Citation
The all-Union Treaty and the future of the USSR

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Title:
The all-Union Treaty and the future of the USSR
Creator:
Darney, Kenneth Alvin
Place of Publication:
Denver, Colo.
Publisher:
University of Colorado Denver
Publication Date:
Language:
English
Physical Description:
vii, 115 leaves : ; 29 cm.

Thesis/Dissertation Information

Degree:
Master's ( Master of Arts)
Degree Grantor:
University of Colorado Denver
Degree Divisions:
Department of Political Science
Degree Disciplines:
Political Science
Committee Chair:
Edelstein, Joel C.
Committee Members:
Thomas, Stephen C.
Conroy, Mary S.

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords:
1985 - 1991 ( fast )
Autonomous soviet socialist republics ( lcsh )
Autonomous soviet socialist republics ( fast )
Political science ( fast )
Politics and government -- Soviet Union -- 1985-1991 ( lcsh )
Soviet Union ( fast )
Genre:
bibliography ( marcgt )
theses ( marcgt )
non-fiction ( marcgt )

Notes

Thesis:
Thesis (M.A.)--University of Colorado at Denver, 1991. Political science
Bibliography:
Includes bibliographical references.
General Note:
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree, Master of Arts, Department of Political Science.
Statement of Responsibility:
by Kenneth Alvin Darney, Jr.

Record Information

Source Institution:
University of Colorado Denver
Holding Location:
Auraria Library
Rights Management:
All applicable rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier:
25380978 ( OCLC )
ocm25380978

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Full Text
THE ALL-UNION TREATY AND THE FUTURE
OF THE USSR
!
i
Kenneth Alvin Darney Jr.
B.S.:, North Carolina State University, 1977
I |
B.A., University of Maine,1987
i
i
A thesis submitted to the
Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Colorado in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
I
Department of Political Science
I
1991


This thesis for the Master of Arts
!
degree by
i
Kenneth Alvin Darney Jr,
j
has been approved for the
I
College of
.1
Liberal Arts and Sciences
by
CX-/C 3/j Zff/
/Date?


ABSTRACT
Darney, Kenneth Alvin Jr. (M.A., Political Science)
The All-Uni(|>n Treaty and the Future of the U.S.S.R.
Thesis directed by Professor Joel c* Edelstein
i
Many in the West have not yet realized the critical
importance of the Sovietfs nationalities issue and its
impacts bn the impending collapse of the Soviet multi-
, i
national state. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
is being radically altered as a result 6f its long term
I
failure to deal with the nationalities issue* The
political!, economic, and ideological failures suffered by
the Soviet system during the last ten years are a direct
result of ttje failure of the Soviet nationalities policy
to resolve ihe critical aspects of the nationalities
resurgence in the Soviet republics.
This ttiesis examines the nationalities issue from
its roots in the Tsarist Russian empire of the 19th
,!
century through its repression under Stalinism to its
i
resurgence during the reforms of the 1980s. The failures
of Soviet policy toward the nationalities are addressed
as veil as complex effects which the issue has had oh
Soviet economic and political stability. The proposed

new Union treaty, which will restructure the U.S.S.R.


into fifteen truly autonomous and sovereign republics, is
(! ( !
examined in detail for its impacts on the future
,j
political form of the republics and their interactions
j
with the proposed decentralized national government.
Based on this analysis, it is clear that the future
survival of, the Soviet Union and the political stability
I
of the international community are dependent on the
|
successful resolution of the Soviet nationalities issue.
The thesis concludes with recommendations for a suggested
i
Western program to aid the Soviet Union and proposes
I
policies which will improve global security and East-
i
I
West relations.
j
The form and content of this abstract are approved. I
I
recommend its publication.
Signed
iv


Tables CONTENTS
i CHAPTER
1.INTRODUCTION..........
Historical Background
vii
.1
,4
Harxxsm-LeninisiD and the Nationalities
i -
I
Soviet Nationalities Policy*..............
ire in Transition
8
11
20
2.
3,
RESURGENCE OF THE NATIONALITIES................... 23
Union-Republic Relations and the
Nationalities Issue.............................. 25
Inter ^Republic Relations..........................37
i
Dejno^nraphic Issues........................... 43
4
Impacts on the Soviet System..................* ... 52
THE All^UNION TREATY AND REPUBLIC SOVEREIGNTY.... 65
Republican sovereignty Movements.............. *66
The New Union Treaty............................ 75
Implications of the Treaty and
Prospects for Success............................84
WESTERN POLICY AND THE FUTURE OF THE USSR........91
Prospects for Future Stability.............92
Political outcomes of the Treaty
95


CONTENTS (contd)
4. WESTERN POLICY AND THE FUTURE OF THE USSR (contd)
Impacts on Western Policy......................... 98
l
Conclusion..........................................102
i
I
i
EPILOGUE. . L.............................................105
:i
BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................110
vi


TABLES
Tables |
1-1 Administrative/Territorial Distribution of
Nationalities............................. 5
i. l
1.2 Political Development of the USSR............15
j
2.1 Populations of the Major Nationalities.... 44
2.2 Populations of the Union Republics ......... 46
i
2.3 Na^io^ial Composition of Union Republics... 50
2.4 Draft Turnout in the Republics........... 60
i
3.1 Byelorussian Sovereignty Declaration........ 71
! i
3.2 Results of the All-Union Referendum......... 77

Vll


CHAPTER 1
I
INTRODUCTION
i
i
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) is
.|
being radically altered by the resurgence of a long term
nationalities problem which has its roots in the colonial
and imperialist policies of 19th century Tsarist Russia.
The vast, multi-ethnic Soviet society was initially

forged by Tsarist colonial expansion and held together by
the authoritarian rule of the central government.
i
Following ttie Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, the new
Soviet government inherited the multi-ethnic Russian
state and began the process of converting it into the
i
worldfs first socialist nation. The Soviet government's
domination of the East European, Caucasian,, and Central
Asian peoples has maintained a "union" of socialist
republics, but the centralized control previously held by
j
Moscow is now being threatened by nationwide economic
i
collapse, loss of authority by the Communist Party,

constitutional and political reform, and resurgent
nationalist jmovements in all of the republics- Glasnost
and the new ,democratic freedoms which have resulted from
i
Gorbachevfs political reforms have brought increased
'j
attention to the nationalities problem but have still not


resolvedthe issues which persist after years of
1
inattentionl, repression, and policy failures.
This thesis will analyze the historical background
of the nationalities problem, examine past and present
Soviet policy towards the non-Russian nationalities, and
determine t^ie prospects for political stability in what
will in future become the Union of Soviet Sovereign
Republics. !This analysis will concentrate on the
constitutional crisis now facing the Soviet Union and
will examine in detail the proposed all-Union Treaty and
.1
its impact on the shape of the future political form of
i \ t
the sovereign republics and their interactions with the
proposed decentralized national government.
The "crisis of Communism" now facing the USSR has
resulted in the resurgence of the nationality issue and
ultimately tjhe dissolution of the Tsarist Russian empire.
The future political and economic stability of the Soviet
:i .
Union is depiendent on the careful resolution of the
nationalities issue and its associated societal problems.
The proposed all-Union Treaty represents the strongest
i
and possibly final opportunity for Gorbachev to resolve
the crisis sjituation facing the central government and to
ensure the f|uture survival of a Soviet HunionM. It is
therefore crjitical that the nationalities issue and its
political impacts be fully understood in order to more


accurately predict the future political stability of the
Soviet union.
with this purpose in mind, this thesis will address
the organizational aspects of the new treaty and examine
i i
the functions of the new Soviet government. The central
I .
governmeht will be responsible for the resolution of a
i
number of serious policy issues with direct bearing on
'!
global security, in particular those dealing with the
>
control ^nd disposition of nuclear weapons, estab1ishment
of foreign policy agendas, the provision of internal
security, and the formulation and implementation of
environmental policy* The analysis will conclude with a
discussion of what the West should do in reaction to the
, .1
radical changes taking place in the Soviet Union and how
the West may best formulate policies which will enhance
global security and improve East-West relations- The
future political stability of the Soviet Union directly
influences global security and the outcome of the all-
Union treaty process will determine the prospects for
stability in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union for many
: i
years tocome.


Historical Background
The natiionalities problem vhich the Soviet Union
i
faces today is in part the result of the process through
'| '.
which Russia acquired its status as a multi-national
i. ,
state. The Soviet Union is one of the most diverse
!
nations in the world, encompassing over 100 distinct
ethnic groups and approximately 200 distinct languages
v |
and dialects. The political organization of the state is
complex and its territorial boundaries correspond to the

I
major ethnic divisions of the overall population. The 15
|
Union republics, 20 autonomous republics, 8 autonomous
I
provincesf and 10 national districts which constitute the
Soviet Uiiion are all based on ethnic heritage (See Table
1-1). Wljile many of these groups are indigenous to their
home territories, others trace their origins to nations
outside tihe Soviet boundaries. The process of expansion
and colonialism which built the current Soviet state
established the multi-ethnic character which today has
become the center of the nationalities problem (Nayhaylo
I
and Svoboda, 1990; Jacobs and Hill, 1985; Baradat, 1989).


Table 1-1 Administrative/Territorial Distribution of
I Nationalities
Russian 6FSR ASSRs .i AOs Okrugs i i Armenian SSR Bashkir, Buryat, Chechen-lngush, Chuvash, Daghestan, Kabardo-Balkar, Kalmyk, Karelia, Komi, Mari, Mordvin, No.Ossetia, Tatar, Tuva, Urdmurt, Yakut Adyge, Birobidzhan, Karachai-Cherkess, Khakass, and Upper Altai Aga-Buriat, Chukchi, Evenki, Khanty- Mansi, Komi-Permiak, Koriak, Nenets, Taimyr, Ust-Orda, Yandamalo-Nenets
Azerbaijan SSR
ASSR Nakhichevan
AO Nagorno Karabakh
Byelorussian SSR
Estonian SSR
Georgian SSR ASSRs AO Kazakh SSR Kirghiz SSR1 Latvian SSR Abkhaz, Adzhar So. Ossetia
Lithuanian SSR
Moldavian SSR
Tadzhik SSR AO j Turkmen SSR Ukrainian SSR Uzbek SSR Gorno-Badakhshan
ASSR Kara-Kalpak
NOTES RSFSR = SSR = ASSK = AO = Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Soviet Socialist Republic Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic Autonomous oblast
p = Oblast (Administrative Territorial Unit)
SOURCE: Country Guide: USSR, U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1975. and Baradat, 1989: 317


From its relatively small beginnings under Ivan III
j
the Grand Duchy of Muscovy began its existence in
northeasterh Russia around the year 1462. This early
predecessor to Hoscov began consolidating its power by
annexing the Slavic inhabited principalities adjacent to
i
Moscow. Ivan iv^s conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan,
I '
following tlie disintegration of the Mongol empire in
.
1552, extended the Russian empire to the upper Volga and
! ,
marked the first significant annexation of non-slavic
!
peoples. The process of consolidation and expansion
i
continued as the empire grew eastvard across the Urals
f j
and into wetern Siberia during the sixteenth and
i
seventeenth |centuries. Westward expansion during the
seventeenth [and eighteenth centuries incorporated areas
inhabited by Finns, Byelorussians9 Ukrainians,. Latvians,
i
Estonians, Lithuanians, Poles, Jews, and Romanians. The
nineteenth century saw the Russian empire extend
southward, annexing the homelands of the Georgians,
Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Kirghiz, Kazakhs, Tadzhiks, and
Turkmen. I the close of the nineteenth century the
Russian empire was essentially complete, as any further
adjustments |to its geographical borders were to come as
i
result of the World Wars or internal political upheaval
(Jacobs and Hill, 1985; Baradat, 1989; also see Nahaylo


and Svoboda^ 1990; Carrere drEncaussef 1978; for detailed
1 |
historical information).
As geographical consolidation vas coTapleted, the
i i
Russian ov_mmeirt initiated attempts to assimilate the
non-Russian minorities through a process of
Russification Until 1881, the basic Tsarist policy
tovard the non-Russian peoples was one of toleration in
i
which most regions were able to maintain some cultural
and linguistic freedoms. This policy changed after the
j
assassination of Alexander III in March of 1881,as the
central government implemented an aggressive plan to
Russify theiminorities and consolidate central control.
The program attempted to establish Russian control by
restricting[the use or practice of local languages,
!
cultures, and religions and forcibly replaced them with
Russian "orthodoxy, autocracy, nationality1* (qtd in
i
Jacobs and Hill, 1985:154).
| j I
Ethnicidiversity continued to exist under this
program due|largely to inefficient administration and
lack of close political supervision in the remote areas
of the empire (Pipes, 1967:126). This policy was
1 I
ultimately counterproductive as it resulted in an
,i
alienated and resentful non-Russian population. Within
the national minorities, political groups began to form
supportina national autonomy and calling for the reform


or elimination of the Tsarist: government. The
nationalities became one of the groups instrumental in
'! I
the eventual downfall of the Tsarist government and in
I
i
the revolutions which followed. Realizing the danger of
|
mishandling the nationality issue, former Russian Prime
i
Minister|Sergei Witte faulted the failed Tsarist policies
; ,
for their inability to recognize that "there was no
i
Russia, ...What existed was the Russian Empire... a
i
conglomerate of different peoples11 which without the
repression of the central government to maintain control
would prove
1991:105).
to be Ma colossus with feet of clay11 (Simes,
Marxism-Leninism and the Nationalities
Recogn:
i
disaffected
zing the revolutionary potential of the
nationality groups, Lenin incorporated their
struggle for autonomy into the overall Bolshevik
, i
political program. Lenin had promised national self-
determination for those non-Russian groups which would
support the Bolshevik cause, and the participation by the
nationalities was crucial in the downfall of the Tsarist
1 |
government and the success of the revolution. Although
the nationality groups participated in the revolution to
secure their own goals of cultural and political
autonomy,, they were also the subject of a deep


ideological struggle vithin the Bolshevik party as to the
! i
status of the non-Russian groups after the establishment
of the Soviet system.
The Tsarist government which had been replaced
j
during the 1917 Revolution had failed to resolve the
issues of national antagonism and ethnic diversity within
the Russian empire. The Marxist-Leninist regime which
replaced it
believed that once socialism had been
implemented,and national equality established, national
antagonisms
and class-struggles would cease to exist.
Lenin,s policy on the nationalities and their right to
self-determ:
differences
nation was based on the belief that national
would recede with the implementation of
socialist democracy (see Barry, 1991 Gleason, 1990;
.1
Pipes,1967). The need for self-determination and
autonomy wolld therefore disappear as the nationalities
i .!
recognized the benefits of belonging to the international
socialist state.
; i
i
Lenin7s ideological position not only expected
nationalist differences to recede, but called for an
eventual|assimilation of nationalities into "citizens of
the new socialist commonwealth" (Hammer,1985.:126) This
process was|to occur in stages with the first being a
growing or coming together of the different ethnic
groups, known in Russian as "sblizhenie'* of the


nationalities. The entire process and ultimate goal of
socialist: policy would be the merging or ^sliyanie11 of
the nationalities. This ideological position was
predicated on the fact that the ethnic groups would no
i
longer aspire to their separatist cultural and political
ideals. i
<
The -period following the revolution saw the near
dissolution
of the Russian empire and the initiation of
civil war. jThis period gave the nationality movements
the opportunity they had sought, and many opted for the
establishment of or a return to their own independent
I
territories. By early in 1918, Latvia, Lithuania,
Estonia, 'Finland, Byelorussia, the Ukraine, Georgia,
i
Armenia f and Azerbaijan had established their
independences. The virtual disintegration of the Russian
empire forced Lenin to make a political choice between
the established ideological position on the self-
determination of nations and the reincorporation of the
' i
separatist areas by force. As described by Pipes
1
(1967:127),Lenin had to make a choice between
maintaining(the old empire by military force or retain "a
1; I
Bolshevik regime the size of Huscovy in the Reign of
Basil II*'.
Lenin chose to abandon the nationality
program in favor of consolidating Bolshevik control over
the nation.
and the nationalities issue was once again
10


resolved'in] the favor of the central government, a fact
not soon to be forgotten by the new ^Soviet Republics"
(Pipes,1967; Hammer,1985; Gleason, 1990; Hanuner,1990;
Jacobs and Hill, 1985).
..3
I
iSoviet Policy on the Nationalities
i
' i
Once the Tsarist empire had been reconstituted under
Bolshevik control, Lenin set about the task of organizing
a Soviet political system to complete the transition to
socialism and to resolve the many unsettled issues facing
i
the government. Lenin proposed a federal system to
accomplish the objectives of the new Soviet government
while Stalin opposed this plan and called for a strong
central,government with little or no authority devolved
i !
to the republics. The resulting compromise plan
attempted to strike a balance between "great: Russian
chauvinism*1' and national self-determination, but the two
leaders continued to differ on their approach toward the
i!
nationalities (Baradat, 1989:314). Lenin hoped that
1 +
eventually the federal system would produce a ,pnew human
cominunity united in class solidarity11 and that all
members of the union vould become examples of the "new
,i
socialist man1' (gtd in Baradat, 1989:314).
!
In contrast, Stalinas only objectives were the
1 r I
consolidation of the multinational state and its
11


continued survival as a socialist country. Stalin was
j
therefore willing to grant more autonomy to the
j
republics, particularly in the areas of language and
'l
culture, if|it furthered economic development in the
j
republics. jThis is not to say that Stalin supported
11 '
self-determination and political autonomy, for he
II-
adamantly opposed these ideas as being detrimental to the
! .1 -
future existence of the multinational Soviet state
J
had carried
i
1 p
developmeint
(Hammerr |1990; Baradat, 1989)*
The federal system under which the Soviet Union
.i
initially operated was established by the constitution of
d I
1924, a political document which, while delineating the
Union republics, did little to resolve the issues which
over from the Tsarist empire. The
of the federal structure continued, as
additional political subdivisions were made and later
modified tojresult in the republic structure which exists
i
today (see Table 1.2).
i 1
Sincie its initial adoption in 1924, the Soviet
i
constitution has made a number of changes in the way in
which it deJls with the nationalities and their
i j
, l
representation in the Supreme Soviet- The 1936 or
"Stalin11 constitution was a revision aimed at giving the
appearance
i
liberaliz'ati
of increased democratization and
on of Soviet nationalities policy. Stalin
12


made these changes in an effort to improve foreign
I
, I
relations with the West at a time when the threat from
i '
Nazi Germany was increasing and a new world war seemed
'I
imminent. The 1936 constitution enhanced the rights of
the republics by giving them the right: -to establish their
own constitutions, formalizing their right to "freely
,'
secede" from the USSR, and giving them limited rights to
i ,
the exercise of residual powers The new constitution
I
also stressed the principle of "general, direct, and
equal suffrage" for national elections and did away with
the Congress of Soviets in favor of an enlarged Supreme
i i
Soviet with!greater representation of the Soviet
' i
,' i
population (Gleason, 1990:47).
The 1977 revision of the constitution reversed the
trend of th^ 1936 constitution by broadening Moscow^
jurisdiction over the governments of the republics. The
i
republics also lost the right to maintain their own
J
military foirces, a right which had been established under
'i
a 1940 amendment to the 1936 constitution. The 1977
i
constitution also weakened the republic7s right t,o secede
r '
by redefining the USSR as a unitary state whose
"sovereignty extends to all its territories". The
j
constitution also made some mention of improving the
rights of ttxe nationalities, but did little in the way of
13


broadening
increasing
heir representation in the Supreme Soviet or
their participation in the government (Nahaylo
and Swobodar 1990:201).
I
The Soviet constitution, while establishing the
individual republics and allowing limited cultural and
| ,
linguistic autonomy, did not decentralize the source of
political power. Carrere d/Encausse (1979:13) gives four
1 i
basic reasons for the central government's ability to
maintain absolute power. First, the party is centrally
|
controlled and oversees all aspects of ^he political
system, including the republic and local levels. Second,
,
_
the central government controls the military and internal
i |
security!forces, providing it with the means to implement
i
its policies in the republics. Third, the legal system
gives federal (all-Union) lavs precedence over those of
i
lesser jurisdictions. Finally, all economic planning was
centered in Moscow, making the republics economically
dependent on the central government for both raw
materials and finished goods* These institutional
controls cojibined to prevent the exercise of political or
i
economic autonomy by the republics.
14


1924
1929
1936
Table 1.2 Political Development of the USSR
Year Development
1922 !The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was
created. It consisted of the Soviet Federated
Socialist Republic (RSFSR)f which included
European Russiar Siberia, the Far East, and
Central Asia; The Transcaucasian Federationf
which included Armenia, Azerbaijan, and
Georgia; the Byelorussian SSR; and the
Ukrainian SSR.
I The Turkman SSR and the Uzbek SSR were
established after being removed from the RSFSR.
jThe Tadzhik SSR was established after being
jseparated from the Uzbek SSR.
jThe Kazakh SSR and the Kirghiz SSR were
|established after being separated from the
[RSFSR, and the Transcaucasian Federation was
!divided, establishing the Armenian SSR, the
Azerbaijan SSR, and the Georgian SSR.
1940 The Karelo-Finish SSR was created by separating
| the Karelian Autonomous Republic from the RSFSR;
j BegsairalDia was annexed from Romania and combined
with the western Ukraine, forming the Moldavian
SSR; and the Baltic states were reconquered
as1 a protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact,
becoming the Latvian SSR, the Estonian SSR,
and the Lithuanian SSR.
1956 The Karelo-Finnish SSR was reincorporated
into the Karelian Autonomous Republic and
re-joined the RSFSR-
SOURCE: Country Guide: USSR, U.S. Government Printing
Office. 1975 and Baradat, 1989:314
! |
I
Stalin/s rise to power in the 192Os brought with it
a change in the nationalities policy of the Soviet Union.
i
The policy initially called for the neutralization of the
non*Russian
nationality threat by allowing some degree of
cultural autonomy and by encouraging regional economic
development- Stalin7 s nationality policies concentrated
15


on a strategy called nation building. According to this
'I
I
strategy, socialism would create such an immense
opportunity for the nationalities that they would now be
:i
able to reach their full developmental potential after
, i i
having been|repressed under the Tsars. The eventual
i |
merger of the nationalities into the Soviet state would
I: i
occur at |a ].ater stage of socialist development.
According to Stalinas program, these "new" socialist
i
states would not desire separation from the Union, would
1
not develop 1 ethnic antagonisms, and would be easily
1 l
i
i
integrated into the "socialist central state11. Stalin
was convinced of the legitimacy of this program and felt
that oncB a number of concessions were made to the
nationalities, they would be satisfied and no longer
disrupt the Soviet system (Simon, 1990:135)- Although
i
unwilling to grant political autonomy to the republics,
!
Stalin did illow them to pursue cultural and educational
.i
programs 'which enhanced political and economic
I I
development (Hammer, 1990)
Although this policy seems to be a liberal one#
Stalinas objective was to further the development of the
Soviet state and represented little in 'the way of
legitimate concern for the non-Russian nationalities. By
the 1930s, concern over the development of the Soviet
|
economy brought about collectivization and the reversal
16


of Stalinas initial nationalities policy. Stalin made
clear his priorities when he stated:
j
There are occasions when the right of self
determination contradicts another and higher right,
the,right of the working class to strengthen its
power.| In these cases it should be frankly stated
-the right of self-determination cannot and must
not|obstruct the rights of the dictatorship of the
working class. The former must give way to the
latteri (gtd. in Nove, 1986:203)
From this point on. Great Russian (Soviet) dominance was
I -|
proclaimed as the key to the nations/ survival,and
i
Stalin cleai-ly expressed this idea at the 17th Party
I
Congress in| 1934 when he described ,fnon-Russian
nationalism1 as being more dangerous to the state than
^ !
"Great Russian chauvinism" (Baradat, 1989:315). The new
i !
policy siougAt to eliminate the historical, cultural, and
i
*
intellectual, traditions of the non-Russian nationalities
and replace | them with a ^national11 Soviet culture. The
principle of "national in form, socialist in content11 was
.; *
_.. i
implemented; dictating that a minimum level of tolerance

of regional culture was acceptable, but that the overall
Soviet culture took precedence. Stalin/s policies caused
tremendous suffering for the non-Russian nationalities,

forcing them to endure the hardships of collectivization,
faminef and|ethnically inspired purges and deportations*
: _.
Stalinas:poicies continued through World War II, as
'I
Great Russian nationalism became a rallying point for the
17


survival of jthe nation against the German invaders
j
(Jacobs and Hill, 1985; Baradat, 1989; Hammer,1985).
The deJth of Stalin in 1953 ended his political
I .
domination of the Soviet Union, but his nationality
^ I
policies left a long standing impression on the non-
Russian natdlonalities. Contrary to their original
i
purpose. Staling nationality policies had resulted in a
marked increase in non-Russian national consciousness and
a strong opposition to the central government. Russian
!]
imperialism jwas now blamed for the economic and social
problems whi!ch prevailed in some of the less developed
i
republics. The ultimate objective of Soviet
i
nationalities policy up to this point had been the
,i
elimination |of national differences, and in this measure
i
it had been junsuccessful (Hammer, 1985; Jacobs and Hill,
1985).
j
Soviet mationalities policy after Stalin became even
more ambiguous than in the past, as Khrushchev and
successive leaders attempted to balance the need for
_ i
strict central government control and the need for
increased autonomy for the growing non-Russian
nationalities, Khrushchev rehabilitated many of the
nationalities which had been victimized by Stalin and
implemented |the first series of reforms aimed at
i
increasing regional autonomy and local government
18


authority. In 1957, Uzbek party leader N.A. Mukhitdinov
i
was promoted to membership in the national party
!
Secretariat | and Politburo, making him the firs^t party
official ofI Muslim background to achieve such a high
_ |
position (see Lairdr 1986; Houghr 1980; for a discussion
of demographic trends in the Soviet leadership)*
Khrushchevas policies also attempted to increase non-
Russian participation on all levels of the party
organization, though it continued to maintain Russian or
:.1 _
Slavic dominance in the higher political and party
.1
'|
organizations. Most of the gains made by non-Russian
nationals were lost when Khrushchevas reforms were
I
eliminated after his fall from power in 1964. Even with
these refonjis, the official policy still called for the
i i
drawing together of the nationalities into what was
! |
described as a Hnew historical community of people of
i
various nationalities" (Hammer, 1985:131).
I
Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko all supported the
idea of the Soviet Union as a sort of "supra-national
.i
community of Soviet peoples", but their policies were
unable to bring this idea to fruition (Hammer, 1985:141).
By the early 1980s, Andropov had returned to the symbolic
* i
appointment of non-Russians to high-level positions when
he named Geidar Aliev, an ethnic Azeri, to full Politburo
membership. 1 Andropov referred to Aliev as a 11 living
19


symbol of the internationalist ideology of the Soviet
i i
regime'1 and called for a return to Leninas policy of "not
only a bringing together of nations, but their merger"
'j j
(Hammer,i1985:141; Jacobs and Hill, 1985). This
ideological trend continued under Chernenko, as he called
for a revival of Marxism-Leninism, a move which brought
i
further ambiguity to Soviet nationalities policy. As
Gorbachev rose to power in 1985, he inherited a Soviet
nationalities policy which had failed in nearly every
aspect and which in some instances had actually
i !
intensified!the nationalist feelings which it had tried
I !
i i
to eliminate.
i
i' An Empire in Transition
1

The critical political situation which the Soviet
I
Union facesiin 1991 is a direct result of the decades of
failed attempts by both the Tsarist Russian and the
Soviet governments to resolve the problems inherent in
their multi-ethnic empires. This threat to the future
existence of the Soviet "Union" lies in both its inherent
i
demography and in the unresolved issue of the rights of
the nationalities within the Soviet system. The
successful iLransition from past policy failures to a
( i
j i
resolution of these issues will determine the future
character arid structure of the USSR*
20


While successful in raising living standards and
i
literacy.rates throughout the Soviet Union over the past
/ |
70 years, the Soviet government has been unsuccessful in
merging its|multi-national peoples into a coherent whole.
Its federal system of government has encouraged the
growth of national loyalty to republic and local
governments even though the governments retain little or
i
1':
no authority. The educated bureaucracy which was
developed at the republic level has become the core of
the new non-Russian intelligentsia which strongly support
1!
local nationalist goals* Soviet institutions give
i
unintentional support to nationality movements through
|
the administrative organization of political subdivisions
along ethnic lines and by the mandatory declaration of
* i
ethnic ,,:originM on each Soviet internal passport (Pipes,
1972; Lapidls, 1989a). After years of operation, Soviet
1 I
federalism U... devised to mollify nationalism, in
effect intensifies it and provides it with institutional
outlets'1 (Pipes, 1972 :130).
i
Repression and political control were also
demonstrate! to be unsuccessful in managing or
i
eliminating nationalist and separatist feelings. When
.
given the opportunity during the civil war, numerous
areas seceded and required the use of force to be brought
back into the Soviet Union.
[
In addition, Marxist-
21


