not only retained Dzerzhinsky as its titular head, but also kept substantially the same personnel, while continuing to operate from its old headquarters in the Lubyanka.(Hingley, 1970: 135) What had changed, at least temporarily, was the service's method of operation and its official standing. The significance of these changes rests not in the events, but rather in the manipulation of the service by the ruling personalities within the party for political as well as personal ends. The security structure has been a vital source of support for the CPSU as well as Soviet government. Historical accounts of the Soviet leadership have proven that the political police were needed to 12


carry out governmental policies along with being used for personal advances at times. This precedent had been established in these earlier iterations of the state security system. The real motivation behind future alterations would generally be more and far reaching. The GPU was succeeded a year later by the Unified state Political Directorate (OGPU), detached from the NKVD, when the Soviet Republics were federated to form the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). This period from 1922 to 1928 was marked by Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP) as well as a respite from the horrors of world and civil war, expansion of legal controls, and a draw-back in the terror of the Chekists; but beneath this era little had really changed; the focus of terror had merely shifted. In place of execution, confinement in prison camps became the established practice. The OGPU had embarked on the of formalizing the repressive functions of the Cheka, systematically expanding its informant networks into all realms of society.(Barron, 1974: 339-40) Lenin's death in 1924 marked the rise of Stalin. During the four years after Lenin's death, investigations and arrests were unquestionably less 13


than during the Red Terror but, nonetheless, numerous enough so that the population remained aware of the presence and influence of the security forces. By 1928, however, the purview of the state security apparatus was once again expanding rapidly. With the declaration of the First Five Year began to rise and terror matching that of the Cheka became the order of the day throughout the dispossession and collectivization process. Stalin was determined to achieve the goals set forth by the State, while simultaneously destroying the one remaining potential center of organized opposition to his dictatorship (the peasantry). In the process, extensive investigations and arrests by the secret police became commonplace until after 1950. The Kulak's (peasant farmers who owned land and employed others) farms were taken over and any possession the peasants had were confiscated. Resisters were shot or sent off to camps under the supervision of the police.(Corson and Crowley, 1986: 287) Stalin turned the police against the Kulak class because he felt they were sabotaging his plans for the State. Amy Knight addresses the point that because Lenin failed to establish legitimate control over the police they became a tool that could be used 14


at the discretion of the Kremlin leaders. (Knight, 1988: 306) Therefore they could be manipulated for personal power and used arbitrarily, which Stalin was guilty of doing in many cases. The next major event for Soviet internal security occurred on 10 July 1934 when Stalin converted the OGPU to the Chief Directorate for State Security (GUGB) and once again made it part of the NKVD under the leadership of Genrikh Grigorevich Yagoda. This reorganization of the state security apparatus was an important milestone in Stalin's drive for personal power. On the surface it appeared that the OGPU had merely been converted into a department of the NKVD, but in reality: ... the new "Administration of State Security" thereby took into its grip the whole administrative area of the People's Commissariat. The NKVD, dominated by the security police, was now in charge of the militia, frontier control, and all armed forces which were not directly part of the army and the fleet, and also of the forced labor camps and prisons, and all the fire brigades. The inter-Soviet pass system, introduced in 1932, guaranteed the complete control of the whole population. The security organs were now more powerful than ever. (Levytsky, 1972: 75) Under Yagoda, as was to be expected from the first chief of the Gulag, the labor camps took on a special role; the greatest purges in the history of 15


the USSR were initiated and the strongest potential roadblock to Stalin's progress toward single rule became a target of the security system. Less than five months after the reorganization, the Soviet world was stunned by the assassination of Sergey Moronovich Kirov, one of Stalin's closest collaborators and an original organizer of the Bolshevik movement in the Northern Caucasuses and Trans-caucasia. Reports vary regarding the exact involvement of the security service in this incident. There appears to be little doubt, however, that it probably could not have been accomplished without some degree of NKVD knowledge or, at least, benign neglect.(Barron, 1974: 123) Whether stalin or Yagoda directly issued the order or they were aware of the exact nature of the plot remains unanswered. In any case, Kirov's demise preceded a further expansion for the powers of the state security apparatus. Soon after it expanded its horizons against "the enemies of the party within the party" based on "the theory that all Stalin's opponents were enemies of the State and traitors."(Levytsky, 1972: 91) Under Stalin's directive massive arrests were initiated by the political police. 16


Yagoda's success soon proved to be his own undoing and in September of 1936 he fell victim to his own brand of terror. He was succeeded by Nikolay Yezhov who became Stalin's next pawn and architect of the Yezhovshchina, the bloodiest chapter in pre-war Soviet history. Under his rule, terror became institionalized. Like his predecessor, his efficiency led to his downfall and Stalin fired him in the winter of 1938 because he knew the most about the worst of the purges. He was eventually shot in the Lubyanka cellar where Yagoda also perished. (Corson and Crowley, 1986: 174) The next stage of the Soviet state security system is identified with Lavrenti Pavlovich Beria who Yezhov's Deputy on 20 July 1936. Later Beria succeeded Yagoda as chief of the NKVD in November of 1938. Beria's charter from Stalin was to transform "the terror machine into a modern apparatus of state security." With Stalin's consent, he initiated a relaxation of the Reign of Terror and installed a program of reform within the NKVD, while conducting a discreet liquidation campaign against Yezhov's loyalists. At the same time, he initiated a reorganization of the Gulag to use prison labor more 17


rationally in the execution of the State's economic plans.(Levytsky, 1972: 130) Under Stalin's orders, on 3 February 1941 the People's Commissariat for State Security (NKGB) became an independent ministry equal to the NKVD. Vsevolod Merkulov, one of Beria's most trusted collaborators and former deputy, became the head of the NKGB. Beria continued to be Stalin's advisor on security as well as head of the NKVD. In reality, Merkulov was de facto placed under Beria on all matters affecting security. During the next five years, these organizations would once again reunite and split while Beria would continue to remain a prominent figure, but eventually he too would be put in a position outside of the security service. In March of 1946 the NKGB and NKVD were renamed ministries, becoming the Ministry of State Security (MGB) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) Simultaneously, Beria was elevated to full Politburo membership and Sergei Nikiforovich Kruglov replaced him as the head of the MVD. Shortly thereafter Merkulov lost his position as chief of the MGB to Vikto Smonovich Abakumov, Krulov's previous superior as the overall head of Smersh.[2] In 1947, the Politburo established the Committee of Information 18


(KI) through absorption of all of the foreign sections of the MGB, some of the units of the ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Military Intelligence Service (GRU). The KI, which answered directly to stalin, was headed by Vyacheslar M. Molotov. The initiation of the Cold War brought external operations to the forefront as the emphasis of the state security apparatus. Control of the clandestine operations abroad reverted back to the MGB in 1951 however, when Beria managed to convince Stalin that Abakumov had been suppressing evidence. Abakumov was arrested and replaced by Semen Denisovich Ignatiev, the KI was abolished, and Beria was once again orchestrating events. Ignatiev remained in charge of the MGB until stalin's death.(Freemantle, 1982: 28-29) The security service has been a familiar aspect of Russian history. Generally, the changes made were only in the name of the organization with the functions remaining very similar. These organizations operated with a wide range of unchecked authority up through Lenin's leadership. The security organization was an important element to Lenin in the early years of his struggle to maintain power. During the Stalin era, the security 19


organization under went a dramatic role change. For the first time, the security organization was internally focused against members of the CPSU and Stalin's political adversaries. In addition, the security organization incorporated the unsystematic use of terror and operated with less checks over its power than ever before. Khrushchev's Ascendance to Power In the void that existed immediately following Stalin's death a significant amount of political maneuvering had taken place. Not surprisingly, Lavrenti Beria, who had been a pervasive force in the secret police for the past fifteen years, was prominent among the main actors in this drama. In the move to consolidate and reinforce his position, Beria removed Ignatiev, merged the MVD and the MGB, assumed charge of the reconstructed service and swiftly asserted his influence and power within the party.(Hingley, 1970: 219-20) Stalin had employed the KGB to its fullest extent; he even surpassed its original function by using it against other party members. He had drawn the political police into numerous factional party disputes that ended up in 21


terror. Therefore, members of the regime became politically vulnerable to the leadership and the use of the security apparatus. After Stalin's death it was important that members of the party prevail. Simultaneous reshuffling of the key party positions concluded with Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev and Georgii M. Malenkov emerging as secretary of the Party Central Committee and Chairman of the Council of Ministers respectively; a Presidium two-fifths its previous size emerged with Beria remaining a member. Eager to disassociate itself from the terrorism of the purges under Stalin, the new leadership publicly stressed the need for Socialist legality rather than the arbitrary police rule which had become so prevalent. The most dramatic symbol of this relaxation was admission that the so-called Doctor's Plot on 4 April 1953 had been fabricated.[3] Khrushchev, Malenkov, and Molotov arrested and removed Beria from power. His dismissal was made public on 10 July 1953 when he was accused of being an agent of the Imperialist secret services, of putting the security forces above the State and Communist Party, and of on the principles of Socialist legality. "Not only [was Beria] an instigator of partisan activity on the part of the 22


police but [he was] also a victim."(Azrael, 1989: 3) He was killed in December of 1953. The new leadership was intent on eliminating the threat which had hung over them since 1934, by insuring that in the future the security machinery would be sufficiently disarmed of its power and authority.(Hingley, 1970: 220-22) Notes 1. This use of terror was characteristic of this period as a means of coercion against the populace. Often it was employed randomly on specific groups of people without legitimized formal procedures. It is important to recognize that the use of terror was part of the Russian experience over a sustained period of time. A nearly continuous reliance on terror andjor coercion as important aspects of the security service can be traced from the service's early origins to the days of Stalin, designed to insure the continuity of the ruling regime. There were variations in the degree and intensity of this force, from relatively tempered usage during the Tsarist era, to extra-legal expansion during the Bolshevik tenure, to total and unbounded utilization during the Stalinist era. 2. Stands for Smert Shpionam or military counterintelligence. Beria created the organization and it operated from April 1942 to March 1946. One function of SMERSH was to collect Soviet citizens that .had lived under German occupation or were deemed sympathetic to the German cause; as a result, most were executed.(Corson and Crowley, 1986: 204) 3. Stalin accused nine physicians of murder, which became known as the infamous Doctor's Plot. Largely the Doctor's Plot was seen as Stalin's way of instituting a government sponsored anti-Semitic campaign.(Corson and Crowley, 1986: 240) 23


CHAPTER 3 POLITICAL INFLUENCE The development and evolution of the state security apparatus into its present form has involved numerous changes. Still, all Soviet leaders, Khrushchev included, have always built their own factional support within the security apparatus. Although the totalitarian model is based on an assumption that all CPSU members are under the control of the general secretary, the Soviet Union, like most governments, also has competing factions and coalitions. Therefore, it only stands to reason that Khrushchev would bring in his own people and attempt to establish a good working relationship with the KGB. De-stalinization An important element of Khrushchevs relationship with the security apparatus was to legitimize the KGB1s role and increase its prestige. Khrushchev never went so far as to blame the entire KGa for the past abuses of power; mainly he condemned Beria and Stalin. The focus was mainly against specific individuals. This allowed Khrushchev to use


his campaign against his own enemies as well as settle political scores.(Knight, 1988: 57) However, Khrushchev did not make rapid personnel changes in the security structure, as one might expect. Instead Khrushchev periodically installed party into the security apparatus.(Knight, 1988: 152) These maneuvers were important from Khrushchev's perspective in controlling the security structure. One primary example was Ivan Serovs appointment to be head of the security apparatus. Serov was a former member of the armed forces of the NKVD, a former Minister of Internal Affairs in the Ukraine, as well as a member of the Ukrainian Politburo and protege of Khrushchev. He was chosen to head the KGB because of his operational orientation and his proven organizational capabilities. Khrushchev and Serov had been closely associated for years; Khrushchev trusted Serov as a political ally and a personal friend.(Talbott, 1970: 115-6) Moreover, Serov was an important pillar to Khrushchev's power. He assisted in the arrest of Beria and Khrushchev relied on his assistance in dealing with other opposition forces.(Azrael, 1989: v) In addition, Serov helped Khrushchev remove 25


Marshal Zhukov from the Presidium, who could have been a potential threat to Khrushchev's power. Yet, Khrushchev did not place all of his support in Serov because he probably feared this could lead to his own destruction. Khrushchev insisted on placing members of his own loyalty to counter-act some of the initiatives Serov had installed for the secret police.(Azrael, 1989: 5) [1] In June of 1957, a majority of the Presidium, led by Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich tried to remove Khrushchev from power, but with the help of Serov and the security apparatus, he was able to overcome his opposition.(Azrael, 1989: 7) Serov headed the collection of evidence that implicated Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich in Beria's and Stalin's crimes. Thus, Serov mobilized the KGB against them, while the majority of the Presidium had supported these men and not Khrushchev. Khrushchev admitted that using the KGB during this crisis was one of the charges he was accused of by his opponents. Khrushchev used the KGB's background information against his opponents, particularly at a time when it was crucial to his retention of power. Party members were aware of this and had also expressed suspicions of being bugged by the KGB. 26


Khrushchev was even quoted as saying "the Stalinists wanted to remove Serov and get their hands on his job ... so that they could destroy.the [secret police] archives that are thereto condemn them."(Micunovic, 1980: 274) Western scholars have gone to great lengths to depict the important role the armed forces played in supporting Khrushchev in the June crisis, but rarely if at all is the KGB's role mentioned. Pethybridge states that the KGB "hardly counted in the political balance," let alone in the balance of "frontline" forces. (Pethybridge, 1967: 89) However, valuable inside accounts provide a different perspective, referring to the KGB as an extremely valuable instrument that Khrushchev used to outmaneuver his opponents. Roy and Zhores Medvedev support this notion that the KGB played a vital role in Khrushchev's retention of power. Stating, who demanded that the Central Committee, rather than the opposition-dominated party Presidium decided Khrushchev's fate and who warned that any unilateral decision by the Presidium would be negated.(Medvedev and Medvedev, 1976: 118-119) Various other insiders have supported this.[2] Due to the fact that Serov 27


assisted Khrushchev in removing his major opposition, he too eventually became expendable. Events remained static up through the end of 1958 when Khrushchev decided to break the final tie with his predecessors. Serov, who had served under Stalin and had been involved in the purges of the 1930's had done his job well for Khrushchev. Unexpectedly, on 9 December 1958, Khrushchev replaced Serov, with Aleksandr Nikolayevich Shelepin to be the new KGB director. Serov was assigned the head of the Chief Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense (GRU), following the discovery of its penetration by the West. Shelepin was not a KGB professional, but instead a devoted party member, not to mention, devoted to Khrushchev for appointing him. Apparently, Khrushchev felt a leader with more political finesse, not organizational capabilities, was necessary for the position. He was from the younger generation who was free from the encumbrances of the Stalinist era. Building support in the KGB Is Khrushchev's case unique that he placed in his own trusted people after denouncing the previous partisan alignment of the security apparatus? 28


Definitely not, it is still important in the Soviet political system that the leaders establish allies among the party apparatchik. Although the Soviet political system is not a bipartisan government like the u.s., members in the CPSU still build coalitions, much like our own senators or representatives do. In many ways the Soviet government is similar to other country's governments. Khrushchev's political maneuvering exemplified one of the party's tightest controls over the security service. Amy Knight addresses the issue that Serov was uprooted from his position because he was a barrier to Khrushchev's efforts for legitimizing the KGB.(Knight, 1988: 54) The stigma of past ties to the security organization under Stalin created partisanship against Khrushchev. Serov's past could have presented a barrier to Khrushchev's efforts for bringing the security organization under tighter party control. Not only did Shelepin's appointment increase party involvement in the security police, it also brought increased legitimacy and efficiency to the security organization. As a result of the party placing one of their own cadre to head the organization, they had more of an oversight role over the KGB's operations 29


and more importantly, this offered more legitimacy to the KGB organization. However, I disagree with Knight's premise that Serov was removed because of his past affiliations, based on the fact that Khrushchev and Serov had been very close and Serov's role in the past had very little negative impact on his initial appointment. The evidence is more supportive of the notion that Khrushchev was responding to outside political pressures. His relationship with Serov had been a well publicized and controversial event.(Knight, 1988: 54-55) Azrael believes Khrushchev was involved in a tradeoff to give up some of the "monopolistic" power he had over the KGB in return for greater authority.(Azrael, 1989: 14) The evidence that Khrushchev made political concessions seems to be more supportive of Azrael's proposal. There are many possible reasons for Serov's removal, but more than likely Khrushchev gained some political advantage. Another very important aspect developed out of Shelepin's appointment. That was the KGB's direct line of communication to top officials. By virtue of Shelepin being a party official first and chairman of security second, this helped the party to endorse the KGB even more. 'shelepin's appointment was an impor30


tant benchmark in the history of the Soviet security services in that he, and all subsequent Chiefs appointed up through Andropovs tenure, came from a political party background rather than from the ranks of the service. These party appointments were significant because they helped to complete the transfer of control over the security organization back to the party. By ensuring party loyalty first and security allegiance second, the Kremlin leaders could keep a lever of control over the security apparatus. Less than two months after assuming leadership of the KGB, Shelepin addressed the 21st Congress of the Communist Party to explain the new platform of the KGB: .. it was to be an organization completely subordinate to and directed by the Party. .'In the last few years, under the immediate direction of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, its Presidium, and Comrade Khrushchev in person, revolutionary legality has been fully restarted, and citizen could now sleep peacefully in his bed, knowing that arbitrary acts of the security service were no longer possible 'Punitive functions have in fact been greatly restricted throughout the country and will remain restricted in the future. The sword of the security service was pointed primarily at the enemies of the Soviet Union and spies.(Levytsky, 1972: 269-70) 31


