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Examining protective order statutes in the United States

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Title:
Examining protective order statutes in the United States v moving from a measure of victim-friendliness to one of victim empowerment
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Tudor, Alison E. ( author )
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Denver, CO
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University of Colorado Denver
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English
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1 electronic file (107 pages). : ;

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Intimate partner violence -- United States ( lcsh )
Restraining orders -- United States ( lcsh )
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bibliography ( marcgt )
theses ( marcgt )
non-fiction ( marcgt )

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Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) is a serious public health concern that will affect 1 in 4 women and 1 in 7 men in their lifetime (Black et al., 2011). IPV has serious consequences for the individual experiencing the violence, the family unit, and society as a whole (Max, Rice, Finkelstein, Bardwell, & Leadbetter, 2004). States have created both criminal and civil interventions to address intimate partner violence (IPV). The Personal Protection Order (PPO) is one civil intervention all states provide to victims of IPV; however, each state varies widely in who can access PPOs, what protections are included in PPOs, and how they are enforced. While PPOs are a widespread intervention, questions remain as to their efficacy: whether they support victim-empowerment and/or are effective in stopping future violence. Given the many changes to state PPO statutes over the last decade, this research replicates a study conducted by DeJong and Burgess-Proctor (2006) that examined the level of victim-friendliness included in states' 2003 PPO statutes. Additionally this research expands on DeJong and Burgess-Proctor's (2006) concept of victim-friendliness by incorporating indicators of victim-empowerment in the examination of PPOs. Here, victim-empowerment is defined as the process of an individual or a group shifting power dynamics between people or a larger system (Brodsky & Cattaneo, 2013). Thus, state statutes were analyzed to determine their ability to allow for greater victim decision-making power within the PPO process (i.e., transfers of power from the abuser and/or the state to the victim). A mixed methods approach is used to provide both quantitative rankings and specific examples to highlight elements of statutes that facilitate empowerment of victims across states. Findings suggest that, based on the DeJong and Burgess-Proctor criteria, states have become more victim-friendly with most states ranking in the highest victim-friendly category. However, when incorporating indicators of victim-empowerment, the majority of states rank in the moderate category. Implications for policy and practice are discussed.
Thesis:
Thesis (M.P.A.)--University of Colorado Denver. Public administration
Bibliography:
Includes bibliographic references.
System Details:
System requirements: Adobe Reader.
General Note:
School of Public Affairs
Statement of Responsibility:
by Alison E. Tudor.

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|University of Colorado Denver
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|Auraria Library
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All applicable rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
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913747568 ( OCLC )
ocn913747568

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EXAMINING PROTECTIVE ORDER STATUTES IN THE UNITED STATES: MOVING FROM A MEASURE OF VICTIM FRIENDLINESS TO ONE OF VICTIM EMPOWERMENT by ALISON E. TUDOR B.S., University of Florida, 2005 A thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate Sc hool of the University of Colorado in partial fulfillment Of the requirements for the degree of Master of Public Administration School of Public Affairs 2015

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This thesis for the Master of Public Administration degree by Alison E. Tudor has been approved for the School of Public Affairs by Angela R. Gover, Chair Tara N. Richards Eric Poole A pril 24, 2015 ii

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Tudor, Alison E. (M.P.A., School of Public Affairs) Examining Protective Order Statutes in the U nited States: Moving from a Measure of VictimFriendliness to One of VictimEmpowerment Thesis directed by Professor Angela R. Gover ABSTRACT Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) is a serious public health concern that will affect 1 in 4 women and 1 in 7 men in their lifetime (Black et al., 2011). IPV has serious consequences for the individual experiencing the violence, the family unit, and society as a whole (Max, Rice, Finkelstein, Bardwell, & Leadbetter, 2004). States have created both criminal and civil int erventions to address intimate partner violence (IPV). The Personal Protection Order (PPO) is one civil intervention all states provide to victims of IPV; however, each state varies widely in who can access PPOs, what protections are included in PPOs, and how they are enforced. While PPOs are a widespread intervention, questions remain as to their efficacy: whether they support victimempowerment and/or are effective in stopping future violence. Given the many changes to state PPO statutes over the last dec ade, this research replicates a study conducted by DeJong and Burgess Proctor (2006) that examined the level of victimfriendliness included in states 2003 PPO statutes. Additionally this research expands on DeJong and Burgess Proctor s (2006) concept of victimfriendliness by incorporating indicators of victimempowerment in the examination of PPOs. Here, victimempowerment is defined as the process of an individual or a group shifting power dynamics between people or a larger system (Brodsky & Cattaneo, 2013). Thus, state statutes were analyzed to determine their ability to allow for greater victim decision making power within the PPO process (i.e., transfers iii

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of power from the abuser and/or the state to the victim). A mixed methods approach is used to pro vide both quantitative rankings and specific examples to highlight elements of statutes that facilitate empowerment of victims across states. Findings suggest that, based on the DeJong and Burgess Proctor criteria, states have become more victimfriendly w ith most states ranking in the highest victimfriendly category. However, when incorporating indicators of victimempowerment, the majority of states rank in the moderate category. Implications for policy and practice are discussed. The form and conten t of this abstract are approved. I recommend its publication. Approved: Angela R. Gover iv

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I would like to thank my amazing thesis committee for their guidance and expertise from the beginnings of an idea to the final edits of m y thesis. Your support and encouragement was priceless. I would also like to thank the School of Public Affairs and the Graduate School at the University of Colorado, Denver. v

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T able of Contents I. Introduction 1 II. Study Backgro und 3 Scope of the Problem 3 Consequences of Intimate Partner Violence 6 History of the Feminist Movement in Relation to Intimate Partner Violence 7 V iolence Against Women Act 12 Civil and Criminal Remedies for Intimate Partner Violence 17 III. Literature Review 18 Explanation of an Intimate Partner Violence Personal Protecti on Order 18 Civil vs. Criminal Protection Orders 20 History of Personal Protection Orders 21 Access t o Personal Protection Orders 22 Profile of a Personal Protection Order Petitioner 24 Law Enforcement Response to Personal Protection Orders 27 Efficacy of Personal Protection Orders 28 Other Issues with Personal Protection Order s 34 Empowerment 35 The Current Study 37 IV. Methodology 39 Design 39 Data Collection 40 Variables 41 vi

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VictimFriendliness Variables (DeJong & Burgess Proctor, 2006) 41 VictimEmpow erment Variables 43 Procedure and Analysis 49 V. Results 50 Replication of VictimFriendliness Scale 50 Comparison of 2003 and 2014 State VictimFriendliness Scores 61 VictimEmpowerment Scores 66 State Personal P rotection Order Statutes & VictimEmpowerment 2014 76 Comparison of 2014 VictimFriendliness Scores and VictimEmpowerment Scores 78 VI. Discussion 80 VII. Conclusion 82 Contributions to Literature 84 Imp lications for Policy and Practice 85 Future Research 86 VIII. References 88 Appendix 97 vii

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LIST OF TABLES PAGE TABLE 1. Score for Strength of PPO Statute by State, 2003 62 2. Scor e for Strength of PPO Statute by State, 2014 64 3. Score for Strength of PPO Statute by State, 2014 VictimEmpowerment 77 viii

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LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE 1. State Rankings in VictimFriendliness Score in 2003 and 2014 65 2. State Rankings for VictimFriendl iness and VictimEmpowerment Scores in 2014 79 ix

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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Intimate partner violence (IPV), also known as domestic violence, is any behavior between intimate partners that causes physical, psychological, or sexual harm (Regehr, 2009). Physical abuse includes, but is not limited to, hitting, punching, pushing, and slapping. Emotional or psychological abuse is typified through tactics such as humiliation, put downs, and minimizing the victim s feelings. Sexual abuse within a relationship is defined as any sort of unwanted or nonconsensual sexual touch. Finally, financial abuse can include the denial of access to money and not allowing the victim to pursue or maintain employment (Pender, 2012). Researchers, the wo men s movement, and law enforcement theorize that there are two distinct forms of IPV: common couple violence and patriarchal terrorism (Johnson, 2005). Common couple violence is common in communities that have a violence prone culture and a culture that e mbraces privacy and individualism; these cultures are common across the U.S. This type of violence is generally not gender based or motivated and occurs when a conflict gets out of control Generally, this type of violence is motivated by a situation, is intermittent, and results only in minor injuries, if any at all (Johnson, 2005). While common couple violence does not usually escalate to levels of violence that are life threatening, this level of violence is not excluded as it could happen as one perso n in the relationship tries to gain control of the situation. On the other hand, patriarchal terrorism is gender motivated and it is expected that the violence escalates over time. It is a product of patriarchal traditions of men s right to control their women where the partner is not only trying to gain control over a situation, but also their partner (Johnson, 1

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2005, p.284). In this form of IPV, violence and coercive tactics are systematically used to gain power and maintain control over the other partne r. States have enacted both criminal and civil remedies to address both common couple violence and patriarchal terrorism. Personal Protection Orders (PPOs) are a common civil intervention for victims of IPV. However, PPO statutes vary widely among states from who can access an order, to what can be included in the order, and penalties for violations. The first part of this research replicates the work of DeJong and Burgess Proctor s (2006) state ranking based on how victimfriendly and progressive each sta te was in 2003 by analyzing eleven variables. The results show that states have become overwhelmingly more victimfriendly and progressive based on the definitions of DeJong and Burgess Proctor (2006) and that the vast majority of states now have victimfriendly statutes. The second part of the research sought to expand DeJong and Burgess Proctor s concept of victimfriendliness to include components of empowerment and to then re rank states based on empowerment scores. While PPOs are commonly sought after to stop violence, there is much question as to their efficacy. However, research has shown that the PPO process can facilitate the empowerment of victims even if the violence does not stop (Grau et al., 1985; Chaundhuri & Daly, 1992; Klein, 1996; Harrell & Smith, 1996; Meloy et al., 1997; Joice, 2006). Empowerment is defined by an individual or a group shifting power dynamics between people or a larger system (Brodsky & Cattaneo, 2013). The more opportunity for victim autonomy that exists within PPO statu tes, the more likely the process will facilitate the empowerment of victims. It was found that the majority of states fall within the moderate category in their statute s ability to facilitate 2

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empowerment. This is an important finding when compared to the victimfriendliness scores for 2014, where the majority of states ranked in the highest category. This research finds that state statutes should be victimempowering, not just victimfriendly. States that have high scores in the victimempowerment scale pr ovide more opportunities for victim autonomy and for power to shift from the abuser and/or the state to the victim, thus facilitating empowerment. State s that rank highly in the victimempowerment scale are also less likely to assume a one size fits all approach, which in many cases, strips a victim of their power in self determination. Chapter II STUDY BACKGROUND Scope of the P roblem Both men and women can be victims or perpetrators of IPV, but women experience IPV at a rate that is almost three times m ore than men (U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics [BJS] 2013). Between 1994 and 2010, 4 out of 5 victims of intimate partner violence were female. Among these, younger women, ages 1834 experienced IPV at rates higher than any age gro up; after age 34, rates of IPV continue to decrease for women overall. During this same time period, white nonHispanic women, black nonHispanic women, and Hispanic women experienced higher rates of IPV than any other race, as did women that were separated from their abuser in comparison to married, divorced, or single women ( U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics [BJS] 2012). Furthermore, poor women experience violence at higher rates than women who are more financially secure. Studies have found an inverse relationship 3

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between socioeconomic status and the severity of violence experienced. It is estimated that 60% of women on welfare have experienced IPV in their lifetime (Kurz, 1998). Until recently, a majority of IPV literature focus ed on heterosexual relationships in which men were the perpetrators and women were the victims. However, IPV can occur within any intimate partnership including heterosexual and samesex relationships, married, unmarried or divorced couples, within dating relationships, and between couples that have a child in common. Additionally, IPV can occur within any age group, gender identity, sexual orientation, race, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and religion. However, some of these categories are considered ris k factors. IPV occurs in both heterosexual and samesex relationships and the level of violence seems to occur at the same frequency, if not slightly higher, in same sex relationships than in heterosexual relationships (Knauer, 1999; Turell, 2000). Inte restingly, lesbians report a higher frequency of physical abuse in their relationships than gay men. Studies have found that between 8% and 60% of lesbians report physical violence in their current or past relationships, whereas 11% to 44% of gay men repor t physical violence (Turell, 2000). Battered gay men report higher rates of psychological abuse than any other form of abuse and share a similar risk profile as battered women. This risk profile includes lower socioeconomic status, unemployment, family histories of violence, childhood sexual abuse, depression, and heavy substance use (Greenwood el al., 2002). IPV is a serious, preventable public health concern that affects millions of women each year (BJS, 2013; Kurz, 1998). Over the course of a lifetime, 29% of women and 10% of men experience IPV in their lifetime (Black, 2011). According to the most recent 4

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National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey, the percentage of both men and women experiencing either rape, physical violence, or stalking by an intimate partner was much higher: 53.8% of multiracial women, 46% of Native American women, 43.7% of African American women, 37.1% of Hispanic women, 34.6% of white (non Hispanic) women, and 19.6% of API women experienced IPV over the course of their lifetime. Men also experienced high rates of IPV with 45.3% of Native American men, 39.3% of multiracial men, 38.6% of African American men, 28.2% of white (nonHispanic) men, and 26.6% of Hispanic men reporting over the course of their lives (Brelding, C hen, & Black, 2013). In fact, IPV is the largest cause of injury for women ages 15 44 and kills an average of four women every day (Stout, 1989; Novello, Rosenburg, Saltzman, & Shosky, 1992; Mills, 1998). Thirty one percent of all homicides are attributed to IPV (Mills, 1998). Since the passage of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 however, the rate of serious IPV declined 72% in the short span of seven years (BJS, 2013). The most recent National Crime Victimization Survey, reporting data from 20022011, found that two thirds of all IPV reported involved a physical attack and the remaining third involved an incomplete attempt or verbal threats of physical attack (BJS, 2013). Eight percent of women reported sexual violence as a part of the physical attack s they experienced and 18% of violent events involved a weapon. Fifty percent of all victimizations from an intimate partner ended in victim injury, with 13% of these considered a serious injury (internal injury, unconsciousness, or broken bones). Only 18% of women were medically treated for these injuries (BJS, 2013). IPV is a pervasive problem throughout the United States that impacts heterosexual and samesex relationships, all genders, and people from all socioeconomic levels, 5

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ethnicities, and countries of origin. There are many injuries that come from IPV, including both physical and emotional consequences. These injuries impact communities in a variety of ways. Consequences of Intimate Partner Violence While IPV is often a private crime, there are many consequences to society. Financially, IPV costs exceed $8.3 billion each year from law enforcement response, judicial engagement, health care, loss of productivity, and the loss of life (Max et al., 2004). Each year, a combined 8 million days of work are missed, 32,000 full time jobs are lost, and 5.6 million days of household productivity are lost (National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, 2003). Many families that experience IPV are living in poverty, yet victims are often not allowed to work due to the controlling tactics of their abuser; this causes a burden on the welfare system (Kurz, 1998). However, it is not just society that is impacted by IPV; individual victims and the children that witness violence often experience lasting effects. IPV, when compared to other traumas, produces more serious consequences for the victim due to exposure to repeated violence over a long period of time. Victims are more likely to experience chronic health problems, reproductive health issues, psychological eff ects, and participate in risky health behaviors like substance use (Johnson & Leone, 2005). These health issues can cause a long term financial burden as victims can experience increased health care costs for as long as 15 years after the abuse ends (Rivar a et al., 2007). Children are also impacted by IPV in the home; children exposed to IPV often use aggressive behavior, have increased emotional and social problems, and typically struggle academically (Fantuzzo & Mohr, 1999). 6

