Citation
From "police" to "executioner"

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Title:
From "police" to "executioner" election outcomes as a catalyst for policy changes during executive wars
Creator:
Self, Dylan ( author )
Place of Publication:
Denver, CO
Publisher:
University of Colorado Denver
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Language:
English
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1 electronic file (132 pages). : ;

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Subjects / Keywords:
Executive power -- United States ( lcsh )
Separation of powers -- United States ( lcsh )
Political participation -- United States ( lcsh )
Genre:
bibliography ( marcgt )
theses ( marcgt )
non-fiction ( marcgt )

Notes

Abstract:
In his "Letters of Hevidius", James Madison boasted, "In no part of the constitution is more wisdom to be found, than in the clause which confides the questions of war or peace to the legislature, and not to the executive department" (James Madison"2000). Yet after World War II, American presidents have frequently carried out wars made possible by congressional authorizations acting more like blank checks that declarations of national solidarity coupled with guarantees of legislative oversight. But in the current political climate where Congressional deference is typically given to presidents on issues of foreign policy, more responsibility in limiting the presidency must be assumed by the American electorate. In order for the Constitutional system of checks and balances to survive, it must be made to act as a check upon the American presidency which has transcended all but the rarest instances of Congressional opposition to its policies overseas. Though such a check has become more necessary, we do not see sufficient cases after World War II where we can conclude the voters have accepted, let along wielded, such power adequately during unpopular wars. Nor do we find enough instances where congressional resolve to counter presidents' war policies have culminated in dramatic changes to them.
Thesis:
Thesis (M.A.)--University of Colorado Denver. Political science
Bibliography:
Includes bibliographic references.
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System requirements: Adobe Reader.
General Note:
Department of Political Science
Statement of Responsibility:
Dylan Self.

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|University of Colorado Denver
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|Auraria Library
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913411124 ( OCLC )
ocn913411124

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CATALYST FOR POLICY CHANGES DURING EXECUTIVE WARS By DYLAN SELF B.A., University of Colorado, Denver, 2009 A thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Colorado in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Political Science 2015

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ii This thesis for the Master of Arts degree by Dylan Self has been approved for the Political Science Program by Michael Berry, Chair Lucy McGuffey Thad Tecza April 14, 2015

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iii Self, Dylan (M.A., Political Science) A Catalyst for Policy Changes During Executive Wars Thesis directed by Assistant Professor Michael Berry. ABSTRACT constitution is more wisdom to be found, than in the clause which c onfides the question out wars made possible by congressional authorizations acting more l ike blank checks than declarations of national solidarity coupled with guarantees of legislative oversight. But in the current political climate where Congressional deference is typically given to presidents on issues of foreign policy, more responsibilit y in limiting the presidency must be assumed by the American electorate. In order for the Constitutional system of checks and balances to survive, it must be made to act as a check upon the American presidency which has transcended all but the rarest inst ances of Congressional opposition to its policies overseas. Though such a check has become more necessary, we do not see sufficient cases after World War II where we can conclude the voters have accepted, let alone wielded, such power adequately during un popular wars. Nor do we find enough in dramatic changes to them. The form and content of this abstract are approved. I recommend its publication. Approved: Michael Berry

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iv DEDICATION I dedicate this work to my wife Sara, whose political indifference has only been matched by her constant and invaluable support throughout this process. Her sacrifices to my son Riley, Next, I dedicate this work to my parents, Deb and G.K. S elf. You were both my inspiration for wanting to challenge myself to be better, without trying to make myself new chapter in life to move towards, and a million ways to tell the pompous to go to hell. To the teachers who inspired me to want to become an educator, I also give my thanks. To Mike Pooleon at Bellingham High School, thank you for teaching me history matters. To Clarence Zylstra at Whatcom Community College, thank you for teac hing me history is real. Marty McGovern at Metro State, your philosophy course taught me to understand the intellectual processes of others so I can develop my own. L ucy McGuf fey, thank you for your example and for giving a direction to what these great men started. Finally, I would like to thank my thesis chair, Michael Berry, for his invaluable time, insight, and dedication in assisting me with completing this project. I a lso thank my committee members, Lucy McGuffey and Thad Tecza, for their assistance during the initial phase of my research and their invaluable contributions to my academic development in the undergraduate and graduate programs at the University of Colorad o, Denver.

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v TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 1 Research Question 3 Methodology 3 II. LITERATURE REVIEW 8 In Party Strengths and Liabilities 18 The Out Party as an Alternative 25 Casual Potency and Tipping Points 27 The Misery Index and Presidential Popularity 33 Literature Review Summary 35 III. ANALYSIS: ANES SURVEYS 39 ANES Results: War 44 ANES Results for Personal and National Economics 52 IV. CASE STUDIES: ELEC TIONS AND RECORDED CHANGES IN WAR POLICIES 61 64

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vi 69 1974: Vietnam and Ending a W ar for $700 Million 75 79 1982: Iran Contra and Turning the Tables of Vietnam 83 Enlargement 88 Double Down 94 96 V. CONCLUSION 104 104 Suggestions for Future Research 105 Conclusion 105 REFERENCES 114

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vii LIST OF TABLES Table 1 In Party Congressional Seat Changes by Election Year Since 1950 20 2. In Party Congressional Seat Changes In Presidential Election Years 21 3. In Party Congressional Seat Changes In Midte rm Election Years 21 4. Korean Conflict 45 5. Responses Regarding Future Korean War Policies 45 6. Responses Regarding Ameri Vietnam Conflict 46 7. Responses Regarding Future Vietnam War Policies 47 8. Responses: 48 9. of Afghanistan 49 10. Responses Regarding Worthiness of Invading Afghanistan 50 11. and War in Afghanistan 50 12. Responses Regarding Worthiness of Invading Iraq 51 13. Historical Tables of ANES Responses for Personal Economic S ituations 53 14. Personal Economic Situations, In Party High Change Gain Elections 54 15. Personal Economic Situations, In Party High Change Loss Elections 54 16. Historical Tables : ANES Responses to N ational Economic Situations 56 17. National Economic S ituations, In Party High Change Loss Elections 56

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viii LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1. DOD Spending by Year: 1945 to 2013 (In Millions, 2013) 6 3 2. Truman DOD Spending By Year (In Millions, 2013) 6 5 3. U.S. Troop Levels, Korean War 6 7 4. Eisenhower DOD Spending By Year (In Millions, 2013) 6 8 5. Johnson DOD Spending By Year (In Millions, 2013) 70 6. U.S. Troop Levels, Vietnam War 72 7. Nixon DOD Spending By Year (In Millions, 2013) 73 8. Nixon/Ford DOD Spending By Year (In Millions, 2013) 7 7 9. Carter DOD Spending By Year (In Millions, 2013) 80 10. Reagan DOD Spending First Term (In Millions, 2013) 82 11. Reagan DOD Spending, First and Second Terms (In Millions, 2013) 88 12. Clinton DOD Spending By Year (In Millions, 2013) 92 13. George W. Bush DOD Spending By Year (In Millions, 2013) 96 14. Obama DOD Spending By Year (In Millions, 2013) 102

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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Although much ink ha s been spent describing how executive power is expanded during wars, there has not been much attention paid to whether or not elections play a role in returning those powers to their pre war levels. In the United States, the abandonment of this type of executive accountability during war has led to a trend which, over time, is showing itself to be destabilizing to the Madisonian system of checks and balances. This trend has taken the form of ever inc reasing assets in the hands of the executive branch while the legislative and judicial branches take years to catch up in asserting their authority to oversee, limit, or declare unconstitutional the actions taken by the president. And during the post Worl d War II era, Congress and the Supreme Court have yet to step in and successfully end any undeclared wars; repeatedly deferring to the the wars are popular or not. As such, my research will focus on the effica cy of elections as a check upon the president when Congress and the courts have shown themselves unwilling to render judgments to the effect of stopping unpopular wars. checked i s fundamental to the protection of individual liberties, representative government, and resistance to par tisan or ideological issue as b oth extremes of the political spectrum tend to not only desce nd into tyranny, but feel they are right to do so (Publius Nov. 22, 1787). And lest anyone forget how real the threat unchecked presidential war powers can be to our federal system, let me remind them that it was only 37 years ago when David Frost sat

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2 dow n with former President Nixon who confidently asserted his belief that when looking at matters of national security, when the president does it that means that it is not illegal (Schachter 2012). Such consolidation of power, especially when it is made to look like it is in keeping with constitutional principles, represents a new era in the history of the federal balance of power at the national level. This is not to say consolidation of power is a new tactic for presidents. It i s just that modern presidents appear to be unwilling to give those powers back once the crisis has abated. Presidents Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt appropriated powers to themselves when the country faced existential threats from both internal and external sources, but the y also acknowledged such actions were temporary and that there would be time for review once the situations were over (Boylan 1999). But later presidents such as Johnson, and especially Nixon, not only usurped war powers on a permanent basis in wartime, b ut even during eras of peace ( Ibid ). Indeed, an air of executive unaccountability has persisted through recent administrations as can be seen by the Bush antanamo Bay (Welch 2007 ) which seems to be the fulfillment of president should be, in law and conscience, a big a man as h e can (Lowery 2007). In the wake of the administratio enemy combatants, Schlesinger and others may be correct in concluding executive war powers have exceeded their constitutional boundaries ( Ibid ). In Democracy and America Alexis de Tocqueville observed there are two things which will always be difficult for democracy: to start a war and to end it (de Tocqueville

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3 1969). And a s radios and fireside chats faded from our living rooms, we turned to our televisions to behold the solemn fac es of presidents declaring their intentions to carry out military action against other nations. Often during these broadcasts there were moments where presidents offered assurances about how these military actions would be deliberately limited. Phrases s troops and described how the oper ations would be robust, but limited; seeking to remind the viewers that even presidents remembered their powers were supposed to be limited as a bulwark against tyranny. Such concessions are reassuring because they mean presidents are aware that military authority has been entrusted to them for safekeeping. But the presence of never ending military operations, over time, may lead to such concessions becoming a moot point. Research Question The presidency is at its most powerful when it is engaged in wars, so in an effort to understand whether national elections are an effective check upon it my research will be answering the following question: do election outcomes act as a catalyst for policy changes in executive wars? Methodology My hypothesis will be tested b y demonstrating through existing literature that unpopular wars are not the primary driver of election outcomes and by comparing troop level s DOD spending, and negotiation policies prior to and after elections Through the

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4 cases I will examine, my hypothesis will demonstrate that while elections can act as a check upon the president during times of war, there is not much evidence of them being utilized as one in during the post war era. In the past, elections have led to c hanges in administrations, but if the public believed the election results were going to end the wars quickly and American troops would just get out, that belief was misplaced. President Eisenhower threatened China after Truman was out of office. Nixon e xpanded military operations across Indochina in around the world and called the Soviet Union an evil empire. Clinton welcomed congressional approval of his military act ions in the Caribbean and Mediterranean Seas, but he did not feel he was required to acquire it. Obama expanded the use of drone strikes, denied the WPR was application to military action in Libya, and simultaneously continued the Bush era policies of tro op withdrawals in Iraq coupled with troop increases in Afghanistan. Utilizing data available on federal websites as well as ANES survey results and peer reviewed literature, I will perform a qualitative analysis of eight elections as case studies. The ind ependent variable will be the election results while the dependent variable will be changes in war policies which will be compared by changes in troop deployment levels, Department of Defense ( DOD ) funding expenditures, and the existence of, or progress du ring, negotiations for the cessation of hostilities between the U.S. and hostile forces. Troop deployments include those American forces deployed into a warzone or, should the administration have used local forces instead, what U.S. forces were utilized to

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5 funds allocated to the DOD and will be measured according to FY 2015 dollar amounts per WhiteHouse.gov Finally, negotiations will analyze progress leading to the cessation of conflict between the U.S. and both state and non governmental organizations during the Korean War, Vietnam War, Cold War, and the War on Terror; specifically focusing on the existence of negotiations and if the administration upheld the terms which had been negotia ted prior to the el ection or if it changed them. In order to examine whether the elections served as catalysts for a change in executive war policies, trends for all three of these variables will be compared as they stood prior to either a pres idential or midterm election. These data will provide variables critical to understanding the level of responsiveness at the highest levels of the American republic. But in addition to this, each will touch upon both different aspects of the war and features of the theory behind the representative government as a system. Troop levels touch upon how committed the administration is to winning the war and, as casualties are the clearest indicator of success to the electorat e they create electoral tipping points in th e polls They directly affect the relationship the public has with the president and are a measureable factor from Americans in the region (Gartner and Segura 2008, Norpoth and Sidman 2007) If the s equitur based solely upon the trends in troop deployments. In this area of federal government, the responsiveness the president demonstrates as an elected official towards the voters after an election is a key function of republicanism. DOD spending is based upon congressional appropriations passed in consultation with the administration, so it

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6 speaks to the interaction between the executive and legislative branches vis vis the separation of powers. Since Congress holds the purse, it maintains a structural check upon the presidency under the constitution. So once an executive war has become unpopular with the American public, principles of republican government would lead us to believe pressure upon representatives, senators, and the president would build towards diminished funding for the war. Peace negotiations fall under the purview of the president as the leader of American foreign poli cy. Presidents Truman and Johnson started negotiation efforts in earnest with opposing forces while Presidents Carter, Reagan, and George W. Bush withheld talks with the Soviets and Taliban respectively in accordance with their policy goals. As such, pea ce negotiations represent the fastest and clearest efforts the administration is making to end the conflict. So while the nation is engaged in an undeclared war, members of the administration are the ones doing the fighting at the negotiating table on beh alf of the American head of state. In short, these three factors touch upon core values within liberal government as they represent the points in which major themes of republican political theory interact with each other. T he interaction between the ci tizens and their president in the face of the human costs of war (republicanism), the balance of power between Congress and the White House (separation of powers), and how the president is personally engaging efforts to end undeclared wars (head of state). In conclusion, a qualitative analysis provides the best method of gauging true ideologies, but upon the levels of resources the nation has committed to the execution of exec utive wars in measurable ways which can be objectively compared to each other.

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7 Troop levels can only increase, decrease or remain the same; likewise with DOD funding. tra nsitioned from one administration to another, the terms which were under discussion can either be accepted or remain under deliberation.

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8 CHAPTER II LITERATURE REV I EW What is being analyzed here is the slow, legal drift away from a Madisonian construction of the pr esidency being an office dependent scholars, demonstrate the American republ divided powers to one where powers are being united in the hands of one overse er to keep the nation secure. Schlesinger identified the threat of the imperial presidency in which presidents have usurped authorit y to conduct military engagements overseas to the detriment of federal checks and balances. He pointed to the feeling among the Founders of being victims of British royal prerogatives and, as such, their desire to create a while having as little political connection with them as possible ( Ibid ). Finally, he identified the desire of presidents like Richard Nixon to not only procure institutional strength, but supremacy within the American government through the use of presidential wars to the detr iment of Congressional oversight (Rudalevige 2006). American system exists through a combination of efforts carried out by the White House and those who enable it. He conten ds the Framers deliberately placed the decision to go to war in the hands of the legislative branch to determine whether hostilities were in the

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9 national interest, but what they tried to avoid by doing so i.e. unilateral presidential war making is occu rring (Fisher 2000). In distinguishing the modern presidency from its early days, Fisher cites incidents whereby Presidents Washington and Adams believed it was appropriate to use military force against the Creek Nation and the French Empire respectively and yet they both referred the matters to Congress (Fisher 2006). During the Jefferson administration, Fisher points out that the president took limited military actions against the Barbary Pirates in 1801, but four years later when conflict arose betwee n the U.S. and the Spanish Empire, President Jefferson confirmed his belief that only Congress is constitutionally invested with the power to take the nation from a condition of peace to war ( Ibid ). Fisher does allow that small fluctuations have occurred whereby the balance of power between Congress and the president changed, but he also found that Congress was consistent in neither delegating or abdicating its war power in the past (Fisher 2000). But that balance efforts in Korea. He points to the Korean War as the most important precedent for executive use of military force without Congressional authority and the war whose results led to presidents becoming more inclined to assert their authority without requirin g formal, legislative consent (Fisher 1995). In the wake of U.S. v. Curtiss Wright whereby in 1936 the had the legal precedent to affirm their contention of executive power during war.

