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South Africa's democratic experiment

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Title:
South Africa's democratic experiment is the incumbent senior civil service Apartheid's rear guard?
Creator:
Bellos, Nondas
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Language:
English
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xii, 342 leaves : illustrations, maps ; 29 cm

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1989 - 1994 ( fast )
Civil service -- South Africa ( lcsh )
Civil service ( fast )
Politics and government ( fast )
Politics and government -- South Africa -- 1989-1994 ( lcsh )
South Africa ( fast )
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bibliography ( marcgt )
theses ( marcgt )
non-fiction ( marcgt )

Notes

Bibliography:
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 326-342).
General Note:
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree, Doctor of Philosophy, Public Administration.
General Note:
School of Public Affairs
Statement of Responsibility:
by Nondas Bellos.

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University of Colorado Denver
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Auraria Library
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All applicable rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
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32077772 ( OCLC )
ocm32077772

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SOUTH AFRICA'S DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT: IS THE INCUMBENT SENIOR CIVIL SERVICE APARTHEID'S REAR GUARD? by Nondas Bellos B.A., University of New Mexico, 1982 M.A., University of New Mexico, 1988 A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Public Affairs of the University of Colorado at Denver in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Public Administration 1994

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This Thesis for the Doctor of Philosophy degree by N ondas Bellos Has been approved for the Graduate School of Public Affairs Date

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Bellos, Nondas (Ph.D., Public Administration, Graduate School of Public Affairs, University of Colorado at Denver) South Africa's Democratic Experiment: Is the Incumbent Senior Civil Service Apartheid's Rear Guard? Thesis directed by Professor Franklin James ABSTRACT The combination of a new political and constitutional dispensation in South Africa together with the policy of retaining senior incumbent administrative personnel is problematic for a postapartheid South Africa. The same, mostly White, senior civil servants who were in charge of implementing apartheid policies are now being asked to usher in a new order. Given their residual administrative expertise, incumbent sentor bureaucrats can influence (positively or negatively) the stability of South Africa's to democracy. This study utilizes a review of and secondary sources, personal interviews, and a sample survey to canvass the views of incumbent senior iv

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civil servants to gauge their prevalent concerns, attitudes, and motivations concerning their prospects and plans under a Black-led government. Incumbent senior civil servants are generally in support of the direction in which South Africa is headed, but this is backing born of a lack of credible alternatives. Incumbents are also apprehensive of their future under Black rule, consequently, a large number of them are planning to leave public service. Of those who wish to continue in the employment of the State, a large proportion are confident that they will be able to influence and change civil service policies. Although there is a general consensus for the need to restructure the South African civil-service to make it more representative of the population as a whole, the means by which to do so is contentious. This study makes a contribution to the theory and practice of democratization. In terms of theory, a new path to democracy is identified and explained by the proposed It enumerates an evolution of political power in which the bureaucracy is one key constituency in situations of political v

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transplacement. In terms of practice, this study highlights the importance of a democratic culture in which political tolerance and trust are central, and practical recommendations are offered to effect democratic procedures and institutions. This abstract accurately the candidate's thesis. publication. of vi

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CONTENTS xi xi; CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND ................... 1 Introduction ................................. 1 Background .................................. 18 2. FROM APARTHEID TO DEMOCRACY ................. 30 Social Class and the Policy of Apartheid: The Stage is Set for Revolution ............. 33 Social Revolution then Democracy? .......... 39 Democratization then Democracy? Modes of Democratization .................... 51 Modes of Democracy: Setting the Stage for Good Government ....... 62 Good Government and Social Institutions: Institutionalizing Democraey ................ 67 Conc 1 us i on .................................. 71 3. THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF SOUTH AFRICA: CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES AND TRANSITIONAL STRUCTURES ................................... 72 Constitutional Issues ....................... 75 The Political Structure of South African Governance, 1994-1999 ....................... 86 Cone 1 us ion .................................. 98 viii

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4. THE ECOLOGY OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM: POLITICAL CULTURE AND DEVELOPMENTAL INFLUENCES ................ 101 Pol itical Culture .......................... 101 Developmental Influences ................... 110 5. FROM APARTHEID ADMINISTRATION TO DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION ................... 115 The Problem of Legitimacy .................. 117 The Problem of Stability ................... 127 Affirmative Action and Training ............ 133 The Administrative of South African Governance, 1994-1999 ........ 147 6. THE .EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: 'RESEARCH DESIGN, METHODOLOGY, AND FINDINGS .. 154 Research Design and Methodology ............ 154 Findings ................................... 166 Conc 1 us i on ................................. 222 7 .. EMPIRICAL CONCLUSIONS, THEORETICAL CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............ 225 A Temporal Balance of Power Theory of Transitions to Democracy ................ 231 Recommendations ............................ 248 APPENDIX A. South African Senior Civil Service Survey Instrument and Cover Letters ............... 264 B. Frequency and Percentage Tables ............ 284 C. Interviews Conducted ....................... 303 D. Constitutional Principles .................. 304 ix

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E. Laws Repealed or Amended ................. F. Provincial Powers .......................... 312 G. System for Elections of National and Provincial Legislatures .................... 313 H. Procedure for Election of the President .... 324 I. Twelve-Point Plan to Combat Corruption (Minister of State Expenditure) ............ 325 BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................... 326

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank all the members of my dissertation committee for their patience and unwavering support. Without the financial assistance of the University of Colorado at Denver and the proprietors of the restaurant at Kempton Park (South Africa) this project would not have been possible. xi

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MAP OF SOUTH AFRICA xii 2OOn-.

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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND The prohibition of the African National Congress, the Pan Africanist Congress, the South African Communist Party' and a number of subsidiary organizations is being rescinded. F. W. de Klerk, Opening of Parliament, February 2, 1990. INTRODUCTION In a year of momentous events, February 11, 1990 marked yet another turning point for South Africa. After 27 years, Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress was released from prison following the legalization of the ANC just a week earlier. In rapid in June of 1991, the lThe African National, Congress (ANC) is the largest Black political organization in South Africa, Nelson Mandela is its current President. See Johns, S. Davis, R. H. (eds.) (1991). A New York: Oxford University Press. For biographical information on South African leader's see: Gastrow, S. (1990). (3rd. rev. ed.). New York: H. Zell and Riley, E. (1991). New York: Facts on File. 1

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Population Registration Act2 and the Group Areas Act3 were repealed. On December 21, 1991,4 the Convention for a Democratic South Africa, better known as CODESA, provided the forum for formal negotiations to begin between the South African government and the various political groups in South Africa. CODESA's purpose was to extend political rights to all racial groups through a new constitution. Constitutional negotiations, however, broke down in June 1992 in part because agreement could not be reached on the majorities needed to entrench the powers and of the future provinces, and consensus was not forthcoming on the role of a second chamber in constitution making. Formal constitutional negotiations, known as 2The Population Registration Act provided the legal mechanism for the application of nearly all apartheid laws. Registration Act, No. 30, as amended, 1, 5, 1 e (S. A f r. 1950). 3The Group Areas Act provided for the segregation of enormous tracts. of the country based on group composition (these consisted of the "White group," the "Black group," and the "Colored group"). Group Areas Act, No. 36, as amended, 12, 23 (S. Afr. 1966). See Appendix E for a current catalogue of repealed laws. 4For a historical account see Friedman, S. (ed.) Johannesburg: Ravan Press.

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the Multi-Party Negotiations Process, were resumed in March 1993. The assassination of Chris Hani of the South African Communist Party (SACP), a walkout by the Concerned South Africans Group (later reconstituted as the Freedom Alliance), a South African Defence Force (SADF) raid on the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), and an "invasion" of the negotiations venue by r-ight wingers all precipitated crises to varying degrees, but none was sufficient to derail negotiations. These culminated with the adoption of an intertm constitution by the South African Parliament in December 1993, and the creation of the Transitional Executive Council (TEC), which was mandated -to level the political playing field ahead of the April, 1994-e1ections-South Africa's first all race general elections. According to the findings of a poll, the ANC is almost sure to win the upcoming elections. Its support as of February 3, 1994 stood at just less than 50%, whereas, the ruling National Party's (NP) support stood at 14%. The Conservative Party (CP) enjoyed 4% support, while the Democratic Party COP) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) each slated 3% on the

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poll, with the PAC bringing up the rear at 1% support. The 25% of undecided voters, 19% of whom say that they have not made their selection, and the 6% who refuse to indicate a preference, could be critical in determining whether the ANC reaches the 66% threshold which would enable it to write and pass a final constitution (Johnson & Whitfield, February 3, 1994, p. 1). The Purpose and Organization of the Study The combination of anew political and constitutional dispensation with the engagement of essentially the same administrative personnel is problematic for a post-apartheid South Africa. -The civil machinery that was created by the apartheid state and employed for implementing apartheid is now being asked to usher in the anti-apartheid polity" (Adam & Moodley,' 1993, p. 173). The purpose of this dissertation is to systematically explore the role that the incumbent national civil bureaucracy will play in promoting (or obstructing) the emergence of truly democratic institutions and procedures. By identifying the degree of support or opposition that a new government will encounter among the incumbent

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senior civil service, intervention strategies can be designed to alleviate or correct potential problems. The term refers to the mediating institution authorized by constitutional and other rules which mobilizes human resources in the service of the civil affairs of the state (Morgan & Perry, 1988, pp. 85-86). The qualifier refers to the top levels of the civil service beginning with those incumbents with the title of or those who earn R108 or more per annum. According to (1984, pp. 73-74) bureaucracies and other institutions can be better understood if the environment, influences, and forces that shape and modify them are identified and ranked in order of relative importance, and if the reciprocal impact of these institutions on their surroundings is also explored. The elements of the environment that impact the civil bureaucracy may be envisioned as a series of concentric circles with the bureaucracy at the center. The largest circle with the least influence on the bureaucracy is the social system. The next smallest circle represents the economic system, and the inner circle with the most decisive influence on the bureaucracy, is the 5

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political system. Following this line of thinking, this study adopts a limited ecological approach to the study of the South African bureaucracy, with a particular emphasis on the South African political system and the influence it exerts on the national civil bureaucracy. A purely descriptive study of the South African political and administrative systems, however, would have made for a very modest public affairs dissertation. This is particularly true in light of not only the general absence of information on the South African bureaucracy, but also because any literature on South Africa prior to 1990 is rendered hopelessly outdated given thephenomenal social and political progress South Africa has made in the last four years. These pitfalls negotiated by providing a contextual framework within which to analyze and understand South Africa in and its administrative system in particular. Further, this study describes the characteristics of the national senior civil service and the structure of South African governance for the period 1994 to 1999. Issues that impact the senior civil service, such as 6

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affirmative action, training, and the supply of, and demand for, public managers are also explored. Original research comprised of a sample survey, a review of primary and secondary sources, and a select number of key informant interviews is presented to delineate the'attitudes and beliefs of incumbent senior bureaucrats and the role that the civil service will play in the transition to and consolidation of democracy. This study concludes by advancing a of and offers specific recommendations to effect democratic procedures and institutions in South Africa. Chapter 1 outlines the influence international community exerted on South Africa's transition to and delineates the worldwide context in.which these changes took place. In addition, it provides economic and demographic background to paint a fuller picture of the conditions South Africa faces and the prospects for successful democratization. Subsequently, Chapter 2 provides a series of theoretical or explanatory vehicles together with select empirical evidence to foster a deeper understanding of South Africa. More 7

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specifically, it is a metaphorical map to explain South Africa's journey toward democracy, with a fork in the road between revolution and democratization; it concludes by presenting a theory of institutions to explain why bureaucracies may playa role in the consolidation of democracy. Chapter 3 describes the political system of South Africa, and focuses on constitutional issues and structures. The next chapter sets the scene for a closer examination of the South African administrative system via a discussion of political culture and developmental influences. In Chapter 5 the problems of legitimacy and stabili.ty as they relate to the South African civil service are outlined, and the implication of these twin problems for democratic administration are examined. Affirmative action and training are presented as partial solutions to these problems. Chapter 6 is the heart of the dissertation where the empirical evidence gathered for purposes of this study is presented. In addition, the study's research design and methodology are explained in this chapter. Finally, Chapter 1 concludes by answering the question "Is the Incumbent Senior Civil Service Apartheid's Rear 8

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Guard?" and propose a temporal balance of power theory of transitions. The final pages of the dissertation consist of several recommendations to effect democratic procedures and institutions in South Africa. The overall design then is one meant to facilitate the understanding of South African intricacies, to expand the empirical and theoretical knowledge base, and by extension, to provide avenues for future research. Delimitations and Limitations of the Study The are three delimitations to this study. The first is a research emphasis on the senior civil service of South Africa. A target population of incumbent central government employees is under consideration comprised of approximately 1 200 individuals who earn R10e 075 or more per annum. Secondly, this study's outlook is toward the future. This dissertation is largely an empirical undertaking with the purpose of documenting the existing characteristics of the South African civil bureaucracy identifying realistic goals for an integrated and democratic public service. It is 9

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also an attempt at making a theoretical contribution to the literature on transitions to democracy. Finally, the differential impact of the political and administrative systems (versus the international, social, and economic systems) on the civil service of South Africa calls for greater attention to these two systems than the rest. The effect of these three delimitations is that other relevant perspectives will not be extensively recognized here. Focus on bureaucratic leadership represents this study's economy and basic rationale since the greatest influence on the civil service and its environment is being assessed by examining the least number of personnel. This strategy, however,is achieved at the expense of other human resource issues, for example, job security and advancement concerns in the lower ranks of the civil service. Similarly, this study is not historical in nature, and is therefore silent on social and other inequities of the past. What is more, the research emphasis on political and questions curbs other relevant perspectives, such as sociological viewpoints. The limitations of this study may be broadly 10

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classified as limitations of timing and limitations of method. Limitations of timing have to do with the unique set of circumstances in which this study was conducted. To say that South Africa is undergoing an historic change without recognizing that social and political turmoil encourages conformity in the face of powerlessness is to ignore one of the key dynamics of the situation. In practice this means that every level and sector of society is over politicized. Feelings of apprehension coupled with a sense of being "politically correct" become the norm. In short, the sensitive nature of the times becomes a confounding variable as far as conducting research is concerned. Limitations of method refer to problems of research design. The main has to do with nonresponse bias. Nonresponse is the principal source of survey error. Short of an effective counter measure, Figures 6.1 to 6.4 identify the parameters of this limitation in trie interest of objective reporting. This source of error is a natural consequence of subjects who have a particular interest in the topic of a survey being 1 1

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more likely to return a mail questionnaire than those who are less interested. This means that the results of mail-back surveys with low response rates will usually be biased in ways that are directly related to the survey's subject (Yeager, 1989). The problem to non response bias is similarly attendant to the interview portion of this study. The self-selection of interviewees was another confounding variable. Furthermore, the relatively unstructured format of the interviews did not serve to directly enhance the survey's results, but did nonetheless increase the study's internal validity. This study was built around a concern for internal validity. To this end, a methodological triangulation was effected consisting of a mail-back survey, a select number of interviews, and a review of primary and secondary sources. Consequently, each leg of the triad increased the study's internal validity, and as a result, satisfactory conditions for external validity were set. The Significance of the Study The significance of this study is in the

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contribution that its findings make to the theory and practice of democratization. The nature of democracy is better defined. Practical guidance is delineated for South African governance, and important lessons may be drawn by other nations undergoing democratization. The findings of this research may have the practical consequence of furthering the process of learning in South Africa. If the resolution of societal conflicts requires such machinery as elections and authoritative governmental decisions, "no less does it require that the adversaries search for additional information and analysis that might permit them to move toward agreement (Lindblom, 1990, p. 6). Fear and entrenched mindsets have taken a heavy toll on the good will of South Africans. Resistance to change in disposition and adopted positions explains why problems like ethnic discrimination persist. The choice for a society often amounts to making a new inquiry into attitude and belief, or finding no adequate solution at all (Lindblom, 1990, p. 6). The success of the democratization process currently underway in South Africa will to a very large extent depend on the

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efficiency and support of the civil service (Van Zyl Slabbert, 1993, p. 5). Learning the attitudes and beliefs of South African senior civil servants is therefore a strategically relevant enterprise. By calling attention to the role that bureaucracies play in democratization processes, this study highlights a neglected area in the study of transitions to democracy. Public administrationS literature focuses on bureaucracies prior to or following transitions to democracy. The role that a civil service might play in democratization is not addressed in the public administration literature. Democratization literature, on the other hand, either briefly menti.ons the role of bureaucracies, or such discussions are embedded in broader classifications of democratization processes. This SA new definition of publ ic adminjstration is introduced in this study to inject a moral component to the construct, necessitated both by the legacy of apartheid and the general lack of such an emphasis in American definitions: is the technology of governance applied with the moral imperative to serve the public interest as expressed through ongoing political processes. This definition emphasizes the practical nature of public administration (it is applied), it clarifies what is applied (the technology--applied science--of governance), why it is applied (to serve the public interest), and how it is (moral imperative and ongoing political processes). 14

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study therefore creates a new focus and contributes to both bodies of literature. In particular, this dissertation examines the role that a country's civil service plays in the transition to and consolidation of democracy in situations of political transplacement. A transplacement occurs when government and opposition are well matched in terms of strength, and as a result, embark on a process of negotiations (Huntington, 1991). In South Africa, the government is negotiating itself out of power, and conversely, the opposition is negotiating itself into power. Thus, South Africa constitutes an excellent case study of these processes. Governments and oppositions, however, are not monolithic groups with defined boundaries, and there is room for elaboration about the degree to which a particular mode of transition is an independent variable that shapes subsequent democracies, or whether it is merely a reflection of the reality of power in the countries concerned (Pinkney, 1994, p. 139). As far as oppositiondominated transitions are concerned, Pinkney (1994, p. 139) notes that unless a regime suffers military

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defeat, internal collapse, or the loss of a powerful foreign backer, it is difficult for the opposition to exercise much leverage against an intransigent government unless it does it by ,proxy through the military, or through a full-blown revolution. But this range of opposition choices does not account for the South African transplacement which has been aptly termed a by Adam and Moodley (1993). Nor, as Pinkney (1994, p. 140) submits, are government-initiated transitions mostly a matter of unpopular rulers running for cover, or seeking the least harmful means of preserving their interests. Rather, as the case of South Africa suggests, authoritarian governments may be able to negotiate from a position of relative strength seeking to maximize their power in the new order. In doing so, they have to "account for not only the opposition, but special interests within their own coalitions and constituencies. This applies to the opposition as well, and both government and opposition have to account for each other's coalitions and constituencies. The bureaucracy is one such constituency. The South African transition to democracy is as

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much a study of the balance of political power as it is a study of negotiation strategies and procedures. The art of conflict resolution and the sophisticated negotiation techniques that have recently been developed in South Africa are skills that can be exported one day (Sparks, October 6, 1993, p; 12). What is more, a successful South African democratization would provide rich lessons for other countries in how to bridge social cleavages, how to foster conciliation, how to design appropriate institutions, and how to counter an array of undemocratic impulses (Horowitz, 1991, p. xiii). Democracy's triumph in South Africa can only serve to stimulate other countries undergoing democratization, particularly those countries which are similarly situated on the African continent. For Adam and Moodley (1993, pp. 12-13) the global relevance of South Africa is that it represents in microcosm the new compromise between the world's North and South, and has the potential to develop into an advanced model for the gradual solution of the North-South cleavage through functional federalism with regional autonomy. Unlike many parts of the world, centripetal forces 17

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in South Africa bind the antagonistic segments into a common state. South Africans cannot divorce each other through partition without destroying the basis of their wealth. Either new forms of cooperative development will emerge, or South Africa like other countries, will divide along racial and ethnic lines. These and other issues will be discussed in greater detail shortly, but before we turn to more substantive matters, it is important to set the scene. BACKGROUND International Setting International law holds that Apartheid is a crime.8 At the same time, a state's attempt to criminalize violence organized. by liberation movements is a breach of the prevailing international norm of self-determination for people in a given territory--as expressed through the United Nations--and makes it impossible for regimes to gain legitimacy for internal solutions which fall BG.A. Res. 3068, 1 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 75, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1974). 18

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short of this norm (Gilomee, 1992). Yet, these international influences working in tandem with each other, ahd against the status quo in South Africa, did not produce a favorable outcome for democracy. That is not to say, however, that international factors did not, and do not, have a substantial impact on South Africa. Huntington (1991) reports that by the late 1980's the Vatican, the European Community, the former Soviet Union, and the United States all helped to bring about the "third wave" of worldwide democratization. wave of democratization is a group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic systems of government that occur within a specified period of time and that substantially outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period of time. The three waves of democratization their associated reverse waves suggest a two-step forward, one step backward pattern. Each reverse wave has elimiriated some but not all of the transitions to democracy of the previous democratization wave. Huntington (1991) therefore concludes that political history is not unidirectional. 19

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The third wave of worldwide democratization began in 1974, and according to Huntington writing in 1991, is sti 11 in progress. A democratization wave includes partial democratization or liberalization in political that do not become fully democratic. What is more, not all transitions to democracy occur during democratization waves. At the peaks of the two previous democratization waves, 45.3 percent and 32.4 percent respectively of the countries in the world were democratic. In 1990 approximately 45.0 percent of the independent countries of the world were democratic. At the troughs of the two reverse waves 19.7 percent and 24.6 percent respectively of the countries in the world had democratic political systems. Huntington (1991) notes that the third wave of democratization was significantly.boosted by U. S. efforts in the form of human rights campaign which placed these values on the world's agenda, President Reagan's endorsement of Project Democracy," and the creation of the National Endowment for Democracy in 1984. The most controversial effort of the United States to promote 20

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democracy in another country was the passage of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act7 (CAAA) of 1986 over President Reagan's veto. The CAAA imposed economic sanctions on South Africa, and sought to advance social, economic, and pol itical change resultinog -in the dismant 1 ing of apartheid and the establishment of a nonracial, democratic political system in South Africa. Although the Act did not explicitly call for a new constitution, the need is implied in its language for "a future political system that would permit all citizens to be full participants in the governance of their country."8 And as far as the South African bureaucracy was concerned, these were not "trickle-down sanctions." The Act prohibited sales of computer equipment to the South African military, police, prison system, and other apartheid-enforcing agencies. Much has been written9 about the pros and cons 7pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1086 (codified amended at 22 U.S.C. 5001-5116 (1988. 822 U.S.C. 5016 (a)(1). 9See Lu1at, Y., G-M. et a1. (1991). 1 1. Boulder, CO.: Westview Press. 21

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of economic sanctions against South Africa both from the initiating country's viewpoint, and in terms of the impact on South Africa. The sanctions issue is now moot, however, given the lifting of most sanctions by sponsoring countries and organizations. The focus has now shifted to investment, redistribution, and reconstruction. Regarding sanctions, Huntington (1991) concludes that American and European san6tions undoubtedly affected the psychology and sense of isolation of South African Whites and provided extra incentives for movement away from apartheid. Sanctions probably affected the speed and nature of that movement, but their effect was second to the impact of economic and social change within South Africa' (p. 98). Sanctions were an overt way for the international to its with apartheid. But other international developments, not directly focused on South Africa, had a more profound effect. Sparks (1990, p. 363) proposes that a major influence on political developments in South Africa can be attributed to Mikhail Gorbachev's revolution. He notes that this was no less a revolution for South Africa than 22

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for East-West relations. -Events halfway around the world had an acute impact on the struggle over apartheid. Moscow's new policy led not only to peace agreements for Angola and Namibia, but changed the geopolitical map of the subcontinent and the strategic outlook from Pretoria. Events in that part of the world did not go unnoticed in the opposition camp either. Joe Slov010 (1990) in 7 states that "we do not pretend that our party's changing postures in the direction of democratic socialism are the results only of our own independent evolution." He goes on to say that this shift "owes a prime, debt" to the process of and initiated by Gorbachev (p. 24). Events in Eastern Europe and the rest of the Second World also affected South Africa's willingness to negotiate and move toward democracy. Under a U.S.-mediated regional peace accord signed in December 1988, Cuba to a_phased troop withdrawal Angola, and in exchange for cessation of South African support for Angolan rebels and Namibian independence, the Angolan 10Joe Slovo, Chairperson, South African Communist Party. 23

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government pledged to dismantle ANC military training camps in its territory. This effectively removed the ANC military camps to more distant Tanzania. Moreover, changes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union deprived the ANC of a significant source of support and bolstered Pretoria's ability to contain the ANC as a military threat. Although international pressure exercised a steady influence, it weighed less than internal forces in bringing about the current transition (Giliomee, 1992). Unfavorable demographic trends and the sorry state of the South African economy were powerful incentives to embark on a different course. Highlights of these trends follow. Economic and Demographic Setting In the past, apartheid was compatible with a relatively poor rural economy; it is now incompatible with a complex, wealthy, urban commercial and industrial economy (Huntington, 1991). Apartheid reform in the 1980s failed in large part because funds were diverted from much needed social programs to security concerns. 24

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Moreover, the government was unable to execute its plans to reduce the political alienation of the Black" urban masses through remedial programs designed to improve their standard of living. Given an annual increase in the workforce of more than 3 percent, estimates indicate that the economy needs to grow at more than 5 percent per annum if there is to be a reduction in the proportion of the workforce unemployed, and at over 6 percent for the total number of unemployed to be reduced (Price, 1991, p. 233). "The stagnating economy of the 1980's produced a situation in which unemployment among Black South Africans, which stood at between 20 and 30 percent in the mid-1980s, could reach 50 percent by the turn of the century" (Price, 1991, p. 233). is synonymous with in this study, and incorporates the ethnic categories of Pedi, Sotho, Tsonga, Tswana, Xhosa, and Zulu. refers to all South Africans of European ancestry" broadly classified into English-speakers (a heterogenous group consisting of Br i t ish descendants, French, German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese, and other groups of immigrants) and Afrikaans-speakers (a fairly homogeneous group of mostly Dutch extraction, also known as refers to EUrafricans consisting of "a complex product of contact among Europeans, Khoi, San, other Africans, and 'Malays' brought by the Dutch from Indonesia" (Horowitz, 1991, p. 24). refers to the descendants of traders and indentured laborers originating from the Indian sub-continent. 25

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Current economic conditions in South Africa are dismal. The South African Department of Finance (September 1993) reports that the South African Economy has been in recession since 1989. The rate of contraction in total real domestic production was 0.5 percent in 1990, 0.4 percent in 1991, and 2.1 percent in 1992. According to Tucker and Scott (1992, pp. 53-55), South Africa also has a highly unequal distribution of income. Economists measure it with the "Gini coefficient. '12 In 1975, South Africa had the most unequal distribution of income of the 57 countries studied by the. World Bank. By 1990, some improvement had taken place and the Gini coefficient stood at approximately 0.60; a coefficient of 0.55 within the Black community, however, suggests that this problem is not only pervasive but excessive even for a Third World country. Although the economy grew fast from the late '50s to the early '70s, there was no wider distribution--no "trickle down" effect for Blacks--confirming their doubts about how the "invisible 12A 0.0 coefficient denotes a perfectly equal income distribution, while 1.0 denotes a perfectly one-sided distribution. 26

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hand" had dealt with them. Demographic change with its attendant effects on the workforce and other economic and political spheres probably weighed heavier than anything else in the recalculation option of the NP government (Giliomee, 1992). This would appear to be the case judging from President de Klerk's comment made at the Aspen Institute's conference in Cape Town, where he said, .our population is expected to grow from 32 million in 1985 to 45 million by the year 2000, less than riine years from now. Urbanization will draw additional millions to our cities. By the turn of the century, the 1985 urban of 16 million will more than double. There will be an increasing drain on our resources both economic and environmentally as we seek to devise policies to combat poverty and provide jobs and services for our people ... (in Clark and McDonald, p. 6) South non-White population is 86 percent of the total--leaving the White population at 14 percent--a small minority even today. It is instructive to note that the NP received just under half the White vote in the 1989 parliamentary elections, meaning that its base in the South African population, as a whole, stood at less than severi percent. At existing annual population growth 27

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rates--2.8 percent for Blacks and 0.8 percent for Whites--92 percent of South Africa's population will be non-White by 2020 (Congressional Research Service, 1992, p. 17). Despite unemployment and poverty among the African population, the South African economy is heavily dependent on the Black labor force, which constitutes two-thirds of the economically active population. At the same time, the power of Black consumers is rising steadily. By the turn of the century, Black personal disposable income is expected to be 57.5 percent of the national total, as opposed to 44.5 percent in 1985, while White disposable income will have fallen from 55.5 percent in 1985 to 42.5 percent for the same time period (Congressional Research Service, 1992, p. 19). Government officials and others have stressed that a political-settlement is needed so that South Africa can obtain the foreign capital essential to its economic growth. Equally important is a restructuring of the economy, which is necessary to effect the government policy of "equity, growth, and stability" (Congressional Research Service, 1992, p. 9). Two alternative 28

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economic development strategies have surfaced in the debate over the future economic development of South Africa. The present South African government and the corporate sector support the strengthening of the free market economy through, inter alia, privatization and deregulation. The ANC, on the other hand, has maintained that economic growth and the reduction of inequalities is only possible on the basis of redistribution of key economic resources and through economic planning in a mixed economy (Harker et a1., 1991, p. 20). Conclusion The rate of economic development is a strong predictor of democracy's potential success in South Africa. "While the successful economic performance of a society does not guarantee democracy, failing economic performance almost certainly guarantees a failure of democracy" (Allison Besche1,' 1992,p. 92). Although economic decline may help to initiate democratization, "paradoxically, a period of decline is the most difficult time in which to attempt a transition as government is under pressure to deliver more than it reasonably can (Tucker and Scott, 1992, p. 27). 29

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CHAPTER 2 FROM APARTHEID TO DEMOCRACY This chapter identifies and applies bodies of theory or explanatory vehicles together with select empirical evidence to provide a contextual framework within which South Africa can be better understood. Theories of social class, theories of social revolution, of and democracy, and theories of social institutions are reviewed in turn in the five major sections below. There is a logical progressionl3 in the way the I3O'Donnell's and Schmitter's three stage process of transitions: (the incumbent government recognizes and confers additional rights to its citizens), (the loser of an election cedes power to the winner with no diminution of citizens' rights and obligations), and (the consolidation of democracy) (in Tucker and Scott, 1992, p. 15) and Huntington's (1991) three stage process of democratization similar to each other in most respects, and both approKimate this '"logical progression. '" The inain point of departure here is that I have sketched some historical background (the policy of Apartheid, particularly econom i c apar the i d) and a .. fork'" (revo 1 ut i on democratization) on the path to democracy. In the South African context, as I suggest in the main text, the branches of this fork are less paradoxical than would probably be the. case in other countries undergoing a transition to democracy. 30

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concepts in this chapter are outlined leading to the three most relevant sets of theories or explanatory vehicles for purposes of this dissertation. is an Afrikaans word which has found its way to English dictionaries. Dictionary definitions, however, do not serve well to describe the various aspects of the official South African government policy codified in law from approximately 1950 to 1991 which sought the separate development of groups of South Africans based on their race, that is to say, whether they were Indian, Colored, Black, or White. Similarly, is a complex construct. The term denotes a system of government that meets three essential conditions: meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and groups (especially political parties) for all effective positions of government power, at regular intervals and excluding the use of force; a highly inclusive level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies, at least through regular and fair elections, such that no major (adult) social group is excluded; and a level of civil and political liberties--freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form and join organizations--sufficient to ensure the integrity of political competition and

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participation ... ,,, (Diamond et a1., 1988, p. As Waldo (1980, p. 84) reminds us, democracy in its purest sense means "rule by the people." In South Africa, several qualifiers of democracy are in vogue: The terms or all refer to the ideal-type of democracy in the Athenian sense. on the other hand, is government based on representation of the people by elected delegates 1983). "The defining characteristic of representative" democracy is not that it rids society of political conflict, but that society is enabled to manage fundamental conflicts in a non-violent, peaceful and democratic way" (Van Zyl Slabbert, 1992, p. 9). Although South Afriqa becoming democratic, final passage into democracy is on, among other things, whether it will continue to engage in and free elections. In other words, must be consolidated before South Africa is pronounced democratic. Consolidation is understood to have occurred when the two-turnover '''Emphases in the or i gina 1 32

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test is satisfied. By this test, a democracy is consolidated if the winning party in the initial election at the time of transition loses a subsequent election and turns over power to the new winners, who must then yield power peacefully to the winners of a later election (Huntington, 1991). Social Class and the Policy of Apartheid: The Stage is Set for Revolution Apartheid has had a long and checkered history in South Africa. In 1983, the South African parliament adopted a new constitution which provided for a tricameral legislature for Whites, Indians, and Coloreds. No chamber was provided for Blacks. The only legal and effective avenue for Black political participation was the Black labor movement. As a result, Black labor unions became increasingly powerful and the Black labor movement in the form of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU'5) achieved unprecedented influence through its eventual partnership with the SACP and the ANC in the so-called tripartite alliance. 15COSATU is currently the largest union federation with an estimated 1.2 million (Cooper, et al., 1993, p. 315). 33

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In 1985, COSATU threatened to take action against the government if it did no abolish the socalled pass laws (the apartheid policy of "influx control"). COSATU also signalled its opposition to the government by declaring its support for foreign disinvestment and international sanctions. In 1992, COSATU launched a program of mass action culminating in a political stayaway on the 3rd and 4th of August of that year costing an estimated R900 million in lost production. Among its demands: elections for a constituent assembly, a democratic constitution, and the permanent removal of value added tax from basic foodstuffs and services (Cooper et a1., 1993, p. 68). In October 1993, COSATU again 'calledfor a general strike this time to protest the draft interim constitution's protection of existing civil servants' positions and pensions, and the employer lockout clauses in. the draft "Bill of Rights." This strike did not materialize, however, in large part because of ANC mediation and assurances that room would be made for affirmative action programs within the civil service. In an address to a COSATU 34

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affi 1 iate in June, 1993, Cyri 1 Ramaphosal8 noted that "in taking up these and other issues, COSATU has correctly identffied the fact that it has to look at the concerns and interests of all working people in South Africa, and not confine itself to a narrow focus on the workplace concerns of its own members" (in Second Quarter, 1993, p. 35). Labor in South Africa serve as a prime example to illustrate the theory of social closure, which is based on concepts of social class. Parkin (1979) has proposed that social closure constitutes the means by which a dominant social class maximizes resources for its own members. The po1iticization of not only because ethnic exclusiveness provides scapegoats and rationalization for hardship, but also because it contributes to individual and group psychological satisfaction when exclusion results in successful competition (Adam & Moodley, 1993, p. 14). The 18Secretary-Genera 1 and Ch ief Negot iator of the ANC. See Wren, C. S. (April 4, 1992). "Polite and Soft-Spoken, He Forges a Revolution." p. A3 (reporting that Mr. Ramaphosa is widely regarded as Mr. Mandela's heir apparent). 35

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exclusion of subordinate classes is justified on the basis of certain social or physical attributes. "'The dominant class in a society can be said to consist of those social groups whose share of resources is attained by exclusionary means; whereas the subordinate class consists of social groups whose strategy is one of usurpation, notwithstanding the occasional resort to exclusion as a supplementary strategy"'IT (Parkin, 1979, p. 93). Whether or not the exclusion of one group by another becomes the primary rather than secondary political objective is partly dependent on the relative size of the competing groups. In most countries, the dominant class is numerically greater than the subordinated class. In South Africa, things are not that simple. Blacks in South Africa are by far the largest segment of the total workforce, sufficient in numbers to contribute to the national wealth and to support an exploitative White workforce as well as a White bourgeoisie. Under these conditions, it is logical for White workers to align themselves with 'TEmphases in the or i gina 1

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their own bourgeoisie rather than to find common ground with the Black proletariat so as to share in the spoils of social closure. Halis; et al. (1991) report that the Afrikaner working class could have become part of a labor movement if it had not been for the success of the Afrikaner elites in mobilizing these workers in support of Afrikaner nationalist objectives. These elites were able to organize the around an ideology of Afrikaner unity rather than class solidarity. Otherwise, an alliance with fellow workers may have led to a threatening working class solidarity. "White workers who clashed with the state in the 1920s had by 1948 been incorporated into what may be referred to as a White welfare state" (in Goldstone, 1991, p. 294). "Closure on racial grounds thus plays a directly equivalent role to closure on the basis of property and credentials" (Parkin, 1979, p. 94). In the South African context, the aptitheosis of this reasoning holds that race class. The fundamental cleavages in South African society do not concern issues of race, but social 18Afrikaans for "people."

