Citation
Welfare reform and the Arizona marriage initiative

Material Information

Title:
Welfare reform and the Arizona marriage initiative
Creator:
Weller, Nicole Lee-Maki
Place of Publication:
Denver, Colo.
Publisher:
University of Colorado Denver
Publication Date:
Language:
English
Physical Description:
vi, 109 leaves : ; 28 cm

Thesis/Dissertation Information

Degree:
Master's ( Master of Arts)
Degree Grantor:
University of Colorado Denver
Degree Divisions:
Department of Political Science, CU Denver
Degree Disciplines:
Political Science
Committee Chair:
Sampaio, Anna C.
Committee Members:
Everett, Jana M.
Stefes, Christoph H.

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords:
Women -- Social conditions -- Arizona ( lcsh )
Marriage -- Government policy -- Arizona ( lcsh )
Family policy -- Arizona ( lcsh )
Welfare recipients -- Family relationships -- Government policy -- Arizona ( lcsh )
Welfare recipients -- Arizona ( lcsh )
Genre:
bibliography ( marcgt )
theses ( marcgt )
non-fiction ( marcgt )

Notes

Bibliography:
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 105-109).
Thesis:
Political science
General Note:
Department of Political Science
Statement of Responsibility:
Nicole Lee-Maki Weller.

Record Information

Source Institution:
|University of Colorado Denver
Holding Location:
|Auraria Library
Rights Management:
All applicable rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier:
75183098 ( OCLC )
ocm75183098
Classification:
LD1193.L64 2006m W44 ( lcc )

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Full Text
WELFARE REFORM AND THE
ARIZONA MARRIAGE INITIATIVE
by
Nicole Lee-Maki Weller
B.A., University of Minnesota, 2000
A thesis submitted to the
University of Colorado at Denver
in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
Political Science
2006


This thesis for the Master of Arts
degree by
Nicole Lee-Maki Weller
has been approved
by
7 3

Dal


Weller, Nicole Lee-Maki (M.A., University of Colorado at Denver)
Welfare Reform and the Arizona Marriage Initiative
Thesis directed by Associate Professor Anna C. Sampaio
ABSTRACT
The 1996 Welfare Reform Act produced a transformed public assistance
program for the United States. Provisions incorporated into the reform policies
included life time limits of welfare receipt, mandated work participation, and
marriage promotion initiatives. The 1996 Welfare Reform Act expected that by
combining time limits, work requirements and marriage promotion welfare
enrollment numbers would decrease. In 1997, Arizona reformed the previous
welfare system to meet the 1996 Welfare Reform Act provisions. Since 2000,
Arizona has been using federal welfare dollars to promote marriage as a means
of reducing dependence on government assistance. Using the mobilization
theory presented by Steven Nock and the Feminist Critical Policy Analysis
theory by Kathleen Shaw, the Arizona case study is examined to determine
what impact welfare reform and the marriage initiative have on women. The
mobilization theory examines what impact the Arizona marriage initiative has
on welfare women when there is a mobilized movement of professionals,
politicians, and faith-based leaders. The Feminist Critical Policy Analysis
examines what impact welfare reform strategies combined with marriage
promotion has on women. Applying both theories to the Arizona case study


demonstrates that marriage promotion in Arizona does not have a positive
influence for welfare women. Utilizing data provided by the Administration of
Children and Families to compare enrollment numbers prior to and after the
inception of the Arizona marriage initiative also demonstrates that the Arizona
case study does not provide beneficial outcomes for welfare women
concerning reduction in enrollment numbers. The implications of the Arizona
case study can be assessed by states developing marriage initiative programs in
accordance with the 1996 Welfare Reform Act.
This abstract accurately represents the content of the candidates thesis. I
recommend its publication.
Signed


Table of Contents
CHAPTER
1. Introduction....................................................7
Supporting the Federal Marriage Initiative.................10
Opposing the Federal Marriage Initiative...................12
Arizona Marriage Initiative................................13
Measuring the Arizona Marriage Initiative..................14
Chapter Outline............................................18
Summary....................................................21
2. Welfare Reform and the Development of the Marriage Initiative.22
Introduction..................................................22
Welfare Demographics..........................................24
Welfare Demographics and Marriage.............................26
Welfare Reform................................................28
Eligibility Standards..................................29
TANF Work Requirements.................................30
Marriage Initiative...........................................34
Healthy Marriage Initiative............................35
Summary.......................................................39
3. Mobilization and Feminist Critical Analysis Theories..........40
Introduction..................................................40
Welfare Reform Critiques......................................41
Mobilization Theory...........................................43
Professional Mobilization..............................45
Political Mobilization.................................46
Religious Mobilization.................................48
Mobilization Theory Conclusion................................50
Feminist Critical Policy Analysis.............................51
Life Time Limit of Welfare Receipt Background..........52
Mandatory Work Related Participation...................56
Reproductive Rights Manipulation.......................57
The FCPA Theory versus
Proponents of Welfare Reform...........................60
The Arizona Case Study........................................63
v


4. The Arizona Case Study..........................................65
Introduction...................................................65
Arizona Marriage Initiative....................................66
Eligibility Criteria for MCS Programs...................70
Funding of MCS Programs.................................72
Measuring the Success of the Arizona Marriage Initiative.......73
Summary of the Arizona Marriage Initiative.....................76
The Arizona Mobilization Effort................................77
Measuring the Mobilization Theory
for the Arizona Marriage Initiative........................79
Feminist Critical Policy Analysis and the
Arizona Marriage Initiative.............................81
Lifetime Limit of Welfare Receipt.......................82
Reproductive Manipulation...............................83
Mandatory Work Requirements.............................84
Summary of the Mobilization Theory and the
Feminist Critical Policy Analysis..............................85
Policy Implications for State Marriage Initiatives.............86
Summary........................................................90
Endnotes............................................................93
Appendix............................................................101
A. Arizona Welfare Enrollment Numbers.........................101
B. Arizona Welfare Enrollment Numbers.........................102
C. National Welfare Enrollment Numbers........................103
D. National Welfare Enrollment Numbers........................104
Bibliography........................................................105
vi


CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
Promoting self-sufficiency and limiting the need for government
assistance is the purpose of the federally funded welfare system. In the mid-
nineties the United States social welfare system was overhauled and
entitlement programs that provided financial assistance to eligible individuals
were eliminated. New legislation labeled the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) replaced the historical
welfare program known as Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC).1 Under PRWORA basic cash assistance programs such as welfare,
food assistance, and Medicaid were now labeled Temporary Aid to Needy
Families (TANF). The key modification for the welfare system was that
welfare benefits were no longer available for a lifetime; instead all services
were now temporary.2 Throughout the nation, states and counties changed
their existing welfare systems into accelerated career-oriented programs that
only permitted sixty months of welfare benefits.3 TANF changed the face of
7


welfare and enrollment numbers decreased by nearly half in the first three
years.4
President Bill Clinton signed PRWORA legislation into law on
August 22nd, 1996 with four established goals of the new program. Three of
the four established goals in PRWORA focused on family formation and
marriage as a means to reducing poverty.5 These goals included promoting
marriage to end dependence on welfare, to reduce the number of out-of-
wedlock births, and to encourage the formation and maintenance of two-
parent households.6 According to McLaughlin and Lichter, proponents
believed that through marriage, young, single mothers who are receiving
welfare benefits will be better able to lift themselves from poverty.7 Benefits
of marriage may include an economic advantage of two working parents
instead of one, more available resources for childcare, and mental and
emotional support from a spouse.8 The ultimate goal of the marriage initiative
was to alter the focus of the welfare system to include the promotion of
marriage.9
Welfare initiatives permitted states to develop their own marriage
programs in order to promote family rather then welfare as a means for
economic survival.10 Some states placed caps on the number of children
eligible for welfare benefits thus eliminating some children from being
counted for any cash benefit increases while others enforced stricter work
8


requirements for mothers receiving welfare benefits.11 States were permitted
to use federal funding to sponsor abstinence only education programs to
reduce the number of out-of-wedlock births as well as decrease the welfare
enrollment numbers.12 Finally, marriage initiatives were established which
rewarded states for increasing the number of two-parent households receiving
assistance. Likewise, states were permitted to use federal funding to promote
marriage through education programs, presentations, public marketing,
marital counseling, and monetary incentives and financial sanction for
welfare recipients.13
Concentrating on the state of Arizona, which has utilized TANF
dollars for marriage programs, this paper will examine whether marriage
promotion within the welfare community has provided beneficial outcomes
for welfare women. Two theories will be applied to the case study to review
what impact welfare reform and the Arizona marriage initiative have had for
welfare women in Arizona. The selected theories are the mobilization theory
by Stephen Nock and the Feminist Critical Analysis (FPCA) theory by
Kathleen Shaw.14 After reviewing additional theories addressing welfare
reform and the marriage initiative, the mobilization theory and the FCPA
theory were selected because each theory provides an evaluation of the
impact that welfare reform combined with marriage promotion have on
women. Data from the Administration of Children and Families (ACF) will
9