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10 President Clinton in Kosovo. At a news conference on October 8, 1998, President Clinton t old the nation that he was going to vote to give NATO the authority to carry out Firs t: [President Clinton] policy. The decision to go to war against another country rested in the hands of one person, exactly what the Framers thought they had rejected. Second, Clinton would be giving NATO authority, instead of Congress giving the President authority. Security Council resolution. C linton said he did not need the support of Congress but he did need the support of Italy, Belgium, and other NATO members ( Ibid ). As these examples represent a violation of constitutionalis bello or war in keeping with the Constitution he identifies five actors he believes enable constitutional violations to continue: Congress, political party leaders, federal courts, academics, and the media. He believes Congress has failed to protect its po wers as effectively as the executive and judicial branches have; criticizing its members for failing to fight off executive encroachments or for finding ways to voluntarily surrender their powers to the other branches ( Ibid ). Second, he believes legislati ve party leaders have regularly subordinated their interests to those of the president; such as when Senate Democrat leader Lucas was asked if President Truman should have notified Congress of his goals in Korea and he signaled his willingness to leave wha t had been done in the hands of the president ( Ibid ). Third, he faults federal judges he claims asserted their powers of review over ongoing wars until the Vietnam era. As he describes it, i t was only with Vietnam that courts began to avoid the merits of war power cases by invoking a variety of

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11 threshold tests such as standing, ripeness, the political question doctrine, and prudential considerations ( Ibid ). Fourth, he blames members of the academic community such as Commager, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and Neustadt for criticizing those in Congress as violating constitutional law and history when they opposed executive overreach for reasons firmly founded in the constitution ( Ibid ). Finally, Fisher accuses the national media for focusing more on battles, vi ctories, and setbacks at the cost of educating the endangers the system of checks and balances the nation depends on ( Ibid ). hereby have been enabled while they have sought to expand their powers; highlighting the steps necessary for our government to be transformed from being guided by republican divisions in power to consolidated ones. Presidents have actively pursued opportu nities to take aggressive military actions in ways their predecessors did not, they have held UN and NATO authorizations sufficient to circumvent the constitutional process, and presidents have been given cover to do so by a combination of political acquie scence, academic sophistry, and a media unconcerned with contextualizing wars. This is not to say that the accumulation of power within the executive branch or a breakdown in the separation of powers is a new phenomenon. Following the Supreme sion in Worcester v. Georgia enforcing it was to let Chief Justice Marshall enforce it himself (Miles 1973). At the beginning of the Civil War, President Lincoln reacted to the existential threat southern seces sion and potential sabotage in Maryland presented by suspending civil rights in such ways he knew the courts would most likely strike down (Calabresi and Yoo

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12 2008). Almost fifty years later, President T. Roosevelt sent the Great White Fleet around the wor viewed in the contexts of their respective eras, they are still indicative of the tensions t hat exist between the federal branches when military authority is in use. In order to gauge the efficacy of election outcomes changing ongoing war policies during executive wars (i.e. w ars which have Congressional authorization, but not a formal declaration of war ) such as Iraq and Afghanistan, existing research has examined how war, as an election issue, affects the actions of the party, members of the opposing party, and the voters themselves (Cotton 1986, Crotty 2009, Norpoth and Sidman 2007, Weisberg 2007) If an ongoing war consistently strengthened the reelection chances of the in party (members of the same political party as the president), then we would see an increase in the use of foreign policy issues being used as the fla gship issue during campaigns. Likewise, we would see evidence of organized resistance to foreign affairs becoming a central campaign issue for the out party, or other in party candidates running to succeed or replace the president What my review of exis ting literature shows instead is a level of issue variance which casts new light on the presumption that war leads to election victories Concerning in party incumbents, the presence of an ongoing war can just as easily help as i t can hurt them since the public remembers very well who was advocating for its initiation For out party candidates it can aid them by allowing them to cast their opposition in a more attractive light rather than just appearing obstructionist. As Kramer noted individuals often vote according to their satisfaction with the performanc e of the

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13 current government (Cotton 1986 ) found little support for the claim midterm elections act as a referendum on the in handling of the economy (Fiorina 1978) This means elections are the in every two years while out party members have the easier task of appearing as a viable and capable alternative But t his can be both a blessing and a curse for incumbents B eing a member of the in party when war is initiated allows incumbents to take advantage of an electoral momentum built up when decisions were made. On the other hand there are also benefits to having not been a member when prior d ecisions later criticisms of the war in Iraq as being wrong while Hillary Clinton, who had voted for the authorization to invade, attempted to make the same case in 2008. This study seeks to test whether any electoral momentum is enjoyed by the in party when it supported the initiation of military action. And though the issue of ongoing war has been demonstrated to have short term boosts in popularity like the Republicans enjoye d in 2002 it also has been demonstrated to erode public support for in party members as was the case for Republicans in 2006. I f the stigma of supporting a war is indeed something which can erode their public support this would increase the chances of a positive electoral result for out party members and make them a more popular alternative on Election Day This chapter will present two major threads in the existing literature. The first shall pertain to how war affects the campaigns of both in party and out party members The second major thread demonstrates how the economy is the greater motivator in

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14 elections during peacetime and war A recent example of this can be found in the 2008 election where after more than four years of the increasingly u npopular war in Iraq the major point of debate in the pre primary days of the race and the issue that initially concern in comparison to the economy (Crotty 2009 ). Shou ld research showing the superiority of the economy as an election issue over war prove to be correct, can it then be said that elections act as a significant check on presidential war powers? Improbable as it is, that would mean any president could learn to assume there would be no retribution from voters for his or her war policies as long as the economy appears positive to a plurality of them This along with a compliant Congress and Supreme Court, would prove a mortal blow to the vision the Founders h ad vis vis checks and balances set up to avoid the institutional corruption and costs of constant warfare. Instead what the literature I will provide indicates is that war, as an election issue, is indeed potent as a rallying issue for the in party and can provide just enough of an increase in popular support to carry the in party through an election M ore consistently it is not shown to influence election outcomes the way the economy as an election issue does. War and the economy are in fact linked together as two of the giants in a field of potential election issues; some of which are known and some of which arrive unexpectedly. Either way, as has been pointed out, the presence of war in an election cycle does not preclude victory for in party or out (Norpoth and Sidman 2007 ).

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15 Both Truman and Johnson assumed office upon the deaths of their predecessors and chose retirement over running again during the climaxes of the Korean and Vietnam wars. Presidents Bus h 41 and Bush 43 reached the highest popularity levels recorded, and yet they both left office with very low approval ratings as well But on the other hand, there is a level of patience the voters have for those who inherited wars as Eisenhower did and t hey are willing to suspend harsh levels of disapproval they would otherwise have voiced towa rds the Truman adm inistration ( Ibid ). S ome existing literature demonstrates in party members are strengthened by the effects of an ongoing Other studies, however, show the opposite; that it weakens the in party in the end more than it boosts their chances for election victories. As a starting point it could be presumed as more likely that committing troo ps into combat would generate a groundswell of support, lending the president great power and some amount of larger than life status. But this presumption does have its detractors. Upon concluding his review of wartime presidents and their rankings in te rms the ( Adler 2003 ). This is not to say the deployment of troops fails to provide a strong legacy, but the results of Adl failed to suggest a predictable success rate. In fact, he concluded only Lincoln, Wilson and Roosevelt perhaps could be said to have fit the formula of deployment leading to greatness, but he provides the caveat that the occasions of war allowe d those presidents the opportunity to find greatness ( Ibid ). This would coincide (Regens,

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16 Gaddie and Lockerbie 1995 ), as well as Petrocik conclu si on that candidates argue for their strengths and sidestep the values of their opponents (Cotton 1986 ). So if we were to accept the premise that war dominates the national dialogue during an election season, what greater issue asset does a president and t heir party have than that of an ongoing military deployment? It affords the president the opportunity to assert the strongest constitutionally directed position as commander in chief It also empowers party to asso ciate themselves with the b ully pulpit the president has at the ready. And in addition to allowing the in party to flex their issue set muscles, war can also provide an opportunity for the electorate to demonstrate some amount political dexterity in how t hey view administrations that inherit wars verses those who start them. anywhere near as much to blame for the manner in which they ended the wars they inherited as were the presidents who oversaw their initiations ( Ibid ). What this means is that at the very least, the voting public is capable of attaching accountability to the initiating administration while reserving it for the next administration. And while this appears a This may be attributable to what Weisberg referred to as aspects of the war which are activated in the minds of the public, associating it with the president, and building an i mage of the president that is consistent wit h that portrayal of the war (Weisberg 2007 ). In short, voters do not appear to treat war as a monolithic issue which falls at the feet of whoever is in the Oval Office Nor do they appear to view it either as all good or

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17 all bad. This notion of voter dexterity pertains to whether the public can look at an ongoing war and decide to use its voting power to remove both presidential and congressional in party members as a deliberate, Constitutional check against the in The next section will explore how campaigns are affect ed by the presence of war as an election issue. It will demonstrate h ow war is used by presidential incumbents and challengers, how in party members coordinate their message s with the administration, and how the in party members distinguish their message from the administration In addition to influences upon in party campaigns, it will also sh ow out party members have framed their arguments in the past and how war on the mi nds of voters has strengthened out party campaigns will all be addressed. After examining existing literature on campaign factors, it will explore the issue of casualty potency and how it affects the ts other in party races and how it has changed over time. Finally I will provide research which indicates biennial elections, even during times of war, are referenda not on the war but on the state of the economy at that time. There is no question that war affects the economy through loss of workers sent overseas and the reallocation of funds from domestic projects to international missions S hould it prove true that the economy affects the war by sapping voter support, this may prove a strong predicto r of in party or out party success regardless of the support a war is experiencing. This literature also suggests how an unpredictable force such as the economy may serve as a greater check upon the presidency than an electorate, fearful of executive exce ss, does.

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18 In Party Strengths and Liabilities When war is present during an election season, it positively affects the campaign of the in party by rallying public opinion behind the president This applies not only to the president, but the in party itself in local elections and thus, applies incentives for in party candidates for Senate and Congressional offices to move their campaign strategies The first benefit the in party receives has been trad a round the definition for the duration of this section: The rally a round the flag effect occurs as follows: a president facing a foreign policy crisis is able to invoke national inte rest in support of his policy during the inside the system." Through appeals to national un ity, the president can expect a s ubstantial increase in public support, as voters coalesce around him in t he role of national leader (Regens, Gaddie, and Lockerbie 1995 As executive wars have become common since World War II research has been able to track this phenomenon over time, but the connection between war and up ticks in pre sidential popularity exist in both times of declared and undeclared wars. Norporth concluded R World War II and his adept handling of i t provided such advantages that, if missing, would have imperiled his reelection due to lingering domestic issues such as unemployment (Norpoth 2012 ). Even as recently as the 2004 presidential election, Norpoth and Sidman found the effects of the Iraq War served as a factor which extended the waning rally effe ct associated with the September 11 th attacks in Washingto n, New York and Pennsylvania (Weisberg 2007 ).

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19 Campbell asserted the thrust behind presidential surges in popularity depends o n the level of information available to voters during the election cycle and who is perceived to have the advantage that year (1987) Some election outcomes are attributable to increased turnout from in party supporters and some are attributable to attrac ting those who can still be convinced. Campbell also found local issues may be the cause f or the diminished increases in c ongress versus the president. He found that while c ongressional candidates may be helped less by a surge of turnout than presidentia l candidates because of the many confounding district level factors that diminish the effect, but they ar e helped nevertheless (Campbell 1987 ). This means national level surges for the in party during presidential election years, though they are vulnerabl e to diminution by loc al issues, may be real events. One example of this would be the presidential election in 2012 wherein Barack Obama beat Mitt Romney by just under 5 million votes, yet congressional Democrats only increased their numbers by eight in t he House and two in the Senate. Based upon the in gained or lost seats since 1950; when executive wars became the norm with the onset of the Korean War. In it, we can see the average outcome of each election cycle from 1950 2012 has resulted in a loss of 11.75 in party seats in the House of Representatives and 2.34 in party seat in the Senate.

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20 Table 1: In Party Congressional Seat Changes by Election Year Since 1950 Year Party House Senate Year Party House Senate Year Party House Senate 1950 D 28 5 1972 R 13 2 1994 D 52 9 1952 D 22 2 1974 R 49 5 1996 D 1 3 1954 R 18 0 1976 R 0 1 1998 D 4 0 1956 R 0 0 1978 D 13 3 2000 D 2 5 1958 R 52 12 1980 D 36 12 2002 R 9 1 1960 R 22 1 1982 R 27 2 2004 R 4 4 1962 D 4 2 1984 R 15 2 2006 R 30 6 1964 D 35 2 1986 R 4 8 2008 R 25 8 1966 D 47 4 1988 R 3 0 2010 D 64 6 1968 D 5 7 1990 R 6 1 2012 D 8 2 1970 R 13 1 1992 R 9 1 Total All 376 75 Total Avg 11.8 2.34 W hen we separate these results into presidential elec tion years and midterm election years, the results show a clear pattern of outcomes favoring the president when their name is on the ballot how elections have tended to result in losing seats when their For example, the Democrats were the in party at the beginning of 1952 However I display the Republicans as the in party in this table since Eisenhower won the plurality of votes that November and thus switched the i n party from Democrats to Republicans Democrat s held the White House and majorities in the House and Senate for the whole party until Eisenhower was sworn in the next year. But the November elections each year represent real change and they occurred while previous administrations and congresses were still in power The 1 st table shows changes in c ongressi onal in party representation resulting from the November elections

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21 in each presidential year while 2 nd table features changes in c ongressional in party representation resulting from midterm election outcomes. Table 2: In Party Congressional Seat Changes In Presidential Election Years Year Party House Senate Year Party House Senate Year Party House Senate 1952 D 22 2 1976 R 0 1 2000 D 2 5 1956 R 0 0 1980 D 36 12 2004 R 4 4 1960 R 22 1 1984 R 15 2 2008 R 25 8 1964 D 35 2 1988 R 3 0 2012 D 8 2 1968 D 5 7 1992 R 9 1 Total All 18 22 1972 R 13 2 1996 D 1 3 Avg 1.125 1.375 Table 3: In Party Congressional Seat Changes In Midterm Election Years Year Party House Senate Year Party House Senate Year Party House Senate 1950 D 28 5 1974 R 49 5 1998 D 4 0 1954 R 18 0 1978 D 13 3 2002 R 9 1 1958 R 52 12 1982 R 27 2 2006 R 30 6 1962 D 4 2 1986 R 4 8 2010 D 64 6 1966 D 47 4 1990 R 6 1 Total All 394 53 1970 R 13 1 1994 D 52 9 Avg 24.6 3.31 W hat these tables show are the differing election outcomes when the president name is on the ballot versus election years when it is not. The House reverts from an average in party seat loss of 24.6 seats d uring midterm elections to an average increase of 1.13 In the Senate, the average midterm loss of three seats decreases to an average in party loss of just over one According to Weisberg, the 2004 presidential election is an example of how a n on goin g war can structure an election through its contextualization of core events