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equity. Rather than ethnicity, it is class that matters most to Blacks and Whites. In an index of twenty-four contentious policy issues, the greatest discrepancies between the racial groups occurred in affirmative action with regard to job replacement in the civil service, land redistribution, and higher taxation to support the poor (Adam and Moodley, 1993, p. 221). Schlemmer (in Friedman, 1993, p. 192) concurs with this view in noting that South Africa's divide is not about people's identities, but how much power and what share of wealth competing groups are to have in a common system and economy. An emphasis on social class does not mean that race, ethnicity, and tribalism are not" significant social factors in South Africa, "rather, these issues are less important than questions of social equity. The reason for this is that social class cuts across the parameters of race, ethnicity, and tribalism. A narrow focus on tribalism, for example, would exclude the White component of the South African power equation, when in reality, Whites have been the dominant force in the government and economy of the country, When there is a more equitable 38

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distribution of wealth in South Africa, the other divisive aspects of that society will probably gain in significance relative to factors of social class. The danger then will be another cycle of inter-group conflict characterized by a renewed emphasis on the differences rather than the commonalities among the various population groups of South Africa. Clearly, South Africa is a deeply divided society whether the metric is race, ethnicity. tribalism, or class. South Africa is also divided by ideology and language, as well as by other social factors capable of producing revolutionary conditions. Social Revolution then Democracy? A social revolution is "the forcible overthrow of a government followed by the reconsolidation of authority by new ruling through new pol itical (and sometimes social) institutions" (Goldstone, 1991, p. 37). In South Africa, several nuanced meanings are applied to the concept of revolution. In his formulation of a process model of modern revolutions, Goldstone (1991) identifies three conditions whose conjunction can lead to state 39

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breakdown. These are: state fiscal distress; elite alienation and conflict; and a high potential for mobilization of the populace. To begin with, fiscal distress becomes critical only when it is accompanied by severe elite alienation. Secondly, elite alienation must be of the type that gives rise to a set of attitudes in opposition to the government yet with deep internal cleavages over the degree to which existing institutions need to be buttressed, modestly reformed, or radically renovated. Sources of division within the elite group may be based on race, ethnicity, religion, social mobility, or differences in regional and local loyalties. Finally, urban or rural groups must have the capacity to mobilize against counterrevolutionaries and the state. In addition to organizational capacities, there must be popular support for change, a willingness to enlist in revolutionary militia, and a willingness to act through demonstrations and riots. Halisi et al. (1991) use Goldstone's threepoint framework to analyze the present revolutionary conditions in South Africa. The following discussion summarizes, and offers support or 40

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clarification to their argument. state Fiscal Distress Beginning with the revenue side, and keeping in mind that South Africa is a developing middle-income it is'apparent upon inspection of Table 2.1 below that the South African government's current capacity to generate additional receipts is limited. The sources of South African government revenue compared to those of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries'9 are highly circumscribed, particularly in regard to increasing the share of personal income tax, company income tax, and sales tax (Loots in MO$s & Obery, 1992) On the expenditure side, in general terms, the fiscal crisis in South Africa has been conditioned by the costs of maintaining apartheid, the requirements of economic and industrial development, the opportunity costs of the Angolan war and the 19Sweden, United States, United Kingdom, Japan, Greece, Italy, Spain, Germany, and Turkey. 41

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"total strategy,"20 and up until recently, the costs associated with the administration of South West Africa (now, independent Namibia). Table 2.1 Shares of Various Sources of Government Revenue 1988 1989-90 % of Revenue % of Revenue Individuals 27.0 29 Companies 15.7 7 Gold Mines 1.5 Other Mines 1.9 Other 0.6 Direct Taxes 46.7 36 Customs & Excise 12.5 10 Sales Tax 23.5 18 Local & Other 14.1 4 Indirect Taxes 50.1 30 Social Security 24 Miscellaneous 3.1 10 Source: Loots, L. J., 1992, p. 466. "Government attempts to pass on these costs through increased rents, taxes, and transportation rates have led to the growth of a variety of popular Black protests, which indicates that a fiscal problem is not only a cause but often an outcome of 2The ideological position of the P. W. Botha regime, 1979-89 to counteract the "total onslaught." 42

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revolutionary mobilization" (Halisi et al., 1991, p. 293) Elite Alienation and Conflict Elite cleavages in South Africa appear to take on ,every possible permutation of race and ethnicity that is available. Halisi et a1. (1991), however, primarily stress the differences between White English-speaking elites and their Afrikaans-speaking counterparts. The current South African situation, however, is far more complicated than these authors acknowledge. Modern intra-Afrikaner elite cleavages, for example, led to the of the Conservative Party (CP) in 1982 out of the faction of the National Party (NP). More recently, the Congressional Research Service (1992) reports that in 1991 the South African government was found to have financed some of Inkatha's22 activities, and the Goldstone Commission has heard numerous allegations of government involvement in 21Afrikaans for "narrow-minded." 22The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)is largely Zulu supported, its leader is Chief Mangosuttiu G. Buthelezi. 43

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assassinations of anti-apartheid activists. Furthermore, there are an unknown number of radical right-wing supporters in the police and armed forces who could support the political right against the government. In early 1992 there were rumors of a possible coup against the government, and reports that high-level military officers did not support the government's negotiations with Black leaders. (p. 7) Louw (November 26 to December 2, 1993) reports that there was dissent recently within the NP caucus the interim constitution. Open criticism was being levelled at President de Klerk and his negotiating team by unhappy Members of Parliament (MP) and Dr. Frik van Heerden, chairman of the National party constitutional development study group, remarked that "we have not finished fighting yet, no-one will convince me that this is a federal constitution" (in p. 2). There are also many intra-Black elite cleavages with implications of their own. IFP for example, are considering fighting the April '94 elections without Mangosuthu Buthelezi who is described as being unable to participate in a process he has so vehemently opposed (Chothia, ly 7 November 26 to December 2, 1993). In a bizarre twist illustrative of the 44

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complexities of modern South Africa, the Freedom Alliance (FA) has hatched an "election plot" to undermine the new government from within. Breier (November 21, 1993) reports that FA strategists are planning to get one of their leaders elected Deputy President under the interim constitution, which mandates the President to consult his deputy, so enabling the FA to obtain government strategy in advance as a means of countering it pp. 1, 2, 3). These are obviously inauspicious signs for a stable South Africa. Mobilization of the Populace Swilling and Rantete (1991, p. 202) report that during 1984, a country-wide popular insurrection broke out that lasted until the middle of 1986 when a national state of emergency was declared. Arising out of violent confrontations between local communities and security forces, this 23A grouping of Black and White pol itical organizations on the right of the political spectrum wh ich consists of the Inkatha Freedom Party, the Conservative Party, the Afrikaner-Volksfront, and the KwaZulu, Bophuthatswana and Ciskei governments.

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insurrectionary period served as a watershed for the mass democratic movement for at least three reasons. First, political organizations realized the potential for revolutionary change through the formation of "embryonic organs of people's power which complemented the ANC's "people's war strategy."2& Second, the way was paved for the re-emergence of the ANC as an openly supported political force. Finally, the Black labor movement and COSATU were mobilized and were uniquely situated to combat the South African regime due to their legal status in the state's industrial relations structures. In February 1989, a nation-wide prisoner's hunger strike motivated the government to release a large number of detainees. The state also softened its stand on popular protest, and beginning in September 1989, there were euphoric country-wide marches which signalled the undeniable mobilization of the populace (Swilling & Rantete, 1991, p. 203). 2&The ANC's revolutionary strategy based on the "four pi llars of: armed struggle, (2) mass resistance, (3) the underground organization of ANC cells, and (4) international isolation of the South African regime (Swilling & Rantete, 1991, p. 199). 46

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Halisi et a1. (1991) note that the South African government has been relatively successful in accommodating most Black workplace demands, but it has failed to meet the demands of Black political elites. The only outlet for unmet demands was for the populace to engage in boycotts, protests, mass actions, and strikes. Black mobilization became widespread mostly because of participation by youths and disaffected intellectuals. "Pivotal to this process of black mobilization has been the expansion and diversification of the Black working class and the creation of a Black leadership based in the trade union movement" (in Goldstone, 1991, p. 295). In their assessment 'of the revolutionary situation in South Africa, Halisi et a1. (1991) conclude that "only major reforms will undercut revolutionary conditions, and any government will have to embark on an aggressive policy of social programs and economic reform" (in Goldstone, p. 296). Implicit in this summary is the acknowledgement that political stability is not automatically attained with a change of government, and if the qualifier government is added, then a more accurate picture emerges of the 47

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considerable challenges that lie ahead for a stable and democratic South Africa. Conclusion The above discussion has focused on the prospects for revolution in South Africa arising out of the actions of the Black majority, and in particular, those on the left the political spectrum. Although the right wing in South Africa is largely White and hence incapable of a large scale mobilization of the populace, it nevertheless possesses a number of revolutionary capabilities. In a candid assessment of this potential, Nel.son Mandela noted recently that the right wing had a substantial following in the army, the police force, and the civil service and was therefore well situated to inflict more damage the country than the ANC's own military wing, Umkhonto we (MK), could when the ANC was still banned (Nyatsumba in November 24, 1993, p. 5) The significance of revolutionary violence according to Huntington (1981) is that it does not have to be overtly successful to be effective. "It simply has to create sufficient trouble to cause divisions 48

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among the dominant group over ways to deal with it" (in Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989a, p. 173). The idea of revolution has persisted in South Africa because of revisionist thinking and the many facets attributed to the concept. Tucker and Scott (1992), for example, suggest that South Africa is in the process of a while Adam and Moodley (1993) speak of a Considerably more important, however, are the views of the resistance movement itself. In an Alliance discussion paper titled "Strategic Objectives of the National Liberation Struggle," the outlined position of the ANC and its allies prior to 1990 was that they were engaged in a National Democratic Revolution (NOR), the object of which was the emancipation of the Black people in general and in particular. This revolution would inaugurate a system of pe6ple's' power. The revolution would be under the overall of the class. It would entail national liberation from Colonialism of a Special Type.25 It 2S0efined as a form of colonialism where the colonial community occupies the same territory as the co 1 on i zed peop 1 e" (van 0 i epen, 1988, p. 4) In attempting to link the ills of colonialism to present day South Africa, the opposition is dismissive of Sbuth Africa's status as an independeht country. South Africa is unique in this sense because its 49

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would involve fundamental political, social, and economic change, transferring power in all sectors into the hands of the people. Second Quarter, 1993, p. 4) The paper goes on to describe the current situation as being a state-centered NOR characterized by an electora1ist or constitutionalist approach which allows for the revolution to be more or less completed with the winning of a non-racial election. A new and final stage is also envisaged as a of popular self-empowerment." The rationale is that "without mass involvement and mass a future democratically-elected state will be relatively weak and isolated in present global arid national balance of forces. Without a mass movement for national ther$ will be very little effective reconstruction;" This approach, according to the Alliance paper, highlights the importance of participatory democracy Second Quarter, 1993, pp. 4-transition to democracy is self-imposed, unlike the history of political development elsewhere on the African continent. 28My emphas is. 50

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6) The point is that even from a revolutionary perspective, democracy in not only possible, but the stated objective of major players. In revisiting core precepts, the resistance movement seems to be engaged in a process of healthy learning. On the face of it, the emphases and terminology might differ according to the chosen paradigm, but at a minimum, the broad and common goal of both the South African government and its opposition is democracy. The question that arises is whether the fundamental conflict is over means, or substantive outcomes? It is suggested later that it is both. Democratization then Dem6cracy? Modes of Democratization Democratization, according to Huntington (1991), consists 6feffecting the end of a nondemocratic regime, the installation of a democratic and the consolidation of the latter. The following discussion paraphrases Huntington (1991) who identifies three transition processes leading to democracy: Replacements, Transformations, and Transplacements.Rep1acements

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result when reformers within an authoritarian regime are weak or nonexistent. The dominant elements in government are conservatives staunchly opposed to regime change. Democratization is driven by the gaining strength and the government 10sing strength until the government collapses or is overthrown. Replacements are characterized by the struggle to produce the fall, the fall, and the struggle after the fall. In transformations those in power in an authoritarian regime play the decisive role in ending that regime and it into a democratic system. The distinction between transformations and transplacements is vague. In the early 1980s, for example, P. W. Botha appeared to be "initiating a process of transformation in the South African political system but he stopped of democratizing it. Facing a different political environment, his successor, F .W. de Klerk, shifted to a transplacement process of negotiation with the ANC. A transplacement is the result of the combined actions of government and opposition when the dominant groups in both government and opposition 52

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recognize that they are incapable of unilaterally determining the future political system of their countries. "Government and opposition leaders often developed these views after testing each other's strength and resolve in a political dialectic" (Huntington,1991, p. 152). This dialectic, according to Huntington (1991, pp. 152-53) occurs in four steps. First, the government liberalizes and suffers a loss of power and authority. Second, the opposition capitalizes on these developments in the hope and expectation that it will be able to bring down the government in the not too distant future. Third, the government reacts forcefully to contain and suppress the mobilization of political power against it. Fourth, government and opposition leaders perceive a stalemate and begin to explore the possibilities of a negotiated transition. In the South African situation, the first step of the political dialectic began in 1979 with P. W. Botha's liberalization policies which culminated in the establishment of the tricameral parliament in 1983. The key political developments that followed were outlined in the previous sections of this 53

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chapter, they correspond to the present discussion's second and third steps. According to Van Zyl Slabbert (1991), Botha's legacy to de Klerk was a "situation of deadlock in which maintaining an inconclusive cycle of repression, reform, revolt, and repression was one option, or breaking out of it the other. De Klerk chose to break out of it" (in Lee and Schlemmer, 1991, p. This, the fourth step, culminated in formal negotiating forums,27 supplemented by "shuttle negotiations"28 between various parties on a need to negotiate basis. All of these contacts and negotiating forums moved the antagonists toward a settlement, but it was the Multi-Party Negotiations Process which produced the most significant results. This forum was structured at several levels. The Plenary session constituted the highest level where agreements were formally presented, and subsequently approved by the leaders of the various parties. 27CODESA 1, CODESA 2, CODESA 3, and the Mu 1 t iParty Negotiations Process. "These were variously known as bilaterals, trilaterals, multi-laterals, or bosberaads--Afrikaans for "bush council." 54

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Daily negotiations were carried out by designated party representatives and managed by a rotating chairperson. Agreements were adopted if there was sufficient consensus in the negotiating chamber. These sessions were supported by various technical committees which formed the bottom, yet an indispensable layer of the Multi-Party Negotiations Process. Another critical component to the success of this forum was a management committee which set the daily agenda, reproduced documents, and performed other administrative tasks. The final stage of the negotiating process'fell into the hands of the South African Parliament which promulgated agreements into law. A transplacement became probable in South Africa because the following sets of conditions ,developed.29 First, the government concluded that the medium term costs of rule would be too high, and that the external and internal political environment was favorable to defend its core interests. Second, the opposition concluded that they would not be able first two pOints are variants of Friedman's discuss i on in Lee and Sch 1 emmer (1991, p. 176). The third point is my own. 55

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to overthrow the incumbent regime in the near future, and that it was possible to achieve a negotiated settlement which secured an order qualitatively different from the days of unbridled apartheid. Third, both government and opposition leaders concluded that sufficient time and prerequisite conditions would be available in the short to medium term to implement negotiated agreements. The discussion up to this point has regarded the main protagonists and opposition) as beiMg more or less monolith'ic.30 In any given society, however, there are other groups that have a stake in democracy:and which may be involved in democratization processes. According to Pinkney (1994, p. 131) the various groups involved in democratization may be classified into_four different poles: government elite, elite, opposition elite, and opposition masses. The cabinet, military junta, ora personal ruler occupy 30Huntington (1991, p. 122) draws a distinction among reformers, derriocratizers, liberals, "standpatters," radical ,extremists, and democratic moderates, but these are categor i zed by government (the first four) and opposition (the last two) camps and are therefore unsuitable for present purposes. 56

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the government elite pole, while the diametrically opposite pole of opposition masses is occupied by anti-government guerrillas and their sympathizers. At the non-government elite pole many indigenous and foreign businesses, including foreign governments, wi.1Jnormally support the authoritarian government, unless it is anti-capitalist. At the opposition elite pole will be found opposition party leaders, and some students and members of the Between the government elite and non-government elite dimension Will be groups which have been created or adapted to sustain the government, but which are not actually a part of the government, such as the security forces, the ruling party, and the state bureaucracy. According to O'Donnell arid Schmitter (in Karl, 1990, pp. 5-6), democratization may be understood to be comprised of analytically distinct, if empirically overlapping, stages of A variety of actors with different resources, followings, preferences, calculations, and time horizons come to the fore during successive stages. Elite factions and social movements play the key role in effecting the demise of authoritarian rule; 57

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political parties drive the transition itself; and trade unions, business associations, and state agencies become the principal determinants of the type of democracy that is eventually consolidated. Karl (1990) advances the discussion further by proposing a contextually-bound and path-dependent approach to the study of democratization. To this end, she differentiates cases in which democracies are the outcome of a strategy based predominantly on overt force from those in which democracies originate from compromise. Karl (1990) places these on one dimension. A second dimension consists of transitions in which incumbent ruling groups, weakened or not, are still dominant relative to mass actors and transitions in which mass actors have gained the upper hand, even temporarily, in relation to dominant elites. The cross-tabulation of these dimensions produces four ideal types of democratic transition: reform, revolution, and pact. These are depicted in Figure 2.1 (the arrows are mine). But these permutations do not account for South Africa's transition to democracy. The empirical evidence from South Africa suggests that what began 58

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as a mass ascendant transition which forced the government to invoke the coercive powers of the state in retaliation (revolution cell) turned into an elite ascendant transition with the release of Nelson Mandela from prison and the ensuing compromises reached between the government and the ANC, culminating in the drafting and adoption of the interim constitution of South Africa (pact cell). F;gure 2.1 Modes of Trans;t;on to Democracy Strateg;es of Trans;t;on COMPROMISE .. c--2 --... FORCE ELITE ASCENDANT PACT IMPOSITION Relat;ve Actor 3 Strength 1 1 MASS ASCENDANT REFORM REVOLUTION Source: Adapted from Karl, 1990, p. 9. This 'path" is depicted by arrow one in Figure 2.1. In other words, Karl does not account for any mid-stream changes in brought about by shifting balances of power. In Chapter 7 I 59

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propose a temporal balance of power theory of transitions to compensate for this shortcoming. The other possible permutations suggested by arrows two and three in Figure 2.1 will have to be confirmed (or refuted) by future case studies of democratization. The interim constitution of South Africa (Act No. 200 of 1993) represents the ultimate form of an elite negotiated pact. South African voters did not participate in the debates; directly, through popularly elected representatives, or by means of a referendum. What is more, in arriving at this settlement negotiators had to accommodate, among other things, a variety of interest groups. The bureaucracy was one such interest group. It is at this juncture that this dissertation seeks to make a contribution to the literature on democratization and public administration. The literature on transitions usually embeds the role of bureaucracies in democratization within other configurations. This dissertation argues that an incumbent bureaucracy in acting as a substantial interest group constitutes one key element to be taken into account in the process of negotiating 60

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elite pacts. Bureaucracies may therefore be said to playa much more prominent role in transitions to democracy than that attributed to them in the literature. The next to last section in this chapter presents some of the possible explanations as to why bureaucracies may act as powerful interest groups, and Chapter 6 identifies personal interest as an additional driving force. In other words, the dynamics of transition, particularly those of transplacement, call for a fuller explanation than the present democratization literature provides. Conclusion In general, the reality of the South African power equation is that each side can prevent the other from exercising control. Therefore, neither side can govern alone peacefully without taking the vital interests of its antagonists seriously. The alternative is protracted violence without victory, which only the most rigid ideologues prefer over accommodation (Adam and Moodley, 1993, p. 158). The relationship between revolution, civil war, and violence on the one hand, and sustainable 61

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democratization on the other, are not discrete options. Aspects of each can be contradictory or mutually reinforcing, the evolution of which will in large part determine the success or failure of South Africa's democratic experiment. Modes of Democracy: Setting the Stage for Good Government According to Horowitz (1991), the principal obstacle to democracy in Africa is internal hegemony. He notes that "despite the prevalence of authoritarian tendencies within new regimes and despite the African single-party hegemony from the inside is the least systematically treated issue of the transition to democracy" (p. 249). For democratic forces to prevail, must be created to prevent vulnerable social forces from capitulating to a authoritarian regime. To help participants commit to a new democratic system, Horowitz (1991, pp. 249-50) recommends four ideal-type models: deterrence, habituation, reciprocity, and belief. 62

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Deterrence Model This a formulation which calls for political power to be located in several places. The rationale here is to discourage participants to use their share of power contrary to their prior commitments. In cost-benefit terms, a regime in power may permit democracy because defeating the opposition may be judged to be unlikely or too costly to justify the attempt. To ensure compliance by all players, one strategy might be to make any attempt at undermining democratic norms unmistakably apparent. Habituation Model This model supposes that if democratic institutions survive long enough and function well, democratic habits will have taken hold that make retrogression less likely and, should it occur, less legitimate and more aberrational than it would otherwise seem. Reciprocity Model. This formulation offers a variety of tangible rewards for cooperation and commits players to 63

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democracy through pacts and other forms of corporatism. But if these pacts are not inclusive of the public--the demos--then they might be considered to be more undemocratic than Horowitz (1991) acknowledges. Be 1 i e f mode 1 The belief through learning model is premised on the possibility that not all actors believe in democracy. They need to learn that the consequence of a failure of democracy in a divided society is protracted conflict. Learning as a strategy should therefore focus on the advantages of cooperation and the risk of trying to secure hegemony. In contrast to habituation, which also involves learning, the changes in belief in this formulation occur at the beginning of a new democratic regime. These four models may be used in various permutations to increase the likelihood that a democratic ethos will develop in South Afr.ica. "The key to building democracy is incrementalism. Democracy comes in parts. No country gets it all 64

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and no country has it all."31 Horowitz (1991) concludes that in spite of the overlap among the models ... none of these models--not even all of them together--can provide a sure path or even a probable path to democracy in South Africa" (p. 251). Matters are complicated further because a hallmark of democracy is that it is context and self defined, that is, by democratizers themselves in their own particular circumstances. If there is one proposition that wins wide approval among theorists of democracy, it is that democracy is no single form of government but an "array of possibilities" (Horowitz, 1991, p. 244). The heavy emphasis placed on redistribution in South Africa is a relatively uncommon yardstick of democracy, but probably the main test for a fledgling democratic order. Redistribution concerns deliberate attempts to reduce inequality, or to improve the absolute position of poor people, or both; as well as 31Larry Diamond's comment in a seminar hosted by the Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa (IDASA) and the United States Information Service. Diamond also remarked that the transition to democracy in South Africa is "easily the most complex transition in the world" (as quoted by Valentine, 1993,p. 16). 65

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economic strategies that produce these outcomes (Moll, T., 1991, p. 1). Larry Diamond notes that a measure of socio-economic redistribution would buy some time and space to build a culture of political tolerance (in Valentine, 1993, p. 16). Accordingly, a successful transition is probably best delineated as a "stable democracy, based on a stable social fabric with rising incomes which are reasonably distributed"' (Tucker and Scott, 1992, p. 1). Yet the democratic lies in the prospect that an authoritarian order with a semblance of popular participation is iike1y to perform better economically and to attract foreign investment at lower labor costs than a genuine institutionalization of the popular will. South Africa's new elites will face their real test when they are unable to satisfy heightened expectations. Do they cancel agreements and join the disaffected masses in renewed struggle? Do they join former adversaries in a new wave of repression in the name of law and order, and economic growth? Or do they educate their followers in the political art of the feasible? (Adam & Moodley, 1993, p.218). 66

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Good Government and Social Institutions: Institutionalizing Democracy An institution is a set of rules that fashions social interactions in particular ways provided knowledge of these rules is shared by the members of the relevant community or society (Knight, "1992). An institution is also a role-oriented organization. The first type of institution is diffused among a multitude of people, the second resides in deliberately constructed human groupings. What they both have in common is stability and persistence (Goldsmith, November/December, 1992). No distinction is made between these two meanings in this dissertation. One of the most pernicious legacies of apartheid is that it tainted the legitimacy of all other institutions. This effectively undermined institutions ranging from the security forces to the educational system, and contributed to the social disintegration that gripped South Africa in the '80s. Consequently, old institutions need to be radically reformed, or new institutions created to replace discredited or undemocratic ones. Knight (1992) provides solid background in this area. 67

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Knight's (1992) theory of institutional change is based on the premise that "social actors produce social institutions in the process-of seeking distributional advantage in the conflict over substantive benefits" (p. 126). The parameters of this conflict are determined by the contestants' relative abilities "to force others to act in ways contrary to their unconstrained preferences" (pp. 126-27). In this formulation, institutional development and change may be viewed as an ongoing bargaining game among the members of particular groups. Strategic actors accept social institutions not because they have agreed to them, but simply because they repre$ent the best option-available to them. What is more, political _representatives or administrative officials have their own interests which have to be taken into account in the bargaining over formal institutions. Whether these interests are political power or material gain, they enter the bargaining equation in two forms: "direct interest in the benefits accruing to those actors who serve as external enforcers and the indirect interest in the effects of the distributional 68

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consequences of formal institutions on the long-term interests of the state" (Knight, 1992, p. 190). Direct interests arise out of administrative tasks. These are the direct benefits to external enforcers derived from the administrative costs imposed on others for external enforcement. Indirect interests arise out of state actors wanting to establish rights that further their own interests: an economic interest in revenues and a political interest in maintaining a level of aggregate growth sufficient to satisfy those social actors necessary to maintain power" (Knight, 1992, In support of this premise, a recent edi.torial noted that the resistance movement knew that the Nationalist regime--that network of mutually supporting politicians, civil servants, bantustan satraps, para-statal administrators, and well-connected businessmen--would always put its privileges above freedom, and its own narrow interest above democracy, So [they] offered [the government] the outlines of a deal: five more years at the trough, with job security, and pensions, and a guaranteed place for the Afrikaans language. (December 5, 1993, p. 20) The agreements made by key political actors and interest groups during a regime transition establish

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new rules, roles, and behavior patterns which mayor may not represent an important break the past. These, in turn, become the institutions shaping the prospects for regime consolidation in the future. Accords among political parties, the security forces, and the bureaucracy establish the initial parameters of civilian and military spheres. Consequently, what at the time may appear to be transitional arrangements often become enduring barriers to change, barriers that can scar a new regime with a permanent "birth defect" (Karl, 1990, p. 8). To increase democratic commitment the substance of the actual rules that are adopted to govern a divided society is extremely important. Moreover, the process by which agreement is reached has a latent function for the institutions that emerge from it because participants are more likely to commit to arrangements they shape (Horowitz, 1991, p. 279). It is for this reason that the ultimate absence of the Freedom Alliance and the nonparticipation of other parties, such as the Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO) in the Multi-Party 70

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Negotiations Process,32 are potentially troublesome developments for a democratic and stable South Africa. Conc'l us i on This chapter outlined relevant bodies of theory or vehicles of analysis that have explanatory power in relation to social, pol itical., and organizational phenomena in South Africa. It also called attention to the need to concentrate on theories of democratization, democracy, and institutions. Although these were as entities in a logical progression, it is equally important to identify themes that unite them and make them generalizable. The concluding chapter of this dissertation is such an attempt. 32The following are the twenty-one parties which stayed the course: African National Congress, Afrikaner-Volksunie, Cape Traditional Leaders, Democratic Party, Dikwankwetla Party of S.A., Intando Yesizwe Party, Inyandza National Movement, Labour Party of S.A., Natal Indian Congress an Transvaal Indian Congress, National Party, National People's Party, Orange Free State Traditional Leaders, Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, Solidarity Party, South African Communist Party, South African Government, Transkei Government, Transvaal Traditional Leaders, United People's Front, Venda Government, Ximoko Progressive Party. 71

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CHAPTER 3 THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF SOUTH AFRICA: CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES AND TRANSITIONAL STRUCTURES This chapter reviews select constitutional issues and outlines the fundamental structure of the transitional political system of South Africa. The discussior. of the structure of South African governance is based on the text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993 (Act No. 200 of 1993)--the interim constitution--and Volume IV of the document pack for the meeting of the plenary of the Multi-Party Negotiations Process held on November 17, 1993 at Kempton Park, South Africa. Transition implies What this means for South Africa is passage from White domination to a multi-racial, multi-party democracy which must then be consolidated. There is also a temporal dimension to and For purposes of this study, the transition is .the period beginning with the South African government's initiatives of 1990 and extending to 1999 when the Government of National Unity (GNU) is expected to be replaced. 72

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The time frame of consolidation cannot be precisely delineated because it is dependent on the scheduling of elections according to the two-turnover test. Almost no discussion on South Africa can proceed without due attention to the question of race. It colors everything. Concepts of race, nation, and class have been central to activist's interpretations and responses to apartheid oppress ion. "An oppos it ion tende"ncy' s def ; nit ions of and priority among these concepts are indicative of its ideology, for each of these concepts implies a potential constituency, long-term goals, and a repertoire of preferred strategy" (Marx, 1991, p. 313). Similarly, on the White side of the equation, and particularly in reference to Afrikaners, questions of race and culture are almost equated with survival itseif. Consider a 1989 document suggestively titled is the Afr i kaans word for "brotherhood. In practice, itis an elite Afrikaner organization, which according to Wilkins and Strydom wr it i ng in 1978, .. is the Government," and .. the South Af r i can Government today is the Broederbond." See Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball. 73

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The document argues that good government was one which governed in the interest of all its subjects, and while language and cultural rights were prerequisites for Afrikaner survival, they had to be promoted in such a way that they were supported across color lines (in Giliomee, 1992). Horowitz (1991) suggests that South African racial and ethnic cleavages are similar to those that in some countries translated into serious postindependence conflict and violence. In his words, "to ignore them in planning for a future South Africa would be to repeat the same fallacy of assuming in the 1950sand 1960s that an inclusive nationalism would be the universal solvent of differences in post-colonial Africa, a fallacy for which many people paid dearly" {po 85). With this background in mind, let some of the current constitutional issues in South Africa. 74

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Constitutional Issues There is a need to create a new order in which all South Africans will be entitled to a common South African citizenship in a sovereign and democratic constitutional state in which there is equality between men and women and people of all races so that all citizens shall be able to enjoy and exercise their fundamental rights and freedoms. Preamble, Republic of South Africa Constitution Act, 1993. Across place and time, this is the enduring problem: To secure the public good and private rights in the face of an organized majority, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government.As if this problem did not pose sufficient challenges, in South Africa majority rule is equated with Slack rule and hen6e with the politics of race. According to Horowitz (1991), the unsatisfactory quality of understanding the .nature of majority rule in South Africa can be illustrated by applying the same thinking in the United States. The United States is clearly governed by principles of majority rule, but to declare that the United States ought to be subject to "White rule" because Whites are more plentiful, would be totally No. 10 (James Madison). 75

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unacceptable. He concludes that "if majority rule means Black majority rule and White minority exclusion, something has gone wrong" (p. 94). In his Opening of Parliament speech on February 2, 1990 President de Klerk said that one of the overall aims to which every reasonable South African should aspire is "the protection of minorities." At the Aspen Institute's conference in Cape Town in April 1991, de K1erk specifically referred to the Madisonian dilemma and concluded that one goal of democracy should entail "equitable guarantees against the misuse of majority power to the detriment of minorities' (in Clark and McDonald, 1991, pp. 5-6). Reflecting recent developments, the 7 7 asks: "What can the ANC do to overcome the undoubted fears and apprehensions among Whites in particular, and minorities in general?" (p. 14). The article goes on to suggest that the fears of other minorities, including the Coloreds, Indians, and the various elements of the Freedom Alliance have not been addressed. But if parochial interests are not to overwhelm catholic interests, what grouping constitutes a minority has to be clearly defined. Moreover, unless every minority 76

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interest can be satisfied, interests should be ranked according to relative merit and whether they form part of the core values of the group in question. The point to be made is perhaps better posed as two questions: Does the South African civil service constitute a legitimate minority? And if it does, which of its interests should be accommodated in a new political dispensation? The interim constitution, for example, provides that "the retirement age applicable to a public servant by law as at 1 October 1993, shall not be changed without his or her consent"35 Further, incumbent civil servants have constitutional protection of their pensions. To get this constitutional guarantee, however, the government had to a deal with the ANC whereby MK veterans and their dependents would also get state pensions based on the proposition that they made "sacrifices or served the public interest in the establishment of a democratic constitutional order" (Lautenbach & Brand, November 35Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, No. 200, 212(7)(b) (S. Afr. 1993), hereinafter "interim constitution." 77

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,9, 1993, p. 1). Lautenbach and Brand (November 9, 1993) note that the deal "will cost taxpayers billions of rands if the government makes good the actuarial losses incurred in accommodating thousands of non-public servants in the State pension fund" (in p. 1). Government negotiators also ensured that "every member of the public service shall be entitled to a fair pension"38 as a 7 This effectively means that this is not merely an interim arrangement, but one which binds37 the future Constitutional Assembly, which is to draw the final constitution, to include such a provision as an entrenched right. The issue of minority protection in relation to the whims of the majority, in different words, is the problem of proper weighting of parochial concerns in relation to the public interest. By any democratic standard, the Constitution, Constitutional Principle See Appendix 0 for the complete list of Constitutional Principles. 37InterimConstitution, 71(1)(a) stipulates that a new constitutional text shall comply with the Constitutional Principles contained in Schedule 4;" and be passed by the Constitutional Assembly in accordance with Chapter 5 of the interim constitution.