present welfare enrollment demographics from the inception of TANF in
1997 through 2004.15 To measure the success of the Arizona marriage
initiative, data reflecting enrollment numbers of single women on welfare
will be compared to the numbers of two-parent households receiving welfare.
The comparison will be based on enrollment numbers from 1997-2000 and
from 2001-2004. It is expected that the Arizona marriage initiative will not
provide beneficial outcomes for welfare women based on the guidelines of
the mobilization theory and FCPA theory as well as the data provided by the
ACF. Success of the Arizona marriage initiative will be measured by the
number of welfare women participating in marriage programs as well as a
significant decrease in welfare enrollment numbers.
Supporting the Federal Marriage Initiative
Supporters of the marriage initiative believe that marriage programs
help establish strong, healthy, families.16 Some research indicates that not
only is marriage beneficial for low income parents, but that children fair
better when both parents are present in the home.17 Likewise, the rising
number of unwed mothers, practically one-third of all births, is creating a
platform for TANF reform.18 Little research has been done to determine the
beneficial outcomes that marriage promotion will produce for unwed TANF
10


mothers. I will look at the potential outcomes that marriage projects will
provide unwed mothers on TANF. Literature will be reviewed to determine if
federally funded marriage programs will result in welfare women getting
married and becoming financially independent, or if marriage promotion in
the welfare community will have any beneficial impact for women.
Another advantage to promoting marriage in TANF programs is the
increased employment options available. Women who are married will have
greater access to childcare.19 Proponents of the initiative argue that having
both parents in the home will allow for reliable childcare thus opening the
work schedule for women to take on jobs they might not have been able to do
without affordable childcare. Additionally, women who are married may
have more time and support to pursue training and education that would not
be feasible without a second income or childcare. The impact of marriage
promotion will be researched to determine if there is any increased
employment opportunities for TANF mothers. Advocates of the initiative
expect that through marriage promotion TANF recipients will be more likely
to marry thus increasing their employment opportunities. They claim that
employment advancements will reduce the likelihood of returning to federal
assistance for family maintenance. I will review whether research supporting
a connection between marriage promotion and financial stability is applicable
to the Arizona case study.
11


Opposing the Federal Marriage Initiative
Controversy surrounding the agenda of marriage for poverty
resolution extends to the very beginning of TANF in 1996. Many groups feel
that TANF needs to focus on the initial goals of employment and training
rather then building the family structure. According to McLaughlin and
Lichter, marriage is more likely to occur if a woman is already employed and
economically self-sufficient.20 Their research examined the positive impact
that job training and educational opportunities had for women receiving
TANF, through an increased potential of desirability to marry. McLaughlin
and Lichter noted in their research that marriage is less likely to occur with
women who have little or no economic stability.21 Another critique of the
marriage agenda is presented by Mark R. Rank who claims that marriage can
not be attributed to reducing female poverty, but rather that by improving the
labor market, reducing occupational segregation and income disparities,
providing child care assistance, and enforcing child support payments, female
poverty will eliminate itself.22 Rank notes that marriage is unlikely in welfare
households with less then 20% of welfare mothers marrying in a three year
time period. Rank emphasizes the importance of the labor market rather then
the marriage market.23 A similar critique of the marriage market notion by
12


Sarah Olson suggests that the few welfare mothers who do marry are limited
to a low-income marriage market, which continues to perpetuate the cycle of
poverty.24
Arizona Marriage Initiative
As mentioned above, only a few states have utilized TANF dollars to
develop marriage programs since welfare reform. Alabama, Arizona, Hawaii,
Michigan, North Carolina, Okalahoma, Oregon, and Utah have been the
pioneers in utilizing TANF funds for marriage promotion.25 Arizona was the
first state to develop a marriage commission funded through the TANF block
grant.26 In 2000, Arizona developed the Marriage Communication and Skills
(MCS) commission to oversee all marriage programs within the state.27
Under Arizona policy, any agency, government or otherwise, can apply for
and receive TANF funds to facilitate marriage promotion programs.28
Arizona was selected as the case study because it was the first state to utilize
a commission to approve marriage programs and because ACF welfare
demographic data is available four years prior to and after the commission
was developed in 2000.
There are three established purposes of the MCS.29 The first is to
develop a marriage and communication skills curriculum that will focus on
building relationships, negotiating and communication skills, as well as
13


provide information and resources for family law and domestic violence.30
Second is to offer vouchers for low-income families to attend marriage
trainings, and third is to create and distribute a handbook about marriage and
communication skills.31 The marriage initiative in Arizona is marketing
marriage as a means to maintaining society, as promoting happy families, and
for raising happy and healthy children.32
While there is no legislation requiring that TANF agencies mandate
marriage program participation for welfare recipients in Arizona, there are
policies written into welfare reform that require TANF agencies to provide
services that will administer relationship and marriage skills development.33
Based on these policies, Arizona welfare programs encourage TANF
recipients to attend marriage programs by providing vouchers for the training,
permitting time in a marriage workshop to count as a work-related activity,
and in some instances providing monetary incentives for individuals that
attend marriage programs.34
Measuring the Arizona Marriage Initiative
Measuring the success of the Arizona marriage project will be based on
an evaluation of three different components. The first measurement is the
MCS commission, which will be assessed through the principles of the
mobilization and FCPA theories. The influence that the MCS commission has
14


on welfare women will be evaluated by applying guidelines of both theories
to the policies and procedures of the commission. Secondly, the number of
welfare women participating in the Arizona marriage project will be
determined based on data provided by the Administration of Children and
Families from the years prior to and after the inception of the marriage
project in Arizona.35 Finally, the potential outcomes impacting Arizona
welfare women will be discussed through a review of previous research on
welfare reform.
Measuring the Arizona MCS commission will begin with an evaluation
of the commission development under the guidelines of the mobilization
theory. The MCS commission will be assessed to determine whether policies
and procedures surrounding marriage promotion occurred through a
collaborative effort of politicians, professionals, and religious groups.36
Based on the mobilization theory, any policy reform that has been developed
through collaborative efforts by the above groups will result in positive
outcomes for society, and in the Arizona case, for welfare women. The
mobilization theory will be applied to the Arizona case study to evaluate the
establishment of the MCS commission and to determine what impact the
commissions actions will have on welfare women.
Following the application of the mobilization theory, the Arizona case
study will be reviewed under the principles of the FCPA theory. Proponents
15


of the FCPA theory claim that change under welfare reform, such as life time
limits for welfare receipt, mandatory work requirements, and the
manipulation of reproductive rights have been influenced by the marriage
initiative.37 Motherhood has become a class issue and welfare reform has
caused a sharp divide between low and middle-income women. Neither group
can really afford to stay at home with the children while depending on only
one income: either that of the father or the state.
According to FCPA theorists, middle-class women have lost the
desire to fight for the rights of all women, including those on welfare, to stay
home rather then work. Once middle-class women started to combine foil
time work with child rearing, any support for welfare women to exclusively
raise children and not work was eliminated. The welfare system was
developed to train single mothers how to become more like working middle-
class women; which is to have a job, a family and be self-sufficient.38 FCPA
theorists claim that the reform package has created an under class of welfare
women who are expected to meet the standards established by middle-class
families.39 In other words, welfare women have had lost the right to be a
mother because they had children out-of-wedlock and because the state,
instead of the father is supporting the family. The FCPA theory will be
utilized to examine what impact welfare reform combined with the marriage
initiative has on women. This examination will be applied to the Arizona case
16


study to determine what impact federal reform mandates and the MCS
commission have on welfare women in Arizona.
The second measurement of success for the Arizona marriage initiative
will be based on data provided by the Administration of Children and
Families (ACF).40 The ACF has collected data about welfare recipients since
1959 and records the demographics of all welfare families based on
information provided by state welfare agencies 41 For the purpose of the
Arizona case study, demographic data from 1997 through 2004 will be
reviewed to compare the number of single parent homes versus two parent
homes. The MCS commission began promoting marriage in 2000 and the
data provided by the ACF will offer a before and after account of whether the
marriage programs have resulted in an increase of two parent homes and a
decrease in single parent homes.
The final measurement of success will be based on a review of research
outlining welfare reform and the marriage initiative. Literature will be
examined to determine whether reform policies surrounding education and
vocational training and the promotion of marriage will meet the expectations
of the four TANF goals. TANF was established to assist families to quickly
exit from welfare and into self-sufficiency. By streamlining training
programs and supplementing a lifetime of benefits with marriage, TANF
agencies expect that families will be able to exit welfare and become
17


financially stable.42 The Arizona welfare system and marriage project will be
evaluated through a literature review to evaluate what impact welfare reform
and marriage will have on welfare women.
Marriage promotion is included within three of the four TANF purposes.
The recent reauthorization of welfare in 2006 brings increased expectations
that states will use TANF funding to promote marriage as a means for
reducing poverty. Measuring the outcomes in the Arizona case study has
critical implications for the recent TANF reauthorization surrounding the
development of marriage programs under TANF guidelines. Measuring the
success of the Arizona marriage project will provide states tools for
successful distribution of TANF funds for marriage programs that will
provide direct services for the welfare community.
Chapter Outline
In order to determine whether the Arizona marriage initiative will
provide women a means to exiting the welfare system I will provide
information describing welfare reform, a review of the selected theories, and
a presentation of the Arizona case study. Through these chapters, it is
expected that the Arizona marriage initiative will prove to be unsuccessful in
assisting women exit welfare through marriage.
18