Khrushchev's address to the 21st Congress likewise pointed out the importa'nce of the role of the revamped KGB while emphasizing the external aspects of its mission. Khrushchev knew that he needed a respected security organization to help in part, support his own interests. This emphasis carried over into the operational realm during Shelepin's tenure as he numerous efforts to enhance and expand the external aspects of KGB operations, while actively pursuing an aggressive program to further the image of the KGB at home. In the domestic arena Shelepin moved to replace the older service veterans with young Komsomol and party members, intensifying the image-building campaign begun by his predecessor, Serov. Finally, in the political realm he proved to be a highly ambitiousand shrewd member of the bureaucracy as witnessed by his very calculated handling of the anti-party group at various stages prior to and during his tenure with the Shelepin was rewarded for his service under Khrushchev when he was promoted to Secretary of the party Central Committee. Hingley refers to Shelepin's political promotion: .. [As Chairman] Shelepin had obtained an important promotion, but one liable to prove a diminishing 32


asset, since the days had passed when control of the political police could be combined with the very highest office."(Hingley, 1970: 236) Outward appearance would indicate that Shelepin managed to please Khrushchev, as well as the party elite. Indeed on the positive side, "he moved on to bigger and better things having brought reality to the slogan 'the police under party control' during his three years as Chief of the KGB."(Tatu, 1969: 1) His departure from the KGB on 14 November 1961 marked a further advancement, coinciding with a more influential appointment --as a Secretary of the party Central Committee.(Hingley, 1970: 236) Due to Shelepin's own political ambitions, in October of 1961, he was succeeded by Vladimir Yefimovich Semichastny. Like his predecessor, Semichastny had risen through the Komsomol; he had proven himself to be a good party functionary and had no previous Chekist affiliation. This similarity of background, along with Shelepin's sponsorship, appears to be more than mere coincidence. Semichastny was one of.Shelepin's oldest and closest friends. Furthermore, Shelepin was not completely out of the picture; he was tasked to supervise the KGB as acting Secretariat.(Azrael, 1989: 15) 33


Therefore Khrushchev could oversee all important initiatives and operations pertaining to his power with a direct link to the security apparatus. Not long after (November 1962) Shelepin became first deputy premier and chairman of the Committee of Party-state control. This position placed Shelepin as commander of a KGB intelligence gathering and enforcement center as well as having authority over KGB operations.(Azrael, 1989: 15-16) Indeed as head of the KGB, Semichastny have acted largely as the agent of Shelepin, who probably continued to count security among his responsibilities as Central Committee Secretary.11(Hingley, 1970: 236) Throughout Semichastny's tenure, as head of the state security apparatus, the KGB continued along the same lines by Shelepin. Image-building remained a primary focus of the KGB for legitimizing its role in the domestic arena; this emphasis was aimed at both public and party consumers. The Leninist principles of Socialist legality tinder full party control was continually asserted in every available forum. Also foreign exploits continued to expand, with a real boost in 1961 from increased budgetary and manpower authorizations.(Barron, 1974: 69) 34


Although Khrushchev incorpor ted many widespread reforms in the security apparatus, he was one of many at the time that felt these changes were necessary. Moreover, it is important that thJse reforms be addressed in the proper setting. Khrushchev did not do away with the KGB, nor did he illow them complete autonomy once he had secured cont,ol over their operation. In fact, Khrushchev retained a great deal of authority over their functions:!. .. established a special commission of the party Politburo to upervise operations ... Khrushchev's Central Committee Secretariat alma t certainly became the principal "transmission belt" between the KGB and its monitoring in the Kremlin, and Khrushchev undoubtedly became a member of this cordmission and possibly its chairman. if the KGB continued to receive its through normal governmental channels, mor5over, its creation was clearly an important factional victory for Khrushchev.(Azrael, 1989: 6) KGB Was ensuring that it wouldn't turn ag inst the party. (Knight, 1988: 151) In fait that was Khrushchev's main focus for takin, such initiatives in downgrading their role. Politically, the KGB had very little autonomy. Khrushchev ad taken many steps to reduce their power, spec'fically in the Although he restricted their role olitically, he did 35


see the KGB's importance in dealing with the domestic problems that were increasing as J result of his liberalism. Yet, even in this arJna Khrushchev had problems in dealing with the domeJtic dissent due to the fact that the KGB wasn't enti ely supportive of his reforms. The Soviet leaders continued to rely on the KGB for internal control as well as ol:rious external functions. The party could not completely repudiate the KGB's power out of necessity, !:specially during a time of de-Stalinization. Khrushdlevs massive reforms were certainly innovativejfor a country that was having trouble international! I as well as domestically. The leadership need!ed the KGB to maintain some stability in a time of turmoil. However, many of the legal reforms Khrushchev initiated were aimed at the securify service. Although Khrushchev denounced of the old practices of the security organizabion, he still recognized their significance. I fact, Khrushchev, himself, the KGB for his own political support. Ultimately, however, he failed to satisfy their I institutional need to legitimize the importance of their role in Soviet society. He bried to carry out 36


too many dramatic reforms that had a significant impact on the security organizatidn.[J] Publicly Khrushchev made manJ1 statements that were damaging to the security apparatus. His Secret Speech in February 1956, lowered j:e prestige of the KGB, not to mention lending a powe[rful blow to the morale of the police. He also sent another message to the security apparatus by only one KGB official as a full member. of the c1entral Committee.(Knight, 1988: 53) By building his own faction o,f support within the security service, Khrushchev ubed the KGB to acquire power and furthermore used their services to retain his power. Khrushchev offered a dynamic i situation; on the one hand he was ready to denounce the past damages of the security fbrce and to impose limits on its action, while at the same time he was willing to support its efforts. Publicly, Khrushchev denounced the former elements of the security service, but internally he continutd to rely on their support for ensuring his own policies in an unstable environment. Khrushchev relied on their help with the collective leadership in the 1950s and he owed them even more for helping him to retain and even increase his status in June of 1957. Many of 37


Khrushchev's reforms for the structure were well intended, but his ultimate fJilure was trying to implement them during a critical deriod of instability. Notes I 1. To include K.F. Lunev, a Moscof party member whom Khrushchev had the highest confidence in: V.I. Ustinov, a former Moscow Raikom seeretary; N.R. Mironov, one of the Ukrainian members whom Khrushchev had long established ties with. I 2. and Heller, who had nuberous informants in the June crisis; Dzirkvelov, whb was head of the first department of the KGB in Geolrgia; Penkovskiy, who was a personal confident of 1989: 9) I 3. This period was paralleled by Khrushchev attempting to split the CPSU in twb; the establishment of comrade courts; mkssive efforts to de-Stalinize all sectors of the government. 38


CHAPTER 4 ORGANIZATION Khrushchev entered the arena under a I turbulent phase, both and internationally. Abuses by the sJcurity organization were still prevalent among the cojcerns of the existing CPSU. Khrushchev's primJry concern with the t k t It t 1 y ran s was y con ro over their functions. Khrushchev took on a task that was difficult to accomplish, but nonet!heless he was successful in removing terror froJ the political leadership. He initiated a series of actions that endorsed the principles of Socialirt legality and at the same time emphasized the KGB's international role. This and other reforms in the KGB would prove to be damaging to his own leadershlip. The Security service under Khrulhchevs Tenure In accordance with mainstream historical writings, Stalin's successors renounced reliance of the secret police as a way for enshring political I support and stability. Although Kprushchev was I 'bl f tl. 1 h e or numerous c anges, even


he was guilty of using the KGB foi his own partisan activity. Khrushchev's internal organi,ational changes in the security structure were designed tobring the organization under tighter To reassert the party's total control over the stJte security apparatus, Khrushchev initiated a series of actions designed to limit its power while restoring the "Leninist principle of Socialist ]egality." Prior to . I Khrushchev, Ber1a's power base had been consol1dated in the MVD and Khrushchev undertodk an immediate purge of the political police sysJem to eliminate all of Beria's support. Previously tJe MVD was split apart as the Chief Administration !of State Security and in March of 1954 the political police were separated from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and reconstituted as the Committee of btate Security under the USSR Council of Ministerls (KGB) (Azrael, 1989: 4) This latest version of Fne state security service was charged with conducting the overall coordination of foreign intelligenbe, espionage and related activities, as well as conbucting internal I counterintelligence and maintaining social and political control. 40


Under Serov a major effort was initiated to give the history of the service a faceJift in order to legitimize it for domestic controJ. "Back to I Dzerzhinsky!" became the phrase o:fi the day.(Levytsky, 1972: 266) Simultaneously, a publicity campaign was undertaken to reestaJlish the image of the political police and its agenJs in a better publjc light. Emphasis in the prJss was given to t f I t th t secur1 y successes 1n ore1gn opela 1ons a depicted the KGB as fearless defenders of Communism pitted against foreign imperialisJ aggression.[!] In February of 1956 the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Unidn convened, marking what is considered "in some respec!ts a turning-point in the history of the Union." (Levyltsky, 1972: 245) In slightly less than two years: . the Party reaffirmed its approval of the policy of the establishment of Socialist legality. In his speech said emphatically that the Berial gang sought to withdraw the state security service from the control of the Party and the power of the Soviet, and to put above the Party and Government, also to create an atmosphere of lawlessness and arbitrariness within the ' I serv1ce. S1multaneously, he also warned the Communists against a certaih distrust of the personnel of the security sbrvice. "The personnel of our State Secu:tity Service," he I sa1d, "are for the most part1 honorable men devoted to our common cause. Further, we know that reactionary in various capitalist countries are opfnly supporting agitation against our country and even boast I 41


of it. Suffice it to say that since 1951 the USA has been spending 100 dollars a year on this propaganda Soviet countries. Consequently wg must use every means to intensify watchfulness among the Soviet people and strengthgning our security services."(Levytsky, 1972: 1245-46) In this speech, Khrushchev simultaneously decried the excesses of the past, while proclJiming the success of the KGB's rehabilitation and iJs strict adherence I to Socialist legality under direct party control. Furthermore, he justified future 1rpport of its operations in defense of Socialism. Yet, he was I careful not to damage the reputati!on of the police so much that the state security wouldn't be trusted to carry out their standard, but still essential duties. Unlike its position under the leadership of Lenin or Stal"in, the party took a more active role in I the KGB's act1v1t1es under Khrushchev. In add1tion, the CPSU openly acknowledged the nlcessity of the KGB's existence to the Soviet statL. From this point on, the party continually stressed the need for the security police. Besides, Khrushchev still relied a I I great deal on the KGB's support for governmental h 11 h 1 .I t t c ores as we as 1s own po 1cy 1n1 1a 1ves. Therefore Khrushchev and KGB continually justified the importance of the service by 42


emphasizing the growing threat of outside subversion, but one underlying reason was tha the KGB was crucial to Khrushchev's power. During his tenure the KGB also made specific efforts to justify their existence by explaining some of functions to I the populace and the of them. (Knight, 1988: 56) Once again the state system had begun to regain its composure. During a very trying and potentially destructive period, the KGB had successfully altered its image doi+stically, while defending the honor of Communism in well publicized foreign exploits. Within a year abd a half following I I the 20th Party congress, Khrushcher had also associated himself with victory ovjr the anti-party group in June of 1957. Notes 1. Oddly enough, the press coverage during this period more closely mirrored the of KGB operations than it had in the past I. A larger portion of the service's efforts were against the non-Communist world than at any other time in its history; only the World War II period comes close to equaling this intensity of foreign operations. 43


CHAPTER 5 LEGALITY Probably the most complicated area of I Khrushchev's relationship with thJ KGB can be seen in the changes of legality. KhrushcJev's changes in legality had a dramatic effect on the KGB's mode of operation. While Khrushchev was the need for Socialist legality and tighteJ over the security structure, he was also rJalizing that the Soviet populace was reacting to hJs massive reforms. Khrushchev needed the KGB to mainJain some domestic stability, but he interfered with bany of their internal functions, which in turn lreduced their 1 I success in dealing with the dissedting population. I Reforms The most significant result of the Beria affair was that.the party vowed to never allow the police apparatus to gain superiority over the political structure again. (Knight, 1988: 48!) However, the most important underlying issue wab that terror as a means for police enforcement would be severely curtailed and in many instances completely abolished. Eliminating the use of terror tranbformed Soviet I I I


decision making to a more open ended and frank I discussion. The bureaucrats could relax knowing that one individual did not control thJ police and the use of terror as a means of recourse. More importantly, any Russian leader thereafter, could no longer solely rely on the police for his power Jase and legitimacy to rule or even to ensure that policies would be I carried out. George Breslauer comments that the post-Stalin leader had to "build Juthority11 by legitimizing his policies and demdnstrating his ability to solve problems instead lof relying on violent recourse.(Breslauer, 1982: 10-14) Along with the removal of te:r;ror, Khrushchev also reduced the number of politi+l a=ests. Instead he relied on moral coercion and social I pressure to actualize his goals. other corruptive methods also became prevalent, e.g., education and material incentives.(Breslauer, 1982: 56) Khrushchev also made initiatiles to induce broader public participation and crnsumer satisfaction. Amy Knight feels this period which I represents a break with the past and the retention of certain Stalinist elements, brought conflicting policies that were latlr reflected in 45 the


relationship between the political police and the legal system.(interview with Dr. Knight-April 1990) Khrushchev's attempts at reversing Stalinism were important steps in controlling the political police. For instance, he granted amnesty for many political prisoners that had been arrested under Beria. Another significant move was to abolish the political police's Special Board. This Board had allowed the police to impose punishments by extra-judicial means. Equally significant Khrushchev reorganized the police apparatus. He divided the organization in two, splitting the state security apparatus from the regular police. This initiative separated daily policing operations from political control, which in turn dispersed the amount of power that had previously been concentrated in a single organization.(Knight, 1988: 49-50) These steps further curtailed the KGB's broad range of power. By administering legal reforms, Khrushchev made efforts to tighten the controls over the police that he felt had been abused under the guidance of Stalin. These legal reforms were intended to protect the citizenry from arbitrary police persecution. In 1959 KGB Deputy Chairman Tikunov emphasized that the laws in the 1958 Fundamentals of criminal Procedure 46


applied to everyone, including the KGB. Furthermore, Khrushchev undertook many efforts to restrict the KGB's power in investigating crimes. A law in December of 1958 and introduced to the 1960 RSFSR Criminal Code restricted the vagueness and broad applicability of the codes on state crimes that had existed since 1927. The 1960 RSFSR Criminal Code also put restrictions on the laws against the state, which drastically reduced the definition of political crimes that was previously used under the auspices of Beria. (Knight, 1988: 48-50) In order to clarify the party's position over the KGB, a statute was produced in 1954 that supposedly outlined the tasks and the parameters of the KGB's functions. However, this statute has never been published. Moreover, the party has never justified how it controls the police. Amy Knight says because of this statute never being officially published it is easy to understand why the political police have been influenced by the changes in Kremlin policies.(Knight, 1988: 307) Thus, Khrushchev was able to make alterations in the security service as he saw fitting to his own personal agenda. 47


