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Our crime problem

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Title:
Our crime problem
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Higginson, Carl Bradley
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English
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ix, 342 leaves : ; 29 cm

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Crime -- United States ( lcsh )
Crime ( fast )
United States ( fast )
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bibliography ( marcgt )
theses ( marcgt )
non-fiction ( marcgt )

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Bibliography:
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 318-342).
General Note:
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree, Master of Arts, Political Science.
Statement of Responsibility:
by Carl Bradley Higginson.

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University of Colorado Denver
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Auraria Library
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ocm31508845
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OUR CRIME PROBLEM by carl Bradley Higginson B.A., Columbia College, 1984 A thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Colorado at Denver in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Political Science 1994

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This thesis for the Master of Arts degree by Carl Bradley Higginson has been approved for the Department of Political Science by /qlf I Datil

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4. Psychological Views Emile Durkheim . . The Development of Sociological Criminology The Development of Conflict Theory Criminology Today . Summary Notes . . . . IS THE CRIME PROBLEM WORSE TODAY? FROM JOHN BILLINGHAM TO JEFFREY DAHMER Introduction . Violence in America Violence Against Native Americans Racial, Religious and Ethnic Violence Violence Against Women . Crime Booms . . . . 1760s 1820s 1830s 1880s . . . 1910 1920s . . . 1940s . . . 1960s . . . How the Media Distort Crime Information Summary . . . . . Notes . . . . . vii 76 78 81 84 94 96 99 102 102 106 110 114 118 119 120 121 125 131 135 141 149 151

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5. 6. CRIME STATISTICS . . . Introduction Agency Based Reports as Crime Statistics Uniform Crime Report The Contents of Uniform Crime Report UCR Measurement Problems The UCR: Reliable and Valid? Victimization Surveys as Crime Statistics National Crime Survey Problems with the NCS . Police Professionalism Increased Reports by Victims of Rape Inflation Has Made Misdemeanors into Felonies Cultural Changes Reporting Practices Are Better S'Ullllllary . Notes HOW SERIOUS IS THE CRIME PROBLEM? Introduction Perceptions and Realities about crime . A Nation of Thieves . Summary viii 159 159 161 163 166 170 174 177 178 182 188 196 198 199 200 201 204 209 209 211 221 230

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7. Notes . . . . CRIME PATTERNS Introduction . . . The Ecology of Crime . . Social Class and Crime . . . Age and Crime Race and Crime . . . The Black-White crime Differential Self-Report Differences Causes of Racial Disparity in Crime . . 231 236 236 237 239 247 258 262 264 265 The Black Experience in American History 266 a. Social and Economic Theories Summary . . Notes . . . . CONCLUSION ........... Explaining Crime in Modern Society How to Live with Crime The Wretched and Vicious Notes . . . . . . . . APPENDIX . . . . . BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . ix 270 272 274 282 284 294 304 310 311 318

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CHAPTER 1 PERCEPTIONS OF CRIME IN THE 1990s Introduction Most people swimming at our seashores do not know about riptides. Riptides occur when waves, hitting a beach at two points, converge as they ebb, thus forming an abrupt, very speedy undertow. Swimmers caught in riptides will probably panic. Finding themselves being carried out to sea, they will flail against the current, trying to fight it. But they will make little headway. Arms and legs become blocks of cement plunging through the water, pulling the swimmer downward. The magnet tugs endlessly. The shoreline grows distant within seconds. The struggle is brief. Experienced swimmers respect riptides, but they are not killed by them. They understand that the key to survival is to conserve strength, avoid panic, and assess the situation rationally. They do not fight a riptide head-on. Instead, they allow the current to carry them out a short distance until it weakens. Then, they swim across it, perpendicular to the current, until they are

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across it, perpendicular to the current, until they are out of it. Thus, they find themselves free to swim to shore. The subject of this work is crime, not tides and swimming. But the riptide concept is useful in beginning an investigation about crime in America. The American public often views crime as a riptide (the common term is crime wave), overwhelming them, sapping their strength, pulling them under. What is the appropriate response? As against the riptide, panic is inappropriate. Panic in the face of our perceived "crime problem" is not likely to kill us literally. But, panic at our "crime problem" can devastate our society economically and socially as we spend income and tax dollars on wars on crime, as we withdraw away from others in our society, and as we try to fight criminals by sacrificing our own legal rights. This research is about not panicking in the face of crime. Since tax dollars spent on crime represent dollars not spent on other pressing problems, selfimposed individual isolation erodes community solidarity, and legal rights once forfeited are not easily regained, we owe it to ourselves to formulate as accurate a picture 2

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of the "crime problem" as possible before engaging in extreme anticrime measures. There is much crime in American, more than ever is reported, far more than ever is solved, far too much for the health of the nation. Every American knows that. Every American is, in a sense, a victim of crime. Violence and theft have not only injured, often irreparably, hundreds of thousands of citizens, but have directly affected everyone. Some people have been impelled to uproot themselves and find new homes. Some have come to doubt the worth of a society in which so many people behave so badly. Some have become distrustful of the government's ability, or even desire, to protect them. Some have lapsed into the attitude that criminal behavior is normal human behavior and, consequently, have become indifferent to it or have adopted it as a good way to get ahead in life. Some have become suspicious of those they perceive to be responsible for crime: adolescents, drug addicts, or demonstrators; policemen who fail to solve crimes or are involved in criminal activities themselves; judges who pass lenient sentences or write decisions restricting the 3

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authorities of the police; or parole boards that release prisoners who resume their criminal activities. Today many people think that crime is a greater threat than ever before. Many seem to remember times when the doors of homes could be left unlocked. They recall when city streets, recreational areas, and other public places were safe for walking, even when alone at night. The past represents to them a time when violence was not only less prevalent; but also less senseless. Now, all too often, we hear of vicious brutes who strike out with no apparent reason. Crime appears to be more rampant than ever. Some recent cases typify this trend. Pamela Basu, age thirty-four, an award-winning chemist with W.R. Grace & Company, was worried about how well her 22 month-old daughter, Sarina, would adjust to her first day at school. When the day arrived, Basu secured her daughter in the car seat, climbed behind the wheel of her pale gold BMW and drove off, edging to a halt at a nearby stop sign. Two strangers appeared at her window, forced her out of the car, and sped off. Basu, her left arm still helplessly tangled in the harness straps of her seat belt, was dragged face down 4

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across the coarse pavement until there was nothing left of her clothes but the bloodstained blouse on her back. A thousand feet from where the two had commandeered the vehicle, the driver stopped, got out and pitched the little girl, still strapped into her car seat, to the side of the road. Then off he drove again still dragging the mother behind. As the car came to a hairpin curve, he careened against a barbed wire fence, trying perhaps to scrape off Basus body. Several hundred feet further, the thieves stopped and dumped her mutilated remains in the road, punctuating a trail of blood and skin.1 Charles Mize, a forty-three year old football coach, was found dead of multiple wounds. Judy Mize was in fair condition after surgery for axe and knife wounds. Charles Toss Mize, Jr. is suspected of battering down a bathroom door and killing his father with an axe, then attacking his mother in a bedroom. Authorities say that he may have been under pressure from his parents about grades.2 Patrick Daly, age thirty-nine, was a fearless, committed, and beloved elementary school principal in Red Hook, Brooklyn. One of his fourth graders fled school 5

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crying. Daly went looking for him down the street in the housing project where the child lived. There, he was caught in the cross-fire of'drug dealers, shot to death, police say, by a seventeen year old, wanted on another murder charge.3 Such deeds of brutality are uncomprehensible. Their violence is inordinate and without focus, reason, or meaning. The public reaction to such incidents has become correspondingly bitter and even desperate. Threefifths of the American public expressed their support for a self-styled vigilante who shot down four young black men after they asked him for five dollars in a New York subway.4 Respected commentators urge people living in cities to "adopt the tough attitudes of an embattled population."5 In addition to the increasing viciousness of crime, Americans also appear to face greater risks of becoming a victim during their lifetime. The probability of a twelve year-old being the victim of violent crime sometime in hisjher life is about 83 percent: 23 percent of all u.s. citizens will experience violence three or more times.6 Even more startling is the fact that 99 6

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percent of the u.s. population will experience personal theft, and 87 percent will become atheft victim three or more times.7 Many of the problems associated with the inner city, from which white suburbanites thought they had escaped, are now beginning to make themselves felt in some of the suburbs. Once virtually isolated members of the middle class, residents of suburbia and rural America, the "respectable" and "comfortable", now hide behind locked doors. In a poll conducted in August 1991 for TimejCNN, 68 percent of New York city residents said the quality of life had grown worse in the past few years: 60 percent were worried about crime: and 45 percent believed the quality of life would continue to get worse.8 over 50 percent would live elsewhere if they could. Some 73 percent felt their city was a dangerous place to live and that it was getting tougher. Young people on the street corner threaten their sense of security. There had been a surge of drugs and violent crime that the government seemed utterly unable to combat. In tougher neighborhoods, teachers train young children to hit the floor at the sound of gunshots. A squeak in the 7

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floorboard at home may suggest an intruder. Faced with these fears, we never feel secure. By no means is this situation characteristic of only New York. Urban centers throughout the country are faced with similar difficulties. As a result of the perceived threat of crime, Americans are becoming exceedingly fearful. On a personal level, fear eats away at feelings of safety and security, elements crucial to our sense of well-being. On a social level, it undermines community solidarity. People withdraw, physically and emotionally, losing contact with their neighbors, weakening the social fabric of our lives. In 1980, Charles Silberman explained, 11Crime does more than expose the weakness in social relationships: it undermines the social order itself to live with fear--to be suspicious of every sound and every person --converts the most elementary and routine aspects of life into an exercise in terror.119 As Americans are convinced they will be assaulted, robbed, raped, and murdered, they change their lifestyles, restricting the places they go and the things they do. 8

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Pervasiveness of Fear Public opinion surveys have reported a continuing pattern of growth in the fear of crime. A gallup poll, conducted in 1992, indicated that 44 percent of people nationwide were afraid to walk alone at night within a mile of their homes, and this was significantly higher than the 31 percent who claimed to be afraid in 1967.10 Political rhetoric that exploits such fears (as reflected in the notorious Willie Horton commercial used by George Bush in the 1988 Presidential campaign) strikes a respondent chord among many citizens. Not only are people concerned about criminal victimization, but many believe the problem is getting worse. In January and June of 1989, Gallup polls asked people whether they thought there was more crime in their neighborhood than a year ago. In these five months, the national rate of those who think there is more crime increased from 47 percent to 53 percent, the highest rate in eight Gallup polls taken since 1972.11 They also viewed crime as becoming quantitatively worse. Criminals are believed to be more savage and incoherent than ever before.12 So, people consider not only that their chances of criminal 9

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victimization are increasing, but also that they are more likely to be seriously injured or even killed if attacked. With the proliferation of fear, the importance of crime as an issue of public concern has steadily increased. The u.s. Department of Housing and Urban Development sought to identify what people perceived to be the most pressing problem in their own city. More people identified crime than anything else --over such other problems as unemployment, air pollution, housing, education, economy, and health care.13 In a similar survey, which asked what would improve the quality of life, crime control was suggested by more people than anything else, outranking curbing water pollution, protecting privacy, and product safety requlations.14 The costs of crime include changes in attitude and behavior by people who fear their own victimization. One way this trend has manifested itself is in the concept of target hardening or making one's home and business crimeproof through locks, bars, alarms, and other devices.15 A victimization risk survey administered to over 21,000 people residing in about 11,000 households across the 10

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United States found that substantial numbers of people have taken specific steps to secure their homes or places of employment.16 ; One-third of the households reported taking one or more crime prevention measures --included having a burglar alarm (7 percent), participation in a neighborhood watch program (7 percent), or engraving valuables with an identification number (25 percent).17 Other commonly used crime prevention techniques include a fence or barricade at the entrance; a doorkeeper, guard, or receptionist in an apartment building; an intercom or phone to gain access to the building; surveillance cameras; window bars; and warning signs. such preventive devices are found not only in high-crime neighborhoods, but also in areas once isolated from such concerns: suburbia and rural communities. Other instances of concern and the desire for protection can be seen in human behavior. People stay off streets at night and lock their doors. They don't wear good jewelry or flash a lot of money in public places. To isolate themselves psychologically, people avoid making eye contact with one another in crowded 11

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places. Planning travel routes to avoid potentially dangerous places, dressing modestly, locking car doors, and calling someone after safely arriving at their destination are more common responses to fear. Letters to the editor placing blame on the police, the courts, or "these rotten times" or "those rotten people" provide an outlet for individual frustration. Seemingly, fear rarely leaves the consciousness of many people. They are cautious and, much like wild animals, constantly check and evaluate the environment for potential predators. such steps are believed be necessary for survival. The reaction to the fear of crime has moved some people to adopt more aggressive and violent means of self-protection. There are those who advocate karate or judo lessons. Some people respond by purchasing guns and taking courses in firearms training. The u.s. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms says there are 67 million handguns in the United states.18 Research by Douglas Smith and 9raig Ucida indicates that gun ownership is highest among people who have already been the victims of crime, who perceive police protection as inadequate, who believe the crime rate is increasing in their 12

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neighborhood, and who take a grim view of their chances for avoiding further victimization.19 Joining a group of concerned citizens, becoming a block watcher, or walking the streets as part of a civilian patrol satisfies the need for action in many people. Others take less aggressive but nevertheless self-protective steps by holding a hatpin, a small can of mace or tear gas, a roll of quarters, or a ring of keys inside a coat pocket when out on the street. The impact of fear of crimes on the quality of American life, on the family, on social relationships, on the conduct of business, and on culture and recreation, is costly to the country's collective psyche and reaches as directly into the pockets of all as the mugger who pokes a knife into a victim's ribs while lifting a wallet or snatching a handbag. The increasing fear of crime has led to a decreasing tolerance for criminal offenders and desire for greater punishment as fear grows. Americans are not particularly satisfied with the severity of punishment shown criminals by the courts. In a 1989 Gallup poll, eight out of ten people questioned thought the courts were not harsh 13

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enough in the treatment of criminals.20 This is a 20 percent increase since 1968 and a 10 percent decrease in the number of respondents who had no opinion of the issue. The results of the poll indicate that most Americans believe the criminal justice system should be more punitive. Attitudes toward the death penalty changed in a similar manner. During the 1960s, less than 50 percent of the population supported capital punishment, but the proportion started to drift upward in the 1980s. Today, eight out of ten citizens favor execution. 21 As crime has risen as an issue of public concern, politicians and public officials have attempted to respond. Most liberal criminology theories during the sixties linked crime to the pressures of social and economic inequality and deprivation and believed that a combination of rehabilitation for offenders, better opportunities for the disadvantaged and a more humane, less intrusive criminal-justice system would reduce crime, if not end it. By the end of the sixties that vision was undermined by the apparent "paradox" of rising crime rates in the midst of the Great Society's social 14

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programs, the general improvement in the American standard of living, and the reduction of unemployment. Conservatives made much of correlation between American society seemingly becoming both more affluent and more committed to action against poverty, inequality, and racial subordination and rising crimes rates. For the last twenty years, conservatives have held the political initiative. The direction of their efforts has been toward ever "tougher" policies. Comments by U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice William Burger, in a speech to the American Bar Association, reflect this mood. He asked, Are we not hostages within the borders of our self-styled, enlightened, civilized country?1122 and, 11Why do we show indignation over alien terrorists and such tolerance of the domestic variety?11 More emphasis on the deterrent effort was sinqled out as the key to a 11damaqe-control program. 11 Chief Justice Burger claimed, 11The massive safeguards for accused persons, built up by the judicial system in recent decades, are out of proportion with the protection afforded to lawabidinq citizens. He called for swift arrest, prompt trials, and finality of judgement to deter crime. 15

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In a more recent response, the Federation of New York Judges declared that the streets had become "lawless marches of robbers, rapists, felons of every kind" and called for more prisons "on the ground that swift and severe punishment is the only defense against predators. "23 Appellate Justice Murphy even went so far as to argue that without a greater investment in punishment, "we live in a sickly twilight of a soulless people too weak to drive predators out of their own house. 1124 State and federal courts have reversed earlier decisions that allowed offenders to go free because of legal technicalities. Many states have passed new legislation requiring preventative detention, selective incapacitation, and mandatory sentencing.25 All three reflect the assumption that the justice system turns criminals loose, allowing them to prey on lawabiding citizens. Proponents of these strategies focus on two aspects of the criminal justice process. The first is judicial discretion. They believe dangerous criminals are set free because judges have unfettered discretion to release them on bail, grant them probation, 16

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or sentence them to inappropriately short prison terms. All three proposals, therefore, are attempts to limit the discretion of judges. The second perceived problem is excessive preoccupation with the rights of suspects, defendants, and criminals. These strategies represent an effort to reverse two of the major criminal justice reforms of the 1960s: the expanded rights of suspects under the due-process clause of the Constitution and the expanded use of non-prison alternatives to sentencing. These efforts are intended to increase the severity of sanctions and to remove from the community those offenders who are most dangerous. Reconsidering Perceptions of Crime Fear of crime and the inducement to do something about it are based on two commonly held beliefs. The first is that we are experiencing an historically unprecedented wave of violent and predatory crime. This implies that the situation is different today than in the past. As part of this initial tenet, there is belief, not only that there is more crime, but also that criminals are more dangerous. The situation is, 17

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therefore, seen as qualitatively worse, more violent, and less rational than in the past. The second belief is that sensitive government should and can respond to the problem. Implied in this assumption is the conviction that crime is a solvable problem, that action can be taken to cure crime and return the nation to the safety and harmony known in the past. Unfortunately, these assumptions are seldom discussed in a public forum. Few people, the media, politicians, or academics ever investigate their validity, ever inquire whether crime is as bad as people think or whether public response can reduce the incidence of crime. In short, we hardly understood crime in the past and, though we know much more about it now, we still really can not say we understand it. What we legitimately can profess to understand well are the dimensions of public concern about 110ur crime problem11 and what structures it. Hence, 110ur crime problem". The quotation marks in the title exist for a reason. They repeat the fact that, as a society, we do not confront crime as a real object but as a set of perceptions which 18

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we have strung together to form what we define as problematic. We construct "Our crime problem". This construction has very important implications for the average citizen. In order to determine the actual state of crime in America and the chances of dealing with it, three of these commonly held perceptions will be examined. The three perceptions are: Crime Perception #1: Crime is becoming qualitatively and quantitatively worse. Crime Perception #2: The chances of being victimized by either a violent crime or a property criminal are high. Crime Perception #3: Adolescents, minorities, and the poor are the perpetrators of most violent criminal activity. By examining these perceptions, I hope to determine how serious the crime problem in the United States actually is. Additionally, I hope to come to some conclusions about what the criminal justice system in the United states is achieving and can expect to achieve. In "Our crime problem," I will try to address the manner in which crime touches the reader. Most people reading this research are neither perpetrators nor victims of serious crime. However, like most members of society, they exhibit a great deal of fear of "street 19

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crimes," both attitudinally and behaviorally. Most make personal decisions that are potentially costly--as an extreme example, keeping guris in the home for protection, which often can lead to accidental shootings! More importantly, fear of crime leads to demands for "law and order" encouragement for legislation and criminal justice efforts to curb crime through restraints on individual rights, and approval of tax spending for anticrime research and programs. Since tax dollars spent on crime represent dollars not spent on other pressing problems and since individual rights, once forfeited, are not easily regained, we must formulate as accurate a picture of the crime problem as possible before supporting various anticrime policies. This thesis will employ a critical framework while still permitting coverage of many traditional criminological concerns. Chapter 2, "A Brief History of Criminology: 2000 B.C. to the Eighteenth Century", discusses crime and the development of criminology from the code of Hammurabi to the eighteenth century. Chapter J, 11A Brief History of Criminology: Eighteenth Century to Present," discusses the various schools of criminology 20

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developed over a period of 200 years. Though they have undergone great change and innovations, each continues to have an impact onthe Chapter 4, "Is the Crime Problem Worse Today? From John Billingham to Jeffrey Dahmer," examines the contemporary crime problem within a historical context and includes a discussion of the media on perceptions of crime. Chapter 5, "Crime Statistics," makes the point that for various reasons crime is probably less under reported today than in the past. Among the reasons are (1) Police are more professional, (2) police sensitivity has led more victims to report rape, (3) inflation has made misdemeanors into felonies, (4) cultural changes, (5) reporting practices have improved. Chapter 6, "How Serious Is the Crime Problem?" studies violent criminal behavior; murder, assault, rape, and robbery. Not only do such crimes cause physical, psychological and economic harm; they also threaten the very quality of life by imprisoning the population in a state of fear. Property crime is contrasted. While violent crime is committed in a sporadic irregular basis, property crime (such as burglary and larceny) constitutes a considerable involvement in crime. Chapter 7, "Crime 21

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Patterns", discusses evidence of an age gap in the crime rate: Young people commit more crime than the elderly. The crime data shows that people commit less crime as they age, but the significance is not completely understood. Similarly there are racial and class patterns in the crime rate. Finally, the last chapter takes a speculative look at the future of crime and social policy. 22

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Notes 1. Ted Gup, "A savage Story -Suburbia Is Not Immune To the Ugliest Crimes Like This Mother's Death In A Carjacking," New York Times, 21 September 1992, 55. 2. Rob Reuteman, 11Son Charged in Dad s Death, 11 Rocky Mountain News, May 8, 1993, 34A. 3. The Denver Post, April 11, 1993, 14A. 4. Vigilante survey: Gallup/Newsweek poll, cited in San Francisco Chronicle, March 4, 1985, 10. 5. Roger starr, "Crime: How it Destroys What We can Do," New York Times Magazine, 27 January, 1985, 19. 6. Department of Justice Statistics. Touched By Crime, 1987 (Washington Justice, statistics 1988), 5. 7. Ibid. Households D.C.: Bureau of 8. J. Attinger, "The Decline Of New York," Time, September 17, 1990, 36. 9. Charles Silberman, Criminal Violence. Criminal Justice, New York: Vintage Books, 1980, 16, 18. 10. Timothy Flanagan and Kathleen Macguire, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice statistics 1991. Washington, D.c.: u.s. Department of Justice, 195. 11. Alison Landers, Mark Siegel, and Carol Foster, eds., Crime -A Serious American Problem 1990, u.s. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1990, 118. 12. Aric Press et al., "The Plague of Violent Crime," Newsweek, March 21, 1981, p. 47. 13. u.s. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research, The HUD 23

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Survey on the Quality of Community Life. (Washington, D.C.: Department of Housing and Human Development, 1978), 217. 14. Louis Harris, 11The Harris Survey, 11 Chicago Tribune, July 3, 1978, 2. 15. Ronald Clarke, 11Situational Crime Prevention: Its Theoretical Basis and Practical Scope, in Annual Review of criminal Justice Research, ed., Michael Tonry and Norval Morris, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983, 130. 16. Catherine Whitacker, crime Prevention Measures (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1986), 95. 17. Dennis Rosenbaum, 11Community Crime Prevention: A Review And Synthesis Of The Literature." Justice Quarterly s, (1988): 347. 18. Listening to America 11So Violent a Nation11, Prod. B.U. Moyers, PBS, 26 May 1992. 19.. Douglas Smith and Craig Ucida, 11The Social Organization Of Self-Help: A Study Of Defensive Weapon ownership. American Sociological Review, 53 (1988): 94 20. Jay Matthews, "Playing Politics With Crime," Newsweek, May 11, 1992, 40. 21. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of criminal Justice Statistics. 1991 (Washington, D.C., u.s. Government Printing Office, 1992), 212. 22. New York Times, February 23, 1981, 41. 23. Elliot currie, Confronting Crime: An American Challenge (New York: Pantheon, 1985), 11. 24. Justice Murphy quotation: New York Times, April 23, 1984, 15. 24

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25. Samuel Walker, Sense and Nonsense About Crime: A Policy Guide Pacific Grove, Calif.: Brooks/Cole, 1989, 63. 25

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CHAPTER 2 A BRIEF HISTORY OF CRIME AND CRIMINOLOGY 2000 BC to the Eighteenth Century Introduction Though the scientific study of criminal behavior is a relatively recent development, people have been concerned about crime, law, and justice throughout recorded history. After all, as the story is presented in the Old Testament, of the first four people on earth, one was a thief, one an uninvited co-conspirator, the third committed murder, and the fourth was a victim of criminal violence. The survivors were given life sentences by a most powerful judge; their fate, which many children learn about in Sunday School, has served as a deterrent ever since. This chapter begins with the first efforts to understand crime 3,700 years ago and then traces the conceptions/treatment of crime from feudal to state and capitalist systems. Law reflects the ethos of a society at a given time, insecure societies will generally be found to concentrate the wrath of their criminal laws,

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found to concentrate the wrath of their criminal laws, both in terms of acts prescribed and in terms of punishment levied, on those who betray state secrets and those who seemingly undermine the security of the country. A religiously oriented society will, on the other hand, devote disproportionate stress in its criminal law to violations of theological precepts. An examination of early criminal law will illustrate these and similar shifts of emphasis. Early Origins We know that crimes and criminal behavior were recognized in many early societies.1 In preliterate societies, mores and folkways were the equivalents of law. Each group had its own set of customs, which were created to deal with situations that arose in daily living. These customs would often be followed long after the reason for their origin was forgotten. Many customs had the force of law and eventually developed into formal or written law. Early criminal law was primarily a private matter in which individuals and families exacted retribution 27

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against those who had wronged them. Regular ex-officio prosecution for a deed was, as Max Weber notes, nonexistent.2 Patriarchs judged the deeds of those within the family who violated the rules of their relations with other family members. This concept of personal justice is clearly evident in all early laws, including the Code of Hammurabi from before 1900 B.C., the Roman tablets of laws from 450 B.C., the Mosaic Code, law in early Greek Society as revealed in the Iliad and the Odyssey, and the laws of Tacitus prevalent among the Germanic people in A.D. 98. The system broke down only when radical alterations took place in the structure and role of the family, and when injustices became unbearable, with punishment being either unfulfilled if the family unit was weak in contrast to those who has wronged it, or too severe if the family unit possessed great strength.3 The code of Hammurabi is the first comprehensive legal document that has come down to us virtually intact. The code mirrors the rigid social stratification of Babylonia with different rules applying to each of the three classes: the freemen, the serfs, and the slaves. 28

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The code pays heed to the religious tone of society, stipulating, for instance, that a priestess was to be burned alive if found entering a tavern. In addition, the constant menace of scarcity in Babylonian society is reflected in detailed regulations concerning marketing of commodities and the fixing of prices. Preserved on basalt rock columns, the code sets out crimes and their correction. Punishment was based on physical retaliation or Lex Talionis ("an eye for an eye"). A physician was to have his hands severed if he performed a careless operation, a man1s daughter was killed if the man was responsible for causing the death of another female through miscarriage. These laws, however, applied only to wrongs against members of the freeman class. Serfs were to be compensated for offenses against them with money rather than through equivalent vengeance. "If a freeman causes a serf to loose his eye, 11 one section of the code states, "he shall pay one ming of silver. 11 The same offense committed against a freeman, however, would cause the perpetrator to lose his own eye.4 Crimes such as burglary and theft were common in ancient Babylon, and officials had to take their duties 29

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seriously. Local officials were expected to apprehend criminals. If they failed in their duties, they had to personally replace lost property; if murderers were not caught, the responsible official paid a fine to the deceased's relatives. Biblical literature strikingly illustrates the close accord between crimes and moral deviancy. The Hebrew language, in fact, contains no equivalent for the word "crime". "It is a strange fact," Goldin writes, "that we find Hebrew words for sin, iniquity, and other synonymous expressions, but we do not meet with words or phrases corresponding to the expressions crime and criminal law in the legal sense. Every offense, no matter what its nature, is termed in the Talmud Aberah, a transgression. 115 The fundamental premise of Jewish jurisprudence was that the revealed will of God was the only source of legislation; consequently, every punishable act constituted a violation of God's will. Precisely the same assumption underlay much of early Christian thinking; in fact, much later, every law in the Massachusetts Bay Colony appended a proper Biblical reference to indicate its essential authority.6 30

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Another of the ancient codes still surviving is the Mosaic Code of the Israelites. According to tradition, God entered into a covenant or contract with the tribes of Israel in which they agreed to obey his law, as the them by Moses, in return for his special care and treatment. Mosaic Law included thirty-six capital crimes, punishable by one of four methods of death: stoning, burning, decapitation, and strangulation. The types of acts leading to death clearly reflect the nature of the society, and included such items as necromancy, idol worship, sorcery, cursing one's father and mother, and sexual relations with a betrothed female.7 The key elements of this law are contained in Exodus 20:1-3, 7-17: And God spoke all these words: I am the Lord, your God, who brought you out of Egypt, out of the land of slavery. You shall have no other gods before me You shall not misuse the name of the Lord your God, for the Lord will not hold anyone guiltless who misuse his name. Remember, the Sabbath day by keeping it holy. Six days you shall labor and do all your work, but the seventh day is a Sabbath to the Lord, your God. on it, you shall not do any work, neither you nor your son or daughter, nor your manservant or maidservant, nor your animals, nor the alien within your gates. For in six days, the Lord made the heavens and the earth, the sea, and all that is in them, but he rested on the seventh day. Therefore, the Lord 31

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blessed the Sabbath day and made it holy. Honor your father and your mother, so that you may live long in the land the Lord your God is giving you. You shall. not murder. You shall not commit adultery. You shall not steal. You shall not give false witness against your neighbor. You shall not covet your neighbor's house. You shall not covet your neighbor's wife, or his manservant or maidservant, his ox or donkey, or anything that belongs to your neighbor. The Mosaic Code is not only the foundation of Judea-Christian moral teachings, but it is also a basis for the u.s. Legal system: prohibitions against murder, theft, perjury, and adultery precede by several thousand years the same laws found in the u.s. Legal system. Other early systems of criminal law serve equally well to underline the close relationship between the systems themselves and the societies that nurtured them. In its earlier period, Greece also resorted to the policy of personal retribution in which offenses against the individual or against family qroups were dealt with privately. Flagrant attacks on the community, as the poems of Homer viyidly portray, were punished by direct and immediate action on the part of the populace, actions that were little more than mob uprisings.8 Later, however, a decisive step was taken in Greece toward 32

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criminal law as we know it today, when Solon, at the beqinninq of the sixth century B.C. qave every citizen the riqht to initiate prosecution for certain offenses, includinq attacks upon individuals as well as upon the state.9 Unfortunately, the precise social and economic conditions which led to this important evolution are not known, but a careful tracinq of the sketchy materials available suggests with some clarity that the development was closely allied to the emerqent cultural conditions of the period. 10 Roman law, findinq much of the Greek system unsuitable to its particular needs, revealed a considerably different pattern of qrowth. Criminal law was slow to develop in Rome and never attained an importance comparable to that of private law.11 The Romans were not concerned with abstract principles of justice, but only with what they considered to be just and effective punishment.12 To some extent, their procedure might be considered comparable to the broad latitude found in the juvenile court today. Special circumstances of each case were taken into consideration, and wide powers were qiven to authoritative judqes. 33

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Toward the end of Roman hegemony, the influences of Christian theology began to pervade the criminal law, with new stress being placed especially on punishment of religious and sexual deviancy.13 This influence carried over to the law of the Middle Ages and to much of American Colonial criminal law. In early Maryland history, for instance, the law called for penalties against a person who was a "common swearer, blasphemous, or curser" and there are records of a number of prosecutions, including one against Captain Thomas Brodnax, a justice of the peace, who was charged with having uttered at least "one hundred oaths. 1114 As late as 1910, North Dakota forbade the use of obscene language over the telephone, as well as the advertising of cigarettes.15 Today, of course, statutes still exist in the United States against such practices as prostitution, homosexuality, and gambling -landmarks to the Biblical heritage of our society. 16 Archaic Society Stanley Diamond asserts that archaic societies, where law and customs exist side by side, are critical in 34

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understanding the evolution of law.17 In archaic societies, people derive their livelihood from agriculture and perhaps handicrafts and commerce. In the history of the west, the primary example of archaic society is the first feudal age before the middle of the eleventh century.18 Local social worlds based on the appropriation of land began to appear, but private property as we know it did not exist. Though the feudal lord owned the land, it was not seen as a commodity which could be traded or sold. Landowners were required to treat their serfs with care, and the status of the serf was generally favorable.19 On the continent, free land was available for cultivating, and one could always move if the landowner became too oppressive.20 The ethic that knit the society together was one of shared responsibility. This found institutional expression in vassalage, feudal land tenure, and the feudal system for the distribution of goods and services. Trade was almost non-existent so that no one survived by buying and selling. The customary law of the times bore little, if any, resemblance to that which developed after the fifteen century. 35

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The major difference between pre-literate and archaic social organization is best noted in historical situations where there has been an evolution from one form to another. Norman cantor provides us with a detailed history of the development of English society from a pre-literate pattern to an archaic one. It can be most clearly seen in the agricultural triangle of the English midlands where a society based on farming was possible. As the kindred groups grew larger, the inadequacies in dealing with problems became more apparent. cantor believes that the lordship developed naturally out of the kin system: In the kinship bond a man followed a leader in his own family, possibly his father or brother or cousin In the community which can no longer organize itself effectively along blood lines, either because the kin are too numerous, large, and disorganized to limit the effects of the blood feud or because the kin have already been decimated by incessant violence, the lord replaces the headman of the family.21 The lord is a kind of father-substitute. When one of the more powerful lords is chosen by a group of his peers to become monarch, the state is born. The process as it developed in early English society took a few centuries. In its beginning, the monarchy was weak and 36

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untried and its centralizing thrust resisted by local units. It developed at the expense of kin groups. Sometimes, as in England, the evolution of the state is speeded up through conflict. The Norman conquerors subjected the Anglo Saxons to their domination and sharpened the inequality that already existed. The inequality was maintained by coercion. The Norman conquerors undermined the kinship bond, and the laws advanced were intended to isolate the individuals so they could be dealt with more easily. William Seagle suggests that isolation of the individual is the basic condition for the growth of law.22 The situation of conquest clearly depicts the opposition of custom and law. The legislation that emerges does not reinforce custom. It is distinct because of its unprecedented character. Diamond's study of the Dahomean proto-state in Africa shows that laws relating to the need for labor, drafting of an army, levying of taxes, the maintenance of an army, and the extent and location of the numbers of population being subject had little or no analogues in tribal crimes were sometimes manufactured or invented for these new purposes. In Dahomey, a specific category 37

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of women in the kings court were distributed in the surrounding villages. Those males who made the mistake of engaging in sexual relations with them were accused of rape. Their punishment was conscription. The intent of the legislation, in short, was conscription. The success of the newly developing states encroachment of old allegiances is predicated on its ability to gain a monopoly on the use of force and violence. This can be most clearly seen in the act of homicide. It came to be regarded as an offense against the state, and only the state had the authority to punish it. By making homicide, along with theft of the king1s property, a capital offense, the monarch discouraged violent opposition to the imposition of his civil order. As the kings authority becomes more widely extended, the legitimacy of local arbitrators is also undermined. According to Seagle, the first courts didnt evolve from arbitrators but destroyed them: It was the court that launched the 11state11, for it was in the court that the sentiment of state socialism, with all its loyalties, was first nurtured. The court was responsible for the etatistic myth because it was only through its officials that the common man was brought into contact with authority. The only social service performed by the governing class was 38