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South African civil service does not constitute a legitimate minority, but rather, a special interest group capable of expounding and defending its parochial objectives. The ANC's declares that "no government can justly clatm authority unless it is based on the will of all the people," and the preamble to the interim constitution refers to "all South Africans." South Africans, however, are not a monolithic group, and concepts such as majority rule have to be better defined as part and parcel of what constitutes "the spirit and the form of popular government." Horowitz (1991, pp. 97...,98) suggests that there are two kinds of majority rule. The first is ascriptive majority rule found in polarized societies. like South Africa where there few uncommitted voters, and a second type of majority rule found in stable democracies where marginal voters choose among competing parties and where the outcome is not predetermined by demography. "The problem of the future is neither majority rule nor majoritarianism, both of which are essential to democracy, but ascriptive majority rule, which kills democracy by turning elections into censuses and 79

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locking minorities out" (Horowitz, 1991, p. 98). Robert Schire (December 17, 1993) suggests that the best guarantee for Whites, and minorities in general, will materialize if polarized parties break out of the ethnic straitjacket. But, in the final analysis, any group that wants its place guaranteed has to have electoral clout (in the p. 15). Horowitz (1991, p. 99) comes to the same conclusion, but proposes that the essence of the problem is to organize an electoral system which does not do violence to aspirations of representation in advance. "The the focus is on generalized rights rather than sub-rights, and the sooner the questfon of minorities is depoliticized, the better it will be for everyone (Schire in the December 17, 1993, p. 15). Put succinctly, a sense of community is a prerequisite for majority rule (Spitz in Horowitz, 1991, p. 99). As a result of the Homelands,38 and other 38The caveat "so-ca lled" often accompanies the term "homelands" in the literature on South Africa because the express i on refers to a group of artificially created territories under the policy of apartheid. These regions are: Gazankulu, KaNgwane, KwaNdebele, KwaZulu, 80

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disdained government policies of the past, regionalism is equated to ethnicity in South Africa. Genuine democracy, in the view of those in the liberation movements, requires strong centralist government intervention to bring regional disparities in" line formula that guarantees greater equality (Adam & Mood1ey, 1986). In the view of the ANC, what is needed is a framework which ensures that there is a strong central government, democratically based, which can embark on a program of reconstruction. This is also necessary for nation building and to ensure the building of a non-racial democratic state" (Ramaphosa, 1991, p. 31). Yet, the fear of Whites and other minorities about Black majority domination can be largely alleviated by a high degree of minority autonomy. "The power sharing model that can best reconcile the conflicting interests with an optimal chance of democratic conflict regulation is a federal system." Lebowa, QwaQwa, and South Africa has granted formal "independence" to the territories in ita1ics--a1so kMown as the TaVC states--which are not officially recognized by any other country. These nominally independent territories within South Africa are also known as 81

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Therefore the constitutional question is better posed as, what kind of federalism should be considered?" (Adam Moodley, 1986, p. 218). "It is precisely the great merit of the federal state, properly conceived, that it integrates the group the individual into one and the same political order" (Forsyth in Adam Moodley, 1986, p. 219). According to (1991, p. 217) federalism has four beneficial functions. First, it can provide support for an accommodative electoral formula. Second, federal units can serve as training arenas in which politicians are socialized in dealing with conflict before they must do so at the national level. Third, federalism disperses conflict by proliferating the points of power. Fourth, federal units can help to maintain a viable democracy by making hegemony more difficult to achieve. All of these functions can be by federalism in South Africa. In general, Horowitz (1991) suggests that such a system would permit a variety of local adjustments and might inhibit a single pattern of domination from emerging. He notes that institutions of the past that have served 82

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White, and in particular Afrikaner interests, are not conducive to the heterogeneous polity South Africa must become if it is to escape a new domination. Appropriate new federal structures must therefore be engineered. Although the interim constitution provides that "government shall be structured at national, provincial and local levels, "39 the powers of the future provinceso are limited both by having "concurrent competence with Parliament to make laws for the prov i nce, ".1 and by ,funct i ona 1 jurisdiction. Ian Smith (January 4, 1994), former Prime Minister of Rhodesia, recommends that the national government perform the absolute minimum of functions: national defense, national finance, and national coordination of interstate matters (in p. 8). Instead of the provinces having exclusive powers which are devolved to the national 39Constitutional Principle XVI .OSee Appendix F for the functional powers of the nine new provinces. These are: Eastern Cape, Eastern Transvaal, KwaZulu/Natal, Northern Cape, Northern Transvaal, Northwest, Orange Free State, Pretor iaWitwatersrand-Vereeniging (PWV), and the Western Cape IInterim Constitution, 126(1). 83

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government in a federal configuration, the central government remains the penter of power in the current formulation, albeit in a looser form. According to Gi1iomee (November 16, 1993), the question of whether a future South Africa will be federal depends' on the details of the final constitution and the intentions of the main parties. '"Ultimately, it wi 11 depend on the mobil izing capacity of the and on whether the central government has the time and the to keep the regions submissive'" (in p. 10). But, as Allen Buchanan (1991) argues, any group in any state has the moral right to' secede. Such a right can be constitutionally acknowledged and specified, for example through referenda, the treatment of minorities, and qualified majority support (in Adam & Mood1ey, 1993, p. 148). Adam and Mood1ey (1993, p. 148) suggest that a constitutionally guaranteed right to secede under regulated conditions and international arbitration might spare any country from civil disorder and possibly civil war in the wake of breakaway tendencies, or the forceful retention of an unwilling region. Considering recent events in 84

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Eastern Europe, it may be to contemplate a secession clause in the new South African constitution. A serious discussion of the to secede would also provide a key incentive to bring the potential secessionist parties into future constitutional negotiations. Ian Smith (January 4, 1994) concurs with this view in noting that the South African constitution should include a right to secede by any grouping which believes that it is denied freedom and justice. "The intention is not to encourage any state to secede but the reverse--to .give them the confidence to join in" (in p. 8). In the prevailin9 climate of negotiations in South Africa, there is a real danger because the government is both participant and referee in the transition, that a powerful. argument can be advanced by non-participants of the negotiated settlement that the prospective South African political system is not a true democracy, but an "elite cartel."u A brokered constitution between self-selecting parties which are not representative of the people 42A term used by Adam and Moodley (1993). 85

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is bound to fail in the long run for want of legitimacy (Govender, 1991, p. 99). As a recent (December 5, 1993) editorial noted: The danger is that, under a defective constitution, the new government may be forced towards totalitarianism by the pressure of events (with Nationalist civil servants and even cabinet ministers in place to help them), so it is essential to mend and improve the constitution. (p. 20) Thus, the drafting of the final constitution proscribed as it is by the existing Constitutional Principles. represents both a closing window of opportunity and the fruit of a poisonous tree. If a future democratically elected Constituent Assembly does not have a free hand in drafting a democratic constitution with appropriate secession provisions and electoral mechanisms, South Africa will face a needlessly uncertain future. The Political Structure of South African Governance, 1994-1999 The National Legislature. In the transition period the legislative authority of South Africa will rest with Parliament will be comprised of the

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and the The National Assembly will consist of 400 members elected through a system of proportional representation (PR).43 The PR system will be of the party list variety whereby registered parties submit to the chief electoral officer a ranked list of their candidates in a given election. Half of the members of the National Assembly will be elected from national party lists and half from regional party lists. The total number of votes cast in favor of a specific party's national candidates will be divided by the quota of voters per seat, yielding the number of seats to be allocated to that party. For purposes of filling National Assembly seats from party regional lists, there is a three step process .. First, the number of votes cast in each province will be divided by the total number of votes cast nationally and multiplied by 200. This refers to a variety of electoral systems designed to ensure that political parties receive approximately the same proportion of the total number of legislative seats as the proportion they received of the total number of votes cast (Horowitz, 1991, p. 166). Proportional representation systems may be broadly classified as list systems or the single transferable vote (Reyno 1 ds 1993, p 40). See Append i x G and the Electoral Act, as amended, (S. Afr. 1993).

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formula will produce the number of seats in the National Assembly to be allocated to each of the nine provinces in a given election. Second, to determine the quota of votes per seat for each province the total number of votes cast in a general election will be divided by the number of seats allocated to each province. Finally, the total number of votes cast in each province in favor of a specific party will be divided by the quota of voters per seat for each province yielding the number of seats to be allocated to a specific party's regional representatives. The upper house of Parliament will be the ninety-member Senate comprised of 10 members from each province who will be elected by the members of the provincial legislatures. Candidates for Senate elections are to be nominated by political parties represented in the provincial legislatures and the election conducted on the basis of proportional representation. Once elected to the Senate, previously held seats in the provincial legislatures must be vacated. All legislation, except laws relating to finance, specified provincial matters, and BB

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constitutional amendments will be regarded as Either House can introduce and pass ordinary legislation by simple majority. In the event of a Bill passing one House only, it will be referred to a jOint committee for amendment. Subsequently, it will be referred to a jOint sitting of both Houses and may be passed with or without amendment by a majority of the total number of members of both Finance Bills (appropriating revenue, or imposing taxation") can only be introduced by the National Assembly, but may be considered by a jOint committee of both Houses and the Financial and Fiscal Commission. If the Senate fails to pass an unamended Finance Bill, it will" be reconsidered by the National Assembly and presented to the President, who in assenting to the Bill, promulgates it into law. The President's signature on duly passed Bills and publication in the signifies and official Act of Parliament. Bills affecting provincial boundaries or their powers and functions must be approved by both Houses of Parliament and a majority of Senators from an affected province if the Bill applies to that province only. Amendments to the Constitution 89

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must comply with the Constitutional Principles and must be passed by a two thirds majority of a joint sitting of the National Assembly and the Senate. When the Senate and the National Assembly sit in joint sessions they will be known as the The prime task of this body will be to replace the interim constitution by drafting a new constitutional text on the basis of the Constitutional Principles. The Constitutional Assembly may also draw on the expertise of various advisory bodies and the Constitutional Court, which is also the final arbiter as to a new constitution complies with the Constitutional" Principles. The Constitutional Assembly has two years within which to adopt the new constitutional text by a two thirds majority. If this body fails to adopt a new constitutional text, various deadlock-breaking mechanisms will be including a national referendum and the dissolution of Parliament. If the latter the next Constitutional Assembly will have one year within which to adopt a new constitution by an ordinary majority. Parliament can also be dissolved as result of a vote of no-confidence by the national 90

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executive. The National Executive The Head of State of South Africa will be the According to the interim constitution, the .first President will be elected by the National Assembly at its first sitting by a simple majority.u Subsequent Presidents are to be elected within 30 days after the office of the President falls vacant, or in the event of a general election held under the interim constitution, within 30 days after the Senate's first sitting. In the event of a vote of no confidence in the President and the Cabinet by Parliament, a new President must be elected within 7 days after passage of such a vote. The election of a President other than the first President, will take place at a joint of the National Assembly and the Senate. No person may be elected President unless he or she has been elected to the National Assembly, and both offices cannot be simultaneously occupied by the same person. USee Appendix H.

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The main powers and functions of the President are to: refer a Bill passed by Parliament back to Parliament in the event of a procedural shortcoming; convene meetings of the Cabinet; refer disputes of a constitutional nature to the Constitutional Court or other appropriate institution; confer honors and appoint, accredit, and receive diplomatic representatives; appoint commissions of inquiry; negotiate and sign international agreements; proclaim referenda in terms of an Act of Parliament or the interim constitution; pardon and reprieve offenders; and exercise the powers of the office of Commander-in-Chtef of the National Defense Force. The comprised of the President, Executive Deputy Presidents, and not more than 27 Ministers appointed by the President will administer the Departments of State to be established by the President. Every party holding at "least 80 seats in the National Assembly may a member of the National Assembly among their ranks to serve as Executive Deputy President. If no party or only one party meets this requirement, the parties holding the largest and second largest number of seats respectively will be able to designate one Executive 92

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Deputy President. An Executive Deputy President will perform functions assigned to him by the President and those provided for in the interim constitution. A party which has at least 20 seats in the National Assembly and which has decided to participate in the Government of National Unity will be entitled to be allocated one or more Cabinet portfolios in proportion to the number of seats held by it in the National Assembly relative to the number of seats held by the other participating parties. Cabinet portfolios will be allocated by determining a quota of seats for each portfolio by dividing the total number of seats in the National Assembly held jOintly by the participating parties by the number of available portfolios plus one. Subsequently, the number of portfolios to be allocated to a participating party will be decided by dividing the total number of seats held by such a party in the National Assembly by the predetermined quota. After consulting the Executive Deputy President(s) and the leaders of participating parties, the President will allocate specific portfolios to the relevant parties based on the 93

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number ,of portfolios that each party is entitled to according to the above formula. The President will then appoint individual Members of Parliament (MP) as Ministers responsible for a particular portfolio, and similarly, the President may establish deputy ministerial posts. In its deliberations the Cabinet will strive to reach decisions by consensus and the spirit underlying the of a Government of National Unity. But if consensus is not forthcoming regarding Cabinet personnel matters and functions, the President's decision will prevail in all cases except those relating to Cabinet personnel matters affecting a person who is not a member of the President's party, in which event the decision of the leader of the party in question will prevail. The Constitutional Court The Constitutional Court will be comprised of a President and 10 other for a period of 7 years by the State President in consultation with the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the Cabinet. The main functions of the Constitutional Court are to rule on:' the constitutionality of any 94

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existing or future law; the constitutionality of a Bill, any other law, and any other matter contained in the Constitution; the constitutionality of executive and administrative conduct; disputes of a constitutional nature between all levels of government and organs.of the state; and violations or anticipated violations of any fundamental right contained in the "Bill of Rights." The Constitutional Court will .have jurisdiction in all parts of South Africa and will serve as the highest court in all matters relating to the enforcement, protection, and interpretation of the Constitution. A decision of the Court will bind all legislative, executive, and judicial bodies of the state, as well as all individuals. The Constitutional Court may declare any law or provision invalid to the extent of its inconsistency with the Constitution, and require any legislature to correct within a specified period of time the defect in the law, which will remain in force pending rectification, or the lapse of the specified period. Similar provisions apply to the executive and administrative organs of state which may be ordered by the Court to refrain or correct 95

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unconstitutional conduct within a specified period of time. Office of the Public Protector The interim constitution establishes the of The Public Protector is to be independent and impartial, subject only to the Constitution and the law. A joint standing committee of Parliament consisting of one member of every political party represented in Parliament will within 60 days of the sitting of the Senate designate a person to be appointed Public Protector. If adopted by 75% percent of the members present at a joint sitting of the National Assembly and the Senate, the President will appoint the nominee to Serve as Public Protector for a period of 7 years. The main powers and functions of the Public Protector are to investigate on his initiative or on receipt of a complaint from the public: maladministration in a governmental body; abuse, undue delay, unfair, capricious, or prejudicial behavior by a public official; and any improper, 45Analogous to 96

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dishonest, or corrupt act involving public money. In performing these functions, the Public Protector may direct any person to appear before him to give evidence, or to produce any relevant document. He, or his agents, may enter any building or premises and seize anything which has bearing on an ongoing investigation. These powers are limited by the "law of privi lege," and to the degree that they are unconstitutional. Moreover, the PubliC Protector is not empowered to investigate the performance of judicial functions by any court of'law. If the Public Protector deems it desirable, he may make a recommendation to the public organ or authority under the redress of an alleged prejudice. In addition, he is to endeavor to resolve any dispute by mediation, conciliation, or negotiation, and may render advice on proper remedies. But upon finding the commission of an offence, he is required to bring the matter to the attention of the relevant authority charged with prosecutions. The public protector is also required to report in writing on his activities to Parliament at least once every year. 97

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Conclusion According to Adam and Moodley(1993, pp. 68-69) there are two dangers that an interim government of national unity must avoid. First, the establishment of such a government must enjoy the support of the right wing because opposition from this quarter could trigger more violence and plunge the country into a real civil war. The legitimacy and stability of any transitional arrangements depend considerably on the degree that they are inclusive of the right wing and dissident Black groups. As indicated the right wing as represented by the Freedom Alliance, and Black supported groups such as AZAPO, chose not to accept the final agreements stemming from the Multi-Party Negotiations Process. The door was left open in particular for the Freedom Alliance to join in a more inclusive negotiated settlement in the period between the end af formal negotiations and the adoption of the interim constitution, but they declined to get on board. The possibility however, f6r of their concerns to be addressed in amendments to the interim constitution, or by the Constituent Assembly in drafting a new constitution. 98

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Second, for the ANC the danger of an interim government of national unity lies in assuming responsibility in the absence of power. While the ANC will have some measure of control of the coercive powers of the state, it is doubtful that this limited power would be enough to stop all the violence that would now be committed in the name of the ANC as well as the old regime. The ANC would also carry the burden of a bad economy, yet be constrained to implement radical restructuring. Frustrated expectations and disillusionment with the ANC are likely to ensue. One outlook according to Adam and Moodley (1993, p. 216) is that apolitical settlement is a necessary but insufficient condition for reversing South Africa's social disintegration and economic decline. They explain that while the political leadership of the two major parties was galvanized into a negotiated settlement, the ultimate determinants of a successful transition are social and economic. "Yet the ultimate paradox remains that economic recovery depends on a credible political settlement" (Adam Mood1ey, 1993, p. 216). The culture of corruption, ethical decay, and 99

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moral bankruptcy has so undermined the social fabric that it would be naive to expect a democratic culture to replace the former, regardless of the government in power (Adam & Moodley, 1993, p. 217). Democracy requires tolerance and is itself a type of ized tolerance. "The many manifestations of intolerance show the desperate need for a democratic culture" (Maphai, February/March, 1993, in p. 25). A general discussion of political culture and developmental influences follows as the springboard to a closer examination of the administrative system of South Africa. 100

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CHAPTER 4 THE ECOLOGY OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM: POLITICAL CULTURE AND DEVELOPMENTAL INFLUENCES Political Culture Of the whole range of social and political factors that impact a country's system of government and national civil bureaucracy the most directly relevant is arguably the native political culture. Pye and Verba (1965) have identified four dimensions of political culture that affect public bureaucracies: Hierarchy and equality; liberty and coercion; loyalty and commitment; and trust and distrust. Hierarchy and Egualitx Hierarchy and equality are common themes in public administration literature. Most administrative structures have a hierarchical structuring of personnel and authority in a formal organization, and distinct cultural values concerning the impersonality of rules and the role of authority (Peters, 1984). Significant changes in

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orientations toward authority have taken place throughout the world. In developed nations, for example, acceptance of authority has declined and may be seen as a part of the new individualism of the postindustrial society. Alternatives to the traditional hierarchical structuring of organizations have been proposed with names such as "collaboration-consensus organizations" and "dialectical organizations" (Peters, 1984, p. 48). These developments bode well for more democratic organizations--away from the increasing rationalization that Max Weber saw in 1947 as the fate of modern man. "Indeed, it was Weber's dream that, through the direct democratic choice of charismatic leaders, societies might finally be able to transcend the limitations of bureaucratic regulation" (Denhart, 1984, p. 32). Concerning a future South African public service, Schrire (1990) notes that the politics of reform and transition will demand a profound reorientation of the civil bureaucracy encompassing a change from control to interest representation and political reconc i 1 i at ion. "Th i s wi 11 enta i 1 not on ly changes in basic policy--the prerogative of the political 102

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elite--but changes in the form and style of service delivery, and change in the racial composition of the bureaucracy itself" (Schrire in Schrire, 1990, p. 87). Liberty and Coercion Closely related to hierarchy and equality is the dimension of liberty--and its counterpart-coercion. Generally speaking, a significant number of societies have been abiding changes in their value systems favoring increased liberty of expression and social action, sometimes at the expense of economic liberty. "It is often the bureaucracy that must decide the limits of both types of liberty and also determine how much coercion is acceptable in enforcing these (Peters, 1984, p. 49). It is instructive to note that South Africa was up until recently second only to the former Soviet in the number of regulations that governed its population, Loyalty and Commitment In many traditional societies, and some developed societies, there is little loyalty and 103

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commitment to government institutions and other factors external to the family. Often, government institutions must compete for loyalty with powerful forces such as religion, language, caste, racial, or ethnic group affiliations. As with social class, indications are that the majority of administrators come from the dominant cultural groups in a society, but a disproportionate share of clients tend to come from the subject cultures. This is certainly the case with the senior civil service of South Africa. "This not only contributes to the underlying tension between the groups, but it may also place limits on the effectiveness of the administrative structures" (Peters, 1984, p. 51). As Nelson Mandela indicates in the quote at the head of the next chapter, loyalty is a fundamental concern as it relates to the South African civil service. It is actually such an important issue that government and opposition negotiators felt that it cannot be relegated to individual whims,and is therefore, constitutionally mandated. The interim constitution provides that the public service is to "loyally execute the policies of the government of the day in the performance of its administrative

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furict ions ... Trust and Distrust The final dimension of political culture identified by Pye and Verba (1965) is the level of trust and distrust in the population. The concept of trust may be divided into interpersonal trust, and trust in government and political institutions. Interpersonal trust, in its collective form, is social trust. In more trusting societies informal and self-policing activities emerge more readily, and supplement the role of government in regulating relationships within the society. Trust in government relates to degree an individual believes that poli,tical institutions serve his or her interests. "Decisions of a 'highly distrusted political system will be difficult for the population to accept as legitimate" (Peters, 1984, p. 54). A useful classification ,matrix of the two aspects of trust has been developed by Peters (1984) as depicted in Figure 4.1. SInterim Constitution, 212(2)(e). 105

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Figure 4.1 Relationship of Dimensions of Social Trust to Administrative Power Source: Peters, 1984, p. 55 The top left cell represents societies that have high levels trust and high levels of trust in government. These societies are conducive to having the weakest administrative structures. "In these political systems the normal political branches of the political system are reasonably successful in ruling the country and tend to maintain a strong hold on their decision-making prerogatives" (Peters, 1984, p. 55). The upper right cell is representative of the 106

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consociational democracies of Austria, Switzerland, and (once) Lebanon. In these societies, strong cleavage between linguistic and religious groups produces relatively few feelings of interpersonal trust (Peters, 1984, p. 57). These countries are fortunate, however, because low interpersonal trust has probably produced trust in government and its administrative structures, and therefore has not eroded the effectiveness of the political The bottom left cell is typified by the United States. "The political culture of the United States has traditionally been one preferring individual and group action to governmental action (Peters, 1984, p. 58). In societies where there is both low interpersonal trust and political trust (bottom right ce 11), .. the bureaucracy may be requ i red to step in to fill a power vacuum in the political system. The country must be run somehow, and the logical heir to powers ordinarily held by parliament or the Executive is the bureaucracy" (Peters, 1984, p. 57). Hence bureaucracies in this type of society will be relatively large, complex, and well developed in comparison to other public 107

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institutions. Probably several European countries and a number of societies in the Third World may be accommodated here including--with difficulty--South Africa. With difficulty because Peters (1984) makes the assumption that all societies have at least a minimal level of trust for their institutions. In South Africa, (and maybe South Africa is a unique case) there is almost a complete distrust of governmental institutions, at least on the part of the majority of the Black population. Nor is trust as discrete and one sided as Peters (1984) implies. Nelson Mandela, for example, has said, "White South Africans do not yet trust us" (in Giliomee, 1992, p. 116) suggesting that trust is both bidirectional and complicated by factors of race in South Africa. As nuanced as Peter's (1984) discussion of trust is, it represents a fairly narrow array of considerations. Trust in the South African .ituation can be more fruitfully viewed from the relative dominance of various groups.-7 To advance social and -7This dominance varies by the scale and topic in question. For example, Whites may be said to be economically stronger, but Blacks have more electoral power, and so on. 108

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political development, less dominant groups should place their trust in more dominant groups. But more dominant groups should reciprocate by demonstrating tolerance toward less dominant groups. In other words, democratic governance requires a certain synergy between trust and tolerance. Kotze (February/March, 1993) notes that tolerance is essential for a democratic society, but that it is difficult to determine what level of tolerance is required for democratic governance. Using an intolerance index.8 of his own construction he attempts to Quantify intolerance in South Africa, and that there is: a clear profile of distribution across different sectors of society. The most intolerant sector is the military, with an intolerance index of 61.5%, followed by agriculture (52.9%). Then we find, in descending order on the intolerance index, the following sectors: lab[o]r (40.9%), churches (33.3%), bureaucracy (31.3%), parastatal (21.8%)iand academic (21.6%). Business (12.2%) and the media (10.1%) show the most toleration. (in p. 29) By this one rough indication, it seems that the South African bureaucracy is neither a very 48See Kotze, (February/March 1993). "Political (In)tolerance: A Survey." In pp. 27-29. 109

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troublesome, nor a very helpful factor in the transition to democracy. I have digressed a little bit by exploring the influence of the bureaucracy on the political system, rather than the effects of the environment on the bureaucracy. The main point is that many aspects of the South African political culture are conducive to the emergence of a bureaucracy which enjoys a relatively high degree of administrative power. The next section reviews specific characteristics of bureaucracies, especially those in developing nations flowing from social, cultural, economic, historical, and political factors. Developmental Influences South Africa is a developing upper middle income country. Its GNP per capita is $2 290 compared to the average of $3 240 for countries with upper middle incomes (Loots, 1992, p. 460). According to Heady, (1984, pp. 281-85) public administration in developing nations exhibits five sets of general attributes which are paraphrased below together with South African examples. First, the basic pattern of public 110

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administration developing countries is imitative rather than home-grown. All countries, including those that escaped Western colonization, have tried to introduce some version of modern Western bureaucratic administration. By virtue of being a British c610ny, South Africa inherited an intact system of Western public administration at the same time that some of its other institut-ions exhibited Third World characteristics. In his review of historical influences affecting the African civil service, Mentz (1993) suggests that the Civil Service should been transformed into a Public Service both in administrative structure and philosophy _involving a process of "Africanization" (pp. 451-52). But this did not happen. Second, bureaucracies in developing countries lack a skilled workforce necessary for advancement. The problem is not a general shortage of employable people; actually, the typical developing country has an excess of labor in relation to other resources-land and capital. The shortage is in trained administrators with technical competence, 111

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developmental skills, and management capacity. Table 4.1 is in support of this point as it applies to South Africa. Table 4.1 Projected Incremental Labor Supply and Demand by category. 1980-2000 Category No. in 1985 Executive 94 000 Sk i l1ed 455 000 Sem i -Sk i 11 ed 2 495 000 Unskilled 3 796 000 Source: Mentz, 1993, p.454. Incr:ements 1985-2000 197 000 897 000 2 500 000 1 028 000 No. in 2000 -103 000 -442 000 o +2 768 000 Third, there is a tendency for bureaucracies in developing countries to emphasize orientations that are other than production-directed. A lot of bureaucratic activity is channeled toward the realization of goals other than -the achievement of program objectives .. Latakgomo (December 20, 1993) reports that many in S6uth Africa have argued that there is going to be a need to use exceptional measures to reverse the wrongs of apartheid. This is "newspeak" for ignoring what is usually unacceptable behavior. "It may be the seed of corruption that can easily take this country into 112

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the same kind of economic and moral decline as many Third World countries" (in p. 12). The greatest challenge ;s going to be how to balance a new set of political imperatives against the need for an efficient public service November 10, .1993, p. 16). Fourth, there ;s a widespread discrepancy between form and reality in bureaucracies of developing bountries. In South Africa, Whites enjoyed a high quality of public administration at the same that were denied many essential services. Cloete 1993) notes that "artificially high World standards of service delivery will have to be replaced by more realistic Third World standards--in fact these are probably already the practical norm as a result of the inability of organizations to adhere to theoretically high standards set on paper" (in pp. 6-7). Finally, the bureaucracy in a developing country is to have a generous measure of operational autonomy. Democratic accountability has not been a hallmark of apartheid bureaucracy. In a recent editorial, (November 10, 1993) noted: 113

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Had John Citizen, or the media, been given access to official information in the bad old days, money would not have disappeared so easily down homeland sinkholes, [and] bureaucrats not have enriched themselves so readily at the taxpayer's expense ... The absence of a Freedom of Information Act meant that a powerful State was able to act in secret and withhold information to which citizens of a free society are normally entitled (p. 16). In sum, the South African civil service is largely a product of its past and the environment in which it operates. 114

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CHAPTER 5 FROM APARTHEID ADMINISTRATION TO DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION It is impossible to say exactly at this stage what proportion of the civil servants should be retained. No person will simply be fired. But the whole civil service infrastructure will obviously be affected through re-incorporation of the TBVC states, doing away with parallel administrations, and the establishment of regions in place of provincial authorities. Many civil servants may want to retire or resign and they should be eligible for standard packages, but not the lucrative retirement packagesand.goldenhandshakes that are current ly being handed out. What is expec"ted of them is that they show full loyalty to a democratically elected government and will abide by the principles of non-racialism, and professional quality service. Ne 1 son Mande 1 a49 in October 25, 1993. This chapter begins by way of a two-part problem statement issues of legitimacy and stability as they relate to the South African bureaucracy's potential influence on thatcountry's transition to democracy. Issues and prospects .uIn response to the question: I put this question to Mr. Mandela through newspaper. 115

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regarding affirmative action and training in response to the legacies of apartheid are also presented. The twin problems of legitimacy and stability may be considered to be largely a byproduct of apartheid, while affirmative action and training are two part"iaT solutions to help bring about a more democratic administrative system (Chapter 7 offers several recommendations to effect democratic procedures and institutions). This chapter concludes by describing "the transitional administrative structure of South African governance based in large part on the text of the interim constitution and Volume IV of the document pack for the meeting of the" plenary of the Multi-Party Negotiations Process held on November 17, 1993 at Kempton Park, South Africa. According to van lyl Slabbert (August/September 1993) the democratization in South Africa is confronted by four basic problems: gtowth, redistribution, legitimacy, and stability. He concludes that "if the civil service itself cannot be reconstructed so that it is at least in line with these goals, South Africans can begin to budget generously for disillusionment in their future" (p. 116

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5). Of these four problems, legitimacy and stability are more directly related to the objects of this inquiry. Establishing a neutrally competent and representative bureaucracy will go a long in satisfying the question of legitimacy. A responsive and accountable bureaucracy, on the other hand, will provide an element of stability to what promises to be a difficult transition to democracy. The Problem of Legitimacy In South Africa, the views of the mostly White incumbent senior civil servants who are initially likely to be charged with executing the policies of a prospective Black-led government remain largely unknown. The incumbent .South African civilian bureaucracy is ill-equipped to playa positive role in the transformation and development of a postapartheid South Africa. The bureaucracy harbors a significant segment of White South Africans who are ideologically most antipathetic to political change. (Hugo, 1990, p. 112). The public service has not only faithfully adopted the National Party's apartheid policies, it has assisted the NP government in fashioning these ideologies into more 117

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feasible policy action plans (eloete, 1993, p. 6). The racial mode of operation of the civil service has attracted personnel who believe in the apartheid system and have served as instruments of its perpetuation. The bureaucracy has been patterned on the concept that Black people are the objects of administration or control rather than part of the democratic political process (Harker et al., 1991, p. 51). The in-coming Government of National Unity will face a nervous civil service, imbued with the ideology of anti-communism and still operating within the "total onslaught" paradigm (Friedman, 1993, p. 185). If these premises are contentious, consider a hypothetical set of similar circumstances in the United States. If aM in-coming American administration espoused a socialist or communist ideology rather than principles in the context of a limited capability of replacing incumbent civil servants,'what be the reaction of the federal bureaucracy? It is reasonable to postulate that some would leave public service rather than compromise deeply held principles, some would toe the line regardless of the political 118

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persuasions of the leadership, and some would be uncooperative or obstructionist agents hoping for a better day. One does not have to go far to get a glimpse of the priorities of the South African civil service. Witness the Commission for Administration's (the policy-making body of the public service) view of its function: "In discharging its responsibilities, the Commission is guided by two principles, those of merit and efficiency" (Commission for Administration Annual Report, 1992, p. 2). This begs the questions: Where does the quality and quantity of product and service delivery fit in? Where does the public interest fit in? Not even mere lip service is paid to principles of democratic administration, if by democratic administration we mean equality of service delivery to all segments of the South African population. The public sector in South Africa is largely a White stronghold, but ironically most of the public servants are Black. Blacks are "hewers of wood and drawers of water--for each White laborer there are 146 Black laborers" (Bekker, 1991, p. 61). And although only a disproportionate minority of public 119

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servants are White Afrikaner males, they tend to occupy virtually all the major management positions in the civil service (Cloete, August/September 1993, p. 6). This state of affairs is apparent upon inspection of Table 5.1. It is a breakdown by race of central government department non-uniformed personnel who were or above in 1990. Table 5.1 The Racial Composition of the Civilian Public Service in South African National Government Departments, 1990. Departments White Admin: Delegates 9 Admin: Representatives 21 Admin: Assembly 138 Home Affairs 27 Foreign Affairs 79 Finance 103 Trade & Industry 29 Justice 559 Agriculture 30 Manpower 38 Mineral & Energy 38 Nat. Health & Pop; 59 Nat. Education 16 Environmental Affairs 31 Education & Training 32 Development Planning 39 Development Aid 51 Public Works & Land 42 Transport 23 Water Affairs 30 Com. for Admin. 32 Auditor-General 22 State President 11 Bureau for Information 16 Column Total 473 Colored o 8 o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o Indian 8 1 o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 12 Source: Hansard, 14 March 1990, columns 481-492. 120 Row Black Total 17 o 31 o 139 o 27 o 79 o 103 o 29 560 o 30 o 38 o 38 o 59 o 16 o 32 33 o 39 o 51 o 42 o 23 o 30 o o 22 o 11 o 16 1 495

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Of the 1 495 personnel comprising the top five income categories in 1990, 1 473 (98.5%) were Whites and 22 (1.5%) were non-Whites. If these numbers had been proportional to the racial distribution of the population, there would have been 209 Whites (14%) and 1 286 Blacks (86%). This situation had not improved significantly by 1993. According to Dr. Roe Venter, Chairman of the Commission for Administration; the incumbent senior 6ivil service consisted of 1"200 individuals of which 43 were nonWhite (Louw, L. November 26, 1993). Applying the same rationale, this number should have been 1 032 non-White, and 168 White officials. Indeed, the ANC has specifically indicated that the top 1 500 posts in the civil service should reflect. the composition of the population as a whole (Hugo & Stack, 1992, p. 58) Table 5.1 clearly shows that the management and professional core of the South African civil service is still predominantly White. "There is, therefore, a need for a restructuring of the civil service with a view to creating unitary structures and ensuring that Black South Africans take senior jobs in government, both at the central and local level" 121

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(Harker et al., 1991, p. 51). The priority areas which are strategically relevant to social transformation are those occupational positions in public administration which will be instrumental in the effort to replace the existing government structures. These include: economic and fiscal managers; legal and judicial personnel; the police, army, and security services; and positions in technical services such as communication officials (Harker et a1., 1991, p. 50). The need to expand the bureaucracy on the basis of non-racial principles and to make it more responsive to the populace and newly elected officials does not imply that the entire existing civil service should, or can, be abolished without serious social repercussions. "Indeed, within the democratic movemeht, or even within society as a whole, there are few ready-made individuals with the necessary skills and experience related to central administration and development management" (Harker et al., 1991, pp. 53-54). As suggested in the next chapter, it is this set of circumstances coupled with their own residual administrative expertise that incumbent senior civil servants are

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capitalizing on. The question then arises whether administrative expertise should be the priority over and above issues of legitimacy, and whether expertise itself can be divorced from legitimacy concerns. Clearly, short of an appropriate balancing test regarding these competing concerns in present-day South Africa, a new democratic government will have to accommodate itself to civil service reform rather than wholesale restructuring, at least in the short term. Legitimacy concerns in the medium to long term, however, can be if a new democratic government engages in long range planning with the view toward cultivating qualified public managers irrespective of racial considerations. The likely, yet incidental outcome of such a strategy would be a qualified and representative civil service. But this end cannot be achieved without a revamping of the current educational system. Differential access to all levels of education is a legacy of apartheid which ironically created a skilled workforce shortage among Blacks while the total labor pool was growing. In general, according to Cooper et al. (1993, p. 622), there wil' be a 123

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shortage of 500 000 skilled workers and a surplus of 2.4 million unskilled workers by 2000. The Agency for International Development (AID) reports that disadvantaged South Africans consider education their highest development priority, essential to their efforts to challenge apartheid structures' and to cultivate leaders for a non-racial democratic South Africa.50 Table 5.2 depicts student enrollment by race and type of tertiary educational institution in 1991-92. Clearly, a skilled workforce could be supplied with White candidates at twice the rate of Black candidates irrespective of the relative sizes of these two population groups in 1991-92. Greatly expanded educational opportunities are essential for a successful transition. Equality of opportunity in a market economy is useless without the skills to compete. Yet the acquisition of these skills is contingent on effective educational opportunities (Tucker & Scott, 1992, p. 142). a 1991: 721 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1991) (statement of Scott M. Sprangler, Assistant Administrator for Africa Bureau, AID). 124