Increased Power for the KGB Ironically as Khrushchev made attempts to restrict the abuses of power that had developed in the KGB, he began to institute more legitimate uses of power for the security service through the legal codes of 1961, which continued to be amended up through his remaining tenure. These legal changes largely increased the jurisdiction of the KGB in investigating crimes. For example, in June of 1961 Article 126 of the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) was amended to enlarge this investigative jurisdiction.(Knight, 1988: 60) Further changes were made that permitted the KGB to protect state and military secrets. The press reinforced the importance for protecting state secrets which added to the credibility of the KGB's role in investigating violations against the state. This new authority also gave the KGB justification for placing security representatives in government ministries and agencies as well as gaining access to all secret information pertaining to security.(Knight, 1988: 61) Through this capacity, the KGB was able to gather information on top government officials. This increased 48


legitimacy brought the KGB more political power in dealing with CPSU members. Further changes in the CCP of 1961 gave the KGB even more authority, by increasing their role for investigating issues dealing with border responsibilities. These powers had already been inherent in the KGB's functions, but they were instituted legally at this time, which gave them more politcal acceptance. The MVD suffered a great deal under Khrushchev's reforms and this move further downgraded the MVD's role in border protection. In June of 1961 Khrushchev instituted an anticrime campaign by enforcing stricter penalties for economic crimes. Soon after the KGB beg_an to bring many of these abuses to light in the criminal justice system.(Knight, 1988: 61) This was just another measure to reinforce the KGB's importance and increased stature in Soviet society. Along with the KGB's increased legitimacy Khrushchev began cosmetic reforms for the security force as well. In the period of Socialist legality, the KGB's role was slightly modified from "policeman" to "moral guardian." (Knight, 1988: 63) To transform this image numerous literary works began to appear about the security police. Typically these 49


publications glorified the KGB and its important role in Soviet society. Khrushchev made attempts not to rely on the KGB, but ultimately resorted to their support in securing him politically. Apparently Khrushchev, as well as other party members, was more concerned with gaining factional control over the security apparatus than joining together to ensure nonpartisan control. The KGB ultimately turned against Khrushchev because he had succeeded in alienating the organization. Although Khrushchev made many legal efforts to curb the security service's role he did not effectively ensure that abuses would not exist. Certainly Khrushchev should be commended for the actions he took to eliminate the use of terror, but he left too many legal loopholes. Externally the KGB was devoid of the use of terror, but internally Khrushchev created more legal powers to legitimize the KGB's role. The KGB remained an instrument that could exercise its power whenever it was politically justified. 50


CHAPTER 6 KHRUSHCHEV'S DOWNFALL In the operational realm, a series of events colored by bold and assertive actions, as well as a series of untimely disclosures and operational miscalculations began to endanger Khrushchev's legitimacy. In retrospect, many of these events could be characterized as strategically devastating moments in history for the man in charge of the Soviet state. Numerous historians have speculated with varying degrees of certainty as to the motivation, exact nature and potential premeditation of these security incidents. A continuum from coincidence to conspiracy exists, involving the KGB's role in the series of events that have at one time or another been directly or peripherally linked with Khrushchev's demise. Based on the data available it appears reasonable to assume that indeed the series of incidents may be more than coincidence and/or mere chance in which KGB actions proved embarrassing and even partially detrimental to Khrushchev's reign. The following incidents appear to have been in Khrushchev's downfall. In late 1962 Khrushchev's prestige suffered a relativelysevere


blow when the KGB arrested Colonel Oleg Penkovsky from the rival GRU, who had been secretly supplying the West with valuable and detailed information on Soviet military and political affairs for nearly two years. Shortly, thereafter, Mr. Greville Waynne, his English contact and courier, was arrested in Budapest and taken to the Lubyanka in Moscow. A public trial was convened on 7 May 1963 which resulted in an eight year prison term for Waynne and death for Penkovsky. In April of 1964 the KGB completed a deal to exchange Waynne for a Soviet spy known as Gordon Lonsdale. (Bingley, 1970: 242-43) Soon after this event, the Soviet press initiated an anti-Western campaign, while simultaneously reporting'in praise of the "vigilant Chekists." Serov was made the scapegoat and this situation contributed to the end of his security career. More significantly, Khrushchev suffered international embarrassment from the exposure of this incident. Moreover, it shocked the Soviet public, enhanced the prestige of the Western services, and shook the leaders in the Kremlin.(Levytsky, 1972: 262) In October of 1963, the KGB was again involved in the first of three incidents that would embarrass and thwart Khrushchev's initiatives on foreign soil. 52


In this instance, a well-known American political scientist from Yale University, Professor F.C. Barghoorn, was arrested on the 31st of October and held on charges of espionage which were announced on the 12th of November.(Hingley, 1970: 240) Khrushchev had been away at the time and Brezhnev had approved the action without his knowledge. Apparently Brezhnev took such action in retaliation for the FBI arrest of a Soviet agent named Igor Ivanov.(Barron, 1974: 63-5) President Kennedy intervened personally and demanded Barghoorn's release. Within a matter of days the Soviets relented, but by then the damage had already been done to Khrushchev's stature and detente was entering a turbulent phase. The second incident which occurred in September of 1964, embarrass_ed Khrushchev internationally, and destroyed his initiatives to conclude a major trade agreement with West Germany. In this case a skilled German technician, Horst Schwirkmann, was conducting a sweep of the West German embassy in Moscow, and found KGB microphones along with an ingenious electronic device that allowed the KGB to gain access to classified embassy message traffic. The KGB retaliated for its losses, by yet another action 53


approved by Brezhnev in Khrushchev's absence. On 6 September, KGB agents sprayed Schwirkmann with a shot of nitrogen mustard gas that ate away at his skin. His life was saved, but his recuperation was long and agonizing. The West German government was outraged and announced that the trade initiative would be terminated, and would not be reconsidered again, until the Schwirkmann case was satisfactorily resolved.(Barron, 1974: 8) The third incident occurred on 28 September 1964 when fifteen plain-clothed agents burst into a hotel room in Khabarovsk occupied by three American military attaches and a British colleague. The KGB searched their baggage and their travel notes were confiscated. On the 6th of October, Moscow rejected protests from the respective governments.(Tatu, 1969: 390) Regardless what the hidden motivation may have been, international relations were once again strained and credibility was undermined. On the 13th of October Khrushchev offered his apology to West Germany with the comment: "Those who indulge in such actions are trying to undermine the good relations between our two countries."(Tatu, 1969: 390) 54


Unexpectedly on that same day, Khrushchev was called back from his vacation to Moscow where he was met by Shelepin and Semichastny, who provided surveillance in route to the Presidium. Upon his arrival, Khrushchev became the victim of a verbal attack led by Suslov who violently denounced the First Secretary. Meanwhile arrangements had been made to prevent: ... Khrushchev from repeating his performance of June 1957 --when he successfully appealed to thecentral Committee over the heads of the hostile majority in the Politburo. The Central Committee on 14 October 1964 proved solidly opposed to Khrushchev, who became a political corpse that day.(Hingley, 1970: 245) Certainly these incidents were detrimental to Khrushchev's power. There is substantial evidence that supports the contention that the KGB (and in part, Brezhenv) was instrumental in Khrushchev's demise. As for the KGB's role in the coup, speculation varies regarding the exact nature and scope of the part that the service played. It appears that opposition to the plot can probably be ruled out due to some of the KGB actors that had a role in his removal. Thus leaving only the depth of its .involvement in question. Shelepin's involvement is still questionable. Due to Shelepin's position, 55


he was entitled to a seat .on the party Presidium, but it became evident that Khrushchev would not or was unable to grant this status to Shelepin prior to Khrushchev's ouster. Possibly Khrushchev wanted Shelepin to remain personally loyal to him and did not want him directly involved in the higher echelons of the party or Khrushchev could have faced serious opposition in trying to bring Shelepin into the high levels. Without substantial evidence we can only speculate that Shelepin decided to participate in Khrushchev's overthrow because he was unable to obtain the political status he desired. In any case, Shelepin could only gain from Khrushchev's overthrow in October of 1964. The KGB leaders certainly were not hurt by the outcome as Semichastny was promoted to the Central Committee and Shelepin gained entrance to the Presidium.(Hingley, 1970: 245) Those who knew of the KGB's role (whether it large or small) considered these promotions to be rewards for their assistance during the coup.(Tatu, 1969: 420) Khrushchev made enough changes in the KGB to alienate some of the organization. Khrushchev had taken great efforts to de-Stalinize, reform the legal structure, and even curb many functions for which the KGB had been responsible. In addition, Khrushchev 56


denied the police its most powerful weapon, the use of terror. By doing this he also gave assurance to party members as well as the populace that terror wouidn't be used to retaliate against dissent. However, Khrushchev's emphasis on mass participation in the political process and comrade courts in the legal system also created conflict within the ranks of the KGB. This initiative and Khrushchev's liberalist reforms helped create a more open Soviet society, but after numerous uprisings the trend started to shift back to Stalinism toward the end of Khrushchev's leadership. At this point Khrushchev resorted to KGB employment to crackdown on public dissent. He tried to reverse his earlier initiatives and made efforts to give the security organization the "legal aspects that were necessary to carry out his initiatives. It was also at this time that the increased push for the KGB's popularity began to become noticeable. However, by this time Khrushchev had lost respect among the ranks of the KGB and the major damage had been done to his position.[1] Roy Medvedev states, "When he [Khrushchev] finally lost support in the highest spheres of the army and KGB, his removal became only a matter of time.(Medvedev, 1979: 176) 57


In the end, Khrushchev risked his power to administer wide reforms into Soviet society. However, it was too much too fast especially for the political police to deal with. .Many KGB authors believe that the KGB's disapproval over Khrushchev's foreign policy (especially Khrushchev's efforts with the West) was also a strong factor for his removal. The Cuban Missile Crisis also presented a serious drawback to Khrushchev's initiatives with the West, but more importantly at home.(See Corson and Crowley, -1986: 272, or 1986: 92) However, there is still a great deal of disagreement over the extent of the KGB's involvement. Shelepin and did have a role, but whether they were passive players or active participants we will probably never know. Shelepin and Semichastny were particularly opposed to his foreign policy and had a great deal to gain from Khrushchev's ouster.(Knight, 1988: 67) It appears that one can assume that the actions by the KGB were aimed at embarrassing Khrushchev's credibility and eventually led to his ouster. 58


Notes 1. Due to Khrushchev's liberal reforms much of the KGB's status was reduced in dealing with the general populace. When he tried to re-employ their efforts for internal control the KGB wasn't entirely supportive of his policies.(Knight, 1988: 62) 59


CHAPTER 7 BREZHNEV'S ACQUISITION OF POWER There appears to have been many reasons for Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev's fall, but perhaps paramount among them was the chaotic state of affairs that resulted from his misguided agricultural and economic policies; for which he was publicly de-nounced by Suslov on 14 October 1964.(Medvedev, 1978: 175) Michael Tatu in his Power in the Kremlin: From Khrushchev to Kosygin argues that Khrushchev's demise was due to a rebellion over internal "organizational issues" rather than political differences. He feels that this is evidenced in the fact that the new leaders appeared: ... to be completely uncertain about their own political line, though they were prodigal with vows of allegiance to the "lines" of previous congresses. Everyone was agreed in condemning "subjectivism," "empty phrases," "harebrained schemes" and "rash decisions," and of course to bury for good any projects which Khrushchev had in store for his November plenum. In short, the new rulers knew roughly what they objected to but, in the three days that the crisis had lasted, they had hardly had time to discuss what they did want. When Khrushchev defeated his adversaries in 1957 he had done so for the sake of a certain policy: he proclaimed that policy as soon as he won, and the accusations he cast at Molotov were essentially political in nature. Brezhnev, Kosygin and Suslov were in a different situation in 1964. It looked as if they had


defended their seals of office rather than a policy.(Tatu, 1969: 427) The prime concern of the new leadership was to gain the acceptance of the masses which had not been consulted during the coup. They took steps to abolish the limitations that Khrushchev had imposed in 1961 and 1962 regarding the size of individual peasants plots of land. Other steps were taken to appeal to the populace; flour, which had been unavailable, was distributed in the cities, an extra New Year's holiday was declared and artists and writers were promised that attacks against them would be discontinued. At the time, Brezhnev wanted to appeal to the masses only to the level that the populace would not be in a continual state of turmoil. The new regime began in an atmosphere of domestic detente.(Tatu, 1969: 428) Immediately following Khrushchev's fall Leonid Illyich Brezhnev and Aleksey Nikolayaevich Kosygin emerged as the First Secretary of the Party Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers respectively. Within eighteen months following his appointment as First Secretary, Brezhnev had advanced from the apparent status as number one caretaker to the position of SecretaryGeneral of the Central Committee. At the 23rd Party 61


Congress of March-April 1966 he assumed the new position which superseded his previous title of First Secretary. This advancement established him as only the second man in the history of the party to achieve that distinction (the other being Stalin), and signaled the triumph of the policy of "Cautious Re Stalinization" that he had initiated. Curtailment of Opposition During the initial period of Brezhnev's rule he had been very successful in establishing himself while at the same time firmly committing Kosygin to second place in public standing and thwarting any serious opposition or contention for power.(Hingley, 1970: 246-247) In this regard, Brezhnev quietly removed, who may well have been the most likely serious rival to Brezhnev, Nikolay Viktorovich Podgorny. Podgorny was moved from his critical slot in the Central Committee Secretariat into the Chairmanship of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in December of 1965, following the publishing of detailed deficiencies in the work of the Kharkov Regional Party Committee Organization with which he had been associated. While he remained in a high position and continued to be a member of the Party 62


Central Committee, Brezhnev had removed him from strategic control over future personnel selections, and thereafter posed little threat to Brezhnevs power.(Hough and Fainsod, 1979: 257) Following Khrushchev's demise, Shelepin arose to the Politburo, but he was not a welcome addition by the anti-Khrushchevites.(Tatu, 1969: 503-4) There was a strong consensus in the higher party echelons that Shelepin should be politically downgraded. This dispels any theory that Shelepin was in the running against Brezhnev. (As a note of interest Semichastny was also ousted as KGB chairman in May of 1967.) Likewise Shelepin, who appeared to be a potential contender for power, suffered major political reverses. In December of 1965, Brezhnev abolished the Party-state Control committee over which Shelepin had presided, and along with it he lost his position as Deputy Chairman of the Council Ministers. Although he remained a Secretary of the Central Committee, his duties centered only on light industry and trade questions. His only real source of remaining influence was his association with Semichastny and the KGB, a link which would last only for another eighteen months at which time Brezhnev relieved Semichastny entirely of his duties. These 63


setbacks were followed by yet a further decline in July of 1967 when Shelepin was removed from the Central Committee Secretariat altogether to become the Chairman of the Central Trade Union Council, a position in which Brezhnev would no longer have to be mindful of his presence.(Hough and Fainsod, 1979: 257-8) Andropovs Appointment On 18 May 1967 Brezhnev made another strategic maneuver by eliminating a possible threat to his authority when he removed Semichastny as head of the KGB.(Conquest, Crozier, and Elliot, 1977: 2) Shelepins departure signaled the end of his influence in the political police and effectively served as a roadblock to any further advancement of Semichastnys political career. This initiative on Brezhnevs part also marked his increased attention to the security organization. Semichastny took a step backward to become the First Deputy Premier of the Ukraine which allowed for the appointment of a third consecutive head of the KGB who did not have any previous association with the state security apparatus, Yuri Andropov.(Hingley, 1970: 248) At the same time Brezhnev began a courtship of the KGB 64


that would ultimately prove to be mutually beneficial in the years to come.[1] Due to Semichastny's removal and Andropov's appointment, many Western analysts believed at the time that the KGB was less of a focus for Kremlin concerns. However, further examination of the incidents that followed under Brezhnev's leadership dispel these notions. It would appear that Brezhnev was in a compromising position, after assuming the leadership from Khrushchev. Many of the high level CPSU members had expressed concern of Khrushchev's rule over the KGB and he had on occasion demonstrated his control over them. Probably the most ironic was the KGB's role in first supporting Khrushchev in the June crisis and then aiding in his demise in 1964. The CPSU members were aware of the KGB's influence in supporting or condemning a leader and therefore were extremely cautious with Brezhnev in dealing with matters of the security apparatus. Azrael refers to Brezhnev's association with the other CPSU members as an "extremely delicate balance of underlying power."(Azrael, 1989: 20) He then goes on to detail eight major events which he titles the 1967 settlement; of those only five involves Brezhnevs relationship with the KGB and need be considered 65


here. First, it was apparent that the other party members did not want another Serov, or KGB chairman loyal to the general secretary only. Khrushchev had made grand statements about keeping the KGB from becoming a partisan tool, but even he-used their services for his own political standing in the June crisis. Secondly, if Brezhnev had the power he would have appointed his own loyalist. Which relates to the next point, that being Andropov's appointment. Brezhnev did not want Andropov initially and their relationship in the beginning was very unstable. Azrael makes references to Brezhnev's "strained and at least intermittently adversarial relationship" with Andropov. The fourth point in this sett"lement was Brezhnev also increased his power base by transferring some of Shelepin's former oversight duties as senior party secretary for administrative organs to the office of the general secretary. By doing this, Brezhnev was able to appoint a political ally who would oversee these important details, Viktor Golikov. Lastly, Azrael does state that there were a few points of which Brezhnev had to accommodate the other party members. The most important being the KGB director was limited to candidate membership of the 66


