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Life-cycle management

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Life-cycle management analysis of the space shuttle program
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Schultz, David Charles
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Denver, CO
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University of Colorado Denver
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208 leaves : illustrations ; 28 cm

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Space shuttles ( lcsh )
Management ( fast )
Space shuttles ( fast )
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bibliography ( marcgt )
theses ( marcgt )
non-fiction ( marcgt )

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Bibliography:
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 177-200).
Thesis:
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree, Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate School of Public Affairs
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School of Public Affairs
Statement of Responsibility:
by David Charles Schultz.

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Full Text
LIFE-CYCLE MANAGEMENT:
ANALYSIS OF THE SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM
by
David Charles Schultz
B.S., University of Michigan, 1960
M.S., University of New Mexico, 1962
M.B.A., University of Houston, 1975
A dissertation submitted to the
Faculty of the Graduate School of Public Affairs of the
University of Colorado in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree
Doctor of Philosophy ^
Graduate School of Public Affairs
1989


This dissertation for the Doctor of Philosophy
degree by
David Charles Schultz
has been approved for the
Graduate School
of Public Affairs
by
Date


Schultz, David Charles (Ph.D., Public Administration)
Life-Cycle Management: Analysis of the Space Shuttle
Program
Thesis directed by Associate Professor E. Samuel Overman
The Space Shuttle Program is the longest lived
and most costly space program ever undertaken by this
nation. It was started in the late 1960's, and despite
recent setbacks, is expected to continue for many more
years. The purpose of this study is to analyze the
management of this large program over its lifetime in
order to identify patterns of management and how these
patterns may have changed with time.
The framework for this analysis is provided by
a combination of life-cycle theory and organization
theory. Life-cycle theory assumes a predictable
pattern of management which changes over time. A number
of life-cycle models were considered for use in this
study. The model selected is defined by four stages;
entrepreneurial, collectivity, formalization and
control, and elaboration of structure. Organization
theory was studied to identify the appropriate
management parameters for life-cycle analysis. The
selected approach considers organizational analysis in
terms of five perspectives or frames; structural,
systems, human resources, political, and symbolic. The
research problem was to identify the relationships


IV
between life-cycle stages and organizational frames for
the Space Shuttle Program.
It was found that there were differences in the
management of the Space Shuttle Program during its
existence. Further, it was found that these differences
could be readily discussed in terms of existing life-
cycle theory, including the four stages of the life-
cycle. However, there was not a distinct movement
through the stages of a life-cycle as described by life-
cycle theory. Rather, there were subtle shifts of
emphasis as the Program evolved.
Additionally, it was found that the management
of the Space Shuttle Program could be readily discussed
in terms of the five frames of organizational analysis,
and that consideration of these frames appeared helpful
in the overall analysis of the organization.
Finally, it was found that there was some
association between the life-cycle stages and the
organizational frames. The characteristics of these
associations were not altogether consistent, but they do
indicate some interesting candidates for future study.
The form and content of this abstract are approved. I
recommend its publicat^
Signed
arge of thesis


CONTENTS
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: FROM MANAGEMENT OF INNOVATION
TO MANAGEMENT OF ROUTINE OPERATIONS............ 1
A Brief History of NASA....................... 4
Description of the Research Problem.......... 13
Anticipated Contributions.................... 14
Summary of Conclusions....................... 18
CHAPTER II
ORGANIZATION THEORY & ORGANIZATIONAL
LIFE CYCLES .................................. 20
Traditional Organization Theory ............. 20
Beyond Traditional Organization Theory ...... 36
Synthesis of Organization Theory ............ 48
Organizational Life Cycles .................. 62
Integration of Organizational Frames
and Life-Cycle Theory .................... 90
CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY .................................... 99
Methodological Strategy .................... 101
Data Collection and Analysis ............... 106
CHAPTER IV
STUDY FINDINGS ............................... 117
Findings Based on the Analysis of Data
Grouped by Life-Cycle Stages ............ 117


vi
Findings Based on the Analysis of Data
Grouped by Organizational Frames ........ 132
Interrelationships Between Life-Cycle Stages
and Organizational Frames ............ 151
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR FURTHER STUDY ........................... 161
Comparison of Actual Findings With
Predicted Findings ...................... 161
Conclusions ............................... 170
Applicability .............................. 172
Recommendations for Further Study ........... 175
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................... 177
APPENDIX
A. KEY PERSONNEL INTERVIEWED .................. 201
B. DATA FOR EACH YEAR
203


vii
TABLES
Table
1. Total Occurrence of Life-Cycle Stages and
Organizational Frames ...................... 152
2. Total Occurrence of Life-Cycle Stages and
Organizational Frames, Entrepreneurial
and Collectivity Stages Combined ........... 152


viii
FIGURES
Figure
1. Framework for Studying Relationships
Between Organization Theory and
Life Cycle Theory .......................... 92
2. Spatial Model .............................. 94
3. Frequency of Life-Cycle Stages ............. 118
4. Occurrence of Life-Cycle Stages per Year ... 126
5. Frequency of Organizational Frames ......... 133
6. Occurrence of Organizational Frames per Year 146


CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: FROM MANAGEMENT OF INNOVATION TO
MANAGEMENT OF ROUTINE OPERATIONS
The Space Shuttle Program is the most costly
space program which this nation has yet undertaken.
Approximately $30 billion has been spent to date by the
U.S. government on the Space Shuttle Program. In
comparison, the Apollo lunar exploration program cost
the taxpayers about $25 billion, and our other space
programs have cost much less. Recently about $6 billion
per year has been spent on the Space Shuttle Program.
Given that the program is intended to continue for many
more years, the total lifetime costs are hard to
predict, but it is certain that they will be large.
The sheer magnitude of this program with its
consumption of valuable resources provides the first of
three major rationales for this study. From the
standpoint of accountability, the citizens of this
nation deserve a full reporting of all aspects of this
program and the chance to evaluate the way in which so
many of their tax dollars are used.
The second major rationale for this study is its
importance to the continuing development of the body of


knowledge of management theory. Study of the Space
Shuttle Program will help to identify management factors
which are unique to large public programs. There is a
tendency, particularly in aerospace and defense, toward
fewer but larger programs. Since these large programs
involve the expenditure of billions of dollars, and
effect the lives of many people, it is important that
they be managed as well as possible. Since there are
relatively few programs, there are few chances to
discover any unique factors, and every opportunity
should be used.
This study provides a longitudinal examination
of the Space Shuttle Program as it evolved from concept
to operational status. Changes in the management of an
activity over time have been characterized as a "life-
cycle," and there have been a number of studies done and
theories proposed to define the typical life-cycle. Two
factors in the present study make it unique. First is
the size of the activity, both in terms of the size of
the activity being studied and in terms of the period of
time covered by the study. Other life-cycle studies
have either dealt with much smaller activities, studied
over a shorter period of time, or have had no empirical
base at all.
As a second element of the importance of this
study to the theory of management, the present study is


3
Che first which involves the analysis of the life-cycle
of a major activity in terms of the most recent
developments in organization theory. The management of
the Space Shuttle Program is examined longitudinally in
terms of five "organizational frames." These frames;
structural, systems, human resources, political, and
symbolic; provide a focus for examination of dominant
influences in the organization. When performed over the
long period of this study, such frame-wise examination
provides for a unique characterization of the life
cycle. Of particular significance here is consideration
of organizational culture as indicated by the political
and symbolic frames. The importance of these cultural
factors has only recently been recognized, and their
effects have not been included in previous life-cycle
studies*
The third major rationale for this study is the
anticipation of contributions to the effective
management of the U.S. space program. This country has
made a long term commitment to the Space Shuttle which
has left us with very little capability to launch
vehicles into space except via the Space Shuttle. This
was due primarily to economic considerations leading to
the conclusion that the continuation of expendable
launch vehicle programs was not affordable. Thus the
Space Shuttle Program is not only a valuable national


resource, it is a singular resource with very limited
backup or replacement capability. This condition
accentuates the importance of the program and the
importance of studying it. In addition, the Space
Shuttle Program is the first open-ended U.S. space
program. Space Shuttle missions will continue as long as
there is a demand. Given the ultimate routinization of
space travel, this characteristic of open-endedness will
also be typical of future space programs. Thus it is
valuable to closely study the management of the Space
Shuttle Program for lessons applicable to future
programs.
A Brief History of NASA
The National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) was created by an act of Congress
in 1958. Downs (1967) has described four ways in which
government bureaus are created. NASA's creation was of
Downs' third type, as NASA was created largely from
existing agencies of the federal government. The main
body of NASA came from the National Advisory Committee
i
on Aeronautics. Other elements absorbed into the new
agency were primarily from the Air Force and Army at
various locations, including Huntsville, Alabama; Cape
Canaveral, Florida; and Edwards Air Force Base,
California.


5
Since its creation in 1958, NASA's aeronautics
side has been responsible for advancing the state-of-
the-art in the theory and operation of aircraft. The
primary mechanisms in place for this activity have been:
large-scale modern wind tunnels at the Langley Research
Center, Langley Field, Virginia, and at the Ames
Research Center, Moffett Field, California; propulsion
test facilities at the Lewis Research Center, Cleveland,
Ohio; and prototype aircraft for the final verification
and the operationalization of aerodynamic theory at the
Dryden Flight Research Facility, Edwards Air Force Ba;se,
California.
The space side of NASA has been responsible for
all aspects of our civilian space program. This has
involved the Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas as
the lead Center for planning and operations of the
manned space programs; the Kennedy Space Center in
Florida as the site for preflight processing and launch
of all the manned and unmanned NASA vehicles; the George
C. Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama,
as the lead center for development of the rockets
associated with all these programs; and the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, California, for the
planning and operations of the planetary exploration
programs. The allocation of responsibilities just
described has been virtually unchanged for most of


6
NASA's existence. The highly visible and highly
successful lunar and planetary exploration programs
(Ranger, Surveyor, Explorer, Viking), the equally
successful and visible manned space programs (Mercury,
Gemini, Apollo, Skylab, Apollo-Soyuz, Shuttle), and a
large number of equally successful but less visible
aeronautical programs have been conducted by NASA.
However, these programs have all been developmental in
nature. The Space Shuttle Program is the first in which
NASA has had the intention to achieve and sustain an
operational program.
The Changing Nature of NASA's Mission
As the Apollo lunar explorations were taking
place in the early 1970's, NASA officials were charting
the course of our future in space. It was determined
that the next major goal of U.S. space exploration
should be the establishment of a permanent manned
presence in space a space station. Early feasibility
studies led to the conclusion that it would not be
economically feasible to construct a space station on
earth and launch it into space. Rather, it would have
to be launched in pieces and assembled in space. This
conclusion naturally led to an analysis of the possible
approaches to launching the elements of a space station.
Three general concepts were studied. These were the use
of existing resources, primarily the Saturn family of


7
rockets used in the Apollo program, the development of a
new super-rocket with even larger lift capability than
the Saturn, and the development of a reusable vehicle
which would be used for shuttling space station elements
to space and returning products and crews from the
station to earth. NASA chose the third option, and the
development of the Space Shuttle began in earnest in
1972. However, budget constraints eliminated the
possibility of parallel development of both the Space
Shuttle and the Space Station, and forced NASA to choose
between the two programs for near-term development.
Since the construction of the Space Station was
dependent on the development of the Space Shuttle, the
decision was made to proceed first with development of
the Space Shuttle, and to follow that with the
development of the Space Station.
Thus, the very nature of the Space Shuttle
Program is different than all of NASA's earlier space
programs. The focus of NASA throughout its entire 25
years of existence has been on developmental activities,
characterized by a predefined set of activities
(typically a specific number of missions), taking place
in a specified time period, and having a definite end
point. In contrast, the Space Shuttle was conceived for
the express purpose of providing routine access to
space. There is no specified sunset for the Space


8
Shuttle Program. In fact, quite the opposite is true.
For the Space Shuttle to satisfy its most fundamental
requirement of placing space station elements in space,
the Space Shuttle Program must continue to exist for
many years. This open-endedness or routinizing of space
travel has been referred to within NASA as "becoming
operational." While a firm, formal definition of
"becoming operational" has not been developed by NASA,
the focus has been on an assumed definition that has as
its focus routine, timely, and successful performance of
scheduled activities, and that is the meaning used in
this study. This intent to become operational
introduces several issues which require consideration
regarding management of the Space Shuttle Program as
compared with previous American space programs. For an
agency with a twenty-five year tradition of research and
development, the intent to develop an operational
orientation presents some significant challenges.
The first challenge deals with management
processes. The management processes used by NASA have
been studied rather intensively, and it has generally
been concluded that NASA's use of a matrix organization
and its extensive use of multi-disciplinary panels and
working groups were significant contributors to NASA's
early success (see for example Sullivan [1970] and the
official NASA history of the Apollo program [What Made


9
Apollo a Success?, 1971]). In a 1980 study, one of the
nation's foremost management consulting organizations
studied the management of the Johnson Space Center and
reached the same conclusion (Organizing for Effective
Operation of the Space Transportation System, 1980), but
went on to counsel NASA that this collegial approach
with its emphasis on time consuming deliberative
consensus seeking would be inappropriate for an
operational program.
A second factor which indicates a need for
changes in NASA's management approach comes from the
Space Shuttle Program's open-endedness. All previous
manned space programs consisted of a fixed, small number
of flights; six on Mercury, ten on Gemini, eleven on
Apollo, three on Skylab, and one joint mission with the
U.S.S.R. This constraint of having a specific number of
flights limited the flexibility available for planning
each specific mission. All activities required of the
program had, by definition, to be accomplished within
the specified number of missions. Thus, there was great
emphasis placed on optimizing the utilization of all the
available resources for each mission. In contrast to
earlier programs, there is no practical limit to the
total number of Space Shuttle flights to be flown. The
Space Shuttle specifications call for a usable lifetime
of 10Q flights per orbiter vehicle, but it is likely


10
that limit could be increased significantly by a
relatively small amount of extra testing and analysis.
Given the capability to perform an essentially unlimited
number of missions, which is the shuttle's raison
d'etre. there is less reason to optimize each one. A
lessening of the optimization types of activities would
clearly be a significant change to the Space Shuttle
Program, and could only be accomplished through overt
changes in some management processes. Of perhaps equal
importance is the change in culture which is implied by
this changing emphasis on optimization.
Further exemplifying the impact of this shift in
emphasis away from optimization is the consideration
that this optimization is very labor intensive. It
requires the extensive use of coordinating activities,
such as meetings. The planning of each mission on
earlier programs required many formal and informal
meetings of experts in each of the resource areas.
This optimization activity is very definitely subject to
the laws of diminishing returns. It is not possible to
determine precisely the cost of optimizing each mission,
but an educated guess says that it is likely that an
increase in the use of critical resources (flight crew
time, and the specific quantities of life sustaining
supplies such as oxygen and water were typically the
most constraining resources) from 807o to 95% of the


11
available supply (a typical NASA goal) has required
doubling the number of labor hours spent on the planning
process. NASA management has stated quite clearly that
times have changed, and that these optimization
activities with their significant expenditures of labor
hours will not be performed in the mature era of an
operational Space Shuttle Program. This change in
emphasis will certainly require a significant management
effort.
A similar case can be made for a change in the
management of the Space Shuttle Program based on the
number of flights. NASA plans to increase the annual
number of flights from the 1984-1985 figures of about
eight per year to a planned 24 per year. To maintain the
same levels of resource utilization on 24 flights per
year as was done on 8 flights per year could reasonably
require as much as a three-fold growth in the mission
planning staff. Since the group being referred to here
as the mission planning staff numbers several thousand
people, trebling that number is clearly incompatible
with a fixed NASA budget.
Thus, it can be considered a given that there
will be changes in the management of the Space Shuttle
Program as it moves from concept to operational status.
Some significant actions have already been taken. Within
the very important area of mission control, major


12
facility modifications have been defined and are being
implemented which will provide for simultaneous conduct
of two Shuttle mission and simulation of a third.
Reductions in the scope of mission control operations
and the size of the ground-based staff to accomplish the
mission control function are also being accomplished.
At the Kennedy Space Center the move toward the
operational era has focussed on the consolidation of
contractual support and a significant enlargement of the
responsibilities delegated to contractors for the
preflight processing and launch activities associated
with each Shuttle flight. The first major step toward
realization of those objectives was taken with the award
of the Shuttle Processing Contract to Lockheed in
September, 1983. A similar consolidation of contractor
activities in support of mission planning and mission
operation activities at the Johnson Space Center has
also recently been accomplished. The Space
Transportation System Operations Contract, which
encompasses work previously done under 22 contracts, was
awarded to Rockwell in September,1985.
It is expected that changes of this nature
will occur in many elements of Space Shuttle Program
management, and that many similar changes have already
occurred over the life of the program. It is the
purpose of this study to systematically identify and


13
study such changes which have already occurred.
A Brief Description of the Research Problem
This study has been conducted to identify and
characterize the life-cycle of the management of the
Space Shuttle Program from the time it began in 1972
through 1985, and to associate those life-cycle
characteristics with five frames used to represent
organizational analysis. Specific questions which are
addressed are listed below.
1. Has there been a life-cycle in the management
of the Space Shuttle Program?
2. If there has been a life-cycle, how can it be
characterized or described?
3. If there has been a life-cycle, how does it
relate to existing theories of life-cycle?
4. If there has been a life-cycle, how does it
relate to organization theory as described by the five
frames of organizational analysis?
5. How did these relationships vary with time?
The development of an integrated theory, one
which provides a framework for the longitudinal analysis
of the performance of a single organization, is overdue.
As Quinn and Cameron (1983) have observed, the tendency
for organizational theory has been to focus on in-depth
cross-sectional analysis. This tendency is


14
understandable, as the data base from which organization
theory was constructed consists primarily of in-depth
analyses of mature organizations, with very little
consideration of the effects of time on the organization
itself. The effects of time have generally been focussed
on the behaviors of the organization members, and only
secondarily on the resulting impacts on the organization
itself. It is the intent of this study to provide the
beginnings of such an integrated theory.
A two part approach was applied to the gathering
and analysis of data for this study. First, a
longitudinal sample of significant documentation over
the period of study was gathered. The contents of this
documentation were analyzed for characteristics of the
four life-cycle stages and the five organizational
frames, versus time. Second, ten key managers were
interviewed. The interviews provided information useful
for interpretation of the results of the contents
analysis as well as unique insights into the usefulness
of the constructs involving the four stages and the five
frames.
Anticipated Contributions
The Space Shuttle Program has four outstanding


15
characteristics. It is technically complex, it has high
cost, it has a long lifetime, and it is highly visible.
Practical application of the findings and conclusions of
this study are expected to be related to the occurrence
of these four characteristics. The most direct
application of the findings and conclusions of this
study will be to those activities or programs which also
have all four of these characteristics.
The most obvious application of the results of
this study will be to the Space Station Program. The
Space Station Program is like the Space Shuttle Program
in terms of the four characteristics just mentioned. The
Space Station Program is NASA's next major initiative.
It is now in the preliminary definition phase, and
formal design definition is expected to start in early
1987. The space station program thus has most of its
life-cycle ahead of it. The space station program is
roughly comparable to the Space Shuttle Program in terms
of cost, schedule, and technical complexity. Being
conducted by the same organization (NASA), it is also
subject to many of the same considerations of structure,
human resource utilization, politics, and symbolism.
Additionally, the two programs have a strong functional
tie. The Space Shuttle will carry the Space Station
modules into space for their assembly. Thus, it is
expected that there will be great similarity between the


16
life cycles of the Space Shuttle and the space station
programs.
It may seem that the Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI) program now under way in the Department
of Defense shares the four characteristics. However,
even with all its publicity, the SDI program is going to
be conducted mostly under the wraps of military
security, and thus the characteristic of visibility is
significantly different than for the Space Shuttle
Program, which has been conducted almost totally in an
unclassified manner. It is expected that there will be
some amount of application to the SDI program due to the
commonality of three of the four characteristics. For
the same reason, it is expected that there will be
application of this study to other major national
defense systems ( e.g., ships, airplanes, missiles).
Using this same rationale, it is possible that
there will be reasonably direct application to projects
in the private sector or elements of the public sector
which are not related to space or defense. These would
probably be major construction projects such as dams,
canals, or power plants. Other projects or activities
which possess two or less of these characteristics can
be expected to have much less application of this
study's findings and conclusions.
In addition to the practical applications just


17
discussed, this study will significantly augment the
body of knowledge regarding organizational life cycles.
All of the potential beneficiaries just mentioned, as
well as many others, will be faced with problems of
management of an organizational life-cycle. There is not
presently in existence a coherent theory of life-cycle
management applicable to these long-term very high cost
activities. It is hoped that this study will provide a
significant foundation for the development of an
approach to life-cycle management which will help these
programs achieve their performance goals with a more
efficient use of limited resources than would otherwise
be the case.
Finally, in response to the recent Space Shuttle
accident and the resulting investigations, it seems
quite likely this study could be of direct benefit to
the Space Shuttle Program itself. Within this context,
this study may have three specific applications as
identified below.
1. For those individuals who will be charged
with analyzing NASA's management practices and
determining their validity, this study should provide
insight into past and existing Space Shuttle management
practices.
2. For those same individuals, this study should
provide insight into possible changes in management


18
practices which might be most useful for safe and
effective continuation of the program.
3. For those officials who will be responsible
for implementing changes and carrying on the active
management of the Space Shuttle Program, this study
should be useful in providing an analysis of past
management practices in terms and in a context different
than those with which they normally deal, and which
therefore should provide some unique insights.
Summary of Conclusions
It was found that there were differences in the
management of the Space Shuttle Program during its
existence. Further, it was found that these differences
could be readily discussed in terms of existing life-
cycle theory, including the four stages of the life-
cycle. However, there was not a distinct movement
through the stages of a life-cycle as described by life-
cycle theory. Rather, there were subtle shifts of
emphasis as the Program evolved.
Additionally, it was found that the management
of the Space Shuttle Program could be readily discussed
in terms of the five frames of organizational analysis,
and that consideration of these frames appeared helpful
in the overall analysis of the organization.
Finally, it was found that there was some


19
association between the life-cycle stages and the
organizational frames. The characteristics of these
associations were not altogether consistent, but they do
indicate some interesting candidates for future study.


Chapter II
ORGANIZATION THEORY AND ORGANIZATIONAL
LIFE CYCLES
Traditional Organization Theory
This study has as its purpose the longitudinal
analysis of an organization. Thus it is appropriate to
discuss some of the ways in which organizations have
been analyzed in the literature. A reasonable starting
point may be a definition. While March and Simon (1958)
say the definition of organization is obvious, Etzioni
offers the following; "An organization is a planned
social unit, deliberately constructed or reconstructed,
to seek specific goals" (Etzioni, 1961, p. 135). Barnard
had included the human element in his earlier definition
" a system of consciously coordinated personal
activities or forces of two or more persons" (Barnard,
1938, p. 81). Webster says an organization is "the
executive structure of a business; the personnel of
management" (Webster, 1948, p. 699).
As a further elaboration, Etzioni (1961) states
that organizations have three characteristics. These
are the division of labor, power, and communications,
presence of one or more centers of power, and


21
replaceability of individuals. Presthus (1962) states
that organizations have three purposes. These are to
increase the stability of interpersonal dealings, to
reduce the uncertainty of such dealings, and to enhance
their predictability.
The high degree of subjectivity inherent in
these views of the definition and purposes of
organizations supports the idea that the concept of
organization is abstract and intangible, and thus it is
reasonable that organization theory will also contain a
considerable element of subjectivity. There is no
single "verified hypothesis applicable to many related
phenomena" (Webster, 1948, p. 1035) required of a
theory. Rather, there has been a changing set of
commonly accepted beliefs regarding organizations, and
the retelling of these beliefs has come to be known as
organization theory. Thus, the situation is unchanged
from that in 1961, when Waldo reviewed Haire's (1959)
summary of the state of organization theory.
Referring to the diversity of approach among
his authors, Haire recalls the fable of the blind
men describing an elephant: There is little doubt
that it is a single elephant being discussed, but,
by and large, each of the observers begins his
description from a different point, and often with
a special end in view." p. 2 (Waldo, 1961, p. 216)


22
Recognizing the lack of unanimity in the field,
the following pages provide one observer's summary of
the current state of organization theory.
The Origins of Organization Theory
The origins of organization theory are not
precisely defined, but many modern writers identify a
set of early activities as classical and/or neo-
i
classical. Frequently cited as the earliest
authoritative writer in the field is Max Weber. Based
largely on his study of the operation of military and
civilian government organizations in his native Prussia,
Weber (1947) identified the following characteristics of
the successful bureaucracy;
1. Management is to be conducted by prescribed
rules rather than ad hoc judgments.
2. As much as possible, everything is to be written
down; this included with work procedures and processes,
rules of behavior for workers, and management rules.
3. There is to be job specialization; each person
would be responsible for a specifically defined subset
of the total work of the organization.
4. Personnel are given specialized technical
training related to the needs of these particular jobs.
5. The organization will be arranged in a formal
hierarchy.


23
6. There will be a clear separation of personal and
organization property.
7. Employees will usually spend their entire career
with this organization.
8. Employees are, to the greatest feasible extent,
to be interchangeable.
Weber wrote in Germany in the early part of this
century, but his work was largely unknown in this
country until it was translated into English in 1947.
Many problems have been found with bureaucracies, and a
number of them are discussed below. As a result, Weber
has been personally and unjustly vilified for his
descriptions of bureaucracies. However, he was
primarily reporting the characteristics of those
bureaucracies which he observed to be most effective.
Any criticism of Weber for advocacy of a bureaucratic
form of organization must be done with the realization
that the development of organizations at the turn of the
twentieth century was not very mature, and that in fact
the bureaucracy represented the highest form of
organization development at that time.
Also during the early part of the twentieth
century, Frederick Taylor wrote on the scientific
approach to management and organization. Taylor's view
(1911) was that there was usually "one best way." This
applied to the work of each individual employee, as well


24
as to the structuring of the organization. The
individual employee was considered only as an extension
of the machine or as a part of an overall work process.
Taylor's most lasting contribution dealt with the need
to specialize, as specified in two principles. First was
the division of work. This meant that the work of any
organization should be divided up so as to take maximum
advantage of the skills of the employees. Second was the
principle of homogeneity, which states that similar
activities should be grouped in a single organization
unit under a single supervisor. Henri Fayol (1949) was
also framing his principles of organization in France
during this period. Like Weber, Fayol remained virtually
unknown in this country for some time. Although his work
was translated into English in 1929, it was not widely
available until 1949. Fayol identified fourteen
principles most responsible for organization success.
Some of the most significant of those principles follow.
1. The division of labor, under which like
activities are concentrated in a single organization
unit for more efficiency.
2. The scalar principle, by which every employee
can identify the chain of command from himself/herself
to the organization's ultimate authority.
3. Unity of command, which states that each
employee should receive orders from only one superior.


25
4. Centralization, under which most decision
making is performed by those at the top of the
organization.
There are two common threads among these early
works. First is the assumption that organizations are
rational entities, and thus there is one best way to
organize. Second is the belief that workers could be
dealt with in the same rational fashion as machines.
Thus, rationality became the theme and label for this
scientific branch of organization theory.
During the 1920's and 1930's, some dissenting
voices began to be heard. There were people who
perceived the nature of man as requiring a radically
different treatment than the other elements of the
workplace. One of the earliest contributors was Mary
Parker Follett (1940), who stressed "power with" rather
than "power over" as the appropriate emphasis for
managerial behavior. At about that same time, Chester
Barnard (1938) gave the informal organization
recognition as being potentially as important as the
formal organization. Additional criticism came from
Herbert Simon (1947), who declared that the rational
"principles of management" were really nothing more than
proverbs. Robert Merton (1957) said that the strong
emphasis on rules would lead to suboptimum organization
behavior, in which rule following replaced the


26
underlying organizational objectives as the leading
goal. Philip Selznick (1957) taught that strict
adherence to the principles of scientific management
would lead workers to internalize the goals of
organizational subunits, often at the expense of the
goals of the overall organization, and Alvin Gouldner
(1959) stated that strong emphasis on rules would lead
to worker apathy and minimal performance. Perhaps the
most concise critique of the early theories was given by
Etzioni (1961), who said they covered half of what
organizational analysis is all about namely the formal
organization.
Growth of the Human Relations Strain of
Organization Theory
The criticisms of these original theories of
the rational/ formal organization (sometimes referred to
as the classical theories) were reaching a crescendo at
about the same time as the significance of some new data
on the importance of individuals in the organization was
being realized. The result was the emergence of the
human relations theory of organization. The series of
experiments conducted at Western Electric's Hawthorne
plant, commonly referred to as the Hawthorne studies,
are generally regarded as the genesis of the human
relations school. Originally intended to study the
effects of varying working conditions such as light


27
levels on worker productivity (a very "scientific
management" objective), the Hawthorne studies produced
quite different results. After initial results showed
the expected increase in output with an increase in
light level, there followed a period in which output
continued to increase even though light level was being
decreased. This increase in output was later understood
to be the first documented experience of the behavioral
phenomenon which has come to be known as the Hawthorne
effect. Simply stated, the Hawthorne effect says that
the act of observing human behavior in the workplace
causes behavioral changes. In this regard, the Hawthorne
effect may also be considered an early statement of
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, which states that no
experimental data can be trusted to be a completely
accurate representation of the phenomenon it is supposed
to measure, because the act of measurement causes
changes. These earliest Hawthorne studies triggered
many generations of additional studies, which eventually
lasted more than a decade. Results were reported by
several participants from Western Electric and Harvard
University, primarily Elton Mayo (1933), Fritz
Roethlisberger and William Dickson (1939), and T.N.
Whitehead (1936). A summary of conclusions from the
Hawthorne studies as reported by Mayo (1933) follows;
1. Organization effectiveness is determined by


28
social norms to a greater extent than either workers
physical limitations or the principles of organization.
2. Group standards strongly influence the
behavior of individuals in organizations, affecting both
productivity and individual satisfaction.
3. The strongest motivators are the social
rewards and sanctions effected by the informal work
group.
4. Effective supervisors are those who consult
with workers frequently and encourage group discussion
of organization goals and objectives.
5. The ultimate of organization effectiveness
will result when workers are administering their own
affairs via a democratic process.
Thus, the human relations theory of organization
rejected much of the dogma of the classical/neo-
classical schools. One thing remained, however. There
was still a belief that there was indeed a best way to
organize. The search continued for that one best way.
The juxtaposition of rational organization
theories with those of humanists is the classic
dichotomy in organization theory. This dichotomy has
produced numerous more recent efforts to develop an
organization theory aimed at reconciling these
differences.