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While there has been an influx in research about IPV for the last few decades, this is not a new societal issue. While IPV was largely considered a private matter for much of history, the Feminist Movement of the 1970 s began to bring about more public awareness and an outcry for justice. History of the Feminist Movement in Relation to Intimate Partner Violence The degree of tolerance shown for a given type of abusive or potentially abuse behavior may vary considerably over the developmental progress of a culture (Binder & Meeker, 1992, p.4). Intimate partner violence has been similarly condoned and addressed by law throughout history. Pleck (1987) categorized IPV reform during three periods of history: 1) 16401680; 2) 18741890; and 3) 1970 to present. During the first period of reform (16401680) the Puritans enacted laws against wife beating. During the second period (18741890) child abuse became a recognized social issue and societies for the prevention of cruelty to children were created. Some of these societies directed efforts t oward abused women. During the third and current period (1970 to present) there has been a resurgence of interest in addressing IPV through community accountability, civil and criminal interventions. It is interesting to note that between 1890 and 1970, th ere was complete inattention given to IPV as a social issue (Binder & Meeker, 1992). It was in the early to mid 1970 s that the feminist/women s movement began to demand that U.S. society become aware of IPV and begin to address it. IPV was generally seen as a private matter and when police were called to a home there was rarely an arrest made; in fact, the police would often side with the abuser (Zorza, 1992). Abused women had very few options, criminally or civilly, to address the violence they were exper iencing at home. In 7

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order to obtain a short term, civil injunction against your partner, a woman had to have begun the divorce or legal separation process. Women were not satisfied with the soft approaches toward IPV taken by law enforcement or the ju dicial system (Langley & Levy, 1977; Zorza, 1992). Law enforcement did receive training on IPV, but were told to take a social service approach and to counsel the couple. There seemed to be genuine concern for the safety of law enforcement during these cal ls and many departments had a no arrest police as there was a belief that arrest might create a more volatile situation (Zorza, 1992). Women all over the country began consciousness raising groups and began demanding criminal interventions for IPV (Binder & Meeker, 1992). Feminist groups felt that until the criminal justice system began taking women seriously, men would continue to abuse women with no consequences (Zorza, 1992). In 1975, women began to take action to keep women safe and opened the first emergency shelter in the U.S., 5 years after the first domestic violence shelter was established in London. Scott v. Hart (1976) was a class action in which the Legal Aid Society of Alameda County brought a suit against the chief of the Oakland Police Departm ent on behalf of five African American women. These women had repeatedly called the police to respond to IPV and, each time, the result was no response or ineffectual response. Because the plaintiffs were African American, they were able to allege denial of the 14th amendment of equal protection under the law and ultimately settled their case (Zorza, 1992). This case got the attention of the nation, and states began to investigate their current IPV laws and began creating new laws. By 1976, Pennsylvania and Washington, D.C., had passed IPV legislation, and, as of 1983, Arkansas, Idaho, Michigan, New Mexico, South Carolina, Virginia, and 8

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Washington were the only states without domestic violence statutes (Binder & Meeker, 1992; Zorza, 1992). It was at this time that the home and family began moving out of the private sphere and into the public sphere, and communities and the criminal justice system began working to find appropriate responses and sanctions for IPV (Cohen, 1994). Again, Pennsylvania took the lead and was the first to allow for Personal Protection Orders (PPOs) in 1976 (Kane, 2000). However, there was still uncertainty about how law enforcement should respond to IPV. Prior to 1980, there were no official law enforcement protocols to follow on IPV calls and very little time was given to train law enforcement officers on IPV. For example, the Chicago Police Department officers were told that IPV calls were potentially dangerous and were instructed not to interfere or make an arrest (Parnas, 1970). Many departments had a no arrest policy in regards to IPV as there was an idea that this could increase the risk of violence toward the officer (Zorza, 1992); moreover, even in departments that did not have an explicit no arrest policy, many officer s chose not to arrest as they did not believe the victim was in any real danger (Kane, 2000). At the same time, prior to an officer being called out, dispatchers were trained to talk a woman out of sending officers to her home. Officers recognized that it was rare for an IPV case to end up in court, so they felt that it would be pointless to respond or make an arrest. Officers would respond to IPV calls in a variety of ways prior to 1980: they would commonly try to mediate between the couple and lighten the mood through joking, refer couples to appropriate counseling, recommend a voluntary separation, and if these failed, they would threaten arrest or sanction (Parnas, 1970). While officers would commonly threaten arrest or sanction, they rarely followed thr ough. In fact, when a woman 9

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demanded that her partner be arrested, officers would refuse to arrest without a warrant. The woman would have to go to the police station to give her statement and then, based on police discretion, they would seek a warrant (o r not) and proceed to arrest her partner (or not). An officer, trying to avoid an arrest, could issue a violation citation, which, in essence, was similar to a traffic ticket in that the offender would have to pay a fine (Parnas, 1970). During the early 1980s Sherman and Berk conducted the Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experience to examine the deterrent impact of arrest in cases of domestic violence (Sherman & Berk, 1984). Throughout the experiment, officers were randomly assigned an intervention which included: arresting offenders, mediation, or separating the couple. Six months after the original incident, researchers examined official data for re arrests and contacted victims to examine whether their partner had perpetrated violence that had not been reported to law enforcement since their arrest. If either of these scenarios occurred, the intervention used was considered a failure (Sherman & Berk, 1984). The study found, based on re arrest, that there was a 13% recidivism rate for those arrested, a 22% recidivism rate for those separated, and a 19% recidivism rate for those mediated. Victims self reported a 19% recidivism rate for arrest and 37% recidivism rate for mediation and separation interventions (Sherman & Berk, 1984). The results from this s tudy found that arresting IPV offenders, more than mediation or separation, decreased the possibility of repeat, future violence (Sherman & Berk, 1984). However, there are many factors that could have influenced this conclusion. After being arrested once, an offender may flee the scene if their partner calls the police after an episode of violence to avoid re arrest or the victim may have chosen not to call the 10

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police as the previous arrest put a huge burden on her. It is also impossible to conclude that me diation and separation, unlike arrest, were not done in the same manner by each officer, thus the outcome of these interventions are not reliable (Dunford, Huizinga, & Elliott, 1990) When Sherman and Berk s (1984) landmark findings were reported, the femi nist movement, among other groups, in the United States had begun believing that the nonpunitive approach to IPV was not working and that the law should do more to protect victims (Langley & Levy, 1977; Zorza, 1992) This sentiment, coupled with the resul ts of the Minneapolis DV Experiment, spurred many states to quickly adopt mandatory, preferred, or discretionary DV laws. Discretionary laws allow the officer to make the arrest decision, preferred or pro arrest laws allow the officer to make the arrest de cision while the state prefers arrest, and mandatory laws seem to mandate arrest (White, Goldkamp, & Campbell, 2005). The National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, provided funding for replications of Sherman and Berk s (1984) study in si x cities across the U.S. Results from the replication sites indicated that 50% of these cities that arrest led to increased violence the opposite of the Minneapolis DV Experiment, but the laws had already begun to change across the country and police departments and statutes were favoring pro mandatory arrest for offenders (Dunford, Huizinga, & Elliott, 1990) While the results of this study and the changes in law seemed like a victory for those wanting a more punitive approach to IPV, there have been many unintended consequences. For example, once these laws were enacted, many offenders were arrested, but very few cases ended up in a court hearing and fewer still resulted in prosecution. If arrest is not likely to lead to prosecution, the arrest means very little to the offender 11

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(White, Goldkamp, & Campbell, 2005). Sherman, Smith, Schmidt, & Rogan (1992) also found that certain types of offenders responded to arrest while others did not. It seems that if an offender wants to conform to society, if arrested, is less likely to be re arrested. On the other hand, if a person does not care what society thinks of them, arrest does not produce a deterrent effect. There continues to be a need to examine best practices in both criminal and civil interventions for IPV ; these interventions need to take into account victimempowerment. The Feminist Movement began to bring IPV to the public consciousness and lawmakers began to take notice. Beginning in the late 1980 s lawmakers began to think through what criminal interve ntions for IPV would look like and how to pass it into federal legislation. In 1994, the Violence Against Women Act was passed and, for many, brought about the legitimization of IPV as a public issue. Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) The definition of IPV and how to address it continues to evolve. In 1981, while many states still did not have IPV statutes, Massachusetts and New Jersey were beginning to refine their definition and created the first laws that made marital rape illegal; a few years later, New York, Florida, and Georgia followed suit. This is important as marital rape is one of the strongest predictors of homicide within a relationship (Zorza, 1992). As IPV became more important on the state and local agendas, the federal government began to fe el pressure to create a law that would show its concern of IPV and help bring states into some alignment in how they recognize and address IPV. As a result, lawmakers began having discussions about how to accomplish this. 12

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The work to pass VAWA began much earlier than 1994 and there were many strategic partnerships and coalitions built beginning in 1989 and probably even much earlier (Stolz, 1999). Supporters of the Act hoped that it would help change the attitudes of people who view violence against women as a lesser crime, to see these crimes as serious and worthy of addressing. Additionally, this legislation hoped to prevent and reduce crimes against women through various criminal justice interventions and prevention programming (U.S. Department of Justi ce [DOJ], 2002). VAWA 1994 is often considered symbolic legislation Symbolic legislation is legislation that is directed toward the general public to provide education, reassurance or threat, moral education, or a model for states to follow (Stolz, 1999, p. 402). This type of legislation is not ineffective, but it is often used to provoke a public reaction; it is less about what the act actually says and more about people s perceptions. Lawmakers were trying to provoke public reaction, as many felt tha t the public did not take violence against women seriously (Stolz, 1999). There were multiple iterations of VAWA before it became law in 1994. Supporters knew that the legislation needed to reflect both conservative and liberal criminal justice policies, or both carrot and stick methods, to encourage bipartisan support. Subsequent House and Senate actions resolving differences in respective versions of the bill resulted in a vote of 235195 in the House and 6138 in the Senate agreeing to the final conferen ce report (Stolz, 1999). Unlike most symbolic legislation, VAWA was part of the Omnibus Anti Crime Act and did have some funding attached in the amount of $1.6 billion over 5 years (Stolz, 1999; DeJong & Burgess Proctor, 2006). Generally speaking, this A ct revised and expanded protections for women experiencing violence in a variety of ways. This bill 13

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directed the United States Sentencing Commission to revise its guidelines and to mandate financial restitution to victims from their perpetrators. The Act a lso amended the Federal Rules of Evidence in sexual assault cases (Stolz, 1999). Criminal sanctions increased for interstate domestic violence for violating PPOs and for stalking (Meyer Emerick, 2002; Eigenberg, McGuffee, Berry, & Hall, 2003). Funds were a lso allocated to help batterers receive counseling and re education; as a result, batterer s intervention programs began multiplying across the nation. Economic benefits for survivors and states were also included in the Act. Victims of violence were no lo nger forced to pay court filing fees and states provided free rape exams and free STI testing. Safety net programs, like shelters for IPV survivors, also received additional funding. Undocumented victims received new protections and became able to petition for protection from deportation through U and T visas (Meyer Emerick, 2002). States also benefitted from VAWA as they were eligible to receive grants from the Department of Justice and Department of Transportation to regulate the new interstate IPV la w. Additionally, states received grants to create rape prevention programs and to work with runaway youth (Stolz, 1999). The National Domestic Violence Hotline was also established by VAWA, as were many research opportunities to better understand violence against women in all of its forms (Meyer Emerick, 2002). Probably one of the most controversial parts of this Act was that it established violence against women as gender motivated crimes, thus making this a civil rights issue, not just a criminal issue (Stolz, 1999). Because of this idea, the Act began to shift how the public viewed violence against women. For the first time, marital rape became illegal in all states and a sexual assault victim s prior sexual history could not be used against them throug hout the criminal justice process (DOJ, 2002). 14

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When VAWA 1994 passed, states across the nation had to begin implementing policy and many had to change laws to come into compliance. States that had previously swept violence against women under the rug, treating it as a lesser crime, had to recognize that IPV was a crime, not a private family matter. VAWA communicated reassurance to law abiding citizens that the government and the criminal justice system would respond to gender based violence and it communica ted a threat to potential lawbreakers (Stolz, 1999). Implementation came at an important time, after the Simpson murder, when the government felt that it needed to convey the seriousness of domestic violence as a crime. VAWA served a moral educative functi on and allowed states to feel that they should create and enforce IPV laws (Stolz, 1999). This was part of the carrot approach as many grants were offered to states to create programs and best practice policies. Because of the money attached, states bega n to pass appropriate laws and create new programs. VAWA also included a firearm ban for abusers either convicted of domestic violence or restrained from their partner. In some areas, this was difficult to implement as the court system felt that people, ev en abusers, needed access to guns for hunting and other activities ( Clark, Biddle, & Martin, 2002). As VAWA implementation began, it became clear that the policy created left certain groups of people out and had some unintended consequences. For instance, VAWA forced states to change their IPV arrest laws to either mandatory arrest or pro arrest. Officers responding to a domestic violence call in many states were mandated to arrest the primary aggressor and in other states they were encouraged to do so. It is not always clear which party is the primary or dominant aggressor, so officers, in an attempt to follow new statues, often began to arrest both parties involved. The arrests of victims 15

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increased dramatically; this had further implications for undocument ed victims of violence as they could face deportation if they called law enforcement when they were in danger (Shapiro, 2002; Frye, Haviland, & Rajah, 2007). VAWA 1994 did not include protections for victims of teen dating violence, victims in a samesex r elationship, and did not protect tribal women in most circumstances. Many also felt that the Act overemphasized IPV and that there was not enough done to address stalking or campus sexual assault (National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, 2006). As wit h most policies, amendments are made when there are unintended consequences and VAWA is no different. Each time VAWA has been renewed (2000, 2005, 2013), protections have increased for different groups of people. Previous to VAWA and since VAWA, governme nts have established both legal sanctions and social interventions to address IPV (Zoellner et al., 2000). Even after VAWA s attempts to align states in how they handle IPV and victims of IPV, states still differ greatly in the criminal sanctions placed on perpetration. Traditionally, many states had legislation that only allowed for arrest in misdemeanor assault cases when the police officer witnessed the incident (Eigenberg et al., 2003). This greatly reduced the effectiveness of IPV legislation and often compromised the safety of victims who contacted law enforcement for intervention. Furthermore, victims would often have to go down to the law enforcement station to request an arrest warrant for an arrest to ever occur. By 1983, 23 states had warrantless arrest and by 1997 all states allowed for warrantless arrest (Eigenberg et al., 2003; Miller, 1997). Due to VAWA 1994 s passage, states had to allow for warrantless arrest and had to determine whether they wanted to put mandatory or pro arrest policy into legislation. By 1997, 19 states had passed mandatory 16

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arrest statues and 7 states had passed pro arrest statutes (Miller, 1997). Sanctions against IPV continue to differ between states and can include misdemeanor or felony offenses, counseling requirements and criminal protection orders disallowing the perpetrator to have contact with the victim. However, criminal justice approaches were not the only remedies needed or available for victims of IPV. Civil and Criminal Remedies for Intimate Partner Violenc e In addition to criminal justice approaches, many states determined a need for civil remedies for IPV. The criminal justice system approaches incidents as isolated and separate from each other while civil remedies can take into account the history of vi olence in a relationship and does not necessarily require or need the criminal justice system to be activated, which may allow for greater victimempowerment (Dasgupta, 2002, p. 1377). All states allow for civil protection orders; these orders are known by different names in different states: restraining orders, emergency orders, ex parte orders, domestic violence orders, personal protection orders, or peace bonds (Eigenberg et al., 2003). Depending on the state, these orders can be obtained in civil or cri minal court. Violations of these orders range from misdemeanor offenses to felonies, and some states require counseling on violation (Chaundhuri & Daly, 1992). Personal Protection Orders (PPOs) are seen as one of the most important advances in addressing I PV and are often seen as a method to prevent future violence (Meloy, Cowett, Parker, Hofland, & Friedland, 1997; DeJong & Burgess Proctor, 2006). Each state s PPO statute contains different allowances and consequences; therefore, while PPOs are seen as imp ortant civil 17