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22 (Weisberg 2007 ) It encourages in commander in chief become more identifiable and sets the table for some peripheral issues to be e mphasized and some to be discarded. This also sets the table for congressional candidates; whose party faithfulness will allow them to be characterized as loyal Democrats or Republicans while those who reach across the aisle are called And it i s the encouragement of party loyalty that the benefits the president most as leader of the party and the person who enjoys the position as nationally elected representative of the nation. Should there not be a party unifying issue prese nt during an election season such as war or the economy the ability of congressmen to pivot towards local issues and decrease the level of cooperation between the legislative and executive branches become more likely. T his cooperation comes about specifi cally because there is the presence of an external threat that acts as a galvanizing force for the in party in a way that the Congress and the president to play these coo perative roles, they will have to rely on more elusive catalysts: character and leadership (Smith 1998 ). correct that international affairs incite in party loyalty, it would follow, then, that the fidelity of in party congress men would be somewhat predictable; and there is such support. According to a study by Wittkopf and McCormick, party loyalty and ideology are t pol icy support (Prins and Marshall 2001 ). I t i s party loyalty that buys the president time for things to get Hess and Orphanides

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23 assumed leaders characteristics are unknown before he takes office but are learned and remain fixed o nce he takes off ice and once he enters a war (Hess and Orphanides 1995 ), meaning engulfed in a war. This will be demonstrated more fully in the case study section but here I will posit the idea that if there will be any major changes in war policies they will most likely not come from the president unless facing immense pressure from his or her own party. party memb ers who are loyal to the death, but rather those who have become d issuaded from their own cost benefit analysis of the situation and the voices of their constituents. research found, even a surge in support following the onset of a war is just a passing trend in a decades long pattern of political upheavals. The in party may gain something, but the gains are only transitory (Adler 2003 ). As this transitory surge in public opinion wanes, the news is not all good for the in party when war has begun as it opens the door for them to begin to be calle d the war party; an identification which hangs upon them the good the war has done as well as the harm. It hangs upon them the accountability for the inevitable losses the war incurs such as loss of lives, national productivity, international prestige and economic soundness. These losses apply pressure to the in party as they were seen to be the main supporters of the president and assistants to pitching the cause. Cotton found the detrimental effect war has had over the past century upon the war party h as depended on the level of national resources commi t t ed to the war effort and, should the war disrupt

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24 domestic affairs, in party candidates were likely to receive lower levels of public support (Cotton 1986 ). This effect can even be magnified by the abs ence of a presidential incumbent as was the case in 1952, 1968 and 2008. As Norpoth noted, aggregate findings s how that the presidential party suffered unexpected vote losses in some wartime elections (Norpoth 2012) It is worth noting that in three of t hose four instances, the president in charge of the war did not run for reel ection in 1952, 1968, and 2008 As the war runs its course, the assessments and assumptions of the in party are held up to the light and are weighed against the experienc es. Unfortunately for the in party who supported the war, the promises made before it started tend to be forgotten as reasons mount for the war having not been worth it. But there is some debate as to whether or not midterm losses represent a natural rej ection of the in party or whether they are issue centered occurrences. Abramowitz, Cover and Norpoth found a grace period exists for all presidents for the first two years of their administrations (1986) Their findings suggest that after an initial hone ymoon work, voters will become impatient and conclude that a change in congress is in order (Abramowitz, Cover, and Norpoth 1986 ). ound that a change of in party leadership led to a consistent ownership of the Whit e House in nearly all cases for eight years rather than just four (2007 ) What this suggests is the strength the in party has through the ownership of the White House for a t least the first four years or his or her

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25 administration. For this reason, the longer the in party has held onto the White House, the more likely they are to become the out party. in party electoral gains being the re sult of information surges, he found that in party losses may reflect more of a return to normalcy rather than the wholesale rejection of the in party. ascension of out party members from that of the minority to a powe rful alter native for the voters ( Campbell 1987 ). His opinion was that midterm elections represent an opportunity for a return to normalcy from the electoral aberration a presidential election year with its informa tion surge represents ( Ibid ). oncluded midterms losses by the in party are simply a retur n to normal for the electorate after the more hectic presidential contest two years earlier (1975 ). These losses however tend to be more extreme when midterms coincide with unpopular costs of war. For an examination of the effects of coinciding midterm elections and war costs, the research is rather consistent. Cotton examined presidential elections from 1896 to 1984 and found the aggregate vote share for incumbent congressional and presidential parties decreased with war cos ts (Rege ns, Gaddie, and Lockerbie 1995 ) The Out Party as an Alternative In his recent studies of wartime elections, Norpoth posited the presence of war allows out party members to appeal to a feeling for a change whereas the in party is limited by their record over the previous years. When put s uccinctly, Norpoth explained w

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26 t Change Horses in Mi dstream (Norpoth 2012 ). This frees the out party candidates to avail themselves of a number of issues and, more importantly, a number of ways of emphasizing issues, which the in party cannot since their hands are all over the issue out party candidates are criticizing. This works bec ause t he party in power time for a change among the presidential contenders of the other party (Norpoth 2011 ). Norpoth found evidence for this conclusion in the pres idential elections where there was no incumbent: again, 1952, 1968 and 2008. Citing these election years, in party status in 1952 and 1968, and the Democrats in 2008: the popularity of those presidents and their electoral prospects. By early 1952, the G allup poll showed only 37% in support of U.S. intervention in Korea, and by early 1968, on ly 4 1% did so for the Vietnam War (Norpoth 2012 ). the fact that a candidate stresses a certain issue and appeals to popular demand for areas in w hich O bama was more credible (Norpoth 2011 ). for popularity in opinion polls, the state of the economy, and how long the same party has controlled the White House as the factors that drive the efficacy of calls for change during presidential election years and successfully predicted that the election results in 2008 would almost certainly lead to a Democratic victory ( Ib id ). So taken as real election drivers Norpoth posited the conclusion that calls for change make out party candidates appear to be more attractive options for voters. C andidates who call for a change must have a message that resonates with voters in or der

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27 for their campaigns to be successful Plus they have the chore of lifting their names as either an attractive alternative to in party candidates or as a direct rejection of them. But how does the out effect for the in party is underway? Two factors appear to be at play in that situation. The first appears to be the effectiveness of wartime casualt ies as a political issue. The second pertains to instances where a public opinion tipping point occurs during an ongoing war These tipping points appear to identify the moment the in party loses its advantage the out party becomes an alternative worth exploring and voters who cast their ballots for one party in the pr evious election cast their votes for a different party Casualty Potency and Tipping Points For a definition, casual potency refers to the number of troops killed in military engagement and the result it has upon levels of presidential support in opinion polls. Considering military deaths as the independent variable and a reduction of presidential approval ratings in national polls as the dependent variable, there has been a clear correlation between the two but it has diminished with the wars the United States has fought from Korea through Iraq. Norpo t h two points: 1) the level of casualty potency has increased 100 to 1 since the Korean War and 2) with that factor in mind, President Bush 43, narrowly avoide d the same electoral outcomes as both Presidents Truman and Johnson (Norpoth and Sidman 2007 ). Had the relative numbers been reached, George W. Bush may not have won a 2 nd term and he

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28 may have exercised the same choice as both Truman and Johnson nomination : weighted casualty effect on presidential approval has multiplied about 100 fold. It would seem that George W. Bush could not have survived in office with a war that amassed casualties of the scale of the wars in Korea or Vietnam along with the degree of public dissatisfaction those wars engendered. He would have joined Truman and Johnson on the list of presidents who were driven from office by ca sualties in an un popular war ( Ibid ). According to Gartner and Segura in the case of the Iraq War under President George W. Bush, the connection between casualties and presidential approval ratings is a natural one to make (Gar tner and Segura 2008) It is both the clearest way to gau ge the costs versus pre war assurances by the in party and a way to demonstrate how politics, even in a superpower, still remains local. Casualties represent ed the most important measure of Iraq War costs and the most objective indicator of success given the lack of other indicators ( Ibid ) So this connection between casualties and support for the war has immediate implications for both the popularity of the president as well as the reelection chances for in party members. And since congressmen and congre sswomen tend to go back to their home states much more often than the president visits them, this makes them initially more attenuated to local shifts than national ones. Gartner and Segura cite d Vermont as one example of casual potency leading to local politics stemming from national policies W hen highest per capita deaths of any state during the Iraq war remained unchanged for years they did not find it a coincidence that Vermont became the first to pass a resolutio n calling on Congress and the president to immediately wi thdraw U.S. force s from Iraq

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29 ( Ibid ). But as Berinsky put it, i t is not simply a direct reaction to casualties or victories on the battlefield that causes su pport f or war to wax or wane (Berinsky 2007 ). Vermont may be an exceptional case as George W. Bush lost it by around 20 point s US President, US Senator 2004 ), but the fact remains that the state with the highest per capita deaths was the first to act against the war. And point where the war changed in 2005 from being simply unpopular to being something which must be officially dealt with via a resolution calling on Congress and the presid ent to withdraw American troops from Iraq. This is an example of what Norpoth and Sidman shold of war diss atisfaction (Norpoth and Sidman 2007 ) but for action changes into a majority held political reaction to an unpopular war. deaths begin to have a determinable appraisals of Korea, Vietnam and Iraq, Norpoth and Sidman concluded as long as the public approves of the decision to enter war, it supports a wartime president even with casualties until a threshold of dissatisfaction is crossed after which casualties begin to take a toll on president ial support ( Ibid ). This occurs because of a combination of the out party and the public itself asking the question the war being worth the costs ( Ibid )

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30 Issues such as pre war assurances left unfulfilled, unanticipated costs and the per ception of incompetency which can create a loss of trust which exacerbates an already declining in admini mass quantities of chemical or biological weapons had eroded the war as necessary (Gartner and Segura 2008 ). Similarly, when the public begins to see unfa vorable results in a war, the changes can come quickly. Crabtree found this present in polls regarding the Korean War: Korea was a mistake, only 20% thought it was, while 65% sa id it was not a mistake. But by the following January, opinion had shifted dramatically, and 49% thought the decision was a mistake, while 38% said it was not, a nd 13% had no opinion (Crabtree 2003 ). A roughly 30 uch a short period of time recover from. Cotton wrote this loss of support is attribu table to either resentment to the cost of fighting or the perceived inco mpetency of the policymakers (Cotton 1986 ) while Mueller concluded that once perceived worth is lost, popular suppo rt for a war does not return (Jacobson 2010 ). Either way, when a tip ping point has been reached, the slow loss of support turned into a terminal one which precluded both Presidents Truman and Johnson from seeking second terms they were constitutionally eligible to seek. Tipping points also appear to have evolved along sim ilar measurements as casualty potency in

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31 that it takes more casualties to hurt the administration and it took a higher dissatisfaction level in Vietnam to cripple the administration than it did in the Korean War. Just as casualty potency has changed 10 fo ld from Korea to Vietnam and again from Vietnam to Iraq, the public opinion tipping point has increased with it. Returning represent a tipping point was ten points lower during the Korean War than it was during the Vietnam War: approval until dissatisfaction is over 32%. It is at this level roughly from June residency, leaving Eisenhower unaffected by casualties during his first nine months as President. For Vietnam, the dissatisfaction level needed is 42%, which roughly covers all of 1967 and 1968, as well as the last half of 1971. Thus both Johnson and Nixon are hurt by casua lties though John son more so (Norpoth and Sidman 2007 ). Were it possible to compare the Iraq War with Korea and Vietnam along similar lines, it might be possible to find the relative tipping point during that war. But there were three major differences distinguishing the election preceding policy changes which ended the Iraq War from those preceding the ends of Korea and Vietnam. The first was t a d ing to dramatically reduced American casualties prior to a change in administrations Second, the Great Recession of 2008 erased any chance that the sharp drop in U.S. casualties in Iraq [post surge] might revive the fortunes of the president an d his party (Jacobson 2010 ) Third, t those held by the major candidates in 1952 and 1968. While candidates Eisenhower and Nixon advocated changes in national policy towards Korea and Vietnam respectively, as I will show in my case studies their opponents were calling for very similar plans.

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32 However in 2008, the policy statements made by Senators Obama and McCain were very plainly different and represented a stark difference in executing the war in such a way that the 1952 and 1968 elections did not. In summary, many scholars have concluded that during wartime there are both institutional benefits and dangers to being a member of the in party while the out party is able to avail itself of the benefit of calling for change and highlighting the true costs of the war up to that point. The in p arty receives a transitory bump in approval ratings once president some electoral coattails which can increase his or her party membership in Congress. As a result, in party loyalty is incentivized but this can also create issues for in party members as well. They run the risk of becoming the party associated with the in party Congressional membership back to a level of normalcy. While this is happening, the out party is more free to move where it wants to since it was n o t the party leading the war and is n o t the party who se face is inextricably linked to it. The out party can call for a change with more nuance than the in party c an since it i s the in having experienced it as the prevailing argument over the previous years. The public also receives periodic updates of wartime causalities which it can then use to gauge its opinion And should enough voters turn against the in party, a tipping point will be reached after which in party defeat becomes much more likely to occur

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33 during the next election. These tipping points have occurred in the past an d have led to two presidents refusing to run for reelection, which preceded changes in party leadership of the White House for the following eight years in each instance And though these tipping points can create groundswell like changes in popular opini on polls, there is a greater constant that can be tracked. E ven with the losses seen in previous wars, the state of the economy appears to be a greater driver of great electoral changes whether the president decides to run for reelection or not. The Mis ery Index and Presidential Popularity The literature points to a different explanation for great electoral changes than disapproval over war policies supply E conomic pain appears to be the factor that truly in vites the voters to render an up or down vot e for in party members. A s A.D. Lindsay analogized remove those who make bad shoes, the incumbent shoemakers could stay in power forever with the claim that the shoes pinch not bec ause the shoes were badly made but because the voters have crooked feet (Caraly 2005 Even during the Vietnam War when statistics of the dead and wounded were being displayed on the news every night and protests were going on in American streets, Page and Brody found the opinion variance existing at the time was not directly correlated with opinions on the war. Instead they found to overwhelmingly coincid ing with opinions on the Vietnam War during one of the most anti war eras in the 20 th century ( Page and Brody 1972 )

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34 The Misery Index can even overtake an in party victory earned through a very blican Party expected to run a presidential campaign highlighting the victory Operation Desert Storm gave the U.S., however, the length of time between a victory in Iraq in February 1991 and the November 1992 election allowed an intervening event such as the economy to gain preeminence within the elect oral agenda (Regens, Gaddie, and Lockerbie 1995 ). In 2008 with the t roop s urge decreasing American casualties, Iraqi security increasing and the war appearing to be winnable, support for the w ar in Iraq had deteriorated by a large degree b ut the onset of the Great Recession became the biggest detriment to the Republicans as the in party. After reviewing pre election polls, Crotty found the poll results pointed more to the state of the economy leading to th e Republican downfall than war opinions did : The most pronouncedly negative views related to the economy (with over 90 percent believing that economic conditions either failed to improve or deteriorated markedly), a key to the outcome of the presidential war in Iraq continued to disapproval ratings of approximately 60 percent (Crotty 2009 ). In addition to the Misery Index, presidential popularity is found to be the other main factor determining election outcomes over a number of presidential and off year model This can be tested by cross referencing presidential el ection years with off year elections and what Tufte found was very telling. First, his model found that e conomic well being and presidential popularity together accounted for elections (Abramowitz, Cover, and Norpoth 1986 ). From there, the results demonstrate midterm elections can be

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35 understood as referenda on the president's performance and with greater weight, the performance of the economy ( Ibid ). This the election outcomes in off year elections. By comparing changes in presidential popularity with changes in real world, disposable inc ome, Tufte found changes in disposable income led to higher changes in congressional voting than changes in presidential popularity. Specifically, a change of ten percentage points in the President's approval rating in the G allup poll is related to a change of 1.3 percentage points in the national midterm congressional vote for the in party ; and a change of $50 in real disposable personal income per capita in the year of the election is related to a change of 1.8 percentage points in the vote (Tufte 1 975 ) Literature Review Summary According to existing literature, there are two large bodies of research pertaining to voting patterns during elections and how they explain the actions of both major parties during executive wars. The first collection pertains to the opportunities each party takes advantage of during war time presidential and off year elections. This collection contains three major factors which must be understood: how war helps during in party cam paigns, how war makes the in party vulnerable and how war benefits out party members running for office. The issue of war aids the in party through a variety of coattails bring more votes for in party members around the country, leading to more incentive for presidents to go to war, research I ha ve found has concluded it is merely