29
More Recent Developments in Traditional
Organization Theory
In more recent years, there has been an
increasing awareness that there may not be a single best
way to organize. One of the first attempts to change
the objective of search from one best way to something
situationally dependent was the concept of technological
determinism. The technological determinists are those
who believe the appropriate organization is determined
by the technology involved in the work of the
organization. Studies performed by Joan Woodward in
England in the 1950's indicated several key
relationships between organization parameters and the
complexity of the technology involved. The complexity
factor was dealt with by placing each of the
approximately 100 organizations analyzed into one of
three groups, depending on the technological complexity
of their work. The organizations were categorized as
using batch processes, mass production, or continuous
flow, in order of increasing technological complexity.
Significant findings were as follows.
Among the organization characteristics
showing a direct relationship with technical
advance were: the length of the line of command;
the span of control of the chief executive; the
percentage of total turnover allocated to the
payment of wages and salaries, and the ratios of


managers to total personnel, of clerical and
administrative staff to manual workers, of
direct to indirect labour, and of graduate to
non-graduate supervision in production
departments. (Woodward, 1965, p. 51)
There also was found to be an optimal
organization for each type of technology. In a follow-
on study, the Aston group under Derek Pugh (1968)
analyzed 46 organizations in England. They did not
confirm any of the Woodward findings, but instead
concluded that size of the organization was the most
important parameter in determining the appropriate
organization structure. James Thompson (1967) studied
number of private and public organizations in this
country and concluded that there was a correlation
between the technology an organization used and the
right way to organize (the work and the organization).
He said organizations could be grouped by the type of
integration most prevalent in their activities. The
three types of integration are long-linked, mediating,
and intensive. Long-linked organizations are those in
which work flows in a serial fashion, such as an
assembly line, or many manufacturing processes.
Organizations characterized as long-linked can optimize
their effectiveness by vertical integration. Examples
of this type of activity are the expansion of an


31
aluminum processor to include a container manufacturing
capability, and the development of the capability to
make windows and batteries by automobile manufacturers.
In mediating organizations, the organizations typical
function is the bringing together of the provider and
the user of a service, such as a broker of stocks or
real estate, or a bank. According to Thompson,
organization effectiveness is optimized for the
mediating organization by growth and increase of market
share. The extensive growth of banks, real estate
brokerages, and stock brokerages in recent times
certainly supports this theory. An interesting side
effect of this struggle for growth has been that it is
increasingly difficult to distinguish between
organizations of the three types used as examples. In
organizations characterized by intensive technology,
there is interactive coordination and communication
between all or many organization elements, such as a
research team or an integrated military unit. The
prescribed approach for organization effectiveness for
the intensive technology organization is the continuous
upgrading of the organizations and individual skills.
The widespread support of continuing education for its
members by organizations of this type supports this
theory.
Another attempt to define the parameters which


32
would prescribe the appropriate organization is provided
by Lawrence and Lorsch in terms of the organization's
handling of uncertainty. Lawrence and Lorsch (1967)
describe the standard organization approach to dealing
with or reducing uncertainty as having two parts. First
is differentiation (division of labor) at the lower
levels, letting each of the differentiated units have
the structure its considers most appropriate for dealing
with the uncertainties of its peculiar environment.
These diverse elements are then integrated at the top of
the organization. Jay Galbraith (1973) has also
developed a generic characterization of organizational
approaches to dealing with uncertainty as taking the
form of some combination of the following four elements.
1. Organizations can reduce the need to deal
with uncertainty by;
a. the creation of slack resources, which gives
them the capability to respond to unanticipated
requirements.
b. the creation of self-contained tasks, which
eliminates the need to deal with the outside world.
2. Alternatively, organizations can increase
their capability to deal with uncertainty by;
a. the creation of information systems to assist
in communicating vertically in the organization.
b. the creation of horizontal relationships for


33
the exchange of information across elements of the
organization at a given level.
The first two approaches described above (la and
lb) are the stereotypical bureaucratic responses, and
certainly are not advocated for organization
effectiveness. The second group of actions (2a and 2b)
form the foundation for the matrix organization, which
has become common, particularly in high technology
organizations.
Marshall Meyer (1976) has summarized the state
of affairs of the organization theories presented so far
rather well. He states the following.
1. There is some comparability between all
organizations.
2. Contingency theory applies; that is, there is
no one best way to organize.
3. Technology is only one of the determinants of
the appropriate organization for a given entity.
In another recent development, Ouchi (1981) has
presented another theory of organization which he calls
Theory Z. Theory Z is represented as being descriptive
of the typical Japanese organization, and is described
as having the following elements;
1. Lifetime employment; the typical professional
employee spends an entire career with the same
organization.


34
2. Slow evaluation and promotion.
3. Non-specialized career paths; the emphasis is
on developing generalists who will be inherently capable
of working at higher levels of the organization.
4. Implicit control mechanisms, not thick books
of rules and procedures, followed up with explicit
measurements.
5. Collective decision making.
6. Collective responsibility.
7. Wholistic concern; the organization is
concerned about the whole employee, not just job
performance.
By contrast, in the typical American
organization the conditions listed above are essentially
all reversed. There is frequent job changing, rapid
promotion, highly specialized career development,
explicit controls, an emphasis on individual decision
making and individual responsibility, and the
organizations interest in the employee stops at the
front gate. According to Ouchi, these conditions are
brought about by a series of underlying beliefs .
1. Trust; there is mutual trust between the
levels of a hierarchical organization.
2. Subtlety; there are complex personal
relationships between members of the organization, and
these transcend the relationships required by their


35
organizational positions.
3. Intimacy; there is an air of caring and
mutual support disciplined unselfishness.
4. Cultural man; man is assumed to be a part of
his culture, motivated and stimulated by his heritage
and surroundings rather than economic considerations.
5. Organizations; they are regarded as an
inherent part of civilized life.
It is Ouchi's contention that American
organizations must reshape themselves along the lines of
Theory Z in order to meet the Japanese challenge. This
seems a very difficult thing for American organizations
to accomplish, especially given the vastly different
cultures of the two countries. Some specific cultural
differences which help explain the acceptance of the
conditions described above are;
1. Homogeneity; the people of Japan are largely
homogeneous in terms of race, history, language,
religion,and culture. The people of America are
homogeneous in none of these areas; the idea of the
"melting pot" is a source of pride in America.
2. Mobility; the people of Japan typically live
in the same town or city all their lives, even in the
same house. Americans change their residence at an ever
increasing rate.
3. Privacy; with half the population of the


36
United States in a small fraction of the area, the
Japanese do not expect or require much private space.
This contrasts with this country, where everyman's dream
includes a three bedroom house in suburbia.
4. Individuality; the Japanese are taught from
the earliest age that the individual is important only
as a part of the group or culture. Americans take great
pride in the rights of the individual, in "doing your
own thing."
Based on these differences, it would seem that
there is a large amount of incompatibility between
conditions in this country and the development of a
Theory Z movement. However, Ouchi maintains that some
of the best run and most successful organizations in
America are already employing Theory Z principles, and
that there is a movement in the direction of ever
increasing utilization The place of Theory Z in
American organization theory must await future
developments.
Beyond Traditional Organization Theory
A Newly Emerging Recognition of the
Importance of Conflict and Power-
Organization theory as summarized in the
preceding section has some shortcomings for the analysis
of an actual organization. Perrow correctly observed


37
that in complex organizations, tasks are divided up
between a few major departments or subunits, and all of
these subunits are not likely to be equally powerful
(Perrow, 1972). That is, the very creation of structure
results in a non-uniform allocation of power within the
organization. Pfeffer has advocated the broadening of
the study of organizations beyond the traditional
boundaries of organization theory by including the
analysis of the use of power within the organization.
Pfeffer deals with power as an element of organization
politics, which he defines as
those activities taken within organizations to
acquire, develop, and use power and other
resources to obtain one's preferred outcomes in
a situation in which there is uncertainty or
dissensus about choices. (Pfeffer, 1981, p. 351)
This is essentially an elaborate restatement of
Lasswell's (1936) definition of politics as the study of
who gets what, when, and how, but either definition
provides an adequate starting point for the
incorporation of power as an element in the study of an
organization. Pfeffer (1981) provides three reasons for
the absence of this critical element in traditional
organization theory. First, the concept of power is not
well understood even by those social scientists who have
studied it. Second, other explanations of organization


38
phenomena such as those provided by the more traditional
organization theories have been more attractive because
they are built on more socially acceptable beliefs such
as the rationality of man and effectiveness as an over-
arching organization goal. Third, there is an inherent
belief among managers that power and politics
necessarily means deceitful, underhanded behavior, and
overtly dealing with these types of behavior may seem to
imply sanctioning them. Baldridge (1971) exposes that
perspective as naive, when he says that "the men in the
critical roles are not bureaucrats, they are
politicians, struggling to make dreams come true and
fighting to balance interest groups off against each
other." Alinsky takes an even stronger stand.
.Political realists see the world as it
really is: an arena of power politics moved
primarily by perceived immediate self-interests,
where morality is rhetorical rationale for
expedient action and self-interest. It is a
world not of angels but of angles, power
principles; a world where we are always moral
and our enemies always immoral. (Alinsky, 1971, pp.
12-13).
Conflict is a related concept which must be
included in a discussion of power. As with power,
conflict is frequently omitted from the study of


39
organizations. Dalton suggests this is because social
scientists "frequently do not get close enough to
situations" to understand "the covert activities and the
meanings assigned to them." (Dalton, 1959, p.3) Selznick
(1957) notes that, based on his studies of the Tennessee
Valley Authority, conflict may even result in changes to
the basic goals of the organization. Dalton (1959)
states that conflicts arise from struggles for scarce
resources, and discusses three specific conflicts. The
epitome of conflict is dealing with cutbacks. Managers
frequently subvert overall organizational goals for
subunit goals in the struggle for personal and subunit
survival. When a number of subunit managers have so
acted, conflict is inevitable, because the subunits will
no longer have the same goals. Second, the process of
allocating promotions is fertile ground for conflict
because of the subjectivity of the evaluation and
selection process. Third, there may be line versus
staff conflicts brought about by their competing demands
for the manager's attention and blessings.
Some writers have found positive aspects to
conflict. Follett (1940) proposed a theory of creative
conflict, and Coser (1956) suggested a whole set of
propositions on the importance of conflict to an
organization, which were summarized by McCurdy.
Conflict is essential for maintaining the


40
identity of the organization. Every public
agency needs combatant pressures from opponents
in order to reaffirm its mission and reenlist
the support of its members. This helps the
agency delineate its boundaries within a
changing world. The military needs a menace;
the environmentalists need polluters; the
police need criminals -or their organizations
would fall apart. Conflict between employees
within such agencies serves the same function.
In the absence of a visible enemy, for example,
the grunts at army boot camp learn to hate
their drill sergeant, a hatred that builds
solidarity and helps the soldiers to identify
with the organization. Later the conflict can
be transferred to a foreign menace.Conflict
between employees also helps to reenforce the
formal hierarchy by creating loyalties among
persons who perform similar roles at similar
levels in the organization. (McCurdy, 1977, pp. 61-
62)
Bolman and Deal (1984) have combined the related
elements of power and conflict, and have synthesized a
"political frame" for organizational analysis. They
summarize the political perspective in the following
five propositions.


41
1. Most important decisions in organizations
involve the allocation of scarce resources.
2. Organizations are coalitions composed of a
number of individuals and interest groups.
3. Individuals and interest groups differ in
their values, preferences, beliefs, information,and
perceptions of reality. Such differences are usually
enduring and change slowly if at all.
4. Organizational goals and decisions emerge
from ongoing processes of bargaining, negotiation, and
jockeying for position among individuals and groups.
5. Because of scarce resources and enduring
differences, power and conflict are central features of
organizational life.
Within this frame are several separate concepts.
First is the concept of the organization as an
aggregation of coalitions of individuals and interest
groups. Today's allies are tomorrow's potential enemies,
depending on the issue. The implication is clear; every
agreement is narrowly prescribed, applicable only to the
specific conditions for which it was negotiated. Second
is the concept of power as an (almost) independent
variable, and made up of multiple types; authority,
expertise, control of rewards, coercive power, and
personal power. The implication here is "that the
capacity of authorities to make decisions is


42
constrained....The multiple pressures operating on
authorities helps to explain why so many administrators
seem more powerful to their subordinates than to
themselves." The third major concept is the need to deal
with conflict. Approaches to dealing with conflict
include gamesmanship, bargaining, and coalition
formation.
Another Important Factor; Symbols
and Organizational Culture
The need for yet another element of
organizational analysis is indicated by the observed
differences between so many organizational actions and
their stated policies and positions. A highly
bureaucratic organization may issue a formal policy
encouraging its employees to be innovative and creative
in suggesting new ways of doing business; the perceptive
(or jaded) long time employee will immediately identify
this "new policy" as an attempt on the part of top
management to show the employees that they (management)
are up to date on the latest management techniques. Or,
the federal government may make highly visible public
declarations that it intends to "whip inflation now,"
while making no policy changes. Or, the federal
government may enact a "windfall profits tax" which had
nothing to do with profits. No element of traditional
organization theory accommodates these conditions, all


43
of which are very real. However, a relatively new
addition to the field of organization analysis which
does help explain these apparent contradictions is the
study of organizational actions for their symbolic
content. In a study of decision making and the
allocation of scarce resources at some.major
universities, Chaffee (1980) found that the presence of
a rational decision making process caused ready
acceptance of decisions, even though there was no
significant difference in the allocation of resources at
the institutions with and without a prescribed rational
decision making process. This is testimony to the
symbolic value of the rational decision making process.
Additional evidence exists which speaks to the
importance of symbolism. Gergen (1969) has determined
that the acceptance of social theories is governed as
much by tastes, preferences, and values as by
consistency with data, and Edelman (1977) determined
that political language and symbols are useful for
mobilizing support and quieting opposition. Pfeffer
(1981) provides several explanations for the apparent
strength of symbols and symbolic behavior in an
organizational setting. Individuals and groups may have
uncertain preferences, and thus they can be satisfied
when told that a particular action was intended to meet
their needs. Or, some individuals and groups will


44
believe what the organization says, simply because of
organizational influence. Organizations frequently have
the capability to withhold data which might support
conclusions other than those which the organization
supports. The subject at issue may be sufficiently vague
or so large in scope that individual observers,
especially within the organization, may not know which
outcome actually occurred. A final possibility is that
the interested individuals and/or groups may expect only
symbolic outcomes.
Other experimental data supporting the
importance of symbols is provided by King (1972). King
determined that employee attitudes regarding job
enrichment and job enlargement were largely determined
by the employees expectations, which had been
manipulated by the amount and tone of pre-change
discussion by management. Also, Edelman (1977) has
studied the formation of self-regulatory agencies for
professionals and concluded that their effect has been
mostly symbolic, since few members were ever
disciplined. Bolman and Deal (1984) have synthesized
the available data and identified a "symbolic" frame for
organizational analysis, summarized by them as follows;
1. What is most important about any event is not
what happened but the meaning of what happened.
2. The meaning of an event is determined not


45
simply by what happened but by the ways that humans
interpret what happened.
3. Many of the most significant events and
processes in organizations are substantially ambiguous
or uncertain it is often difficult or impossible to
know what happened, why it happened, or what will happen
next.
4. Ambiguity and uncertainty undermine rational
approaches to analysis, problem solving, and decision
making.
5. When faced with uncertainty and ambiguity,
humans create symbols to reduce the ambiguity, resolve
confusion, increase predictability, and provide
direction. Events themselves may remain illogical,
random, fluid, and meaningless, but human symbols make
them seem otherwise.
Within this symbolic frame are myths, rituals,
ceremonies, fairy tales, stories, humor, and play. Myths
are beliefs that are not amenable to validation, and
their presence is one of the characteristics of elite
institutions. Examples are IBM, with its image of
unsurpassable computer expertise, the Ivy League schools
with their promise of superior career achievement for
their graduates, and the U.S. Marine Corps with its call
for "a few good men." Rituals and ceremonies serve four
major functions. These are to socialize, to stabilize,


46
to reduce anxieties and ambiguities, and to convey
messages to external constituencies. Some organizational
activities usually viewed as rational, but which
frequently are primarily ritualistic, are performance
appraisals, meetings (especially those of standing
committees), management training programs, and pre-
employment testing. The annual meetings of publicly held
companies are generally ceremonial, as are many public
sessions of legislative bodies at all levels of
government. The activities of these entities are far
too complicated for resolution in infrequent mass
meetings. Their real business is conducted in many
smaller sessions, many of them held very informally.
Fairy tales, according to Westerlund and Sjostrand,
(1979) serve several functions. They fulfill a wishful
dream, they entertain, they give security, they give
knowledge, and they disseminate propaganda. The belief
that Harley Procter was divinely inspired to push his
company into the sale of Ivory soap "suggests that even
God is on the side of Procter and Gamble." Stories are
the medium for passing along the organizations myths.
All large organizations have some interesting stories in
their histories, and those that serve the organization's
purposes best are encouraged and told and retold. Humor
is frequently used in "we versus they" organizational
situations to refer to an organizational opponent or


47
enemy in exaggerated (usually derogatory) terms. Play .
is frequently seen in the use of sports metaphors for
organizational activities, as in "we will have to punt"
instead of "I cannot make a decision."
Schein (1985) views symbols as the outward
manifestations of a larger concept, that of
organizational culture, which is defined as
a pattern of basic assumptions- invented,
discovered, or developed by a given group as it
learns to cope with its problems of external
adaptation and internal integration- that has
worked well enough to be considered valid and9
therefore, to be taught to new members as the
correct way to perceive, think, and feel in
relation to those problems. (Schein, 1985, p. 9)
Schein (1985) further develops the concept of
culture as existing at three levels. Level 1 consists of
basic assumptions regarding the environment, reality,
time, space, human nature, human activity, and human
relationships, which are the essence of organizational
culture. They are generally invisible and not subject to
examination. Level 2 consists of values, which are first
order manifestations of the basic assumptions. Values
may often be acknowledged as expressed rationale for
organizational policies and decisions. Level 3 consists
of artifacts and creations, which are the physical


48
manifestations or end products of culture, and thus can
be directly observed. These includes patterns of
behavior, the use of technology, and characteristics of
written and spoken communications.
Synthesis of Organization Theory
Within the framework of organization theory as
outlined above, there have been many attempts to
synthesize and integrate the various perspectives. Some
of these attempts have been intended as the definitive
prescriptive statement of organization theory, and
others have been mainly descriptive in nature, intended
to serve as an aid in organizational analysis. Since the
present study has as its purpose the analysis of an
organization, not the development of organization
theory, the focus in this synthesis will be descriptive.
Several descriptive approaches from the literature were
considered for use in this study. These are Parsons and
Smelser's Societal Model, Pascale and Athos' 7-S
Framework, Lynn's Process/Structure/Behavior Model, and
Bolman and Deal's Structural/Human Resources/ Political/
Symbolic Model. Consideration of the elements of these
descriptive approaches, or models, led to the decision
to combine the elements of several of them into a single
new model. The model selected for use in this study is a


49
modified version of Bolman and Deal's model, consisting
of the five elements structure, human resources,
political, symbolic, and systems.
A Societal Model
Parsons and Smelser (1964) developed a societal
model composed of four elements. These are the polity,
the economy, social stratification, and culture. In this
model, the political system concerns itself primarily
with societal goals, especially their definition,
development of the means for their attainment, and
measuring the effects of the efforts at their
attainment. The economy concerns itself primarily with
the actual doing of whatever it is that society elects
to do, and the distribution of the resulting products
and profits. It includes the allocation of scarce
resources and the development of new products and/or
distribution schemes as required by the continuous
search for optimum performance in the face of changing
environmental conditions, as well as the stimulation of
demand and the creation of markets. social
stratification is the integrating element of society. It
provides the working definition of success and its many
variations. The patterns of rewards and reward
expectations, prestige, status, and social standing are
also developed here. The resulting patterns can be
quite different from those which people say are "right"


50
or deserved. The cultural element provides for pattern
maintenance. It includes many institutions, like
families, churches, and schools, which serve to provide
the socializing experiences, especially for the young.
Of increasing importance as an element of the culture
are the media, especially television. Behaviors are
observed, practiced, and reinforced (or punished).
Values and mores are developed and modified by the
cultural element, and the definition of acceptable
behavior results.
It should also be noted that none of the four
elements of this model is bounded totally by its general
definition. For instance, the political system has
influence on more than just the definition of goals.
There are some very strong influences from the political
system on goal accomplishment, even though that activity
is primarily under the influence of the economy.
This model suffers from the attempt to be a
universal model. Its broadness makes application to
specific situation difficult. However, it is worth
noting that Parsons and Smelser were very early to
recognize the significance of organizational culture.
As -noted below, Bolman and Deal have elaborated the
concept of culture somewhat, and this elaborated version
is used in the present study.


51
The 7-S Framework
Pascale and Athos (1981) developed the 7-S
framework, which was subsequently popularized, with one
minor change by Peters and Waterman (1981). The 7-S
framework as developed by Pascale and Athos consists of
seven frames. They are structure, strategy, systems,
skills, style, staff, and superordinate goals. The first
three, structure, strategy, and systems, are regarded as
traditional elements of organizational analysis.
Strategy includes the organization's top-level statement
of where it wants to go and how it plans to go there.
This includes the organization's long term plans and its
budget, as the budget is typically the first
operationalization of a plan; it provides a statement of
how the organization intends to allocate its limited
resources. Structure is rather narrowly defined in this
model, including only the formal organization chart and
its characteristics. This includes considerations such
as whether it is flat or tall, emphasizing project or
functional or matrix setups, the push to be centralized
or decentralized, and the relative reliance on line
versus staff. Systems are the means for moving
information around within the organization. This
includes standard operating procedures, normal reports
and reporting processes, as well as other organizational
behaviors such as frequency, duration, and degree of


I
v 52
formality of meetings, and the normal decision making
processes used. Systems also include the tools used by
management in gathering and processing data for use in
decision making. Hardware, especially computers, and
software are a large and growing part of this element of
the model.
The other four elements are called "soft,"
because they deal with the softer or social sciences;
the people who comprise the organization and the
organization's unique qualities which emanate from these
individuals. Staff is the description of the typical
employee and the composite employee. This includes the
demographics of the organization, in terms such as
average age, amount of education, type of education, and
career categories. Staff would also encompass the
individual aspirations of the organization's employees,
which may not always be aligned with the organization's
goals. Skills are the organization's distinctive
competencies. That is, those things it does best, and
likes to think it does better than any other
organization. These are the reasons the organization
exists. Without some unique capabilities no organization
can continue to exist. Skills also include the unique
capabilities of key personnel, both as individuals and
in groups. Style is the characterization of how the
organization's members, especially its key managers,


53
behave in achieving the organization's goals. Typically,
the chief executive's personal style will have a very
strong effect on the style of the total organization.
There may also be a dominant overall style of behavior
for the total organization. There will certainly be an
interaction between this element and Staff because of
the association of certain personality types with
specific career choices. Style will also reflect itself
in the organization's approach to decision making. There
is a continuum from autocratic to democratic decision
making, and the organization will tend to have a single
predominant style Superordinate goals (referred to as
shared values by Peters and Waterman) include those
concepts which transcend the organization and provide
the glue that both holds the organization together and
helps ensure the consistency between organization and
individual goals. These may include overall agreement on
such spiritual concepts as the importance of life and
the significance of the organization within the context
of the whole society, but probably of more importance is
the general agreement on more earthly matters such as
whether the organization is to be a price leader, have
the lowest price, return the highest rate on shareholder
equity, etc.
One weakness of this model for the present study
is the total absence of evidence that it might apply to


54
the public sector. All the examples used to illustrate
the model, as well as the experiences which stimulated
the creation of the model, came from the private sector.
However, it does appear that there was not excessive
emphasis on unique aspects of the private sector, and it
is concluded that this model would apply as well to the
public sector as to the private. There are some
limitations, however. First, there is no overt mention
of politics. It may be that this omission stems from the
authors' roles as management consultants, who must take
great care when approaching the discussion of internal
politics. The too-direct approach may lead to the
implication that the client is less than professional,
which may very well result in the loss of a client. Or,
it may be that the element of politics is not considered
sufficiently important; this conclusion is not
considered valid. Whatever the cause, the element of
politics is missing, and this is considered a serious
omission. Second, there is very little mention of
culture. The cultural aspects of organizations have
been considered increasingly important, and this lack of
emphasis is also considered to be significant. Finally,
there is the matter of convenience. The 7-S model has
seven elements. Adding those just mentioned would result
in nine elements, and nine elements are too many for
convenient usage in this study. The concept of a


55
Systems element was considered especially useful, and
this element was added to the model selected for use in
this study.
Process/ Structure/ Behavior Model
Another approach is suggested by Lynn (1981).
While specifically addressing measures which have been
taken over the years to improve the performance of
government organizations, this approach lends itself to
the study of organizational performance in an
interesting way. This model looks at the "how" question
rather than the "what" by examining a number of specific
programs and initiatives through which presidents and
other high government officials attempted to improve
performance in the organization for which they were
responsible. There is only a secondary look at the
specific objectives of these programs and initiatives.
This model has three elements. These are
organizational processes, organizational structure, and
organizational behavior. Processes are the standard
routines and operating procedures organizations use to
accomplish their designated tasks and achieve the
necessary internal coordination. Among the most
important are the processes used for budgeting,
planning, and performance measurement. Special emphasis
has often been placed on the budgetary processes because
the budget is seen as forming the backbone of all


56
organizational activity, especially government
organizations. The continuous search for efficiency and
economy has resulted in many proposals and reforms and
other new ways for developing government budgets.
Structure deals with the way departments are identified
and divided; the organization chart defines an
organizations structure, at least to the first level of
inspection. Span of control, distribution of functions,
reporting levels, and channels of communication are also
parameters useful for the description of structure.
There are two measures or indicators of organizational
behavior, called simply soft and hard. Soft indicators
are those activities generally associated with the human
relations school of thought, and are based on the
assumption that long-lasting changes in performance
require changes in the quality of the working
environment and in the nature of the work itself.
Examples are sensitivity training, organization
development, participative management, and other
activities aimed at changing behavior through gentle
persuasion. Hard indicators include productivity
measurement and improvement programs, pay-for-
performance, and other programs that are more closely
associated with the traditional carrot and stick school
of motivation.
The outstanding advantage of this model is that


57
it was devised expressly for the public sector. It
suffers from some of the same shortcomings as Athos and
Pascale's model, in that it does not address the
political element at all and addresses the cultural only
slightly. Also, it does not address the Systems element.
It was concluded that the elements of this model were
completely addressed by the model selected for use in
this study.
Structural/ Human Resources/ Political/ Symbolic Model
Most recently, Bolman and Deal (1984) have
proposed that there are four approaches to the
management of organizations. They are the structural,
human resource, political, and symbolic approaches.
These four approaches can also be viewed as four
elements of organizational analysis, and are so viewed
here. Structure deals with the formally defined roles
and relationships, and thus probes behind the
individuals who comprise the organization to examine the
context in which they relate and work together. There
are four major elements of structure in this model.
These are organizational levels, goals, roles, and
linkages. The most important determinants of the
appropriate structure are the technology that the
organization deals with and its environment. Structure
may be studied by analysis of the organization chart,
responsibility charting, or mapping of the flow of


58
communications. The tendency to emphasize the importance
of structure in dealing with organizational problems has
been with us as long as organizations have existed.
The Human Resource frame recognizes the fact
that it is individuals who give the organization its
existence. These humans have needs which may be viewed,
as Maslow did, as emanating from the survival instinct
(physiological and safety needs) or from higher level
behaviors (the need for love, esteem, and self-
actualization). The focus of this frame is on the fit
between organization and individual. When there is poor
fit there will be organizational ills, and when there is
good fit there will be high productivity and high
morale. This frame has its origins in the Human Resource
school of management, which is usually dated from the
Hawthorne experiments in the 1920's. Large
organizations tend to have more of the problems which
this frame deals with. This is partly just because
there are more people whose needs must be considered,
but also because there is an exponential growth in the
number of interpersonal dealings required for
accomplishing normal business as the size of the
organization increases. These interpersonal dealings,
including group decision making, are subject to frequent
improvement efforts with a large amount of training
being given to organization members.


59
The political frame is unique to this model.
This frame goes beyond considerations of classical
organization theory and organization behavior and looks
at how decisions are actually made. Goals, structure,
and policy are seen as resulting from bargaining and
negotiating by interest groups. Sometimes the formal
organization is the holder of the power, but often there
is compromise between parties. In most elements of the
federal government these parties include the involved
agency, Congress, the Office of Management and Budget,
frequently the General Accounting Office, and sometimes
the Office of Personnel Management. As a further
complication, Congress is of course not monolithic.
There are budget, appropriations, and authorization
cqmmittees in both houses, and the Congressional Budget
Office. Completing the iron triangle, the interest
groups dependent on the involved agency also have
varying degrees of clout. These groups include the
companies who owe their livelihood to contracts from the
specific agency and the clients or beneficiaries of its
programs. These clients may be other government agencies
at the federal, state, or local levels, and thus another
set of political activities may be present. In addition
to these "external" political forces, there exist within
most organizations many of the same elements of
political activity, such as coalition formation, power


60
struggles, compromise and negotiation. The focus of
these internal political activities, as with the
(
external political activities, is on the allocation of
scarce organizational resources, primarily money and
people. The epitome of the political frame's advocates
may be Machiavelli, who counsels us that "if a prince
wants to maintain his rule he must learn how not to be
virtuous, and to make use of this or that according to
need" (Machiavelli, 1961 [1514], p. 163). Evidence of
the continued existence of this mindset in modern times
is provided by the Malek Manual, used by some of the
White House staff during the Nixon administration as a
guide book on how to circumvent the civil service
regulations in staffing.
Also unique in name, although not totally unique
in concept, is the symbolic frame. With this frame
Bolman & Deal "abandon the assumption of rationality
that appear in the other frames and treat the
organization as theater or carnival" (Bolman and Deal,
1984, p.6). For instance, in this frame, the
organization structure is looked at for its symbolic
value rather than the normal approach of looking at
structure as a rationally derived expression of
organizational purpose. This frame also points out the
presence of significant symbolic value in many of the
standard organizational processes. Meetings in


61
particular are regarded as frequently having more
symbolic than operational value. Additionally,
organizational planning processes, personnel evaluation
procedures, and collective bargaining are seen as
typically having high symbolic content, and often very
little operational content. Within the context of the
symbolic frame, this condition in not seen as negative.
Symbolic activities have the potential for significant
benefit to the organization, by adding some amount of
ceremony and tradition to the otherwise sterile,
impersonal organizational life. The ability to view
some elements of structure and processes as primarily
symbolic in nature is preferred to the common
frustration of believing them to have little or no
operational value and hence concluding that they are
therefore totally without value. Myths, fairy tales,
stories, rituals, ceremonies, add zest to organizational
life, and should be recognized as a very real element of
organizations.
As described below, The Bolman and Deal model
was used as the basis for selection of an overall model
for use in the analysis of the organization.
Selection of a Model for Use in the Present Study
The Bolman and Deal model strikes the best
balance between simplicity (Lynn) and complexity (Athos
and Pascale), both in terms of the number of elements


62
and the definitions of the elements. It includes
numerous examples of both public and private sector
applications, and appears to be equally applicable to
both. Therefore, the Bolman and Deal model will be used
as the foundation for the analysis of organization in
this study. Some modification will be necessary to
ensure a good fit with this study.
The only significant flaw in the Bolman and Deal
model for the present study is the lack of sufficient
attention to the many systems involved in the workings
of a large organization. There is brief mention of the
existence of systems, but they are treated by Bolman and
Deal as a segment of the structural frame. For the
present study, the many pieces of management system
hardware and software and the many coordinating and
integrating mechanisms.involved have a significant
effect on many organizational activities. Thus there
will be a frame added to the Bolman and Deal model to
deal with systems, resulting in a model having five
elements. These are structure, human resources,
political, symbolic, and systems.
Organizational Life Cycles
Unlike organization theory, there is not a
recognized body of literature which chronicles the
development of life cycle theory. As has been pointed


63
out,
a historical bias in the literature has been
the tendency to generate studies which focus on
mature organizations, and that are executed with
a cross-sectional rather than a longitudinal
perspective. (Quinn and Cameron, 1983, p.33)
Thus the discussion of the theory of life cycles
will necessarily take a different form than the
discussion of organization theory.
The approach here will be to describe and
analyze several specific life cycle models which have
been presented in the literature, and to consider these
models and their sources as providing the necessary
theoretical foundation for the study of organizational
life cycles. A short critique of the applicability of
each model to the present study is also presented,
leading to selection of a model proposed by Quinn and
Cameron for use in the present study. The life cycle
models considered for use in this study are presented in
chronological order, according to the year of their
publication. Finally, the rationale for selection of
the Quinn and Cameron model is presented. This model
consists of four stages called entrepreneurial,
collectivity, formalization and control, and elaboration
of structure.