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interventions, it is important to look at the differences between each state statute and determine if they contain aspects that are empowering for the victim and may prove to be effective in curtailing violence. In summary, the last four decad es have brought about many changes in how individuals, communities, and the government address IPV. As a result of the feminist movement, there has been an increase in legislation and national attention on the prevalence of IPV. After the passage of VAWA, states increased their criminalization of IPV and research was conducted to determine how best to stop and reduce IPV. However, victims often do not become involved with the criminal justice system for many reasons and this has led states to rely on the ci vil PPO process to address IPV in a more widespread and timely manner. The next chapter will explain the process for receiving a PPO, who can access PPOs, what is typically included in PPOs, the history of PPOs, and analyze the efficacy of PPOs. CHAPTER III LITERATURE REVIEW Explanation of an Intimate Partner Violence Personal Protection Order As mentioned above, civil protection orders are known by many different names, but will hereon be referred to as Personal Protection Orders (PPOs). A PPO is a court order signed by a judge which restricts access of one person to the person, property, children, family, or live in friends of another person over a designated period of time that varies between states (Fernandez, Iwamoto, & Muscat, 1997). While PPOs are c ivil orders, if violated, there are criminal sanctions that vary from state to state. The purpose of these civil orders is to prevent future physical violence, threats or intimidation, but not to punish past conduct (Meloy et al., 1997). PPOs then give law enforcement the 18

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opportunity to intervene before the violence occurs again unlike before civil orders were available, when a victim would have to wait to be injured again for intervention (Kaci, 1992). Civil orders are also helpful to victims who are from communities that have historically experienced abuse in the criminal justice system as they are more likely to receive protection in this way. PPOs also provide protection to a victim where there is no criminal case (Weissman, 2007; Grau, Fagan, & Wexler, 1985; Chaundhuri & Daly, 1992). In addition to the protection that may come from a PPO, there are other benefits. When victims reach out for help in receiving a PPO, they generally find access to many other resources that may be helpful to them, like she lter or counseling services (Fischer & Rose, 1995; DeJong & Burgess Proctor, 2006). Also, receiving a PPO brings the victim s private experience with IPV into the public sphere and legitimizes their victimization, is a way to record the abuse, and a wa y to break the silence (Fischer & Rose, 1995; Thueson, 2004). A PPO can also be a symbolic "reclamation of what the abuse has systematically stripped from them: their control over their activities, their bodies, and their lives" (Fischer & Rose, 1995, p.423). The process of applying for and receiving a PPO varies across the states, but typically involves two steps. The first step is receiving a temporary protection order, which can be obtained through the criminal or civil court depending on the state (Grau et al., 1985; Chaundhuri & Daly, 1992; Kaci, 1992; Zoellner et al., 2000; DeJong & Burgess Proctor, 2006). These orders are also known as Temporary Protection Orders, Temporary Restraining Orders, or Ex Parte Orders and are granted immediately if there is reasonable proof of abuse and are in effect for anywhere from 321 days depending on 19

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the state (Ko, 2002). The second step of the process is an evidentiary hearing that the abuser must be notified about. At this hearing, both the victim and the abuser c an give testimony in regards to the allegations of abuse. The purpose of this hearing is to determine if the temporary order was justified and if it should be extended to the allowable statutory maximum (Grau et al., 1985; Chaundhuri & Daly, 1992; Kaci, 1992; Zoellner et al., 2000; DeJong & Burgess Proctor, 2006). Statutory maximums range from 6 months to 3 years (DeJong & Burgess Proctor, 2006). The process of obtaining a temporary protection order is often a much easier process than obtaining a final PPO. Even if a PPO is granted, victims are often confused about the content of the order (Harrell & Smith, 1996). If a PPO is granted, the burden of responsibility for contact between the victim and abuser is seen in two different ways. There is one viewpoi nt that the burden of responsibility lies with the abuser alone; the victim should not have to modify their life from day to day as they are not the one being punished (Chaundhuri & Daly, 1992). The other viewpoint puts a larger burden of responsibility fo r upholding the PPO on the victim as is illustrated in the following quote. In taking out a restraining order, the victim makes a contract with the court to leave the relationship for a specific period in exchange for legal protection. The defendant mus t stay away from the victim, but the victim too must not pursue further relationship issues (Horton, Simonidis & Simonidis, 1987, p. 266). Civil vs. Criminal Protection Orders Victims of IPV can also receive protection orders through the criminal justice process. Both civil and criminal protective orders were seen as a critical policy change because IPV was considered a criminal matter, not just a civil matter (Lerman, 1981). Criminal orders differ from civil orders as they are issued at a judge s discret ion. Criminal orders can include nocontact orders, counseling for victims or perpetrators, 20

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child visitation orders, and tenancy orders (Kethineni & Beichner, 2009). However, criminal protection orders are not available as quickly as civil orders due to th e lengthy delays from overburdened court dockets. (Kethineni & Beichner (2009) found that victim s experiences of abuse were similar between those who received criminal orders and those who received civil orders. The biggest difference between which protec tion order a victim received was based on the type of abuse: those who received criminal protection orders experienced more physical abuse and those who received civil orders cited emotional abuse in their petition. The efficacy of criminal orders and civi l orders was found to be similar and will be addressed below, but the disadvantage remains that the value of any protection order is determined by the abuser. For many IPV victims, criminal orders are not available, so civil orders continue to be the pri mary form of protection (Ko, 2002). In fact, many victims do not want the criminal justice system involved in addressing the violence in their relationships for many reasons. Civil protection orders are considered empowering by some and preferred by many b ecause greater remedies are available (Ko, 2002; Goldfarb, 2008). In addition, the victim can maintain more financial sustainability if they rely on the abusers income, as the abuser will not be in jail (Ko, 2002; Kethineni & Beichner, 2009). Civil protect ion orders couple victimempowerment with deterrence and can offer remedies that do not require the blunt instrument of criminal law, which is not an acceptable solution to many victims of IPV (Quarm & Schwartz, 1985; Waul, 2000). History of Personal Prote ction Orders In 1976, Pennsylvania became the first state to pass civil PPO legislation; by 1988, all but two states (Delaware and Arkansas) had authorized this legislation (Horton, 21

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Simonidis, & Simonidis, 1987; Klein, 1996; Kane, 2000; Eigenberg et al., 2003). By 1994, all 50 states made some sort of PPO available to victims of IPV (Ko, 2002). This legislation came in part as a direct result from coalitions of feminist shelter workers, academics, and lawyers that had worked to bring the issue of violence against women into the public purview by working to expand both criminal and civil remedies (Chaundhuri & Daly, 1992). However, these early PPOs were not as victimfriendly as most are currently. Prior to 1983, protective orders were available, but only as a part of divorce proceedings. This was problematic as many victims do not want a divorce and other victims that experience IPV are not married to their partner (Lerman et al., 1981; Fiedler, Briar, & Pierce, 1984; Chaundhuri & Daly, 1992). Since 1988, PPO statutes have changed both in accordance to VAWA legislation, but also to create a more victimfriendly system. For instance, access to PPOs has increased, there are broader definitions for relationship eligibility, many states waive or reduce filing fees, there is help for victims filling out paperwork, and victim s addresses can be kept confidential (Eigenberg et al., 2003). However, not all victims of IPV are able to access PPOs for protection from their abusive partner for many reasons. Access to Per sonal Protection Orders As previously mentioned, PPOs vary wildly between states, but in order for PPOs to be effective, they must be accessible, must meet the victim s needs, and be enforced (Brown, 1998). PPOs may appear inaccessible to individuals if t hey have never filled out legal paperwork and if there is no one available to help them through this process. A few states explicitly disallow court clerks in helping with PPOs (DeJong & Burgess Proctor, 22

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2006). Yet another barrier in this process is if the re is a filing fee for the PPO paperwork once it is complete. Some states waive filing fees, others force the abuser to pay the court fees, and still others continue to charge filing fees. All PPO paperwork requires an address from the petitioner, and all states now allow for the address to be kept confidential, thus allaying some fears a victim may have (DeJong & Burgess Proctor, 2006). Additionally, yet not in all states, a victim does not have to have a criminal case to receive a PPO (Thueson, 2004). As of 2006, federal law allows a current or former spouse, a current or former cohabitant, and people with a child in common to apply for a PPO (Vittes & Sorenson, 2006; DeJong & Burgess Proctor, 2006). Also as of 2006, 32 states allow for victims in a dating relationship that have never lived with their partner to apply for a PPO. This may or may not include samesex couples across the states (DeJong & Burgess Proctor, 2006; Vittes & Sorenson, 2006). However, the majority states use gender neutral language, t hus allowing jurisdictions to give samesex victims a PPO (Knauer, 1999; DeJong & Burgess Proctor, 2006). As of 2006, Delaware, Montana and South Carolina explicitly mention that PPOs are for heterosexual couples only (DeJong & Burgess Proctor, 2006). Addi tionally, in some states, minors can apply for PPOs without a guardian (Vittes & Sorenson, 2006). Typically, the victim is not the only person that needs protecting when a PPO is being sought. Some states allow for family members and children to be listed on the PPO, thus addressing custody issues (Thueson, 2004; DeJong & Burgess Proctor, 2006). People are not the only entities that need protection from an abuser, but animals as well. In a 2011 study, 52% of single women seeking shelter said that their part ner had 23

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threatened to hurt or kill a pet and 69% of women with children said the same (Vellucci, 2011). In 2006, Maine was the first state to allow animals to be protected through a PPO followed by Vermont, New York, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecti cut, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Minnesota, Nevada, North Carolina, Tennessee, Washington, and West Virginia (Vellucci, 2011). Federal law prohibits anyone with a domestic violence restraining order or PPO from purchasing or possessing a firearm (Vittes & Sorenson, 2006). One reason for this law is that a victim is at five times the risk of being killed by her partner if the partner has access to firearms (Campbell et al., 2003; Vittes, Webster, Frattaroli, Claire, & Wintemute, 2013). As of 2006, eight sta tes prohibited abusers with a PPO injunction from having a firearm, but most states leave it up to the judge s discretion (DeJong & Burgess Proctor, 2006). However, there is concern that firearm removal after a PPO is in place could put both victims and la w enforcement at risk (Vittes et al., 2013). Interestingly, a few states have tried to pass language in their PPO statute to allow victims a temporary concealed weapons permit (Joice, 2006). Profile of a Personal Protection Order Petitioner While many vict ims are able to access PPOs if desired, not all do. Many studies have been conducted that aim to quantify and understand the types of people that obtain temporary or longer term protection orders. Interestingly, there is no typical profile of a type of vic tim that obtains a PPO. This decision is not affected by education level, employment status, children, living situation, length of relationship, duration of abuse, or severity of abuse (Grau et al., 1985; Harrell & Smith, 1996). PPOs are generally not used as an early intervention strategy, but more of a last effort to end the abuse as most victims 24

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had been in their relationship between 2 and 5 years (Harrell & Smith, 1996; Thueson, 2004), though may be a more successful tool if the relationship is of a shorter duration (Grau et al., 1985). Survivors stated the reason they were obtaining a PPO was because they were tired of the abuse they were experiencing and this was a last resort (Hofeller, 1982; Fischer & Rose, 1995). In fact, the incident that drove the victim to obtain a PPO was not necessarily the worst incident, but likened to the straw that broke the camel s back (Harrell & Smith, 1996). Many victims that decided to obtain a PPO did so as they felt that the abuse was becoming more severe (60%), frequ ent (59%), or believed it was affecting their children (50%) (Fischer & Rose, 1995). Even though over 50% of victims requesting a PPO have experienced severe abuse, not all follow through with the temporary or longer term protection order process (Thueson, 2004). Dependency on the relationship, severity of abuse, confusion about the PPO process, and fear of the abuser often inhibit a victim in the PPO process (Fernandez et al., 1997). There are some differences that arise in the literature when comparing t he types of relationships of those obtaining a PPO. In one study, married couples are far less likely to receive permanent or long term POs than any other living arrangement; this is interesting as married couples may experience more violence than couples whose living arrangements differ (Kaci, 1992). Most commonly, PPOs are accessed by those in a dating relationship; in one study, over 70% of PPOs were for this type of relationship (Vittes & Sorenson, 2006). It was also found that as victim age increased, the probability of keeping the PPO in effect increased (Harrell & Smith, 1996). After receiving at temporary PO, one to two weeks later there is a court date where a final PPO can be issued. Many victims that receive a temporary PO do not follow 25

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through with the final PPO. Between 37% and 40% of victims that receive a temporary order follow through to receive a final PPO (Kaci, 1992; Harrell & Smith, 1996; Zoellner et al., 2000). There are many reasons why a victim would not follow through or would be de nied a final PPO. In one study, of those that did not follow through with the final PPO, 64% said that the abuser was not bothering them anymore, 27% reconciled with the abuser, 35% stated that the abuser talked them out of the final PPO, and 25% stated th at the abuser began seeking counseling (Harrell & Smith, 1996). In a study by Zoellner et al. (2000), of the 63% of victims that did not receive a final PPO, 5% withdrew their request, 55% had their request dismissed for failure to prosecute, and 2% were denied. Of orders denied or granted, studies have found similar profiles of either the type violence or of the victim that were significant. Severity of abuse and relationship status did not seem to have an impact on the issuance of a final PPO (Kaci, 1992; Zoellner et al., 2000). Additionally, ethnicity, educational status, age, and the length of the relationship were not related to obtaining a final order (Zoellner et al., 2000). The one characteristic that was significant was victim employment; 74% of unemployed women were not granted a final order in one study (Zoellner et al., 2000). Surprisingly, the type of violence may or may not have an impact on PPO issuance. Vittes and Sorenson (2006) found a few characteristics positively impacted PPO issuance: if sexual assault was involved, if a child witnessed the event, if the abuser threatened people other than victim, and if there was use of a knife or person weapon. It is interesting to note that the use of a firearm did not impact the issuance decision. A lternately, Zoellner et al. (2000) found that any type of weapon present, the victim experiencing physical harm, or children witnessing the event had no impact on PPO issuance. However, they found that threats to 26

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kill the victim (not children) increased th e chances of receiving a final PPO. Additionally, a victim always received a PPO if the victim was not going to return to their abuser, even if the abuser changed. After a PPO was granted, even though most orders call for no contact with the abuser, peacef ul contact is allowed when dealing with shared children. Therefore, the majority of victims have some sort of contact with their abuser. In a study by Harrell and Smith (1996), 75% of victims with PPOs reported contact with the abuser within the first year It is interesting to note that contact percentages did not differ greatly with victims without PPOs that decided to leave their partner; 80% of these victims had contact with their abuser in the first year. This could speak to the fact that abusers are a lmost always granted visitation, thus contact between the victim and abuser must continue. Because of this, Goldfarb (2008) suggests that contact be determined by the victim as this allows for a redress of the power imbalance within the relationship and fo r greater self determination. This however, could become difficult for law enforcement as they are charged with enforcing these orders. Law Enforcement Response to Personal Protection Orders Once a victim goes through the process of obtaining a PPO, one pa rt of ensuring its effectiveness is through law enforcement response upon violation (Harrell & Smith, 1996). Additionally, the initial separation of a victim and the abuser is the most dangerous time for a victim (Joice, 2006). Law enforcement response seems more discretionary than one would expect based on the mandatory and pro arrest policies many states put into effect due to VAWA. States often use the term may or shall within legislation in regards to arrest policy. The use of the term shall evin ces the 27

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legislative intent that the provisions be considered mandatory and not subject to judicial discretion (Greer & Purvis, 2011, p. 290). The term may allows for judicial discretion. Many states allow for law enforcement to use their discretion in making an arrest even if their PPO statute states that mandatory arrest or pro arrest is the policy (Greer & Purvis, 2011; Joice, 2006). The case of Castle Rock vs. Gonzales further encouraged law enforcement discretion when the judge found that law enforcement does not have to enforce restraining orders and stated that PPOs are not an entitlement or property interest (Joice, 2006). This can be seen by the difference between calls to law enforcement for PPO violations and the subsequent arrests (Harrell & S mith, 1996). Arrest rates based on PPO violations range from 3% (Langley & Levy, 1977) to 13.9% (Bayley, 1986) to 20% (Smith, 1997). There have been many studies done that have found PPO violations are difficult for victims to have enforced or even responded to (Harrell & Smith, 1996; Eigenberg et al., 2003; Burgess Proctor, 2003; Greer & Purvis, 2011). Burgess Proctor (2003) found that PPO enforcement was more likely if there was also property damage reported and was less likely if there was no physical in jury or if the victim was drunk. Efficacy of Personal Protection Orders As mentioned previously, leaving an abusive relationship can be the most dangerous time for a victim (Erez & Belnap, 1998; Joice, 2006), and PPOs are the most common remedy women use for protection (Goldfarb, 2008). This information, coupled with every state allowing some sort of PPO, seems to indicate that PPOs are effective; however, research has not always shown this to be true. To determine effectiveness, there are many measures t o consider in addition to simply reviewing rates of re abuse. It is 28