To begin, a thorough background analysis of welfare reform and the
establishment of TANF will be presented. Additionally, the implementation
of the marriage initiative will be presented with the background of welfare.
The chapter focusing on TANF and the marriage initiative will provide
detailed information about the requirements for welfare receipt and how these
requirements are connected to the marriage initiative.
Following the background of welfare reform and the marriage
initiative, a debate between welfare reform implementation and the
implications that the reform policies have for women, one chapter will
present the mobilization theory and the FCPA theory. The mobilization
theory will be introduced and details will be provided about the relationship
between politicians, professionals and religious leaders and why Nock bases
his theory on the collaborative efforts of these three groups. The mobilization
theory will be discussed in particular concerning the role that the three groups
had in reforming welfare and why their involvement resulted in a successful
policy change. The principles of this theory will be applied to the Arizona
case study to debate whether the MCS commission meets the expectations of
the mobilization theory.
Following the examination of the Arizona case study under the guide of
the mobilization theory, the FCPA theory will be introduced. The FCPA
examines the direct impact that reform changes have on women by focusing
19


solely on the impact the policy reform has on gender. This theory is applied
to the Arizona case study to determine what impact welfare reform and the
marriage initiative will have on women. The FCP A theory looks at three
policy changes that developed from welfare reform in 1996. Life time limits
of welfare receipt, mandatory participation in a work-related activity, and the
manipulation of reproductive rights are the three policies that will be applied
to the Arizona case.43 The FCPA theory will be discussed to evaluate whether
Arizonas marriage project is replacing the loss of education and vocational
training with marriage.
The Arizona case study will be presented after establishing the
background of welfare and the marriage initiative and after providing the
basis of the mobilization theory and the FCPA theory. The Arizona case
review will provide a description of the MCS commission including the
relationship of the commission to Arizonas welfare system. The Arizona
case study will be debated between the mobilization theory and the FCPA
theory to determine whether marriage promotion will benefit welfare women.
The last chapter will focus on providing data that is expected to support the
hypothesis that marriage promotion within the welfare system does not
provide direct benefits to women.
20


Summary
Part of welfare reform in 1996 was the expectation that every five
years TANF would be reauthorized based on the demands of society.44 In
2001 TANF reauthorization was introduced but there was no reauthorization
until 2006, but rather a continuation of the system originally proposed in
1996. Current TANF reauthorization includes the four main purposes of
TANF established in 1996 but there is an increased emphasis on the
promotion of marriage as a means for reducing poverty. During the first nine
years of TANF, marriage promotion was not strictly enforced and few states
utilized the available funding to develop programs focused on marriage.
Under the new the reauthorization, marriage promotion has taken the lead as
a key factor in reducing dependence on welfare and eliminating poverty. The
Arizona case study has been using TANF dollars to promote marriage since
2000. The purpose of this thesis is to prove that utilizing TANF dollars to
promote marriage rather then education and vocational training will not
improve the lives of welfare women through successful exit from the welfare
system.
21


CHAPTER TWO
WELFARE REFORM AMD THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MARRIAGE
INITIATIVE
Introduction
Prior to 1996, the welfare system was considered an entitlement
program that was available to any family needing assistance. Aid to Needy
Families with Children (AFDC) was the previous welfare system that
provided cash benefits to low income families for an extended period of time
with little or no state-imposed requirements on the recipients.45 With the
passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act (PRWORA) in 1996, the United States welfare system was dramatically
altered and the result was a work-first program that was focused on
improving the lives of welfare families through four main objectives. In order
to meet the outcomes of the four objectives, the Temporary Aid to Needy
Families (TANF) system was established to replace the previous AFDC
system.
22


Welfare reform began with the establishment of four primary goals
developed through PRWORA legislation. These goals are to provide
assistance to needy families; end dependence on welfare by promoting job
preparation, work and marriage for needy families; prevent and reduce the
incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies; and establish annual numerical
goals for preventing and reducing the incidence of these pregnancies and,
encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent families.46 Three of
the four purposes focus on family formation and marriage as a means to
reducing poverty. Although TANF has been established since 1996 and these
goals have been the sole purpose of the welfare system, it was not until the
reauthorization of TANF in 2005 that marriage promotion began to become a
central focus for reducing welfare enrollment numbers.47 One of the less then
dozen states to promote marriage prior to 2005 was Arizona. In 2000,
Arizona established the Marriage and Communications Skills (MCS)
Commission to develop and fund marriage programs that would assist low-
income and welfare families develop communication and relationship skills
ultimately resulting in marriage and the reduction of welfare enrollment
numbers.48
Welfare reform in 1996 introduced the notion that marriage could be a
resolution to poverty and that by promoting healthy relationships states could
potentially reduce the number of families receiving welfare.49 This chapter
23


will outline the changes that occurred with the inception of TANF in 1996
including the demographics of welfare families, eligibility standards, and
work requirements. Following the background discussion, an analysis of the
impact that TANF reform has had on welfare women will be presented and
the concept of the marriage initiative will be introduced. The development of
the marriage initiative will be examined and the connection between welfare
reform and marriage promotion will be presented. Welfare reform and the
marriage initiative have had a profound impact on the lives of women and
this chapter will provide background information concerning reform policies.
In the following chapter, welfare reform and the marriage initiative will be
examined under the principles of the mobilization theory and the FCPA
theory.
Welfare Demographics
The first indicator of welfare use is the presence of young children.50 The
most common characteristic of welfare recipients is that they are young,
single mothers with children under the age six.51 The reality of the welfare
52
system is that the largest percentage of welfare recipients are children.
Adults are eligible for assistance only if they have a dependent child. There is
a high percentage of current welfare recipients that were raised under the
previous welfare program, AFDC .53 The probability of current welfare
24


receipt increases if the womans parent was on welfare, thus demonstrating
that poverty and welfare dependence can be cyclical.54
The duration that a woman receives cash benefits is measured by her
education levels, the number and ages of children in the home, and her
residence.55 Welfare length increases with lower levels of academic
achievements. Individuals with no high school diploma or equivalency will
remain on TANF longer then individuals with a high school education.
Individuals with some college or a certificate degree will have the shortest
tenure of government assistance. Research has shown that the educational
level of an individual can be used as measurement of how long that person
will be receiving government assistance.56 The measurement shows that with
more education, the length of welfare use decreases.57 Higher academic
achievements are attributed to an increase in employment opportunities
which reduces the need for government assistance.
The number and the ages of children in the home also impact welfare
duration. Women with young children who require full time childcare are
more dependent on assistance when compared to women with children who
do not need childcare or only care before and after school.58 Many states will
provide some provision for childcare but this is only available while the
woman is participating in a welfare program. Women who begin working and
are preparing to exit the system, will be expected to pay for childcare on their
25


own. Women with multiple children requiring full time care struggle to
afford the expense under low-income wages. Because of this, women with
young children are likely to stay on welfare longer because childcare is not an
added expense.59 Similar obstacles face women with more then one child.
With each child requiring care, the cost rises and the chances of becoming
financially independent of government assistance decreases.60
Where a person lives is the final measurement for the duration of welfare
use. Individuals living in low-income areas with decreased employment and
educational opportunities are more likely to receive government assistance.61
Despite employment exits from the welfare system, geographical location can
influence a familys ability to sustain financial independence.62 The
limitations placed on educational and vocational attainment through welfare
reform limits a womans potential to earn high wages that would allow the
family to move out of low income areas.
Welfare Demographics and Marriage
The relationship between marriage and poverty has been researched to
determine what impact marriage promotion will have among low-income
women. According to studies by Aassve, the financial stability of women has
an impact on their likelihood of marriage.63 Despite previous assumptions
that welfare receipt results in lower incidences of marriage, it is actually the
26


increase of economic wealth that lowers marriage rates64 The more
economically independent a woman is, the less likely she will be to marry.65
Likewise, higher education, higher earnings, and higher work experience also
decrease the likelihood of marriage. Economic independence for women is a
reason for the decline in marriage rates, not the increase of female poverty
and welfare rolls.66
Women receiving government assistance have long been presumed to
avoid marriage in order to receive more cash benefits and to remain eligible
under the new TANF regulations. However, research claims that women
receiving welfare are not getting married because they have demographic
disadvantages for finding suitable marriage partners.67 These women are
living in low-income areas, not working, and have young children. All these
factors decrease a womans opportunity to find a marital partner that will
emotionally and financially support the family. A reoccurring critique of
marriage promotion programs is that there are not enough marriageable men
available for women living in poverty.68 The argument stands that if both
partners lack education, work experience, and high wage earning potential
then the family will remain in poverty and subsequently be ineligible for
TANF based on the household income. Women, who are working and
earning high wages to support their families, are themselves more attractive
marriage partners and have an increased potential to encounter marriageable
27


men as well. Research has shown that women who fall under the
classification of working poor are more likely to marry then those women are
not working and are considered poor.69
Welfare Reform
Funding for state welfare programs is based on block grants
administered by the federal government.70 States are given the discretion to
spend the block grant in any manner as long as federal guidelines and the
four TANF purposes are met. Specific federal regulations and expectations
have been established, and states need to adhere to these regulations to
continue funding. The first expectation outlines eligibility for cash assistance.
Eligibility requirements have been established by the federal government and
cannot be altered based on state discretion. TANF benefits are distributed
based on the number of children in the home, the household income, living
expenses of the family, and whether or not both biological parents are living
together 71 These are only a small list of eligibility requirements but they are
the most relevant for the purpose of the Arizona case study.
28