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the administration of justice--that is the holding of a court, the waging of war, and the collection of taxes. The only other functions of early government were more difficult to disguise as civil sacraments.24 Legal historian John Austin, examining the English system of common law, argued that the role of judges was innovative.25 Though they claimed to be only applying law that was part of customary procedure or that which was implicit in custom, they were actually making new law. The peculiar anomaly is that the judges denied their rule-creating-role even as they were creating new laws. Henry Maine, in tracing the evolution of law from status to contract, refers to this stage as the one of "legal fictions". 26 Reforms are initiated under the cover of fictions. The problem was to fit changes that seemed necessary into established law so that they did not clash with those parts of the system that weren't altered and to reassure the population that nothing was being changed. Judicial decisions were legitimized by the appeal to local values. As a body of decisions accumulated, the custom was what the judges said it was and not what the people involved held. common Law courts came to be the main source of new rules of law. They 39

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remain, as others have pointed out, the most important source of law to this day throughout the Common Law world. Preservation of the peace was the primary concern of archaic societies. Rusche and Kirchheimer give some feel for how wrongs were reconciled in the first feudal age: If, in the heat of the moment or in a state of intoxication, someone committed an offense against accepted morality, or religion or severely injured or killed his neighborof property rights did not count for much in this society of landowners--a solemn gathering of free men would have to be held to pronounce judgment and make the culprit pay wergild or do penance so that the vengeance of the injured parties should not develop into blood feud and anarchy The chief deterrent to crime was fear of the private vengeance of the injured party. Crime was looked on as an act of war. In the absence of a strong, central power, the public peace was endangered by the smallest quarrel between neighbors, as these quarrels automatically involved relatives and servants. The preservation of peace was, therefore, the primary preoccupation of criminal law. As a result of its method of private arbitration, it performed this task almost entirely by the imposition of fines.27 Though the authors describe this form of dispute settlement as "criminal law", technically it was not. The dispute-settling procedure was not promulgated by a political authority nor was the sanction backed up by the coercive apparatus of any state. In the first feudal 40

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age, any "law" having politicality and penal sanction would have been scorned as an attempt by outsiders to violate the bonds of kinship and companionage. But as feudal estates expanded, the bonds of fealty were weakened, and petty violence increased in frequency and savagery. The breakdown of feudal institutions became apparent when they could no longer control reprisals and counter-reprisals. This occurred in the second feudal age and was aggravated by re-population and the makings of an economic revolution that was taking shape. As feudal institutions waned, the state consolidated its political power. During this transitional period, class conflict became more pronounced which, in turn, led to the creation of new criminal laws. As Seagle has noted, "the criminal law springs into life during every great period of class conflict". 28 Archaic law, in its later phases, rests on force and violence. It becomes particularly harsh in its final development. Persons are treated as property, and debtors allowed to be sold into slavery. Archaic law emphasized institutions of pledge and suretyship which, because kinship solidarity was disintegrating and mutual suspicion and distrust were ripe, required 41

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debtors either to post forfeits or to find guarantees to ensure the discharge of legal obligations. 29 At this point, the upper strata push hard for centralization and consolidation of political authority. A new set of social goals, pursued by a new and unanticipated power in society, becomes embodied in the criminal law. An ever-increasing degree of control over the system of composition occurs; self-help is eliminated and a dis-affiliated individual is created whose bearings no longer depend1 on kinship or custom. Crime and the laws which served it were covariants of the evolving state.30 The laws that were enacted against treason, theft, and homicide in this period all assumed an emergency character. The luxuriant growth of the criminal law was ad hoc. In thirteenth-century England, there was only a small number of crimes which entailed the loss of life or limb and the confiscation of goods-that is, felonies. By 1780, there were over 200 capital offenses punishable by common law or statute.31 Early criminal law reveals itself to be an instrument of domination. Legislation is enacted openly directed against the lower classes. The most important 42

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consideration, however, in the growth of criminal law according to Rusche and Kirchheimer was fiscal--the administration of criminal law proved to be highly remunerative for those who administered it.32 A sharp rise in population occurred during the Middle Ages which, combined with the exhaustion of the soil, forced those who made their living on the land into the towns seeking employment. Their numbers increased and since they possessed no property, they could not realistically be fined. This led to the evolution of corporal punishment. Lower class wrongdoers, unable to pay the fines levied against them, were severely beaten, tortured, or mutilated. The penal system thus came to be restricted to a minority of the Mark Kennedy has suggested that the structure of formal law at this stage is an alliance of capital and the As a result, two kinds of citizenship and responsibility are created-the laboring forces of the early industrial society are bound by the criminal law and punishments associated with it, the owners of labor are bound by a civil law which regulates their competition between each other. 43

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Internal trade came into its own after 1250. With it came the institutionalization of private property, entrepreneurship, and the market system. Petty merchants who were objects of scorn in the second feudal age began to develop institutions of private property and a labor force freed of feudal ties. The institutions regulating conflict under the old feudal system were in a state of collapse. The philosophy of the emerging merchant group was the quest for profit. They grew with every decline of feudal institutions. The ethic of individual responsibility supplanted the ethic of shared responsibility. crimes came to be conceived in terms of individual transgressions for which individuals should bear responsibility. Therefore, "political considerations", like an individual's attachment to a wider group, were removed from legal considerations that were handled by courts: It was made a purely legal question by pretending that the only interest before the court was that of the litigants--in other words, by pretending that the supports of the litigants (their clans, families, friends) were not involved 34 It is the class character of the criminal law emerging that leads to Kennedy's conclusion--criminal law 44

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and penal sanctions are subdued warfare waged by one powerful segment of civil society against an individuated segment of citizens--it is a thinly disguised system of state vengeance.35 Further, the warfare can be conducted without fear of reprisal. The fundamental characteristic of a criminal act is that it can't be compromised by the individuals involved. The criminal law prescribed far more behaviors as crime than had ever existed in the second feudal age. The Emergence of Capitalist Society and Modern Law There are many differences between archaic and modern criminal law. The most striking difference is that modern society is law-ridden, whereas archaic society had only a few laws. The emphasis on which crimes are most serious also shifts. Theft is a much more serious offense in capitalist, society since private property is the basic institution. Seagle summarized the difference between archaic and modern criminal law: The archaic penal code has ten commandments. The mature penal code may have ten thousand commandments. But far more important than the quantitative aspect is a shift in the category of major crimes. It has sometimes been said that homicide is the very "centrum" of the 45

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criminal law, which developed primarily in relation to the need for its suppression. But archaic penal law pays precisely the least attention to those offenses which, in mature civilizations, are treated as the most vicious crimes--namely, ordinary murder and theft. Nothing is more symptomatic of the spirit of the archaic criminal law. It may be said, perhaps without paradox, that the failure to treat violence against private persons and property as crimes against the state may have corresponded to a truer public conception of crime as an act which directly affects the whole community.36 He further states that theft is the great crime in capitalist society and that the criminal law must suppress, with great severity, all forceful means of amassing capital precisely because as an end it commands such universal respect. With the consolidation of political power, the older forms of justice became criminal as the state specifically forbade them; thus, obtaining a monopoly over the processing of acts of violence. To pursue commercial activity with a sufficient amount of vigor, the merchants needed the cooperation of the crown. It became increasingly clear to the monarchs of the period that their destiny was linked to that of the merchants. The tradesmen gained wealth and power by loaning money, using land as collateral, to feudal lords to finance local wars. The 46

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end result was the landed wealth of Europe fell into their hands. Land became a commodity for buying and selling as private property in the interests of profit. The creation of a law effective in combating offenses against property was one of the chief preoccupations of the rising urban bourgeoisie. Wherever they had the monopoly of legislation and jurisdiction, they pursued this demand with the greatest energy. They even attempted to restrict the right of private settlement resulting from feuds In France, too, it was the bourgeoisie who always tried to obtain from the Crown an intensification of the repressive system The bourgeoisie demand for increased efficiency in the administration of law were largely promoted by the growing centralization of the administration in the hands of a bureaucracy trained in Roman Law. 37 During the latter Middle Ages, outlaw bands ruled the countryside. The constant famines, taxes, wars, and plagues that had Europe in their grip throughout this period'brought recruits to these bands. Landlords and members of the nobility actually negotiated with outlaws in order to encourage them to leave their lands. When soldiers caught up with outlaws, their punishment was immediate and brutal. Well-known clergymen, such as Martin Luther, called for rulers to 11pursue, beat, strangle, hang, and torture" offenders.38 47

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By the fifteenth century, changing social conditions influenced the relationship between crime and punishment. First, the population of England and Europe began to increase, after a century of being decimated by constant warfare and plague. At the same time, the developing commercial system caused large tracts of agricultural fields to be converted to grazing lands. Soon, unemployed peasants and landless noblemen began moving to newly developed urban centers, such as London and Paris, or taking to the roads as beggars and highwaymen. The later Middle Ages also saw the rise of strong monarchies, such as Henry VIII and Elizabeth I of England, who where determined to keep a powerful grip on their realm. The administration of the King s Peace11 under the shire reeve and constable became stronger. These developments led to the increased use of capital and corporal punishment to control the criminal poor. While the wealthy could buy their way out of punishment and into exile, the poor were executed and mutilated at ever-increasing rates. It is estimated that 72,000 thieves were hung during the reign of Henry VIII alone.39 Executions, banishment, mutilation, branding, 48

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and flogging were used on a wide range of offenders, from murderers and robbers to vagrants and gypsies. Punishments became unmatched in their cruelty, featuring a gruesome variety of physical tortures. Also, during this period, punishment became a public spectacle, presumably so the sadistic sanctions would act as a deterrent. But the imaginative variety of tortures inflicted on even minor criminals before their death suggests that sadism and spectacle were more important than any presumed deterrent effect. Criminologists generally view the rise of the prisons as an eighteenth century phenomenon. However, Marvin Wolfgang has written about Le Stinche, a prison in Florence, Italy, that was well used to punish offenders as early as 1301.40 Prisoners were enclosed in separate cells, classified on the basis of gender, age, mental state, and seriousness of crime Furloughs and conditional release were permitted, and perhaps for the first time, a period of incarceration replaced corporal punishment for some offenses. Though Le Stinche existed for 50 years, relatively little is known about its administration or whether this early example of 49

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incarceration is unique to Florence or can be discovered in other areas. By the end of the sixteenth century, the rise of the city and overseas colonization provided tremendous markets for manufactured goods. In England, France, Germany, and Spain, population growth was checked by constant warfare and internal disturbances. Labor was scarce in many manufacturing areas of England, Germany, and Holland. The punishment of criminals changed to met the demands created by these social conditions. Instead of the wholesale use of capital and corporal punishment, many offenders were made to do forced labor for their crimes. Poor laws developed in the early seventeenth century required that the poor, vagrants, and vagabonds be put to work in public or private enterprise. Hours of correction were developed to make it convenient for petty law violators to be assigned to work details. Many convicted offenders were pressed into sea duty as galley slaves, a fate considered so loathsome that many convicts practiced self-mutilation rather than subject to it. 50

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The constant shortage of labor in the colonies also prompted the authorities to transport convicts overseas. In England, the Vagrancy Act of 1597 legalized deportation for the first time. An Order In Council of 1617 granted a reprieve and stay of execution to people convicted of robbery and other felonies who were strong enough to be employed overseas. Similar measures were employed in France and Italy to recruit galley slaves and workers. Transportation of convicts to the colonies became popular; it supplied labor, cost little, and was actually profitable for the government, since manufacturers and plantation owners paid for convicts services. The Old Bailey Court in London supplied at least 10,000 convicts to the colonies between 1717 and 1775.41 After convicts had served a period at labor, they were granted their freedom. There were occasional efforts at reform. In France, the Criminal Ordinance of 1670 was the first attempt to codify legal sanctions. It limited the arbitrary power of judges: but in some instances, it did not specify a penalty, giving the magistrate discretion to increase or 51

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diminish punishments according to the circumstances of the case.42 Despite such efforts, it was not until the eighteenth century that a coherent view of law, crime, and society developed. Summary The history of crime and criminology can be traced back for 5,000 years. Early civilizations, including the Sumerians, Hebrews, Babylonians, and Romans, used codes defining crimes and punishments that still exist today. In preliterate societies, criminal law was primarily a private matter. Punishment was based on physical retaliation. Crimes such as murder, theft, and burglary were commonplace. The primary example of archaic society was the first feudal age. The feudalist system of political organization prevailed in Europe from the 9th to about the 15th centuries having its basis the relation of lord to vassal with all land held in fee and as chief characteristics homage, the service of tenants under arms and in court, wardship, and forfeiture. Isolation of the individual was the basic condition for the growth of 52

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law. Common law courts came to be the main source of new rules of law. The breakdown of feudal institutions occurred in the second feudal age. Class conflict became more pronounced, and led to the creation of new criminal laws. During this period, archaic law rested on force and violence. crimes and justice were dealt with in a haphazard manner. Punishment was harsh and severe. Modern society is law ridden whereas archaic society had few laws. Theft is the great crime in capitalist society, because amassing capital has such universal respect. During the latter middle ages, land became a commodity for buying and selling. The middle ages also saw the rise of strong monarchies. Corporal punishment was utilized to preserve the "King's Peace". Punishments were unmatched in their cruelty. For the first time, a period of incarceration replaced corporal punishment for some offenses. Criminal law arises out of a specific social situation and is designed to address the needs of particular interest groups. It can only be understood in terms of the social relationships prevailing at any given 53

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period. Whether these interest groups reflect some kind of consensus or simply the views of a powerful and strategically place minority is problematic. 54

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Notes 1. The historical material in this chapter was derived from a number of sources. Some of importance are: Jackson Spielvogel, Western Civilization (St. Paul: Western Publishing, 1991): Eugene Weber, A Modern History of Europe (New York: w.w. Norton, 1971); James Heath, Eighteenth Century Penal Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963); and Randy Martin, Robert Mutchnick, and w. Timothy Austin, Criminological Thought. Pioneers Past and Present (New York: Macmillan, 1990). 2. Max Rheinstein, ed. Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), 55. 3. E.A. Westermarck, The History of Human Marriage (New York: MacMillan, 1956), Vol. 1, 212. 4. William Seagle, "Hammurabi: King of Babylon, 11 Men of Law (New York: Macmillan), 14. 5. Hyman E. Goldin, Hebrew criminal Law and Procedure (New York: Twayne 1952), 11. 6. Mabel A. Elliot, Crime in Modern Society (New York: Harp$r, 1952), 22. 7. Goldin, Hebrew Criminal Law and Procedure 18. 8. George M. Calhoun, The Growth of Criminal Law in Ancient Greece (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1927), 6. 9." Ivan M. Linforth, Solon the Athenian, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1919), 25. 10. Calhoun, Growth of Criminal Law in Ancient Greece, 37. 11. Hans Julius Wolff, Roman Law: An Historical Introduction (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1951), 53. 55

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12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. Fritz Schultz, Principles of Roman Law (Oxford: Clarendon, 1936), 176. Fritz Schultz, History of Roman Leaal Science (Oxford: Clarendon, 1946), 298. Raphael Semmes, Crime and Punishment in Early Maryland (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1936), 162. Peter Odegad, The American Public Mind (New York: Columbia University Press, 1930), 262. Isabel Drummond, The Sex Paradox (New York: Putnam, 1952), 20. Stanley Diamond, "The Rule of Law versus the Order of Custom," Social Research, 38 (Spring 1971), 42. Mark Bloch, Feudal Society Vol. I, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 220. Mark c. Kennedy, "Beyond Incrimination: Some Neglected Facets of the Theory of Punishment," Catalyst, 5 (Summer 1970): 30. George Rusche and otto Kirchheimer, Punishment and Social Structure (New York: Russell and Russell, 1939), 19. Norman F. Cantor, The English: A History of Politics and Society to 1760 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967), 46. 22. William Seagle, The Ouest for Law (New York: Knopf, 1941), 64. 23. Diamond, The Rule of Law, 42. 24. Seagle, The Ouest for Law, 65. 25. John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence (London: J. Murray, 1890), 90. 56

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26. Henry Maine, Ancient Law (London: J.H. Dent, 1972), originally published in 1861. 27. George Rusche and otto Kirchheimer, Punishment and Social Structure, 9. 28. Seagle, The Ouest for Law, 232. 29. Ibid., 68. 30. Diamond, The Rule of Law, 45. 31. Seagle, The Ouest for Law, 66. 32. George Rusche and Otto Kirchheimer, Punishment and Social Structure, 12. 33. Kennedy, Beyond Incrimination, 32. 34. Seagle, The ouest for Law, 67. 35. Kennedy, Beyond Incrimination, 33. 36. Seagle, The Quest for Law, 229. 37. Rusche and Kirchheimer, Punishment and Social Structure, 15-16. 38. Marcello Maestrao, Voltaire. and Beccaria (New York: Octagon, 1972), 2. 39. Rusche and Kirchheimer, Punishment and Social Structure, 19. 40. Marvin Wolfgang, "Crime and Punishment in Renaissance Florence," Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, (1990), 567-589. 41. G. Ives, A History of Penal Methods (Montclair, NJ: Patterson-Smith, 1970), 79. 42. Ysabel Rennie, The Search for Criminal Man (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1978), 8. 57

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CHAPTER 3 A BRIEF HISTORY OF CRIME AND CRIMINOLOGY EIGHTEENTH CENTURY -PRESENT Introduction This chapter traces the development of the first criminological theories in the mid-eighteenth century, their scientific evolution during the nineteenth century, and their refinement during the early stages of the twentieth. The discussion follows a chronological order, tracing the rise of a variety of schools of thought and theoretical perspectives. This approach might give the erroneous impression that earlier criminological theories were abandoned as newer, more technically advanced views were formulated. On the contrary, criminological theories and perspectives have proven to be quite robust. Various concepts and theories of crime have dominated the field only to see their influence waive as new positions became popular. After being dormant for years, their earlier views may once again be embraced by a new scientific generations. For example, during the nineteenth century, criminologists believed that crime

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nineteenth century, criminologists believed that crime had a biological basis. This position was abandoned in the mid-twentieth century, when the large majority of criminologists embraced sociological explanations of crime. Biological explanations of crime have been revived once again in a more sophisticated form in the 1990s. In summary, though their importance may have changed over time, each of the theoretical positions and schools of though discussed here have maintained a share of influence within the field of criminology and inspired devoted followers to continue research efforts designed to verify their principles. Foundations of Classical Criminology By the mid-eighteenth century, social philosophers began to call for rethinking the prevailing concepts of law and justice. While a majority still advocated that the most rigorous penalties be meted out to law violators, because they represented a threat to the existing order and rule, others argued for a more sensible approach to punishment. They stressed that the 59

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relationship between crimes and punishment should be balanced and fair. This view was based on the prevailing philosophy of the time called utilitarianism, which stressed that things must be useful, purposeful, and reasonable. Instead of cruel public executions designed to frighten people into obedience or punish those the law failed to deter, reformers called for a more moderate and just approach to penal sanctions. Two of these reformers, Cesare Beccaria (1738-1794) and Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) can be considered among the founders of criminology because their writings described both a motive for committing crime and methods for its control. Their views are today referred to as classical criminology. Beccaria based many of his ideas on crime and punishment on the philosophy of the greatest good for the greatest number. While this concept has been closely associated with the writing of Jeremy Bentham on utilitarianism, it was Beccaria who influenced Bentham. The concept of utilitarianism, while not specifically identified as such, was first used by Beccaria and appeared first in his work. Bentham's related writing 60

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was published not long after Beccaria's work. Bondanello and Bondanello state that in his Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789), "Bentham not only repeats the concept of the greatest happiness for the greatest number, but he further develops thee notion of a hedonistic calculus. 111 Beccaria's Views For Beccaria, the principle of utility maintains that people are basically rational creatures who choose their own courses of action. Humans, according to this view, wish to achieve pleasure and avoid pain. Crimes must, therefore, provide some pleasure to the criminal. It follows that to deter crime, one must administer pain in an appropriate amount to counterbalance the pleasure obtained from crime. Beccaria viewed law and justice as conditions similar to those that the French philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau described in his concept of the social contract: a set of rules that guarantee life, liberty, and happiness to all people. Beccaria stated, "Weary of living in a continual state of war, and of enjoying 61

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liberty rendered useless by the uncertainty of preserving it, people sacrificed a part so that they might enjoy the rest of it in peace and safety. 112 Yet, he did not suggest that people obey laws freely, sacrificing a portion of their personal liberty merely to promote the common good. Since people are egotistical and selfcentered, they must be goaded by the fear of punishment, which provides a tangible motive for them to obey the law and suppress the despotic spirit that resides in every person. Beccaria believed that for a criminal penalty to achieve its purpose, the pain it inflicted had only to exceed the advantage that could be obtained from the crime it sought to control. In calculating the relationship between crime and punishment, the law should take into account the "certainty of punishment and loss of good the crime might have produced."3 Certainty of punishment, rather than severity, is of the greatest import for deterrence. Beccaria is credited with almost single-handedly causing the abolition of that most odious punishment -torture -which was at that time routinely used to obtain 62

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confessions from the accused or punish the convicted. He pointed out to world leaders how torture enabled the "robust scoundrel" who would resist it to qo free, while it condemned the innocent person who happened to be weak. Torture, Beccaria claimed, put the innocent in a position in which they could lose (if they confessed to a false accusation) and the quilty in a position in which they could qain (if they resisted torture and were absolved of a wronq). Beccaria stronqly believed that severe, brutal punishment was unnecessary. He suqqested that people could adapt to even the most hideous punishment. "The severity of punishment," he wrote, "of itself emboldens men to commit the very wronq it is supposed to prevent."4 Moreover, when punishment is very severe, criminals will commit additional crimes, since they have nothinq more to lose. It is not surprisinq that Beccaria was a staunch opponent of the indiscriminate use of capital punishment and believed the death penalty should be used only on rare occasions. Rather than stress the cruelty of punishment to control criminality, Beccaria believed it would be more 63

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effective to closely link crime with its consequences in the minds of would-be criminals. Of greatest importance to Beccaria was establishing the proper proportions between crimes and punishments. There are several reasons for this approach. Most importantly, if two crimes that do not equally injure society are punished equally, then people will not be deterred from committing the greater of the two crimes. For example, if both bank robbery and murder were punished by death, a bank robber would have little reason to refrain from killing any witnesses to the robbery. To be effective, the punishment for a crime must be justified by the harm done. In conclusion, Beccaria states the following theorem: In order for punishment not to be in every instance, an act of violence of one or many against a private citizen, it must be essentially public, prompt, necessary, the least possible in the given circumstances, proportionate to the crimes, dictated by the laws.5 Though some have questioned Beccaria's principles and motives, even his harshest critics recognize that he was one of the rare reformers to have an enduring 64

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influence on justice policy and a true criminological "success story". 6 It is Beccaria's ideas and writings that inspire criminologists who believe that criminals choose to commit crime and that crime can be controlled by judicious application of criminal punishments. Jeremy Bentham British philosopher Jeremy Bentham was another early pioneer of the concept of criminal choice.7 Born in 1748 to a well-to-do-family, Bentham spent his life trying to develop a system of scientific jurisprudence and legislation. His writings made his thoughts so famous that Benthamism continued to influence British policy and governmental structure for more than 50 years after he died. 8 Bentham was steeped in the ethos of his own period and particularly in the utilitarian ideas of the Scottish philosopher David Hume, who believed that human behavior is the product of environmental influences--that what we know is no more than the sum of what we experience. SaiQ Bentham, Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters--pain and 65

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pleasure they govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think. Every effort we can make to throw off our subjection will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it.9 This statement briefly summarizes Bentham's thoughts on the nature of human behavior. Actions are evaluated by their tendency to produce advantage, pleasure, and happiness, and to avoid or prevent mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness. Bentham created a moral calculus for estimating the likelihood that any individual would engage in a particular act. It involves a balancinq test--weiqhinq the possibility that an act will cause current or future pleasure aqainst the possibility that it will create current or future pain. Since human judgment is so complex, Bentham provides hundreds of independent factors to be considered and evaluated; they include "the pleasures of wealth, the pleasures of skill the pleasures of benevolence the pleasures of piety the pains of desire disappointment of the sense (hUnger 1 thirst) 0 ntO Bentham believed that the purpose of all law is to produce and support the total happiness of the community 66

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it serves. Since punishment is in itself harmful, its existence is only justified if it promises to prevent greater evil than it creates. Punishment, therefore, has four main objectives: (1) to prevent all criminal offenses; (2) when it cannot prevent a crime, to convince the offender to commit a less serious one; (3) to ensure that a criminal uses no more force than is necessary; and (4) to prevent crime as cheaply as possible. Bentham derived six rules to guide punishment: 1. The value of the punishment must not be less in any case than what is sufficient to outweigh that of the profit of the offense. 2. The greater the mischief of the offense, the greater is the expense which it may be worthwhile to be at, in the way of punishment. 3. Where two offenses come in competition, the punishment for the greater offense must be sufficient to induce a man to prefer the less. 4. The punishment should be adjusted in such a manner to each particular offense that every part of the mischief there may be a motive to restrain the offender from giving birth to it. 67

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5. The punishment ought in no case to be more than what is necessary to bring it into conformity with the rules here given. 6. That the quantity actually inflicted on each individual offender may correspond to the quantity intended for similar offenders in general, the several circumstances influencing sensibility ought always to be taken into account. 11 Classical Criminology The writings of Beccaria and Bentham form the core of what today is referred to as the Classical School of Criminology. As originally conceived in the eighteenth century, Classical Criminology had several basic elements: (1) people in society have free will to choose criminal or law-abiding solutions to meet their needs or settle their problems; (2) criminal solutions may be more attractive than conventional ones because they usually require less work for a greater payoff: (3) a person's choice of criminal solutions may be controlled by fear of society's reaction to such acts: (4) the more severe, certain, and swift the reaction, the better it can 68

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control criminal behavior; and (5) the most efficient crime prevention device is punishment sufficient enough to make crime an unattractive choice.12 The basic premise of classical theory was that all men and women have the potential to be criminals if not kept in check by fear of punishment. The classical perspective controlled United States and European judicial philosophy during much of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Men and women were sent to prisons in outlying areas to serve their punishment. Capital punishment was still widely used but slowly began to be employed for only the most serious crimes. The byword was "let the punishment fit the crime. 11 However, during the nineteenth century, a new vision of the world was about to challenge the validity of classical theory and present an innovative way of looking at the causes of crime. This "struggle" for criminological dominance continues on. The Nineteenth Century: Positivism While the classical position held sway as a guide to understanding crime, law, and justice for almost 69

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100 years, a new movement was under way that would challenge its dominance. The positivist tradition began to develop in the mid-nineteenth century as the scientific method began to take hold in Europe. This movement was inspired by new discoveries in biology, astronomy, and chemistry. If the scientific method could be applied to the study of nature, then why not use it to study human behavior? The initial great prophet of this view was Auguste Comte (1798-1857), who applied scientific methods to the study of society. Comte is often viewed as the founder of sociology. According to Comte, societies pass through stages that can be grouped on the basis of how people try to understand the world in which they live. People in primitive societies consider inanimate objects as having life (e.g., the sun is a god); in later social stages, people embrace a rational, scientific view of the world. comte called this final stage the positive stage, and those who followed his writings became known as positivists. As we understand it today, the positivist tradition has two main elements. The first is the belief that 70

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human behavior is a function of external forces that are beyond individual control. Some of these forces are social, such as the effect of wealth and class, while others are political and historical, such as war and famine. Other forces are more personal and psychological, such as an individual's brain structure and his or her biological makeup and/or mental ability. Each of these forces operates to influence human behavior. The second aspect of positivism is the embrace of the scientific method to solve problems. Positivists rely on the strict use of empirical methods to test hypotheses. That is, they believe in the factual firsthand observation and measurement of conditions and events. A positivist would agree that an abstract concept such as "intelligence" exists because it can be measured by an IQ test. They would challenge a concept such as "the soul" because it is a condition that cannot be verified by the scientific method. The positivist tradition was spurred on by Charles Darwin (1809-1882), whose work on the evolution of man encouraged a nineteenth-century "cult of science" 71

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that mandated that all human activity could be verified by scientific principles. Darwin had suggested that all living organisms, including men and women, had come into existence not through divine creation but by a process of evolution and natural selection in which the strongest survived, referred to as "survival of the fittest". Darwin's reliance on careful measurement to prove his theories set the stage for science to be a dominant force in explaining human behavior. Positivism eventually dominated all scientific inquiry and was considered the modern way of doing things. Classical criminology, with its reliance on armchair theorizing, was challenged by more scientific approaches to crime, including biological, psychological, and sociological views. Cesare Lombroso and Criminal Man With the publication of Charles Darwin's Origin of the Species in 1859, the scientific quest to unlock the secrets of human origin and behavior received considerable momentum. In Italy, Cesare Lombroso was studying the cadavers of executed criminals in an effort 72

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to scientifically determine whether law violators were physically different from people of conventional values and behavior. Lombroso (1835-1909), known as the "father of criminology", was a physician who served much of his career in the Italian army. That experience gave him ample opportunity to study the physical characteristics of soldiers convicted and executed for criminal offenses. Later, he studied inmates at institutes for the criminally insane at Pavia, Pesaro, and Reggio Emilia.13 Lombrosian theory can be outlined in a few simple statements. First, Lombroso believed that serious offenders, those who engaged in repeated assault or theft-related activities were born.to be criminals. These crimogenic people have inherited physical problems that impel them into a life of crime.14 Second, said Lombroso, criminals suffer from atavistic anomalies--physically, they are throwbacks to an earlier and more primitive evolutionary period. such born criminals could be identified by certain "physical stigmata", outward appearances, particularly facial, which tended to distinguish them from non-criminals. In 73

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addition, Lombroso compared criminals' behavior to that of the mentally ill and those suffering some forms of epilepsy. According to Lombrosian theory, crimogenic traits can be acquired through indirect heredity, being from a "degenerate family with frequent cases of insanity, deafness, syphilis, epilepsy, and alcoholism among its members". 15 Direct heredity--being related to a family of criminals--is the second primary cause of crime. In addition to heredity, environmental conditions can promote crime--alcoholism, lack of education, temperature swings (hot temperatures were related to violent crime), and imitation of well-publicized crimes. Thus, while Lombroso believed that inherited biological factors'are the primary cause of criminality, he also recognized that environment can affect anti-social behavior. Lombroso's contemporaries continued his search for a criminal man. For example, Raffaele Garofalo (1852-1934) stated that among criminals, "a lower degree of sensibility to physical pain seems to be demonstrated by the readiness with which prisoners submit to the operation of tattooinqi 16 But despite his respect for 74

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Lombroso, Garofalo argued that no proof of the existence of a criminal or delinquent type had been produced and that murderers and other serious criminals manifest many different physical traits. Garofalo explained deviant behavior with his concept of psychic, or moral, anomaly-the criminal's lack of compassionate and altruistic feelings, a lack that has an organic root. The moral anomaly, said Garofalo, is a psychic force found more frequently in so-called inferior races and transmitted through heredity. Though environment plays a role in the development of criminality, internal factors predominate. They include the "instincts" that are congenial or inherited or that are acquired in early infancy and thereafter become inseparable from the "psychic organism." Garofalo recognized the differences among individual criminals and suggested that criminals be classified as murderers, who are totally lacking in humanity, or as lesser criminals, who in turn should be classified as violent criminals, thieves, and lascivious criminals. A student of Lombroso, Enrico Ferri (1856-1929) believed that a number of biological, social and organic 75

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factors caused delinquency and crime.17 It was in criminal sociology that Ferri made one of his most important contributions: the concept of the law of criminal saturation. For Ferri, 11the level of crime each year is determined by the different conditions of the physical and social environment combined with the congenital tendencies and accident impulses of individuals, in accordance with a law, which, in analogy to the law of chemistry, 1118 is the law of criminal saturation. It was Ferri's view that criminals should not be held personally or morally responsible for their actions because forces outside their control caused criminality. Psychological Views Another type of positivist criminology focused on the mental aspects of crime, including the association between intelligence, personality, learning and criminal behavior. The earliest 11psychological11 view was that criminals were possessed by evil spirits or demons. Later theories suggested that mental illness and insanity 76

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were inherited and that deviants were inherently mentally damned by reason of their inferior genetic makeup. Charles Goring was an early advocate of an association between mental dysfunction and crime. Goring (1870-1919), considered Lombroso and his followers, imprecise and inadequate. In The English Convict, published in 1913, Goring described his use of the biometric method to study 3,000 English convicts.19 The biometric method applies precise statistical tests to the study of human characteristics. Goring rejected Lombroso's claims of biological determinism. In measuring such traits as distance between the eyes, head circumference, weight, hearing, hair and eye color, he found little difference in the physical characteristics of criminals and non-criminals. Goring discovered, however, that criminal behavior bore a significant relationship to a condition he referred to as "defective intelligence." Consequently, Goring believed that criminal behavior was inherited and could therefore best be controlled by regulating the reproduction of families exhibiting such traits as "epilepsy, insanity, feeblemindedness, and defective social instinct 11 20 77

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Gabriel Tarde (1843-1904) used a somewhat different psychological approach in his early research: he is the forerunner of modern day learning theorists.21 Unlike Goring, who viewed criminals as mentally impaired, Tarde believed people learn from one another through a process of imitation. Tarde's ideas are quite similar to modern social learning theorists who believe, that both interpersonal and observed behavior, such as movies or television, can influence criminality. Emile Durkheim At the same time biological and psychological views were dominating criminology, another group of thinkers were developing the science of sociology in order to "scientifically" study the major changes that were then taking pace in nineteenth century society. Comtes conclusion that society contained fundamental forces that guide the direction of social life set the stage for a more scientific analysis of society by early sociologists. Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) was one of the founders of sociology and a significant contributor to 78

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criminology.22 In fact it is probably accurate to claim that his presentation of crime has been more influential in modern criminology than any other. Durkheims most significant contribution was his conclusion that crime is a "normal" and necessary social behavior. Since, it has existed in every age, in both poverty and prosperity, it seems part of human nature. If crime exists everywhere, he states, it cannot be viewed as According to Durkheim, the inevitability of crime is linked to the differences within society. Since people are so different from one another and employ such a variety of methods and forms of behavior to meet their needs, it is not surprising that some will resort to criminality. Thus, as long as human differences exist, crime is inevitable and one of the fundamental conditions of social life. Crime, argued Durkheim, can also be useful, and on occasion even healthy, for a society to experience. The existence of crime implies that a way is open for social change and that the social structure is not rigid or inflexible. Put another way, if crime did not exist, it would mean that everyone behaved the same way and agreed 79

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totally on what is right and wrong. such universal conformity would stifle creativity and independent thinking. In addition, Durkheim argued that crime is beneficial because it calls attention to social ills. A rising crime rate can signal the need for social change and promote a variety of programs designed to relieve the human suffering that may have caused crime in the first place. Durkheim is also closely associated with the concept of anomie.24 According to Durkheim, an anomie society is one in which rules of behavior--norms--have broken down or become inoperative during periods of rapid social change, war, conflict, or unrest. Anomie undermines society's social control function. Every society works to limit people's goals and desires. If a society becomes anomie, it can no longer establish and maintain control over its population's wants and desires. Since people find it difficult to limit their appetites, their demands become unlimited. As originally conceived, anomie resulted from disruption in the social world arising from natural or human-made catastrophes, such as economic depression, 80

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of its own destruction and that from its ashes would grow a socialist state in which the workers themselves would own the means of production. In his analysis, Marx used the dialectic method, based on the analysis developed by the philosopher Georg Hegel (1770-1831). Hegel argued that for every idea, or thesis, there exists an opposing argUment, or antithesis. Since neither position can ever be truly accepted, the result is a merger of the two ideas, a synthesis. Marx adapted this analytic method for his study of c'lass struggle. History, argued Marx, is replete with examples of two opposing forces whose conflict promotes social change. When conditions are bad enough, the oppressed will rise up to fight the owners and eventually replace them. Thus, in the end, the capitalist system will destroy itself. Marx did not write a great deal. on the subject of crime. Engels, however, did spend some time on the subject in his work The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844.29 Here, he portrayed crime as a function of social demoralization--a collapse of people's humanity reflecting a decline in society. Workers, demoralized by 89