Leninist ideology has been discredited as a result of the
failure of fhe policy on self-determination and the
inabilit^ of the nationalities to be merged into the f,iiew
Soviet man"'(Goldman,1983), The past failures to
:.i
solve11 the I nationality issue, when combined with the
I
rapidly changing demographics of the Soviet Union, will
make the ^transition to the 21st century a daunting
i. j
challenge for the Soviet leadership* The old official
1
position that Mthe victory of socialism in the USSR
i
created a new historical community in which national
_
antagonismsjwere obliterated" must appear to today7s
Soviet leadership a tragic remintier of past errors
r I
(Lapidus> 1989:92). Based on this analysis of the
background to the nationalities issue, it is apparent
I
that the problem has not been solved and that the past
j | .
Soviet methods of dealing vith the issue are no longer
appropriate. As Richard Pipes has stated (1972:131) in a
warning issued many years ago:
1 I
There is a great deal of nationalist frustration in
the I Soviet Union. Unless the Soviet rulers face up
to it and begin the process of decentralization
voluntarily, it is likely someday to explode in a
most destructive manner
22


CHAPTER 2
THE RESURGENCE OF THE NATIONALITIES
Since the early 1980s, the Soviet Union has been
experiencing a rapidly expanding resurgence of national
i
self-assertion by the numerous ethnic nationalities
._ i
within its borders. Every significant group with a
grievance against the central government has come forward
with claims of past injustices or to obtain some degree
of political freedom. The critical factor in this
resurgence lies not only in the intensity of the
. |
nationalistic feelings, but also in its occurrence at
this critical juncture in the history of the Soviet
Union. The Soviet system, including all of its
i
ideological and institutional values, is being called
into question by a widespread and problematic reform
process* The loss of authority and legitimacy suffered
by the central government and the Communist party as a
^
result of the reform process has served to support and
advance the cause of the nationality movements, but is
not the root cause. There are numerous short term causes
I
of the resurgence which are connected to Gorbachevas
programs of perestroika and glasnost# but: the basic
motivation jLies in the historical background of decades


served underi the control of both the Tsarist and the
i
Soviet authcjjritarian governments.
'i
The first phase of the dismantling of the Tsarist
empire took place during the 1917 Bolshevik revolution
(Simon, l99lJ). The final phase of that dismantling is
now underjway after 70 years of Soviet rule and the
l |
failure of the Soviet system to resolve the complex
issues involved in maintaining a multi-national state.
Significantly, this ongoing resurgence is not simply a
! i
random series of uncoordinated uprisings made by
dissatisfied workers or political radicals. Each
republic or nationality group pressing for self-
determination is a singular product of its own long term
j
cultural and historical development, a feature which
further aimpiifies the difficulties which the Soviet
system faces in attempting to resolve the complex demands
of the multiple groups. Most significant of all is the
j
fact that this is not just a non-Russian nationalities
issuer but an all encompassing political and cultural
resurgence lly every nationality, to include the Russians.
I
i
This chapter will examine the important Union-
Republic inter-republic, and demographic issues which
I
!
underlie the resurgence of nationalism in the Soviet
I
Union- It will continue with an analysis of the impacts
of Gorbachev/s refonri process on Soviet nationality
i
24


policy and how this effects the Soviet political and
economic system. The chapter concludes with a focus on
proposals by the Soviet government to improve the current
1 I
situation and the possibilities for future reform of the
i
USSR constitution.
Union-Republic Relations
and the Nationalities Issue
The complex nature of the Soviet political and
economic:system involves a great deal of interaction
between the central bureaucracy and the republic level
administrative organizations. Through this immense
bureaucracy the central government has been able to
control neayly all aspects of political and economic
activity. It is precisely this degree of outside control
which has perpetuated the feelings of resentment and
alienation within the non-Russian republics. The

i i
resurgence of nationalism and the attempts at self-
assertion which have taken place during the last decade
i .
are a result of this failure in the relationship between
the central!government and the republic-level authorities
i
and is symbolic of the broader failure of Soviet
. |
nationalities policy.
I
Ethnic
unrest has spread to virtually every part of
the Soviet Union, and it has appeared in a number of
different forms. Some areas have seen only limited and
25


1.1
peaceful demonstrations by political movements, while
i .!
others have,been the site of intense anti-government
i
activity and labor strikes. Still other areas have seen
violent episodes of communal violence which have resulted
i .
in numerous deaths and many thousands of refugees. The
varying degrees and types of activities associated with
the recent nationalities resurgence is best explained if
1. |
one examines the process by which the national groups
develop*
r ; i
Brzezinski (1989) describes the process as a series
I .
of five stages through which the ethnic group passes as
it becomes more culturally and politically self-
i .
assertive* During the first stage, the non-Russian
i
ethnic group limits itself to self-preservation
activities ind opposition to Russification policies.
Typical concerns of these groups are the rehabilitation
"I
or restoration of peoples punished or deported by Stalin,
complaints against population shifts for economic or
! i
industrial purposes, and colonization by non-natives for
I
government benefit. Once successful,rhe group advances
to the second stage in which it makes demands for both
I
linguistic and cultural autonomy. This stage is followed
::'!
by demands for greater economic freedom, which involves
the removal of corrupt officials, implementation of more
,*
efficient economic policy, and the implementation of
26


environmental programs. The fourth stage involves the
f
pursuit of national political autonomy^ while the fifth
stage results in the acquisition of full national
sovereignty!
| I
When this criteria is applied to specific republics,
the stage of national development becomes more clear.
For examplei all six of the Soviet republics which have
r |
voiced opposition to the new al1-Union treaty (Estoniaf
Latvia, Lithuania, Georgia, Armenia, and Moldavia) have
i
advanced to|the fourth stage of development and are
officially pursuing national sovereignty. By the same
token, the Central Asian republics have reached the third
or fourth stage and have not yet consolidated gains in
economic or I political autonomy (Brzezinski 1989;
Lapidus,;1989b; Sakwa, 1990).
There are numerous specific issues which are common
to one or more of the nationality movements. The ability
| j
to pursue these issues is directly related t:o the stage
of development of the group and its leadership. The
i !
major issues currently being pursued can be categorized
]
into what Lapidus (1989b) has called the six varieties of
i
national,self assertion. The first and most commonly
pursued issue is that of political and economic autonomy
(Lapidus> 1989b; Brzezinski, 1989). Currently, only the
i I
most advanced and well-organized movements have achieved
27


any degree cjf success in this area^ but nearly every
republic and poli^tical^adjninistrative unit: has made a
, .r
declaration of some form regarding its desire for
_ l
political| and economic autonomy. Even the Russian
republic, wtiich was in the past most closely aligned with
;]
the central igovernment^s position on economic and
i
political autonomy, has actively pursued this issue not
.j
only for itself but in the name of other less developed
republics.
The republics, with the exception of the six
mentioned earlier who desire total sovereignty, are
seeking a compromise with the central government dividing
the responsibility for federal spending, resource
i
allocation, land environmental and defense policy, while
allowing jtotal economic and political autonomy at the
republic le1* The Kazakh republic is a good example of
r
how Union-republic relations have proceeded in an attempt
to reach;!a compromise on the issue of economic autonomy.
Nursultan Nazarbayev, the president of the Kazakh SSR,
i
presented a plan to local Communist party and government
officials in March of 1991 which called for the radical
reform and privatization of the Kazakh economy (Dejevsky,
1991).Effective l July 1991,the republic has taken
over "all enterprises of all-union jurisdiction,
! |
including defense industry enterprises1' from government
28


control after negotiating a compromise on fiscal revenues
and tax distributions (RFE/RL Daily Report, 21 June
I |
1991:8).! This type of compromise is tha basis for
i
Gorbachev^ proposed new union treaty, a subject which
will be discussed in greater detail in chapter three.
i
i
A second example of a self-assertion issue is that
of inter-ethnic conflicts (Lapidus, 1989b) These
conflicts are based on long standing cultural,religious,
i .
or territorial disputes currently taking place as either
I
an inter4republic problem or as an inter-ethnic conflict
within a single republic. The dispute between Armenia
i
and Azerbaijan is an excellent example of inter-republic
conflict >as religion, culture, and territorial disputes
all enter into a deadly dispute which the central
i
goveriunent is unable to resolve. The ethnic conrlicts
involving the Georgian republic, the Ablchaz ASSR, and the
i
South Ossetian autonomous oblast are an example of the
L J '
complex nature of the ethnic disputes which must be
I I
resolved bythe central government. These smaller ethnic
groups within republic borders depend on the central
government as their guarantor of national rights, and
i
when Moscow is unable or unwilling to resolve the issue,
the authprity and legitimacy of the center are further
i
reduced (Lapidus, 1989b; Brzezinskir 1989).
29


Inter^ethnic violence is also a factor in the third
category pf problems associated with national self-
,
assertion. In many instances, communal violence is now a
result of economic grievances which have risen over the
,' ''
i
failure of economic reforms and the long term degradation
of the standard of living in some of the poorer
republics. This problem is particularly bad in central
Asia and the Transcaucasus, where unemployment rates are
l
high and!living standards are low. In Azerbaijan and
i
Uzbekistan, the unemployment rates for young adults are
23 and 27 percent, respectively, extremely high rates
, l
when compared to the 8 percent rate of the more developed
Russian republic (qtd.in Lapidus, 1989b).
, I
The alienation and resentment felt by the young in
.I
these areastends to exacerbate already existing ethnic
j
tensions, and causes the native population ~to strike out
j
at any representative of the central government or of the
non-native population. An incident of this nature
i '
occurred;in Uzbekistan during June of 1989 when ethnic
11
gangs drove out nearly 16000 Meskhetian Turksf killing
100 and wounding nearly 1500. The Turks had been
i J
deported from Georgia to Central Asia by Stalin and were
':i
thus treated as non-natives by the Uzbeki gangs (Sakva,
1990:237). The economic and social problems facing many
i .
of the republics make this issue one of serious concern


which, based on the already limited resources of the
I
subject republics, will require outside assistance to
resolve (Lapidus, 1989b; Sakwa,1990).
A fou r|h issue to examine is the increasing number
of sovereignty demands coming from the smaller autonomous
I
regions within other republics. With the large number of
.
national groups within the Soviet union^s borders, the
i
requests! for territorial homelands and full republic
status have
the potential to rapidly overextend the
already complex Soviet federal system. The problem which
| l
the government and the republics face is where to draw
the line interms of national status, since many groups
have already been granted protected status and to prevent
other applicants at this time would risk further
i
escalations of communal violence.
i
,1
A side issue in this matter involves the Russian
, !
republic and the central government in a dispute over the
..1
status of the 32 national jurisdictions within the
Russian republic. The Russian republic has accused its
| -
political enemies in Moscow of trying to lfbreak up the
I .-
RSFSR in order to slow down its sovereignty movement
(Sheehy, 1991a:18) An example of ^the problems that
i..1
these autonomy declarations can cause is the recent move
i '
by the Yakut ASSR, located in the eastern portion of the
Russian republic, to declare itself a full republic.
31


Yakut has a population of less than one million in an
i
area approximately five times the size of France, and it
;
!
contains large reserves of gold, diamonds, oil, coal, and
- .!
fur. The autonomy declaration includes sovereignty over
all natural resources in its territory, a claim which the
!
Russian republic will dispute since it considers the
territory to be a part of the Russian republic. Moscowrs
i- !
reaction| was to cite its prerogative to support the
legitimate claims of national minorities (Clark, 1991),
| j
Arbitrating jthe claims of up to one hundred national
i I
groups is not an enviable task, and it is likely that
Moscow will |be glad to delegate that responsibility to
the appropriate republics (Lapidus, 1989b}.
The 1(punished peoples11 represent the fifth problem
of nationaliself-assertion, and this group presents
political! dilemmas similar to those of the minorities
with territorial demands. The Crimean Tatars, Volga
Germans, and Chechen-Ingush are all examples of peoples
i i
i ,
calling for 'rehabilitation after being deported and
4
punished by|Stalin. The majority of these peoples were
i
i
forcibly Amoved to Central Asia, where they are now
subject to communal violence for being non-natives, over
130,000 Crimean Tatars have been allowed to return to the
Crimean peninsula, and additional national groups are
petitioning the government for similar approval (RFE/RL
32


Daily Report, 20 June 1991:8). The political
:i
repercussions of granting territorial status to these
.i
groups are inany, particularly since it would most likely
i
i
entail displacing some other national group with an
equally valid historical claim (Lapidusf 1989b)*
!
The final dilemma posed by the current rise in
j
national self-assertion is the resurgence of Russian
nationalism. The increasing political unrest, and ethnic
violence taking place in the non-Russian republics
against the!central government and past Russian
domination has caused the Russians to rediscover their
own national consciousness. The movement has thus far
:
stressed national self-determination and political and
i
economic autonomy for the republics, but some fear that
there may be a return of Great Russian chauvinism bent on
maintaining the Soviet state and repressing the newly
i
released nationality movements in the republics (Lapidus,
I
1989b). The future of Russian nationalism remains
unclear, bul: the Russian republic's current political
i
activities under Boris Yeltsin seem to be leading the
cause of sovereignty and political autonomy for all
national groups.
Under the great pressure of the issues associated
with the autonomy movements, the Soviet government has
sought to develop policies which will either contain or
33


resolve tihe demands of the nationality movements. In a
broad sense, the government has only t^wo options in
dealing with the issues. First, they can change from
past nationality policies and grant greater political and
economic autonomy to those groups who have established
legitimate claims. This would result in a system in
which republics would be free to pursue sovereignty
within a confederation of Soviet republics. The second
option avoids greater political recognition for the
subject groups and argues that increased political and
]
economic ;intiegration are the best solution to the
i
problems facing the Soviet Union. This option considers
the overall rights of the "Soviet citizen to be of
greater concern than the individual demands of the
j
various ethnic groups (Sakwar 1990; Lapidus, 1989b).
This theoretical argument within the Soviet system
as to howto reconcile the demands of the nationality
j
movements has a direct impact on Union-republic
,:
relations. :Gorbachev has been forced to maintain a
delicate balance between supporting legitimate claims for
autonomy and taking all steps necessary t.o ensure the
survival of
i
i
Gorbachevas
.1
the union. The ultimate success of
economic and political reforms depends on the
support of the nationality movements which now control or
are at least partners in,the governments of every
34


republic. E
conomic autonomy at the republic level and
improved efficiency at the Union level will serve to
'.
satisfy the demands of all but the most radical national
groups while stabilizing the overall economic system.
Gorbachevas {pursuit of a new union treaty is the
r
j
goveriunent:,s plan to grant as much autonomy as possible
to the reputlics while still maintaining a formal union
structure to protect the rights of all Soviet citizens.
A majorj issue which concerns both Gorbachev and the
I
I
remaining conservative party and government officials is
the overall
national security and survival of the Soviet
Soviet defense minister, Dimitri Yazov, had
Union. The
' ;i
the following comments on the nationality movements:
i' i
Today |the ambitious nationalist and separatists
forces are doing their utmost to ruin the Union.
Only a strong and single Union of Sovereign
Soyiet Republics can act on the world arena as a
superpower. (gtd. in Sneidar, 1991:6)
It should be noted that even though the Soviet military
opposes sHratis,, it stiXl supports the concept of
"sovereign" jrepublics. The KGB has warned on numerous
occasions of the dramatic rise in political terrorism in
the Soviet tjnion and has called for more concerted
, i
government action to correct the situation. The ethnic
disputes are blamed for hijackings# bombingsf and attacks
on government and military facilities and personnel. KGB
officials have stated that "the Soviet leadership now has
35


to consider this kind of crime as a serious threat to
national jsecjurity" (New York Times, 7 June 1991:8),
i :l
Using national security interests as justification, the

government has ordered numerous interventions into the
republics.
When ttJe government intervenes in a republic, it
'i |
risks further political and ethnic unrest due to the
complex relajtionships between the ethnic groups in
dispute, the local republic government, and the national
]
security interests which the government seeks to protect.
When Moscow
recently deployed Interior Ministry troops to
Armenia to stabilize the ongoing ethnic conflict, the
|
Armenian^ responded by "nationalizing11 some Coimunist
Party buildilngs, which in turn drew additional reaction
i
from the I Soviet government. The Armenians then charged
. .i
that the government troops were not protecting Soviet
. j
security/ but taking sides with Azerbaijan in an attempt
J
i
to disrupt the political situation in secession minded
'i
Armenia (The Economist,18 May 1991:54). In a similar
]
instance, Georgian president Gamsakhurdia has accused
r I
Moscow of provoking the ethnic conflict in Ossetia to
i
provide provocation for government action against the
independence minded Georgian republic (Lieven, 1991:6).
' i
With these serious issues to contend with/ the government
will be less likely to become involved unless the fate of
36


;| .
the Union is determined to be at: risk. Union-republic
relations will also follov this example, as the central
government gradually seeks to turn over responsibility to
the republics while pursuing a compromise on the future
form of the |union of Soviet Sovereign Republics.
Inter"Republie Relations
In contrast to the contentious relationship between
the government and the republics, inter^republic
! I
relations are generally good and seem to be improving as
the Soviet Union moves toward greater economic and
political autonomy. The republics are currently engaged
..|
in a great deal of political and economic interaction in

an attempt to stabilize their situations and replace
their now fading relationship with Moscow with new
I
arrangements both within the Soviet Union and in the
, , i
global arena.
The! key factor in this initiation of inter^republic
economic and political activity was the gradual transfer
of economic responsibility from the all-Union bureaucracy
to local level administrators. The decentralization and
:.1 '
destatization of the Soviet economy under Gorbachev/s
reforms has
helped to fulfill the republics demands for
economic autonomy Although the transfer has taken a
long period
of time and has only begun in earnest in a
37


relatively spall number of republics, the impact on
i I .
inter-republic trade has been significant:. The Kazakh
..i
SSR is a good example, as it only recently received
i
control of t|he all-Union enterprises within its republic.
i
I
As the previous planning arrangements with Moscow ended
I
.
on 1 July 19j91, the republic needed to make new trade
agreements to ensure continued supplies of raw materials
i i
and buyers fpr its finished goods. In most instances,
1 i
the old trade relations with the central government
:
continued, the decisions about production, profits,
| r .
and enterprise manageiaent remained at the local level.
(RFE/RL Dail'y Report, 21 June 1991)-The republic was
.1
motivated to take control of its own trade arrangements,
so it hasJ bJcome involved in a number of trade deals with
republics in Central Asia and across the Soviet Union.
i
, i
The Soyiet planned economy did not include a great
.1
deal of d!ive{rsification, choosing instead to build
I _i
specializ;ed lindustries which provided output on a
i
contractual basis to the state. For this reason, the
i 9
Soviet economic system is spread throughout the country,
j '
with veryj few republics capable of self-sufficient
! 1
operation. Many of the republics are heavily dependent
I
on food ^iroduced in other republics because their task in
the central plan had been to grow 00^011 or animal
fodder. The demand for manufactured goods is even more
38


difficult to fill, as certain goods are made in only a
i '
very few locations. Examples of this are fork-lift
' I
trucks which are made only in the Ukraine, pumps for oil
wells which |are made only in Azerbaijan, and agricultural
tractors which are made only in the Russian republic (The
Economist, 29 September 1990:77).
Prior to the economic reform process, most republics
j
traded an amount equal to about 50-75 percent of their
gross prpduct with the central government- Under the new
i
plans, this amount will be reduced to le^s than 50
percent, as inter-republic trade is increased
i
significantly. Some of the republics will have
i
significant trade imbalances to make up, as republics
like the Turkmen and Armenian SSRs formerly imported up
to 75 percent of their goods and had low levels of
manufactured product to sell or trade. Some barriers to
trade werie initially raised by republics in an effort to
.i
gain control of economic transactions and to stabilize
republic economiesr but many are nov being eliminated in
keeping with newly signed trade agreements. Price
increases ijnitially made to encourage local production,
have combined with reduced exports by some republics to
cause natioxi-vide shortages. The central government is
still working to control this problem as the economy
39


makes the1 transition to a market economy (The Economist,
29 September 1990:77).
Inter-republic cooperative agreements have been
,L !
reached by a number of republics during the last year.
'I
In June of 1990, the Central Asian republics (Uzbekh,
i
Kirghiz, Tadzhik, and Turkmen SSRs) and the Kazakh SSR
r '
i
signed a regional pact agreeing to strengthen inter-
J
republic relations and cooperate on economic, scientific,
technical1, Jnd cultural programs (FBIS: Soviet Union,
28 June 1990b122).
Noldavi
Armenia Jll
af Latvia> Lithuania# Estonia, Georgia, and
signed documents on 10 June 1991 establishing
what they called 11 a consultative and coordinating body to
I
i -
further political and economic cooperationH. In an
ironic tv|ist of fate, these six republics who have
i -
declared lindependence from the Soviet Union and have
therefore refused to take part in the all-Union treaty
negotiations, produced the agreement's final document in
1 )
Russian. | The document describes "the USSRs use of
!
political!, economic, and military pressure against our
states" ind Mthe need to coordinate our political,
i
economic^ and diplomatic efforts toward establishing our
i i j
countries state independence" (RFE/RL Report,10 June
I
1991:3). This measure is significant because it
i |
represents the first multilateral attempt at cooperation
40


by the republics not supporting the Union treaty.
I '
on li2 June 1991, the Lithuanian and Beyelorussian
i |
Cooperation preaty was announced by the Ministers of
Internal Affairs of both republics. The representatives
i
at the signing of the treaty called it *'a step which
consolidates] the sovereignty of both countries" and that
"coordinated activity will be placed on the recognition
1 i

of the statehood of Lithuania and Byelorussia11. Both
repub licsi a iL declared their future intention to sign a
similar aigreement with the Russian republic (RFE/RL Daily
,
Report,12 Jyne 1991:4). Support for the independence of
the Baltic states by other republics, particularly the
Russian republic, is a significant development in inter-
!
republic rellations. Also significant is the fact that
this represents an agreement between republics on
differing sides of the all-Union treaty debater a point
which will have an impact on the final structure of the
treaty as: it
As a
relates to non^signatories*
IdLSt example of inter-republic cooperation,
i
representatives of the Moldavian and Ukrainian SSRs met
on 13 June 1991 to promote direct economic cooperation
and to finalize details for a Ukrainian-Moldavian Treaty
of Cooper at ijon (RFE/RL Daily Report,13 June 1991:8) *
There are numerous examples of cooperation agreements
between the republics, with new documents being signed on
41


a weekly basis. Boris Yeltsin has been particularly busy
i
in this area!, signing agreements for the Russian republic
with Sovilet
the Russian
republics and European nations. Typical of
republic cooperative agreements is one signed
by the Russian and Ukrainian republics in November of
1990. It provided a framework for economic, political,
i
I
defense, ^nd cultural cooperation. Yeltsin described the
hJvi:
treaty as;
ring "united the efforts of two republics
which have aj total of 200 million people and the powerful
resources th'at are the equal of any two states in the

i
world" (London Times, 20 November 1990:A6).
i
i
Almost jail ethnic violence currently taking place in
I
the Soviet Union is occurring at the communal level
i '
within single republics* The republics are working both
individually and in regional groups to resolve these
i
conflicts;, l>ut many are a result of territorial disputes
l
which will only be resolved by some all^Union level
I |'
authorityji The conflict in Ossetia between local
!
nationals and the Georgian SSR government is an example
1 I
of this type| of ethnic territorial dispute (Sheehy,
1991a:18). !
.1
The only current example of inter^ethnic violence at
the republic level is the ethnic territorial dispute
between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This conflict is
|
actually ^he result of a territorial dispute over the
42


Nagorno Karb|akh autonomous oblast. This dispute has long
I
term historijc roots and is not likely to be resolved
without strong intervention by an all-Union authority,

possibly after the signing of the new all-Union treaty
i
(see Smith, 1990; Nahaylo and Swoboda, 1990).
I ,
Demographic Issues

The rel|ationships betveen the republics and the
central government and the inter-reputolic relationships
developed over the past year can provide significant
insight into| the nationalities movements and reform
process currently taking place in the Soviet Union*
Another useful tool in understanding the underlying
causes of
thje resurgence of the nationalities is an
L
examination of the demographics of the Soviet Union*
While the overall population has grown at a fairly
constant rate, there has been a wide variation in the
growth ori dejcline of certain major national groups. The
number of RuLsians has grown from a total of 114 million
in 1959 tp a; total of 145 million in 1989, for a total
increase pf |27 percent over the thirty year period.
i
During the same period, the population of Tadzhiks grew
from 1.4 mil
lion to 4.2 million, an increase of 200
percent. The comparative increases for the major
nationalitiets can be seen in Table 2*1, and the
43


0.0
48.1
134.5
64.3
159*7
150.0
200.0
170.0
125.0
! Russians 114
Ukrainians 37
Byelorussians Moldavians ! 7 2
Lithuanians 2
Latvians 1
Estonians 1
Georgiansi 1 2
Azerbaijanis! 2
Armenians 2
Uzbeks j 6
Kirghiz Tadzhiks : 1 1
Turkmens 1
Kazakhs i 3
Source: Smith,1990:363 and Simon, 1991:372-375
The|Sov|iet Union is currently undergoing a major
1 i
demographic shift away from the historic SlavicEuropean
domination of the past. In 1959, the Russian nationality
i '
accounted for 55 percent of the total population of the
!
USSR, while today it:s share of the total population has
dropped to 5
1 percent. The population of the Slavic
nationalities (Russian, Byelorussian, and Ukrainian) has
also dropped
significantly, from 76 percent of the total
stanstics present some facts wmch have a direct impact
on the Soviet political system*
Table 2.1 Populations of Major Nationalities
Population
(millions)
Change
C%)
Nationality
1959
1979
1989
1959-89
12 4 5 8
7 8 0 4 4
2 13 5 3
113415008675271
540331146462428
4 4 1 1
X
435094065259906
729321135421226
3 4 1
39234079800406
44


population in 1959 to 69 percent in 1989. A major
I !
population shift of this sort has a significant impact on
the power bdse of the country. As the Russian and Slavic
population decreases, it becomes more difficult for the
Soviet government to maintain its historic power base and
it loses the ability to dominate the rapidly growing non-
Russian "minority". At the current rate of growth among
the non-Russian nationalities, the Russians will become a
!
technical mi'nority (i-e_ less than 50 percent) before the
end of this century (see Table 2*2).
This shift in population can also be seen when the
birthrates of various national groups are examined. The
'i
birthrate iiJ the European portion of the Soviet Union has
']
held at appriximately 15/1000 population over the last
ten years, jxhe birth rate in the Central Asian republics
has reached i34/1000 population, with some nationalities
within the area having birth rates as high as 42/1000
i
population (Smith, 1990:372)- As these birth rates are
representative of future population trends, it is likely
that the Russians and their Slavic counterparts will
continue to represent a smaller percentage of t:he Soviet
|
population into the 21st ciBntury (Baradat, 1939:310}.
45


Table 2.2 Populations of the Union Republics
i
Increase
Republic __________ 1979_________1989_________(percent)
RSFSR 137.5 147.4 7*2
Ukrainian1 SSR 49.7 51-7 3.9
Byelorussian SSR 9.6 10.2 6*7
Moldavian S^R 3.9 4.3 10.0
Lithuanian SSR 3.4 3.7 8.6
Latvian SSR ; 2.5 2.7 6.3
Estonian SSR 1.5 1.6 7-3
Georgian SSK 5.0 5.5 8.7
Azerbaijan SSR 6.0 7,0 16*6
Armenian SSk 3.0 3.3 8.3
Uzbek SSk 15.4 19.9 29.3
Kirghiz SSR 3.5 4.3 21.6
Tadzhik SSR 3.8 5.1 34.5
Turkmen SSR 2.8 3.5 28.1
Kazakh SSR 14.7 16.5 12.6
. i Source: Report on the USSR, 19 May 1989,p,3 and
Hammer, 1990:184
A significant effect of this shift away from Russian
J ' '
domination of the population is its impact on the
i
political cdntrol held by Russians over most: aspects of
I
the Soviet political system. Although the Russian
I

population is approximately 50 percent of the total
Soviet population, Russians have in the past held over 70
percent of the upper leadership positions in both the
Communist palrty and the government. Over 60 percent of
i
, i '
all ConaDimilt party members are ethnic Russians, a figure
which als|o Exceeds the proportion of Russians in the
total Soviet population (Laird, 1986:145; Barry,
i
1991:246),. The Soviet government and Communist party
46


will have an1 increasingly difficult time convincing the
non-Russian ethnic groups that this disproportionate
,j
representati'on is acceptable. A gradual increase in non-
I I
Russian r|epresentation is now underway, and the final
resolution of the Union treaty will determine how the
future al'l-Union government will be constituted.
After the Russians^ the single largest and most
i
rapidly growing ethnic group in the Soviet Union is the
.1
Muslims* The Muslims are located in the Central Asian
and Transcaucasus republics and have a very high level of
ethnic consciousness due to their religious beliefs and
their close-knit culture. There are approximately 50
million Musi|ims in the Soviet Union at this time, and
I
they will represent nearly 25 percent of the total
I
population by the year 2000 (Smith, 1991:363; Hammer,
1985:143). In the future, Muslims will constitute a
large portion of the manpower for the militaryf the
,.i
industrial workforce, and the political constituency of
i
their native! republics. The future resolution of ethnic
i
!
issues and the form of the future Soviet political

structure must take this significant group into account*
i .
An impact: of this demographic shift which is already
;|
being felt in the Soviet Union is the decrease in
j
available' manpower for industrial, agriculturalf and
j
i .
military applications. The Soviet economy is extremely
47


labor intensive and is beginning to run into labor
shortages at industrial and manufacturing plants,
particularly in the European portion of the country* For
mis reason, a number of plants have been relocated to
the area east of the Ural mountains and into Central
Asia, where
there are abundant numbers of workers. As a
result of this shift in industrial production, the
;i j
population of the area east of the Urals has increased
from 18 percent to 25 percent of the total Soviet
i

population (iBaradat, 1989). In the past, this was seen
I
as an unsatiisfactory political solution as it meant the
i
diffusion of economic and political power away from
Moscow arid towards the non-Russian republics. In the
"j
future, it roay be the only choice available to the
central government.
i