Eligibility Standards
Adults who do not have a dependent child living with them are not
eligible for TANF assistance and women with no children are eligible only
after six months of pregnancy.72 Living expenses such as rent, utilities, and
childcare are considered when establishing eligibility. For example, if a teen
mother is living with her parents who pay the rent, utilities, and her childcare,
than that teen mother will be denied because she has no personal expenses.73
Finally, the living situation of the welfare mother and the father of her
children are considered for welfare receipt. If the mother is not living with
the father of her children then she is more likely to receive welfare benefits
than if she was living with him.74 Benefit approval is higher when both
biological parents are not living together because the poverty level of a single
parent household is greater then that of a two-parent home.75 If the mother is
living with the father of her children, the household may not even be eligible
for welfare benefits. If the household is approved for assistance, both the
mother and the father will be expected to participate in work-related
programs.76 However, if the mother is living with a man that is not the father
of her children, than that man is not required to participate in the TANF
29


program but his income is still considered and can be used to deny the family
any assistance 77
There are two main opposing views for the reform welfare system.
One opposing view is that the strict eligibility requirements are a limitation of
access to services that could benefit poor adults. By excluding childless
adults from welfare assistance will ultimately force these individuals to
continue living in poverty 79 The other opposing view considers TANF
reform to be promoting out-of-wedlock births and discouraging marriage.80
These critics claim that providing services only to families with children
perpetuates the number of out-of-wedlock births.81 By requiring families to
have children for welfare receipt and enforcing work requirements on both
parents if they are living together will only discourage marriage among
welfare parents.82 Under either criticism, TANF eligibility requirements are
only servicing single parents, which, according to TANF demographics are
primarily young single mothers.83
TANF Work Requirements
Once approved for TANF, all recipients are expected to participate in
activities which require no less then thirty hours a week of participation in a
work-related program.84 PRWORA mandates that all recipients be working
for their cash benefits in a federally approved program. Allowable activities
30


include a lifetime maximum of twelve months for vocational education, job
readiness programs, six weeks a year for job searching, and community
service activities.85
TANF does not permit welfare recipients to enroll in two or four year
degree programs while receiving cash benefits.86 The 1996 reform policies
established welfare systems as work first program that did not allow for long-
term training. As a result of these reform policies, welfare recipients are not
allowed to attend any higher education programs that would enhance their
academic careers.87 Academic training that is permitted while receiving
welfare benefits include short term certificate programs and preparation for
the General Equivalency Diploma (GED).88 Critics of welfare work
requirements claim that by removing the opportunity for long-term education
women have become disadvantaged in the workforce.89 Women will exit
welfare through low paying jobs that will not provide sufficient incomes to
support the family.
Welfare work requirements were established to develop working habits
that would help families transition from TANF. A part of the work
requirement aspect is the notion that welfare families learn how to maintain a
full time work week while balancing childcare demands.90 All recipients are
expected to participate in weekly, work-related activities which requires
reliable childcare. The purpose of mandating work-related activities is that
31


recipients will be more prepared to exit welfare through employment if
obstacles such as childcare have already been stabilized.91 Women with
childcare arranged prior to employment are less likely to lose their jobs and
return to welfare assistance because of childcare issues.92
While some states may provide childcare, the federal government does
not mandate that childcare provisions be provided through the welfare
system.93 Women with children requiring care are not exempt from the
mandated work requirements and will have to pay for childcare services on
their own. This can deter women from applying for assistance because they
will not be able to afford childcare which is needed to participate in the
mandated welfare work requirements.94
TANF work requirements allow minimal exemptions for work activities
if the family has mental health and medical emergencies, domestic violence
circumstances or life obstacles such as homelessness and transportation
issues.95 For example, in circumstances where there is a medical emergency
or domestic violence, a welfare recipient is temporarily exempt from
participating in a work related activity. However, states are motivated to have
recipients participate in work activities based on federal requirements and
will often place a time limit on exemptions from work that range from six
weeks to six months.96
32


Each state is expected to demonstrate that a minimum of 50 percent of
welfare recipients are participating in a monthly work-related activity. If a
recipient is not participating in an activity, and is not meeting the required
monthly work hours, the state receives a penalty.98 Continued federal funding
for TANF programs is partly based on the total percentage of welfare
recipients that are participating in the monthly work activity.99 If the state
fails to meet the monthly participation rate they can be subject to a loss of
funding for the TANF programs and are expected to use state dollars to make
up the difference. Since states do not want to lose federal funding for welfare
programs, TANF agencies have been established to assist recipients meet the
required participation hours in a month. These agencies are state and county
specific and are developed to provide services to welfare families based on
PRWORA guidelines. As long as the state meets federal expectations for
distributing welfare funds, the state can mandate that welfare families
cooperate with the TANF agencies as part of their work requirements.100
Currently, agencies across the country are beginning to develop marriage
promotion programs that would be used towards the recipients required work
activities. The 1996 Welfare Reform Act included marriage promotion as a
means for reducing poverty and recipients participate in marriage programs
can use that time towards the states 50 percent participation requirement.
33


Marriage Initiatives
Marriage promotion is listed as the fourth TANF purpose as a means for
ending dependence on government assistance. The marriage initiative is a
federally funded policy that provides $150 million dollars for marriage
promotion, over five years, based on competitive grants.101 The federal
government has established eight allowable activities that can be funded
through the grant. These include providing marriage education classes,
workshops, budgeting courses, job and career development, premarital
education, research programs and project development.102 There is no
restriction on what population is served under this funding.103 Promoting
healthy marriages through federal funding is not limited to welfare recipients
despite the fact that the funding comes from welfare dollars.104
There are four main budgeting requirements for states receiving federal
dollars for TANF.105 The first requires that states match at least fifty percent
of federal funding for all marriage projects. However, instead of using funds
from other state programs, the state is allowed to earmark incoming TANF
funds, provided by the federal government, to meet the fifty percent
requirement.106 The federal government will accept this state contribution and
34


provide the remaining funds needed for marriage promotion. What happens
in this scenario is the depletion of funding for existing TANF programs such
as job training, childcare, and education. Thus, all funding of marriage
promotion is likely to come from federal dollars that have been allocated for
TANF programs. There is no federal limit on using TANF funds to support
marriage promotion programs.107
The second spending requirement is that states spend at least $100
million per year on marriage promotion projects.108 These projects cannot be
linked to any existing TANF programs which do not primarily promote
marriage. Funding for these annual projects come from the fifty percent
funding and matching requirement developed by the federal government. The
third requirement expects that states will spend a minimum of $20 million per
year on fatherhood programs.109 Fatherhood initiatives can be tied into the
second requirement as long as marriage promotion is the priority. The final
expectation is that states will develop technical language which establishes
concrete goals for promoting marriage.110 As mentioned above, marriage
promotion does not need to be focused on the welfare population.
Healthy Marriage Initiative
Marriage promotion has been a part of the TANF legislation since its
inception in 1996, however, up until the 2006 welfare reauthorization there
35


have only been a few states that with developed marriage projects or that
have provided incentives for marriage within the TANF system. The current
administration has taken steps to ensure that marriage promotion under
TANF is utilized by all states receiving federal dollars for welfare
programs.111 One such development is the Healthy Marriage Initiative (HMI)
that focuses on early intervention, voluntary participation, and targeting both
men and women regardless of economic backgrounds to meet the
expectations of the TANF guidelines surrounding marriage promotion.112 The
HMI is based on the belief that there is no shortage of marriageable men, that
marriage reduces out-of-wedlock childbirth, that marriage can lift a woman
from poverty, and that instances of domestic violence are more likely to
occur in cohabitating relationships rather then in stable marriages.113
On the surface, the HMI was establish to address the questions of how
marriage can improve the physical and emotional health of men and women,
why married couples are economically more stable, why children of married
parents are more successful in academic programs, and why the prevalence of
domestic violence and child abuse are less likely in married couples then in
comparable relationships.114 Initial welfare reform in 1996 focused on
congressional findings which declared that the foundation of a successful
society is marriage.115 The marriage promotion clause included in the TANF
36