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36 t the margin of error for most polls. And rather than strengthening the in across the spectrum of potentialities being a member of the in party during a n ongoing war creates losing opportunities due to the time and political capital which could be better used elsewhere being spent on maintaining support for the war. It also paints the in party economically and in terms of loss of life, continue to mount while the out advantages add up. Out party members benefit because they are not the party whose face is attached to it and they are able to ask voters to consider other extra presidential alternatives. Voting for an unpopular war can lead to challenges later as it did for Hil lary Clinton in 2008. Having voted for the authorization to invade Iraq, she later lost the Democratic nomination to Barack Obama in large part due to his steadfast opposition to the war. Out party members are able to take advantage of their role as th the final decision makers while being able to legitimize their position through defending it as a legitimate, c onstitutional check on executive power. They can diversify their positions in a way the in party cannot as the y ve a war policy to defend the way the in party does. Out party members can assume the policies the public likes and they can reject the ones the public do political platform Finally, out party gains appear to be inevitable during off year presidential information surges which typically benefit in party members through in party voter turnout. These results present a mixed bag for the in party overall because

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37 their centralized position within the government becomes stronger, but it also leaves them be there for them and their opponents can always represent them as something which must be peacefully rebelled against. The second collection of literature indicates war may have an effect on the election, but the salient issues that really drive the outcome of elections are the economy and the pr party can allege the president misled the country about the costs of the war and things of that nature but the election outcomes have to match up and an opinion poll tipping point must be met for is an important factor, research suggests it is not as salient as the issue of diminished economic prosperity is in getting support out for the in party during off year elections where the greatest number of high change elections has occurred. the in on years, there have been five high change elections where over five percent of either chamber of Congress has changed party hands. As noted before, three of these instances (1952, 1968, and 2008) featured elections where there was no incumbent as Truman and Johnson declined to run despite being eligible to do so. This could be construed as a check on executive wars through dissuading potential incumbents from running again but the wars they oversaw and supposedly drove them from office continued to esca late after they were gone rather than ending quickly by their successors. The other two instances of high

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38 loomed large over the country and the election of 1980 with all of its economic c hallenges. Off year elections with high change outcomes however, have been much more plentiful. There has been twice the number of high change elections during midterms than there have been in presidential election years (1950, 1958, 1960, 1966, 1974, 1982, 19 86, 1994, 2006, and 2010). W hile these elections intermittently coincide with increase s in anti war responses in ANES results which I will address in the analysis section, t hey do not do so consistently. N or do they do so in numbers which account for the election outcomes being high change or not. Instead, most of the off year elections where the in party lost seats coincide with times of economic recession. There has been the consistent assertion that war does affect the president and the economy and it would appear obvious to assume as such. It affects how both parties campaign, which candidates choose to run for reelection the language and tactics used during the campaigns and the overall level of a llegiance between the president and other in party members running for office. But war, according to the literature available, appears to be a coinciding event with high change elections rather than their primary cause. At the very most the literature po sits war as the third most salient issue behind presidential popularity the economic reality of the voters.

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39 CHAPTER III ANALYSIS: ANES SURVEY RESULTS In adding my research to the existing body of research, I have chosen to analyze both the outcomes of elections and American National Elections S tudies (ANES). I will be studying election results to determine whether elections have resulted in changes i n ongoing war policies and ANES results to determine if the voters were thinking of the elections as referendums on unpopular wars or other issues. Upon completing my analysis I have concluded that there is not sufficient evidence to determine elections l ead to changes in ongoing war policies that can be interpreted as the voters quickly ending the war As such, I believe there is good reason skeptical that elections lead to significant levels of change in war policies and another solution must present it self if the imperial presidency is going to be sufficiently checked Based upon the results of ANES surveys regarding salient issues in election years and case studies investigating troop levels, military spending, and peace negotiations before and after s pecific presidential and midterm elections, I cannot find any indication Further, there is little evidence of Further, there is very little evidence that direction(?) have changed in contravention to those the administration sought prior to the election. I have identified 16 elections since the end of World War II which I qualify as high change meaning in party seats lost in either chamber of Congress ha ve been twice the average amount lost in the post WWII era. Of these 16, I have examined eight as

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40 they fit the following qualifications: they are high change elections, they provide differing contexts in which the elections occurred, and the elections hap pened during periods of ongoing military engagements via American forces or proxy forces. During post World War II period, the three greatest occurrences of an in party chang ing from one party to the other during unpopular fazes of their contemporary wa rs were 1952, 1968 and 2008 And in line with these changes, ANES s urvey results during each of these elections show the drivers of the outcome to be much more complex than simpl e opposi tion to the wars. President Truman may have declined running for ree distrust in his handling of foreign affairs, but the voters Stevenson eir (Campbell, Gurin and Miller 1953). A survey of voters in st ), urban unrest (2 nd ) and the power of government (3 rd ) to be more salient to their decision in the ballot box than was escalation or de escalation of the Vietnam war (4 th ); or an immediate withdrawal/milita ry victory (9 th ) in the war (Boyd 1972). Finally, a Gallup survey conducted the week before the 2008 election showed the economy as the number one issue in the minds of Republicans, Independents and Democrats while terrorism tied for 2 nd with Republicans (51%), 3 rd for Independents (37%), and terrorism, Iraq, or Afghanistan failed to register in the top five responses for Democrats (Saad 2008). So if discontent over the Korean, Vietnam, and Afghan Iraq wars, as unpopular as they became over time, was not considered by voters to be their primary motivation for voting patterns, how can we conclude election s can be something as deliberate as a check on executive war powers? In order to find any levels

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41 look at economic questions to find it. with their economic situations is nothing new. There has been an extensive amount of research showing a closer correlation between the combination of real earnings of voters and presidential popularity and in party losses in Congress than any other factor (Tufte 1978, Lewis Beck and Rice 1984, Nadeau and Lewis Beck 2001, Campbell 2008). These results point to the possibility that there is an obstacle in the way of finding sup port finding support for the hypothesis that elections act as a check on executive war powers or change war policies. This obstacle is made manifest when the greatest outcome determining factors can be found in real earnings and presidential popularity ov er all other potential factors. This creates the opportunity for unpopular war policies to continue beyond an election if the economic and presidential popularity hurdles can be overcome, as was the case in 1972 and 2004. Many of the major studies on t he interplay between national economics and levels of incumbent reelection have utilized similar methods yielded similar findings. Tufte explained midterm congressional elections as referenda on the presidency over the previous two years and changes in re al disposable income (Tufte 1978). A few years later, Hibbs concluded that midterm election outcomes were specifically driven by changes in personal income based on quarter on quarter growth rates (Hibbs 1982). Lewis est correlation between the economic growth rate in real GNP per capita from nine to six months prior to the election and the

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42 election offered the best basis for forecasting presidential election results ( Lewis Beck and Rice 1984) significant relationship between election year real per capita income growth and the vote share of candidates in the in party, a lthough the relationship tends to punish Senators for below average growth much more than it rewards them for above average income growth who to vote for they tend to look back between about six and nine months regarding the real growth rate and about two years regarding the inflation rate (Fair 1998). Finally, quation combining the Labor Day poll standing of in party candidate and 2 nd quarter growth rate in the economy produces most accurate forecast of national two party popular vote (Campbell 2008). icacy. Nadeau and Lewis found voters considering the presidential office as the command post of the economy, irrespective of whether the president actually has sufficient control of Congress to implement his or her economic plan (Nadeau an d Lewis Beck 2001). s model produced findings showing o utcomes of presidential elections can be predicted rating, change in real GNP during election year, a nd timing of the election (Abramowitz election outcomes, with strong results showing t he economy matching candidate

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43 supplemental finding that the state of the economy is an even better predictor or an f the two major party candidates ( Ibid ). Though voters tend to approach elections first as referend a on the economy, presidents are still able to define them after the fact as mandates for their foreign policies. As Kelly theorized, by emphasizing the belief that elections carry message about problems, policies, and programs, election outcomes can then become specific enough to Suspiciously t hough presidents desire clear mandates while they are rarely achieved. President Nixon secured only 43% of the popular vote in 1968, Carter 50.1% in 1976, and Reagan just under 51% in 1980 and yet all three claimed a mandate ( Ibid ). P residents have tended to interpret election outcomes in opposition their immediate or near predecessors have. President Johnson using the language of war, proclaimed his intention to eliminate poverty following his victory in 1964 (Johnson 1965) while President Nixon three years before the fall of Saigon and the end of Viet nam war, rhetorically asked the nation how it would use the hard won peaceful era it was just entering (Nixon 1973). President Reagan claimed in his 1 st Inaugural Address his intention to curb the growth of government while dramatically increasing the nat military stance around the globe (Reagan 1981) President Clinton defined the preeminent mission of the same government to guarantee a real opportunity to build better lives for all citizens (Clinton 1997), but such opportunities were also being sen t abroad through economic globalization. Finally, because of his aggressive stance in the war on terror, President Bush proclaimed hope had returned to the nation when he was

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44 reelected in 2004 (Bush 2004) while President Obama, whose campaign had been alm ost claimed real change had come to America (Obama 2008). ANES Results: War Using ANES data from 1952 to 2010, we can view responses regarding executive wars as they were ongoing and examine respondents attitudes regarding war sentiments and high change elections. Once these have been provided, I will include summaries of economy to see which answers, war or economy, adhere closer to election results. These answer we can find regarding whether the voters themselves considered the elections as referenda s upporting or opposing executive wars or if they were focusing on alternative issues. respondents were asked if the U.S. had gone too far in concerning itself with problems around the world while a received a n equal division of answers.

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45 Table 4 : Global Role and Entering the Korean Conflict Agree/Agree, with Qualifications 52% (999) Yes, Did the Right Thing 40.6% (705) Pro Con, It Depends 2% (41) Pro Con 5.5% (96) Disagree/Disagree, with Qualifications 30% (572) No, Should Have Stayed Out 42.5% (739) Don't Know 7% (139) Don't Know 11% (198) NA or No Pre Election Interview 8% (148) NA or No Pre Election Interview 8% (148) In Party After Election R In Party After Election R Winning Presidential % 54.9 Winning Presidential % 54.9 Losing Presidential % 44.4 Losing Presidential % 44.4 evacuation: Table 5: Responses Regarding Future Korean War Policies Pull out of Korea Entirely 9.5% (167) Keep on Trying to Get a Peaceful Settlement 46% (810) Take a Stronger Stand and Bomb Manchuria/China 38.5% (374) Either 1 or 3 (But refuses to or Does Not Choose) 1% (18) Don't Know 4.6% (81) NA or No Pre Election Interview 8% (148) / / In Party After Election R Winning Presidential % 54.9 Losing Presidential % 44.4 posture in the abstract, the choice to get involved in the conflict, and what to do after its commencement in very telling ways. Essentially, the answers to an abstract question like the first are more isolationist, the answers to the moral second question are almost evenly split and the recommendation seeking third question feature answers where a plurality

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46 are in favor of seeking a peace settlement while four times as many support escalating the war than favor withdrawing. Regardless, it is difficult to find a correlation between the responses and the outcome of the election in November 1952. For responses pertaining to the Vietnam War, the ability to observe long term responses to the same questions shows us how public opinion evolved over its duration. fighting in Vie Table 6: Responses Voter Response 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 Yes, Did Right Thing 38% (551) 42% (535) 30% (472) 30% (455) 29% (777) Yes, Depends 0.1% (14) 0.7% (9) 1% (19) 0.9% (14) 5.6% (152) Should Have Stayed Out 24% (353) 29% (370) 51% (804) 49% (744) 57% (1539) Don't Know 17% (242) 19% (244) 16% (253) 19% (283) 8.5% (231) NA/Refused 0.05% (7) 1% (13) 0.5% (8) 0.7% (11) 0.15% (4) No Interest 19.5% (283) 7% (90) / / / / / / / / / In Party D D D R R Winning Presidential % 61.1 / 43.4 / 60.7 Losing Presidential % 38.5 / 42.7 / 37.5 The other question within ANES results which allows us to follow the trends in do you think we should do now in removed f rom the 1972 ANES questionnaire.

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47 Table 7: Responses Regarding Future Vietnam War Policies Response 1964 1966 1968 1970 Pull out of Vietnam entirely 10.7% (125) 9.7% (117) 19.5% (303) 32.4% (489) Keep soldiers in but try to end 30.3% (352) 38.5% (460) 36.7% (571) 32% (483) Take stronger stand, even invade North 38.8% (450) 38.8% (464) 33.5% (522) 24% (362) Don't Know 19.2% (223) 10.3% (123) 6.6% (103) 5.7% (86) N/A 0.7% (9) 0.3% (4) 0.3% (6) 0.6% (9) / / / / / In Party D D D R Winning Presidential % 61.1 / 43.4 / Losing Presidential % 38.5 / 42.7 / Unlike the results in the prior question which resulted in a clear majority of those who viewed our entry into Vietnam as something that should have been avoided, there was still a somewhat even split among respondents regarding what the policy should be i n 1970. The Republicans did lose 13 House seats in 1970, but they also gained one seat in the Senate; suggesting the electorate was more patient with President Nixon two years into his administration than they were with the Johnson led Democrats in 1966. The Iranian Hostage Crisis of 1979 1981 was a front page event which was interpreted widely as one where the U.S. was caught flat footed when the American embassy in Tehran was overrun. The Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 also terests in the region began to be threatened. A question in the 1980 ANES survey asked respondents to indicate their indicate a stronger level of support than not. When th

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48 Table 8: Responses Regarding Handling of American Hostages in Iran Strongly Approv e 35.3% (356) Not Strongly Approve 19.3% (193) Both Approve and Disapprove 0 Not Strongly Disapprove 8.3% (83) Strongly Disapprove 30% (301) Don't Know 6% (60) N/A 0.9% (9) In Party D Winning Presidential % 50.7 Losing Presidential % 41 Given the actions we now know President Carter took, when respondents were asked about the invasion of Afghanistan the numbers, paradoxically, came in more critical to the administration. Another question requested respondents consider President cutting back on American trade and ties with the Soviet Union and asked them, In this section the answers show a de sire by a significant minority for President Carter to have done more as a response although he had suspended talks with the Soviet Union, boycotted the Moscow Olympics, and authorized covert aid to the mujahedeen.

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49 Table 9: Responses Regarding President Afghanistan Reacted too strongly 3.4% (34) Response has been about right 56.75% (566) Reacted not strongly enough 34.6% (345) Don't Know 5.3% (53) In Party D Winning Presidential % 50.7 Losing Presidential % 41 Interestingly, President Carter received higher marks for the Iranian crisis which was marked more by failure than the one in Afghanistan which was not as widely known by the majority of Americans. By the time this ANES study had been completed, President Carter had unsuccessfully attempted to free the hostages in Iran; an action which led to the crash of the rescue helicopter and the death s of eight servicemen. Unbeknownst to much of the public, Carter had also initiated Operation Cyclone which would eventually grow to become the largest covert undertaking the CIA had ever attempted and would lead to billions of dollars of aid being sent to the Afghanistan during the Reagan administration. Turning to the most recent examples of executive wars in Afghani stan and Iraq during the war on terror, ANES results have indicated deteriorating public support over handling of the War on Terror and both the Afghan and Iraqi fronts due to the inconsistencies in survey questions. Respondents were only asked four times over the past six surveys whether they felt the war in Afghanistan had been worth the cost. In orth were removed from the

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50 ANES questionnaire, but his handling of the war on terror was tracked in 2006 and his handling of the Afghanistan war was tracked in 2008. Table 10: Responses Regarding Worthiness of Invadin g Afghanistan Afghanistan 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 Worth It 79.8% (948) 68.9% (835) / / 36.8% (578) 26.4% (1562) Not Worth It 17% (202) 29% (352) / / 62.8% (985) 70.5% (4170) Don't Know 2% (25) 1.9% (23) / / / 1.9% (115) Refused 0.25% (3) 0.16% (2) / / / 1.1% (67) N/A 0.75% (9) 0 / / 0.3% (5) 0 In Party R R R R D D Winning Presidential % / 50.70% / 52.90% / 51.10% Losing Presidential % / 48.30% / 45.70% / 47.20% in Afghanistan The responses light of the heavy losses in party Republicans experienced in both chambers of Congress. Losing 30 House seats and 6 Senate seats that year to the Democrats while recording an almost 6 po were motivated by more salient factors than national security.