An additional problem which has occurred as a result
' i
of the growling dependence on Central Asian manpower is
i
one of education and ability. Although Soviet education
programs haye greatly increased the literacy rate among
i
the non-Russian nationalities, many of the Central Asians
do not speak Russian and are not as well-trained in
technical applications as their European counterparts.
This adversejly affects economic efficiency and production
i I
and also alijenates the workers if told they must learn
i !
i
Russian. | The Soviet military has also encountered
I
4B


similar problems with Muslim recruitsr as they lack the
Russian language training and technical background to be
able to operate advanced Soviet equipment. They are
therefore assigned to construction battalions and not
i
given leadership positions, although this to may change
i
as a result of the growing manpower shortage (Baradat,
1989; Szayna., 1991).
The language issue also has an impact on the
|
nationalities issue as a whole* A number of the non-
Russian national movements began their campaigns asanti-
Russification efforts, and the pressure to learn and use
Russian within the Soviet system has always been great*
Russian is vjital for work in the political system, the
j
military, and higher education* Ethnic Russians account
for 145 million of the country7s Russian speakers, while
i
another 16 million non-Russians also consider it to be
their first language. Over 61 million Soviets consider
i
Russian to b|e their second language, so a total of 222
_|
million Soviets representing 82 percent of the total
population speak Russian (Barry, 1991:246 Smith,
1990:368). This is an incredible accomplishment
considering the ethnic diversity of the country and the
resistance to past Russification policies, but future use
of Russian is likely to decline as the demographic trend
moves away f|roin Russians and toward the other national
49


RSFSR |
Ukrainian! SSR
Byelorussian] SSR
Holdaviani SSR
Lithuanian s|sr
Latvian SSR
Estonian SSR
Georgian SSR
Azerbaijan SSR
Armenian SS_
Uzbek SSR !
Kirghiz SSR ,
Tadzhik SSR !
Turkmen SSR
Kazakh SSk
Source: Current Digest of the Soviet Press,34,49,p.4
,'
The presence1 of significant numbers of non-native
citizens effects the political and economic reform
'
process and preates conflicts over nationality issues.
In the Baltic republics, much of the central government's
interventiori| activity has been on behalf of the Russian
groups,
The |demographic factor which most complicates the
i;
resolution of a number of the nationality issues is the
n i
intermingling of ethnic populations throughout the Soviet
republics. Every republic has a some significant non-
native popul-ation which complicates the resolution of
.1
political and economic issues (see Table 2.3).
Table 2.3| National Composition of the Union Republics
!
i
Republic i
Native
fpercentl
Russian
fpercent)
Others
fpercent>
6941375692 295
1 211 21 22322
390290590339252
8111 32 1 12 114
3515078749646 3
878685667 CO 64553
50


minorities living in Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania.
i I
Even Lithuania, where over 80 percent of the population
!
is native!, has had difficulty in pursuing its sovereignty
| I
objectives over the resistance of the non-native
minority. Kazakhstan has only a 33 percent native
population, with 60 percent of its population made up of
Russians and Ukrainians (Brzezinskir 1990:6; Smith,
1990). These inherent demographic divisions set the
stage fori most of the anti-Russian sentiment and
i
conflicts! which occur in the republics.
1 I
Inter-ejthnic conflicts also occur as result of non-
native minoriities established in autonomous republics or
oblasts Within union republics. The dispute over Nagorno
Karabakh, an Armenian enclave within the territorial
boundary of Azerbaijan, is an example of this type of
ethnic dispute (Schxnemann, 1991).This conflict and
others of a |similar nature have caused numerous deaths
and resulted in thousands of refugees, adding to the
population movements across borders and further
j
exacerbating! ethnic tensions, Gorbachev has recognized
the complexity of the intermingling of ethnic groups, but
the political situation and inter-republic turmoil which
j
it causes hab created a probleia which is beyond the
i
current government's capability to resolve.
51


Impacts on the Soviet System
The nationalities resurgence of the 1980s cane as a
collectiv.e shock to the Soviet system. Speaking at a
conference i|n Bashkiria in 1989, the director of the
Central Goimittee Academy of Social Sciences, 1.1.
Antonovich, [stated that the whole Communist party was
surprised by the nationalistic resurgence:
It 'is necessary to say that we did not: think
perestroika would provoke such a total
aggravation of national relations through the
whole country... The party did not feel the
nation|al bitterness that had built up in the
people1. The sharp reaction was unexpected.
(qtd. in Hough, 1989:37)
After an examination of past Soviet nationalities policy,
it is not difficult to imagine that the current Soviet
i ' .
leadership could have underestimated or misuncJerstood the
by the nationalities issue. The 1986
the Communist Party still asserted that "the
threat posed
i
Programme! of
nationalities question inherited from the past has been
! i L
successfully solved in the Soviet Union11 (gtd. in Sakva,
i i !
1990:259)Gorbachev gave little priority to nationality
!
policy during his first months in power and did not
i
pursue any serious revision of existing policy until
| r
1988, wheh he identified nationality policy as "the most
i |
fundamental,, vital issue of our society1*. By July of
.'
1988, Gorbachev was calling for a comprehensive
' .1
. i
restructuring of nationality policy to include the
52


transformation of the Soviet
political system (Lapidus,
198.9b:211).
1 ,
Gorbacliev had little experience in dealing with

nationality .issues during his career, and he initially

had little patience for dealing with its complex
political issues before he had completed his ovm economic
and political reforms (Lapidus, 1989a:98). Gorbachev *s
initial delays in dealing with the nationality issue and
in formulati'ng new policy allowed the issue to become
critical,ta
king precedence over and adversely impacting
his economic and political reforms.
The reforms implemented by Gorbachev in 1986
correspond to the resurgence in nationalism, but were not
'I
the basic, cause. However, three aspects of the reform
i ..
program did help to bring the nationalities issue to the
i '
I
publicfs .attention. First, the policy of glasnost
i
allowed expressions of grievances and political
demonstrations which would have been banned only a few
' i
j
years before!. Second, the political democratization of
the Soviet system allowed for political activism on the
local levelresulting in the formation of the popular
1 I
fronts which! are now leading the nationalities movements.
Third, this severe economic problems which beset the
Soviet system corresponded to the nationalities demands
for more economic autonomy at the republic level and the
53


removal of the centrally controlled command economy
I
(Lapidus,1 1989a:99). Gorbachev continues to insist that
perestroilka
nationalist
and glasnost are not to blame for the
unrest, but that f,perestroika has exploded
the illusory peace and harmony Which reigned during the
i
years of |stagnationv, (gtd. in Sakwa, 1990:257) #
For jwhatever long term or short term reasons, the
1
Soviet empire has been brought critically close to the
i
point of |p]itical and economic disintegration by the
'i
resurgent: nationalities movement. The political reforms
brought ajbout by national unrest have seen the Communist
party lose itiuch of its authority and legitimacy. When
the Congress of Peopled Deputies voted 1771 to 164 to
| .
end the Communist party,s monopoly on power in March of
i.
1990, the first multi-party political system in the
i
Soviet Union had been approved (The Economist,17 March
1990:41)
The
Communist Party has suffered a significant loss
in authority and legitimacy as a result of the political
reforms initiated due to the nationalities resurgence.
The party his been subject to numerous accusations of
1
corruption,
i
sovereignty
repression, and ethnic bias. Due to the
movements in the republics, a number of party
officials have renounced their membership and left he
i.
i
Party to |join Popular Fronts or separatist movements.
I 1
54


The Commiinist Party has also become a member of coalition
reformist governments in several republics, supporting
..I
national interests over Comnunist Party ideology. As a
.i .
result or thle nationalities resurgence and political
1 )
sovereignty movements, the Communist Party has lost a
i.
great deal of its power and is no longer a mechanism by
i
which the! central government can control the republics
(Lapidus,19189b).
1
The ; (economic collapse has brought hardships
! .
throughout the country which have led to the eventual
, :
! I
destatization and decentralization of the economic system
and the gr
i i
The republic
ng of economic autonomy to the republics,
sovereignty movements have crippled the
central government^s ability to enforce production
quotas, c61l|ect taxes and budget contributions, and
_ . _!
-I
exploit natural resource development. The jurisdictional
' I
dispute bietwpen the republics and the central government
over enterprjises and infrastructure development has
exacerbated the problems associated with delivery and
transport of.
agricultural.
_ i
goods and the inter-republic transfer of
and manufactured products.
The tax and budget issue has become acute, as each
republic which refuses to submit even minimal revenues to
|
55


issues also|cause significant international concerns, as
the creditworthiness of the Soviet government and banking
,j
system is brought intd question (Sakwa, 1990).
! I i
!
Finally, the dispute over property rights and the
.'
ownership of natural resources has hurt the economy as

republics obtain industrial enterprises and government
!' i
faciliticis either through economic transfer or republic
i |
confiscation. The withholding of oil, gasf and mineral
ji i
resources has hinciered the central government's ability
to raise [hard currency. The ability to raise hard
i
, !
currency is critical in the central government's attempts

to resolve its international credit problems (Simon,
'i
1990). {
j
Thej'overall political and economic reforms demanded
1 i i
by the republics have led Gorbachev to the point of
h j
sharing power with the republics. As a result of the
j
September 19,89 Central Committee Plenum on the
!: .|_
Nationalities Question, a number of specific actions were
:::: .
taken in an [attempt to resolve the crisis. The Law on
Economic1ReJations between the USSR and Union and
Autonomous Republics, passed in April of 1990, proposed
r I
greater economic authority for the republics in
!
controlling
taxationr finances, investment policy, and
economic inanlagement. The law also approved inter-
i
56


republic^ itrade agreements and authorized republics to
l
trade directly with foreign countries (Sakvar 1990:263).
In March of 1990, Gorbachev created the Council of
Federation Js a political means of providing the
1 : i'
1
republics with more direct input into the Soviet
government. | The council was well receivedf but
eventually burned out to have little authority and was
.1 j
of limited effectiveness due to the differing opinions of
:
its multi-ethnic membership* At the same time, Gorbachev
called for the drafting of a new Union Treaty to replace
'
the exist'mgf Soviet constitution and consolidate a number
.i
of reforms in Soviet nationalities policy (Sheehy,
' j
1991a:17;; Sakwa, 1990). The new Union Treaty will limit
the central lor all-Union government to a specific area of
nationalresponsibility while devolving all other
j
political and economic authority to the republics* The
proposed treaty will be discussed in greater detail in
1
chapter three.
Thehat
i
significant
:ionalities resurgence has also had a
impact on the Soviet military. The Soviet
.i .
military has been described as undergoing an
''institutlonLl crisis" as a result of the ethnic unrest
both in the republics and in the military itself. The
most critical issue relates to the loss of military
readiness due to desertions, ethnic violence, terrorist
j
57


attacks, :draft resistance, and declining pools of
1
qualified manpower. The major factor in each of these
issues is the ethnic unrest currently taking place in the
|
republics; and the governinent,s efforts to manage the
" i
crisis (Schemmer, 1990:30).
[
As a matter of policyf the Soviet Army has resisted
i
government e|fforts to subordinate Army forces to the
Ministry of Jlnternal Affairs (MVD) for use in suppressing
.i i
civil disiordWrs associated with ethnic unrest* The Anny
dislikes being involved in civil actions because it fears
a declanei in
i _
I
Instead, the
public support for the military as a whole,
military prefers to see the use of the MVD^s
internal forlces anci the local militias when suppressing
I
i I
civil disorder (Zaloga, 1990:20).
j
Ethnic violence and draft evasion are major issues
effectingj the Soviet military. Ethnic violence has been
-! i
a long term problem in the Soviet military, and with the
!
i '
advent of| glasnost and political reform even more is
|
being discovered about the scale of the problem. A
government investigation initiated after public
.]
complaints about non-combat deaths in the Soviet military
concluded! that as many as eight thousand service members
have diedj per year during the last 15 years. The Defence
Ministry stuay estimated that between 75 and 85 percent
58


of all delates and injuries were as a result of violence
1 .
in Army life (RFE/RL Daily Report, 20 June 1991:6).
L I
An additional report by a commission of the Russian
r I
Supreme Sovilet stated that approximately 300,000 soviet
j
soldiers had died in non-combat incidents since the end
of World Wan II, with 50 percent resulting from suicide,
20 percent from beatings, and 10 percent from training
1 ' i
accidents, (RFE/RL Daily Report, 20 June 1991:6).
I I
Statistics of this nature are certain tci drive away
i
conscripts and make republics more hesitant to allow
..j
their conscrjipts to serve outside their ovn borders.
i .
The rise of republic sovereignty movements has meant
i
that many republics have stopped pursuing draft evaders
!: I
and others have stopped enforcing compulsory military
. 1 I
service altogether. As of July of 1990, the military
I
| |
draft turnoujt had reached a record low^ with many
.i
republics holding back their conscripts for potential
I
territorial bervices in their own republics (see Table
2,4). i
59


Table 2.4 Draft Turnout in the Republics
ReDublic 1989 1990
, Azerbaijan 97.8% 100*0%
Moldavia 1 100.0% 100.0%
Ukraine 97.6% 99.4%
Kazakhstan 100,0% 99.2%
Byelorussia 100.0% 98.9%
RSFSR 100.0% 98.6%
Tajikistan 100.0% 92.7%
Turkmenistar 100.0% 90.2%
Kirghizia 100.0% 89.5%
Uzbekistan 100.0% 87.4%
Latvia 90.7% 54.2%
Estonia 79-5% 40.2%
Lithuania 91.6% 33-6%
Georgia 94.0% 27.5%
Armenia 100.0% 7.5%
Source: RFE/RL Report on the USSR, 27 July 1990:4
The draft turnout figures can be used as a sort of
referendum dn Soviet government policy by examining which
republics comply and which resist. The republics which
! !
have declared full independence from the Soviet union
(the Baltics, Georgia, and Armenia) have low turnouts,
i
while the republics working on the comproinise to preserve
1 i d
the USSR have little significant change in their
part icipajti on Draft resistance has placed Soviet
military forces approximately ten percent below required
manning levejls r and the outlook for improved
..i
participation is bleak (Zaloga, 1991a:16; Foye, 1990:4).
i.
The: development of republic militias and the
1 |
increase in armed guerilla activity associated with
60


, I
ethnic unrest have also effected the Soviet military.
Deserters haye left their units and returned to their
native republics to participate in local militias, taking
with them mokern Soviet equipment. Ethnically motivated
attacks against the Soviet military by militias or
conscripts have resulted in numerous casualties, with 85
i
officers being assassinated and 189 severely injured in
1990. Compared to a total of three deaths in the
previous two^years, this rapid increase has gained the
attention of'the Soviet military and may cause them to
change their)policy about the draft and move toward an
all-volunteer force (Weiss, 1990:939).
As the pool of qualified manpower declines, the
Soviet military becomes more concerned about the source
I
of its future soldiers. As previously discussed, the
growing Muslim population presents an unsuitable source
because of the ability and reliability of the conscripts.
The Soviet system used to consider the military as a tool
for the cultural assimilation and training of the non-
i
Russian minorities* Brezhnev once stated:
Our army is a special one. It is a school for
internationalism, instilling sentiments of
fraternity, solidarity, and mutual respect for
all nations and nationalities of the Soviet Union,
(qtd.inj Baradat, 1989:326)
61


The rise of iethnic tensions and the growing sovereignty
I j
movements have ushered in the end of the Soviet military
j
as a toolor cultural assimilation1
A final issue of more international concern is the
disposition of Soviet nuclear weapons at a time when
i
ethnic unrest and military disruptions are taking place
in the republics where some veapons vere known to be
i
i
stored. Nuclear veapons security became a concern when
it was reported that during an outbreak of ethnic
violence in jl989, Azeri rebels attacked a Soviet nuclear
weapons storage facility and were driven baclc by local
security forjces. The major concerns in this issue regard
the safety of the Soviet nuclear weapons and the
I
safeguards aigainst their use if they happen to be
i
captured. jThe Soviets have withdrawn some weapons from
I
threatened alreas and have increased security around other
facilities,but the issue remains one of concern for both
j
Soviet and fjoreign officials (Mossberg, 1991:A14; Zaloga,
I
1991b:28; Ra|hr and Bryan, 1990: 6).
1
The Soviet Union has undergone a significant amount
|
of change as a result of the resurgence of the
nationality Lovements* The relationship between the
central govejrnment and the Union republics has become one
of compromise and concession as result of ethnic unrestr
|
demands for jpolitical and econoioic autonomy, and
62


threatened authoritarian crackdowns. The end result has
been an attempt at securing the future of the Union
through theipassage of a new union treaty which will
completely revise the Soviet: political structure and
grant virtual autonomy to each participating republic.
The inter-republic relationships, while still
violent as i result of individual ethnic conflicts in the
Transcaucasus region, have generally improved. The
agreements on economic and political cooperation being
signed by ttje various republics enhance stability and
promote further development both for the republics
involved and for the union as a whole,
|
The difficult task now faced by the Soviet Union is
i
how to integrate the many autonomous republics and ethnic
interest grdups into the proposed union of sovereign
states. This can only be accomplished by overcoming the
i
past societal divisions and authoritarian rule through a
' | ,
process of democratization and decentralization. The
i
process of Mjnew thinking11 on the nationality question is
vital and must be fully developed through interaction
between the republics and the central government. As
63


Aleksandr Bovin stated in a recent Izvestiya editorial:
It is desirable to preserve the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, perhaps after changing the
nature of the relationships between the republics
and ijf necessary the name of the union.
Nobody roust limits under any pretext, the freedom
of choijce of the union republics or obstruct their
withdrawal from the USSR. The rights and interests
of ethnic minorities must be reliably guaranteed
by the central authorities not just in words
but in bleeds. (qtd.in World Press Review,
May 1991117)
64


CHAPTER 3
THE ALL-UNION TREATY
AND REPUBLIC SOVEREIGNTY
i
i
As a result of the resurgence of the Soviet
nationalities, many republics have renewed their demands
for sovereignty and the right to self-determination.
Marxist-Leninist ideology included in its program the
right to sel'f-determination and had promised this right
j
to the membe|rs of the new Soviet state in 1917. The
i
federal system formed under the initial Soviet
i
constitution of 1924 and repeated in the 1936 and 1977
constitutions maintained the republics# right to self-
i
determination through a process of secession from the
union, but tlhe right was essentially a theoretical one.
i
At that time, no republic had the political power or the
level of ethnic consciousness to challenge the authority
. i
and legitimacy of the central government on the issue.
I
The Soyiet Union now faces a situation in which its
republics azje demanding their constitutionally guaranteed
right to self-determination and all have declared
sovereignty jor initiated the secession process. The
continued deterioration in the levels of support for the
central government by the republics has significantly


decreased the authority of the central government and the
political legitimacy of the ^Union11 of republics. The
proposed Union treaty may be Gorbachev#s last opportunity
to retain a Union of Soviet republicsr as the demands for
political and economic sovereignty have begun to outweigh
i
the support for maintaining the existing Union. In the
words of Martha Olcott (1991:135);
For many non-Russians, independence and political
autonomy are worth dying for. So far no one is
expressing any willingness to risk dying for the
Union.
This chapter will examine the republic's
i
declarations of sovereignty and the Soviet federal
system^s at4empts to deal with the disintegration of the
i
Union. The !proposed Union treaty will be analyzed in
detail both 'for its implications for the Soviet Union and
i '
its effects on the sovereign republics. The chapter will
conclude with a discussion of the prospects for success
of the treaty and the outlook for the Soviet Union.
i Republican Sovereignty Movements
During jthe last eighteen months, the impending
disintegration of the Soviet Union has become an issue of
critical concern to both the central government anc3 its
constituents republics. The three Baltic republics,
Georgia, and Armenia have all declared their outright
independence from the Soviet Union or are pursuing
66


independence through legal proceedings with the Soviet
government. All of the remaining Union republics have
adopted declarations of sovereignty which establish
j
republic authority over economic and political matters
and challenge the legitimacy of the existing a11-Union
government.
The sovereignty issue is a complex one which has
held historic interest for the Soviet government since
its formation in 1922. Soviet state law defines
sovereignty as *'the supremacy of state power, which makes
it unlimited and independent within its own borders and
I
-
independent in its relationship with other states*1 (Nove,
1986:199). In contradiction to this definition is the
federal interpretation of supremacy as it: applies to the
a11-Union gdverrment and Soviet people:
In the USSR, sovereignty belongs to the multi^
national Soviet people, who exercise it through
its socialist state and through the supreme organs
of statie power (Nove, 1986:199)
The limits o|f a republics sovereignty extend to its own
interactions with other states and within its borders,
but the sovereignty of all Soviet citizens is guaranteed
by the centrjal government itself. This in effect limits
republic sovereignty by giving the central government the
ultimate authority in all issues, with Soviet law always
taking precedence over republic law, regardless of the
i
republic^ sovereignty considerations.
67


The Soviet legal position on sovereignty justifies
i
state precedence by reference to the Soviet constitution.
The constitution describes the USSR as a voluntary union
in which the republics have voluntarily surrendered
certain powers to the central government:. The republics
retain all residual powers not specifically granted to
the central government, but the list of specified powers
is broad land all encompassing. This lack of control over
I
political and economic issues and the inability to make
policy which is not subordinate to Soviet state policy
are the main complaints which the republics have brought
forward when debating the issue of sovereignty with the
central government (Nove, 1986:199).
The declarations of sovereignty by every republic in
the Union are representative of the broad national
support for self-determination. The declarations have
been motivated by the republics dissatisfaction with the
i
central government's performance in managing the Union,
The political and economic problems which beset the
country have driven the republics to seek the autonomy
required to manage their own systems. Bureaucratic
mismanagement, pollution of the environment, restrictive
language and cultural policies, and ethnic abuses in the
military ar6 all reasons given by the republics for
68


wanting to remove themselves from the control of the
central government (Sakwa, 1990:237).
j
The proliferation of political parties and popular
fronts within the republics has added to the chaos
present in tihe Soviet political system. Many of the
popular fronts have led the sovereignty movements in
their republics, while others have attained very little
support but have been able to further the cause of
democratiz at ion. The parties and fronts represent a
number of different interest groups, including
environmentalists, intellectuals, radical reformers, and
in some areas even the Communist Party. In the Georgian
SSR, the current political leadership is a coalition made
up of a nationalist popular front, political reformers,
and a small group of former party officials and labor
leaders. Since most of these groups are nationality
oriented/ there is little overlap of their organizations
into other republics or the Soviet Union as a whole. The
|
wide variety and diverse developmental levels of the
numerous grciups will make any attempts at regional
political coordination somewhat difficult (Lapidus,
1989b; Smith, 1990).
In addition to the declarations by the 15 Union
republics, over 20 of the autonomous republics and
regions within the Union have similarly declared their
69


sovereignty The sovereignty declarations have become so
numerous that a Soviet journalist remarked Hin the
parade of sovereignty... Latvia/s claims to statehood
have become indistinguishable from those of the medieval
Khanate of Kazan11 (OXcott, 1991:128). The lumber of
declarations have influenced the central government
i
enough that jits past policies of coercion and repression
have now been replaced by compromise and concession. The
idea of a single "voluntary Union,f has been proven to be
unacceptable to entire national conununitiies and to the
millions of I Soviet citizens whose interests they
represent (Olcott, 1991)
The sovereignty declarations commonly include major
i
statements on political and economic autonomyr political
democratization, enterprise management, bank and finance
arrangementst republic currency, and international trade
The most controversial statements involve republic
control over natural resources and the primacy of
republic law over Union law, both of vhich are issues of
i
dispute with the central government due to their
_unconsti!tutliona 1 ity Finally, the declarations
normally include arrangements for the raising of republic
military forces, internal security forces, and a
'j
statement about the republicfs plan to become politically
neutral or non-aligned (Sheehy, 1991a:16).
70


The sovereignty declaration by the Byelorussian
republic is|an excellent example of the typical statement
made by a republic. Table 3.1 summarizes the major
points of tike Byelorussian declaration.
Table 3.1 Byelorussian Sovereignty Declaration
* the Byelorussian constitution, law, and state
authority on the territory of the republic are
supreme
* the republic conducts independent foreign
relations
* the people are citizens of Byelorussia; there
is no reference to USSR citizenship
* the Byelorussian people have the exclusive right
of ownership of the land, natural resources,
mineral wealth, and airspace of the republic
* provision is made for a national bank, an
independent financial system, separate taxes
and customs dutiesf and currency
* Byelorussia shall be compensated for the
Chernobyl disaster and other ecological
damage | caused by Union and foreign enterprises
* the republic has the right to maintain army and
security forces independent of the Union and
subQrd+nate to the Byelorussian Supreme Sovietf
the republic is to determine conditions of
military service
* there shall be no troops, military bases, or
armament without the republicfs approval; the
state is to be a non-nuclear zone and neutral
in future
* the republic shall appoint the public prosecutor
i
source: Mihalisko, 1990:12
I
There are numerous serious impacts for the central
i
government as a result of the sovereignty declarations.
The legitimacy of the federal constitution has been
seriously challenged by the number and degree of
71


violations of Soviet law present in nearly every
declaration by the republics. The loss of control over
enterprises though already in progress as a part of the
staters reform plansr represents another serious
challenge toj the governments authority* The foreign
policy and international trade implications are a serious
matter because the additional political units seeking
|
western agreements or assistance will decrease the
Union^s negotiating legitimacy and further complicate the
issues* ,The Baltic republics already consider themselves
to be a separate country, as they refer to their
relations with Moscow as their "Eastern policy {Olcott,
'|
1991: 129),
The Eastern European response to the sovereignty
movements has been broadly supportive. The Hungarian
i
government has announced its intention to treat Lithuania
i
and the Ukraine as independent states, while Poland has
I
called for iliriproved relations with all of its bordering
nations* In the southern portion of the country, both
Iran and Turjkey have entered into or are seeking nes
with the Central Asian and Transcaucasus republics
(Olcott, 19^1:130)-
i
Gorbachev has taken a number of steps counteract
the disintegration of the Union, but all have met with
little or no success. His initial response to the Baltic
72


independence declarations of early 1990 was to declare
them null and void and order them to follow the Soviet
l
constitutional procedures for secession. The Baltic
states immediately rejected this demand, stating that due
to their legal status as a country illegally annexed by
the Soviet Union, they were exempt from any Soviet law on
secession. Gorbachev then criticized the Lithuanians for
I
being in a hurry "to sever 50 years of ties during a
single weekend of furious parliamentary activity11
i
(Olcott, :1991125).
!
In an attempted compromise with the republics on
i
economic autonomy, Gorbachev supported a Law on Economic
Relations wliich granted greater powers to the republics
in the areas of taxation, finances, and investment
policy. The republics were willing to accept the new
authority, liut still pursued their demands for full
j
economic and political autonomy. The issue of economic
autonomy is still an open one, but the government
continues to compromise as the reforms of perestroika
continue the process of decentralization (Sakva#
1990:263).
The Law on Secession, passed in May of 1990, made
the secession process extremely difficult: if not
impossible to accomplish. The required public-wide
i

referendums |and five year waiting period were more than
73


the republics would accept, so they have simply ignored
the law and continued with their insistence on
independence. Gorbachev has referred to this type of
activity by. the republics as the War of Laws1in which
the republics passed laws which were in direct conflict
I
with all-Union laws in an attempt to circumvent the
system. This tactic has been particularly successful in
restrictingjthe tax payments made to the central
government and in disrupting the Soviet economy by
restricting trade arrangements between republics
(Sheehy,1991a:17; Lapidus, 1989b).
In an attempt to end the "War of Laws' Gorbachev
implemented two more reforms aimed at meeting the demands
of the republics. First, he formed the Council of
Federation, ja body designed to give the leaders of the
republics more access to the government decision-making
process. Next, Gorbachev attempted to "federalize11 the
Communist party structure, giving the republic party
officials more control over local activities and
installing the Republic Party First Secretaries as ex
officio meraljers of the Politburo. Both of these reforms
failed to improve the situationr as they were simply
overcome by ithe pace of events in the republics and their
i
policy making authority became irrelevant (Sheehy,
1991a}.
74