system was established to further promote the betterment of society, the
family, and children.
According to the HMI, the welfare system has been responsible for
the decline in marriages, the increase in out-of-wedlock births, and the
increase in divorce rates.116 Welfare penalizes recipients for marrying the
biological parent of the child by decreasing monetary grants to the family and
increasing expected work participation hours. The current welfare system has
over 70 means tested programs that continuously award single parents.117
Programs such as food assistance, Medicaid, housing subsidies, and cash
assistance provide assistance based on the number of adults in the home. The
presence of both biological parents reduces the amount of services available
to a single parent. The HMI has been modeled to improve family
relationships so dependence on government assistance programs will be less
likely.
Any participation in HMI sponsored programs is purely voluntary.118
This ensures that only couples interested in marrying will participate in
marriage programs and prevents forcing participation of unwilling couples
into a legal commitment. HMI programs have been developed from existing
marriage skills curriculum that would be altered to meet the needs of
participants in the program. Key components of HMI programs would be
aimed at reducing domestic violence factors, increasing employment
37


opportunities for low-income families, and intervening in high-risk
relationships.119 Although funding for the HMI comes from block grants for
TANF programs, the welfare population would not be the sole audience.
Working under the assumption that welfare mothers have already
experienced failed relationships, the HMI intends to focus on young adults
prior to the development of negative assumptions about failed relationships
and a reduced desire for marriage. 120
Early prevention and isolation imposed by poverty and single
parenthood is the primary focus of the HMI.121 Intervention prior to
conception will help reduce out of wedlock births and increase the
sustainability of healthy marriages. Intervention is achieved through using
federal funding to refer adults into life-planning workshops that include
marriage promotion, relationship training and discussing the benefit of
delaying childbearing until stable marital relationships can be developed.
According to the Fragile Families Survey, there is a magic moment at the
time of birth when both parents are open to the idea of marriage.122 Under the
right guidance and mentoring, new parents are more likely to consider
marriage. According to supporters of the HMI, if marriage does not precede
conception, at least it can occur after birth.123 Although not ideal under the
HMI goals and mission, marriage after conception can still promote the well
being for the child and both parents.
38


Summary
The 1996 Welfare Reform Act replaced a previous system of life time
cash benefits and introduced the TANF system which provided temporary aid
to needy families. This system required all welfare recipients to participate in
work-related activities which would provide the tools necessary to exit
welfare. Included in welfare reform was the introduction of the marriage
initiative. This initiative was added to the PRWORA legislation as a means
for reducing poverty. The expectation of the marriage initiative was to
promote marriage in conjunction with training and education to reduce
welfare enrollment numbers. Few states have utilized federal dollars to
promote marriage. Arizona was the first state to develop a marriage
commission and has had marriage programs since 2000.124 The next chapter
will review the critiques of welfare reform and introduce the theories that will
be applied to the Arizona case study to examine what impact welfare reform
and the marriage initiative have had on women.
39


CHAPTER THREE
MOBILIZATION AND FEMINIST CRITICAL ANALYSIS THEORIES
Introduction
Marriage and welfare are two social institutions that have been
transformed over time through changes in public policy. Historically, welfare
and marriage have not been viewed as mutually exclusive but recent
legislation has connected marriage to welfare as a means for reducing poverty
among single parents.125 The 1996 Welfare Reform Act introduced the notion
of marriage as a means for reducing poverty. Combined with life time limits
of welfare receipt and mandated participation in work-related activities,
marriage promotion has been added to welfares goals for reducing
poverty.126 Similarities between welfare and marriage include an association
of values, norms, and standards. Literature has shown that both marriage and
welfare can have a profound impact on a persons life, either positive or
negative.127 Using theories presented by Stephen Nock and Kathleen Shaw,
40


this chapter will overview current debates in social science literature
regarding the impact of marriage promotion for welfare women.
Both the mobilization theory by Nock and the Feminist Critical Policy
Analysis (FCPA) theory by Shaw discuss the effect of welfare reform and the
marriage initiative on women. Nocks mobilization theory will be reviewed
to determine what outcomes marriage promotion has for women when
welfare policies are established through a collaborative movement. The
Feminist Critical Policy Analysis theory presented by Shaw will be reviewed
to determine what the outcomes of marriage promotion, through welfare
reform policies, has on women. The mobilization and FCPA theory will be
applied to the Arizona case study to evaluate what impact marriage
promotion has had to on welfare recipients in Arizona. Prior to presenting the
theories, a brief description of the critiques surrounding welfare reform will
be identified.
Welfare Reform Critiques
Despite initial success of the reform system, two leading views of
opposition to welfare reform have risen from groups both in support of and
against cash benefits programs. To begin, the opposition of pro-family
organizations have long claimed the welfare system promotes out-of-wedlock
childbearing.128 Pro-family organizations attack TANF eligibility policies
41


which require that the biological father of the children not be present in the
home.129 If the father is living with his children, TANF programs can impose
different penalties on the family. The cash benefits may be reduced based on
the fathers income or the father may be required to participate in work-
related activities each month.130 Failure to comply with the work activities
could result in the case being denied or closed. Anti-TANF, pro-family
activists also claim that TANF encourages women to have more children
because each additional child will increase the monthly cash benefit.131
Proponents of the marriage initiative claim that current welfare policies deter
recipients from developing relationships with the father of their children
because of the potential financial sanctions for the family.132
The second opposition view point comes from feminist groups which
claim that welfare reform has restricted womens access to education, high
paying jobs, and financial independence.133 Feminist opponents of welfare
reform claim that by removing access to education and training programs, the
state has pushed women into financial dependency on the state or on a
husband.134 Welfare women who were dependent on the government for
support will now become dependent on male partners to support their family;
since their earning potential has been diminished. Women are forced into low
paying jobs to exit welfare, which does not successfully lift a family from
poverty. While any exit from welfare through employment is considered a
42


success, without quality education and job training, women will still have to
depend on the government, or a husband, to support her family.135 Critics of
both the TANF system and the marriage initiative believe that welfare is
supplementing marriage for education and job training.136 Instead of
providing job skills to become financially independent of the welfare system,
TANF is providing relationship skills that will assist women to secure
economic freedom through marriage.
Regardless of the critiques surrounding welfare reform, the system will
remain the same until reauthorization is introduced in 2010. Two theories
have been selected to examine what impact welfare reform and the marriage
initiative have had on women. In particular, these theories will be applied to
the Arizona marriage initiative to determine how marriage promotion in the
welfare community has influenced the lives of women.
Mobilization Theory
Beginning with the potential influence that welfare reform and the
marriage initiative will have for women is an examination of research
presented by Steven Nock. Nock is credited with having founded a school of
thought regarding administration, know as the mobilization theory.137
Utilizing three different movements by professionals, politicians, and faith-
based groups, Nock developed a theory to explain why reform policies are, or
43


are not, successful in serving the needs of society.138 For the purposes of
welfare reform and the marriage initiative, Nock applied the mobilization
theory to explain why both welfare reform and the marriage initiative have
had a positive impact for women.139 According to Nock ... research showing
that marriage is good for adults and children, (and) strengthening marriage
has become a goal of both public and private initiatives in recent years.140
Based on this growing interest in marriage, the mobilization theory
was developed to describe successful processes that result in policy reforms
that benefit society as a whole. Proponents of the theory claim that varying
demands from society, force changes in policies which impact the well-being
of the general public.141 Nock, describes three essential movements that result
in successful policy reforms.142 These three movements are organized and
mobilized movements of professionals, politicians, and religious
organizations.143 Advocates assert that the success of the 1996 welfare reform
can be explained as a collective effort of community leaders and politicians
working together to improve the welfare system.
This chapter will review the literature focusing on the mobilization
theory and apply the tenets of the theory to the Arizona marriage initiative.
The Arizona case study will be examined under the principles of the
mobilization theory to determine whether the marriage initiative has provided
44


beneficial outcomes for welfare women, specifically reducing in poverty
levels.
Professional Mobilization
The first mobilization effort was the organization of professionals.
Social scientists, practitioners, and working professionals are some of the
categories that Nock includes in his description of the professional category.
These individuals became involved in the marriage initiative when society
began to adapt the social acceptance of previous marital norms.144
Professionals began to notice changes in the social acceptance of relationship
norms that altered societys perception of marital values. Increases in
cohabitating couples, out-of-wedlock births, divorce rates, and single parent
homes motivated professionals to become involved in the marriage initiative.
The transition of relationship norms directly impacted the professional
organizations through economic outcomes. The financial stability of the
home improves when there are two working adults supporting the family.145
With the transformation of family demographics, professionals began to
notice that the labor market was also transforming. Unemployment rates were
impacted by rises in divorce, career opportunities for teen parents were
restricted based on education and work experience, and there was an increase
in welfare enrollments. The professional community was concerned about the
45


change in family dynamics that could have a potential influence on the labor
market.146
Professional communities began to organize under a goal to explain
what the social ramifications of changing family dynamics would have on the
economy as well as the future of marriage. Additionally, the professional
mobilization movement also examined what social aspects were influencing
the transformation of family demographic. The mobilization of professionals
resulted in an onset of healthy relationship workshops, marriage counseling
sessions, and educational classes that focused on marriage, the family, and
parenting.147 Fatherhood programs, pregnancy prevention, and child support
enforcement services were also developed by the professional community as
a means to supplement relationship and marriage programs.148
Political Mobilization
While professionals were mobilizing to develop services aimed at
promoting relationship and marriage skills, political leaders at the federal
level were assembling to implement public policies that would establish
marriage as a means to reducing poverty among the welfare community.149
At the state level, politicians were launching marriage initiatives focused on
improving family relationships. In one such instance, the state of Oklahoma,
a pioneer in marriage promotion, used federal funding from AFDC to launch
46