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Table 5.2 The Racial Composition of Students in Educational Institutions, 1991-92 Type of Institution White Technikons-64 735 Universitiesb 140 395 Colored 8 946 17 055 Indian 5 743 22 205 Black 24 228 75 330 Total 205 130 26 001 28 948 100 558 -Figures are for 1991. Techni.kons are institutions of higher learning simi lar to community cO,11ege9 in the United States bFigures are for 1992 Source: Cooper et al., 1993, pp. 620-21. There is undoubtedly a need to substantially increase the number of tertiary level Black students, and also to achieve full desegregation of all tertiary institutions. Social upheaval has a way of generating a liberation agenda which leads to demands for political instruction in the educational system (Tucker & Scott, 1992, p. 144). To avoid a permanently "mobilized" and reactionary stUdent body, public administration curriculums need to be expanded in tertiary institutions to constructively channel interest in governance. Table 5.3 supports this point. Another benefit would be to increase the supply of Black candidates for public administration posts. 125

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Table 5.3 Certificates, Diplomas, and Degrees Awarded in Seleeted Subjects by Teehnikons and Universities, 1990. Subject Technikons Universities Agriculture 408 620 Architecture 461 642 Commerce 2 601 6 511 Communication 220 350 Computer Science 564 766 Education 230 10 406 Engineering 2 B22 1 69B Health Sciences 1 174 3 BB9 Law 5 2 B4B Mathematics 30 674 Public Administration 957 Social Sciences 218 B 225 Total 9 690 36 649 Souree: Cooper et a 1 1993, pp. 620-22. Table 5.3 shows that public administration as a subject is under represented. Several universities have public administration programs (some of them new), but obviously these had not produced graduates in 1990. Finally, it is important to include in the 6alculus the competition that the private sector will exert on the limited pool of potential Black managers in comparison to the attraction that the public sector holds for these candidates given the public sector's meager salary scales (de Klerk, J. H., Personal Interview, October 19, 1993). In summary, there are demand and supply side aspects to the problem of legitimacy as it relates to the South African civil service. A neutrally competent and representative bureaucracy is 126

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difficult enough to achieve without having to deal with an underqualified labor pool that has limited educational opportunities. The issue is not only (a representative bureaucracy), but to effect a supportive, efficient, and responsive public service while at the same time making it more representative the people it serves. The question of has immediate practical consequences revolving around the problem of stability. The Problem of Stability South Africa's potential for instability during the transition revolves around two fundamental factors: the disorientation brought about by the sudden change of all the rules of the political game, and the complexity of the society itself. First, the sudden change in the political dynamics of the country has resulted in confused"political identities. Those once at the peripheries of their parties are being driven toward the of the newly forming political spectrum, while those moderates in the center of their parties are being drawn to the gradually forming core of the new political establishment. Second, the complexity of 127

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South African society fosters a host of interests on both sides of the racial divide. These interests will be directly affected by the compromises the negotiating parties make. Because the ANC cannot fully control trade unionists, activist youths, or former guerrillas; and the NP cannot fully control business people, the security forces, and civil servants, these interest groups will not automatically endorse compromises because negotiators wish them to do so if their own agendas are seriously undermined (Friedman, 1993, pp. 91). Change of this magnitude cannot be expected without ripples in the pond. The South African senior civil service can affect the country's overall stability because senior control accumulated knowledge which they can use to define some of the constraints within which policies are to be implemented. The monopoly on expertise which senior civil servants have in their departments means that they dominate the general framework in which decisions are made, they help to define important questions, and they influence the direction of policies in support of their own proposals (Latib, August/September, 1993, 128

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p. 14). Hugo and Stack (1992, .pp. 51-52) justify an emphasis on White public servants' attitudes and concerns (this study's basic focus) as being in the interest of reconciliation, and as a means of minimizing areas of potential racial conflict. If the fears and-uncertainties of White senior civil servants are not taken into account, they could not only lead to policy-crippling inter-bureaucratic conflict, but militant subversion as well. In support of the latter premise, (June 9, 1993) reports that the recent resignation of Johan Scheepers, Deputy'Minister for Land Affairs, was his deep with the bureaucracy within his department. "This points to an area which should be of deep concern to those negotiating the future of the country: the capacity of the dying apartheid monster to make the transition difficult" (p. 16). And in case the practicalities of achieving a representative bureaucracy had escaped anybody, Gerie Fifield,s, reminds us that any attempt to discharge public servants SIChief Director: Personnel Utilization and General Systems, Commission for Administration 129

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to make way for people from under represented groups, would be problematical. Apart from being to the provisions of the envisaged bill on human rights and the envisaged constitution, it could also constitute a grossly unfair labor praciice which would almost certainly be contested in the courts. (Personal Interview, November 30, 1993) In examining the real or likely problems of the South African transition, it is essential to identify and separate competing perspectives. The senior civil service, like other key players, has its own perspective. To arrive at common ground, however, parochial attitudes have to be relaxed in favor of the overall public interest. This clash of perspectives can be illustrated by the government's program of encouraging the voluntary attrition of senior civil servants in preparatiori for a new dispensation.52 Participants of the program are obviously satisfied. But from the interest viewpoint, these "golden handshakes and other 520ne crude indication of turnover in the senior civil service is the number of posts advertized in the mass media and in the public service itself. This number stood at 238 in 1992 (Commission for Administration Annual Report, 1992, p. 15). This figure suggests a 20 percent turnover. It wou 1 d be interesting to compare this rate both before and after the transition. 130

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attractive retrenchment packages may be considered to be a form of corruption, or at least inefficiency. This problem is compounded by a lack of information regarding the size of these packages and the prevalence of this program. Another potential problem area is the reincorporation of the homeland administrations in the "new" South Africa. Black bureaucrats of the selfgoverning states may be regarded as "bureaucrats-inwaiting" and a possible source of qualified, skilled, and experienced personnel, but this view ignores very real implementation issues. The homeland administrations have had significant corruption problems, and there is a question whether this pool of candidates has the requisite level of skills and accountability ethos to serve in a reconstituted civil service. Mentz (1993) raises the question whether these senior managers would be acceptable in a new political d1spensation having been so closely associated with the apartheid structures developed by the Nationalist government (Mentz, 1993, p. 452). On the face of it, training and retraining of civil servants appear to be promising strategies, 131

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but even these common solutions are fraught with their own set of problems. Besides the cost of these programs, it is important not to repeat the mistakes of the past. For examp 1 e, inset t i ng up the homelands as independent states, White instructors were sent to train future-Black public administrators. What happened on the ground was that the trainers created for themselves permanent positions without the requisite transfer of skills. (Professor Thornhill, Personal Interview, October 11, 1993). In conclusion, the transition to democracy in Africa might not be as smooth as discussions of civil service restructuring imply. Not achieving a representative public service be problematical for the legitimacy and stability of the South African transition. The composition of a restructured civil service will have "to reflect the makeup of the country's population as a whole. This will be difficult to achieve and will by necessity entail affirmative action, and the retraining and resocializing of incumbent civil service personnel. Other criteria which the new civil service will have to meet, include: efficiency, accountability, a 132

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keen sense of political nuances, the maintenance of an orderly administration, and a smaller role in the economy (Rezelman in Mentz, 1993, p. 455). In short, the South African civil service will have to change from an apartheid mode to more democratic of operation. The concluding chapter of this dissertation offers specific recommendations as to how this might be achieved. Affirmative Action and Training The primary aims of action must be to redress the imbalances created by apartheid ... What we are against is not the upholding of standards as such but the sustaining of barriers to the attainment of standards; the special measures that we envisage to overcome the legacy of past discrimination are not intended to ensure the advancement of unqualified persons" but to see to it that those who have been denied access to qualifications in the past can become qualified now, and that those who have been qualified all along but overlooked because of past discrimination, are at last given their due ... Overwhelmingly, but not exclusively, its principal beheficiaries will be Black, and, to the extent that women even more than men have been forced to live in the most precarious of circumstance ... the goal of affirmative a6tion will be truly to achieve equal chances for all ... Nelson Mandela, 1991 (quoted in Hugo & Stack, 1992, p. 67). Affirmative Action Affirmative action is the principle whereby 133

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individuals from historically disadvantaged groups are given temporary special treatment relative to their counterparts from non-disadvantaged groups. Affirmative action may be effectively applied in any program which adopts the concept of "'equality as a fact and as a result"' (Du Plessis, 1991, p. 107). Since 1948 the South African civil service has not only been White dominated, but pripr to that year it was also extensively dominated by Englishspeaking South Africans. Currently the civil service is male and White dominated, particularly at the senior management level (Mentz, 1993, p. 452). The new political dispensatl0n now emerging in South Africa as a result of negotiations has created the .xpectation that there will be wholesale restructuring of the civil service. Since the public service will be under the more immediate control of the new government than the private sector, and since newly included political parties will have to deliver some tangible benefits to their constituencies, it is likely that the civil service will become a key avenue for Black advancement through a reduction in the White component of the civil service, or an. expansion of the civil service, 134

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or both (Hugo & Stack, 1992, p. 64). Cyril Ramaphosa, for example, has indicated that South Africa's public service can expect significant reconstruction at high levels after the April '94 elect.ions (in Younghusband, October 24, 1993). In the short-term, affirmative action is the most promising strategy to effect a representative public bureaucracy, but one which is fraught with a number of problems. First, it is important to recognize that there will. be no legal barriers to the implementation of affirmative actions programs. The equality clause of the interim constitution's chapter on fundamental rights does not "preclude measures designed to achieve the adequate protection and advancement of persons or groups or categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. "53 But as Hugo and Stack (1992, p. 64) note, the ensuing institutionalization of a human rights culture may provide a countervailing influence against any form of action by the state which is to the detriment of White public servants. Second,there are certain legitimate but 53Interim Constitution, Section 8(3)(a). 135

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competing viewpoints relating to affirmative action in South Africa that have to be taken into account. One of these issues is the granting of job guarantees to incumbent White civil servants while simultaneously seeking to apply affirmative action programs. A broader question revolves around one of the ANC's central tenets--non-racialism. Hugo and Stack (1992) suggest that it hardly seems possible to promote a race-neutral consciousness when race is used as a criterion for preferential treatment. "While affirmative action and Black advancement may be the only way to achieve a society in which race eventually recedes into the background of our national consciousness, non-racialism is not a realistic immediate prospect" (p. 62). Cunningly, however, the .principle of non-racialism has been used by the government to further its own ends by obscuring racially statistics in the post-1990 period. Adam and Moodley (1993) do not see any contradiction between non-racialism and affirmative action. They contend that after centuries of racial discrimination, non-racialism cannot mean colorblindness. Identical treatment of the races 136

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could itself be discriminatory because it would leave apartheid's legacies intact by focusing exclusively on equality of opportunities without the necessary attention to equality of results. "Colorblind equality of opportunities without state intervention merely continues to favor those who monopolized the opportunities in the past" (p. 25). Finally, there is a practical dimension to affirmative action. In attempting to redress past discrimination through affirmative action programs, a democratic government will certainly be accused of reverse discrimination and partisan political favoritism. Moreover, experience indicates that the incumbent senior civil servants will learn fast how to mask their decisions in" acceptable non-racist terms. In other words, hiring" practices and behavior can be superficially neutral while remaining discriminatory in effect (Klug, May/June, 1993). In the recerit past, the Afrikaans language requirement for entry into the civil service functioned as an effective barrier not only to Blacks, but to English-speaking South Africans as well. These two official languages have now been 137

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supplemented by 9 others.54 If a new democratic government finds legitimate paths to affirmative action blocked, it might revert to the tactics of previous apartheid regimes by applying a stringent Black languages requirement for entry into the civil service, thus becoming susceptible to warranted reverse discrimination charges. Another implementation issue revolves around the relative importance of merit as a basis for civil service appointments. A 1992 Human Sciences Research Council of 5 320 of the largely White Public Servants' Association found that 57.7% of respondents believed that merit as a basis for appointment and promotion would disappear from the South African civil service. Respondents in the senior civil service were also increasingly of the opinion that merit would come under pressure. Concerning affirmative action, 60.1% of those polled indicated they were not positive about affirmative action. The same proportion were negative about S4The interim constitution, 3(1), establishes Afrikaans, English, isiNdebe1e, Sesotho sa Leboa, Sesotho, siswati, Xitsonga, Setswana, Tshivenda, isiXhosa and isiZulu as the official languages of South Africa. 138 1-, ....

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reorientation, and 50.4% were negative regarding retraining (in Schwella, August/September, 1993). These trends do not bode well for on-the-job training, mentoring, sharing of information, and other necessary methods to effect a representative and efficient bureaucracy. Training Training appears to be the best option of instituting affirmative action programs while maintaining the principle of merit intact, but a strategy which needs to be considerably bolstered and refined. The (RDP)of the ANC, for example, stipulates that the Civil Service Training Institute must be transformed to train and retrain public service employees. One of the priorities of this Institute must be to ensure that a corps of public servants is developed to transform the public service effectively, with attention to high levels of service delivery and excellence. The RDP further stipulates that the Institute must be provided with the necessary resources, and that it must cater for at least four levels of training: top-level 139

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management development; retraining of incumbents; instruction for promotion within the public service; and lateral entry for progressive academics, activists, organizers, and non-governmental organization workers (African National Congress, February 17, 1994, p. 64). Tables 5.4 and 5.5 illustrate the existing provision of training available in select public affairs fields in South Africa. Harker et al. (1991, pp. 64-65) note that topics relating to central and local government, such as administration, financial management, banking, and law are widely taught, but their curricula generally assume a continuation of the present system. University courses in public affairs clearly cater to the existing civil service trends, which emphasize control and the regulatory aspects of public administration. Training at virtually all institutions concentrates on the technical aspects for professional qualification; they little concerning the relationship between training in a particular subject and the alleviation of race, gender, and rural-urban

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Table 5.4 Degrees, Diplomas, and Courses Offered in Select Subjects at South African Universities' Subjects Undergraduate Level Graduate Level Total Admin. for Central Gov. (a) 14 Admin. for Local Gov. (a) 7 JUdicial Services for Central and Local Gov: (b) -16 Economic & Human Resource Planning 4 Banking & Financial Management for Central Government 4 Banking & Financial Management for Local Government Ca) 2 Teacher Education 14 Educ. Management & Planning (a) 4 Town & Regional Planning 4 Civil Engineering 5 Social Policy & Planning (b) 4 Social Welfare Training B Agricultural Development (c) 5 Transport Planning (a) 2 Communication Skills (a) 2 Communication Planning & Management 1 4 12 5 5 7 4 4 3 4 1 2 'Based on information supplied by 7 of the 22 universities Africa. in (a) Not all full degrees in this" field. (b) Courses only. 22 11 2B 9 9 3 27 11 B 9 7 16 9 3 4 1 South (c) Not all institutions offer full degrees. Technical courses only, except at Fort Hare. Source: Harker et al., 1991, p. 62. Moreover, they do not address the relationship between the educational institutions and the needs of local communities, nor are most courses concerned with the construction of a democratic post-apartheid order. In short, these are supply side shortcomings, but there are demand side issues.

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Table 5.5 Diplomas Offered at Technikons Subjects Admin. for Central Gov. Admin. for Local Gov. Judicial Services for Gov. Economic & Human Resource Planning Banking & Financial Management for Central Government Banking & Financial Management for Local Government Teacher Education Educ. Management & Planning Town & Regional Planning Civil Engineering Social Policy & Planning Social Welfare Training Agricultural Development (a) Transport Planning (a) Communication Planning & Management (a) Courses only. Total No. of Technikons Offering Training 8 0 0 5 9 2 4 0 0 0 0 Source: Harker et al., 1991, p. Technikons Predominantly for Black Students Offering Training 5 5 0 0 2 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 Adam and Moodley (1993, pp. 173-74), for example, report that the absence of.economic skills in the opposition is due to an internal "progressive" attitude and a culture fostered by exile education that dismissed stUdies of "bourgeois economics as a waste of time and a sellout to the 142

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system. For those in the opposition that remained in the country, the state was the enemy. No one wanted to know how the state ran the country, the main concern was how the state was used as a mechanism of repression. Instead, those in the res ista-nce movements concentrated on a romant i c notion of popular participation embodied in the slogan: Now the ANC, and others, will have to pay the price of keeping such myths alive rather than preparing to administer the country. This state of affairs is reflected in Sonwabo Funde's (Member, Civil Service Unit, ANC) comment that the ANC does not even have a "skills inventory" of its membership and therefore a reliable means of effecting civil service placements (Personal March, 1993). The process of learnihg that has occurred within the resistance movement, for example regarding the desirability and feasibility of a social revolution, has not been as prevalent in other policy areas. For training to be meaningful, realistic policies should be built on receptive mindsets on the balance of the available and relevant evidence. 143

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Conclusion Unless effective affirmative action programs ensure a more representative managerial class, apartheid will continue as a nameless condition, despite the new constitution. Since the South African private sector can finance its own managerial it is the neglected area of public administration that needs most attention (Adam & Moodley, 1993, p. 174). There has been some movement in this direction. "A policy of inclusion of Blacks, not exclusion of Whites, appears to reflect the government's attitude towards the political imperative of creating a public service which is more representative of the country's population make-up" (Hugo Stack, 1992, p. 66). This view gains corroboration from J. Grabe (Deputy Director-General, Commission for Administration) in submitting that the expansion of the senior civil service will mirror the Namibian model (Personal Interview, March, 1993). More specifically, there is a set plan which is being followed. A new layer of senior civil servants will be between the current Director-Generals (Heads of Departments) and the 144

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relevant Ministers. Under the next government, these political appointees are likely to be Black and ANC affiliated. In Namibia, the officials of this political layer are known as Permanent Secretaries and Deputy Permanent Secretaries, while the equivalent of South Africa's Director-Generals are known as Under-Secretaries. A new South African senior civil service might be similar in form and content to the Namibian configuration,but it is unlikely that echelon beneath the level df (the career civil service) will be significantly affected in the short term. It is also important to note that this strategy was arrived at in consultation with the ANC and other political parties, as well as public sector employee organizations (D. du Toit, Chief Director, Commission for Administration, Personal Interview, August, 1993). But the small number of prospective South African officials that will be involved in a Namibian-type expansion raises the prospect that the politicization of the senior civil service will transpire without a true africanization at the senior management level. As Adam and Mood1ey (1993) 145

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opine, "the South Africa is a misnomer; only more color has been added at the top of the old s t rat i fica t i on" ( p. 2 16) In conclusion, the limitations of affirmative action must also be acknowledged. In South Africa there is "an "unreal isti-c expectation tha"t affirmative action can deliver benefits to all disadvantaged segments of society. As Du Plessis (1991) notes, in the United States affirmative action made sense as a means of extending the privileges of the majority to deprived minorities, but in South Africa the situation is reversed. "The privileged category is in the minority; it is the majority who will have to benefit most from change. Affirmative action alone is therefore inadequate" (p. 107). Horowitz (1991) suggests that affirmative action mai be desirable, but the asymmetrical nature of the likely returns in this exchange counsels against making it part of a future constitutional bargain. "Group political rights may be conferred by a stroke of the pen, but the fruits of affirmative action may take years to appear" (p. 157). 146

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The Administrative Structure of South African Governance, 1994-1999 The interim constitution of South Africa stipulates that a department of state or other institution that performed governmental functions prior to the adoption of the constitution continue to do so under its previous mandate notwithstanding the repeal of several consequential laws.55 The interim constitution, however, also provides for the streamlining (rationalization) of all public services and public institutions as soon as is feasible after the enactment of the interim constitution. The purpose of rationalization is to effect a revised public administration at the national level and for each of the nine new provinces. The responsibility the rationalization of public services, departments, and other institutions will rest with the national government in cooperation with the governments. The President by proclamation in the may inter alia, repeal or amend any law regulating a 55Interim Constitution, 236(1). See Appendix E for a catalogue of repealed and amended laws. 147

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department of state or other public institution, provided that arrangements are made for the application of any general law regulating the employment of persons, or the employment of a class of persons in the service of the state.58 A Prestdentia1 proclamation must also be submitted to Parliament within days of publication, and if Parliament disappr9ves of such a proclamation, it will immediately cease to be in force to the extent that Par 1 i ament objects to its prov i si ons. In addition, the interim constitution establishes a special tribunal consisting of a judge and two assessors in with'legis1ation to be enacted by Parliament to assess all disputes and claims arising out of laws regulating public employment as of November 1, 1993 in relation to the implementation of rationalization initiatives. Parliament is also directed to enact legislation 58The primary vehicle is the Public Service Labor Relations Act, No. 102 (S. Afr. 1993) whose purpose it is "to regulate anew labor relations in the Public Service, including collective bargaining at central and departmental levels, the registration, recognition and admission of employee organizations, and the prevention and settlement of disputes of a collective and individual nature between the State as employer, its employees and employee organizations; and to provide for matters connected therewith."

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with the view toward establishing expeditious adjudication procedures, including interim and final relief. These adjudication provisions are to lapse one year from the commencement of the interim constitution. Continuity of administration is furnished by the interim constitution's provisions for a Public Service Commission--the policy making body of the civil service--to replace the for Administration. This body will exercise its mandate in accordance with legislation in force at the time of the implementation of the interim constitution, or until such time as enabling statutes are amended. The Public Service Commission will be accountable to Parliament and is to submit an annual report to the national legislature on matters under its jurisdiction. When requested by the President, a Minister, or a Provincial executive, the Commission will offer advice concerning any matter relating to the civil service, such as remuneration, and other conditions of employment. In addition, the Public Service Commission is empowered to make recommendations, conduct inquiries, and give directions regarding: the 149

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organization and administration of departments; the conditions of service and personnel practices in the public service; the promotion of efficiency and effectiveness; and to institute a code of conduct for civil servants. Moreover, the Public Service Commission may delegate any of its powers to any official of the public service within constraints imposed by law. A direction or recommendation issued by the Commission is to be executed within a period of 6 months unless the President objects and refers the matter. back to the Commission, or unless such rulings involve public expenditure and therefore require the endorsement of the treasury. Operative public administration at the national level, excluding security functions, rests with the departments of state delineated in Table 5.1 (some of these will probably be eliminated, or reconstituted by a new government). The interim constitution of South Africa stipulates that the public service is to be "regulated by laws dealing specifically with such service, and in particular with its structure, functioning and conditions of 150

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service ... 57 Further, the civil service is required to be structured by department and other organizational components, and the head of such formations is to be responsible for the efficient management and administration of these units. The current personnel structure, and select-staffing developments in the senior civil service are depicted in Table 5.6. Table 5.B Hirings and Promotions in the Senior Civil Service (Year Ending, 1992) Post Level Hirings Promotions Total Director-General 0 7 7 Superintendent-General 0 1 1 Chief Executive Director 0 1 1 Deputy Director-General 0 -15 15 Executive Director 0 1 1 Chief Director 1 63 64 Director 5 148 153 Total 6 236 242 Source: Commission for Administration Annual Report, 1992. p. 14. Although the racial breakdown of the senior 57Interim Constitution, 212(2)(d).

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civil service hirings and promotions depicted in Table 5.6 is not available, it is suggestive to note that there is a "business as usual" climate irrespective of the social and political turmoil surrounding the senior civil service. In the words of the (Apri 1 4, 1993), "-bureaucracy, even Nationalist bureaucracy, is preferable to chaos" (p. 20). In general, the interim constitution directs civil-servants to be non-partisan, careerorientated, impartial in performing their duties, and guided by fair and equitable principles. Individual members of the public are further protected by a "Bill of Rights" which in part calls for administrative justice to be procedurally fair, including the-furnishing in writing of reasons for administrative action which affect or threaten an individual's rights and interests.58 The interim constitution also provides for employment in the public service to be accessible to all South Africans who comply with legal and professional requirements. Moreover, the civil 58Interim Constitution, 24.

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service is obliged to promote efficiency and be broadly representative of the South African community. 153

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CHAPTER 6 THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: RESEARCH DESIGN, METHODOLOGY, AND FINDINGS Research Design and Methodology This study employed face-to-face interviews, a mail-back sample survey, and published primary and secondary sources to record the prevalent attitudes and beliefs of targeted officials and to delineate the context in which they operate and the influence -they exert on South African governance. The elements of these objectives constitute the dependent variables of this study. This research was conducted on the ground in South Africa over a period of approximately 14 months. The Interviews The first leg of the research entailed interviewing a select number of key informants (see Appendix C). The interviews were the beginning of a methodological triangulation designed to increase the internal validity of this study. The purpose of the interviews was to develop a greater 154

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understanding of the central objectives of this inquiry, and to complement the sample survey. The findings of the interview portion of the research are interspersed throughout the. dissertation. Subjects were selected using two criteria: The position they occupied; and the organization or organizational component they represented. Regarding the first strategy, the most senior executives were targeted which, more often than not, resulted in these officials nominating subordinates to represent them. This experience led me to also target the officialspokepersons of the various organizations I was in. The second strategy aimed at selecting subjects from the widest possib1p. spectrum of South African society because of their particular varied and insights. Th'is criterion was relaxed, however, in favor of officials in the Commission for Administration. At a certain point in the study members of the management echelon of the Commission for Administration were aware of all the previous interviews I had conducted. The effect, if any, of such an informal group process are unknown to me. An unstructured interview format with open-

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ended questions and probes was employed to encourage the most open and honest presentation of views. Subjects often had a convergence of views which made for repetitive conversations. Subjects also had a tendency to mirror official organizational policies although it was hard to distinguish whether these also represented personal beliefs and attitudes. The most comprehensive and open views emanated from targeted officials outside the government and opposition. The Sample Survey A mail-back sample survey constituted the second leg of the research. The survey instrument used for this purpose is reproduced in Appendix A. This questionnaire was designed to elicit five categories of information: (i) A profile of the personal and professional characteristics of the senior civil service (Section IV, except Q27, and Q1 and Q2); (ii) attitudes, beliefs, and motivations regarding social and political developments in South Africa (Section II, Q5, Q19, and Q20); (iii) opinions on job satisfaction and professionalism (Q3, Q4b, and Q11); (iv) general opinions (Q6, Q10, 156

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Q12, Q14, Q18b, Q18c, Q21. and all "other" categories); and (v) technical details for purposes of identifying appropriate respondents and independent variables (Q4a, Q18a, Q22, Q23a, Q23b, and Q27). More specifically, the survey instrument was designed with the view toward constructing three indices. According to Hirschman (1970), workers have three general categories of options in the employment relationship: to to their concerns, or to demonstrate or otherwise. These broad classifications were used to formulate specific questions which were then recast in the form of indices for purposes of analysis. These are d; scussed in deta in the .. find i ngs" section below. Mostly close-ended questions were utilized to facilitate comparisons among respondents and for ease of data analysis. Another advantage of this type of questionnaire design is that the fixed list of response possibilities tends to make the question clearer to the respondent. A subject who may otherwise be uncertain about the question can be enlightened as to its intent by the .answer categories. In addition, such categories may remind 157

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the respondent of alternatives that otherwise would not have been considered. In short, fixed responses are less burdensome to respondents who find it easier to choose a given response than to construct one. Consequently, this type of questionnaire desi.gn increases the likelihood that the response rate will be as high as possible. On the other hand, an inherent disadvantage with a series of questions is that it compels respondents to choose a "closest representation" of what would have otherwise been unconstrained preferences (Rea and Parker, 1992, pp. 39-43). To compensate for this problem an "other, please. specify category was included .in most questions of the survey instrument. The majority of the close-ended questions elicited satisfactory information for purposes of analysis. Those survey questions not addressed in the text of this dissertation did not yield sufficient variance to reporting. Nevertheless, simple frequencies and percentages for all close-ended questions may be found in Appendix B. A five-point Likert scale is another major

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design element of the questionnaire in Appendix A. According to Rea and Parker (1992), "the Likert scale works particularly well in the context of a series of questions that seek to elicit attitudinal information about one specific subject matter" (p. 74). Furthermore, most questions of the survey instrument were structured on an ordinal scale, and interspersed among them were open-ended or venting questions. The latter were meant to elicit additional information, to increase the interest of respondents, and to facilitate the readability of the questionnaire. Many of these questions, however, did not yield useful information for reporting purposes. The execution of the sample survey was undertaken at a time of heightened expectations and unresolved conflicts in South Africa. Because of the sensitive nature of the study and the times,the penchant for secrecy in the civil service, and the constraints of the research budget, a 95% level of confidence and a 10% confidence interval were selected as the statistical standards for the sample survey. Given these research parameters, the appropriate sample size (n) was determined by 159

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utilizing the general equation for small and large populations = ____ where Z. is set at 1.96 for the 95% level of confidence, the confidence interval in terms of proportions (C is set at 10%, and the population (N) of senior civil servants is 1 individuals (Dr. Venter, Chairman of the Commission for Administration, in Louw, November 26, 1993). Solving for sample size = (1.96)2(.25) = 1152 11.99 = 89 To obtain a sample size of 89 responses, erring on the side of caution, an operative sample of 326 senior civil servants was effected from the directory: to The survey instrument together with a cover 160

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letter, instructions, a suggested deadline for completion, and a stamped, self-addressed return envelope were forwarded via the South African Post Office to the subjects. Follow-up letters were mailed approximately a week later to encourage participation in the survey (see Appendix A). There are two crude indications of the practical difficulties that this research may have encountered: First, the survey instrument used in this study was discussed at a Heads of Departments (Director-Generals) meeting while it was being circulated (Dr. Calitz, November 9, 1993, Personal Interview). Secrecy and the control of information has been a revered tradition within the civil service. I can only speculate that an uncertain political climate and being under the spotlight--the subject of a study--compounds this tendency. Second, as a matter of policy, the Commission for Administration does not participate in surveys (Fifield, November 30, 1993, Personal Interview). Consequently, approximately 23 potential respondents were likely to have been influenced from participating in the survey portion of this study. Nevertheless, the sample survey process achieved a 161

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30%. response rate in the form of 99 returned questionnaires. According to Yeager (1989) nonresponse is the principal source of survey error. This source of error is a natural consequence of subjects who have a particular interest in the topic of a survey being more likely to return a mail questionnaire than those who are less interested. This means that the results of mail-back surveys with low response rates are usually biased in ways that are directly related to the survey's subject. Short of an effective counter measure, Figures 6.1 to 6.4 help to identify the parameters of the response/nonresponse limitation. Since the Administration of the House of Representatives (Department C in Figure 6.1) and the Administration of the House of Delegates (Department B in Figure 6.1) are clearly racially structured (the former serving the Colored chamber and the latter the Indian chamber of the tricameral parliament, which will be replaced under the new dispensation), they are prime targets for restructuring. One could therefore argue that the high reply rates from these departments are a 162

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response bias of this study. This position, however, would ignore the almost equally high response rates from the departments of Agriculture and Finance (0 and J in Figure 6.1), nor would it account for the various assurances that public servants have been given that they would not be simply fired. Figure 6.1 The Profile of Government Departments Represented in the Survey 11 10 9 8 w 7 6 c w 5 w 4 2 1 0 C 8 D J R H T U X F A = House of Assembly. B= Administration House of Delegates. C= Administration House Of Representatives. D = Department of Agriculture. E = Office of the Auditor-General. F = Commission for Administration. G = Constitutional Development. H = Department Of Education and Training. I = of Environmenta1 Affairs, J = Department of Finance, K = Department Of FOreign Affairs. N = Department of Local Government and National HOUSing. 0 Department Of Manpower, R = National Health and Popu1ation Deve10pment. S = Office for PUb1ic Enterprise and Privatization. T = Department Of Public Works, U = Department of State Expenditure, v = Department of.Trade and Industry, W Department of Transport, X = Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, Z "Unknown". 163

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Key: Figure 6.2 Who Answered the Survey? (Gender, Race, Age) RACE Figure 6.3 Who Answered the SurVey? (Education and Skill Level) EDUCATION SKIULEVEL A = School Diploma, B = Technikon COllege Diploma, C = or Bachelor's Degree with D = Degree, E = Doctoral or ProfeSSional Degree, F = "Skill Level" was not defined for respondents in the survey instrument. It is self-defined. 164

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Figure 6.4 The Profile of Select Political Parties/Organizations Represented in the Survey NP "OTHER" Dr IFF Political Party Key: ANC Nationa' AVF CP Conservative DP Democratic Party, IFP Inkatha Party, NP Nationa' Othep not 'isted.in the supvey instrument and those respondents indicating that they were apo'itica'. In addition to the problem of nonresponse bias, those respondents who chose to complete the questionnaire might in part represent those individuals who .have already accepted the new social and political dynamics in South Africa and are consequently keen to demonstrate their progressive attitudes. If this is the case, the survey process might have been something akin to "preaching to the converted." Alternatively, some respondents might have been inclined to hold back their true feelings 165

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to mask their fundamental attitudes in the face of conflicting and sweeping societal changes. In other words, some respondents might simply be practicing a form of "political correctness." It is also important to note, however, that these problems might in reality be nonexistent, or for purposes of this study. The Canvassing of Primary and Secondary Sources The third and last leg of the methodological triangulation was a review of South African primary and secondary sources to support (or refute) the results of the previous two legs. Primary sources included Acts and and select documents emanating from the Multi-Party Negotiations Process. Secondary sources included local newspapers, magazines, and journals; and the sources identified in the text and bibliography of this dissertation. Findings A key objective of this study was to determine the influence that the senior civil service exerts on South African governance. Focus on bureaucratic 166

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leadership represents this study's economy and basic rationale since the greatest influence on the civil service and its environment is being assessed by examining the least number of personnel. This study also aimed at documenting the existing characteristics of the incumbent senior civil service (the education, gender, age, racial, and professional composition); and the projected concerns and expectations of senior civil servants (their hopes, fears, and attitudes towards future Black leaders, supervisors, and colleagues). What are the Fundamental Characteristics and Attitudes of the-Senior Civil Service? _Figures 6.1-6.4 above are a visual representation of the age, ra6ial, educational, and other attributes of the South African senior civil servic.. Upon inspection of these figures, it is apparent that the senior civil service is White, and-National Party dominated. The only characteristic approaching a normal distribution is the age of respondents. Table 6.1, by way of comparison, quantifies the relative proportions of select aspects of the South 167

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African senior civil service, subject to a margin of error of 10%. Table 8.1 A Proportional Profile of the South African Senior Civil Service Select Characteristics Age: Education: Gender: Race: 30to under 40 40 to under 50 50 to under 60 60 and over High School Diploma Technikon/College Diploma Bachelor's Degree Master's Degree Doctoral/Professional Degree Other Female Male Black Colored Indian White 3.03 31.31 50.51 15.15 2.00 11. 10 41.40 19.20 22.20 4.00 6.10 93.90 1.00 4.10 4.10 90.80 Table 6.1, particularly the racial composition of the senior civil service,is in support of previous studies by Harker et a1. (1991), and others. It is additional testimony for the need to 168

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make the senior civil service more representative of the people it serves. Indeed, the ANC's (ROP) states that "an extensive program[me] of affirmative action must be embarked on to achieve the kind of public service that is truly reflective of our society, particularly at the level of management and senior employees" (p. 64). In addition, this policy document calls for a defineq quota of new employees to be filled from gro.ups which were disadvantaged in the past on the basis of race and gender. Individuals from these groups are to be given access to appropriate tra'ining and support systems. The ROP stipulates that by the turn of ,the century, the personnel composition of the public sector must have changed to reflect the national distribution of race and gender. "Such progress wi 11 enhance the full utili[s]ation of the country's labo[u]r power and productivity" (p. 63). By way of comparison, Table 6.2 the racial and gender composition of the national public service, including .the lower ranks of the civil service.