Gorbachevas concessions to the republics and his
compromises on legal issues were not sufficient to stem
i
the growing dissatisfaction with the all-Union
government When the Russian republic joined the ranks
of those republics declaring sovereignty, Gorbachev
initiated a plan to save the Union structure by drafting
a new Union|treaty vhich would implement most of the
i .
changes called for by the republics. This was a change
in position for Gorbachev, as he had rejected the idea of
a Union treaty when it was proposed at the CPSU Central
|
Coironittee Plenum in September of 1989 (Sheehy, 1991a:18).
The new Union Treaty now represented the best possible
solution |to resolving the constitutional crisis facing
the Soviet Union.
, i
! The Nev Union Treaty
Gorbachev began the planning process for the new
i
Union treaty in June of 1990 by naming R-N. Nishanov,
i
Chairman of the Council of Nationalities of the USSR
Supreme Soviet, to head the committee tasked with
drafting the treaty. VWien the first draft was submitted
to the Supreme Soviet in November of 1990, it was heavily
criticized for not going far enough in its reform of the
I
existing Soviet constitution. Although the treaty had
been drawn up by members of the Supreme Soviet, it was
I
75


also criticized for being "imposed from above1', a
reference to Gorbachev and the influence of the senior
leadership. The draft treaty was returned to the
committee for significant revisions (Sheehy,199111).
i _
The second revision vas drawn up by a committee to
be composed of representatives from each of the Union and
Autonomous republics* Only 9 of the 15 Union republics
agreed to take part, marking the first delineation of
republic positions with regard to support for the treaty,
i
The participating republics were the RSFSR, Ukraine,
! !
Byelorussiaj Kazakhstan, the four Central Asian
republics, and Armenia. These republics represent 93
percent of the Soviet Unions population, so the central
government was willing to continue work on the treaty
based on their support. Their work was completed by 9
i
March 1991,|with the revised treaty available for public
inspection qrior to the 17 March 1991 all-Union
referendum on the preservation of the Soviet Union
(Sheehy, 1991b).
Gorbachev had called for the all-Union referendum
for two main political reasons- The major reason was to
consolidate support for the survival of the Union by
.1 .
ensuring passage of the Union treaty* Gorbachev
obtained the mandate of support which he was seeking, as
voters nationwide supported the plan with approximately
76


USSR 80
RSFSR 75
Ukraine 83
Byelorissia : 83
Uzbekistan 95
Kazakhstan 89
Azerbaijan 75
Kirghizia 93
Tadjikistan | 94
Turkmenistan 98
Source: Sheehy,1991c:22
i i
Gorbachev7s second reason for calling the referendum
i

was in an attempt to speed up the consideration and
i
approval of Ithe treaty by the republics. With the
support of a national referendum, Gorbachev thought that
j
he could circumvent any delaying tactics employed by the
76 percent of the vote. In the nine republics supporting
the treaty, jsupport varied widely from a low of 71
I
percent in t:he RSFSR to a high of 98 percent in
Turkmenistar! (see Table 3.2). The six republics vho
' ,
oppose the treaty refused to organize the referendum, and
only light voting by non-native nationalities took place
in the six republics (Sheehy, 1991c).
Table 3.2 Results of the All-Union Referendum
Republic I
Turnout
fpercent)
In Favor
(percent)
6103443568
7778999999
77


republics in an effort to modify or sabotage the treaty.
This tactic,was partially successful, as work on the
i
treaty continues. However, the treaty is now months
behind schedule and their are a number of issues which
i
i i
must: be resolved before final approval is obtained
i
(Sheehy, 1991c).
The proposed Union treaty represents a significant
I
change in the Soviet federal system and constitutes a
remarkable victory for the national sovereignty
'I '
movements. Their concerted political and economic
efforts, con|bined with the effects of the other crises
facing the Soviet central government, have resulted in a
document whilch^ when approved, will make landmark changes
in the Soviet Union,
The Treaty on the Union of Soverign Republics begins
with a series of very significant statements which
i
recognize the gains made by the national sovereignty
I
movements in their pursuit of self-determination. The
preamble of jthe docuTnent states that:
The soverign states that are parties to the
treaty ._ recognizing the right of nations
and peoples to self-determination; proceeding
from t'he declarations of state sovereignty
proclaimed by the republics ... have decided
to con'struct their relations in the USSR on
new principles.
This statement removes all doubts as t:o the validity of
] -
the republic!s past sovereignty declarations, as they
78


have become! the basis for the new treaty. The USSR is
defined in the treaty as a sovereign federal democratic
|
state formed on the basis of a voluntary association of
republics, Although this varies little from the existing
constitution in terms of the federal arrangementr it is
noticeably different in that all references to Socialist
!
principle or Socialist republics have been eliminated.
(Note: all material in this and folloving sections is
based on the draft treaty printed in Pravda, 9 March
1991, reprinted in Current Digest of the Soviet Press,
Vol XLIII, No 11,17 April 1991).
Under the terms of the new treaty, the republics
will possess full state power and will be able to
determine their own national-staite and administrative -
i
territorialj structure. This article gives the republics
the freedom to determine their own economic-political
arrangements and to establish governments incorporating
. i
national cultural heritage. The republics also become
full-fledged members of the international community under
the treaty terms, allowing republics the right to
establish diplomaticr consular, and trade relations with
foreign nations. The republics even have the right to
conclude international treaties provided that they do not
i
"infringe on the interests of the part-ies of this treaty
and does not violate the USSR/s international
79


commitmentsV (CDSP,17 May 1991:10). The rights under
*
this treaty!appear to grant full statehood to the
republics, another major accomplishment by the
sovereignty j movements.
i
Under the new treaty, the right to secede is
i
granted, but procedures for implementation are to be
' i
determined by the treaty signatories at a later date.
The territorial boundaries of the USSR and its republics
will remain,fixed at their present locations, and this
i
item presents some concerns for those regions which are
currently involved in territorial disputes. The treaty
also includes a form of non-aggression pact in its
I
section on inter-republic relations. In the area of
inter-republic relations, the treaty essentially
formalizes the current de facto arrangements existing
I
under the parameters of the sovereignty movements and the
loss of control by the central government.
The delineation of the responsibilities between the
all-Union government and the republics is a major issue
I
in the treaty- The all-Union USSR government will be
i
responsible for ensuring state security, organizing the
leadership and constituents of the JJSSRf& armed forces,
managing all defense enterprises, conducting all-Union
foreign policy, and maintaining a Union budget to fund
the above mentioned responsibilities. The all-Union
i
80


government will also be responsible for space research,
the control of all-Union funded scientific research,
monitoring of compliance with the new constitution, and
coordinating all-Union efforts at combatting crime.
The all-Union government will share joint
responsibility with the republics for the development of
foreign and,military policy, national social and economic
development, the management of defense enterprises, and
the protection of natural resources and the development
i i
of environmental policy. In an unusual article which is
most likely|aimed at those Central Asian republics
j
interested in Baintaining close ties with the central
government, the treaty provides republics with the right
to delegate republic authority for any and all functions
to the all Union government. This item essentially
allows a republic to maintain the old arrangement of
i
central authority if it so chooses, but it is unlikely
that this option will be used anytime in the near future.
The treaty incorporates all of Gorbachevas economic
i
reforms, specifically noting the implementation of
liberal policies on private property and republic control
of economic 1 policy. The treaty encourages the
unrestricted development of property, promotes the
development of a market economy for the USSR, and allows
the republics to share in the USSR^s gold, diamond, and
81


I I
foreign currency supply. The consolidation of all of
these economic reforms into the proposed treaty
I
represents another considerable accomplishment for the
reform movejnents of the Soviet Union. If successful,
i
these reforms have the potential to improve the economic
.| '
situation, stabilize the political crisis, and ensure the
continued survival of the Union.
j
A new Soviet constitution is mandated under the
i
treaty, and current discussions among the republics
supporting the treatyfs implementation reflect a desire
to see the new constitution in place within six months of
the Treatyfs approval. The constitution will reflect the
language and content of the new Union treaty and will be
subject to approval in a process controlled jointly by
the republics and the USSR government.
In another example of an issue which the treaty
resolves in:favor of the sovereignty movements, the
dispute over the legal precedence of Union and republic
laws gives jurisdiction to republic laws on republic
|
territory, 'The only exception is when an issue falls
under the responsibility of the USSR government, at which
i
time the USSR law takes precedence. This situation could
occur in issues of defense enterprises, environmental
policy, or criminal activities
82


I
The1 Supreme Soviet will be revised under the new
treaty to include two legislative chambers. The first,
i
replacing t^ie existing Council of the Nationalitiesf is
the CouncilI of the Republics. This upper chamber of the
Supreme Soviet will be formed from an equal number
s
representatives elected in the republics. The lower
chamber will continue to be called the Council of the
Union, and its members will be elected by the population
of the entire country on the basis of election districts.
The USSR wiil also have a president and a vice president,
.
elected together in a nationwide vote with "universal,
equalf and direct suffrage" (CDSP,17 May 1991:12). The
two offices I are held for five year terms, with the
Maximum time in office being two terms*
The Council of Federation has been eliminated by the
new treaty,[but it will be replaced in the future by an
i
as yet undetermined representative body. The existing
Cabinet of Ministers is retained, but in a much reduced
form due to |the elimination of numerous central
|
government responsibilities in the areas of economic
planning and bureaucratic administration* The Council of
i
Ministers will be responsible for the administration of
all USSR government activities prescribed under the new
treaty. The constitution also makes a final, more subtle
i i
change by describing Russian as the "official language of
83


" \
the USSR", rejecting the existing constitution
description, of Russian as the ^state11 language.
i
The proposed treaty makes numerous and significant
i
changes in the Soviet federal system and incorporates
i
many of Uie demands put forvard over the past three years
by the sovereignty movements in the union republics*
These changes will have far reaching impacts both for the
| !
Soviet Union and the international community.
I
1 Implications of the Treaty
and Prospects for Success
i
The major implication of this treaty is the
significantjamount of change it brings to every aspect of
the Soviet federal system. The process of economic and
political decentralization, although already in progress
under perestroika reforms, will require an enormous
bureaucratic effort and an extended period of transition.
The treaty fill require national elections for the new
all-Union assemblies and an approval process for the new
constitution. It will also require a major policy
assessment with regard to the status of the non-signatory
|
republics and how their political situation will be
resolved. The first major obstacle to be overcome,
however, is the approval and implementation of the final
form of the treaty.
84


As previously mentioned, the republics are split
over the support and approval of the proposed treaty.
The group of nine republics which support the treaty have
recently issued a joint statement with the central
government '"stressing the urgency of the situation and
the need fo^ a rapid conclusion of t:he treaty process1'
(Solchanyk,j1991b:1).This statement of support came as
part of a political compromise, as the group had pressed
the central government to resolve several treaty issues
i
in their favor. The RSFSR wanted the Autonomous
republics to sign the treaty as members of delegations
from their respective Union republics, as opposed to
i
being allowed to enter the treaty as individual states.
This issue Was critical to the HSFSR because it:
!
alleviates the need to deal with over twenty individual
i
sovereign units within the RSFSR borders.
The nine republics supporting the treaty were also
concerned that the new constitution be written and
approved as|soon as possible after the treaty went into
I
effect. The compromise reached was that the new
constitution must be completed within six months of final
treaty approval- The compromise with the government also
included guarantees that elections for membership to the
i
new all-Union assemblies be held in a rxmely manner
i
following treaty approval. The nnal issue involved the
85


granting ofmost favored nation trading status to the
initial parties to the treaty, which the group has also
had included in the treaty text (Solchanyk, X991b:2).
The "Big FiyeM republics, a consultative group consisting
i
of the five largest republics in the USSR (RSFSRr
Ukraine, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan) played
I
a significant part in pressuring the government to
concede on these issues in return for their political
support forthe treaty (Solchanyk, 1991a:16)
' i
The six republics opposing the treaty have also
organized in an effort to improve their political and
economic stability following the eventual approval of the
treaty. The six republics (Georgia, Armenia, Moldavia,
and the three Baltic states) have established a
consultative body called the Assembly of Popular Fronts
and Movemenis from Republics Not Joining the Union
Treaty, also known as the Kishinev Forum. The groups
purpose is lio enhance political and economic cooperation
and to seek the protection of international law against
| I
what they describe as ^Soviet military repression in the
Baltics and Transcaucasus11. The participants are
actually representatives of political parties from the
six republics, but the signatory movements are currently
in power injfive of the six republics, the exception
being Moldavia (Socor,1991:18)
86


The final battle over approval of the treaty will
probably revolve around economic issues associated with
I
the transition to the new decentralized economic system*
The longer the two groups of republics and the central
i
government debate the treaty, the worse the economic
situation becomes. The budget situation in the USSR is
now desperajte, as the federal budget deficit is projected
to exceed 125 billion rubles this year* When combined
with the budget deficits of the Union republics, the
total is estimated to be nearly 330 billion rubles, an
amount equivalent to 20 percent of the estimated GNP of
the USSR (Hanson, 1991:15).
The central government is considering a number of
proposals to handle the six non-participating republics
and regain ^ome much needed capital at the same time.
The government plans to penalize the six republics with
economic sanctions if they do not participate. First,
the republics will be treated as foreign countries,
receiving no favored treatment or economic support from
the USSR. Next, the republics will be forced to "buy
back" a11-Union assets on their territory, convert them
i
into joint ventures with the USSR, or dismantle and
relocate them back to USSR territory. Third, the
republics will be required to retire their "share11 of the
Soviet Unios national debt, but the means of
87


determining! that share has not been announced. Finally,
the republics will not be allowed to use the ruble or
receive credit from the Soviet state bank. The nine
republics supporting the treaty support these measures
because it will help defray some of the enormous costs
i
involved ini making the transition to a market economy and
establishing the ruble on the international market
i
(Hanson, 1991).
I
There are a number of major implications which come
as a result, of the international aspects of the treaty.
i
First, the Soviet Union will become a group of nine
i
individual states able to develop their own foreign
relations, enter into trade agreements, and join
international organizations. The Russian republic has
already been pursuing its own foreign policy interests
over the last year by meeting with the Japanese to
discuss trade arrangements and through its entering into
i
a number of! inter-governmental agreements with numerous
European and Western nations (FBIS:Soviet Union, 27 April
i
1990:110; Guinbel, 199HA14)-
The Baltic states as non-members of the USSR raises
i
a serious economic and military problem for ^the Soviet
i
government.^ The strategic importance of the Baltic
states to the Soviet Union7s territorial defenses is
enormous, and this fact is supported by the number and
88


types of forces which are permanently stationed there.
The Soviet Baltic Fleet, headquartered in the Kaliningrad
Oblast, RSFSR, deploys some 87,000 sailors on 460
warships of,a variety of types, all harbored at
I
facilities along the Baltic sea coast. Soviet Army
, i
forces in the area amount to 14 divisions 'totaling nearly
200,000 troops, deployed throughout the Baltic area* The
air defence system is modern and extensivef comprising an
important part of the Soviet territorial defenses. In
i
keeping wit^i Soviet military policy, a large number of
the troops stationed in the Baltic republics are from
Central Asia and the Transcaucasus, further exacerbating
! i
the ethnic hostility in the area (International Defense
Review, 1990:631).
If the ^ Soviets are required to remove these forces
i
. i
from the Baltic region, the Soviets will lose what they
refer to asstrategic defensive positions" and will
also incur ^he treiaendous costs associated with the
relocation of over 300,000 troops. They will also have
i
to relocate|their Air Defense system back three to four
hundred miles into Byelorussia and the RSFSR, with no
guarantee that these republics would be receptive about
having an additional Soviet presence on their soil
(International Defense Review, 1990;631)-
I 89
r


The proposed Union treaty improves the political and
economic outlook a great deal for both the sovereign
I
republics and for the central government. There are a
i
number of issues which must be resolved in the near
future, but there is sufficient pressure from the
political arid economic crisis situation to encourage a
rapid solution. The international community is also
putting on its own pressure to see the situation
stabilized, | because they fear the possible results of a
disintegrating Soviet Union nearly as much as the Soviet
government es (Rosenthal, 1991:1). Political pressure
from the West in the form of withheld financial
assistance should provide sufficient motivation for the
rapid approyal and implementation of the Union Treaty.
I
90


CHAPTER 4
WESTERN POLICY AND THE FUTURE
OF THE USSR
The USSR is currently facing a crisis situation of
i
such historic proportions that it threatens not only the
1
future survival of the Soviet Union but brings legitimate
concern for the future stability of the entire
international community_ The United States and its
Western allies must consider the international political
and econo,!} destabilization that will result should the
ethnic separatism, loss of political legitimacy, and near
i
total economic failure which plague the Soviet Union
i
today result in its total disintegration in the near
future.
The Soviet Union is still a significant world power
I
with extensive natural resources, a large and well
educated population, a modern and well equipped
conventional military force, and over 30,000 nuclear
weapons with which they can threaten any nation on this
planet. At I the same time, however, the Soviet Union also
i '
has an annual budget deficit which exceeds 20 percent of
its GNP, a crisis of legitimacy in its government, and a
!
i
resurgent nationalities problem which has resulted in


over 1000 deaths and an estimated 600,000 internal
refugees during the last three years (Brzezinski,
i
1990:31).U.S. and Western policy-ioaXers must recognize
the fact that the Soviet Union is ceasing to exist and
i
that their future policy must account for this
significant change.
j
Prospects for Future Stability
I .
There are two major areas for concern when examining
i
the future stability of the Soviet Union and its impacts
|
on the international community. First, one must examine
I
the potential for future stability within the Soviet
i
Union based| on the current political, economic, and
social situation. Second, the impacts of the Soviet
i
Union on the international community must be analyzed
based on the determination of the USSR^s potential future
stability* Once these two areas are understood, the
formulation of foreign policy to meet the demands of
future global security can be accomplished.
The Soviet Union today faces four major crises which
threaten its survival not only as a world power but even
as a nationj-state (Allison and Blackwell, 1991:81).
First, it faces a crisis of authority within its own
borders and national institutions. Every Union republic
and numerous other smaller political subdivisions have
92


challenged the legitimacy of the Soviet Union by
declaring themselves sovereign entities within the
borders of the Soviet multi-national state. Disrespect
for civil authority is spreading and the legal system is
beset by disputes over jurisdiction and precedence. The
i
central government must first regain the authority to act
before it can implement any solutions (Allison and
Blackwell^ 1991).
i .
The next crisis is that of union, or the inherited
I
I
multi-national state which is the Soviet Union, The
!
I
history of the national struggles which have taken place
during the formation and consolidation of the Soviet
Union are very relevant for today, as the Soviet Union is
being torn apart by resurgent nationality movements
1 i
inherited from the Tsarist empire (Allison and Blackwell,
i
1991), Kennan (1990:162) best described the
irreconcilable nature of the Soviet nationalities issue
when he sta
bed:
In the relationships between the Great. Russian
people and nearby peoples outside the confines
of the old Tsarist Empire, as well as non-Russian
national groups that were included in the empire,
there is no conceivable pattern of borders or
institutional arrangements which, measured against
the concepts prevailing to date, would not: arouse
violent resentments and involve genuine injustices
in many quarters.
The economic crisis facing the USSR threatens the
living stanLard of every Soviet citizen and thereby
I
93


Full Text

PAGE 1

! ., I I ITHE ALL-UNION TREATY AND THE FUTURE OF THE USSR by Kenneth Alvin Darney Jr. ; B.s., North Carolina State University, 1977 B.A., University of Maine, 1987 I A thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the of Colorado in partial fulfillment I o.f the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Department of Political Science 1991 .;,.:._ .......

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.I This thesis for the Master of Arts I I degree by Kenneth Alvin Darney Jr. has been approved for the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences by bij)hen C. Thomas

PAGE 3

I I ,. I ... ABSTRACT i Darney, Alvin Jr. (M.A., Political Science) ., The All-eni6n Treaty and the Future of the U.S.S.R. I I Thesis by Professor Joel c. Edelstein I Many in the West have not yet realized the critical t .! lfth 't' t' l't' d' 1mpor ance o e sov1e s na 1ona 1 1es 1ssue an 1ts I impacts on ihe impending collapse of the Soviet multi-' I national 'state. The Union of soviet Socialist Republics I is beinglradically.altered as a result of its long term I failure to 4eal with the nationalities issue. The I I and ideological failures suffered by the Soviet system during the last ten years are a direct I I result of the failure of the Soviet nationalities policy : to resolve critical aspects of the nationalities I in the Soviet republics. tJesis examines the nationalities issue from I its roots iri the Tsarist Russian empire of the 19th I century ihrdugh its repression under Stalinism to its I resurgence quring the reforms of the 1980s. The failures I I of soviet pdlicy toward the nationalities are addressed I I I as well tjhe complex effects which the issue has had oil Soviet e4?,on4mic and political stability. The proposed new Union t1eaty, which will restructure the U.s.s.R.

PAGE 4

into fifteen truly autonomous and sovereign republics, is examined in detail for its impacts on the future I political :fbrm of the republics and their interactions with the prbposed decentralized national government. I Based on this analysis, it is clear that the future I survival of: the Soviet Union and the political stability I of the international community are dependent on the i successful resolution of the Soviet nationalities issue. The thesis concludes with recommendations for a suggested Western ;program to aid the Soviet Union and proposes I policies which will improve global security and East' I West relations. I I The form and content of this abstract are approved. I 1rs publication. Signed. __ iv

PAGE 5

I I CONTENTS Tables :I vii CHAPTER . l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. 2. 3. 4. I INTRODUCTION. 1 'I Histlrical Background ..... 4 :I Marxism-Leninism and the Nationalities . 8 [ iJ soviet Nationalities Policy . ll I I Ari in Transition ....... 2 0 I RESURGENCE OF THE 'NATIONALITIES ........... 23 I Relations and the Issue ........... 25 I Relations ...... 37 DemoJraphic Issues .................. 43 I ' Impaets on the soviet system ................ 52 :. :1 THE All-UNION TREATY AND REPUBLIC SOVEREIGNTY ... 65 sovereignty Movements .............. 66 I The New Un1on Treaty ......................... 7 5 :1 of the Treaty and for Success ............. 84 I I WESTERN POLICY AND THE FUTURE oF THE USSR ..... 91 il ir Prospects for Future Stability ........... 92 : :1 Polit.ical outcomes of the Treaty ........... 95 i

PAGE 6

, I I CONTENTS (contd) j 4. WESTERN POLICY AND THE FUTURE OF THE USSR (contd) :I Impacts on Western Policy .... 98 ; I I Conclus1on ..................................... 102 I I I I EPILOGUEi . l .......................................... 105 I BIBLIOGRA.PHY ............................... 110 I I vi

PAGE 7

' i TABLES Tables I I 1.1 Distribution of :I 'I Nationalities............................. 5 I i' :1 1.2 Development of the USSR . 15 I 2.1 of the Major Nationalities 44 I 2.2 2.3 2.4 3.1 3.2 Populations of the Union Republics 46 I National Composition of Union Republics 50 in the Republics ...... 60 I ,: I Sovere1gnty Declarat1on ..... 71 ; I Re'sults of the All-Union Referendum ... 77 I I vii

PAGE 8

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION i I The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) is being radicllly altered by the resurgence of a long term problem which has its roots in the colonial and imperialist policies of 19th century Tsarist Russia. I The vast, multi-ethnic Soviet society was initially ' forged by Tsarist colonial expansion and held together by the rule of the central government. i Following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, the new I I I soviet government inherited the multi-ethnic Russian I state and began the process of converting it into the I I I world's socialist nation. The Soviet government's Jf the East European, Caucasian,. and Central I I Asian has maintained a "union" of socialist republics, but the centralized control previously held by i Moscow is now being threatened by nationwide economic I collapse,' loss of authority by the Communist Party, I constitutiorlal and political reform, and resurgent !movements in all of the republics. Glasnost and the new 1democratic freedoms which have resulted from I Gorbachev's 'political reforms have brought increased I i I attention to the nationalities problem but have still not

PAGE 9

resolved:the issues which persist after years of i repression, and policy failures. I This will analyze the historical background of the nati9nalities problem, examine past and present Soviet polirY towards the non-Russian nationalities, and determine prospects for political stability in what will in futare become the Union of soviet sovereign !This analysis will concentrate on the crisis now facing the Soviet Union and will examinJ in detail the proposed all-Union Treaty and : I its impact qn the shape of the future political form of the republics and their interactions with the I proposed deqentralized national government. : I The "crisis of Communism" now facing the USSR has I 'I resulted in :the resurgence of the nationality issue and ultimately Jhe dissolution of the Tsarist Russian empire. I 1 The future pol1t1cal and econom1c stability of the Soviet .I .I Union is deP,'endent on the careful resolution of the I nationalities issue and its associated societal problems. The proposed all-Union Treaty represents the strongest ' and final opportunity for Gorbachev to resolve the crisi s s :ituation facing the central government and to ensure the survival of a Soviet "union". It is therefore cr[tical that the nationalities issue and its I political impacts be fully understood in order to more 2

PAGE 10

,[ ,, accurately predict the future political stability of the il sov1.et Unl.on. I ,] With purpose in mind, this thesis will address the organizational aspects of the new treaty and examine : the functions of the new soviet government. The central . I governmerit will be responsible for the resolution of a I number of s+rious policy issues with direct bearing on global in particular those dealing with the I control 'I disposition of nuclear weapons, establishment of foreiJn policy agendas, the provision of internal ,, I security, and the formulation and implementation of ;, I env1.ronmental policy. The analysis will conclude with a I discussi'qn ci>f what the West should do in reaction to the radical taking place in the Soviet Union and how the West,may best formulate policies which will enhance b 1 '1. d t t 1 t' h glo a secur1.ty an 1.mprove Eas -Wes re a 1.ons. T e future poli{ical stability of the Soviet Union directly I : : r l.nfluenc:es global securl. ty and the outcome of the all-. I .I Union process will determine the prospects for Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union for many 'II I I years to:colf'e. i' I I '! 3

PAGE 11

I I I :I I I I Historical Background I The :nattionalities problem which the Soviet Union 1 j faces today 'I is in part the result of the process through :I I which acquired its status as a multi-national : ,1 state. Union is one of the most diverse nations world, encompassing over 100 distinct ethnic giouJs and approximately 200 distinct languages and The political orqanizatiOn of the state is complex andlits territorial boundaries correspond to the major ethnil divisions of the overall population. The 15 Union republics, 20 autonomous republics, 8 autonomous provinces, Jnd 10 national districts which constitute the I Soviet Union are all based on ethnic heritage (See Table 1.1). whilJ many of these groups are indigenous to their : I home others trace their origins to nations I outside fhe Soviet boundaries. The process of expansion I 'I and colonialism which built the current Soviet state multi-ethnic character which today has become denter of the nationalities problem (Nayhaylo and 1990; Jacobs and Hill, 1985; Baradat, 1989). : I I : 'i I I i I 4

PAGE 12

Table 1.1 Administrative/Territorial l Nationalities Distribution of Russian SFSR ASSRs AOs I Armen1an SSR Azerbaijan ASSR I AO SSR Estonian: SSR Georgian ss:R ASSRs AO I I Kazakh SSR I Kirqhiz SSR1 Latvian SSR Lithuanian SSR o I Moldav1an SSR Tadzhik SSR AO Turkmen ssR1 Ukrainian SSR Uzbek SSR ASSR Bashkir, Buryat, Chechen-Ingush, Chuvash, Daghestan, Kabardo-Balkar, Kalmyk, Karelia, Komi, Mari, Mordvin, No.Ossetia, Tatar, Tuva, Urdmurt, Yakut Adyge, Birobidzhan, Karachai-Cherkess, Khakass, and Upper Altai Aga-Buriat, Chukchi, Evenki, KhantyMansi, Komi-Permiak, Koriak, Nenets, Taimyr, Ust-Orda, Yandamalo-Nenets Nakhichevan Nagorno Karabakh Abkhaz, Adzhar So. Ossetia Gorno-Badakhshan Kara-Kalpak NOTES: RSFSi SSR A.SSR AO = Russian Soviet Federated Socialist q Republic = Soviet Socialist Republic = Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic = Autonomous Oblast = Oblast (Administrative Territorial Unit) SOURCE: Guide: USSR, u.s. Government Printing Office, 1975. and Baradat, 1989: 317 5