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51 Finally, when asked over a series of surveys if respondents felt the war in Iraq had been worth the costs, again the ov erall trend is clear but the high change election year of Table 12: Responses Regarding Worthiness of Invading Iraq Iraq 2004 2006 2008 2010 Worth It 38.36% (465) / 20.4% (475) 27.1% (426) Not Worth It 58.9% (714) / 76.5% (1776) 75.6% (1138) Don't Know 2.48% (30) / 2.6% (61) / Refused 0.25% (3) / 0.4% (10) 0.25% (4) In Party R R R D Winning Presidential % 50.70% / 52.90% / Losing Presidential % 48.30% / 45.70% / During the surveys conducted since 2004, Iraq was consistently the war viewed regret Iraq had until American troops had been pulled out of Iraq and Afghanistan had become again the central theater of the War on T error. But from the ANES results spanning the executive wars from Korea to the present, the ANES data provided fail to correlate war attitudes with their corresponding elections. For example, the election of 1972 presents a problem for the idea that elect ions do act as a check on unpopular war policies. Although Vietnam was an incredibly unpopular issue at the time and third party candidate George McGovern was an outspoken advocate for its end, President Nixon won with an overwhelming majority of the popu lar vote while Congressional Republicans had mixed results; having gained thirteen seats in the House and while two seats in the Senate were lost.

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52 ANES Results: Personal and National Economics perceived worth) more consistent trend in the data. ANES surveys have consistently included questions national financial situation, both retrospectively and prospectively. These data give us the m ost complete election year representation of how the respondents have felt over generations over a long term perspective Below are the total results for how respondents related their personal economic situations; first during the previous year and then how they expect their personal financial situations to be in the following year. To focus on cases where large changes occurred, I have identified high change elections where the in party gained five percent or more of seats in either chamber of congress The reason for this is that such elections represent statistically significant outcomes; doubling the average levels of seat changes. The average biennial election results in a loss of 2.7 percent of House seats and 2.3 percent of Senate seats by the i n party. As such, a five percent change in either chamber approximately represents twice the amount of change typical election outcomes create. This will let us test the Using averages based upon ANES results and comparing results taken from high change election years, the correlation between economic attitudes and elections becomes d their

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53 corresponding el ections. What we see when we look at ANES responses pertaining to wars has been a mixed bag of the in victory in 1972, some four years after he was elected by vaguely promising to end the Vietnam War, or th e Republican losses in the 2006 midterm elections when President Bush had a five point advantage in ANES responses regarding his handling of the war on What the follo wing results demonstrate is that optimistic responses about the following personal economic situations are less positive than average during high change election years adding to the in party; a trend absent from ANES survey questions pertaining to w ar policies in the same years. Table 13: Historical Tables of ANES Responses for Personal Economic Situations

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54 Table 14: Personal Economic Situations During In Party High Change Gain Elections, ANES Two of these elections are anomalies as 1960 s aw in party Republicans gain seats while losing the presidency and 2000 saw the Democrats gain seats in Congress while Republican George W. Bush secured a majority in the Electoral College while losing the popular vote. Table 15: Personal Economic Situations During In Party High Change Loss Elections, ANES High Change Losses High Change Losses Personal, Last Year Better Same Worse Personal, Next Year Better Same Worse 1958 / / / 1958 43 44 13 1966 35 39 26 1966 35 53 12 1968 34 47 20 1968 34 56 10 1974 28 31 41 1974 22 45 33 1980 32 25 42 1980 30 49 22 1982 30 32 38 1982 27 55 18 1986 40 33 27 1986 40 49 12 1994 39 33 28 1994 33 59 7 2006 / / / 2006 / / / 2008 32 18 50 2008 37 49 15 Avg 33.75 32.25 34 Avg 33.44 51 15.77 ANES Avg 36 34.4 29.6 ANES Avg 35.6 51.6 12.76 Change 2.25 2.15 4.4 Change 2.16 0.6 3.01

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55 Despite the overall similarity in the average Worse responses for following year predictions, higher than average pessimism does persist. What is missing though is a consistent correlation between how pessimistic respondents felt and the level of losses for the in party that November. Worse prediction was slightly higher than the ANES average when the in party Republicans lost 52 House and 12 Senate seats that year. 1966 registered slightly lower than the ANES average when the in party Democrats lost 47 House and seven Senate seats. Finally, predictions in 197 4 were t he highest registered to date when the in party Republicans lost 49 House and five Senate seats. So while heavy losses occurred in election years where responses were slightly higher than average (1958), lower than average (1966), or at a record high (197 4), when high change losses are all taken together, higher than average economic pessimism has consistently been recorded during election cycles when high change elections have occurred. Starting in the 1980 ANES survey, respondents have been asked to provide their their predictions for the national economy for the following year. By examining the avera ge of these results, the data show again that responses during high change elections since 1980 appear to be more consistent during years where the in party lost seats th an years where they gained them, noting again the anomaly of 2000 where the in party g ained seats but lost the presidency. During high change elections where in party membership decreased, we can note both very similar levels of optimism and the only collection of average responses which are more opti mistic than the overall average.

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56 Table 16: Historical Tables of ANES Responses for National Economic Assessments Table 17: National Economic Situations During In Party High Change Loss Elections, ANES The differences between average responses for personal financial situations economic situation (Fisher 2006). If individuals are doing well financially, we would expect the average responses about the national economic situation to correlate to a

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57 certain extent so overall trends go up and down together. But according to the ANES average s since 1980 where questions about personal and national situations have been asked, Worse responses about the previous year were higher for national appraisals wh ich were even higher for national appraisals than for personal. These results point to worse than the individuals themselves. ANES data fails to demonstrate that ant i war sentiment is a dominant factor motivating voting behavior, and therefore, election outcomes. After the election of President Eisenhower in 1952, ANES responses showed an almost even split between whether the U.S. should have gotten involved in the w ar or not and only 9.5% favored pulling out of the conflict immediately. During the early years of the Vietnam conflict when Democrats were the in party, 1964 was a high change election for them while 1966 years before. Not surprisingly given the status of the war at that time, the ANES results did not register much change in become involved in the war did not become t he majority in ANES results until 1968. But Once national optimism began to be tracked with the 1980 ANES survey, and his response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the results offered overall support for his actions in excess of 50% on both issues, but h e still lost the election that year.

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58 During the War on Terror, a majority of respondents supported taking action against Iraq before the invasion and when that majority changed in 2004, President Bush was not only easily reelected over Senator John Kerry, but the Republican in party gained four seats in the Senate almost qualifying it as a high Responses about Afghanistan grew increasingly negative, but due to the absence of questions about Iraq or Afghanistan f or 2006 when the Democrats regained the majorities in both chambers of Congress and 2008 when in party status changed hands means we cannot find answers to the question of voters rejecting the in party or not from the ANES data. Due to the weak correlatio n of responses to foreign affairs questions vis vis election outcomes, ANES results demonstrate answers which are more consistent when questions regarding economic situations are asked when those answers are compared the corresponding election outcomes; thus corresponding with the research of Tufte, Campbell, and others. Responses about personal and national financial situations have tended to increase against the in party during high change elections with the only exception being the level of future pes simism leading to in party losses during mid term elections since 1980. Studies that have previously occurred during wartime have shown an increase in the amount of anti war sentiment over time, but those increases fail to reach levels that match the hi gh change outcomes the elections yield. As a result it is difficult to conclude from these results that even unpopular wars, though they are a part of the issue matrix voters bring with them to the polls, appear to be the galvanizing issue that leads to h igh change elections against the in party.

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59 In order for this to be the case, voters would first need to have a full grasp of the issue as it relates to their own priorities and those presented by the candidates. As The American Voter put it, the process for this conclusion to be true would have to involve a majority of the voters caring about the issue with some passion, taking a position on the issue, being familiar with the positions of the competing candidates, and seeing some differences among those positions (Norpoth playing out in the ANES responses regarding war policies. In terms of economic factors, so called Misery I ndex. The Misery Index, defined as the sum of unemployment and inflation multiplied by the percentage identifying the economy as the most important problem facing the country in polls (James and Oneal 1991) appears to be an accurate metric by which elec tion outcomes, and possibly the onset of executive wars, can be predicted. According to Hess and Orphanides, t he probability of conflict initiation or escalation exceeds 60 percent in years in which a president is up for reelection and the economy is doin g poorly. By contrast, the probability is only about 30 percent in years in which either the economy is healthy or a president is not up for reelection (Hess and Orphanides 1995). the elusive answer to the question of economics shaping wars or wars shaping economics remains unanswered, there is a consensus within existing literature that points to the Misery Index being a fundamental motivator for voters at the polls; even greater t han the unpopularity of ongoing wars.

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60 These results present two problems to the question of elections acting as a check on executive war powers: one being the responses held against the corresponding election outcomes and the other being the relatively short period of time they inquired about worst showings for the in party do not corr elate with their election outcomes. This was the case in 2010 when the out party Republicans gained 64 seats from the Democrats in the House, the largest gain in House seats in the post war era, while the nation was winding down the unpopular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; wars the Republicans had been held accountable for during the previous two election cycles and which contributed to George W. Bush near historic low job approval numbers when he left office in January, 2009

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61 CHAPTER IV CASE STUDIES: ELECTIONS AND RECORDED CHANGES IN WAR POLICIES The case studies discussed in this section focus o n eight elections which have occurred within four political contexts while comparing pre and post election levels of defense spending, troop de ployments, and peace negotiations with opposing parties in the region The four contexts examined are instances of Abandoned Incumbency (1952, 1968), Ideological Shift (1980, 2008), Midterm Shift (1994, 2006 ), and Congressional Blocks (1974, 1982). Abandon ed Incumbency refers to elections where incumbent presidents were eligible to run for reelection, but they declined to do so. Ideological Shift refers to elections where the incumbent president was an adherent to one ideological position and his successor was an adherent to an opposing (i.e. conservative to progressive, or multilateralist to unilateralist). Midterm Shift cases focus on elections where the majority in Congress changes. Finally, Congressional Blocks refers to cases where Congress has been falsely accused of de funding a military operation (Jespersen 1984). What t hese cases show is that despite ideological changes in the White House, unified or divid ed government, and Congressional prohibitions on executive discretion, the overall trend reveals events in each situation outside of the elections have determined policy changes. There have been cases where troop levels were decreased as was the case in V ietnam post 1968 and Iraq post 2008. But the decreases in Vietnam took four

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62 years while the decreases in Iraq had already been arranged prior to the 2008 election by the Iraqi American Status of Forces Agreement. There have also been decreases in spendin g in the past such as the post lasting. Nor have they withstood unforeseen events such as the onset of the Korean War or the attacks of Sep tember 11, 2001. Finally, the cases selected feature different military conflicts that this study defines or characterizes as wars, but which may not fall into the classic definition of wars. Though the legal definition may differ slightly and the wars i ncluded in this study represent different examples the case studies qualify as they are all periods featuring the use of military assets to achieve foreign policy objectives in hostile nations. Legally speaking, there is a difference between authorized w ars (Vietnam, Iraq 2003, and Afghanistan 2001), funded wars (Korea, Serbia, and Kosovo), and clandestine wars (Afghanistan 1979 and Nicaragua 1984 ) as they reflect upon cooperation between the president and Congress. Not all of these examples are wars as declare the president empowered to carry them out in unquestionable terms. But for the purpose of securing diverse examples and demonstrat e how the executive branch has used the powers it has been bequeathed, the conflicts of Ko rea, Vietnam, Nicaragua, Haiti, Serbia, Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan are referred to as executive wars because they did not follow in the model of the declared wars against Britain (1812), Mexico (1846), Spain (1898), the Central Powers (1917), and the Axi s Powers (1941). Soon after the decreases seen at the conclusion of WWII, the overall trend in DOD funding ha s been one of alternating periods of flat lining followed by periods of

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63 exponential growth, with levels never returning to what they were before t he alterna te changes. Eras of similar funding form the appearance of steps with each one representing a new plateau below which the next step does not fall. Step 1 (1951 1966) was superseded by increases in funding that led to Step 2 (1967 1978). Step 3 (1986 1999) preceded the massive increases during the George W. Bush administration and it remains to be seen how deep DOD cuts will be and how long they will remain now that the global war on terror which was so much of a driver of military spending has been declared over by Pr esident Obama (Shrinkman 2013). And while the greatest eras of increased spending occurred during the terms of Presidents Nixon, Reagan, and George W. Bush, their successors appear to have been either unable or unwilling to push th rough changes which would have returned spending levels to what they had been before the increases. Figure 1 DOD Spending by Year: 1945 to 2013 ( In Millions, 2013 ) 0 100,000 200,000 300,000 400,000 500,000 600,000 700,000 800,000 1945 1948 1951 1954 1957 1960 1963 1966 1969 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011

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64 In the post World War II value in time of adversity (Medhurst 2000) while coping with the reality that the U. S. and its partners did not have the forces ready and available to reverse Soviet mov es at the obal influence, and force it to conform to accepted in ternational standards ( Ibid ). What followed, after the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950, was the first real States, Soviet Union, and Communist China. President Truman sent troops to support the South on June 30, 1950, as part of a by following the UN authorization for the invasion rather than seeking a formal declaration of war or any other authorization or any other authorization from Congress (Crabtree 2003). This move created a fulcrum in the history of constitutionalis bello or constitutional war, between the president and Congress, meaning Congressional authorization for t he prolonged deployment of troops into an active war zone with the legislative sanction of Congress had been circumvented by citing the authorization of an international body ( Gallagher 2011). exponentially. The American military presence on the Korean Peninsula increased from

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65 under 500 to over 48,000, on its way to a highpoint during the Truman administration of 196 5). In addition to this, the decline in spending the Department of Defense (DOD) had endured since the end of World War II was reversed to almost three times pre Korean levels by the time President Truman left office Figure 2 Truman D OD Spending By Year (In Millions, 2013) Although troop levels and military spending quickly increased, negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the Korean War took almost a year to formally begin. Negotiations began at Kaesong in July 1951 and were expected to be soon concluded (Matray 2012). These hopes soon faded as the Communists adopted an uncompromising posture in reaction to the first proposal submitted by the U.S. delegation ( Ibid ). The talks remained essentiall y stalled for the duration of the Truman administration as the president remained firm in his conviction that the forced repatriation of prisoners of war against

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66 their w ill would not be allowed (Boose 2000). In the coming years, support for the administra ed from a high of 78% (Crabtree 2003), culminating in lai Stevenson (1960 proclaimed during his acceptance speech and the Republican National Convention he was nst fascism a decade before (Cannon 2004). Eisenhower sought to end the war in Korea quickly and had no compunctions with threatening to utilize nuclear weapons to meet any perceived threat to His New Look policy centered on f our dimensions aimed directly at shoring up nations sided with the U.S. while making aggression its allies appear to be a grave mistake. These included threatening nuclear attacks to minimize strategic risk and control spending [Military], upholding Ameri avoid the regional instability socialist movements thrived within [Economy], committing to defense, advancement, and de colonization of free world allies [Political], and demonstrating freedom as the appeal of the American system of government [Psychology], all of which prioritized the U.S. being the blue line between Soviet global domination (Metz 1993). transition from Truman t o Eisenhower did no t lead to a diminution of willingness to employ war powers. As unpopular as the Korean War had become by 1953, Eisenhower