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Table 8.2 The Racial and Gender Composition of the Central GovernmentC Race Black Colored Indian White Gender Female Male Figures are for 1992 Figures are for 1991 Figures include provincial administrations Source: Cooper et a1., 1994, pp. 455-57. Number 322 491 125 055 30 283 305 129 310 126 445 922 41 16 4 39 41 59 When senior civil service subjects were asked if they agreed, disagreed, or had no opinion on whether the state should adopt the implementation of programs aimed at achieving speedily the balanced structuring in non-racial form of the public service (Q15g in the survey "instrument), 76.8% answered yes. But when asked "to what degree do you think that the composition of a future senior civil service should reflect the following segments of south African society ... (Q13), the proportion of respondents who agreed that a future senior civil service should reflect South Africa's White/Black ratios, to 43:4% (Q13a). When asked in even more specific terms whether race should be used in future hiring or promotional decisions (Q11f}, a 170

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mere 3% of respondents thought that race should be a valid criterion. These trends indicate that the senior civil service, subject to a margin of error of 10%, displays a progressive attitude toward racially based civil service restructuring, but when their own personal interests are factored in, for example in being passed over for a promotion because they do not belong to a previously disadvantaged population group, their attitude changes markedly in favor of preserving the status quo. South African senior civil servants (like 6ther survey participants in other studies) show a marked of appreciation regarding the relationship between accomplishing certain ends and the means by which to do so. In sum, given the ANC's timetable to effect a representative senior civil servicethe age characteristics of incumbent senior civil servants are a helpful factor. A full fifty percent 6f incumbents belong in the 50 to under 60 age group (see Table 6.1). This implies that by the turn of the century attrition rates due to retirement, or other reasons, will create considerable opportunities for Black or female public management 171

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candidates. Moreover, a period of 6 to 8 years is sufficient time for interested individuals to gain the necessary public management qualifications without diminishing the general educational standards established by the existing cadre of senior civil servants. -As reflected in Table 6.1, the majority (41.40%) of incumbents only possess a Bachelor's degree. It is important to note, however, that even this level of education is hard to attain in South Africa due to exacting higher education standards, and a relatively small number of tertiary educational institutions. What do Senior Civil Servants Anticipate Black Rule? According to Horowitz; (1991) "in divided societies, there are some studies indicating that elites are less ethnocentric than their followers, but there are more showing that ethnocentrism increases with education. There is little or nothing in the available South African studies to suggest a different conclusion" (p. 140). To test whether elites are less ethnocentric than their followers and hence more apprehensive concerning 172

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Black rule, I replicated a segment of a survey conducted by Sch 1 emmer et a 1. in 1991. In a survey of 1 312 White voters considered to be more liberal than the general population by Schlemmer et al. (1991), the authors report that approximately 29% of voter respondents thought that order and safety would be threatened if Blacks were to rule South Africa. By way of comparison, 34% of White senior civil servant respondents thought that it would be likely or very likely that societal order would be Black rule (Q16a in the survey instrument). Schlemmer et al. (1991) also report that approximately 21% White voters believed that White incomes and standards of living would decline under Black rule .. On the other hand, 69% of White public managers felt this way (Q16c). This pattern was approximated when both groups were asked if White occupational.security would be threatened under Black rule (Q16b): the proportion of White voter respondents who agreed was 10%, whereas 63% of public manager respondents felt threatened over occupational security. Finally, 20% of White voter respondents indicated that standards of public administration would fall if Blacks were 173

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to rule South Africa, and again, White senior civil servants were more pessimistic since 59% of them thought that this was likely or very likely to happen (Q16f). Table 6.3 summarizes these results. Table B.3 A Comparison of Select Views of Elites and Their Followers White incomes and standards of living White occupational security Standards of public administration Order and safety = n = 90 10 20 29 e 7 c 69 63 59 34 Table 6.3 clearly shows that White senior civil servants, 'subject to a margin of error of 10, more pessimistic concerning the four identified issues than White voters. Assuming that senior civil servants are elites, is it accurate to tilt the balance in favor of the premise that elites are 174

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more ethnocentric than their followers? Regardless of confounding variables,59 the pattern of clustering in Table 6.3 calls for a different interpretation than one grounded solely in ethnocentricism. The results of Table 6.3 make more sense when considered from the perspective of the individual, rather than a group based viewpoint, such as race, or ethnicity. Since White public managers are embattled under realistic threats of "rationalization" andaffirmatlve action, they are more concerned with their personal incomes and occupational security in comparison to the average White voter. Support for this approach can be effected from a different angle when the subject of public administration, which is a relatiVely abstract concept from an individual's persp.ctive, is considered. Although public management is in the realm of senior civil servants, when the issue is put in more general terms (standards of public administration), as opposed to a category like occupational security which can be more readily 59Political affiliations, religious beliefs, and so

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identified with at a personal level, both its ranking among public managers drops in relation to the more "persona categor ies, and the gap between elites and their followers also narrows in relation to the more "personal" categories. Now, if the remaining variance can be explained by ethnocentricism, so be it. Another objective of this study was to gauge the expectations of senior civil servants who anticipated the inauguration of a Black-led government. Table 6.4 ranks"the answers of senior civil servants sampled response to the question: "What do you think will be the most likely effects of a government on the senior civil service" in the survey instrument), and depicts the mean for each category based on a scale of 1 (very likely) to 5 (very unlikely). The results depicted in Table 6.4 are generally negative. That is to say, senior civil servants expect the quality of their working conditions to be diminished under Black management. They anticipate a politicized, relatively unprofessional, more inefficient, more ineffective, unprincipled, and relatively tense working environment, with reduced 176

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opportunities for advancement. Table 6.4 Ranking of Likely Effects of a Black-Led on the Civil Service Expansion to Accommodate Black Civil Servants A Highly Politicized Senior Civil Service Reduced Opportunities for Promotion Reduced Levels of Professionalism Diminished Levels and Quality of Services Increased Corruption More Tense Superior/Subordinate Relations Retrenchments Increased Transparency Increased Accountability Requirements 1.58 2.36 2.40 2.49 2.59 2.68 2.83 2.96 3.10 The envisioned expansion of the civil service, the highest ranking option, is probably based on an informed assessment of this possibility. This likelihood is in contrast to the prospect of widespread retrenchments, although both options are at the positive end of the scale. Increased transparency (that is, public scrutiny and oversight) is only moderately anticipated, while increased accountability is neither expected, nor unexpected. If the latter two possibilities materialized despite the expectations of senior civil servant it would be a positive 177

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development for the country as a whole. All other options, however, with the possible exception of a public service expansion, would have a negative impact on the senior civil service, and by extension, on the efficiency and stability of the South African transition. When senior public servants were asked what they considered to be the two main problems facing the South African civil service (Q6 in the survey instrument), 52% felt that uncertainty was a major predicament. These misgivings were variably expressed, but typical response was a concern with "uncertainty about the future" (respondent B08). In sum, senior civil servant respondents are substantially fearful of their prospects under Black rule. It is undeniable, however, that the ideal of a nonsexist and nonracial society demands reform and restructuring not only of the senior public service, but other institutions as well. Does the Senior Civil Service Wield Significant Influence on South African Governance? According to Knight's (1992) theory of social institutions bureaucrats have their own interests

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which have to be taken into account in the bargaining over formal institutions. These interests are both political power and material gain. They entered--and in the future are likely to enter--the bargaining calculus in two forms: "direct interest in the benefits accruing to those actors who serve as external enforcers and the indirect interest in the effects of the distributional consequences of formal .institutions on the long-term interests of the state" (Knight, 1992, p. 190). If Knight (1992) is correct, the South African incumbent senior civil service may be said to constitute a political power bloc willing and capable of asserting its demands and interests. Sufficient evidence exists from primary and secondary published sources to indicate that the civil service figured prominently in constitutional negotiations. The interim constitution, for example, provides that the retirement age applicable to a public servant by law is not to be changed without his consent. Further, incumbent civil servants have constitutional protection of their pensions. Government negotiators in consultation with senior civil servants also ensured that every 179

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member of the civil service will be entitled to a fair pension as a constitutional principle. This effectively means that agreements reached are not merely interim arrangements, but terms which bind the future Constitutional Assembly--which is to draw the final constitution--to include such provisions as entrenched rights to the extent that special majorities are needed to oVerride the constitutional principles. Besides material gain being elevated to a constitutional level, senior civil financial interests were also accommodated by the Commission for Administration in granting the senior civil service pay hikes following the conclusion of formal negotiations. This finding is depicted in Table 6.5. Sam de Beer, the Minister responsible for the Commission for Administration, defended the 20% salary increase for Director-Generals as being necessary to guarantee that upper management played a "central role to ensure a stable public service (in Waugh, January 24, 1994, p. 1). On the other hand, Gerhard van der Merwe of the South African Police Union, regarded such exorbitant

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increases as a disgrace when viewed in the light of the increases appropriated to the lower ranks of the civil service. He noted that it "is proof of the ignorance and contempt the state has for the people from whom they expect loyalty and a professional service (in Maker, January 23, 1994, p. 2). Table 6.5 Senior Civil Service Salary Scales as of December 1, 1993 Old Annual Salaries Revised Annual % Post Level Salaries Increase Director-General Deputy Director-General Chief Director Director R221 602 R155 326 R126 411 R10B 075 R266 784 R183 432 R148 599 "R126 411 Source: Maker in January 23, 1994, p. 2. By way of comparison, Table 6.6 depicts the average monthly salaries and wages of the national public service, including the lower ranks of the civil service by race group for 1991, "and the real and constant percentage changes since 1990 (decreases are indicated in brackets). The timing, focus, and extent of these pay 20.3 18.1 17 .6 17 .0 hikes raises the question as to whether the state is attempting to buy the loyalty of its senior civil

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service, and whether this is a viable, or desirable strategy. Attractive retrenchment packages and security of pensions, on the other hand, seem to be a strategies designed to encourage the exit of senior civil servants who are potentially disloyal to the new political and constitutional dispensation. Clearly, these financial developments in the senior civil service are in support of Knight's (1992) contention that material gain is a key factor in the bargaining calculus regarding formal institutions. This finding speaks to the constitutional level of influence effected by the senior civil service. Table B.B Averaga Monthly Salaries and Wages for the Central Government, 1991 Black Colored Indian White R/month 1 172 1 876 2 719 2 979 Chenge 9.8" 6.8" 9.0" 0.2" Reel Chenge (4.5") (7.8") (5.9") 13. 1" Source: Cooper et a1., 1 .993, p. 198 According to Hirschman (1970), senior civil servants, like other types of employees, have three basic options to express their demands and 182

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interests: to to their concerns, or to demonstrate or otherwise. Using the three categories of employee options as an organizing principle, I have constructed indices for each category from the survey instrument in Appendix A to analyze current trends in the South African senior civil service based on the tendencies identified in the survey sample. Although there are many possible permutations regarding the type and number of options that can be included in each category, these indices are of my own construction (only the broad classifications are borrowed from Hirschman (1970)), and are limited in their scope by the type of questions asked in the survey instrument. The Exit Index Table 5.7 i llustrates the exit option by length of service. The exit of senior civil servants is potentially troublesome for a future Black-led government for the following reasons: First, 46% of the total sample 'of senior civil servants are planning to leave public service in one way or another. This finding is based on an analysis of those respondents planning to exit, but without double counting the methods of departure when more than one option was indicated.

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Although the departure of senior civil servants will create opportunities for affirmative action programs to be implemented if these trends materialize, the large proportion involved may lead to staffing problems in the short run, subject to a margin of error of 10%. Table 8.7 Exit Index by Length of Service QuH the publ ic service and go to the private sector Emigrate out of South Africa Retire as soon as possible Under 15 yrs. 15 yrs & oyer 3 20 12 80 1 11 8 89 3 8 38 92 15 15.2 9 9.1 39 39.4 -Respondents indicating that they were 1 ikely or very likely to exercise one or more of the three exit options identified above (itemsQ8b,e, and i in the survey instrument). In 1992, prior to the resumption of formal negotiations, two. hundred and thirty-eight80 8Commission for Administration Annual Report, 1992. It is possible that this figure includes newly created positions--but it is assumed that this is not the case--since there was a general contraction of the senior civil service from approximately 1 500 individuals in 1990 to approximately 1 200 individuals in 1993.

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management posts beneath the level of DirectorGeneral were advertized outside the public service, which is another indication of turnover trends in the senior civil service. A conservative estimate is that there was a 20% turnover in 1992, but the potential turnover rate doubled in 1993 when formal negotiations were resumed as is being reported here. A mitigating factor, however, regarding the results of the survey is that the three exit options operate on variable time scales. Thus, it is more likely for an individual respondent to quit the civil service sooner than it is for him to retire, the latter option being more closely related to length of service. Second, there is at least a four times greater frequency of responses for the designated exit options among respondents who have over 15 years of experience in their counterparts who have less than 15 years of service. If senior civil servants exercised one or mote of their exit options, a considerable flight of skills would occur at the same time that administrative expertise is in short supply, particularly within the Black community. 185

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Table B.B Exit Index by Age Under 40 yrs. 40 yrs over 7 % % % Quit the public service and go to the private sector 0 0 15 100 15 15.2 Emigrate out of South Africa 0 0 9 100 9 9.1 Retire as soon as possible 0 0 39 100 39 39.4 -Respondents indicating that they were 1 ikely or very 1 ikely to exercise one or more of the three exit options identified above (items QBb,e, and i in the survey In sum, the exit tendencies81 depicted in Tables 6.7 and 6.8 are fairly predictable in light of the uncertain future senior public servants face under a Black-led government on instituting affirmative action programs aimed at achieving a 81The obverse cases, that is,the frequencies and percentages of those indicating that they would not quit the civil service, emigrate, and so on, and those who were neutra 1 on the subject may be found in Appendix B. This applies to all and indices when the focus is at one end of the scale of the survey instrument although attention must be paid to the phrasing of the questions when directions are reversed. When applicable, the one (1) to five (5) scale has been consolidated to "positive," "neutral," and "negative" categories for ease of analysis. 186

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more representative senior civil service. From the new government's perspective these trends are a mixed blessing because they create affirmative action opportunities while none (0%) of those leaving are under 40 years of age, a better 'return 'on future training investment in the short to medium term; but these exit trends also represent a loss of valuable skills over a relatively short period of time. Although senior civil servants obtained constitutional guarantees after the survey was conducted, this development is likely to increase their motivation to stay in public service only long enough to obtain retirement benefits without having to prolong their dependence on new political superiors. The Voice Index The voice option--and possible permutations--are the employee alternatives that should be of most interest to anew government. Table 6.9 depicts the voice index by opinion on negotiations, which were in progress at the time the survey was conducted. Table 6.9 holds a seemingly contradictory finding. The large frequency of responses for one

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or more of the voice options among respondents who supported negotiations indicates a high level of dissatisfaction regarding the prospects of the senior civil service, but it is disquiet tempered by general support for formal negotiations. Table 8.9 Voice Index by Opinion on Negotiations ice Protect your job interests through legal action Seek a transfer to a less politicized department Join or form an organization to serve and voice your interests Seek to influence and change civil service policies Positive 21 95 16 94 34 97 67 96 Negative 1 5 1 1 3 2 3 7 22 22.2 17 17.2 35 35.4 89 69.7 -Respondents indicat ing that they were 1 ikely or very 1 ikely to exercise one or more of the four voice options identified above ({tems Qaa,c,d, and h in the survey instrument). This result speaks to Adam and Moodley's (1993) observation that the South African power equation is one in which each side can prevent the other from exercising control. Consequently, neither side can govern alone peacefully without taking the vital interests of its antagonists seriously. The 188

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alternative is protracted violence without victory. which only the most rigid ideologues prefer over accommodation. Further support for this position is evident upon examining the distribution of opinion on negotiations. Of those respondents indicating a preference, 93 (96.9%) were in favor of negotiations, 2 (2.1%) did not favor the Multi-Party Negotiations Process, and 1 (1.0%) was uncertain regarding this issue. Moreover, 96 (97%) of the respondents specifically indicated that "the government has no real choice other than to negotiate with the ANC and others about Black participation in government." Only 3 (3%) did not agree with this statement (Q19a in the survey instrument). It is also important to note the distribution of response frequencies among the various voice options. The highest ranking option is to "seek to influence and change civil service policies." This denotes a substantial preference for remedies that are likely to be internal, or put a form of "constructive engagement." The evidence therefore points to senior civil servants having 189

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leverage regarding administrative affairs under a new government, at least by their own expectations. Dissatisfied senior civil servants can exercise one voice option by way of active obstruction. According to Latib(August/September, 1993), the South African senior civil service can be obstructive because senior bureaucrats control accumulated knowledge which they can use to define some of the constraints within which policies are to be implemented. The monopoly on expertise which senior civil servants have in their departments means that they dominate the general framework in which decisions are made, they help to define important questions, and they influence the direction of in support of their own proposals. Table 6.10 illustrates the extent to which those in the sample who anticipated a new constitutional and political. dispensation indicated that they would employ a fuMdamental tool at their disposal--the withholding of job related information. Table 6.10 illustrates an encouraging result. Among senior civil servants who anticipate a new 190

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constitutional and political dispensation--and therefore of interacting with Black co-workers-90 (91%) of them were willing to share job related information. The control of job related information is the most comprehensive and effective method of influencing one's working environment. Table 6.10 The Control of Job Related Information by Senior Civil Servants Expecting a New Political and Constitutional Dispensation Civil Servants Expecting a New Dispensation Positive Uncertain Negative Total (%) 7 7 7 Likely or Very Likely 90 1 0 91 (92) Neutral 6 0 0 ( 6) Unlikely or Very Unlikely 2 0 0 2 ( 2) Total 98 1 0 99 % 99 1 0 100 ( 100) -Q9c in the survey instrument. A SUbstantial willingness on the part of senior civil servants to share information signifies that a future Black-led government can be relatively confident of the professionalism of its senior bureaucrats, subject to a margin of error of 10%.

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This, however, is not an unqualified endorsement of the incumbents' motivations. Future administrative efficiency will not only be contingent on the general cooperation of the senior civil service, but also on the specific government policy in question and whether it stems from, or is perceived to stem from the ANC and its allies, or the National Party and its allies. A crude indication of what is happening on the ground, and perhaps not exclusively related to the senior civil service, is that public servants are following their own agendas irrespective of political developments. Louw (January 28 to February 3, 1994) reports that the Transitional Executive Council (TEC), the body which replaced the Multi-Party Negotiations Process and is mandated to level the political playing field in preparation for elections, was being foiled by an uncooperative state bureaucracy. He recounts that: a senior official conceded in private this week that the TEC has executive powers but lacks administrative capabi 1 ity. "We are dependent on civil servants for the execution of decisions taken by the council. In many cases they are either indifferent or hostile towards the TEC. (in the & p. 2) 192

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This stance bn the part of civil servants may reflect an "us" versus "them" attitude and can be reconciled with the results of Table 6.10 when viewed in this light. Having gained entry into the civil service (and passing a number of professional and litmus tests), the onus shifts to othersincluding political superiors--to prove their worth in the eyes" of the senior civi 1 service. The incumbent senior civil servant who is satisfied with her new colleague readily shares job related information with the view toward molding the newcomer in her own image and the culture of the senior civil service. Such proclivities are not conducive to an open, accountable, and democratic public service. To correct such tendencies, if they appear, a new should not only be aware and plan for such contingencies, but also take a systematic and long-term approach to solving the problem. In sum, the senior civil service is in overwhelming support of the direction in which the country is headed, but it is backing born of a lack of credible alternatives. What is more, it is only general support. When it comes to civil service 193

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matters, civil servants are willing to voice their concerns in ways which suggest that they are confident of their own power. The Loyalty Index The final category of employee alternative available to the South African senior civil service is to either demonstrate loyalty or to do otherwise. Table 6.11 illustrates the elements of the loyalty index and the proportion of senior civil servants who are positively motivated by these principles. Table 8.11 The Proportion of Senior.Civil-Servants Who are Positively Motivated by the Elements in the Loyalty Index Serving the the current a future duly elected gov. Abiding by the current a new constitution Q5f and Q5g in the survey instrument 82 57 62.8 57.6 "Respondents indicating that their motivations were strong very strong regarding one both of the loyalty alternatives identified above. Given the objective of a politically neutral and professional public service, the reverse ranking 194

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of options than those depicted in Table 6.11 could have been expected. But this finding is not totally surprising considering that the new constitution was a remote possibility at the time the survey was conducted and its contents an unknown entity. At a minimum, a new government can expect 57% of the incumbent senior civil service to be motivated by loyalty to the South African constitution, subject to a margin of error of 10%. Perhaps of more significance for practical governance is the finding that almost two-thirds of senior civil servants derive their primary professional and personal motivations from serving any government that is duly elected. Consequently, an ANC-led government has a solid foundation from which to embark on the democratization of the South African administrative system. Programs like affirmative action should therefore be carefully designed and implemented so as not to dilute the level of support inherent in the incumbent senior civil service. In the final analysis, it is equally important to place indications of loyalty to the constitution and any legitimately elected government within a

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context of competing influences that might vie for the loyalty of incumbent senior civil servants. Table 6.12 does this. Table 8.12 Ranking of Professional and Personal Motivations by Object of Motivation Your profession Representing the South African population as a whole Serving the current or a future duly elected government Abiding by the current or a new constitution Your superior(s) Your religion Your remuneration Representing your cultural/language group Representing your racial group Your political party It ranks competing objects of motivation and Mesn 1.53 1.95 2.20 2.38 2.B1 2.B8 2.94 3.5B 3.97 4.07 displays the mean for each response on a scale of 1 (very strong) to 5 (very weak) to the statement: "Please indicate the extent to which you derive your primary professional and personal motivations in your present capacity as a civi 1 servant from ..... (Q5 in the survey instrument). Table 6.12 depicts a 196

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recurring theme in this research, namely, that motivations grounded in personal identity and interests supersede any group based loyalties. Thus, the highest standing option indicates that motivation and satisfaction based on professional identity ranks higher than or racially based allegiances, which are in the neutral range of Table 6.12. It is safe to say that the principle of a politically-neutral and professional public service is well established in the existing corps of incumbent senior civil servants, subject to a margin of error of 10%. Supp6rt for this view is also forthcoming from the bottom placement of motivation derived from party affiliation, which is the only category in the negative range of Table 6.12. In general, senior civil servant subjects are only moderately motivated by their superior(s), their religion, and their remuneration. The most interesting finding is that respondents are strongly motivated by representing and serving the South African population as a whole. It is instructive to note that the ethos of a service (ranked 197

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second) stands both loyalty to a duly elected government (ranked third) and the constitution (ranked fourth). Perhaps this is the most significant democratic ideal that a truly public service could aspire to attain. A possible and practical variation of the loyalty option is the level of support that a new government can enjoy for its policies from the incumbent senior civil service. Table 6.13 depicts the support for select ANC policies among senior civil servants. Clearly, there is substantial support among senior civil service respondents for the ANC policies depicted in. Table 6.13. Are respondents merely being politically correct? In part, this is probably true. The high frequency of positive responses, however, is also a function of the way Q15 was framed. Unlike most other questions in the survey instrument which were structured on a Likert scale, the choices in Q15 were limited to "Yes," "No," and "Uncertain." 198

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Table 6.13 Support for Select ANe's Policiesiciesb 1) In its activities and functioning, the state should observe the principles of non-racialism and non-sexism, and encourage the same in all public and private bodies 97 2) A full-time independent office of the Ombud should be created,with wide powers to investigate complaints against members of the public service B8 3) All men and women entitled to vote should be entitled to stand for and occupy any position or office in any organ of government or administration 68 4) The civil service should be impartial in its functioning, and accountable both to parliament and the broad community it serves 99 5) The state should remove the barriers which keep large .ections of the population out of professional, and managerial positions 84 6) The state should adopt the implementation of programs aimed at achieving speedily the balanced structuring in non-racial form of the public service, defence and police forces, and the prison service 76 9B.O BB.9 6B.7 84.B 76.8 -See, inter alia, to bQuestions 15a-c, and 15e-15g. Respondents indicating "yes" (agree). But respondents have also been tonsistent in some of their responses. For example, the principle that the civil service should be impartial in its functioning, which enjoys unanimity in Table 6.13, is a prevalent theme. Both in response to Q11h and Q13f in the survey instrument, senior civil servant respondents disagreed, or strongly disagreed, that political affiliation and major political parties 199

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should be a consideration in staffing, managing, or configuring the civil service. On the first score, 81.8% of respondents felt this way, and on the second,79.8% believed this to be the case. Neither is a 88.9% level of support surprising for the policy of establishing an office of the Ombud (Public Protector). This is because the Ombudsman Act, No. 118 (S. Afr. 1979) had the same general purpose and was in force for some years prior to the ANC policy. Table 6.13 also depicts a high level of support (76.8%) for the implementation of programs aimed at achieving a nonracial public service. But as explained earlier, when individual interests are included in the calculus, this high level of support drops by a large margin. The same sort of reasoning can be advanced to explain the high levels of support for policies dealing'with non-sexism (1 and 3 in Table 6.13). When subjects were asked whether the composition of the sen'ior civil service should reflect South Africa's male/female ratios (Q13d), 33.3% of respondents disagreed, or strongly disagreed, with this statement. Similarly, 56.6% of senior civil service respondents believed that 200

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gender should not be a criterion for future hiring or promotional decisions (Q11c). If the remaining supportive tendencies suggested by Table 6.13 are genuine, then one can only be encouraged that an ANC-led government will encounter a senior civil service which is receptive to its policies, subject to a margin of error of In sum, respondent senior civil servants show a substantial degree of loyalty to the legitimacy of government--the current or a future duly elected government--but the primacy of the constitution was not clearly establ.ished in part because it was an abstract entity at the time the survey was conducted. Incumbent senior civil servants also expressed considerable support for several ANC policies, but this belies a more general feeling among respondents that the country would be worse off under a Black government. Besides the prevailing climate of being politically correct, it is probable that respondents are merely resigned to the implementation of these policies (the high level of support is therefore akin to a self-fulfilling prophesy), and it does not necessarily mean that

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senior civil servants genuinely favor the governance conditions that would prevail under Black rule. There is a clear indication, however, that the principle of professionalism enjoys sUbstantial support among senior civil service respondents. Hence, a solid foundation exists on which to build an impartial and representative public service. Conclusion In addition to the arguments offered above, four concluding remarks may aid the interpretation of the data in answer to the question "does the senior civil service wield significant influence on South African governance?" First, support for the premise that the incumbent senior civil service constitutes a political power bloc willing and capable of asserting its demands and interests is self evident in the text of the interim constitution. Additional signs that the presence of the senior civil service is being keenly felt abides in the timing and extent of remuneration increases effected on its behalf by the Commission for Administration. What is more, the senior civil service in expressing a motivation to influence and 202

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change civil service policies under a new government, is demonstrating a self awareness revolving around an assessment of its own residual political power. Second, in favoring the process of formal negotiations and certain policies of a future government, the senior civil service appears to be caught up in the societal dynamics causing such a sea change. The process of negotiations has probably itself created a convergence of views between the major protagonists. The primacy of the public interest and the rule of law therefore gain added importance in reflecting the values of the South African society at large rather than the two most powerful political parties. Third, there is substantial vacillation of opinion on the part of senior civil servants. This supports the more general contention of Schlemmer et al. (1991) that the essence of White political consciousness includes marked ambivalence. There appears to be a dualism involving a concern about White security under Black rule as well as a more enlightened concern with fairness, political justice, and general welfare (in Lee & Schlemmer, 203

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1991, p. 167). There is always a problem inherent in social research in extrapolating from general societal trends what self-interested individuals or groups are willing and capable of doing, even if they are in fundamental agreement with the direction in which their society is headed. Finally, taking into account natural attrition, the past and future departure of senior bureaucrats from public sector employment is tacit confirmation that they are not supportive of a Black-led government. On the other hand, the remaining senior civil servants who are not planning to leave public service in the short term are probably predisposed to professionalism, or alternatively, are supportive of a new government. To the degree that dissatisfied senior bureaucrats have already made their exit from public service renders the results of this research biased in favor of progressive attitudes. The departure of a large proportion of senior'civil servants, nevertheless, has a negative net impact on administrative efficiency. Preliminary indications based on the functioning of the TEe regarding the civil service's influence on South African governance has led the 204

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(January 3D, 1994) to comment that the TEC, trying to do everything except ensure a free and fair election. complains that it is bogged down, and that Pretoria's bureaucrats are frustrating its purposes. If this carries over into the government of national unity, the new South Africa may well be strangled at birth by red tape. (p. 18) The second and third points above have a neutral effect on the arguments. made previously and hence cannot be used to answer the question "does the senior civil service wield significant influence on South African governance?" The last point weighs in favor of a positive answer to the question posed, albeit in a passive way. The major support for a positive answer thus rests with the first point. On balance of the avai.lable evidence, the answer to the question posed is yes. Are Senior Civil Servants Significantly Predisposed to Protecting Existing Privilege? According to Parkins' (1979) theory of exclusionary social closure, inflated requirements of educational achievement and credential ism serve to protect existing privilege. Based on this premise, the following question can be fruitfully posed for purposes of this inquiry: Are incumbent

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senior civil servants significantly predisposed to protecting existing privilege and, consequently, will respondents rationalize their views in terms of maintaining professionalism, merit principles, and so on? Under the policy of apartheid trends within the civil service were established which favored White, male, Afrikaner-speaking South Africans. As a result, the senior civil service emerged as a fairly homogeneous group owing allegiance to the political party (NP) which had propelled it into the halls of power. Traditionally in sympathy with National Party ideology, but overwhelmed with the speed of political developments initiated by political leaders, the senior civil service moved--and is likely to move in the future--to maintain its status based on its residual administrative expertise to a greater extent than adherence to a specific party ideology. Are accurate assertions? Table 6.14 and the following analysis will demonstrate that they are true. Table 6.14 ranks the answers of senior civil servants sampled in response to the question: "Please indicate the degree to which you think the 206

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following employee attributes should be used in future hiring or promotional decisions" in the survey instrument), and depicts the mean for each category based on a scale of 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree). Table 6.14 Ranking of Employee Attributes for Purposes of Hiring and Promotional Decisions Technical/professional qualifications Educational qualifications Experience/seniority Ability to communicate in English Ability to communicate in English and Afrikaans Ability to communicate in one or more African languages Ability to communicate in Afrikaans Gender Race Political affiliation Mean 1.36 1.44 1. 75 .95 2.58 2.69 3.14 3.79 4.14 4.41 Upon inspection of Table 6.14 it is apparent that professional and educational qualifications are deemed by respondents to be the primary means by which to manage and staff the ranks of the senior civil service. By way of contrast, an individual's political affiliation is the least important factor. 207

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The findings of Table 6.14 can be fruitfully examined by the following criteria: (1) the tangible accomplishments of respondents; (2) the potential accomplishments of respondents and others; (3) the immutable factors of respondents and others; and (4) the social and political context in which senior public servants operate. The tangible accomplishments of respondents refers to those professional qualifications which were earned by individuals through personal initiative and sacrifice, and by virtue of the positions they in the senior civil service. Since the attainment of such qualifications is not predetermined, the advantage having been gained in competition, the natural tendency is to prevent any diminution in the value of the achievement in question relative .to the capabilities of others to gain the same or similar professional qualifications (potential accomplishment of others). On the other hand, having secured a specific level of seniority, this accomplishment is not in direct threat from outsiders. What is more, it is beyond the control of incumbents and consequently not of immediate concern (ranked third). 208

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It is competition from outside the public service that drives incumbent bureaucrats to be concerned with others paying their dues relative to their own professional accomplishments. An excess in the supply of qualified public administrators as a consequence of the availability of educational and technical credentials, reduces the demand and the real value of incumbent senior civil servants. The two major options that present themselves in such a situation are to either control the access to development opportunities, or to inflate the value of one's own professional accomplishments. The first option is out of the control of senior civil servants, therefore the tendency as Table 6.14 shows, is to emphasize those employee attributes stemming from personal merit. The second part of the question posed at the head of this section asks whether targeted officials will rationalize their views in terms of maintaining professionalism, merit principles, and so on. When asked what the probable effects of a Black-led government would be on the senior civil service, 62% of respondents .that it was likely or very likely that there would be reduced levels of 209

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professionalism (Q7b in the survey instrument). In the view of J. Grabe of the Commission for Administration, any personnel decision based on merit is "apartheid in reverse" (Personal Interview, March, 1993). This, of course, is the ultimate rationalization, in substance and in form. Similarly, D. du Toit of the Commission for Administration is of the opinion that "quotas" should play no role in the senior civil service, instead, there should be a program of affirmative action (Personal Interview, August, 1993). Extending the argument against any non-merit principles further, Len Dekker of the Transvaal Provincial Administration raises the question of where such a road'might lead beyond racial considerations: to ethnic, and other criteria? (Personal Interview, May, 1993). Racial and gender attributes are immutable factors. A senior bureaucrat cannot compete on the basis of these criteria--for example--when it comes to affirmative action. It is for this reason that

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race and gender occupy the bottom halfof Table 6.14, particularly when no specific advantage (or perhaps disadvantage) accrues by belonging to a group which is out of favor. Although learning new languages is relatively difficult for adults, it is not an insurmountable task. It is a "potential accomplishment" within the reach of incumbent senior civil servants and others. On average, senior bureaucrats are not familiar with an African language and hence not motivated to defend such an attribute--yet afforded the opportunity to acquire such skills. relative to outsiders--renders the placement of the various language options in the middle of Table 6.14 predictable according to the arguments advanced here. The precise ranking of specific languages, however, is more problematic. For example, ability to communicate in English and Afrikaans (the two former official languages) ,could have been 82Although the gender attribute falls within the bounds of the neutra 1 category, it is st ill troublesome because South Africa is aspiring to be a non-sexist state. The point I am making refers merely to the relative rankings of the various attributes in Table 6.14. 211

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anticipated to rank higher than senior civil servants' ability to communicate in English alone. The reverse is the case in Table 6.14. The relative ranking of specific language attributes is explicable when the social and political context in which senior public servants operate is factored in. English was the language of choice for formal negotiations, and according to Gerrie Fifield of the Commission for Administration, fortuitously so, because it afforded a common medium of communication among negotiators who were on average not conversant with other languages besides English and their own home languages (Personal Interview, November 30, 1993). On the other hand, ability to communicate in Afrikaans used to be an asset (a tangible accomplishment), but in the current legitimacy crisis it is neither an asset, nor a liability. This is reflected in its ranking and placement in the neutral of Table 6.14. Finally, the social and political context in which senior public servants function influences most directly the relative advantages of belonging to one political party or another. Political affiliation is easily the most changeable employee 212

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attribute. It is neither immutable like race, nor does it require substantial investment of time and effort like educational and technical qualifications. It is this elasticity in the context of an unstable environment that in large part drives the bottom ranking of thia employee attribute in Table 6.14. When asked what the probable effects of a Black-led government would be on the civil service, 74% of indicated that it was likely or very likely that a highly politicized senior civil service would ensue (Q7{ in the survey instrument). But, the current South African societal and political call for a nonpartisan,professional, and career personnel corps (G. Fifield, Personal Interview, November 30, 1993). Unlike the ability to communicate in Afrikaans, which is a benign characteristic, adherence to National Party ideology used to be an asset, but it is currently a liability. I quote Gerrie Fifield to provide another example of senior civil servants rationalizing developments affecting them, and to illustrate the uncomfortable situation of having to 213

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reconcile the senior civil service's partisanship of the past with the reality of trying to be politically neutral in the future: the public service cannot afford to lose the skills and expertise of the present corps of public servants due to illconceived restructuring efforts. No has a reservoir from which such public s,ervants can simply be replaced ... Political affiliations do not play any role at present and the Commission [for Administration] believes that it should not be allowed to become a selection in [the] future. To allow this would have serious consequences. (Personal Interview, November 30, 1993) This view is well represented in the low ranking of "political affiliation" relative to the other employee attributes in Table 6.14, and in its placement in the negative range of the one to five scale of the survey instrument. In sum, a theme of competition was used to interpret the findings depicted in Table 6.14. Further, the levels of-personal control and effort involved in effecting professional qualifications and other skills, together with the four criteria delineated earlier, are sound vehicles to explain the findings of Table 6.14. On the basis of the 83My emphas is. 214