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important that PPOs are easily accessible to victims, meet the victims needs, and are consistently enforced (Brown, 1998). In addition, to determine PPO efficacy, one must also take into account the victim s perception of the process and their experience (Burgess Proctor, 2003). Furthermore, effectiveness may be limited by the definitions and provisions provided within the legislative statute (Grau et al., 1985). This section will review the rates of re abuse, victim perception of effectiveness, and characteristics of abuse or abusers that determine PPO efficacy. Many studies on re abuse rates end in mixed results of PPO effectiveness. It has become evident that PPOs are not a panacea that will work for every person (Chaundhuri & Daly, 1992). Studies show that anywhere from 35% 60% of victims with PPOs experience re abuse (Grau et al., 1985; Chaundhuri & Daly, 1992; Klein, 1996; Harrell & Smith, 1996; Meloy et al., 1997; Joice, 2006). There is also some evidence that violence may escalate after receiving a PPO (Berk, Berk, Loseke, & Rauma, 1983; Baker, 1997; Joice, 2006). However, one study found that while PPOs may not protect victims from further abuse, violence did not get worse than the victim was already experiencing (Klein, 1996). Time may also play a factor on PPO effectiveness; while research has found that the most dangerous time for a victim is during the early separation, two studies have found that the likelihood of abuse after re ceiving a PPO increases over time (Harrell & Smith, 1996; Keilitz, Hannaford Agar, & Efkeman, 1997). Keilitz et al. (1997) found, at the initial interview, one month after receiving the PPO, that only 28% of victims had experienced some form of re abuse. H owever, six months after receiving the PPO, 35% reported experiencing abuse. Harrell and Smith (1996) found that 60% of victims experienced re abuse within the first year, and the majority experienced re abuse within 29

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the first four months after the PPO was in effect. The definition of effectiveness used in research seems to determine if studies find PPOs to be effective. Some research bases effectiveness on re abuse rates while others base it on calls to law enforcement. For example, Horton et al. (1987) fo und PPOs to be effective when 50% 56% of victims did not experience re abuse. Similarly, Carlson, Harris, and Holden (1999) found that PPOs reduced victim calls to law enforcement by 66%, but re abuse rates from the victim were not collected. Still other r esearch has focused on the effectiveness of mutual orders, where both the victim and abuser receive PPOs restraining each other. Meloy et al. (1997) found that these types of orders were more effective in stopping abuse than when a PPO was given solely to the victim. Much of the research on PPOs effectiveness is mixed, with PPOs found to be effective in some situations, but not in others, or to have limited effectiveness (Chaundhuri & Daly, 1992; Harrell & Smith, 1996; Fernandez et al., 1997). A study conducted by Logan, Walker, Shannon, & Cole (2008) sought to determine the differences in PPO efficacy based on the relationship status between the petitioner and respondent. They found that for 53% of victims that chose to leave the relationship and 68% of those that chose to remain in the relationship experienced re abuse. Response from law enforcement and the criminal justice system may also play a part in the effectiveness of PPOs. Even with mandatory or pro arrest policies in place, arrest is unlikely for violations of PPOs (Chaundhuri & Daly, 1992) and even if an arrest is made, there is rarely any sort of criminal justice follow up or sanction (Klein, 1996). Mandatory or pro arrest policies may also deter victims from reporting PPO violations as they do not want the abuser arrested. Similarly, even if the abuser is arrested for a 30

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violation, the victim may be persuaded or intimidated into dropping charges before the case is heard in court (Alder, 1999). Arrest is also not a deterrent for every abuser and ma y stop some types of violence, but not necessarily all forms of violence (Harrell & Smith, 1996). However, in one study, the impact of law enforcement response was positive to victims regardless of arrest. Women with PPOs found that law enforcement responded more quickly and were more supportive and found the experience empowering, regardless of the criminal justice outcome (Chaundhuri & Daly, 1992). While the effectiveness of PPOs is unclear, there is also a lack of clarity if PPOs are more effective in cu rtailing different forms of abuse. Grau et al. (1985) found that PPOs appeared to be more effective in reducing the levels of re abuse for both verbal abuse and general harassment, but not physical abuse. On the other hand, Burgess Proctor (2003) conducted a study that theorized that PPOs would be more effective for women experiencing common couple violence rather than patriarchal terrorism. However, she found that re abuse rates and PPO violation rates did not change depending on the type of violence exper ienced. However, both studies found that PPOs were far less effective if women had experienced severe abuse in the past or were considered high risk victims (Grau et al., 1985; Burgess Proctor, 2003). Despite all of the mixed information around the eff ectiveness of PPOs, there is some consensus around the types of abusers that are likely to re abuse or not re abuse if there is a PPO in place. PPOs generally appear to be less effective when the history of violence is extensive and/or severe (Grau et al., 1985; Chaudhuri & Daly, 1992; Burgess Proctor, 2003; Eigenberg et al., 2003) or if there is a history of stalking (Logan et al., 2008). Even if the violence was not severe or extensive, but the victim and abuser had to 31

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remain linked due to finances or chi ldren, PPOs were not effective (Grau et al., 1985) or it was more difficult for the victim to discontinue their relationship with their partner (Logan et al., 2008). Additionally, if the abuser has a prior criminal history, a PPO is less likely to be effec tive (Chaudhuri & Daly, 1992; Sherman, et al., 1992; Klein, 1996; Fernandez et al., 1997). In another study, it was found that PPOs were twice as likely to be ineffective if the abuser had prior drug or alcohol arrests (Meloy et al., 1997). Other indicator s were good predictors in determining the effectiveness of PPOs. For example, it was found in one study that if the victim was any race other than African American, if the victim was unemployed, and if the couple was separated, there was greater risk for violation of the PPO (Burgess Proctor, 2003). Similarly, younger, unmarried abusers were more likely to violate the PPO (Klein, 1996). Abusers who did not abuse their partner severely, who were employed, and who had no prior criminal history were more likel y to follow the provisions of the PPO and were less likely to re abuse their partner (Fernandez et al., 1997). This speaks to the idea that a stake in conformity is largely what deters people from actions that will lead to arrest and may be the best indica tor for the effectiveness of PPOs (Sherman et al., 1992). Similarly, those abusers who are more socially bonded, like those that are married or employed, are less likely to violate a PPO (Sherman, 1984). There is one final way to look at the effectiveness of PPOs and that is through the perspective of the victim, as efficacy is both subjective and objective (Ko, 2002). Victim s feelings about their PPO s effectiveness varies greatly between different jurisdictions due to the process of receiving a PPO and how it is enforced (Wan, 2000). Many victims found that police response was positive once they had a PPO; the response 32

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was quick and the officers were supportive (Grau et al., 1985; Chaudhuri & Daly, 1992). In a study by Fischer and Rose (1998), of victims that received PPOs, 91% felt that the PPO was a good choice for them, 89% felt more in control of their relationships, and 98% felt more in control of their lives. However, the PPO may be more than just a way to stop the abuse for many victims and can be a n empowering process (Chaudhuri & Daly, 1992; Keilitz et al., 1997). In a study by Harrell and Smith (1996), 79% of victims felt that the PPO sent a message to the abuser that the abuse was wrong and were able to break their silence; 62% of victims felt th at the PPO was a good punishment for the abuser. Interestingly though, only 50% believed that the abuser would follow the PPO. Keilitz et al. (1997) found that there were other positive effects that led victims to feeling that their PPO was effective. Six months after the PPO was granted, 85% of survivors reported life improvement, 90% felt better about themselves, and 80% felt safer. Additionally, through the PPO process, survivors connected with one other service on average (Durfee, 2009). So, satisfactio n may also be connected to the services the survivor received. Not all survivors were satisfied with the outcomes of their PPO. While many female survivors did recognize an increase in law enforcement response, male survivors were not satisfied with the r esponse from law enforcement (Buzawa, Austin, Bannon, & Jackson, 1992). Still other women were dismissed by law enforcement and told that violence was a way of life (Chaudhuri & Daly, 1992). While many victims were satisfied with the legal process to obtai n a PPO, others likened it to a second assault due to the public storytelling (Chaudhuri & Daly, 1992). Further still, 58% of victims did not feel that the PPOs guaranteed their safety; moreover, for some, they felt less safe with a PPO (Erez & Belnap, 1998). For some victims, the PPO represents the end of their relationship, for 33

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others it represents the beginning of a protracted process of ending their relationship, and still for others, it represents seeking safety in their relationship with their partner (Logan et al., 2008). While PPOs can be seen as an intersection of community based approaches with the criminal justice system (Waul, 2000), they may also be too simple of a solution to help solve a complex problem (Ferraro, 1993). There may need to be m ore variation and even different enforcement strategies to accommodate victims situations and needs (Logan et al., 2008, p. 384). Since there is debate as to the effectiveness of PPOs in curtailing violence, it is important to analyze PPO statute s ability to facilitate empowerment. Other Issues with Personal Protection Orders In addition to questions regarding PPO effectiveness, prior research has also uncovered other issues regarding implementation of PPOs. One such issue includes gender bias: PPO appr oval seems to favor female victims rather than male victims. For example, Basile (2005) found that 91% of women that petitioned for a PPO were granted versus only 66% of men. This study found that courts are not immune from social norms (Basile, 2005, p. 178) and that men are not granted protection as often as women even if the victimization is similar. Questions regarding gender bias have led to additional concerns regarding whether PPOs are being leveraged to gain an advantage in custody or divorce proceedings, or for general one upmanship (Quarm & Schwartz, 1985; Muller, Desmarais, & Hamel, 2009; Murdoch, 2005; Robe & Ross, 2009). An additional concern focuses on the lack of due process afforded to a defendant when a temporary PO is granted. When the PO is temporary, the defendant does not get to make a statement, nor do they need to be present. However, research suggests that due process concerns can be 34

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tempered if the PPO hearing is scheduled between 7 and 14 days after the temporary order is granted (A dler, 1999; Thueson, 2004). It is also important to recognize that the criminal justice system does not work equally for each person, namely communities of color and the LGBTQ community due to racial and homophobic bias (Ruttenburg, 1994). In fact, the sta te can often take the place of the role of the abuser by continuing to control the victim by dictating how violations are enforced or not enforced. While PPOs may be one solution for preventing abuse, it must be acknowledged that it is not the only solution and perhaps not the most effective solution. Empowerment Within both research and practice, the term empowerment is used in many different ways and lacks a clear definition (Perkins & Zimmerman, 1995; Chamberlin & Schene, 1997; Cattaneo & Chapman, 2010; Brodsky & Cattaneo, 2013; Cattaneo & Goodman, 2014). Many definitions of empowerment incorporate elements of self efficacy and power dynamics; however, some see empowerment as a process and others an outcome (Ford, 1991; Perkins & Zimmerman, 1995; Chamberl in & Schene, 1997; Busch & Valentine, 2000; Russell & Light, 2006). In addition, empowerment may be conceptualized differently at the micro vs. macro level. For example, Brodsky and Cattaneo (2013) have worked to create a clear definition of empowerment fo r individual victims. Based on their model, items/concepts broadly considered empowering are divided into one of two categories resilience or empowerment. Resilience is internally focused; it is about adapting, withstanding, or resisting a negative or ri sky situation. Conversely, in this model, empowerment refers to an individual or a group shifting power 35

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dynamics between people or a larger system. For example, creating a labor union may facilitate empowerment in a company of laborers, because instead of management holding all of the power in making decisions that will impact laborers, laborers get a voice in the decision making. In cases of unionized labor, management must share power, thus there has been a shift in power between management and laborers i n the company. In this model, empowerment cannot be gifted or coerced but rather, it can be facilitated or hindered. Both resilience and empowerment are considered a process that is iterative and includes reflection. Self efficacy, change in knowledge and skills, and community resources, which are often included in definitions of empowerment, remain the core of this model. However, the core is placed within a larger social context that includes meaningful goals, action to achieve those goals, and a reflecti on on the impact of the achievement (Brodsky & Cattaneo, 2013). According to Brodsky & Cattaneo s (2013) model of empowerment for victims of IPV, victims first must change the power dynamic between themselves and their partners, so they may apply for and r eceive a PPO. After the shift in the power dynamic, a victim may need to use a resilience strategy to adapt to a new level of risk by moving or changing their children s school. Prior research has demonstrated that applying for and/or receiving a PPO can be an empowering process for victims of IPV (Chaudhuri & Daly, 1992; Keilitz et al., 1997). There are many different aspects of a PPO statute and each part of the process represents an opportunity to facilitate or hinder a victim s empowerment. For example, PPO statutes that allow the court clerk to offer the victim nonlegal assistance with the PPO application could facilitate empowerment by increasing the victim s knowledge, skills, and self efficacy. On the other hand, there are some aspects of PPO statutes that may 36

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facilitate empowerment for some, while hindering empowerment for others. For example, if a state s response to a PPO violation results in an automatic felony for the abuser, some victims might feel empowered, while other victims may not want th eir abuser charged with a felony (i.e., it may anger the abuser and put the victim at higher risk or the abuser may lose their job and not be able to help the victim financially). The Current Study The present study has two objectives. First, this research replicates the work of DeJong and Burgess Proctor (2006) by applying their conceptualization of victimfriendliness to 2014 personal protection order statutes to determine whether states have become more or less victimfriendly since 2003. Specifically states will be grouped and rank ordered based on their victimfriendliness score in 2014. State scores from 2003 will be compared to state scores from 2014. Secondly, because protection order statutes have continued to evolve based on best practices, thi s study expands on and re conceptualizes DeJong and Burgess Proctor s (2006) victimfriendliness measure to include indicators of victimempowerment. Comparisons will be made between 2014 state victimfriendliness scores and 2014 victimempowerment scores to determine how the expanded concept of victim empowerment impacted state rankings. This research contributes to and informs the literature, policy, and practice in several ways. First, this study contributes to the understanding of how states PPOs have changed over time. Periodic information can be used by policy makers and advocacy groups when amending their state s PPO statute to incorporate current best practices based on how they rank compared to other states. Model statutory language will be identif ied that facilitates victimempowerment. This study additionally has important 37

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implications for research. PPO statutes tend to show a trending pattern in what aspects states choose to adopt or remove from the statute language. These trends can be further e xamined to determine the efficacy of the different aspects of these statutes. This study further informs the literature as to the extent to which personal protection order statutes contain aspects that could facilitate empowerment in victims. The definitio n of empowerment remains unclear in literature and practice (Perkins & Zimmerman, 1995; Chamberlin & Schene, 1997; Cattaneo & Chapman, 2010; Brodsky & Cattaneo, 2013; Cattaneo & Goodman, 2014). There is much controversy around the effectiveness of PPOs in reducing future violence, but there is evidence that the process of obtaining a PPO can be empowering for victims (Chaudhuri & Daly, 1992; Waul, 2000; Kethineni & Beichner, 2009). As a result, this research will utilize the definition of empowerment propos ed by Brodsky and Cattaneo (2013) to identify victim empowering elements within PPO statutes. In the previous work by DeJong and Burgess Proctor (2006), assumptions were inherently made within their operationalization of victimfriendliness that may not be applicable to all victims of IPV. Their conceptualization of victimfriendliness was captured by their four domain coding scheme: recognition of VAWA, petitioner respondent relationship, administrative process, and punishing violations. However, not all of the elements included in their coding scale will facilitate empowerment for victims. For example, under their punishing violations scale, there is an assumption that all victims want their abuser to receive harsh penalties upon violation. However, resear ch has revealed that victims are not uniform in their desire for criminal justice sanctions on their abuser (Smith, 2000; Phillips & Sobol, 2010). Thus, the present 38