64
A Three Stage Model: Autonomy/ Rapid Growth/
Steady State
This model was developed as part of a study of
the life and death of government bureaus (Downs, 1967).
Although Downs uses government bureaus as his explicit
focus, most of his points are quite applicable to a wide
range of organizations. He identifies four ways in which
government bureaus are created. A bureau may form
around a particularly charismatic person in response to
the attraction of the person and his or her ideas, as
the National Socialist Party in Germany formed around
Hitler. Second, an organization may be created out of
nothing to fill a specific perceived need. The federal,
government provided several examples in the form of the
alphabet agencies of the New Deal. New organizations are
created continuously by state and local governments, and
by private organizations. Third, a new organization may
be created by combining elements of several existing
groups. At the federal level, examples are the spinning
off of the Air Force from the Army, the elaboration of
the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics into
NASA, and the more recent formation of the Departments
of Energy and Education. Fourth, a bureau can be
created through the entrepreneurship of a group of
individuals who feel sufficiently strong about a subject
or a policy. The semi-privatization of the Post Office
Department into the U.S. Postal Service is an example.


65
For an agency that has been established, Downs
describes a set of activities which usually occur in
sequence, and which are indicative of a life cycle.
Three stages of a life cycle which can be inferred are
the struggle for autonomy, rapid growth, and steady
state. The first stage, the struggle for autonomy, is
really a struggle for survival, for "the older a bureau
is, the less likely it is to die" (Downs, 1967, p. 20).
During this stage, the bureau is attempting to stake a
claim to the resources it needs to assure its continued
existence, and it does so by demonstrating some
combination of unique competences, dedicated clientele,
and clear authority over an issue or function. As a
second stage, most young bureaus also undergo a period
of rapid growth in both size and the social significance
of their functions, culminating (in successful bureaus)
with the arrival at a survival threshold. This survival
threshold is defined by a minimum size and age. An
organization must be large enough to render useful
services, and old enough to have a significant client
base. The third stage, steady state, is characterized
by a continuous search for sources of external support
to assure continued survival, as well as a continuous
coping with accelerating or decelerating growth, usually
in response to external forces.
Downs also provides some insight into the


66
apparent immortality of government organizations by
providing reasons they are unlikely to die.
1. They will change functions if required to
ensure survival.
2. Established clientele will lobby for their
continued existence.
3. There is usually no accurate accounting of a
bureau's total costs and benefits.
.4. Bureaus will usually not fight each other to
the death.
5. Bureaus tend to be large, and large
organizations of any type tend to survive.
6. As a last resort, a struggling bureau will
seek a merger with another bureau.
This model is intended for application at the
bureau level, and this orientation hampers its
usefulness for the present study, in which the unit of
study is a subset of a bureau. Also, the requirement to
infer the stages indicates that Downs does not intend an
application of his study to life cycle analysis, which
leads to some unease in making such an application.
A Three Stage Model: Birth/ Youth/ Maturity
In another three stage model it is suggested
that all business organizations go through three stages
called birth, youth,and maturity (Lippitt and Schmidt,


67
1967). Further, in progressing through these stages
they encounter six crises. The underlying proposition is
that
the true criteria for determining the stage of
development of an organization are found more in
the manner of coping with predictable
organizational crises than in the number of
employees in the company, its share of the
market, or its managerial sophistication.
(Lippitt and Schmidt, 1967, p. 103)
Crises encountered during the birth stage are
the creation of the organization and early sacrifice to
ensure continued survival. The act of creation of an
organization requires making substantial commitments and
taking risks. These risks and commitments include
deciding what and how much the organization is willing
to risk and identifying specifically who must risk the
dollars,time, and energy to bring this idea to life. The
risks are weighed against the organizations goals and
the chances of their attainment if the risks are taken.
If the organization copes with this crisis by
successfully making the commitments and taking the risks
required, it is ready for the second crisis, which
requires deciding how much it is willing to sacrifice to
help ensure survival. These sacrifices are usually made
from the personal savings, personal time, and personal


68
energy of key individuals in the organization.
Continued survival of the organization is requires key
people to make these sacrifices in a timely manner.
Crises encountered during youth center around
gaining stability and earning a favorable reputation.
In order to achieve stability, the organization must be
willing to accept and enforce organization and
discipline. This may be troublesome because it
eliminates most of the flexibility that the
organizations leaders had enjoyed, and replaces it with
rules and procedures, organizational politics, and
record keeping. Earning and keeping a favorable
reputation may require spending significant resources on
self examination. This activity requires that
management keep its collective ego in check and subject
itself to continuous monitoring, evaluation, and
improvement.
During maturity, significant crises are
achieving uniqueness and adaptability and developing the
ability to contribute meaningfully to society.
Achieving uniqueness may require traumatic changes in
the organization, including changing goals when a change
in the environment is anticipated. An organization's
uniqueness or distinctive competencies must be
sufficiently narrow to permit definition, but
sufficiently broad to provide flexibility in changing


69
times. The final crisis requires the organization to
contribute to society without a direct return. This can
take the form of advocating and supporting employee
development activities which are not job related and
making direct contributions of time or money to
community activities which would improve the quality of
life for the entire community.
This model has several major drawbacks for
application to the present study. These are its total
concentration on the private sector, its focus on the
total organization (very much like the previous three
stage model), its small theoretical basis, and its lack
of substantiating data.
A Four Stage Model Based on Worker Maturity
Another applicable study was performed with the
objective of showing that a different leadership style
is appropriate to each of the four stages that they see
in the typical organizational life cycle (Hersey and
Blanchard, 1969). In this early statement of
situational leadership, the stages of the life cycle are
not named, but it is implied that they could be named
for the maturity levels of the employees. This leads to
the names low, moderately low, moderately high, and
high. The maturity level here does not mean physical or
emotional maturity in the normal sense. The operative
definition of maturity for this application is taken


70
from Argyris and McClelland as "relative independence,
ability to take responsibility, and achievement-
motivation" (Hersey and Blanchard, 1969, p. 30).
According to this model, there is a natural progression
from low to high maturity in many organizational
situations, and there is an appropriate style of
leadership for each of the maturity levels or life-cycle
stages. For the low maturity group, a leadership style
with high emphasis bn task performance is advocated. For
organizations in which maturity has progressed to
moderately low, high emphasis on both task performance
and interpersonal relationships is suggested. When the
organization has reached a moderately high level of
maturity, a lessening of task focus by the leader is
recommended, but a continued high concentration on
relationships remains valid. Finally, for the fully
mature organization, it is suggested that the leader
"back off" in emphasis of both task orientation and
personal relationships. The four leadership styles
advocated have been called telling, selling,
participating, and delegating. A number of experiments
validating their recommendations are mentioned. Anothe.
application of their work is to organizational
structure, specifically span of control. Life cycle
theory suggests that the appropriate span of control
should be a function of the maturity of the individuals


71
being managed instead of, or in addition to other
organizational considerations.
This model is supported by a number of
experiments and has an extremely sound theoretical base.
However, it is far too narrow for use in the present
study because of its total emphasis on employee
behavior. The exclusive reliance on behavior as a
determinant and/or descriptor of life cycle ignores
other elements known to be significant, such as
structure, management systems, as discussed elsewhere in
this study.
Five Phases of Evolution and Revolution
Another life cycle model has been proposed which
has five phases of relatively calm organizational
growth, each followed by a management crisis (Greiner,
1972). Underlying the life cycle model is a model of
organizational development which also has five elements.
The five elements of the organizational development
model are age of the organization, size of the
organization, stages of evolution (periods of continuous
growth without a major setback), stages of revolution
(periods of substantial turbulence spaced between
smoother periods of evolution), and growth rate of the
industry. The influence of organizational age on the
current organization is felt primarily through the
institutionalization of behavior patterns, especially


72
management behaviors. As the organization ages, behavior
becomes more stable and predictable. It also becomes
more difficult to change. Organizational growtn tenas to
cause problems of communication and coordination, for
two reasons. First, the plain physical presence of more
people causes more communication and coordination, and
second, organizational growth usually results in
organizational elaboration, which results in the need
for more coordination and communication to perform a
given function. Stages of evolution and revolution are
discussed below. The main effect of the growth rate (or
shrinkage rate) of the particular industry is on the
length of the periods of evolution and revolution and
their volatility.
There are five phases of evolution and
revolution, with each period of evolution characterized
by a dominant management style and each period of
revolution characterized by a dominant management
problem. First there is a creativity phase, with
informal management and immediate market feedback.
Eventually a leadership crisis develops, resulting from
a need to rationalize organizaLional activities to cope
with organizational growth and specialization. The
organization now has too many employees for management
to know each one, and standard techniques and practices
need to be documented to avoid chaos. In phase two,


73
growth is fueled by the improved organizational
structure, systems, processes, and procedures developed
in response to the first crisis. Phase two ends with a
crisis of autonomy which results from demands of lower
level managers for more freedom and decision making
authority. This second crisis is resolved by increased
delegation, which results in another growth period until
upper level managers sense they are losing control. This
results in the third crisis in which the upper level
managers struggle for control. In the fourth phase,
growth resumes due to the use of formal systems for
coordination, until the organization is overwhelmed with
systems and procedures. There results the fourth
crisis, which is characterized as a red-tape crisis. The
red-tape crisis is solved by the extensive use of teams
and matrix structures, and these management approaches
characterize the fifth stage. A fifth crisis is
predicted but it is not defined or described.
This model has the advantage of five reasonably
well defined stages and of dealing with the inter-stage
crises. It has the disadvantages of being aimed at
private sector organizations at the corporate level and
being based exclusively on literature reviews.
A Nine Stage Model Based on Stages of Human Development
A nine stage model has been proposed based on
the behaviors of individual members of an organization,


74
similar to Hersey and Blanchard's three stage model
described above (Torbert, 1974). This model is based on
an earlier eight stage model of individual development
Erikson, 1959), and Torbert's first eight stages are
intended to be directly analogous to the eight stages of
the earlier model. The first stage in this model is
defined by shared fantasies. The members of the
organization have a common vision of the future, and
share their opinions and views freely with each other.
The second stage requires the commitment of significant
financial, structural, and spiritual investment in the
organization by its members. Also during this period,
leaders and leadership styles begin to emerge. In the
third stage, specific determinations of goals, division
of work, and unity against external forces are made.
While the first three stages are defined primarily by
the behaviors of individual members of the organization,
the next three stages revolve around considerations of
structure. Stage four is the stage of experimentation,
with alternative processes and systems for operation of
the organization being attempted. Parameters
experimented with during this stage include
administrative practices, communications channels and
procedures, planning procedures, and scheduling
practices. Stage five is a stage of predefined
productivity. The focus is on the task and standard


75
rules and procedures, and success is determined by
product viability. This stage frequently results in the
selection of a bureaucratic form of organization,
especially if it is populated largely with people who
have not progressed beyond the analogous Erikson stage
in their personal growth. Torbert believes that the
healthiest organizations will be forced by their members
to go beyond this stage to a sixth stage of openly
chosen structure, characterized by contemplation of the
larger purposes of the organization. The final three
stages reflect a spiritual growth, in which members
struggle to achieve genuine intimacy. Stage seven is
the stage of intimacy or foundational community, in
which members transcend themselves in genuine intimacy.
This stage may also span a crisis of organizational
survival. The eighth stage, that of liberating
disciplines, involves easy transitions between the
organization and its environment, and an openness of
leaders to challenge regarding their authority.The final
stage is not named or described. Its existence is
implied by consonance with Erikson. In fact Torbert
acknowledges that few organizations achieve any of the
final three stages. In this regard the model diverges
from its Eriksonian origins, because Erikson believes
that healthy adults experience all eight of his stages.
Use of this model in the present study is not


76
feasible because of its total concentration on members'
behaviors. As mentioned earlier, there are serious
weaknesses in using a model based solely on members'
behaviors. The primary reason is the lack of
consideration of other significant factors such as
structure and systems. In addition, this model has an
extremely small experimental base. Data in support of
the model was gathered from the behaviors of several
groups of about 25 people over periods of seven weeks.
This model may have legitimate application for studying
a very short organizational life cycle in great detail.
However the present study will involve a much broader
study of a much longer life cycle, and the cited
experimental data base has very little correlation with
the organizational conditions involved in the present
study.
The AGIL Model
Another four stage life cycle model was based on
Parsons and Smelser's earlier general model for a social
system (Parsons and Smelser, 1964), in which there are
four "functional imperatives" (Lyden, 1975). These are
functions which must be continuously performed for the
social system (e.g., an organization) to stay in
existence. The four identified imperatives are;
adaptation, goal-attainment, integration, and latent


77
pattern maintenance (hence the acronym AGIL). In
addition, the Parsons and Smelser model of a social
system is composed of four elements; the polity, the
economy, social stratification, and culture. The polity
is then divided by Mitchell into four elements for
further analysis ; the elected executive, the
legislature, the judiciary, and the administrative
(Mitchell, 1969). Each of these elements has prime
responsibility for one of the imperatives to assure
continued functioning of the government. Goal
attainment belongs primarily to the elected executive,
integration to the legislature, pattern maintenance to
the judiciary, and adaptation to the administrative
branch. However, none of these relationships is
exclusive. Each of the four branches participates in
each activity.
Of interest to the present study are the
activities of the administrative branch, which Lyden
describes as generally following a sequence which may be
viewed as a life cycle, at least for a new agency. The
first stage for a new agency may be either adaptation or
goal attainment, depending on the circumstances of its
inception. If goal attainment is expected to be
difficult, and/or if its charter is controversial,
adaptation (the gathering of resources needed to achieve
the organizational goals and the development of outside


78
support from allies and clients) will be the prime focus
of the organization during its early days. In the
absence of either of the problem conditions mentioned,
the first stage will be focussed on goal attainment. The
second stage for a new agency faced with strong
competition for resources will be the integration of the
resources and support assets gathered during the
adaptation phase, and the utilization of them in the
formation of hierarchy, defined work flows, and
procedures. If resources are to be easily attained, the
agency may step directly to goal attainment as a second
stage. For an agency which had to integrate its
resources and assets the third stage will be devoted to
the attainment of organizational goals, with emphasis on
productivity and effectiveness. Finally, pattern
maintenance becomes dominant, consisting of emphasizing
the public interest, the organization's legal mandate,
employee satisfaction, and morale.
This model has the advantages for the present
study of being directed at the public sector and of
providing some discussion of the factors involved in
stepping from stage to stage. The main disadvantage is
I
its!complexity, owing to its attempt to present a
universal framework for organizational analysis (similar
in this respect to von Bertalanffy's general systems
theory). It also has the disadvantages of being intended


79
for application at the total bureau or agency level (in
fact, for new agencies) and the complication of
different sequences of stages depending on environmental
factors.
A Three Stage Model: Primitive/ Stable/
Elaborate
Another three stage model was proposed based on
three stages of organizational growth; a primitive
system, a stable organization, and a period of
elaboration of structure (Katz and Kahn, 1978).
In the primitive system, a group of people with
common needs and appropriate abilities come together to
confront an environmental problem. They create the
required technical structure and engage in cooperative
task behavior. As the organization moves toward
stability, the individual needs of the members assumes
more importance, and may result in identifying some
weaknesses in the primitive production structure put in
place during the first stage.
There is increased emphasis on the maintenance
of reliable performance, which results in the
development of a formal managerial structure. In
addition to this authority structure, there develops a
maintenance subsystem which ensures that rules are
known, new members are appropriately socialized, and
rewards and punishments are administered. Perhaps the
most significant development during this stage is the


80
formation of informal structures. As the organization
has grown and become more formalized, the avenues
officially available for individual expression have been
reduced. To compensate, people develop their own
informal agreements and working relationships, even
establishing production norms. Aligning the objectives
of informal work groups with the formal organization's
goals is a continuing management challenge.
Elaboration of structure is a recognition of the
need for continuous support from the environment. There
develop at the organization to environment boundary a
number of specialized subunits to deal with the
environment. These include the input and output
functions, and frequently an external relations
function. Input deals with the gathering of required
supplies and labor, and it includes the procurement and
personnel functions. Output deals with the disposal of
the organization's products, and includes marketing,
advertising, sales, and service activities. External
relations activities take many forms, including dealing
with the media, dealing with regulatory agencies and
other governmental bodies, and dealing with the general
public. Also during this stage there appear adaptive
structures whose function is to prepare the organization
for anticipated changes in the environment. They are
products of the internal change agents, who attempt to


81
see that the organization's products and processes stay
in tune with the demands of society, the customers, and
the owners.
This model has the advantages of being
sufficiently general to be applicable to private and
public sector organizations, and to be applicable to
various levels of organization. It has the disadvantages
of having no stated theoretical roots, and no stated
experimental validation.
A Six Stage Model: Courtship/ Infancy/ Go-go/
Adolescence/Prime/ Maturity
In this model, organizational life is described
in terms of changing emphasis on four management roles.
(Adizes, 1979). These roles are the production of
results, administration, entrepreneurship, and
integration. Approaches are prescribed for solving
organizational crises by use of the appropriate mix of
the four roles, and six stages on the path to
organizational maturity are described. They are
courtship, infancy, go-go, adolescence, prime, and
maturity. The potential for organizational death at
each stage is also discussed, and the appropriate
actions for its avoidance are prescribed. Particular
emphasis is placed on the several potential causes of
decline for the mature organization and the prescribed
actions for continued life.


82
In the courtship stage, entrepreneurship is
dominant, as characterized by a shared vision of what
might be. No organization actually exists yet, but there
is a missionary like zeal and enthusiasm on the part of
the founders as they sell others on their ideas and
simultaneously provide continuous reinforcement to each
other. It may develop that the fundamental ideas around
which the organization intends to build are not sound,
in which case the organization would be stillborn.
Assuming survival, infancy is the next stage.
There is a nearly total focus on production during
infancy. There are "hardly any policies, systems,
procedures, or even budgets" (Adizes. 1979, p. 5).
Selling continues to be a major activity, and the
remaining organizational energies go into "doing" types
of activities. Few records are kept and the top
executive runs a highly centralized organization. All
resources, especially management talent, are in short
supply, so a single mistake in judgment or use of
resources may easily result in organizational decline or
f
death.
The go-go organization is characterized by both
results and entrepreneurial orientations. Decisions are
made quickly, and there is a strong "bias for action"
(Peters and Waterman, 119). Resources remain thin, and
the organization is subject to failure on all fronts.


83
The main threat, however, is internal. If the founder
will not or cannot let go of his qr her personal
involvement in all decisions and allow the establishment
of administrative systems the organization will be
severely limited.
Adolescence results from an increased focus on
administrative systems and procedures necessary to "get
organized." Standard operating procedures are developed
and put in place, and sub-unit charters and personal job
descriptions begin to get formalized. Entrepreneurship
is still strong, and there is internal conflict between
the advocates of entrepreneurship and strengthening the
administrative systems. The main threat to the
organization is this conflict, and it can cause
organizational decline or death if members spend too
much of their energies on internal struggles and not
enough on productive work.
The epitome of organizational life is the prime
stage, in which concern for product, administration, and
entrepreneurship are in positions of shared dominance.
It still has a results orientation, has matured
sufficiently to have developed administrative systems,
and still has not lost its zest. However, no
organization exists in a vacuum, and the passage of time
will will cause changes in.the delicate balance between
the three forces. The most notable causes of change are


84
the aging of the work force, reaching the point of
declining marginal return from growth, and internal
organization structural problems. The main threat to
the prime organization is the difficulty of staying in
the prime stage, especially maintaining a high level of
entrepreneurship in the face of change caused by those
three conditions, either singly or in combination.
If there is a lessening of the entrepreneurial
spirit and a strengthening of the integration
activities, the mature organization results. In the
mature organization, concerns for results,
administration, and integration share dominance.
Integration may take the form of an absence of conflict.
If this condition is taken to the extreme, groupthink
may-result. Extended lack of emphasis on entrepreneurial
activities may cause decline in the emphasis on results,
which would put the organization into a downward spiral.
This model is unique in its in-depth treatment
of organizational decline and death, and it has
apparently been used successfully by over 50
organizations of widely diverse sizes, although no
specific data are provided. It also provides good
discussion of the causes of each transition and
prescriptions for avoiding decline. Disadvantages
include the fact that it is focussed entirely on the
private sector, it has no apparent theoretical basis,


85
and its focus on the total business entity.
A Four Stage Model: Preparations/ Formation/ Growth/
Institutionalization
This model is based on the analysis of the birth
and early growth of a medical school. It contains an
implied life cycle with stages of pre-natal
preparations, initial formation, growth, and
institutionalization (Kimberly, 1979).
Pre-natal activities include the decision to
create, the allocation of resources, preparation of the
environment, and definition of goals. Of importance in
each of these steps are political, economic, social, and
psychological forces. In the specific case studied by
Kimberly, the specific factor of most importance to the
decision to create a new medical school was a "national
mood [which] favored the establishment of new medical
schools" (Kimberly, 1979, p. 441). This mood was related
to and derived from a feeling of relative affluence in
the country, an increasing awareness of and desire for
improved medical care for all citizens, and a
willingness on the part of the Congress to provide
substantial funding for new medical schools.
Initial formation includes selection of the
leaders and charter members, gathering up the required
resources, and tapping the available environmental
resources for support. Of most significance in the case


86
study was the personal entrepreneurship of the
individual designated as the first dean of the new
school. He immediately committed himself to developing
community support for the new school, and through his
own efforts enlisted positive support from most of the
physicians in the area.
Growth is frequently perceived as an indicator
of organizational effectiveness, and thus organizational
growth is usually an explicit or implicit goal. It is
more likely that growth is in fact a result rather than
a cau^e of organizational effectiveness, and thus most
organizations would be better off emphasizing other
factors, such as quality of service and creativity.
However, many organizations stress growth for growth's
sake, and look at measures such as sales and market
share (in the private sector) and number of members and
size of budget (in the public sector) as indicators of
effectiveness.
Institutionalization involves the formalization
and rigidization of policies, procedures, and structure,
and an overall conservative leaning as the organization
attempts to minimize perturbations to its internal
mechanisms caused by environmental pressures. There are
conflicting pressures at work as the need for
institutionalization causes actions which tend to stifle
or hinder creativity. The appropriate balance of the two


87
forces is largely dependent on the environment. There is
a general environment which inclqdes factors such as
national and international moods and economic
conditions. There is also a local or specific
environment which deals with the individuals and
organizations with which the subject organization has
dealings on a frequent basis.
This model has the interesting feature of
emphasis on the pre-natal and early organizational life
periods. Thus it may well provide some unique insights
into early organizational life, but it is too limited
for direct application to the present study. In
addition, the apparent single case basis for the model
detracts from its appeal.
A Four Stage Model: Entrepreneurial/
Collectivity/ Formalization/ Elaboration
This model, developed by Quinn and Cameron
(1983) was selected for use in this study. It is
composed of four stages; entrepreneurial, collectivity,
formalization and control, and elaboration of structure.
In the entrepreneurial stage, there is a
marshalling of resources, and a lot of ideas and
entrepreneurial activities. There is little planning
and coordination. The focus is on finding a niche for
the organization, and power is in the hands of a prime
mover, frequently a single individual. This stage


88
represents a synthesis of Downs' struggle for autonomy,
Lippitt and Schmidt's birth stage, Hersey and
Blanchard's stage of low maturity, Scott's stage 1,
Torbert's stage of shared fantasies, Lyden's adaptation
and integration stages, Adizes' courtship stage, and
Kimberly's pre-natal stage.
The collectivity stage is characterized by
informal communication and structure and a sense of
collectivity, mission, and high commitment. Members
work long hours and innovation is high. This stage
represents a synthesis of Downs' stage of rapid growth,
Hersey and Blanchard's stage of moderately low maturity,
Greiner's creativity stage, Torbert's stages of high
commitment and specific determinations, Katz and Kahn's
primitive system, Adizes' infant and go-go stages, and
Kimberly's stages of initial formation and growth.
In the formalization and control stage, there is
a formalization and institutionalization of rules and
procedures. The structure is stable, and there is
emphasis on efficiency, maintenance, and conservatism.
This stage represents a combination of Downs' steady
state, Lippitt and Schmidt's stage of youth, Hersey and
Blanchard's stage of moderately high maturity, Scott's
stage 2, Greiner's second stage, Torbert's stages of
experimentation and predefined productivity, Lyden's
stages of goal attainment and pattern maintenance, Katz


89
and Kahn's stable organization, Adizes' adolescent,
prime, and mature stages, and Kimberly's
institutionalization stage.
The final stage centers around elaboration of
structure, which emphasizes decentralization and domain
expansion. There may also be some efforts at adaptation
to changing conditions and organizational renewal. This
stage is a synthesis of Lippitt and Schmidt's maturity
stage, Hersey and Blanchard's stage of high maturity,
Scott's stage 3, Greiner's stages of delegation ,
coordination, and collaboration, Torbert's stages of
openly chosen structure, intimacy, and liberating
disciplines, and Katz and Kahn's elaboration of
structure.
Selection of a Model for This Study
The Quinn and Cameron four stage model discussed
above was intended to be an integration of most of the
models previously discussed. It encompasses the
significant elements of the earlier models, with the
obvious exception that it does not deal with
organizational decline and death in an explicit manner.
That is clearly an acceptable omission for the present
study, as the organization being studied was clearly
alive and well for the entire period of study. This
model, by virtue of.being based on the others, has
eliminated most of the shortcomings and captured most of


90
the benefits of the other models.
For these reasons, and also because it is the
most current of the models studied, the Quinn and
Cameron four stage life cycle model will be used to
provide the basis for the life cycle aspect of this
study.
Integration of Organizational Frames
and Life Cycle Theory
The development of an integrated theory, one
which provides for the longitudinal analysis of the
performance of a single organization, is overdue. Such a
theory would contain elements relating to the
performance of the organization at a single point in
time (such as the organizational frames), as well as
providing for longitudinal analysis. As mentioned
earlier, it has been observed that there has been a
tendency for organizational theory to focus on in-depth
cross-sectional analysis (Quinn and Cameron, 1983).
This tendency is understandable, as the data base from
which organization theory was constructed consists
primarily of in-depth analyses of mature organizations,
with very little consideration of the effects of time on
the organization itself. The effects of time have
generally been focussed on the behaviors of the
organization members, and only secondarily on the
resulting impacts on the organization itself.


91
It is the intent of this study to present a
framework for the development of a theory for the
integrated consideration and explanation of the
relationships between organization theory and life cycle
theory. This framework is based on in-depth longitudinal
analysis of the management of the Space Shuttle program,
and is built around the models discussed earlier in this
chapter as having been selected for use. The model
specifically used for consideration of organization
theory consists of the five organizational frames;
structural, systems, human relations, political, and
symbolic. The model used for studying life cycle
considerations consists of the four stages;
entrepreneurial, collectivity, formalization and
control, and elaboration of structure. The body of this
study consists of gathering and analyzing data
associated with the elements of the matrix formed by
combining these two sets of parameters, which is shown
on Figure 1. Specific objectives in the gathering and
analysis of data were the identification of the
existence and relative strength of each stage of the
life cycle over time, the existence and relative
strength of each organizational frame over time, and the
existence and strength of relationships between life
cycle stages and organizational frames over time.