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capitalist society, are caught up in a process that leads to crime and violence. Marx saw crime as a function of class struggle. He believed that the capitalist system's emphasis on competition and wealth produces an economic and social environment in which crime is inevitable. Marx's most famous comment on the subject of crime.is an almost tongue-in-cheek statement describing the relativity of law: A philosopher produces ideas, a poet poems, a clergyman sermons, a professor compendia, and so on. A criminal produces crime. If we look closer at the connection between this latter branch of production and society as a whole, we shall rid ourselves of many prejudices. The criminal produces not only crimes but also criminal law, and with this also the professor who gives lectures on criminal law and in addition to this the inevitable compendium in which this same professor throws his lectures onto the general market of commodities. The criminal moreover produces the whole of the police and of criminal justice, constables, judges, hangmen, juries, etc.; and all these different lines of business, which form equally many categories of the social division of labor, develop different capacities of the human spirit, create new needs and new ways of satisfying them. Torture alone has given rise to the most ingenious mechanical inventions, and employed many honorable craftsmen in the production of instruments.30 90

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Marx seems to be implying in this passage that there may be benefits from crime in capitalist society, foremost being its role in producing and sustaining social institutions--police, courts, law, and law professors.31 Marx may be suggesting the possibility of a crime-free society by showing that capitalist economic and social relationships produce crime. Moreover, Marx is ridiculing the consensus/functionalist theorists, who maintain that all behavior serves a function or reflects a consensus of societal viewpoints. So long as capitalism exists, Marx is saying, it is foolish to think that people obey the law because it is "right"; they do so because the law represents the will of those who hold it. Though these writings laid the foundation for a neemarxist criminology, decades passed before Marxist theory had an important impact on criminology. In the United States during the 1960s, social and political upheaval were fueled by the Vietnam War, the development of an anti-establishment counterculture movement, the civil rights movement, and the women's movement. Positivist criminology, with its emphasis on a stable society being 91

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besieged by law violators, no longer made much sense. The world seemed to be filled with the conflict between the "have" and "have not", those who controlled the political order and others--women, minorities, and college students--who were demanding freedom and an end to violence. During this time, Marxist thought inspired the revolutions in CUba and other Third World countries. To some American and European scholars, these countries became ideal societies which respected human rights and abolished the aggressive class system. Young sociologists who became interested in applying Marxist principles to the study of crime began reading Bonger and Vold, and what came forth from this intellectual ferment was a Marxist-based radical criminology. In Class. State and Crime, Richard Quinney boldly lays the issue of crime at capitalism's door and suggests that a socialist revolution may be the only way of eradicating the economic inequities and class oppression of our capitalist society. 32 Today, over a decade after Quinney's book appeared, the bright dawn of Marxist criminology has been eclipsed 92

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by the collapse of communism. This is to be sure, one of the minor, incidental casualties of historical disintegration, but one cart see now that communism can produce crimes as well as inefficiency. The demon of capitalism, at least in the field of criminology, seems to have been partially exorcised by the revealed evils and petty corruptions of its opposite. However, one cannot, on that basis, exculpate capitalism from any involvement in fueling the rise of street crime. Persuasive evidence links our freewheeling economic system with the problems we find in our cities. The symbiotic relationship of religion and capitalism has given birth, in Latin America, to a liberation theology that flies in the teeth of the Catholic Church's message of meek acceptance of one's fate on earth in order to achieve salvation in the hereafter. The implication of this revolt is that misery is not ordained by God and inevitable, and that one must fight to achieve social and economic justice. Brought to its conclusion, the message would be clear to a ghetto dweller viewing "The Lifestyles of the Rich and Famous" 93

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on TV: He shouldn't accept his fate and ought to get out and grab some of that good life. This disaffection of the underclass and the greed of the overclass have combined to create tensions that inevitably lead to the adoption of panic-induced solutions, mostly snatched at in desperation and with little chance of succeeding as they, at the same time, undermine democracy. Criminology Today The various schools of criminology developed over a long period of time. Though they have undergone great change and innovation, each continues to have an impact on the field. For example, classical theory has evolved into the Choice theories. Choice theorists today use large data sets and advanced statistical methods to determine the effect of legal factors, such as the probability of arrest and/or the severity of punishment, on the decision to choose crime. Part of their efforts involves analyzing how change in legal policy, such as the resumption of the death penalty, can influence the decision to commit crime. 94

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Biological and psychological views of crime have also undergone considerable evolution. While criminologists no longer believe that a single trait or inherited characteristic can explain crime, some are convinced that biological and mental traits interact with environmental factors to influence all human behavior, including criminality. Biological and psychological views are also advanced by new information being gathered on the evolution of criminal careers. Data indicates that a relatively few people commit most crimes, and that fits in well with the view that a few people with physical and mental problems may account for most of society's antisocial behavior. Sociological theories, tracing back to Durkheim, have continued to dominate the field. Some are direct offshoots of these pioneering efforts and maintain that individual's life-styles and living conditions directly control their criminal behavior. Those at the bottom on the social structure cannot achieve success and experience anomie, strain, failure and frustration. Those sociologists who have added psychological dimensions to their views of crime causation also 95

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continue to flourish. This school of thoughts holds that individuals' learning experiences and socialization in relationships with their parents, peers, school and society directly control their behavior. In some cases, children learn to commit crime by interacting and modeling their behavior after others they admire, while other criminal offenders are people whose life experiences have shattered their social bonds to society. Finally, the view of Marx and his followers continues to be influential. Many criminologists still view social and political conflict as the. root causes of crime. Criminology then has had a rich history that still exerts an important influence on the thinking of its current practitioners. Summary During the eighteenth century, legal philosophers Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham produced famous texts that form the basis for the classical school of criminology. They held that people used their free will to commit crimes and that if the pains of punishment 96

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outweigh the benefits of crime, people will be deterred. Beccaria noted that punishment must be certain, severe, and swift enough to control crime; excessive punishment and torture were futile. During the nineteenth century, scientific discoveries heralded the positivist movement in criminology. A physician, cesare Lombroso, concluded that criminals suffered from physical defects that made them crime-prone. Lombroso believed that criminals had primitive traits which he called atavistic anomalies. Lombroso's contemporaries continued his search for criminal man by looking at such physical traits as body build and genetic inheritance. Others, such as Charles Goring and Gabriel Tarde, added a psychological dimension to the study of crime. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, sociologists began to dominate.the field of criminology. Durkheim had shown how social forces influence human behavior. Two schools of thought on crime developed--one stressing urban life and social disorganization, the other human interaction and 97

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socialization. Finally, the view of Marx and his followers continues to be influential. 98

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Notes 1. Peter Bondanello and Julia Bondanello, Dictionary of Italian Literature (Westport, Ct.: Greenwood Press, 1979), 42. 2. Cesare Beccaria, on Crimes and Punishments Sixth Edition, Trans. Henry Paolucci (Indianapolis: BobbsMerrill, 1977), 11. 3. Ibid. I 13. 4. Ibid. I 43. 5. Ibid., 99. 6. Graeme Newman and Pietro Marongiv, "Penological Reform and the Myth of Beccaria," Criminology 28 (1990): 344. 7. Jeremy Bentham, A Fragment on Government and an Introduction to the Principle of Morals and Leaislation ed. Wilfred Harrison (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967). 8. Ibid. I xi. 9. Ibid. I 21. 10. Ibid. I 152. 11. Ibid. I 1. 12. Ibid. 13. Marvin Wolfgang, "Cesare Lombroso," Pioneers in Criminology ed. Hermann Mannheim, Montclair, NJ: Patterson-Smith, 1970), 232. 14. Cesare Lombroso, Crime: Its Causes and Remedies (Montclair, NJ: Patterson-Smith, 1968), 89. 15. Ibid., 136. 99

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16. Raffaelo Garafalo, Criminology trans. Robert Miller, (Boston: Little Brown, 1914), 12. 17. Enrico Ferri, Criminal Sociology (New York: D. Appleton, 1909), 92. 18. Ibid. I 90. 19. Charles Goring, The English Convict: A Statistical Study, 1913 (Montclair, NJ: Patterson-Smith, 1972). 20. Edwin Driver, "Charles Buckman Goring," in Pioneers in Criminology ed. Hermann Mannheim (Montclair, NJ: Patterson-Smith, 1970), 440. 21. Gabriel Tarde, Penal Philosophy trans. R. Howell (Boston: Little Brown, 1912), 54. 22. Robert Nisbit, The Sociology of Emile Durkheim (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), 209. 23. Emile Durkheim, .Rules of Sociological Method trans. S.A. Solvay and J.H. Mueller, ed. G. Calin (New York: Free Press, 1966), 65. 24. Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society (New York: Free Press, 1964). 25. Robert Park and Ernest Burgess, The City (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1925), 110. 26. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy trans. E. Aveling, (Chicago: Charles Kern, 1906); Karl Marx, Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy trans. P.B. Bottomore, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956). For a general discussion of Marxist thought, see Michael Lynch and w. Byron Groves, A Primer in Radical criminology (New York: Harrow and Heston, 1986), 6-26. 27. William Bonger, Criminality and Economic Conditions abridged ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969): George Rusche and otto Kircheimer, 100

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Punishment and Social Structure (New York: Columbia University Press 1939); Ralf Dabrendolf, Class and Class conflict in Industrial society (Palo Alto, Cal: Stanford University Press, 1934); George Vold Theoretical Criminology (New York: Oxford University Pres, 1953). 28. Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, trans. Martin Nicolaus (New York: Vintage, 1973), 106-107. 29. Friedrich Engels, The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1950). 30. Karl Marx, Theories of Surplus Value, Vol. 1, (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1969), 387-388. 31. Ian Taylor, Paul Walton, and Jack Young, The New Criminology: For a Social Theory of Deviance (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973), 212. 32. Richard Quinney, Class. State and Crime (New York: Longman, 1977). 101

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CHAPTER 4 IS THE CRIME PROBLEM WORSE TODAY? FROM JOHN BILLINGHAM TO JEFFREY DAHMER Introduction Whether the stark assertion that violence is "as American as cherry pie" has any historical validity, the recent state of street crime, urban rioting, and a crime wave of allegedly epidemic proportions has clearly convinced many Americans that their persons and property are endangered to an unprecedented degree. While the wave of crime that has plagued the 1990s is manifestly unsettling to our restive society, it is probable that the fear of personal assault-the dark specter of the stranger working in the night-currently instills the greatest sense of terror in the collective American psyche. In this chapter, I will deal with crime perception #1: Crime is becoming qualitatively and quantitatively worse. To begin unraveling the mystery of crime in the United states, one should consider how public opinion is formed. When developing ideas and beliefs about crime,

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formed. When developing ideas and beliefs about crime, people consider information from a variety of sources. Some of these sources consist of direct personal experience with social situations and first-hand contact with other people. They have been assaulted or some property has been stolen. Yet, surveys indicate that fewer than eight percent of households experience crimes of high concern (a rape, murder, robbery, assault, or a burglary).1 In addition, information may be learned from others who relay their experiences to provide second-hand knowledge about crime. Today, however, a great deal of the available information about events in social environments near and far is provided by the media. The media--in newspapers, television, radio and periodicals--keeps us aware of the seriousness of the crime problem. Chances are that on any given day, the daily newspaper of every major u.s. city will present a snapshot of America's relentless problem of crime. Articles will cover a range of violent acts: murder, assault, child abuse, and rape. Syndicated news services, such as Associated Press, Reuter, and news wire services, allow newspapers to carry not only local 103

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stories but also reports of violence throughout the nation. The broadcasting industry also engages in vigorous crime reporting. On an average evening, the u.s. public is routinely confronted with media coverage of grisly and shocking violent crimes: In New York, an angry patron sets fire to the Happy Land Social Club in the Bronx and 87 people die; a group of youths go "wilding" in Central Park and rape and beat a female jogger; a Utah family attending the u.s. Open tennis tournament is attacked in a Manhattan subway station, one son is stabbed to death while protecting his mother, and afterwards the culprits go dancing; in Los Angeles, 15 police officers go on a rampage and savagely beat a handcuffed motorist; in Milwaukee, police found 11 dismembered and partially eaten bodies in the apartment of Jeffrey Dahmer.2 By bringing violence right into the home, such dramatic portrayals paint a picture of an increasingly dangerous world ridden with crime and violence, in which any of us could, with increased likelihood, find ourselves fall prey. Violent crime in America seems to have risen to a crisis point. There is no adequate explanation for what 104

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is happening, and few pragmatic solutions to the problem exist. In analyzing the crime problem, the media often call on law enforcement officials to affirm the seriousness of violent and predatory crime: Dallas Police Chief Bill Rathburn observes, "It's time for the state of Texas to recognize that we have a major problem with violence, and it's time to do something about it. My assessment is that we can't hire enough police officers to turn the situation around drastically."3 Washington, D.C., Police Chief Issac Fulwood, a native Washingtonian with a reputation as a street-smart lawman who came up through the ranks, vowed to make a difference. But three years later, he's turning in his badge. Fulwood says, "My decision to retire is based on the inability of law enforcement to deal with increasingly random and senseless violence.114 Former u.s. Attorney for the District of Columbia Joseph Digenova states: The criminal justice system alone is not going to solve the crime problem, and if people think it is, they're qoinq to throw their money in the wrong place. We have to continue to spend money to improve the criminal justice system, more police, more prosecutors, more judges, more prisons, but that's not going to solve the problem we're facing of violent crime today.5 105

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twentieth century.7 Between 1882, when records of lynchings were first kept, down to 1941, lynchings averaged 78 per year.8 And the violence of Jesse James, Billy the Kid, and others was so striking that they have left their marks permanently on our understanding of the era in which they lived. Violence Against Native Americans In its four thousand years of recorded history the world has witnessed a number of holocausts in which an entire race was systematically exterminated. Genocide is the term of international law for such exterminations. Usually it is carried out as a matter of legal, state policy, as when Nazi Germany attempted its "final solution", the total obliteration the Jewishpeople in Europe. Sometimes it is justified under a contrived pretext, as when the Turks under Abdul Hamid II massacred the Armenians on the grounds that they were subverting his empire. When white Americans tried to exterminate the Indians, they relied on neither policy nor pretext. They did it out of greed, and without benefit of law. They simply wanted the Indians land and the resources 110

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that lay beneath it. The resulting record of white lawlessness is of course notorious: Indian tribes were forced to sign 370 treaties with the federal government, each one of which was violated until they had lost almost 2 billion acres of land. By World War I, more than a million Indian people had been killed.9 Land was certainly the principal attraction in the westward expansion. But there were other, lesser profits to be made by the petty exploiters who joined in the extermination game. The most grizzly enterprise was the traffic in human scalps. In Denver in the 1870s, Indian scalps were worth $10 each. In Central City the price was $25, in Deadwood, South Dakota, $200. Naturally, the killers were proud of their bloody prizes. Kit Carson, who "pacified" the Navajos in New Mexico in 1862-63 for the Indian-hating military commander, General James H. Carlton, bragged how he destroyed everything in the Indianvillages, not just people but also "more than two million pounds of Navajo grain". 10 The Navajos who were taken prisoner and interviewed in the Forts of Canby and Wingate didn't fare much better. In a single week in 1864 at Fort Canby, 126 died of dysentery and exposure. 111

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Congress then allotted $100,000 for relief of the Navajo prisoners. The Bureau of Indian Affairs channeled most of that sum into the pockets of corrupt agents or supplier friends, paying for example, $18.50 for army blankets that retailed at $5.85. Only about $30,00 worth of goods ever reached the Navajos: by May 1868, more than two thousand of the near ten thousand prisoners were dead. Fearing similar treatment, the Cheyenne and Arapahoe decided to sign a peace treaty. The federal government promised to give them supplies for the winter if they stayed on their reservation, which they did. Then, early one morning in November 1864, when most of the camp was still asleep, the Colorado volunteers under Colonel John M. Chivington attacked them without warning at Sand Creek, killing 450 men, women, and children. Chivingtons men systematically raped the young women before scalping them, cut off the dead braves genitals and placed them on display when they returned to Denver. Congress demanded an investigation of the massacre, which was carried out in 1865, but nothing came of it except a 500 page report two years later detailing the corruption 112

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of Colorado Indian agents and the miserable conditions of the tribes. 11 Obviously, jealous of CJiivington1s Sand Creek massacre, General George Custer brought his troops up onto the Washita River in Oklahoma on Thanksgiving Day 1868. He waited until the Indians in a small village across the bend were fast asleep, then, violating the Treaty of Medicine Lodge, attacked in force, killing all its occupants 103 men and an unknown number of women and children, who Custer didn .t think were worth adding up. At Camp Grant, Arizona, in 1871, a.detachment from Tucson attacked 300 women, old men, and children working the field under firm protection of the u.s. Army, killed 118 women, 8 men, and sold 30 children into slavery in Mexico. President Grant, in this case, was furious. He demanded a trial of the murderers. He got one, but the judge told the all-white jury that killing Indians who might be a menace was not murder. The defendants were acquitted. The local Denver newspaper remarked: We congratulate them on the fact that permanent peace arrangements have been made with so many and we only regret that the number was not double. Camp Grant is the last of those victories for civilization and progress which have made sand creek, washita and other similar 113

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occurrences famous in western history.12 Racial. Religious and Ethnic Violence Violence has been an intrinsic part of the black American experience from the start. Every other immigrant group came here voluntarily, often illegally; Africans came in chains, having been uprooted from their homes and transported across the sea at a ghastly cost in human life. Moreover, slavery was maintained by violence; so was the racial caste system that was erected after emancipation and that still endures, in diminished form, in parts of the rural south. For the most of their history in this country, in fact, blacks were victims, not initiators, of violence. In the Old south, violence against black was omnipresent-sanctioned both by custom and law. Whites were free to use any methods, up to and including murder, to control "their negroes". As Raymond Fosdick learned when he studied American police methods shortly before the countrys entry into World War I, southern police departments had three classes of homicide. 11If a nigger kills a white man, thats murder", one official told 114

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Fosdick. "If a white man kills a nigger, that's justifiable homicide. If a nigger kills another nigger, that's one less nigger. 1113 A quarter of a century later, Gunnar Myrdal found little change: "Any white man can strike or beat a Negro, steal or destroy his property, cheat him in a transaction and even take his life without fear of legal reprisal. "14 With the end of slavery and its conjoined slave patrols and black codes, the white people of the south developed a special organization for dealing with blacks: The Ku Klux Klan, which has been one of the most consistent features in the last 100 years of American violence. There have been three Ku Klux Klans: the first Ku Klux Klan of reconstruction times, the second Ku Klux Klan of the 1920s, and the third Ku Klux Klan of the 1950s to 1970s. The first Ku Klux Klan was employed to intimidate the radical Republicans of the reconstruction era and, by violence and threats, to force the freedman to accept the renewed rule of southern whites.15 The second Ku Klux Klan differed significantly from both its predecessor and successor. Although the second Ku Klux Klan was founded in Atlanta in 1915, its greatest growth 115

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and strength actually took place beyond the borders of the old confederacy. During the 1920s it became a truly national organization. Fot 'a time it enjoyed great strength in the southwest, west, north and east. The strongest state clan was in Indiana, and such wholly unsouthern states as Oregon and Colorado felt its vigor. The second Ku Klux Klan surely belongs to the violent history of American, but, unlike the first or third Klans, blacks were only a secondary target for it. Although denunciation of Catholics and Jews ranked onetwo in the rhetoric of the second Klan, recent students of the movement have shown that Klan violence--whippings, torture, and murder--were directed less against catholics, Jews, and blacks than against ne'er-do-wells and the allegedly immoral of the very same background as the Klansmen: white, Anglo-Saxon Protestant. The Klan, thus, attacked Americans of similar background and extraction who refused to conform to the Bible Belt morality that was the deepest passion of the Klan movement of the 1920s.16 Paralleling the Ku Klux Klan has been a host of other movements of racial, ethnic, and religious malice. 116

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Before the civil War, the northeastern United States was marked by convent burnings and anti-Catholic riots.17 This 11Protestant Crusade11 eventually bred the political Know-Nothing movement. Anti-Chinese agitation that often burst into violence became a familiar feature in California and the west as the nineteenth century wore on.18 The anti-Chinese sentiments were manifested in brutal, violent attacks and harsh treatment of Chinese people as they became convenient scapegoats for crime, poverty, disease, and other social ills. Mayhem, murder, pillage, bloodshed, humiliation, and incendiarism top the cruelties Chinese were subjected to. In 1891, eleven Italian immigrants were the victims of a murderous mob in New Orleans. The fear and loathing of Catholics (especially Irish and Italians), which often took a violent form, was organized in the nonviolent but bigoted American Protective Association of 1887.19 Labor clashes of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century were in reality, often, ethnic clashes with native, old stock Americans ranged on one side as owners, foremen, and skilled workers against growing numbers of unskilled immigrants--chiefly Jews, Slavs, 117

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Italians, and others from southern and eastern Europe.20 Violence Against Women The problem of violence against women is not new. Women in American society have always been victims of humiliation, torture, and exploitation. There are numerous records of episodes such as rape, incest, battering, and murder of women. Until recently, however, female victims of violence have not been given much attention in the literature of social problems or in the literature of criminal violence. Although recent data suggest that "more than half of all married women are beaten by their husbands", abuse of women has been an undercover subject in our society, an uncomfortable "abnormality" not to be discussed, and very little historical data is available.21 However, pioneer daughters like Mary Austin have realized the costs of concealment and focused on violence against women in their autobiographical narratives. Four texts, in particular, by western women writers suggest that violence against women was commonplace in the American West! Mari Sandoz's Old Jules (1935); Agnes Smedley's 118

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Daughter of Earth (1929); Meridel LeSueur's The Girl (written in 1939, published in 1978); and Tillie Olsen Yonnodio's from the thirties: (written between 1932 and 1937, published The four writers view the incidents of aggressive violence towards women to be escalating alarmingly and the apparent consequence of the general acceptance of man's superiority over women. Violent acts against women appeared as socially acceptable, rather than deviant or criminal. Crime Booms Unlike some European countries, which have maintained national crime statistics for more than a century and a quarter, the United States has maintained national crime statistics only since 1930.23 To examine the crime problem prior to 1930, it is anecdotal evidence--newspaper articles, diaries, etc., must be used. Because the rural areas were slow in coming into the system and reported poorly when they did, it was not until 1958, when other major changes were made in the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), that reporting of rural crimes was sufficient to allow a total national estimate without special 119

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adjustments.24 Changes in overall estimating procedures and two offense categories -rape and larceny -were also made in 1958. Because of these problems, figures prior to 1958, and particularly those prior to 1940, must be viewed as neither fully comparable with nor nearly so reliable as later figures. 1760s -1820s In 1767, Benjamin Franklin, in his capacity as agent for Pennsylvania, petitioned the British Parliament to stop solving its crime problem by shipping convicted felons to the American colonies.25 Transported felons were corrupting the morals of the poor, Franklin complained, and terrorizing the rest of the population with the many burglaries, robberies, and murders they committed. Alarming rates in robbery and violent crime were reported throughout the country prior to the revolution. Crime was a problem of great concern after the republic was established, and Americans attributed the problem to the recent crop of immigrants, who were believed to be more prone to crime than their 120

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predecessors. "Immigrants to the city are found at the bar of our criminal tribunals, in our bridewell, our penitentiary, and our state prison, the managers of the Society for the Prevention of Pauperism in New York City reported in 1819.26 "And we lament to say that they are often led by want, by vice, and by habit to form a phalanx of plunder and depredation, rendering our city more liable to the increase of crimes, and our houses of correction more crowded with convicts and felons.1127 1830s 1880s Twenty years later, things seemed to have deteriorated further. "One of the evidences of the degeneracy of our morals and of the inefficiency of our police is to be seen in the frequent instances of murder by stabbing", Philip Hone, a former mayor of New York, wrote in his diary for December 2, 1839.28 Fear of crime was becoming common place in many-cities as well. In 1844, a Philadelphian wrote that people were arming themselves because experience taught them not to expect pr'otection from the law.29 In a single fifteen month period in the 1850s, a total of forty-four murders were 121

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recorded in Los Angeles, then a town of only 8,000 inhabitants--about forty or fifty times as high as the city 1 s current murder .' Theodore Ferdinand 1 s study of Boston begins in 1849, and virtually every arrest indicator he uses show two sharp increases in crime after 1849, the first peaking in 1855-1859 and the second around 1870.30 And just prior to the Civil War a u.s. Senate Committee investigating crime in Washington, D.C., reported that "riot and bloodshed are of daily occurrence, innocent and unoffending persons are shot, stabbed and otherwise shamefully maltreated, and not infrequently the offender is not even arrested. 1131 The Civil War related crime waves have been explained in terms of degradation of war, recession, social disruption caused by the mobility engendered by war, anomie caused by destruction of the social order, and the notion that crime waves somehow have a role in "redefining the acceptable boundaries of behavior. 1132 Contemporary accounts of San Francisco told of extensive areas where no decent man was in safety to walk the street after dark: while at all hours, both night and day, his property was jeopardized by incendiarism and 122

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burglary. Teenage gangs gave rise to the word "hoodlum." The San Francisco Herald in 1855 complained: There are certain spots in our.city infested by the most abandoned men and women The upper part of Pacific Street after dark is crowded by thieves, gamblers, low women, and drunken sailors who thronged the 1,000 saloons and gambling dives of the Barbary Coast. From 1860 to 1880, there was not one night along the Barbary Coast without at least one murder and innumerable robberies. The "fame" of the Barbary Coast and of its bagnios spread far and wide. 33 Across the country in New York, accounts were equally sharp. A "stone's throw" from Broadway was the Five Points, the most notorious place in the city. "Policemen entered only in pairs and never unarmed. Respectable New Yorkers avoided the area in daylight It was the home of murderers, thieves, prostitutes, and fencers of stolen goods." The sovereign of Five Points was a "Captain" Isaiah Nynders, who mobilized a large gang of brutes, terrorized the polling places during elections and put in as mayor, Fernando Wood, who gave Nynders legal immunity for the operation of dives and gambling establishments.34 George Templeton Strong, a prominent New York lawyer, whose diaries, kept from 1835 to 1875, comprise one of the great source books for nineteenth century social history, records in the diary for 1869: 123

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February 12 .. crimes of violence--burglaries, robberies, and murders--have been of late many and audacious beyond example tonight's Post speaks of secret meetings of respectable citizens and of vigilance committees already organized and ready for action in this ward and others. And a incident: year later, strong indignantly records January 25, Tuesday at half-past ten this evening, Franklin Hughes, winding his way home from a dinner at a friend's was set upon and robbed by three men on the corner of Fifth Avenue and Eleventh Street. Of course, there was no arrest. Crime was never so bold, so persistent, so safe as it is this winter. Few criminals are caught, and less are punished. Municipal law is a failure we must soon fall back on the law of selfpreservation. 35 an In a study of Salem, Massachusetts, Ferdinand found that assault rates and serious offenses generally went sharply upward in the 1860s and 1870s.36 Edwin Powell reports a similar rise in crime against the person in Buffalo, New York, beginning in the 1850s and peaking out in 1870.37 Another city whose early arrest data show a rise beginning in the 1850s was New Orleans.38 James Q. Wilson has said that early studies agree that during the period immediately following the Civil War, the rate of violent crime in the big cities was higher than at any 124

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other time in our history.39 The overall increase in arrests for major crime in the 20 years after 1849 was roughly 300 percent.40 In fact I have found no historical study of American crime for this period whose evidence traces any other pattern, though only Powell regards the wave as any way exceptional or worth explaining.41 1910 -1920s The speeches by politicians and officials and news articles of the 1920s, the latter part of the 1940s, and the 1960s, resemble those of today. Contemporary news magazines need not employ reporters to write about the present crime wave. They can simply paraphrase stories written in the 1920s. The titles alone show a stark resemblance to those of today. "American's High Tide of Crime" (Literary Digest, December 11, 1920). "Permanent Crime Wave" (New Republic, .January 5, 1921). "America First In Crime" (Literary Digest, September 15, 1923). "Lawlessness: The Shame of America" (CUrrent Opinibn, July 5, 1924) "Crime: A Chronic Complaint; Why Not cure It by Eliminating the Chronic Criminal" (Outlook, April.14, 125

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1926) "CUrbing Crime in the United States" (Current History, January 1926) "Law Protects the Criminal" (Good Housekeeping, March 1927) "Boys, Gangs, and crime" (Literary Digest, April 13, 1929) More revealing and meaningful than the news stories are people's perceptions and opinions around crime during the 1920s. Many Americans were convinced that a crime wave was in progress, as serious offenses against persons and property increased from just before the first World War until the onset of the Great Depression. For the first time, presidents of the United States felt it necessary to speak and act on the crime problem. Shortly after taking office, Herbert Hoover appointed a national crime commission to study and make recommendations about violence and the administration of criminal justice. After a year of study, the commission reported: Since 1890, there has been, and continues, a widening, deepening tide of lawlessness in this country, sometimes momentarily receding, to swell again into greater depth and intensity. At intervals, this tide billows into waves that rise and break but only for a time, attracting public attention. 42 One reporter stated, "Today, America is the paradise 126

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of the criminal. It is literally true that ours is the one supposedly civilized country in which crime is a paying proposition for a capable crook, and in which the professional criminal is a good risk for an insurance company. A far better risk than a policeman."43 District Attorney Banton of New York was moved to remark that, "Prosecuting criminals today is like trying to catch a 1927 automobile with an ox-team. 1144 The Literarv Digest observed, "The truth is that the United States is approaching a condition somewhat resembling anarchy, and that unless something practical is done pretty soon, it will be too late. 1145 Chicago, with its underworld figures and corrupt criminal justice system, and New York, suffering an outbreak of homicides and general disorder, were centers of criminal activities. A study of Chicago from 1919 -thru the 1920s by Harry Willbach shows that arrest rates for crimes against persons increased sharply throughout the period. The same author's careful study of New York during this period gives similar results.46 Many other large cities--including Los Angeles, Detroit, and Cleveland--had serious crime problems.47 127

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Almost all of the data also indicates that the situation in the United states was the worst in the world. Indeed, in the average American city, there were seven to ten times more crimes of a serious nature committed each year than were committed during the same period in English, French, and German municipalities of similar size.48 These crimes included homicide, burglary, robbery, and other felonies. In 1916, there were nine pre-meditated murders in London which had a population of 7.25 million people: in Chicago, one-third as large, there were 105.49 This, on the basis of population, is a ratio of nearly 35 to one. Now, compare Chicago, not with London, but with England and Wales--that is to say, compare 2.5 million people with 38 million. There were 20 more murders in Chicago than in all England and Wales. New York City had six times as many homicides as London in 1918, 1919, and 1920. Each year from 1914 to 1920, New York had more homicides than occurred in London during any three-year period before 1914. Glasgow, 1916 to 1918 inclusive, had 38 homicides; Philadelphia, just a trifle larger, had 281. Liverpool and st. Louis, which were similar in size 128

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in 1916, show a proportion of one to 11. Los Angeles, one-twentieth the size of London, perpetrated two more homicides than London in 1916 and 10 more than London the following year. Berlin, before the war, averaged 25 murders a year, Vienna 19. The burglary statistics are no less ignominious. New York in 1916 had 11,652 burglaries; London had 1,459. All of England and Wales had 6,777 in 1918, when London had 2,777 felonies which we should classify as burglaries. New York had 7,412; Chicago 3,643; Detroit 2,047; Cleveland 2,608; and st. Louis had 2,989. Of robbery and assault with intent to rob, New York City in 1915 reported 838 cases, enough to furnish at least two news stories a day and three a day for several months.50 In the same year, there were 20 robberies in London. During 1918, Chicago had 22 robberies for every one committed in London. Detroit and Cleveland regularly averaged from three to five times as many robberies as England. Among the factors identified as contributing to the growing criminality of the 1920s were the heterogeneity of the population, desperate resort to dope, juvenile 129

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delinquency, unemployment-and poverty, lessening respect for the law, and the inadequacy and demoralization of the police machinery. 51 The increased propensity for crime was also attributed to a complete breakdown of the administration of criminal law in the United states.52 Edward Hale Bierstadt notes, "Our perpetual delays in administering justice, methods of selecting juries, abuse of the bail system, and right to appeal all make, in the long-run, for the protection of the criminal at the expense of public safety.1153 over and beyond criminal procedure, according to Bierstadt, there were at least two other factors that militate strongly in favor of the criminal. The first lies in the enormous and ever increasing number of undesirable and unenforceable laws that cog our statute books (we have a total of 1,900,000 statutes on the books now); the second is due to the sentimentality of the American public, which alternately howls for more law and less enforcement.M The proposed solution was to "get tough" on the criminal and eliminate the abuses on the system. The Boston Post stated that attitude succinctly: "Let citizens, juries, and judges do their duty fearlessly and strictly. Put criminals where they belong. Return to 130

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sane justice. That's the only medicine for the disease. 1155 The general belief was that the criminal justice system stresses rehabilitation at the expense of punishment. Professor William R. Vance, of the Yale Law School, observed, Our lauded idealism runs into sentimentality. We coddle criminals and build magnificent jails to put them in.until they are happier than their victims or the widows and orphans of their victims. We let. out sentiment run away with us instead of seeing the criminal in his true light as a public enemy. The results of this public sentimentality are ridiculous. Not more than 34 percent of our murders ever go to trial. About one percent of them pay the final penalty. An average of six policemen are killed for every murderer that society sends to the electric chair or the gallows. The victims leave more dead on the field than the losers. 56 1940s After the 1920s, the scourge of the Great Depression and weight of a world war temporarily diverted attention from the crime problem. But as soldiers returned and tried to reestablish their lives, crime once again surfaced as a problem of much concern. In 1946, a major crime was committed in the United States on the average of once every 18. 7 seconds. 57 In a report estimating that 131

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principal crimes reached a total of 1,685,203, J. Edgar Hoover, then directorof the Federal Bureau of Investigation, said that every 5.7 minutes during 1946, there was a murder, manslaughter, rape, or assault to kill.58 The 1,685,203 major crimes were not only the greatest number in 10 years, but were also 119,662 more than in 1945, according to the survey. During the average day, 36 persons were slain, 33 raped, and 185 others feloniously assaulted. Every day also brought 172 robberies, 981 burglaries, 630 automobile thefts, and 2, 580 miscellaneous larcenies. Between 1945 and 1946, murders and non-negligent manslaughter rose 23.3 percent; robbery 15.7 percent; rape 5.0 percent; aggravated assault 12.9 percent; larceny 8.8 percent; and burglary 17 percent. A new upsurge in crime was gaining headway rapidly in the country. The 1945 crime increase of 12.3 percent, biggest in history, was nearly doubled in 1946. Mr. Hoover reported that the increases were "for cities of.all sizes, and in each of nine geographic divisions of the country. 1159 In 1940, 64.5 violent crimes were committed for every 100,000 of the nation's population.60 This rate rose to 132

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68.7 in 1943. It jumped to a new high of 81.2 in 1945. In the five years after 1940, murder increased two percent; assault 19.7 percent; and rape 22.2 percent. Mr. Hoover stated, "America is in the grip of a rising wave of crime. Thus far, there is no indication of a decrease, and the record of the past holds little hope for improvement unless something positive is done.1161 The aftershock of World War II was considered to be an important factor in the crime wave of the 1940s. One reporter stated, The post-war crime wave is a delayed reaction to war The dislocation of families, the easy money for young workers, and the general demoralization of war boosted crime rates relatively little in wartime. The big reason was that missions of men under 30 years of age were overseas. And normally, half of all crime is committed by persons under 30. Now the demobilization is filling this age group again, the degenerating effects of war are being felt. The result is a new crime wave. If this trend is not checked quickly, this year will see a crime rate at least 25 percent worse than in the previous year.62 A lack of enforcement and punishment was once again perceived to be a primary factor in the crime wave. Throughout his career with the FBI, J. Edgar Hoover was quick to emphasize this point: You know and I know that human lives are taken daily, homes are plundered, hard-earned life savings are stolen, 133