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67 even deployin g over 56,000 more troops by the time the armistice had been signed in July 1953 than Tru man had pr eviously Figure 3 U.S. Troop Levels, Korean War ( Statistical Data on Strength and Casualties for In addition to increasing American troops in Korea, Army appropr iations nearly tripled from $6 billion before Korea to $17 billion by the end of the war (Fautua 1997). these levels would remain almost unchanged throughout his administration and almost three times higher than pre Korean War lev els. 0 50000 100000 150000 200000 250000 300000 1/1/1950 1/1/1951 1/1/1952 1/1/1953

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68 Figure 4 Eisenhower DOD Spending By Year (In Millions, 2013) The greatest impact of the change from Truman to Eisenhower took place in the stall ed peace negotiations in Kaesong. Having languished since 1951 on questions such on forced repatriations ( Boose 2000). Four months after Eisenhower was sworn in, the decision was made that if no progress was found, the allied forces would initiate a military offensive that might include attacks on China and th e use of nuclear weapons ( Ibid ); a move which then Secretary of State Allen Dulles later credited with bringing about the swift end to the war fall of the Soviet Union that dispute the effectiveness of these threats co mpared to the Khrushchev (Weathersby 1999). 0 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960

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69 did not lead to the de escalation of the Korean War, but to the globalization of it via the threat of nuclear weapons being used against the North Koreans and Chinese. At the same time, American troop levels increased in Korea, spending levels never returned to their pre war levels and the peace negot iations ended roughly as they had been brokered under Truman, save the instances of nuclear threats and the death of Joseph Stalin. In the end, the Eisenhower administration did not significantly change Truman era policies. It only prosecuted what previo usly had been treated as a local war as a hemispheric one until the armistice was signed. 1968: From The presidential election of 1968 resulted in similar outcomes to those seen after the election of 1952 in that an isolated war became internationalized But rather than simply threatening to expand the operation into a neighboring country such as China, ployment of American troops and munitions into Cambodia and Laos This expansion would not have been possible though had it not been for the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964; a resolution whose equal did not exist in the Korean conflict and in whose wake Congress took steps to correct in the form of the War Powers Act of 1973 (Anderson, et al. 2011). Though American aid and troops acting in an advisory capacity had initially been sent to Vietnam by Eisenhower in 1954, their numbers grew considerably under watch; increasing them from 700 in January 1961 to 16,000 by the end of 1963 ( Ibid ).

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70 During the Johnson administration, troop levels and spending were dramatically d States would and only escalation to higher levels of troop deployment was preferred by the president ( Ibid ). Throughout 1965 the number of American forces in Vietnam again rose dramatically by reaching 47,000 in May, with 50,000 more deployed in July and another 50,000 scheduled for deployment b y the end of the year (Logevall 2004). By the end of 1968, there were over a half r Allied 2008). At the same time, DOD spending levels had increased 30% from the levels seen when Johnson assumed the White Ho use. Figure 5 Johnson DOD Spending By Year (In Millions, 2013) By the end of 1967, it became a working and Johnson began to pressure South Vietnamese President Thieu to consider 0 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000 70,000 80,000 90,000 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968

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71 opening talks with the National Liberation Front (NLF) representatives of North Vietnam (Anderson, et al. 2011). Though Thieu refuse d, Johnson took the step in March 1968 to unilaterally order a limited bombing halt for most of North Vietnam while remaining ready to dispatch an American delegation to any peace conferences the resulted (Sieg 1996). These negotiations began in Paris in support, and while the Johnson administration pushed feverishly for an end to hostilities before the November election, few regarded any victory in Vietnam as a meaningful possibility (Mil ne 2011). When the election of 1968 came, despite negotiations having and the unilateral implementation of a halt to all U.S. bombing operations against North Vietnam, Richard Nixon still defeated Vice President Humphrey. ds race and urban unrest (Boyd 1972) led Republicans to gain five House seats, seven Senate seats, and the White House (Sieg 1996). After 1968 aimed to balance the existing demands of the war while it laid out some vague features. These included negotiating with the Soviets and China, use of force and the util

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72 (Anderson et al. 2011). And though there were multiple occasions when President Nixon indicated he was in no hurry for withdrawal, American forces in Vietnam did see consistent reductions in numbers from 1969 until the end of the war (Page and Brody 1972). These decreases continued through 1970 when the withdrawal of 150,000 U.S. troops was announced despite increased activity by the North and a lack of progress was being seen in the Paris negotiations (Katz 1997). Thus, the speed with which the of the war transpired was almost identical Americaniz ation under President Johnson. Figure 6 U.S. Troop Levels, Vietnam War ( Vietnam War Allied T roop Levels 1960 Though President Nixon did change policies by decreasing American troop levels in Vietnam, he also unilaterally introduced them into Cambodia and Laos. Only two months into his first term, Nixon approved the Menu bombing campaign as a means to destroy North Vietnamese supply lines running through Cambodia. This step was taken 0 100000 200000 300000 400000 500000 600000

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73 without Congressional approval and it expanded the theater of combat a neighboring country, led to the destabilization and fall of the Cambodian monarchy, and c reated an alliance of convenience among Cambodian, Vietnamese and Chinese communists (Morocco 1985, Anderson, et al. 2011). Under pressure by the public, Congress, and internal dissention in his own administration, Nixon pulled U.S. forces out of Cambodia in June of 1970 (Anderson, et al. 2011). Although five months earlier he began a bombing campaign in Laos which would drop over 58,000 tons of bombs to stop North Vietnamese soldiers from taking the country (Leary 1995). In terms of DOD spending, 1968 did mark the highpoint during the Vietnam era, having grown substantially under President Johnson. Starting in 1969, spending levels on national defense began a downward trend that continued through the end of the war, though they began to rise sharply a ncy. Figure 7 Nixon DOD Spending By Year (In Millions, 2013) 70,000 72,000 74,000 76,000 78,000 80,000 82,000 84,000 86,000 88,000 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975

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74 While peace negotiations with the North Vietnamese were ultimately successful destabilizing. During the fall of 1968, representatives from the Nixon campaign had been s ending signals to the Thieu regime that the South may obtain a better deal once Johnson was out of the White House. And though President Johnson viewed these actions as nd 2011). Beginning in July of 1969, the Nixon administration embarked on a two tracked approach to negotiating with the North. The first track involved the furth er Vietnamization of the war as American troops were slowly withdrawn. The second track, making followed by increased violence in Northern territories ( Ibid ). By October 1972, negotiations had arrived at an agreement which called for all U.S. forces to leave Indochina, gave Northern communists legal authority over the territory they controlled, and, finally, achieved an agreement between both sides that Vietnam was in fact one country; avoiding the partit ion which divided both Germany and Korea at the time ( Ibid ). Finally, in January 1973, the Paris gradual abandonment of all negotiating planks save retaining the South Vietnamese gover n ment for Nguyen Van Thieu (Katz 1997). Just like in Korea, this in party change during a war in East Asia led to the escalation of the war before it led to a truce. While Eisenhower only threatened to expand the conflict into neighboring China, Nixon ac tually did it in Cambodia and Laos.

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75 movements, the decision to secretly move troops and drop bombs into Cambodia without Congressional approval and the decision to bomb areas in Laos, a nation who was officially neutral, represent the problems that elections have in dramatically changing existing policies during an ongoing war when the opposing forces are determined to continue fighting. Troops were ultimately withdrawn from Vietnam, military spending for five more years 1974: Vietnam and Ending a War f or $700 million Once the Vietnam War had ended and its main proponents had time to reflect spread. In describing the mood in Washington, D.C. during the final days of the war, Lewy w rote weary Congress, in the face of a badly weakened executive, became increasingly anxious to liquidate any further American involvement in Southeast s which undermined the South (Jespersen 2002). Henry Kissinger abdication, cut off m ilitary and economic assistance to people whom we had given every encouragement to count on our protection ( Ibid ). But when the facts are examined

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76 regarding what actions congress and President Ford took leading up to the fall of Saigon in 1975, the narrat ive of congress losing a winnable war falls short of being objective. When President Nixon resigned in August 1974, Vice President Gerald Ford assumed the office in the midst of a plethora of policies which prevented him from significantly changing the di rection of the war. The signing of the Paris Peace Accords had removed U.S. troops from Vietnam in 1973 and the Nixon Kissinger team had China (Jespersen 2002). Militar increase again in 1974 while Vice size of the Army from 1.6 million to 800,000, passage of the War Powers Act of 1973 and the elimin ation of the draft represented a more assertive Congress attempting to wrest power back from t he presidency Defense Melvin Laird had simultaneously engineered the withdrawal of American troops from while President Nixon, followed by President Ford continued to request emergency aid continue to be sent in support of the South Vietnamese government ( Mieczkowski 2005) I n January 1975, North Vietnamese forces advanced int o Southern territory, marking the first time Northern forces had occupied Southern territory ( Ibid ). Yet while Congress had appropriated $700 million of the $1.45 billion former President Nixon had reque sted for that fiscal year (Moise 2005), then President Ford requested an additional $522 million in emergency aid for both South Vietnam and Cambodia w hich was

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77 threatened by a communist insurgency (Mieczkowski 2005). C ongress denied all requests in excess of what had already been allocated for that fiscal year Over the next two years, President Ford intended on continuing funding the South Vietnamese up to $1 billion for the 1975/1976 fiscal year and $1.3 billion for the 1976 1977 fiscal year (Jespersen 2002) while military spending continued its post 1973 increase s. Figure 8 Nixon/Ford DOD Spending By Year (In Millions, 2013) But with the fall of Saigon in April 1975, no more budget negotiations between the White House and Congress were necessary as there was no South Vietnam remaining to support. An unnamed South Vietnamese official accused the U.S. of setting up the you have the material we need and we do not have the vast arsenal or anywhere near the kind of supplies that the Communists have (Goodman 1975). That may have been correct, but 70,000 75,000 80,000 85,000 90,000 95,000 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976

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78 the $700 million the U.S. was providing to the South Vietnamese government in 1974/1975 was, when adjusted for inflation, greater than the amount it later covertly provided to the mujahedeen some ten years later in their struggle against the Soviet Union (Tyler and Ottowa y 1986). With the Vietnam War over, the policy goals of the Ford administration shifted from a war footing to that of dtente. In what was symbolically the final battle of the Vietnam War, the SS May a guez, an American container ship, was seized in intern ational waters by Cambodian soldiers and the crew was taken hostage. But rather than internationalizing the incident by pressuring the Soviets or Chinese who held sway over and the swift recall of all military personnel involved in Cambodia (Gawthorpe 2009). Negotiations between the U.S. and Soviets also continued with the signing of the Lithua nia and acquiesced to Soviet domination of Eastern Europe (Snyder 2010). Years later, Ford himself credited the agreement with bringing about the human rights revolutions in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary while perpetuating an easing of Soviet America n tensions in the post Vietnam era (Snyder 2010). So what changes in troop, spending, and peace negotiations can be found in a post 1974 Ford administration? U.S. forces in Vietnam had already been withdrawn by the time President Ford took office as pa rt of the Paris Peace negotiations, though he declined to use more force than he could have during the Mayaguez incident and avoided pinning responsibility for Cambodian actions on fellow communists in Moscow or Beijing. Spending levels at the DOD began t o rise in 1973 and continued undiminished

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79 already been concluded while the dtente between the Soviet Union and U.S. and the establishment of close ties with China all beg (Jespersen 2002). With these steps already in place, it allowed President Ford to focus on his own Pacific Doctrine stressing the importance of the Japanese and American alliance, normalize relations with China, and st ructure economic cooperation with nations in Southeast Asia (Ford 1975) as communist domination of the region had already become a settled issue. When Jimmy Carter was elected president in 1976, the post Vietnam status of international affairs was a strained one which he aimed to fix. As Brinkley put it, Jimmy Carter became the first president since Woodrow Wilson to try actively to reform repressive regimes in other nations (Berggren and Rae 20 06). After entering the White House full of optimism, he hoped he would be able to reduce international tensions through communicating with Soviet leaders and by agreeing to major arms reductions (Aronoff 2006). But the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in D ecember 1979 shook his optimism and his actions became more forceful. In reaction to the Soviet invasion, Carter initiated clandestine support for resistance groups in Soviet occupied Afghanistan with the objective of minimizing Soviet power in southwes t Asia (Prados 2002, Sidky 2007). The mujahedeen fighters from all over the Muslim world who flocked to Afghanistan, who were seen by the West as being

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80 draw the Soviet s into their own Vietnam style trap (Sidky 2007). Dubbed Operation Cyclone, was unconventional and covert in nature. It was led by the U.S., but it left no real smoking gun. The soldiers on the ground were not American and their weapons were provided by the CIA through third party producers and nations (Bearden 2001). Soviet made weapons were made in Egypt while cash subsidies and assistance with smuggling them in were provided by international partners (Sidky 2007). Military spending during the Carter administration also became more aggressive. DOD funding levels continued the increases it had seen during the waning years of the increases for the first time since the J ohnson administration (Johnson 1989) Figure 9 Carter DOD Spending By Year (In Millions, 2013) ( On the negotiations front, President Carter announced a boycott of the Moscow Olympics in 1980, suspended the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) 0 20,000 40,000 60,000 80,000 100,000 120,000 140,000 160,000 1977 1978 1979 1980

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81 negotiations, an embargo was imposed on the sale of grain and modern technology to the Soviet Union, So viet fishing in American waters was curtailed, and diplomatic relations were indefinitely postponed as Ambassador Watson was called back from Mo scow (Jabeen, Mazhar and Goraya 2010). To put it succinctly, President Carter essentially shut down high level communication between Washington, D.C. and Moscow in a way the whole world could see it. High inflation, high unemployment, foreign embarrassments, and a wide feeling of di scontent had taken over the mood of the country and the lengthy public debate about f the Reagan campaign (Petrocik 1996). During the campaign, Reagan had claimed that the Soviets had conducted the d let U.S. forces atrophy (Pach 2006), thus chipping away at the foreign affairs advant age an incumbent president typically relies upon. And with recent setbacks in Southeast Asia, Africa, Central America, the hostage situation in Iran and Afghanistan still under Soviet control, both the domestic economic and international environments were conducive to the argument that the U.S. was in a weak position (Newmann 2004). supporting the mujahedeen via the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) rather than intr oducing CIA officers into the theater (Prados 2002). When the Soviets introduced MI 24D attack helicopters a few years later, the administration approved supplying anti Soviet fighters with Stinger missiles; known as the most effective anti aircraft weapo n at

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82 the time (Sidky 2007). Using minimal assets aside from funding and covert officers, the United States began inflicting serious losses upon Soviet forces which, in the end, did give the Soviets their own Vietnam without the loss of American lives. Ov erall DOD spending during the Reagan administration expanded as well. Funding for Afghanistan rose from $30 40 million in 1981 to almost $700 million provided betwe en $6 9 billion in weapons (Pach 2006, Tyler and Ottoway 1986, Sidky posture against the Soviet Union : Figure 10 Reagan DOD Spending, First Term (In Millions, 2013) Finally, high Union on the subject of Afghanistan until 1982. Expecting Reagan to be complicit with worked towards an 0 50,000 100,000 150,000 200,000 250,000 1981 1982 1983 1984

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83 acceptance of mutual equality with the hopes that such overtures would be returned. ment on the Afghan 1985 (Jabeen, Mazhar and Goraya 2010). In this situation where there was a change from a more liberal administration to a more conservative one spending, and negotiation policies. The Carter administration was marked domestically by the consolidation of more federal bureaucracy in the form of the Department of Energy and Department to foreign policies while Ronald Reagan asserted in his first inaugural speech that government was the problem in the country and advocated a strong American military presence around the world. 1982 : Iran Contra and Turning the Tables of Vietnam The case of the midterm elections of 1982 is unique for two reasons. First, the military conflict the administration was engaged in was covertly supporting proxy groups the administration believed would inc rease the costs of Soviet expansion (Pach 2006). Deemed the Reagan Doctrine, this tactic focused upon low intensity warfare as a means of projecting American power while providing efforts to help democratic movements and forces effect political change in Moscow aligned nations (Kornbluh 1987/1988, Pach 2006). The second reason this case is unique is because of the deliberate and illegal steps the administration took to go around legislation passed by Congress which prohibited the

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84 use of funds for the purp ose of overthrowing the Sandinista government in Nicaragua Knowing these actions were illegal, the Reagan administration allowed arms to be sold to Iran and the profits to be routed to the Contras Prior to the 1982 midterms, the Reagan administration had been firmly committed to supporting freedom fighters around the world like the mujahedeen in Afghanistan as part of its effort to support anti communist groups (Pach 2006). Likewise, gr oups in Angola, Mozambique, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Cambodia also received financial and Ottaway 1986). So when Congress passed legislation prohibiting military funds for the Nicaraguan Contras, the administration had a choice to make: do they abide by the law or do they proceed with their strategy of supporting anti communist groups? The answer the administration came up with was to get creative with the source of the funds and to support the Contras anyway. In 1981, the administration sent word to the Nicaraguan government that arms shipments to neighboring El Salvadorian guerrillas would not be permitted to continue. And though the Nicaraguan government complied, the U.S. cancelled a $15 billion disbursement in economic aid and suspended Nicaraguan credit lines used to purchase wheat (Roberts 1990). Over the next year, negotiations over Nicaraguan troops and weapons acquisitions became strained as it became clear that the only settlement the U.S. government would accept was the demise of the Sandinista government itself ( Ibid ).