Politburo and not a full member; this subjected the KGB director to the entire leadership and therefore prevented single loyalty.(Azrael, 1989: 20-21) At the time, this probably satisfied Brezhnev because he did not have full trust in Andropov anyway. Therefore Azrael'S comment that Brezhnev had to accommodate the other party members on certain points is based on Brezhnev and Andropov's successful relationship; it took a while for this relationship to prosper. Thus it would appear that Brezhnev didn't mind, and probably preferred, if he didn't have choice of the KGB director that it would be in his best interest that Andropov not be allowed full Although Azrael feels Brezhnev had to succumb on certain issues, he asserts that the settlement of 1967 did not by any means curb Brezhnev's use of the KGB in higher party politics. Azrael's assessment is very thought provoking and would seem to fit with the overall events that occurred, but he offers the reader little insight as to where he obtained this information. Brezhnev effectively curtailed his major opposition. In doing so, he was able to publicly reduce Kosygin and downgrade Podgorny and Shelepin's role in the CPSU. Although Brezhnev was effective in 67


outmaneuvering his opponents, he did not have the political power to appoint his own director for the KGB. Therefore, Andropov was not Brezhnev's first choice but he agreed to his appointment because at the time, Andropov was politically neutral. Notes 1. Due to the fact that Andropov was selected for KGB leadership under Brezhnev, it is often difficult to discern the two leader's time periods. Many of Brezhnev's structural changes in the KGB were due to Andropov's promptings. Therefore I will make note when a certain action was clearly initiated by one of them. [See Andropov section] 68


CHAPTER 8 POLITICAL INFLUENCE The party retains the ultimate trump card with the approval over appointments and promotions in the KGB. Khrushchev was particularly concerned that the party maintained control over these powers in order to make sure the security apparatus wouldn't use its will against the party. Brezhnev also recognized this importance of maintaining control over the KGB. Brezhnev covered the most critical sectors of the Soviet security system with his supporters. Initially Brezhnev was restricted from placing loyal players in the primary security positions, but eventually he was able to incorporate a sizable number. Furthermore, Andropov proved not to be the barrier that Brezhnev had initially anticipated. In fact, Andropov was extremely cooperative and understandably so for the position to which he aspired to attain in the Kremlin. Installation of the Dnepropetrovsk Mafia[1] Brezhnev managed to stay in power for a long period of time and therefore it is important to examine the basis of his power. Brezhnev was able to


build a strong power base because 1) he was quick to uproot anyone who openly opposed him and 2) he was able to position political allies in top posts. Brezhnev was successful in neutralizing, and in some instances removing, the potential sources of opposition at the highest levels of the Soviet party and state bureaucracies. In conjunction with this effort, he also initiated a series of maneuvers designed to expand his personal influence and power base throughout the government and party structures. He carried this out by establishing former close associates and subordinates from Moldavia and Dnepropetrovsk in key government positions. This effort was massive in both scope and depth and included many key appointments that were vital to his power base. A few primary examples of officials whom Brezhnev uprooted are: v.s. Tikunov, the top official in the regular police, who had formally been linked to Shelepin in both the Komsomol and the KGB, was removed in September of 1966. In July of 1967, N.B. Egorychev, the First Secretary of the Moscow city party committee lost his post after attacking Brezhnevs Middle East policy at a session of the Central Committee. In addition, N.N. Mesiatsev and 70


N.A. Mikhailov, two former colleagues of Shelepin in the Komsomol Central Committee were also removed from their posts as Chairman of the Television and Radio Committee and the State Committtee for Publishing respectively in 1970. Each position was filled with men that had close ties to Brezhnev. (Hough and Fainsod, 1979: 258) The significance of the KGB chairman appointment as well as other important security positions was clearly understood by Brezhnev. He took great efforts to establish his own cadre within the security organization once Andropov was selected, therefore ensuring that his own power base would be instituted in the KGB. Between 1967 1970, three former.Dnepropetrovsk and Moldavia officials became Deputy Chairmen of the KGB. Semen Kuzmich who coincidentally was married to the sister of Brezhnev's wife, assumed the position of First Deputy Chairman of the KGB.(Knight, 1988: 81) Tsvigun went on to publish many works that glorified the KGB's role in Soviet society. This publicity certified him as a high ranking official within the KGB and later he became Brezhnevs top man in the KGB. The second was Viktor Mikhailovich Chebrikov. He had not previously worked in the committee for state 71


Security, but had worked with Brezhnev as the Communist Party Second Secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk Province. He served many different posts, but most importantly became the head of the KGB Personnel Department from 1967 to 1968. From this position he was able to fill key positions with Brezhnev loyalists. Later he was rewarded being promoted to Deputy Chairman of the USSR KGB with a rank of Major-General.(Knight, 1988: 82) The last Dnepropetrovsk appointment was Georgy Karpovich Tsinev. He was a graduate of the Dnepropetrovsk Metallurgy Institute and served on the same fronts as Brezhnev during World War II. He became a KGB Deputy Chairman with the rank of Colonel-General.(Conquest, 1977: 2) In addition to the aforementioned officials, many other key officials from Dnepropetrovsk were given increased political positions.[2] Other key appointments were: K.U. Chernenko, who headed the Moldavian propaganda-agitation and eventually became head of the sensitive General Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This department distributes communications to the Central Committee, party 72


officials, and departments; it also handles internal security within the Secretariat. (Hough and Fainsod, 1979: 258) Andrey Pavlovich Kirilenko was Brezhnev's second secretary at Zaporozhe and successor in Dnepropetrovsk. He assumed the responsibilities and general supervision of personnel selection for the KGB. Kirilenko also became supervisor of the urban economy that Podgorny relinquished when he was transferred to the Presidium the supreme Soviet.(Hough and Fainsod, 1979: 258) Nikolai Anisimovich Shchelokov was a Brezhnev subordinate both in Moldavia and Dnepropetrovsk. His reward was becoming the USSR Minister for the Preservation of Public Order (later renamed Internal Affairs). Shchelokov was also important in maintaining Brezhnevs security of for his dramatic reforms as head of the MVD, the regular police forces which aided in preserving order within the USSR.(Conquest, 1977: 2-3) Indeed Brezhnev underwent much effort to place the members of his Mafia throughout the various bureaucratic hierarchies of the Soviet state and party apparatus.(Hough and Fainsod, 1979: 259) These appointments helped to 73


further instill Brezhnev loyalists in the ranks of the KGB as well as the party. In regard to the armed forces, Brezhnev had quietly taken steps to secure control prior to his takeover of the KGB. He accomplished this through a series of maneuvers and through his long association with two key officers, General Aleksey Yepishev and General Petr Ivashutin. Yepishev, a Deputy MGB Minister during Stalin's tenure, was appointed to fill several key positions under Khrushchev. By Brezhnev's arrival, he had advanced to chief of the main political administration of the Soviet armed forces. Brezhnev insured that Yepishev was elected to full membership to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Ivashutin had extensive NKVD, MGB, MVD, and KGB counterintelligence experience, as well as being a SMERSH chief in the Ukraine, Austria, and East Germany. Peter Deriabin in Watchdogs of Terror points out that in 1963 Ivashutin was appointed head of the Military and Strategic Intelligence Services (GRU) following Serovs removal. His appointment apparently came from Brezhnev's instigation, during Khrushchev's decline.(Deriabin, 1972: 345) 74


On 14 March 1980, the Washington Post reported the expansion of the Dnepropetrovsk Banda. The article appeared when Brezhnev's son-in-law, Yuri Churbanov, was named as First Deputy Interior Minister, of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. He replaced the late Lieutenant General Viktor Semyenovich Paputin. Paputin died on 28 December 1979 amidst unexplained circumstances during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. There is a great deal of speculation that the Dnepropetrovsk Mafia was involved in his death.(Klose, 1980: A27) Churbanovs appointment, along with Paputin's death certainly raise interest in the Dnepropetrovsk Mafia's power and control of Brezhnev's opposition. Sources are in disagreement as to whether the MVD was the perpetrator of his death, or if this was just another discrediting campaign carried out by the KGB against the MVD.(See Klose, 1980: A27, or Knight, 1988: 88) Thus the Dnepropetrovsk Mafia or the Dnepropetrovskaya Banda, as they were known in Moscow according to Peter Deriabin, was formed around such personalities as Chebrikov, Andropov, Tsvigun, Tsinev, Shchelokov, Yepishev, Ivashutin, and Tikhonov. It isn't a coincidence that a significant portion of 75


these political players formed the core of the elite membership which surrounded and supported Brezhnev and they were members of, or had direct connections with, the state security apparatus. Brezhnev secured the critical positions in the KGB in order to maintain the organization's loyalty. The relationship between Brezhnev and the Dnepropetrovsk Mafia managed to provide a significant degree of mutual support and security during Brezhnevs tenure. By placing these selected loyalists in key positions, Brezhnev managed to build his primary basis for power. His selected allies were able to implement important actions against the internal dissidents as well as monitoring the economic reforms that Brezhnev had implemented.(Barry and Barner-Barry, 1987: 282) All this happened during the time many CPSU members were still remembering the Stalin era and feared Brezhnevs stern rule. Although the CPSU realized the security police was no longer a tool of terror that could be used at whim, there were other actions (i.e., removal from post, undesirable assignments) that could also be damaging. Therefore through Brezhnevs manipulation of the ranks of the KGB he was able to maintain his policies. 76


Brezhnevs strong ties to KGB personnel provided massive power to his leadership. He could, at any time tap those sources for information or carry out secret operations that would provide support to his reign. The KGB was particularly important to Brezhnevs retention of power in keeping a tight control over his opposition.(Corson and Crowley, 1986: 382) Furthermore, the KGB was also able to channel their own agenda up through Brezhnev. [Andropov was very insturmental in many of the KGB's reforms as a result of access to Brezhnev.] This mutually beneficial relationship strengthened the careers of Brezhnevs allies as well as his own political base. This mutual assistance is an aspect that is often overlooked by scholarly analysis of this period. Amy Knight concentrates on the careers of Brezhnev's friends, but doesn't give enough attention to the actual prospering of Brezhnevs own career. Brezhnev was in a position that he could have used the KGB for more support than he did; possibly the party controls were much tighter than they appeared at the time. Robert Conquest describes the Dnepropetrovsk Mafia as, "conservative to the point of being reactionary, the old men who rule the USSR greatly 77


value security, and none more than Leonid Brezhnev himself. He has clearly taken every possible step to insure his power base."(Conquest, 1965: 3) Brezhnev's political maneuvering was designed to insure his total security and was so successful that he managed to stay in power for over fifteen years. Expansion of Brezhnev's Personal Power Position A review of Brezhnev's building his position of power also indicates that he did well in expanding and maintaining its integrity. Throughout Brezhnev's tenure he maintained a strong power base of support and eventually this became evident to the world. More importantly in the practical realm, Brezhnev provided his subordinates inside the party and government bureaucracies with a degree of stability unprecedented in previous regimes.(Hough and Fainsod, 1979: 263-4) Simultaneously, he was not hesitant to take decisive action when it appeared necessary to sustain the reins of power. This fact can be witnessed in Brezhnevs decision to assume the position of Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. This occurred following a quarrel with Podgorny (the previous incumbent) at a session of the Politburo in June of 1977. Brezhnev 78


established a new position of First Deputy Chairman (or Vice-President) to be filled with a man of his choice to exercise the routine administration of the office, only four months after assuming the position. (Duevel, 1978: 6) Further, Brezhnev took great care to insure that a sizable group of the voting membership of the Central Committee was beholden to him for their promotions; he expanded the size of that body by 64 percent which gave him a great deal of latitude in hand picking his cohorts. Brezhnev was also able to avoid the problems which Khrushchev experienced by allowing party bureaucrats a degree of autonomy in deciding political questions within their field of competency and by providing annual budgetary increases for nearly all of his supporters.(Knight, 1988: 170) During Brezhnev and Andropov's leadership, the KGB also experienced increased political status inside party organizations. The number of KGB representatives in the CPSU congresses rose considerably, while still representing only a small proportion of the total delegates. A more dramatic signal was the increased KGB representation on the CPSU Central Committee.(Knight, 1988: 171) By 1981 79


the KGB had reached its maximum proportion of delegates in CPSU Party Congresses and CPSU Committee membership. Amy Knight believes that Andropov probably developed some loyalty to the KGB organization and its functions, while serving under Brezhnev. (Knight, 1988: 308) I would speculate that Andropov may not have recognized the importance the KGB played politically until he served as its leader for fifteen years and held critical positions in the higher party politics. The KGB definately became a more professional and effective organization under Brezhnev and Andropov.(See Chapter 9) Some degree of this evidence is seen in the increased role the KGB played in Kremlin politics, specifically in the career of Andropov. Brezhnev was successful in securing and consolidating his power because he clearly understood party politics. By October of 1979, he had held his position for fifteen years --an extremely long tenure by any comparative standard --and nothing suggests that his basic policy line was challenged and defeated during his period of leadership by the pattern of policy over that fifteen years.(Hough, 1980: 263-4) However there is evidence to support the notion that Andropov was attempting to secure his 80


own policy line by moving away from Brezhnev during his last year. He carried out numerous investigations against Brezhnev's family and political allies and later exposed selective individuals. (See Chapter 11) Courtship of the KGB The fact that Brezhnev remained in power for over fifteen years must be considered a measure of his success in the Soviet political system. Analysis of the formula Brezhnev used to achieve this end far beyond the scope of this thesis. However, I will propose that Brezhnev's courtship and relationship with the KGB was an important element of this formula. During Brezhnev's tenure stability was a vital condition for political as well as economic policies. Therefore Brezhnev relied on the KGB to enforce a stable environment. Therefore, Brezhnev did not renounce reliance on secret police because he explicitly used them to support his agenda. Thus, he wanted to increase their prestige while increasing their capabilities for him. The KGB began a steady and continuous rise in stature and power under Brezhnev. The stature of the KGB was no longer suppressed as it had been under 81


Nikita Khrushchev, after Andropovs appointment. Author Paul Wohl states, "KGB officers never forgave him and which may have lead to his ultimate downfall."(Wohl, 1978: 7) An outward expression of the rapid ascendance of the state security system began in 1964 and overthe next eight years yielded in excess of 2,400 books and articles. All of which glorified the exploits and achievements of the operatives of the organization that previously admitted no spy connection at all.(Barron, 1974: 69) Historical evidence shows, Andropov had his own political career agenda while in the KGB organization and this is often one reason cited for the KGB's popularity campaign.(See Knight, 1988: 86, or Azrael, 1989: 25) Brezhnev continually maintained close relations with the KGB organization; people at all levels were aware of the KGB's omnipresence and power during. (Conquest, Crozier, and Elliot, 1978: 2-3) A continued manifestation of this closeness can be witnessed in the following recorded accounts: When Brezhnev left for his visit to France on 20 June, and returned on 25 June, 1977, there were no fewer than five top-ranking representatives of the Soviet police establishment (both KGB and MVD) among 82


those who both saw him off and welcomed him back at Vnukovo Airport. According to Pravda they were Yuri Andropov, Semen K. Tsvigun, Georgi K. Tsinev, Nikolai A. Shchelokov and Yuri M. Churbanov. The KGB had very little public showing during Khrushchev's tenure. Generally, only one KGB officer would greet Khrushchev, but usually this task was reserved for the MVD agents.(Duevel, 1977: 1) ... on 18 September 1978, leaving for what appeared to be a fairly routine trip to Baku .. Brezhnev was seen off at the Moscow railway station by the obligatory group of Politburoand other high CPSU functionaries. It was unusual for his son Yury [Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade] to be included in official reports of the send-off party, but the presence of Semen Kuzmich Tsvigun, Brezhnev's brother-in-law and First Deputy Chairman of the KGB, has become almost routine .... Moreover, on his way south, Brezhnev actually stopped his special train at Mineralnye Vody to talk to KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov, who was on holiday in the Caucasian resort. (Conquest, Crozier, and Elliot, 1978: 3) Another documented event of Brezhnev's close association with the KGB was recorded when he arrived in .Baku on 20 September 1978, among the dignitaries of the reception committee were Azerbaidzhan First Secretary Geidar Aliev, formerly a Major-General in charge of the republic's KGB, and MajorGeneral Makarov of the Transcaucasus KGB Frontier Troops.(Conquest, Crozier, and Elliot, 1978: 3) 83