PAGE 13

From relatively small beginnings under Ivan III, the Grand of Muscovy began its existence in Russia around the year 1462. This early I :[to Moscow began its power by Slavic inhabited principalities adjacent to ; Moscow. Ivan IV's conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan, i following disintegration of the Mongol empire in 1552, extenqed the Russian empire to the upper Volga and marked the first significant annexation of non-slavic peoples. TJe process of consolidation and expansion I continued as the empire grew eastward across the Urals i I and into. Siberia during the sixteenth and seventeedth!centuries. Westward expansion during the eighteenth centuries incorporated areas inhabited Finns, Byelorussians, Ukrainians, Latvians, Estonians, Lithuanians, Poles, Jews, and Romanians. The I nineteenth dentury saw the Russian empire extend I I southwarq, annexing the homelands of the Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Kirghiz, Kazakhs, Tadzhiks, and i I Turkmen. By the close of the nineteenth century the I ,I t 11 1 t f th Russ1an was essen 1a y comp e e, as any ur er I jto its geographical borders were to come as a I result of the World wars or internal political upheaval (Jacobs and:Hill, 1985; 1989; also see Nahaylo 'I I 'i 6 I

PAGE 14

and 1990; Carrere d'Encausse, 1978; for detailed I I historical information). As geoJraphical consolidation was completed, the Russian initiated attempts to assimilate the ; I non-Russian:minorities through a process of ofo tO I RUSSl. l.Ca l.On. I I Until 1881, the basic Tsarist policy toward the peoples was one of toleration in h h t I 0 bl t 0 t 0 lt 1 w l.C mos r,eg1.ons were a e o ma1.n a1.n some cu ura and linguistic freedoms. This policy changed after the 'I I assassimition of Alexander III in March of 1881, as the central implemented an aggressive plan to Russify thelminorities and consolidate central control. The I attempted to establish Russian control by restrictingjthe use or practice of local languages, culturesJ aJd religions and forcibly replaced them with Russian "orthodoxy, autocracy, nationality" (qtd in I, '! I I 0 Jacobs and ij111, 1985:154). 1 1 1 1 I I Ethn1cid1vers1ty cont1nued to ex1.st under thl.s I program dueJlargely to inefficient administration and lack of Jlose political supervision in the remote areas I I of the empiie (Pipes, 1967:126). This policy was I ultimately counterproductive as it resulted in an I alienated artd resentful non-Russian population. Within I the national minorities, political groups began to form :1 I autonomy and calling.for the reform I t 7

PAGE 15

or elimination of the Tsarist novernment. The I '::J I I I nationalities became one of the groups instrumental in : I I the eventua+ downfall of the Tsarist government and in I I the revolutions which followed. Realizing the danger of I mishandling the nationality issue, former-Russian Prime I I Witte faulted the failed Tsarist policies I I ., for their inability to recognize that "there was no 'i :i Russia, existed was the Russian Empire a conglomerate of different peoples" which without the repressiqn 6f the would be 1991:105). central government to maintain control "a colossus with feet of clay" (Simes, MJrxism-Leninism and the Nationalities I the revolutionary potential of the d ff t'l dl t' l't . t d th 1sa ec e 1na 1ona 1 y groups, Len1n 1ncorpora e e1r strugglefor autonomy into the overall Bolshevik politicai. pJogram. Lenin had promised national self determinatiJn for those non-Russian groups which would I support theiBolshevik cause, and the participation by the nationalities was crucial in the downfall of the Tsarist I governmerlt tne success of the revolution. Although the groups participated in the revolution to I I secure their own goals of cultural and political autonomy., : I I, I I '' were also the subject of a deep 8

PAGE 16

I I ideologi.cbal struggle within the Bolshevik party as to the I status of the non-Russian groups after the establishment : .I of the sov1et system. I The government which had been replaced during I I the 1917 Revolution had failed to resolve the I issues of antagonism and ethnic diversity within the i empire. The Marxist-Leninist regime which replaced i it:l believed that once socialism had been I implemented1and national equality established, national would cease to exist. Lenin's policy on the nationalities and their right to self-determination was based on the belief that national ''. differences would recede with the implementation of socialist democracy (see Barry, 1991; Gleason, 1990; Pipes, The need for self-determination and I autonomy would therefore disappear as the nationalities : I I the benefits of belonging to the international I state. I I ideological position not only expected :1 differences to recede, but called for an eventuai!assimilation of nationalities into "citizens of I I the new commonwealth" (Hammer, 1985:126). I process occur in stages with the first being a growing or coming together of the different ethnic groups, known in Russian as "sblizhenie" of the I i I I 9 This

PAGE 17

The entire process and ultimate goal of I I socialist. pQlicy would be the merging or 11sliyanie11 of the nationalities. This ideological position was predicated on the fact that the ethnic groups would no : I I longer aspire to their separatist cultural and political ideals. The:period following the revolution saw the near dissolut'.ion! of the Russian empire and the initiation of I civil ;!This period gave the nationality movements the they had sought, and many opted for the establishmeAt of or a return to their own independent I By early in 1918, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Byelorussia, the Ukraine, Georgia, i Armenia, and Azerbaijan had established their independJncl .. The virtual disintegration of the Russian I I I empire f6rc4d Lenin to make a political choice between I the established ideological position on the selfof nations and the reincorporation of the '' I separatist areas by force. As described by Pipes : r 'I ( 1967:127) ':Lenin had to make a choice between [the old empire by military force or retain "a I Bolshevik the size of Muscovy in the Reign of Basil ILenin chose to abandon the nationality program in favor of consolidating Bolshevik control over I the nati,on, I and the nationalities issue was once again I 10

PAGE 18

resolved.inlthe favor of the central government, a fact ,I not soon toibe forgotten by the new "Soviet Republics" i (P1pes, 1967; Hammer, 1985; Gleason, 1990; Hammer, 1990; Jacobs Hill, 1985). Soviet Policy on the Nationalities Once the Tsarist empire had been reconstituted under I Bolshevik control, Lenin set about the task of organizing I a Soviet.political system to socialism abd to resolve the I complete the transition to many unsettled issues facing I i the Lenin proposed a federal system to accomplish objectives of the new Soviet government while opposed this plan and called for a strong I I central ,government with little or no authority devolved i: I I to the republics. The resulting compromise plan I I attempted tf strike a balance between "great Russian chauvinism"'and national self-determination, but the two :I I leaders cont1nued to d1ffer on the1r approach toward the ol I 'I nationalities (Baradat, 1989:314). Lenin hoped that J . i eventually federal system would produce a "new human community uttited in class solidarity" and that all : I members of the un1on would become examples of the "new I socialist m1n" (qtd in Baradat, 1989:314). I In contrast, Stal1n's only obJectives were the 'I I of the multinational state and its ; 11

PAGE 19

i continued. sU.rvi val as a socialist country. Stalin was I therefore willing to grant more autonomy to the I :1 particularly in the areas of language and I culture, [if : it furthered economic development in the This is not to say that Stalin supported .1 .I self-determination and political autonomy, for he I 'I adamantly these ideas as being detrimental to the I future existence of the multinational Soviet state , I i :1 (Hammer,.! 19j0; Baradat, 1989). The:'lfed.eral system under which the Soviet Union was established bythe constitution of I 1924, a political document which, while delineating the Union did little to resolve the issues which :j . I had from the Tsarist empire. The development of the federal structure continued, as I political subdivisions were made and later I I modified ;to .result in the republic structure which exists :: I today 1.2). Jts initial adoption in 1924, the Soviet has made a number of changes in the way in which it!deJls with the nationalities and their in the Supreme Soviet. The 1936 or lcojstitution was a revision aimed at giving the l. If d d t t d appearanc,e 1ncrease emocra 1za 1on an liberalizlatJon of soviet nationalities policy. Stalin I I I I 'I 12

PAGE 20

made these in an effort to improve foreign i I relations with the West at a time when the threat from ; I Nazi Germany was increasing and a new world war seemed l I imminent. The 1936 constitution enhanced the rights,of the republiJ:s by giving them the right to establish their own constitJtions, formalizing their right to "freely I I I secede" from the USSR, and giving them limited rights to the exerbisl of residual powers. The new constitution I also the principle of "general, direct, and equal for national elections and did away with :I I t f f 1 the Congress of sov1e s 1n avor o an en arged Supreme I I Soviet with1greater representation of the Soviet i ,. I population (Gleason, 1990:47). The 1977 revision of the constitution reversed the trend 1936 constitution by broadening Moscow's I over the governments of the republics. The republics a+so lost the right to maintain their own . .[ . . m111tary,forces, a r1ght wh1ch had been establ1shed under . I I a 1940 amendment to the 1936 constitution. The 1977 I constitution also weakened the republic's right to secede I I I by the USSR as a unitary state whose I I "sovereignty extends to all its territories". The I also made some mention of improving the rights of tJe nationalities, but did little in the way of I I I I I I 13

PAGE 21

I their representation in the Supreme Soviet or I increasifg their participation in the government (Nahaylo and Swobbdal 1990:201). I constitution, while establishing the and allowing limited cultural and linguistic autonomy, did not decentralize the source of I pbwer. Carrere d'Encausse (1979:13) gives four basic reasons for the central government's ability to power. First, the party is centrally ; I I controlled and oversees all aspects of the political system, including the republic and local levels. Second, I the cent+allgovernment controls the military and internal security!fotces, providing it with the means to implement I its policies in the republics. Third, the legal system I I !. g1ves (all-Un1on) laws precedence over those of lesser jurisdictions. Finally, all economic planning was centered in Moscow, making the republics economically on the central government for both raw I material$ and finished goods. These institutional i I h f t 1 controls to prevent t e exerc1se o pol1 1ca or I economic:autonomy by the republics. I I I 14

PAGE 22

I i i Table 1.2 Political Development of the USSR I I 'I I I Year Development 1922 1The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was It consisted of the Soviet Federated so9ialist Republic (RSFSR), which included European Russia, Siberia, the Far East, and Asia; The Transcaucasian Federation, ,which included Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia; the Byelorussian SSR; and the Ukl ra1.n1.an SSR. I 1924 i Tu:r;kman SSR and Uzbek SSR were , establl.shed after be1.ng removed from the RSFSR. 1929 jTh+ Tadzhik SSR was established being !separated from the Uzbek SSR. 1936 Kazakh SSR and the Kirghiz SSR were after being the iRSfSR, and the Transcaucas1.an Federat1.on was 1diyided, establishing the Armenian SSR, the ,Azerbaijan SSR, and the Georgian SSR. 1940 'The Karelo-Finish SSR was created by separating I I I : the Karell.an Autonomous Republl.c from the RSFSR; .Bessarabia was annexed from Romania and combined !!with the western Ukraine, forming the Moldavian , I :ssR; and the Balt1.c states were reconquered -as' a protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, becoming the Latvian SSR, the Estonian SSR, and the Lithuanian SSR. 1956 The Karelo-Finnish SSR was reincorporated into the Karelian Autonomous Republic and 'rejoined the RSFSR. : :I SOURCE: Guide: USSR, u.S. Government Printing -Office. 1975 and Baradat, 1989:314 I I I Stalinrs rise to power in the 1920s brought with it a change in the nationalities policy of the Soviet Union. The initially called for the neutralization of the ] ,I nationality threat by allowing some degree of I .] cultural autoriomy and by encouraging regional economic I I Stalin's nationality policies concentrated 15

PAGE 23

on a strategy called nation building. According to this 'I I strategy; socialism would create such an immense opportun:ity for the nationalities that they would now be able to rea6h their full developmental potential after I i I having b.een 1 repressed under the Tsars. The eventual I ., I ,I merger of the nationalities into the Soviet state would I i occur at!a iater stage of socialist development. stalin's program, these "new" socialist I states would not-desire separation from the Union, would 'I not develop1ethnic antagonisms, and would be easily I I into the "socialist central state". stalin was of the legitimacy of this program and felt '' that a number of concessions were made to the I nationalities, they would be satisfied and no longer I I disrupt t;.heisoviet system (Simon, 1990:135). Although td grant political autonomy to the republics, Stalin did them to pursue cultural and educational J programs :which enhanced political and economic ,! (Hammer, 1990). Although this policy seems to be a liberal one, Stalin's .objective was to further the development of the I Soviet state and represented little in the way of 'I legitimate doncern for the non-Russian nationalities. By ,_ I the 1930s, concern over the development of the Soviet I : I economy about collectivization and the reversal 16

PAGE 24

' -I I ,. of Stalin's;initial nationalities policy. stalin made :i clear hf$_ Pfiorities when he stated: There occasions when the right of self determination contradicts another and higher right, the.right of the working class to strengthen its power.l In these cases-it should be frankly stated the right of self-determination cannot and must the rights of the dictatorship of the worfing class. The former must give way to the (qtd. in Nove, 1986:203) From thi:s pbint on, Great Russian (Soviet) dominance was I: .I the key to the nations' survival, and I Stalin clearly expressed this idea at the 17th Party I when he described "non-Russian nationalism; as being more dangerous to the state than I "Great Russian chauvinism" (Baradat, 1989:315). The new I I policy to eliminate the historical, cultural, and I intellectual traditions of the non-Russian nationalities I I and repl,-ce:them with a "national" soviet culture. The principle of."nat:ional in form, socialist in content" was implemented; dictating that a minimum level of tolerance of .1 culture was acceptable, but that the overall Soviet took precedence. stalin's policies caused tremendous suffering for the non-Russian nationalities, '. forcing them to endure the hardships of collectivization, I famine, 'ndjethnically inspired purges and deportations. 'I Stalin's:poiicies continued through World War II, as .: I Great nationalism became a rallying point for the 17 I ''

PAGE 25

I I I .[ survival of !the nation against the German invaders I I (Jacobs and IH111, 1985; Baradat, 1989; Hammer, 1985). The of stalin in 1953 ended his political i domination the soviet Union, but his nationality I I policies a long standing impression on the non1 Russian Contrary to their original I nationality policies had resulted in a I marked incrJase in non-Russian national consciousness and a strong .opJosition to the central government. Russian imperialism iwas now blamed for the economic and social problems prevailed in some of the less developed republics. jThe ultimate objective of Soviet I I policy up to this point had been the I elimination !of national differences, and this measure i it had iunsuccessful (Hammer, 1985; Jacobs and Hill, 1985). I I Soviet ,nationalities policy after Stalin beqame even i more ambiguous than in the past, as Khrushchev and I successive ieaders attempted to balance the need for I I strict central government control and the need for I increased arltonomy for the growing non-Russian I Khrushchev rehabilitated many of the nationalitiJs which had been victimized by Stalin and implementedlthe first series of reforms aimed at I I increasing autonomy and local government I I I 18

PAGE 26

I authority . In 1957, Uzbek party leader N.A. Mukhitdinov I! was prom6ted to membership in the national party Politburo, making him the first party official ofjMuslim background to achieve such a high position. (ske Laird, 1986; Hough, 1980; for a discussion '1 ;I of demographic trends in the Soviet leadership). I policies also attempted to increase non1 I Russian participation on all levels of the party organiza.t,ioA, though it continued .to maintain Russian or :I .I slavic domiyance in the higher political and party organizai.tots. Most of the gains made by non-Russian nationals were lost when Khrushchev's reforms were I ifter his fall from power in 1964. Even with these the official policy sti.ll called for the I drawing of the nationalities into what was I : I I described as a "new historical community of people of i various nattonalities" (Hammer, 1985:131). Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko all supported the idea of the!soviet Union as a sort of "supra-national 'I I community, of Soviet peoples", but their policies were I unable to this idea to fruition (Hammer, 1985:141). By the 1980s, Andropov had returned to the symbolic I I non-Russians to high-level positions when I he named Geidar Aliev, an ethnic Azeri, to full Politburo I I membership. l Andropov referred to Aliev as a "living I 19

PAGE 27

I I symbol of the internationalist ideology of the soviet I regime" :and. called for a return to Lenin's policy of "not only a bringing together of nations, but their merger" : I (Hammer, :1985:141; Jacobs and Hill, 1985). This I ideologi6al]trend continued under Chernenko, as he called for a revival of Marxism-Leninism, a move which brought i further ambiguity to Soviet nationalities policy. As I I Gorbachev rose to power in 1985, he inherited a Soviet nationaliti1s policy which had failed in nearly every aspect and in some instances had actually I I intensifi.edithe nationalist feelings which it had tried I to I An Empire in Transition I I I The'cr.itical political situation which the Soviet I I Union faces1in 1991 is a direct result of the decades of I failed atterrpts by both the Tsarist Russian and the I Soviet governments to resolve the problems inherent in their ethnic empires. This threat to the future I existence of the soviet "Union11 lies in both its inherent I I in the unresolved issue of the rights of the within the Soviet system. The I successful transition from past policy failures to a i resolutibn 6f these issues will determine the future I character structure of the USSR. 20 I

PAGE 28

I I While I .I successful I in raising living standards and I literacy:rates throughout the Soviet Union over the past 70 t*e Soviet government has been unsuccessful in merging its1multi-national peoples into a coherent whole. I Its federallsystem of government has encouraged the I growth of national loyalty to republic'and local I though the governments retain little no authority. The educated bureaucracy which was 'I developeQ at the republic level has become the core of or the new intelligentsia which strongly support :I local goals. Soviet institutions give I unintenttonal support to nationality movements through the organization of political subdivisions I I along lines and by the mandatory declaration of I I ethnic ";origin" on each soviet internal passport (Pipes, 1972; 1989a). I After years of operation, Soviet I I I federal1sm dev1sed I to mollify nationalism, in I : J I I I I effect 1t and prov1des it with institutional I I outlets"' 1972:130). I Repression and political control were also 'I I '! I I demonstrated to be unsuccessful 1n manag1ng or I I I eliminating'nationalist and separatist feelings. When I I given the obportunity during the civil war, numerous areas sec;:eded and required the use of force to be brought I back into the Soviet Union. In addition, Marxist 21

PAGE 29

, I 'l ,, I Leninist ideology has been discredited as a result of the failure of the policy on self-determination and the oi the nationalities to be merged into the "new 'I I I 1 Soviet (Goldman, 1983). The past failures to i "solve" I nationality issue, when combined with the rapidly changing demographics of the Soviet Union, will make the to the 21st century a daunting I ': .I challeng'e f0r the Soviet leadership. The old official I I position that "the victory of socialism in the USSR created ntw historical community in which national antagonisms:were obliterated" must appear to today's soviet a tragic reminder of past errors 1 I . (Lap1dus:, 1989: 92) Based on th1s analys1s of the I to the nationalities issue, it is apparent I I that the,pr6blem has not been solved and that the past Soviet of dealing with the issue are no longer I As Richard Pipes has stated {1972:131) in a .I warn1ng .1ssued many years ago: I There is a great deal of nationalist frustration in Union. Unless the Soviet rulers face up to it iltnd begin the process of decentralization voltindlrily, it is likely someday to explode in a I I I most destructive manner. i I 22

PAGE 30

CHAPTER 2 THE RESURGENCE OF THE NATIONALITIES I Since the early 1980s, the Soviet Union has been experiencing a rapidly expanding resurgence of national I by the numerous ethnic nationalities I within its borders. Every significant group with a grievance against the central government has come forward with claimslof past injustices or to obtain some degree of freedom. The critical factor in this I +ies not only in the intensity of the I nationalistic feelings, but also in its occurrence at I this critical juncture in the history of the Soviet Union. Soviet system, including all of its I ideological and values, is being called I into question by a widespread and problematic reform process. The loss of authority and legitimacy suffered by the central government and the Communist party as a I result of the reform process.has served to support and I I advance the cause of the nationality movements, but is not the root cause. There are numerous short term causes of the resurgence which are connected to Gorbachev's programs of perestroika and glasnost, but the basic motivation in the historical background of decades

PAGE 31

served the control of both the Tsarist and the I : I soviet authoritarian governments. I I! I The phase of the dismantling of the Tsarist I empire took 1place during the 1917 Bolshevik revolution (Simon, The final phase of that dismantling is I now after 70 years of Sov1et rule and the I failure of the Soviet system to resolve the complex I issues in maintaining a multi-national state. '. Significantly, this ongoing resurgence is not simply a random of uncoordinated uprisings made by dissatisfie9 workers or political radicals. Each group pressing for self determinatiJn is a singular product of its own long term cultural and historical development, a feature which further ampiifies the difficulties which the Soviet :I I . system fcices in attempting to resolve the complex demands I of the m4ltiple groups. Most significant of all is the fact that tJis is not J'ust a non-Russian nationalities : I 1ssue, but all encompassing political and cultural resurgence every nationality, to include the Russians. This cJapter will examine the important unionRepublic) iAter-republic, and demographic issues which I I underlie.! resurgence of nationalism in the Soviet I Union. It 4ill continue with an analysis of the impacts of GorbacheV's I i I reform process on Soviet nationality 24

PAGE 32

. : , I policy and this effects the Soviet political and economic The chapter concludes with a focus on bt the Soviet government to improve the current I situation and the possibilities for future reform of the I ' USSR con'sti tution. I I I Union-Republic Relations and the Nationalities Issue .I I I The' col!lplex nature of the Soviet political and economic:system involves a great deal of interaction : I between the 'I central bureaucracy and the republic level .I administ*attve organizations. Through this immense the central government has been able to 'I I control nearly all aspects of political and economic activity. It is precisely this degree of outside control I which has :I alienation perpetuated the feelings of resentment and I yithin the non-Russian republics. The resurgenc;:'e of nationalism and the attempts at self-. . I. . assert1on wh1ch have taken place dur1ng the last decade ; I are a of this failure in the relationship between I the centi-al!government and the republic-level authorities I; I I and is symbblic of the broader failure of Soviet I policy. has I spread to virtually every part of the Soviet Union, and it has appeared in a number of I different fcbrms. Some areas have seen only limited and ' 25

PAGE 33

' 'I ''. i peaceful by political movements, while I ., others the site of intense anti-government activity' labor strikes. Still other areas have seen violent of communal violence which have resulted in numerJus!deaths and many thousands of refugees. The I varying and types of activities associated with the recent resurgence is best explained if ,. I one the process by which the national groups develop . (1989) describes the process as a series i I of five stages through which the ethnic group passes as i it becomes more culturally and politically self1 I assertive. louring the first stage, the non-Russian ethnic group limits itself to self-preservation t' 't' I d 't' t R 'f' t' 1' ac o po Typical poncerns of these groups are the rehabilitation : I or of peoples punished or deported by Stalin, Jgainst population shifts for economic or I I I industrial purposes, and colonization by non-na:tives for I government benefit. Once successful, the group advances I to the stage in which it makes demands for both I linguistic cultural autonomy. This stage is followed 'I by demands for greater economic freedom, which involves I the remo':'al ;1 of corrupt officials, implementation of more I economic policy, and the implementation of I I 26

PAGE 34

I 'I I I environmental programs. The fourth stage involves the I I pursuit .of national political autonomy, while the fifth stage results in the acqUisition of full national I I I I Whe.n t:t:lis criteria is applied to specific republics, I I the stage of national development becomes more clear. I For all six of the Soviet republics which have voiced to the new all-Union treaty (Estonia, t i thl . d ld ) h La v1a, uan1a, Georg1a, Armen1a, an Mo av1a ave I I advanced1to:the fourth stage of development and are official:{y national sovereignty. By the same token, the Asian republics have reached the third I . . or and have not yet consol1dated ga1ns 1n economic orlpolitical autonomy (Brzezinski, 1989; Lapidus,;'1989b; Sakwa, 1990). 1: I I :I ' There are numerous spec1f1c issues which are common I to one m6re of the nationality movements. The ability I to issues is directly related to the stage I I I of development of the group and its leadership. The I : major issues currently being pursued can be categorized into what Lipidus {1989b) has called the six varieties of I I : I national self assertion. The first and most commonly I pursued .issue is that of political and economic autonomy : I {Lapidus; 1989b; Brzezinski, 1989). Currently, only the : I most and well-organized movements have achieved 1 1 l I: I' I 27

PAGE 35

. I -I I I I .I I I any df success I in this area, but nearly every republic and political-administrative unit has made a I declarati'on [of some form regarding its desire for political! i I 'I and economic autonomy. Even the Russian I republic, I; wJich was in the past most closely aligned with I I the central :government's position on economic and i political autonomy, has actively pursued this issue not I only for' jitself but in the name of other less developed republicJ. j I The :republics, with the exception of the six eJrlier who desire total sovereignty, are seeking a compromise with the central government dividing : I the for federal spending, resource I allocation, land environmental and defense policy, while allowing: jto-tyal economic and political at the republic' :eJ,e1. The Kazakh republic is a good example of ', how relations have proceeded in an attempt h 1 I . f to reac : i a comprom1se on the 1ssue o econom1c autonomy. I Nursultan Nazarbayev, the president .of the Kazakh SSR, I a/plan to local Communist party and government if March of 1991 which called for the radical reform privatization of the Kazakh economy (Dejevsky, I 1991). Effective 1 July 1991, the republic has taken over e+terprises.of all-Union jurisdiction, I i includin,9 d$fense industry enterprises" from government I : I 28

PAGE 36

I control negotiating a compromise on fiscal I and tax distributions (RFE/RL Daily Report, 21 June ) hi t f . th "b f 1991:8 1 TS ype o comprom1se 1s e as1s or s :I proposed new union treaty, a subject which I will be in greater detail in chapter three. I I A second example of a self-assertion issue is that I of inter...;.ethnic conflicts (Lapidus, 1989b). These aJe based on long standing cultural, religious, : I or territorial disputes currently taking place as either an problem or as an inter-ethnic conflict within a republic. The dispute between Armenia I and Azerbai]an is an excellent example of inter-republic conflictiaslreligion, culture, and territorial disputes all a deadly dispute which the central I I government is unable to resolve. The ethnic conflicts I : I involving tne Georgian republic, the Abkhaz ASSR, and the I i South autonomous oblast are an example of the ; ,I complex hature of the ethnic disputes which must be : I ; ; I resolved by:the central government. These smaller ethnic groups within republic borders depend on the central I as their guarantor of national rights, and I I when Mos9owlis unable or unwilling to resolve the issue, the auth1riTy and legitimacy of the center are further reduced (Lapidus, 1989b; Brzezinski, 1989). I I 29 I II,

PAGE 37

Inter-ethnic violence is also a factor in thethird I category pf:problems associated with national self'I In many instances, communal violence is now a result eronomic grievances which have risen over the failure of economic reforms and the long term degradation I I of the of living in some of the poorer I I I republics. !This problem is particularly bad in Central Asia andlthT Transcaucasus, where unemployment rates are I high and:living standards are low. In Azerbaijan and Uzbekist:an, .[the unemployment rates for young adults are I 2 3 and 2,7 percent, respectively, extremely high rates : I I when compared to the 8 percent rate of the more developed : .I I Russian republic (qtd.in Lapidus, 1989b). I I The:alienation and resentment felt by the young in these to exacerbate already existing ethnic : I causes the native population to strike out : I at any representative of central government or of the non-native An incident of this nature I occurred :in! Uzbekistan during June of 1989 when ethnic :I I gangs drove!out nearly 16000 Meskhetian Turks, killing 100 and nearly 1500. The Turks had been deported!frim Georgia to central Asia by Stalin and were I :I thus tre1a.ted as non-natives by the Uzbeki gangs ( Sakwa, 1990: 237,}, . i The economic and social problems facing many of the republics make this issue one of serious concern I 30

PAGE 38

'' '' .I I .,1 ; I which, on the already limited resources of the subject will require outside assistance to resolve (Lapidus, 1989b; Sakwa, 1990). A issue to examine is the increasing number : ., of sovereignty demands coming from the smaller autonomous regions other republics. With the large number of national:gr6ups withinthe Soviet union's borders, the requestsr territorial homelands and full republic status have the potential to rapidly overextend the '' i I already cpomplex Soviet federal system. The problem which I , I the government and the republics face is where to draw the line: in: terms of national status, since many groups I have been granted protected status and to prevent other at this time would risk further escalations of communal violence. A S1ide I issuEa in this matter involves the Russian I republic:. and the central government in a dispute over the I status of tfue 32 national jurisdictions within the R ': ibl' USS1an 1C. The Russian republic has accused its political enemies in Moscow of trying to "break up the RSFSR" fn to slow down its sovereignty movement I (Sheehy, 1991a: 18). An example of the problems that i I these au-t;:_onfmy declarations can cause is the recent move I by the ASSR, located in the eastern portion of the Russian rep1blic, to declare itself a full republic. 31

PAGE 39

I Yakut alpopulation of less than one million in an area appJoximately five times the size of France, and it I 'I contains:;la1rge reserves of gold, diamonds, oil, coal, and .: I fur. The a4tonomy declaration includes sovereignty over all natural1resources in its territory, a claim which the I Russian republic will dispute since it considers the I I I territory to be a part of the Russian republic. Moscow's i I to cite its prerogative to support the ; I of national minorities (Clark, 1991). I claims of up to one hundred national groups is ndt an enviable task, and it is likely that I Moscow glad to delegate that responsibility to I the apprqpriate republics (Lapidus, 1989b). The, : "pJnished peoples 11 represent the. fifth problem of national :\self-assertion, and this group presents political dilemmas similar to those of the minorities I with demands. The Crimean Tatars, Volga I Germans,: and.Chechen-Ingush are all examples of peoples calling lrehabili tat ion after being deported and I punished 1bY!Stalin. The majority of these peoples were ' I forcibly :moved to Central Asia, where they are now I subject dommunal violence for being non-natives. over :! I 130,000 crimean Tatars have been allowed to return to the i I Crimean peninsula, and additional national groups are petitioning;the government for similar approval (RFE/RL l i 32

PAGE 40

I I I Daily Report, 20 June 1991:8). The political repercussioJs of granting territorial status to these I groups are particularly since it would most likely I entail displacing some other national group with an I I equally valid historical claim (Lapidus, 1989b). I I The dilemma posed by the current rise in I national self-assertion is the resurgence of Russian I The increasing political unrest and ethnic i violence taking place in the non-Russian republics against government and past Russian I domination has caused the Russians to rediscover their I I I own national consciousness. The movement has thus far I i stressed national self-determination and political and I economic'aufonomy for the republics, but some fear that I there may a return of Great Russian chauvinism bent on maintaininglthe Soviet state and the newly I I released .. na"tj;ionality movements in the republics (Lapidus, I 1989b). Th4 future of Russian nationalism remains i unclear, but the Russian republic's current political I activities Boris Yeltsin seem to be leading the I cause of. soyereignty and political autonomy for all I national gr6ups. I ;I I I Under thegreat pressure of the issues associated I I with the.autonomy movements, the Soviet government has .I sought to develop policies which will either contain or 33

PAGE 41

I .I I I I I resolve the.demands of the nationality movements. In a broad sense,l the government has only two options in : I dealing with the issues. First, they can change from I I past nationality policies and grant greater political and I economic to those groups who have established rilaims. This would result in a system in : 1. wh1ch republ1cs would be free to pursue sovere1gnty within a, of Soviet republics. The second I option aJoids greater political recognition for the I subject and argues that increased political and economic ;innegration are the best solution to the bl :f I. th t . Th' t' 'd Pro ems r ac1ng e sov1e Un1on. 1s op 1on cons1 ers I the overa'll.rights of the "Soviet citizen" to be of I ! I t I greater qon1ern than the 1nd1v1dual demands of the I various groups (Sakwa, 1990; Lapidus, 1989b). argument within the soviet system as to how:td reconcile the demands of the nationality a direct impact on Union-republic 1Gorbachev has been forced-to maintain a delicate balance between supporting legitimate claims for autonomy anq taking all steps necessary to ensure the survival: :of 'I the union. The ultimate success of I Gorbachev's.economic and political reforms depends on the support 6f the nationality movements which now control or I are at least partners in.the governments of every I 34 .,.