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and crimes by the score occur only because some gullible parole board or pardon dispenser has released upon society some unreformed criminal; or because some politically expedient prosecutor lacks the fortitude to prosecute, or comprises with defense counsel to allow the criminal to plead to a lesser-defense though definitely guilty of the major crime; or because technical and capricious interpretation of statutes and rules of procedure theoretically takes the handcuffs from and places them on law enforcement. When human jackals are loosed to prey upon society without even fundamental regard for the responsibilities of law enforcement, we should not hesitate to speak out. It is no secret that hardened convicts in many instances leave prison at will; others enjoy privileges of sob-sister' prisons closely akin to a country club atmosphere, with money, guns, and the comforts of life to be had for the asking. Likewise, it is no secret that criminals have bought their way to freedom from slimy renegades who slander the good name of law enforcement. Law enforcement has gained much ground in the crusade against dishonesty and crime during the past decade, but recently, we have suffered reverses. The present trend, unless abated, foretells difficult days ahead. We have the experience of the past to guide us. In meeting these problems, please keep constantly in mind that the FBI is ready every hour of the day and night to assist you. Assuredly, the security of America is law enforcement's greatest responsibility. Our problems, it is true, are major ones. They will try the patience and test the perseverance of strong men. But our effort is a holy crusade. It is to protect the dearest of all our institutions--the home. Whatever the difficulties, we must and will fight on. The men of law enforcement, in every sense of the word, are soldiers at heart--brave and courageous, persistent and determined-and they are fighting a battle that mush not be lost."63 Hoover's underlying message about the need for additional funding of law enforcement efforts if the rise of crime was to be curtailed was not concealed. He 134

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believed law enforcement could manage the problem if given the necessary freedom, support, and resources. 1960s As Americans settled into the routine of the 1950s, they became accustomed to the postwar levels of crime. Threats from foreignsources overshadowed any worry about domestic public safety. Not until the 1960s did Americans discover again that they faced a significant crime problem. Crime surged into public awareness as never before: "FBI reports crime at all-time high" (American City, December 1961) "Crime Goes On and Gets Worse" (U.S. News and World Report, September 9, 1963) "Every Street a Jungle" (Christian Cent., July 22, 1964) "Crime is Running Wild" (U.S. News, August 3, 1964) "City Streets Now are More Unsafe Than Ever" (U.S. News and World Report, August 9, 1965) "Lawlessness Galore" (U.S. News, September 13, 1965) "Five Serious Crimes Every Minute Now" (U.S. News, August a, 1966) "U.S. crime Keeps Going Up Everywhere" (U.s. News, March 25, 1968) 135

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"Disorder in u.s. at a Climax" (U.S. News, June 17, 1968) These statements suggest a more cynical reaction to crime than in the past. Implied, if not stated, was a notion that social life and political structure were on theverge of total coliapse. Not only did the individual face a high probability of being assaulted or robbed, but the growth and dispersion of lawlessness threatened the very fabric of the American way of life. FBI statistics showed that the rise in crime far outstripped population increases. Between 1958 and 1962, the u.s. population grew by seven percent, while the crime rate swelled by a staggering 27 percent--increasing nearly four times that of the population.M An additional increase of 13 percent in 1963, 13 percent in 1964, and six percent in 1965 pushed the spiral of crime to six times the population Between 1960 and 1967, the crime rate increased by 71 percent, while the population grew by only 10 percent.66 "Crime is rising nine times faster than the population" was a stock punch line of Richard Nixon's all-purpose campaign speech in 1968.67 Observers noted that crime was taking on new features in the 1960s. The wave of crime was no longer confined 136

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to big cities. Official crime statistics showed it to be spilling over more and more into the suburbs and showing up even in smaller communities. In 1966, an FBI report revealed that the crime rate was up 22 percent in suburban communities, 20 percent in the cities, and 16 percent in rural Most parks and transportation systems were seen as places of danger.69 The spread of crime seemed to cross all geographic and class boundaries. Additionally, police noted a rise in "needless" crimes of u.s. News and World Report stated that a leaping rise in "senseless" crime was widespread in 1963, noting that several brutal murders had occurred across the country in the space of a few days. 70 These new characteristics of the crime problem led many to believe the new crime wave was different in intensity and nature from previous "crime waves." Crime during the 1870s, the 1920s, and 1940s could be attributed to the aftermath of war and the social chaos of ensuing years, but crime in the i960s did not follow a war. Moreover, in the words of James Q. Wilson, the increase in crimes came concurrently with a general rise 137

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in the standard of living and thus could not be explained by worsening social conditions.71 Other forms of social upheaval and unrest (sit-ins:and demonstrations), which accompanied the crime wave, were viewed by some to be criminal in themselves. Many Americans feared complete social disorganization. During the 1968 Presidential campaign, a reporter for The New York Times polled the citizens of Webster City, Iowa, which called itself 11Main Street, u.s.A.11 He found the overriding concern to be 11crime in the 1172 Another New York Times article. stated that, 11After a decade of this steady drumbeat of crime rises, many, if not most, Americans have become conditioned to feel that as a function of the law of averages, their chances of escaping rape, murder, or mugging much longer must be about to run out.73 In the summer of 1968, the Harris Poll found that 81 percent of those polled believed that law and order had broken down.74 Charles E. Whittaker, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, foresaw the danger of a complete breakdown of law and order resulting from the rapid increase and spread of crime. He warned that 11unless much is done to check current vicious 138

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cycles, we are in for a period of violence beyond anything we have yet seen. 1175 Superintendent of Chicago Police, Orlando Wilson, claimed, "Crime is overwhelming our society In the name of protecting individual liberties, we are permitting so many technicalities to creep into our system of criminal justice that we are no longer convicting a sufficiently high portion of guilty criminals. 1176 Washington Police Chief Robert v. Murray has pictured his men as "frustrated" by restrictions on their efforts to enforce the law and by court decisions that have thrown out convictions of criminals because of technicalities. Chief Murray said, "I often wonder who, besides the police, is concerned about the rights of citizens to be free from attack by criminals.1177 Ohio Municipal Court Judge George Heitzler observes, "One of the principal causes in the increase in crime is the tendency of some of our courts to release and set free otherwise guilty criminals on minor technicalities."n New Mexico Police Chief Paul Shaver stated, "I personally think we ought to take another look at our 139

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system as far as procedures and laws are concerned. It's getting increasingly harder to make a case against an individual There is always: a bunch of do-gooders who want to release these people to rehabilitate them. 1179 FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover noted, "Justice is meant for the protection of a society as a whole, not for the protection of a single individual. When you take one individual and permit him or her on one pretext or another, to prey upon the public--with occasional periods of restraint--then justice is not being carried out. 1180 Many people believe that the United States is experiencing an unprecedented amount of crime. Yet, within a historical context, the current crime problem is not so new and contemporary Americans are not unique in their fear of crime. Their ancestors have felt similar concerns. The idyllic image of a relatively crime-free past shared by many is untenable in light of historical evidence. Americans nearly always have felt threatened by immorality, deviance, and crime. Crime and violence, as well as public concern with crime and violence, rise and fall with regularity. Crime waves are not new; they have existed throughout history. 140

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So we can see that crime perception number 1, crime is becoming quantitatively and qualitatively worse, is not valid. Many in the past have been quick to forecast the impending ruin of American culture as a result of crime and lawlessness. Given this tendency, the situation today must be reevaluated. Is the crime problem as bad as we think? The United States has gallantly survived other periods when crime supposedly ran wild, public streets became jungles, and violence was rampant. Given this history, one may be justified in suggesting that the mass media are overdramatizing the crime problem. How the Media Distort Crime Information One need not closely scrutinize.media reports to find numerous examples of distortions and exaggerations in crime reporting. Newspapers. and magazine articles, as well as the evening news, offer illustration after illustration. A few examples will make it clear that overdramatization is the norm rather than the exception in modern crime reporting. The media distorts its presentation of crime patterns by selecting particular incidents to report, unusual, 141

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bizarre, violent, and macabre incidents receive more media attention. A review of research about patterns of crime reporting found that "without exception, violent individual crimes--particularly murders--are represented disproportionately in news media presentations. This was true in Minneapolis; St. Louis; Houston; Chicago; Oslo, Norway; Ontario, Canada; England; and the Netherlands. Typical of these findings is an analysis of the 1976 crime news appearing in the Chicago Tribune: Murder accounted for 26 percent of the specific crimes mentioned; robbery, assault, and rape together accounted for another 20 percent. In contrast, common property crimes (burglary and larceny/theft) accounted for less than 6 percent of the crimes mentioned. Tax cheating, embezzlement, and drunken driving accounted for only 3. percent. 11 These percentages bear no relationship to the percentage of the total number of crimes each actually represents.81 The relationship of the media, crime, and the public has been the subject of intensive study for several decades. Writers on media coverage of crime have for many years been virtually unanimous in their contention that media coverage of crime is biased; there is little or no correspondence between objective characteristics of crime and crime reported in the media.82 Distortions in the reporting of crime were believed to contribute to 142

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misconceptions about the prevalence of different sorts of crime and to lead to an exaggerated public fear of crime. 83 A most germane question remains: Does the media shape behavior, or is it merely an unblinking and at times unpleasant mirror of society? For example, some writers observe that the media sometimes have been responsible for the artificial production of crime waves such as the one discussed above.84 Newspapers can use crime news as circulation builders--they create alarm, arouse apprehension, and stimulate calls for action. But whether such stories are guides to accuracy is dubious. For crime headlines often appear when readers are saturated with Somalia, Iran, and Bosnia, and the very timing of such crusades casts doubt on the question of whether there is more crime or simply more excitement about crime. Similarly, changes in police reporting practices might produce apparent shifts in certain crime rates which, though little more than statistical artifacts, could be played upon by the media to give the impression of an upsurge in actual criminal activity. Television's prime-time dramatic programming also 143

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distorts its image of crime. Gerber reported that since monitoring began in 1967 and 1968, an average of 80 percent of programs contained violence and 60 percent of major characters were involved in violence.85 The average rate of violent episodes was seven and one-half per hour and in weekend, daytime children's programs, violent episodes averaged almost 18 per hour. Indeed, programs directed at children typically scored high on most measures of violence except killing. Cartoons, in particular, consistently exceeded all other categories of programs, including adult-action-adventure and crimedetective shows. Other critics have emphasized the failure of the media to place reports of major crimes in a proper historical perspective. Prominent coverage of serious violent crimes made sensational copy but could also produce inflated public perceptions of the frequency of what, in reality, are the least frequent of crimes. That is, the media tend to exaggerate the amount of street violence by the amount of attention they give it.86 In addition, sensationalizing crime has led to the suggestion that the media influences not only jury 144

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decision-making, but also the decisions of.judges.87 Media reporters seldom present information on victimization rates or trends, so that the public, lacking this essential contextual background, are often unintentionally misled by the media to believe that the world is a far more dangerous place than it really is. The interpretations added to stories also distort the image of crime. Senseless violence will be reported as increasing; however, since there is no official category for "senseless violence," it would be difficult to define. This kind of media is usually supported by graphic descriptions of gruesome murders for which no motives seem to exist. This scenario occurred recently in Denver. Gangs were depicted as taking over neighborhoods. Members had uzis and other automatic weapons. There were reports of senseless random shootings of innocent people ("drive-bys"). Homicides had suddenly increased. Such presentations encourage the conclusion that such happenings are a recent phenomenon and suggest that criminals are becoming more sadistic and more ruthless. There is no basis for such arguments. History is 145

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replete with violent atrocities. The book, Bloodletters and Badmen by Jay Nash documents this unfortunate aspect of our history.88 From Burton Abbot, a frail and shy man executed for strangulation murder of a 14-year-old girl, to Abner Zullman, syndicated gangster, Nash relates the national legacy of murderers, gangsters, outlaws, burglars, bootleggers, bank robbers, assassins, brothel keepers, sex offenders, jewel thieves, kidnappers, and narcotics peddlers who have American history with mayhem. Our custom of violence was started in 1621 by John Billingham, who became the country's first murderer when he ambushed a fellow pilgrim. The incidents today are no worse than the grotesque deeds of cannibal Albert Fish in the 1930s; or Charles Starkweather, who killed nine people during a week-long murder spree in 1958; or Henry Mudgett who killed more than 200 women in Chicago in the 1890s. We can see that senseless violence is not new. Americans have a lengthy history of such despicable acts. In fact, prudent inspection of Uniform Crime Report statistics reveals that senseless violence may be decreasing. Stranger-to-stranger murders reported in 146

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1976 accounted for 18.4 percent of total murders, but by 1986, the percentage had dropped to 12.5 percent.89 Research efforts indicate that the rate of stranger homicides during the past decade has remained relatively stable.90 The mass media tend to impose a negative image of the environment on the public, as sociologist Michael Fisherman documents.91 The process starts with a series of related news stories, for example, a rash of assaults of offenses against children. If these incidents are selected for reporting, a pattern may appear. The events need not be unusual or suggest an actual change in incidence rates. The key factor is their selection for reporting. Once the stories have appeared, the media need only suggest that there may be a crime At this point, the response of politicians and law enforcement officials becomes important in establishing the trend. Authorities may "augment, modify, or deny a burgeoning crime wave" by their public statements. Since journalists rely on police reports of crime, officials actually control the raw material of the crime wave. By selectively releasing information, they have the power to 147

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make news. The interaction between law enforcement officials and the news media is the key to turning out a crime wave. The yearly publication of the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) provides an excellent example of this process. The statistics, which are collected, examined, and offered by the law enforcement establishment, provide the statistical basis on which assertions may be made. The media take this information, interpret it, and may even distort it to intimate that there is a crime wave. Then the media turn to the leading members of the law enforcement establishment to give credence to their claims. Big city law enforcement officials, nationally known judges, and district attorneys are interviewed to authenticate the trends. In this way, the media give law enforcement officials the opportunity to legitimize the trends established by the crime statistics they produce. Law enforcement agencies, like the national news media, distort crime data to fit their particular needs. The information from the UCR is used to illustrate that crime is increasing or decreasing, depending ori political demands. To date, neither the law enforcement 148

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establishment nor the media questions the validity or accuracy of the other's use of crime information, thereby a symbiotic, if not collusive, relationship between the two. In the next chapter, I will turn attention to these statistics and potential problems with reporting and interpretation. Summary Crime is no new plague. Long before our time it ravaged people worldwide. In every society, in every century since humankind evolved, there have been thieves and murderers, rapists and gangsters, swindlers and extortionists. The history of every people tells us of criminals who preyed upon their fellow beings and broke the law of the land. Although the news media do not ignore the question of their obligations to the public, neither do they grant these obligations the same importance as "selling news". As business enterprises, the media cannot devote their energies to discerning and communicating a representative picture of crime to the public. Thus, representative crime -that is, property and white collar offenses -is 149

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not the "news" the public receives. Nor does the government consciously attempt to persuade or employ the news media to present a full picture of crime in America. Instead the government generally restricts itself to offering data on a few selected offenses, primarily violent crimes and a few property crimes, and leaves presentation of the data to the media. 150

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Notes 1. u.s. Department of Justice, Crime and the Nation's Households, 1990 (Washington D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1991), 2. 2. Todd Purdom, "The Perceptual Crime Wave Crests, and a City Shudders," New York Times, 1 August 1990, 7. Kevin Cullen, "Evidence Seized from Stuart Holmes," Boston Globe, 6 January 1990, 1. 3. Listening to America "So Violent a Nation". Prod. Bill Moyers, PBS,26 May 1992. 4. CNN Newshour, "Violent Crimes on the Rise". Anchor, Bernard Shaw, CNN 20 April 1992. 5. This Week with David Brinkley. Anchor, David Brinkley, ABC 26 April 1992. 6. Robert v. Bruce, 1877: Year of Violence (New York: Bobbs'-Merrill, 1959), 132. 7. Herbert Asbury, Gangs of New York (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1928),118; Robert M. Fogelson, The Riots: Interpretation and Recommendation. A Report to the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Adminstration of Justice, 1966. 8. Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, The History of Violence in America, 430. 9. Joseph Jorgensen, "A Century of Political Effects on American Indian Society 1880-189011 Journal of Ethnic Studies, Vol. VI(May 1970): 18. 10. Langdon Sully, "The Indian Agent: A Study in Corruption and Avarice", American West, Vol. X, No. 2, (1970): 5. Edmund Danziger, Jr., "The Steck Carleton Controversy in Civil War New Mexico", Southwestern Historical Quarterly, Vol. LXXIV, No. 2, 189. 11. Harry Kelsey, "The Dolittle Report of 1867: Its 151

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Preparation and Shortcomings", Arizona and the West, Vol. XVII, No. 2, 107. 12. John Upton Terrell, Land Grab: The Truth About The Winning of the West New York: (Doubleday and company, 1972), 182. 13. Raymond Fosdick, American Police Systems (Montclair, N.J.: Patterson Smith Reprint Series, 1972), 45. 14. Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma (New York: Harper Row, 1944), 559. 15. Allen W. Trelease, White Terror: The Ku Klux Klan Conspirace and Southern Reconstruction (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1971), 212. 16. On Violent Aspects of the second Ku Klux Klan, see David M. Chambers, Hooded Americanism: The First Centurv of the Ku Klux Klan. 1865-1965 (Garden City, N.Y., 1965); and Charles c. Alexander, The Ku Klux Klan in the Southwest (Lexington, 1965). 17. Ray A. Billington, The Protestant Crusade. 1800-1860: A study of the Origins of American Nativism (New York: Harper Row, 1952), 25. 18. Milton Meltzer, The Chinese Americans (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1980), 107. 19. Donald L. Kinzer, An Episode in Anti-Catholicism. The American Protective Association (Seattle: Pantheon, 1964), 38. 20. David Brody, steelworkers in America: The Non-Union Era (Boston: MIT Press, 1960), 40. 21. Reported in Boston Globes (6 June 1982), p. 17; See also Murray A. Straus, Wife-Beating: How Common and Why? in Murray A. Straus and Gerald T. Hotaling, eds. The Social Causes of Husband-Wife Violence (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980), 31. 152

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22. Mari Sandoz, Old Jules (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1962); Agnes Smedley, Daughter of the Earth (Old Westbury, N.Y.: Feminist Press, 1976); Meridel LeSueur, The Girl (Minneapolis, Minn.: West End Press, 1978); Tillie Olsen Yonnondio, From the Thirties (New York: Dell, 1974). 23. France was the first country to collect crime statistics, beginning a series for Judicial officer in 1827. Interest in criminal statistics began in Europe in1829; a collection plan for statistics was presented in England in 1856 and has been a regular part of an annual report since 1857. Leon Randrinowicz, Idelogy and Crime (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), 31. 24. Department of Justice, FBI Uniform crime Report. 1958, Special Edition (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1959), 33. 25. Allan Nevins, The American States During and After the Revolution. 1775-1789 (New York: MacMillian Press, 1924), 451. 26. W.O. Bourne, History of the Public School Society of the City of New York (1970), 90; New York Society for the Prevention of Pauperism, Documents Relative to Savings Banks, Intemperance, and Lotteries (1819), 21. 27. Ibid. 28. Paul Dolan, "The Rise of Crime in the Period 1830-186011 Journal of Criminal Law 30 (1976): 853. 29. Ibid. 30. Theodore N. Ferdinand, "The Criminal Patterns of Boston since 184911, American Journal of Sociology 73 (July 1967): 688. 31. Philip D. Jordan, "The Capital of Crime", Civil War Times Illustrated, Vol. XIII, No. 10, 4. 153

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32. D. Aruher and R. Gantner, "Violent Acts and Violent Times: A Comparative Approach to Post-War Homicide Rates", American Sociological Review, 41: (May 1976): 937; E. Monkkonen, Police in Urban American, (New York: Cambridge University Press), 78. 33. Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, The History of Violence in America (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1969), 489. 34. Ibid. 35. Ibid. 36. Theodore N. Ferdinand, "The Criminal Patterns of Boston since 1849,11 American Journal of Socioloav, 73, (July 1967) 688. 37. Elwin H. Powell, "Crime as a Function of Anomie", Journal of Criminal Law. Criminoloav. and Police Science, 57 (June 1966): 161. 38. Charles Tilly et al., How Policing Affected the visibility of Crime in Nineteenth-Centruy Europe and America (Ann Arbor: Center for Research on Social Organization, University of Michigan, 1975), 60. 39. Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, The History of Violence in America, 490. 40. Ferdinand, "The Criminal Patterns since 184911, 688. 41. Powell, "Crime as a Function of Anomie", 169. 42. William B. Swaney, "What shall we do to stop crime?" New York Times current History, (September 1922), 924. 43. Edward Hale Bierstadt, "Our Permanent Crime Wave", Harpers Monthly, December 1927, 68. 44. Ibid. I 62. 45. "The Rising Tide of Crime", Literary Digest 86, 154

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(August 1925): 5. 46. Harry Willbach, "The Trend of Crime in New York City", Journal of Criminal Law and criminology 29 (1938): 62; and "The Trend of Crime in Chicago", Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 31 (1941), 720. 47. "The Permanent crime Wave", New Republic (5 January 1921), 1. 48. "The Crime Wave in America", New Republic (6 April 1921), 150. 49. "The Permanent Crime Wave", 1. SO. Ibid. 51. George w. Kirchwey, "The So-Called Crime Wave", current Opinion, (February 1921): 169. 52. "The Crime Wave in America", 151. 53. "Major Crimes Up by 20 Percent in Nation," New York Times, 16 June 1967, 45. 54 Ibid. I 62. 55. The Boston Post, quoted in "The Rising Tide of Crime", 6. 56. Wiliam R. Vance, "Increase of Crime is Laid to Coddling", New York Times, 13 August 1926, 10, 11. 57. "Crime is on the Rise", Senior Scholastic, .10 April 1946, 20. 58. Ibid. 59. Ibid. 60. J. Edgar Hoover, "The Crime Wave We Now Face", New York Times Magazine, 21 April 1941, 36. 155

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61. Ibid. 62. 11A New Upsurge in Crime", u.s. News, 17 May 1946, 30. 63. J. Edgar Hoover, 11The Battle on the Home Front", Vital Speeches, 8 September 1943, 730. 64. "Record of Crime set in 196211, New York Times, 19 July 1963, 12. 65. "Is Crime Running Wild?", u.s. News and World Report, 3 August 1964. 11Crime Rate Rises in u.s. Suburbs", New York Times. 27 July 1965, 14. 66. The History of Violence in America, p. 493. 67. Ibid. I p. 489. 68. J. Edgar Hoover, "Major Crimes Up by 20 percent in Nation", New York Times, (June 16, 1967), pp. 45-47. 69. "Is Crime Running Wild?", 64. 70. "Crime Goes On and Gets Worse", u.s. News and World Report, 9 September 1963, 76. 71. James Q. Wilson, "Crime and the Liberal Audience", Commentary, (January 1971), 71. 72. "The History of Violence in America", 496. 73. Ibid., 494. 74. Ibid., 486. 75. "Lawlessness in u.s.--warning from a Jurist", u.s. News and World Report, 5 July 1965, 60. 76. "Crime in U.S.--Is it Getting Out of Hand?", U.S. News and World Report, 26 August 1963, 40. 77. Ibid. I 41. 78. "Is Crime Running Wild?",. 20. 156

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79. Ibid. so. "Crime in the u.s.--Is it Getting out of Hand?", 41. 81. James Garofolo, "Crime and the Mass Media: A Selective Review of Research", Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 18 (July 1981): 319. 82. T.E. Conklin, "Dimensions of Community Response to the Crime Problem", Social Problems, 18 (December 1971): 373. 83. T.E. Conklin, The Impact of Crime on New York, (New York, MacMillan Press, 1975), 25. 84. F.J. Cook, "There's Always a Crime Wave," in D.R. Cressey (ed.), crime and Criminal Justice (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971), 75. 85. G. Gerber, L. Gross, M. Jackson-Beeck, N. Signorelli, and M. Morgan, "The Demonstration of Power: Violence Profile No. 1011 Journal of Communications, (July 1971): 177. 86. Joseph F. Sheley and Cindy D. Ashkins, "Crime, Crime News, and Crime Views", Public Opinion Quarterly 45 (1981): 492. John w. Windhauser, Jennifer Seiter, and L. Thomas Winfree, Jr., "Covering the Roots of Justice: Louisiana Crime News in the 1980s", Journalism Quarterly 67 (1990): 72. 87. Beverly B. Cook, "Public Opinion and Federal Judicial Policy", American Journal of Political Science 21 (1979): 567. James H. Kuklinski and John E. Stanga, "Political Participation and Government Responsiveness: The Behavior of California Superior Courts", American Political Science Review 73 (1979): 1090. Ray Surette, "Media Trials", Journal of Criminal Justice 17 (1989): 293. 88. Jay Robert Nash, Bloodletters and Badmen (New York: M. Evans & Company, 1973). 89 Mark Reidel, "Stranger Violence: Perspectives, 157

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Issues, and Problems", Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 78 (1987): 223. 90. John Hewitt, "The Victim-Offender Relationship in Convicted Homicide Cases: 1960-198411, Journal of Criminal Justice 16 (1988): 25. 91. Michael Fisherman, "Crime Waves as Ideology", Social Problems 25 (June 1978): 532. 158

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CHAPI'ER 5 CRIME STATISTICS Introduction In chapter 4, I noted that the primary source of information about crime for most people is the media. Stories about criminal incidents account for a considerable proportion of media coverage, and because the volume of crime is too great, not all crime can be reported, so only stories that will grab the public's attention are selected. These incidents are usually more violent, bizarre, and unusual, which probably contribute to a distorted image of crime. Yet these reports alone fail to indicate whether crime is actually increasing. Official statistics are used to show how crime rates vary over time. The FBI produces these figures from local reports of criminal activity. When an increase is indicated, the media report it. They then turn to politicians and law enforcement officials to confirm the trends, which allows those responsible for producing the statistics an opportunity to verify them.

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In this chapter I will examine the contents of the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) and the National Crime Survey (NCS). Then I will discuss some shortcomings of both sets of statistics. Despite its importance and wide use by criminologists, the accuracy of the UCR has been heavily criticized. One major concern of criminologists is that many serious crimes are not reported by victims to police and therefore do not become part of the UCR. The reasons for not reporting vary. Some people do not have property insurance and therefore believe it is useless to report theft-related crimes. In other cases, the victim may fear reprisals from the offender's friends or family. In recent years there has been an increase in the official crime rate. I will argue, however, that this apparent change may not represent an increase in actual crime rates, but rather a change in the proportion of all the crimes that are recorded by the police. Specifically, I will argue that a major reason for rising crime rates is that reporting and recording practices have been improving, thus reducing the proportion of crime that remains unknown to the police. 160

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Agency-Based Reports as Crime Statistics All government bureaucracies produce statistical reports. Criminal justice agencies are no exception. At the local level, police departments, sheriff's offices, and municipal or county courts provide annual statistical reports as part of the public record of their activities. Most state courts publish annual reports, as do the office of the attorney general and the state prison authority. Annual summaries of probationers and parolees may be provided by the state courts and prison authorities or, in some states, by separate statistical accounting agencies. The federal government annually publishes thousands of crime-related statistical summaries. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) publishes the Uniform Crime Reports: Crime in the United States. Another source of federal criminal justice statistics is the Administrative Office for u.s. Courts (AOC). This agency tracks the workings of the entire federal court system and summarizes it in a document called the Annual Report of the Director. The Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBP) system 161

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submits the annual report as a description of its yearly operations. One federal agency, the National Criminal Justice Information and statistics Service (NCJISS), was created in 1969 solely to collect and disseminate crime-related information. In 1980, NCJISS was disbanded and reformed as the Bureau of Justice Statistics with the National Institute of Justice. The Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) produces dozens of reports annually on crime and punishment in America, ranging from summaries of the information collected by the National Crime survey to projects of its own undertaking. Among the major periodic publications sponsored by the BJS are the Sourcebook of criminal Justice Statistics, published annually since 1974 with the Hindelang Center for Criminal Justice Research, and periodic research bulletins. When the official rate of crime is reported by the media in this country, the source of those statistics is probably the FBI's Uniform Crime Report. 162

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Uniform Crime Report Congress recognized the need for national crime statistics in 1870 when it authorized the u.s.Attorney General to collect and report on the incidence of crime in the United States. However, it:took sixty years for this idea to bear fruit. At its 1927 annual meeting, the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) reached an agreement in principle with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to create aimechanism for the I collection of national crime statistics. over the next three years, the IACP developed a voluntary national data collection effort: it still advises the FBI. In 1930 I Congress formally assigned for serving as a national clearinghouse for crime.statistics to the FBI. The first edition of the Uniform Report (UCR) was published in that year. In 1966 the National Sheriffs' Association established a committee on Uniform Crime Reporting. This committee serves in an advisory capacity and encourages participation in UCR program by sheriffs across the country. Today, the previous year's crime statistics are released with considerable fanfare:in the late summer. 163

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The UCR contains data gleaned from more than sixteen thousand law enforcement agencies covering 98 percent of the United states population.1 Most states require law enforcement agencies to submit crime data monthly to a state agency, often called a 11SAC11 or Statistical Analysis Center, that collects it for the UCR. In the rest, the monthly reports qo directly to the FBI. The UCR provides information about two types of crimes, Part I offenses and Part II offenses. The definitions of these offenses were adopted in November 1932 as the Standard of Offenses of the Compilation of criminal Statistics. Except for the addition of arson in 1978, little about these definitions has changed in the past sixty years. Part I offenses are crimes (1) that are most likely to b reported by victims or witnesses, (2) that occur frequently, and (3) that are serious by nature or a result of their frequency of occurrence. Part I offenses are ranked in order of seriousness. There are four violent index crimes and four property index crimes. Part I offenses represent crimes reported to the police: they are pre-arrest crime statistics. However, the FBI 164

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asks that clearance information be provided on the monthly forms. The total clearances irrespective of means and the clearances by an arrest are recorded. For a case of clearance by an arrest, it is the number of persons arrested that is recorded. The four violent personal crimes are criminal homicide, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. All except homicides include attempted acts. (See Appendix for a detailed description of violent index crimes and property index crimes.) Examples of aggravated injury included in the UCR instructions are broken bones, loss of teeth, internal injuries, injuries requ'iring stitches, and loss of consciousness. Police agencies customarily consider an aggravated assault to be any assault causing an injury of sufficient magnitude to warrant medical treatment beyond first aid. Also, UCR a-d do not distinguish between completed and attempted acts. The defining quality is the "weapon" used in the assault or battery. The four property crimes are burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson. Motor vehicle theft was included in 1930 largely at the insistence of the 165

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insurance lobby which was interested in deterring fraudulent claims of stolen cars. Arson was included on a trial basis by congressional mandate as of 1 January 1979. Congress was concerned that arson was becoming a major crime, but, since it was a Part II offense at that point, there were no hard statistics on the number of arson committed. Part II Offenses. Part II offenses are based on arrests recorded, rather than on complaints received, by law enforcement agencies. Part II offenses, UCR 9-29, do not meet the test of frequency of occurrence and seriousness, or they may be 11victimless11 crimes. In addition, UCR 27-29 are not true criminal offenses, although they are reasons for taking a person into custody. The Contents of a Uniform Crime Report Each UCR volume contains three forms of crime statistics. First, the UCR describes index crime offenses, or all Part I crime less nonnegligent manslaughter, with monthly and regional variations and trends over the past several years. The report includes 166

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victim information for some crime index offenses. For example, murder victims are described in terms of age, sex, race, weapons used, and relationship, if any, to the known perpetrator. A feature common to all index crimes is clearance rates. The UCR provides these data, along with trends from the previous year, for the United States as a whole; geographic regions (northeast, south, midwest, and west); individual states; standardized metropolitan statistical areas (a SMSA is an office of management and budget designation for a city or urbanized area with at least 50,000 residents and a high degree of economic-and social integration); cities, towns, and counties; and college and university campuses. Second, the UCR provides an abbreviated analysis of "cleared" crime index offenses. The crimes are broken down by region; community type, a classification determined solely by population size, suburban counties; rural counties; and suburban areas, the last of which excludes central cities in metropolitan areas. The traditional method of clearing crimes is to make at least one arrest. Crimes are cleared by exceptional means "when some element beyond law enforcement control 167

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precludes the placing of formal charges against an offender. 112 The UCR includes the following examples of exceptional clearances: ( 1) death of a suspected offender, (2) victim's refusal to cooperate in prosecution after the perpetrator has been identified, and (3) cases of extradition denial because other alleged perpetrator has committed another crime and is being prosecuted in a second legal jurisdiction. Third, a section entitled "Person Arrested" provides arrest data for Index Crimes and Part II offenses. An arrest is counted whenever a person it taken into custody, notified, or cited. As a result, the UCR contains the number of total arrests made by police, not an indication of the number of people arrested. This section reports crime trends over time, along with comparisons by age, sex, and race (ethnic origin was deleted in the late 1980s). Arrest data by age, sex, and race within the various city, suburban, rural, suburban area, and state designations are also provided. One category of crime is conspicuously absent: corporate crime-e.g., price-fixing, discharging hazardous waste, or producing unsafe products. There is some 168

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difference of opinion about the reason for this omission. These activities are difficult to detect or may constitute only a civil harm, not a crime. Its absence from the UCR has led to speculation that the government is not interested in crimes committed by the rich and powerful.3 Given its statistical content, does the UCR provide an answer to the basis question, how much. crime? A quick review of incident reports filed in virtually any local law enforcement agency might reveal that many single criminal incidents involve more than a single felony. All or some of the crimes from a single incident might be classified as Part I offenses. The FBI report of offenses for these same incidents might also reveal a different picture. Because of the hierarchy rule, only the highest rated offense per incident is reported. For a case in which a kidnap victim is robbed and murdered with an unlicensed handgun, the UCR reporting system mandates that the police report one murder (Part I offense and Index crime). If a suspect is arrested, one kidnapping (Part II offense) and one possession of weapons-firearm (Part II offense) will also be counted, 169

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along with a "clearance by an arrest" for a Part I offense. The Part I offense of robbery is not counted because of the hierarchy rule. As a result, the UCR fails to convey a complete qualitative (which crimes are committed?) and quantitative (how many crimes are committed?) sense of crime in America. UCR Measurement Problems Besides the problems created by what is left out, there are other troubling measurement questions associated with the UCR. Part I crime statistics are based on reports from victims or witnesses who act as complainants, or person who bring the crime to the attention of the police. The original complainant is rarely a police officer. This observation raises the specter of unreported crimes that are not included in the UCR statistics. I have referred to crime that lies between that committed and that known to the police as the dark sides of crime. Underreporting of crime occurs for many reasons, some of which are crime-specific, including the following: 170

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1. Rape victims often feel a sense of shame or degradation and wish to avoid discussing the crime with police officers, particularly male police officers. They may fear reprisals or view the matter as private, particularly if they knew the assailant-a family friend or even a relative. 2. Some assault victims consider the matter equally private-an argument that turns into a fist fight, for example. Similarly, wives who are physically abused may not want their husbands arrested, because they have no other source of income. Some studies suggest that victims of spouse abuse may believe the beating was deserved or that the spouse has a right to behave in this manner. 3. Victims of robbery, burglary, and larceny often felt that the crime is not worth reporting, either because the amount lost was small or because they believe that the police cannot do anything about it. Victims may also be involved in criminality themselves, in which case reporting the loss would place them in a legally vulnerable situation. For example, drugs or money from drug sales are frequent crime targets in a criminal 171