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research only labels elements of PPO statues as empowering if they provide opportunity for victim autonomy and decision making power. The present research utilizes a mixed methods approach to provide both quantitative rankings and specific examples to highlight elements of statutes that facilitate empowerment of victims across states. As such, the current study assesses the extent to which state PPO statutes includes elements that facilitate victimempowerment as this is another way to determine PPO efficacy. This information can be used by policy makers and advocacy groups to identify model sta tute language that facilities empowerment for victims. This study is guided by the following research questions: According to DeJong and Burgess Proctor s original conceptualization of victimfriendliness have states PPO statutes become more or less vi ctimfriendly in 2014? Using a new coding scheme that captures a state s ability to facilitate victimempowerment through personal protection order statutes, how do states rank nationally? CHAPTER IV METHODOLOGY Design This study replicates DeJong and B urgess Proctor s (2006) research by using their coding scheme to develop victimfriendliness scores for each state s 2014 PPO. Specifically, quantitative content analysis was used to extract information from each PPO across the 11 variables that DeJong and Burgess Proctor (2006) examined previously and 2014 victimfriendliness scores were created for each state. Next, a second level of coding was completed for additional codes regarding concepts facilitating victimempowerment and quantitative scores for th ese 18 variables were developed. Further, 39

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qualitative content analysis was utilized to extract narrative examples that contextualize how elements of empowerment are expressed in PPOs with respect to language differences within each statute as well as to pr ovide example language for states that want to increase elements to facilitate victimempowerment or revise less victim empowering language currently included in their PPO. Data Collection Content analysis was used to examine state s PPO statutes. This pro cess allowed for large amounts of data to be condensed and made systematically comparable (Berg, 2001, p.238). Qualitative coding can include both manifest and latent content. Manifest content coding is limited to elements that are physically present an d countable while latent content coding focuses on interpreting symbolic information beneath the manifest content (Berg, 2001, p.242). This research focused solely on manifest content. When a new statute is introduced, implementation is not always clear. As legal cases move through the system, case law and rules are created to set precedent for implementation. Therefore, even if something is ambiguous or unclear in a statute, there may be a clear method in which it is being enforced or enacted. Since mani fest content of the statutes were used to determine each quantitative code, not case law or rules, how laws are actually enforced within the court system is not reported in this research. PPO statutes from all 50 states and Washington, D.C were included in the present analysis. Importantly, each state adopts new statutes at different times during the year with the majority of changes taking effect in January of each year. For the present study, statutes were obtained through states websites through August 31, 2014, and thus, reflects information included in statutes by the end of August 2014. The majority of 40

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state s PPO statutes were found in one location in their entirety (e.g. family law or criminal law); however, some states referred to other sections of statutes. For example, New York s PPO statutes are found in family and criminal sections of the statute. Data for these analyses focused solely on statutory language, no case law or notes were included. Variables Victim Friendliness Variables (DeJong & Bu rgess Proctor, 2006) Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). When VAWA was passed into legislation, states needed to change many of their laws to comply with federal standards and some of these specifically applied to state s PPO statutes. First, states needed to add language around full faith and credit for foreign orders. As per VAWA, states were mandated to recognize and enforce PPOs from other states or tribal land. PPOs need not to be registered in the new state for validity, but should be accepted as long as it appears valid on its face (Carbon, Macdonald, & Zaya, 1999). Full faith and Credit was assessed regarding the level of acceptance of a foreign PPO (1= foreign orders were enforced after registration, 5 = foreign orders were not enforced, 0 = the st atute was silent on the issue). Second, mutual PPOs are not to be accepted outside of the state where they are given unless there is proof of mutual violence (DeJong & Burgess Proctor, 2006). Mutual protection orders used to be given often as law enforcem ent or the court system did not take the time to determine a victim or offender (Topliffe, 1992). This could, and often does, lead to victims being penalized for violating a PPO. Mutual protection orders were assessed regarding the states mandate for acc eptance (1= state requires proof of 41

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mutual combatance for acceptance, .5= disallowance implied or ambiguous, 0= statue was silent). Petitioner respondent relationship. At their inception, PPOs could only be accessed by women who were actively seeking a di vorce from their male partner (Grau et al., 1985). Over time, PPOs have become more accessible and, in many states are now available to other groups of victims including victims of samesex couple violence and heterosexual male victims. States were assesse d to determine if same sex couples could apply for a PPO (1= yes, 0=no). Second, since historically, PPOs were limited to female victims, gendered language was used in statutes. States were then assessed to determine if gendered language was used (1= no, 0= yes). Administrative process. The legal system often poses barriers to victims seeking PPOs due to a lack of understanding regarding the required paperwork, the court process, or the associated costs. To help interpret the PPO legal process, some states have allowed the court clerk to provide some nonlegal assistance to the petitioner. States were assessed to determine if clerk assistance is provided (1= yes, 0= no or statute silent). For many court documents, a filing fee is required. In order to reduce barriers to victim s safety, some states have waived the filing fee. States were assessed to determine if or how filing fees were charged (1= fee waived, .5= fees charged to respondent, 0= filing fees charged to victim). Just as PPOs were more restrictiv e in eligibility in the past, similarly, many states would only issue PPOs if there were criminal proceedings in progress. However, many states recognize that victims may not be involved in the criminal justice system and need a way to receive protection t hrough the civil process. States were assessed to determine if a victim could receive a PPO outside of filing 42

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criminal charges (1= yes, 0= no). Lastly, if a victim has fled from their abuser and does not want their address to be public, legal paperwork cou ld pose a barrier, as it requires an individual s address to be listed. States were assessed to determine if the victim s address could remain publically confidential (1= yes, 0= no). Punishing violations. In order for PPOs to be effective in reducing violence, there must be consequences for their violation. Such consequences may include criminal justice sanctions, counseling programs, and weapons restrictions. First, state statutes were analyzed to determine the criminal justice implications for a violation (1= felony upon first violation, .5= felony upon subsequent violations, 0= misdemeanor on each violation). New crimes would be associated with different criminal justice response in addition to any consequences to PPO violation. Many states feel that ha ving a strong criminal justice response provides the best protection to victims. Second, in an effort to provide rehabilitation to abusers, some states include counseling services as an optional or mandated sanction. The role of counseling as a response to violations was captured as 1= state requires counseling upon violation, .5= allow for counseling after violation or within PPO, 0= counseling not mentioned. Lastly, weapons, specifically firearms, often play a role in abusive relationships. Abusers often use a firearm to threaten their partner or may use the firearm to hurt or attempt to kill them. States were assessed to determine their regulation of firearms upon the issuance of a PPO (1= mandate the surrender of firearms, .5= allow the surrender of fire arms, 0= statute is silent). Victim Empowerment Variables Since DeJong and Burgess Proctor (2006) completed their analysis of 2003 statutes, state PPO statutes have continued to evolve based on best practices and/or new 43

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trends in policy. In addition, thi s research aims to identify elements that facilitate victimempowerment, a concept not specifically examined by Dejong and Burgess Proctor. To capture these changes, the coding scheme was expanded to include additional indicators of victimempowerment. Add itionally, some of DeJong and Burgess Proctor s variables were recoded to show greater nuance and some of their original items were included without change. Since factors that facilitate empowerment are subjective to each individual, the second coding scheme was created to highlight factors that allow for greater victim opportunity in the PPO process. Still other variables were omitted from the new coding scheme given that they do not necessarily facilitate empowerment. Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). Th ese items from the DeJong and Burgess Proctor (2006) scheme remained unchanged and were included as facilitators of empowerment. Full faith and credit enforcement allows a victim greater opportunity to flee or move out of state if desired; if mutual PPOs a re only allowed with proof of mutual combatance, victims are less likely to be wrongfully accused of abusing. Petitioner respondent relationship. Coding for the allowance of samesex couples to file for a PPO was expanded (1= explicitly allow victims in sa me sex relationship to apply, .5= statute ambiguous, 0= disallow). In addition, access was captured by an additional variable for dating couples: state statutes were coded in regard to their recognition of dating couples (1= explicitly allow dating couples .5= dating couples allowed only if cohabitating, 0= dating couples disallowed). This is an important determination as up to 70% of PPOs are filed by those in a dating relationship (Vittes & Sorenson, 2006). When included in state statutes, this is an inc lusive item that allows for a greater number of victims to access PPOs, thus it is considered to be an empowerment 44

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facilitator. The gender neutral language variable from the DeJong and Burgess Proctor (2006) coding scheme remained unchanged. Administrative process. The filing assistance variable was expanded to determine how much assistance could be provided to a victim through the court system (1= statute mandates filing assistance from court clerk or other appointee, .5= assistance is allowed, 0= do not a llow assistance or provide paperwork only). When a victim receives the assistance needed, their knowledge and skills may increase and they might be connected to a meaningful community resource. These are core components of the empowerment process. Filing a ssistance, as an example, may demonstrate how a more nuanced assessment of PPO statutes can bring a greater understanding of the impact of the PPO process on a victim. The following indicators of victimempowerment were identified from a thorough search of the literature and were added to the administrative process domain: (1) if provisions of custody and other forms of support can be included in the PPO; (2) if documentation is required for the denial of a PPO request; (3) if a petitioner is allowed a temp orary concealed weapons permit upon issuance of a PPO; (4) if pets can be protected in the PPO; (5) if forms of violence other than physical are included by definition; (6) if minors can apply without a guardian or adult; and (7) if undocumented citizens a re able to access PPOs. Many victims feel trapped in their abusive relationships because of a lack of financial resources or other supports; additionally, children are often used as an abusive tactic (Finley, 2013). Therefore, statutes were assessed rega rding their inclusion of custody and/or other forms of support in their PPO statute (1= can include provisions 45

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around custody and support in PPO request, .5= can include either custody or support, 0= statute is silent). If a victim can request additional f inancial support, they will have greater opportunity for autonomy from their abuser. Similarly, the legal system may pose a barrier for victims given that many forms of abuse are not included in the criminal code (Bingham, 2005). More widely defining abusi ve behavior provides opportunities for a greater number of victims to access PPOs, and thus facilitating victimempowerment. Statutes were examined to determine if they included any other forms of violence in their definition in the PPO statute (1= sexual and psychological abuse included in definition of abuse within PPO, .5= sexual or psychological abuse mentioned, 0= sexual and psychological abuse not explicitly included). Many victims choose to stay in a relationship because of fear of losing their child ren (Finley, 2013) and, similarly, what might happen to their pets if they flee their home (Vellucci, 2011). Some states have begun including the protection of pets in their statute; this is considered an empowerment facilitator because of the greater opportunity for victims (1= protection of pets allowed, 0= statute silent). Since many PPOs involve individuals in dating relationships (Gallopin & Leigh, 2009), it is important to analyze if minors can access PPOs and if they can access PPOs without an adu lt. Adolescent dating relationships are often not taken seriously by adults, thus if they are only allowed to apply for a PPO with an adult, an adolescent may not be able to apply for protection. Additionally, a minor may not have a supportive parental rel ationship. If minors of a certain age or mental capacity are allowed to apply on their own, this is considered an empowerment facilitator as a greater number of victims have the opportunity to apply for a PPO in an autonomous manner (1= minors of a certain age 46

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can apply on their own, .5= minors can apply with a guardian or other adult, 0= minors cannot apply for a PPO). Other new trends are beginning to emerge in PPO statute language. One such trend is the allowance of petitioners to access a temporary con cealed weapons permit upon the issuance of a PPO (Joice, 2006). Research shows that the availability of firearms, regardless of whether they are associated with the victim or the abuser, increases the risk of homicide (Siegel, Ross, & King, 2013). Additionally, women (often the victim) are twice as likely to be killed by their abuser with a firearm as any other mechanism (Greer & Purvis, 2011; Sorenson, & Shen 2005). And, 31% of all homicides are attributed to IPV (Novello et al., 1992). With this information in mind, being able to carry a concealed weapon might facilitate empowerment for some victims, but it also increases the risk of homicide more generally, which is not empowering. As such, the presence of a temporary concealed weapons permit in PPO lang uage was captured as 0= allows a concealed carry permit, 1= does not allow a concealed carry permit. Another trend is the inclusion of language documenting the reasons for denying a PPO. This documentation allows a victim to appeal the decision, thus impa cting child custody and support decisions. Documentation regarding the reasons for denial of a PPO was coded as 1= documentation of denial required, 0= no documentation required. Again, while a denial of a PPO may hinder empowerment of a victim, the abilit y to appeal could facilitate empowerment. The DeJong and Burgess Proctor (2006) filing fee, independent filing, and confidential address items remain unchanged in this coding scheme. Punishing violations. As mentioned above, many states allow counseling or treatment for the abuser within the PPO process and/or as an option upon violation. The 47

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coding for this domain changed with the aim of providing a better understanding of the empowerment facilitation process. Specifically, access to counseling was divided into two different codes: counseling by way of victim request in the application process versus counseling as decided by the state. Victims ability to request counseling within the application process may facilitate empowerment (i.e., victim choice) and w as coded dichotomously (1= victims can request counseling, 0= not mentioned in statute). Conversely, state mandated counseling may also facilitate empowerment and was coded as 1= counseling mandated upon violation; .5= counseling is an option upon violatio n; 0= not mentioned in statute. This may facilitate empowerment as many victims do not wish harsh sanctions for their partner as this could limit financial support from their abuser and many simply want their partner to change to increase their safety. The coding regarding abusers access to firearms remained unchanged as the removal of the abusers firearms increases victim s safety which may facilitate victimempowerment (1= mandate the surrender of firearms, .5= allow the surrender of firearms, 0= statute is silent). Violation penalties were excluded from the empowerment coding scheme as prior research suggests that many victims report negative interactions with the criminal justice system during the help seeking process (Gover, Tomsich, & Richards, in pr ess; Smith, 2000; Phillips & Sobol, 2010), and similarly, many victims find a misdemeanor conviction for PPO violation as demeaning for a crime that they perceive to be so severe (Hart, 1993). As Freeman said, the criminal law is a blunt instrument and fe w women want to use it. This is perfectly understandable...sentences are often derisory" ( as cited in Quarm & Schwartz, 1985, p.39). As such, criminal justice system punishment for violations were perceived as hindering empowerment for many victims. 48

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Proced ure and Analysis Atlas.ti7 qualitative software suite was used for qualitative data management and organization (Muhr, 2013). Atlas.ti is a code based theory builder that allows multiple forms of data, tracks coding, and allows for the retrieval of codes a nd other data (Berg, 2001). Qualitative data analysis unfolded over several phases. In the first phase, DeJong and Burgess Proctor s (2006) coding scheme was applied to the state statutes so that the current 2014 statutes could be compared to the 2003 resu lts and any changes could be identified. In a second round of coding, an additional coding scheme was employed to enhance DeJong and Burgess Proctor s concept of victimfriendliness by including indicators of victimempowerment. Variables measuring empowe rment facilitators were based on PPO statute trends from 2003 to 2014 and were explained in detail above. For example, for the variable filing assistance, DeJong and Burgess Proctor coded statutes as either providing filing assistance or not mentioni ng or allowing for filing assistance The victimempowerment coding scheme expanded this dichotomous variable so that greater variation in filing assistance could be identified. The new variable identified whether the statute mandated the filing assistan ce provision allowed for the filing assistance provision or only provided the PPO paperwork or made no mention of filing assistance This coding expansion demonstrates the range of options for filing assistance and allows a more in depth examination of how these options are utilized across states In regard to coding procedures, the statues were examined for manifest content elated to the items presented on the coding sheet including items established by DeJong and Burgess Proctor (2006), 2 items r ecoded from DeJong and Burgess Proctor, and 9 49

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new items developed for the current research to measure victimempowerment across state PPO statutes. Once statutes were coded across the 16 constructs, the numerical scores for each item under the (1) DeJong & Burgess Proctor s (2006) victimfriendliness coding scheme and (2) the new victimempowerment coding scheme were entered into SPSS. To determine the inter rater reliability of coding, two researchers coded 10% of the statutes and interclass correlations w ere estimated. The results of the ICCs demonstrated a correlation of 1 exhibiting perfect agreement across coders 1 and 2. Chapter V RESULTS The following presents results for the replication of the victimfriendliness coding in 2014 and then compares s tates 2003 victimfriendliness scores to 2014 scores. Second, results for how states rank in their ability to facilitate victim empowerment are presented. The similarities and differences of the victimfriendliness and victimempowerment findings are then identified. Replication of Victim Friendliness Scale First, each state s PPO statute was analyzed using the DeJong and Burgess Proctor (2006) coding scheme to determine their 2014 victimfriendliness score across four domains: Violence Against Women Act, Petitioner Respondent Relationship, Administrative Process, and Punishing Violations. Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). Two variables were included in this domain: foreign orders being given full faith and credit and the issuance of mutual PPOs. In 2003, DeJong and Burgess Proctor (2006) found that a majority of states gave foreign orders full faith and credit in their PPO statute and only one state required foreign 50