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85 When the election returns came in for the 1982 midterms, it became evident the catalyst for Republican losses was the poor economic rec overy over the previous two years. With the onset of the 1981 recession, the national unemployment rate reached a post World War II high of 10.8 percent (Urquhart and Hewson 1983), causing respondents in the 1982 ANES survey to list unemployment, domestic issues having precedence over foreign issues, and government spending/balanced budget as the most important issues. As a result, the Republicans lost 26 House seats but gained two seats in the Senate while in the final days of 1982, the president signed the defense appropriation act featuring the Boland Amendments which prohibited funds to support the overthrow of Over a year later, a meeting was held by the National Security Planning Group i n June of 1984 that contained the highest level members of the Reagan administration and resulted in the initiation of an act which was at most an impeachable offense and at least a case of brazen sophistry. During the meeting, the heart of the Iran Contr a Scandal was discussed wherein weapons would be illegally sold to Iran hoping they would pressure arms sales would be routed to the Contras in Nicaragua. In attendance were President Reagan, Secretary of Weinberger, Secretary of State Shultz, UN Ambassador Kirkpatrick, and others; all of whom were discussing ways to maintain pressure upon Nicaragua. Secretary of State Shultz is quoted in the transcript as war I would like to get money for the Contras, but another lawyer...said that if we go out and try to get money from third countries, it is an impeachable offense Ambassador Kirkpatrick then warned if the U.S. failed to fund

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86 the Contras, the world would view the situation as the U.S. abandoning the Contras and the resulting humanitarian crisis would lead to a communist takeover of El Salvador. Finally, President Reagan affirmed his belief that pressure must be kept on t he Sandinista government in order to force an agreement; tacitly agreeing the goal of funding the would not be spending the money for the anti Sandinista program; it is m erely helping the anti Sandinistas obtain the money from other sources. Therefore, the United States is not, as a government, spending money obtained from other sources the defense authorizations which congress had previously implemented and ones it would implement i n succeeding years. Though the initial congressional prohibitions upon funding the Contras had begun uent international events. Throughout 1984 and 1985, seven Americans were taken hostage in Beirut and while the administration maintained that the inducements to Iran were not solely intended to secure their release, it would have been a welcome side effe ct (Hemmer 1999). And even though there were dissenting voices within the administration who argued selling arms to hostile nations such as Iran and accommodating Lebanese terrorism by paying for the tic disasters, President Reagan agreed with their arguments, claiming he was willing to suffer such costs to free the hostages (Hemmer 1999). During fiscal year 1985, a joint resolution echoing the 1982 appropriation prohibited funds available to the Cen tral Intelligence Agency, the Department of

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87 Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities from being obligated or expended in like manner. Specifically, it prohibited urpose or which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual halting legal military funding for the gue rrillas (Sobel 1995). Estimations regarding how much funding the Contras received have varied according to which body performed the accounting, but what transpired was contrary to what congress had authorized. Attorney General Edwin Meese estimated the amount to be around $10 million ( Ibid ). In late 1987, the congressional Iran Contra committee estimated the arms sales to have netted $16.1 million in profits, of which $3.8 million was received by the Contras from November 1985 to November 1986 ( Ibid ). These figures however do not include $2.7 million in private funds and $34 million in third country funding whose request or implementation on the part of U.S. personnel violated the Bol and restrictions included in the defense bills ( Ibid revolutionary forces in Nicaragua, the Sandinista government withheld the prospect of negotiations to end the conflict until 1988 (Barlow 1993). This means exa mining troop levels and negotiation policies are moot points. Though the Reagan Doctrine focused on the use of proxy forces rather than American troops on the ground, DOD spending continued to rise prior to and after the midterms of 1982

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88 Figure 11 Reagan DOD Spending, First and Second Terms (In Millions, 2013) In conclusion, the case of the 1982 midterms presents us with an administration that knowingly carried out an illegal foreign policy which risked inciting an international and domestic crisis, though it held a minority in Congress before the election and a n even smaller one after it (Hemmer 1999). There were no changes in troop levels after the election as the administration utilized local forces rather than American troops and negotiations between the U.S. and Sandinista governments did not change because the Americans had consistently made clear they were hostile to them (Barlow 1993). The changes seen in military spending were increases in overall DOD funding while the administration continued to fund the Contras despite multiple, clear prohibitions pas sed by Congress and signed by the president himself. Although the primary concern of the 1992 Clinton campaign was to focus on domestic issues such as the economy, the Clinton administrat 0 50,000 100,000 150,000 200,000 250,000 300,000 350,000 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988

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89 ranging (Bolton multilateral world than had existed until a few years prior which wo uld act as the reverse (Brinkley 1997). President Clinton forcefully sought the expansion of NATO, encouraged the sale of U.S. weaponry abroad, and envisioned a world where free markets would revive the economies Soviet socialis col lapsed in its wake (Schlesinger 1998/1999). But for all of the changes the Clinton administration sought in the post Cold War world, the pattern of U.S. military deployments absent congressional declarations of war present since the K orean War would remain essentially unchanged. Prior to the midterm elections of 1994, President Clinton took over the humanitarian mission in Somalia which had begun under George H.W. Bush and sent American troops into Haiti. Though the Bush administra originally envisioned as a short deployment followed by a complete withdrawal, the Clinton administration pushed the UN passage of Resolution 814 which extended the international commitment to help Somalia during its civil war Once UN authorization was secured, the administration initiated plans for the deployment of 8,000 American logistical troops as well as 1,000 man quick reaction force to fulfill its mandate (Bolton 1994). In 1994, the Clinton administration secured a nother UN resolution it believed gave sufficient authorization to deploy troops for the removal of the military junta which authority to deploy troops without a congression al declaration of war, Assistant Attorney

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90 took the position that the President had the inherent authority to deploy up to 20,000 troops into Haiti on the invitation of that c ountry s legitimate government (Dellinger 1995). This statement, taken as a matter of executive policy, meant the president and his counsel did not feel they were compelled to seek congressional authorization for a military operation involving tens of th ousands of American troops. Their position was confirmed again during an August 1994 speech in which the president stated he arties, I have not agreed that I was constitutionally mandated to get it As credible negotiating partners were lacking in Somalia, Haiti, and Iraq prior to the 1994 midterms, negotiation policies tended to take the form of military action s rather than formal negotiations. Somalia descended further into anarchy after the hurried government to negotiate with. The Hussein regime in Iraq had been an internation al pariah for years and the international community had isolated its ability to project power via UN resolutions, the Oil for Food program, and by implementing the northern and southern No Fly Zones (Mitchell 1996). Meanwhile the administration attempted to promote an internal solution to the situation in Haiti by authorizing a $12 million CIA covert operation to topple the junta leaders by offering funds, communication equipment on 1997). When the midterm elections were held, the Republicans gained control of both chambers of Congress for the first time in decades. Many Americans lived with stagnant

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91 wages, downsizing companies, and the beginnings of globalization while the unp government was unable to effectively deal with national problems (Abramowitz 1995). So Democrat majorities gave way to Republican ones and fiscal discipline became the m antra of the day. 1994 cut funding for the State Department overseas missions, foreig n aid and consolidated agencies into others to save money (Schlesinger 1998/1999). With the passage of the Contract with America, the House of Representatives passed legislation that reined in U.N. peacekeeping funding, limited U.S. participation within t hem, and Finally, during the balance budget negotiations of 1997, the assumption going forward was that DOD spending would remain relatively unchanged through 2002, b ut the combination of Republican majorities, a president being impeached, and advocates in the Joint Chiefs of Staff led to a swift reinstatement of all of the cuts the presiden t had advocated for As such, the administration that oversaw the onset of dec reased military spending in its early years ended with levels higher than when it had begun

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92 Figure 12 Clinton DOD Spending By Year (In Millions, 2013) For troop level policies, there are two subjects that are essential for an elections: President Clinton became the first president to cite a NATO authorization as sufficient for him to deploy military force and he declared his i ntention to overlook limits placed upon his foreign policy options. Congress had passed a defense appropriation in 1993 instructing defense appropriations should not be expended for a deployment in support of a peace settlement in Bosnia Herzegovina unles s previously authorized by Congress (Banks and Straussman 1995). Two years later when the administration wanted to deploy troops to enforce the Bosnian treaty, the administration produced the Dellinger memorandum. This memorandum put forward the administ The President, acting without specific statutory authorization, may lawfully introduce United States ground troops into Bosnia in order to assist North Atlantic Treaty Organization to 250,000 255,000 260,000 265,000 270,000 275,000 280,000 285,000 290,000 295,000 300,000 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

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93 the power to dispose of troops and equipment in such manner and on such duties as best to promote the safety of the country (Dellinger 1995). Based on this presumption of authority President Clinton ordered the deployment of 22,000 U.S. ground troops to Bosnia (Banks and Straussman 1995). The Clinton administration then resisted, and even promised to ignore, the clear intention of the sense of C ongress in the 1993 defense appropriation. When the intergovernmental negotiations were takin g place between members of the congressional ignore any attempts to interfere with his foreign policy prerogatives ( Ibid ). With this assumed authority, anything short of a direct injunction by congress, impeachment, or the complete withholding of defense appropriations would leave congress with less decision making capabilities in a European crisis than that of any majority of NATO members. In effect what the administrat deployed 22,000 troops to Bosnia in 1994 to enforce the peace agreement which had been reached. He deploye d thousands more into Kosovo without fully consulting with or receiving authorization from Congress (Olson 2004) in 1998 with an addition 7,000 more deployed the following year for any peacekeeping mission NATO would maintain after President Clinton launched airstrikes in Iraq in 1996 for sending its troops into the Kurdish areas of northern Iraq (Mitchell 1996), again in 1998 when Iraq declared it would no longer work with UNSCOM insp

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94 over 100 times from 1999 2000 when enforcing the northern and southern no fly zones (Samples 2011), and fired cruise missiles into Afghanistan and Sudan in response to the attacks on Americ 1998). In conclusion, the behavior of the Clinton administration prior to and in the handle international affairs without congressional encroachment. President Clinton was just as willing to deploy troops in Somalia and Haiti prior to 1994 as he was to send them to Bosnia and Kosovo after 1994. Spending levels decreased until 1996, but they escalated again based on the poli cy goals of Republican lawmakers taking advantage of an impeachment weakened president. Finally, the absence of honest brokers in Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans, and Iraq abetted both the need for American use of force and the lack of substantive peace negot iations with the nations the administration was in conflict with. H Down When the Democrats retook the House and Senate after the 2006 midterm handling of domestic and international issues was in a steep decline. Poll results showed 64% of the public viewed the war in te House and Congress (Best, Ladewig, and Wong 2013). A sluggish response to Hurricane Katrina, high gasoline prices, a struggling economy, the indictment of Republican Majority Leader Tom Delay, and declining job approval ratings for President Bush set t he table for the American electorate to treat the 2006 midterm congressional elections as a referendum on the Republican

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95 Party (Shogan 2006, Jacobson 2007). Yet with a divided government consisting of a Democrat congress and a Republican president, we don war policies of the Bush administration. We do not see any changes in military spending, troop level, or negotiation policies which the administration did not already want. Prior to the 2006 midterms, Department of Def ense spending had almost doubled from 2001 2006 Historical reached over 20,000 in Afghanistan and over 140,000 in Iraq (Belasco 2009). Peace negotiations between the Taliban were a non starter for both the Bush admini stration and Afghan President Karzai as well (Dreazen, Gorman and Soloman 2008) while the annual renewal of the UN authorization keeping multinational forces in Iraq precluded any negotiations until the fledgling Iraqi government requested it be renewed on e final time in 2007 (Bruno 2008). D espite the loss of both chambers of Congress and newly elected Speaker of the 2006), there were no drastic changes in the administratio 2007, President Bush announced a surge of 7,000 additional U.S. forces in Iraq in 2007 and another 9,500 in 2008 Troops reach ed a peak of 157,800 by the time he left office (Belasco 2009) which afford ed him the opportunity t o credit the surge policy with decreasing violence in Iraq to post invasion levels (Sky 2011). U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan also increased between 2006 and 2008 by another 10,000 (Belasco 2009) while DOD spending continued to rise throughout his admin istration growing at a higher rate of increase following the Republican loss of Congress

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96 Figure 13 George W. Bush DOD Spending By Year (In Millions, 2013) As President Obama later said, elections have consequences (Thies sen 2010). So what were the consequences war policy changes in the wake of the 2006 midterm elections? Troop increases continued in Iraq and Afghanistan, military spending negotiations between the United States and both Iraq and Afghanistan continued along the same course they had since the wars began. George W. Bush was part of the Bush family dynasty, a staunch social conservative, and was exceedingly than willing to act unilaterally in foreign affairs when economic s student studying in Hawaii, an openly progressive advocate of social and economic policies, and promised to both realign troop commitments in the war on terror 0 100,000 200,000 300,000 400,000 500,000 600,000 700,000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

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97 while reopening dialogue with those countries the Bush administration would not such as Russia and Iran (Lindsay 2011). After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush administration implemented foreign policy assumptions that advocated a much more aggressive posture on the part of the United States. These assumptions included the need for mi litary dominance to take the fight overseas, reversing the reluctance of previous administrations to respond militarily to terrorist attacks, the need for a new doctrine than that of Cold War deterrence, the destruction of state supported terrorism, and th e occasional, but not essential, assistance of alliances and multilateral organizations ( Ibid ). And with these assumptions in mind, it would become the position of President Bush that Afghanistan was the type of war American had to fight while Iraq was th e type of war America should fight. The initial invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan were smaller than many expected, but differing reasons led to these situations. In Afghanistan, the choice was to insert 5,200 troops on the ground and work with existing a nti Taliban groups in the northern part of the country while in Iraq, the initial number of troops quickly reached 130,600 within the first year (Belasco 2009). And though it was much higher, the level of troop commitment in Iraq was lower than the 200,00 0 U.S. troops which were dispatched during Operation Desert Storm under George Bush, Sr. (Crabb and Mulcahy 1995). This was partially due to resistance from allies such as Turkey in 2003 and partially because hawks like Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfel d believed Iraqis would be quickly trained to fight alongside coalition forces (Rhem 2003). Under President Bush, troop