The KGB's presence within official welcoming delegations apparently extended beyond Moscow. How far it may have gone and exactly what it meant cannot, of course, be known for sure. Unlike Khrushchev, these events were important during Brezhnevs tenure in that they were not isolated instances. Occurrences such as those detailed above became the rule, rather than the exception, during the Brezhnev years. In addition to the aforementioned, the outward expression of the KGB's rapid ascendancy can be virtually traced from 1964 up through Andropov's party tenure. Indications of this increased stature are reflected in numerous historical events. Examples of the increased importance include the presentation of such prestigious awards as the Order of the October Revolution, one of the Soviet's highest decorations, given to Andropov and several other key KGB functionaries and the promotion of Andropov, Tsvigun, Tsinev, Chebrikov and Matrosov to the highest military rank attainable, General of the Armies.(Freemantle, 1982: 32) In April 1973, Brezhnev repealed a policy that had been in affect for 20 years by promoting Andropov to full membership in the Politburo, making him the 84


first head of the political police to sit on the Politburo since Beria. This "enhanced both his [Andropov's] personal authority and that of the KGB as an institution"(Knight, 1988: 81-3) Notably, Andropov's promotion in 1973 marked one of the most significant steps for the KGB's status because Brezhnev reinstated the KGB's status in Communist Party politics. Brezhnev realized the risk he would be taking by promoting Andropov, but he had also witnessed how Khrushchev suffered for not promoting Shelepin and more importantly, failing to give the KGB the status that it desired. Promoting Andropov proved to make the KGB more loyal to Brezhnev's leadership and therefore became a more reliable and intimidating source that could be utilized. These honors and promotions were unprecedented in the history of tpe Soviet state security apparatus. Further, and perhaps more importantly, they were bestowed on the KGB with greater frequency and on a broader scale than on any other organ of the Soviet bureaucracy under Brezhnev's rule. Finally, in July of 1979 it was announced that, by order of the Procuratory General of the USSR, Mikhail Nikolaevich Rogov was "confirmed as a Member of the Department of the USSR Procuracy for the 85


Supervision of Investigations in KGB Organs.11(Social ist Law, 1979: 73) Rogovs appointment added an aura of legitimacy to KGB operations. However, it must be noted that the Procurators: cannot extend their supervision to any party committee or secretariat. The Party State Control Committee, when it was set up in 1963, was originally intended to include the organs and officials of the party in its area of supervision. However it soon became plain that, whatever the original intention, this Committee was not in practice allowed to discipline members of the party apparatus directly, but only to refer their cases for enquiry and disciplinary action, if required, to the appropriate party instance. Since the replacement of the Party-State Control Committee in December of 1965 (and it should be noted at this point that Brezhnev moved to eliminate this committee at the same time that he had Shelepin removed as its head --thus eliminating a significant potential threat to the development and continuance of his personal power position), it has been made clear that its jurisdiction does not extend to the organs of the party.(Schapiro, 1978: 145) With no real freedom to act on its own accord due to the system of government in which it existed, the Procuracy remained ultimately accountable to the party. Therefore the Procuracy merely served a nominal function and at the same time providing an aura of legitimacy for KGB operations. 86


Increased Status of the KGB under Brezhnev As I have stated before, the leadership following Stalin's death in 1953, was fearful of the ruthless police apparatus and outraged at Berias unprecedented bid for power. The new regime moved decisively to regain control and downgrade the position and stature of the political police. The MVD, as the agency was then called, was split in two with the political police functions being given to what became the KGB. The CPSU made sure career Communist bureaucrats from outside of the KGB were placed at the helm instead of veteran leaders of Stalin's terror campaigns. Throughout Khrushchev's reign, and to a lesser extent during the first three years of Brezhnevs rule, the KGB remained under the tight control of the party of a single authority. The CPSU maintained the KGB appointments throughout Khrushchev's reign and kept a similar watch in the early years of Brezhnevs tenure. (Richelson, 1986: 246) However, in 1967, with the appointment of Yuri Andropov as the head of the KGB, a new period of ascendancy began for the security organization. 87


The Ascendance of KGB Personnel. Under Brezhnev, the KGB embarked on a period of ascendance, restoring the preeminence that it had enjoyed only under Stalin. Brezhnev became heavily dependent on the KGB and in turn the organization received an unprecedented line of honors and privileges granted to the organization's leaders and officers.(Conquest, Crozier, and Elliot, 1979: 3) Many KGB officials were recognized with increased status and awards, particularly Andropov who was singled out in many events. When Andropov replaced Semichastny as head of the KGB in May of 1967, he became a candidate member of the Politburo that following June. Subsequently he became intimately involved in a relationship with Leonid Brezhnev that proved to be mutually beneficial. Brezhnev saw the utility in many of Khrushchev's earlier efforts of increasing the status and prestige of the security service. Brezhnev became extremely concerned with the KGB's publi"c image thus the KGB's popularity campaign took on its full initiative. KGB officials were (and still are) portrayed by the media as humane and caring, but more importantly well educated and cultured, unlike their predecessors. Furthermore, they were deemed to have outstanding 88


character and abilities.(Knight, 1988: 177) The Soviet press continued to bolster the KGB's image with lengthy articles describing the KGB only in a positive light. This glorification didn't stop just with literary works, even movies about the KGB were made. By examining Brezhnev's actions, it is apparent he was concerned with taking care of things domestically and to carry this out he had to legitimize the role of the KGB, both legally and publicly. Efforts to increase the KGB's popularity hit their peak on 20 December 1967, which marked the fiftieth anniversary of the origin of the political police. (Knight, 1988: 83) Numerous literary and artistic works were produced to mark this grand celebration. Glorifying documentation about the security organization became a significant characteristic of the .Brezhnev period, even though they had their beginnings in the Khrushchev period,. These efforts were even carried to the point of awarding prizes for the best works that depicted the KGB in a positive light.(Knight, 1988: 84) September 1977 marked Dzerzhinsky's 100th birthday; Andropov paid tribute to this occasion with a speech that d"epicted the KGB as carrying out the outstanding 89


Chekist tradition. (Typically Andropov never gave much emphasis to the historical excesses of the KGB on these occasions.) Amy Knight comments that Dzerzhinsky and the Chekist tradition in the KGB, very much like the party, needed a mythology to legitimize its existence and to provide a focal point for patriotism.(Knight, 1988: 85) Tne continual references to Dzerzhinsky and the Chekist traditions were so prevalent during this period they were mentioned at almost every formal occasion involving the KGB. Apparently the KGB had succeeded in becoming more acceptable to Soviet society. In April of 1973, Yuri Andropov was elected to full membership in the Politburo in recognition of the KGB's vital role in expanding Soviet policies at home and abroad.(Conquest, Crozier, and Elliot, 1974: 5) He became the first head of the KGB to achieve this distinction since Beria.(Conquest, 1975: 46) The significance of this event is further amplified by the fact that even during the Stalinist era, the Politburo normally included no more than one man with ties to the state security apparatus. However, of the seventeen members who made up the Politburo in 1973, three had spent significant portions of their careers in the apparatus: Andropov, Shelepin, and 90


Arvid Y. Pleshe.(Barron, 1974: 11) The KGB certainly was well represented in the higher party echelons which was also beneficial to Brezhnevs leadership; the more loyalists in the party the more support he had for his own agenda. By giving the KGB an active role in party politics Brezhnev was able to ensure his own security based on their loyalty. In honor of his sixtieth birthday, on 24 June 1974, Andropov was awarded a third Order of Lenin and a gold Hammer and Sickle medal to add to his already substantial collection of awards. President Podgorny presented Andropov with his medals and conferred the title of 11Hero of Socialist Labor11 on him while wishing the KGB chief health, happiness, and great success in his difficult but useful work. During the course of his presentation speech, Podgorny stated that: . As a member of our collecti"ve leadership, headed by Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, you play a direct and active part in working out and implementing the home and foreign policies of our Party and the soviet State, in carrying out the decisions of the 24th CPSU Congress. (Radio Moscow, 24 June 1974) This pronouncement is one of the most significant statements to date regarding the ascendancy and status of the KGB. It was the first time in the history of the state security apparatus and the 91


Soviet Union, that KGB involvement in the development and implementation of domestic and foreign policy had ever been admitted, let alone praised. Clearly this event was a major benchmark in the resurgence of the KGB, as a major element of support to the Brezhnev regime. In September of 1974, Pravda announced the award of the October Revolution to Semyon Ignatiev on the occasion of his seventieth birthday. Ignatiev was Stalin's last organizational head and was responsible for the notorious Doctor's Plot Purge.(Conquest, 1974: 137) Apparently harsh policies in the name of the State must have again become acceptable in the Brezhnev regime. Another event which marked the KGB's increasing status under Brezhnev was recorded on 28 October 1975 when a new award, The Order for Services of the Homeland in the USSR's Armed Forces, was specifically established for the KGB and the MVD. Holders of this award were entitled to "priority housing, a free round-trip journey first-class anywhere in the country once a year, free use of all urban transportation within the district where they lived, and special treatment in shops, places of entertainment and cultural institutions."(Wohl, 1975: 92


4) The KGB had already enjoyed numerous privileges under Brezhnevs guidance and he complied when Andropov pushed for a more legitimate status for ascertaining such privileges. on 11 September 1976, Andropov and Nikolai Shchelokov, who had been installed by Brezhnev in 1966 as chief of the MVD, were both promoted to the rank of General of the Armies, the highest rank in the Soviet military system.(Conquest, Crozier, and Elliot, 1977: 3) This promotion dispelled any question as to who was in charge of the internal forces. These promotions also carried weight for the MVD and the KGB among the bureaucrats. In early 1977 a "bloodcurdling link with the past" was reported by the London Sunday Times: .. whose Moscow correspondent has particularly good contacts with officialdom: Ramon Mercader, the assassin of Leon Trotsky, long settled in Moscow, had been made a "Hero of the Soviet Union," Gold Star equivalent of the American Congressional Medal of Honor. Publicity was not given to this event, but the mere award is a sinister sign of how the KGB regards itself.(Conquest, Crozier, and Elliot, 1977: 2) Perhaps the London Times was a bit extreme in reporting that this medal was a significant mark on the KGB's status. More than likely the award was a move towards symbolism for the respect of the 93

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organization, which in and of itself is a significant element. This is one case in which many former operatives were well received during the period of Brezhnev. In early 1977, Colonel-General Tsinev was presented a "Hero of Socialist Labor" medal on the occasion of his seventieth birthday to become the first KGB Deputy Chairman to have been so honored. (Conquest, Crozier, and Elliot, 1977: 2) This award was considered rare even at the ministerial level and can be considered an exceptional move on Brezhnev's part in preserving KGB loyalty during a difficult "period. On 20 December 1977, the KGB celebrated the sixtieth anniversary of the state security apparatus. Speaking at this occasion, Brezhnev wished the organs of state security: ... good health and further success in the name of the triumph of Communism .... The glorious traditions begun by Dzerzhinsky live on and develop in your hard, but honorable, very necessary and responsible work in defending the gains of the Great October Revolution, in ensuring the security of the Soviet State.(Conquest, Crozier, and Elliot, 1978: 7-8) Regarding this address, Robert Conquest notes that in Brezhnev's silence in passing over the earlier crimes of the Soviet security police, there was reason for 94

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increased concern that their activities were illegitimate and being further encouraged by the Soviet leadership. Ultimately though, Andropov withthe aid of Brezhnev ensured legal jurisdiction for a wide.range of KGB activities. On 27 September 1977, to mark his sixtieth birthday, Colonel-General Tsvigun was presented a "Hero of Socialist Labor" medal, an award described by Radio Liberty on 13 December 1977 as "unprecedented in the post-Stalin period."(Harvey and Kohler, 1978: 6) Andropov's increasing stature was again demonstrated on 5 August 1978, as he was chosen to represent the party and state apparatus at a ceremony to present the "order of the Labor Red Banner" to the city of Petrozabodsk. His speech praised the city for its important role and place in the history of the motherland, its revolutionary services and military valor, and its contributions to strengthening and developing the economic and defensive might of the Soviet state. Simultaneously, he praised Brezhnev for his insightful leadership, espoused the value of the recent detente initiatives and urged the city's population to continue its fine efforts for the future glory of the soviet state.(FBIS, 5 August 1978) 95

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On 27 December 1978, Colonel-Generals Tsvigun, Tsinev, and Colonel-General Aleksandrovich Matrosov, head of the KGB Frontier Troops, were promoted to the rank of General of the Armies. Reinforcing evidence that a mutually benefitial insurance pqlicy existed between Brezhnev and the KGB. On 17 January 1979, Army General Tsvigun, although not generally distinguished as a master of literary style, gained extensive publicity when he published an article in the Literaturnaya Gazeta entitled 11The Artist and the Frontier.11 The article was based on a speech he had given a year before at a conference devoted to 11Literature and Art and the Guarding of the Homeland's Sacred Borders.11(Conquest, Crozier, and Elliot, 1979: 3-4) Certainly the prestige and popularity of the KGB was being manifested in almost every aspect of modern Soviet society. The Supreme Soviet Presidium instituted a new military medal for the KGB, MVD, and Ministry of Defense forces on 25 May 1979. A Tass article on that date announced that: ... The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet had decreed to institute a medal 11for the strengthening of comradeship-in-arms.11 The medal in the USSR is to be awarded to servicemen, state security service, and militia men, citizens of the Warsaw Treaty member states and also other socialist and other friendly states for their services in 96

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strengthening comradeship-in-arms and military cooperation.(FBIS, 25 May 1979) Five days later, on 30 May 1979, Krasnaya Zvezda [Red Star] announced that a KGB Prize Committee had been established to administer a new program which would award annual prizes for the best literary works and movies on Chekist operatives and Border Guards. This effort displayed both the extensive nature of the incentives that were being offered to increase esprit de corps as well as the massive public relations campaign that was undertaken on behalf of the KGB.(Krasnaya Zvezda, 30 May 1979) On 30 August 1979 Brezhnev presented Andropov with the "order of the October Revolution, 11 the "Lofty Award of the Motherland." During Brezhnev's presentation speech and Andropov's acceptance reply, they addressed each other on a first name basis. This was something new in the protocol of leadership between the two men.(FBIS, 31 August 1979) They had indeed become very close since 1967 when Brezhnev's needs for security began to be satisfied and the KGB began to ascend. Even though Brezhnev didn't hand pick Andropov, he became one of Brezhnev's main pil-lars of power. It would appear that Andropov supported Brezhnev because he recognized the 97

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potential career advancement he could have access to via Brezhnev. Another documented manifestation of the phenomenon described above occurred on 1 February 1980 when Pravda announced that a collection of selected speeches and articles by Andropov was to be published. This event is significant because of the fact that only two of Andropovs predecessors have been so distinguished, Dzerzhinsky and Beria.(FBIS, 12 February 1980) In assessing the courtship, we must conclude it was a successful and mutually beneficial endeavor for the KGB as well as the Brezhnev regime. The examples of the ascendance of the KGB personnel that I have detailed represent a significant advancement in stature relative to the position of the KGB during the tenure of Khrushchev. During the Brezhnev reign, leaders and officers of the KGB moved to recouping the power and.positions that their predecessors held and enjoyed only under stalin. In return for its ascendancy and status, the KGB served Brezhnev well by bringing stability to the domestic environment. This element of the relationship was crucial early in Brezhnevs tenure for his retention of power. Also for more than fifteen years, the KGB provided him a 98

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way of surrounding himself with his own loyal cadre that was supportive of his policies. In addition, Andropov was also able to develop his own power base within Brezhnev's establishment of prominent status for the KGB. Notes 1. The term mafia or banda refers to Brezhnev's comrades that gained political advantages due to Brezhnev's leadership. The use of this term does not connote a terrorist or criminal organization. 2. N.A. Tikhonov, a steel plant manager in Dnepropetrovsk under Brezhnev, became a Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers in 1965 and was promoted to First Deputy Chairman in 1976. I.T. Novikov, a graduate of the Dnepropetrovsk Metallurgy Institute, and I.V. Arkhipov, a former Dnepropetrovsk official, also became Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers responsible for construction and foreign economic affairs respectively. In the diplomatic arena, V.I. Drozdenko and N.P. Tolubeev, the ambassadors to two of the most sensitive positions in the Communist world at the time, Rumania and Cuba, also came from Dnepropetrovsk.(Knight, 1988: 81-83) 99

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CHAPTER 9 ORGANIZATION Brezhnev's political strategy was based on building coalitions from different institutional groups rather than relying on the party apparatus alone. Thus he sought to satisfy the demands of the KGB and ensure its prerogataives.(Knight, 1988: 79) Frequently Brezhnev tapped this source of support, especially in dealing with the internal dissidence that was prevalent in the latter 160s and early '70s. To control this growing dissidence Brezhnev instituted structural changes in the KGB so that they could effectively counteract these internal problems. Organizational Growth During his initial years of tenure Brezhnev oversaw two significant organizational changes in the state security apparatus; the first occurred in 1968. General Ivan Ivanovich Agayants had been the first director of the KGB's Disinformation Department or Department "D" of the First Chief Directorate until his death. Thereafter Andropov changed it to Department "A" and gave it more influence in the