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protection orders to be registered within the state before they would be enforced. Further, Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania did not mention protocols around foreign protection orders, but did mention foreign orders upon their violation and thus, it was assumed that foreign orders were enforced on their face value. New Jersey and Oregon did not mention foreign orders within any part of their statute. Comparatively, in 2014, forty nine states and the District of Columbia included language around accepting and enforcing foreign orders on face value with or without th eir registration. The lone state that did not include such language was New Jersey. The language used was similar across all states; for example in Idaho: A law enforcement officer of this state, upon determining that there is probable cause to believe th at a valid foreign protection order exists and that the order has been violated, shall enforce the order as if it were the order of a tribunal of this state. Presentation of a foreign protection order that identifies both the protected individual and the r espondent and, on its face, is currently in effect constitutes probable cause to believe that a valid foreign protection order exists. For the purposes of this subsection, the foreign protection order may be inscribed on a tangible medium or may have been stored in an electronic or other medium if it is retrievable in perceivable form. Presentation of a certified copy of a foreign protection order is not required for enforcement (ID Penal Code 396306A (3)(g)(ii)(4)(a). New Jersey s statue remained sile nt, but it can be assumed that foreign orders are enforced since federal statues override state s statutes. However, as noted by DeJong & Burgess Proctor (2006), this can be confusing to an officer when determining how to handle foreign orders. Under VAWA, states are not required to accept mutual restraining orders. However, many states will allow mutual restraining orders if they are applied for separately and there is evidence that the violence was truly mutual. In 2003, twenty one states were silent regarding the issuance of mutual restraining orders (DeJong & Burgess Proctor, 51

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2006). In 2014, only twelve states continue to be silent on mutual protection orders (Connecticut, District of Columbia, Delaware, Hawaii, Louisiana, Minnesota, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode, Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia). When mutual PPOs are allowed for mutual combatance, states have adopted similar language within statute to outline when they are appropriate. For example, Colorado s statute said that, a court shall not grant a mutual protection order to prevent domestic abuse for the protection of opposing parties unless each party has met his or her burden of proof as described in section 13 14104.5 (7) and the court makes separate and sufficient findings of fact to support the issuance of the mutual protection order to prevent domestic abuse for the protection of opposing parties (CO Penal Code 1314106(3). Overall, states have become more victimfriendly in this domain as states have updated their statutes since 2003 t o become more in line with VAWA requirements. However, 23% of states remain silent on the allowance or disallowance of mutual PPOs. Petitioner respondent relationship. Two variables were included in this domain: same sex couple application and the use of gender neutral language. In 2003, there were three states that specified that PPO applicants must be in a heterosexual relationship (Delaware, Montana, and South Carolina) (DeJong & Burgess Proctor, 2006). While Delaware and Montana have changed their stat utes to become more inclusive of same sex couples, South Carolina s PPOs remained only for people in heterosexual relationships as of 2014. Interestingly, since 2003, North Carolina has changed their PPO statute language from ambiguously allowing same sex couples to apply for a PPO to now only allowing people in heterosexual relationships to apply. Specifically, in North Carolina, those in a personal relationship can apply for a PPO; personal relationship is defined in part as: persons of the opposite sex who live together or have lived together and persons of the opposite sex who are in a dating relationship or who have been in a dating 52

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relationship (NC Penal Code 50B 1b(2)(6)). Louisiana, in 2014, continued to exclude people in same sex relations hips from applying for a PPO, but did allow dating couples, both heterosexual and same sex, to apply for a PPO under the Protection for Dating Violence Act of 2001. There are currently no states that explicitly include samesex relationships within their s tatutes, but rather, remain ambiguous or allow case law to further define their statute. However, as samesex marriage becomes legal in more states as of August 31, 2014, samesex marriage was legal in eighteen states the need for explicitness diminish es as all states allow for spouses or ex spouses to apply. There would only be a discrepancy within samesex couples that are dating. In 2003, many states referred to victims as she and to offenders as he. This gender specific language may reinforce that men are never victims or that individuals in samesex couples do not engage in or experience IPV. The use of gender neutral language and the lack of explicit language around samesex couple application may help create some strategic ambiguity within statu tes. This ambiguity may be a loophole that states are using to include petitioners in samesex relationships. Many states may still struggle to pass a PPO statute that explicitly allows for samesex couples, but in an effort to recognize petitioners of any gender, states have created gender neutral statutes. The outcome of this is that petitioners in samesex relationships can apply for a PPO in most states, but the final decision is often left to the local jurisdiction due to the ambiguity. This strategy m ay also help protect LGBT individuals in other parts of law. If samesex relationships are explicitly listed in one part of law and not in another, it could be assumed by local jurisdictions that the nonexplicit part of the law does not apply to individua ls in a samesex relationship. 53

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Administrative Process. There are four variables within this domain: 1) filing fees, 2) filing assistance, 3) independent application, and 4) address confidentiality. In between the desire for a PPO and the ability to apply f or one, there often stands a large gap. Victims may not be able to afford the court process, understand the legal paperwork, and have worries about their safety. The administrative process can either facilitate or hinder a victim from beginning and followi ng through with the PPO process. Filing fees are typically collected by courts within the civil process. However, many states understand that filing fees may create a financial barrier to a victim s safety. Thus, states generally handle filing fees in one of three ways. First, a state can choose to completely waive the filing fee for PPOs; as of 2014, twenty nine states waive fees entirely. For example, Alaska s statute stated, filing fees may not be charged in any action seeking only the relief provided in this chapter (AK Penal Code 18.66.150(d)). Second, states can choose to charge the fee to the respondent. While this may seem like a form of justice, this can have negative outcomes for the victim. This fee may anger the abuser more or may cause a decrease in finances for the victim if the abuser withholds money because of the court fee. In 2014, twenty one states collected filing fees in this way; for example Maryland s statute stated: The final protective order may order the respondent to pay filing fees and costs of a proceeding under this subtitle (MD Penal Code 4506(d)(12)). Third, states can choose to keep the filing fee intact for PPOs. In 2003, both Alabama and Georgia explicitly charged filing fees to the petitioner (DeJong & Burgess Pro ctor, 2006). In 2014, only Delaware s statute remained silent on this issue. PPO forms and the legal process can be very confusing for people who have little to no experience working with legal documents. States either did not allow the court clerk to 54

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pr ovide assistance or they did allow for some sort of assistance. This assistance might consist of a range of activities including court staff ensuring that the correct paperwork is given to a petitioner to mandating non legal help in filling out the forms. In 2003, DeJong and Burgess Proctor (2006) found no states disallowing filing assistance. However, in 2014, there were fifteen states that did not mention any form of filing assistance (Colorado, DC, Hawaii, Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia) and one state specifically disallowing assistance (Nebraska). Nebraska s code stated that the clerk and his or her employees shall not provide assistance in completin g the forms (NE Penal Code 42924.02). Still other states mandated assistance or allowed for paperwork and instructional brochures to be distributed. Nevada required the clerk of the court to provide assistance: The clerk of the court or other person de signated by the court shall assist any party in completing and filing the application, affidavit and any other paper or pleading necessary to initiate or respond to an application for a temporary or extended order. This assistance does not constitute the practice of law, but the clerk shall not render any advice or service that requires the professional judgment of an attorney (NRS 33.050(3)). Still other states, allowed, but did not mandate filing assistance. In Georgia, the clerk shall not be require d to provide assistance to persons completing such forms or in presenting their case to the court (GA Penal Code 19133 (d)). Other states only specified providing the correct paperwork for PPOs; Kansas s statute stated that, the clerk of the court sh all supply the forms for the petition and orders, which shall be prescribed by the judicial council (KRS 603104). Similar to DeJong and Burgess Proctor s (2006) findings in for 2003 PPOs, ascertaining whether or not victims are allowed to file for a PPO separate from a criminal 55

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charge in 2014 was also difficult. Many states continued to allow for PPO application in addition to other remedies like divorce or criminal charges, but they did not explicitly state if the other remedies are mandatory. Alabama s statute explicitly allowed for PPO application outside of other remedies: a protection order may be requested in any pending civil or domestic relations action, as an independent civil action, or in conjunction with the preliminary, final, or postjudgme nt relief in a civil action (AL Penal Code 3053). The ability to keep a victim s address confidential is important for victim safety. If a victim has fled to a shelter or another undisclosed location, they may feel that releasing their address on co urt documents would decrease their safety more than a PPO would increase their safety. In 2003, DeJong and Burgess Proctor (2006) found that most states allowed for addresses to remain confidential at the petitioner s request. This remained true in 2014; only nine states were silent on this issue (Alaska, District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Tennessee). Some states mentioned address confidentiality within the court process and many others also had an address confidentiality program. Typically, an address confidentiality program allows a victim to apply and then use a PO Box address of the program coordinator, often the Secretary of State. The coordinator then sends the mail to the victim s confidential addres s. California allowed victims to keep their addresses confidential both within the court system and have an address confidentiality program through the Secretary of State. Within the court system, California statute stated, a petition for an order describe d in this division is valid and the order is enforceable without explicitly stating the address of the petitioner or the petitioner s place of residence, school, employment, the place where the petitioner s child is provided child care services, or the chi ld s school (CA Penal Code 6225). 56

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All states, with the exception of Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming, had a confidential addr ess program set up for all mail going to a victim s residence. Overall, not many administrative processes changed in state PPO statutes from 2003 and 2014. About two thirds of states waived the filing fee for victims, most offered some sort of filing assistance, most allowed for the independent application of a PPO, and most states allowed the victim s address to remain confidential. In 2003, states were considered victimfriendly overall and the replication in 2014 showed similar results. Punishing violations. Within the DeJong and Burgess Proctor coding scheme, states were considered to be more victimfriendly if a violation of a PPO was considered to be a felony and if batterer s intervention or some form of counseling was required upon violation. Historically, the feminist movement has demanded harsher criminal justice policies (Binder & Meeker, 1992), noting that increased criminal justice sanctions may deter an abuser from further abuse and may show the victim and the greater community that IPV is not only a crime against a person, but also the state. In 2003, DeJong and Burgess Proctor (2006) found Maine and Connecticut to be the only states that charged the first violation of a PPO as a felony. In 2014, there were still only two states that did this: C onnecticut, and now, Arizona. Interestingly, Maine changed its statute to charge a violation of a PPO as a misdemeanor. In 2003, Missouri, Nebraska, and North Dakota charged the first violation as a misdemeanor and subsequent violations as a felony (DeJong & Burgess Proctor, 2006). In 2014, nine additional states had written this into code (Arkansas, Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, 57

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Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, and Washington). These charges referred only to viol ations of the PPO, not any additional crimes committed in the process of the violation. In addition to the charges for the violation of a PPO, many states have begun to include penalty enhancements (Arkansas, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming). For example, in Maryland, each convicted violation of a PPO was charged as a misdemeanor, and regarding punishment, for a first offense, a fine not exceeding $1000 or imprisonment not exceeding 90 days or both; and for a second or subsequent offense, a fine not exceeding $2500 or imprisonment not exceeding 1 year or both (MD Penal Code 4509). In addition to other criminal justice sanctions, states often mandate or allow counseling or other treatment for the abuser in an effort for rehabilitation. In 2003, two states mandated counseling upon a violation of the PPO (M assachusetts and Nevada) (DeJong & Burgess Proctor, 2006). In 2014, this number increased to eight states (Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Mexico, and Oklahoma). And, for example, Hawaii s statute stated: a person convi cted under this section shall undergo domestic violence intervention at any available domestic violence program as ordered by the court (HI Penal Code 5864(4)(e)). Nevada no longer included this mandate in their statute. In Louisiana, treatment was a c ondition of probation, thus the abuser must be on probation for this mandate to be considered. Other states, offer treatment as an option upon violation or even within the original order, rather 58

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than mandate treatment. A victim can request treatment within the PPO or the judge can order it before there is a violation. In 2003, sixteen states allowed treatment as an option (Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Iowa, Michigan, Nebraska, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Ver mont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin) (DeJong & Burgess Proctor, 2006). In 2014, 34 states (67%) allowed for treatment (Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Main e, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming). For example, Tennessee s st atute stated: A protection order granted under this part to protect the petitioner from domestic abuse, stalking, or sexual assault may include, but is not limited to: directing the respondent to attend available counseling programs that address violence and control issues or substance abuse problems (TN Penal Code 366606 (a)(8)). Firearms can decrease safety for victims, especially when the abuser has access to them. Abusers often threaten their partners with firearms; therefore, many states manda te or allow the removal of firearms upon the issuance of a PPO. In 2003, eight states required the removal of firearms (California, Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin) (DeJong & Burgess Proctor, 2006). In 2014, this more than doubled as seventeen states mandated firearm removal (Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin). A s an example, West Virginia s statute stated that, the protective order must prohibit the respondent from possessing any firearm or 59

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ammunition (WV Penal Code 4827502(b)). It is interesting to note that Michigan and Utah no longer required firearm rem oval in 2014 as they did in 2003. Both in 2003 and in 2014, many more states allowed firearm removal as an option than as a mandate. In 2003, sixteen states allowed the removal of firearms (Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Mo ntana, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia) (DeJong & Burgess Proctor, 2006). In 2014, twenty three states allowed firearm removal as an option within the PPO process (Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, District of Columbia, Delaware, Indiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Utah). When firearm removal is an option, the statute tends to use the term may which allows for judicial discretion (Greer & Purvis, 2011). Rhode Island was a good example of this: After notice to the respondent and a hearing, the court in addition to any other restrictions, may order the defendant to surrender physical possession of all firearms in his or her possession, care, custody or control (RI Penal Code 15153(5)). In 2014, there were eleven states that did not mention the removal of firearms within their code (Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, South Carolina, Vermont, and Wyoming). Overall, punishment for a PPO violation has increased since 2003. More states have established penalty enhancements after subsequent PPO violations, more states required or allowed for abusers to be mandated to treatment, and more states mandated or considered firearm removal from the abuser. This reflects the feminist movement s desire 60

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for the criminal justice system to move IPV from the private to the public sphere. Comparison of 2003 and 2014 State Victim Friendliness Scores Next, 2014 total scores were computed for state statues across DeJong and Burgess Proctor s (2006) four domains of victimfriendliness: Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), Petitioner Respondent Relationship, Administrative Process, and Punishing Violations. States were ranked into three categories based on their total score, where the higher scores represent higher levels of victimfriendliness and progressiveness (low: 4.05.5; medium: 6.07.0; high: 7.510.0)1. Overall, results suggest that states victimfriendliness scores improved since 2003. Table 1 displays state victimfriendliness scores in 2003. In 2003, seventeen states were ranked in the highest category for victimfriendliness; nineteen ranked in the middle category; and fifteen states and the District of Columbia ranked in the lowest category. In 2003, states were fairly equally spread across each ranking category with an average score of 6.62, ranging from a highest score of 10 and a lowest score of 4. 1 Categories used by DeJong & Burgess Proctor (2006) 61

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Table 1: Score for Strength of PPO Statute by State, 2003 State Score Number of States with Score Missouri 10.0 1 Massachusetts 9.0 1 Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, New Hampshire, Washington, Wyoming 8.5 7 California, I llinois, Maine, Texas, Wisconsin 8.0 5 Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma 7.5 3 Colorado, Louisiana, Minnesota, North Carolina 7.0 4 Alaska, Arizona, Iowa, Kentucky, Pennsylvania 6.5 5 Alabama, Maryland, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Te nnessee, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia 6.0 10 Arkansas, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, New Mexico, Ohio, South Dakota, Virginia 5.5 8 Delaware, Mississippi 5.0 2 District of Columbia, Georgia, New York, Oregon 4.5 4 South Carolina 4.0 1 Table 2 display s results displays state victimfriendliness scores in 2014. The highest possible victimfriendliness score a state could receive in 2003 and 2014 was 11. Six state s rankings did not change from 2003 to 2014, representing 12% of all states (Massachusetts Michigan, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Texas, and Washington). Thirty nine states (76% of states and the District of Columbia) experienced a positive change in their ranking, thus becoming more victimfriendly than they were in 2003 (Alabama, A laska, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, 62