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community that places little -emphasis on honor, but a great deal on immediate possession. Similarly, the loss of ill gotten gains-objects obtained through robberies and larcenies-are not reported to the police. 4. An unknown number of cities "take the law into their own hands" and rely on "private justice" rather than on "public justice". In the previous example of the drug merchant who is "ripped off", private justice is the only possible recourse. In addition, problems with the UCR can also result from changes and "errors" in the way local law enforcement agencies record complaints of crime. As a result, specific crimes can be underreported or overreported by law enforcement. In 1950 the New York City Police Department changed its crime-recording procedures. The previous system had underreported crime. As a result of the change, there was a massive increase in the number of recorded robberies, aggravated assaults, and burglaries. In 1988, the University of New Mexico led the nations college campuses in aggravated assaults. A clerk in the campus police department miscoded simple assaults as aggravated assaults.4 When questioned about 172

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the error, an FBI spokesperson said, 11You have to consider that probably 10 percent of all college contribute You cant make comparisons between colleges. We discourage anything like that.115 The underreporting of crime by police has also been a perennial problem. For many years Chicago boasted of having one of the nations lowest crime rates among big cities. Knowledgeable police officials realized that this was the result of a policy known as 11Killing Crime.11 In 1982, Pam Zekman, an investigative reporter for the CBS-TV affiliate in Chicago, revealed that the police department had a policy of suppressing reports of crime by systematically 11unfounding11 them. As noted above, every police department has some 11unfounded11 complaints. For more than twenty years, however, Chicago had an extraordinary number of crimes listed as 11unfounded11 -fourteen times as many as any other police department. In addition to underreporting crime, police administrators interested in lowering the crime rate may falsify crime reports; for example, by classifying a burglary as a nonreportable trespass6 Changes in UCR definitions can also change the crime rate. For example, 173

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in 1973, Florida experienced a "crime Wave" of larceny-a doubling of larceny cases known to the police. The cause was a change in the way the UCR recorded the offense. Until 1973, "theft" had been a larceny of over $50 and appeared in Part I; "Larceny" under $50 had appeared in Part II, which is not used in determining the crime rate. In 1973 the two categories were merged to form the "Larceny-theft category of Part I, raising Florida's index crime rate from 101,221 in 1972 to 234,263 in 1973.7 The UCR: Reliable and Valid? The sources of error in the UCR increases the concern about the reliability of the crime statistics. Among Part I offenses, motor vehicle theft and criminal homicide have a high degree of reliability. Motor vehicles are usually insured against theft, but an insurance company will not honor any theft'claim unless a police report has been filed. While most motor vehicle thefts are reported as a result of this provision, motor vehicle thefts continue to be a UCR reporting problem. It is estimated that between ten and fifteen percent of 174

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reported vehicle thefts are fraudulent; they are "stolen" in collusion with the owner to defraud an insurance company, In a 1984 "sting" operation by the police and the FBI, a fake "chop shop" was set up in Brooklyn, New York. (A chop shop dismantles wrecks or stolen vehicles to _sell salvageable parts.) In a six month period the shop received 142 vehicles from owners who then reported their vehicles stolen to collect insurance money-and the shop turned away more business than it accepted.8 Data on criminal homicides are also highly reliable since every death requires a physician-signed death certificate stating the cause of death. Suspected homicides (which includes suicides) must be reported to the police and medical examiner or coroner. Still, problems with UCR homicide data do exist. Investigations of medical examiners' officers have revealed many mistakes. For example, in one New York Citycase "it was discovered by accident that the severed head of an unidentified woman believed to have drowned actually contained a bullet". 9 In 1985 The New York Times published four front page articles on the problems with the city's medical examiners office. which was accused of 175

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producing misleading autopsy findings, many involving people who died in police custody. The office was described as understaffed and using outmoded equipment, and it was generally regarded by the law enforcement community as unreliable.1 Finally, the bodies of some murder victims-Teamster boss Jimmy Hoffa, for instance, who disappeared in 1975-are never found and thus do not appear in UCR 1.11 For all these problems and shortcomings, recent research suggests that for certain types of crime-especially violent crime-the UCR constitutes a valid measure.12 While the UCR may not provide a totally reliable and valid image of crime, for serious crime it is a reasonable estimate. 13 Anne Schneider summarizes the problems with the UCR that led to the development of victimization surveys, an alternative system to help answer the question, How much crime? She notes that these problems include the fact that official crime reports contain no record of the "dark figure of crime" resulting from victims who do not report the offenses. In addition, case studies of many police departments indicate that some portion of the crimes that are reported by victims are not recorded as crime events. There is some documentation indicating that police departments 176

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may, at times, systematically "down classify" crimes (for example, attempted rape may be reclassified as simple assault) in order to reduce the overall crime index, which includes only the more serious offenses.14 Victimization Surveys as crime statistics The idea of surveying a population to locate crime victims is well over 250 years old.15 The modern version of the victimization survey dates back only to 1966 when three large-scale crime surveys were conducted. One study looked only at the high crime areas of the nation's capital; it assessed the strengths and weaknesses of the survey technique.16 The second surveyed the entire city of Washington and added Boston and Chicago; it provided a broader-based picture of citizen crime attitudes and victimization frequencies. 17 The third survey was a nationwide pilot study (a study intended to determine the feasibility of a particular research strategy); it estimated the incidence of crime in the nation as a whole.18 Beyond finding twice as much crime as was reported to the police, the victimization surveys were-and remain-useful for such tasks as: (!)Assessing the costs of crime attributable to direct losses, injuries, insurance premiums, and crime-reduction measures; (2) fostering direct descriptions of offenders, thus providing the 177

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first new data on criminals since 1930; (3) eliciting descriptions of their modus operandi, including use of weapons, means of access to targets, the efficiency of alarms, and the utility of resistance; (4) discovering who calls the police and why, what happens when they do (and do not), and whether they are satisfied with the results. 19 The federally-sponsored national crime surveys were begun in 1972. At first there were two parts: the Cental city Survey, a series of victimization studies conducted in twenty-six major metropolitan areas, and the National crime Survey (NCS), a survey of homes and businesses. The Cental City crime Survey was abandoned in 1975. The National Crime Survey, minus the survey of businesses, continues today. The victimization survey remains the single best available method to penetrate the "dark figure of crime", that portion of the total crime victimizations that, for a variety of reasons, goes unreported. Among victimization surveys the National Crime Survey is arguably the best. National Crime Survey The National Crime Survey (NCS) samples the general population, seeking crime information directly from 178

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victims.20 The Census Bureau conducts the interviews that form the basis of the NCS. The NCS uses the panel survey method to collect data. A representative sample of households is drawn and each household is surveyed seven times at six month intervals, called "waves", over a three year period. This method is called a panel survey not because the same people are interviewed repeatedly. Rather, the randomly selected addresses constitute the panel. If a family at 1400 Oak Street, Anytown, USA, is included in Waves 1 and 2, and then moves, the new residents of 1400 Oak Street are included in later waves. The National Crime Survey begins with roughly 60,000 households as primary sampling units representing as many as 136,000 people 12 years of age and older. The housing units are selected using a multi-stage cluster sampling procedure. The clusters include SMSAs-counties and small groups of contiguous counties. At the final sampling stage, roughly four neighboring housing units are selected in a systematic fashion. Each housing unit in the country must have an equal probability of being selected. Both households and individuals are used as units of analysis. The BJS Bulletin entitled 11Households 179

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Touched by Crime" summarizes annual victimization reports on households and criminal victimizations in the United States contains summaries of individual victimizations. The total household sample is subdivided into six rotations with roughly 10,000 households in each; each rotation is further subdivided into six panels. Each month one panel from each of the six rotations is surveyed about crime. In a six month period, all panels and all rotations are surveyed. The process is repeated in six months. Every six months a rotation that has been in the sample for three years is replaced with a new one. As a result, the NCS sample is continually changing. Each year more than 8,000 housing units are found to be vacant, demolished, or converted into non-residential buildings. They are dropped from the sample. Another 2,000 housing units are dropped because the residents refuse to cooperate. In a normal year, Census Bureau workers conduct two interviews each with approximately 100,000 people aged 12 or older in 49,000 housing units, or more than 95 percent of the available subjects. In the language of survey researchers, the NCS sampling and interviewing procedures provide a reliable sample with a 180

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small error factor. Translated: Give or take a percentage point or two, you can trust the crime information reported by the NCS. The initial NCS contact with a sample household is established by the personal visit of a Census Bureau interviewer. This visit, Wave 1, provides an orienting time frame for the panel members and bounds the data collection. Crime data obtained from Wave 1 are not reported in the NCS; however, all subsequent waves -a total of six -are included. The initial interview includes all household residents 12 years of age or older. As of 1988, about half the members of any panel were interviewed in person for Wave 5. Otherwise, virtually all remaining interviews are conducted by telephone. The NCS questionnaire and crime incident report (Form NCS-2) elicit information on the relevant crimes committed against the household as a whole (e.g., burglary, and larceny without contact) and against any of its members age twelve and over. Besides the basic screening questions, such as the number of persons in the household over twelve years old and family income, there 181

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is a series of questions about crime. A positive answer to anyone of these questions results in the administration and completibn of an incident report for each specific type of offense and each unique incident. (See Appendix for a detailed description of personal sector offenses and household sector Problems with the NCS There are two major sets of problems with the NCS. The first type is associated with the sampling method used to represent the nation as a whole; the second involves data collection in the field. Sampling problems. The first sampling problem is related to the spatial segregation of crime. As Wesley Skogan observes: While crime is relatively infrequent in the general population, this is not the case among certain subgroups. Crime is spatially segregated. For example, in 1970 two-thirds of the reported robberies in the United States were concentrated in 32 cities which housed only 16 percent of the nation's population As a result, a small portion of the population is exposed to high levels of risk, especially from violent crime. People from those places contribute disproportionately to the total count of victims.21 182

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According to Skogan, interviewers have problems locating representative samples that include subgroups with high rates of victimization. These subgroups include persons in lower socioeconomic circumstances, young males -especially young minority males -and transients. Such persons tend to have unstable residential situations; they move about a great deal, which makes their inclusion in panels problematic. One answer to the problem is the representative national sample. However, the problem of the spatial segregation of crime remains. For example, a typical national survey, such as those used by the Gallup organization and Roper to gauge public opinion, employs a sample of 1,500 carefully chosen respondents. A crime survey of 10,000 Detroit residents revealed only 150 robbery victims. The NCS employs national samples of 49,000 households in order to guarantee a reliable and valid image of crime victimization by providing statistically significant numbers of events in each of the eight NCS crime categories. Second, any time a panel is used there is a problem of attrition, defined as panel mortality. Over a three-183

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and-a-half year period, some respondents move, die, or refuse to be interviewed. It is not uncommon to respond to a victimization experience by moving to another neighborhood. Researchers have found that the "more victimizations one reported, the higher the chance that he or she would move or refuse to be interviewed later.1122 Data collection problems. Another sort of problem has to do with the effects of interviewers on the data received recorded. The interviewer must abstract the incidents from the social context for statistical purposes. Thus, while the interviewer may record an incident as a "crime", the respondent may not view it as such. Violent disputes among family members, neighbors, and friends would be in this category. This discrepancy can account for the high level of nonreporting to the police found by the NCS. Moreover, interviewers interpret information differently. Some probe vigorously, while others passively accept "don't know" or another nonresponse. The methods used to explain commonly misunderstood questions differ from interviewer to interviewer. The correction of problems associated with these forms of interviewer bias began in the early 184

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1980s. Before 1981 interviewers were allowed to move crime reports from the point at which they were detected by screening questions to the categories in which they clearly belonged. This practice was stopped and the "offense" counted as it was revealed by the subject.23 As Skogan points out, "The effects of interviews can be quite substantial, especially when survey personnel have had comparatively little training and have little supervision. 24 A second data collection problem is respondent reliability. Crime is so prevalent in the lives of some people that they have difficulty distinguishing one incident from another. As Skogan notes, "Crimes can be recorded in victim surveys only if they are known as discrete events" -events in a series are not recorded. 25 Other kinds of "misremembering" are poor recall and telescoping, or the tendency of respondents to "bring forward" crimes that actually occurred considerably earlier. Some victims respond to traumatic events by blocking them from memory, while for others the trauma may remain as vivid as through it happened "only yesterday". Telescoping is one major reason for using 185

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the bounded panel method. The same respondents are interviewed every six months and data is collected only on events that have occurred since the previous reference period and interview. That is the reason the NCS does not "count" crime data from the binding interview. The panel method leads to a third problem: respondent fatigue. The novelty of being interviewed may eventually wear off, causing respondents to suppress reports of victimization in order to speed up the interview. There is some speculation that persons more prone to experience such fatigue may also be more likely to be victimized by crime. If so, crime will be significantly underreported. On the other hand, "their ability to recall events could be enhanced by this unexpected continuing interest in their experiences on the part of the government11,26 leading to a more accurate recording of incidents of crime. A problem no survey researcher likes to consider is respondent lying. There appears to be a correlation between lying or not telling and the relationship between victim and offender. Victims are more likely to provide 186

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accurate information about incidents when there is no relationship. Skogan speculates that Persons who have been victimized by someone they know frequently may not think it is any of the interviewer's business Although these incidents [may not be reported] to the police, the victim may not have been the party who called them; many crimes are reported to the police by friends, relatives, and bystanders, and the offended partv may not wish to spread the story even further. A fifth problem is to distinguish the 11do-ee11 from the 11do-er11 The victim perpetrator question is often a matter of perception or interpretation, and those involved may have conflicting answers to what is essentially a legal question. For example, an oral exchange following a minor traffic accident results in pushing and an exchange of blows: Who's the victim, and who's the perpetrator? There are "victims" who view their own negligence as a factor in the incident-they left keys in the front door-and do not report the "crime" to an interviewer. Finally, interviews may also increase interest and concern about crime, leading respondents to take protective measures such as better locks and guard dogs. The employment of protective measures by sensitized 187

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respondents could mean that later surveys will underestimate the level of victimization in the nation as a whole. Respondents awareness that they are the objects of study, the so-called Hawthorne effect, stands as a possible confounding influence on the longitudinal study. An important point is that for many reasons crime reports are more reliable today than in the past. Among these reasons are, (1) there are more and more professional police, (2) police sensitivity has led to increased reporting by victims of rape, (3) inflation has made misdemeanors into felonies, (4) reporting practices are better, (5) there have been cultural changes. This gives the perception that crime is rising when only reported crime or known crime is rising. Police Professionalism The onset of police professionalism might be traced to the 1920s and the influence of August Vollmer28 While serving as police chief of Berkeley, California, Vollmer instituted university training as an important part of his development of young officers. He also helped develop 188

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the school of criminology at the University of California at Berkeley, which became the model for justice-related programs around the country." Vollmer's disciples included o.w. Wilson, who pioneered the use of advanced training for officers when he took over and reformed the Wichita, Kansas, police department in 1923. Wilson also was instrumental in applying modern management and administrative techniques to policing. His text, Police Administration, became the single most influential work on the subject. Wilson eventually became dean of the criminology school at Berkeley and ended his career in Chicago when Mayor Richard J. Paley asked him to take over and reform the Chicago Police Department in 1960. One important aspect of professionalism was the technological breakthroughs that significantly increased and expanded the scope of police operations. The first technological breakthroughs in police operations came in the area of communications. In 1867, the first telegraph police boxes were installed; an officer could turn a key in a box and his location and number would automatically register at headquarters. 189

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Additional technological advances were made in the area of transportation. The Detroit police department outfitted some of its patrol officers with bicycles in 1897. By 1913, the motorcycle was being employed by departments in the eastern part of the country. The patrol car first appeared in Akron, Ohio, in 1910. In 1922 less than 1,000 patrol cars were in use in the entire country. To a certain extent, patrol cars were adopted simply to keep up with citizens and criminals. More important, a motorized police force promised efficient patrol coverage. Police administrators believed that motorized patrol would effectively deter crime. The car also allowed the police to respond quickly to crimes and other problems. Gradually, American police departments converted from foot to motor patrol. By the 1960s only a few major cities still used foot patrol to a great extent. The two-way radio became widespread in the 1930s and had two important consequences. First, it completed the communications network and allowed departments to dispatch in response to citizen calls. Second, it revolutionized police supervision. For the first time 190

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ever, supervisors could maintain continuous contact with police officers. The telephone had existed since 1877, but its impact on policing was not felt until the appearance of the patrol car and the two-way radio.29 Together, they completed a communications link between citizens and the police. The telephone allowed citizens to contact the police easily and to request service: the two-way radio enabled the police department to dispatch a patrol officer to.the scene: the patrol car, in turn, allowed the patrol officer to reach the scene quickly. In recent years, the use of technology in police work has markedly increased, prompted in part by World War II scientific breakthroughs and discoveries and the infusion of federal support into scientific inquiry in the law enforcement field. In no area have these changes been more apparent than in electronic data processing. In 1964 only one major city, st. Louis, had a police computer system, by 1968, 10 states and 50 cities had state-level criminal justice information systems. Most recent surveys suggest that virtually all jurisdictions 191

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of 50,000 or more population were using computers in 1981.30 The new communications technology had far-reaching consequences. Routine police work became dominated by citizen requests for service. Police .departments fostered this trend by encouraging people to call. Gradually, citizens became socialized into the habit of "calling the cops" to handle even the smallest problems. A new set of citizen expectations arose about the quality of life. Because they could call on someone to handle little problems, citizens became less tolerant of minor disorders. The new system fed on itself producing an ever-increasing demand for police services. The more the police responded to citizens requests, the more the public came to expect it. Rising numbers of calls overloaded the police, forcing them to add more officers, more patrol cars, and more sophisticated communications systems. These steps, however, only encouraged still more citizen requests for service. This was particularly true in large urban areas. In the seventies, while the official crime rate increased dramatically, victim 192

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surveys and self-report surveys showed a fairly stable crime rate during that period. 31 The telephone-generated request for service altered the nature of police-citizen contact. Previously, police officers rarely entered private dwellings, patrolling on foot, they had no way of learning about problems in private areas. Nor did citizens have any way of summoning the police. The new communications technology made it possible for citizens to invite the police into their homes. Thus, where as the patrol car isolated the police from the public in certain aspects, the telephone offered an even more intimate degree of contact. Police officers came in contact with citizens in their living rooms, kitchens, and bedrooms. These officers became involved in the most intimate domestic problems: husbandwife disputes, alcohol abuse, parent-child conflicts, and other issues 32 Through the 1960s, police professionalism was interpreted as tough, hiqhly trained, rule oriented law enforcement department organized alonq militaristic lines. The most respected department was in Los Angeles, under the leadership of its no-nonsense chief William 193

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Parker. It is no mere coincidence that two of the most popular television shows of the period, "Dragnet" and "Adam 1211, stressed the high, motivation, competence, and integrity of Los Angeles police officers. The urban unrest of the late 1960s changed the course of police department development. Efforts were made to promote understanding between the police and community, reduce police brutality, and recognize the stresses of police work. Efforts also were made, usually under court order, to add members of minority groups and women to police departments. The proportion of sworn officers who were women went from 2% in 1971 to almost 7% in The proportion of police officers and detectives who were black went from 8% in 1983 to 10% in 1987.34 The federal government's law enforcement education program (LEEP) encouraged officers to get college training. In 1982, 79% of police officers in a sample survey conducted by the FBI reported that they had done some college work.35 Twenty-three percent of the respondents had received baccalaureate degrees. An argument can be made that college-educated police officers communicate more effectively with the public as 194

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a result of their acquisition of greater verbal skills. Those possessing college degrees may also have better promotional potential within their departments.36 Among police officers themselves, ideas of professionalism reflect a concern for acquiring knowledge about police operations, the ability to cope with a wide range of problems requiring the exercise of discretion, and a degree of pride in uniform and appearance not unlike the military.37 In jurisdictions where computerassisted instruction is used in police training, police officers have prided themselves in acquiring essential information concerning criminal justice procedures, such as use of the exclusionary rule for evidence gathered during police investigations.38 Most police officers are genuinely concerned with a professional image and support programs designed to enhance that image.39 In some jurisdictions, such as White Plains, New York, a 40-hour in-service training program is required of all personnel below the rank of captain. The program is designed to increase job proficiency and to enhance self-image and motivation.40 Training in human relations skills is increasingly a part of the recruit's 195

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instructional activities in most departments as well.41 The relatively new human relations emphasis dovetails nicely with the trend toward greater police-community interaction, and it says something about the priority given to the tasks and problems confronting police officers in over 75 percent of their daily routine.42 As a result of increasing professionalism, the ideal police officer came to be viewed as a product of the computer age, skilled in using the most advanced techniques to fight crime. A significant majority of funds went toward developing police hardware; in some quarters, technological advances were seen as the answer to the crime problem. Increased Reports by Victims of Rape The women's movement has been largely instrumental in altering public and official views of rape and rape victims. Susan Brownmiller in Against Our Will: Men, Women. and Rape claims, correctly or incorrectly, that the criminalization of rape took place with the emergence of a money economy, in which violation of virginity posed potential economic hardship for the family since the 196

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future bride was now tainted Statistics regarding the extent of rape have been notoriously poor. Women have been reluctant in the past 'to report rapes for a variety of reasons, including: The stigma attached to rape victims, which alleges that they either invited the attack or cooperated in it Sexist treatment given to many women, who are in effect mentally raped a second time by the criminal justice system (the police, prosecutors, and judges). Legal procedures that in the past have permitted courtroom prosecutors to probe the victim's sexual past, which can be both humiliating and embarrassing. The burden of proof that often has been shifted to the victim, to assure that the attack was forced and against her will and that she resisted the attack. For these and other reasons, only recently have a significant proportion of rape victims been willing to report rapes and undertake prosecution of their attackers. The growth of rape crisis centers, featuring counseling and supportive services to victims, has been instrumental in this greater willingness to prosecute. Other factors with account for an increase in the tendency to report rape include: More women 197

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police officers,,better training of police in sensitive handling of rape cases, changes in rape laws in many states, and eliminating barriers such as forbidding prosecutors fromfrobing into the victim's prior sexnal behavior.4 Rape was the fastest growing of uniform crime report (UCR) index crimes in the seventies, increasing 85 percent form 1970 to 1979.45 However, the national crime survey (NCS) victim data that was available for part of this same period shows virtually no change in the rape The increase in the seventies rape rate was primarily due, not to an increase in the number of rapes, but rather to a growth in the willingness to report such crimes. Inflation Has Made Misdemeanors Into Felonies The crime index is primarily made up of property crimes. Auto theft, a less serious and highly reported and cleared offense, artificially inflates this index and perhaps should be dropped from Part I designation.47 Inflation causes bicycle thefts to become larceny, an index offense; while after 1973, all larcenies were included in the index, thus increasing the crime rate.48 198

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Greater insurance coverage further encourages reporting of property loss. In this same vein, thefts of any amount are included in the uniform crime reports. This is done to counter inflated reports of an item's worth by owners, but also tends to inflate the volume of property crime reflected in the reports. Cultural Changes There is an increasing willingness on the part of the public to report criminal victimization, as suggested by Charles Kindermann, former director of the Statistics Division of the Bureau of Justice statistics.49 To the extent that the social programs of the 1960s and 1970s were successful in bringing minorities and the poor into dominant, mainstream society, a growing number of the newly integrated should utilize and depend on police services. Reliance on formal institutions also appears to be increasing. Many incidents that in the past were resolved within the family or the neighborhood are now reported to the police. Illegal acts have always occurred: it is only now that they being formally 199

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defined. As society moves in this direction, the change produces yet another stimulus for the increase in reported crime. Reporting Practices Are Better The FBI is preparing to implement some important changes in the Uniform Crime Reports. First, the definitions of many crimes will be revised. For example rape will now be defined in sexually neutral terms: The carnal knowledge of a person, forcibly and/or against that person's will; or forcibly or against the person's will where the victim is incapable of giving consent because of his/her temporary or permanent mental An attempt also will be made to provide more detailed information on individual criminal incidents. Instead of submitting statements of the kinds of crime that individual citizens reported to the police and summary statements of resulting arrests, it is planned that local police agencies would provide at least a brief account of each incident within the existing type 1 crime categories. In addition, agencies serving more than 100,000 people and a sample of smaller departments would provide detailed reports on 23 crime patterns, including 200

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incident, victim, and offender information. These expanded crime categories would include numerous additional crimes, such as .blackmail, embezzlement, drug offenses, and bribery. This would allow a national database on the nature of crime, victims, and criminals to be developed. The third change would impose more stringent auditing techniques to ensure the accuracy and completeness of the material being submitted by the police.51 Other information to be gathered include statistics gathered by federal law enforcement agencies, as well as data on hate or bias crimes. These changes were initiated in 1990, and the first reports reflecting them should be our in the near future. If it is implemented on schedule, the new UCR program may bring about greater uniformity in cross-jurisdictional reporting and improve the accuracy of official crime data. Summary When we count crimes, there is more than one view of what we count. Crime statistics are produced by government agencies at all levels; they are reported by 201

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citizens to victimization surveyors; and they are the admissions of law violators. The critics of such statistics are many. Their reasons, for concern usually center on the reliability, validity, and generalizability of the statistics. The review of the statistical picture of crime in the United States is at odds with the popular perception of crime -especially violent crime -as constantly rising. Perhaps this section of the chapter challenged you to think about crime and criminals in new and different ways. Perhaps the review generated even more questions about how much crime we have in the United States. The focus of the review of crime statistics was on crime trends, for both the Uniform crime Report and the National Crime Survey. In the final analysis, all that crime statistics no matter what their source -give us an approximation of the nature and the extent of the crime problem. Comparing crime trends over a decade or more may give the consumer of those statistics some sense of where we have been and where we are going. Yet questions continue to haunt crime statisticians, 202

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questions about both the "dark figure of crime" and the political nature of crime statistics. 203

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Notes 1. Department of Justice, Uniform Crime Reports: Crime in the United States (Washington, D.C.: u.s. Government Printing Office, 1989). 2. Ibid., 157. 3. Harold Repinsky and Paul Jesilow, Myths that Cause Crime (Cabin John, M.D.: Seven Locks, 1984. Jeffrey Reiman, The Rich Get Richer and the Poor Get Prison: Ideology, Class and Criminal Justice (New York: John Wiley, 1990), 75. 4. 11F.B.I. releases crime data: schools question accuracy, 11The National College Newspaper (February 1990): 2, 27. 5. Ibid. I 27. 6. D. Seidman and M. Couzens, 11Getting the Crime Rate Down: Political Pressure and Crime Reporting." Law and Society Review, 8 (1986), 457. 7. Paul Brantingham and Patricia Brantingham, Patterns in Crime (New York: Macmillan, 1984), 79. 8. 11122 held in Crime of the Haves.11, Chicago Tribune 18 December 1984, sec. 1:6. 9. Lindsey Grunson, 11Second Opinion on Medical Examiners", New York Times 15 May 1986: E3. 10. Philip Shenon, "Chief Medical Examiner's Reports in Police custody cases Disputed," New York Times, 27 January 1985:1: idem, "Family of Victim Levels Charges of Deceit in Autopsy Conclusion," New York Times, 28 January 1985:1: idem, "Coroner's Work in Hospital Case and 2 Trials Challenged by Critics", New York Times, 29 Janaury 1985:1: idem, "Broad Deterioration in Coroner's Office Charged," New York Times, 30 January 1985:1. 204

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11. "Informant: Hoffa Under Stadium", El Paso Times, 21 Sept. 1989: 9a. 12. Walter R. Gave, Michael Hughes, and Michael Geerken, "Are Uniform Crime Reports a valid indicator of the index crimes? An affirmative answer with minor qualifications", Criminology 23 (1985): 451. Michael J. Hindelang, Travis Hirschi, and Joseph G. Weis, "Correlates of Delinquency: The Illlusion of Descrepancy between Self-report and official measures", American Sociological Review 44 (1979): 995; idem, Measuring Delinquency (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1981). 13. Ibid. see Scott Menard and Herbert Covey, "UCR and UCS: Comparisons over space and time," Journal of Criminal Justice 16 (1988): 371, for caveats on this interpretation. 14. Anne L. Schneider, "Difference between Survey and Crime in Current and Historical Perspective," Robert G. Lehnen and Wesley G. Skogan, ed., The National Crime Survey: Working Papers (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Priting Office, 1981), 39. 15. Marshall B. Clinard, "Comparative Crime Victimization Surveys: Some Problems and Results", International Journal of Criminology and Penology 6 (1978): 22. 16. Albert D. Biderman et al., Report on a Pilot Study in the District of Columbia on Victimization and Attitudes toward Law Enforcement. Field Surveys 1. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (Washington,D.C.: u.s. Government Printing Office, 1967). 17. Philip H. Ennis, Criminal Victimization in the United States: A Report on a National Survey. Field Surveys II. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967). 205

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18. Wesley Skogan, Victimization Surveys and Criminal Justice Planning (Washington, D.C.: u.s. Government Printing Office, 1978), 20. 19. Wesley Skogan, Issues.in the Measurement of Victimization (Washington, D.C.: u.s. Government Printing Office, 1981), 4. 20. James Garofalo, Local Victim Surveys: A Review of the Issues (Washington, o.c.: u.s. Government Printing Office, 1977) James Garofalo and Michael J. Hindelang, An Introduction to the National Crime Survey (Washington, D.C.: u.s. Government Printing Office, 1977). Department of Justice. Criminal Victimization in the United States, 1988 (Washington, D.C.:U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989); Idem, Households Touched by Crime. 1988 (Washington, D.C.: u.s. Government Printing Office, 1989). Wesley Skogan, Victimization Surveys and Criminal Justice Planning (Washington, D.C.: u.s. Government Printing Office, 1978). 21. Skogan, Issues in the Measurement of Victimization, 4. 22. Ibid. I 26. 23. Richard w. Dodge, Response to Screening Questions in the National Crime Survey (Washington, D.C.: u.s. Government Printing Office, 1985). 24. Skogan, Issues in Measurement of Victimization, 8. 25. Ibid., a. 26. Ibid. I 25. 27. Ibid., 16. 28. Samuel Walker, A Critical History of Police Reform: The Emergence of Professionalism (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1977), 60. 206

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29. Survey of Police Operational and Administrative Practices of 1978 (Washington: Police Executive Research Forum, 1978), 80. 30. Mark.H. Moore and George L. Kelling, "To Serve and Protect: Learning from Police History", The Public Interest, 7 (Winter 1983): 49. 31. Adam L. Paez, and R.W. Dodge, Criminal Victimization in the United States: Technical Report. (Washington, D.C.: u.s. Department of Justice, 1982), 10. 32. Samuel Walker, "Broken Windows and Fractured History: The use and misuse of history in Recent Police Patrol Analysis," Justice Quarterly, 1 (March 1984): 77. 33. Susan E. Martin, "Women on the Move? A Report on the status of women in policing," Women and Criminal Justice, 11, No. 1 (1989), 21. 34. Brian Reaves, Profile of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 1987 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics 1989), 20. 35. Robert Fisher and Bruce Heininger, "Issues in Higher Education for Law Enforcement Officers: An Illinois Study", Journal of Criminal Justice, 13, (1985): 329. 36. Ibid., 334. 37. S.E. Brown, and Ron E. Vogel, "Police Professional," Journal of Crime and Justice 6 (1983): 17. 38. T. Wilkerson, and J. Chattin-McNichols, "The Effectiveness of Computer-assisted Instruction for Police Officers," Journal of Police Science and Administration 13 (1985): 230. 39. See, for example, Thomas M. Frost, "Police Recruit Training in Urban Departments: A Look at Instructors,11 Journal of Police Science Administration 11, (1983): 296-302: R.G. Hunt, and K.S. McCadden, A Survey of Work Attitude of Police 207

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Officers: Commitment and Satisfaction a, (1985): 17-25. 40. J.M. Bradley, "Training Doesn't have to be Expensive to be Good." FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin 55 (1986): 11. 41. D. Lip K. Das, "A Review of Progress toward State Mandated Police Human Relations Training", Police Journal 58 (1985): 150. 42. Robert M. Bohm, Crime, "Criminal and Crime Control Policy Myths", Justice Quarterly 3, (1986): 193. 43. Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1975). 44. Ibid. 45. FBI. Uniform Crime Reports-1981 (Washington, D.C.: u.s. Government Printing Office, 1982), 36. 46. u.s. Department of Justice, Criminal Victimization in the United States. 1979 (Washington, D.C.: u.s. Government Printing Office, 1981), 86. 47. Leonard D. Savitz, "Official Police statistics and their Limitations." In crime and Society, edited by Leonard D. Savitz and Norman Johnson (New York: Wiley, 1978), 69. 48. Robert P. Rhodes, The Insoluble Problem of Crime (New York: Wiley, 1977), 89. 49. Charles R. Kinderman, "Crime Statistics" (speech before the subcommittee on crime, Committee on the Judiciary, u.s. House of Representative, June 10, 1981). 50. u.s. Department of Justice, The Redesigned UCR Program (Washington, D.C.: u.s. Department of Justice, n.d.), 89. 51. Ibid. 208

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CHAPTER 6 HOW SERIOUS IS THE CRIME PROBLEM? Introduction Are people safe in their homes at night, on the streets of their cities? What is the likelihood of their lives being snatched away by some unknown, armed assailant? How concerned about the passing stranger should one be? Is the terror one feels after being awakened by a noise in the night justified? Must one fear the loss of a valuable to some callous thug? These questions are important in determining the quality of everyday life. The answers to them will suggest whether people must live in fear and terror or can relax comfortably in our civilized society. This leads us to the question of how serious the crime problem really is. How valid is the perception that the chances of victimization by either a violent criminal or property criminal are extremely high? Violent crime refers to any criminal act which results in the threat or actual physical harm to a victim. The violent crime to be discussed in this chapter will

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violent crime to be discussed in this chapter will include homicide, assault, robbery, and rape. Property crimes are unlawful acts with the intent of gaining property but which do not involve the use of threat of force against an individual. Burglary and motor vehicle theft are examples of property crimes. The rate of victimization must be considered and analyzed to give meaning within the context of everyday life to the perceptions and relativities associated with criminal victimization. I will start by examining incidence rates for various types of crimes. The rates do not represent an exact examination of a person's chances of becoming a victim, but they do provide an approximation. The logic behind using rates to suggest the probability of victimization is that if an average of 100 people per year are victimized over several years, it is reasonable to expect that 100 people will be victimized the following year. If these 100 are members of a group of 1,000 people, then one in ten would be expected to become a victim. 210

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Perceptions and Realities about crime How many crime victims are there in the United States and what are the trends and patterns in victimization? The National Crime Survey (NSC) is the leading source of information today about the nature and extent of victimization. The NSC employs a highly sophisticated and complex sampling methodology to annually collect data from thousands of citizens. Statistical estimation techniques are then employed on the sample data to make estimates of victimization rates, trends, and patterns that occur in the entire United States population. At last count, an estimated 34.8 million criminal events occurred during 19901 To gain a sense of its magnitude, we note that the figure is smaller than the number of personal injuries (estimated at around 59 million) but significantly larger than the number of automobile accidents each year (estimated at around 14 million in 1990).2 This rate of occurrence suggests that there are tremendous social and human costs associated with crime, but the figure alone does not explain the nature and extent of the problem. It fails to specify the basic 211

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human costs of crime. What are the monetary losses, how many lives are taken, and how much work is missed? In evaluating the human costs, one might consider the proportion of the population that is actually affected by these 34.8 million incidents. This is not as easy to determine because a ratio of the number of victimizations to the total population cannot be calculated. If each of these nearly 35 million victimizations affected a different individual, the number of victims would exceed the combined population of Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Nevada, Washington, Oregon, California, Alaska, and Hawaii, but since some people are victims on more than one occasion, the number of victimizations exceeds the number of victims.3 When a home is burglarized, a single incident has taken place, but all inhabitants are victims. A number of crimes, including household burglary, motor vehicle theft, and household larceny, suffer from this accounting problem. To deal with this problem, the Bureau of Justice statistics created a new category of criminal victimization to measure the incidence of crime among households or dwelling units. For 1990, at least one 212