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82) Further, Department "A" received increased manning authorizations and began a massive expansion of its operations. The second major event occurred in 1969 when the Fifth Chief Directorate was created to "obliterate political dissent and reinforce controls over the general population. The perversion of psychiatry for political purposes and most of .the other intensified repressions reported since 1969 are traceable to this new Directorate."(Barron, 1974: 84) The increased stature and formalization of such operations within the KGB organizational hierarchy during this period marked an intensified control over internal dissidence and Soviet society. Even to this day, the Fifth Chief Directorate is known to have an extensive informant network throughout the Soviet Union with such wide-ranging powers as veto authority over job applications,. visas, and university admission. It also operates prison camps and mental hospitals and directs the Soviet campaign against dissidents, all of which are managed from its headquarters.(See Corson and Crowley, 1986: 62-4) 101

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Expansion of Operations In the domestic arena, operations, against national minorities, dissident intellectuals, and religious believers were stepped-up significantly relative to such actions conducted under the previous regimes. Brezhnev gave Andropov a great deal of autonomy in dealing with these matters. The actions of the KGB reflected the personal outlook of Yuri Andropov. He expressed this in a speech prior to his election to full membership when he stressed that relaxation of international tensions must not be allowed to lead to a relaxing of party control over the Soviet people. He also stressed that external operations, including espionage and subversion throughout the world, showed no signs of decreasing during that period (1974) and would only increase in both number and boldness. (Conquest, Crozier, and Elliot, 1974: 5) An analytical treatment of this trend can be found in an article written by Paul Wohl for The Christian Science Monitor in early 1975. After noting Andropovs ascendance to prominence, Wohl addressed the nature of increasing KGB operations, stating that "Mr. Andropovs prominence coincided 102

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with the emergence of a new life style in foreign and domestic policy --hard line without being Stalinist." Expanding on this theme, he cited a letter from Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko to United States Secretary of state Henry Kissinger denying any_commitment to a more lenient emigration policy toward Soviet Jews.(Wohl, 1975: 1) Although Brezhnev allowed Andropov to take a hard line against internal dissidence, Wahl does point out, unlike Stalin, Andropov never resorted to the use of terror. The methods for handling internal dissidence changed systematically during Khrushchev's reign and operations against dissidents were carried out in greater numbers under Brezhnevs guidance. The CPSU ensured that terror was no longer a viable mechanism for control and because of this, Brezhnev had to resort to more precise forms of control. Violence was replaced with more sophisticated psychological tactics. Frequently the dissidents the KGB was trying to suppress were intellectuals. Therefore the KGB officials had to be well-educated to be persuasive at their level. Under Brezhnevs tenure the KGB became a more educated and professional organization.(Knight, 1988: 159-60) Typically, the West has a common notion that the KGB is staffed with 103

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crude individuals, who have bushy eyebrows, wear baggy suits, and speak with thick accents. Nothing could be further from the truth. The KGB is an elite organization composed of well-educated and sophisticated individuals. All of these reforms in the organization were progressive compared to the thug-like mentality of the earlier security services. It is necessary to address the political environment of the Soviet Union during the latter half of the 1960's to fully understand the importance of and circumstances under which the KGB's resurgence occurred. Khrushchev's liberal reforms created internal movements that Brezhnev eventually felt had to be suppressed. Brezhnev knew that the KGB was the only agency strong enough to deal effectively with the dissenting populace. Furthermore, to capitalize on the situation the KGB singled out well known individuals that could. be made public examples. By doing this the KGB took on the role of defending the homeland from dissenters that were trying to destroy the state. Documentary evidence of the resurgent KGB repression on the domestic scene began to become available as early as 1972 when perhaps the soviet 104

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Union's greatest nuclear physicist, Andrei Dmitrevich Sakharov, in writing to the Central Committee stated: . With hurt and alarm I am forced to note, in the wake of illusory liberalism, the growth of restrictions on ideological freedom, of striving to suppress information not controlled by the government, of persecution for political and ideological reasons, of an international exacerbation of national [minority] problems. The wave of political arrests in the first months of 1972 is particularly alarming ... The use of psychiatry for political purposes is extraordinarily dangerous in its consequences for society and completely intolerable ... The persecution and destruction of religion has been conducted with persistence and cruelty ... (Barron, 1974: 16-17) Sakharov's plea was ignored and domestic operations were increased. Sakharov himself became a target for repression. was particularly intent on justifying the KGB's actions; he dwelt on this theme at some length in his Dzerzhinsky anniversary speech in September of 1977. Here he denied propaganda to the effect that: the Soviet system does not tolerate independent thinking by its citizens and persecutes anyone who thinks differently that is, other than as prescribed by the official line. It is a difficult matter when a few people who have torn themselves from our society take the path of anti-Soviet activity, break the law, supply the West with slanderous information, sow false rumors and try to organize various antisocial sorties.(Harvey and Kohler, 1978: 6) Further, in planning for the 1980 Summer Olympics, it appeared that the KGB was forced to crackdown 105

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even more repressively on the perpetrators of the crimes Andropov specified. In an article in The Observer of November 1979, Vladimir Bukovsky, a Russian human rights campaigner, who had been studying in Cambridge since his release from a Soviet prison in i976, appealed for support for his friends: ... now threatened by the KGB campaign to "cleanse" the USSR before the 1980 Olympics: "Unless a broad-based campaign of protest develops in the West in the immediate future, the political arrests in Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev and the Baltic will multiply rapidly in the coming weeks." (Conquest, Crozier, and Elliot, 1979: 4) Indeed KGB internal operations escalated significantly, culminating, with the arrest and exile of Andrei Sakharov and his wife for what was reported in Izvestia as "embarking on the road of open calls to reactionary circles or imperialist states to interfere in the USSR's internal affairs."(Klose, 1980: A28) In a Washington Post editorial, Peter Osnos provided a detailed account of the continuous KGB attacks and harassment of Sakharov starting in 1972. This campaign was waged as part of their internal operations to break down and stamp out the crimes against the State that were described by Andropov in his Dzerzhinsky anniversary speech.(Osnos, 1980: A19) 106

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We also see an escalation beginning during Brezhnev's tenure in reviewing the KGB's foreign operations. This increase may be attributed to moves toward detente to a large degree. Many Soviet analysts viewed detente as a mechanism for increasing the KGB's ability to infiltrate Western countries. (Binder, 1975: 14) The massive expansion of KGB foreign operations was clearly witnessed in the number of espionage cases that were uncovered and in the extensive disinformation campaigns that the Soviets undertook during this period. Regarding the magnitude of Soviet foreign intelligence operations in the late 70s, former Federal Bureau of Investigation director of counterintelligence W. Raymond Wannall states: "in magnitude and intensity, the Russians' current subversive campaign exceeds any they have mounted against us since World War II."(Barron, 1978: 78) Brezhnev realized the of the security police to the survival and successful functioning of the Soviet regime. One important operation Brezhnev employed the KGB for was controlling internal dissident movements. He depended on the KGB's assistance in combatting the internal uprisings which were damaging to the domestic environment Brezhnev 107

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was trying to bring stability. To deal with this problem, Brezhnev made organizational changes in the security structure and expanded the KGB's role in the domestic environment. During the period, the KGB closely maintained and took action against intellectuals that were responsible for internal uprisings. 108

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CHAPTER 10 LEGALITY Upon assuming the leadership after Khrushchev, the Soviet domestic environment was incredibly unstable. Brezhnev entered at a time that stability was crucial for his leadership to be successful. At the time, the majority of the Western media made Brezhnev out to be a very harsh ruler, when in fact he was trying to bring the soviet economy as well as the populace some stability. Brezhnevs relationship with the KGB was an important factor in his leadership of the Kremlin. He was more involved with the security service than Khrushchev because he relied on their efforts to enforce stability. His efforts to bring stability were clearly related to the degree of his involvement with the security service. Also by maintaining a close relationship with the KGB organization, Brezhnev was able to keep a watchful eye over the general populace as well as his own political adversaries. This is one of the many reasons Brezhnev positioned his political cadre in strategic areas within the ranks of the organization. He also ensured that the

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KGB's status was elevated to a respectable level and had the authority to carry out their programs. Khrushchev's tenure as head of the Soviet state had come to an end thus terminating a period of subordination of the KGB, which proved beneficial for the leaders of the state security apparatus. Soon .the process of ascendancy would begin again for the security organization under the reign of Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev. In December of 1965, a statute was createdthat extended the investigative authority of the KGB in dealing with economic crimes. Particularly, internal affairs were upgraded as anti-corruption and economic crimes came to the forefront as enemies of the state. Not long after Andropov's appointment, the KGB took on the initiative to combat economic crimes, specific cases reside in Azerbaidzhan and the Ukraine. Andropov particularly focused on high level party members in these areas.(Azrael, 1989: 21) This focus was not restricted to the common classes, even senior officials and high ranking party members were under close supervision of the KGB. Many elite CPSU members were placed in compromising positions where they eventually lost their posts of authority. Ultimately, the KGB seemed to be involved in nearly 110

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every internal crime committed. Eventually this effort fell by the way side (until Andropov's interest in battling corruption for his own motives became a major operation.) Even though this initiative began after Andropov assumed the leadership of the KGB, he may not have been entirely its motivating factor. Tsvigun and Tsinev were strong actors in the campaign. The importance of this is that, "Brezhnev was the prime mover behind what turns out on close inspection to have been factionally-motivated "abuses" of the power of the KGB.''(Azrael, 1989: 21-23) Brezhnev applied this anti-corruption coperation against his opponents. The danger didn't lie so much in the KGB's vested authority over the anti-corruption campaign, but rather in one man's personal use of that legality for his own advancement. Brezhnev initiatied the anti-corruption campaign for the KGB because he knew this operation would be successful in damaging his opponents as well as furthering his own leadership. Dissent While Khrushchev's reforms resulted in a more open society, with fewer restrictions on 111

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communications and artistic expression, the environment took a dramatic turn when Brezhnev began to re-Stalinize. Brezhnev enlisted the KGB to crackdown on public dissent and other liberal forms of expression. Brezhnev was extremely concerned at tackling internal dissent; early in his reign (February 1966) he was confronted with what became an internationally known case, the trial of Andrei Siniavskii and Yuli Daniel. The two Soviet writers had smuggled their literary writings out of the Soviet Union because they were outside the acceptable limitations of published works. The two were eventually tried under Article 70 of the RSFSR Criminal Code, of "Anti-Soviet Agitation and _Propaganda."(Barry and Barner-Barry, 1987: 225) The trial in fact greater uprisings for which Brezhnev relied on the KGB to repress. The cultural arts and literary world were extremely stifled during this period. Name Change: Committee for State Security of USSR Council of Ministers Becomes the Committee for State Security of the USSR Brezhnev orchestrated a very and significant step in the KGB's status on 6 July 1978, when the organization was given a new name. This 112

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name change signaled the KGB's increased status in the Soviet political system; after this event the KGB was no longer subordinate to the Council of Ministers. This fact was initially overlooked in the West. One possible reason for that could have been the Soviet's outward treatment of this change; it was obscurely published in Pravda. The Official Party Line Explanation Izvestia announced that by unanimously approving a draft law on the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the Soviet of the USSR had decreed in part "in accordance with the Constitution of the USSR and the laws of the USSR on the USSR Council of Ministers . to rename the Committee for state Security (KGB) of the USSR council of Ministers (pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR): Committee for State Security of the USSR." Simultaneously commenting on this aspect of the new bill with regard to the KGB change, Premier Kosygin stated, "As is well known in recent years the rights of the ministries and departments in the USSR have been expanded. Practice has shown that the measures taken in this direction have on the whole given positive results."(Conquest, Crozier, and Elliot, 1978: 3) This first official pronouncement 113

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regarding this very important change described it as purely administrative in nature. Kosygin's remarks hinted that bureaucratic streamlining was being aimed to bring management and operations in line to be more efficient. The fact is that the name chan9e marked a rise of the KGB above the Council of Ministers, to which it had been subordinated under Nikita Khrushchev. Due to its title change, the KGB became responsible only to the very highest echelon of the Central Party organ, a status held previously only during the rule of Stalin. Once again the security organs had come under the rule of a select few, mainly Brezhnev and Andropov. Subsequent treatment of this issue by Soviet newspapers on 7 July proved equally as vague and unassuming, regarding the change in the status of the KGB. The issue was addressed in a few pages that were devoted to the work of the ninth session of the Supreme Soviet, but it was for the most part, overlooked in the West. on the surface there seemed to be little significance in the move; the KGB remained the KGB. Article 26 of the new law on the USSR Council of Ministers listed twelve Union Republic State Committees of the USSR, of which the KGB came eleventh (after Forestry), and it stood out 114

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from the others only in that it began with the word "Committee" rather than "State" as did the rest.(Conquest, Crozier, and Elliot, 1978: 3) Further treatment of this issue was found in a Radio Liberty Research article dated 1 August 1978 and entitled "The New Law on the USSR Council of Ministers." Here Christian Duevel provided a review of the textual changes that appeared in the upgraded status. He advised that the new law on the USSR Council of Ministers, which was adopted at the session of the USSR supreme Soviet on 5 July 1978, featured a number of important organizational and administrative changes, ranging from minor to extensive. Duevel addressed the change affecting the KGB as merely part of an effort to create a single type of State Committee of the USSR in place of the three that previously existed: the State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers, the State Committee attached to the USSR Council of Ministers, and the State Committee of the USSR.[l] Still further interpretations viewed the name change as simply one more step in the series of events that had marked the ascendance of the organization during Brezhnev's tenure. (Some sources don't even address this transformation of the 115

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security apparatus, e.g. Breslauer, Barron, Corson and Crowley.) It is possible many Western analysts didn't understand the levels of control under which the KGB operated. Another possibility for the little attention it received is that the change merely formalized an already acknowledged fact that the authority for the operation of the state security apparatus rested with the Communist Party as a whole and not with the state machinery headed by Kosygin and the Council of Ministers. Practical/Functional Implications A very important and significant event lies at the heart of all this low-key treatment. Despite the rather trivial Izvestia pronouncement and Kosygin's evasiveness and avoidance of detail in his remarks, a very profound observation was made in the 28 September 1978 issue of the Soviet Analyst in an article entitled "The KGB Expands Its Influence." Here Robert Conquest states: ... there is clearly a considerable difference in the functions of the KGB and, for example, the State Committee of the USSR for Professional and Technical Education. The Council of Ministers now has even less control than before over the KGB. The organization's head is now in the Council of Ministers by law, which formerly was not the case. 116

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Further, Kosygin might well have been alluding to the expanding role of the KGB when he said: "The government's tasks in further strengthening State discipline, raising the responsibility of all administrative organs and officials towards the task entrusted to them and increasing investigation into the fulfillment of decisions of the Party and Government also find reflection in the new Bill."(Conquest, Crozier, and Elliot, 1978: 3) From a practical perspective, author Paul Wohl analyzes the genuine effects of this change in an 11 October 1978 article in The Christian Science Monitor entitled "Moscow's KGB Gets New Power, Soviet Union Restores Some of Its Authority." Wohl states that the change was of genuine and far reaching significance in that it gave back some of the power and status held by the KGB under stalin. Wohl also commented that because the KGB officially recouped some of the status that it held under Stalin, fewer limits would be imposed on the KGB's authority (a reduction in status for which KGB officers never forgave Khrushchev). He supported this comment by noting the marked increase in KGB activities both within and outside of the USSR, during this time period. Examples of increased operations are cited both in Wohl's article and the 28 September 1978 Soviet Analyst. Paramount among those noted are the 117

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cases of the late Nikolai Bukharin and Georgi Markov.(Wohl, 11 October 1978) Another article on the subject is taken from a translation of an article by Avtorkhanov that appeared in Posev in September of 1978. Here the author addressed the name change and was in general agreement with Wahl's analysis, especially regarding the ascendance of the KGB under Brezhnev and the return of nearly all of the power wielded by the organization under Stalin. The main exception he noted from Stalin's tenure was that the KGB was no longer used violently as a primary mechanism against or within the Party.(Avtorkhanov, 1978: 5) Avtorkhanov also accentuated the fact that the KGB had reached these levels without resorting to the unchecked use of terror that was prevalent during Stalin's state security apparatus. Brehnev had ensured that he surrounded himself with his own infrastructure of support in the security organization. Therefore, he could count on the majority of the key positions in the KGB to be loyal to his leadership. Certainly, Brezhnevs employment of the KGB as partisan weapon in consolidating his power was a vital source to his long tenure in the Soviet 118

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leadership. Brezhnev had successfully altered the security organization enough to legally change the KGB's government status. These changes gave the KGB more leeway in dealing with domestic problems as well as possible opposition to Brezhnevs leadership. Notes 1. The Committee for State Security attached to the USSR Council of Ministers had consequently been renamed Committee for State Security of the USSR (KGB). The All-Union Association of the USSR Council of Ministers had been simultaneously renamed State Committee of the USSR for the Supply ofProduction Equipment to Agriculture. The Central statistical Administration attached to the USSR Council of Ministers had become the Central Statistical Administration of the USSR. In a related development, the Main Administration of State Material Reserves attached to the USSR Council of Ministers was upgraded into a State Committee of the USSR for Material Reserves.(Dueyel, 1978: 2) 119