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results reported here, the answer to the question posed at the head of this section is yes. In addition, these findings suggest that the protection of existing privilege is more catholic than Parkin's (1979) arguments revolving around social class. Conclusion Beyond questions of social class, ethnocentricism, and other macro views, a large portion of the findings of this research can be explained on the basis of individuals' attitudes and actions seeking to maximize personal benefit in the context of a rapidly changing social and political environment. Four criteria are in delineating the interplay between individuals' motivations and the in they find themselves: (1) the tangible accomplishments of individuals, (2) the potential accomplishments of individuals and their competitors, (3) the immutable, or non-competitive, factors of individuals and their rivals, and (4) the socia) and political context in individuals function. In. trying to justify (rationalize) their own attitudes and actions to themselves and others,

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individuals may resort to concepts of social class, race, professionalism, and other suitable vehicles. Future research on the South African senior civil service should therefore adopt methodologies which clearly demarcate the scale (individual or group) in question, and strive to establish the relationships between individual and group based factors. Is Public Sector Corruption a Significant Problem? The transition period which, for purposes of this study encompasses the decade of the '90s, is likely to be an interval of heightened government corruption in relation to periods both before and after this decade. This may be a by-product of social and economic chaos which, among other things, results in norms of behavior becoming more elastic in part because the priority between various sanctions changes, and legal enforcement is rendered less certain. South Africa also shares at least some of the political culture that in other parts of Africa has led to an environment conducive to maladministration and the advent of corruption. Across Africa, corruption has become endemic. The level of corruption is not easily quantified, 216

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but some countries have become better known for their graft than others (Latakgomo, December 20, 1993). Perhaps it is an overstatement, but according to Sparks (March 3, 1993), when counting the dangers that await the new South Africa, fears about socialism or nationalization or the redistribution of wealth should be put aside. "Corruption is the thing" (p: 12). Gerrie Fifield, speaking on behalf of the Commission for Administration, states that "it is ... acknowledged that there has been a substantial increase in the number of misconduct cases over the last 13 years in comparison to the sixties and seventies" (Personal Interview, November 3D, 1993). In perhaps the most celebrated corruption case recently, the South African government seized the financial administration of Lebowa. This led the (October 3, 1993, p. 24) to conclude that the homelands are "sumps of corruption" and that the corruption has reached levels which threaten even Finance Minister Keys' arduous financial reconstruction. The editorial goes on to argue for the dissolution of the rest of the homelands and offers reasons such as, the ruler of 217

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the Ciskei being the subject of a murder investigation, Venda being a place where things are done from time to time by witchcraft, and KwaZulu being a territory where arms and ammunition are wont to disappear as in South Africa itself. More specifically, the De Meyer Commission issued a 750-page indictment of the Lebowa government for squandering millions (Perlman, March 20, 1993). Similarly, the Auditor-General reprimanded the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei governments for "undisciplined conduct," including an inability to keep within financial guidelines and overspending on salaries February 23, 1993). The South African Chamber of Business also pressured the South African central government to expose the behind a wave of fraud and corruptibn in national State Departments following reports by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Public Accounts and the AuditorGeneral (Chester, February 26, 1993). In addition, the Pickard Commission found numerous examples of deficient management and several cases of serious malpractice in the former Department of Development Aid February 23, 1993). 218

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Another instance of government corruption involving almost three billion rand was revealed by a former Auditor-General pertaining to the Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund, which is administered by the Department of Transport. In a report by a former Assistant Chief Auditor, the Department of Transport is also implicated in allocation of state subsidies to a transport company, the bribery of transport officials, corruption and theft at Jan Smuts Airport outside Johannesburg, and the large-scale squandering of money (Pauw, February 12, 1993). Measures adopted to combat the recent spate of corruption include: the creation of the Department of State Expenditure in April 1991; the development of a new persoAnel and salary system (PERSAL) together with a revised financial management the introduction of a new computerized provisioning administration system; and a proposed twelve-point plan introduced by the Minister of State Expenditure (G. Fifield, Personal Interview, November 30, 1993). The latter measure is reproduced as Appendix I and can serve as framework for future researchers to determine the effectiveness of these particular 219

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counter-corruption tactics. These developments are tacit confirmation that government corruption is on the increase, requiring preventative steps to reduce it. Looking to the future, a possible scenario for South Africa according to Adam and Mood1ey (1993), is that it descends into a patronage system with changing state clients favoring shifting alliances of expediency in a new c1iente1ism. This c1ientelism [would be] characterized by high levels of corruption and little democratic accountability. South Africa would resemble the "authoritarian populism" of many African states, particularly Zimbabwe, where the White minority remains economically privileged and oils a kleptocracy in which an indigenous Black bourgeoisie dominates the political scene exclusively in the name of a victorious liberation struggle. Zimbabwe's burgeoning civil service increased from 60 000 at the time of independence to 180 000 twelve years later, despite a declining economy and an increasing national debt. (p. 203) Perhaps it is indicative of things to come that the bureaucracies of the" six non-independent homelands, although likely to be reincorporated into South Africa proper, have been recently enlarged by a record number of employees. The Central Statistical Service reports that between March 1991 220

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and March 1993, the number of civil servants for all six non-independent homelands jumped by 45 187 to 247 639 (in Chandler Kotlolo, August 17, 1993). Senior civil servants themselves expect an increase in government graft. When asked whether increased corruption would be likely under a Black-led government (Q7h in the survey instrument), 51% of respondent senior civil servants believed that this would be likely or very likely to materialize. The first indication of how accountable a Black-led government will be, can be gleaned from the functioning of the TEe. In its assessment of the functioning of this body, the (January 1994) reports that the ANC applied for permission from the to use Financial Rands to buy a commercial building, would effectively amount to a discount. Not content with currency fiddles, the ANC also tried to use its new clout to avoid import duties on electronic equipment and Land Rovers. The concludes that "if the TEC .is any guide, thenext five years will be similar in many respects to the past five, only more so" (p. 18). Clearly, there is a perception that government corruption is both a 221

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problem and a possibility in the South African transition to democracy. In conclusion, preliminary indications are that public sector corruption in South Africa is a significant problem. As much attention, if not more, should be paid to this problem as to affirmative action and other policy issues that can impact the governance conditions of the transition. My intent here was to provide both a beginning and a challenge to other researchers to explore and establish the patterns 6f relationship between social, economic, and political uncertainty, and the levels of government corruption. South Africa presents a suitable case study, particularly' within the context of the rest of the African continent. Conclusion The South African seriior civil service constitutes a significant power bloc willing and capable of asserting its demands and interests. Focus on bureaucratic leadership is therefore desirable because, as a group, senior public servants can affect the stability of the South African transition to democracy. The senior civil 222

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service however lacks legitimacy and should, at a minimum, be restructured to be more representative of the South African community as a whole. A new government will have to contend with senior civil service exit trends which offer both opportunities and obstacles. These trends create affirmative action openings at the same time that they create skills shortages. A new government should embark on a dual strategy of responsible affirmative action and methods by which to expand the overall pool of potential Black public administrators. Although the incumbent senior civil is in overwhelming support of the direction in which the country is headed, it is backing born of a lack of credible alternatiVes. A new government will have to contend with senior civil servants who are willing to voice their concerns in ways which suggest that they are confident of their own power. A new government should stress the following priorities: the public interest, the rule of law, the principles of professionalism, and the constitution. Incumbent senior civil servants are also substantially apprehensive concerning their future under a Black government. A new government 223

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should allay these fears by rewarding and motivating cooperative public servants who demonstrate loyalty and professionalism. Beyond questions of social class, ethnocentricism, professionalism,.and other macro views, a large portion of the findings of this research can be explained on the basis of individuals' attitudes and actions seeking to maximize personal benefit in the context of a rapidly changing social and political environment. Future research should therefore adopt methodologies which clearly demarcate the scale (individual or group) in question, and strive to establish the relationships between individual and group based factors. 224

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CHAPTER 7 EMPIRICAL CONCLUSIONS, THEORETICAL CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS The first all race elections slated for April, 1994 will be a watershed for the political development of South Africa, but whether true democracy will be ushered in remains an open question. South Africa might or might not muddle through to democracy. Democracy might or might not be consolidated. The public service, the senior civil service, will be one key ingredient in South Africa's democratic experiment. Obstruction by civil servants together with revelations that some officials were more concerned with emptying the public purse ahead of political change, may create difficulties for a joint government. The ANC is aware of the problem and has attempted to allay civil service fears. It is possible that the problem will abate as the future becomes more certain, but tension may also be just beginning. As the major political force in the Government of 225

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National Unity, the ANC will confront tremendous pressure to accommodate its supporters in the new bureaucracy. Although the problem may be partially ameliorated by retaining the services of incumbents while allowing the public service to swell, the ANC will not be able to stay in government long unless at least some senior civil service positions are transferred to Black aspirants. White resentment within the civil service seems inevitable, and when it materializes, it will impede the state's functioning and create new dangers of more determined disruption from within (Friedman, 1993, p. 187). The power struggle, expectations, and emotions generated by elections could tempt the elite of the Government of National Unity to revert to authoritarian rule to suppress common adversaries. "Both the National Party and the ANC contain hegemonic strains; their respect frir liberal pluralism is neither absolute nor unqualified" (Adam & Moodley, 1993, p. 37). According to Adam and Moodley (1993, p. 61), South Africa is headed toward a corporatist state where business, unionized labor, and state bureaucrats agree among themselves about 226

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the basics of an unwritten contract at the expense of the unorganized and weaker sections of the population. As Karl (1990, pp. 11-12) aptly notes, the foundational pacts on which some new democracies are built are necessarily comprehensive and inclusive of virtually all politically strategic actors. Because pacts are negotiated compromises in which competing forces agree to forsake their capacity to harm each other by extending guarantees not to jeopardize each other's vital interests, they are successful only when they include all significantly threatening interests. Consequently . the typical foundational pact includes agreements between the military civilians concerning the conditions for establishing civilian rule, an agreement between political parties to compete and the methods of electoral contestation, and a "social contract" among business associations, trade unions, and state agencies concerning market arrangements, property rights, and the distribution of benefits. The actual decision to enter into a pact can create a habit of negotiation and pact making based on a "pact to make pacts." These pacts serve to ensure survivability 227

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because they are simultaneously inclusionary plus designed to restrict the scope of representation to reassure traditional dominant classes that their vital interests will be coddled. In essence they are antidemocratic mechanisms, bargained by elites, which seek to create a deliberate socioeconomic and political contract that demobilizes emerging mass actors while delineating the extent to which all actors can participate or wield power in the future. (Karl, 1990, p. 12) This dissertation has argued that the South African bureaucracy represents one politically strategic interest group which was able to shape constitution and pact making in such a way that its vital interests were accommodated at the expense of" truly democratic governance. Thus, the incumbent senior civil service is not apartheid's rear guard--it is the frontline of a burgeoning bureaucratic-led domination. For South Africa's democratic experiment to succeed new conditions must prevail. In the process of fixing what is perceived to be the only problem, namely the legacies of apartheid, the individual's responsibility for his or her own destiny has been eroded. Consequently, individuals think of 228

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themselves as collectively entitled, but individually non-accountable. The solution is to fix the system in such a way that individual responsibility is strengthened, not further undermined (Tucker & Scott, 1992, p. 111). Responsibility for one's actions is one prerequisite. A sense of community is another. The psychological make-up of South Africans of all races does not display the ambivalent identities common in divided societies elsewhere. All South African groupings lack such self doubts and confront each other as equals. This perception of equality is an important requirement for successful negotiations and pacting, and perhaps even a minimal sense of community. "The chances of a future South African democracy and stability do not falter on incompatible identities but depend mainly on the promise of greater material equality in a common economy" (Adam Mood 1 ey, 1993. p. 222). But no country in modern times has made a successful transition to democracy starting from the South African position of 15 years of economic stagnation, and over 10 years of decline in per capita incomes (Tucker & Scott, 1992, p. 29). 229

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All race elections, the repeal of apartheid laws, and a new constitution are all necessary, but insufficient conditions for a lasting settlement. A democratic culture and a sense of community have not had time to take in South Africa. Witness the breakaway tendencles of the Zulus and conservative Afrikaner Whites who want a While recognizing their moral right to secede, enough effort has not been directed toward their concerns and the nurturing of a common nationhood. Without trust and political tolerance, not to mention racial tolerance, South Africa is likely to coalesce into oases of White privilege and pockets of disaffected minorities and This is a prescription for" degenerating into :a Yugoslavian-type civil war. The role of national political leaders thus becomes even more South Africa is fortunate to have :two able and charismatic leaders in Nelson Mandela F. W. de Klerk. Nobel Peace Prizes notwithstanding, politicians should set the example and th. tone for a minimal democratic culture to take hOild. Premature electioneering is not conducive to visionary leadership necessary to propel South Africa toward democracy. Although 230

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heightened expectations for early multi-party, elections are at a level where canceling them would invite chaos, following this exercise, national political leaders of all persuasions will face their greate.t challenge. True reconciliation is the only hope for effecting a Government of National Unity of its name. The next section summarizes the theoretical stemming from this study, and a temporal balance of power theory of transitions is proposed to account for the role that bureaucracies play in democratization in relation to other significant variables. A Tempora 1: Sa 1 ance of Power Theory of Transitions to Democracy The following discussion has a broad perspective and necessity only highlights a few aspects and variatiles of democratization together with select South Africa is again the vehicle of There are two major elements of the temporal balance of power of transitioris being proposed here. Fiirst, for a transition to occur the

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evolution of power in a particular society must be sufficiently developed with competing groups aligned in which produce a of power and where the outcome of political contestation is open-ended. Second, the success or failure of a transition is largely dependent on different indigenous factors and combination of factors that have a variable impa6t at different times, namely, on whether the democratization process in a particular society is in the beginning or consolidation phase. To begin with,it is necessary to delineate the five main proposed stages of the evolution of political power. First, the .aggregate sum of choices rational individuals make to maximize personal benefit through the advantages of collective action: result in dynamic power asymmetries among groups over time. C6mpeting groups are assumed to be willing to their power prerogatives, or to threaten to do so in a credible way. In:the socio-economic arena these power asymmetries:may lead to social closure and the exclusion of less: dominant groups; in the political arena, to revolution, transition, or the transfer of 232

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power through elections; and in the arena of conflict over formal institutions, to the creation or modification of social and political institutions which reflect the power balance among various competing groups at any given time. Second, competition occurs over scarce resources which manifests itself in a distributional conflict over outcomes, or the strategic means of influencing these outcomes, or both. In South Africa, the essence of this distributional conflict is captured by the slogans: "redistribution through growth" (government), and "growth through redistribution" (opposition). Third, in large part because of being engaged in the contest itself, competing groups have considerable knowledge of the power asymmetries between various groups and the status of resources, and engage ina pr:ocess of commun i cat ion. var i ous 1 y known as a political dialectic, collective bargaining, negotiations, and so on. All these forms of communication share the cycles of action, reaction, and learning that they induce in competing groups. Fourth, as a result of these processes when no 233

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new resources or strategic options are available in the short to medium term, competing groups seek to alter power imbalances in their favor by forming coalitions with similar minded groups. In the South African situation, the best examples of this are the Freedom All iance, ,and the ANC-led tripartite all iance. Finally, if and when government coalitions and opposition coalitions face riff in a rough of strength, they each have to account for the other camp's and weaknesses and the various constituencies within their own coalitions as well as those of the competing camp. The bureaucracy is one such constituency. The circumstances of the evolution of political power in South Africa have led to conditions suitable to a political transplacement. According to Huntington (1991), an essential ingredient for successful transplacements is a rough parity of strength. between government and opposition as well as on each side as to who would preva i 1 in a major; test of strength (p. 153). Although this is a; simple formulation involving only two broad groupings (government and opposition), it

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captures the essential South African power equation. But it is precisely because there is a crude parity of strength that it becomes pivotal to examine in more depth the uses of, and struggle for, political power (since the outcome is not predetermined in favor of the more powerful party). What is more, any parity of str,ngth between government and opposition is not:static. As suggested in Chapter 2, government and opposition strategies may change at various times during a transitibn in response to new political and social and may in turn generate shifttng equilibriums of power. For example, new political groups can be organized; existing groups can band together in new configurations; and former coalitions can disband, reconstitute themselves into new alliances, or accept secondary r:oles. Two question. will further the regarding the uses of, and struggle for, political power as it relates to South Africa: What elements of power is the South African government willing to give up? And what elements of power does the government to keep to ensure its political survival? (2) What does the opposition 235

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say w ill do, a d w hat w ill i tin fa c t dow h newfound power? Looking at the elements of power that the South African government is willing to give up, it is illustrative to note the following developments. President De Klerk announced on March 24, 1993 that South Africa had produced six nuclear devices during the '70s and '80s. The decision to undertake a nuclear weapons was taken in 1974, against the background of Soviet expansion in southern Africa and the build-up of Cuban forces in Angola. The program was abandoned in 1989, and the six nuclear bombs dismantled in 1990. By then, the Cubans were withdr.aw;ng from Angola, and the Cold War was all but over. Roberton and Fabricius (March 25, 1993) comment that "a nuclear deterrent had become not only superfluous, but an obstacle the development of Africa's international relations" (in p. 3). When other countries were, aryd are, striving to join the international nuclear club, the South African government this prestigious status symbol, and chose instead ,to concentrate on the real threat to its survival--the internal threat--and to 236

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willingly give up its nuclear weapons. As Whitfield (June 9, 1993) aptly comments, legislation being forced through the NPdominated parliament is designed to take away from a future government those. weapons which the NP accumulated for itself. A crude example is recent legislation designed to ensure that South Africa by the nuclear nonproliferatioh agreements. Or, as one cyn i ca 1 observer dr i 1 y commented: "The children are coming into the room so they are removing all the breakables." (in p. 16) According to, Adam and Moodley (1993), a devi6us design concerning the strategic discarding of is the government's preemptive privatization program. The ANC notes that "the current privatization program is simply transferring wealth to a and diminish the stock of assets and resources available to a future government to a pent-up demand for social services" (in & Moodley, p. 34). Similarly, the publicly funded and government controlled South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) writes Van Zyl (July 4, 1993), is "about to become a conglomerate of c9mpanies competing with private production houses; .. run by the same men who ran the old SABC" (in the: p. 20). 237

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Perhaps the most sinister form of "unloading" was the recent wholesale destruction of classified documents those relating to the national SecuritYiManagement System under P. W. Botha) by all government departments and the South African Defence Force on instructions issued by the State Security Council. In terms of the Archives Act, no record be destroyed without the authorization of the Director of State Archives. But the National Intelligence Service obtained a legal opinion--untested in court--declaring classified information exempt from the Archives Act (Davis, G. August ,13 to August 19, 1993, & Archives Director Dr. Nel, however, was of the opinion that classified documents fell within the ambit of the Archives Act (Dumbutshena, September 19, 1993, These developments speak both to the need for a historical record, and the importance of controlling vital "inside information." The elements of power that are essential for the South African government's political survival are the security fbrces, the civil service, and the fiscal resources of the state (in response to the 238

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second part of the first question posed above). Louw (September to September 9, 1993) reports that the National Party's plan to stay in power is tied up with the economy, the civil service, and the armed forces (in p. 6). This is correct, at least on two counts. The government is only a player, and not the determinant factor in the economy. The fiscal resources of the South African government and how they are utilized are a better indication of National Party motives and priorities. For example, national budgets of the past favored the government's White constituency and the security forces at the expense of social programs for Blacks. A 1992 International Monetary Fund report titled a suggests a basic reordering of priorities within the social spending budget to adequately redress social problems without resorting to deficit financing, or fiscal revenues. The report recommends increases in expenditure on Africans and a substantial reduction in expenditure on Whites. It also notes that South African defence expenditure exceeded that of other upper-middle income countries (in Cooper et al., 1993, p. 550). 239

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The role of the military in the transition to democracy is described by Huntington (1991) as the "praetorian problem. In his review of worldwide democratization patterns, Huntington (1991) notes that "while militaries that cooperated in democratization might attempt to prolong their power, the record suggests that in countries at middle levels of ec6ndmic development military power tended to diminish (p. 241).B4 To ensure the of the military, the South African interim constitution provides the civilian control of the South African Defence Force "subject to the directions of the Minister responsible for and, during a state of national defence, of the President."Bs Presumably a "state of national defence" means the conditions that would if South Africa were attack by a foreign state. In sum, gover:nments in the process of giving up power do so selectively and try to retain those elements of power ,which will maximize their B4The of Cooperative security forces" in Figure 7.1 supports this point. BSInterim Constitution, 225. 240

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influence under the new political dynamics, The three most important elements to do this are: (1) control of central government finances; (2) control of the security forces, particularly in the short term or transition/period; and (3) control of the national civil bureaucracy, particularly in the medium term or consolidation period, The question that arises then is whether there are degrees of transplacement. If an out-going authoritarian government controls these tools of governance, even at substantially reduced levels, perhaps it is more accurate to describe the process of transition as "transplacing," The second part of the South African power equation revolves around what the ANC says it will do, and what wi 11 it in fact do wi th its newfound power. One issue: is particularly illustrative. According to Paul Jourdan, the ANC's mineral and energy coordinator, ANC policy was to return mineral rights to the State, but instituting a nationalization program. He acknowledged, however, that this policy be perceived as a "legislative, form of nationalization (in Tommey, January 13, 1994, p. "The 241

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organization's advisers generally preface their public statements with the caveat that they represent the speaker's personal views, not those of the organization. That simply adds to uncertainty among prospective investors in job-creating enterprises, and confusion is heaped on uncertainty when differences between the various ANC factions surface" December 13,1993). Ken Andrew of the Democratic Party accused the ANC of speaking with a tongue on economic policy, with realists holding sway one day, and the socialists on the ,next (iM "Nyatsumba, December 14, p. 13). "What will the ANC actually do regarding minerals? Nelson Mandela openly" stated on February 9, 1994 that South Africa's minerals belonged to the State, and miningdompanies should lease the right to exploit mineraiS. The people own the mineral rights, with the State acting as trustee (Rantao & Soderlund, Februar:y 10,1994, p. 3). But nationalization is likely to benefit the middle classes which are politically powerful and entrenched in relations, rather than poor people (Moll, T., 1991). Which people'" was Mr. 242

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Mandela thinking of? What the ANC will do concerning this and other issues remains to be seen. The point is; that opposition groups while they are not yet in power in societies with underdeveloped political contestation systems mask their true intentions to suit the eXlsting economic and political order. If, and when, they do come to power they are like1y to feel less constrained to undertake and programs that would have beeri anathema under the old regime. That is why it is important to gauge ahead of time through public statements and proclamations of the opposition what their genuine intentions might be so as to level the political playing'field, at least as far as the voters are concerned. The discussidn up to this poirit has concentrated on the "power" component of the temporal balance of power theory of transitions. Let us turn to the "temporal" component next. Many hav. been proposed and numerous independent variables identified to explain democratization. :Huntington pp. 37-38) identifies such variables, but concludes that no single factor is sufficient to 243

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explain the advent of democracy, and that democratization is the result of a combination of causes. Although Huntington (1991) engages in an extensive analysis of the reasons for democratization, he does not offer a detailed discussion regarding the relationship of temporal factors to most of his independent variables.ss Horowitz (1991), on the other hand, acknowledges the question of time in his discussion of propitious sequencing of political change, and eeThese are: high level of economic wealth; relatively equal distribution of income and/or wealth; a market economy; economic development & social modernization; a feudal aristocracy at some point in the history of society; the absence of feudalism in the society; a strong bourgeoisie; a strong middle class; high levels of literacy & education; and instrumental rather than consummatory culture; Protestantism; social pluralism & strong intermediate groups; the development of political contestation before the expansion of political participation; democratic authority structures within social groups, particularly those closely connected to politics; low 1 eve 1 s of c i v i 1 vi 0 1 ence; low 1 eve 1 s of po 1 i ca 1 polarization & political leaders committed to democracy; exper i ence as a Br i t ish co 1 ony; traditions of toleration & compromise; occupation by a prodemocratic foreign power; influence by a prodemocraticforeign power; elite desire to democratic traditions of respect for law & individual rights; communal (ethnic, racial, religious) communal heterogeneity; consensus on political & social values; and absence of consensus on political and social values. 244

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explains that "propitious sequencing has full participation as the culmination. of a process of building national identity and legitimate authority, rather than the reverse" (p. 114). But Horowitz (1991) correlates only a small number of variables as they apply to South Africa to his temporal analysis. A two-dimensional division of time as it pertains to democratization together with those independent variables most meaningful South African democratization are identified in Figure 7.1 as they are likely to relate to both divisions of time. It. is beyond. the scope of this study to examine each independent variable in detail, suffice it to say, that the importance of a cooperative South African civil service for democratic consolidation lies in what Peters (1984) describes as the bureaucracy's ability to step in to fill a power vacuum in the political system. This will hold true for South Africa since newly legitimated political parties, previously untested in general elections, will invariably alter the political power equation in such a way that it will take some time for a new and relatively stable power equilibrium to

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surface. Figure 7.1 Some of the Useful and Desirable Indigenous Conditions for Successful Democratization in South Africa and Other Divided Societies Desipable Conditions Pepiod Mope De'sipable Cond i t.i ons Tpansilion Pepiod Desipable 'Acceptable levels of political and civil violence. 'Independent and objective mass media. 'Acceptable levels of government corruption. 'Political tolerance. 'A supportive or tolerant religious establishment. 'Cooperative Civil Service. 'Acceptable budget priorities and adequate fiscal resources for governance .. 'Acdountable and responsive officials. 'Effective and respected democratic institutions. 'Independent, objective, and diverse mass media. 'A democratic culture. Hope Dcsipable 'Cooperative security forces. 'Dynamic political leaders. 'The form, but not the substance of democracy being negotiable. 'Level political playing field. 'Timely, free, and fair general elections. 'Democrlltic Constitution. Justiciable Bill of Rights. 'Independent Judiciary. Regular free, and fair general elections. 'A sound and expanding economy. According to Horowitz (1991, p. 279), timing is a central issue in any transition to democracy. The advantages of gradualism--in permitting the growth of new elites, of forces that can check each other, of interests with a in democracy, of new expectations and modes of cooperation--cannot be 246

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enough. The significance of appropriate timing is highlighted by way of Figure 7.1. This figure illustrates, among other things, the importance of the cooperation of the security forces in the transition to democracy, and the cooperation of the civil service in the consolidation of democracy. In summary, the discussion focused on South to delineate the two major elements of the proposed temporal balance of power theory of transitions. The evolution of political power was explained, and by implication, the primacy of the development of political contestation in divided societies. Further, it is submitted that democratization causes are better understood in a two-dimensional temporal context. Future research regarding democratization in a given society would.be particularly fruitful if the relative importance and the relationships among three variables are explored in detail. These are: the selective use of government fiscal resources throughout a given period of liberalization and transition, the influence that the armed or security forces exert in the beginning stages of 247

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democratization, and the influence that the national bureaucracy exerts in the consolidation of democratic gains. Concerning the latter, it would be especially worthwhile to identify the tools that the bureaucracy has at its disposal to impact governance conditions, and the means by which a democratic government can counter any negative tendencies in an incumbent bureaucracy. The next and final section moves the discussion from theory to praxis. To this end, four recommendations are offered to help bring about democratic public administration in South Africa. Recommendations One: Create a "Critical Mass" of Model Democratic Institutions The first democratic structures to emerge in 1994 are likely to have an inordinate influence on future developments and must therefore be carefully nurtured and designed. It is not possible to clearly demarcate policies and programs in the transition period and those which will need to be cultivated in the consolidation period. The former 248

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will have profound consequences on the latter. But the distinction is important since it is not possible to engage immediately and simultaneously on all desirable fronts. Priorities must therefore be established. A "critical mass" of democratic institutions will help to' create a snowballing effect which will.make each successive democratic institution easier to establish and consolidate. Extending this further, a limited number of small institutions should be targeted for strategic intervention. As a first step, good candidate institutions include, but should not be limited to, the senior civil service, and in particular, the future Public Service Commission. This recommendation operationalizes Horowitz's (1991) habituation model outlined in Chapter 2. The making of a paragon democratic institution requires both structural and procedural design considerations. In terms of structure; the racial and gender composition of the senior civil service and the Public Service Commission should reflect as much as possible the composition of the South African community as whole. This will entail affirmative action programs which are fair and well 249

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thought out. Specific recommendations are offered in the next subsection. Besides the planned rationalization of homeland administrations into central and provincial government structures, new configurations of democratic institutions should be explored. A good start would be to systematically link the prospective Office of the Public Protector to the future Public Service.Commission. The association between police organizations and the prosecuting organs of a state might be fruitful examples to examine. At a minimum, the annual reports to Parliament required of the Public Protector should be made available to the Public Service Commission. These should form part of the plan of how to improve service delivery. According to Papie Moloto of the ANC, efficient service delivery is the true test of a democratic public service (Personal Interview, May, 1993). In terms of pr06edural strategies, the principle of "sovereign immunity" should be relaxed, particularly when government corruption results in individual injury. Freedom of information legislation should also be enacted. The purpose of 250

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a freedom of information statute would be to grant individuals the right of access to all official records pertaining to themselves. Louw (August/September, 1993) argues that "concerned people should have the right to provide countervailing information and demand explanations for disproportionate interest in them. Where Parliament has not mandated confidentiality, they should be given sources of incriminating or contentious information" (p. 20). Further, legislation dealing with appropriate administrative procedures be adopted. Oversight and legal control of the bureaucracy is an essential element of democratic governance. The South African Law Commission has drafted an Administrative Review Bil,l, but'Davis (May 28 to June 3, 1993) asks: "Why did the Commission not even look at the nature and correct procedures adopted in the United States? .. In [South Africa], where administrators draft subordinate legislation, ... the least one could have hoped for was some response by the Commission to this authoritarian practice" (p. 23). The Administrative Procedure Act (1946) of the

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United States could be emulated to achieve three objectives: First, that departments of state publicize information about their organization, field office locations, general purposes, and procedures. Second, that a set of minimum procedural requirements be created concerning department rule-making and adjudication. Third, that the right to, procedure for, and scope of judicial review be clearly established (Rosenbloom, 1989, p. 556). Modifying and paraphrasing Rosenbloom's (1989) discussion to fit the South African situation, the following recommendations are advanced: (1) Departments of state should be required to make available information concerning their rules, opinions, orders, and public records, all of which should be published in the and other more accessible sources.. In addition, departmental central and field office locations should be publ icized. At these loca,tions members of the public should be able to obtain information, decisions and the means by which decisions were arrived at, get mission statements and functions, make submittals or requests, and obtain the 252

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requirements for all formal and informal procedures. (2) Notice and opportunity for hearing must also be afforded to substantially interested members of the public and other substantially interested parties when department rule-making or rule-changing is imminent. "(3) Departmental decision-making should include adjudication procedures which are based on statutory provisions, or constitutional requirements, or both. Notice, opportunity for hearing, legal representation, the right to crossexamination, the right to present evidence and make proposals, and a record of the proceedings should be the hallmarks of administrative adjudication. (4) Judicial review of administrative actions should also be catered for based on an assessment of whether potential administrative remedies have been exhausted, whether an individual has standing to sue, and whether or not primary jurisdiction rests with a particular department of state, or not. Although these recommendations will place a heavy burden on government departments, the broad principles outlined here should be seriously considered in the interest of democratic governance. Davis (May 28 to June 3, 1993) reports that the 253

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development of the South African Administrative Review Bill was hampered because the Law Commission's original proposal that an administrative decision could be reviewed by an appropriate judicial court based on whether the principles of natural just'ice had been breached, did not meet with the approval of the Department of Justice. Davis writes: The Department of Justice, more concerned with artificial just{ce, suggested that these "principles should not apply to every decision because to so comply would place an almost impossible burden on ... governmental departments." Amazingly, the [Sciuth African Law] Commission agreed and has now watered down its recommendation to meet an argument which places bureaucratic inconvenience above justice and accountability. (p. 23) My intent here was to provide possible guidelines that could be used iM the drafting of freedom of information and administrative procedure legislation. The details, of course, need to be tailored to the South context and capabilities, and the actual substance of such legislation will have to evolve over time, in part based on case law. In conclusion, both structural and procedural mechanisms should be implemented to break down the

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entrenched secrecy and control ethos of the South African civil service. Two: Implement "Responsible" Affirmative Action and Training Aside from the inability of the public service to fulfil its requirements from the ranks of Whites," Black advancement is both desirable and feasible when one considers that the civil service in South Africa is a growth industry because of a" growing and increasingly urban population (Hugo, 1990). The need for a representative bureaucracy which is at the same time efficient and"effective requires the adoption of balancing tests involving both merit principles and immutable human attributes, namely, gender and race. In the short to medium term, affirmative action is the most promising strategy to effect a representative public bureaucracy. The need to maintain at least a minimal standard of professionalism in the face of an underqualified Black labor pool, however, necessitates programs that take both factors into account. The American system of granting limited test pOints to veterans seeking public employment 255

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could serve as a basic model for an affirmative action program in South Africa. This model has the advantage of preserving merit principles at the same time it creates opportunities at the margin for targeted groups. In-the South African context, the ability to communicate in more than two of the new official languages could serve as the cornerstone of a responsible affirmative action program. Unlike the stringent Afrikaans language requirement of the past which functioned as an effective barrier to a large segment of the South African population, an African languages criterion would only be operative at the margin. A points system for entry into the civil service could be designed which .awarded up to 80 percent of the available points for the work experience and level of technical and educational qualifications of applicants, and which awarded the remaining points in 5 percent increments for being female, or being conversant with more than two of the new official languages, or both. Previously disadvantaged groups, namely, Blacks and women, would thus gain a reasonable head start, provided that at base they are competitive in terms of 256

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experience, and technical and educational qualifications. Moreover, a record of racial and gender based statistics should be kept by all departments of state concerning the composition of their workforces, salary scales, appointments and promotions, training undertaken, and other relevant conditions of employment. These statistics should form part of the Public Commission's annual report to Parliament, and be made publicly available through the and other more accessible sources. Without such records it will be close to impossible to evaluate .the effectiveness of affirmative action programs. According to Harker et a1. (1991), a short term public administration training program is also urgently needed. The cost of this program, covering approximately 1B 000 trainees, is estimated to be approximately R30B million. Of this amount, approximately R1B.47 million will be needed to provide high-level training to Blacks in 600 key positions in government. Strategic positions include: economic and fiscal managers; legal and judicial personnel; and positions in technical 257

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such as educational staff and management, diplomatic staff, transport and communication officials, and the social development sector. In addition, intensive training courses such as. leadership skills and training of trainers should be undertaken, and scholarships targeted at key professions within the public sector. Together with the Harker (1991) proposals, it is recommended that all future education and training be undertaken in the context of inculcating democratic and ethical standards to foster political tolerance and professionalism. This would promote a stable and efficient geared toward serving the public interest. In addition to affirmative action and training, a long term approach to increase the pool of skilled Black workers is called for as well. Human resources development is intimately related to economic development in South Africa. Literacy improves productivity; education and training improves opportunities for income; and a better educated society will in general increase its relative political and economic standing (Harker et al., 1991, p. 16). According to the United States Agency

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for International Development (AID), disadvantaged South Africans education their highest development priority, essential to their efforts to challenge apartheid structures and to cultivate leaders for a non-racial democratic South Africa.57 A long-term strategy for the post-apartheid period must include a plan to substantially increase the number of Black students, and to achieve full desegregation of all tertiary institutions as a means of educating and training future Black public administrators. In conclusion, the benefits derived by both short-term and long-term strategies will have a differential impact on the senior civil service, but all benefits will eventually permeate and change the character of the South African civil eervice. Three: Solicit the Support of the Public For too long the South African civil service has only had an officious relationship with most of the people it is supposed to serve. Given the illegitimacy of apartheid institutions, Tucker and 57Sprangler, note 50. 259

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Scott (1992) suggest that a change from top-down decision making to a process of consultation involving all segments of society should be embarked on. This will entail the creation of a series of area-specific and problem-specific forums to aid inthe management of selected geographical and problem areas. Fortunately, there has been considerable progress in this domain.ss For example, the National manpower Commission has been restructured to include all trade unions and employer bodies. What is lacking is a Civil Service Forum. Such a forum should be established. At a minimum, it should include members of the Public Service Commission; Office of the Public Protector; COSATU and public unions; provincial and other sub-national governmental and employee bodies; and SSA number of forums are already operative, they include the: National Economic Forum, National Education and Training Forum, National Electrification Forum, National Forum, National Housing Forum, National Consultative Forum on Drought and Rural Development, National Transport Policy Forum, Local Negotiating Forum, Telecommun.ications Forum, and Tourism Forum. There are also about 100 local negotiating arenas, like Metropolitan Chamber_in Johannesburg, and 10 regional economic and development forums (Haffajee, December 23 to 29, 1993, p. 10). 260

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interested non-governmental organizations. The purpose of such a forum should be five-fold: (1) to design strategies aimed at achieving a representative civil service at national and provincial levels, (2) to promote an efficient and effective public sector, (3) to recommend methods to improve service delivery to all segments of society, (4) to propose democratic administrative procedures, and (5) to recommend. means by which to improve the training, education, and professionalism of the public sector. According to Haffajee (December 23 to December 29, 1993), such a forum would makeit easier for a new government to implement programs since policy positions would have been debated in detail, and the canvassing of positions would not need not be undertaken anew. forums serve as a training ground for future leaders by schooling politicians and others in policy formulation and negotiation (p. 10). In sum, the success of other public policy forums speaks to the desirability of establishing a Public Service Forum as one of the means to effect a truly democratic service. 261

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Four: Solicit the Support of the International Community South Africa can learn much from the experience of neighboring countries particularly, and Zimbabwe. Incumbent senior civil servants. particularly Black officials with advancement potential. would benefit most from such contacts. Harker et al. (1991) recommend a program of study visits and work experience attachments to other counties in the region. Skilled personnel and technical experts from the region could be seconded for short periods to South African institutions and organizations to assist institution-building during the transition. Training programs could also be linked with high level internships in government departments, study visits, exchanges, and networking with supportive countries' bureaucracies. Harker et al. (1991) also suggest" that the human resource structures of the Southern African Development Community, especially regional institutions like the Eastern and Southern African Management Institute (ESAMI), Pan-African institute for Development (PAID), Mananga Agricultural Management Center (MAMC), and the youth Center in 262

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Lusaka be fully utilized to facilitate human resource development. In addition to the Harker et al. (1991) proposals, assistance should be sought for scholarships and other material aid from AID. In sum, besides gaining monetary or professional benefits through these programs, overseas training has the added advantage of not being burdened with apartheid ideology. It also avoids the pitfall of creating an entrenched cadre of trainers on whom a new government would be overly dependent. In general, contributions should be solicited from the West for peacekeeping, voter education, election monitoring, and democratic institutionbuilding. And attention is called for, according to Adam and Moodley (1993, p. for neglected areas of foreign development assistance, namely, professional policing, AIDS education, women's rights, low-cost housing, public works programs, and tourist development.