marriage initiatives aimed at reducing the states divorce rate.150 Using
federal welfare dollars to fund marriage programs was seen as an innovative
initiative that would prove influential during welfare reform in 1996.
Oklahoma was a prototype in the development the marriage initiative due in
part to the states ability to endorse marriage and reduce divorce rates.151
While Oklahoma was the first state to use federal funding for marriage
promotion, other states were developing marriage initiatives that aimed to
strengthen the family in similar ways. One such example was the
establishment of covenant marriages across the nation that made divorce
more difficult to obtain.152
Following the model set by states such as Oklahoma, the federal
government became involved in the marriage initiative though welfare reform
legislation. In 1996 the Personal Responsibility Work Opportunity and
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) was signed into law which completely
altered the federal welfare system.153 Subsequent chapters will detail the
transformation of the social welfare system and the role of marriage in this
reform. As for the role of the federal government in welfare reform, the
mobilization theory states that the federal government recognized that the rise
of out-of-wedlock births and single parent homes correlated to the increase of
welfare recipients.154 Attention quickly shifted to improving the welfare
system in order to reverse the staggering statistics. Politicians began to
47


examine the previous welfare system, Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC), to determine the connection between the decay of
marriage in society and the increase of out-of-wedlock births. Through this
collaborative effort to resuscitate decaying family values, politicians
introduced the notion of welfare reform that included a marriage initiative.
Religious Mobilization
The final mobilization effort presented by Nock, impacting welfare
reform and the marriage initiative occurred among the faith based
organizations. According to Nock, conservative Protestants have a strong
influence over family matters and politics and for the purpose of the religious
movement, it is Protestant beliefs that are being imposed.155 Religious groups
became involved in welfare reform after they began to see the deterioration
of traditional, conservative family values. Faith based groups argued that
after World War II values such as marriage, marrying into the same religion,
or waiting until marriage for childbearing were a strong influence on
society.156 Social movements were influenced by the ideals of family. During
the 1970s and 1980s faith-based organizations began to witness the
declining influence of family on society. The demands and expectations of
society were influencing family values and social acceptance of family roles
were changing. As such, religious attendance began to decline, people were
48


getting married later in life, or not at all, there was an increase in cohabitating
couples, and people of different faiths began to many one another. Religious
leaders connected the growing influence of society of non-traditional
families, such as single parent homes, or a rise in divorced homes, with the
decline of family values.157
According to religious critics, societys altering perception of
marriage included the acceptance of cohabitation, premarital sex, and non-
marital childbearing. Likewise, concern was growing among religious leaders
regarding the narrowing wage gap between genders and the flight of women
from the home and into the labor force.158 Patrick Jennings argues that
traditionally, individuals who strongly identify with a religious affiliation are
more conservative and bear stereotypical family values.159 Thus the increase
of women forfeiting child rearing to leave the home and enter the work force
went against traditional gender roles. While there was concern over women
giving up child rearing to work, there was even greater alarm over the
increase of women receiving welfare. Religious leaders saw the increase of
welfare rolls just as damaging to family values as the rise in working
mothers.160 They argue that the rise of welfare recipients was the result of
pre-marital sex and out-of-wedlock births and that the faith-based community
was provoked by this decline in family values to organize and become
involved in policy reform.
49


Mobilization Theory Conclusion
Consistent with the values and goals of religious groups, faith based
leaders wanted to ensure that any reforms made to the welfare system
included the underlying principles of religion; such as, marriage prior to
pregnancy, both biological parents raising children, and a decline in teenage
pregnancies.161 Because of this, the faith-based community collaborated with
professionals and politicians to examine the social indicators that were
causing marriage to deteriorate. This collaboration resulted in the
establishment of PRWORA which was supported by professionals,
politicians, and religious leaders. PRWORA reformed the welfare system and
introduced the notion of marriage as a means to reducing poverty. The 1996
welfare reform was a collaborative effort by the three groups to develop a
system that would serve the purposes of each population while also providing
positive outcomes for society. Therefore, the marriage initiative incorporated
into the 1996 Welfare Reform Act was a direct result of collaboration among
three different factions. According to professional communities would benefit
from government programs that were promoting marriage since this
population would become service providers for marriage programs.
50


Politicians were satisfied with the promotion of marriage as a means to
reducing the welfare rolls which would ultimately reduce dependence on
government assistance by low income families. Finally, religious leaders
were pleased with the idea that family values, such as marriage, were
becoming a focal point for welfare as a means for lifting families from
poverty. For example, three of the four goals of welfare reform which
focused on ending poverty were focused on family formation and marriage
promotion.162
Feminist Critical Policy Analysis
According to proponents of the mobilization theory, welfare reform and
the marriage initiative provide beneficial outcomes for welfare women due to
the collaboration of politicians, professionals, and religious leaders.163 In
contrast, social scientists of Feminist Critical Policy Analysis (FCPA)
contend that the replacement of education and training with marriage
promotion under the 1996 Welfare Reform Act has had a substantially
negative impact on welfare women.164 Within the 1996 Welfare Reform
ACT, the FCPA identifies three major policy changes that produce
destructive outcomes for women. These three policies are a life time limit of
welfare receipt, mandated work-related activities, and a state-imposed
manipulation of reproductive rights.165 FCPA proponents explore whether
51


marriage promotion, under the guidelines of welfare reform, will benefit
welfare women as a means of lifting families from poverty. Essentially,
FCP A advocates question any action by politicians and policies aimed at
individuals who are not represented in the decision making process.166
FCPA proponents claim that any policies created by the state are
developed to sustain and maintain the wellbeing of society as whole.
According to the guidelines of the FCPA theory, welfare reform in 1996 did
not address the particular needs of welfare women dependent on government
assistance to support their families. Specifically authors such as
Lichtenwalter and Nam deduce that the welfare policies life time limits and
work requirements have a negative impact on women.167 The following, I
will review these three central critiques of welfare reform as developed in the
literature of the Feminist Critical Policy Analysis.
Life Time Limit of Welfare Receipt Background
Welfare reform in the late nineties included a complete overhaul of
the previous Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) system.
Entitlement rights to cash benefits no longer existed and instead a life time
limit for cash benefit receipts was established.168 Shaw uses the FCPA theory
to demonstrate how time limit regulations on welfare receipt are the result of
increasing welfare rolls in the nineties. States were recording large
52


enrollment numbers of young, single women applying for cash benefits
during this decade. In an attempt to reduce the numbers and reverse the trend,
time limits were introduced into the 1996 reform package titled PRWORA.169
Prior to PRWORA states were encouraged to experiment with the
welfare system to determine the best practice, for reducing families on cash
assistance. According to the mobilization theory, a collective effort to
improve the welfare system introduced the federal government with the
notion of time limits for welfare receipt.170 PRWORA adopted the time limit
mandate and placed a sixty month limit for welfare receipt for persons
171
receiving assistance regardless of individual circumstances or situations.
The Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF) time clock started ticking
when an individual received their first cash benefit and continued ticking for
every month of subsequent payments.
Since TANF funds are dispensed in block grants, states are allowed to
flex the TANF clock in some manners such as pausing the clock if an
individual is complying with their work activities.172 However, as long as an
individual is receiving benefits, their clock is running. The clock follows a
person from state to state and is irreversible. There are no exceptions for
medical or mental health emergencies, there is no break from the clock if an
individual starts working and is still receiving cash benefits. Lastly, there is
no distinction between a twenty-four year old mother with four children and a
53


forty-year-old mother with one child, both have sixty months on the clock.
Once the sixty allowed months are exhausted there is no opportunity to renew
the clock and start over. There are opportunities to request additional months,
but this requires documentation of work during the sixty-month time frame as
well as extensive applications, interviews, and letters of recommendations to
acquire an extension of time.173
According to Shaw, time limits and the TANF clock do not take into
consideration obstacles which women on welfare face on a daily basis. Lack
of education and job training, minimal or any work experience, medical and
mental health disabilities, unstable housing, infant children, domestic
violence, and criminal backgrounds are a few of the common obstacles
reported by welfare recipients. Proponents of the FCPA theory claim that
time limits do not allow for trained agencies to address these issues and
prepare a woman to become self-sufficient.174 Restrictions on education and
job training are considered to have the largest impact on women.175
Education is not always necessary for employment but it is essential in
securing and maintaining employment that will support a family.176 Shaw
maintains that time limits on welfare do not allow a welfare mother to earn a
two or four year degree or even enroll in a long-term certificate program.
Welfare was revised to be a work first system that would not financially
Support a family while the mother is earning her degree, even if it was a two-
54


year degree program.177 FCPA advocates note that time limits on welfare
receipt ultimately remove poor women from academic and vocational
advancement programs, thus perpetuating the cycle of poverty for previous
recipients of welfare benefits.178
In addition, Shaw argues that limited access to education and
vocational training results in social isolation. Shaw utilizes the FCPA theory
to conclude that without time to earn a degree or adequate job training,
women will be limited in their career opportunities. Restrictions on career
choices force women into female dominated employment such as domestic
services and childcare services. The time limits policy requires women to
find employment quickly, and without education, in order to stop the TANF
clock. While this policy immediately reduces welfare enrollment, in the long
term it can actually result in a repetitive cycle of entry and exit from the
welfare system. Shaw asserts that the time limits policy did not consider the
needs of women to be trained for careers that will provide long term job
security or that will provide sufficient salaries to raise a family. Proponents of
the FCPA theory, believe that the time limit policy reflects the needs of the
state, which is to reduce the number of welfare enrollees and decrease the
long-term dependence of government assistance.179
55