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Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, New Mexico, Nort h Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin). Arkansas, Arizona, Oregon, and Utah experienced the greatest positive change in their ranking, jumping 3.5 points from their ranking in 2003 to their ranking in 2014. While the majority of state victimfriendliness scores increased from 2003 to 2014, five states (10%) experienced a negative change in their victimfriendliness score (Louisiana, Indiana, Tennessee, Missouri, and Wyoming). Missouri experienced the greatest decrease in victimfriendliness scores dropping 1.0 point overall from 10 to 9. Overall, 40 states ranked in the highest category of victimfriendliness; 10 states and the District of Columbi a ranked in the middle category; 1 state ranked in the lowest category. State s average victimfriendliness scores increased from 6.62 in 2003 to an average score of 7.97 in 2014, which falls in the highest victimfriendliness category. In addition to th e comparison of overall victimfriendliness scores from 2003 to 20142, states scores across the four domains were also reported. The average score for the VAWA domain (range of 02) was 1.7. The average score for the Petitioner Respondent Relationship dom ain (range of 02) was 1.96. The average Administrative Process domain (range of 04) score was 3.1. The average score for the Punishing Violations domain was 1.2. 2 Domain scores cannot be compared between 2003 and 2014 data for two reasons: 1) domain scores were not reported in Dejong & Burgess Proctors (2006) research and 2) the range for domain scores are different, thus would not be comparable. 63

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Table 2: Score for Strength of PPO Statute by State, 2014 State Score Number of States wit h Score Arizona, Florida, Illinois 10.0 3 California, Oklahoma, Utah 9.5 3 Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana 9.0 6 Connecticut, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, New Hampshire, South Dakota, Washington, Wisconsin 8.5 8 Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Indiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, Wyoming 8.0 14 Idaho, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, West Virginia 7.5 6 Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia 7.0 4 Ge orgia, Louisiana 6.5 2 Delaware, Hawaii, South Carolina, Washington DC 6.0 4 Tennessee 5.5 1 Figure 1 provides an additional comparison of the changes in states victimfriendliness scores according to DeJong and Burgess Proctor s (2006) coding scheme in a 2003 and 2014. 64

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Figure 1: State Rankings in Victim Friendliness Score in 2003 and 2014 65

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Victim Empowerment Scores The second research question examined states PPO statutes through a lens of victimempowerment and created a national ranking similar to that of the victim friendliness scores. To begin, scores were developed across four domains of victim empowerment: Violence Against Women Act, Petitioner Respondent Relationship, Administrative Process, and Punishing Violations. Violence Against Wom en Act (VAWA). When VAWA was passed into legislation, states needed to change many of their laws to comply with federal standards and some of these specifically applied to state s PPO statutes. Specifically, states were mandated to accept PPOs from other states on full faith and credit and mutual orders must be considered invalid between states unless violence has been perpetrated by both parties (DeJong & Burgess Proctor, 2006). Under the VAWA domain, states could score up to two points and the majority of states (39) received a score of two. There were eleven states that only received one point in this category and only New Jersey scored 0. This is because New Jersey remained silent both on foreign and mutual orders that are mandated through VAWA. It can be assumed that VAWA is followed in New Jersey since federal law supersedes state law, but this ambiguity could create confusion among citizens and law enforcement alike. The other eleven states did not state whether or not they allowed for mutual PPOs. If states allow for mutual PPOs without separate petitions, many victims end up having PPOs issued against them. This can have many negative implications in regards to future child custody decisions and employment opportunities. Additionally, mutual PPOs are often not accepted outside of the state they were issued. 66

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Thus, if a victim flees the state and the abuser follows, there is no recourse for a violation. Petitioner Respondent Relationship. This domain looked at three aspects of petitioner respondent relationships within each statute: if same sex couples could apply for a PPO, if dating couples could apply, and if gender neutral language was used throughout the statute. Under this domain, states could score up to 3 points. However, as of 2014, the highest state score was 2.5 as there were no states that explicitly allowed samesex couples to apply for a PPO. For all states that did not explicitly disallow, they were ambiguous regarding petitioner respondent relationships. This ambiguity could be considered a negative shift, since in 2003, some states did explicitly state the eligibility of samesex couples to file for PPOs (DeJong & Burgess Proctor, 2006), or it might be a function of a positive shift in marriage equality, given that many more states allowed for samesex marriage in 2014 than in 2003, and there may be an assumption that there is less need to explicitly include this population within a statute. Additionally, there could also be a risk to explicitness within statutes, if this explicitness is not similar in other statutes. More specifically, explicitness for same sex couples in one area of a law, may be used as precedent to exclude equality in another area of the law. On the other hand, without explicit inclusion of samesex couples in PPOs the decision of allowing or disallowing individuals in samesex relationships to access PPOs is left up to each jurisdiction or to be determined by individual case law precedents. North Carolina and South Carolina were the only states that explicitly did not allow individuals in samesex relationships to apply for a PPO. North Carolina allowed people that were former or current spouses, formerly or currently cohabitating, couples that had 67

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a child in common, or were dating, to apply for PPOs and defined cohabit ating and dating couples as persons of the opposite sex (NC Penal Code 50B 1(b)(2) & 50B 1(b)(6)). South Carolina also made this same distinction. It is interesting to note that Louisiana allowed only household members of the opposite sex to apply for a PPO (LA Penal Code 462132(4)). However, they did allow individuals in a samesex relationship to apply for a PPO under their dating abuse statute (LA Penal Code 28A 2151). All states used gender neutral language within their PPOs. The greatest varia tion in scoring for this category came from states allowance of dating couples to apply for a PPO. Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Ohio, South Carolina, Utah, and Virginia only allowed dating couples to apply for a PPO if the couple was currently or had previously cohabitated. The other states explicitly allowed dating couples to apply, regardless of cohabitation. Most of these states defined a dating relationship similar to that of Hawaii, which noted a dating relationship as a social relationship of a romantic nature. Factors that the court may consider in making this determination include: (a) The nature of the relationship; (b) The length of time the relationship has existed; (c) The frequency of interaction between the parties; and (d) The time since the termination of the relationship, if applicable (HI Penal Code 396303(2)). The average state score under this domain was 2.4 out of 3. This shows that states have only a slight variation in who is allowed to apply for a PPO. Most states have modified their statutes in an attempt to be more inclusive by using gender neutral language, to include individuals in same sex relationships, and to include dating couples. Administrative Process. This domain had the largest number of variables; states could score up to 11 points. Variables included items that facilitate the process of obtaining a PPO for victims and items included within the PPO that support a victim s 68

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safety and autonomy. There was a wide range of scoring under this domain, the highest scoring state was Washington (9.5) and the lowest was Nebraska and Georgia (4.5). Two variables looked at the PPO filing process how and if filing fees are assessed and if filing assistance was provided. States showed a variety of scores regarding how t hey charge or don t charge filing fees and how they provide filing assistance. Nebraska was the only state that explicitly disallowed court clerks from providing filing assistance of any kind. Their code stated that, the clerk and his or her employees sha ll not provide assistance in completing the forms (NE Penal Code 42924.02). Other states allowed the clerk or other court employee to provide assistance, but did not mandate such assistance. Iowa s statute stated, A county attorney s office may provide assistance to a person wishing to initiate proceedings pursuant to this chapter or to a plaintiff at any states of a proceeding under this chapter, if the individual does not have sufficient funds to pay for legal assistance and if the assistance does not create a conflict of interest for the county attorney s office. The assistance provided may include, but is not limited to, assistance in obtaining or completing forms, filing a petition or other necessary pleading, presenting evidence to the court, and enforcing the orders of the court entered pursuant to this chapter. Providing assistance pursuant to the section shall not be considered the private practice of law for the purposes of section 331.752 (IA Penal Code 236.3B). Additional states includi ng, Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin all mandated the clerk or some other i ndividual to provide filing assistance. Missouri s statute went as far as to say that notice of the fact that clerks will provide such assistance shall be conspicuously posted in the clerks offices (MO Penal Code 455.025). 69

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States showed variation reg arding how they collected (or did not collect) filing fees, Twenty states charged the filing fee to the respondent and twenty nine states and the District of Columbia waived the fee completely. Only New Jersey and Delaware s statutes remained silent on thi s issue, which may mean that the petitioner was charged a filing fee. The PPO process generally requires a victim s address during the filing and serving process and this can cause a victim to feel that their safety is compromised if their abuser does not know where they are residing. To protect victims, some states allow addresses to remain confidential throughout the court process and many states offer some sort of address confidentiality program that protects the victim s address in a more long term and comprehensive way. In regard to address confidentiality, Alaska, District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Tennessee were the only states that did not explicitly state a protocol for address confidentiality duri ng the PPO process or have an address confidentiality program for victims. Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia had an address confidentiality program in addition to allowing a victim to keep their address confidential throughout the court process. Once the victim was been approved, they could list their address as a PO Box set up by a government office where their mail will be collected. The mail was then sent out to the victim s address by the governmental office. 70

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Child custody and financial support may be the only way that a victim feels that they can separate from their abuser and many states allow for these requests within the PPO. The majority of states allowed for requests for child custody and/or support within the PPO order; Arizona, Michigan, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin were the only states that did not mention either custody or support within their statute. The majority of remaining states allowed victims to apply for both custody and support, but Connecticut, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Maryland, and Nebraska only allowed for child custody to be requested. Alabama s statute is an example of how monetary support was often outlined: order the defendant to pay temporary reasonable support for th e plaintiff or any children in the plaintiff's custody, or both, when the defendant has a legal obligation to support such persons (AL Penal Code 3057(c)(5)). Documentation for denial of a PPO is a new trend in legislation. Many states allow a judge to deny a PPO and do not require the judge to provide any written documentation or verbal reason for the denial. Without this documentation, a victim has no basis to appeal the court for a different decision. This could have implications for child custody wh ere the victim and the children are kept in harm s way. Currently, only Florida, Kentucky, Michigan, and West Virginia had language identifying why a PPO was not granted in their statute. Michigan s statute stated, if the court refuses to grant a personal protection order, it shall state immediately in writing list the specific reasons it refused to issue a personal protection order. If a hearing is held, the court shall also immediately state on the record the specific reasons it refuses to issue a personal protection order (MI Penal Code 2950(7)). There is also a growing trend in states working to pass legislation that would allow victims granted a PPO to apply for a temporary concealed weapons permit (Joice, 2006). 71

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Currently, only Kentucky allowed thi s, however, North Carolina has attempted to pass similar legislation. In Kentucky, this section of the statute stated a petitioner for an order of protection granted under KRS 403.715 to 403.785 may apply for a temporary permit to carry a concealed deadl y weapon on or about his or her person into those places and under the same conditions as a person holding a carry concealed deadly weapon license issued under KRS 237.110 (KRS 403.754(1)). A temporary permit issued under this section shall be valid fo r forty five (45) days from the date of issuance and not be subsequently extended or reissued. A temporary permit which has expired shall be void and shall not be valid for any purpose (KRS 403.754(5)). Pets often experience mistreatment at the hands o f an abuser and may pose another barrier to a victim fleeing a violent home if they cannot bring their pets with them (Vellucci, 2011). A little less than half of states and the District of Columbia allowed for the protection of pets to be requested within a PPO. The language within California s statute stated, on a showing of good cause, the court may include in a protective order a grant to the petitioner of the exclusive care, possession, or control of any animal owned, possessed, leased, kept, or held by either the petitioner or the respondent or a minor child residing in the residence or household of either the petitioner or the respondent. The court may order the respondent to stay away from the animal and forbid the respondent from taking, transferri ng, encumbering, concealing, molesting, attacking, striking, threatening, harming, or otherwise disposing of the animal (CA Penal Code 6320(b)). Often, the definition of IPV is narrowly defined within a PPO statute, even though victims experience a wid e range of abuse beyond physical abuse. Victims often experience psychological and sexual abuse. Most states, aside from Connecticut, Georgia, and Iowa explicitly mentioned sexual abuse. Psychological abuse is often excluded, as it is hard to either prove or disprove; however, Delaware, Illinois, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and West Virginia mentioned it in statute. This form of abuse was widely defined by the states that include it in statute. For example, 72

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Delaware s defined psychol ogical abuse as engaging in a course of alarming or distressing conduct in a manner which is likely to cause fear or emotional distress or to provoke a violent or disorderly response (DE Penal Code 1041(1)(d)). While West Virginia s statute included c reating fear of physical harm by harassment, stalking, psychological abuse or threatening acts within its definition (WV Penal Code 4827202(3)). Since individuals in dating relationships make up a large percentage of those applying for PPOs (Vittes & Sorenson, 2006), minors may be in need of this form of protection. State statutes were examined to determine whether minors could access a PPO and, if so, under what conditions. Several states (Florida, New Jersey, and South Dakota) explicitly excluded min ors from applying for a PPO under the same statute as an adult. Many states allowed minors to apply with an adult, such as a guardian or a social worker. Arkansas allowed minors accompanied by a volunteer or employee of a domestic violence agency to apply for a PPO (AR Penal Code 915201(d)(4)). Minnesota allowed a minor to be represented by a reputable adult age 25 or older (MN Penal Code 518B.01 Subd.4(a)). Other states, such as California, District of Columbia, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming, allowed minors of a certain age to apply on their own behalf, with no restrictions such as a spousal relationship or past cohabitation. For example, in California, a minor 12 years of age or older may appear in court without a guardian, counsel, or guardian ad litem to request a PPO (CA Penal Code 372(b)(1)). In the District of Columbia (DC Penal Code 161003(34)), Oklahoma (OK Penal Code 22 60.2(A), Washington (WA Penal Code 26.50.020(1)(b)) and Wy oming (WY Penal Code 3521102(a)(i)) minors could apply 73

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without a guardian at the age of 16. New Hampshire did not set an age in which minors can apply for a PPO on their own (NH Penal Code 173B:3(II)(a b). And, Oregon allowed any minor under 18 to a pply for a PPO on their own if the respondent is or was their spouse or if the couple had been sexually intimate, and if the respondent was the age of majority (OR Penal Code 107.726(12)). Rhode Island and Wisconsin did not state an exact age, but allow ed minor application within their statute. The last variable under this domain measured whether undocumented citizens were eligible to apply for a PPO. There were no states that explicitly included or excluded undocumented citizens from applying. All state statutes were ambiguous. Only Kentucky mentioned undocumented citizens, but only within the language regarding concealed weapons permits: The Department of Kentucky State Police shall, within one (1) working day or as soon as practically possible after t he date of receipt of the completed application, a recent color photography of the applicant, and, for applicants who are not citizens of the United States, any documentation required under KRS 237.110, either issue the temporary permit or deny the application based solely on the grounds that the applicant fails to qualify under the criteria set forth in KRS 237.110 (KRS 403.754(6)). This permit was only available to victims receiving a PPO, so it can be inferred that undocumented citizens are eligible to apply for a PPO and receive a concealed weapons permit. While this ambiguity could benefit this population, ambiguity may not be enough. If the language isn t explicit, undocumented citizens may not feel comfortable coming forward to apply for a PPO, or may be denied a PPO in some jurisdictions. This domain has the largest number of variables and the largest number of variables new to the victimempowerment coding. Since the highest score is 9.5 out of 11 74

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(Washington) and the average score is 6.8, there is much work to be done for states to facilitate empowerment through their administrative process. Punishing Violations. There were two variables under this domain, so the maximum potential score was two points. States were assessed to determine if treatment or counseling could be requested within the PPO prior to a violation and how states manage weapon ownership after a PPO is enforced. Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia, sco red a 2. Victims, regardless of if they intend to stay in their relationship, may want their partner to stop their abusive behavior and feel that treatment or counseling may facilitate this process through their PPO, prior to any violation. Eighteen states did not allow for treatment or counseling of the abuser to be requested within the PPO, prior to violation. The remaining states and the District of Columbia allowed the petitioner and/or the judge to require this of the respondent. The second variable in this category looked at if states mandated weapons restrictions due to the issuance of a PPO. States statutes remained unchanged from the DeJong and Burgess Proctor (2006) coding. Two states, South Carolina and Vermont, scored a zero in that there was no mention of weapons restrictions. On average, states scored 1.2 in this category. There is a wide range of how state s punish or seek to prevent violations within these variables. Statutes demonstrate a positive trend regarding the prevention of violatio ns and seek to shift the response to violations from punishment to treatment. A focus on treatment may facilitate the empowerment of victims as many victims may want 75