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member of more than 23 million households--about one out of every four--fell victim to some type of violent crime. 4 This figure is astoundinq. From this perspective, it's easy to understand why Lois Herrinqton states, "Every citizen of this country is more impoverished, more fearful, less free, and less safe, because of the everpresent threat of the criminal.115 Crime is so prevalent that it affects practically everyone. In fact, at the current rate, some members of your household should be victimized every four years. But before you head for a flea market to purchase a handqun or install an elaborate security system, further evaluation should be done. It is important to note these statistics include many relatively minor offenses that are not personally threateninq and in which the victim plays a less siqnificant role. For example, when you leave your jacket in a qymnasium and someone walks off with it, that may become an official crime--theft. In 1990, larceny (personal and household thefts with no contact involved) accounted for 59 percent of the 34.8 million 213

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victimizations, and quite often the value of the stolen property was small.6 Because 23 million of the households across the nation experienced violent crime in 1990, and many of these incidents were unsuccessful attempts that did not involve physical injury, specific types of crime must be examined.7 In 1990, 23,600 murders came to the attention of law enforcement.8 This number represents a rate in which only one American in 10,000 will die at the hands of a murderer each year. Relative to other forms of fatal mishap, this rate of occurrence is rather infrequent. More people (two in 10,000) take their own lives than have their lives taken.9 More people (31 in 10,000) die from disease of the heart.10 More people (three in 10,000) die from influenza.11 And finally, you are much more likely to be killed in an automobile accident (two per 10,000) than to be murdered.12 But there is no conscious effort by government to get tough on household accidents or community organizations to see that neighbors wear seat belts. Our major fear is strangers lurking in the dark to take our lives, but most murders are not committed by strangers. In only 214

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13 percent of the murders in which the police were able to determine the relationship between criminal and victim were the actors classified as strangers to one another.13 Considering that only 3,100 or so Americans are murdered by strangers, you should be less concerned when you witness unsavory characters standing at the street corners. You are relatively safe from victimization by a stranger. You are much more likely to die from a motor vehicle crash (16 times), a fall (four times), accidental poisoning (two times), or a fire (two times). Almost as many people die from complications due to medical procedures (2,900 each year) as are killed by unknown assailants (3,000).14 But murder is only one type of violent crime and, certainly, not the most frequent. There are many more rapes, assaults, and robberies than murder. A report by the United States Bureau of Statistics indicates that over six million of these crimes occurred in 1990.15 Nearly six percent of all violent crimes in the United States usually occur in three cities: New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago.16 Rape is the least frequent of the four non-fatal violent crimes (130,000) reported, 215

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while simple assault is the most frequent (3,128,000).17 Robbery and aggravated assaults (use of a weapon or by means likely to produce great bodily injury) fall between rape and simple assault.18 Unlike murder, strangers commit most--about 60 percent--non-fatal violent crimes that are reported.19 The rate of violent crimes by strangers averages about 18 victimizations per 1,000 people and has actually declined since the early 1980s. In contrast, the less frequent, non-stranger victimization rate for violent offenses (12 per 1,000 people) increased somewhat since that time.2 For violent crimes in general, those small fluctuations between stranger and non-stranger victimizations average out, and a pattern of stability has been established with a yearly average of 30 victimizations per 1,000 people. When studying types of violent crime, an interesting pattern develops. With approximately 20 victimizations per 1,000 people, robbery is a relatively rare event. Most robberies involve only the threat of violence. Less than seven robbery victims in 1,000 will suffer physical injury. 21 216

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Assault is a different case. There are more assaults than any other type of violent crime. Almost four percent of all households are victimized by assault each year.22 Several reasons are given for this--most often that violence is an integral part of our culture. One author suggests that it is as "American as Jesse James. 1123 Violence is reinforced by television dramas, violent reports, and even early morning cartoons. Social and cultural values of independence, smartness and machismo, and a keen sense of moral indignation also add to the high levels of assault. Even so, the magnitude of the problem seems to be exaggerated. Only about 30 percent of all assaults result in an injury.24 In 1989, more than eight million people were injured in automobile accidents, yet only 533,000 Americans were injured in aggravated assaults.25 Some 18 million people were injured in accidents at home, and 3,100,000 of them suffered disabling injuries.26 For 13 percent of all violent assault victims, the injury is serious enough to require medical care.27 Injury accounts for four million years of life lost before age 65 each year; heart disease and cancer (combined) account for 217

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3.8 million years lost before age 65.28 These figures suggest that Americans may be quick to attack but are rarely vicious. Attacks are more likely to be simple assaults without a weapon than aggravated assaults with a weapon. It is important to understand that the figures offered are aggregate statistics and that your actual chances of being victimized differ dramatically and depend on your individual social circumstances. It can be said, however, that violent crime is not as threatening to safety as people believe. In considering this proposition, four points need to be reviewed. First, violent crimes--murder, rape, robbery, and assault--make up about 11 percent of all crime.29 Property crime is much more frequent (chances are higher that you will be injured in an accident at home, on the job, or in an automobile than that you will be a victim of a violent criminal act).30 Second, if you are unfortunate enough to be attacked, it is more likely that your assailant will not have a weapon. In only 34 percent of crimes of violence is the criminal armed.31 This varies from crime to crime, with 218

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30 percent of the rapists, 31 percent of the assaulters, and 46 percent of the robbers being ar.med.32 Victims are more likely to sustain an injury if the weapon used is not a firearm or knife. The likelihood of injury is greatest when the weapon is a rock, stick, brass knuckles, fists or feet, for example. Perhaps the victim is less intimidated by an assailant that doesn't have a firearm and, consequently, more likely to be combative. These statistics are for violent crimes that do not result in death. It is unlikely that the negative relationship between the weapon and likelihood of injury will hold for murder. The third important point is that victims of violent crimes are rarely injured. For only seven percent of all violent crime victims, the injury is serious enough to require hospital care. Of those who go to the hospital, a majority are treated in an emergency room and released; an overnight hospital stay is necessary for only one percent of the -So even if you have the misfortune of being a victim, it is not likely that you will be seriously injured. 219

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A final point worth noting about the threat of violent crime is that the chances of being injured are greater if you know your attacker. Robbery and assault victims are more likely to require medical care if they know the attacker. This is particularly true for the crime of aggravated assault and is more pronounced for women than for men. Furthermore, people attacked by someone they know are likely to be more seriously injured than those attacked by strangers. More than 50 percent of the women who were victims of violence committed by family members or intimates said they were injured, 23 percent said they received medical treatment, and 10 percent said their injuries were serious enough to require medical care in a hospital.34 So violence does occur, and people are seriously injured, but such incidents are relatively infrequent: and cases in which actual injury is sustained are even rarer. Most crimes are not violent, and most victims suffer no physical injury. Because the FBI likes to utilize units of time to illustrate frequency of crime (i.e., one serious crime is committed in the nation every two seconds, and one 220

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robbery is committed every one it is interesting to examine the chances of violent victimization I with time as the unit of analysis. Since 10 people in I I 100,000 are murdered each year, you should expect to be I murdered once every 10,000 years. Women over the age of i 12 should expect to be raped once 2,000 years. You should expect to be robbed apprqximately every 50 years. Your chances of being assaulted are sdmewhat higher, and I you should expect to be the victim of !an assault every 30 years. Perhaps Americans can live rith these probabilities and feel safer than in past. I A Nation of Thievej I It would seem that violent crime not be as serious a problem as thought, but whatl about the incidence and monetary loss from propeky crimes? We are I a nation of thieves. we steal from stJres, from neighbors, and from where we work. Some 88 percent of the 34 million crimes committed each involve property theft of one kind of another.i5 Of these, just over 48 percent are perpetrated againsf individuals, I while the remaining 52 percent are crimes against 221

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households.36 Offenses against househJ I shoplifting, theft of bicycles, I snatch1ng, and other forms of personal not involve contact of the victim witJ I I including burglary, household larceny 'i theft. 1 You and your family should expect! i theft. About 25 percent of the 95 mil I contain at least one individual who ex of property crime during the past 12 J I one in 14 households in the nation we, motor vehicle was stolen from every si: across the nation.38 In focusing on ij I that one out of every 16 people fell vi I I theft. 39 In contrast to the infrequen1 property crime is a common event that j several times during an individual 's 11 I family automobile will be stolen about\ i years, the home burglarized every 15 Yi I property stolen every 16 years. Becau: is so frequent, most readers of this wi I to relate at least one personal experi; 222

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The cost of property crime is extremely high. The 1989 Uniform Crime Reports estimate tJat 578,000 known I I robberies involve a yearly property loss of $405 million, that the 3.2 million reported burglarJes represent a $3.4 billion loss, that the eight milJion reported larceny/thefts produced $3.6 billion Jn losses, and that the 1.5 million motor vehicle thefts dost $7.1 billion.40 I I The FBI estimates victims lose about billion in 1 property and regain about $5 billion a net loss of about $9 billion a year.41 This figurJ exceeds the Sincl the median family revenues of all but 18 states.42 1 I income in the United states is about $35,000, crime costs I I approximately the same as the combined income of 275,000 I such an economic burden must place a I substantial drag on the economy and cjeate hardships for many businesses, families, and individuals. I I Furthermore, the $9 billion loss is substantially I underestimated. Researchers base it 9n reported crime which ignores the vast "dark figure" Jf crimes never reported. Three-quarters of naelvletrheref:110srtanedd robberies and burglaries are I Unreported crimes tend to be less but some 223

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monetary loss is often involved. A conservative estimate would project the total cost of propeJty crime to be at I I I least half again, if not double, the billion estimate. In spite of the extremely high inbidence rate and I dollar costs, property crime may not as serious as one might think. To explain this idea, points need to be examined. First, because people mJst fear crimes where there is direct contact with thJ criminal, property crimes with confrontation are regardeJ as the most I serious. The two property crimes involve contact between the victim and the assailant, lbut do not contain I the element of violence, are pocket-picking and purse1 snatching. These crimes are the forms of theft; only two people out of every 1,000 arJ so victimized each I year.45 Only murder and rape occur less frequently. Most I larcenies are without contact; a ball lis taken from a I I playground, a stereo is removed from a:n automobile, clothes are taken from a public These crimes I irritate us, but they are less threate:ning than face-to1 face victimizations. The reaction of rictims reflects this: larcenies--both personal, withopt contact, and I I household--are the crimes least often reported. Only 224

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about 26 percent are brought to the authorities. 46 aJtention I I I of local A second reason that property may be less I serious than generally believed is thJ monetary losses I are generally small. Forty percent of all losses from property crimes were valued at under $!so. I Seventy percent of these crimes invol1rd a loss of less than $250. Not all property losses ale low. When an automobile is stolen, the loss is usually substantial. I In 15 percent of the robberies and 27 percent of the I burglaries, the value of goods stolen ;exceeds $500.47 I Still, the economic losses are usuall1 not great. Third, the seriousness of property crime is also I minimized because many events officiallly recorded and counted as crimes are attempted ratheJ than completed I I acts. Specifically, one in three robbieries, one in five automobile thefts, and one in 18 household larcenies are I unsuccessful attempts in which the retains possession of the I The public's distorted view of is a fourth important point. Burglars are viewed one of two I I types: the brute who breaks down a dobr or a crafty cat 225

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burglar who uses sophisticated cuttinJ tools to chop i through a roof or skylight. In both cases, the criminal I forces their way into the premises. most burglaries I I (six out of every 10), the enters through an I I unlocked door or window.49 The does not have to I I i be a brute or particularly cunning, but simply someone I who walks off the street through an udlocked front door. I In fact, approximately 40 percent of ai11 burglaries are I i committed by family or acquaintances o!f the victim. 50 I While the costs of property crime lare high, they pale beside other forms of loss. Motor vehd.cle accidents are I I i estimated to cost $89 billion each while the annual monetary loss from work-related accidebts is estimated to I I be $64 billion. 51 Other crimes that el!icit far less I I concern than that associated with commbn street crimes I involve far greater dollar losses. In! 1976, embezzlement i alone was estimated to cost from $5 to $10 billion annually. 52 It is estimate!d that between I I o o 10 percent and 25 percent of the $100 f1ll1on spent annually on federal health care is lost to fraudulent I Some experts claim and I corporate crime cost in the hundreds of billions of 226

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dollars each year.54 Other forms of disaster, such as fires and violent natural catastropheJ, including I earthquakes, hurricanes, and tornadoes, come close to costing as much as crimes in the damaJe they cause--$8 billion and $1 billion So even though the cost of ordinary crime may be high, other social ills are comparable, and some far exceed iJ. I Just as the tragic aspect of liveJ lost and injuries sustained from violent criminal acts dannot be ignored, an unfortunate aspect of property criJe cannot be overlooked. In nearly three-quarters lof the personal crimes, none of the stolen goods is The only exception to this is auto theft in about 59 percent I of some portion of the theft was although in 20 percent of the cases was the entire car and its contents recovered.$ When the item tJat is stolen is a I government check that is needed for dJily subsistence, I I I the social as well as economic impact icould be devastating. The victim often has no 1recourse. Americans spend billions of dollars an effort to I I apprehend and prosecute criminals ignoring the real I I social harm. Justice is seldom achieV.ed. The system 227

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fails to ensure that the criminal for the crime while generally neglecting the victiml I I Some people bel1eve that the Un1ted States has more crime than any other nation. This oblervation is h I somew at accurate. In recent years, Amer1cans have faced I roughly seven to 10 times the risk ofldeath by homicide as the residents of most European countries and Japan.57 Our closest European competitor in hoJicide is Finland, and we murder one another at more thaJ three time the rate the Finns These are sometimes explained as the result of America 1 s 'j frontier" ethos or its abundance of firearms. Both of these are important, but neither even begins to explain thJ dimensions of these international differences. WitJ a similar frontier I tradition, canada has a murder rate wJich is less than i one-third of ours.59 Though their populations are roughly I I six times as the same, Californians are murdered I often as Canadians.60 Nor does this simply reflect the relative ease with which Americans caJ obtain handguns; more Californians are killed with alone than i Canadians are by all means put And Canada ; ranks fairly high internationally in homicide rates. 228

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Clearly, the occurrence of violent deaths in the United I States is several times more frequent!than in most I I developed countries. Still, the United States homicide I I I rate is not the highest found in the world. Of the I countries for which data exists, the United States ranks I seventh behind Mexico, Chile, South Africa, Columbia, I Guatemala, and Kenya. Mexico's rate, lfor example, is four times that of the United States.6j Because legal definitions vary considerably, I comparisons of property crime among nJtions are also I difficult. Yet, most criminologists igree that theft, burglary, and robbery in the United states are among the I highest found in the world, among developed countries. This situation is not new.j Comparatively, i I high crime rates were an issue of concern 1n the 1920s. Yet, some experts believe things are Jmproving. Sociologist Daniel Bell observes, "A Jaber look at this problem shows that there is probably crime today in I the United states than existed 100, oJ 50, or even 25 I years ago, and that today the Un1ted States is a more lawful and safe country than public oJinion suggests."63 I If this is true, crime may be a facto 1 of a nation's age, 229

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requiring development of certain social characteristics I I and conditions found only in more mattire societies. Summary In this chapter, I have tried to provide an overview I of the extent of crime in our society.! I have examined data about numerous crimes, some of whlich we fear greatly, some not. I showed that differences exist in the amount of reported crimes againlst property as I compared to crimes against persons. was noted that I while property crimes are far more numrrous than crimes against the person, and so dominate any reported trends, I : there is much more public concern about crimes against persons. The points addressed in thisl chapter lead to a I questioning of our crime-concern priorities. The questioning may or may not bring change, cut certainly I f d w1ll 1ncrease understand1ng of the dynam1cs o cr1me an I concern about it in our society. 230

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1. 2. 3. Notes I Bureau of Justice Statistics, Victimization in the United states, 1991 (Washington, D.C.: u.s. Government Printing Office, 1992 Preliminary Report), p. 107. I u.s. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstracts of the United States. 1991, 112 ed., (Washington, D.C., 1993), 121, 609. Ibid. I 22. 4. Bureau of Justice Statistics, of Criminal Justice Statistics, 1991 D.C.: u.s. Government Printing Office, 1992) 'i 293. 5. Alison Landes, Crime, 1990, (Wylie, Texas: Sage Publication, 1990). I 6. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Criminal Victimization in the United States, 1991, 10. I 7. u.s. Department of Justice, Crime!and the Nation's Households. 1990 (Washington, D.c.l: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1991), 12. I 8. FBI Un1form Cr1me Report, 1990, 9. Lee Krantz, The Best and Worst ofiEverythinq (New York: Prentice Hall, 1991), 261.1 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid., 82. 12 Ibid. I 2 62 13. u.s. Department of Justice. in the United States. 1983 (Washington, D.C.: q.s. Government Printing Office, 1984), 12. 231

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14. u.s. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstracts, 1992, 89. 15. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Criminal Victimization in the United States, 1991, 1. 16. Bureau of Justice Statistics, sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, 1991, 388. 17. Bureau of Justice Statistics, criminal Victimization in the United States, 1991, 2. 18. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstracts, 1992, 184. 19. Ibid. I 185. 20. Ibid. 21. Landes, Crime, 35. 22. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstracts, 1992, 186. 23. Charles Silberman, Criminal Violence. Criminal Justice (New York: Vintage Books, 1980), 7. 24. Landes, Crime, 33. 25. u.s. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstracts, 1992, 121, 184. 26. u.s. Department of Safety, Accidents Facts, 1992, (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1992), 93. 27. Violent Crime in the United States, (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, 1991), 9. 28. Mark L. Rosenberg and Mary Ann Fenley, Violence in America -A Public Health Approach (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), viii. 29. Landes, crime, 3. 232

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30. Accident Facts, 1992, 8. 31. Landes, Crime, 36. 32. Ibid., 31. 33. Violent Crime in the United States (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, 1991), 9. 34. Ibid. 35. FBI Uniform Crime Reports, 1989, 48. 36. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Crime Victimization in the United States 1990 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1991, Preliminary Report), 40. 37. Michael Rand, Crime and the Nation's Households, 1989 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1990) 1 5. 38. Ibid. I 5. 39. FBI Uniform Crime Reports, 1989, 20. 40. Ibid. I 70. 41. u.s. Department of Justice, Crime in the United states. 1989 (Washington, D.C.: u.s. Government Printing Office, 1990), 160. 42. u.s. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstracts, 1992, 286. 43. Ibid. I 449. 44. Bureau of Justice Statistics, sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, 1991, 268. 45. FBI, Uniform Crime Reports, 1989, 32. 46. Landes, Crime, 21. 47. Ibid., 38. 233

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48. Ibid., 39. 49. FBI, Uniform Crime Reports, 1989, 27. so. Frank E. Hagan, Introduction to Criminology, Theories, Methods and Criminal Behavior (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1990), 283. 51. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstracts, 1992, 120. 52. Charles McGaghy, Deviant Behavior, (New York: MacMillan, 1976), 178. 53. Paul D. Jesilow, Herbert N. Pontell, and Gilbert Geis, "Physician Immunity from Prosecution and Punishment for Medical Program Fraud", Law and Policy 6 (1984): 408. 54. Elizabeth Moore and Michael Mills, "The Neglected Victims and Unexamined Costs of White-Collar Crime", Crime and Delinquency 36 (1990): 408. 55. u.s. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstracts, 1992, 201, 219. 56. Landes, crime, 37. 57. Carol Kalish, International Crime Rates, Bureau of Justice statistics Special Report. 1988 (Washington, D.C.: u.s. Government Printing Office, 1989), 5. 58. Ibid. 59. Ibid. 60. California Comparisons: Calculated from State of California, Office of Criminal Justice Planning, Crimes in California (Sacramento, 1983), 6; u.s. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstracts, 1992, 181. 61. Ibid. 234

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62. Frank E. Hagan, Introduction to Criminology, 1990, 225. 63. Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology (New York: Collier Books, 1960), 151; quoted in Thomas E. Cronin, Tania z. Cronin, and Michael E. Milakovich, u.s. Crime in the Streets (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), 9. 235

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CHAPTER 7 CRIME PATTERNS Introduction What patterns exist in the crime rate that can help us understand the causes of crime? This question is among one of the most important issues in criminological literature. criminologists look for stable patterns in the crime rate in order to gain insight into the nature of crime. If crime rates are consistently higher at certain times, in certain areas, and among certain groups, this knowledge might help them better understand why people break the law. For example, if criminal statistics show that crime rates are consistently higher in poor neighborhoods than in large urban areas, then a theory of crime may suggest that poverty and social disorganization are strongly associated with criminality. In contrast, if crime rates were spread evenly across the social structure, then there would be little evidence that crime has an economic basis. In this chapter, I will deal with crime perception 3: adolescents, minorities, and the poor that are the

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In this chapter, I will deal with crime perception 3: adolescents, minorities, and the poor that are the perpetrators of most violent criminal activity. These correlates must be examined to see if a basis for this contention exists. The discussion of correlates relies primarily on inferences drawn from official arrest statistics and secondarily on those drawn from selfreported criminality and victimization survey results. Each of these data sets focus predominantly on index offenses. For this reason, my review of correlates of criminality is primarily a review of possible correlates of the commission of index offenses. The Ecology of Crime There seem to be patterns in the crime rate that are linked to temporal and ecological factors. Some of the most important of these discussed below. Season and climate. Most reported crimes occur during the warm summer months of July and August. During the summer, teenagers, who usually maintain the highest crime levels, are out of school and have greater opportunity to commit crime. During warm weather, people 237

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spend more time outdoors, making themselves easier targets. Similarly, homes are left vacant more often during the summer, making them more vulnerable to property crimes. Two exceptions to this trend are murders and robberies, which occur frequently in December and January (though rates are also high in the summer). Population Density. Areas with low per capita crime tend to be rural. Large urban areas have by far the highest violence rates. These findings are also supported by victim data. Exceptions to this trend are low population resort areas with large transient or seasonal populations-such as Atlantic City, New Jersey: and Nantucket, Massachusetts. Region. Definite differences are apparent in regional crime rates. For many years, southern states had a significantly higher crime rate in almost all crime categories than that found in other regions of the county: this data convinced some criminologists that there was a southern subculture of violence.1 However, the western states now have the dubious distinction of having the highest crime and violence rate.2 238

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Social Class and Crime A most important issue in the criminological literature is the relationship between social class and crime. Historically, crime has been thought to be a lower-class phenomenon. After all, people at the lowestlevel of society have the greatest incentive to commit crimes. Those unable to secure necessary goods and services through legal channels may consequently resort to theft and other illegal activities-such as the sale of narcotics-to secure them. Those living in impoverished areas are also believed to engage in disproportionate amounts of violent crime as a means of expressing their rage, disappointment, and indignation against society. Rates of crimes, such as rape and assault, may also be higher in impoverished areas because those engaging in violence can develop an alternative source of positive self-image by viewing themselves as tough, strong, or "bad". Official statistics indicate that crime rates in inner-city, high poverty areas are generally higher than those in suburban or wealthier areas. Studies using aggregate police statistics (arrest records) have 239

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consistently shown that lower classes tend to be more criminally involved.3 Also, researchers have generally concluded that lower-class youths are more likely than other class youths to be labeled and processed as delinquents.4 The primary criticism of using official data to interpret class differences in criminal activity is that such statistics may be more of a reflection of differential treatment within the criminal justice system than actual crime rate differences. Police may devote more resources to poverty areas and certain types of crime, and, consequently, apprehension rates may be higher. Similarly, police may.be more likely to formally arrest and prosecute lower-class citizens than those in middle and upper classes, which could account for the lower classes' overrepresentation in the official data. Because of these factors, self-report data has been used extensively to test the class-crime relationship. If people in all social classes self report similar crime patterns but only those in the lower class are formally arrested, that would explain the higher crime rates in lower-class neighborhoods. However, if lower-class 240

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people report greater criminal activity than their middle-and upper-class peers, it would indicate that the official statistics are an accurate representation of the crime problem. Surprisingly, early self-report studies conducted in the 1950's, specifically those conducted by James Short and F. Ivan Nye, did not find a direct relationship between social class and youth crime.5 They found that socioeconomic class was related to official processing by police, court, and correctional agencies but not to the actual commission of crimes. In other words, while lowerand middle-class youth self-reported equal amounts of crime, the lower-class youth had a greater chance of getting arrested, convicted, and incarcerated and becoming official delinquents. In addition, factors generally associated with lower class membership, such as broken homes, were found to be related to institutionalization but not to admission of delinquency. Other studies of this period reached similar conclusions.6 For more than 20 years after the use of self-reports became widespread, a majority of self-report studies 241

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agreed that a class-crime relationship did not exist: if the poor possessed greater criminal records than the wealthy, it was because of differential law enforcement and not class-based behavior differences. Perhaps the strongest support for this position is the work of Charles Tittle and colleagues, who concluded after a review of thirty-five studies on the relationship between social class and crime that little, if any, evidence exists supporting the lower-class theory of crime and that official statistics likely reflect a class bias in lower-class processing.7 The Tittle review is generally cited by criminologists as the strongest statement refuting the claim that the lower class is disproportionately criminal. In 1990, writing with Robert Meier, Tittle once again reviewed existing data (published in the 1978-1990 period) on the class-crime relationship and again found little evidence that a consistent association could be found between class and crime.8 While persuasive, this research has sparked significant debate over the validity of studies assessing the class-crime relationship. Many self-report 242

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instruments include trivial offenses, such as using a false ID or drunkenness except "driving under the influence." This inclusion may obscure the true classcrime relationship because members of the middle and upper classes frequently engage_in trivial offenses such as petty larceny, and simple assault. If only serious felony offenses (acts punishable by death or imprisonment in a penitentiary) are considered, a true class-crime relationship could be determined. One of the most widely noted arguments for the existence of a class and crime interrelation can be seen in the work of Delbert Elliot and Suzanne Ageton.9 Using a national sample of 1,726 youngsters ages 11 to 17 and a sophisticated self-report system, the researchers found that lower-class youths were much more likely than their middle-class counterparts to engage in serious offenses such as robbery, sexual assault, and vandalism; that lower class youths were much more likely than those of the middle class to have committed many serious property and personal crimes; and that when lower-and middle-class youths were compared for serious delinquent acts lowerclass youths were significantly more delinquent. It is 243

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important to caution, however, that official statistics undercount the typical crimes of upper socioeconomic groups so that, even if the lower class has higher official crime rates, this does not indicate that they necessarily have excess criminality. In a follow-up study, Elliott and Huizinga again found that middle-class youths (males) were much less likely to commit serious crime than lower-class youths. There were substantial class differences in both the prevalence and incidence of serious crime.10 Braithwaite offers a comprehensive review of previous research, though he covers studies that Tittle et al. might reject as methodologically unsound.11 He notes that even though self-report studies generally do I not find links between class and crime, more of their studies find links than chance alone would indicate. He refuses to dismiss official statistics as being so biased that all inferences based upon them must be considered invalid. Braithwaite concludes that only twenty-one of ninety studies of both official records and self-reported criminality which he reviews fail to provide outright support that class is linked to crime. Further, his 244

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research omits ecological studies of crime (comparisons of crime rates by geographic sector), though their studies consistently report a class-crime association.12 Thornberry and Farnsworth offer the results of their study of law violations committed through the years by a cohort of males born in 1945 who resided in Philadelphia from the ages of ten to eighteen.13 Their research includes examination of arrest data for the members of the cohort and of data gathered from personal interviews of many of those members. Looking at both types of data for crime generally and for index offenses and violent offenses particularly, they report that only a weak relationship exists between class and delinquent activity for juveniles; lower-class youth seem only slightly more involved in delinquency than do middle-class youth. For adults, however, the relationship is considerably stronger. Lower-class adults clearly are more actively criminal than are middle-class adults. The relationship between class and crime is an important one for criminological theory. If crime is related to class position, then it follows that such factors as poverty and neighborhood deterioration are 245

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associated with criminal behavior. However, if class and crime are unrelated, the causes of crimes may be found in biological and developmental processes that might be experienced by all classes-poor family environment, peer pressure, or school failure. Because of its importance, the class-crime relationship remains one of the most enduring criminological controversies. Debate is likely to continue as long as different methods are used to test the class-crime relationship. There is evidence that the way class and crime variables are interpreted and calculated influences their interrelationship. For example, David Brownfield found that some widely used measures of social class, such as father's occupation and education are only weakly related to self-reported crime, while others, such as unemployment, or receiving welfare, are strong correlates of criminality.14 In addition, the class-crime relationship may vary according to an individual's age and race.15 So the weight of recent evidence seems to suggest that serious andjor official crime is more prevalent among the lower classes, while less-serious and self-246

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reported crime is spread more evenly throughout the social structure. 16 However, the debate over the "true" relationship between class and crime goes on because many highly respected criminologists still doubt that a relationship actually exists. It is obvious that rigorous research efforts must continue on this important area of criminology. Age and Crime There is general agreement that age is inversely related to criminality. Criminologists Travis Hirschi, and Mrchael Gottfredson state, "Age is everywhere correlated with crime. Its effects on crime do not depend on other demographic correlates of crime. 1117 Regardless of economic status, marital status, race, sex and so on, younger people commit crime more often than their older peers. Official statistics tell us that young people are arrested at a disproportionate rate to their numbers in the population; victim surveys generate similar findings for crimes in which the age of the assailant can be determined. Research also shows that the age 247

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distribution of crime is remarkably stable. That is, the proportion of teenagers committing crime today is about the same as it has been for 40 years.18 While youths aged 15 to 18 collectively make up about 5 percent of the total u.s. population, they account for about 23 percent of the index crime arrests and 15 percent of the arrest for all crimes.19 As a general rule the peak age for property crime is believed to be 16 and for violence, 18.20 In contrast adults 40 and over, who make up 32 percent of the population, account for only 9 percent of the index crime arrests.21 The elderly (65 years old and over) are particularly resistant to the temptations of crime; they make up 8 percent of the population and less than 1 percent of the arrests.22 Elderly males 65 and over are predominantly arrested for alcohol-related matter (public drunkenness, drunk driving) and elderly females for larceny theft (shoplifting); the crime rate of both groups has remained stable for the past 20 years.23 It is also possible to obtain some estimates of offense rates by age for the violent personal crimes measure by the National Crime Survey because victims had 248

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the chance to view their attackers and estimate their ages. Research by John Laub and his colleagues at the Hindelang Research Center in Albany, New York, shows that the estimated offense rates for youths aged 18 to 20 is about three times greater than the estimated rate of adults 21 and over: youths aged 12 to 17 offended at a rate twice that of adults.24 For some specific crimes, such as robbery and personal larceny, the youthful offending rate is perceived to be almost six times the adult rate. The relationship between age and crime is of major theoretical importance because existing criminological theories fail to adequately explain why the crime rate drops with age, which is referred to a the "aging out" or desistance phenomenon. This theoretical failure has been the subject of much academic debate. There are two contending perspectives: one argues that biological processes account for "aging out", and the other argues that social factors play the key explanatory role. The first position, championed by respected criminologists Travis Hirschi and Michael Gottfredson, is that no one has produced an explanation 249

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of the age factor in criminality that accounts for its invariability across all types of demographic and social conditions.25 Because all people, regardless of their demographic characteristics (race, gender, class, family structure, domicile, work status, etc.) commit less crime as they get older, is it not important to consider age as a factor in explaining crime. Even hard-core chronic offenders will commit less crime as they age.26 Hirschi and Gottfredson find that differences in group offending rates (for instance, between males and females or between the rich and poor) that exist at any point in their respective life cycles will be maintained throughout their lives. If 18-year-old boys are four times as likely to commit crime as 18-year-old girls, then so-year-old men will be four times as likely to commit crime as soyear-old women, though the real number of crimes committed by males and females will constantly be declining. Hirschi and Gottfredson's view has biological overtones: as they age, people commit less crime because they lost strength, ambition, energy, and mobility. Youth is the adventurous time of life; old age the 2SO

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settled time. This leads not only to more youthful crime, according to this line of thought, but also to more detectable youthful crime. Older people often occupy positions of trust, in which they can commit surreptitious crimes. Young people are less skilled in their work than older people, hence more likely to be caught when they break the law. Youth is a time of intense and unfulfilled passions, leading to crimes for goods and pleasures that older people either crave less or can enjoy legally. Young people suffer more unemployment, hence have not only the need but the time for illegal gains. Young people experience more inequity than older people, and tend to express their feelings more overtly. Older people have learned that crime does not pay. Young people are more exposed to the disinhibiting influences of the mass media; old people are more interested in religion, with its moral injunctions. This position has been supported by the research of Walter Grove, who finds that the uniformity of maturational changes in the crime rate suggests that it must be part of a biological 11evolutionary process. 1127 251

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Those who oppose the Hirschi and Gottfredson view of the age-crime relationship suggest that social factors directly associated with a person's age, such as lifestyle, economic situation, or peer relations, explain desistance and the aging out process.28 For example, David Farrington has shown that people begin to specialize in crime as they age and that the frequency or type of an offender's criminal behavior is not constant. Farrington and his associates Alfred Blumstein and Jacqueline Cohen believe that criminality undergoes evolving patterns or cycles over a person's lifetime.29 The probability that a person may become a chronic or career criminal may be determined by the age at which he or she begins the offending career. Arnold Barnett, Alfred Blumstein, and David Farrington argue that the population may contain different sets of criminal offenders, one group whose criminality declines with age (as predicted by Hirschi and Gottfredson) and another whose criminal behavior remains constant as they mature.30 This view is supported by research conducted by Darrell Steffensmeier and his associates, who found that while the rates of some crimes are associated with age, others 252

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do not peak as early or decline as fast. Crimes that provide significant economic gain, such as gambling, embezzlement, fraud and cheating on taxes, are less likely to decline with maturity than high-risk, lowprofit offenses, such as assault.31 Steffensmeier's research also indicates that age-crime pattern is changing: a greater proportion of criminal behavior is concentrated among youthful offenders than it was forty years ago. Other criminologists also conclude that age-related factors are an important determinant of offending patterns.32 Their position is that persons who get involved in criminality at a very early age and who gain official records, will be the ones most likely to become career criminals: the age of onset of criminality is a key determinant of the probability of future law In sum, some criminologists view the relationship between crime and age as a constant, while other believe that it varies according to offense and offender. This difference has important implications for criminological research and theory. If age is a constant, then the 253

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criminality of any group can be accurately measured at any single point in time. If, conversely, the relationship between age and crime varies, it would be necessary to conduct longitudinal studies that follow criminals over their life cycle in order to fully understand how their age influences their offending patterns.34 Crime would then be conceived of as a type of social event that takes on different meanings at different times in a person's life.35 Disagreements over this critical issue have produced some of the most enthusiastic debates in the recent criminological literature.36 Presently, efforts are being undertaken to examine this issue in the United state and in a cross-national perspective using cohorts in Sweden and Britain. Early results from the Scandinavian study find many general similarities with the u.s. research; however, there seem to be some important differences, such as in the crime rate decline among people grouped on the basis of social class, crime specialization, and demographic characteristics.37 Clearly, more research is required on this subject. 254

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Despite the debate ranging over the relationship between age and crime, there is little question that overall crimes rate declines with age. But why does this phenomenon happen? There are a number of explanations for the "aging out" or desistance phenomenon. Some recent research indicates that desistance is caused by a cognitive change occurring in the late teens when troubled youths are able to develop a long-term life view and resist the need for immediate gratification.38 Gordon Trasler agrees with this view when he suggests that "much teenage crime is fun." Youths view their petty but risky and exciting crimes as a social activity that provides adventure in an otherwise boring and unsympathetic world. As they grow older, Trasler finds, their life patterns are inconsistent with criminality; delinquents literally grow out of crime. 39 James Q. Wilson and Richard Herrnstein suggest that the aging-out process is a function of the natural history of the human life The rise in crime in childhood coincides with the arousal of major sources of reinforcement for delinquent behavior-money, sex, and peers who value independence of, or even disdain for, 255