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APPENDIX A: South African Senior Civil Service Surve:t Instrument and Cover Letters SECTION I: JOB SATISFACTION 1. How long have you worked in the civil service? (a) under 1 year. (b) 1 year to under 5 years. (c) 5 years to under 10 years. (d) 0 10 years to under 15 years. ee) 0 15 years to under 20 years. (f) 0 20 years to under 25 years. (g) 0 25 years to under 30 years. (h) 0 30 years 'and over. 2. How long have you been in your present position? (a) 0 under 1 year. (b) 0 1 year to under 5 years. (c) 0 5 years to under years. (d) 0 10 years to under 15 years. ee) 0 15 years to under 20 years. (f) 20 years to under 25 years. (g) 0 25 years to under 30 years. (h) 30 years and over. Q 3. Please indicate your opinion concerning the following characteristics of your present job: a) Opportunity to gain .. .... .. ......... J_ ...... ....... _J_ .. __ .... _._ .... .. ___ .. ___ ...... J_ ... .... _. __ .. 264

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b) Opportunity to influence department pol icies c) Opportunity to grow professionally d) Opportunity to perform a useful public service e) Recognition of my contribution to the department f) Sufficient remuneration for my efforts g) Opportunity to develop congenial relationships among colleagues h)' Adequa te resources to perform any assigned tasks ;5 Key: 1 = Strongly Agree; 2 = Agree; 3 = Neutral; 4 = Disagree; 5 = Strongly Disagree. Q 4a. What is your title or. job classification in your present position and for which government department do you work? 265

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Q 4b. Do you feel that your title and remuneration accurately reflect the level of your responsibilities? (a) 0 Yes (b) 0 No (c) 0 Uncertain/Don't know Q 5. Please indicate the extent to which you derive your primary professional and personal motivations in your present capacity as a civil servant from: ... ,.;:;:,,a) Your profession b) Your political party c) Your rel igion d) Your superior(s) e) Representing your racial group f) Serving the current or a future duly elected government g) Abiding by the current or a new constitution h) Representing your cultural/language group i) Your remuneration j) Representing the South African population as a whole k) Other (please specify) Key: 1 = Very Strong; 2 = Strong; 3 = Neutral; 4 = Weak; 5 = Very Weak. 266

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Q 6. Could you mention what you feel are the two major problems facing the South African civil service at the moment: (a)-------------------------------------------------(b)------------------------------------------------SECTION II: ATTITUDES AND BELIEFS Q 7. What do you think wi'l be the most likely effects of a Black-led government on the senior civil service? a) Widespread retrenchments b) Reduced levels of professionalism c) Increased transparency 1 234 5 ...... --..... ................ .......... ..... -..... -_. __ __ ............. _-_. __ -_ .. .. ....... --_._. ......... ......... --_._---d) Expansion to accommodate Black civil servants e) Increased accountability __ .... .. ..... _..J ........ ... _. __ _L .. ___ ._ ..... ... ____ ._........ .. .. ... ... ..... 1 267

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1 / /1 111 4 . .. t 1 2 3 5

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1'1' ....... .... .. -.-.. ---....................... -----.---.. .. -.... b) Qu itt he I' public service and go to the private .. ___ ._ .... ...... .. _________ ._ ... ,, ____ ._ .. "._,, __ ........ ___ .. ...... _._ ........ _ __ .. ... .. ..... ,, __ .. ....... 1 c) Seek a transfer to a less politicized 1 d) Join or form an organization to serve and voice your interests ... n .. .... _._._ .. __ .. ___ ........ .._._ .. ___ __ ...... _.-.. _-_.-..... .-... .. ....... -.y ._ .. _-_................ -_. __ ... ...... e) Emigrate out of South Africa f) Develop your professional skills to advance your civil service career g) Stay in the civi 1 ser.vice even if demoted h) Seek to influence and change civil service policies _.......... __ ........ __ .............. _----..... __ -i) Retire as soon as possible --t-_.._ .... _-..... ..... ... Key: 1 = Very Likely; 2 = Likely; 3 = Neutral; 4 = Unlikely; 5 = Very Unlikely. 269

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Q 9. If you find yourself after the next general elections having to interact on a daily basis with Black co-workers who are not your subordinates. please indicate how likely it would be for you to: .. : .. a) Maintain your professiona 1 ism and continue with your normal practices --....... ..... -_ _-_ ........ __ ...... _-........ -......... __ ...... b) Cooperate only to the degree to maintain a working relationship c) Withhold important information related to the job d) Cooperate fully and willingly share e) Be less inclined to fo 11 ow instructions and orders from superiors ..... --... --.----..... -.................. -....... .. --............. _--.......... __ .... _... _--_ .... _-_ ....... ... ...... --_ -... _....... f) Feel less motivated in your work _._. ___ ... _._" .. .... .. "" ... ".,, __ __ .",,_. ___ ........... __ ..... _J_ ... __ ....... ..... __ ._._,, __ ..... _____ .... .. ... __ ............... .. _____ .J_ ......... .. _. __ ... ___ .1. 270

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1"' ..... ---.. -1' ............... h) Fee 1 'i! I I resentful that your Black colleagues did not pay their 1: Ii) Prepare for tense interpersonal I j) Eager 1 y awa k) Other (please I, specify), Key: 1 .Very Likely; 2 Likely: 3 Neutral; 4 = Unlikely; 5 = Unlikely. Q10. What are some of the methods.that a new government can use to ensure that the senior civil service will be responsive to its 271

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Q11. Please indicate the degree to which you think the following employee attributes should be used in future hiring or promotional decisions: 5 ----1---------t---j--qualifications, I, b) Ability to communicate in Afrikaans c) Gender d) Technical/ professional qual ifications --.--... ...... --_--_ __ ... -_._-_ ......... ............ __ ...... -........ -e) Ability to communicate in English f) Race g) Abi 1 ity to communicate in one or more African languages h) Political affiliation i) Ab i 1 ity to communicate in English and Afrikaans j) Experience/ seniority 272

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g) ,1 h) Afrikaans/ English speaking ratios ;) Other (please specify) Key: 1 = Strongly Agree; 2 = Agree; 3 = Neutral: 4 = Disagree; 5 = Strongly Disagree. What role should Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) and Affirmative Action (AA) policies play under a new government? Q1S. The following statements relate either directly or indirectly to the civil service. Please indicate whether you agree disagree or have regarding the following concepts: a) In its activities.and functioning, the state should observe the principles of non racialism and non-sexism, and encourage I t ........ .. .. .. 11 b) A full-time independent office of the ; ____ ._. .. .... ........ _._ .... .. 274

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'f .. ----------.. .. -.. -----.... -... -...... --..... ----.---.--.. -............ ,--.... c) A 11 men and women ent i t led to vote shou 1 d be ent i t 1 ed to stand for and occupy I II any position or office in any organ of ... .. .. .. ... .. .. ... ...... ..... ---......... .... -... -.......................... -............. -. _._ ... ... J .................. d) Job and pensions security for state employees should be included in a new constitution e) The civil service should be impartial ,in its functioning, and accountable both to parliament and to the broad community it serves f) The state should remove the barriers which keep large sections of the population out of technical, professional and managerial positions g) The state should adopt the implementation of programs aimed at achieving speedily the balanced ,structuring iri of the public service, defence and police forces, and the prison service h) The Constitution should incorporate special provisions to safeguard the security forces and functionaries and institutions such as the Auditor-General, the Ombudsman and the for Administration against political ... c.:..,--=.:;;::" __ Key: 1 = Yes; 2 = .No; 3 = No Opinion. Q16. Please indicate the degree to which you believe the following societal conditions are likely to occur if Slacks were to rule South Africa: '1':::""''''-:::::::::::;::::::::'''::;:::::::'''':::::::''::;::;'''::'';'''::::::'::''''''::::::'i'"""="::::::::";j"'::::::"::;:;::::""'''''T''::O:::'''''''''''''';:O;'::::"::r;::;""':""""":::::r'"::''-'"'''':::::::::::''''''' 111415 ..... --.. -... -------.... -.. -..... ....................... -.... -... --.--.. -.... _-.--......... --.-.... ---... -.. ---.... --.. -................ __ .. -.-.. -..... ...... .. .. .. .. 1 a) Order and Safety would be .. .... _. __ .. __ ____ L ..... _____ .L_. __ .. _._J. ___ .. ____ ._._.L .. __ ._._. __ 1 ... .. ___ .. _11 275

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Wh te occupa tiona 1 secur ity wou d 1 c) White incomes and standards of living would decline d) Afrikaans language and culture would be weakened e) White iving habits would have to change f) Standards of pub 1 ic administration would fall g) No serious or permanent changes h) Other (please specify) ... IQIB is adapted lee and 1991] Key: = Likely; = Likely; = Neutral; 4 = Unlikely; 5 = Unlikely. Q17. SECTION lIt: GENERAL Do you anticipate a new constitutional and political dispensation in the near future? DYes o No Uncertain/Don't know 276

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Q18a. Do you support the current round of talks between the government and the various groups at the multi-party negotiating forum? o Yes (go to Q18b) o No (go to Q18c) o Uncertain/Don't know Q18b. If you answered "Yes" to Q18a, what do you expect the practical outcome of these negotiations to be, and how long do you think it will take to implement agreed upon resolutions? Q18c. If you answered "No" to Q18a, what plan of action would you recommend that the South African government follow? Q19. Please indicate whether you agree disagree or have regarding the following statements: r:;:.::':::'"'''''"'''''"'''''"'''::::::'::='::::'::'::::'::'::::::'''::'::''''':'''':::::::''''':::::,"'::::::::::::"'="""":::::::,""":::;"':,,""""''';:::::::::::::;,,,,::,''''''',,:::::::::::::::::'-"'::::;:""r-:::::::::::::::"""""'="-:::;::::::=:::" a) The government has no real choice other than to negotiate with the ANC and others about Black participation b) The government has a choice to negotiate with moderate Black groups aside from the ANC .. .. .. ... .......... -.. ... .. .... -........ .... .. ... .. .. __ .. ..... ... __ ........................ ..... ........... ... ....... .... __ _._._ ...... .. 277

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........ -.... .. -.. --.-..... -....... -........ -.... -.... .. -..... ................. -............ -.-............. -.......... -.. -... --.. -............... -.......................................................... T ...... .. .. "1'1 .... __ .-.-" .. "" .. -... -....... -......................... -.---.. ..... -... --..... ... -.. -.... _-.,,_ ....... -....... .. -.... -.-...................... -.................................................. .... -J .. .. .. --.. .. J... .... .. 1 .. Democracy Characteristics Democracy .... ... _._ ...... __ .. ........................ _---_ ......... .. ..... __ ... ....... ..... ... __ ._ ..... _.. ..... __ .... .. c ......... -j--.... .................. -_.-." ......... '-""'-'''''''._-' ........ .. ..... -..... ..... "--.. 1--.--.... ...... _... -.......... representat ives __ __

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1'1' ....... ---.. -... -.......... -................. -.. -.. -.... ----.. -.. ---.-.. l .. .. ----. ---+----" --.-.--.-.-.. --.... --.-.----.... -.--.--.. -.. --.--.-.. -... _-.-.. -"-'--'--'-" ...... --.... -----....... ... -.. -.... ...... __ .... .. --_ .. .... r .. .. .... ___ ............ .._ .. _____ ._ .. ____ ........... .. ... _._._._ .... __ ......... _._ ...... ....... ___ ._ ........... .. 4 recent past.

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Q22. Which one political party or organization do you support the most (listed alphabetically)? (a) African National Congress (b) Afrikaner Volksfront (c) Afrikaner Volksunie (d) Afrikaner Vryheidstigting Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (f) Azanian People's Organization (g) Black Consciousness Movement of Azania (h) Boerentia Party of South Africa (i) Boerestaat Party (j) Conservative Party (k) Democratic Party Herstigte Nasionale Party em) Inkatha Freedom Party (n) Labour Party National Party (p) National People's Party Pan-Africanist Congress (r) Solidarity (s) South African Communist Party (t) United Party (u) Other (please specify) Q23a. Have you held any office in a political party organization in the past five years? Yes (b) 0 No Q23b. If "YES" to Q23a, what type of office and what level? SECTION IV: BACKGROUND INFORMATION Q24a. Respondent is: (i) Ma e (ii) 0 Female Q24b ( 0 Wh e (ii) 0 Black (iii) 0 Indian e i v' ) 0 Co lor e d 280

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To what age group do you belong: (a) 0 under 20 (b) 0 20 to under 30 (c) 0 30 to under 40 (d) 0 40 to under 50 (e) 0 50 to under 60 (f) 0 60 and over What is the highest level of your formal education? (a) 0 Standard 8 or less (b) 0 Senior Certificate/High school diploma (c) Technikon or college diploma. (d) Bachelor's or Bachelor's degree with honors. (e) 0 Master's degree (f) 0 Doctoral or professional degree. (g) 0 Other (please specify) Q27. Please indicate whether your base is R108 075 or more per annum: Yes No. No Response/I Consider this to be Confidential Information Q28. Do you consider yourself to be: (a) 0 Sk ill ed (b) 0 Semi-professional (c) 0 Professional Cd) 0 Other (please specify) 281

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COVER LETTER University of Colorado at Denver Internalional Center ror Adminlstrarion and Policy Graduate School or Public Arrairs 1445 Markel Slreel. Suile 380 Denver. Colorado 80202 Phone: (303) 0 Fax: (30l) 53-1-8774 September 13, 1993 Dear Servant of South Africa: We need your The International Center for Administration and Policy of the University of Colorado (U.S.A.) is conducting a survey of senior civil servants central government departments. Enclosed is a questionnaire which takes approximately 25 minutes to complete. Please take the time to complete it. There are no correct or incorrect answers, only your muchanticipated opinions. All responses will be treated confidentially and will not be traceable to individual respondents once the survey process has been concluded. The questionnaire booklet contains an identification number which will be used for follow-up purposes only. The information you provide will help the South African government's planning and will assist you in your own decision making by informing you of what your colleagues think about a number of issues concerning public service .. The results of this research will be offered for publication South Africa. Please drop your postage-paid, pre-addressed envelope in the mail by October 4, 1993. Thank you for your cooperation. Sincerely Nondas Bello Research As ociate, Graduate School of Public Affairs. you think. Franklin James, Professor of Public Policy Director, Ph. D. Program. P.S.: oThis questionnaire is available in Afrikaans upon demand. oIf you do not consider yourself to be a senior civil servant please pass this material on to one of your colleagues in the senior public service or return the blank booklet the envelope provided. 282

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FOLLOW-UP LETTER Uaiverslty of Colorado at Denver International Center for Administration and PoUq Graduate School PubUc Afraln Markel SIReI, Suite 380 Denver, Colorado 80202 Phone: (303) Fax: (303) 534-8774 ptember 21, 1993 ar Civil Servant of South Africa: short time ago I mailed you a questionnaire as part of my study the South African senior civil service. I am writing now to ge you to take the few minutes necessary to complete the iginal form. Without your input this important research will t be comprehensive. e results of. this research will be offered for publication in llth Africa, The information YQU provide will help the South rican government's planning and will assist you in your own making by informing you of what your colleagues think :)ut a number of issues concerning public service, Please member that your confidentiality is assured. will be glad to furnish you with a replacement a postage-paid,. pre-addressed envelope if terials are unavailable. A response by October greatly appreciated. questionnaire the original 4, 1993 would mk for your cooperation notwithstanding the many demands time, lcere ly yours, ldas Be os, ,earch .ssociate and ,D. Candidate, International Center, lduate School of Public Affairs. 283

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Q1 <15 years 15+ years APPENDIX B: Frequency and Percentage Tables 15 83 % 15.3 84.7 Cumu 1 15 98 f Missing = 1 Cumu 1 15.3 100.0 Key: f = frequency; % = Percentage; Cumul. f = Cumulative frequency; Cumul. % = Cumulative Percentage. Q2 1 year 14 1-5 years 51 5-10 years 25 10-15 years 3 30+ years 2 Q3A f % 14.7 53.7 26.3 3.2 2.1 f Cumu 1 14 65 90 93 95 Missing Cumu 1 f 4 Cumu 1. 14.7 68.4 94.7 97.9 100.0 Cumu 1 positive 89 89.9 89 89.9 neutral 6 6.1 95 96.0 negative 4 4.0 99 100.0 Cumul. Cumul. Q3B f % f % positive 85 85.9 85 85.9 neutral 9 9.1 94 94.9 negative 5 5. 1 99 100.0 284

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Q3C positive 84 84.8 neutral 12 12. 1 negative 3 3.0 % Cumu 1 84 96 99 Cumu 1 Cumu 1 84.8 97.0 100.0 Cumu 1 % positive 97 98.0 97 98.0 neutral 1 1.0 98 99.0 negative 1 1.0 99 100.0 Cumul. Cumul. Q3E % % positive 84 84.8 84 84.8 neutral 13 13. 1 97 98.0 negative 2 2.0 99 100.0 Cumul . Cumu 1. Q3F % positive 42 42.4 42 42.4 neutral 34 34.3 76 76.8 negative 23 23.2 99 100.0 Cumu 1 Cumul. Q3G positive 81 81.8 81 81.8 neutral 18 18.2 99 100.0 Cumul. Cumul. Q3H positive 50 50.5 50 50.5 neutral 19 19.2 69 69.7 negative 30 30.3 99 100.0 285

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Q4B no yes uncertain Q5A strong neutral Q5B 28 63 8 93 6 28.3 63.6 8.1 93.9 6.1 Cumul. 28 91 99 Cumul. 93 99 Cumu 1. Cumul. 28.3 91 .9 100.0 Cumu 1 93.9 100.0 Cumul. % ----------------------------------------------------strong 3 3.0 3 3.0 neutral 36 36.4 39 39.4 weak 60 60.6 99 100.0 Cumu 1 Cumu 1. Q5C % % strong 37 37.4 37 37.4 neutral 37 37.4 74 74.7 weak 25 25.3 99 100.0 Cumul. Cumul. Q5D % strong neutral weak Q5E strong neutral weak 34 52 13 3 40 56 34.3 52.5 13. 1 3.0 40.4 56.6 286 34 86 99 Cumu 3 43 99 34.3 86.9 100.0 Cumu 1 % 3.0 43.4 100.0

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Q5F % strong 62 62.6 neutral 31 31.3 weak 6 6.1 Q5G Cumu 1 62 93 99 Cumu 1 Cumu 1 62.6 93.9 100.0 Cumu 1 % ----------------------------------------------------strong 57 57.6 57 57.6 neutral 32 32.3 89 89.9 weak 10 10. 1 99 100.0 Cumul. Cumu 1 Q5H % strong 13 13. 1 13 13. 1 neutral 43 43.4 56 56.6 weak 43 43.4 99 100.0 Cumul .. Cumul. Q51 % strong 35 35.4 35 35.4 neutral 41 41.4 76 76.8 weak 23 23.2 99 Cumul. Cumu 1. Q5J % strong 76 76.8 76 76.8 neutral 17 17.2 93 93.9 weak 6 6.1 99 Cumu 1. Cumul. Q7A % likely 45 45.5 45 45.5 neutral 23 23.2 68 68.7 unlikely 31 31.3 99 287

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Cumu 1 Cumu 1 Q7B % likely 61 61.6 61 61.6 neutral 27 27.3 88 88.9 unlikely 1 1 11. 1 99 100.0 Cumul. Cumu 1 Q7C % % likely 33 33.3 33 33.3 neutral 35 35.4 68 68.7 unlikely 31 31.3 99 100.0 Cumu 1 Cumu 1 Q7D likely 97 98.0 97 98.0 unlikely 2 2.0 99 100.0 Cumul. Cumul. Q7E likely 28 28.3 28 28.3 neutral 29 29.3 57 57.6 unlikely 42 42.4 99 100.0 Cumul. Cumul. Q7F % likely 48 48.5 48 48.5 neutral 32 32.3 80 80.8 unlikely 19 19.2 99 100.0 Cumul. Cumul. Q7G % likely 56 56.6 56 56.6 neutral 29 29.3 85 85.9 unlikely 14 14.1 99 100.0 288

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Cumu 1 Cumu 1 Q7H % likely 50 50.5 50 50.5 neutral 34 34.3 84 84.8 unlikely 15 15.2 99 100.0 Cumu 1 Cumu 1 Q71 % likely 73 73.7 73 73.7 neutral 17 17.2 90 90.9 unlikely 9 9.1 99 100.0 Cumu 1 Cumu 1. Q7J % likely 62 62.6 62 62.6 neutral 19 19.2 81 81.8 unlikely 18 18.2 99 100.0 Cumul. Cumu 1. Q8A % % likely 23 23.2 23 23.2 neutral 34 34.3 57 57.6 unlikely 42 42.4 99 100.0 Cumu 1. Cumu 1 Q8B % likely 15 15.2 15 15.2 neutral 22 22.2 37 37.4 unlikely 62 62.6 99 100.0 Cumul. Cumu 1 Q8C % likely 19 19.2 19 19.2 neutral 19 19.2 38 38.4 unlikely 61 61.6 99 100.0 289

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Q8D likely neutral unlikely Q8E likely neutral unlikely Q8F 37 27 35 9 1 1 79 % 37.4 27.3 35.4 9. 1 11. 1 79.8 Cumul. 37 64 99 Cumul. 9 20 99 Cumu 1. Cumul. 37.4 64.6 100.0 Cumul. % 9.1 20.2 100.0 Cumul. % likely 60 60.6 60 60.6 neutral 26 26.3 86 86.9 unlikely 13 13. 1 99 100.0 Cumul. Cumu 1. Q8G likely 15 15.2 15 15.2 neutral 25 25.3 40 40.4 unl ikely 59 59.6 99 100.0 Cumul. Cumu 1 Q8H % likely neutral unlikely Q8l likely neutral unlikely 71 18 10 39 30 30 71.7 18.2 10. 1 % 39.4 30.3 30.3 290 71 89 99 Cumul. 39 69 99 71.7 89.9 100.0 Cumu 1 39.4 69.7 100.0

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Q9A positive 94 94.9 neutral 5 5.1 Q9B Cumul. 94 99 Cumu 1 Cumu 1 94.9 100.0 Cumu 1 positive 10 10.1 10 10.1 neutral 20 20.2 30 30.3 negative 69 69.7 99 100.0 Cumul. Cumul. Q9C positive 2 2.0 2 2.0 neutral 6 6. 1 8 8. 1 negative 91 91.9 99 100.0 Cumu 1. Cumul. positive 94 94.9 94 94.9 neutral 3 3.0 97 98.0 negative 2 2.0 99 100.0 Cumul. Cumul. Q9E positive 3 3.0 3 3.0 neutral 12 12. 1 15 15.2 negative 84 84.8 99 100.0 Cumul. Cumu Q9F positive 7 7. 1 7 7. 1 neutral 15 15.2 22 22.2 negative 77 77.8 99 100.0 291

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Q9G positive neutral negative Q9H pos i t i ve neutral negative positive neutral negative Q9J 94 4 1 7 28 64 18 25 56 % 94.9 4.0 1.0 7 1 28.3 64.6 18.2 25.3 56.6 Cumu 1 Cumu 1 % 94 94.9 98 99.0 99 100.0 Cumu 1 Cumu 1 % 7 35 99 Cumul. 18 43 Cumu 1 7 1 35.4 100.0 Cumu 1 18.2 43.4 100.0 Cumu 1 positive 76 76 .. 8 76 76.8 neutral 22 22.2 98 99.0 negative 1 1.0 99 100.0 Cumu 1 Cumu 1 Q11A agree neutral Q11B agree neutral disagree 95 4 28 40 31 96.0 4.0 28.3 40.4 31.3 292 95 99 Cumul. 28 68 99 96.0 100.0 Cumu 1 28.3 68.7 100.0

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Q11C agree neutral disagree Q11D agree neutral Q11E 8 35 56 98 1 8. 1 35.4 56.6 % Cumul. 8 43 99 Cumul. 98 99 Cumul. Cumu 1 % 8. 1 43.4 Cumu 1 % Cumul. agree 82 82.8 82 82.8 neutral 15 15.2 97 disagree 2 99 Cumul. Cumu 1 Q11F % agree 3 3 neutral 27 27.3 30 disagree 69 69.7 99 100.0 Cumul. Cumul. Q11G % % agree 43 43.4 43 43.4 neutral 44 44.4 87 87.9 disagree 12 12. 1 99 100.0 Cumul. Cumu 1 Q11H % % agree 2 2.0 2 2.0 neutral 16 16.2 18 18.2 disagree 81 81.8 99 100.0 293

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011 agree neutral disagree 011 J 49 41 9 49.5 41.4 9.1 Cumul. Cumu 1 % 49 49.5 99 Cumul. Cumul. % agree 89 89.9 89 89.9 neutral 8 8. 1 97 98.0 disagree 2 99 Cumu 1 Cumul. 013A agree 43 43.4 43 43.4 neutral 27 27.3 70 70.7 disagree 29 29.3 99 100.0 Cumul Cumul. 0138 % % agree 5 5. 1 5 5. 1 neutral 32 32.3 37 37.4 disagree 62 62.6 99 Cumul. Cumul. 013C % ----------------------------------------------------agree neutral disagree 013D agree neutral disagree 31 32 36 29 37 33 31.3 32.3 36.4 % 29.3 37.4 33.3 294 31 63 99 Cumul. 29 66 99 31.3 63.6 Cumul. 29.3 66.7

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Cumu 1 Cumu 1 Q13E % % agree 13 13. 1 13 13. 1 neutral 35 35.4 48 48.5 disagree 51 51.5 99 100.0 Cumu 1 Cumu 1 Q13F -% % agree 4 4.0 4 4.0 neutral 16 16.2 20 20.2 disagree 79 79.8 99 100.0 Cumul. Cumu 1 Q13G % agree 24 24.2 24 24.2 neutral 37 37.4 61 61.6 disagree 38 38.4 99 100.0 Cumu 1. Cumu 1. Q13H agree 15 15.2 15 15.2 neutral 39 39.4 54 54.5 disagree 45 45.5 99 100.0 Cumul. Cumul. Q15A % yes uncertain Q15B yes uncertain 1 97 1 2 88 9 1.0 98.0 2.0 88.9 9.1 295 98 99 Cumul. 2 90 99 99.0 100.0 Cumu' -2.0 90.9 100.0

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Q15C no yes uncertain Q15D no yes uncertain Q15E 25 68 7 90 2 % 25.3 68.7 6.1 % 7 1 90.9 2.0 % Cumu 1 25 93 99 Cumu 1 7 97 99 Cumu 1 Cumu 1 % 25.3 93.9 100.0 Cumu 1 % 7. 1 98.0 100.0 Cumu 1 % yes 99 100.0 99 100.0 Cumul. Cumul. Q15F % % no 5 5.1 5 5.1 yes 84 84.8 89 89.9 uncertain 10 10. 1 99 100.0 Cumul. Cumul. Q15G % % no 10 10.1 10 10.1 yes 76 76.8 86 86.9 uncertain 13 13. 1 99 100.0 Cumul. Cumul. Q15H % % no 1 1.0 1 1.0 yes 95 96.0 96 97.0 uncertain 3 3.0 99 100.0 296

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Cumu 1. Cumu 1 Q16A % likely 39 39.4 39 39.4 neutral 32 32.3 71 71.7 unlikely 28 28.3 99 100.0 Cumu 1 Cumu 1 Q168 % % 1 ike 1 y 67 67.7 67 67.7 neutral 14 14. 1 81 81.8 unlikely 18 18.2 99 100.0 Cumul. Cumu 1 Q16C % % likely 76 76.8 76 76.8 neutral 12 12. 1 88 88.9 unlikely 1 1 11. 1 99 100.0 Cumul. Cumu 1 Q16D % % likely 55 55.6 55 55.6 neutral 13 13. 1 68 68.7 unlikely 31 31.3 99 100.0 Cumul. Cumul. Q16E % % likely 69 69.7 69 69.7 neutral 17 17.2 86 86.9 unl ikely 13 13. 1 99 100.0 Cumu 1. Cumu 1 Q16F % % likely 62 62.6 62 62.6 neutral 22 22.2 84 84.8 unlikely 15 15.2 99 100.0 297

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Q16G % % Q17 Q18A Q19A Q19B Q19C 18 31 50 98 2 93 1 3 96 50 44 5 89 7 3 18.2 31.3 50.5 % 99.0 1.0 % 2. 1 96.9 1.0 3.0 97.0 50.5 44.4 5.1 89.9 7.1 3.0 298 18 49 99 98 99 2 95 96 18.2 49.5 100.0 % 99.0 100.0 2.1 99.0 100.0 3 3 99 50 94 99 89 96 99 3.0 100.0 % 50.5 94.9 100.0 % 89.9 97.0 100.0

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Q19D no 87 87.9 yes 6 6.1 uncertain 6 6.1 Q19E Cumu 1 87 93 99 Cumul. Cumu 1 87.9 93.9 100.0 Cumu 1 no 78 78.8 78 78.8 yes 5 5. 1 83 83.8 uncertain 16 16.2 99 100.0 Cumul. Cumul. Q20A agree 98 99.0 98 99.0 neutral 1 1.0 99 100.0 Cumu 1 Cumu 1 Q20B % agree 92 92.9 92 92.9 neutral 6 6.1 98 99.0 disagree 1 1.0 99 100.0 Cumul. Cumul. Q20C agree 96 97.0 96 97.0 neutral 3 3.0 99 100.0 Cumu 1 Cumul. Q20D % agree 85 85.9 85 85.9 neutral 10 10. 1 95 96.0 disagree 4 4.0 99 100.0 299

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Q20E agree neutral Q20F agree neutral disagree Q20G agree neutral Q20H agree neutral Q201 97 2 64 23 12 94 5 97 2 % 98.0 2.0 64.6 23.2 12. 1 94.9 5.1 98.0 2.0 Cumul. 97 99 Cumu 1 64 87 99 Cumul. 94 99 Cumul. 97 99 Cumul. Cumu 1 % 98.0 100.0 Cumu 1 64.6 87.9 100.0 Cumul. 94.9 100.0 Cumul. % 98.0 100.0 Cumu 1 agree neutral 97 98.0 2.0 300 97 99 98.0 100.0

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Q22 % CP DP 15 16.7 NP 49 54.4 other 18 20.0 IFP 3 3.3 AVF 2 2.2 ANC 2 2.2 Cumu 1 1 16 65 83 86 88 90 Cumu 1 1 1 17.8 72.2 92.2 95.6 97.8 100.0 f Missing = 9 Key: CP = Conservative Party; DP = Democratic Party: NP = National Party; other = other parties, those .indicating they were apolitical, etc; IFP = Inkatha Freedom Party; AVF = Afrikaner Volksfront; ANC = African National Congress. Q23A no 98 100.0 Q24A Cumul. 98 Cumul. 100.0 f Missing = 1 Cumu 1 Cumu Male Female Q24B White Colored Indian Black 93 6 89 4 4 1 301 93.9 6.1 90.8 4.1 4.1 1.0 93 99 Cumu 1 89 93 97 98 93.9 100.0 Cumu 90.8 94.9 99.0 100.0 f Missing = 1

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<40 years 40+ years
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APPENDIX C: Interviews Conducted Calitz, E. (November 9, 1993), Director-General, Department of Finance. Cronin, J. (November 8, 1993), Head of the Department of Information and Publicity, South African Communist Party. De Klerk, J. H., (October 19,1993), Director: Americas, Department of Foreign Affairs. Dekker, L (May 14, 1993), Director-General, Transvaal Provincial Administration. Du Toit, D. S. (August 24, 1993), Chief Director, Labor Relations, Commission for Administration. Fifield, G. (November 30, 1993), Chief Director: Personnel Utilization and General Systems, Commission for Administration. Funde, E., (March 11,1993), Civil Service Unit, ANC. Grabe, J. J. (March 23, 1993), Deputy DirectorGeneral. Commission for Administration. Graham, P. (October 18, 1993), Program Director, Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa. Moloto, P. (May 13, 1993), Human Resources Department, ANC. Thornhill, C. (October 11, 1993), Professor, University of Pretoria. Van der Merwe, A. (May 14, 1993), Department of Constitutional Development. 303