92
Stages in the Organizational Life Cycle
Organizational Frames Entrepreneurial Collectivity Formalization and Control Elaboration of Structure
Structural
Systems
Human Resources Political

Symbolic
Figure 1. Framework for Studying Relationships
Between Organization Theory and
Life Cycle Theory
Comparison With an Earlier Model
At least one earlier attempt has been made at
the development of an integrated model (Quinn and
Cameron, 1983). Quinn and Cameron's model was based on
an earlier spatial model of organizational effectiveness
(Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983). The spatial model was used
by Quinn and Cameron as the representation of
organization theory. The spatial model, which in turn
has its roots in Parsons' AGIL model (discussed earlier
in this study), was an attempt to pictorially correlate
four major models of organizational effectiveness (as
perceived by Quinn and Rohrbaugh) with three methods by


Full Text

PAGE 1

LIFE-CYCLE MANAGEMENT: ANALYSIS OF THE SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM by David Charles Schultz B.S., University of Michigan, 1960 M.S., University of New Mexico, 1962 M.B.A., University of Houston, 1975 A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Public Affairs of the University of Colorado in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy / Graduate School of Public Affairs 1989

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This dissertation for the Doctor of Philosophy degree by David Charles Schultz has been approved for the Graduate School of Public Affairs by DateAPI(IL ..).? 19/'7

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Schultz, David Charles {Ph.D., Public Administration) \ Life-Cycle Management: Analysis of the Space Shuttle Program Thesis directed by Associate Professor E. Samuel Overman The Space Shuttle Program is the longest lived and most costly space programever undertaken by this nation. It was started in the late 1960's, and despite recent setbacks, is expected to continue for many more years. The purpose of this study is to analyze the management of this large program over its lifetime in order to identify patterns of management and how these patterns may have changed with time. The framework for this analysis is provided by a combination of life-cycle theory and organization theory. Life-cycle theory assumes a predictable pattern of management which changes over time. A number of life-cycle models were considered for use in this study. The model selected is defined by four stages; entrepreneurial, collectivity, formalization and control, and elaboration of structure. Organization theory was studied to identify the appropriate management parameters for life-cycle analysis. The selected approach considers organizational analysis in terms of five perspectives or frames; structural, systems, human resources, political, and The research problem was to identify the relationships

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iv between life-cycle stages and organizational frames for the Space Shuttle Program. It was found that there were differences in the management of the Space Shuttle Program during its existence. Further, it was found that these differences could be readily discussed in terms of existing life-cycle theory, including the four stages of the life-cycle. However, there was not a distinct movement through the stages of a life-cycle as described by lifecycle theory. Rather, there were subtle shifts of emphasis as the Program evolved. Additionally, it was found that the management of the Space Shuttle Program could be readily discussed in terms of the five frames of organizational analysis, and that consideration of these frames appeared helpful in the overall analysis of the organization. Finally, it was found that there was some association between the life-cycle stages and the organizational frames. The characteristics of these associations were not altogether consistent, but they do indicate some interesting candidates for future study. The form and content of this abstract are approved. I recommend its publicat Signed s

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CONTENTS CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION: FROM MANAGEMENT OF INNOVATION TO MANAGEMENT OF ROUTINE OPERATIONS.......... 1 A Brief History of NASA..................... 4 Description of the Research Problem . 13 Anticipated Contributions .... 14 Summary of Conclusions .... 18 CHAPTER II ORGANIZATION THEORY & ORGANIZATIONAL LIFE CYCLES . .. . . . . . . 20 Organization Theory . . . . . . 20 Beyond Traditional Organization Theory 36 Synthesis of Organization Theory 48 Organizational Life Cycles ... 62 Integration of Organizational Frames and Life-Cycle Theory ... 90 CHAPTER III METHODOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 Methodological Strategy .... 101 Data Collection and Analysis ....... 106 CHAPTER IV STUDY FINDINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 Findings Based on the Analysis of Data Grouped by Life-Cycle Stages ..... 117

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vi Findings Based on the Analysis of Data Grouped by Organizational Frames 132 Interrelationships Between Life-Cycle Stages and Organizational Frames . 151 CHAPTER V CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 161 Comparison of Actual Findings With Predicted Findings . 161 Conclusions .......................... ...... 170 Applicability ... 172 Recommendations for Further Study .... 175 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 APPENDIX A. KEY PERSONNEL INTERVIEWED .. 201 B. DATA FOR EACH YEAR . 203

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TABLES Table 1. Total Occurrence of Life-Cycle Stages and Organizational Frames 152 2. Total Occurrence of Life-Cycle Stages and Organizational Frames, Entrepreneurial and Collectivity Stages Combined .. 152 vii

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FIGURES Figure 1. Framework for Studying Relationships Between Organization Theory and I l viii Life Cycle Theory ... 92 2. Spatial Model 94 3. Frequency of Life-Cycle Stages .... 118 4. Occurrence of Life-Cycle Stages per Year ... 126 S. Frequency of Organizational Frames .... 133 6. Occurrence of Organizational Frames per Year 146

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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION: FROM MANAGEMENT OF INNOVATION TO MANAGEMENT OF ROUTINE OPERATIONS The Space Shuttle Program is the most costly space program which this nation has yet undertaken. $30 billion has been spent to date by the U.S. government on the Space Shuttle Program. In comparison, the Apollo lunar exploration program cost the taxpayers about $25 billion, and our other space programs have cost less. Recently about $6 billion per year has been spent on the Space Shuttle Program. Given that the program is intended to continue for many more years, the total lifetime costs are hard to predict, but it is certain that they will be large. The sheer magnitude of this program with its consumption of valuable resources provides the first of three major rationales. for this study. From the standpoint of accountability, the citizens of this nation deserve a full reporting of all aspects of this program and the chance to evaluate the way in which so many of their tax dollars are used. The second major rationale for this study is its importance to the continuing development of the body of

PAGE 10

knowledge of management theory. Study of the Space Shuttle Program will help to identify management factors which are unique to large public programs. There is a tendency, in aeiospace and defense, toward fewer but larger programs. Since these large programs involve the expenditure of billions of dollars, and effect the lives of many people, it is important that they be managed as well as possible. Since there are relatively few programs, there are few chances to discover any unique factors, and every opportunity should be used. This study provides a examination of the Space Shuttle Program as it evolved from concept to operational status. Changes in the management of an activity over time have been characterized as a ''lifecycle," and there have been a number of studies done and theories proposed to define the typical life-cycle. Two factors in the present study make it unique. First is the size of the activity, both in terms of the size of the activity being studied.and in terms of the period of time covered by the study. Other life-cycle studies have either dealt with much smaller activities, studied over a shorter period of time, or have had no empirical base at all. As a second element of the importance of this study to the theory of management, the present study is 2

PAGE 11

3 the first which involves the analysis of the life-cycle of a major activity in terms of the m6st recent developments in organization theory. The management of the Space Shuttle Program is examined longitudinally in terms of five "organizational frames." These frames; structural, systems, human resources, political, and symbolic; provide a focus for examination of dominant influences in the organization. When performed over the long period of this study, such frame-wise examination provides for a unique characterization of the life cycle. Of particular significance here is consideration of organizational culture as indicated by the political and symbolic frames. The importance of these cultural factors has only recently been recognized, and their effects have not been included in previous life-cycle The third major rationale for this study is the anticipation of contributions to the effective management of the U.S. space program. This country has made a long term commitment to the Space Shuttle which has left us with very little capability to launch vehicles into space except via the Space Shuttle. This was due primarily to economic considerations leading to the conclusion that the continuation of expendable launch vehicle programs was not affordable. Thus the Space Shuttle Program is not only a valuable national

PAGE 12

resource, it is a singular resource with very limited backup or replacement capability. This condition accentuates the importance of the program and the importance of studying it. In addition, -the Space Shuttle Program is the first open-ended U.S. space program. Space Shuttle missions will continue as long as there is a demand. Given the ultimate routinization of space travel, this characteristic of open-endedness will .also be typical of future space programs. Thus it is valuable to closely study the management of the Space Shuttle Program for lessons applicable to future programs. A Brief History of NASA The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was created by an act of Congress in 1958. Downs (1967) has described four ways in which government bureaus are created. NASA's creation was of Downs' third type, as NASA was created largely from existing agencies of the federal government. The main body of NASA came frpm the National Advisory Committee l on Aeronautics. Other elements absorbed into the new agency were primarily from the Air Force and Army at various locations, including Huntsville, Alabama; Cape Canaveral, Florida; and Edwards Air Force Base, California. 4

PAGE 13

Since its creation in 1958, NASA's aeronautics side has been responsible for advancing the state-ofthe-art in the theory and operation of aircraft. The primary mechanisms in place for this activity have been: large-scale modern wind tunnels at the Langley Research Center, Langley Field, Virginia, and at the Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, California; propulsion test facilities at the Lewis Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio; and prototype aircraft for the final verification and the operationalization of aerodynamic theory at the Dryden Flight Facility, Edwards Air Force California. The space side of NASA has been responsible for all aspects of our civilian space program. This has involved the Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas as the lead Center for planning and operations of the manned space programs; the Kennedy Space Center in Florida as the site for preflight processing and launch of all the manned and unmanned NASA vehicles; the George C. Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, as the lead center for development of the rockets associated with all these programs; and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, California, for the planning and operations of the planetary exploration programs. The allocation of responsibilities just described has been virtually unchanged for most of 5

PAGE 14

I NASA's existence. The highly visible and highly successful lunar and planetary exploration programs (Ranger, Surveyor, Explorer, Viking), the equally successful and visible manned space programs (Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, Skylab, Apollo-Soyuz, Shuttle), and a large number of equally successful but less visible aeronautical programs have been conducted by NASA. However, these programs have all been developmental in nature. The Space Shuttle Program is the first in which NASA has had the intention to achieve and sustain an operational program. The Changing Nature of NASA's Mission As the Apollo lunar explorations were taking place in the early 1970's, NASA officials were charting the course of our future in space. It was determined that the next major goal of U.S. space exploration should be the establishment of a permanent manned presence in space -a space station. Early feasibility studies led to the conclusion that it would not be economically feasible to construct a space station on earth and launch it into space. Rather, it would have to be launched in pieces and assembled in space. This conclusion naturally led to an analysis of the possible approaches to launching the elements of a space station. Three general concepts were studied. These were the use of existing resources, primarily the Saturn family of 6

PAGE 15

rockets used in the Apollo program, the development of a new super-rocket with even larger lift capability than the Saturn, and the development of a reusable vehicle which would be used for shuttling space station elements to space and returning products and crews from the station to earth. NASA chose the third option, and the development of the Space Shuttle began in earnest in 1972. However, budget constraints eliminated the possibility of parallel development of both the Space Shuttle and the Space Station, and forced NASA to choose between the two programs for near-term development. Since the construction of the Space Station was dependent on the development of the Space Shuttle, the decision was made to proceed first with development of the Space Shuttle, and to follow that with the development of the Space Station. Thus, the very nature of the Space Shuttle Program is different than all of NASA's earlier space programs. The focus of NASA throughout its entire 25 years of existence has been on developmental activities, characterized by a predefined set of activities (typically a specific number of missions), taking place in a specified time period, and having a definite end point. In contrast, the Space Shuttle was conceived for the express purpose of providing routine access to space. There is no specified sunset for the Space 7

PAGE 16

Shuttle Program. In fact, quite the opposite is true. For the Space Shuttle to satisfy its most fundamental requirement of placing space station elements in space, the Space Shuttle Program must continue to exist for many years. This open-endedness or routinizing of space travel has been referred to within NASA as "becoming operational." While a firm, formal definition of "becoming operational" has not been developed by NASA, the focus has been on an assumed definition that has as its focus routine, timely, and successful performance of scheduled activities, and that is the meaning used in this study. This intent to become operational introduces several issues which require consideration regarding management of the Space Shuttle Program as compared with previous American space programs. For an agency with a twenty-five year tradition of research and development, the intent to develop an operational orientation presents some significant challenges. The first challenge deals with management processes. The management processes used by NASA have been studied rather intensively, and it has generally been concluded that NASA's use of a matrix organization and its extensive use of multi-disciplinary panels and working groups were significant contributors to NASA's early success (see for example Sullivan [1970] and the official NASA history of the Apollo program [What Made 8

PAGE 17

9 Apollo a Success?, 1971]). In a 1980 study, one of the nation's foremost management consulting organizations studied the of the Johnson Space Center and reached the same conclusion (Organizing for Effective Operation of the Space Transportation System, 1980), but went on to counsel NASA that this collegial approach with its emphasis on time consuming deliberative consensus seeking would be inappropriate for an operational program. A second factor which indicates a need for changes in NASA's management approach comes from the Space Shuttle Program's open-endedness. All previous manned space programs consisted of a fixed, small number of flights; six on Mercury, ten on Gemini, eleven on Apollo, three on Skylab, and one joint mission with the U.S.S.R. This constraint of having a specific number of flights limited the flexibility available for planning each specific mission. All activities required of the program had, by definition, to be accomplished within the specified number of m{ssions. Thus, there was great emphasis placed on optimizing the utilization of all the available resources for each mission. In contrast to earlier programs, there is no practical limit to the total number of Space Shuttle flights to be flown. The Space Shuttle specifications call for a usable lifetime of 10Q flights per orbiter vehicle, but it is likely

PAGE 18

that limit could be increased significantly by a relatively small amount of extra testing and analysis. Given the capability to perform an essentially unlimited number of missions, which is the shuttle's raison d'etre, there is less reason to optimize each one. A lessening of the optimization types of activities would clearly be a significant change to the Space Shuttle Program, and could only be through overt changes in some management processes. Of perhaps equal importance is the change in culture which is implied by this changing emphasis on optimization. Further exemplifying the impact of this shift in emphasis away from optimization is the consideration that this optimization is very labor intensive. It requires the extensive use of coordinating activities, such as meetings. The planning of each mission on earlier programs required many formal and informal meetings of experts in each of the resource areas. This optimization activity is very definitely subject to the laws of diminishing returns. It is not possible to determine precisely the cost of optimizing each mission, but an educated guess says that it is likely that an increase in the use of critical resources (flight crew time, and the specific quantities of life sustaining supplies such as oxygen and water were typically the most constraining resources) from 80% to 95% of the 10

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11 available supply (a typical NASA goal) has required doubling the number of labor hours spent on the planning process. NASA management has stated quite clearly that have changed, and that these optimization activities with their significant expenditures of labor hours will not be performed in the mature era of an operational Space Shuttle Program. This change in emphasis will certainly require a significant management effort. A similar case can be made for a change in the management of the Space Shuttle Program based on the number of flights. NASA plans to increase the annual number of flights from the 1984-1985 figures of about eight per year to a planned 24 per year. To maintain the same levels of resource utilization on 24 flights per year as was done on 8 flights per year could reasonably require as much as a three-fold growth in the mission planning staff. Since the group being referred to here as the mission planning staff numbers several thousand people, trebling that number is clearly incompatible with a fixed NASA budget, Thus, it can be considered a given that there will be changes in the management of the Space Shuttle Program as it moves from concept to operational status. Some significant actions have already been taken. Within the very important area of mission control, major

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12 facility modifications have been defined and are being implemented which will provide for simultaneous conduct of two Shuttle mission and simulation of a third. Reductions in the scope of mission control operations and the size of the ground-based staff to accomplish the mission control function are also being accomplished. At the Kennedy Space Center the move toward the operational era has focussed on the consolidation of contractual support and a significant enlargement of the responsibilities delegated to contractors for the preflight processing and launch activities associated with each Shuttle flight. The first major step toward realization of those objectives was taken with the award of the Shuttle Processing Contract to Lockheed in September, 1983. A similar consolidation of contractor activities in support of mission planning and mission operation activities at the Johnson Space Center has also recently been accomplished. The Space Transportation System Operations Contract, which encompasses work previously done under 22 contracts, was awarded to Rockwell in September,1985. It is expected that changes of this nature will occur in many elements of Space Shuttle Program management, and that many similar changes have occurred over the life of the program. It is the purpose of this study to systematically identify and

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such which have already A Brief Description of the Research Problem This study has been conducted to identify and characterize the life-cycle of the management of the Space Shuttle Program from the time it began in 1972 through 1985, and to associate those life-cycle characteristics with five frames used to represent organizational analysis. Specific questions which are addressed are listed below. 13 1. Has there been a life-cycle in the management of the Space Shuttle Program? 2. If there has been a life-cycle, how can it be characterized or described? 3. If there has been a life-cycle, how does it relate to existing theories of life-cycle? 4. If there has been a life-cycle, how does it relate to orgartization theory as described by the five frames of organizational analysis? 5. How did these relationships vary with time? The development of an integrated theory, one which provides a framework for the longitudinal analysis of the performance of a single organization, is overdue. As Quinn and Cameron (1983) have observed, the tendency for organizational theory has been to focus on in-depth cross-sectional analysis. This tendency is

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14 understandable, as the data base from which organization theory was constructed consists,primarily of in-depth analyses of mature organizations, with very little consideration of the effects of time on the organization itself. The effects of time have generally been focussed on the behaviors of the organization members, and only secondarily on the resulting impacts on the organization itself. It is the intent of this study to provide the beginnings of such an integrated theory. A two part approach was applied to the gathering and analysis of data for this study. First, a longitudinal sample of significant documentation over the period of study was gathered. The contents of this documentation were analyzed for characteristics of the four iife-cycle stages and the five organizational frames, versus time. Second, ten key managers were interviewed. The interviews provided information useful for interpretation of the results of the contents analysis as well as unique insights into the usefulness of the constructs involving the four and the five frames. Anticipated Contributions The Space Shuttle Program has four outstanding

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15 characteristics. It is technically complex, it has high cost, it has a long lifetime, and it is highly visible. Practical application of the findings and conclusions of this study are expected to be related to the occurrence of these four characteristics. The most direct application of the findings and conclusions of this study will be to those activities or programs which also have all four of these characteristics. The most obvious application of the results of this study will be to the Space Station Program. The Space Station Program is like the Space Shuttle Program in terms of the four characteristics just mentioned. The Space Station Program is NASA's next major initiative. It is now in the preliminary definition phase, and formal design definition is expected to start in early 1987. The space station program thus has most of its life-cycle ahead of it. The space station program is roughly comparable to the Space Shuttle Program in terms of cost, schedule, and technical complexity. Being conducted by the same organization (NASA), it is also subject to many of the same considerations of structure, human resource utilization, politics, and symbolism. Additionally, the two programs have a strong functional tie. The Space Shuttle will carry the Space Station modules into space for their assembly. Thus, it is expected that there will be great similarity between the

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life cycles of the Space Shuttle and the space station programs. 16 It may seem that the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program now under way in the Department of Defense shares the four characteristics. However, even with all its publicity, the SDI program is going to be conducted mostly under the wraps of military security, and thus the characteristic of visibility is significantly different than for the Space Shuttle Program, which has been conducted almost totally in an unclassified manner. It is expected that there will be some amount of application to the SDI due to the commonality of three of the four characteristics. For the same reason, it is expected that there will be application of this study to other major national defense systems ( e.g., ships, airplanes, missiles). Using this same rationale, it is possible that there will be reasonably direct application to projects in the private sector or elements of the public sector which are not related to space or defense. These would probably be major construction projects such as dams, canals, or power plants. Other projects or activities which possess two or less of these characteristics can be expected to have much less application of this study's findings and conclusions. In addition to the practical applications just

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17 discussed, this study will significantly augment.the body of knowledge regarding organizational life cycles. All of the potential just mentioned, as well as many others, will be faced with problems of management of an organizational life-cycle. There is not presently in a coherent theory of life-cycle management applicable to these long-term very high cost activities. It is hoped that this study will provide a significant foundation for the development of an approach to life-cycle management which will help these programs achieve their performance goals with a more efficient use of limited resources than would otherwise be the case. Finally, in response to the recent Space Shuttle accident and the resulting investigations, it seems quite likely this study could be of direct benefit to the Space Shuttle Program itself. Within this context, this study may have three specific applications as identified below. 1. For those individuals who will be charged with analyzing NASA's management practices and determining their validity, this study should provide insight into past and existing Space Shuttle management practices. 2. For those same individuals, this study should provide insight into possible changes in management

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practices which might be most useful for safe and effective continuation of the program. 18 3. For those officials who will be responsible for implementing changes and carrying on the active management of the Space Shuttle Program, this study should be useful in providing an analysis of past management practices in terms and in a context different than those with which they normally deal, and which therefore should provide some unique insights. Summary of Conclusions It was found that there were differences in the management of the Space Shuttle Program during its existence. Further, it was found that these differences could be readily discussed in terms of existing lifecycle theory, including the four stages of the lifecycle. However, there was not a distinct movement through the stages of a life-cycle as described by lifecycle theory. Rather, there were subtle shifts of emphasis as the Program evolved. Additionally, it was found that the management of the Space Shuttle Program could be readily discussed in terms of the five frames of organizational analysis, and that consideration of these frames appeared helpful in the overall analysis of the organization. Finally, it was found that there was some

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19 association the life-cycle stages and the organizational frames. The characteristics of these associations were not altogether consistent, but they do indicate some interesting candidates for future study.

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Chapter II ORGANIZATION THEORY AND ORGANIZATIONAL LIFE CYCLES Traditional Organization Theory This study has as its purpose the longitudinal analysis of an organization. Thus it is appropriate to discuss some of the ways in-which organizations have been analyzed in the literature. A reasonable starting point may be a definition. While March and Simon (1958) say the definition of organization is obvious, Etzioni offers the following; "An organization is a planned social unit, deliberately constructed or reconstructed, to seek specific goals" (Etzioni, 1961, p. 135). Barnard had included the human element in his earlier definition a system of consciously coordinated personal activities or forces of two or more persons" (Barnard, 1938, p. 81). Webster says an organization is "the executive structure of a business; the personnel of management" (Webster, 1948, p. 699). As a further elaboration, Etzioni (1961) states that organizations have three characteristics. These are the division of labor, power, and communications, presence of one or more centers of power, and

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replaceability of individuals. Presthus (1962) states that organizations have three purposes. These are to increase the stability of interpersonal dealings, to reduce the uncertainty of such dealings, and to enhance their predictability. The high degree of subjectivity inherent in these views of the definition and purposes of organizations supports the idea that the concept of organization is abstract and intangible, and thus it is reasonable organization theory will also contain a considerable element of subjectivity. There is no single "verified hypothesis applicable to many related phenomena" (Webster,.1948, p. 1035) required of a theory. Rather, there has been a changing set of commonly accepted beliefs regarding organizations, and the retelling of these beliefs has come to be known as organization theory. Thus, the situation is unchanged from that in 1961, when Waldo reviewed Haire's (1959) summary of the state of organization theory. Referring to the diversity of approach among his authors, Haire recalls the fable of the blind men describing an elephant: liThere is little doubt that it is a single elephant being discussed, but, by and large, each of the observers begins his description from a different point, and often with a special end in view." p. 2 (Waldo, 1961, p. 216) 21

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Recognizing the lack of unanimity in the field, the following pages provide one observer's summary of the current state of organization theory. The Origins of Organization Theory 22 The origins of organization theory are not precisely defined, but many modern writers identify a set of early activities as classical and/or neoclassical. Frequently cited as the earliest authoritative writer in the field is Max Weber. Based largely on his study of the operation of military and civilian government organizations in his native Prussia, Weber (1947) identified the following characteristics of the successful bureaucracy; 1. Management is to be conducted by prescribed rules rather than ad hoc judgments. 2. As much as possible, everything is to be written down; this included with work procedures and processes, rules of behavior for workers, and management rules. 3. There is to be job specialization; each person would be responsible for a specifically defined subset of the total work of the organization. 4. Personnel are given S?ecial1zed techni=al training related to the needs of these particular jobs. 5. The organization will be arranged in a formal hierarchy.

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23 6. There will be a clear separation of personal and organization property. 7. Employees will usually spend their entire career with this organization. 8. Employees are, to the greatest feasible extent, to be interchangeable. Weber wrote in Germany in the early part of this century, but his work was largely unknown in this country until it was translated into English in 1947. Many problems have been found with bureaucracies, and a number of them are discussed below. As a result, Weber has been personally and unjustly vilified for his descriptions of bureaucracies. However, he was primarily reporting the characteristics of those bureaucracies which he observed to be most effective. Any criticism of Weber for advocacy of a bureaucratic form of organization must be done with the realization that the development of organizations at the turn of the twentieth century was not very mature, and that in fact the bureaucracy represented the highest form of organization development at that time. Also during the early part of the twentieth century, Frederick Taylor wrote on the scientific approach to management and organization. Taylor's view (1911) was that there was usually 11one best way." This applied to the work of each individual employee, as well

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24 as to the structuring of the organization. The individual employee was considered only as an extension of the machine or as a part of an overall work process. Taylor's most lasting contribution dealt with the need to specialize, as specified in two principles. First was the division of work. This meant that the work of any organization should be divided up so as to take maximum advantage of the skills of the employees. Second was the principle of homogeneity, which states that similar activities should be grouped in a single organization unit under a single supervisor. Henri Fayol (1949) was also framing his principles of organization in France during this period. Like Weber, Fayol remained virtually unknown in this country for some time. Although his work was translated into English in 1929, it was not widely available until 1949. Fayol identified fourteen principles most responsible for organization success. Some of the most significant of those principles follow. 1. The division of labor, under which like activities are concentrated in a single organization unit for more efficiency. 2. The scalar principle, by which every employee can identify the chain of command from himself/herself to the organization's ultimate authority. 3. Unity of command, which states that each employee should receive orders from only one superior.

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4. Centralization, under which most decision making is performed by those at the top of the organization. There ate two common threads among these early works. First is the assumption that organizations are rational entities, and thus there is one best way to organize. Second is the belief that workers could be dealt with in the same rational fashion as machines. Thus, rationality became the theme and label for this scientific branch of organization theory. During the 1920's and 1930's, some dissenting voices began to be heard. There were people who perceived the nature.of man as requiring a radically 25 different treatment than the other elements of the workplace. One of the earliest contributors was Mary Parker Follett (1940), who stressed "power with" rather than "power over" as the appropriate emphasis for managerial behavior. At about that same time, Chester Barnard (1938) gave the informal organization recognition as being potentially as important as the formal organization. Additional criticism came from Herbert Simon (1947), who declared that the rational "principles of management" were really nothing more than proverbs. Robert Merton (1957) said that the strong emphasis on rules would lead to suboptimum organization behavior, in which rule following replaced the

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underlying organizational objectives as the leading goal. Philip Selznick (1957) taught that strict adherence to the principles of scientific management would lead workers to internalize the goals of organizational subunits, often at the expense of the goals of the overall organization, and Alvin Gouldner (1959) stated that strong emphasis on rules would lead to worker apathy and minimal performance. Perhaps the 26 most concise critique of the early theories was given by Etzioni (1961), who said they covered of what organizational analysis is all about -namely the formal organization. Growth of the Human Relations Strain of Organization Theory The criticisms of these original theories of the rational/ formal organization (sometimes referred to as the classical theories) were reaching a crescendo at about the same time as the significance of some new data on the importance of individuals in the organization was being realized. The result was the emergence of the human relations theory of organization. The series of experiments conducted at Western Electric's Hawthorne plant, commonly referred to as the Hawthorne studies, are generally regarded as the genesis of the human relations school. Originally intended to study the effects of varying working conditions such as light

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27 levels on worker productivity (a very ''scientific management" objective), the Hawthorne studies produced quite different results. After initial results showed the expected increase in output with an increase in light level, there followed a period in which output continued to increase even though light level was being decreased. This increase in output was later understood to be the first documented experience of the phenomenon which has come to be known as the Hawthorne effect. Simply stated, the Hawthorne effect says that the act of observing human behavior in the workplace causes behavioral changes. In this regard, the Hawthorne effect may also be considered an early statement of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, which states that no experimental data can be trusted to be a completely accurate representation of the phenomenon it is supposed io because the act of measurement causes changes. These earliest Hawthorne studies triggered many generations of additional studies, which eventually lasted more than a decade. Results were reported by several participants from Western Electric and Harvard University, primarily Elton Mayo (1933), Fritz Roethlisberger and William Dickson (1939), and T.N. Whitehead (1936). A summary of conclusions from the Hawthorne studies as reported by Mayo (1933) follows; 1. Organization effectiveness is determined by

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28 social norms to a greater extent than either workers' physical limitations or the principles of organization. 2. Group standards strongly influence the behavior of individuals in organizations, affecting both productivity and individual satisfaction. 3. The strongest motivators are the social rewards and sanctions effected by the informal work group. 4. Effective supervisors are those who consult with workers frequently and encourage group discussion of organization goals and objectives. 5. The ultimate of organization effectiveness will result when workers are administering their own affairs via a democratic process. Thus, the human relations theory of organization rejected much of the dogma of the classical/neoclassical schools. One thing remained, however. There was still a belief that there was indeed a best way to organize. The search continued for that one best way. The juxtaposition of rational organization theories with those of humanists is the classic dichotomy in organization theory. This dichotomy has produced numerous more recent efforts to develop an organization theory aimed at reconciling these differences.

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More Recent Developments in Traditional Organization Theory In more recent years, there has been an 29 increasing awareness that there may not be a single best way to organize. One of the first attempts to change the objective of search from one best way to something situationally dependent was the concept of technological determinism. The technological determinists are those who believe the appropriate organization is determined by the technology involved in the work of the organization. Studies performed by Joan Woodward in England in the 1950's indicated several key relationships between organization parameters and the complexity of the technology involved. The complexity factor was dealt with by placing each of the approximately 100 organizations analyzed into one of three groups, depending on the technological complexity of their work. The organizations were categorized as using batch processes, mass production, or continuous flow, in order of increasing technological complexity. Significant findings were as follows. Among the organization characteristics showing a direct relationship with technical advance were: the length of the line of command; the span of control of the chief executive; the percentage of total turnover allocated to the payment of wages and salaries, and the ratios of

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managers to total personnel, of clerical and administrative staff to manual workers, of direct to indirect labour, and of graduate to non-graduate supervision in production departments. (Woodward, 1965, p. 51) 30 There also was found to be an optimal organization for each type of technology. In a followon study, the Aston group under Derek Pugh (1968) analyzed 46 organizations in England. They did not confirm any of the Woodward findings, but instead concluded that size of the organization was the most important parameter in determining the appropriate organization structure. James Thompson (1967) studied a number of private and public organizations in this country and concluded that there was a correlation between the technology an organization used and the right way to organize (the work and the organization). He said organizations could be grouped by the type of integration most prevalent in their activities. The three types of integration are long-linked, mediating, and intensive. Long-linked organizations are those in which work flows in a serial fashion, such as an assembly line, or many manufacturing processes. Organizations characterized as long-linked can optimize their effectiveness by vertical integration. Examples of this type of activity are the expansion of an

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aluminum processor to include a container manufacturing capability, and the development of the capability to make windows and batteries by automobile manufacturers. In mediating organizations, the organizations typical function is the bringing together of the provider and the user of a service, such as a broker of stocks or real estate, or a bank. According to Thompson, organization effectiveness is optimized for the mediating organization by growth and increase of market share. The extensive growth of banks, real estate brokerages, and stock brokerages in recent times certairily supports this theory. An interesting side effect of this struggle for growth ha& been that it is increasingly difficult to distinguish between drganizations of the three types used as examples. In organizations characterized by intensive technology, there is interactive coordination and communication between all or many organization elements, such as a research team or an integrated military unit. The prescribed approach for organization effectiveness for the intensive technology organization is the continuous upgrading of the organizations and individual skills. The widespread support of continuing education for its members by organizations of this type supports this theory. Another attempt to define the parameters which 31

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32 would prescribe the appropriate organization is provided by Lawrence and Lorsch in terms of the organization's handling of uncertainty. Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) describe the standard organization approach to dealing with or reducing uncertainty as having two parts. First is differentiation (division of labor) at the lower levels, letting each of the differentiated units have the structure its considers most appropriate for dealing with the uncertainties of its peculiar environment. These diverse elements are then integrated at the top of the organization. Jay Galbraith (1973) has also developed a generic characterization of organizational approaches to dealing with uncertainty as taking the form of some combination of the following four elements. 1. Organizations can reduce the need to deal with uncertainty by; a. the creation of slack resources, which gives them the capability to respond to unanticipated requirements. b. the creation of self-contained tasks, which eliminates the need to deal with the outside world. 2. Alternatively, organizations can increase their capability to deal with uncertainty by; a. the creation of information systems to assist in communicating vertically in the organization. b. the creation of horizontal relationships for

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33 the exchange of information across elements of the organization at a given level. The first two approaches described above (1a and 1b) are the stereotypical bureaucratic responses, and certainly are not advocated for organization effectiveness. The second group of (2a and 2b) form the foundation for the matrix organization, which has become common, particularly in high technology organizations. Marshall Meyer (1976) has summarized the state of affairs of the organization theories presented so far rather well. He states the following. 1. There is some comparability between all organizations. 2. Contingency theory applies; that is, there is no one best way to organize. 3. Technology is only one of the determinants of the appropriate organization for a given entity. In another recent development, Ouchi (1981) has presented another theory of organization which he calls Theory z. Theory Z is represented as being descriptive of the typical Japanese organization, and is described as having the following elements; 1. Lifetime employment; the typical professional employee spends an entire career with the same organization.