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CHAPTER 11 ANDROPOV'S RISE The appointment of the KGB director was critical to both Brezhnev and Andropov's careers. Andropov was not in political alliance with any particular faction at the time; due to this fact, he was an easy choice for the party membership to agree upon. However, Brezhnev was not strong enough to put in the man of his choice, but Andropov was considered a neutral that Brezhnev could agree to. It is important to remember that even though the soviet general secretary is very powerful, the leadership is still a collective body and during this period the collective voice was prevalent on issues as important as the security organization. Party members didn't want Brezhnev to put in one of his own loyalists and be able to resort to Stalinist control over the policing structure. Brezhnev agreed to Andropov's appointment on the condition that Tsvigun was appointed as First Deputy Chairman of the KGB and Viktor Chebrikov as Andropovs Deputy for Cadres. (Azrael, 1989: 20) By agreeing to Andropov's appointment, Brezhnev endorsed a man who had begun a successful career

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under Stalin, who had no previous KGB associations or loyalties, who was ten years older than Semichastny (making him ten years closer to Brezhnev's own age), and a man who would be able to lead the KGB back to the premier position (within those boundaries acceptable_to Brezhnev's own personal methodology) that it had enjoyed under stalin. Andropov lost his Secretaryship of the Party Central Committee by accepting the KGB position. It is apparent from Andropov's memoirs that he did not see his own appointment as a promotion. Yet, the chain of events that followed make it pretty clear that Andropov's selection for KGB chairman was the political stepping stone that he needed to build his own power. His compensation was elevation to membership in the Politburo as a candidate 1970: 248) Yuri Andropov had not been affiliated with the KGB prior to May of 1967 like his predecessors under Khrushchev. Rather, he had worked successfully in the Komsomol through the height of the Stalin terror to become Komsomol First Secretary in the new Karelo-Finnish republic, transferring to the party machine as Second Secretary in Petrozavodsk in 1944 and Party Second Secretary for the entire Republic in 1947. He was brought to Moscow to work in the 121

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apparatus of the Central Committee in 1951 like many of Stalin's favorites.(Conquest, Crozier, and Elliot, 1974: 5) From 1953 to 1957 Andropov served in the Soviet Embassy in Budapest and then as Ambassador in 1956. As Ambassador, he played an important role in crushing the Hungarian uprising and installing the puppet Kadar regime. In 1957 he returned to the Soviet Union to receive a promotion as head of the Central Committee department for relations with Communist Parties in Socialist Countries. In 1961 he was elected to the Central Committee ofthe Communist Party of the Soviet Union and was appointed Secretary of the Central Committee in 1962.(Conquest, Crozier, and Elliot, 1974: 5) It is surprising to see that Andropov's career even prospered under Brezhnev in light of the fact that Brezhnev did not hand pick Andropov. It would appear that Brezhnev learned to trust Andropov somewhere along the line of his dictatorship. Most of Khrushchev's wide reforms were being curtailed at the end of his tenure only to meet head on with Brezhnev's crackdown and employment of the KGB. {This was particularly important to Brezhnev during the economic slump of the Soviet economy.) Brezhnev made sure that Andropov had the political 122

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pillars to carry out the KGB's functions as well as his own methodology. Andropov certainly carried his goals to Brezhnevs level and was able to build an exclusive (and often misunderstood) relationship. The KGB as well as Andropov mutually benefited from the grand publicity campaign that was carried out under the auspices of Brezhnev. (Knight, 1988: 86) Largely, Andropov was the main force behind the KGB's increased public stature and he benefited in building his own power by doing so. Realistically, Brezhnev probably did not oppose these initiatives; Brezhnev had invested a great deal of his effort into the KGB for his own political base. In September of 1976 Andropov gained even more authority when he was promoted to the rank of Army General; this had not been done since the early days of Beria. Brezhnev failed to realize Andropov's own political ambitions and the power base that he had developed by working as the head of the KGB. It became evident in the late '70s that Andropov was building his own support, while Brezhnev still believed Andropov to be politically loyal. By being responsible for nominating and appointing numerous deputy chairman in the KGB, Andropov built his own support. Apparently Brezhnev did not understand that 123

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Andropov was building his own coalition that would later turn against Brezhnev's power. If Brezhnev had, he certainly would have vetoed a large portion of Andropov's appointments. This further supports the theory that Andropov's own political ambitions coincided with his initiative in instilling the anti-corruption campaign. A notable increase in the economic afflictions once again became a primary concern during the late 70s and early 80s. The KGB had the most accurate and detailed information about the economy and the public attitude out of any organization in the Soviet Union. In addition, the KGB was one of the few.bodies that was relatively free of corruption. (Azrael, 1989: 27) Historical evidence supports this theory that Andropov used the corruption campaign for his own political advances as a weapon in an effort to uproot the Brezhnev mafia that was seated in the party bureaucracy and even to dilute members of the MVD. (See Corson and Crowley, 1986: 13-15, or Azrael, 1989: 24-28) The KGB publicly humiliated the MVD for their dismal efforts in curbing economic crime and by doing so the KGB took on this initiative. The KGB's justification was that these economic had 124

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serious implications for the security of the state. Yet, Andropov knew many of the Brezhnev loyalists were corrupted and this would be the easiest way to damage their power base. Andropov thoroughly investigated Brezhnevs family and relatives and their ties to the underworld. Even though Andropov had access to a great deal of incriminating evidence, at the time he didn't have the political base or the power to support uprooting Brezhnev. However, it didn't take long for Andropov to envision himself as Brezhnevs successor to the general secretary; reports proliferated supporting this transition.(Peck, 1979: 2) The incriminating evidence about Brezhnevs relatives and friends came out at a critical time and was crucial for Andropovs success in establishing his credibility. Furthermore, he depended on the KGB's support for removing any opposition on charges of corruption. Many mainstream analysts do not even address this issue, but only recite the events. Andropov was able to secure control over the KGB as well as be in a position to threaten those that Brezhnev had placed in high levels. For certain, Andropov was the major force behind eliminating Brezhnevs most likely successors between 1978 and 1980. 125

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Unexpectedly in January of 1982, First Deputy Chairman Semen Tsvigun, "Brezhnev's most influential ally in the KGB," died. Within a week, Mikhail Suslov "one of the most powerful men in the party leadership," also died. There are many theories as to the death of these men, but most are annotated with Andropov's detailed investigations into their background.(Knight, 1988: 88) It is of no great shock that these deaths were to Andropov's benefit; his political stature rose considerably there after. Near Brezhnev's final years, it is clear that there was conflict between Brezhnev and Andropov, ultimately with Andropov being the winner. Whether Brezhnev was just too weak to fight or he gave in to Andropov's political ambitions we will never know. We do know that Andropov had access to enough information and the know how to use it that he didn't experience substantial barriers to Brezhnev's succession. Konstantin Chernenko was the only one who posed a threat to Andropov and initially Chernenko was in the fore-front, but Andropovs control over the KGB allowed him to succeed Brezhnev.[1] Surprisingly, many scholars rarely credit Andropovs chairmanship of the KGB as a notable component. Furthermore, when his leadership 126

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was acknowledged most scholars referred to his security affiliation as an obstacle to his succeeding Brezhnev.(See Bialer, 1986: 86, or Colton, 1986: 98) However, there is an abundance of facts that proves otherwise. Azrael says, "It is almost certain, for example, that some members of the Soviet establishment backed Andropov precisely because of his KGB background and affiliation."(Azrael, 1989: 26) The older and more conservative membership in the CPSU feared that the USSR could and probably would fall into economic decline and social unrest, unless the KGB was permitted to maintain order. For this reason, as well as the fact that many had watched Andropov bring down his own opposition, there was a wide range of support for Andropovs succession. Azrael further comments, "In effect, Andropov intimidated Brezhnev into giving him a lien on the general secretaryship of the party in return for a promise to defer collection for the remainder of Brezhnevs life and to assume a truce with the ranking Brezhnevites for a decent interlude thereafter."(Azrael, 1989: vi) Azraels commentary is thought provoking, but perhaps a bit too conclusive for the known evidence. Although his commentary appears in the preview of the text, Azrael 127

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offers little justification for his strong conclusion. In fact, he hardly uses any citations.(See Azrael, 1989: 28-31) Jeremy Azrael cites the following events that occurred: ... By the spring of 1982, Andropovs campaign for the succession had gained such momentum that Brezhnev himself could no longer be confident of riding it out, let alone of overriding it on behalf of Chernenko. In consequence, he apparently tried to buy time by striking a deal with Andropov at Chernenko1s expense. It is impossible to say whether his efforts culminated in the conclusion of an explicit agreement. However, they probably resulted in a mutual understanding that Andropov would be given a lien on the general secretaryship in return for a promise to defer collection for the remainder of Brezhnevs life, or at lest for a decent interlude. This can be inferred from the fact that Brezhnevs increased willingness to negotiate on Andropovs terms in the spring of 1982 was followed by a marked relaxation of KGB pressure on Brezhnevs relatives and cronies in the summer and fall. The first clear sign that Brezhnevs resistance was weakening came in late May, when Andropov was reappointed to the Central Committee Secretariat-this time, by virtue of his concurrent membership on the Politburo, as a senior party secretary. Because it required him to give up the chairmanship of the KGB, this appointment was a mixed blessing from Andropovs point of view, especially as he was not allowed to designate his own successor. Nevertheless, he had reportedly been seeking the appointment for some time to broaden his power base and enhance the legitimacy of his candidacy for the post of general secretary.(Azrael, 1989: 28) Apparently Brezhnev accepted the situation on the condition that Vitaly Fedorchuk be Andropovs 128

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successor as chairman of the KGB. Fedorchuk was loyal to Brezhnev; Andropov probably had to accept this minor detail as a compromise for his position. Brezhnev died in November 1982 and Andropov was inaugurated unanimously as general secretary. A short.time thereafter Fedorchuk became chairman of the KGB. If Brezhnev had lived longer its possible that he would have tried to use Fedorchuk and the KGB against Andropov. However, it is unlikely Fedorchuk could have done much because Andropov had sixteen years of power built in KGB subordinates. on the other hand, Andropov had built enough of a power base that he could. get rid of Fedorchuk, but he wasnt strong enough to pick a political ally to direct the KGB. Andropov was successful in demonstrating that the KGB could be a very pervasive force in party careers and political offices. He successfully carried out many programs (e.g., anti-corruption, KGB1s popularity campaign) for Brezhnev that contributed to his own political standing. In May of 1982 Andropov went from the KGB into the Secretariat via use of the security apparatus that he helped to build and mold. 129

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Notes 1. As a note of interest: Even Chernenko went to great lengths to publicize his own status as a former Chekist citing his earlier service in the border guards.(Pravda 27 May 1987) 130

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CHAPTER 12 CONCLUSION stalin's successors were unable to establish nonpartisan control over the police or even politically neutralize their efforts. In fact, as I have tried to demonstrate, players in the Kremlin did everything possible to involve the security apparatus as a formidable weapon. As a result, the KGB became actively involved in elite Soviet politics. A review of the events recounted in these volumes and articles provides a picture which portrays the importance of the KGB in the eras of both Khrushchev and Brezhnev. The evidence shows, the KGB was a vital organ to both the government and party politics in the Soviet Union, under their tenures. I have tried to use the evidence to support that both Khrushchev and Brezhnev had a relationship with the KGB, but at varying levels, impacted largely by their personal styles of leadership. Even with the available historical evidence, there is still little research devoted tothe KGB and the changes that the system has undergone since the Stalin era. Timothy Colton said the KGB has "never exercised much independent influence over grand

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decisions" and they are no longer significant enough to be solicited by "warring groups within the party."(Colton, 1986: 98) There is enough historical evidence to support the hypothesis that the KGB has, since the days of Stalin had significant relationships with the Kremlin leadership and at times proven to have an influential role in government and party politics. Definately Colton's assessment is more in line with the current Soviet political environment. Both Khrushchev and Brezhnev are primary examples of more than a casual relationship with the KGB. Although each had a different approach in dealing with the organization, both leaders did employ their support and made substantial changes in the KGB in three significant aspects: politically, legally, and organizationally. Khrushchev's relationship with the KGB organization is far more complex to understand than that of Brezhnev. While Khrushchev madeefforts to reduce the role of the KGB both for political and governmental means, he also realized that he needed their support and assistance to maintain stability. His domestic reforms had a significant impact on the political realm within which the KGB operated Khrushchev tried to introduce substantial changes 132

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that often uprooted the status quo domestically as well as in the KGB. However, by the time he realized that the KGB was vital for retaining domestic stability he had alienated their ranks and lost their support. Khrushchev's curtailment of the use of terror through legal means was a positive move, but he didn't move quick enough to replace this control with something of equal authority. Instead of relying entirely on the KGB to carry out policing actions, Khrushchev took steps to increase mass participation, (with the incorporation of comrade courts) which reduced the KGB's role in the domestic environment. These legal modifications developed a .greater barrier in his relationship with the organization. It was too late when he tried to reverse this trend and give the KGB more judicial authority. In the political arena, Khrushchev made attempts to establish the security service as a nonpartisan tool and downplay the role of the KGB in essentially every aspect. At the same time, he tried to establish a relationship with the security service by placing his own political allies within the organization. By doing this, Khrushchev was able to utilize their support in removing his own opposition 133

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as well as retaining power in the June crisis. Ultimately, Khrushchev's failure to establish a significant bond with a large percentage of the KGB organization had an impact on their enforcement of his policies as well as his tenure. Even if Khrushchev would have wanted to build a strong coalition in the KGB, it is highly unlikely that he would have been able to do so because Stalin's abuses of the security serVice were still prevalent in the minds of the CPSU. Furthermore, Khrushchev's efforts to downplay the role of the KGB later came to be destructive to his own leadership because he didn't have their support in October of 1964. Where Khrushchev didn't have the available support for his initiatives because he had alienated the KGB with many of his reforms, Brezhnev was able to support his policies and leadership with the help of a loyal security apparatus. We might even go as far to say that the KGB developed into a very distinct organ with its own upwardly mobile force, if not its own political agenda. On the other hand, Brezhnev had a significant and supportive relationship with the KGB. Curbs on cultural freedom, the crackdown on dissent, and the process of re-Stalinization marked the programs 134

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Brezhnev implemented that relied on the KGB's support. His relationship with the KGB was more involved than Khrushchevs because he took an active role in almost all aspects of the security organization. More importantly, the KGB was able to bring to Soviet society at a time'that was crucial to Brezhnev's retention of power. Another important element in this relationship was the dramatic advancements in the ascendance of the KGB organization and personnel under Brezhnev. The KGB came a long way toward recouping the vast power that it held under Stalin, and completely emerged from the subordination it experienced under Khrushchev. In return, Brezhnev remained secure in his position, while simultaneously knowing that he had a strong state security service to facilitate and back his policies. Brezhnev also tried to avoid conflict with the KGB by satisfying their organizational interests. Amy Knight takes the approach that because Brezhnev reinstated Stalinism, the security police were able to maintain legitimate control and at the same time support Brezhnev.(Knight, 1988: 80) Unlike Khrushchev, Brezhnev assured the KGB had the status 135

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and legitimate authority to be an effective organizat.ion. Politically, Brezhnev ensured that he built support among different coalitions instead of pocketing his_support in the party. Brezhnev was particularly concerned with building a strong political base in the security structure. The Dnepropetrovsk Mafia made up a significant portion the prominent posts within the KGB. After placing several of his proteges in the KGB, I he had a stake in enhancing the authority and prestige of the of organization. This established a close bond between Brezhnev and the KGB's operations. Further,, the presence of his allies in KGB leadership was a source of strength for Brezhnev, at the same time, the KGB was able to communicate directly with the elite party echelons. Brezhnev attempted to establish the equilibrium between an effective security service and maintaining control over the policing power. While he instituted many changes in the KGB and increased their power, he kept a close relationship with the organization he could have control over their operations. He realized the importance of the security apparatus to his own leadership and for the most part, he 136

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prevented the KGB from gaining enough power to be threatening to his own leadership. For the extended period of time Brezhnev held power he was successful. At the very end of Brezhnev's tenure, Andropov began a campaign to increase his own political standing at Brezhnev's expense. Andropov played an instrumental role in the party appointments. Further, Andropov oversaw the KGB's popularity campaign which gave him valuable status within the the higher party levels. He also carried out the anti-corruption campaign against Brezhnev loyalists that posed opposition to his advancement into the Secretariat. To the extent that there was a relationship between Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and the KGB, the security service has indeed been a part of Kremlin politics. The major difference in the KGB's role in Soviet society and government has been determined by the approach of the varying leaders. Although Western data does little to support this notion, the evidence compiled here should at least warrant further research in this area. With the Soviet environment changing daily, the role of the KGB is coming under the fire of Gorbachev's reforms. What role the security apparatus will play in the future 137

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of the Soviet Union will largely be determined by the leader's relationship to the organization at the time. Regardless what the future may hold, clearly in the past the security apparatus had a significant relationship with the Russian leaders. 138

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APPENDIX Milestones in the KGB's Ascendance 5 March 1953 Stalin's death 7 March 1953 Beria consolidated the MVD and MGB and assumed command of the state security apparatus as Chief of the MVD. 26 June 1953 Beria arrested and removed as head of the state security apparatus. December 1953 Beria executed. 1955 Khrushchev in control of the CPSU. 1954 Khrushchev sought to limit the power of the state security apparatus while restoring the Leninist principle of Socialist Legality. Beria's remaining supporters in the KGB were purged. 13 March 1954 The. security service was separated from the MVD and the KGB was formed under Serov. He was chosen because of his organizational capabilities and affiliation with Khrushchev. February 1956 Khrushchev decried the excesses of the past and proclaimed the success of the KGB's rehabilitation at the 20th Party Congress. 9 December 1958 Shelepin became Chairman of the KGB. He was chosen because Khrushchev believed he now needed a leader with political finesse. 28 January 1959 Khrushchev hailed the revamped role of the KGB while emphasizing the external aspects of its mission at the Extraordinary 21st Party Congress.