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APPENDIX D: Constitutional Principles The Constitution of South Africa shall provide for the establishment of one sovereign state, a common South African citizenship and a democratic system of government committed to achieving equality between men and women and people of all races. u Everyone shall enjoy all universally accepted fundamental rights, freedoms and civil liberties, which shall be provided for and protected by entrenched and justiciable provisions in the Constitution, which shall be drafted after having given due consideration to the fundamental rights contained in Chapter 3 of this Constitution. UI The Constitution shall prohibit racial, gender and all other forms of discrimination and shall promote racial and gender &.quality and national unity. IV The Constitution shall be the supreme law of the land. It shall binding on all organs of state at all levels of government. V The legal system shall ensure the equality of all before the law and an equitable legal process. Equality before the law includes laws, programmes or activities that have as their object the amelioration of the conditions of the disadvantaged, including those disadvantaged on the grounds of race, colour or gender. There shall be a separation of powers between the legislature, executive and judiciary, with appropriate checks and balances to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness. VU The judiciary shall be appropriately qualified, independent and impartial and shall have the power and jurisdiction to safeguard and enforce the Constitution and all fundamental rights. VIII There shall be representative government embracing multi-party democracy, regular elections. universal adult suffrage, a common voters' roll, and, in general, proportional representation. IX Provision shall be made for freedom of information so that there can be open and accountable administration at all levels of government. X Formal legislative procedures shall be adhered to by legislative organs at all levels of government. XI The diversity of language and culture shall be acknowledged and protected, and conditions for their promotion shall be encouraged. 304

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XII Collective rights of self-determination in fonning, joining and maintaining organs of civil society, including linguistic, cultural and religious associations, shall, on the basis of non-discrimination and free association, be recognised and protected. XIII The institution, status and role of traditional leadership, according to indigenous law, shall be recognised and protected in the Constitution. Indigenous law, like common law, shall be recognised and applied by the courts, subject to the fundamental rights contained in the Constitution and to legislation dealing specifically therewith. XIV Provision shall made for participation of minority political parties in the legislative process in a manner consistent with democracy. xv Amendments to the Constitution shall re.quire special procedures involving special majorities. XVI Government shall be structured at national, provincial and local levels. XVII At each level of government there shall be democratic representation. This principle shall not derogate from the provisions of Principle XIII. XVIII The powers, boundaries and functions of the national government and provincial governments shall be defined in the Constitution. Amendments to the Constitution which alter the powers, boundaries, functions or institutions of provinces shall in addition to any other procedures specified in the Constitution for constitutional amendments, require the approval of a special majority of the legislatures of the provinces, alternatively, if there is such a chamber, a two-thirds majority of a chamber of Parliament composed of provincial representatives, and if the amendment concerns specific provinces only, the approval ofthe legislatures of such provinces will also be needed. Provision shall be made for obtaining the views of a provincial legislature concerning all constitutional amendments regarding its powers, boundaries and functions. XIX The powers and functions at the national and provincial levels of government shall include exclusive and concurrent powers as well as the power to perform functions for other levels of government on an agency or delegation basis. 305

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xx Each level of government shall have appropriate and adequate legislative and executive powers and functions that will enable each levello function elfectively. The allocation of powers between different levels of government shall be made on a basis which is conducive to financial viability at each level of government and to effective public administration, and which recognises the need for and promotes national unity and legitimate provincial autonomy and acknowledges cultural diversity. XXI The following criteria shall be applied in the allocation of powers to the national government and the provincial governments: I. The level at which decisions can be taken most effectively in respect of the quality and rendering of services, shall be the level responsible and accountable for the quality and the rendering of the services, and such level shall accordingly be empowered by the Constitution to do so. 2. Where it is necessary for the maintenance of essential national standards, for the establishment of minimum standards required for the rendering of services, the maintenance of economic unity, the maintenance of national security or the prevention of unreasonable action taken by one province which is prejudicial 10 the interests of another province or the country as a whole, the Constitution shall empower the national government to intervene through legislation or such other steps as may be defined in the Constitution. J. Where there is necessity for South Africa to speak with one voice. or to act as a single entity-in particular in relation to other states-powers should be allocated to the national government. 4. Where uniformity across the nation is required for a particular function, the legislative power over that function should be allocated predominantly, if not wholly. to the national government. S. The determination of national economic policies, and the power to promote interprovincial commerce and to protect the common market in respect of the mobility of goods, services, capital and labour, should be allocated to the national government. 6. Provincial governments shall have powers, either exclusively or concurrently with the national government, for the purposes of provincial planning and development and the rendering of services; and in respect of aspects of government dealing with specific socioeconomic and cultural needs and the general wellbeing of the inhabitants of the province. 7. Where mutual co-operation is essential or desirable or where it is required to guarantee equality of opportunity or access to a government service, the powers should be allocated concurrently to the national government and the provincial governments. 8. The Constitution shall specify how powers which are not specifically allocated in the Constitution to the national government or to a provincial government, shall be dealt with as necessary ancillary powers pertaining to the powers and functions allocated either to the national government or provincial governments. XXII The national government shall not exercise its powers (exclusive or concurrent) so as to encroach upon the geographical, functional or institutional integrity of the provinces. XXIII In the event of a dispute concerning the legislative powers allocated by the Constitution concurrently to the national government and provincial governments which cannot be resolved by a court on a construction of the Constitution, precedence shall be given to the legislative powers of the national government. 306

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XXIV A framework for local government .powers, functions and structures shall be set out in the Constitution. The comprehensive powers, functions and other features of local government shall be set out in parliamentary statutes or in provincial legislation or in both. XXV The national government and provincial governments shall have fiscal powers and functions which will be defined in the Constitution. The framework for local government referred to in Principle XXIV shall make provision for appropriate fiscal powers and functions for different categories of local government. XXVI Each level of government shall have a constitutional right to an equitable share of revenue collected nationally so as to ensure that provinces and local governments are able to provide basic services and execute the functions allocated to them. XXVII A Financial and Fiscal Commission, in which each province shall be represented, shall recommend equitable fiscal and financial allocations to the provincial and local governments from revenue collected nationally, after taking into account the national interest, economic disparities between the provinces as well as the population and developmental needs, administrative responsibilities and other legitimate interests of each of the provinces. XXVIII Notwithstanding the provisions of Principle XII, the right of employers and employees to join and form employer organisations and trade unions and to engage in collective bargaining shall be recognised and protected. Provision shall be made that every person shall have the right to fair labour practices. XXIX The independence and impartiality of a Public Service Commission, a Reserve Bank, an Auditor-General and a Public Protector shall be provided for and safeguarded by the Constitution in the interests of the maintenance of effective public finance and administration and a high standard of professional ethics in the public service .. XXX There shall be an efficient, non-partisan, career-orientated public service broadly representative of the South African community, functioning on a basis of fairness and which shall serve all members or the public in an unbiased and impartial manner, and shall, in the exercise of its powers and in compliance with its duties, loyally execute the lawful policies of the government of the day in the performance of its administrative functions. The structures and functioning of the public service, as well as the terms and conditions of service of its members, shall be regulated by law. 2. Every member of the public service shall be entitled to a fair pension. XXXI Every member of the security forces (police, military and intelligence), and the security forces as a whole, shall be required to perform their functions and exercise their powers in the national interest and shall be prohibited from furthering or prejudicing party political interest. 307

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The Constitution shall provide that until 30 April 1999 the national executive shall be composed and shall function substantially in the manner provided for in Chapter 6 of this Constitution. The Constitution shall provide that. unless Parliament is dissolved on account of its passing a vote of no-confidence in the Cabinet. no national election shall be held before 30 April 1999.

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APPENDIX E: Laws Repealed or Amended Number and year of law Title Extent of repeal Act No. 46 of 1959 Representation between the The whole Republic of South Africa and Self-governing Territo.ries Act, 1959 AetNo. 32 of 1961 Provincial Government Act, The whole 1961 Act No. 22 of 1963 Provincial Councils and ExecuThe whole tive Committees Act, 1963 Act No. 48 of 1963 Transkei Constitution Act, 1963 The whole Act No. 101 of 1967 Transkei Constitution AmendThe whole ment Act, 1967 Act No. 36 of 1968 Transkei Constitution AmendThe whole ment Act, 1968 Act No. 26 of 1969 South Africa Act Amendment The whole Act, 1969 Act No. 26 of 1970 National States Citizenship Act, The whole 1970 Act No. 21 of 1971 Self-governing Territories ConThe whole stitution Act, 1971 Act No. 31 of 1971 Transkei Constitution AmendThe whole ment Act, 1971 Act No. 61 of 1975 Transkei Constitution AmendThe whole ment Act, 1975 Act No.3 of 1976 Transkei Constitution AmendThe whole ment Act, 1976 Act No. 65 of 1976 Financial Relations Act, 1976 The whole, except sections 27 and 28 Act No. 100 of 1976 Status of Transkei Act, 1976 The whole Act No. 30 of 1977 Constitution Amendment Act, The whole 1977 Act No. 31 of 1977 Financial Relations Amendment The whole Act, 1977 Act No. 89 of 1977 Status of Bophuthatswana Act, The whole 1977 Act No.8 of 1978 Bophuthatswana Border ExtenThe whole sion Act, 1978 Act No. 13 of 1978 National States Citizenship The whole Amendment Act, 1978 Act No. 36 of 1978 Alteration of Provincial BoundThe whole aries Act, 1978 Act No. 107 of 1979 Status of Venda Act, 1979 The whole 309

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Act No. 20f 1980 Borders of Particular States Extension Act, 1980 The whole Act No. 70 of 1980 Republic of South Africa ConThe whole stitution Amendment Act, 1980 Act No. 101 of 1980 Republic of South Africa ConThe whole stitution Fifth Amendment Act, 1980 Act No. 77 of 1981 Borders of Particular States Extension Amendment Act, 1981 The whole Act No. 101 of 1981 Republic of South Africa ConThe whole stitution Second Amendment Act. 19BI Act No. 102 of 1981 Financial Relations Amendment The whole Act. 198) Act No. 110 of 1981 Status of Ciskei Act, 1981 The whole Act No. 34 of 1982 Financial Relations Amendment The whole Act, 1982 Act No. 25 of 1983 Borders of Particular States ExThe whole tension Amendment Act, 1983 Act No. 88 of 1983 Provincial Affairs Act, 1983 The whole, except section 5 Act No. 109 of 1983 Borders of Particular States ExThe whole tension Second Amendment Act, 1983 Act No. 110 of 1983 Republic of South Africa Con-The whole stitution Act, 1983 Act No. 105 of 1984 Constitution Amendment Act, The whole, except sections 1984 12,13 and 14 Act No. 114 Financial Relations Amendment The whole Act, 1984 Act No.3 of 1985 Financial Relations Amendment The whole Act, 1985 Act No. 26 of 1985 Alteration of Provincial BoundThe whole aries Act, 1985 Act No. 104 of 1985 Constitutional Affairs Amend-The whole ment Act, 1985 Act No. 69 of 1986 Provincial Government Act, The whole, except section 20 1986 Act No. 80 of 1986 Joint Executive Authority for The whole KwaZulu and Natal Act, 1986 Act No. 112 of 1986 Borders of Particular States Ex-The whole tension Amendment Act, 1986 310

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Act No. 20 of 1987 Constitution Amendment Act, The whole 1987 Act No. 32 of 1987 Constitutional Laws AmendSections 18, 19,20.31 and 32 ment Act, 1987 Act No. 43 of 1988 Constitutional Laws AmendSections 10, II, 12 and 13 ment Act, 1988 Act No. 50 of 1988 Constitution Amendment Act, The whole 1988 Act No. 59 of 1988 Borders of Particular States ExThe whole tension Act, 1988 Act No. 85 of 1988 National States Constitution The whole Amendment Act, 1988 Act No. 86 of 1988 Promotion of Constitutional The whole Development Act, 1988 Act No. 101 of 1988 Constitution Third Amendment The whole Act; 1988 Act No. 42 of 1989 Incorporation of Certain Land The whole in the Republic of South Africa Act, 1989 Act No. 71 of 1989 Constitution Fourth AmendThe whole ment Act, 1989 Act No. 61 of 1990 Constitution Amendment Act. The whole 1990 Act No. III of 1990 National States Constitution The whole Amendment Act, 1990 Act No. 59 of 1991 Provincial Matters Amendment The whole Act, 1991. Act No. 62 of 1991 Financial Relations Amendment The whole Act. 1991 Act No. 74 of 1991 Joint Executive Authority for The whole KwaZulu and Natal Amendment Act, 1991 Act No. 146 of 1992 Constitution Second Amend-The whole ment Act, 1992 Act No. 149 of 1992 Constitution Amendment Act, The whole 1992 Act No. 82 of 1993 Constitution Amendment Act, The whole 1993

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APPENDIX F: Provincial Powers Agriculture Casinos, racing, gambling and wagering Cultural affairs Education at al\ levels, excluding university and technikon education Environment Health services Housing Language policy and the regulation of the use of official languages within a province, subject to section 3. Local government, subject to the provisions of Chapter 10 Nature conservation, excluding national parks, national botanical gardens and marine resources Police, subject to the provisions of Chapter 14 Provincial public media Public transpon Regional planning and development Road traffic regulation Roads Tourism Trade and industrial promotion Traditional authorities Urban and rural development Welfare services

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APPENDIX G: System for Elections of National and Provincial Legislatures Election or National Assembly I. Panies registered in terms of the Electoral Act, 1993. and contesting an election of the National Assembly, shall nominate candidates for such election on lists of candidates prepared in accordance with this Schedule and the Electoral Act, 1993. 2. The 400 seats in the National Assembly referred to in section 40(1), shall be filled as follows: 200 seats from regional lists submitted by the respective parties, with a fixed number of seats reserved for each region as determined by the Commission for a panicular election, taking into account available scientifically based data in respect of voters, representations by interested panies and the following proposed determination in respect of the various regions: Western Cape Eastern Cape Nonhern Cape Natal Orange Free State NonhWest Northern Transvaal -21 seats -26 seats --4 seats -40 seats seats -17 seats -20 seats Eastern Transvaal -14 seats PretoriaWitwatersrandVereeniging -43 seats; and 200 seats from national lists submitted by the respective panies, or from regional lists where national lists were not submitted. 3. The lists of candidates submitted by a pany, shall in total contain the names of not more than 400 candidates, and each such list shall denote such names in fixed order of preference as the pany may determine. 4. A pany's lists of candidates shall consist ofboth a national list and a list for each region; or a list for each region. with such number of names on each list as the party may determine subject to item 3.

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5. The'2oo,seats referred to in item shall be allocated per region to the parties contesting an election. as follows: A quota of votes per seat shall be determined in respect of each region by dividing the total number of votes cast in a region by the number of seats, plus one, reserved for such region under item The result plus one, disregarding fractions, shan be the quota of votes per seat in respect of a particular region., number of seats to be awarded for the purposes of paragraph in respect of such region to 'a party, shall, subject to paragraph be determined by dividing the total number of votes cast in favour of such party in a region by the quota of votes per seat indicated by paragraph for that region. Where the result of the calculation referred to in paragraph yields a surplus not absorbed by the number of seats awarded to a party concerned, such surplus shall compete with other similar surpluses accruing to any other party or parties in respect of the relevant region, and any seat or seats in respect of that region not awarded in tenns of paragraph shall be awarded to the pany or parties concerned in sequence of the highest surplus. The aggregate of a party's awards in terms of paragraphs and in respect of a particular region shall indicate that party's provisional allocation of the seats' reserved under item for that region. The aggregate of a party's provisional allocations for the various regions in terms of paragraph shall indicate its provisional allocation of the seats referred to in item no recalculation of provisional allocations is required in terms of item 7 in respect of the seats referred to in item 2( the provisional allocation of such seats in tenns of paragraphs and, shall become the final allocation of such seats to the varioUs parties, and if such a recalculation is required the provisional allocation of such seats, as adjusted in tenns of item 7. shall become the final allocation of such seats to the various panies.

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6. The 200 seats referred to in item shall be allocated to panies contesting an election, as follows: A quota of votes per seat shall be determined by dividing the total number of votes cast nationally by 401, and the result plus one, disregarding fractions, shall be the quota of votes per seal. The number of seats to be awarded to a pany for -the purposes of paragraph shall, subject to paragraph be determined by dividing the total number of votes cast nationally in favour of such party by the quota of _votes per seat determined in terms of paragraph Where the result of the calculation in terms of paragraph yields a surplus not absorbed by the number of seats awarded to a party concerned, such surplus shall compete with other similar surpluses accruillg to any other patty or panies, and any seat or seats not awarded in terms of paragraph shall be awarded to the party or panies concerned in sequence of the highest surplus. up to a maximum of five seats so awarded: Provided that subsequent awards of seats still remaining unawarded shall be made in sequence to those parties having the highest average number of votes per seat already awarded in terms of paragraph and this paragraph. The aggregate of a party's awards in terms of paragraphs and shall be reduced by the number of seats provisionally allocated to it in terms of item and the result shall indicate that party's provisional allocation of.the seats referred to in item )fno recalculation of provisional allocations is required in terms of item 7 in respect oflhe seats referred to in item the provisional allocation of such seats in terms of paragraph shall become the final allocation of such seats to the various panies, and if such a -recalculation is required. the provisional allocation of such seats, as adjusted in terms of item 7. shall become the final allocation of such seats to the various parties.

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7. (I) a party has submitted a national or a regional list containing fewer names than the number of its provisional allocation of seats which would have been filled from such list in terms of item 8 or 9 had such provisional allocation been the final allocation, it shall forfeit a number of seats equal to the deficit. (2) In the event of any forfeiture of seats in terms of subitem (1) affecting the provisional allocation of seats in respect of any panicular region in terms of item 5 such allocation shall be recalculated as follows: The party forfeiting seats shall be disregarded in such recalculation, and its provisional allocation of seats in terms of item for the region in question, minus the number of seats forfeited by it in respect of its list for such region, shall become its final allocation in respect of the seats resen'ed for such region in terms of item An amended quota of votes per seat shall be determined in respect of such region by dividing the total number of votes cast in the region, minus the numberofvot.es cast in such region in favour of the pany referred to in paragraph by the number of seats, plus one. reserved for such region under item 2 minus the number of seats finally allocated to the said pany in terms of paragraph The rc;sult plus one, disregarding fractions, shall be the amended quota of votes per seat in respect of such region for purposes of the said recalculation. The number of seats to be awarded for the purposes of paragraph in respect of such region to a party participating in the recalculation, shall, subject to paragraph be determined by dividing the total number of votes cast in favour of such party in such region by the amended quota of votes per seat indicated by paragraph for such region. Where the result of the recalculation in terms of paragraph yields a surplus not absorbed by the number of seats awarded to a party concerned. such surplus shall compete with other similar surpluses accruing to any other pany or parties panicipating in the recalculation in respect of the said region. and any seat or seats in respect of such region not awarded in terms of paragraph shall be awarded to the pany or parties concerned in sequence of the highest surplUS. The aggregate of a party's awards in terms of paragraphs and in respect of such region shall. subject to subitem (4). indicate that pany's final allocation of the seats reserved under item for that region. (3) In the event of any forfeiture of seats in terms of subitem (1) affecting the provisional allocation of scats in terms of item such allocation shall be recalculated as follows: The party forfeiting seats shall be disregarded in such recalculiuion, and its provisional allocation oheats in terms of item 6 minus the number of such seats forfeited by it. shall become its final allocation of the seats referred to in item An amended quota of votes per seat shall be determined by dividing the total number of votes cast nationally. minus the number of votes cast nationally in favour of the party referred to in paragraph by 401, minus the number of seats finally allocated to the said party in terms of paragraph

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The result plus one, disregarding fractions, shall be the amended quota of votes per seat for the purposes of the said recalculation. The number of seats to be awarded for the purposes of paragraph to a party participating in the recalculation shall, subject to paragraph be determined by dividing the total number of votes cast nationally in favour of such party by the amended quota of votes per seat indicated by paragraph Where the result of the recalculation in terms of paragraph yields a surplus not absorbed by the number of seats awarded to a party concerned, such surplus shall compete with other similar surpluses accruing to any other party or parties participating in the recalculation, and any seat or seats not awarded in terms of paragraph shall be awarded to the party or parties concerned in sequence of the highest surplus; up to a maximum of five seats so awarded: Provided that subsequent awards of seats still remaining una warded shall be made in sequence to those parties having the highest average number of votes per seat already awarded in terms'of paragraph and this paragraph. (/) The aggregate of such a party's awards in terms of paragraphs and shall be reduced by the number of seats finally allocated to it in terms of item and the result shall, subject to subitem (4), indicate that party's final allocation of the seats referred to in item (4) In the event ofa party being allocated an additional number of seats in terms of this item, and its list in question then does not contain the names of a sufficient number of candidates as set out in subitem (1), the procedure provided for in this item shall be repeated until all seats have been allocated.

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8. (I) Where a party submilled both a national list and regional lists. the seats finally allocated to it-in terms of item shall be filled from its regional lists in accordance with its final allocation of seats in respect of the various regions; and in terms of item shall be filled from its national list in accordance with its final allocation of seats in terms of that item. (2) A seat finally allocated to a party in respect of a region. shall. for the purposes of subitem (I)(a). be filled only from such party's list for that particular region. 9. (I) Where a pany submitted regional lists only. the seats finally allocated to it-in terms of item 5(8), shall be filled from such lists in accordance with its final allocation of seats in respect of the various regions; and in terms of item shall be filled from the said lists in the same proportions as the proportions in which the seats referred to in paragraph are to be filled in respect of the various regions for which the party was finally allocated seats in terms of item Provided that if a party was not allocated any seats in terms of item 5 the seats allocated to it in terms of item shall be filled from its regional lists in proportion to the number of votes received by that pany in each of the regions: Provided funher that surplus fractions shall be disregarded save that any remaining seats shall be awarded to regions in sequence of the highest surplus fractions. (2) A seat finally allocated to a party in respect of a region, shall, for the purposes of subitem (1)( be filled only from such pany's list for that particular region. Election of provincial legislatures 10. The Commission shall de.termine the number of seats in.each provincial legislature, taking into account available scientifically based data in respect of voters. representations by interested parties and the following proposed determination: Western Cape Eastern Cape Northern Cape Natal Orange Free State North-West Northern Transvaal Eastern Transvaal --42 seats -52 seats -30 seats ---80 seats -30 seats -34 seats --40 seats -30 seats PretoriaWitwatersrandVereeniging ---86 seats: Provided that the Commission may for the purposes of any provincial election after the first election under this Constitution vary any determination under this item. II. Parties registered in terms of the Electoral Act. 1993. and contesting an election of a provincial legislature. shall nominate candidates for election to such provincial legislature on provincial lists prepared in accordance with this Schedule and the Electoral Act. 1993.

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12. Each party shall be entitled to submit only one list per province, which shall contain the names of not more than the number of seats determined under item 10 for the relevant provincial legislature and in such fixed order of preference as the party may determine .. 13. The seats determined for a provincial legislature shall be allocated to parties contesting an election, as follows-A quota of votes per seat shall be determined by dividing the total number of votes cast in the province concerned by the number of seats, plus one, determined under item 10 for such province and the result plus one, disregarding fractions, shall be the quota of votes per seat for such province. The number of seats to be awarded to a party for the purposes of paragraph shall, subject to paragraph be determined by dividing the total number of votes cast in the province in favour of such party by the quota of votes per seat determined in terms of paragraph Where the result of the 'calculation in terms paragraph yields a surplus not absorbed by the number of seats awarded to a party concerned, such surplus shall compete with other similar surpluses accruing to any other party or parties in respect of the province concerned, and any seat or seats not awarded in terms of paragraph shall be awarded to the party or parties concerned in sequence of the highest surplus. The aggregate of a party's awards in terms of paragraphs and shall indicate that party's provisional allocation of seats in .the provincial legislature in question. no recalculation of provisional allocations for a province concerned is required in terms of item 14, the provisional allocation of .seats in respect of that province in terms of paragraph shall become the final allocation of such seats to the various parties, and if such a recalculation is required the provisional allocation of such seats as adjusted in terms of item 14 shall become the final allocation of such seats to the various parties.

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14. (I) a party has submitted a provincial list containing fewer names than .the number of seats provisionally allocated to it in terms of item it shall forfeit a number of seats equal to the de!icit. (2) In the event of any forfeiture oheats in terms of subitem (I). the allocation of seats in respect of the province concerned shall be recalculated as follows: The party forfeiting seats shall be disregarded in such recalculation. and its provisional allocation of seats in terms of item 13(d). minus the number of seats forfeited by it in respect of its list such province. shall become its !inal allocation seats in the provincial legislature concerned. An amended quota of votes per seat shall be determined in respect of such province by dividing the total number of votes cast in the province. minus the number of votes cast in the province in favourofthe party referred to in paragraph by the number of seats. plus one. determined in terms of item 10. in respect of the province concerned. minus the number of seats finally allocated to the said party in tenns of paragraph The result plus one. disregarding fractions. shall the amended quota of votes per seat in respect of such province for purposes of the said recalculation. The number of seats to be awarded for the purposes of paragraph in respect of such province to a party participating in the recalculation, shall, subject to paragraph be determined by dividing the total number of votes cast in favour of such party in such province by the amended quota of votes per seat indicated by paragraph for such province. Where the result of the recalculation in terms paragraph yields a surplus not absorbed by the number of seats awarded to a party concerned. such surplus shall compete with other simihir surpluses accruing to any other party or parties participating in the recalculation. and any seat or seats in respect of such province not awarded in terms of paragraph shall be awarded to the pany or parties concerned in sequence the highest surplus. The aggregate oCsuch a party's awards in terms paragraphs and in respect of such province shall, subject to subitem (3), indicate that party's final allocation of the seats determined under item 10 in respect of that province. (3) In the event of a party being allocated an additional number of seats in tenns of this item, and its list in question then does not contain the names of a sufficient number of candidates as set out in subitem the process provided for in this item shall be repeated until all seats have been allocated. 320

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Declaration of support by one party of another party 15. (I) A party intending to contest the election of one or more or all the provincial legislatures. but not the election of the National Assembly. may. within the time and in the manner prescribed by or under the Electoral Act. 1993. declare that it supports another party which is contesting the election of the National Assembly. and if it so declares, all votes cast in its favour shall, for the purpose of the election of the National Assembly. be deemed to be votes cast in favour of such otherpany. (2) A party intending to contest the election of the National Assembly, but not the election of one or more or any of the provincial may, within the time and in the manner prescribed by or under the Electoral Act, 1993. declare that it supports another party which is contesting the election of a provincial legislature which the first-mentioned pany is not contesting, and ifit so declares, all votes cast in its favour shall, forthe purpose ofthe election ofthat panicular provindallegislature or legislatures, be deemed to be votes cast in favour of such other pany. (3) A pany intending to contest the election of one or more provincial legislatures, but not the election of all the provincial legislatures, may. within the time and in the manner prescribed by or under the Electoral Act, 1993, declare that it suppons another pany which is contesting the election of a provincial legislature or legislatures which the first-mentioned pany is not contesting, and if it so declares, all votes cast in its favour shall, for the purpose of the election of the last-mentioned provindallegislature or legislatures, be deemed to be votes cast in favour of such other pany. (4) For the purposes of subitems (2) and (3). a party may suppon different parties in the different provincial legislatures. (5) This item shall apply only to an election of the National Assembly which is held simultaneously with the election of the provincial legislatures.

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Designation of representatives 16. (I) After the counting of votes has been concluded, the number of representatives of each party has been determined and the election has been certified by the Commission as having been free and fair or a declaration has been made by the Commission under section the Commission shall, within two days after such certification or declaration, designate from each list of candidates published in terms of section 23 of the Electoral Act, 1993, the representatives of each party in each legislature. (2) Following the designation in terms of subitem (I), if a candidate's name appears on more than one list for the National Assembly or on lists of both the National Assembly and a prOvincial legislature and such candidate is due for designation as a representative in more than one case, the party which "Submitted such lists shall, within two days after the said certification or declaration, indicate to the Commission from which list such candidate will be designated or in which legislature the candidate shall serve, as the case may be, in which event the candidate's name shall be deleted from the other lists. (3) The Commission shall forthwith publish the list of names of representatives in all legislatures. Supplementation of lists of candidates 17. No lists of candidates of a party for any legislature shall be supplemented prior to the designation of representatives in terms of item 16, save where provided for by an Act of Parliament. 18. Lists of candidates may, after the designation of representatives in terms of item 16 has been concluded, be supplemented by the addition of an equal number of names at the end of the applicable list, if-a representative is elected as the President or to any other executive office as a result of which he or she resigns as a representative of a legislature; a representative is elected as a member of the Senate; a name is deleted from a list in terms of item 16(2); or a vacancy has occurred and the appropriate list of candidates of the party concerned is depleted. 19. Lists of candidates of a party published in terms of section 23 of the Electoral Act, 1993, may be supplemented on one occasion only at any time during the first 12 months following the date on which the designation of representatives in terms of item 16 has been concluded, in order to fill casual vacancies: Provided that any such supplementation shall be made at the end of the list. 20. The number of names on lists of candidates as supplemented in terms of item 18 shall not exceed the difference between the number of seats in the National Assembly or a provincial legislature, as the case may be, and the number of representatives of a party in any such legislature. 322

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Review of lists of candidates a party 21. A party may review its undepleted lists as supplemented in terms of items 18. 19 and 20. within seven days after the expiry of the period referred to in item 19, and annually thereafter, until the date on which a party has to submit lists of candidates for an ensuing election, in the following manner: all vacancies may be supplemented; no more than 25 per cent of candidates may be replaced; and the fixed order of lists may be changed. Publication of supplemented and reviewed lists of candidates 22. Candidates'lists supplemented in terms of items 18 and 19 or reviewed in terms of item 21 shall be published by the Secretary to Parliament and the Secretaries of the provincial legislatures within 10 days after the receipt of such lists from the parties concerned. Vacancies 23. (1) In the event of a vacancy occurring in the representation of a party in any legislature, such vacancy shall forthwith be filled in accordance with section 44 or 133. (2) a party represented in a legislature dissolves or ceases to, exist and the members in question vacate their seats in consequence of section or the seats in question shall be allocated to the remaining parties as if such seats were forfeited seats in terms of item 7 or 14, as the case may be. Alteration or numbers and boundaries of provinces 24. the numbers or boundaries of provinces are altered pursuant to section 124, the Commission shall review the determinations made in terms of items 2 and 10, and such revised determinations shall then the basis of any elections for the National Assembly or the provincial legislatures held after any such alteration. Defmitions 25. In this Schedule"Commission" means the Independent Electoral Commission, established by the Independent Electoral Commission Act, 1993 (Act No. 150 of 1993), or; in relation' to 'any election held after the first election under this Constitution, that Commission or any other body established or designated by an Act of Parliament; "national list" means a list of candidates prepared by a party for an election of the National Assembly to reflect that party's order of preference of candidates in respect of the allocation of seats on a national basis; "provincial list" means a list of candidates prepared by a party for an election of a provincial legislature; "region" means the territorial ,area of a province; "regional list" means a list of candidates in respect of a region prepared by a party for an election of the National Assembly to reflect that party's order of preference of candidates in respect of the allocation of seats in respect of such region. Application of Schedule reference to section 26. The provisions of this Schedule shall be subject to any regulations made or directions given by the Commission in terms of section 124(7) in so far as affected areas within the meaning of that section are concerned.

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APPENDIX H: Procedure for Election of the President 1. Nominations of candidates for election as President shall be called for by the Chief Justice or the other judge presiding at the meeting at which the President is to be elected. 2. Every nomination shall be submitted on the form prescribed by the Chief Justice and shall be signed by two members of Parliament and also by the person nominated, unless the person nominated has in writing signified his or her willingness to accept the nomination. 3. The names of the persons duly nominated as provided for in item 2 shall be announced at the meeting at which the election is to take place by the person presiding thereat. and no debate shall be allowed at the election. 4. If in respect of any election only one nomination has been received, the person presiding at the meeting shall declare the candidate in question to be duly elected. S. Where more than one candidate is nominated, a vote shall be taken by.secret ballot, each person present and entitled to vote having one vote, and ariy candidaie in whose favour the majority of all the votes cast is recorded, shall be declared duly elected by the person presiding at the meeting. no candidate obtains a majority of all the votes so cast, tlie candidate who has received the smallest number of votes shall be eliminated and a further ballot shall be taken in respect of the remaining candidates, this procedure being repeated as often as may be necessary until a candidate' receives a majority of all the votes cast and is declared duly elected. Whenever two or more candidates being the lowest on the poll have received the same number of votes, the meeting shall by separate vote, to be repeated as often as may be necessary, determine which of those candidates shall for the purpose o(paragraph be eliminated. 7. Whenever' only two candidates have been nominated; or after the elimination of one or more candidates in accordance with this Schedule, only two candidates remain; and there is an equality of votes between those two candidates, the person presiding at the meeting shall at the time the result of the election is announced, fix the time at and date on which a further meeting will be held, being a date not more than seven days thereafter. 8. At the further meeting referred to in item 7, the provisions of this Schedule shall apply as if such further meeting were the first meeting called for the purpose of the election 'in question. The Chief Justice shall make rules in regard to the procedure to be observed at a meeting at which the President is to, be elected, and rules defining the duties of the presiding officer and of any person appointed to assist him and prescribing the manner in which the ballot at any such meeting shall conducted. (2) Any such rules shall be made known in such manner as the Chief Justice may consider necessary.

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APPENDIX I: Twelve-Point Plan to Combat Corruption (Minister of State Expenditure) 325

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Ackermann, L. W. (1989). "Constitutional Protection of Human Rights: Judicial Review." In Ackermann, W. et a1. "Human Rights in the Post-Apartheid South African Constitution." 21: 1-249. Adam, H. & Mood1ey, K. (1993). Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers. Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press. -----( 1971) London: Oxford University Press. (Second Quarter, 1993). "Strategic Objectives of the National Liberation Struggle." 133: 3-10. (February 17, 1994). Johannesburg: ANC Department of Information and Publicity. a Johannesburg: Policy Unit of the African National Congress. Allison, G. T. & Beschel, R. P. (1992). United States Promote Democracy?" 107: 81-98. "Can the Almond, G. A. & Powell, B. (eds.) (1988). Po 7 Glenview, Ill.: Scott Foresman. Verba, S. (1963). Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 326

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Arora, R. K. (1972). New Delhi: Associated Publishing House. Bekker, J. C. (1991). Nepotism, Corruption and Discrimination: A Predicament for a PostApartheid South African Public Service.' 18: 55-73. Breier, D. (November 21, 1993). "Mandela's RightHand Men." pp. 1, 2, 3. Brunner, R. D. & Livornese. K. M. (1982). A Boulder, CO.: Center for Public Policy Research, University of Colorado. (December 13, 1993). ."Pit-Falls." p. 4. (1992). A a Cape University of the Western Cape. Chandler, R. C. (1989). "A Guide to Ethics for Public Servants." In Perry, J. L. (ed.). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. -----, N. & Kotlolo, M. (August 17, 1993). "Homelands Jobs Surge." p. 6. Cherry, V. R. & Holzer, M. (1992). New York: Garland Publishing. Chester, M. (February 26, 1993). Govt. Pressured to on Graft." p. 5. Chothia, F. (November 26 to December 2,1993). "IFP may Fight Election without Buthelezi." & p. 5. (February 23, 1993). "A-G Slams Govt. Over rBVC States." p. 1, p. 2. 327

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Clark, D. McDonald, S. (dir.). (1991). 1-6, 1991, Queenstown, MD: The Aspen Institute. Cloete, F. (August/September, 1993). "Turning "" Around the Sh i p of State." pp. 6-7. Cohen, H. (1991). "Status Report of U.S. Sanct ions on South Afr ica," Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee (April 30, 1991). In 2: 325-26. Collins, p, (ed,) (1989). New York: St. Martin's Press. (1992). 1992. Cape Town: CTP Book Printers. (1992). Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Cook, T. D. (1979)." Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. Cooper, C. et a 1. (1994). 1993/94. Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations. -----( 1993) 7a "1992/93. Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations. Crocker, C. A. (1992). a New York: W. W. Norton. Davis, D. (May 28 to June 3, 1993). the Civil Service Just That." p. 23. 328 "Why Not Make 7 7

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