PAGE 42

II i ,I i .j republ1c. Econom1c autonomy at the republ1c level and improved efJiciency at the Union level will serve to satisfy t:he demands of all but the most radical national groups stabilizing the overall economic system. Gorbachev's jpursuit of a new union treaty is the I I I plan to grant as much autonomy as possible to the repuJlics while still maintaining a formal union :. I structure. protect the rights of all Soviet citizens. A ma.j issue which concerns both Gorbachev and the I I remaining cqnservative party and government officials is : I the overall !national security and survival of the soviet Union. The lsoviet defense minister, Dimitri Yazov, had I : the comments on the nationality movements: I I Today the ambitious nationalist and separatists forces are doing their utmost to ruin the Union. Only strong and single Union of Sovereign Soviet Republics can act on the world arena as a (qtd. in Sneidar, 1991:6) I I I It should be noted that even though the Soviet military I opposes it still supports the concept of "sovereign" irepublics. The KGB has warned on numerous i occasions of the dramatic rise in political terrorism in I the Soviet qnion and has called for more concerted government to correct the situation. The ethnic disputes blamed for hijackings, bombings, and attacks on qoverrimeJt and military facilities and personnel. KGB i officials have stated that 11the Soviet leadership now has I 35 I

PAGE 43

i I : I I to :this kind of crime as a serious threat to t 11 :1 't II ( k na 1ona y New Yor T1mes, 7 June 1991:8). Using security interests as justification, the h!as ordered numerous interventions into the I I republicsi. 1 When: tJe government intervenes in a republic, it . .I risks further political and ethnic unrest due to the complex r'elJtionships between the ethnic groups in : I dispute, :thllocal republic government, and the national security which the government .seeks to protect. When Mos9;ow .:lrecently deployed Interior Ministry troops to I Armenia stabilize the ongoing ethnic conflict, the by 11nationalizing11 some Communist Party which in turn drew additional reaction : I from the :soviet government. The Armenians then charged . I .that the:;go'ferrunent troops were not protecting Soviet security) taking sides with Azerbaijan in an attempt. to poliiical situation in secession minded I . i I . : Armen1a .(The Econom1st, 18 May 1991:54). In a similar ,[ Gamsakhurdia has accused Moscow of pJovoking the ethnic conflict in Ossetia to d : I t f t t prov1 e proyoca 1on or governmen ac 1on aga1nst the I I minded Georgian republic (Lieven, 1991:6). With these lerious issues to contend with, the government : I will be less likely to become involved unless the fate of 36

PAGE 44

the Union is determined to be at risk. Union-republic I I I relations. will also follow this example, as the central I government gradually seeks to turn over responsibility to i the republi9s while pursuing a compromise on the future form of the !union of Soviet Sovereign Republics. Inter-Republic Relations I In to the contentious relationship between I the government and the republics, inter-republic I relations are generally good and seem to be improving as the Soviet Union moves toward greater economic and ' political atitonomy. The republics are currently engaged : I in a deal of political and economic interaction in I I an attempt to stabilize their situations and replace I their noJ. fJding relationship with Moscow with new I arrangements both within the Soviet Union and in the I I global az:oena. I The: key factor in this initiation of inter-republic economic 'and political activity was the gradual transfer f I b. 1. t f th 11 u b o econom1c respons1 1 1 y rom e a -n1on ureaucracy to local level administrators. The decentralization and '; .I destatization of the Soviet economy under Gorbachev's I reforms pas :I helped to fulfill the republics demands for economic.: autonomy. Although the transfer has taken a I: r long period of time and has only begun in earnest in a 37

PAGE 45

I relatively s.mall number of republics, the impact on I trade has been significant. The Kazakh i SSR is a godd example, as it only recently received ., control o'f t:he all-Union enterprises within its republic. As on I I the previ!ous 1 July' 19191, planning arrangements with Moscow ended the republic needed to make new trade agreements ensure continued supplies of raw materials ,_1 i and f1or 1 ts f 1n1shed goods In most instances, I the old t'rade relations with the central government ., continued:, }jut the decisions about production, profits, and enterbri!se management remained at the local level. I (RFE/RL o:ailiy Report, 21 June 1991) The republic was motivated: td take control of its own trade arrangements, I so it has: bJcome involved in a number of trade deals with republics in Central Asia.and across the Soviet Union. The planned.economy did not include a great .I deal of choosing instead to build I specializ:ed !industries which provided output on a I contractual ;basis to the state. For this reason, the I Soviet econdmic -system is spread throughout the country, with republics capable of self-sufficient I I ;Many of the republics are heavily dependent I on food produced in other republics because their task in I the 'plan had been to grow cotton or animal fodder. .The demand for manufactured goods is even more I 38

PAGE 46

to fill, as certain goods are made in only a very few 1loqations. Examples of this are fork-lift i i trucks whicij are made only in the Ukraine, pumps f.or oil wells which 1are made only in Azerbaijan, and agricultural tractors are made only in the Russian republic (The I Economist, September 1990:77). I Prior to the economic reform process, most republics I ,, ,! traded an amount equal to about 50-75 percent of their gross product with the central government. Under the new plans, amount will be reduced to less than 50 I percent, ;as inter-republic trade is increased i significant]y. Some of the republics will have '. I [trade imbalances to make up, as republics like the [TuJkmen and Armenian SSRs formerly imported up to 75 of their goods and had low levels of .I manufactured product to sell or trade. Some barriers to I I trade weie raised by republics in an effort to gain of economic transactions and to stabilize I republic economies, but many are now being eliminated in keeping with newly signed trade agreements. Price I I made to encourage local production, I I have with reduced exports by some republics to cause natiorl-wide shortages. The central government is I still working control this problem as the economy 39

PAGE 47

l I I. I : I makes thl t,ans1t1on to a market economy (The Economist, 29 Septem:e1 1990:77). Inter-,epublic cooperative agreements have been reached number of republics during the last year. In June Jf J990, the Central Asian republics (Uzbekh, : I Kirghiz, .Tadzhik, and Turkmen SSRs) and the Kazakh SSR ; L 1 t t t th ot signed a :reg1ona pac agree1ng o s reng en 1n republic and cooperate on economic, scientific, I 'I technical;, cultural programs (FBIS: soviet Union, :1 28 June 122) Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Georgia, and Armenia ;signed documents on 10 June 1991 establishing ; what the:i-: "a consultative and coordinating body to further and cooperation". In an ironic tJisJ of fate, these six republics who have :j declared. from the Soviet Union and have I refused to take part in the all-Union treaty I .I produced the agreement's final document in . I Russian. : The document describes "the USSR's use of Jconomic, and military pressure against our .I i states" and:"the need to coordinate our political, ,I economic,;.and diplomatic efforts toward establishing our :I I 0 0 countr1es' state 1ndependence11 (RFE/RL Report, 10 June 1991:3). !. Jhis measure is significant because it Jhe first multilateral attempt at cooperation I. '' I I 40

PAGE 48

I by the not supporting the Union treaty. :1 on J;jne 1991, the Lithuanian and Beyelorussian 'I !Treaty was announced by the Ministers of Internal of both republics. The representatives at the signi!tg of the treaty called it "a step which consolidates1 the sovereignty of both countries" and that "coordinated! activity will be placed on the recognition I I of the statehood of Lithuania and Byelorussia". Both I I republicsi also declared their future intention to sign a similar with the Russian republic (RFE/RL Daily I I Report, 1,2 J:une 1991:4). Support for the independence of the Baltic s1tates by other republics, particularly the Russian is a significant development in inter-. I I republic :rel1ations. Also significant is the fact that lj this represents an agreement between republics on differing sides of the all-Union treaty debate, a point I which will h'ave an impact on the final structure of the treaty as:itl relates to non-signatories. j I As a! example of inter-republic cooperation, I of the Moldavian and Ukrainian SSRs met I on 13 June 1,991 to promote direct economic cooperation and to finaliize details for a Ukrainian-Moldavian Treaty ., of (RFE/RL Daily Report, 13.June 1991:8). There are1 examples of cooperat1on agreements between the tepublics, with new documents being signed on 41

PAGE 49

a weekly basis. Boris Yeltsin has been particularly busy I in this area, signing agreements for the Russian republic :: i with jrepublics and European nations. Typical of I the Russi.an :!republic cooperative agreements is one signed by the Russi!an and Ukrainian republics in November of 1990. It P:t[OVided a framework for economic, political, I I defense, and cultural cooperation. Yeltsin described the treaty as: halving "united the efforts of two republics I I which hav. e a! total of 200 million people and the powerful resources: th!at are the equal of any two states in the I world" (London Times, 20 November 1990:A6). I Almo,st !all ethnic violence currently taking place in I I I I: I I I the sov1et Un1on 1s occurr1ng at the communal level within The republics are working both I individuallY; and in regional groups to resolve these I conflicts;, but many are a result of territorial disputes :I which will only be resolved by some all-Union level authori tJI'i' rhe conflict in Ossetia between local nationals! and the Georgian SSR government is an example :. I of this of ethnic territorial dispute (Sheehy, 1991a:18). 1 I The only current example of inter-ethnic violence at h b 1 I 1 h th 1 d' t e repu 1c evel 1s t e e n1c terr1tor1a 1spute between ArmJnia and Azerbaijan. This conflict is actually result of a territorial dispute over the 42

PAGE 50

Nagorno autonomous oblast. This dispute long I term histori1lc roots and is not likely to be resolved 'th t I t w1 ou 1n ervent1on by an all-Un1on author1ty, possibly the signing of the new all-Union treaty I I I (see Nahaylo and Swoboda, 1990). Demographic Issues :i The between the republics and the central and the inter-republic relationships developed, over the past year can provide significant insight into1 the nationalities movements and reform ' process taking place in the Soviet Union. Another tool in understanding the underlying causes of1 th1e resurgence of the nationalities is an I examination iof the demographics of the Soviet Union. I While the overall population has grown at a fairly constant tate, there has been a wide variation in the growth oi: of certain major national groups. The number of: has grown from a total of 114 million I in 1959 tp a! total of 145 million in 1989, for a total increase of percent over the thirty year period. i During the s:ame period, the population of Tadzhiks grew I from 1.4 to 4.2 million, an increase of 200 I I percent. The comparative increases for the major I can be seen in Table 2 .1, and the 0 I ' 43

PAGE 51

I statistics p;resent some facts which have a direct impact .[ on the Soviet political system. I Table 2 11 .Populations of Major Nationalities I I I Population Change (millions) (%) Nationality 1959 1979 1989 1959-89 Russians I 114.1 137.4 145.1 27.1 ': Ukrainians 37.3 42.3 44.1 18.2 7.9 9.5 10.3 30.4 Moldavians 1 2.2 3.0 3.4 54.5 Lithuanians I 2.3 2.9 3.1 34.8 Latvians 1.4 1.4 1.5 7.1 Estonians 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 Georgians, 2.7 3.6 4.0 48.1 Azerbaijanis! 2.9 5.5 6.8 134.5 Armenians, I 2.8 4.2 4.6 64.3 Uzbeks 6.0 12.5 16 .. 7 159.7 Kirghiz 1.0 1.9 2.5 150.0 Tadzhiks 1.4 2.9 4.2 200.0 Turkmens 1.0 2.0 2.7 170.0 Kazakhs 3.6 6.6 8 .1 125.0 Source: sinith., 1990:363 and Simon, 1991:372-375 The; Union is currently undergoing a major demograph,ic away from the historic slavic-European domination of the past. In 1959, the Russian nationality I accounted for 55 percent of the total population of the I USSR, while today its share of the total population has i I dropped tp 51 percent. The population of the slavic nationalities (Russian, Byelorussian, and Ukrainian) has also dropbed! significantly, from 76 percent of the total 44

PAGE 52

populatio,n fn 1959 to 69 percent in 1989. A major I population shift of this sort has a significant impact on the power! bJse of the country. As the Russian and slavic I population decreases, it becomes more difficult for the .I Soviet gover,nment to maintain its historic power base and it loses ability to dominate the rapidly growing non I t t th t f Russ1an m1nor1 y". A e current ra e o growth among the nationalities, the Russians will become a technical minority (i.e. less than 50 percent) before the I end of this ;century (see Table 2 2) This in population can also be seen when the birthrates various national groups are examined. The ' i1 the European portion of the Soviet Union has held at 15/1000 population over the last ' I ten years. :The birth rate in the Central Asian republics '. has reached i34/1000 population, with some nationalities I within the having birth rates as high as 42/1000 : I 1990:372). As these birth rates are of future population trends, it is likely that the Rus,sians and their slavic counterparts will I continue to a smaller percentage of the Soviet population i!nto the 21st century (Baradat, 1989: 310) I .I I: I 45

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I Table 2.2 :Populations of the Union Republics I I Republic I RSFSR I Ukrainian SSR SSR Moldavian Lithuanialn SSR Latvian s'sR, Estonian SSR Georgian SSR Azerbaija:n Armenian, ssR ': I Uzbek SSR-1 Kirghiz SSR :, Tadzhik SSR Turkmen SSR Kazakh SSR 1979 137.5 49.7 9.6 3.9 3.4 2.5 1.5 5.0 6.0 3.0 15.4 3.5 3.8 2.8 14.7 1989 147.4 51.7 10.2 4.3 3.7 2.7 1.6 5.5 7.0 3.3 19.9 4.3 5.1 3.5 16.5 Increase Cpercentl 7.2 3.9 6.7 10.0 8.6 6.3 7.3 8.7 16.6 8.3 29.3 21.6 34.5 28.1 12.6 I I Source: Repqrt on the USSR, 19 May 1989,p.3 and Ha:mnler, 1990:184 I A effect of this shift away from Russian :1 domination of the population is its impact on the I political held by Russians over most aspects of I I the Soviet system. Although the Russian I I approximately 50 percent of the total Soviet Russians have in the past held over 70 I percent of upper leadership positions in both the and the government. Over 60 percent of I all party members are ethnic Russians, a figure I which als;o exceeds the proportion of Russians in the total soJieJ population (Laird, 1986:145; Barry, 1991: !The Soviet government and Communist party 46

PAGE 54

will have an increasingly difficult time convincing the I non-Russian 1ethnic groups that this disproportionate representrotilon is acceptable. A qradual increase in nonRussian rfprlesentation is now underway, and the final resolutior o.f the Union treaty will determine how the future afl-Union government will be constituted. After the Russians, the single largest and most I rapidly ethnic qroup in the Soviet Union is the Muslims. . The Muslims are located in the Central Asian and Transcaucasus republics and have a very high level of I ethnic copsc:iousness due to their religious beliefs and I I their close-knit culture. There are approximately so I million in the Soviet Union at this time, and : I they will. represent nearly 25 percent of the total I population by the year 2000 (Smith, 1991:363; Hammer, I 1985:143)'. :In the future, Muslims will constitute a large portion of the manpower for the military, the I industriaa:. w1orkforce, and the poiiticca.l constituency of their republics. The future resolution of ethnic I I issues and the form of the future Soviet political I I structure: mu'st take this significant group into account. I An of this demographicshift which is already being il the Soviet Union is the decrease in t I available! manpower for industrial, agricultural, and military : I The Soviet economy is extremely 47 I I

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labor and is beginning to run into labor i I shortages at industrial and manufacturing plants, I I ; I particularly in the European portion of the country. For this a number of plants have been relocated to the area of the Ural mountains and into Central I Asia, !there are abundant numbers of workers. As a result tHis shift in industrial production, the populatidn df the area east of the Urals has increased I I I from 18 percent to 25 percent of the total soviet population (iBaradat, 1989). In the past, this was seen I as an political solution as it meant the 'I diffusion oe economic and political power away from :: I tJ ., Moscow and towards the non-Russ1an republ1cs. In the I I future, it may be the only choice available to the I central government. An problem which has occurred as a result I of the dependence on Central Asian manpower is f d : 1t. d b'l't lth h t d t' one o e.uc, 1on an a 1 1 y. A oug sov1e e uca 1on programs greatly increased the literacyrate among I the nationalities, many of the Central Asians do not speak Russian and are not as well-trained in I 'I techn1cal appl1cat1ons as their European counterparts. I I This adversely affects economic efficiency and production 1 .\ ' I and also the workers if told they must learn Russian. The Soviet military has also encountered 48

PAGE 56

similar problems with Muslim recruits, as they lack the I I Russian lan9fage training and technical background to be able to advanced Soviet equipment. They are therefore; to construction battalions and not I given leader:ship positions, although this to may change I as a resu,l t of the growing manpower shortage (Baradat, 1989; 1991). The :lan:guage issue also has an impact on the nationali tie's issue as a whole. A number of the non-Russian national movements began their campaigns as antiefforts, and the pressure to learn and use Russian wi th:in the Soviet system has always been great. I Russian is viital for work in the political system, the military, higher education. Ethnic Russians account I I for 145 mill'ion of the country's Russian speakers, while another 16 million non-Russians also consider it to be their first 1language. Over 61 million Soviets consider Russian to their second language, so a total of 222 million spviJets representing 82 percent of the total population speak Russian (Barry, 1991:246; Smith, 1990:368 )'. This is an incredible accomplishment considering ,the ethnic diversity of the country and the I t'o past Russification policies, but future use i!s likely to decline as the demographic trend resistance of Russian I f,rom Russians and toward the other national moves away 49

PAGE 57

I I groups. 1 I I I I The 1demographl.c factor which most complicates the I' I 9f a number of the nationality issues is the I o J 1.nterm1.ng11.ng of ethnic populations throughout the Soviet I republics. :Every republic has a some significant non-i native popul!ation which complicates the resolution of :I political. an1d economic "issues (see Table 2. 3). I I Table I 2. 31 Nlational Composition of the Union Republics Native Russian Others Republic RSFSR Ukrainian' SSR ByelorUS!:?ian; SSR Moldaviani SS!R Lithuanian sisR Latvian SSR I Estonian ss:RI Georgian SSR Azerbaijan S:SR Armenian SSR Uzbek SSR 1 Kirghiz SSR I Tadzhik SSR Turkmen :1 Kazakh SSR I I Source: Curr:ent Cpercentl Cpercentl (percent) 83 75 81 65 80 57 68 67 74 89 66 44 56 57 33 83 19 10 12 9 30 25 9 10 3 13 29 12 15 42 17 6 9 24 11 13 7 25 16 9 22 27 32 29 25 Digest of the Soviet Press,34,49,p.4 The of significant numbers of non-native Citizens:ef,ects the and economic reform process a;nd :1creates confll.cts over nationality issues. 'I In the Ba'lti:c republics, much of the central government's I I interventlori1 activity has been on behalf of the Russian I 50 l : I

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' I minoritie:s in Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania. i i Even where over so percent of the population is nativei, Jas had in pursuing its sovereignty objective's dver the resistance of the non-native I minority. has only a 33 percent native I population, 60 percent of its population made up of J Russians and Ukrainians (Brzezinski, 1990:6; Smith, 1990). Tfes:e inherent demographic divisions set the stage for:molst of the anti-Russian sentiment and conflicts: wh,ich occur in the republics. I I Inte'r-e;thnic conflicts also occur as result of non-native minor:i ties established in autonomous republics or oblasts thlin union repubiics. The dispute over Nagorno Karabakh;: aJ Armenian enclave within the territorial boundary of Azerbaijan, is an example of this type of ethnic disptite (Schmemann, 1991). This conflict and I others of a 'similar nature have caused numerous deaths I and in thousands of refugees, adding to the Jovements across borders and further I I exacerbating, ethnic tensions. Gorbachev has recognized the complexity of the intermingling of ethnic groups, but I the poli t:icail situation and inter-republic turmoil which I :. I it causes hals created a problem which is beyond the i. I current capability to resolve. 51

PAGE 59

I' ,, I, Impacts on the Soviet System I I resurgence of the 1980s came as a colflecti v:e hkto. sytshtemd . Spteakingf at a con erenc;:e 1'n as 1r1a 1n 19891 e 1rec or o the Central Academy of Social Sciences, I. I. 1 lstated that the whole Communist party was surprised: bJ the nationalistic resurgence: It : !is necessary to say that we did not think would provoke such a total aggra.Jation of national relations through the whole houritry . The party did not-feel the nati.onlal bitterness that had built up in the people. The sharp reaction was unexpected. in Hough, 1989:37) '' After an'examination of past Soviet nationalities policy, it is di,fficult to imagine that the current Soviet have underestimated .or misunderstood the i threat by the nationalities issue. The 1986 Programme!. of the Party still asserted that "the :I nationalities question inherited from the past has been solved in the Union". (qtd . in Sakwa, 1990:259)! gave l1ttle priority to nationality policy du;t'ingl his first months in power and did not I 'I, pursue any serious revision of existing policy until 19881 hL identified nationality policy as "the most I I 'I fundamental, vital issue of our society". By July of I I '' 1988, Gorbachev was calling for a comprehensive !. I . restructuring of nationality policy to include the 52

PAGE 60

' I transfor:m:ation of the Soviet political system (Lapidus, 1989b:211:' I had little experience in dealing with I lissues during his career, and he initially had littl:e for dealing with its complex political isisues before he had completed his own economic and reforms (Lapidus, 1989a:98). Gorbachev's initial in dealing with the nationality issue and in new policy allowed the issue to become critical,.' taling precedence over and adversely impacting his economic! and political reforms. . The implemented by Gorbachev in 1986 correspond t!o the resurgence in nationalism, but were not . I the basic. However, three aspects of the reform program d,-id help to bring the nationalities issue to the public's First, the policy of glasnost allowed e?'pr1essions of grievances and political which would have been banned only a few years .Second, the political democratization of I the Soviet allowed for political activism on the I I I local level ,,1 resul the of the popular fronts are now leading the nationalities movements. Third, th severe economic problems which beset the : I Soviet system corresponded to the nationalities demands for more autonomy at the republic level and the I I I sJ I I :I

PAGE 61

removal of ehe centrally controlled command economy : I (Lapidus,' 1989a: 99}. Gorbachev continues to insist that I and glasnost are not to blame for the I I unrest, but that "perestroika has exploded I the illu,or] peace and harmony which reigned during the years oflstagnation" (qtd. in Sakwa, 1990:257}. : I For :whatever long term or short term reasons, the : I Soviet has been brought critically close to the point of ipoJitical and economic disintegration by the J lt. l't' t h l't' 1 f na 1ona 1 1es movemen T e po 1 1ca re orms : I . brought by nat1onal unrest have seen the Commun1st party Juch of its authority and legitimacy. When the of People's voted 1771 to 164 to : I -end the qommunist party's monopoly on power in March of 1990, thJ fJrst multi-party political system in the Soviet had been approved (The Economist, 17 March I 1990: 41) .; I The tCommunist Party has suffered a significant loss I I in and legitimacy as a result.of the political reformsinitiated due to the nationalities resurgence. The hJs been subject to numerous accusations of repression, and ethnic bias. Due to the movements in the republics, a number of party I I officials-have renounced their membership and left he t I Party to 'join Popular Fronts or separatist movements. I I 54

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''' The CommU:nist Party has also become a member of coalition 1 . I I reform1st:. governments in several republics, supporting : i. I . . nat1onal .1nterests over Commun1st Party 1deology. As a result tJe nationalities resurgence and political I I sovereignty the Communist Party has lost a qreat 4f its power and is no lonqer a mechanism by which the! central government can control the republics I '! (Lapidus, i 19.j89b) :: I The :. collapse has brought hardships : i the country which have led to the eventual , I I I destatiz::tior and decentralization of the economic system and the gran;ting of economic autonomy to the republics. The sovereignty movements have crippled the I central government's ab1l1ty to enforce product1on : I quotas, 6ollfct taxes and budget contributions, and I exploit natuiral resource development. The jurisdictional '! il dispute bbt,een the republics and the central g-overnment over enterprlises and infrastructure development has 1 I he problems associated with delivery and transpori1ofl qoods and the inter-republic transfer of and manufactured products. 'i :i Thei tax and budget i'ssue has become acute, as each I I ; .I . republ1c wh1ch refuses to subm1t even m1n1mal revenues to : I I ., the central government contributes to the rapidly growing i I national :debt. The national debt and budget deficit [ .i :J : I 55

PAGE 63

'i : i I .I II issues also'cause significant international concerns, as ,., the credl tw<;>rthiness of the Soviet government and bank.ing 'I I system bl!'ought into question (Sakwa,. 1990). : I the dispute over property rights and the : I ownership'of natural resources has hurt.the economy as bl l jt . d t 1 repu a1n 1n us r1a enterpr1ses and government 4ither through transfer or republic 1. I conf1scat1on. The withholding of oil, gas, and mineral i I I resources has hindered the central government's ability to raise' \haJd currency. The ability to raise hard currency in the central government's attempts : i '; to resolve international credit problems (Simon, I I 1990) 0 : l '; li The! 1overall political and economic reforms demanded . I '! '' by the repunlics have led Gorbachev to the point of II :1 I! sharing with the republics. As a result of the. , I' 19!89 Central Committee Plenum on the , I Nationali:ties Question, a number of specific actions were :1 '' taken in: 'an attempt to resolve the crisis. The Law on Economic I :Rellations between the USSR and Union and I: I rl I'' I I Autonomo'l:ls Republ1cs, passed_1n Apr1l of 1990, proposed greater authority for the republics in r j J controlllng taxation, finances, investment poiicy, and !.: The law also approved inter-. I : 56

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: [ 0 :1 : I republic; ;trade agreements and authorized republics to :; :1 trade ditectly with foreign countries (Sakwa, 1990:263). : !I i In March of 1990, Gorbachev created the Council of : ;I as a political means of providing.the I; ;I more direct input into the Soviet :1 The -council was well received, but 'I . I eventually out to have little authority and was of limitJd Jffectiveness due to the differing opinions of '; ;1 li ,( 1. ts mul tl.'-etihnl.c membershl.p. At the same time, Gorbachev I I called fbir t:he drafting of a new Union Treaty to replace 'I : I the exist1ing Soviet constitution and consolidate a number !" I of Soviet nationalities policy (Sheehy, :1 . ; II 1991a: 17 ;: Sa!kwa, 1990) The new Un1.on Treaty Wl.ll limit the centl:-al lor all-Union government to a specific area of national: while devolving all other 'I . politica(an!d economic authority to the republics. The .I proposed will be discussed in greater detail in I .[ chapter tp.ree. has also had a :impact on the Soviet military. The Soviet I . military,pas. been described as undergoing an "institutiionlal crisis" as a result of the ethnic unrest both in tbe and in miiitary itself. The most cri1:tc+ issue relates to the loss of military readines$: due to desertions, ethnic violence, terrorist 57