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34 2. Slow evaluation and promotion. 3. Non-specialized career paths; the emphasis is on developing generalists who willbe inherently capable of working at higher levels of the organization. 4. Implicit control mechanisms, not thick books of rules and procedures, followed up with explicit measurements. 5. Collective decision making. 6. Collective responsibility. 7. Wholistic concern; the organization is concerned about the whole employee, not just job performance. By contrast,in the typical American organization the conditions listed above are essentially all reversed. There is frequent job changing, rapid promotion, highly specialized career development, explicit controls, an emphasis on individual decision making and individual responsibility, and the organization's in the employee stops at the front gate. According to Ouchi, these conditions are brought about by a series of underlying beliefs 1. Trust; there is mutual trust between the levels of a hierarchical organization. 2. Subtlety; there are complex personal relationships between members of the organization, and these transcend the relationships required by their

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organizational p6sitions. 3. Intimacy; there is an air of caring and mutual support -disciplined unselfishness. 4. Cultural man; man is assumed to be a part of his culture, motivated and stimulated by his heritage and surroundings rather than economic considerations. 5. Organizations; they are regarded as an part of civilized life. 35 It is Ouchi's that American organizations must reshape themselves along the lines of Theory Z in order to meet the Japanese challenge. This seems a very difficult thing for American organizations to accomplish, especially given the vastly different cultures of the two countries. Some specific cultural differences which help explain the acceptance of the conditions described above are; 1. Homogeneity; the people of Japan are largely homogeneous in terms of .race, history, language, religion,and culture. The people of America are homogeneous in none of these areas; the idea of the "melting pot" is a source of pride in America. 2. Mobility; the people of Japan typically live in the same town or city all their lives, even in the same house. Americans change their residence at an ever increasing rate. 3. with half the population of the

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36 United States in a small fraction of the area, the Japanese do not expect or require much private space. This contrasts with this country, where everyman's dream includes a three bedroom house in suburbia. 4. Individuality; the Japanese are taught from the earliest age that the individual is important only as a part of the group or culture. Americans take great pride in the rights of the individual, in "doing your own thing." Based on these differences, it would seem that there is a large amDunt of incompatibility between conditions in this country and the development of a Theory Z movement. However, Ouchi maintains that some of the best run and most successful organizations in America are already employing Theory Z principles, and that there is a movement in the direction of ever increasing utilization The place of Theory Z in American organization theory must await future developments. Beyond Traditional Organization Theory A Newly Emerging Recognition of the Importance of Conflict and Power Organization theory as summarized in the preceding section has shortcomings for the analysis of an actual organization. Perrow correctly observed

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that in complex organizations, tasks are divided up between a few major departments or subunits, and all of these subunits are not likely to be equally powerful ( (Perrow, 1972). That is, the very creation of structure results in a allocation of power within the organization. Pfeffer has advocated the broadening of the study of organizations beyond the traditional boundaries of organization theory' by including the analysis of the use of power within the organization. Pfeffer deals with power as an element rif organization politics, which he defines as those activities taken within organizations to acquire, develop, and use power and other resources to obtain one's preferred outcomes in a situation in which there is uncertainty or dissensus about choices. (Pfeffer, 1981, p. 351) This is essentially an elaborate restatement of Lasswell's (1936) definition of politics as the study of who gets what, when, and how, but either definition provides an adequate starting point for the incorporation of power as an element in the study of an organization. Pfeffer (1981) provides three reasons for the absence of this critical element in traditional organization theory. First, the concept of power is not well understood even by those social scientists who have studied it. Second, other explanations of organization

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38 phenomena such as those provided by the more traditional organization theories have been more attractive because they are built on more socially acceptable beliefs such as the rationality of man and effectiveness as an overarching organization goal. Third, there is an inherent belief among managers that power and politics necessarily means deceitful, underhanded behavior, and overtly dealing with these types of behavior may seem to imply sanctioning them. Baldridge (1971) exposes that perspective as naive, when he says that "the men in the critical roles are not bureaucrats, they are politicians, struggling to make dreams come true and fighting to balance interest groups off against each other." Alinsky takes an even stronger stand . Political realists see the world as it really is: an arena of power politics moved primarily by perceived immediate self-interests, where morality is rhetorical rationale for expedient action and self-interest. It is a world not of angels but of angles, power principles; a world where we are always moral and our enemies always immoral. (Alinsky, 1971, pp. 12-13). Conflict is a related concept which must be included in a discussion of power. As with power, conflict is frequently omitted from the study of

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39 organizations. Dalton suggests this is because social scientists "frequently donot get close enough to situations" to understand "the .covert activities and the meanings assigned to them." (Dalton, 1959, p.3) Selznick (1957) notes that, based on his studies of the Tennessee Valley Authority, conflict may even result in changes to the basic goals of the organization. Dalton (1959) states that conflicts arise from struggles for scarce resources, and discusses three specific conflicts. The epitome of conflict is dealing with cutbacks. Managers subvert overall organizational goals for subunit goals in the struggle for personal and subunit survival. When a number of subunit managers have so acted, conflict is inevitable, because the subunits will no longer have the same goals. Second, the process of allocating promotions is fertile ground for conflict because of the subjectivity of the evaluation and selection process. Third, there may be line versus staff conflicts brought about by their competing demands for the manager's attention and blessings. Some writers have found positive aspects to conflict. Follett (1940) proposed a theory of creative conflict, and Coser (1956) suggested a whole set of propositions on the importance of conflict to an organization, which were summarized by McCurdy. Conflict is essential for maintaining the

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identity of the organization. Every public agency needs combatant pressures from opponents in order to reaffirm its mission and reenlist the support of its members. This helps the agency delineate its boundaries within a changing world. The military needs a menace; the environmentalists need polluters; the police need criminals -or their organizations would fall apart. Conflict between employees within such agencies serves the same function. In the absence of a visible enemy, for example, the grunts at army boot camp learn to hate their drill sergeant, a hatred that builds solidarity and helps the soldiers to identify with the organization. Later the conflict can be transferred to a foreign menace.Conflict between employees also helps to reenforce the formal hierarchy by creating loyalties among persons who perform roles at similar 40 levels in the organization. (McCurdy, 1977, pp. 61-62) Bolman and Deal (1984) have combined the related elements of power and conflict, and have synthesized a "political frame" for organizational analysis. They summarize the political perspective in the following five propositions.

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1. Most important decisions in organizations involve the allocation of scarce resources. 2. Organizations are coalitions composed of a number of individuals and interest groups. 3. Individuals and interest groups differ in their values, preferences, beliefs, information,and perceptions of reality. Such differences are usually enduring and change slowly if at all. 4. Organizational goals and decisions emerge from ongoing processes of bargaining, negotiation, and jockeying for position among individuals and groups. 41 5. Because of scarce resources and enduring differences, power and conflict are central features of organizational life. Within this frame are several separate concepts. First is the concept of the organization as an aggregation of coalitions of individuals and interest groups. Today's allies are tomorrow's potential enemies, depending on the issue. The implication is clear; every agreement is narrowly prescribed, applicable only to the specific conditions for which it was negotiated. Second is the concept of power as an (almost) independent variable, and made up of multiple types; authority, expertise, control of rewards, coercive power, and personal power. implication here is ''that the capacity of authorities to make decisions is

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42 constrained .... The multiple pressures operating on authorities helps to explain why so many administrators seem more powerful to their subordinates than to themselves.'' The third major concept is the need to deal with conflict. Approaches to dealing with conflict include gamesmanship, bargaining, and coalition formation. Another Important Factor; Symbols and Organizational Culture The need for yet another element of organizational analysis is indicated by the observed differences between so many organizational actions and their stated policies and positions. A highly bureaucratic organizationmay issue a formal policy encouraging its employees to be innovative and creative in suggesting new ways of doing business; the perceptive (or jaded) long time employee will immediately identify this "new policy" as an attempt on the part of top management to show the employees that they (management) are up to date on the latest management techniques. Or, the federal government may make highly visible public declarations that it intends to "whip inflation now," while making no policy changes. Or, the federal government may enact. a "windfall profits tax" which had nothing to do with profits. No element of traditional organization theory accommodates these conditions, all

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43 of which are very real. However, a relatively new addition to the field of organization analysis which does help explain these apparent contradictions is the study of organizational actions for their symbolic content. In a study of decision making and the allocation of scarce resources at some .major universities, Chaffee (1980) found that the presence of a rational decision making process caused ready acceptance of decisions, even though there was no significant difference in the allocation of resources at the institutions with and without a prescribed rational decision making process. This is testimony to the symbolic value of the rational decision making process. Additional evidence exists which speaks to the importance of symbolism. Gergen (1969) has determined that the acceptance of social is governed as much by tastes, preferences, and values as by consistency with data, and Edelman (1977) determined that political language and symbols are useful for mobilizing support and quieting opposition. Pfeffer (1981) provides several explanations for the apparent strength of symbols and symbolic behavior in an organizational setting. Individuals and groups may have uncertain preferences, and thus they can be satisfied when told that a particular action was intended to meet their needs. Or, some individuals and groups will

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44 believe what the organization says, simply because of organizational influence. Organizations frequently have the capability to withhold data -which might support conclusions other than those which the organization supports. The subject at issue may be sufficiently vague or so large in scope that individual observers, especially within the organization, may not know which outcome actually occurred. A final possibility is that the interested individuals and/or groups may expect only symbolic outcomes. Other experimental data supporting the importance of symbols is provided by King (1972). King determined that employee attitudes regarding job enrichment and job enlargement were largely determined by the employees' expectations, which had been manipulated by the amount and tone of pre-change discussion by management. Also, Edelman (1977) has studied the formation of self-regulatory agencies for professionals and concluded that their effect has been mostly symbolic, since few members were ever disciplined. Bolman and Deal (1984) have synthesized the available data and identified a "symbolic" frame for organizational analysis, summarized by them as follows; 1. What is most important about any event is not what happened but the meaning of what happened. 2. The meaning of an event is determined not

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simply by what happened but by the ways that humans interpret what happened. 45 3. Many of the most significant events and processes in organizations are substantially ambiguous or uncertain -it is often difficult or impossible to know what happened, why it happened, or what will happen next. 4. Ambiguity ano uncertainty undermine rational approaches to analysis, problem solving, and decision making. 5. When faced with uncertainty and ambiguity, humans create symbols to reduce the ambiguity, resolve confusion, increase predictability, and provide direction. Events themselves may remain illogical, random, fluid, and meaningless, but human symbols make them seem otherwise. Within this symbolic frame are myths, rituals, ceremonies, fairy tales, stories, humor, and play. Myths are beliefs that are not amenable to validation, and their presence is one of the characteristics of elite institutions. Examples are IBM, with its image of unsurpassable computer expertise, the Ivy League schools with their promise of superior career achievement for their graduates, and the U.S. Marine Corps with its call for "a few good men." Rituals and ceremonies serve four major functions. These are to socialize, to stabilize,

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46 to redute anxieties and ambiguities, and to convey messages to external constituencies. Some organizational activities usually viewed as rational, but which frequently are primarily ritualistic, are performance appraisals, meetings (especially those of standing committees), management training programs, and preemployment testing. The annual meetings of publicly held companies are generally ceremonial, as are many public sessions of legislative bodies at all levels of government. The activities of these entities are far too complicated for resolution in infrequent mass meetings. Their real business is conducted in many smaller sessions, many of them held very informally. Fairy tales, according to Westerlund and Sjostrand, (1979) serve several functions. They fulfill a wishful dream, they entertain, they give security, they give knowledge, and they disseminate propaganda. The belief that Harley Procter was divinely inspired to push his company into the sale of Ivory soap "suggests that even God is on the side of Procter and Gamble." Stories are the medium for passing along the organizations myths. All large organizations have some interesting stories in their histories, and those that serve the organization's purposes best are encouraged and told and retold. Humor is frequently used in "we versus they" organizational situations to refer to an organizational opponent or

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enemy in exaggerated (usually derogatory) terms. Play is frequently seen in the use of sports metaphors for organizational activities, as in "we will have to punt" instead of "I cannot make a decision." Schein (1985) views symbols as the outward manifestations of a larger concept, that of organizational culture, which is defined as a pattern of basic assumptions-invented, discovered, or developed by a given group as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration-that has well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think,and feel in relation to those problems. (Schein, 1985, p. 9) 47 Schein (1985) further develops the concept of culture as existing at three levels. Level 1 consists of basic assumptions regarding the environment, reality, time, space, human nature, human activity, and human relationships, which are the essence of organizational culture. They are generally invisible and not subject to examination. Level 2 consists of values, which are first order manifestations of the basic assumptions. Values may often be acknowledged as expressed rationale for organizational policies and decisions. Level 3 consists of artifacts and creations, which are the physical

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48 manifestations or end products of culture, and thus can be directly observed. These includes patterns of behavior, the use of technology, and characteristics of written and spoken communications. Synthesis of Organization Theory Within the framework of organization theory as outlined above, there have been many attempts to synthesize and integrate the various perspectives. Some of these attempts have been intended as the definitive prescriptive statement of organization theory, and others have been mainly descriptive in nature, intended to serve as an aid in organizational analysis. Since the present study has as its purpose the analysis of an organization, not the development of organization theory, the focus in this synthesis will be descriptive. Several descriptive approaches from the literature were considered for use in this study. These are Parsons and Smelser's Societal Model, Pascale and Athos' 7-S Framework, Lynn's Process/Structure/Behavior Model, and Bolman and Deal's Structural/Human Resources/ Political/ Symbolic Model. Consideration of the elements of these descriptive approaches, or models, led to the decision to combine the elements of several of them into a single new model. The model selected for use in this study is a

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49 modified version of Bolman and Deal's model, consisting of the five elements structure, human resources, political, symbolic, and systems. A Societal Model Parsons and Smelser (1964) developed a societal model composed of four elements. These are the polity, the economy, social and culture. In this model, the system concerns itself primarily with societal goals, especially their definition, development of the means for their attainment, and measuring the effects of the efforts at their attainment. The economy concerns itself primarily with the actual doing of whatever it is that society elects to do, and the distribution of the resulting products and profits. It includes the allocation of scarce resources and the development of new products and/or distribution schemes as required by the continuous search for optimum performance in the face of changing environmental conditions, as well as the stimulation of demand and the creatiun uf stratification is the integrating element of society. It provides the working definition of success and its many variations. The patterns of rewards and reward expectations, prestige, status, and social standing are developed here. The resulting patterns can be quite different from those which people say are "right"

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50 The cultural element provides for-pattern maintenance. It includes many institutions, like families, churches, and schools, which serve to provide the socializing experiences, especially for the young. Of increasing importance as an element of the culture are the media, especially television. Behaviors are observed, practiced, and reinforced (or punished). Values and mores are developed-and modified by the cultural element, and the definition of acceptable behavior results. It should also be noted that none of the four elements of this model is bounded totally by its general definition. For instance, the political system has influence on more than just the definition of goals. There are some very strong influences from the political system on goal accomplishment. even though that activity is primarily under the influence of the economy. This model suffers from the attempt to be a universal model. Its broadness makes application to specific situation difficult. However, it is worth noting that Parsons and Smelser were very early to recognize the significance of organizational culture. As-noted below, Belman and Deal have elaborated the concept of culture somewhat, and this elaborated version is used in the present study.

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51 The 7-S Framework Pascale and Athos (1981) developed the 7-S framework, which was subsequently popularized, with one minor change by Peters and Waterman (1981). The 7-S framework as developed by Pascale and Athos consists of seven frames. They are structure, strategy, systems, skills, style, staff, and superordinate goals. The first three, structure, strategy, and systems, are regarded as traditional elements of organizational analysis. Strategy includes the organization's top-level statement of where it wants to go and how it plans to go there. This includes the organization's long term plans and its budget, as the budget is typically the first operationalization of a plan; it provides a statement of how the organization intends to allocate its limited resources. Structure is rather narrowly defined in this model, including only the formal organization chart and its characteristics. This includes considerations such as whether it is flat or tall, emphasizing project or functional or matrix setups, the push to be centralized or decentralized, and the relative reliance on line versus staff. Systems are the means for moving information around within the organization. This includes standard operating procedures, normal reports and reporting as well as other organizational behaviors such as frequency, duration, and degree of

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52 formality of meetings, and the normal decision making processes used. Systems also include the tools used by management in gathering and processing data for use in decision making. Hardware, especially computers, and software are a large and growing part of this element of .the model. The other four elements are called "soft," because they deal with the softer or social sciences; the people who comprise the organization and the organization's unique qualities which emanate from these individuals. Staff is the description of the typical employee and the composite employee. This includes the demographics of the organization, in terms such as average age, amount of education, type of education, and career categories. Staff would also encompass the individual aspirations of the organization's employees, which may not always be aligned with the organization's goals. Skills are the organization's distinctive competencies. That is, those things it does best, and likes to think it does better than any other organization. These are the reasons the organization exists. Without some unique capabilities no organization can continue to exist. Skills also include the unique capabilities of key personnel, both as individuals and in groups. Style is the characterization of how the organization's members, especially its key managers,

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53 behave in achieving the organization's goals. Typically, the chief executive's personal style will have a very strong effect on the style of the total organization. There may also be a dominant overall style of behavior for the total organization. There will certainly be an interaction between this element and Staff because of the association of certain personality types with specific career choices. Style will also reflect itself in the organization's approach to decision making. There is a continuum from autocratic to democratic decision making, and the organization will tend to have a single predominant style Superordinate goals (referred to as shared values by Peters and Waterman) include those concepts which transcend the organization and provide the glue that both holds the organization together and helps ensure the consistency between organization and individual goals. These may include overall agreement on such spiritual concepts as the importance of life and the significance of the organization within the context of the whole society, but probably of more importance is the general agreement on more earthly matters such as whether the organization is to be a price leader, have the lowest price, return the highest rate on shareholder equity, etc. One weakness of this model for the present study is the total absence of evidence that it might apply to

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54 the public sector. All the examples used to illustrate the model, as well as the experiences which stimulated the creation of the model, came from the private sector. However, it does appear that there was not excessive emphasis on unique aspects of the private sector, and it is concluded that this model would apply as well to the public sector as to the private. There are some limitations, however. First, there is no overt mention of politics. It may be that this omission stems from the authors' roles as management consultants, who must take great care when approaching the discussion of internal politics. The too-direct approach may lead to the implication that the client is less than professional, which may very well result in the loss of a client. Or, it may be that the element of politics is not considered sufficiently important; this conclusion is not considered valid. Whatever the cause, the element of politics is missing, and this is considered a serious omission. Second, there is very little mention of culture. The cultural aspects of organizations have been considered increasingly important, and this lack of emphasis is also considered to be significant. there is the matter of convenience. The 7-S model has seven elements. Adding those just mentioned would in nine elements, and nine elements are too many for convenient usage in this study. The concept of a

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55 Systems element was considered especially useful, and this element was added to the model selected for use in this study. Process/ Structure/ Behavior Model Another approach is suggested b_y Lynn (1981). While specifically addressing measures which have been taken over the years to improve the perfo!mance of government organizations, this approach lends itself to the study of organizational performance in an interesting way. This model looks at the "how" question rather than the "what" by examining a number of specific programs and initiatives through which presidents and other high government officials attempted to improve performance in the organization for which they were responsible. There is only a secondary look at the specific objectives of these programs and initiatives. This model has three elements. These are organizational processes, organizational structure, and organizational behavior. Processes are the standard routines and operating procedures organizations use to accomplish their designated tasks and achieve the necessary internal coordination. Among the.most important are the processes used for budgeting, planning, and performance measurement. Special emphasis has often been placed on the budgetary processes because the budget is seen as forming the .backbone of all

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56 organizational activity, especially government organizations. The continuous search for efficiency and economy has resulted in many proposals and reforms and other new ways for developing government budgets. Structure deals with the way departments are identified and divided; the organization chart defines an organization's structure, at least to the first level of inspection. Span of control, distribution of functions, reporting levels, and channels of communication are also parameters useful for the description of structure. There are two measures or indicators of organizational behavior, called simply soft and hard. Soft indicators are those activities generally associated with the human relations school of thought, and are based on the assumption that long-lasting changes in performance require changes in the quality of the working environment and in the nature of the work itself. Examples are sensitivity training, organization development, participative management, and other activities aimed at changing behavior through gentle persuasion. Hard indicators include productivity measurement and improvement programs, pay-forperformance, and other programs that are more closely associated with the traditional carrot and stick school of motivation. The outstanding advantage of this model is that

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57 it was devised expressly for the public sector. It suffers from some of the same shortcomings as Athos and Pascale's model, in that it does not address the political element at all and addresses the cultural only slightly. Also, it does not address the Systems element. It was concluded that the elements of this model were completely addressed by the model selected for use in this study. Structural/ ,Human Resources/ Political/ Symbolic Model Most recently, Bolman and Deal (1984) have proposed that there are four approaches to the management of organizations. They are the structural, human resource, political, and symbolic approaches. These four approaches can'also be viewed as four elements of organizational analysis, and are so viewed here. Structure deals with the formally defined roles and relationships, and thus probes behind the individuals who comprise the organization to examine the context in which they relate and work together. There are four major elements of structure in this model. These are organizational levels, goals, roles, and linkages. The most important determinants of the appropriate structure are the technology that the organization deals with and its environment. Structure may be studied by analysis of the organization chart, responsibility charting, or mapping of the flow of

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58 communications. The tendency to emphasize the importance of structure in dealing with organizational problems has been with us as long as organizations have existed. The Human Resource frame recognizes the fact that it is individuals who give the organization its existence. These humans have needs which may be viewed, as Maslow did, as emanating from the survival instinct (physiological and safety needs) or from higher level behaviors (the need for love, esteem, and selfactualization). The focus of this frame is on the fit between organization and individual. When there is poor fit there will be organizational ills, and when there is good fit there will be high productivity and high morale. This frame has its origins in the Human Resource school of management, which is usually dated from the Hawthorne experiments in the 1920's. Large organizations tend to have more of the problems which this frame deals with. This is partly just because there are more people whose needs must be considered, but also because there is an exponential growth in the number of interpersonal dealings required for accomplishing normal business as the size of the organization increases. These interpersonal dealings, including group decision making, are subject to frequent improvement efforts with a large amount of training being given to organization members.

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59 The political frame is unique to this model. This frame goes beyond considerations of classical organization theory and organization behavior and looks at how decisions are actually made. Goals, and policy are seen as resulting from bargaining and negotiating by interest groups. Sometimes the formal organization is the holder of the power, but often there is compromise between parties. In most elements of the federal government these parties iriclude the Lnvolved agency, Congress, the Office of Management and Budget, frequently the General Accounting Office, and sometimes the Office of Personnel Management. As a further complication, Congress is of not monolithic. There are budget, appropriations, and authorization committees in both houses, and the Congressional Budget Office. Completing the iron triangle, the interest groups dependent on the involved agency also have varying degrees of clout. These groups include the companies who owe their livelihood to contracts from the specific agency and the clients or beneficiaries of its programs. These clients may be other government agencies at the federal, state, or local levels, and thus another set of political activities may be present. In addition to these "external" political forces, there exist within most organizations many of the same elements of political activity, such as coalition formation, power

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struggles, compromise and negotiation. The focus of these internal political activities, as with the I external political activities, is on the allocation of scarce organizational resources, primarily money and people. The epitome of the political frame's advocates may be Machiavelli, who counsels us that "if a prince wants to maintain his rule he must learn how not to be virtuous, and to make use of this or that according to need" (Machiavelli, 1961 [1514], p. 163). Evidence of the continued existence of this mindset in modern times is provided by the Malek Manual, used by some of the White House staff during the Nixon administration as a guide book on how to circumvent the civil service regulations in staffing. 60 Also unique in name, although not totally unique in concept, is the symbolic frame. With this frame Bolman & Deal "abandon the assumption of rationality that appear in the other frames and treat the organization as theater or carnival" (Bolman and Deal, 1984, p.6). For instance, in this frame, the organization structure is looked at.for its symbolic value rather than the normal approach of looking at structure as a rationally derived expression of organizational purpose. This frame also points out the presence of significant symbolic value in many of the standard organizational processes. Meetings in

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61 particular are regarded as frequently having more symbolic than operational value. Additionally, organizational planning processes, personnel evaluation procedures, and collective bargaining are seen as typically having high symbolic content, and often very ,little operational content. Within the context of the symbolic frame, this condition in not seen as negative. Symbolic activities have the potential for significant benefit to the organization, by adding some amount of ceremony and tradition to the otherwise sterile, impersonal organizational life. The ability to view some elements of structure and processes as primarily symbolic in nature is preferred to the common frustration of believing them to have little or no operational value and hence concluding that they are therefore totally without value. Myths, fairy tales, stories, rituals, ceremonies, add zest to organizational life, and should be recognized as a very real element of organizations. As described below, The Bolman and Deal model was used as the basis for selection of an overall model for use in the analysis of the organization. Selection of a Model for Use in the Present Study The Bolman and Deal model strikes the best balance between simplicity (Lynn) and complexity (Athos and Pascale), both in terms of the number of elements

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62 and the definitions of the elements. It includes numerous examples of both public and private sector applications, and appears to be equally applicable to both. Therefore, the Belman and Deal model will be used as the foundation for the analysis of organization in this study. Some modification will be necessary to ensure a good fit with this study. The only significant flaw in the Belman and Deal model for the present study is the lack of sufficient attention to the many systems involved in the workings of a large organization. There is brief mention of the existence of systems, but they are treated by Belman and Deal as a segment of the structural frame. For the present study, the many pieces of management system hardware and software and the many coordinating and integrating mechanisms involved have a significant effect on many organizational activities. Thus there will be a frame added to the Belman and Deal model to deal with systems, resulting in a model having five elements. These are structure, human resources, political, symbolic, and systems. Organizational Life Cycles Unlike organization theory, there is not a recognized body of literature which chronicles the development of life cycle theory. As has been pointed

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out, a historical bias in the literature has been the tendency to generate studies which focus on mature organizations, and that are executed with a cross-sectional rather than a longitudinal perspective. (Quinn and Cameron, 1983, p.33) 63 Thus the discussion of the theory of life cycles will necessarily take a different form than the discussion of organization theory. The approach here will be to describe. and analyze several specific life cycle models which have been presented in the literature, and to consider these models and their sources as providing the necessary theoretical foundation for the study of organizational life cycles. A short critique of the applicability of each model to the present study is also presented, leading to selection of a model proposed by Quinn and Cameron for use in the present study. The life cycle models considered for use in this study are presented in chronological order, according to the year of their publication. Finally, the rationale for selection of the Quinn and Cameron model is presented. This model consists of four stages called entrepreneurial, collectivity, formalization and control, and elaboration of structure.

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A Three Stage Model: Autonomy/ Rapid Growth/ Steady State 64 This model was developed as part of a study of the life and death of government bureaus (Downs, 1967). Although Downs uses government bureaus as his explicit focus, most of his points are quite applicable to a wide range of organizations. He identifies four ways in which government bureaus are created. A bureau may form around a particularly charismatic person in response to the attraction of the person and his or her ideas, as the National Socialist Party in Germany formed around Hitler. Second, an organization may be created out of nothing to fill a specific perceived need. The federal. government provided several examples in the form of the alphabet agencies of the New Deal. New organizations are created continuously by state and local governments, and by private Third, a new organization may be created by combining elements of several existing groups. At the federal level, examples are the spinning off of the Air Force from the Army, the elaboration of the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics into NASA, and the more recent formation of the Departments of Energy and Education. Fourth, a bureau can be created through the entrepreneurship of a group of individuals who feel sufficiently strong about a subject or a policy. The semi-privatization of the Post Office Department into the U.S. Postal Service is an example.

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65 For an agency that has been established, Downs describes a set of activities which usually occur in sequence, and which are indicative of a life cycle. Three stages of a life cycle which can be inferred are the struggle for autonomy, rapid growth, and steady state. The first stage, the struggle for autonomy, is really a struggle for survival, for "the older a bureau is, the less likely it is to die'' (Downs, 1967, p. 20). During this stage, the bureau is attempting to stake a claim to the resources it needs to assure its continued existence, and it does so by demonstrating some combination of unique competences, dedicated clientele, and clear authority over an issue or function. As a second stage, most young bureaus also undergo a period of rapid growth in both size and _the social significance of their functions, culminating (in successful bureaus) with the arrival at a survival threshold. This survival threshold is defined by a minimum size and age. An organization must be large enough to render useful services, and old enough to have a significant client base. The third stage, steady state, is characterized by a continuous search for sources of external support to assure continued survival, as well as a continuous coping with accelerating or decelerating growth, usually in response to external forces. Downs also provides some insight into the

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apparent immortality of government organizations by providing reasons they are unlikely to die. 1. They will change functions if required to ensure survival. 2. Established clientele will lobby for their continued existence. 66 3. There is usually no accurate accounting of a bureau's total costs and benefits. 4. Bureaus will usually not fight each other to the death. 5. Bureaus tend to be large, and large organizations of any type tend to survive. 6. As a last resort, a struggling bureau will seek a merger with another bureau. This model is intended for application at the bureau level, and this orientation hampers its usefulness for the present study, in which the unit of study is a subset of a bureau. Also, the requirement to infer the stages indicates that Downs does not intend an application of his study to life cycle analysis, which leads to some unease in making such an application. A Three Stage Model: Birth/ Youth/ Maturity In another three stage model it is suggested that all business organizations go through three stages called birth, youth,and maturity (Lippitt and Schmidt,

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67 1967). Further, in progressing through these stages they encounter six crises. The underlying proposition is that the true criteria for determining the stage of development of an organization are found more in the manner of coping with predictable organizational crises than in the number of employees in the company, its share of the market, or its managerial sophistication. (Lippitt and Schmidt, 1967, p. 103) Crises encountered during the birth stage are the creation of the organization and early sacrifice to ensure continued survival. The act of creation of an organization requires making substantial commitments and taking risks. These risks and commitments include deciding what and how much the organization is willing to risk and identifying specifically who must risk the dollars,time, and energy to bring this idea to life. The risks are weighed against the organizations goals and the chances of their attainment if the risks are taken. If the organization copes with this crisis by successfully making the commitments and taking the risks required, it is ready for the second crisis, which requires deciding how much it is willing to sacrifice to help ensure survival. These sacrifices are usually made from the personal savings, personal time, and personal

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energy of key individuals in the organization. Continued survival of the organization is requires key people to make these sacrifices in a timely manner. Crises encountered during youth center aroun_ d gaining stability and earning a favorable reputation. 68 In order to achieve stability, the organization must be willing to accept and enforce organization and discipline. This may be troublesome because it eliminates most of the flexibility that the organizations leaders had enjoyed, and replaces it with rules and procedures, organizational politics, and record keeping. Earning and keeping a favorable reputation may require spending significant resources on self examination. This activity requires that management keep its collective ego in check and subject itself to continuous monitoring, evaluation, and improvement. During maturity, significant crises are achieving uniqueness and adaptability and developing the ability to contribute meaningfully to society. Achieving uniqueness may require traumatic changes in the organization, including changing goals a change in the environment is anticipated. An organization's uniqueness or distinctive competencies must be sufficiently narrow to permit definition, but sufficiently broad to provide flexibility in changing

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69 times. The final crisis requires the organization to contribute to society without a direct return. This can take the form of advocating and supporting employee development activities which are not job related and making direct contributions of time or money to community activities which would the quality of life for the entire community. This model has several major drawbacks for application to the present study. These are its total concentration on the private sector, its focus on the total organization (very much like the pievious three stage model), its small theoretical basis, and its lack of substantiating data. A Four Stage Model Based on Worker Maturity Another applicable study was performed with the objective of showing that a different leadership style is appropriate to each of the four stages that they see in the typical organizational life cycle (Hersey and Blanchard, 1969). In this early statement of situational leadership, the stages of the life cycle are not named, but it is implied that they could be named for the maturity levels of the employees. This leads to the names low, moderately low, moderately high, and high. The maturity level here does not mean physical or emotional maturity in the normal sense. The operative definition of maturity for this application is taken

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70 from Argyris and McClelland as "relative independence, abiliSY to take responsibility, and achievementmotivation" (Hersey and Blanchard, 1969, p. 30). According to this model, there is a natural progression from low to high maturity in many organizational situations, and there is an appropriate style of leadership for each of the maturity levels or life-cycle stages. For the low maturity group, a leadership style with high emphasis on task performance is advocated. For organizations in which maturity has progressed to moderately low, high emphasis on both task performance and interpersonal relationships is suggested. When the organization has reached a moderately high level of maturity, a lessening of task focus by the leader is recommended, but a continued high concentration on relationships remains valid. Finally, for the fully mature organization, it is suggested that the leader "back off" in emphasis of both task orientation and personal relationships. The four leadership styles advocated have been called telling, selling, participating, and delegating. A number of experiments validating their recommendations are mentioned. Anothe_ application of their work is to organizational structure, specifically span of control. Life cycle theory suggests that the appropriate span of control should be a function of the maturity of the individuals

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being managed instead of, or in addition to other organizational considerations. 71 This model is supported by a number of experiments and has an extremely sound theoretical base. However, it is far too narrow for use in the present study because of its total emphasis on employee behavior. The exclusive reliance on behavior as a determinant and/or descriptor of life cycle ignores other elements known to be significant, such as structure, management systems, as discussed elsewhere in this study. Five Phases of Evolution and Revolution Another life cycle model has been proposed which has five phases of relatively calm organizational growth, each followed by a management crisis (Greiner, 1972). Underlying the life cycle model is a model of organizational development which also has five elements. The five elements of the organizational t model are age of the organization, size of the organization, stages of evolution (periods of continuous growth without a major setback), stages of revolution (periods of substantial turbulence spaced between smoother periods of evolution), and growth rate of the industry. The influence of organizational age on the current organization is felt primarily through the institutionalization of behavior patterns, especially