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to reconcile with their partner and their partners may benefit from batter intervention tr eatment. Overall, the wide variety of how state s work with abusers may show that there is more information needed to understand how to effectively prevent violations and further violence. State Personal Protection Order Statutes & Victim Empowerment 2014 Finally, total scores were computed for state statues across the four domains of victimempowerment. Similar to the victimfriendliness scale, states were ranked into three categories within the victimempowerment scale: high victimempowerment (16.514.5), moderate victimempowerment (14.012.0), and low victimempowerment (11.59.5)3. The highest possible score a state could receive was 18. Six states ranked high for facilitating victimempowerment, 34 ranked moderate, and eleven ranked low (Table 3). T he average victimempowerment score was 12.7. 3 State scores ranged from 9.5 16.5; to determine ranking categories, this range was divided equally among three categories. 76

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Table 3: Score for Strength of PPO Statute by State, 2014 Victim Empowerment State Score Number of States with Score Washington 16.5 1 Illinois 16.0 1 Florida, Massachusetts, Oklahoma 15.0 3 Maine 14.5 1 California, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Texas, West Virginia 14.0 5 Arkansas, Iowa, Missouri, New Mexico, Utah 13.5 5 Alaska, Colorado, Maryland, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, Wyoming 13.0 7 Connecticut, Kansas, Michigan, Ohio, Oreg on 12.5 5 Arizona, District of Columbia, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Jersey, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Virginia, Wisconsin 12.0 12 Alabama, Delaware, New York, South Dakota 11.5 4 Pennsylvania, Vermont 11.0 2 Hawaii, Tennes see 10.5 2 Georgia, South Carolina 10.0 2 Nebraska 9.5 1 The majority of states were ranked in the highest category on the victimfriendliness scale, while the majority of states ranked in the middle category on the victimempowerment scale. Arizona, Florida, and Illinois had the highest victim friendliness scores. According to victimempowerment scale scores, Illinois and Florida 77

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still ranked near the top, but Arizona ranked toward the bottom of the middle category. Tennessee ranked at the bottom of t he victimfriendliness scale and continued to rank within the lowest category for victimempowerment. However, Nebraska ranked the lowest for victimempowerment, but was in the highest category for victim friendliness. Comparison of 2014 Victim Friendlin ess Scores and Victim Empowerment Scores States ranked, on average, in the highest category for victimfriendliness while they ranked, on average, in the moderate category for victimempowerment. If only looking at victimfriendliness scores, it would seem that most state PPO statutes supported victims. Victimempowerment scores, however, suggest that additional improvements are needed to state PPO statutes to ensure the support of victims. The average victimempowerment VAWA domain score was 1.7 (range of 02), the same average for this domain for victimfriendliness in 2003 (range 0 2). The average victimempowerment domain score for the Petitioner Respondent Relationship domain was 2.4 (range 03). The average score for the Administrative Process doma in was 6.8 (range of 011). The average score for the Punishing Violations domain was 1.7 (range of 03). Figure 2 compares 2014 victimfriendliness scores to victimempowerment scores. 78

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Figure 2: State Rankings for Victim Friendliness and Victim Empowe rment 2014 79

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Chapter VI DISCUSSION The current study replicated the research conducted by DeJong and Burgess Proctor (2006) to determine state s victimfriendliness ranking in regards to their PPO statute and to rank states in the ability of their stat ute in facilitating empowerment among petitioners. There were two research questions guiding this analysis: (1) Between 2003 and 2014, have states become more or less victimfriendly according to DeJong and Burgess Proctor s 2006 conceptualization; and (2 ) using a new coding scheme that captures a state s ability to facilitate victimempowerment through personal protection order statutes, how do states rank nationally? In regards to the first research question, findings suggest that states have become m ore victimfriendly according to DeJong and Burgess Proctor s 2006 conceptualization. Many state s rankings changed from 2003 2014, which is consistent with prior research noting that state s regularly respond to research suggesting the need for change as well as changes in legislation from surrounding states (Mooney, 2001). Overall, there was a shift from the median 2003 state victimfriendliness score of 6.0 and an average score of 6.6 to a median 2014score of 8.0 and an average score of 7.9. This represents a shift from most states having PPO statutes that are moderately victimfriendly to the majority of states having PPO statutes that are ranked high for victimfriendliness. States that continue to have low to moderate measures of victimfriendliness (ranked 4.07.0) were clustered on the eastern side of the United States. Tennessee, a deeply southern state remains the only state to fall into the lowest measure of victimfriendliness, falling into the 4.05.5 category. Interestingly, in 2003, Tennessee s statute ranked in the 6.0 7.0 category. 80

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Additionally, six state s rankings remained unchanged, but at the same time, their PPO statutes did change in some way a state may have changed their PPO statute to become more victimfriendly in one domain and less victimfriendly in another domain. Interestingly, there have not been many shifts in how penalties are assessed for the violation of a PPO. Most states still charge a first violation as a misdemeanor and many states mandate penalty enhancements for s ubsequent violations. When the feminist movement began pushing for recognition of IPV as a public crime and VAWA became federal legislation, there was a corresponding demand for greater criminal justice sanctions (Langley & Levy, 1977; Zorza, 1992); howeve r, since 2003 state PPO statutes have not become more punitive Arizona is the only state that has increased the sanction for an initial violation from a misdemeanor charge to a felony charge. Conversely, there has been an increase in allowing or mandating treatment or counseling for abusers upon violation of a PPO. These changes may be demonstrating the types of responses to violations that are preferred by victims or those that might reduce recidivism among abusers. There has also been an increase in remo ving firearms from abusers as a part of the PPO. However, there is an alarming trend in states pursuing the issuance of a temporary concealed weapons permit for petitioners of PPOs. While this has only passed in Kentucky, other states have tried to pass th is into statute (Joice, 2006). This will be an important trend to watch as this could have negative consequences for victims. In regards to the second research question, the victimempowerment scale demonstrates that most states rank moderately, thus the re is room for much improvement in how victims are supported through the PPO process; only six states rank in the highest category in the ability of their PPO statute to facilitate empowerment. The greatest need 81

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for improvement is within the administrative process to facilitate empowerment of the petitioner. States could ensure that there is no filing fee levied against the petitioner or respondent and that filing assistance is mandated. It is also important that states remove barriers from the petitioner l eaving the respondent. For example, financial support from the respondent, the ability to protect pets, and a broader definition of IPV should be included as options. Since PPOs are not always effective in curtailing violence, it is important to take into account whether a statute s language is effective in facilitating empowerment for the petitioner. While many victims do not feel that a PPO will stop the abuse, they do anticipate that a PPO will be effective in assisting them with a way to regain control in their relationship (Chaudhuri & Daly, 1992; Keilitz et al., 1997). If a PPO will not prevent re abuse and it does not facilitate empowerment of the victim, than what purpose does the PPO serve? Chapter VII CONCLUSION Based on the variables created by DeJong and Burgess Proctor (2006), most states have continued to enact new statutes to address IPV. By definition, over 78% of states are considered victimfriendly and progressive. The feminist movement began working to end violence against women, in part by compelling the legal and criminal justice systems to take this violence seriously. Through the passage of VAWA in 1994, the government took steps to address IPV as a public issue rather than private problem. This movement, and the evolution of our understandings of the impacts of IPV have continued to inform state statutes. State PPO statutes have not remained static, but have shown many changes to better support victims of IPV. This shows that IPV continues to be an important issue 82

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within state governments and criminal justice systems and that finding ways to support victims is a continuing effort. Comparing the victimfriendliness scale to the victimempowerment scale is important as there is great variation in states rankings across the two scales. The victimfriendliness scale does not capture many of the variables that the victimempowerment scale does that could help facilitate empowerment, keep victims safe, and allow for greater access to PPOs. Thus, if one simply looks at the victimfriendlines s results, they might conclude that the majority of states have created PPO statutes that support victims and that no other changes need to be made. However, based on the results from the victimempowerment scale, there are many changes states could make t o facilitate empowerment of victims. This research suggests that states should aim for their statutes to be more victimempowering rather than victim friendly as it shifts power from the abuser or the state to the victim. While there has been much progre ss made toward addressing IPV both legally and across society, many remedies remain one size fits all in their approach, including PPOs. When looking at PPOs through a victimempowerment lens, the more options available for a victim to determine individualized solutions is important. Equally important is the ability for anyone in an intimate partnership to be able to access a PPO like individuals identifying within the LGBTQ population, those in dating relationships, and minors. Allowing individualized options will allow an even greater shift in power from respondent to petitioner through the PPO process, thus facilitating victimempowerment. 83

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Contributions to Literature This research contributes to and informs the literature, policy, and practice in sever al ways. The replication of DeJong and Burgess Proctor s (2006) victimfriendliness rankings shows that states have become more victimfriendly based on this conceptualization. This periodic information shows current trends and might be used by policy makers and advocacy groups to determine where their states statute could be modified to become more victimfriendly. These trends also give important information as to what is being adopted or removed from statute language; these trends can be further examined to determine if specific changes improve the efficacy of PPOs. Furthermore, this study looks at the efficacy of PPOs through the lens of victimempowerment and provided model language that law makers could adopt for their statutes. This research utilized the definition of empowerment proposed by Brodsky and Cattaneo (2013) to identify victim empowering elements within PPO statutes. In the previous work by DeJong and Burgess Proctor (2006), assumptions were inherently made within their operationalization of victimfriendliness that may not be applicable to all victims of IPV. For example, within their victimfriendliness measure, there is an assumption, similar to that of Sherman and Berk in 1984, that all punitive criminal justice actions benefit victims. While punitive sanctions may benefit some victims, it remains that not all victims desire this or even desire to separate from their partner (Logan et al., 2008). Therefore, this research does not advocate getting rid of punitive criminal justice sanctions entirely, but instead allowing these sanctions as an option for a victim. This research only labeled elements of PPO statues as empowering if they provide opportunity for victim autonomy and decision making power. 84

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Implications for Policy and Practice This study challenges law makers and advocates to look at the purpose of PPOs in a different way because we don t want to make the same mistakes, as we did with the Sherman and Berk (1984) research, where it was assumed all victims would benefit from mandatory arrest. The main outcome of PPOs may not be a decrease in re abuse, but instead empowerment of a victim. Looking at PPOs as a way to facilitate empowerment would change elements within statute and how advocates view this tool. Statutes that focus on faci litating empowerment would be less focused on punitive measures against the petitioner and instead, focus on the needs of the victim, whether it be financial support, the ability to protect children and/or pets, or simply the desire to break their silence about the abuse they are experiencing, whether it be physical or psychological. IPV advocacy programs place a great deal of importance on advocates helping victims receive PPOs to garner safety. This research calls for advocates to look at PPOs as a tool t hat may increase the physical safety of a victim and also as a step in the process of a victim being able to make their own decisions for what is best for them. Advocacy programs should place less importance on the outcome of PPOs and more importance on th e process for the victim. As part of this process, it is also important for advocates to recognize that victims are an important part of the decision making team when applying for a PPO as a way to facilitate empowerment (Russel & Light, 2006). Advocates a re often faced with an enormous caseload of victim s seeking PPOs and do not have the time to work with the victim as an integral part of the team to determine what requests to make within the PPO and to do specialized safety planning based on their curren t or future relationship with their partner. Additionally, advocates can experience frustration 85

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when a victim requests a PPO, they work to get the PPO approved, and then the victim drops the PPO; sometimes, the victim will return at a later date to re issu e the PPO. However, this needs to be seen as part of the process and advocates need to work with the victim to understand why they chose to drop the PPO to help them find a better solution. Future Research Since PPO statutes have changed quite a bit over t he last eleven years, there are many opportunities for future research. If the premise of the efficacy of PPOs is determined by how much they facilitate empowerment for victims, it would be helpful to interview victims about different aspects of their PPO to determine what specifically facilitated or hindered empowerment. On the other hand, if the premise of the efficacy of PPOs is determined by their ability to reduce violence against the victim, future research could focus on what penalties reduce recidiv ism: does a criminal justice charge of a misdemeanor or felony reduce recidivism, does treatment, either requested by the victim or mandated by the court reduce recidivism, or does some combination of criminal justice charges blended with counseling reduce recidivism? Additionally, determining the impact of the Kentucky policy to allow for temporary concealed weapon permits for victims through the lens of its effectiveness in reducing violence experienced by the victim, in reducing homicides of either the victim or the abuser, and if it facilitates empowerment for victims. Overall, states could allow for more options for victims within the administrative process as a way to facilitate empowerment. Simple changes like allowing pets and other forms of support to be included in the initial PPO request could allow victims to feel more autonomy and decision making power. Additionally, allowing for victims to request 86

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that the abuser attend treatment or counseling may prevent future violence more effectively than a PPO alone. This research suggests that a longitudinal research design is necessary to examine the long term empowering impacts of PPOs and other legal remedies for victims of IPV. This research, as suggested by Logan et al. (2008), should differentiate be tween victim and abuser relationship: whether the couple has separated, intends to separate, or intends to stay together, as the results may vary. Additionally, longitudinal research should take into account the differences that may exist between heterosexual relationships and relationships in which one or more people identify with the LGBTQ community. The results from this research will allow law makers and advocacy programs alike to work with victims to create more individualized solutions to address IPV Finally, there must be more research on the role of criminal justice solutions and community based solutions in ending and preventing IPV in our communities. State control of PPO violations may seem more dangerous to communities of color than community based solutions, as it may bring along with it additional surveillance of their family from child welfare or immigration services (Ruttenberg, 2004). In looking for solutions to ending IPV, there must be equal attention paid to ending racism, homophobia, cl assism, and sexism. By doing this, there is a greater chance of facilitating empowerment among victim s to use many tools to address the violence in their lives, whether it be through the criminal justice system or through other community solutions. 87

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Appendix Variable Victim Friendliness (DeJong & Burgess Proctor, 2006) Vi ctim Empowerment Violence Against Women Act ^ Foreign orders are given full faith and credit 0= not stated .5= upon registration 1= yes 0= not stated .5= upon registration 1= yes ^ Does not allow mutual orders 0= not stated .5= implied, not stated explicitly 1= mutual orders not allowed without proof 0= not stated .5= implied, not stated explicitly 1= mutual orders not allowed without proof Petitioner respondent relationship Allows for individuals in samesex relationships to file for ord er 0= no 1= yes 0= no .5= ambiguous 1= explicitly allows ^ Uses gender neutral language 0= no 1= yes 0= no 1= yes Dating couples eligible to apply 0= no .5= only if cohabitating 1= yes Administrative process ^ Explicitly states no fi ling fee 0= does not state/fees charged .5= fees charged to respondent 1= no fees charged to either party 0= does not state/fees charged .5= fees charged to respondent 1= no fees charged to either party ^ Address of victim may remain confidential 0= not stated 1= yes 0= not stated 1= yes PPO includes provisions for custody and support 0= includes neither custody or support .5= includes either custody or support 1= includes both custody and support Requires documentation for reason of denial for PPO 0= no 1= yes 97

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Variable Victim Friendliness (DeJong & Burgess Proctor, 2006) Vi ctim Empowerment Administrative Proccess Con t Allows petitioner to apply for a temporary concealed weapons permit 0= yes 1= no Allows for the protection of pets 0= no or not explictly stated 1= yes Definition of intimate partner violence includes forms of abuse other than physical 0= only mentions physical violence .5= mentions either psychological or sexual abuse explicitly 1= explicitly includes psychological and sexual abuse Punishing violations Penalty for viola tion/subsequent violation 0= violation is a misdemeanor .5= first violation is a misdemeanor 1= any violation felony Treatment and/or counseling mandatory on violation or as part of order 0= does not state .5= allows treatment/counseling as an option in order or for violation 1= treatment is mandatory upon violation or in order Treatment and/or counseling can be requested or mandated within order prior to violation 0= no 1= yes = coding scheme rem a ined unchanged from VictimFrien dliness measure; *= coding scheme changed from VictimFriendliness measure 98