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I I I attacks, :draft resistance, and declining pools of The major factor in each of these issues is1 ethnic unrest currently taking place in the : I republics: arid the government's efforts. to manage the i I crisis ($,chemmer, 1990:30). As a.! ma!tter of policy, the Soviet Army has resisted ejfforts to subordinate Army forces to the I Ministry bf Internal Affairs (MVD) for use in suppressing I civil disbrders associated. with ethnic unrest. The Army d l'k bi .'1 1 d 1.s 1. es e1.ng 1.nvo ve 1.n civil actions because it fears a decline;. inl public support for the military as a whole. I I Instead, .the military prefers to see the use of the MVD's I I internal forbes and the localmilitias when suppressing civil (Zaloga, 1990:20). riolence and draft evasion are major issues effecting1 the Soviet military. Ethnic violence has been a long ibroblem in the Soviet military, and with the : I advent of! and political reform even more is being about scale of the problem. A t : I t t t t d ft bl governmen; l.:rves J,ga 1.on 1.a e a er pu 1.c complaints about non-combat deaths in the Soviet military i I concludedlthat as many as eight thousand service members d I d h 1 h have 1.ed1.per year t e ast 15 years. T e Defence I I Minis_try study estimated that between 75 and 85 percent I I i I 58

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'' of all and inJ'uries were as a re_sult of violence I -in Army life (RFE/RL Daily Report, 20 June 1991:6). An report by a commission of the Russian Supreme stated that approximately 300,000 soviet I soldiers 'had died in non-combat incidents since the end :. I of World wa, II, with 50 percent resulting from suicide, 20 beatings, and 10 percent from training 'I" I ' acc1.dents, (RFE/RL Da1.ly Report, 20 June 1991:6). Statistic;:'s J1f this nature are certain td drive away conscripts and make republics more hesitant to allow : :[ their conscr1ipts to serve outside their own borders. The:risf of republic sovereignty movements has meant that many: republics have stopped pursuing draft evaders 1:. I and others have stopped enforcing compulsory military i :[ service As of July of 1990, the military draft had reached a record lowi with many back their for potential territorial rervices in their own republics (see Table 2.4). 1 I ' I I. 1 .. 59

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Table 2.4 Turnout in the Republics ReJ2ublic 1989 1990 b .. Azer aJ.]an 97.8% 100.0% Moldavia1 100.0% 100.0% Ukraine I 97.6% 99.4% Kazakhstan 100.0% 99.2% 100.0% 98.9% RSFSR 100.0% 98.6% Tajikistan 100.0% 92.7% Turkmenistan 100.0% 90.2% Kirghizia I 100.0% 89.5% 100.0% 87.4% Latvia 90.7% 54.2% Estonia 79.5% 40.2% Lithuania 91.6% 33.6% Georgia 94.0% 27.5% Armenia 'I 100.0% 7.5% I : I Source: RFE/RL Report on the USSR, 27 July 1990:4 1.. :1 The turnout figures can be :used as a sort of I referendum dn Soviet government policy by examining which republics cdmply and which resist. The republics which I have full independence from the Soviet union I (the Balt'ics, Georgia, and Armenia) have low turnouts, I I ' whJ.le the1 republJ.cs workJ.ng on the compromJ.se to preserve I the USSR haV:e little significant change in their Draft resistance has placed Soviet military approximately ten percent below required manning leve!ls, and the outlook for improved .i is bleak (Zaloga, 1991a:16; Foye, 1990:4). I. The; of republic militias and the I I increase in armed guerilla activity associated with I I I I 60

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I ethnic unrest have also effected the Soviet military. i I Deserters haye left their units and returned to their : I native republics to participate in local militias, taking I with Soviet equipment. Ethnically motivated I attacks against the Soviet military by militias or conscripts have resulted in numerous casualties, with 85 I officers beihg assassinated.and 189 severely injured in I I 1990. Compared to a total of three deaths in the previous two years, this rapid increase has gained the I attention of!the Soviet military and may cause them to change theirlpolicy about the draft and move toward an all-volunteer force (Weiss, 1990:939). i As the pool of qualified manpower declines, the Soviet military becomes more concerned about the source I I of its soldiers. As previously discussed, the growing population presents an unsuitable source because of the ability and reliability of the conscripts. I I I The Soviet system used to consider the military as a tool for the assimilation and training of the nonI Russian Brezhnev once stated: Our army is a special one. It is a school for instilling sentiments of fraternity, solidarity, and mutual respect for all nations and nationalities of the Soviet Union. Baradat, 1989:326) 61

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The rise of ethnic tensions and the growing sovereignty movements ushered in the end of the Soviet military I as a "tool for cultural assimilation". A final issue of more international concern is the I disposition;of soviet nuclear weapons at a time when I ethnic and military disruptions are taking place I in the republics where some weapons were known to be I I stored. Nudlear weapons security became a concern when I it was repoi;ted that during an outbreak of ethnic violence in j1989, Azeri rebels attacked a Soviet nuclear weapons facility and were driven back by local I security The major concerns in this issue regard the safety of the Soviet nuclear weapons and the I I safeguards against their use if they happen to be I captured. jThe Soviets have withdrawn some weapons from I threatened areas and have increased security around other f . I .h acl.ll.tl.es, 1but t e 1.ssue rema1.ns one of concern for both i Soviet and f;oreign officials (Mossberg, 1991:A14; Zaloga, I 1991b:28; and Bryan, 1990:6). i The Sov,iet Union has undergone a significant amount I I of change a result of the resurgence of the I nat1.onal1.ty :movements. The relat1.onsh1.p between the central and the Union republics has become one I of compromis,e and concession as result of ethnic I demands for political and economic autonomy, and I I I I 62 unrest,

PAGE 70

I threatened authoritarian crackdowns. The I been an attJmpt at securing the future of I end result has the Union through thejpassage of a new union treaty which will completely tevise the Soviet political structure and grant virtuJl autonomy to each participating republic. I The relationships, while still I violent as a result of individual ethnic conflicts in the I I Transcaucasqs region, have generally improved. The I agreements on economic and political cooperation being I I signed by tne various republics enhance stability and I I promote development both for the republics involved and for the union as a whole. I I task now faced by the Soviet Union is I The I how to integrate the many autonomous republics and ethnic interest grdups into the proposed union of sovereign I states. can only be accomplished by overcoming the I past societal divisions and authoritarian rule through a I I process of democratization and decentralization. The I I process of "inew thinking" on the nationality question is vital and must be fully developed through interaction I between the !republics and the central government. As I i 63

PAGE 71

Aleksandr Borin stated in a recent Izvestiya editorial: It is d 1esirable to preserve the Union of Soviet Sociali:st Republics, perhaps after changing the nature ,of the relationships between the republics and -i:f necessary .;.. the name of the union. Nobody limit, under any pretext, the freedom of choi:ce of the union republics or obstruct their from the USSR. The rights and interests of ethn'ic minorities must be reliably guaranteed by the central authorities -not just in words but in (qtd.in World Press Review, May 199!1: 17) I 64

PAGE 72

I I CHAPTER 3 THE ALL-UNION TREATY AND REPUBLIC SOVEREIGNTY As a of the resurgence of the Soviet nationalities, many republics have renewed their demands I for and the right to self-determination. Marxist-Leninist ideology included in its program the right to self-determination and had promised this right i to the of the new Soviet state in 1917. The federal system formed under the initial Soviet of 1924 and repeated in the 1936 and 1977 maintained the republics' right to self1 determination through a process of secession from the union, but Jhe right was essentially a theoretical one. I I At that time, no republic had the political power or the level of ethnic consciousness to challenge the authority and legitimacy of the central government on the issue. I I The SoV,iet Union now faces a situation in which its republics demanding their constitutionally guaranteed right to and all have declared sovereignty ;or initiated the secession process. The continued deterioration in the levels of support for the I central by the republics has significantly

PAGE 73

' decreased tJe authority of the central government and the I political l$gitimacy of the "Union" of republics. The proposed Union treaty may be Gorbachev's last I I to retain aiUnion of Soviet republics, as the political aJd economic sovereignty have begun : opportunity demands for to outweigh the support,for maintaining the existing Union. In the I words of Martha Olcott (1991:135): For maJy independence and political autonomy are worth dying for. So far no one is expressing any willingness to risk dying for the Union. I This cJapter will examine the republic's I I declarations of sovereignty and the Soviet federal I system's to deal with the disintegration of the I Union. The!proposed Union treaty will be analyzed in I detail both:for its implications .for the soviet Union and I its effects ion the sovereign republics. The chapter will conclude a discussion of the prospects for success of the and the outlook for the Soviet Union. 1 Republican Sovereignty Movements Duringithe last eighteen months, the impending disintegration of the Soviet Union has become an issue of critical corlcern to both the central government and its constituentj republics. The three Baltic republics, Georgia, and Armenia have all declared their outright I independence from the Soviet Union or are pursuing 66

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through legal proceedings with the Soviet I government. I All of the remaining Union republics have i adopted declarations of sovereignty which establish I I republic authority over economic and political matters and challenJe the legitimacy of the existing all-Union government. The soJereignty issue is a complex one which has held historJc interest for the Soviet government since its formation in 1922. Soviet state law defines I sovereignty las "the supremacy of state power, which makes .I it unlimited and independent within its own borders and independent lin its relationship with other states" (Nove, 1986:199). 1In contradiction to this definition is the I federal intJrpretation of supremacy as it applies to the all-Union government and Soviet people: In the lussR, sovereignty belongs to the multinational Soviet people, who ex.ercise it through its sodialist state and through the supreme organs of state power (Nove, 1986:199) The limits qf a republic's sovereignty extend to its own interactionJ with other states and within its borders, but the sovereignty of all Soviet citizens is guaranteed i by the government 1tself. This in effect limits republic soV;ereignty by giving the central government the ultimate ;authority in all issues, with Soviet law always taking over republic law, regardless of the republic's Jovereignty considerations. 67

PAGE 75

' I The legal position on sovereignty justifies I state precedence The by reference to the Soviet constitution. describes the USSR as a voluntary union in which the republics have voluntarily surrendered certain to the central government. The republics ret,ain all residual powers not specifically granted to the central government, but the list of specified powers I : I 1s broad:anq all encompass1ng. Th1s lack of control over I political and economic issues and the inability to make policy whicJ is not subordinate to Soviet state policy I I are the main complaints which the republics have brought forward when debating the issue of sovereignty with the I central (Nove, 1986:199). The deqlarations of sovereignty by every republic in the Union aie representative of the broad national I support for'self-determination. The declarations have been motivated by the republics dissatisfaction with the I central govJrnment's performance in managing the Union. I i The political and economic problems which beset the I country have driven the republics to seek the autonomy I ' required to :manage their own systems. Bureaucratic pollution of the environment, restrictive language and cultural policies, and ethnic abuses in the military are all reasons given by the republics for 68

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wanting to J;"emove themselves from the control of the I central government (Sakwa, 1990:237). I I I The prqliferation of political parties and popular fronts the republics has added to the chaos present in Soviet political system. Many of the I I popular fronts have led the sovereignty movements in their while others have attained very little support but!have been able to further the cause of The parties and fronts represent a number interest groups, including environmentalists, intellectuals, radical reformers, and in some areas even the Communist Party. In the Georgian I SSR, the political leadership is a coalition made up of a popular front, political reformers, i and a sma+l lgroup of former party officials and labor I leaders. Since most of these groups are nationality oriented, there is little overlap of their organizations into othe'r :depublics or the soviet Union as a whole. The I wide variety and diverse developmental levels of the numerous will make any attempts at regional I political somewhat difficult (Lapidus, 1989b; Smith, 1990) I In to the declarations by the 15 Union republics, over 20 of the autonomous republics and regions within the Union have similarly declared their 69

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.I I The sovereignty declarations have become so I numerous a soviet journalist remarked "in the parade of sovereignty Latvia's claims to statehood have becomelindistinguishable from those of the medieval Khanate of (Olcott, 1991:128). The number of have influenced the central government I enough thatlits past policies of coercion and repression have now beJn replaced by compromise and concession. The idea of a "voluntary Union" has been proven to be unacceptablJ to entire national communities and to the I millions of1soviet citizens whose interests they represent (Olcott, 1991). I I The sovereignty declarations commonly include major I I statements qn political and economic autonomy, political democratiza,ion, enterprise management, bank and finance arrangements, republic currency, and international trade. I I The most corttroversial statements involve republic I control over republic dispute natural resources and the primacy of over Union law, both of which are issues of the central government due to their Finally, the declarations normally inJlude arrangements for the raising of republic military forces, internal security forces, and a I statement about the republic's plan to become politically neutral qr Jon-aligned (Sheehy, 1991a:16). 70

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The sotereignty declaration by the Byelorussian republic islan _excellent example of the typical statement made by a Table 3.1 summarizes the major I points of Byelorussian declaration. Table 3.1 Byelorussian Sovereignty Declaration I the constitution, law, and state authority on the territory of the republic are I supreme the republic conducts independent foreign relations the people are citizens of Byelorussia; there is no to USSR citizenship the Byelorussian people have the exclusive right of ownership of the land, natural resources, minerai wealth, and airspace of the republic provision is made for a national bank, an financial system, separate taxes and customs duties, and currency Byelorussia shall be compensated for the Chernobyl disaster and other ecological damage1caused by Union and foreign enterprises the republic has the right to maintain army and security forces independent of the Union and to the Byelorussian Supreme Soviet; the republic is to determine conditions of milita:ty service I -I there shall be no troops, m1l1tary bases, or without the republic's approval; the state is to be a non-nuclear zone and neutral in future the republic shall appoint the pUblic prosecutor source: Mihalisko, 1990:12 i There are numerous serious impacts for the central I government a result of the sovereignty declarations. The legitimacy of the federal constitution has been seriously challenged by the number and degree of 71

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violations of Soviet law present in nearly every declaration ;by the republics. The loss of control over I enterprises,: though already in progress as a part of the state's refqrm plans, represents another serious challenge tq the governments authority. The foreign policy and international trade implications are a serious matter because the additional political units seeking i I western or assistance will decrease the Union's negotiating legitimacy and further complicate the issues. Baltic republics already consider themselves I to be a country, as they refer to their relations wi!th Moscow as their "Eastern policy" {Olcott, : I : I 1991: 129). I The Eastern European response to the sovereignty movements been broadly supportive. The Hungarian government tias announced its intention to treat Lithuania and the Ukraine as independent states, while Poland has I called for fmproved relations with all of its bordering nations. In the southern portion of the country, both Iran and have entered into or are seeking ties I with the Asian and Transcaucasus republics {Olcott, I Gorbachev has taken a number of steps to counteract i the of the Union, but all have met with little or nd success. His initial response to the Baltic I I 72

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' declarations of early 1990 was to declare them null void and order them to follow the Soviet I I constitutional procedures for secession. The Baltic states immediately rejected this demand, stating that due to their status as a country illegally annexed by the Soviet Union, they were exempt from any Soviet law on secession. Gorbachev then criticized the Lithuanians for I being in a hurry "to sever 50 years of ties during a single weekend of furious parliamentary activity" I (Olcott, I In an attempted compromise with the republics on economic autonomy, Gorbachev supported a Law on Economic I Relations which granted greater powers to the republics in the areas of taxation, finances, and investment policy. The republics were willing to accept the new authority, but still pursued their demands for full I economic and political autonomy. The issue of economic autonomy 'is !still an open one, but the government continues to compromise as the reforms of perestroika continue ,the process of decentralization (Sakwa, I 1990:263). The Law on Secession, passed in May of 1990, made the secessidn process extremely difficult if not impossible to accomplish. The required public-wide I referendums :and five year waiting period were more than I 73

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I the would accept, so they have simply ignored law and!continued with their insistence on the Gorbachev has referred to this type of i I activity bylthe republics the republics passed laws I as the 'War of Laws", in which which were in direct conflict with all-Union laws in an attempt to circumvent the I I system. This tactic has been particularly successful in I restrictingjthe tax payments made to the central government and in disrupting the Soviet economy by restrictinqltrade arrangements between republics Lapidus, 1989b). In an attempt to end the "War of Laws", Gorbachev I I implementedltwo more reforms aimed at meeting the demands I I of the republics. First, he formed the Council of i Federation, Ia body designed to give the leaders of the republics access to the government decision-making I process. Next, Gorbachev attempted to "federalize" the I Communist I party structure, giving the republic party I mqre control over local activities and officials installing Republic Party First Secretaries as ex I officio of the Politburo. Both of these reforms I failed to the situation, as they were simply overcome byithe pace of events in the republics and their I policy makirlg authority became irrelevant (Sheehy, I 1991a). 74

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concessions to the republics and his compromiseson legal issues were not sufficient to stem the growingldissatisfaction with the all-Union I government. When the Russian republic joined the ranks of those declaring sovereignty, Gorbachev initiated a:plan to save the Union structure by drafting a new Union:treaty which would implement most of the I changes called for by the republics. This was a change I in position for Gorbachev, as he had rejected the idea of a Union tre4ty when it was proposed at the CPSU Central I Committee Plenum in September of 1989 (Sheehy, 1991a: 18.). The new Union Treaty now represented the best possible solution:to!resolving the constitutional crisis facing the Soviet Union. I The New Union Treaty Gorbachev began the planning process for the new I Union in June of 1990 by naming R.N. Nishanov, Chairman of!the council Nationalities-of the USSR I Supreme S9vjet, to head the committee tasked with drafting the treaty. When the first draft was submitted to the Soviet in November of 1990, it was heavily criticized for not going far enough in its reform of the I I existing Soyiet constitution. Although the treaty had been drawn up by members of the Supreme Soviet, it was I I 75

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also for being "imposed from above", a reference to Gorbachev and the influence of the senior leadership.: The draft treaty was returned to the committee f?r significant revisions (Sheehy, 199lb). I The se9ond revision was drawn up by a committee to be composed'of representatives from each of the Union and Autonomous republics. Only 9 of the 15 Union republics I agreed to take part, marking the first delineation of I republic positions with regard to support for the treaty. I The participating republics were the RSFSR, Ukraine, Byelorussia; Kazakhstan, the four Central Asian republics, and Armenia. These republics represent 93 percent of Soviet Union's population, so the central government was willing to work on the treaty based on their support. Their work was completed by 9 I ; March 1991, !with the revised treaty available for public inspection prior to the 17 March 1991 all-Union I referendum qn the preservation of the Soviet Union (Sheehy, 1991b) Gorbacnev had called for the all-Union referendum I for two political reasons. The major reason was to consolidate.support for the survival of the Union by .I ensuring passage -of the Union treaty. Gorbachev obtained mandate of support which he was seeking, as I voters nationwide supported the plan with approximately I 76

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I 76 percent of the vote. In the nine republics supporting the treaty, :support varied widely from a low of 71 I percent in the RSFSR to a high of 98 percent in I Turkmenis;taq {see Table 3. 2) The six republics who oppose the refused to organize the referendum, and only light Joting by non-native nationalities took place in the six (Sheehy, 1991c). I Table 3.2 !Results of the All-Union Referendum Republic USSR RSFSR Ukraine Byelorissia Uzbekistan Kazakhstan Azerbaijan Kirghizia Tadj ikistan ; Turkmenistan Turnout Cpercentl 80 75 83 83 95 89 75 93 94 98 Source: Sheehy, 1991c:22 In Favor (percent} 76 71 70 83 94 94 93 95 96 98 Gorbachev's second reason for calling the referendum I was in an to speed up the consideration and I approval of lthe treaty by the republics. With the support of a national referendum, Gorbachev thought that I "I he could circumvent any delaying tactics employed by the 77

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' republics in an effort to modify or sabotage the treaty. This tactic1was partially successful, as work on the I treaty continues. However, the treaty is now months behind schedule and their are a number of issues which I must be resolved before final approval is obtained I I (Sheehy, '1991c). The proposed Union treaty represents a significant I change in the Soviet federal system and constitutes a I remarkable for the national sovereignty Their concerted political and economic efforts, with the effects of the other crises i facing Soviet central government, have resulted in a document whfch, when approved, will make landmark changes in the Union. I The Treaty on the Union of Soverign Republics begins with a series of very significant statements which recognize the gains made by the national sovereignty I movements their pursuit of self-determination. The preamble of lthe document states that: The soverign states that areparties to the treaty recognizing the right of nations and. pe,oples to self-determination; proceeding from the declarations of state sovereignty procla!imed by the republics have decided to con1struct their relations in the USSR on I 1 new es. This statement removes all doubts as to the validity of l the republid's past sovereignty declarations, as they 78

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I I have becomel the basis for the new treaty. The USSR is defined in the treaty as a sovereign federal democratic I state formed on the basis of a voluntary association of republics. [Although this varies little from the existing in terms of the federal arrangement, it is noticeably different in that all references to Socialist I I principle of Socialist republics have been eliminated. (Note: all material in this and following sections is I based on:the draft treaty printed in Pravda, 9 March I 1991, reprinted in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, I Vol XLIII, 11, 17 April 1991). Under the terms of the new treaty, the republics I will possess full state power and will be able to determine their own national-state and administrative I territorialistructure. This article gives the republics the freedom to determine their own economic-political and to establish governments incorporating I national cu+tural heritage. The republics also become full-fledged members of the international community under I the treaty terms, allowing republics the right to establish diplomatic, consular, and trade relations with I foreign nations. The republics even have the right to conclude treaties provided that they do not I oi;t the.interests of theparties of this treaty .. and does not violate the USSR's international I 79

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commitments (CDSP, 17 May 1991:10). The rights under this treaty appear to grant full statehood to the republics, another major accomplishment by the sovereignty,movements. I Under the new treaty, the right to secede is I granted, :buf procedures for implementation are to be I determined by the treaty signatories at a later date. The boundaries of the USSR and its republics will at their present locations, I and this I item presents some concerns for those regions which are currently in territorial disputes. The treaty also includes a form of non-aggression pact in its I section on inter-republic relations. In the area of I inter-republic relations, the treaty essentially I I formal1zes the current de facto arrangements existing I under the of the sovereignty movements and the loss of control by the central government. The deiineation of the responsibilities between the all-Union g6vernment and the republics is a major issue : I in the treaty. The all-Union USSR government will be I I I respons1}:;1lelfor ensuring state security, organizing the leadership and constituents of the USSR's armed forces, managing defense enterprises, conducting all-Union I foreign policy, and maintaining a Union budget to fund the above mlntioned responsibilities. The all-Union 80

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also be responsible for space research, the control'of all-Union funded scientific research, monitoring compliance with the new constitution, and all-Union efforts at combatting crime. The all-Union government will share joint I responsibility with the republics for the development of foreign and military policy, national social and economic I the management of defense enterprises, and the protection of natural resources and the development I of environmental policy. In an unusual article which is most likelylaimed at those Central Asian republics I interested in maintaining close ties with the central government, I the treaty provides republics with the right to delegaterepublic authority for any and all functions to the all bnion government. This item essentially I allows a republic to maintain the old arrangement of I central if it so chooses, but it is unlikely that this option will be used anytime in the near future. The incorporates all of Gorbachev's economic I reforms, noting the implementation of liberal policies on private property and republic control I of economiclpolicy. The treaty encourages the I unrestr1cted development of property, promotes the I I developmentof a market economy for the USSR, and allows the republi6s to share in the USSR's gold, diamond, and 81

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foreign supply. The consolidation of all of these econobic reforms into the proposed treaty I represents another considerable accomplishment for the I reform movements of the Soviet Union. If successful, I these reforms have the potential to improve the economic situation, the political crisis, and ensurethe continued of the Union. A constitution is mandated under the I treaty, discussions among the republics supporting the treaty's implementation reflect a desire to see the new constitution in place within six months of I the Treaty's approval. The constitution will reflect the I language and content of the new Union treaty and will be subject t.o approval in a process controlled jointly by I the republics and the USSR government. I , In another example of an 1ssue wh1ch the treaty resolves in;favor of the sovereignty movements, the I dispute ovet the legal precedence of Union and republic laws gives jurisdiction to republic laws on republic I territory. 1The only exception is when an issue falls under the of the USSR government, at which I time the USSR law takes precedence. This situation could .I fdf t tl occur 1n o e ense en erpr1ses, env1ronmen a policy, or criminal activities. 82

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I The1Supreme Soviet will be revised under the new I treaty to include two legislative chambers. The first, I replacing existing Council of the Nationalities, is the Council1of the Republics. This upper chamber of the Supreme Soviet will be formed from an equal number I representatives elected in the republics. The lower chamber continue to be called the Council of the I Union, and its members will be elected by the population of the entire country on the basis of election districts. I The USSR wiil also have a president and a vice president, elected together in a nationwide vote with "universal, I I equal, and d1rect suffrage" (CDSP, 17 May 1991:12). The two offices!are held for five year terms, with the maximum in office being two terms. The coJncil of Federation has been eliminated by the new treaty, [but it will be replaced in the future by an i as yet undetermined representative body. The existing I I Cabinet of is retained, but in a much reduced form due to1the elimination of numerous central I I government responsibilities in the areas of economic planning .anq bureaucratic administration. The Council of I Ministers will be responsible for the administration of all USSR'goJernment activities prescribed under the new treaty. The constitution also makes a final, more subtle I change by Russian as the "official language of 83

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the ussRi', the existing constitution's I description. of Russian as the "state" language. I The proposed treaty makes numerous and significant I changes in the Soviet federal system and incorporates many of the demands put forward over the past three years by the movements in the union republics. These changes will have far reaching impacts both for the I I I Soviet Union and the international community. Implications of the Treaty and Prospects for Success I I The major implication of this treaty is the significant: amount of change it brings to every aspect of the Soviet federal system. The process of economic and I political decentralization, although already in progress I under perestroika reforms, will require an enormous bureaucratic effort and an extended period of transition. The treaty will require national elections for the new all-Union assemblies and an approval process for the new constitution. It will also require a major policy assessment with regard to the status of the non-signatory ald how their political situation will be I resolved. The. f1rst maJor obstacle to be overcome, I . however, is the approval and implementation of the final form of the,treaty. 84

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I As previously mentioned, the republics are split I over the support and approval of the proposed treaty. I The group of nine republics which support the treaty have recently is$ued a joint statement with the central government ''stressing the urgency of the situation and a rapid conclusion of the treaty process" (Solchanyk, j1991b:l). This statement of support came as part of a pblitical compromise, as the group had pressed .. the central'government to resolve several treaty issues I in their favor. The RSFSR wanted the Autonomous .I republics tb sign the treaty as members delegations from their respective Union republics, as opposed to I : I being to enter the treaty as individual states. This issue was critical to the RSFSR because it alleviates the need to deal with over twenty individual I sovereign units within the RSFSR borders. The nine republics supporting the treaty were also I . concerned that the new const1tut1on be wr1tten and approved as1soon as possible after the treaty went into I effect. Th$ compromise reached was that the new must be completed within six months of final treaty approval. The compromise with the government also included that elections for membership to the I new all-Uni0n assemblies be held in a timely manner I I following approval. The final issue involved the 85

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granting of;most favored nation trading status to the initial parties to the treaty, which the group has also had included in the treaty text (Solchanyk, l99lb:2). The "Big Fiye" republics, a consultative group consisting I of the five:largest republics in the USSR (RSFSR, Ukraine, ,BYflorussia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan) played a part in pressuring the government to I concede on issues in return for their political support for:the treaty (Solchanyk, 1991a:l6). The six republics opposing the treaty have also organized iJ an effort to improve their political and I economic following the eventual approval of the h I bl ( ld treaty. T e s1x repu 1cs Georg1a, Armen1a, Mo av1a, and the Baltic states) have established a I body called the Assembly of Popular Fronts and from Republics Not Joining the Union Treaty, also known as the Kishinev Forum. The groups I purpose is to enhance.political and economic cooperation and to seekthe protection of international law against : what they describe as "Soviet military repression in the Baltics The participants are actually representatives of political parties from the six republis, but the signatory movements are currently I in power inifive of the six republics, the exception being MoldaJia (Socor, 1991:18). 86

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I The final battle over approval of the treaty will I probably revolve around economic issues associated with I the transition to the new decentralized economic system. The longer the two groups of republics and the central government debate the treaty, the worse the economic situation becomes. The budget situation in the USSR is now as the federal budget deficit is projected to exceed 125 billion rubles this year. When combined I with the budget deficits of the Union republics, the total is to be nearly 330 billion rubles, an amount to 20 percent of the estimated GNP of the USSR (Hanson, 1991:15). I The government is considering a number of proposals t9 handle the six non-participating republics and regain some much needed capital at the same time. I The plans to penalize the six republics with economic sanctions if they do not participate. First, the republics will be treated as foreign countries, receiving I nc:> favored treatment or economic support from the USSR. Next, the republics will be forced to "buy back" all-Union assets on their territory, convert them I into joint ventures with the USSR, or dismantle and relocate back to USSR territory. Third, the I republics will be required to retire their "share" of the I I Soviet national debt, but the means of 87