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5 February 1959 Shelepin reinforced the theme that Khrushchev had set only days earlier in his speech to the 21st Party Congress: "The sword of the security service was now pointed primarily at the enemies of the Soviet Union and spies." 18 May 1959 An All-Union Congress of the leading workers of the state security organs was held. 1961 Andropov became a member of the CC/CPSU 17 October 1961 Khrushchev hailed the role of the state security apparatus as defender against foreign Imperialist aggression at the 22nd Party Congress. 31 October 1961 Semichastny replaced Shelepin and became a candidate member of the CC/CPSU. 14 October 1964 Khrushchev was removed and Brezhnev became Party First Secretary. November 1964 Semichastny became a full member of the CC/CPSU. Shelepin became a full member of the Presidium; having previously had no candidacy status. December 1965 A statute was released that gave the KGB tremendous authority for dealing with economic crimes. 29 March 1966 Brezhnev proclaimedthe success of the KGB in its work against external forces in his opening speech at the 23rd Party Congress: "The agencies of state security and our glorious border guards are vigilantly on duty exposing and preventing the intrigues of Imperialist intelligence services and their agents." May 1967 Semichastny removed as KGB chairman. 140

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18 May 1967 Andropov became Chairman of the KGB. He was chosen because of his previous record, non-affiliation with the KGB and because Brezhnev viewed Semichastny as a possible threat. July 1967 Andropov became a candidate member of the Politburo, CC/CPSU. 20 December 1967 A commemorative stamp was issued in honor of the 50th Anniversary of the Security Service. 20 December 1967 Andropov presented a speech on the occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the Security Service: "Fifty years in the Struggle for Security of the Soviet peoples." 1968 Department "D" was retitled Department "A" and its operations were upgraded and expanded. 1969 The 5th Chief Directorate was formed to obliterate political dissent. 1967 1970 Tsvigun, Tsinev, and Chebrikov were given key KGB positions. 30 March 1971 Brezhnev praised the KGB's vigilance, absolute observance of Socialist legality and continued success in its struggle to safeguard Soviet society against the actions and intrigues of Imperialist intelligence services at the 24th Party Congress. April 1973 Andropov became a full member of the Politburo, CC/CPSU in recognition of the vital role of the KGB in expanding Soviet policy at home and abroad. He was the first KGB Chief to attain such status since Beria. 141

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24 June 1974 Andropov was awarded the Order of Lenin on the occasion of his 60th birthday in recognition of his active part in developing and implementing domestic and foreign policies. September 1974 Ignatiev was awarded the Order of the October Revolution. He was stalin' last Chief of the Security Service and was responsible for the Doctor's Plot. 28 October 1975 The award of the Order of Service to the Homeland was created for KGB and MVD personnel. 10 September 1976 Andropov became a (four star) General of the Armies of the USSR; the highest rank attainable in the Soviet military system. 4 May 1977 Tsinev, a KGB Deputy Chairman, was awarded the Order of Hero of Socialist Labor, with a gold medal bearing a Hammer and sickle, for services rendered in assuring the security of the State. He became the first KGB Deputy to be so honored in the history of the state security apparatus. 9 September 1977 Andropov presented the principal address at the Dzerzhinsky 100th anniversary celebration at the Bolshoi: "Communist Conviction is the Great Form of the Builders of the New World." 27 September 1977 Tsvigun was awarded the Order of Hero of Socialist Labor. He became the original First Deputy Chairman of the KGB to be so honored; however, public acknowledgement of this unusual award was only made in Pravda on 27 December 1977. 20 December 1977 A Commemorative stamp was issued in honor of the 100th anniversary of Dzerzhinsky's birth. The KGB simultaneously celebrated the 60th anniversary of the State Security Service. Andropov presided at the ceremonies and Tsinev delivered the principal address: "Sixty Years of the Security Guard of the Soviet Fatherland." 142

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27 June 1978 Andropov was awarded the highest Peruvian military medal for contributions to the two countries developing and expanding relationship; the Grand Cross for Military Service. 6 July 1978 The KGB was renamed. The Committee for State Security of the USSR Council of Ministers became the Committee for State Security of the USSR. 5 August 1978 Andropov delivered a speech, as the representative of the Party, in presentation of the Order of the Red Banner of Labor to the city of Petrozavodsk. His address dealt with American Hawks, Doves, and the nature of Detente. 27 December 1978 Three full Generals of the USSR Army were conferred upon Andropovs subordinates: First Deputy Tsvigun, Deputy Chairman Tsinev, and Border Guard's Chief Matrosov. These promotions were on a scale totally unprecedented in the history of both the KGB and USSR. 17 January 1979 General Tsvigun delivered a speech on "Literature and Art and the Border Guards of the Motherland" to the All-Union conference of Creative Writers in late 1978. Literaturnaya Gazeta coverage of the event was published on this date. January -March 1979 Thirteen of fourteen KGB Chiefs in the Soviet Republics, together with Andropov and Tsvigun and Chebrikov were elected, for five-year terms, to the Eleventh Supreme Soviet of the USSR. 25 May 1979 The Supreme Soviet Presidium instituted a new Military medal for the KGB, MVD, and Ministry of Defense Forces to be awarded for "strengthening of Comradeship-in-Arms." 143

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30 May 1979 A KGB Prize Committee was established for the administration and awarding of annual cash and other awards for the best Literary works and movies on Chekist operatives and Border Guards. July 1979 Rogov was appointed by the Procurator General to be Supervisor of KGB investigations. A cosmetic move designed to satisfy the requirements for Socialist Legality. 30 August 1979 Andropov was awarded the Order of the October Revolution; the "Lofty Award of the Motherland.11 1 February 1980 Pravda announced that a collection of selected speeches and articles by Andropov was to be published. The only other KGB Chiefs to be so honored were Beria and Dzerzhinsky. 10 November 1982 Death of Brezhnev, which is quickly followed by Andropovs unanimous election as general secretary. 144

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Conquest, Robert, [Crozier, and Elliot.]. 1977. "Andropov and the Future." Soviet Analyst, Vol. 6, No. 18:1-4, September 15. Conquest, Robert, 1974. [Crozier, and Elliot.] 1974. "Honours for KGB Troops." Soviet Analyst, Vol. 3, No. 12:a, June 6. Conquest, Robert, [Crozier, and Elliot.] 1974. "In the Best Chekist Tradition." Soviet Analyst, Vol. 3, No. 14:5-6, July 4. Conquest, Robert, [Crozier, and Elliot.] 1979. "KGB 'Cleansing Campaign' Before Olympics." Soviet Analyst, Vol. 8, No. 23:4-5, November 23. Conquest, Robert, [Crozier, and Elliot.] 1979. "KGB Generals Promoted." Soviet Analyst, yol. 8, No. 2:3-4, January 25. Conquest, Robert, [Crozier, and Elliot.] 1978. "Praise for Stalin's Victims --and KGB." soviet Analyst, Vol. 7, No. 19:2-4, January 12. Conquest, Robert, [Crozier, and Elliot.] 1978. "The KGB Expands Its Influence." Soviet Analyst, Vol. 7, No.2:4-5, September 28. Crozier, Brian. Drift II." January 26. 1978. "Carter's Year of Strategic soviet Analyst, Vol. 7, No. 2:4-5, Crozier, Brian. 1973. "The Peacetime strategy of the Soviet Union." Institute for the Study of Conflict Special Report, February-March. Crozier, Brian. 1978. "The Surrogate Forces of the Soviet Union." Institute for the Study of Conflict Conflict Study, No. 92, February. Fenyvesi, Charles. 1982. "The Secret Files of Mr. X." The Washington Post Magazine, July 11, pp. 22-27. "The Geriatric Race to Succeed the Ailing Brezhnev." 1982. Business Week, March 29, pp. 54-58. Harvey, Mose, and Foy Kohler eds. 1978. "Praise for KGB On Anniversary." Soviet World Outlook, Vol. 3, No. 1:6-7, January 15. 152

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Hyland, William G. 1979. "Brezhnev and Beyond." Foreign Affairs, vol. 58, pp. 51-66. Hyland, William G. 1982. "Kto Kogo in the Kremlin." Problems of Communism. January-February, pp. 17-26. "KGB: Russia's Old Boychiks." 1978. Time, February 6, pp. 25-26. Knight, Amy w. 1980. "The Powers of the Soviet KGB." survey, vol. 25 pp. 138-55. Peck, David. USSR." 1979. "Succession Problems in the Soviet Analyst, vol. 18 no. 16, August 9. "Pecking Order Vying for the Succession." 1982. Time, March 15, pp. 24-25. "Rise of a Secret Policeman." 1982. Time, June 7, pp. 44-45. Schapiro, Leonard. 1975. the CC of the CPSU." "The General Department of survey, vol. 21, pp. 53-65. Sharlet, Robert. 1977. "The New soviet Constitution." Problems of Communism, September-October, pp. 1-25. "The Soviet succession Crisis." 1982. Global Political Assessment, October-April, pp. 51-54. "Still in Charge, Brezhnev waves to the Crowd." 1982. Time, May 10, p. 36. Tucker, Robert C. 1981-82. "Stalin's Legacy." Foreign Affairs, vol. 50, pp. 414-35. Whitaker, Mark. 1982. "Brezhnev: The Final Days." Newsweek, April, pp. 30-35. 153

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NEWSPAPERS Andropov, Yuri v. 1978. Speech in Presentation of the Order of the Red Banner of Labor to the City of Petrozavodsk (Karelia), 5 August 1978, in Pravda, 6 August 1978. For trans. see FBIS, SOV-78-154, Vol. III, No. 154: R2-R7, August 9. Avtorkhanov. 1978. "What Is the Significance of the Change in the Name of the KGB?" Posev (Munchen), September, pp. 3-5 trans. Binder, David. 1975. "Detente Is Said to Give the KGB a Bigger Work Load." The New York Times, June 2, p. 14. "Canada Expels 3 Soviets for Spying on U.S." 1980. The Washington Post, January 22. Conquest, Robert. 1974. "The KGB Plays Dirty Tricks, Too." The New York Times, September 29. Doder, Dusko. 1982. "Brezhnev Once Again Is Said to Be Sick but Kremlin Is Silent." The Washington Post, April 1, p. A23. Doder, Dusko. 1982. Seriously Ill." A1. "Brezhnev Reported to Be The Washington Post, April 2, p. Doder, Dusko. 1982. "Brezhnev's Illness Fuels Speculation of Power Battle." The Washington Post, April 5, p. A1. Doder, Dusko. 1982. "For soviet Media, Silence Is Golden." The Washington Post, May 21, p. A28. Doder, Dusko. 1982. "KGB Head Andropov Wins Promotion." The Washington Post, May 25, p. Al. Doder, Dusko. 1982. "Career Officer Replaces Andropov as KGB Chief." The Washington Post, May 26, p. AS. Fenyvesi, Charles. 1982. "Suave Savy Westernized and Maybe Russia's New Leader." The Washington Post, May 30, p. C1. 154

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Frankel, Glen. 1982. "Intrigue Deceit Paranoia and Who succeeds Brezhnev." The Washington Post, May 20, p. Cl. Gallagher, Jim. 1982. "KGB Chief Laundering Self for Top Job." The Chicago Tribune, April 25, p. 29. Hough, Jerry F. 1982. "Who Is Yuri Andropov?" The Washington Post, May 27, p. A24. Kaiser, Robert G. 1982. "Defector Terms Kremlin Infighters Political Pygmies. The Washington Post, June 6, p. A1. Klose, Kevin. Rumors." 1980. "Death of Soviet General Spurs The Washington Post, March 14, p. A27. Klose, Kevin. 1980. for Subversion." 23, pp. A1, A28. "Sakharov, Wife Exiled to Gorki The Washington Post, January Kraft, Joseph. 1982. "Looking Past Brezhnev." The Washington Post, May 27, p. A24. Krasnaya Zvezda [Red Star], 30 May 1979. "Now the KGB Tries a 'Soft Sell' Approach." 1967. The Observer, December 10. Oberdorfer, Don. 1982. "US Sees Soviet Leadership in Transition." The Washington Post, April 3, p. A2. Osnos, Peter. 1975. Traditionalism." 23, pp. A1,A5. "From Russia, With The Washington Post, December Osnos, Peter. 1980. "Sakharov --A Personal Recollection." The Washington Post, January 24, p. A19. "Pravda ReviewsAnthology of Andropovs Speeches, Articles." 1980. From Pravda in Russian, February 1. For trans. see FBIS, SOV-8 0-03 0, Vol. III, No. 30:R1-R5, February 12. Schmemann, -Serge. 1982. "Moscow's Changing of the Guard at the KGB." The New York Times, May 28, p. A2. 155

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Schmemann, Serge. 1982. "New KGB Chief Named by Moscow." The New York Times, May 27. Staar, Richard F. 1979. "Moscow's Escalating Espionage." The Christian Science Monitor, December 26, p. 23. Temko, Ned. 1982. "Soviet Insiders How Power Flows in Moscow." The Christian Science Monitor, February 22, p. 1. Wohl, Paul. 1978. "Moscow's KGB Gets New Power: Soviet Union Restores Some of Its Authority." The Christian Science Monitor, October 11. Wohl, Paul. 1975. "Moscow's Two Faces: Detente vs. KGB Tactics." The Christian Science Monitor, July 30, p. 26. Wohl, Paul. 1975. "Soviet KGB Tightens Grip." The Christian Science Monitor, January 10. GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS "Brezhnev Presents Order of October Revolution to Andropov." 1979. For trans. see FBIS, SOV-79-171, Vol. III, No. 171: R1-R2, August 31. Colton, Timothy. 1986. the Spviet Union." Relations. "The Dilemma of Reform in New York: Council of Foreign Duevel, Christian. 1978. "The Internal Structure of the USSR." Radio Free Eurooe --Radio Liberty Research, RL 70/78: 1-19, March 31. Duevel, Christian. 1978. "The New Law on the USSR Council of Ministers." Radio Free Europe -Radio Liberty Research, RL 171/78: 109, August 1. Duevel, Christian. 1977. "The Number of KGB and MVD Officials in Brezhnevs Entourage Increases." Radio Free Europe --Radio Liberty Research, RL 156/77: 1-2, June 24. 156

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"Peruvian Security Chief Presents State Honor to Andropov." 1978. From Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, 2030 GMT, June 27. For trans. see FBIS, SOV-78-125, Vol. III, No. 125: N1, June 28. "Presentation of Order of Leninto Andropov." 1974. From Moscow Home Service in Russian, 1830 and 1900 GMT, June 24. Sotsialisticheskaya Zakonnost [Socialist Law]. 1979. No. 7:73, July. "Supreme Soviet Presidium Institutes New Military Medal." 1979. In Tass in English, 25 May 1979. See FBIS, SOV-79-104, Vol. III, No. 104:V3, May 25. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Is Chernenko's Star in the Ascendant? 1982. (by Elizabeth Teague.) RL55/82, February 2. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. The Foreian Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU 1980. (by Elizabeth Teague.) RL27, October 1980. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Kirilenko at 75, Chernenko at 70: What Chance Does Either Have of Succeeding Brezhnev? 1981. (by Elizabeth Teague.) RL356/81, September 16. U.S. Senate, Soviet Intelligence Collection and Operations Against the United States. 1976. Final Report of the Select Committee. Washington, D.C., Appendix III, Book I, pp. 557-62. Knight' Amy w 0 Washington, INTERVIEW 1990. Interviewed by Geri Born, D.C., April 6. 157