Mandated Work-Related Participation
Another reform issue that the FCPA theory addresses is the PRWORA
policy demanding all welfare recipients be placed into work related activities
no less then thirty-two hours a week and not exceeding forty hours a week.180
This policy was developed in response to politicians that wanted to remove
the stigma of welfare as a system where the recipient does not work or
participate in programs but is still getting paid by the government.181 As the
numbers of mothers participating in the paid workforce rose in the 1980s
and 90s, the expectation grew that welfare mothers would also be required to
work rather then receive life time benefits. This thought process led to the
time limits policy as well as the required participation in work-related
activities.182 The presumption was developed based on the idea that if non-
welfare mothers were able to work and raise children then welfare mothers
would be able to do the same thing.183
Overall, women are expected to contribute to the paid labor force as well
as maintain the home and there is no exception for poor and unwed mothers.
The end of maternal propriety for women was developing as women were
joining the workforce and sharing the household responsibilities with their
56


spouses.184 Only women who came from high-income households that could
afford only one income were given the choice to work or stay home.
Proponents of the mandated work requirements philosophy explain that the
system will assist single parents in adjusting to a full time work schedule
while facing real life issues such as childcare, stable housing, as well as
mental and medical health situations.185 Proponents of the FCPA theory claim
that the work first philosophy was developed without considering the needs
of welfare women. In fact, FCPA advocates maintain that the policy is
completely gender blind and by extension is negligent to womens specific
needs; that is there is no mention of women as the primary recipient of
welfare benefits and how the work participation policy will impact these
women.186 The policy does not address any of the needs that may cause
women to lose a job or leave a job such as childcare, domestic violence, the
birth of a child, or mental and medical health problems.
Reproductive Rights Manipulation
The final policy reform addressed by the FCPA is the manipulation of
reproductive rights that are implied under PRWORA. In order to reduce the
number of out-of-wedlock births and decrease the number of children living
in poverty, welfare policy has attempted to control the sexual and
reproductive actions of recipients receiving government assistance.187
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Attempts to control reproductive activities of welfare women include
providing no or low cost birth control, providing surgical sterilization
procedures through Medicaid, or imposing financial sanctions for women
who have children while receiving welfare.188 Similarly, agencies providing
welfare services will coordinate with public health departments to educate
welfare clients about birth control methods, sexually transmitted disease, and
other pregnancy prevention related topics.189
According to Aassve, multiple children can be an economic burden on
a family and this impact is even greater for single parents.190 One of the
greatest expenses for families is the cost of childcare.191 Based on research
provided by Boris and Kleinberg, if childcare becomes too expensive for a
single working mother to afford, she is left with few choices but to quit her
job and apply for TANF.192 TANF programs will provide childcare subsidies
or low-income childcare while recipients are participating in work related
activities. This is one expense that the welfare system is expected to cover.
The other cost is the increase in cash benefits when a welfare woman has
another child. Families are eligible to receive an increase in cash benefits
when a baby is bom. Critics of the welfare system claim that the cost of
providing childcare and additional cash benefits is reason enough to control
the sexual and reproductive activities of welfare women.193 According to
proponents of the FCPA theory, reproductive manipulation in the welfare
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population can be seen as a punishment on welfare women for having
multiple children while living in poverty.194 Instead of distinguishing the
economic causes of poverty, reproductive control policies are identifying out-
of-wedlock births as the root of poverty. As indicated by the FCPA theory,
reproductive manipulation is a gender blind policy that pushes family
planning rather than gender specific education and job training as a means for
reducing poverty.
The FCPA theory examines three policies developed under PRWORA
that have affected womens lives. Life time limits of welfare receipt,
mandated work-related participation activities, and reproductive manipulation
are identified as having the largest impact on welfare women.195 According to
Shaw, these policies have limited access to educational and vocational
opportunities which have been proven to be tools for reducing poverty.196
Applying the FCPA theory to welfare reform proves that the marriage
initiative has been developed to replace the lost economic potential for
welfare women.197
Under the life time limit of welfare receipt, women are restricted from
attending degree programs which would exhaust their sixty month TANF
clock. This restriction limits women from attending any long-term certificate
program that would provide them the necessary skills to acquire a well-
paying job that would improve the households economic status. Although
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employment is possible without higher education or advanced job training, it
is unlikely to provide enough financial security for a single mother to exit
welfare and provide for her family without any assistance from government
programs.198 Moreover, the gender gap in pay equality will continue since
jobs in domestic services fields are typically occupied by women and do not
require education or employment skills.199 Childless men and married fathers,
who have had the opportunity to pursue higher education and extensive job
training, will continue to dominate in positions of high paying wages or in
executive positions.200 Finally, through reproductive manipulation the
government is attempting to control who has the right to reproduce based on
economic standards. By providing birth control and surgical sterilization, the
welfare state has declared that welfare women are not capable of raising
children and until they are either employed or married, they should be
provided any means available, to limit child bearing.201
The FCPA Theory versus Proponents of Welfare Reform
Proponents of the marriage initiative claim that the economic
shortcomings resulting from time limits of welfare receipt are outweighed by
the economic advantages present in marriage.202 They maintain that marriage
brings the addition of two incomes, housing security, emotional support and
the sharing of household responsibilities. Proponents of the FCPA theory
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disagree with the policy to limit receipt of welfare to only sixty months. They
argue that the time limitation forces welfare women to secure low-paying
jobs that will stop the TANF clock but will not lift the family from poverty.
And although some welfare women may marry to end the TANF clock and
exit welfare, they may be entering abusive relationships putting themselves
and their children in danger.203
According to Lichter, Batson, and Brown, similar benefits provided
women such as time limits of welfare receipt and mandated work-related
participation requirements, marriage can also provide beneficial outcomes.204
Welfare women are provided an opportunity to participate in work-related
activities that mimic a forty-hour work week while raising a family. Welfare
reform provides women the skills needed to maintain full time employment
and raise a family. Marriage promotion is included to ease the burden of
doing this alone as well as increasing the betterment of the family. Not
surprising, proponents of FCPA theory do not believe that mandated work-
participation will assist women in improving their familys situation. They
contend that work requirements focus solely on working and do not address
An(
challenges to single parents that may interfere with employment. Shaw
claims that women on welfare who exit from the system without marrying are
not given the life skills needed to manage a family and a career.
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Finally, proponents of the marriage initiative claim that sexual and
reproductive manipulation will assist welfare womens exit from TANF and
becoming self-sufficient.206 State control over sexual activity will lower the
number of children a woman has while receiving welfare as well as promote
family planning that will be crucial to the financial stability of the family. By
promoting birth control, they argue that the state can reduce the number of
children living in poverty as well as assist families from returning to poverty
after securing employment.
Aassve presents the idea that additional child births are a leading
cause for women returning to welfare.207 When women have to take unpaid
maternity leave or are faced with unstable childcare options, they are likely to
return to welfare for assistance.208 Proponents of the marriage initiative claim
that marriage will provide two adults to support the family when additional
children are bom. For instance, while the mother is on maternity leave the
father can still financially support the family.209 Supporters of the FCPA
theory claim that while additional children may increase financial tension for
a family it is not reason enough to promote marriage over education and
training. Families are as likely to return to welfare after losing a job from
inadequate education or skills as they are to return after the birth of a child.210
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The Arizona Case Study
Using guidelines established by the mobilization theory and the FCPA
theory, welfare reform and the marriage initiative will be applied to the
Arizona case study. The state created a Marriage and Communication Skills
(MCS) commission in 2000 to approve, maintain, and distribute funding for
marriage projects throughout the state.211 Arizona was the first state to use
federal welfare dollars to support a marriage program and is considered a
pioneer in promoting marriage as a means to ending poverty.212 In chapter
four there is further discussion surrounding the background of the Arizona
MCS as well as an examination of the marriage project under the principles
of both theories presented in this paper.
Each theory presents an opportunity to demonstrate whether marriage
promotion in Arizona will produce positive or negative outcomes for welfare
women. These outcomes are identified as economic stability and
independence from welfare assistance. First, the mobilization theory will be
applied to the Arizona case to determine whether welfare reform and the
marriage initiative were developed through a collaborative effort of
professionals, politicians, and faith-based leaders. Based on the guidelines of
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the mobilization theory, polices that have been developed with a cooperative
work from the three above groups will result in positive outcomes for the
applicable parties.2131 expect that the mobilization theory will uncover
Arizonas failure to develop a marriage commission based on the
requirements of the mobilization theory thus failing to meet the needs of
welfare women.
Once establishing that the Arizona MCS commission failed to
develop a collaborative group based on the requirements of the mobilization
theory, the FCPA theory will be applied to analyze whether the combination
of federal welfare reform mandates and the Arizona marriage initiatives are
presenting positive or negative outcomes for welfare women. Welfare