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I determining! that share has not been announced. Finally, the republics will not be allowed to use the ruble or I receive creait from the Soviet state bank. The nine republics supporting the treaty support these measures I i because 1t W111 help defray some of the enormous costs i involved inl making the transition to a market economy and establishing the ruble on the international market i (Hanson, 1991). There kre a number of major implications which come I as a result, of the international aspects of the treaty. I First, the Soviet Union will become a group of nine I I individual states able to develop their own foreign I relations, enter into trade agreements, and join international organizations. The Russian republic has I already beep pursuing its own foreign policy interests over the year by meeting with the Japanese to discuss trade arrangements and through its entering into a number' of! inter-governmental agreements with numerous European and Western nations (FBIS:Soviet union, 27 April I I I 1990:110; Gumbel, 1991:A14). The Baltic states as non-members of the USSR raises I a serious ebonomic and military problem for the Soviet I government.! The strategic importance of the Baltic states to the Soviet Union's territorial defenses is I enormous, apd this fact is supported by the number and 88

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I types of forces which are permanently stationed there. I The Sov1et Fleet, headquartered in the Kaliningrad Oblast, RSFSR, deploys some 87,000 sailors on 460 warships of, a variety of types, all harbored at I facilities along the Baltic sea coast. Soviet Army I forces in the area amount to 14 divisions totaling nearly 200,000 troops, deployed throughout the Baltic area. The I air defence system is modern and extensive, comprising an important of the Soviet territorial defenses. In I keeping Soviet military policy, a large number of the troops in the Baltic republics are from Central Asia and the Transcaucasus, further exacerbating I the ethnic in the area (International Defense Review, 1990:631). If the:soviets are required to remove these forces I I from the Baltic region, the Soviets will lose what they refer to as "strategic defensive positions" and will also incur the tremendous costs associated with the : relocation of over 300,000 troops. They will also have I to relocate:their Air Defense system back three to four hundred into Byelorussia and the RSFSR, with no guarantee that these republics would be receptive about I having an additional Soviet presence on their soil I (International Defense Review, 1990:631). I I 89

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I The prpposed Union treaty improves the political and economic: ouflook a great deal for both the sovereign republics and for the central government. There are a number of which must be resolved in the near I I future, but there is sufficient pressure from the political ahd economic crisis situation to encourage a rapid solution. The international community is also I putting on own pressure to see the situation stabilized,jbecause they fear the possible results of a d .. t tl. t u 1 h th t 1s1n egra Sov1e n1on near y as muc as e Sov1e government (Rosenthal, 1991:1). Political pressure from the West in the form of withheld financial I assistance should provide sufficient motivation for the rapid approyal and implementation of the Union Treaty. I 90

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CHAPTER 4 WESTERN POLICY AND THE FUTURE OF THE USSR I The is currently facing a crisis situation of I such historic proportions that it threatens not only the I I future survfval of the Soviet Union but brings legitimate I concern for!the future stability of the entire internationll community. The United States and its I Western a1lies must consider the international political I and economib destabilization that will result should the I ethnic separatism, loss of political legitimacy, and near I I total economic failure which plague the Soviet Union I I today resulr in its total disintegration in the near future. The sotiet Union is still a significant world power I I with extensive natural a large and well I educated a modern and well equipped I conventional military force, and over 30,000 nuclear . I . weapons w1th wh1ch they can threaten any nat1on on th1s I planet. Atlthe same time, however, the Soviet Union also i has an annufl budget deficit which exceeds 20 percent of its GNP, a 6risis of legitimacy in its government, and a resurgent problem which has resulted in

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I I I over 1000 dfaths and an estimated 60o,ooo internal refugees the last three years (Brzezinski, I I 1990:31). r.s. and Western policy-makers must recognize the fact:that the soviet Union is ceasing to exist and h I . t at the1r future pol1cy must account for th1s significant change. Prospects for Future Stability There two major areas for concern when examining I the future of the Soviet Union and its impacts I I on the international community. Firs.t, one must examine I I I the potential for future stability within the Soviet I Union basedjon the current political, economic, and 1 t It' soc1a s1 ua 1on. Second, the impacts Qf the Soviet I Union on international community must be analyzed based on determination of the USSR's potential future I stability. 1once these two areas are understood, the formulation! of foreign policy to meet the demands of future $ecurity can be accomplished. The sotiet Union today faces four major crises which I threaten survival not only as a world power but even as a nationtstate (Allison Blackwell, 1991:81). I First, it faces a crisis of authority within its own borders and national institutions. Every Union republic and other smaller political subdivisions have I I : I 92

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challenged the legitimacy of the Soviet Union by d 1 tl 1 t't' . ec ar1ng iemse ves sovere1gn en 1 1es w1th1n the borders of Soviet multi-national state. Disrespect for civil is spreading and the legal system is I I beset by disputes over jurisdiction and precedence. The I I central must first regain the authority to act I before it. implement any solutions (Allison and I Blackwell, 1991). I I The crisis is that of union, or the inherited I I multi-natiOJ,1al state which is the Soviet Union. The i history of the national struggles which have taken place during the and consolidation of the soviet I Union are vtry relevant for today, as the Soviet Union is being torn by resurgent nationality movements inherited the Tsarist empire {Allison and Blackwell, I I I 1991). (1990:162) best described the I irreconcilable nature of the Soviet nationalities issue I when he stated: In the relationships between the Great Russian people and nearby peoples outside the confines of the1old Tsarist Empire, as well as non-Russian national groups that were included in the empire, there ts no conceivable pattern of borders or instithtionai arrangements which, measured against the cohcepts prevailing to date, would not arouse violent resentments and involve genuine injustices I t 1n many quar ers. I I I The ecbnomic crisis facing the USSR threatens the I living standard of every Soviet citizen and thereby I I 93

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exacerbates the other problems within the system. The t. I d Sov1e comman economy has fa1led and 1s gradually being I replaced byl systemic reforms, but in the near term I conditions continue to deteriorate. In some areas the I t 't'1 h b Sov1e c1 1zenry as een reduced to a "hunter-gatherer" society.in thich maximum effort is required just to meet survival needs (Allison and Blackwell, 1991:83). I The fohrth crisis facing the Soviet Union is the I I severe political.collapse which has occurred as a result of the faillre of ideology. The political system has I deteriorated into a dispute between reformers and the I historic of authority. The basis of the I I entire system has been challenged and found to I be wanting,!and a political struggle is on to determine I the successor (Allison and Blackwell, 1991). Considering I I the facing the system, it is apparent that the I Soviet multi-national. state has no future. I The future stability of the international community I is dependent on the outcome of the ongoing Soviet . I internal struggle. Gorbachev has significantly improved the securitt of Europe through his policy of "new I I thinking" in foreign affairs, and his restructuring of I Soviet na.ti?nal security policy has helped to reduce tensions inlother areas of the globe. The restoration of independenci for Eastern Europe, the reunification of 94

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I Germany, rehewed arms control efforts, foreign policy I disengagemehts in areas of past conflict, and the future economic infegration into the world market all contributed!to an easing of tensions and improved I relations (Allison and Blackwell, 1991). I A failure to adequately resolve the Soviet Union's I internal prbblems can have a serious impact on the I international community. The destabilization which would I ' result from! a Soviet disintegration would not be i contained soviet borders, as southwest and Central I Asian states would be adversely impacted. The potential I for civii war or increased ethnic strife cannot be ruled out, and: international political consequences of the of a nation with nuclear, biological, and I chemical.welpons would be immense. I There future of I 1 Political outcomes of the Treaty I a number of potential outcomes for the I the Soviet Union based on the results of the I I new Un1on Treaty. First, if the treaty is not approved and the of cooperation and compromise which exists I today between the republics dissolves, the outlook will I I be extremely bleak. The reform process will lose its I base of support, with the each republic and the central I government their own way or forming small regional 95

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' i I alliances tor trade and security. The economic and I political crises will enter a period of stagnation, with I little for any major recovery until some form of I political cooperation can be arranged. This scenario I could for a number of years, but the real danger I I I is of its deterioration into an even more serious I I internal st:ruggle (Allison and Blackwell, 1991). I A seco'nd possible outcome which could result from I the failure' to implement the proposed Union treaty would I . see a resurgence of institutional conservatism which uses I I the internal security forces, and government I repression stop political and economic reform and I essentially\ put the Soviet Union under permanent martial I law. There. are political conservatives, Communist I I and Great Russian chauvinists who would support and! in fact still propose today a return to this I I type of to ensure the survival of the Soviet I I Union. pue1 to the broad-based political support for the I reform movement and the resurgence of non-Russian I national consciousness, the potential for a return to I hardlinepo1icies by the central government is small. I I However, the greatest danger in this scenario is that an attempted in direct I crackdown, while unsuccessful, may still result I cpnflict which leads to civil war or political I chaos and Blackwell, 1991). 96

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I I ,j I I I I The third and most dangerous outcome results from I either the ifailure to successfully implement the treaty I reforms or [from an attempted return to hardline policies. The politidal and economic chaos which would result from I these ou.tclmes cquld lead directly to disintegration and I reg1onal nat1onal conflict. There are numerous paramilitar,y organizations already existing in the republics alnd the number of separatist guerilla groups I I continues t!o expand. The Soviet military installations ' spread throughout the Union would be attacked in order to . I . . ga1n equ1pment, and the potent1al for some group ga1n1ng I I access to nfclear or chemical weapons exists. This I scenario wo:uld result in huge numbers of refugees fleeing i the conflicit's, with most heading either for Eastern Europe or alcross the southern borders of the USSR I I (Allison Blackwell, 1991). I The .fihal possible outcome is of a more positive Ifl the treaty is successfully concluded and implemented[, the chance for the s:uccess of the reform process goes up considerably. Even with the treaty . I I and successful political cooperation, the I recovery ofj the economy and social structure will take many years and could easily slip into economic I stagnation.! The key to long term success will be _persistencelon I I I I I I the part of Soviet reformers and some form 97

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' i I I I of assistajce from the West (Allison and Blackwell, I 1991) I I When from a Western perspective, an I additional :"ideal" political outcome can be defined. In I this the treaty is successfully implemented and results in lan accelerated and highly successful program of reform. The internal political reforms are also I successful iand result in what Brzezinski (1989:21) refers I to as "a pluralistic Eurasian commonwealth". The Soviet would continue its decentralization and l democratizaJtion and would successfully integrate into the world commJnity. This scenario would provide the I I ul t1.mate_ soilutl.on to the West's concerns over future stability, both for the Soviet Union and for the rest of I the internaitional community. I Impacts on Western Policy I foreign policy objectives are ultimately driven by security interests. These national I I security inrerests are vital to our own individual nation, buti similar interests apply to both our allies and to the our mutual stabilize levels of Union. For that reason, the pursuit of I hational security interests will help to I I the international community and reduce the cpnflict in all regions of the world. 98

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The pt,imary national security interest of the u.s., its Western allies, and the Soviet Union is the avoidance I I of nuclear 'war. This issue is of critical importance because !the consequences of failure. The West is therefore v.ery interested in the disposition of Soviet nuclear particularly in light of prospective political change in the Soviet Union. The West is concerned about the safety of Soviet nuclear I I weapons in event of internal civil disturbance or ethnic unrest. A basic objective of any Western policy will be to the danger involved in this or any other involving nuclear weapons (Allison and Blackwell, fl99l). Another national security interest of the West is I the negotia1tion and implementation of arms control and ' I d1sarmament: agreements 1n the areas of nuclear, conventiona:;l, biological, and chemical weapons. Arms control andi disarmament agreements improve national I security byi reducing the threat, improving coordination I between the: West and the Soviets, and by minimizing the I spread and potential for the weapon's use. Western i interests have been directly served by pursuing the 1 conventional! Forces Europe (CFE) agreements, which will lt. t 1 L 'l't t f E d th b u 1ma e y 1 ar1ze mos o urope an ere y I I 99

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I improve security (Allison and Blackwell, 1991; Brzezinski,l1990). National security interests can also be obtained through political and economic cooperation and the full integration of nations into the international community. i During the past five years, the Western allies have coordinated with the Soviet Union on a i number of i:ssues, and international security has definitely been improved. Tensions have been reduced in I a number ofl regions around the world, and the cooperation demonstrate6 by the global powers in seeking regional I security' anr pursuing non-proliferation pacts is a positive sirn (Allison and Blackwell, 1991). The "E:Uropean Community" or EC approach may hold I valuable lessons for both Western policy makers and the I . sov1et a11-pn1on government. The EC prov1des a class1c I example and political integration while retaining the full sovereignty of each of its member I states. The removal of all trade barriers, use of a common currency, elimination of internal border restrictions, and the use of joint economic planning all combine to !improve efficiency and encourage economic I I development. for all members. The Soviets would have to i overcome sipnificant problems with infrastructure and political but the EC has been successful in 100

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this matter and with time the Soviets may also be able to overcome these obstacles. I .The uJs. and its Western allies pursue their foreign I policy based on what they perceive to be their national security interests. In the international community, !other nations with whom we compete, including the Soviets, pursue their foreign policy based on their I national For that reason, nations should not be so as to think that their own objectives I are the only correct ones or that their policies will ultimately be dominant in the international community. Regarding the u.s. on this issue, Kennan (1990:159) stated: Above iall, it behooves us Americans, in this conneqtion, to repress, and if possible to extinguish once and for all, our inveterate tendency to judge others by the extent to which 'they contrive to be like ourselves. The West mu:st therefore take into account the vi tal interests o:f the Soviet Union when attempting to formulate future policy. I I The political and economic collapse of the soviet Union and i,ts resulting lack of ability to actively pursue its 1former foreign policy interests in the internationlal community should not be seen as a complete "victory" fbr Western policy interests. While the .I I political and military pressure applied against the 101

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I I Soviet I during the last 40 years .certainly had Un1qn an I impact, mady of the I recent changes in Soviet policy have I a change in Soviet national come as a l:jesult of I I interests, !driven by internal economic and political I pressures I i The we:stern allies therefore have a number of f It t h h 1 t th t f t spec1 1c 1n eres s w 1c w1 app y o e sov1e u ure. I First, the [allies should pursue their own security by the I reduction ojf military forces through arms control and I disarmament! agreements. Second, the West should seek to support the! process of peaceful change both in the Soviet Union and in the neighboring regions. Finally, the West I should to support the Soviet Union and its Union republics i1n the pursuit of a peaceful resolution of the nationaliti!es issue (Allison and Blackwell, 1991; Brzezinski,! 1990). With these broad objectives in mind, I the West' seek to establish specific policies for I future glob1al security as it relates to the Soviet Union. I Conclusion The. re1surgence of the nationalities movement in the I I Soviet Union has emerged as the critical factor in the I I cont1nued surv1val of the sov1et system. The current i I resentment hostility being expressed by the non-1 Russian natiional groups .toward the central government is i 102

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a result of decades of repression and subjugation. The Soviet multi-national empire which exists at this point in the century represents an anachronism in terms of the development of modern nation-states. The failure of the Soviet policy to the nationalities issue has led directly to the economic, political, :and ideological failures which the Soviet I system has ;exper1.enced during the last ten years. The I nationaliti!es resurgence has its roots in the colonial and imperialist policies of 19th century Tsarist Russia, but its modern appearance has also been shaped by the programs of perestroika and glasnost implemented by I Gorbachev 1986. This modern resurgence of national I consciousne:ss and the associated demands for political I sovereignty: have brought the Soviet system to a critical point in history. The Soviet Union must resolve its nationalities problem in brder to prevent the total collapse of the I I I pol1.t1.cal and econom1.c system. The new Union treaty represents the best possible solution to the Soviet's national dilemma. While ensuring total political and economic sovereignty for the republics, it will also encourage the decentralization, destatization, and I of the Soviet system which is crucial I I to the Union's long term survival. The Soviet 103

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government and the leadership of the republics must make whatever concessions or compromise are necessary to I I ensure the [rapid approval and implementation of the I treaty. The West should encourage the Soviets in their efforts and support their movement towards total economic and political integration in the international community. Through this process, global security and the future I I stability 9f the international community will be assured. 104

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EPILOGUE POLICIES FOR FUTURE GLOBAL SECURITY Given the current political situation in the Soviet Union, what should the u.s. and its Western allies do to achieve our national security goals and maintain security? I The political stakes are great, I because the failure of policy in this matter could result in the total disintegration of the USSR, regional destabilization, and decreased international security. It is therefore in the national security interests of the I I West to a specific and effective policy for I the USSR and guaranteeing the future security i ,of the international community. ; The political options come down to two basic alternative approaches. The first alternative says that I I our national security interests are best served by staying out of the internal conflict of the Soviet Union and that we should protect our own interests by adopting more of an isolationist view. The U.S. lacks the readily disposable .economic resources to provide support for the failing economy and the u.s. has its own domestic I and to resolve. The West has no effective means of implementing policy within the Soviet Union and lacks the necessary influence to significantly

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,. I affect matters in the Union republics. As Olcott has stated: no way that the West can confer upon Gorbachev the political legitimacy that his own have denied him. . I W1thout a leg1t1mate system to support within the sov1et Union, anylwestern assistance would most likely be ineffective or wasted (Allison and Blackwell, 1991; 1989), There[is a great deal of risk associated with this If the West does nothing.to support the I Soviet Unidn or to mitigate the possible destabilizing effectswhJch a disintegration of the Soviet Union would have, we wJ11 fail in meeting our national security I interests and our responsibility to the international I I community. If we do take action but are ineffective or I become invdlved in an internal political or ethnic I I struggle, we will also have failed. As Kennan (1990:163) I I warned 40 years ago: I . Amer1cans should be extremely .careful 1n committing their support or to an1 specific arrangements in this sphere. The basic of this alternative is that the future I of the nati!onalities is for them to decide. The West can I I encourage change, but should not expect to see effective I results should it take steps which would involve it I I I I 106

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in the internal struggles of the last of the multi-national empires. I The second alternative sees the current situation in I I the Soviet :union as an exceptional opportunity to pursue our national policy objectives while increasing the potential future international security. While this I recognizes in the intJrnal issues I the dangers of becoming involved of another nation, it sees ways of mitigating the threat that the West may become trapped in a long term or costly involvement. In essence, the risks of doing nothing to assist the Soviet Union are far outweighed 'by the potential rewards of establishing the USSR as a and integral member of the internatiortal community. The being presented to the West at this time is of :historic proportions and should be taken advantage of through a series of steps designed to stabilize Soviet Union and integrate it into the community. The West should be willing to assist the Soviets, but only on a controlled and conditional basis. The Soviet government or the Union republics must be able to demonstrate that "they are exercising !legitimate authority" before they receive assistance (Olcott, 1991:136). The West should also "support a free political process that leads to a 107

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I I I I political supported by the inhabitants of the I terr1tor1es concerned" (Ellman, 1991:26). I With criteria in mind, the West should I I implement a policy based on the following measures. First, we must expand our knowledge of the situation in I the Soviet iunion and the Union republics so as to make I better choices with respect to the most effective Jssistance to be supplied. Second, we should I encourage reform process in the Soviet Union and help I establish the political legitimacy needed to stabilize the cris:is land implement change. Third, financial and material aild should be provided to directly assist in the stabilizatfon of the economy and the political reform I I process. 'J1he aid will be conditional, based on Soviet I behavior demonstrates a commitment to continued I social, polii tical, and economic reform. Fourth, the West I should pursue significant advances in arms .I control and disarmament agreements by linking the I treaties td the political integration of the Soviet Union I into the: in'ternational community. The significant I political s:tability which can be achieved by gaining I access to t:he world credit markets and trade establishme1nts should encourage the Soviets to actively participate[ in this objective. Finally, the West should I aid Eastern Europe to further advance its political and . I i 108

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! ; I economic reforms. The success of East European countries I should encourage similar success in the I i Un1on republ1cs and may also encourage the development of I economic ties with Eastern Europe which could support I regional stability (Allison and Blackwell, 1991; I I Brzezinski) 1990). i I Theselmeasures are offered as a means of improving the West's!ability to formulate and implement a foreign I I policy whi9h will stabilize the USSR and at the same time I improve security of the international community. The I West's hopJ for the Sovie.t future should be I I I .. that she lift forever the Iron Curtain, that she certain limitations to the internal authoiity of government, and that she abandon, as and unworthy, the ancient game of imperialist expansion and oppression. (Kennan, 1991:164) 109

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I I I I I REFERENCES I Allison, Graham and Robert Blackwell 1991 ;Anierica'S Stake in the Soviet Future." Summer 1991:77-97 Baradat,. Leon P. 1989 Political Society. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall . I Barry, D. and 1991 'contemporary Englewodd Cliffs: Carol Barner-Barry soviet Politics: an Introduction. Prentice Hall Brzezinski ,i Zbigniew 1989 '.'Post Communist Nationalism." Foreign Affairs. 1-24 Brzezinski ,I Zbigniew 1990 "Tne Break Up of the USSR." Christian Science World Mdnitor. November 1990:30-35 I Carrere d'Encausse, Helene . I 1979 Decl1ne of an Emp1re. New York:. Newsweek Books I Clark, Bruce 1991 :"A Jewel in the Soviet Crown Threatens to Become a Thorn in Yeltsin's Side." London Times. 2 Jan 1991:6 Current oiJest of. the Soviet Press 1991 Revised Draft of a New Union Treaty." curre'nt !Digest. of the soviet Press. Vol. XLIII, No .11, 17 Apri] 1991:10-13 : I DeJevsky., Mary 1991 "Ka!zakhstan Leader Quietly Embarks on Road to I o Free Malket." London T1mes. 14 March 1991:12 Ellman, Michael 1991 :"THe NATO Economics Colloquium on the Soviet A General Comment." NATO Review. Vol.39, Aprl.l:. 19!91: 23 FBIS: SoviJt Union 1990a:. Minister Cited on Foreign Contacts." PBIS: UDion. 1 May 1990:110 I

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FBIS: soviet union l990b "Gentral Asian Republics Sign Regional Pacts." FBIS: Union. 28 June 1990:122-123 i Foye, St4apl'ien 1990 "Sfatistics Show Low Military Draft Turnout in RFE/RL Report on the USSR. Vol.2, No.30, 27 July 1990:4 I Gleason, 1990 Federalism and Nationalism: the struqqle for Riqhts in the USSR. Boulder: Westview Press I Goldman,. Marshall I. 1983 'USSR in Crisis: the Failure of an Economic I System. 1New York: w. W. Norton j Gumbel, Petier 1991 Gets Its Own Voice in Soviet Foreign Policy." Wall Street Journal. 16 April 1991:A14 Hammer, Dariryl P. 1985 11RJssian Nationalism and Soviet Politics." Soviet Politics: Russia After Brezbnev. Ed. Joseph L. Nogee. I New Praeger I I Hammer, P. 1990 Politics of Oliqarchy. Boulder: Westview Press Hanson, Philip 1991 Union Treaty: Embargoesor Surrender?" RFE/RL Report on the USSR. 28 June 1991:15-16 i Hough, Jerl:jY 1980 Leadership in Transition. Washington D.C.: Brookings Hough, Jeri,y F. 1989 Politics." Foreiqn Affairs. Winter ; International Defense Review I 1990 11Th;e strategic Importance of the Baltic Republics." International Defense Review. June 19911:631 I 111

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Jacobs, N. and Theresa M. Hill 1985 "Soviet Ethnic Policy in the 1980s: Theoretical and Political Reality." soviet Politics: Russia After Brezhnev. Ed. Joseph L. Nogee. New York: Praeger Kennan, ,George F. 1990 n.Alfierica and the Russian Future." (Reprint of April article) Foreign Affairs. Spring 1990:159-164 Laird, RoyJo. 1986 Demographic Trends, Gorbachev, and the Future. Westview Press Lapidus, Gail w. 1989a "Gorbachev's Nationalities Problem" Foreign Fall 1989, 92-108 Lapidus, Gciil w. 1989b and the 'National Question': the Soviet Federation." soviet Economy. Vol. 5 (July-September). 201-205 I I Lieven, Anatol 1991 "Georgian President Accuses Moscow of Provoking London Times. 11 January 1991:6 Mihalisko, ]Kathleen 1990 "Byelorussia as a Sovereign State." aFE/aL Report on the ossa. 31 August 1990:11-16 Mossberg, Walter s. 1991 "Soviet Nuclear Arms Security is Source of Grow:i,ng Concern." Wall street Journal. 31 May 199l:A14 I Nahaylo, Bohdan and Victor Swoboda 1990 Disunion: A History of the Nationalities Problem in the ossa. New York: The Free Press New York Times 1991 "Pchitical Terrorism is Rising in soviet Union, KGB Says." New York Times. 7 June 1991:8 Nove, Alec 1986 socialism, Economics, and Development. London: Allen arid Unwin I I 112

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Olcott, 'Martha B. 1991 "The soviet (Dis)Union.11 Foreiqn Policy. spring i991: 118. '. I P1pes, Richard 1967 ;"S9lving the Nationality Problem." Prol:lems of Communism. Vol XVI (Sep-Oct), 125-131 Rahr, Alexlnder and R. Alex Bryan 1990 ,"C9ncern over Security of soviet Nuclear Arms." RFE/RL Report on the USSR. 12 October 1990:7 I RFE/RL Daily Report 1991 '"Mchdavian, Ukrainian Leaders Confer in Kiev. 11 I o RFE/RL Da1ly Report. No.lll, 13 June 1991:8 I 'I RFE/RL Dai+y Report 1991 "Lithuanian/Byelorussian Cooperation Treaty." RFE/RL raily Report. No.lll, 13 June 1991:4 RFE/RL Daily Report . I 1991 "Non Combat Deaths 1n the Army." RFE/RL Daily Report. No.ll6, 20 June 1991:6 I RFE/RL Report . 1991 ."Non Combat Deaths S1nce World War II. 11 RFE/RL raily Report. No.ll6, 20 June 1991:6 RFE/RL Daily Report 1991 of the Crimean Tatars to Crimea." Report. No.ll6, 20 June 1991:8 I RFE/RL Daily Report 199111Kazakhstan to Take over Jurisdiction for Enterprises." RFE/RL Daily Report. No.117, 21 Junejl991:8 RFE/RL European Report 1991 "Six Republican Groups Sign Accord and Condemn I Soviet Intervention in their Internal RFE/RL soviet/East European Report. Vol.VIII, No.34, 10 June 1991:3 Rosenthal, IAndrew 1991 "Bush Weighs United Soviet Question." Hew York Times. 28 July 1991:1 I Sakwa, Richard 1990 and His Reforms:1985-1990. New Prentice Hall 113

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Schemmer, Benjamin F. 1990 "E*tent to which soviet Military Power has Splits House Panel." Armed Forces Journaliinternational. August 1990:30 Schmemann, I Serge 1991 Ethnic Clashes are Reported in the Soviet South." New York Times. 8 May 1991:A5 Seely, 1990 "Yeltsin Signs Pact with Ukraine." London times. 20 November 1990:46 I Sheehy, Ann I 1991a "The State of the Multi-National Union." Radio Liberty Report on the USSR. Vol.1, No.3, 4 January 1991:16-19 Sheehy, Ann 1991b "Revised Draft of the Union Treaty." RFE/RL Report on the soviet Union. 22 March 1991:1-4 I I Sheehy, Ann I 1991c "The All-Unl.on and RSFSR Referendums of March 17." RFE/RL Report on the soviet Union. 29 March 1991:19-23 Simes, Dimitri 1991 Time of Troubles." Foreign Policy. I Spr1.ng 1991, 105-117 I Simon, Gerhard I 1991 :Nat1onal1sm and Policy Toward the Nationalities I 1n the sov1et Un1on. Trans. Karen Forster and Oswald Boulder: Westview Press Smith, (ed.) 1990 Nationalities Question in the soviet union. London: 1 Longman d I 1 Snel. ar, Danl.e 1991 "SQviet Military Cautions Against Breakup of Uniort."IChristian Science Monitor. 10 May 1991:6 I Socor, Vladimir 1991 "Pchi tical Forces of Six Republics Set Up Coordinating Mechanism." RFE/RL Report on the soviet Union. 7 June 1991:18-20 114

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Solchanyk,i Roman 1991a "The Draft Union Treaty and the Big Five." RPE/RL the soviet Union. 3 May 1991:16-18 Solchanyk,; Roman 1991b "['he Gorbachev-Yeltsin Pact and the Union Treaty." RFE/RL Report on the soviet union. 10 May I Szana, Thoinas s. 1991 The Ethnic Factor in the soviet Armed Forces. Santa Mbnica: Rand Corporation The Economist 1990 "From Planned to Unplanned Chaos." The Economist. 29 1990:77 i. The Economll.st 1990 "TSar of a Crumbling Empire. 11 The Economist. 17 March 1990:41 Weiss, Peter 1990 and Draft Evasion in the Soviet I o Army." :Internat1onal Defense Review. September 1990:939 I I World Press Rev1ew 1991 Editorial." World Press Review. May 1991.:17 Zaloga, J. 1990 11Sbviet Internal Forces Specialize in suppressing civil Disorder." Armed Forces Journal July 1990:20 Zaloga, steven J. 1991a "Soviets Draft Reform Plan." Armed Forces Journal:International. February 1991:16 Zaloga, Steven J. 1991b ":Russia's Military Chernobyl?" Armed Forces Journal' International. June 1991:28 115