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conventional morality. Simultaneously, the growing youth is becoming literally, as well as psychologically, independent of influential adults (parents and teachers, etc.) who might enforce conventional standards. Given energy, strength, potent new sources of drive but little means of consummation couples with a lack of economic and social skills and relationships with peers who are similarly vigorous and frustrated create the conditions needed for a rise in criminality. Why does the crime rate then decline? Wilson and Herrnstein find that as a person matures, the small gains from petty crimes will lose their attractiveness because legitimate sources of money, sex, alcohol, and status become attainable. Adulthood brings increasingly powerful ties to conventional society, perhaps along with a family. Adult peers will further make crime an unattractive choice by express opinions in opposition to risk taking and law violation ("you're acting childishly"). Adults also develop the ability to delay gratification and forgo the immediate gains that law violations bring. 256

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Wilson and Herrnsteins explanation of the desistance phenomenon is closely linked to socialization. However, research conducted by Barry Glassner, Margaret Ksander, Bruce Berg, and Bruce Johnson finds that aging out of crime might also be linked to a very practical consideration: the fear of punishment.41 According to Glassner and his associates, youths are well aware that once they reach their legal majority, punishment takes a decidedly more sinister turn. They are no longer protected by the kindly arms of the criminal justice system. As one teenage boy told them: When you're a teenager, you're rowdy. Nowadays, you aren't rowdy. You know, you want to settle down because you can go to jail now. When you are a boy, you can be put into a detention home. But you can go to jail now. Jail ain't no place to go.42 And, as Charles Tittle suggests, aging out of crime may be more a function of interpersonal relationships than any physical or emotional process. Children who get in trouble with the law at an early age, who are labeled by teachers, police, parents, and neighbors as troublemakers, and who may consequently find their relationships to significant others weakened or broken 257

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may have little choice but to remain committed to their criminal While most people desist, some may find a criminal career a reasonable alternative. Yet, even people who actually remain in a criminal career will eventually slow down as they age. Crime is too dangerous, physically taxing, and unrewarding, and punishments too harsh and long-lasting, to become a longterm way of life for most people. Race and Crime Official crime data indicate that minority-group members are involved in a disproportionate share of criminal activity. The UCR (Uniform Crime Reports) tell us that although black citizens make up about 12 percent of the general population, they account for about 45 percent of violent crime arrests and 31 percent of the property crime arrests.44 "Black crimes," those for which blacks are arrested most often appear to be robbery and manslaughter. Gambling arrests are essentially equal in I number for whites and blacks. Crimes displaying a very low percentage of black arrests (less than 20 percent) are loitering and public drunkenness.45 One study 258

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estimated that blacks living in cities of more than 250,000 people stood a 51 percent chance of ever being arrested for a crime index offense compared to a white rate of only 14 percent.46 Evidence suggests that these types of discrepancies have existed for decades, appearing as far back as the census of 1910.47 The overrepresentation of blacks in arrest rates for crimes is clearly reflected in their proportion of the general incarcerated population: according to the Annual Survey of Jails as of September 1989, 41 percent of the persons held in local jails in the United States were black compared to 39 percent white.48 The disproportion of blacks is equally as alarming in state and federal prisons. As of 1986, the governments own statistics revealed that 47 percent of the state prisoners and 32 percent of the federal prisoners in the u.s. were black.49 By 1990, the proportion was over fifty percent and rising. Black males accounted for 45 percent of the nations male prisoners, while black females represented 48 percent of the female prisoners nationwide.50 259

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Blacks are about eight times more likely to be imprisoned than whites or other minorities.51 The likelihood of black males being imprisoned is eight times that of white males or those of ethnic groups and 207 times that of white females. Black females are eight times more likely to be imprisoned than white females and face at least six times greater likelihood than other minority group females. During their lifetime, black males are six to seven times more likely to serve time in prison than white males in the United States. Similarly, black females are six to eight times more likely to be imprisoned within their lifetime than white females. At the current rate, one in every four AfricanAmerican males will go to prison at least once during his lifetime. Many will do time more than once. A black male in America is presently twice as likely to go to prison as he could be if he were living under outright apartheid in South Africa. If the present upward trend holds, as it has for sixty years ("only" twenty-three percent of the u.s. prison population was black in 1930), half of all African American males will go to prison by the end of the present decade.52 Official statistics reveal that 260

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non-whites consistently receive sentences thirty percent more severe than Euroamericans upon conviction for identical People of color are at least twenty-five percent less likely than whites in similar circumstances to receive early parole. About fifty percent of all prisoners on death row are people of color, although whites are convicted of some two-thirds of all capital crimes. Particular note needs to be made regarding the "war on drugs", probably the largest single factor behind the rise in prison populations during the past decade. While drug arrests and prosecutions have increased each year since 1980, the number of African-Americans arrested for drug offenses has increased at an even more rapid rate than has the arrest rate for the population as a whole. From 1984 to 1988, the black community's percentage of all drug arrest nationally increased from thirty percent to thirty-eight In Michigan, drug arrests overall have doubled since 1985, while drug arrest of blacks have tripled. 55 A front page story in The Los Angeles Times reported that while about eighty percent of the nation's drug users are white, the majority of those 261

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arrested for 11drug crimes11 are black. 56 With a 11war on drugs11 primarily waged through the criminal justice system and disproportinately targeting inner-city drug users, the end result is an increasing number of prisoners and an ever larger share of black inmates. Black juveniles held in juvenile custody facilities also exhibit a high rate in proportion to their population. Blacks under the age of 18 account for approximately 15 percent of the nation's juvenile population.57 In 1990, more than 40 percent of the residents of public juvenile custody facilities were black. 58 The Black-White Crime Differential Despite the seemingly different crime rates between blacks and whites, the two racial groups for which most comparisons in racial disparities are made, many scholars maintain that black and white crime rates are not dissimilar when the variable of sex, age, and socioeconomic conditions are constant. Since the UCR statistics represent arrest data, racial in the crime rate may be more of a 262

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reflection of police practices than an accurate picture of criminal participation. Consequently, criminologists have sought to verify the UCR findings through analysis of NCS (National Crime Survey) and self-report data. The NCS supplies racial data on crimes in which victims were able to identify the attackers-rape, assault and robbery. John Laub and his associates analyzed NCS data and found that the results were consistent with the official crime statistics.59 The proportion of victims who identified their assailant as black is comparable to the ratio of minorities in the arrest statistics. Blacks are identified as committing a disproportionate share of personal violent crime. Nonetheless, the proportions are somewhat less than reported in UCR arrest statistics, especially for the crime of rape. This could mean that the police are more likely to arrest black suspects for that crime or the women attacked by black offenders are more likely to report the crime to police. Also, rape tends to be an intraracial crime, and black women are twice as likely to report rapes to police than are white It is unclear whether this difference in 263

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reporting practices is a function of race, income or other factors. Self-Report Differences Another way to examine this issue for youth is to compare the racial differences in self-reported data with those found in the official delinquency records. Charges of racial discrimination in the arrest process could be supported if the self-reported data were significantly different. Early efforts by Leroy Gould in Seattle, Harwin Voss in Honolulu, and Ronald Akers in seven midwestern states found the relationship between race and self-reported delinquency was virtually nonexistent.61 Two recent self-report studies that make use of large national samples of youth have also found little evidence of racial disparity in offending. The first, conducted by the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan, found that if anything, black youth self-report less delinquent behavior and substance abuse than whites.62 The second, a nationwide study of youth by social scientists at the Behavioral Science Institute at Boulder, Colorado, found few interracial 264

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differences in crime rates, though black youths maintained a much greater chance of being arrested and taken into These and other self-report studies seem to indicate that the delinquent behavior rates of black and white teenagers are generally similar and that differences in arrest statistics may indicate a differential selection policy by These findings are similar to those for class discussed earlier. Causes of Racial Disparity in Crime Racial differences in crime is an extremely sensitive issue. While there is question about the validity of UCR data, the fact remains that AfricanAmericans are arrested for a disproportionate amount of violent crime, for instance robbery and murder. While it is possible that the UCR is only a reflection of discriminatory arrest practices, as self-report studies would have us believe, it is unlikely that police discretion alone would account for these proportions: it is doubtful that police ignore white vandals and rapists while arresting violent black offenders. Today, many 265

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criminologists concede that recorded differences in the black-white violent crime arrest rate cannot be explained away solely by differential treatment within the criminal justice system.65 To do so would be to ignore the social problems that exist in the nations inner cities. How then can racial patterns be explained? Most theories put forth to explain black-white crime differentials focus on elements of economic deprivation, social disorganization, subcuitural adaptations, and the legacy of racism and discrimination on personality and The Black Experience in American History One approach has been to trace the black experience in the United states. Some criminologists view black crime as a function of socialization in a society where the black family was torn apart and black culture destroyed in such a way that recovery has been impossible. In American Violence and Public Policy, James Comer argues that the enslavement of black people left in them a bitter taste, made more bitter by racism and lack of opportunity.67 Children of the slave society 266

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were thrust into a system of forced dependency and negative self-feelings. Comer writes that it was a system that promoted powerful forces for identification with an aggressor (slave owner) and ambivalence and antagonism toward one's self and group. After emancipation, blacks were shut out of the social and political mainstream. Frustrated and angry, they were isolated in segregated communities, turning within for support. The result is a combination of anger, rage, and negative self-images. Comer writes: In reaction to failure, the most vibrant and reactive often become disrupted and violent in and out of schools, both individually and in groups and gangs. Neighborhoods and communities of adequately functioning families are then overwhelmed by the reactive and most troubled individuals and families. Models of violence and other troublesome behavior for children abound in relatives, friends, and neighbors unsuccessful in previous According to Comer, the intraracial aspect of black violence is in reaction to being unable to cope with the larger society or to identify with black and white leaders and institutional gains. Frustration and anger is taken out on people most like self.69 Comer's opinion fits well with the criminological concept that a 267

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subculture of violence has developed in inner-city ghetto areas that condones the use of physical force as solutions for everyday encouriters.70 Charles Silberman also views the problem as a function of the black experience in this country-"an experience that differs from that of other ethnic groups". 71 Silberman 1 s influential argument is that black citizens have learned to be violent because of their treatment in u.s. society. First, they were violently removed from their African homelands. Then their slavery was sustained by violence. After emancipation, their lower-class position was enforced by violent means, such as intimidation by the Ku Klux Klan. To strike back meant.harsh retaliation by the white-controlled law. Moving to northern cities, blacks suffered two burdens unknown to other migrants: their color and their heritage of slavery. After all, the color black in u.s. culture suggests sinister, dirty, evil, or bad things, while white connotes goodness and purity (the good guys perpetually wear white hats; social outcasts are black listed; brides wear white, and witches wear black). Consequently, to endure and reach cultural and personal 268

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fulfillment, blacks have developed their own set of norms, values, and traditions. In the 1960s, many blacks began to adopt the image, first developed in southern folklore and myth, of being "bad" in their personal lives. After 350 years of fearing whites, Silberman notes, "black Americans have discovered that the fear runs the other way, that whites are intimidated by their very presence; it would be hard to overestimate what an extraordinary liberating force this discovery is JSO years of festering hatred has come spilling out. 1172 Using the colonial model to analyze black violence, Frantz Fanon, a black psychoanalyst and author of The Wretched of the Earth, explained such violence as politically necessary for black people seeking their independence and personally necessary for "colored natives" striving to be "men". 73 Fanon argued that the degradation the natives endured as a result of the systematic violence of colonialism made "psychic wholeness" possible only through violent acts against the white masters and rulers whom they desired to replace. Robert Staples examination of black crime addresses the main feature of colonialism as they apply to American 269

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society and economic exploitation of black people. Staples correlates the black rate of crime to the fact that The racist fabric of white America denies blacks a basic humanity which permits the violations of their right to equal justice under the law. In America, the right to justice is an inalienable right; for blacks, it is still a privilege to be granted at the whim and goodwill of whites who control the machinery of the legal system and the agents of social control.74 Social and Economic Theories Racial differences in crime rates are also expressed in social and economic theoretical proportions. James Wilson and Richard Herrnstein cite three prominent socioeconomic theories that seek to explain racial disparities in criminal involvement: 1. Blacks more than whites face a greater shortage in economic opportunities; hence they resort to crime in greater number. 2. Black family life does not promote sufficiently conventional norms and values. 3. The higher rate of black crime is a product of many blacks' acquiring through experience hostilities toward the outer world and its value system.75 Another major socioeconomic theory of racial differentials in crime is Marvin Wolfgang and Franco Ferracutti's subculture of violence theory. The authors 270

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advance that the black experience is largely responsible for this violent subculture in inner-city black ghettos where violence is seen as an answer for daily encounter. They further propose: There is reason to agree that whatever may be learned responses and special conditions contributing to criminality, persons visibly identified and socially labeled as (blacks) appear to possess them in considerably higher proportions than do persons labeled white. Our subculture of violence thesis would, therefore, expect to find (extensive) learning of, resort to, and criminal display of the violence value among minority groups such as blacks.76 Other studies have supported the existence of a subculture of violence.77 Racial patterns in the crime rate have also been tied to trends in black political participation and educational attainment. Roy Austin found that the black power movement's emphasis on the self-concept of the black community, coupled with economic and social gains, was associated with relative decreases in the ratio between white and black violence rates in the 1970s.78 Austin concludes that it may take a social movement as sweeping and powerful as black power to alter crime producing subcultural values and promote crime-reducing social change, such as economic and political power. 271

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Summary The data sources show that there are stable patterns in the crime rate. There are ecological patterns that show that some areas of the country are more crime-prone than others, that there are seasons and times for crime, and that the ecological patterns are quite stable. Official statistics on crime indicate that most of those arrested are young (fifteen to nineteen years of age). This is particularly the case with serious property crimes. The crime data show that people commit less crime as they age, but the significance and cause of this pattern is still not completely understood. Age profiles would be altered upward were we to have accurate estimates for corporate and "upperworld" violators. Officials statistics show an inverse relationship between social class and criminality (as measured by arrests); that is, as social class increases, criminality decreases. The relationship remains a subject of debate. Most recent self-report surveys indicate that patterns of lower class admissions match those of official statistics. such findings still do not belie the 272

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possibility of higher upper class criminality, since most typical offenses are not tapped by such sources. UCR arrest statistics indicate a black crime rate, particularly for violent crimes, that is in great excess of their proportion of the u.s. population. Despite countervailing biases in these statistics, it would appear that they are accurate descriptions of excess commission of these offenses. Most crime is intraracial in nature; that is, most whites victimize whites and most blacks victimize blacks. While self-report surveys show mixed results, most recent studies confirm high rates among blacks for serious offenses. However, it is still unclear whether these are true differences in rates of criminality or a function of discriminatory law enforcement. 273

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Notes 1. Raymond Gastil, "Homicide and the Regional Culture of Violence", American Sociological Review 36 ( 1971) : 412. 2. u.s. Department of Justice, FBI Uniform Crime Reports, 1991 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1989), 47. 3. Marvin Wolfgang, "Delinquency in Two Birth Cohorts," in Van Dusen and Mednick, Perspective studies, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 7. 4. Reported Behavior as a Criterion of Deviant Behavior," Social Problems 5 (1959): 207-13. 5. James Short and F. Ivan Nye; "Extent of Undetected Delinquency, Tentative Conclusions," Journal of Criminal Law and Police Science 49 (1958): 296. 6. Ivan Nye, James Short, and Virgil Olsen, "Socio economic status and Delinquent Behavior," American Journal of Sociology 63 (1958): 381. 7. Charles Tittle, Wayne Villemez, and Douglas Smith, "The Myth of Social Class and Criminality: An Empirical Assessment of the Empirical Evidence," American Sociological Review 43 (1978): 643. a. Charles Tittle and Robert Meier, 11Specifying the SES/Delinquency Relationship," criminology 28 (1990): 271. 9. Delbert Elliot and suzanne Ageton, 11Reconciling Race and Class Differences in Self-Reported and Official Estimates of Delinquency," American Sociological Review 45 (1980): 95. 10. Delbert Elliot and David Huizinga, "Social Class and Delinquent Behavior in a National Youth Panel: 1976198011 Criminology 21 (1985) 147. 274

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11. J. Braithwaite, "The Myth of Social Class and Criminality Reconsidered," American Sociological Review 46 (1981): 36. 12. G. Kleck. "On the use of self-report data to determine the class distribution of Criminal and delinquent behavior." American Sociological Review 47 (1982): 427. 13. T. Thornberry and M. Farnsworth. "Social correlates of Criminal involvement: Further evidence on the relationship between social status and criminal behavior." American Sociological Review 47 (1982): 505. 14. David Brownfield, "Social class and violent behavior," Criminology 24 (1986): 422. 15. Douglas Smith and Laura Davidson, "Interfacing Indicators and Constructs in Criminological Researqh: A note on the Comparability of self-report violence data for Race and Sex groups," Criminology 24 (1986): 475. 16. Judith Blau and Peter Blau, "The Cost of Inequality: Metropolitan structure and Violent crime," American Sociological Review 147 (1982): 115. 17. Travis Hirschi and Michael Gottfredson, "Age and explanation of Crime," American Journal of Sociology 89 (1983): 552. 18. Chester Britt, "Constancy and Change in the u.s. Age Distribution of Crime, 1952-1987.11 Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology, Baltimore, Maryland, November 1990. 19. u.s. Bureau of the Census, statistical Abstracts of the United States. 1992, 112 ed., (Washington, D.C., 1993), 15. 20. Ibid. I 440. 275

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21. Statistical Abstracts, 1992, 15. Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, 1991, 441. 22. Ibid. 23. Kyle Kercher, Causes and Correlates of Crime Committed by the Elderly," 1st ed. E. Bergatta and R. Montgomery, Critical Issues in Aging Policy (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1987), 254. 24. John Laub, David Clark, Leslie Siegel and James Garofolo, Trends in Juvenile Crime in the United States: 1973-1983 (Albany, N.Y: Hindelang Research Center, 1987), 93. 25. Hirschi and Gottfredson, "Age and the Explanation of Crime", 555. 26. Michael Gottfredson and Travis Hirschi, "The True Value of Age would Appear to be Zero: An Essay on Career Criminals, Selective Incapacitation, Cohert studies and Related Topics," Criminology 24 (1986): 213. 27. Walter Grove, The Effect or Age and Gender on Deviant Behavior: A Biopsychosocial Perspective," in Gender and the Life Course, ed. A. Ross: (Chicago: Aldine, 1985), 131. 28. Kyle Kerchner, "Explaining the Relationship Between Age and Crime: The Biological vs. Sociological Model," Paper presented at the American Society of Criminology Meeting, Montreal, Canada, November 1987. 29. Alfred Blumstein, Jacqueline Cohen, and David Farrington, "Criminal Career Researh: Its value for Criminology," Criminology 26 (1988): 32. 30. Arnold Barnett, Alfred Blumstein, and David Farrington, "Probabilistic Models of Youthful Criminal Careers," Criminology 25 (1987): 89. 276

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31. Darrell Steffensmeier, "Age and the Distribution of Crime", American Journal of Sociology 94 (1989), 805. 32. David Greenberg, "Age, .crime, and Social Explanation", American Journal of Sociology 91 (1985): 20. 33. Lyle Shannon, Assessing the Relationship of Adult Criminal careers to Juvenile Careers: A summarv (Washington, D.C.: u.s. Department of Justice, 1982); Donna Hamparian, Richard Shuster, Simon and John Conrad, The Violent Few (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1978). 34. Peter Greenwood, "Differences in Criminal Behavior and Court Responses among Juvenile and Young Adult Defendc:mts' II in Crime and Justice r and Annual Review of Research, ed. Michael Tonry and Norval Morris (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 151. 35. John Hagan and Alberto Palloni, "Crimes as Social Events in the Life Course: Reconceiving a Criminological Controversy," Criminology, 26 (1988}: 87. 36. Travis Hirschi and Michael Gottfredson, "Age and Crime, Logic and Scholarship: Comment on Greenberg," American Journal of Sociology 91 (1985}: 22; John Baldwin, "Thrill and Adventure Seeking and the Age of Distribution of Crime: Comment on Hirschi and Gottfredson,11 American Journal of Sociology 90 (1985): 1326. 37. Per-Olof Wikstrom, "Age and Crime in a Stockholm Cohort," Journal of Quantitative Criminology 6 (1990}: 63. 38. Edward Mulvey and John LaRosa, "Delinquency Cessation and Adolescent Development:Preliminary Data," American Jouranl of Orthopsychiatry 56 (1986): 212. 277

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39. Gordon Trasler, "Cautions for a Biological Approach to Crime," in Sarnoff Mednick, Terrie Moffitt, and Susan Stack, The Causes of Crime, New Biological Approaches (Cambridge University Press, 1987), 7. 40. James Q. Wilson and Richard Herrnstein, Crime and Human Nature (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985), 126. 41. Barry Glassner, Margaret Ksander, Bruce Berg, and Bruce Johnson, "A note on the Deterrent Effect of Juvenile vs. Adult Jurisdiction," Social Problems 31 (1983): 219. 42. Ibid., 219. 43. Charles Tittle, "Two Empirical Regularities in Search of an Explanation: Commentary on the Age/Crime Debate," Criminology 26 (1988): 75. 44. Statistical Abstracts, 1992, 17; Sourcebook of Criminal Justice statistics, 1991, 444. 45. Ibid. 46. Alfred Blumstein and Elizabeth Graddy, "Prevalence and Recidivism in Index Arrest: A Feedback Model," Law and Society Review 16 (1981-1982): 270. 47. Gwynn Nettler, Explaining Crime 3d ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1984), 137. 48. Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, 1991, 620. 49. Ibid., 648. 50. Ibid., 656. 51. u.s. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, -The Prevalence of Imprisonment (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1985), 3,5. 278

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52. Jim Murphy, A Question of Race (Albany, NY: Center for Justice Education, 1988), 105. 53. Mark Mauer, Young Black Men in the Criminal Justice System: A Growing National Problem (Washington D.C.: The Sentencing Project, February 1990), 34. 54. Sam Meddis, "Drug Arrest Rate is Higher for Blacks," USA Today, December 20, 1989, 34. 55. E.J. Mitchell, II, "Cops burst in, you feel violated," Detroit News, April 26, 1990, 26. 56. Ron Harris, Los Angeles Times, April 22, 1990, 1. 57. Statistical Abstracts, 1992, 15, 18. 58. Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, 1992, 604. 59. John Laub, David Clark, Leslie Siegel and James Garofolo, Trends in Juvenile Crime in the United States: 1973-1983 (Albany, N.Y.: Hindelang Research Center, 1987. 60. M.A. Schulman, Survey of Spousal Violence against Women in Kentucky. Harris Study #792701, 1979, 29. 61. Leroy Gould, "Who Defines Delinquency: A Comparison of Self-report and Officially Reported Indices of Delinquency for Three Racial Groups," Social Problems 16 (1969): 325; Voss, "Ethinic Differentials in Delinquency in Honolulu"; Ronald Akers, Marvin Krohn, Marcia Radosenich, and Lonn Lanza-Kaduce, Social Characteristics and Self Reported Delinqyency, Sociology of Delinquency ed. Gary Jensen (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1981), 48. 62. Institute for Social Research, Monitoring the Future (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1990), 102. 63. David Hurzinga and Delbert Elliot, "Juvenile Offenders: Prevalence, Offender Incidence, and 279

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Arrest Rates by Race," Crime and Delinquency 33 (1987): 206. 64. Paul Tracy, Race and Class Differences in Official and Self-Reported Delinquency, From Boy to Man. from Delinquency to Crime,ed. Marvin Wolfgang, Terence Thornberry, and Robert Figlio (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 120. 65. Daniel Georges-Abeyie, "Definitional Issues: Race, Ethnicity and Official crime/Victimizational Rates," in The Criminal Justice System and Blacks, ed. D. Georges-Abeyie (New York: Clark and Boardman, 1984), 12. 66. Barry Sample and Michael Philip, "Perspectives on Race and Crime in Research and Planning," in the Criminal Justice System and Blacks, ed. D. GeorgesAbeyie (New York: Clark Boardman, 1984), 21. 67. James Comer, "Black Violence and Public Policy," in American Violence and Public Policy ed. Lynn curtis (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, ), 63. 68. Ibid., 80. 69. Ibid., 81. 70. Marvin Wolfgang and Franco Ferracuti, The Subculture of Violence (London: Tavistock, 1967), 340. 71. Charles Silberman, Criminal Violence, Criminal Justice (New York: Random House, 1979), 119. 72. Ibid., 153. 73. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1963), 79. 74. Robert Staples,"White Racism, Black crime, and American Justice: An Application of the Colonial Model to Explain Crime and Race" (Paper presented at the International Association of Criminology Conference, Caracas, Venezuela, November 1972). 280

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75. James Q. Wilson and Richard J. Herrnstein, Crime and Human Nature (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985), 175. 76. Marvin E. Wolfgang and Franco Ferracutti, The Subculture of Violence: Toward an Integrated Theory in Criminology (London: Tavistock, 1967), 264. 77. See Neil Alan Weiner and Marvin E. Wolfgang, "The Extent and Character of Violent crime in America," In Lynn Curtis, ed., American Violence and Public Policy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Pres), 17. 78. Roy Austin, "Progress toward Racial Equality and Reduction of Black Criminal Violence," Journal of Criminal Justice 15 (1987): 437. 281

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CHAPTER 8 Conclusion Even with a protracted record of unsuccessful alterations, few authorities have been willing to acknowledge that the criminal-justice system is doing about as well as it can. Instead, there is a will to make it succeed. Theory after theory is tried, and dollar after dollar is spent--but always with little evidence of increased crime control. Fault is laid on unfulfilled expectations. Noting that crime is infectious, this politician or that columnist will lash out at the system,claiming that it has been unfaithful to its objectives, that not enough effort has been devoted to offender reform, or that sanctions have not been severe enough to restrain the depraved among us. Historically, criminal-justice policy has varied substantially. It has been severe as well as tolerant. It has been legalistic and charitable. Policing methods have become more sophisticated, the courts are more efficient, and many ideas for altering, threatening, and reforming criminals have been attempted. But above all

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reforming criminals have been attempted. But above all else, the crime control establishment has grown. New agencies have been created and additional personnel have been hired. Research into the causes and cures of crime are continually under way. But none of these efforts has made a noticeable difference. Crime continues to be a serious problem in the minds of most Americans. Is it not time to stop expecting that something more can be done? Clearly, none of the "wars on crime" that emerge regularly as policy priorities in American politics will be won. No new commission, plan or project, no change in the justice system is going to produce the results desired. This inference is not satisfactory, in fact, some will consider it un-American. Because the United States is an achievement-oriented society, criminal-justice professionals are motivated to control crime in order to win the war on crime. It is distressing to realize that you are doing as well as you can, especially when that is not very good. So the crime control establishment continually seeks new ways to succeed. These efforts are bolstered by,a fearful citizenry, who want someone to 283

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solve the problem for them, and by politicians, who play on public sentiment to acquire votes. The failure of the system becomes self-promoting. Each failure becomes a reason for trying something novel and for further expansion of the system. But each new innovation produces little change in the incidence of crime because the burden of social control cannot be carried by the criminal-justice system single-handedly. Order cannot be accomplished by coercion alone; it must be obtained through voluntary and automatic compliance.1 Improvements in criminal justice cannot provide voluntary compliance and consequently will always fail. Explaining Crime in Modern Society If people begin to comprehend and internalize the proposition that government cannot resolve the crime problem, the potential for lessening criminality may improve. As long as people believe that the institutions of government can handle the problem for them, they will be tempted tp abdicate their own responsibility for it. With crime, it is easy to say that it does not involve 284

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me, that it's not my problem, that it only threatens me, and then to demand that local agencies do something about it. In this way, the accountability for both the causes and the cures of crime is shifted to others. As individuals, we avoid the responsibility of selfconstraint as well as that of social constraint. This position is more comfortable than recognizing one's own contributions to the social ills of society, but it is not practical. The perceptions I have examined in this research allow people to assume such a position. Acceptance-of the official interpretation of crime statistics indicating a new wave of criminal activity (crime perception 1) allows the public to focus on a common adversary: a group of predators toward whom resentment and hate can be aimed. In doing so, one's own transgressions, those forms of exploitation not defined criminal or considered culpable, may be excused, and criminals become the scapegoats for everything that is wrong. In this way, society maintains a clear distinction between right and wrong. Criminals are other folks-not ourselves or anyone we know. They are worthy 285

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of moral condemnation, and it is society's duty to avenge the pain they have caused. If crime is viewed as increasing, it follows that the quality of life in the community must be deteriorating (crime perception 2). Fear forces people to isolate themselves in their homes and to avoid social contact with other people, especially strangers. Retreat from strangers to avoid victimization represents a breakdown in citizens informal surveillance and correction of potential offenders. When people desert the streets and become aloof and indifferent to the plights of others as they try to seal themselves off from crime, they actually may make the streets safer for criminals who are relatively free to attack the people who venture out. In response, the public clings to a simple explanation of the causes of crime and its control. Human behavior and criminality, in particular, are considered to be motivated by utilitarian drives. For society to respond, the threat of punishment must be sufficient to diminish the utility of criminality, to do 286

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this, criminal sanctions must be made more certain and more severe. The public consistently places its faith in the criminal-justice system, apparently never questioning its potential for success. Even when crime is perceived to be worsening, people turn to the system without appraising any other alternative. As long as the crime control establishment reinforces beliefs about criminals by arresting and vigorously prosecuting only individuals whose characteristics are consistent with those commonly perceived by the public-willful wrongdoers who threaten public safety-people are happy someone else is taking responsibility for the problem. To understand crime in the United States, changes in the community that occurred during the 1970s must be considered. Think about how your neighborhood has changed over the twenty, thirty, or even forty years. It is not longer a significant point of reference for many of life's activities. Because of modern transportation, socializing often occurs outside the neighborhood. The same is true for employment and leisure activities. The growth of municipal, state, and national governments and 287

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the expansion of the services they provide has lessened the importance of community politics and voluntary service. Neighborhood schools have been replaced by larger, consolidated institutions. The activities of the neighborhood police precinct are now less important than decisions made by the city police commissioner. As significant as any change has been the expansion of geographic boundaries through technological advances in communications. Because of the relatively low costs of long-distance telephoning and faxing, business and social relations can be carried on with people all over the nation, and there is a tendency to keep up with what is going on in other areas, whether it is war, sporting events, or violent crime. These changes have increased the number of people with whom individuals interact and have expanded the events of which they are aware. Before rapid communications, television, and syndicated news services, ties to the outside world were more limited and information of important events took a few days to penetrate the local news. Today we hear of them instantaneously. The effect is the expansion of our world beyond the neighborhood. 288

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Increased social and geographic mobility has removed many people from the old neighborhood and new families have taken their place. Chiidren who once remained in the area no longer do so. Of particular importance is the recent breakdown of ethnic and racial barriers in housing. Fewer urban neighborhoods, whose residents are predominantly of a single ethnic or racial group, currently exist. Perpetual increases in housing costs and growing discontent with commuting and suburbia has brought whites into "coming back" neighborhoods in many cities. These changes have transformed the environment of residential neighborhoods, rendering them different the neighborhoods of the past. Other important social changes have also altered the community. As increasing number of women joined the work force, fewer people were in the neighborhoods during the day. And the women, who in the past maintained the social ties within the community, giving it solidarity and influence, are no longer there. Social relations are now more often generated by business associations. People who w.ork at IBM associate with 11IBMers". Divorce has also impacted neighborhoods. When families break up, 289

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their patterns of association and the people with whom they socialize frequently change. Responsibility for child-rearing becomes a shared effort by people living in different neighborhoods. These changes have caused the neighborhood to become less significant as a social unit. To a much greater degree today than in the past, people live in a society of strangers. Neighbors are less likely to know one another, and the frequency and intimacy of their social interaction is diminished. This is a matter of degree, not one of total elimination, but on an aggregate level, important social changes have occurred in American communities. People within the neighborhood are now less socially important to one another. Membership in a particular community, other than the status inferred and its relationship to property values, is less important to people today. These changes have contributed to further atomization of American people. Rather than moving toward more tribelike organizations within particular areas, social networks became more diffuse. One should not infer that these changes indicated deterioration of the social fabric of this nation. They 290

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do not necessarily denote any reduction in social integration that is leading to further interpersonal exploitation and American communities have never been well-integrated tribelike social units with universally ascribed-to norms. In the past, some neighborhoods were more socially meaningful and more tribelike than today. They may have been more ethnically homogeneous, and social relations within them may have been more important. But across neighborhoods considerable normative diversity has always existed. There remain the people who are socially important to each of us: family, friends, and fellow workers. Informal norms and sanctions that influence the choice of behavior endure. We refrain from particular acts for fear we will embarrass ourselves. Young people still undergo strong and important socialization processes as they grow and mature socially. That informal controls have become geographically more diffuse suggests that these controls may have weakened. This could explain some of the increase in crime during the 1960s. Sociologist John Conklin argues that "if neighbors do not know each other and if no web of social relationship 291

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exists, people will not be able to guard each other from harm." In this situation, residents will be unable to differentiate the intruder from fellow inhabitants, and adequate surveillance of the community will be diminished. Furthermore, as people become more fearful, they limit social contact. Because few people are on the streets, informal social controls are weakened, and public places become the domain of criminals. Conklin suggest that in this way fear of crime becomes a selffulfilling prophecy.2 Since victimization rates stabilized in the late 1980s, however, these changes are more significant for their effect on the way people perceive crime. With any unknown, fear and misunderstanding are greater. In a society of strangers, you're never sure if the individual you encounter on the street is a friendly neighbor or a mugger. someone who offers to assist you with a load of packages may be a helpful stranger or a bold thief. As you run through the park, you worry that a fellow runner might be an assailant. Whether or not crime is actually increasing, the effect is that fear grows and the quality of life is reduced. 292

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Signs of incivility exacerbate this tendency. Urban decline, demonstrated by boarded-up buildings, graffiti, rubbish, and derelicts leave people uneasy. Rambunctious, assertive, self-assured juveniles, instead of the respectful young people we thought we were or knew in the past, worry us. Rude and combative people contribute to our distrust and fear of what someone might do to us. Both the people around us and the physical environment are not as familiar as in the past. They seem to be more severe, more indigent, and more turbulent than ever. We feel less in command of our surroundings and our futures. Because the people around us--neighbors and the individuals in our expanded environments--are strangers, patterns of social interaction have become more formalized. Informal processes are only effective within groups of known and meaningful people. Outside these groups, one must depend on formal processes and pressures to resolve conflicts and guarantee some level of harmony. As neighborhoods lost their familiarity, incidents that in the past would have been handled informally-interpersonal conflicts, vandalism, petty theft, are now 293

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resolved officially and are defined as crimes. When people are unfamiliar with individuals involved and are fearful, they tend to be less tolerant of offenders. So as neighborhoods changed, the method of problem resolution changed from informal to formal, and the interpretation of what is criminal changed. The current crime problem in the United States is therefore as much a product of erroneous interpretation as anything. Contemporary lifestyles are changing. One must examine the context of those changes in order to understand crime and to consider the potential for doing something about it. How to Live with crime The inability of official control agencies to reduce the amount of crime and violence does not necessarily signify that nothing can be done. As people understand the restraints of the criminal-justice system, they may accept greater responsibility for social control. A reduction in criminal activity could be produced by the of social atomization in the United States. Erecting sturdier networks capable of effective 294