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72 management behaviors. As the organization ages, behavior becomes more stable and predictable. It also becomes more difficult to change. growtn to cause problems of communication and coordination, for two reasons. First, the plain physical presence of more people causes more communication and coordination, and second, organizational growth usually results in organizational elaboration, which results in the need for more coordination and communication to perform a given function. Stages of evolution and revolution are discussed below. The main effect of the growth rate (or shrinkage rate) of the particular industry is on the length of the periods of evolution and revolution and their volatility. There are five phases of evolution and revolution, with each period of evolution characterized by a dominant management style and each period of revolution characterized by a dominant management problem. First there is a creativity phase, with informal management and immediate market feedback. Eventually a leadership crisis develops, resulting from a need to rationalize organizaLional accivities to cope with organizational growth and specialization. The organization now has too many employees for management to know each one, and standard techniques and practices need to be documented to avoid chaos. In phase two,

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73 growth is fueled by the improved organizational structure, systems, processes, and procedures developed in response to the first crisis. Phase two ends with a crisis of autonomy which results from demands of lower level managers for more freedom and decision making authority. This second crisis is resolved by increased delegation, which results in another growth period until upper level managers sense they are losing control. This results in the third crisis in which the upper level managers struggle for control. In the fourth phase, growth resumes due to the use of formal systems for coordination, until the organization is overwhelmed with systems and procedures. There results the fourth crisis, which is characterized as a red-tape crisis. The red-tape crisis is solved by the extensive use of teams and matrix structures, and these management approaches characterize the fifth stage. A fifth crisis is predicted but it is not defined or described. This model has the advantage of five reas9nably well defined stages and of dealing with the inter-stage crises. It has the disadvantages of being aimed at private sector organizations at the corporate level and being based exclusively on literature reviews. A Nine Stage Model Based on Stages of Human Development A nine stage model has been proposed based on the behaviors of individual members of an organization,

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74 similar to Hersey and Blanchard's three stage model described above (Torbert, 1974). This model is based on an earlier eight stage model of individual development Erikson, 1959), and Torbert's first eight stages are intended to be directly analogous to the eight stages of the earlier model. The first stage in this model is defined by shared fantasies. The members of the organization have a common vision of the future, and share their opinions and views freely with each other. The second stage requires the commitment of significant financial, structural, and spiritual investment in the organization by its members. Also during this period, leaders and leadership styles begin to emerge. In the third stage, specific determinations of goals, division of work, and unity against external forces are made. While the first three stages are defined primarily by the behaviors of individual members of the organization, the next three stages revolve around considerations of structure. Stage four is the stage of experimentation, with alternative processes and systems for operation of the organization being attempted. Parameters experimented with during this stage include administrative practices, communications channels and procedures, planning procedures, and scheduling practices. Stage five is a stage of predefined productivity. The focus is on the task and standard

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15 rules and procedures, and success is determined by product viability. This stage fre_quently results in the selection of a bureaucratic form of organization, especially if it is populated largely with people who have not progressed beyond the analogous Erikson stage in their personal growth. Torbert believes that the healthiest organizations will be forced by their members to go beyond this stage to a sixth stage of openly chosen structure, characterized by contemplation of the larger purposes of the organization. The final three stages reflect a spiritual growth, in which members struggle to achieve genuine intimacy. Stage seven is the stage of intimacy or foundational community, in which members transcend themselves in genuine intimacy. This stage may also span a crisis of organizational survival. The eighth stage, that of liberating disciplines, involves easy transitions between the organization and its environment, and an openness of leaders to challenge regarding their authority.The final stage is not named or described. Its existence is implied by consonance with Erikson. In fact Torbert acknowledges that few organizations achieve any of the final three stages. In this regard the model diverges from its Eriksonian origins, because Erikson believes that healthy adults experience all eight of his stages. Use of this model in the present study is not

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76 feasible because of its total concentration on members' behaviors. As mentioned earlier, there are serious weaknesses in using a model based solely on members' behaviors. The primary reason is the lack of consideration of other significant factors such as structure and systems. In addition, this model has an extremely small experimental base. Data in support of the model was gathered from the behaviors of several groups of about 25 people over periods of seven weeks. This model may have legitimate application for studying a very short organizational life cycle in great detail. However the present study will involve a much broader study of a much longer life cycle, and the cited experimental data base has very little correlation with the organizational conditions involved in the present study. The AGIL Model Another four stage life cycle model was based on Parsons and Smelser's earlier general model for a social system (Parsons and Smelser, 1964), in which there are four "functional imperatives" (Lyden, 1975). These are functions which must be continuously performed for the social system (e.g., an organization) to stay in existence. The four identified imperatives are; adaptation, goal-attainment, integration, and latent

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77 pattern maintenance (hence the acronym AGIL). In addition, the Parsons and Smelser model of a social system is composed of four elements; the polity, the economy, social stratification, and culture. The polity is then divided by Mitchell into four elements for further analysis the elected executive, the legislature, the judiciary, and the administrative 1969). Each of these elements has prime responsibility for one of the imperatives to assure continued functioning of the government. Goal attainment belongs primarily to the elected executive, integration to the legislature, pattern maintenance to the judiciary, and adaptation to the administrative branch. However, none of.these relationships is exclusive. Each of the four branches participates in each activity. Of interest to the present study are the activities of the administrative branch, which Lyden describes as generally following a sequence which may be viewed as a life cycle, at least for a new agency. The first stage for a new agency may be either adaptation or goal attainment, depending on the circumstances of its inception. If goal attainment is expected to be difficult, and/or if its charter is controversial, adaptation (the gathering of resources needed to achieve the organizational goals and the development of outside

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78 support from allies and clients) will be the prime focus of the organization during its early days. In the absence of of the problem conditions mentioned, the first stage will be focussed on goal attainment. The second stage for a new agency faced with strong competition for resources will be the integration of the resources and support assets gathered during the adaptation phase, and the utilization of them in the formation hierarchy, defined work flows, and procedures. If resources are to be easily attained, the agency may step directly to goal attainment as a second stage. For an agency which had to integrate its resources and assets the third stage will be devoted to the attainment of organizational goals, with emphasis on productivity and effectiveness. Finally. pattern maintenance becomes dominant, consisting of emphasizing the public interest, the organization's legal mandate, employee satisfaction, and This model has the for the present study of being directed at the public sector and of providing some discussion of the factors involved in stepping from stage to stage. The main disadvantage is I itsicomplexity, owing to its attempt to present a i uniyersal framework for organizational analysis (similar in this respect to von Bertalanffy's. general systems theory). It also has the disadvantages of being intended

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79 for application at the total bureau or agency level (in fact, for new agencies) and the complication of different sequences of stages depending on environmental factors. A Three Stage Model: Primitive/ Stable/ Elaborate Another three stage model was proposed based on three stages of organizational growth; a primitive system, a stable organization, and a period of elaboration of structure (Katz and Kahn, 1978). In the primitive system, a group of people with common needs and appropriate abilities come together to confront an environmental problem. They create the required technical structure and engage in cooperative task behavior. As the organization moves toward stability, the individual needs of the members assumes more importance, and may result in identifying some weaknesses in the primitive production structure put in place during the first stage. There is increased emphasis on the maintenance of reliable performance, which results in the development of a formal managerial structure. In addition to this authority structure, there develops a maintenance subsystem which ensures that rules are known, new members are appropriately socialized, and rewards and punishments are administered. Perhaps the most significant development during this stage is the

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80 formation of informal structures. As the organization has grown and become more formalized, the avenues officially available for individual expression have been reduced. To compensate, people develop their own informal agreements and working relationships, even establishing production norms. Aligning the objectives of informal work groups with the formal organization's goals is a continuing management challenge. Elaboration of structure is a recognition of the need for continuous support from the environment. There develop at the organization to environment boundary a number of specialized subunits to deal with the environment. These include the input and output functions, and frequently an external relations function. Input deals with the gathering of required supplies and labor, and it includes the procurement and personnel functions. Output deals with the disposal of the organization's products, and includes marketing, advertising, sales, and service activities. External relations activities take many forms, including dealing with the media, dealing with regulatory agencies and other governmental bodies, and dealing with the general public. Also during this stage there appear adaptive structures whose function is to prepare the organization for anticipated changes in the environment. They are products of the internal change agents, who attempt to

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81 see that the organization's products and processes stay in tune with the demands of society, the customers, and the owners. This model has the advantages of heing sufficiently general to be applicable to private and public sector organizations, and to be applicable to various levels of organization. It has the disadvantages of having no stated theoretical roots, and no stated experimental validation. A o/ .In this model, organizational life is described in terms of changing emphasis on four management roles. (Adizes, 1979}. These roles are the production of results, administration, entrepreneurship, and integration. Approaches are prescribed for solving organizational crises by use of the appropriate mix of the four roles, and six stages on the path to organizational maturity are described. They are courtship, infancy, go-go, adolescence, prime, ahd maturity. The potential for organizational death at each stage is also discussed, and the appropriate actions for its avoidance are prescribed. Particular emphasis is placed on the several potential causes of decline for the mature organization and the prescribed actions for continued life.

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82 In the stage, entrepreneurship is dominant, as characterized by a shared vision of what might be. No organization actually exists yet, but there is a missionary like zeal and enthusiasm on the part of the founders as they sell others on their ideas and simultaneously provide continuous reinforcement to each other. It may develop that the fundamental ideas around which the organization intends to build are not sound, in which case the organization would be stillborn. Assuming survival, infancy is the next stage. There is a nearly total focus on production during infancy. There are "hardly any policies, systems, procedures, or even budgets" (Adizes. 1979, p. 5). Selling continues to be a major activity, and the remaining organizational energies go into "doing" types of activities. Few records are kept and the top executive runs a highly centralized organization. All resources, especially management talent, are in short supply, so a single mistake in judgment or use of resources may easily result in organizational decline or death. The go-go organization is characterized by both results and entrepreneurial orientations. Decisions are made quickly, and there is a strong "bias for action" (Peters and Waterman, 119). Resources remain thin, and the organization is subject to failure on all fronts.

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83 The main threat, however, is internal. If the founder will not or cannot let go of his qr her personal involvement in all decisions and allow the establishment of administrative systems the organization will be severely limited. Adolescence results from an increased focus on administrative systems and procedures necessary to "get organized.'' Standard operating procedures are developed and put in place, and sub-unit charters and personal job descriptions begin to get formalized. Entrepreneurship is still strong, and there is internal conflict between the advocates of entrepreneurship and strengthening the administrative systems. The main threat to the organization is this conflict, and it can cause organizational decline or death if members spend too much of their energies on internal struggles and not enough on productive work. The epitome of organizational life is the prime stage, in which concern for product, administration, and entrepreneurship are in positions of shared dominance. It still has a results orientation, has matured sufficiently to have developed administrative systems, and still has not lost its zest. However, no organization exists in a vacuum, and the passage of time will will cause changes in.the delicate balance between the three forces. The most notable causes of change are

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the aging of the work force, reaching the point of declining marginal return from growth, and internal organization structural problems. The main threat to the prime organization is the difficulty of staying in the prime stage, especially maintaining a high level of entrepreneurship in the face of change caused by those three conditions, either singly or in combination. 84 If there is a lessening of the entrepreneurial spirit and a strengthening of the integration activities, the mature organization results. In the mature organization, concerns for results, administration, and integration share dominance. Integration may take the form of an absence of conflict. If this condition is taken to the extreme, groupthink mayresult. Extended lack of emphasis on entrepreneurial activities may cause decline in the emphasis on results, which would put the organization into a downward spiral. This model is unique in its in-depth treatment of organizational decline and death, and it has apparently been used successfully by over 50 organizations of widely diverse sizes, although no specific data are provided. It also provides good discussion of the causes of each transition and prescriptions for avoiding decline. Disadvantages include the fact that it is focussed entirely on the private sector, it has no apparent theoretical basis,

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and its focus on the total business entity. A Four Stage Model: Preparations/ Formation/ Growth/ Institutionalization 85 This model is based on the analysis of the birth and early growth of a medical school. It contains an implied life cycle with stages of pre-natal preparations, initial formation, growth, and institutionalization (Kimberly, 1979). Pre-natal activities include the decision to create, the allocation of resources, preparation of the environment, and definition of goals. Of importance in each of these steps are political, economic, social, and psychological forces. In the specific case studied by Kimberly, the specific factor of most importance to the decision to create a new medical school was a "national mood [which] favored the establishment of new medical schools" (Kimberly, 1979, p. 441). This mood was related to and derived from a feeling of relative affluence in the country, an increasing awareness of and desire for improved medical care for all citizens, and a willingness on the part of the Congress to provide substantial funding for new medical schools. Initial formation includes selection of the leaders and charter members, gathering up the required resources, and tapping the available environmental resources for support. Of most significance in the case

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study was the personal entrepreneurship of the individual designated as the first dean of the new school. He immediately committed himself to developing community support for the new school, and through his own efforts enlisted posit{ve support from most of the physicians in the area. 86 Growth is frequently perceived as an indicator of organizational effectiveness, and thus organizational growth is usually an explicit or implicit goal. It is more likely that growth is in fact a result rather than a cau?e of organizational effectiveness, and thus most organizations would be better off emphasizing other factors, such as quality of service and creativity. However, many organizations stress growth for growth's sake, and look at measures such as sales and market share (in the private sector) and number of members and size of budget (in the public sector) as indicators of effectiveness. Institutionalization involves the formalization and rigidization of policies, procedures, and structure, and an overall conservative leaning as the organization attempts to minimize perturbations to its internal mechanisms caused by environmental pressures. There are conflicting pressures at work as the need for institutionalization causes actions which tend to stifle or hinder creativity. The appropriate balance of the two

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87 forces is largely dependent on the.environment. There is a general environment which incl4des factors such as national and international moods and economic conditions. There is also a local or specific environment which, deals with the individuals and organizations with which the subject organization has dealings on a frequent basis. This model has the interesting feature of emphasis on the pre-natal and early organizational life periods. Thus it may well provide some unique insights into early organizational life, but it is too limited for direct application to the present study. In addition, the apparent single case basis for the model detracts from its appeal. A Model: Entre reneurial/ This model, developed by Quinn and Cameron (1983) was selected for use in this study. It is composed of four stages; entrepreneurial, collectivity, formalization and control, and elaboration of structure. In the entrepreneurial stage, there is a marshalling of resources, and a lot of ideas and entrepreneurial activities. There is little planning and coordination. The focus is on finding a niche for the organization, and power is in the hands of a prime mover, frequently a single individual. This stage

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represents a synthesis of Downs' struggle for autonomy, Lippitt and Schmidt's birth stage, Hersey and Blanchard's stage of low maturity, Scott-'s stage 1, Torbert's stage of shared fantasies, Lyden's adaptation and integration stages, Adizes' courtship stage, and Kimberly's pre-natal stage. 88 The collectivity stage is characterized by informal communication and structure and a sense of collectivity, mission, and high commitment. Members work long hours and innovation is high.. This stage represents a synthesis of Downs' stage of rapid growth, Hersey and Blanchard's stage of moderately low maturity, Greiner's creativity stage, Torbert's stages of high commitment and specific determinations, Katz and Kahn's primitive system, Adizes' infant and go-go stages, and Kimberly's stages of initial formation and growth. In the formalization and control stage, there is a formalization and institutionalization of rules and procedures. The structure is stable, and there is emphasis on efficiency, maintenance, and conservatism. This stage represents a combination of Downs' steady state, Lippitt and Schmidt's stage of youth, Hersey and Blanchard's stage of moderately high maturity, Scott's stage 2, Greiner's second stage, Torbert's stages of experimentation and predefined productivity, Lyden's stages of goal attainment and pattern maintenance, Katz

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and Kahn's stable organization, Adizes' adolescent, prime, and mature stages, and Kimberly's institutionalization stage. 89 The final stage centers around elaboration of structure, which emphasizes decentralization and domain expansion. There may also be some efforts at adaptation to changing conditions and organizationil renewal. This stage is a synthesis of Lippitt and Schmidt's maturity stage, Hersey and Blanchard's stage of high maturity, Scott's stage 3, Greiner's stages of delegation coordination, and collaboration, Torbert's stages of openly chosen structure, and liberating disciplines, and Katz and Kahn's elaboration of structure. Selection of a Model for This Study The Quinn and Cameron four stage model discussed above was intended to be an integration of most of the models previously discussed. It encompasses the significant elements of the earlier models, with the obvious exception that it does not deal with organizational decline and death in an explicit manner. That is clearly an acceptable omission for the present study, as the organization being studied was clearly alive and well for the entire period of study. This model, by virtue of.being based on the others, has eliminated most of the shortcomings and captured most of

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the benefits of the other models. For these reasons, and also because it is the most current of the models studied, the Quinn and Cameron four stage life cycle model will be used to provide the basis for the .life cycle aspect of this study. Integration of Organizational Frames and Life Cycle Theory The development of an integrated theory, one which provides for the longitudinal analysis of the 90 performance of a single organization, is overdue. Such a theory would contain elements relating to the performance of the organization at a single point in time (such as the organizational frames), as well as providing for longitudinal analysis. As mentioned earlier, it has been observed that there has been a tendency for organizational theory to focus on in-depth cross-sectional analysis (Quinn and Cameron, 1983). This tendency is understandable, as the data base from which organization theory was constructed consists primarily of in-depth analyses of mature organizations, with very little consideration of the effects of time on the organization itself. The effects of time have generally been focussed on the behaviors of the organization members, and only secondarily on the resulting impacts on the organization itself.

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91 It is the intent of this study to present a framework for the development of a theory for the integrated consideration and explanation of the relationships between organization theory and life cycle theory. This framework is based on in-depth longitudinal analysis of the management of the Space Shuttle program, and is built around the models discussed earlier in this chapter as having been selected for use. The model specifically used for consideration of organization theory consists of the five organizational frames; structural, systems, human relations, political, and symbolic. The model used for studying life cycle considerations consists of the four stages; entrepreneurial, collectivity, formalization and control, and elaboration of structure. The body of this study consists of gathering and analyzing data associated with the elements of the matrix formed by combining these two sets of parameters, which is shown on Figure 1. Specific objectives in the gathering and analysis of data were the identification of the existence and relative strength of each stage of the life cycle over time, the existence and relative strength of each organizational frame over time, and the existence and strength of relationships between life cycle stages and organizational frames over time.

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92 Stages in the Organizational Life Cycle ...-l ctl .-l t: :>. 0....-l Q) ;::::l .u .-l 0 t: Q) .-l 0 ;::::l t: :> ctl.U .-l .u Q) .-l N t: .u 0 .u .-l 0 ctl ;::::l 0.. 0 ...-lU Organizational Q) Q) ctl o.u ...-l E'O ,.OCI) Frames .u ...-l t: ctl t: 0 0 ctl ...-l 4-l til u [%.., ti!O Structural Systems Human Resources Political Symbolic Figure 1. Framework for Studying Relationships Between Organization Theory and Life Cycle Theory Comparison With an Earlier Model At least one earlier attempt has been made at the development of an integrated model (Quinn and Cameron, 1983). Quinn and Cameron's model was based on an earlier spatial model of organizational effectiveness (Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983). The spatial model was used by Quinn and Cameron as the representation of organization theory. The spatial model, which in turn has its roots in Parsons' AGIL model (discussedearlier in this study), was an attempt to pictorially correlate four major models of organizational effectiveness (as perceived by Quinn and Rohrbaugh) with three methods by

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93 which individuals make judgments about organizational effectiveness. The three methods were determined in a two stage Delphi type study involving experts in the field. The three methods were then correlated with the four models of organizational effectiveness, as shown on Figure 2. Shown on the four corners of the figure are the four major models of organizational effectiveness; human relations, open system, internal process, and rational goal. The properties of each of the three methods by which individuals make judgments about organizational effectiveness which relate most closely to each of the four models are indicated by the listing of these properties in the quadrant identifying that model. The first method, shown on the abscissa, is the focus of the organization, varying from an internal focus on the well-being and development of the people in the organization to an external focus, in which the well-being and development of the organization itself is paramount. The second method, shown on the ordinate, is the structural characteristic of the organization, with the opposite poles being flexibility and control. The third method, listed within each quadrant, acknowledges the possibility of emphasis on either means or ends to achieve organizational goals. Totally independent behavior of each of the three methods could obviously

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94 HUMAN RELATIONS OPEN SYSTEM flexibility Means: Cohesion, morale Ends: Human resource development. internal Means: Information management, communication Ends: Stability, control control INTERNAL PROCESS Means: Flexibility, readiness Ends: Growth, resource acquisition external Means: Planning, goal-setting Ends: Productivity,efficiency RATIONAL GOAL Figure 2. Spatial Model

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95 result in eight models of organization effectiveness. It was concluded that considerations of means-versus-ends are not independent, and thus it was concluded that the four models shown are sufficient (Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983). Hypothesized relationships were developed between the spatial model of organizational effectiveness and the four stage life cycle model (Quinn and Cameron, 1983). The entrepreneurial stage was expected to be almost totally represented by the open systems model. The collectivity stage would be primarily explained by the open systems and human relations models. Organizations in the formalization and control stage would be mostly associated with the internal process and rational goal models. Finally, in the elaboration of structure stage, the open systems model would again predominate. A single case study was provided to support these hypothesized relationships between organizational effectiveness and the life cycle. Much more such data is required before the hypothesized relationships can be considered valid, but the referenced work can be considered an important first step toward the development of the needed integrated theory. The model for organizational frames used in the present study consist of structural, systems, human

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96 relations, political, and symbolic frames. These frames can be compared to the spatial model. The systems frame is quite comparable to the sum of the internal process and rational goal models in that they all focus on the "how" of getting the organization's job done. Both models include a unique element which emphasizes the human relations aspects of organizations, and they are thus roughly comparable on that score. The structural frame is somewhat comparable to the .open systems model, and is also represented in each quadrant of the spatial model because of the inclusion of the structural dimension as one of the determinators of the spatial model. The biggest differences between the model used for this study and the spatial model are represented by the political and symbolic frames, which are not addressed in the spatial model. The inclusion of these two frames is the most unique aspect of the five frame model, and reflects current recognition of the importance of political and symbolic factors. In view of the importance of political and symbolic considerations in the space program, it is clearly appropriate to include analysis of them in this study. Internal political considerations abound in any large organization, and NASA is no exception. In addition, as an agency of the federal government, NASA is subject to

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many external political pressures, such as dealing with the various (other) executive agencies such as OMB and GAO, dealing with the Congress, and dealing with state and local governments in the areas where NASA has facilities. There are also internal and external aspects of the symbolic frame. Internally, just as in any large organization, management actions can take on importance due to their symbolic nature as well as (or instead of) their 11true11 importance. Externally, NASA has made masterful use of the concept of the space program as a symbol of American prestige. Problem and Propositions 97 The purpose of this study is to analyze the management of the Space Shuttle Program over its lifetime in order to identify patterns of management and how these patterns may have changed with time. The research problem is to identify the relationships between life-cycle stages and organizational frames for the Space Shuttle Program. The framework for this analysis, as depicted on Figure 1, is provided by a combination of life-cycle theory and organization theory. Life-cycle theory assumes a predictable pattern of management which changes over time. The life-cycle model used in this study is defined by four stages; entrepreneurial, collectivity,

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98 formalization and control, and elaboration of structure. Analysis of organization theory for use in this study led to the. use of five perspectives or frames; structural, systems, human resources, political, and symbolic. Initial propositions suggested by review of literature on life-cycle theory and organization theory are as follows. 1. Management of the Space Shuttle Program over the life of the program is consistent with the selected four stage model of life-cycle theory. 2. The five organizational frames provide a framework for thorough analysis of organizational performance. 3. The structural frame will have a positive association with formalization and control and elaboration of structure stages, but not with entrepreneurial or collectivity stages. 4. The systems frame will have a positive association with the formalization and control stage. 5. The human resources frame will have a positive association with the collectivity stage. 6. The political frame will have a positive association with the collectivity stage. 7. The symbolic frame will have a positive association with the elaboration of structure stage.

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CHAPTER III METHODOLOGY The approach in this study is in large part derivative of the problem or research question at hand. There are well known principles in academic research which hold ( 1 ) there is no such thing as a universal research methodology and, therefore, (2) a methodology must be selected which fits the type of research in question. (Summer, 1980, p. 355) Although organizational life-cycles are not a new phenomenon, there is not a complete empirical base for their study. Therefore, an exploratory study seems most appropriate for the purpose of this investigation since it will permit seeking what is, rather than predicting relations to be found. Exploratory studies have three purposes. These are to discover significant variables in the field situation, to discover relations among variables, and to lay the groundwork for later, more systematic and rigorous testing of hypotheses. (Kerlinger, 1973, p. 406) This study, which includes a synthesis of relevant

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100 literature, will set the stage for more systematic and rigorous empirical investigation of important hypotheses discovered. In exploring the relationships between organization theory and organizational life cycles, the specific methodology to be employed is the exploratory study. The general purpose of such research is to study intensively the background, current status, and environmental interactions of a given social unit: an individual, group, institution, or community. (Isaac and Michael, 1981, p. 48). Compared to a survey study which examines a small number of variables across a large sample of units, the exploratory study examines a small number of units across a large number of variables and conditions. The most important consideration in choosing exploratory and field study research is the matter of complexity. Use of this methodology is well established in the study of business and public administration because it can comprehend such a wide range of forces and causal effects, as well as a set of complex interrelated variables (see for example Allison, 1971, Kotter and Lawrence, 1974, and Dihl, 1961). This methodology is particularly relevant to this study, because it will bring to light the important variables, processes, and

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101 interactions involved in life cycle management that deserve more extensive attention. In pioneering new ground--by investigating empirically the actual practice of life cycle management--this research effort above all expects to be a source of fruitful hypotheses for further study and additional empirical research. This goal will be accomplished through the research plan outlined below. Methodological Strategy The approach used for gathering data for this study has two elements. These elements derive in part from the general approaches to exploratory studies as discussed by Summer (1980), Isaac and Michael (1981), and Kerlinger (1973), and in part from the author's involvement in the management of the Space Shuttle Program. This involvement provides ready access to data and records covering the management of the Space Shuttle Program for the period of interest, and provides ready access to other senior management officials. The first element in gathering data for use in this study was the detailed analysis of key program records and documents. The first step in that process was the identification of the specific records to be analyzed and their source. This step started with a detailed review of the use of time by the Program

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102 manager, the top official of the Space Shuttle Program, for an entire year. All records available, which consisted of the Program Manager's secretary's calendar, were reviewed. However, it has never been a legal requirement or part of the NASA culture to maintain rigorous records of how key individuals spend their time. The records which did exist contained data on 1184 activities covering 1134 hours, or about half of the Program Manager's time during 1984. Records for prior years do not exist. Analysis of these records indicated that a great deal of subjective judgment was required to identify the specific activities with organizational frames and life cycle stages. These assignments also were very time consuming, and this technique would probably have to be judged not feasible for the present study even if complete records were available. The combination of scarcity of records and difficulty of analysis caused this technique to be determined not feasible. The next approach to gathering data was an analysis of correspondence leaving the Program Manager's office. It must be noted that items of correspondence are frequently voluminous, including with them multiple enclosures. This analysis also covered an entire year There were 622 items listed in the correspondence log as having been signed by the Program Manager or his deputy.

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103 This log identifies the addressee and the subject, which appeared to be sufficient to permit a reasonably accurate allocation of each with the appropriate organizational frame and life cycle stage, and to do it with reasonable expenditure of time. These allocations were made for a sample of the 52 of these 622 items, using the selection criteria defined in the next section of this chapter. Next, a detailed analysis was made of these same 52 items. They were all read and allocated to specific organizational frames and life cycle stages. The results of this detailed analysis were compared with the earlier results obtained by analysis of the correspondence log, and were found to be not sufficiently consistent. Thus it was concluded that examination of the Program Manager's correspondence log would not provide an acceptable approach to gathering the required data. However, the actual correspondence is available for analysis, and would proyide an excellent basis for the analysis required in this study. Development of Sample Given that the Program Manager's correspondence is to be the basis for analysis, the quantity of data involved over the period of this study is so great that the only feasible approach is via sampling. Thus, the second step in gathering data for use in this study was the development of the sample to be used. Judgment was

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104 used in the selection of size of the sample and in specific items to be analyzed. Criteria for selection involved scope and impact. Items were included in the sample only if they were sufficiently broad in scope as to effect a significant portion of the workforce involved on the program (scope), and only if that effect was potentially significant (impact). Using these criteria, ninety three items were selected as representative of the management of the Space Shuttle Program over the period of the study. These ninety three items, while clearly not exhaustive, were judged to provide a reasonably comprehensive portrayal of the management of the Space Shuttle Program, and also were judged to be representative and unbiased. The content analysis of these ninety three items resulted in 344 individual data elements, each associated with a life-cycle stage and an organizational frame. The criteria for coding these associations are defined in the next section of this chapter, as are the detailed techniques used in the analysis. Interviews The second major element of methodological strategy was the interviewing of personnel who held key roles in the management of the Space Shuttle Program during the period of the study. In any major program,

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105 many things are left unsaid in the official records which will be studied under the first element, and the Space Shuttle Program is no exception. There are several reasons for this situation; first, there is simply not enough time to totally document every program management act or deci$ion; second, there are not enough people on the staffs of the various offices involved in the management of the program to do such documentation; third, some material is withheld from the record because it is not considered important at the time; fourth, some material is withheld from the record because it is considered too sensitive for publication at the time; and fifth, the mental processes of retrospection and integration of past activities take time, and their results are by definition not available until some time after the fact. Individual interviews were conducted with the nine key people identified in Appendix A. The interviews-were conducted after the analysis of documentation was complete. The main objective of the interviews was to get additional perspectives in interpreting the data obtained by analysis of the documentation. The interviewees all had held several positions of importance in the management of the Space Shuttle Program over the period of the study, and thus were able to provide unique insights and

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106 interpretations. Only two of them are no longer significantly_involved in the Space Shuttle Program. The interviews were not rigidly structured, but did include a brief overview of the theoretical concepts which underlie the study. Typically, very little further prompting was required. The interviewees were able to relate to enough of the theory to describe their experiences with the program in their own terms, and the interviewer was able to relate those descriptions to the specific content of this study. The interviews averaged about one hour. Data Collection and Analysis As described above, ninety three items of program documentation were selected for detailed analysis. Content analysis as described in the following paragraphs produced 344 data elements, each associated with a life-cycle stage and an organizational frame. In the first step of the data collection and analysis process, each item of progiam documentation was coded into one or more of the five organizational frames; structural, systems, human resources, political, and symbolic. The coding was accomplished by comparing the contents of each item with a predefined set of characteristics used to characterize each of the organizational frames. These characteristics are

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107 defined next. The Structural Frame deals with what the organization does and who does it. For this study, specific data items were associated with this frame if they dealt with the following. -work division by levels of the organization -the presence or uses of hierarchical relationships -roles of the organization -roles of organizational subunits -size of the organization -sizes of organizational subunits -worker/ manager ratios -organizational responsibility/ authority/ accountability -formalized structure established for accomplishing planning, integration, goal definition, productivity, or policy development -reorganization -reorganization rationale (stated and real) -formal statements of goals Some of the specific documentation items which were categorized as having applicability to the structural frame were formal organization charts, formal statements of organizational goals, and several studies

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108 dealing with the future allocations of responsibilities for various aspects of the Space Shuttle Program. The Systems Frame deals with how work is managed and performed. For this study, specific data items were associated with this frame if they dealt with any of the following. management information systems, either computerized or manually operated -procedures, systems, and methods for accomplishing planning, integration, goal definition, communication, productivity improvement, work measurement, and policy development -actual policy, whether stated or not -actual plans, whether stated or not -actual goals, whether stated or not Specific documentation items categorized here included a description of the conduct of design certification reviews, a plan to require formal performance management systems for each element of the program, and a consultant's study which advocated improved cost and schedule management processes. The Human Resources Frame deals with the individual members of the organization and their interrelationships. In this study, specific data items were associated with this frame if they dealt with:

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-definition of the work force (demographics), such as age, educational level, and work experience -training offered -training taken -affirmative action planning and actions -job enrichment -participative management -organizational development 109 Examples here were an Affirmative Action Plan, a report on the anticipated need for additional people over the following several years, and a report on the demographics of the work force. The Political Frame deals with power and conflict. There is a somewhat circular relationship between the two, as the allocation of power causes conflict, and conflict frequently results in reallocation of power. A further elaboration of politics is the distinction between external and internal politics. External politics involve the relationships between NASA and other groups and organizations, such as the White House, the Congress, the media, the public, other executive agencies, interest groups, local governments, or foreign competition. Internal politics involves dealings within NASA which affect the allocation of power and the resulting conflicts. This

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110 involves dealings between NASA Headquarters and the field centers, between the field centers, and dealings between internal interest groups such as scientists, Shuttle proponents, and expendable launch vehicle advocates. As a further elaboration, these groups are not mutually exclusive, as there is a lot of shared membership between groups. Also, these groups are not monolithic. The science community has within its ranks advocates of lunar exploration, planetary exploration, materials processing, and life sciences. In this study, specific data items were associated with the Political Frame if they dealt with any of the following, either internally (within NASA) or externally (between NASA and another institution). -bargaining between organizational elements -allocations of resources -coalitions -interest group formation and subsequent activities -domain expansion Politically oriented items of documentation found included NASA press issuances, several studies concerning the future allocation of responsibilities for management of the program, and Congressional testimony by NASA officials. The Symbolic Frame deals with the way things

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111 seem, as opposed to the way things really are. Of course, sometimes the two are the same, but this is far ) from a universal condition. Items were associated with the Symbolic Frame if they related to the following. -apparent involvement of group or individual for purposes of face validity -apparent expressions of policy beyond the required distribution -rituals -ceremonies -activities aimed at attaining high public visibility, especially via the media Specific examples identified included discussions of the visitor program at various NASA centers, speeches by NASA officials, and several issuances stressing NASA's support and use of productivity improvement initiatives. Many of the documentation items examined for this study contained indicators of more than one frame, as indicated by 344 data elements being obtained from study of ninety three documentation items. Examples include the several reorganization studies examined. By their very nature, these items addressed the structural frame, but they usually also addressed the allocations of scarce-resources or responsibilities, which are politically oriented.