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98 levels in Afghanistan and Iraq would ultimately grow enormously to 30,100 and 157,800 respectively (Belasco 2009). Following the inc reases during the final years of the Clinton administration, President Bush also continued the growth of DOD spending as American power was projected globally to dissuade aggression by those th e administration deemed threats. And contrary to the growth in troops and DOD spending, peace negations in Afghanistan refused to have official dealings with any Taliban representatives; even going so far as responding to an approac h to work together by the former Taliban Foreign Minister by simply arresting him (Dreazen, Gorman and Solomon 2008). In Iraq, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1211 which officially recognized the Coalition Provisional Authority and authorized a multinational force to bring stability to the country until 2007 when Prime Minister Maliki asked the Security Council to extend the mandate for a final time (Bruno 2008). As the election of 2008 approached, the voters were given the choice between Republican John McCain and D voters of and Abramowitz 2008). On the other side, there was Senator Obama vowed to remove American f orces from Iraq, which he viewed as a distraction from the real war of terrorism which was the Afghan front, and assured the American public that he would respect and restore the federal system of checks and balances (Devins 2009, Jacobsen 2010). When the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the U.S. and Iraqi

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99 number one election issue for Republicans, Independents, and Democrats (Jacobsen 2010, Saad 2008). With the transition from Bush to Obama, there was a shift in policy fundamentals, will m ake no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them (Lindsay 2011) while the only recently defined Obama Doctrine is much less definitive. In a recent press conference in the Philippines, President Obama said his may be able to hit a home run. But we steadily advance the interest of the American people and our partnerships with folks around the world ge in Chief (Friedersdorf 2011). When Barack Obama assumed the presidency, he did so after a campaign whose context had been set by the Bush administration and wi thin a global struggle whose priorities remained unresolved (Crotty 2009, McCrisken 2011). In December of 2008, there were some 198,000 American troops in Afghanistan and Iraq and President ps to Afghanistan; though these numbers were later augmented at the behest of his military commander by another 30,000 troops (Belasco 2009, Jacobson, 2010). The troop levels in Iraq were

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100 allowed to decrease in accordance with the SOFA which had been sign ed during the Bush administration. Despite the overall drawdown of U.S. forces from the Middle East, President Obama initiated other military policies which went beyond what had been implemented during the Bush years. The use of drones under President Obama has increased dramatically from 52 strikes under President Bush to 326 in Pakistan alone during personally reviewed by President Obama at his insistence; leading of ficials to believe President Obama prefers a kill not capture method of eliminating terrorist threats (McCrisken 2011). This method has even included the targeting of Am erican citizen Anwar al Awlaki, (Becker and Shane 2012). And when his use of targeted strikes became the focus of discussions really good at killing people (Kelley 2013). The American role in the Libyan civil war to oust Qaddafi also introduced a policy preference which had been absent during the Bush years; again challenging the existing understanding of constitutionalis bello as the administration defined conflict for itself in a way that made th e War Powers Act non applicable. As there has been a strong tradition dating back to the Korean War of presidents citing UN resolutions as sufficient to initiate military action, the Obama administration continued the trend in the case of Libya. UN Resol ution1973 had been passed by the Security Council and it authorized the U.S. to enforce a no

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101 a new claim of suppl support (Savage and Landler 2011). When questioned how the president could continue a military ope ration in conflict with the language of the War Powers Act, the a UN resolution and that it did not rise to the full definition of the War Power Act ad dresses (Wolf 2011). according to Fisher it is going to only broaden future presidential actions even more (Fisher 2012). Despite his intention to end the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD spending levels continued to increase above Bush era levels for another two years after President Obama had been sworn in It was only due to the drastic spending cuts due within Budget Control Act, or sequestration, cuts viewed to be so draconian that no one would allow them to happen, that military spending began to decrease for the first time since 1998.

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102 Figure 14 Obama DOD Spending by Year (In Millions, 2013) Finally, Afghan and Iraqi peace negotiations under the Obama administration inauguration, the administration quietly joined with NATO allies to beg in talks with disparate elements of the insurgent groups within the Afghanistan Pakistan border region, a step the Bush administration deemed unthinkable (McCrisken 2011). Unfortunately, this step towards reconciliation preceded what has been a meltdown i n relations between the U.S. and Afghanistan President Karzai. While work continued on a bilateral security agreement between the U.S. and Afghanistan, drone strikes, nighttime patrols, and innocent casualties of the anti insurgency campaigns drove Presid ent Karzai to publicly excoriate the U.S. and NATO as demanding the freedom to attack the Afghan people at will; motivating him to refuse to sign any bilateral agreements which would allow coalition troops to remain in his country and leaving that responsi bility to whomever the 580,000 600,000 620,000 640,000 660,000 680,000 700,000 720,000 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

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103 Afghan people elect as their new president (Reichmann and Quinn 2013). In Iraq, President Obama kept his campaign promise to remove American troops from the country in accordance with the SOFA which had been signed during the Bush a dministration, but a last minute failure to successfully negotiate a continued U.S. presence led to the abrupt withdrawal of all U.S. forces by the end of 2011 (Kessler 2013). W e do not find fundamental changes in the wake of the transition from the Bus h administration to the Obama administration President Bush left office with American forces heavily involved in Iraq and Afghanistan, but his administration had also negotiated the SOFA with Iraqi President Maliki which set the terms for American withdr awal. Under Bush, military spending was increasing while there were no ongoing talks with members of the Afghan insurgency. President Obama fulfilled his promise to abide by the SOFA and his administration began talks with Afghan insurgents while continu reached its highest levels in 2011 and, depending on the outcome of the Afghan presidential elections, American and NATO troops may or may not remain beyond 2014 to assist with training Afghan forces and supporting the government in Kabul.

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104 CHAPTER V CONCLUSION As my research employed a qualitative methodology with empirical data as its source the presence of benefits and shortcomings affecting its efficacy must be of the issues pertaining to elections and wars and allowed for a more diverse discourse through the utilization of a broader collect ion of cases. The opportunity this provided also created potentially different cases to be compared; such as wars like Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan where Congress provided formal authorizations being compared to wars like Operation Cyclone which was run through the CIA. In choosing my cases I utilized election outcomes featuring a definition of high change that allowed for more cases to be studied at the potential cost of focusing on elections leading to much greater in party seat changes. I used the measurement of twice the normal level of seat changes (22 House or 5 Senate seats) as high change elections, whereas using a definition of triple average change or quintuple average change would have focused on much stronger seat changes. Had I used t riple the average change (35 House or 7 Senate seats) my cases would have consisted of ten elections (1958, 1964, 1966, 1968, 1974, 1980, 1986, 1994, 2008, 2010) but would have eli minated the Korean War election of 1952 which was the first case of an exec utive war. Using a definition of high change meaning five times the average change (59 House or 12 Senate seats), the number of cases available would have consisted of only two elections (1958, 1980) and

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105 would have been of no worth to focus upon. By usin g twice the average level of election outcome change as a measurement, I was able to focus on sixteen elections across the breadth of the post WWII period; eight of which featured contemporary wars which could be examined in light of their differing electo ral contexts (Abandoned Incumbency, Ideological change, Midterm Shift, and Congressional Blocks). Suggestion For Future Research In light of the apparent sabotage the Nixon campaign carried out during the peace negotiations in the fall of 1968 (Anderson 2011), my suggestion for future research would focus on how upcoming national elections in the U.S. or in nations where conflict seen how former Afghan President Kar zai refused to sign the Status of Forces feet on negotiations with the Soviet Union a bout withdrawing their troops until the election of Premier Mikhail Gorbachev in March 1985 (Kuperman 1999). Conclusion My research question did not seek to answer can wartime elections act as a check upon the president, but do they. Declarations of war are effective because they do in fact change the nation from a state of peace to a state of war. But if a nation were to declare war on another one and nothing changes, it would be fitting to question whether such declarations mean anything at all. Simi larly, although elections have the capacity to act as a check upon the presidency, the pub Opinion polls

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106 take those answers into the power. This is not to discount wars as a factor in elections. It s persistence as a featured question in the AN ES surveys, the influence it wields upon the campaigns for both in party and out party candidates, and existence of casualty tipping points shows that war as the true nurse of executive aggrandizement appear to attenuate their feelings about even unpopular wars in favor of the economy as an issue. Even in cases of wartime elections where the in party either lost the presidency or significant seats in Congress, subsequent war policies have not reflected those election outcomes. In short, election outcomes such as 1952, 1968, 2006, and 2008, which have been interpreted as demand s for the swift end to wars appear to have been demands that went unful filled When a war induced sentiment has been a prevailing election year attitude and it preceded significant in party losses, the changes on the batt lefield a voter might have expected in the wake of significant in party losses. into a mold which can be described as an effective check on the presidency due to the changes the followed. Yes, President Nixon did withdraw troops from Vietnam following the election of 1968. B until the last American troops left in 1973 and Congress was still funding the South

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107 Vietnamese forces to the tune of $700 million in 1975; some seven years after Lyndon Johnson left office. 2008 represents a potential exception because President Obama did follow through with his campaign promise to remove all U.S. troops from Iraq, but this was in keeping with the Status of Forces Agreement signed during the Bush administration. In addition, President Obama has continued in the tradition of Presidents Yemen, Somalia, Iraq, and Syria, but not believing it is required prior to the utilization of his already Transcript: President Obama's Speech As a result, this research concludes that elections have not been an effective means of checking t he presidency during an unpopular war. For some examples of how this can be demonstrated, I posit the following responses to such claims. If one were to contend an unpopular war would end if an incumbent president declined to run for reelection, the elec tions of 1952 and 1968 serve as contradicting examples as the wars in Korea and Vietnam saw their theaters expand; threatening to entangle the regions in what were previously civil wars executed as proxy wars for the Soviets, Chinese, and American governme willingness to disregard legal prohibitions placed upon him by Congress and the election of 1974 demonstrat still fund an unpopular war under a presidency is crisis. If one were to contend ideology was at fault and that a war started under a conservative president would be ended by a progressive one or vice versa, the elections of 1980 and 2008 demonstrate that ideologically opposed successors have not only continued the policies of their

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108 predecessor, but have, in fact, taken them to new levels. Finally, if one were to contend divided government surge policy in Ira q; a policy later emulated by President Obama in Afghanistan. Over the past 62 years, elections have had a poor record of leading to changes in war policies; nce as the dominant power within the federal government has not been caused by a single moment of inter branch encroachment but rather has shaped the national conve rsation before it even occurs. L egislative or judicial deference on issues of war have not single handedly create d this situation, but their voluntary submission to the presidency as the tone setter such events as September 11 th Hurricane Katrina, the civil war s in Libya and Syria, and the Great Recession of 2008 have bequeathed to the presidency the position of primary voice of the nation rather than its intended role; that of one who faithfully executes the law and defends the Constitution So if elections are not acting as a check upon the presidency and, as demonstrated through previous examples of Congressional and judicial reluctance to impose their authority upon the matter, what, if anything, has led to the abandonment of a seemingly ce rtain use of executive military action? T he case of an impending attack on the Assad regime in Syria may present the answer to that question. During the Obama administration there have been two incidents where American military power has been

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109 deployed int o theaters seemingly untouched by the Bush administration: Libya and Syria. Despite Congressional protests, President Obama asserted he was not bound by the War Powers Act to seek their approval for the action as he was simply enacting a no fly zone. Buf assistance to Libyan rebels and civilians in their civil war. Polling by the Washington Post found 56% of respondents favored the U.S. enforcing a no fly zone over parts of Libya (Cohen 2011) while a CNN poll placed the number closer to 70% (Memoli 2011). With the use of chemical weapons in Syria, President Obama faced similar protests from Congressional leaders and appeared to be heading in the same direction he had in Libya. But at the last moment, he seems to have relented. Polling could explain why. According to separate opinion polls performed by NBC and Reuters, respondents only sup ported military intervention, including a no fly zone, at 42% and 28% respectively ( Good 2013). Congress was not only as divided in 2011 as it was in 2013, but in party Democrats had more seats during the Syrian debate than during the Libyan one following House and Senate gains in 2012 Could it be that the farther the federal government gets from divided powers to consolidated ones, the more democratic the checks upon the president as national representative become? Could it be that institutional checks such as War Powers Resolution are less threatening to an administration than starting a war already under water in the polls? In recent testimony before the House Judiciary Committee, George Washington University professor and self professed supporter of Jonathon Turley articulated his case regarding the dangers posed by an inflated

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110 presidency. He warned that reluctance from Congress and the Supreme Court to protect their constitutionally granted powers are enabling a pr esidency routinely violating their roles. reluctance to involve itself in cases addressing the separation of powers between Congress and the president in cases like Raines v. Byrd of separation of powers; likening the situa tion to reinforcing lines of separation by seeking to decide if non repeatedly confirmed in the cases of Campbell v. Clinton and Kucinich v. Obama ( Ibid ). Turley also faulted Congress for its partial abandonment of its power of the purse. In cases of health care and the Libyan conflict wherein both secured funding by the and equipment around without needing to ask Congress for anything ( Ibid ). In an environment where presidents feel empowered to go it alone rather than working with or relying upon the other branches, instances have occurred where a president has appeared disrespectful towards the other branches. In a February 2002 memorandum, the Bush administration redefined who m the Geneva Convention could be applied to in the wake of the new paradigm created by the war on terror. This memo provided the reasoning for the indefinite detentions of enemy combatants at Guantanamo Congress or seeking judicial review. During his January 2004 State of the Union address, President Bush said, July 2004), some ten months after the country had invaded Iraq; apparently forgetting or ignoring the UN Charter the United States had signed which

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111 declared nations di d need permission from the UN to attack other UN members such as More recently, President Obama demonstrated executive antipathy towards the legislative and judicial branches in their very presence. In his 2010 State of the Union Address, President Obama voiced solid disagreement with the recent Supreme Court decision in Citizens United v. FEC and implored Democrats and Republican in Congress to pass legislation that corrected the situation (Obama 2010). Not only was this an unprecedented move for a president in the television age (Barnes 2010), but it occurred during an occasion where there justices, by tradition, are expected to essentially sit with ( Ibid ). During the 2014 State of the Union, President Obama promised the chamber that and whenever I can take steps without legislation to expand opportunity for more Am Ibid ). Though such statements are hardly new as presidents have a long history of using executive orders to shape domestic policies, the instances of 2010 and 2014 are troubling for thr ee reasons: a sitting president looked the members of co equal branches in the eyes and implied they were failing their commissions before the whole world he implied his plan was to go around them to get what he wanted accomplished, and, stunningly, roughly half of the members of Congress in attendance reacted with uproarious applause on both occasions.

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112 In Federalist 48 Madison, writing under the name Publius, warned that mere demarcation s written on constitutional parchment would not be a sufficient guard against the encroach ments lead ing to the concentration of the powers of government in the same hands (Publius 1 Feb. 1788). In order for such a concentration of power to arise, the powers of the other branches, formerly entrenched created them, would have to be taken or surrendered. Legislative and judicial limitations upon victory for one ideology is spun by national ideologues as the right move and a loss is spun as a corruption of the nation. Likewise, as war policies have continued despite the through elections it may be the case that the commission within the constitutional system has been abdicated as well. i s the people role to be worthy of representation by remaining jealous of their liberties. But o ur system, having been built upon the desire to see a (Lincoln 2014) is being hamstrung. This is not occurring at the hands of a dictator, but through the majestification of a presidency designed to be dependent upon others for things to do ; be it Congress giving it laws to carry out or external aggressors providing it the opportunity to carry out its mission to defend the country. This majestic presidency, through its bu reaucratic expansion has assumed the role of a national guarantor of harmony with m any look ing to it as the source of law, fairness, vision, jobs, healthcare, bailouts, security, identity, and relief in the wake of acts of God But this latitude, so far, has chiefly been granted as long as the economy is doing well. The

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113 commission of being worthy of representation appears to be suffering the same fate s the people and both th e legislative and judicial branches have seemingly lost their ambition to resist encroachment upon their powers mbition must be made to counteract

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