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informal control would help bring about this change. After an extensive study, Charles Silberman makes a similar advancement, claiming that reduced crime is possible through development of self-control processes in impoverished neighborhoods rather than through improving the coercive threat of criminal justice. Silberman argues that poor communities need large amounts of outside assistance to prevail over the inertia of years of economic malaise, but the assistance given in the past in the form of federal welfare programs has only reinforced dependence and a sense of individual impotence and helplessness. As a result, poor people are less capable of controlling their own lives. In contrast to unsuccessful conventional and official proposals, Silberman describes various self-help programs implemented in poor neighborhoods that built on the idea of community. Leadership developed from within, and self-direction and autonomy followed. With these programs, greater community control evolved and crime was frequently reduced.3 Reorienting antipoverty programs to develop selfreliance rather than dependence may be a step in the 295

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right direction, but it alone will not resolve the crime problem in the United States. Crime is not limited to the poor; it is but one manifestation of the exploitive behavior common in our achievement-oriented but weakly constrained society. Street crime is the form of exploitation available to the poor, but crime is tied to other forms of exploitation, and it alone cannot be eliminated. There are also issues of how to induce the formation of meaningful groups and then get them to accept a common set of norms. It would cause conventional institutions of government to undertake such a program of socialization and indoctrination. The inability of the former Soviet government to instill the "good" Soviet identity in its workers speaks to the futility of such practices. If informal controls were sufficient to maintain conformity in the first place, the formal controls would not exist. Since they do, it is unlikely that they will render themselves useless. Another activity with the potential for stimulating community solidarity for control are the neighborhood block watches organized to prevent crime. People unite 296

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to patrol their community, watching for suspicious behavior while maintaining surveillance of property and possessions. But because these programs are designed to catch intruders and deter outsiders, rather than control the behavior of community residents, they are limited in what they can achieve. They may eliminate some property crimes like burglary, but they do not address the fundamental issue of informal controls, which will ultimately reduce the likelihood of offenses being committed. on the other hand, it seems clear that in some cases neighborhood-watch programs can bring otherwise automized community residents together and like police foot patrols, help reduce the fear of crime. In the long run the benefits to crime control may be greater because of improved social integration in the community than because of surveillance and prevention. Other social trends could also contribute to the reduction of social atomization. Some parents are realizing that frequent job relocation has negative consequences for children and are now considering that in making employment decision. The result may be a strengthening of ties in certain communities. Current 297

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national economic problems could also affect social interaction and integration. With employment opportunities rare and fewer chances for mobility, people may have little choice but to remain where they reside. Economic adversity may also heighten interdependence so that people must interact more and so that neighbors end up being more important and meaningful to one another. To the extent that adversity pulls people together for their own survival, informal controls will be strengthened.4 Revitalized interest and participation in organized religion may enhance the attention given to individual honor, integrity, self-restraint, and greater concern for others. As people also come to consider how their actions affect others, exploitation might decline. But these possibilities are speculative at best, and at this time it would be unwise to pin great hopes for crime control on them. If people can come to the realization that crime cannot be abolished, or even reduced, they may be willing to explore how they might live with the problem. I previously noted that one way to do this would be to reduce the physical symbols of incivility within 298

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communities. Reducing deteriorated conditions, dilapidated and abandoned buildings, graffiti, rubbish, and other signs of disorder may lessen the impression that control is getting out of hand and increase perceptions of personal safety. Since the harm caused by fear alone appears to be ample, community improvement, while not affecting the incidence of crime at all, might contribute significantly to reducing the effects of crime. Incivility is also conveyed by the open practice of vice--for example, crimes of sexual conduct (prostitution, obscenity, pornography, adultery, fornication, sodomy, and other 11unnatural.acts11 such as oral-genital contact), illegal gambling, and illegal substance possession (for example, possession of heroin or marijuana) which leaves the impression of disorder and a sense of insecurity. Increasing recognition that these activities are victimless crimes (because they are without unwilling victims) that may corrupt the moral fabric of our society but are not serious threats to public safety has led to a reduction in enforcement activities. Most police departments believe that their 299

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resources are better spent on protection from criminal behavior. Not everyone, however supports this ordering of police priorities. George L. Kelling and James Q. Wilson argue that the police should devote more to the little nuisance problems that define the quality of life on the neighborhood level. Police should be more aggressive in keeping prostitutes off the street (or at least out of the neighborhood), for example, as a way of maintaining a sense of public safety among law-abiding residents. The police neglect of the small "quality of life" issues, according to Kelling and Wilson, contributes to neighborhood deterioration.5 The way individuals interact is also important in their perceptions about personal safety. As people erect emotional barriers around themselves, not even looking at strangers they pass on the street, the message they convey is one of unfriendliness and callousness, which fosters the perception that the community is becoming cold and less caring. These attitudes are heightened when people are rude and impatient. In the end. perceptions of security are diminished, as compared with 300

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times when people lived in neighborhoods composed of people they knew. Government can do little about this. People cannot be impelled or cajoled to interact differently. Only their recognition of the pathology of such behavior patterns will change this aspect of contemporary urban life and reduce its effects. Citizens must realize that barricading themselves, both physically and emotionally, from their environments only heightens their fears. Minimizing the effects of victimization-the mental stress, the physical hardship and the financial damagesmay be another way to cope with crime. Historian David Rothman notes that other catastrophes such as floods, tornadoes, hurricanes and industrial accidents, for example--are generally accepted as unavoidable and inevitable. Instead of investing all our resources and efforts in determining whose fault such thins are, attention is directed more toward preventing their occurrence and coping with their effects. Various methods of aiding victims and survivors have been devised. Insurance money rebuilds boarded-up buildings, and worker's compensation aids people out of work due to 301

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an injury. Yet little attention, either in the form of economic compensation or emotional support, is provided for victims of crime.6 One,research project attempted to assess the feasibility of restitution by offenders to victims of property offenses: Larceny, burglary, vehicle theft, purse snatching and pocket picking, and unarmed robbery.7 Analysis of national victimization survey data indicates that victims of theft rarely are compensated through return of their stolen property or through insurance coverage. Victims of crimes are seldom counseled to help them recover from their ordeal. After years of being ignored by the criminal justice system, increased sensitivity to rape has only recently spurred the opening of crisis centers throughout the country. Americans would rather pursue crooks; they want to find the violators, to affix blame, to get even. They wish to right the wrong. But if our criminal system fails to catch, prosecute, and sufficiently punish most dangerous criminals and the victims predicament is generally ignored, we must ask whether many wrongs are being righted. Maybe some of the funds spent on law 302

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enforcement should be diverted to helping victims cope with their losses. These suggestions will not abolish crime or even substantially reduce it. Crime and other forms of exploitation have been around for a long time, and lawlessness have been recurrent themes throughout American history, and it is unlikely that they will soon disappear. But it should be noted that coercion is of limited usefulness in controlling crime. People must begin to evaluate other alternatives, to reexamine their own activities and what they can realistically expect their government to do for them. The answer to crime lies in improving informal controls, but that cannot be legislated and it entails gradual cultural changes. It is not even clear that Americans would choose a wellcontrolled society. That would require yielding some of their individuality, autonomy, mobility, and the division of public and private functions. But these proposals could reduce some of the effects, some of the suffering associated with crime, and if nothing else, they furnish an alternative to spending more money on retooling punitive sanctions. 303

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The Wretched and Vicious But we cannot disregard the pestering and emotional problem of what to do with perverted and coldhearted hoodlums who disfigure or slaughter innocent people. Most people have personally experienced violence or know a friend who has been victimized; most everyone has heard about someone being robbed, beaten, or killed; riots and mass disturbances have ravaged urban areas; racial attacks plague schools and college campuses; assassination has claimed the lives of political, religious, and social leaders all over the world.8 In each instance, human lives have been taken by an individual who seemingly had no feeling or concern for the sanctity and worthiness of life. These deeds are unexplainable. They are not just. The offender should suffer and compensate with their own pain for the torment they have caused. How, then, do we achieve retribution and protect ourselves from such people? In spite of its lack of appeal, the answer is to continue doing just what we are doing. This nation cannot afford to base its entire criminal-justice process on reaction to such vicious 304

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incidents.. They are the exception, rather than the rule. Most crime involves property loss, not physical injury, and when violence occurs it more often than not ensues from conflict between people who are related (husband, wife, brother, son, or the like) or acquainted (friend, boyfriend, girlfriend, neighbor, and so on). Statistics show that violent crimes committed by strangers are common, but media reporting and societal changes have given us a much different impression. The threat of violence is a distressing phenomenon of life in contemporary America, but not one that is as threatening as often believed. In considering what to do with violent criminals, we should realize that the criminal-justice system has been relatively successful in apprehending these offenders. Nationally only 20 percent of all crimes reported to the police are cleared by arrest, but the clearance rate for violent crimes is much higher. Violent crimes are more likely to be solved than property crimes, probably because police devote more resources to these more serious acts, because witnesses (including the victim) are available to identify offenders, and because, in many 305

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instances the victim and offender were previously acquainted. An arrest is made in 67 percent of the reported murders, 57 percent of the aggravated assaults, and 53 percent of the forcible rapes. The only violent crime with a low clearance rate is robbery, in which only 25 percent of the reported crimes result in arrest (and with robbery the violence is often only threatened, not actually executed). Property crimes are the difficult incidents to solve, with only about 18 percent of the reported burglaries, larcenies, and motor vehicle thefts concluding in an arrest.9 These figures indicate that we truly fear and from whom we want retribution--the violent offenders--are usually caught. The notion that criminals are literally getting away with murder is also not accurate. In 3 out of every 4 murders, someone is arrested, and most are successfully processed through the justice system and eventually removed from society.10 A prosecution rate of nearly 75 percent is not exactly a sign of softness on crime. Nearly (48 percent) of these adults plead guilty to a misdemeanor. We could legitimately debate whether these people are getting off too easy. But the main point is 306

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that these cases are not lost. The period of incarceration for violent crimes is generally quite longtwenty years, forty years, and even longer. What criminals are getting away with is property crime, because these crimes typically involve offenders who are not known (and, in the case of burglary and most thefts, not seen) by the victim and the volume is overwhelming. Consequently, there is little hope for ever improving the system's ability to control these offenses. The occasional anomaly, where a very violent criminal is not in fact sanctioned, is paroled prematurely, or through a procedural loophole escapes punishment altogether, is rare. Think about how frequently you read about such cases. It isn't very often: a few such cases yearly. But when some blunder occurs anywhere in the United States it will be reported in every newspaper. Since there are more than 14 million arrests for serious crimes and over soo,ooo prisoners are paroled each year, that so few procedural slip ups and incorrect parole decisions occur speaks well for the system. Given that our criminal justice system catches, prosecutes, convicts and sufficiently punishes most 307

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dangerous criminals, we must ask whether it is worth altering the system to eliminate these few problems. The exclusionary rule is one of the few protections citizens have against police intervention. Parole keeps correctional costs down and assists in controlling incarcerated inmates. The United States already has the longest sentences of any modern nation. If nothing else, Americans need to curtail their preoccupation with crime. Realistically, it is but one of the numerous evils in our society. People are also injured by hurricanes, floods, fires, earthquakes, accidents, and automobiles. Yet these incidents do not receive the attention crime gets from the media, in political campaigns, or even from the entertainment industry. The grip crime has on people is unhealthy. It has become a basis for defining everything from noises in the night to the missing house keys. Americans must come to terms with their fears. To regain a sense of security, Americans should not look to the criminal-justice system. Plans to be more energetic, more punitive, and even more innovative will only be more expensive. Americans should resist the 308

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temptation to fall for the politician, law enforcement official, and the prosecutor who claim they can do something about crime. They cannot. The system is doing as well as it can. The answer to crime lies not in coercion but in self-restraint and informal controls. Some day the standards may be adequate and laws will be unnecessary. Until then, Americans should ask how they might cope with those unfortunate events that will continue to occur. 309

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Notes 1. Charles Silberman, Criminal Violence. Criminal Justice (New York: Vintage Books, 1980), 581. 2. John Conklin, The Impact of Crime (New York: MacMillan, 1975), 145. 3. Ibid. I 580. 4. Kevin Wright, Crime and Criminal Justice in a Declining Economy (Cambridge, Mass.: Oeleschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1981), 51. 5. George L. Kelling and James Q. Wilson, "Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety," Atlantic Monthly 249 (March 1982), reprinted in James Q. Wilson, Thinking About Crime, rev. ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1983), Chap. 5. 6. A.T. Harland, Restitution to Victims of Personal and Household Crimes (Washington, D.C.: u.s. Department of Justice, 1981), p.240. 7. David Rothman, "Prisons: The Failure Model", The Nation, December 21, 1974, 658. 8. Hans Toch, Violent Man (Chicago: Aldine, 1969), 1. 9. u.s. Department of Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics. 1991 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992), 462. 10. Ibid., 548. 310

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APPENDIX NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY Personal Sector Offenses 1. Rape is defined as in the UCR. Data for attemped and completed rapes are collected. 2. Robbery is completed or attempted theft, directly from a person, of property or cash, by force or threat of force, with or without a weapon. Robbery is further into robbery with injury, in which case serious assaults are distinguished from minor assaults, and robbery without injury. Serious assaults involve weapsons of any kind or an injury requiring two or more days of hospitalization. Injuries are classified as minor assaults if the injury was minor or undetermined but required less than two days of hospitalization. 3. NCS Assault goes beyond the aggravated assault data collected by the UCR. An assault is an unlawful physical attempt, whether aggravated or simple upon a person. With the UCR, aggravated assault distinguishes between assaults whose victims had sustained injuries and those attempted assaults involving a weapon. If injuries

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those attempted assaults involving a weapon. If injuries are sustained by the vitim, they must be clearly serious (e.g., broken bones, loss of teeth, internal injuries or loss of consciousness) or if undertermined, an injury must require a hospital stay of two or more days. Simple assaults occur when respondents indicate that the attack did not involve a weapon, but the victim sustained minor injuries (bruises, black eyes, cuts, scratches, or swelling) or undetermined injuries requiring less than two days of hospitalization. 4. Personal Larceny with contact refers to the UCR crime of personal larceny in which the victim has actual physical contact with the perpetrator. Attempted and completed acts of purse snatching are included in this category, along with completed acts of pocket picking. 5. Personal Larceny without contact can be said to occur when someone attempts to deprive another of his or her property in an illegal fashion. There is no contact between victim and perpetrator. The property need not be strictly personal in nature; it is distinguisable from household larceny solely by the latter's occurrence within the home. 312

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It is important to note that criminal homicide is missing from the NCS category of person crimes. Also, personal larceny is not a UCR personal offense. Household Sector Offenses 1. Burglary, or the entering of a household with the intent to commit a felony therein, includes forced entry, unlawful entry without force, and attempted forcible entry. As long as the person entering had no legal right to be present in the structure, which includes housing unit, garage, shed, or any other structures on the premises, a burglary has occurred. There is nothing in this definition about intent to commit a felony within the premises. 2. Household larceny is a crime in which something of value is taken from the household, but there is no single individual involved as victim. The crime is broken down by the value of the larceny; less than $50, more than $50, and amount not available. Unlike the UCR definition, NCS's houselhold larceny includes a dollarvalue figure for the items taken in the larceny. 313

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3. Motor vehicle theft is a traditional UCR crime in which completed thefts are distinguished from attempted thefts. In the property crimes sector UCR-8 arson is not included in the NCS. Uniform Crime Reports UCR 1. Criminal Homicide: Murder and nonnegliegent manslaughter. Criminal homicide is a summary category, not a single codified offense. It embraces all instances in which the perpetrator causes the death of another person without legal justification of excuse. It includes: UCR la Murder and nonnegliegent manslaughter (the latter means there is some mitigation, e.g., a "crime of passion", it is not punishable by execution); UCR lb. Manslaughter by negligence, or what some codes call involuntary manslaughter. UCR 2. Forcible rape is sexual intercourse or attempted sexual intercourse with a female against her will, by force or by threat of force. It includes: UCR 2a. Rape by force; UCR 2b. Attempt to commit forcible rape. UCR 3. Robbery is the unlawful taking or attempted taking of property that is in the immediate possession of another, by force or the threat of force. Robbery includes; UCR 3a. Using a firearm; UCR 3b. Using a knife or cutting instrument; 314

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UCR 3c. Using any other weapon; UCR 3d. Strong-arm robbery ("mugging"). The crime of "purse-snatching" (also defined as "larceny with contact") is classified as a less serious crime, larceny-theft or UCR 6. UCR 4. Aggravated Assault is the unlawful international causing of serious bodily injury with or without a deadly weapon. (Many states define the commission of an unlawful injury upon the person of another as aggravated battery, while the threat to cause such grievous injury is an aggravated assault. Such differences in statutory definitions have historically caused problems in UCR reporting forms, although there is more reliability today. Both aggravated assault and aggravated battery are included in this UCR definition of aggravated assault.) Aggravated assault includes: UCR 4a. Using a firearm; UCR 4b. Using a knife or cutting instrument; UCR 4c. Using any other dangerous weapon; UCR 4d. Using hands, fists, feet, etc., to cause aggravated injury. UCR 5. Burglary is the unlawful entry of any fixed structure, vehicle, or vessel used for regular residence, industry, or business, with or without force, with the intent to commit a felony or larceny. An unlawful entry of this sort is also designated a burglary if it is accompanied by the commission or attempted commission of forcible rape, robbery, or aggravated assault (which includes attempted murder), or by the commission of criminal homicide. Any other unlawful entry without intent to commit a felony or larceny is classified as "all other offenses" (UCR 26). Burglary is further subdivided into: UCR 5a. Forcible entry; UCR 5b. Unlawful entry (no force); UCR 5c. Attempted forcible entry. 315

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UCR 6. Larceny theft is the unlawful taking, carrying, leading, or riding away by stealth of property, other than a motor vehicle, from the possession of constructive (that is the legal rather than physical) possession of another, including attempts. It includes: UCR 6a. Pocket picking; UCR 6b. Purse snatching; UCR 6c. Shoplifting; UCR 6d. Thefts from motor vehicles; UCR 6e. Theft of motor vehicle parts and accessories; UCR 6f. Theft of bicycles; UCR 6g. Theft from buildings; UCR 6h. Theft from coin-operated devices or machines; UCR 6i. All other larceny. UCR 7. Motor Vehicle theft is the unlawful taking, or attempted taking, of a self-propelled road vehicle owned by another, with the intent to deprive the owner of it permanently or temporarily. Motor vehicle thefts include: UCR 7a. Automobiles; UCR 7b. Trucks or buses; UCR 7c. Other vehicles. UCR a. Arson is any willful or malicious burning or attempted burning or property with or without intent to defraud. This UCR category includes offenses of burning one's own property, the property of others, and public property; for arson, the UCR instructions advise to score one offense for each distinct operation. UCR Ba-g. Arson-structural is burning or attempted burning of either a residence or a nonresidence. There are seven structures recognized, such as "single occupancy residential", "other residential", "storage", "industrial/manufacturing", "other commercial", "community/public", and "all other structures". UCR Bh-i. Arson-mobile is burning or attempted burning of either a motor vehicle (h) or other mobile property (i); UCR aj. Arson-other is burning or attempted burning of all other property not classified as structural or mobile. 316

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Part II offenses are as follows: UCR 9. Simple assault. UCR 10. Forgery and counterfeiting. UCR 11. Fraud. UCR 12. Embezzlement. UCR 13. stolen property: buying, receiving, possessing. UCR 14. Vandalism. UCR 15. Weapons: carrying, possessing, etc. UCR 16. Prostitution and commercialized vice. UCR 17. Sex offenses (except forcible rape and prostitution and commercialized vice.) UCR 18. Drug abuse violations. UCR 19. Gambling. UCR 20. Offenses against the family and children. UCR 21. Driving under the influence. UCR 22. Liquor Laws (offense). UCR 23. Drunkenness. UCR 24. Disorderly Conduct. UCR 25. Vagrancy. UCR 26. All other offenses (except traffic law violations). UCR 27. suspicion. UCR 28. Curfew and Loitering Laws (Juveniles). UCR 29. Runaway (Juveniles). 317

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Yonnondio, Tillie Olsen. From the Thirties. New York: Dell, 1974. 328

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Periodicals Aruher, D. and R. Gantner. "Violent Acts and Violent Times: A Comparative Approach to Post-War Homicide Rates", American Sociological Review 41 (1976) 937-963. Austin, Roy. "Progress Toward Racial Equality and Reduction of Black Criminal Violence." Journal of Criminal Justice 5 (1987): 437-39. Baldwin, John. "Thrill and Adventure Seeking and the Age Distribution of Crime": comment on Hirschi and Gottfredson. American Journal of Sociology 90 (1985): 1326-29. Barnett, Arnold, Alfred Blumstein, and David Farrington. "Probabilistic Models of Youthful criminal Careers". Criminology 25 (1987): 83-107. Bierstadt, Edward Hale. "Our Permanent crime Wave". Harpers Monthly 10 (March 1922) 38. Blau, Judity and Peter Blau. "This Cost of Inequality: Metropolitan Structure and Violent Crime." American Sociological Review 147 (1982):437-88. Blumstein, Alfred, Tacqueline Cohen, and David Farrington. "Criminal Career Research: Its Values for Criminology". Criminology 26 (1988): 83-107. Bohn, Robert M. "Crime, Criminal and Crime Control Policy Myths". Justice Quarterly 3 (1988): 193-214. Bradley, J.M. "Training Doesn't have to be Expensive to be Good". FBI Enforcement Bulletin 55 (1986): 11-14. 329

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Braithwaite, J. "The Myth of Social Class and Criminality Reconsidered". American Sociological Review 46 (1981): 36-57. Brown, S.E. and Ron E. Vogel. 11Police Professionalism". Journal of Crime and Justice 6 (1983): 17-37. Brownfield, David. 11Social Class and Violent Behavior. Criminology 24 (1986): 421-39. Clinard, Marshall B. 11Comparative Crime Victimization Surveys: Some Problems and Results, 11 International Journal of Criminology and Penology 6 (1978(: 18-24. Conklin, T.E. 11Dimensions of Community Response to the Crime Problem". Social Problems 18 (Winter 1971): 373-385. Cook, Beverly B. "Public Opinion and Federal Judicial Policy. American Journal of Political Science 21 (1979): 567-599. 11Crime Goes on and Gets Worse. u.s. News and World Report, 9 September 1963, 76. 11Crime is on the Rise.11 Senior Scholastic 4, April 1946, 20. 11Crime in U.s.--Is it Getting Out of Hand?11 U.S. News and World Report, 26 August 1963, 60. "The Crime Wave in America. New Republic, 6 April 1921, 150. Danziger, Edmund. "The Steck-Carleton Controversy in Civil War New Mexico." Southwest Historical Quarterly (Vol. LXXIV, No. 2):189-203. Das, Dilip K. "A Review of Progress toward State Mandated Police Human Relations Training.11 Police Journal 58 (1985): 147-62. Diamond, stanley. "The Rule of Law versus the Order of Custom." Social Research 38 (Spring 1971): 42-72. 330

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Dolan, Paul. "The Rise of Crime in the Period 1830-1860.11 Journal of Criminal Law (Vol. XXX): 859-61. Elliott, Delbert, and David Huizinga. "Social Class and Delinquent Behavior in a National Youth Panel: 19761980.11 Criminloqy 21 (1985): 149-172. Ferdinand, Theodore N. "The Criminal Patterns of Boston since 1849." American Journal of Sociology 73 (July 1966): 688-698. Fisher, Robert, and Bruce Heininger. "Issues in Higher Education for Law Enforcement Officers: An Illinois Study." Journal of Criminal Justice 13 (1985): 329-38. Fisherman, Michael. "Crime Waves as Ideology." Social Problems 25 (June 1987): 531-534. Frost, Thomas W. "Police Recruit Training in Urban Development: A Look at Instuctors.11 Journal of Police Science Administration 11 (1983): 296-302. Garofolo, James. "Crime and the Mass Media: A Selective Review of Research." Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 18 (July 1981): 319-350. Gastil, Raymond. "Homicide and the Regional Culture of Violence." American Sociological Review 36 (1971): 412-422. Glassner, Barry, Margaret Ksander, Bruce Berg, and Bruce Johnson. "A note on the Deterrent Effect of Juvenile vs. Adult Jurisdiction." Social Problems 31 (1983): 219-21. Gottfredson, Michael, and Travis Hirschi. "The True Value of Law would appear to be zero: An Essay on Career criminals and Selective Incapacitation." Criminology 24 (1986): 213-34. Gould, Leroy. "Who Defines Crime Delinquency: A Comparison of Self-Report and Officially reported 331

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Indices of Delinquency for Three Radical Groups." Social Problems 16 (1969): 325-36. Green, Edward. 11Race, Social Status, and Criminal Arrest." American Sociological Review 35 (1920): 476-90. Greenwood, David. "Age, Crime and Social Explanation." American Journal of Sociology 91 (1985): 1-21. Gross, Gerber G., L. Jackson-Beeck, M. Signorelli, and M. Morgan. "The Demonstration of Power: Violence Profile No. 10.11 Journal of Communications 10 (July 1971): 177-196. Grove, Walter R., Michael Hughes, and Michael Geerken, 11Are Uniform Crime Reports a Valid indicator of the Index Crimes? An Affirmative answer with minor qualifications." Criminology 23 (1985): 451-501. Hagan, John, and Alberto Palloni. "Crimes as Social Events in the Life Course: Reconceiving a Criminological Controversy." criminology 26 (1988): 87-101. Hewitt, John. "The Victim Offender Relationship in Convicted Homicide Cases: 1960-1984.11 Journal of Criminal Justice 16 (1988): 25-33. Hindelang, Michael J., Travis Hirschi, and Joseph G. Weis, "Correlates of Delinquency: The illusion of descrepancy between self-report and official measures." American Sociological Review 44 (1979): 995-1014. Hirschi, Travis and Michael Gottfredson. "Age and Explanation of Crime." American Journal of Sociology 89 (1983): 552-84. "Age and Crime, Logic and Scholarship: Comment on Greenberg." American Journal of Sociology 91 (1985): 22-27. Hoover, J. Edgar. "The crime wave we now Face." New York Times Magazine, 21 April 1941, 36. 332

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"The Battle on the Homefront.11 Vital Speeches, 10 September 1943, 730. Hunt, R.G., and K.S. McCadden. "A Survey of Work Attitudes of Police Officers. Commitment and Satisfaction 8, (1985): 17-25. Hurzinga, David, and Delbert Elliot. "Juvenile Offenders: Prevalence, Offender Incidence, and Arrest Rates by Race." Crime and Delinquency 33 (1987): 206-223. "Is Crime Running Wild?" u.s. News and World Report, 3 August 1964, 10. Jordan, Philip D. "The Captital of Crime." Civil War Times Illustrated vol. X14, No. 10: 4. Jorgensen, Joseph. "A Century of Political Effects on American Indian Society 1880-1890.11 Journal of Ethnic studies 6 (1982): 18-30. Kelling, George L., and James Q. Wilson. "Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety." Atlantic Monthly 249 (March 1982). Kelsey, Harry. "The Dolittle Report of 1867: Its Preparation and Shortcomings." Arizona and the West, Vol. XVII, No. 2: 107-20. Kennedy, Mark c. Beyond Incrimination:Some Neglected Facts of the Theory of Punishment. Catalyst 5 (summer 1970): 1-38. Kirchwey, George w. 11The so-Called crime Wave. current Opinion 10 February 1921, 169. Kleck, Gary. "One of the Uses of Self-Report Data to Determine the Class Distinction of Criminal and Delinquent Behavior. American Sociological Review 47 (1982): 427-33. Kulkinski, James H. and John E. Stanga. "Political Participation and Government Responsiveness: The 333

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Behavior of California Superior Courts." American Political Science Review 73 (1979): 1090-1099. "Lawlessness in U.S.--Warning from a Jurist." U.S. News and World Report, 5 July 1965, 60. Martin, susan E. women on the Move? A Report on the Status of women in Policing. 11 Women and Criminal Justice 11 (1989): 21-40. Matthews, Jay. "Playing Politics with Time." Newsweek, 11 May 1992, 40. Menard, Scott, and Herbert Covey, 11UCR and UCS: Comparisons over Space and Time." Journal of Criminal Justice 16 (1988): 371-84. Moore, Elizabeth, and Michael Mills. "The Neglected Victims and Unexamined Costs of White Collar Crime." Crime and Delinquency 36 (1990): 408-18. Moore, Mark H., and George L. Kelling. 11To Serve and Protect." The Public Interest, 7 (Winter 1983): 49. Mulvey, Edward, and John La Rosa, "Delinquency Cessation and Adolescent Development: Preliminary Data. 11 American Journal of orthopsychiatry 56 (1986): 212-224. "New Upsurge in crime". u.s. News, 17 May 1946, 30. Newman, Graeme, and Pietro Marongiv. "Penological Reform and the Myth of Beccaria." Criminology 28 (1990): 344. Nye, Ivan, James Short, and Virgil Olsen. "Socio-Economic Status and Delinquent Bahavior. 11 American Journal of Sociology. 63 (1958): 381-89. 11The Permanent Crime Wave. New Repulic, 5 January 1921, 1. 334

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Powell, Elwin, H. "Crime as a Function of Anomie." Journal of Criminal Law. Criminology. and Political Science 57 (June 1966): 161-171. Press, Aric. "The Plague of Violent Crime. Newsweek, 21 March 1981, 47. Reidel, Mark. "Stranger Violence: Perspectives, Issues and Problems." Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 78 (1987): 223-258. "The Rising Tide of Crime." Literarv Digest 86 (August 1925): 5. Rosenbaum, Dennis. "Community Crime Prevention: A Review and Syntheses of the Literature." Justice Quarterly 5 (1988): 347-367. Rothman, David. "Prisons: The Failure Model." The Nation, 21 December 1974, 656-669. Seidman, D., and M. Courzens. "Getting the Crime Rate Down: Political Pressure and Crime Reporting." Law and Social Review 8 (1980): 457-469. Sheley, Joseph F., and Cidy D. Askins, "Crime News and Crime Views." Public Opinion Quarterly 45 (1981): 492-506. Short, James, and F. Ivan Nye "Extent of Undetected Delinquency, Tentative Conclusions." Journal of Criminal Law and Police Science 49 (1958): 296-302. Smith, Douglas, and Craig Ucida. Organization of Self-Help: Weapon ownership." American (1988):94-102. "The Social A study of Defensive Sociological Review 53 ___ and Laura Davidson. ''Interfacing Indicators and Constructs in Criminological Research: A note on the Comparability of Self-Report Violence data for Race and Sex Groups." Criminology 24 (1986): 473-88. 335

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Starr, Roger. "Crime: How It Destroys, What Can Be Done." New York Times Magazine. 27 January 1985, 19. Steffensmeier, Darrell. "Age and the Distribution of Crime." American Journal of Sociology 94 (1989): 803-831. Sully, Langdon. "The Indian Agent: A study in Corruption and Avarice." American West Vol. X, No. 2: 4-9. Surette, Ray. "Media Trials." Journal of Criminal Justice 17 (1989): 293-308. Swaney, Willam B. "What Shall we do to Stop the Crime?" New York Times current History, 12 September 1922, 924. Thornberry, T., and Mr. Farnsworth. "Social correlates of Criminal Involvement: Further Evidence on the Relationship between Social Status and Criminal Behavior." American Sociological Review 47 (1982): 505-18. Tittle, Charles, Wayne Villemez and Douglas Smith. "The Myth of Social Class and Criminality: An Empirical Assessment of the Empirical Evidence." American Sociological Review 43 (1978): 643-56. "Two Empirical Regularities in Search of an Explanation: Commentary on the Age/Crime Debate." Criminology 26 (1988): 75-85. ___ and Robert Meier. "Specifying the SES/Delinquency Relationship." Criminology 28 (1990):271-301. Vance, William R. "Increase of Crime is Laid to Coddling." New York Times Magazine, 13 August 1926, 10. Walker, Samuel. "Broken Windows and Fractured History: The Use and Misuse of History in Recent Police Patrol Analysis." Justice Quarterly 1 (March 1984): 77-90. 336

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Wikstrom, Per Olaf. "Age and Crime in a Stockholm Cohort." Journal of Ouantitiative Criminology 6 (1990): 61-82. Wilkerson, T., and J. Chattin-McNichols. "The Effectiveness of Computer-assisted Instruction for Police Offenders." Journal of Police Science and Administration 13 (1985):230-35. Willbach, Harry. "The Trend of Crime in New York City." Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 19 (138): 62-75. Wilson, James Q. "Crime and the Liberal Audience." Commentary 28 (January 1971): 71-80. Windhauser, John W., Jennifer Seiter, and L. Thomas Winfree, Jr., "Covering the Roots of Justice: Louisiana Crime News in the 1980s.11 Journalism Quarterly 67 (1990): 72-78. Wolfgang, Marvin. "Crime and Punishment in Renaissance Florence.'' Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (1990): 567-589. 337

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Newspapers Boston Globe Chicago Globe Denver Post Detroit News El Paso Times Los Angeles Times National College Newspaper Rocky Montain News San Francisco Chronicle U.S.A. Today 338

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Government Publications Biderman, Albert D. et al., Report on a Pilot study in the District of Columbia on Victimization and Attitudes toward Law Enforcement. Field Surveys 1. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. Washington, D.C.: u.s. Government Printing Office, 1967. Dodge, Richard w. Response to Screening Questions in the National Crime Survey. Washington, D.C.: u.s. Government Printing Office, 1985. Ennis, Philip H. Criminal Victimization in the United states: A Report on a National survey. Field Surveys II. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (Washington, D.C.: u.s. Government Printing Office, 1967). Garofalo, James. Local Victim Suryeys: A Review of the Issues. Washington, D.C.: u.s. Government Printing office, 1977. and Michael J. Hindelang. An Introduction to the National Crime survey. washington, D.C.: u.s. Government Printing Office, 1977. Schneider, 'Anne L. Differences between Survey and Crime in Current Historical Perspective, Robert G. Lehnen and Wesley G. Skogan, ed., The National Crime Survey: Working Papers. Washington, D.C.: u.s. Government Printing Office, 1981. u.s. Bureau of the Census. Statistical Abstracts of the United States. 1992. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993. u.s. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research. The HUD Surey 339

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on the Quality of Community'Life. Washington, D.C.: Department of Housing and Human Development, 1978. u.s. Department of Justice. Crime and the Nations Households 1990. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1990. Crime and the Nations Households 1988. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1989. ----------Crime Prevention Measures. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1986. Crime Victimization in the United states 1990. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice statistics, 1991. Crime Victimization in the United States 1988. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1989. Crime Victimization in the United States 1983. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1984. Crime Victimization in the United states 1979. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1980. FBI Uniform Crime Report Handbook. Washington, D.C.: u.s. Government Printing Office, 1984. FBI Crime in the United States. 1989. Washington, D.C.: u.s. Government Printing Office, 1990. FBI Crime in the United states. 1983. Washington, D.C.: u.s. Government Printing Office, 1984. 340

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FBI. Uniform Crime Report 1990: Preliminary Annual Release. Washington,D.C.: U.S.Government Printing Office, 1991. FBI Uniform Crime Report 1981. Washington, D.C.: u.s. Government Printing Office, 1982. International Crime Rates. Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report 1988. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1989. The Prevalence of Imprisonment. Washington, D.C. Government Printing Office, 1985. Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics. 1991. Washington, D.C.: u.s. Government Printing Office, 1992. The Redesigned UCR Program. Washington, D.C.: u.s. Department of Justice, N.d. Violent crime in the United States. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justices, 1991. u.s. Department of Safety. Accident Facts, 1992. Chicago: National Safety Council, 1992. 341

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Television Programs CNN Newshour. "Violent Crimes on the Rise." Anchor, Bernard Shaw. CNN, 20 April 1992. Listening to America. 11So Violent a Nation." Prod. Bill Moyers, PBS, 26 May 1992. This Week with David Brinkley. Anchor. David Brinkley. ABC, 26 April 1992. 342