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112 The second step in the data collection and analysis process was to associate each documentation item with one or more stages of the life cycle; entrepreneurial, collectivity, formalization and control, and elaboration of structure. This was accomplished by comparing the contents of the item with the characteristics of the life cycle phases as defined below. Unique characteristics of the Entrepreneurial Stage are as follows. -a marshalling of resources -lots of new ideas -entrepreneurial activities -little planning and coordination -formation of a niche for the organization -organizational power is in the hands of a prime mover Only one of the 344 identified data elements was associated with this stage. Data items were associated with the Collectivity Stage if they indicated the presence of the following. -informal communication -informal structure -long hours spent a strong sense of mission -continuing innovation

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high commitment of individuals to the organization 113 Examples of data items which indicated the presence of this stage included a letter advocating the implementation of improved statistical analysis methods, requests from managers for increased innovation, and several studies advocating innovative reallocation of responsibilities. The Formalization and Control Stage is indicated by the following. -formalization of rules -stable structure -emphasis on efficiency and maintenance -conservatism -institutionalized procedures Examples of data which indicated the presence of this stage included the issuance of formal program management procedures, organizational studies which advocated the status quo, and management issuances stressing the need for ever increasing efficiency. The Elaboration of Structure Stage is characterized by the following. -elaboration of structure -decentralization -domain expansion adaptation to changes in the environment

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114 -renewal of the organization Examples of data which indicated the presence of this stage included increasingly complex organization charts, several studies indicating interest in decentralizing control of the program, and several studies indicating changes in management needed to reflect-changing times. Many documentation items studied had indications of several life cycle stages. As an example, several items stressed both the need for innovation (collectivity stage) and the need to preserve the current situation (formalization and control). Following the coding of each item of data with a stage of the life cycle and with an organizational frame, percentages of occurrence were computed and plotted. This was done for each year and for the entire period of the study for each organizational frame and for each life-cycle stage. Based on the computed percentages, rankings were developed for the occurrence of each organizational frame and for each life-cycle stage for each year and for the entire period of the study. The highest ranking was assigned to the parameter of interest (organizational frame or life-cycle stage) having the highest frequency of occurrence.The lowest ranking was assigned to the parameter of interest (organizational frame or life-cycle stage) having the

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lowest frequency of occurrence. Ties were handled by assigning computed average rankings. 115 In the next step of the analysis, the subgroups of data associated with each life cycle stage within the group of data for each organizational frame were analyzed, and the subgroups of data associated with each frame within the group of data for each specific life cycle stage were analyzed. Percentages were then computed and rankings developed, and percentages and rankings were plotted for each subgroup, using the same techniques as for grouped data. The plots of percentages and rankings for grouped and subgrouped data were then analyzed for trends, patterns, and other characteristics of interest. The results of the analysis activity just described were evaluated for applicability to each of the three activities mentioned earlier as the most likely beneficiaries of this study. These were the management of the Space Shuttle Program, the management of other programs which have some shared characteristics with the Space Shuttle Program, and the continued development of theories of organizational development and management. For the first two target activities, the objective was to identify specific lessons learned in a manner amenable to reasonably application to a specific program. These lessons learned fell into three groups.

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116 There were those dealing with the existence of a life cycle in a major program, those dealing with the utility of the five organizational frames, and those dealing with the inter-relationships between life cycle and organizational frames. For the academic community, there were lessons dealing with the validity and utility of the models used to characterize the organizational life cycle model and the organizational frames. There were also some candidate areas for further study developed.

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CHAPTER IV STUDY FINDINGS Findings from the study are presented in this chapter. Almost all of the findings relate directly to organizational frames, life cycle stages, or the relationships between organizational frames and life-cycle stages. These three categories provide the major divisions in this chapter. The few not associated with these three categories, including findings related to the process or methodology of the study, are presented at the end of this chapter. Findings Based on the Analysis of Data Grouped by Life Cycle Stages Frequency of Life-Cycle Stages Data for the total period of the study, grouped by life-cycle stage, are shown on Figure 3. These data indicate the nearly complete absence of the entrepre-neurial stage, moderate presence of the collectivity stage, high presence of the formalization and control stage, and moderately high presence of the elaboration of structure stage.

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40 1-30 z w -20 ,_ 10 0 ... > z ... zw t: ag II:IC :) !i ct-w () z w 8 w ... mii:IC II:IC 6 Q ct-A. ..JUJ w () w LL. II:IC 0 1-LL. z w r-150 125 100 118 > t: 175 z c :) 0 50 25 0 Figure 3. Frequency of Life-Cycle Sta8es

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119 Entrepreneurial stage. Even though data analyzed for this study did not provide much indication of the entrepreneurial most of the individuals interviewed found that the standard descriptors of the entrepreneurial stage accurately described activities during the early years of the Space Shuttle Program. These descriptors include a marshalling of lots of new entrepreneurial and formation of a niche for the new organization. interviewees in this study recalled an early period of "selling" the Space Shuttle to various the most influential of which were Congressional leaders and their and White House staffers. There was significant effort to prove the worth and economic viability of the Space Shuttle. Representative of the entrepreneurial this period included gathering together of forces from the main NASA centers (Johnson and Marshall) and NASA Headquarters to advocate the Space Shuttle as NASA's next major program (a marshalling of resources). It also involved these same people and organizations in the closely related activity of forminga niche for the Space by dealing with potential customers such as the Department of Defense and various commercial satellite and convincing enough of the clientele group that the Space Shuttle was the best overall

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120 approach to providing routine access to space. There was a feeling that there was not an absence of planning and coordination, just an absence of formality in the planning and coordination. One noticeable difference between theory and experience was the absence of a single prime mover predicted for this stage. Instead, there were many people identified with the germination of the Space Shuttle Program. Several explanations for the absence of a prime mover or product champion are possible. The Space Shuttle Program is very large, and quite likely did require the concerted efforts of more than one person to bring it into existence. (It is interesting to note that some very large programs are associated with a single prime mover, such as the nuclear submarine program and Hyman Rickover. Perhaps this is a myth or a legend, and more properly belongs with the discussion of the symbolic frame.) Another possible explanation here is that the success of the Space Shuttle Program during the period of this study has resulted in efforts by some people to attempt to retroactively broaden their roles in its inception. Finally, there is the general difficulty of identifying key individuals within a large public sector organization. Even the absence of data indicative of the entrepreneurial stage may be considered a positive

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121 indicator of the entrepreneurial stage, as this stage is typified by a lack of formal written records. An additional factor which helps explain the absence of programs records indicative of the entrepreneuriat stage may be the fact that the Space Shuttle Program organization was a subunit of a strong institution, the Johnson Space Center. This institution, having been in existence for some years before the start of the Space Shuttle Program, had experienced its own entrepreneurial stage several years earlier. This lessened the magnitude and impact of an entrepreneurial stage by the Space Shuttle Program, because most of the Space Shuttle Program management personnel, as well as the surrounding organization, had experienced the earlier institutional entrepreneurial stage, and had moved on to other stages of the life-cycle. Collectivity stage. As shown on Figure 3, the collectivity stage was the second lowest represented in the data analyzed. About 25 percent of all the data elements analyzed indicated the collectivity stage, over the entire period of the study. Interview data indicated the presence of the collectivity stage, as defined by informal communications, informal structure, long hours spent, continuing innovation, and a strong sense of mission, accurately described activities during the

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122 early part of the program. Specifically, interviewees in this study recalled a period of developing many options for the configuration of the Space Shuttle. Key decisions were made, such as departing from the concept of total reusability, the deletion of air-breathing engines. in favor of the ferry concept, and the concept of strap-on solid propellant rockets. There was in place an organization designated to manage the Space Shuttle Program, but its exact role was loosely defined compared to other elements of the Johnson Space Center. Similarly, there were mechanisms in place early in the program for the management and control of the program, but they were relatively flexible as compared to the mechanisms being utilized on the Apollo program, which was still in operation at that time. In the early days of the Space Shuttle Program management office, a very small technical staff was in place, and it was expected to stay that way. Interviewees admitted to considerable naivete concerning the complexity of the organizational and technical interfaces. As these complexities became recognized and acknowledged, the organization to manage them grew. Formalization and control stage. The formalization stage appeared most frequently in the data analyzed for this study. About 42 percent of all data analyzed indicated the formalization stage, over the

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123 entire period of the study. This high percentage may be indicative of the location of the Shuttle program management organization within an institution (the Johnson Space Center) which has developed its own formalization requirements of such magnitude that it masks the life-cycle tendencies of its subunits, such as the Space Shuttle Program. Interviewees provided mixed inputs as to whether there had been, or was still occurring, a period of formalization and control. There seemed to be a perception of negative connotations to this stage and some of its descriptors, primarily the formalization and institutionalization of rules and procedures, apparently because of implications of excessively bureaucratic behavior. There was no hesitatLon to identify with some other of this stage, such as emphasis on efficiency, conservatism, and stable structure. Interviewees and data analysis also indicated an institutional influence here. By the beginning of the Space Shuttle Program, the Johnson Space Center had already developed a tradition of formality. Owing to this strong institutional influence, highly formalized rules and procedures were put in place very early in the Space Shuttle Program. In addition, the influence of individuals was stressed here. It was stated that the first program manager felt that the size of the Space

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124 Shuttle Program and the complexity of the organizational and technical interfaces associated with the program required formalization at an early time in the program. Elaboration of structure stage. Over the entire period of the study, the elaboration of structure stage was the second highest ranked, with 33%of the data analyzed for this study indicating this stage. Indicators of this stage include elaboration of structure, decentralization, domain expansion, adaptation to changes in the environment, and renewal of the organization. Many of these activities have been in reaction to the pressures from outside to treat the Space Shuttle Program like an operational rather than a developmental program. A significant amount of such pressure was political in nature, and probably resulted from the early NASA activities of convincing OMB, and the White House of the viability of the program by emphasizing its operational potential. Specific actions in response to these pressures generally took the.form of lessening the emphasis on strict adherence to rules and procedures used in the early days of the program. Central finding. Based on life-cycle theory, one might expect a nearly uniform distribution of occurrence of the four stages over the life of a

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125 program. As shown by Figure 3, there is far from a uniform distribution in the present study. Interviews suggest that the entrepreneurial stage actually did exist to a greater extent than shown on the figure. However, it is clear that the management of the Space Shuttle Program has been characterized predominantly by considerations of formalization and control and elaboration of structure. The lack of documentation associated with the entrepreneurial stage is the primary reason for the apparetit absence of indicators of this stage. There is an implication that it may be impossible to find indications of an entrepreneurial stage in any organization by a study of its documented records, since that stage is characterized by an absence of documentation. The strong influence of the institutional organization and the public sector nature of the Space Shuttle Program have both contributed strongly to the large occurrence of the formalization and control stage and elaboration of structure stages. Life-Cycle Stages Over Time The occurrence of data indicative of the various life-cycle stages for each year is shown of Figure 4. Specific trends indicated are discussed in the following paragraphs. Collectivity. The collectivity stage accounted

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._;. z Ul 80 70 80 u 40 a:: Ul Q. 30 20 10 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ /' I \ I \ I \ I \ I \ / \ I \ I \ LEGEND: --COLLECTIVITY ---FORMALIZATION AND CONTROL ELABORATION OF STRUCTURE I \ II \ I --, ' --, .. ).-... .. ' .... ... 1\ ... .. .. l ...__,. .,, I ........ '. .,. .. __.. .. 1975 1978 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 Figure Occurrence of Life-Cycle Stages Per Year ....... N "'

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127 for no more than 34 percent of the data for any one year, and was the least represented stage in almost every year. There were peaks in the o -ccurrence of the collectivity stage in 1976, 1980, and 1982 through 1984. The 1976 peak, which carried over into 1977, may have resulted from the of the horizontal flight test program during that People who had worked for five years on a "paper program" were able to see and participate in an actual flight operation. This experience may have provided a "lift" to personnel, and a strong sense of mission, which is an indicator of the collectivity stage. It is also possible that the influence of specific people could explain the 1980 and 1982-1984 data. In 1980, the structure for managing the Space Shuttle Program at NASA Headquarters was changed, and a different person at Headquarters was responsible for directing Space Shuttle Program activities In 1982, the Program Manager at the Johnson Space Center retired, and a new Program Manager was named. This is not to disparage the previous managers, but a new manager typically brings new ideas to the job, sometimes resulting in innovative concepts, and this may have been the case here. Formalization and control. As discussed earlier, for the entire period of the study, the formalization stage was the most represented in program

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128 data. This was very consistent throughout the period of the study in that the formalization stage was highest ranked in each year of the study except one (1982), including ties. The explanation for this consistently high yearly representation is the same as that for the overall high occurrince of this stage; the existence of the Space Shuttle Program management organization within a strong institution, and the public sector nature of the Space Shuttle Program. Elaboration of structure. As shown on Figure 4, the elaboration of structure stage was the most consistently represented over the period of the study, varying only between. 21 and 40 percent for each year. The data also indicates the existence of two cycles of increase and decrease in emphasis on this stage, one from the beginning of the program through 1980, and one from 1981 to 1984. A third cycle may have been beginning in 1985. These two cycles bear an interesting correlation to developments in the structure of the Johnson Space Center over this 'period. By 1975, there were four top level organizations at the Johnson. Space Center involved in managing the Space Shuttle Program. The first organizational element for the management of the Space Shuttle Program, the Space Shuttle Program Office, was created in 1970. In February, 1973, a separate office for management of the

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129 development of the Orbiter was spun off of the Space Shuttle Program Office . In March, 1973, a separate office for the support of integration activities involving the two existing offices and other NASA and external elements was created. In November, 1975, a fourth top level organization involved in .the management of the Space Shuttle Program was formed, with responsibility for dealing with Shuttle payloads and the customers. A reversal of this trend was started in 1982, when the payload related activities were blended into the main program management office. In 1983, the office created for integration activities was abolished and its functions absorbed by the remaining two management offices. Finally, in 1985, the Orbiter management office was merged with the Space Shuttle Program Office, resulting in a return to the very first condition of a single top level program management organization. These organizational changes may correlate to the two apparent cycles mentioned above, although there is clearly a lag of several years between the organizational changes just described and the the cycles seen in the occurrence of data indicative of this stage of the life cycle. The six major organizational changes described above can possibly be explained by a combination of life-cycle theory and the long standing Johnson Space Center tradition of organizational flexibility to

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130 accommodate its top personnel. Life-cycle theory predicts the elaboration of structure, such as was seen between 1970 and 1975. A rational explanation of this elaboration is provided by acknowledging that the total magnitude and complexity of the job of developing the Space Shuttle and bringing it to operational status was not accommodated in the program's initial organizational structure. Thus there was good technical justification for some amount of elaboration simply to accommodate the anticipated and recognized increase in overall program scope in a timely manner. However, it is generally accepted that the additions of the third and fourth top level management offices were accomplished primarily to accommodate the people involved. In one case, another program ended, leaving a program manager with no program. In the other case, a highly regarded manager sold Johnson Space Center management on the idea of a separate top level organization, with himself as its head. Similarly, the first two consolidations or abolishments of top level offices were recognized as long overdue and finally made possible by the retirement of .one manager and the promotion of the other. The final consolidation was the result of circumstances outside the Space Shuttle Program, primarily the creation of the Space Station Program office. Thus there is somewhat of a mixed picture here in terms of identification of a

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131 life-cycle. Life-cycle theory is not contradicted, but neither does it explain all that happens. Central finding. This study validates .the concept of an organizational life-cycle consisting of entrepreneurial, collectivity, formalization and control, and elaboration of structure life-cycle stages, based on analysis of the management of the Space Shuttle Program over the period of its existence, from the late 19601s through 1985. There was not a distinct movement through the stages of a life-cycle as may be inferred from life-cycle theory. Rather, there were subtle shifts of emphasis as the program evolved. The entrepreneurial stage was predominant from 1968 through 1970, and the collectivity stage in 1971 and 1972. Formalization and control was the most significant stage for a much longer period, from about 1973 to 1981. The elaboration of structure stage did not dominate any one portion of the life-cycle, but was most consistently represented with a significant presence throughout the entire period of study. During the period 1982 through 1985, the collectivity, formalization and control, and elaboration of structure stages were all of approximately equal strength.

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Findings Based on the Analysis of Data Grouped by Organizational Frames Frequency of Organizational Frames 132 Data for the total period of the study, grouped by organizational frame, are shown on Figure 5. These data indicate almost equal representation of the structural, political, and symbolic frames, and significantly lower representation of systems and human resources frames. Structural frame. As shown on Figure 5, the structural frame was third most indicated by program data. About 24 percent of all the data elements analyzed deal, t with the structural frame, over the entire period of the study. These data indicate moderate by management in ensuring the presence of well defined sets of organizational responsibilities, which is what the structural frame is all about. Among the program records analyzed as part of this study were twenty-seven studies dealing with the long term management of the Space Shuttle Program, which had as their emphasis identification of the appropriate organizational structure for the long term. The idea of the Space Shuttle as an operational vehicle and program dates to the very beginning of the program. The Space Shuttle Source Evaluation Board even had a committee to deal with operational considerations, and most bidders

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... z w CJ a: w a. 30 20 10 0 0 2 w ... 0 > 0 0 w CJ a: = 0 0 I! z i = % s.! ..1 0 I > 0 ..... 133 100 80 60 > !:: ... 40 20 0 z c( 8 Figure 5. Frequency of Organizational rrames

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134 had teaming arrangements with airlines, to provide operational experience. Studies concerning operation of the Space Shuttle Program also go back nearly to the beginning of the program. The earliest study cited in the present study was conducted in 1976. Discussion of this subject in interviews led to the conclusion that the underlying cause of all these studies was the fact that the Space Shuttle Program has not received the unquestioning support that was accorded earlier NASA manned programs (especially Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo). The Space Shuttle Program did not even have the total support of NASA. It was admittedly NASA's second choice for its major initiative of the 1980's, a Space Station being preferred. In addition, the viability of the basic concept of the Space Shuttle has been questioned by members of Congress, some elements of the media, some scientists, and others. Some of these same individuals and groups have questioned not only the viability of the Space Shuttle, but have also questioned the necessity for it. Some have taken the ultimate next step, that of questioning the whole concept of a manned space program. Justification for the program was based at least partly on the prospect of long term payback from customers, and there has been an interest from the very beginning of the program in the questions of long term

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135 management. Some individuals and groups have assumed that NASA would not, or should not, be involved in the long term because NASA's forte is research and development, and in the long term the program was intended to be operational, not developmental. Others have assumed the DOD should take over management of the Space Shuttle because of its importance to national security. Organizations considered for long term Space Shuttle management have included the following. -NASA, in its current organizational configuration -NASA, with a segregated Space Shuttle operations organization -A private sector organization -A government agency other than NASA or DOD DOD -NASA/ DOD partnership -A quasi-private sector organization (like Amtrak) Recommendations provided by those conducting the twentyseven studies were quite varied. Each of the options listed above was recommended by at least one of the studies. What was common to the studies was the general assumption that the Space Shuttle would rapidly evolve from a developmental to an operational activity, and that management of operations could be easily and safely

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separated from the people and the organization that managed the development. 136 Systems frame. As shown on Figure 5, the systems frame was second lowest ranked in terms of being represented in the program data. About 15 percent of all the data elements analyzed dealt with the systems frame, over the entire period of the study. Overall, this indicates a low level of management interest in the definition and modification of systems used for management of the Space Shuttle Program. Human resources frame. Over the entire period of the study, the human resources frame was the least represented. This frame, which deals with the individual members of the organization and their interrelationships, was represented by about 10 percent of all the data elements analyzed, over the entire period of the study. This low frequency of occurrence may be interpreted as evidence of several assumptions by program management personnel. The first assumption would be that there was in place a highly qualified staff for the management of the program. The second assumption would be that the principle of enlightened self interest would work to cause the staff members to seek out any additional training they felt they required. The third assumption would be that there was

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137 in place at the Johnson Space Center a functional organization specifically intended to deal with human resources activities, and that functional organization would service all the human resources needs of the program management organization. This condition appears to be almost independent of life-cycle considerations. It probably indicates the organization is not in the entrepreneurial stage, as considerations of staffing are. quite important in that stage. It is more likely an indicator of the presence of a strong institutional influence, one which allows the program management organization to concentrate on its mainline job by providing essential assistance. Demographic analysis of the workforce involved in the management of the Space Shuttle Program at the Johnson Space Center, conducted in mid-1985, revealed the following. -the average age was 43.7 years, while about 20% were under 35 years old. -the average length of service with NASA was 16.2 years. 70.9% had bachelor's degrees as their highest degree, 18.7% had master's degrees, 7.7% had doctor's degrees, and 2.7% had no degree. 58.9% had engineering degrees, 18.9% had science degrees, 13.6% had their degrees in mathematics, and about 6% had other degrees.

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138 About 1% had advanced degrees in a management field after having a technical bachelor's degree. In summary, the average worker involved in the management of the Space Shuttle Program at the Johnson Space Center in 1985 was middle-aged, had been involved in the program since its inception, had one or more technical or scientific degrees, and showed little interest in changing fields. Implications of these conditions include the following. -these people have spent most of their careers in the spotlight, or at least sharing the spotlight, as a result of the high visibility of the U.S. manned space program -as a result of this experience, they have a high regard for technical excellence, and a relatively low regard for cost and schedule requirements -they have a high resistance to change as a result of their age -they have an inclination toward technical rather than managerial activities, as indicated by their educational preferences Taken at face value, there may be some contradiction in these implications. The continuing excellence of the U. s. manned space program has

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139 demanded continuous innovation, but one cannot simultaneously resist change and be innovative. One interpretation, presented in an interview, is that there will be (is) resistance to organizational change, but support of technical innovation. This condition would indicate the collectivity stage. Another interpretation is that there needs to be a significant infusion of new people into the organization, and the new people need to be less interested than the present work force in technical innovation and more in meeting cost and schedule commitments. Political frame. As shown on Figure 5, about 27. percent of all the data elements analyzed dealt with the political frame over the entire period of the study. The political frame, which deals with conflict and power, and the allocation of resources, is thus the most prevalent of the organizational frames. It was observed by several of the interviewees that the original decision to develop the Space Shuttle was strongly influenced by political considerations, as discussed earlier in this study. The political influence has stayed heavy, perhaps even incteasing over the life of the program. The specific configuration selected for implementation was also influenced by political considerations. One particularly significant decision

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140 with a large political component was the sizing of the cargo bay to meet DOD requirements. In an apparent contradiction, several of the key personnel interviewed expressed difficulty relating to the political and symbolic frames. There was an apparent reluctance to acknowledge the importance of activities in those frames, and an apparent belief that the Johnson Space Center and the Space Shuttle Program are above such considerations. Significant competition between NASA centers was also mentioned by several interviewees as a part of the program from the very beginning. Tensions between the centers have been a part of this competition, and significant attention by the program manager has been required to keep tensions from exceeding acceptable limits. Additionally, political considerations played a major role in numerous other decisions as the program matured. Among the most prominent examples are the inclusion of a Senator and a Congressman on Shuttle flight crews. A contrast can be made with earlier programs, especially Apollo, in which NASA was given a clear mandate, and had no need to explain or justify its activities. Actually, most program records data indicative of the political and/or symbolic frames, but it was nearly always implicit. There are two elements

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141 involved in this discussion. The high rate of occurrence of data in these frames, and the generally implicit nature of the data. First, it can be argued that everything in the whole world has a symbolic meaning or interpretation, given a sufficiently creative observer. Admitting that this is an overstatement, it is still true that many official issuance of a large organization have a significant symbolic meaning. That is, they express what program management chooses to believe, or would like to believe, or would like to have others believe, rather than what is. Some records are created primarily for their symbolic value, and some which are not so created still have high symbolic content. In considering the political frame, nearly every record which addresses structure or systems (the organizational what, who, and how) necessarily addresses the allocation of scarce resources, especially people and money. Again, judgment was applied in the allocation of program records data to the political frame, with the result that many but not all documents were identified with the political frame. The second factor to be considered here is the generally implicit nature of indicators of the symbolic and political frames. In most instances, it would be self defeating for program management to issue a document and declare it to be for symbolic purposes.

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142 Documents can usually only serve as useful symbols if they are perceived to be seriously intended as expressions of management intent regarding one or more of the other organizational frames. As for the political frame, NASA managers have always prided themselves as being above politics. It has long been an organizational credo at NASA (a good example of mythology in an organizational setting) that technical correctness will prevail. Political considerations are considered distasteful, and are addressed obliquely if at all. These considerations encompass all life-cycle stages, and thus no real indicators of specific life-cycle stages are present here. Symbolic frame. As shown on Figure 5, about 25 percent of all the data elements analyzed dealt with the symbolic frame, over the entire period of the study. This frame deals with the way things seem, as opposed to the way things really are. The observed high level of occurrence was consistent with the observation made in the discussion of the political frame that, while written records such as memoranda, letters, and reports usually dealt overtly with subject matter representing the structural, systems, or human resources frame, most of these written records also contained data indicative of the political and/or symbolic frames. These political and symbolic indications were nearly always implicit,

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143 which is also consistent with the fact that nearly all data indicative of the political and symbolic frames were implicit. Indicative of the symbolic frame is a legend concerning the decision to build a partially reusable rather than fully reusable Space Shuttle. During the time when NASA was developing the overall configuration to be designed and built as the Space Shuttle, the concept most favored by NASA designers was based on full reusability. This concept involved reuse of all flight elements of the Space Shuttle, and thus promised lower long term operating costs than the competing concept involving partial reusability. However, the fully reusable concept was predicted to cost approximately $8 billion to develop, as compared to the $5 billion development cost for a partially reusable Shuttle. Caspar Weinberger, then the director of OMB, is alleged to have had a chat with the head of NASA at a cocktail party, and informed him that OMB would not support NASA in getting White House and Congressional approval of the Space Shuttle Program if the development cost exceeded $5 billion. Shortly thereafter, NASA selected the current partially reusable approach, in which the external tank is jettisoned after use. NASA effectively used symbolism early in the period of justifying and selling the Space Shuttle

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144 Program to Congress. There was major emphasis placed on the concept of a new age in space, one of exploitation, in contrast to the earlier thrust of exploration. Exploitation held the allure of a positive rate of return on the Another example of symbolism at work was cited in several interviews. During the earlier manned space programs, NASA had developed an image as a real "can-do" organization. This image became internalized, and resulted in overly.ambitious schedules. Central finding. The data analyzed for this study indicates almost equal representation of the structural, political, and symbolic frames, and significantly lower representation of systems and human resources frames. The high presence of the structural frame is primarily due to the national importance of the Space Shuttle Program. Due to this importance, there has been significant attention paid, both within NASA and externally, to ensuring the best possible program management. The stereotypical approach to ensuring optimum management is focussed on structure. This is evidenced by the 27 studies dealing largely with structure, as well as the many other data elements identified with the structural frame. The importance of the Space Shuttle Program is also a factor in the large

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145 presence of the political frame, along with high cost and high visibility. All these factors draw attention from politicians and from many other people and organizations which covet the importance, money, and visibility associated with the Space Shuttle Program. High visibility and the 'need for continued acceptance by the Space Shuttle' s many clientele groups (payload customers, Congress, various executive the American public, and the aerospace community, including NASA's employees) have resulted in a large and continuing to things symbolic. Organizational Frames Over Time The occurrence of data indicative of the various organizational frames for each year is shown on Figure 6. The behavior of these data provides clear indication that there are complex relationships at work here, both in terms of the behavior of each individual organizational frame over time and the interrelations between frames. Structural frame. As discussed earlier, about 24 percent of all the data elements analyzed dealt with the structural frame, over the entire period of the study. As shown on Figure 6, this varied between 18 and 38 percent for single years over the period of the study. There was an apparent upward trend from the

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50 40 30 15 A. 20 10 A :\ . . : \ . . i \ \ 'lo . . i r .... 4 : / ...... \ 1/ \ ,/ ,f! i\ I i :\ . . . . .. . . . LEGEND: ---STRUCTURAL ---SYSTEMS ----HUMAN .. . ... ----SYMBOLIC . . . . . . . : \ ; . ., r ., : ,....... .. ,, : .......... ,.........._ I I .... \ ', ', I \ : I \ /. I /. 1--, I \ I .. / '' I /"' ,., ., / / ... I '. \ I ./ ". ... I '. \ I // / \\ I / I \ I i '.\ I // -/ ;I' '-.:' ./ / 0 I 'f -I < I I y I I I 1975 1978 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 Figure 6. Occurrence of Organizational Frames Per Year .p. (J'\

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147 beginning of the period of the study until 1979, followed by a trend downward for the remaining years of the study. These data indicate a continued moderate interest by management in ensuring the presence of well defined sets of organizational responsibilities, but also a lessening of emphasis on them in the later years of the study. These data may also indicate a tendency toward the elaboration of structure stage of the lifecycle, followed by a tendency away from it. More extensive discussion of this pattern was presented earlier in this chapter, in the discussion of the elaboration of structure stage of the _life-cycle. It is also possible that there is a fifth stage of the life cycle, or maybe there is a circular pattern, in which earlier stages are revisited. In any case, it is reasonable to believe that there is a lessening need to talk and write about what it is that a large organization does after it has been in existence for a number of years, although life-cycle theory would lead one to expect structural activities related to elaboraticin of structure to increase in a mature organization. The existence of twenty-seven studies regarding the structure of the management of the Space Shuttle Program was discussed earlier, in the context of total occurrence of indicators of the structural frame.

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148 However, perhaps the major finding to be reached in the present study regarding these twenty-seven studies is related to their timing; there may well have been a 'premature emphasis on structural changes to accommodate a perceived shift from development to operations. The very existence of the studies indicates strong interest in Shuttle operations, by NASA, the DOD, the Congress, and others. However, official program records in the early years of the program consistently predicted first orbital flight earlier than real, and official program records have since the beginning of the program consistently over-estimated the number of flights which would be accomplished in each year of the program. Since the twenty-seven studies generally used NASA's overestimates as input data, essentially without question, all conclusions must be considered suspect. In lifecycle terminology, there was apparent concern that, left to its own devices, the Space Shuttle Program management would evolve to an overly elaborate structure in an era of Shuttle operations. Thus, there was a perceived need to consider other options for the management of Shuttle operations. However, it is not clear that any particularly useful information has resulted from all these The main implication relative to lifecycle theory is that are indications of the Elaboration of Structure Stage very early in the program

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149 in these data. Systems frame. As shown on Figure 6, the frequency of occurrence of the systems frame varied between zero and 36 percent for single years over the period of the study. However, there appears to be a cyclic pattern in the occurrence of the systems frame, in which the frequency of occurrence peaks in 1975, 1979, and 1984, and trends downward in the intervening I years. It is possible that this cyclic trend is an indication of infrequent management attention, perhaps attention given only in crisis conditions. This in turn may be a result of the fact that most of the formal systems for managing the program were put in place quite early, and require only infrequent management attention because they continue to work satisfactorily, or at least adequately. Human resources frame. As shown on Figure 6, the frequency of occurrence of the human resources frame was consistently very low over the period of the study, varying between zero and 18 percent for single years over the period of the study. There was a slight trend upward indicated in the incidence of the human resources frame over the period of the study, and a much more significant upward trend in the later years of the study. It may be that the combination of the aging of

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150 the work force, the shrinkage of the work force, and the recognition of the changing nature of the work involved in the management of the Space Shuttle combined to promote a more overt look at improving the work force. Political frame. As shown on Figure 6, the frequency of occurrence of the political frame varied between 13 and 50 percent for single years over the period of the study. There were several apparent cycles here, with peaks in 1976 and 1981, and a trend toward another possible peak starting again in 1985. The years of peak occurrence coincide with the beginnings of the two major flight phases of the Space Shuttle Program, suborbital and orbital phases. It may be that, during the years of intense planning leading up to the flight tests, political considerations were suppressed in the interest of getting the job done. Upon accomplishment of the major milestone of test accomplishment, these stored up considerations were dealt with. Symbolic frame. As shown on Figure 6, the occurrence of the symbolic frame varied between 6 and 33 percent for single years over the period of the study. There were several cycles of decreased occurrence followed by increased occurrence, and there is no ready explanation. Central finding. The concept of an

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organizational analysis based on the structural, systems, human resources, political, and symbolic 151 organizational frames clearly has merit. This was evidenced by both analysis of data and interviews of key personnel. For the present study, there does not appear to be any significant relationship between the organizational frames and the time periods identified earlier with the life-cycle stages. Interrelationships Between Life-Cycle _Stages and Organizational Frames In order to examine the interrelationships between stages of the life-cycle and organizational frames, a bivariate analysis was performed, utilizing the chi-square statistic. Data from the grouped by stage and frame, are shown on Table 1. The first step is to verify the applicability of the chi-square statistic. The chi-square statistic may be used only if the expected frequencies are greater than five. The expected frequencies may be computed using the equation: E ij np p i j ith row total jth column total total number of observations The expected frequencies are computed under the assumption that the two attributes making up the

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_, I z m > Se Ill t: z I! w a: -'! A. u !:::: w lu a: _, a: a ROW i5 0 oz FRAME u I&.C TOTAL STRUCTURAL 0 9 42 30 81 SYSTEMS 0 8 34 8 50 HUMAN RESOURCES 1 10 11 12 34 POLITICAL 0 29 47 18 94 SYMBOLIC 0 29 12 44 85 COLUMN TOTAL 1 85 148 112 344 Table 1. Total Occurrence of Life-Cycle Stages and Organizational Frames .J> iS: z ::::-Se Ill zu Ca: a:.J :J! cU A.O wu iu a:Q a: a It; ROW oz ........ FRAME I&.C 1110 TOTAL STRUCTURAL 9 42 30 81 SYSTEMS 8 34 8 50 HUMAN RESOURCES 11 11 12 34 POLITICAL 29 47 1'8 94 SYMBOLIC 29 12 44 85 COLUMN TOTAL 88 148 112 344 Table 2. Total Occurrence of Life-Cycle Stages and Organizational Frames, Entrepreneurial and Collectivity Stages Combined 152

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1S3 contingency table are in fact independent. Results of the computations are shown below. Row 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 s s s s Col 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Row Sum 81 81 81 81 so so so so 34 34 34 34 94 94 94 94 8S 8S 8S 8S Col Sum 1 8S 146 112 1 8S 146 112 1 8S 146 112 1 8S 146 112 1 8S 146 112 E(I,J) 0.24 20.01 34.38 26.37 0.1S 12.3S 21.22 16.28 0.10 8.40 14.43 11.07 0.27 23.23 39.90 30.60 0.2S 21.00 36.08 27.67 Because of the almost total absence of data indicating the entrepreneurial stage, the expected frequencies associated with that stage are all less than five. Thus, the chi-square test is not applicable in this case. However, the analysis may still be performed by merging two or more of the categories together. If the entrepreneurial stage data is merged with the collectivity stage data, the results are shown on Table 2. The new expected frequencies have been computed in the same way as before and are shown below.

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1S4 Row Col Row Sum Col Sum E(l,J) 1 1 81 86 20.2S 1 2 81 146 34.38 1 3 81 112 26.37 2 1 so 86 12.SO 2 2 so 146 21.22 2 3 so 112 16.28 3 1 34 86 8.SO 3 2 34 146 14.43 3 3 34 112 11.07 4 1 94 86 23.SO 4 2 94 146 39.90 4 3 94 112 30.60 s 1 8S 86 21.2S s 2 8S 146 36.08 s 3 8S 112 27.67 The next step is the computation of the actual chi-square statistic. The chi-square statistic is found through the use of the following equation: 2 (observed -expected ) 2 m n ij ij X i=1 j=1 expected ij Results of the computation are shown below. Row Col Observed Expected Factor 1 1 9 20.2S 6.2S 1 2 42 34.38 1.69 1 3 30 26.37 o.so 2 1 8 12.SO 1.62 2 2 34 21.22 7.70 2 3 8 16.28 4.21 3 1 11 8.50 0.74 3 2 11 14.43 0.82 3 3 12 11.07 0.08 4 1 29 23.50 1.29 4 2 47 39.90 1.27 4 3 18 30.60 5.19 5 1 29 21.25 2.83 5 2 12 36.08 16.07 5 3 44 27.67 9.63 Chi-square statistic 59.86

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155 The next part of the analysis is to determine the significance of this value of the chi-square statistic. First, the number of degrees of freedom must be determined. The number of degrees of freedom of the chi-square statistic is defined by DOF = (Rows -1) (Columns -1) There are five rows and three columns. Therefore the degrees of freedom are DOF (5 -1) (3 -1) 4 2 = 8 For 8 degrees of freedom, it may be seen from a chi-square table that if the attributes of frames and stages are in fact independent, then a statistic of 59.86 would occur less than one-tenth of one percent of the time. Thus, it is very unlikely that these two attributes are independent, or conversely, there is a significant relationship between frames and stages. The most significant of these interrelationships are discussed below. Significant Interrelationships Collectivity stage. As shown on Tables 1 and 2, the collectivity stage was dominated by considerations of the political and symbolic frames. High occurrence of the political frame within the collectivity stage is indicative of the use of innovative approaches to the building of coalitions and the allocation of power. The

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156 frequency of occurrence of the political frame within collectivity stage data showed a declining trend of about 12% per over the last 4 years of the study. This indicates a perception of a lessening need for building coalitions and an abatement of power struggles involved in enhancing the sense of mission and high commitment of individuals to the program and to the organization. The high occurrence of the symbolic frame within the collectivity stage is an indication of the creative use of symbolism, and the use of symbolism to stress innovation. Activities which typify this stage/frame combination include the NASA Productivity Program and formalized activities associated with goal development and statement, The frequency of occurrence of the symbolic frame within this stage showed an upward trend of about 8% per year over the last five years of the study. Thts could indicate an increasing concentration of long hours and high commitment of individuals to the organization on activities with high symbolic value. Again, there have been increasing amounts of emphasis on activities of this nature in recent years, especially the productivity enhancement and goal development activities above. Formalization and control stage. The

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157 formalization and control stage was dominated by the political, structural, and systems frames. The high occurrence of the political frame indicates significant management attention to the efficient allocation of power. Typical of items having this characteristic are studies concerning future sharing of Space Shuttle Program management duties between NASA and the DOD. These data may also indicate the formation of coalitions and the allocation of power to deal effectively with formalization and institutionalized rules and procedures. The structural frame first became of major significance with this stage. This indicates significant management attention to maintaining stability in the formal organizational structure, and formalization and institutionalization of rules and procedures. The frequency of occurrence of the structural frame within this stage showed an upward trend of about 9% per year over the first four years of the study and a downward trend of about 6% per year over the last six years of the study. This could indicate high and increasing concentration on formalizing the agreements concerni-ng allocation of organizational responsibilities early in the program, followed by a lessening of such a concentration later in the program. This trend reached its peak in 1979, which coincides

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158 with the peak number of studies concerning shared NASA/DOD operat{on of the shuttle. The trend downward in the later years of the study should logically be replaced by another concentration, such as formalizing how the work is to be managed, and that was the case. That interrelationship is discussed later. The only presence of the systems frame was within the formalization stage. This indicates management interest in the development of management systems aimed at the formalization and institutionalization of management rules arid procedures. The frequency of occurrence of the systems frame within this stage showed an upward trend of about 7% per year over the last four years of the study. This would indicate an increasing concentration on formalizing the systems and procedures of the organization late in the program, and may have been in response to the demands of what was being perceived as an operational program, with new emphasis being placed on efficiency. Elaboration of structure stage. The elaboration of structure stage is dominated by the symbolic and structural frames. The high occurrence of the symbolic frame indicates a high level of management attention to the use of symbolism to emphasize the renewal of the organization and the adaptation of the organization structure to the environment. Examples are the many

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159 studies stressing the need for NASA to adapt to the anticipated new era of operational shuttle activities. The symbolic aspect of these studies was the large emphasis placed on the likelihood that shuttle operations might be jointly managed by NASA and another agency. There was a major trend downward from 1982 to 1985, perhaps indicative of a management perception that approaches other than symbolic were becoming more appropriate for adaptation to changing times. The high incidence of the structural frame within the elaboration of structure stage was largely due to the similarities in the definitions of the elaboration of structure stage and the structural frame. Process Findings Finally, some findings were developed which dealt with the analysis process. These findings may be of, use for others who would attempt a similar study, as they are areas where a small amount of attention early in the research process would greatly facilitate data analysis. 1. Identifying the applicable life cycle stage is quite easy for data related to the structural frame. 2. Identifying the applicable life cycle stage is slightly more difficult for data related to the systems, political, and symbolic frames.

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3. It is quite difficult to identify the applicable life cycle stage for data related to the human resources frame. 160 4. Since the entrepreneurial stage is typified by very little record keeping, its existence must be de .termined by means other than analysis of program records.

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CHAPTER V CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY Comparison of Actual Findings With Predicted Findings In support of the discussion of conclusions which follows, a comparison is made between aciual findings and predicted findings. Fifteen propositions which were suggested as likely outcomes of this study at its inception are presented and compared with actual findings. In each case, the first sentence states the expected finding, and the remainder is a discussion of the actual findings of the study. 1. An evolution from a relatively loosely defined organic organizational structure to a relatively rigidly defined mechanistic structure was expected. Program records do not indicate this trend, but the key personnel interviewed said that such a trend had been experienced. However, it was pointed out that the loosely defined organic structure existed only for a short time, very early in the program. Explaining the absence of such a trend in program records, there was no doubt an institutional influence. The Space Shuttle Program management office was a subunit of the Johnson

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162 Space Center, and there were institutionally imposed requirements regarding formalization of structures. Additionally, it would be expected that formal program records would deal with the formal structure more than the informal. 2. An evolution from relatively unstructured job assignments to relatively rigidly structured job assignments was expected. The results here are very similar to those in the first item above. Formal program records do not indicate any absence of formal job assignments, but personnel involved in the very early days of the program do recall a period of relatively free-wheeling entrepreneurial activity, in which things were happening too fast write down much of anything. The influence of the institution was probably also a factor here. 3. A trend toward elaboration of organizational structure, involving more levels, more subdivisions, more specialization over the life of the program was expected. An interesting trend was seen here. There appeared to be significant elaboration of structure early in the program, followed by a contraction. This situation is attributed to two institutional factors. First, the Johnson Space Center has a policy of structural flexibility to accommodate its top people. Thus, several of the expansions of the program

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163 management structure, and several of its contractions, can be attributed to the changing availability and career plans of some of the top people. Second, during the last several years of this study, increasing management attention at the Johnson Space Center was being focussed on the Space Station Program. This had the effect of decreasing the supply of available top level people to the Space Shuttle Program, and also provided an impetus for decreasing the structure involved in the Space Shuttle Program. should also be noted that there was a clear series of symbolic messages concerning the declining relative importance of the Space Shuttle Program being sent to the entire Johnson Space Center when the Space Shuttle management structure was "being reduced from four to one top level office between 1982 and 1985. Similarly, there had been clear signals being sent about the ever increasing importance of the Space Shuttle Program as the structure grew between 1972 and 1975. 4. It was expected that there would be increasing usage of formal management systems as the program matured. There was slight recognition of this trend in interviews, alchough not by analysis of program records. This is attributed to institutional effects, as requirements for systems for major NASA programs are specified in agency wide direction. Only

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164 for a very short time, very early in the program, was there not a significant set of management systems in place for the program. The real trend in this area has been one of changing mechanization of the management systems, from manually operated and maintained management data systems to intensive use of computers. An anticipated trend for the future is the increased use of desktop computers by managers. The potential implications on all aspects of program management are quite significant. 5. It was expected that there would be an increasing emphasis on management control with time. There was no indication of this trend found, either in program records or interviews. This is attributed to the existence of an established "comfort zone" of management control at the Johnson Space Center in the years leading up to the Space Shuttle Program. Managers or potential managers who were not compatible with this "comfort zone" either did not attempt to become program managers, or were not selected. 6. It was expected that decisions would be made at lower levels of the organization as the program matures. There was some indication of this trend beginning to occur. For example, in 1985, the function of chairing the Flight Readiness Review for each Space Shuttle flight was delegated from the NASA Headquarters

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I I 165 Associate Administrator for Space Flight to the Space Shuttle Program Manager. Also, authority to define some key characteristics of Space Shuttle flights was delegated by the program manager to senior members of his staff. 7. A trend toward less personal flexibility in defining job assignments and responsibilities as the program matured was expected. This trend was not found. This is probably because of the long standing policy at the Johnson Space Center of providing significant flexibility in interpreting job requirements, especially in defining methods to be used to accomplish work. This institutional characteristic probably masked any tendencies in this direction which may have been present in the Space Shuttle Program management organization. 8. It was expected that there would be an expressed desire by management for less innovation as the program matured. It was also expected that the real need would be for increased innovations, but innovations relative to the process of producing Shuttle flights rather than innovative Shuttle hardware or software design. There definitely was an expressed desire by the program management to avoid changes to the shuttle hardware and software. Although the three individuals who have served as program managers through 1985 have avoided the use of slogans and buzzwords, there has been

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166 an implicit acknowledgement that "better is the enemy of good enough." The implication is that hardware and software that is performing adequately should not be changed. Based on the fact that most personnel involved in the management of the Space Shuttle Program are engineers and scientists, and the fact that engineers have a known propensity for continuously developing "improvements," there have been several management initiatives taken. Regarding contractor engineers, the approach taken to reduce the amount of potentially unnecessary (and potentially dangerous) innovation was to reduce the number of engineers working on the Space Shuttle. Regarding NASA engineers, whose numbers are much less flexible due to civil service personnel regulations, the thrust was to try to get the engineers to devise more efficient ways to ensure on time and on cost flights. However, it was a6knowledged during interviews that there has been at best only moderate success in this endeavor. Staffing up of the Space Station Program has probably been more effective here, as it reduced the number of NASA engineers working on the Space Shuttle. 9. An increasing level of stress and a decreasing level of reward for program personnel was expected as the program became operational. The increased stress associated with frequent Space Shuttle

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167 flights was commented upon by several interviewees. One former program manager said the hardest decisions he had ever made in his career were those involving the commitment to launch in the face of uncertain or marginally acceptable weather conditions. Clearly, the stress is of a different type in an operational program than during the design stages of a program. Which is greater is highly subjective. As for decreasing reward, there are only indirect indicators. These include the fact that the top management of the Johnson Space Center (director, deputy director, and associate director) have devoted most of their attention since 1982 to activities other than the Space Shuttle Program, primarily the Space Station Program. The implication is that other activities, the Space Station in particular, have become more important than the Space Shuttle Program, and that promotions and other career enhancements will more likely result from involvement in those other activities. 10. Securing adequate resource allocations (people and money) was expected to be increasingly difficult with time. It is hard to say if there was really such a trend, because the Space Shuttle Program was born in an era of tight budgets. As several people pointed out in interviews, the Space Shuttle was not NASA's first choice for its next major program. There

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168 was a strong desire on the part of quite a few top NASA officials in the late 1960's to develop a Space Station, with development of a small shuttle vehicle considered a possible add-on to provide servicing to the station. There was also sentiment for planetary exploration, most likely to Mars. However, these arguments were taking place while the "Great Society" was crumbling, and it was clear that NASA would not be able to do all the things it wanted to do. Mqst recently, the Space Station Program has taken an increasing share .of critical resources. Through 1985, this was primarily people. The Space Station program management organization at the Johnson Space Center grew from about twenty people to about 200 by the end of 1985, and most of the new personnel on that program were formerly involved in management of the Space Shuttle Program. 11. Increasing influence by external special interest groups on program decisions was expected. This trend was seen clearly by some, while others observed that there had been such a strong political influence from the earliest days of the program that it was not feasible to increase external influences. What is clear is that there has always been and will always be a strong political component in management of the Space Shuttle Program. 12. Increasing amounts of interpersonal conflict

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169 were expected as the program became operational. While increased interpersonal conflict would seem to go hand in hand with increased stress, none of the interviewees mentioned interpersonal conflict in any context, and of course it was not the subject of formal program records. Again, the effects of the institution may be masking or compensating for happenings within the Space Shuttle Program. Three institutional characteristics are of significance here. First, most of the personnel involved in the management of the Space Shuttle Program have been at the Johnson Space Center for about twenty years, and the key people are well known by the other key people. Second, there is a strong work ethic among the involved personnel, and a tendency to focus on the job to be done without regard to personal feelings. Third, there is a strong belief in the following of orders, which results in conflict typically not being allowed to get in the way of work. 13. An increasing number of legends and stories commonly believed by program personnel was expected. Indicative of this trend were stories told during interviews, as several of the interviewees described the conception and growth of the program from their perspective. While no two versions were identical, there were some common elements, some of which were probably factual, and some of which were the stuff of

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170 myths and fairy tales. 14. An increasing number of rituals in the program was expected. Indicative of this trend is the increased number of formal reviews held regarding preparations for each specific Space Shuttle flight. These reviews all have technical merit, but also served to symbolize the importance of some of the detailed work involved in preparing for each flight, and the need to perform, control, and report on work in an orderly and predefined manner. 15. An increasing number of symbols and slogans in the program were expected. Such a trend was clearly indicated by program records. Such things as formal publication and distribution to every NASA employee the NASA administrator's goals and objectives are very high in symbolic value. Others include NASA's sponsorship of numerous productivity improvement seminars and productivity improvement programs. Conclusions The following conclusions are offered as a result of this study. Each conclusion is derived from one or more findings from the previous chapter. 1. The concept of an organizational life-cycle consisting of entrepreneurial, collectivity, formalization and control, and elaboration of structure

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stages is not confirmed. 2. Movement of an organization through a lifecycle may not occur in discrete steps, but is more likely to occur incrementally. 171 3. Life-cycle theory alone explains some organizational phenomena, but there are frequently other factors involved. 4. Other significant factors which must be considered along with life-cycle theory in explaining organizational phenomena include key personnel (especially changes in key personnel assignments), available resources, external influences, and institutional influences. 5. Institutional influences did dominate some life-cycle considerations in the management of the Space Shuttle Program. 6. The public sector nature of the Space Shuttle Program also dominated some life-cycle considerations, and also was a partial cause of the large influence of structural, political, and symbolic considerations. 7. The national importance, high cost, and high visibility of the Space Shuttle Program dominated some life-cycle considerations, and also helped cause the large influence of structural, political, and symbolic considerations. 8. More awareness by managers of the importance

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of political and symbolic considerations would enable them to deal more effectively with program management issues. 172 9. Organizational analysis is benefitted by the use of the framework consisting of structural, systems, human resources, political, and symbolic frames. Of particular significance is the high occurrence of political and symbolic data. This emphasizes the importance of using these relatively new factors in the conduct of organizational analysis. 10. The two sets of constructs, the four lifecycle stages and the five organizational frames, are not orthogonal. In particular, there is significant commonality in the definitions of the structural frame and the elaboration of structure stage. Applicability Early in this report, three areas of potential applicability of the results were identified. The conclusions presented above have clear applicability to the three areas, as described below. Of significance to theoreticians, it was anticipated that this study would significantly augment the body of knowledge regarding organizational life cycles. There is not presently in existence a coherent theory of life-cycle management applicable to long-term

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173 very high cost activities. This study has provided a significant foundation for the development of an approach to life-cycle management which will help such programs achieve their performance goals with a more efficient use of limited resources than would otherwise be the case. As a practical application, this study will be of benefit to the management of activities which share the four outstanding characteristics of the Space Shuttle Program; technical complexity, high cost, long lifetime, and high visibility. The most obvious beneficiary of the results of this study will be to the Space Station Program. The Space Station Program is very similar to the Space Shuttle Program in terms of the four characteristics just mentioned. The Space Station Program is also NASA's next major initiative. It is now in the preliminary definition phase, and formal design definition is expected to start soon. Thus, the Space Station Program thus has most of its life-cycle ahead of it. The Space Station Program is roughly comparable to the Space Shuttle Program in terms of cost, schedule, and technical complexity. Being conducted by the same organization (NASA), it is also subject to many of the same considerations of structure, human resource utilization, politics, and symbolism. Additionally, the two programs have a strong functional

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174 tie. The Space Shuttle will carry the Space Station modules into space for their assembly. Thus, it is expected that there will be great similarity between the life-cycles of the Space Shuttle and the Space Station Programs. Finally, there is practical application of the findings and conclusions of this study to the continued management of the Space Shuttle Program. This study has three specific applications. First, for the analysis of NASA's management practices and determination of their continued validity, which was by the Presidential Commission which investigated the Space Shuttle Challenger accident, this study provides insight into past and existing Space Shuttle management practices. Second, this study provides insight into possible changes in management practices which might be most useful for safe and effective continuation of the program. Third, for the implementation of changes and carrying on the active management of the Space Shuttle Program, this study will be useful in providing an analysis of past management practices, in terms and in a context different than those with which NASA management personnel normally deal, and which therefore provide some unique insights.

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175 Recommendations for Further Study This study provides positive support to the development of the theory of organizational life cycles and the association of life cycle theory with organization theory. The most meaningful follow-on to this study would be to conduct similar analyses of other organizations. In view of the Space Shuttle Challenger accident in 1986, and the possibility of significant management changes which might result, consideration was given to enlarging the scope of the study to encompass these changes. However, consideration of three factors resulted in a determination that the study should be completed within the original scope, that of analyzing the evolution of the Space Shuttle Program from its conceptual stage to the late 1985 condition of frequent flight. First, the evolution of this large program from its inception through the seemingly routine operati9ns achieved by 1985 are worthy of study no matter what follows, for reasons already cited in this report. Second, no changes in the management of the Space Shuttle Program as a result of the accident had been identified at the time when the data gathering and analysis underlying this study occurred. Third, even at the time of publication of this report, changes to the management of the Space Shuttle Program as a result of

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176 the Challenger accident are still evolving. However, in view of anticipated major changes, a follow-up to this. study in which the management of the Space Shuttle Program is again analyzed after the program resumes would be extremely interesting.

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APPENDIX A LISTING OF KEY PERSONNEL INTERVIEWED

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Name A. D. Aldrich R. w. Young D. A. Nebrig J. c. Bostick J. B. Jackson, Jr. J. P. Loftus W. R. Kelly A. Cohen C. E. Charlesworth 202 Position Manager, Space Shuttle Program Director of Administration, Johnson Space Center Deputy Director of Administration, Johnson Space Center Former Deputy Program Manager Manager, Management Integration Office Assistant to the Director, Johnson Space Center Director of Center Operations, Johnson Space Center Director of Research and Engineering, Johnson Space Center Director of Space Operations, Johnson Space Center

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APPENDIX B DATA FOR EACH YEAR

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.... I z zw m > oa:: t: -= z Ca:: w cu a: a:= A. (,) oa:: w W-iu mt-a: .... .... a::c ccn m 0 oz ..... FRAME u &&.C wo STRUCTURAL 0 0 1 1 SYSTEMS 0 0 4 0 HUMAN RESOURCES 0 0 0 0 POLITICAL 0 0 1 1 SYMBOLIC 0 0 2 1 COLU. TOTAL 0 0 8 3 Occurrence of Life-Cycle Stages and Organizational Frames in 1975 .... I z zw m > oa:: z t: Ca:: -= w cu a: a:= A. (,) oa:: w a: ::IU mt-.... a::c ccn m 0 oz ..Ill. FRAME (J &&.C wo STRUCTURAL 0 0 1 1 SYSTEMS 0 0 0 0 HUMAN RESOURCES 0 0 0 0 POLITICAL 0 2 2 0 SYMBOLIC 0 1 0 2 COLUW4 TOTAL 0 3 3 3 Occurrence of Life-Cycle Stages and Organizational Frames in 1976 204 ROW TOTAL 2 4 0 2 3 11 ROW TOTAL 2 0 0 4 3 9

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....1 I z z&U m > oa: t: _::a z Ca: ...... w il!: Nt-cu a: ... a: :::a a. u oa: w iu mta: ccn ... ....1 a: a li 0 oz ..IU. FRAME (J u.c wo STRUCTURAL 0 0 2 2 SYSTEMS 0 0 1 1 HUMAN RESOURCES o 0 0 0 POLITICAL 0 1 2 0 SYMBOLIC 0 2 0 2 COLUMN TOTAL 0 3 5 5 Occurrence of Life-Cycle Stages and Organizational Frames in 1977 ....1 I z zw m > oa: z t: _::a w il!: ...... ... cu a: ... a: :::a a. (J oa: w w iu a: ....1 mt-... ....1 a: a ccn iri 0 oz ..IU. FRAME u u.c wo STRUCTURAL 0 0 3 0 SYSTEMS 0 0 2 0 HUMAN RESOURCES 0 0 0 0 POLITICAL 0 0 1 0 SYMBOLIC 0 0 0 2 COLUMN TOTAL 0 0 6 2 of Life-Cycle Stages and Organizational Frames in 1979 205 ROW TOTAL 4 2 0 3 4 > 13 Row TOTAL 3 2 0 1 2 8

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...1 I z zw iii > t: -= z t-t-w Nt-cu t-::i! A. CJ w w iu IDt-...1 ... ...1 ccn iii 0 oz ...II&. FRAME CJ ILC wo STRUCTURAL 0 2 4 2 SYSTEMS 0 1 3 1 HUMAN RESOURCES 0 1 1 0 POLITICAL 0 4 4 0 SYMBOLIC 0 2 1 3 COLU.TOTAL 0 10 13 6 Occurrence of Life-Cycle Stages and Organizational Frames in 1980 ...1 I z iii > zw t: z -= w Nt-t-t-cu a: t-::i! A. CJ w iu IDt-... ...1 ccn iii 0 oz -'I&. FRAME CJ u.c _wo STRUCTURAL 0 0 3 2 SYSTEMS 0 1 0 0 HUMAN RESOURCES 0 0 0 1 POLITICAL 0 2 4 2 SYMBOLIC 0 0 0 1 COLUMN TOTAL 0 3 7 6 Occurrence of Life-Cycle Stages and Organizational Frames in 1981 206 ROW TOTAL 8 ) 2 8 6 29 ROW TOTAL 5 1 1 8 1 16

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_, I z zw m > oac: t: -= z 2: ...... w Nt-cu ... ac:= A. CJ oac: w iu ml-... _, CCQ c"' 0 oz -II&. FRAME CJ wo STRUCTURAL 0 1 4 5 SYSTEMS 0 0 1 0 HUMAN RESOURCES 0 0 0 0 POLITICAL 0 6 6 1 SYMBOLIC n 3 0 8 COLUMN TOTAL 0 10 11 14 Occurrence of Life-Cycle Stages and Organizational Frames in 1982 _, I z m > zw t: oac: z cac: -= 2: ...... w Nt-cu ac: ... :::;! ac:= A. u w iu oac: ac: mt-1-_, CCQ c"' 0 oz -'I&. FRAME CJ wo STRUCTURAL 0 1 5 3 SYSTEMS 0 1 2 1 HUMAN RESOURCES 0 1 0 1 POLITICAL 0 5 5 1 SYMBOLIC 0 3 1 6 COLUMN TOTAL 0 11 13 12 Occurrence of Life-Cycle Stages and Organizational Frames in 1983 207 ROW TOTAL 10 1 0 13 11 35 ROW TOTAL 9 4 2 11 10 36

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.., I z zw ra > t: -= z Cg: w Nt-cu cc (,) w :&<.> cc 1-.., CCQ ccn m 0 oz FRAME (,) LI.C wo STRUCTURAL 0 3 6 4 SYSTEMS 0 1 8 2 HUMAN RESOURCES 1 3 2 0 POLITICAL 0 5 6 2 SYMBOLIC 0 9 4 5 COLUMN TOTAL 1 21 26 13 Occurrence of Life-Cycle Stages and Organizational Frames in 1984 I z ra > zw t: z ccc -= ... w Nt-cu cc 1-(,) w iu a: 1-.., a: a ccn FRAME m 0 oz ..Ill. (,) I&.C wo STRUCTURAL 0 2 13 10 SYSTEMS 0 4 13 3 HUMAN RESOURCES 0 5 8 10 POLITICAL 0 4 16 11 SYMBOLIC 0 9 4 14 COLUMN TOTAL 0 24 54 48 Occurrence of Life-Cycle Stages and Organizational Frame5 in 1985 208 ROW TOTAL 13 11 6 13 18 61 ROW TOTAL 25 20 23 31 27 126