recipients in Arizona are subject to time limits, mandated work related
activities and reproductive manipulation.214 Likewise, welfare recipients are
also eligible to participate in any marriage program that has been approved
by the MCS.215 This chapter will provide research that supports the FCPA
theory that welfare reform mandates which require marriage as a replacement
for education and training will not improve welfare womens economic
stability nor will it increase independence from government assistance.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE ARIZONA CASE STUDY
Introduction
Previous chapters discussed literature surrounding welfare reform and
marriage promotion through an analysis of two theories. The Feminist
Critical Policy Analysis (FCPA) theory presented by Shaw and the
mobilization theory presented by Nock. These theories were selected to
determine what value marriage initiatives would provide for female recipients
of welfare. The marriage initiative was included in the 1996 Welfare Reform
Act which drastically altered the United States welfare system by changing
the previous entitlement program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC), into a temporary, work-first program.216 The revised program
established in 1996 was now labeled Temporary Aid to Needy Families
(TANF) and promoted employment and marriage as a means to resolving
poverty.217
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This chapter will focus on the Arizona marriage initiative which was
established in 2000, four years after welfare reform. The Marriage and
Communication Skills commission was developed in Arizona to facilitate the
approval, funding, and review of all marriage programs receiving welfare
dollars.218 The Arizona case provides four years data surrounding the impact
of marriage promotion prior to and after the implementation of the states
marriage initiative. This chapter will analyze data provided by the
Administration of Children and Families to determine any impact that
marriage promotion has had on welfare women concerning welfare receipt.
The FCPA theory by Shaw and mobilization theory by Nock will be applied
to the Arizona case study to review what impact welfare reform and the
Arizona marriage initiative have had for welfare women in Arizona. The
chapter will conclude with discussion on the potential implications that the
Arizona marriage initiative will have on a national level.
Arizona Marriage Initiative
In 2000 Arizona became the first state to directly appropriate TANF
funds for marriage classes and has since allocated over one million dollars
annually from the TANF block grant to fund the Marriage and
Communications Skills Commission (MCS), which awards grants and
vouchers to agencies providing marriage and pre-marital workshops.219 This
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commission was created under recommendation of the Arizona Department
of Economic Security (DES) and was expected to implement the marriage
initiative through TANF funding. The DES delegates all federal expectations
for marriage promotion to the MCS commission. The MCS is divided into
three components: one part is the Marriage and Communication Skills
Program which focuses on developing curriculum centered on relationship,
communication, and negotiation skills. The second component focuses on
administering vouchers for low-income couples to attend marriage programs
and the third component focuses on creating and distributing the Arizona
Marriage Handbook to pre-marital couples.220
The MCS is composed of nine members. The commission has two
house members, two senate members, one representative from the governors
office, the director of the department of economic security, one member from
the media, an expert from a marriage and family education center, and one
marriage and family law attorney.221
There are five purposes of the MCS commission222:
1. The first is to review plans that are submitted to the DES by community-based
organizations to participate in marriage and communication skills programs as
well as recommend community-based organizations that are eligible for funding
under the TANF grant.
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2. The second purpose is to review all renewal applications and make
recommendations for continuation or termination to the DES.
3. The third is to develop a marriage handbook available free of charge to all
applicants of marriage licenses. This handbook must include information about
communication skills, shared parenting responsibilities, child support
enforcement, domestic violence and child abuse resources, and information
concerning family law such as divorce and alimony processes.
4. The fourth purpose is to develop qualifications for persons interested in starting
a marriage program and develop a training seminar for organizations selected to
run a marriage program.
5. The fifth purpose requires the MCS to review and evaluate all existing marriage
programs that receive TANF funds.
The MCS was established in 2000 based on two core beliefs. The first
was that marriage will benefit the state economy. The MCS used research
from the Heritage Center that showed that children raised in married homes
are less likely to live in poverty when compared to children raised in single
parent homes or cohabitating homes.223 By promoting marriage throughout
the state, Arizona was attempting to reduce child poverty as well as
developing strong, healthy families.
The second belief was that children in Arizona will benefit when their
parents are married.224 Research from the Heritage Center (2004) states that
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academic achievements are higher for children raised by both biological
parents as compared to children raised by single parents or cohabitating
couples.225 Children from married homes are less likely to have juvenile
delinquency issues and are more likely to contribute to the community
through employment, volunteerism, and social activism.226 Arizona
established the MCS based on expectations from the welfare reform package
in 1996 and based on research that demonstrated marriage would benefit a
society through economic advances and improved child welfare.227
On average, Arizona has between seven and eleven counties that are
providing marriage programs. The availability of services within a particular
county varies depending on the calendar of classes. For example, one
program may not be available in one a particular county if the program is a
short-term class offered only once or twice a year. The marriage programs are
facilitated by non-government agencies which have been approved by the
MCS. The programs are 100 percent funded through the Arizona TANF
block grant.228 Some of the agencies that have been approved to provide
services include the Lutheran Social Ministry of the Southwest, Catholic
Social Services, and the Jewish Family & Childrens Services of Southern
Arizona.229 Each organization offers services in more then one county. The
largest contractor is the Lutheran Social Ministry that provides marriage
classes in seven counties at any point during the calendar year.
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The services provided by Arizona marriage programs include
counseling, marriage resource information, and education focused on healthy
relationships and marriage.230 These services are based on curriculums that
provide pre-marital couples skills and information that are needed to maintain
a marriage. Marriage programs in Arizona utilize more common marriage
curricula such as Pre-Marital Relationship Enhancement Program (PREP)
and Practical Application of Intimate Relationship Skills (PAIRS).231 These
curricula are based on collaboration between community and religious
leaders working together with mentor couples. The majority of curriculum
developed has been created for a mainstream audience, which has primarily
been white, middle-to-upper class, couples.232 As a result, adaptations of the
marriage curriculum have occurred, which attempt to address the specific
needs of low-income families or teen parents. Under these circumstances, the
material presented in the core curriculum remains the same, but the focus is
altered to meet the needs of the audience.
Eligibility Criteria for MCS Programs
Federal policy for welfare reform mandates that the marriage initiative
target all pre-marital couples with no restriction on income levels or welfare
receipt. Unlike cash and food assistance programs that require families to be
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below 150 percent of the federal poverty level, marriage programs do not
require couples to provide verification of the household income.233
Arizona created the MCS to meet the expectations of federal policy
concerning marriage promotion. The MCS allocates funding for marriage
programs under a competitive grant process. Any state agency, community
organization, or religious group can apply for and receive funding for a
marriage program. Currently in Arizona there are seven counties that have
been approved through the MCS to run marriage programs with funding from
the TANF grant.234 There are fees for each class depending on the workshop.
According to MCS guidelines, couples are expected to pay 15 percent of the
program fee and the state covers the remainder.235 Low-income families that
cannot afford the fees are given state issued vouchers to attend programs free
of cost. Vouchers are administered through welfare offices and are eligible to
any family whose income is below 150 percent of the federal poverty level.236
On an annual average, over five hundred couples attend a TANF funded
marriage program.237 Only 5 percent of participating couples are attending
through a welfare voucher program.238
Participation in marriage programs by welfare recipients is completely
voluntary in Arizona.239 Welfare eligibility standards do not require that a
recipient attend a marriage program to receive cash benefits.240 Mentioned
earlier was that welfare reform requires all recipients to participate in a work
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related activity. These activities range from short-term education or
internships. Another allowable activity that would count as a work-related
activity is attending marriage classes or workshops. TANF recipients that
receive vouchers and participate in marriage programs are able to use those
hours of attendance as part of their required monthly activities.241 In Arizona,
participation in marriage programs that count towards monthly work
activities can also provide monetary rewards to the welfare recipient.242
Recipients that meet the required work hours in a month are eligible to
receive monetary incentives. To continue federal funding for welfare
programs states are required to demonstrate that a minimum of 50 percent of
welfare recipients are complying with their work activities. Failure to meet
this 50 percent requirement can result in states losing federal funding for
welfare programs.243
Funding ofMCS Programs
Under federal guidelines funding for marriage initiatives comes
directly from the states TANF block grant. The MCS funding in Arizona is
divided into four parts.244 At least one million of the grant is used for
marriage education classes that are facilitated by community-based programs.
A quarter of a million is used on a media campaign aimed at promoting
abstinence only and abstinence until marriage programs. And a quarter of a
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million is equally divided to provide vouchers to low-income families to
attend marriage courses as well as funding for a marriage handbook that will
be distributed free of charge to all persons applying for a marriage license.245
Measuring the Success of the Arizona Marriage Initiative
Success of the marriage initiative will be based on two outcomes. The
first is a comparison of two-parent households prior to and after the inception
of the MCS commission. The second measure of success is the percentage of
welfare women participating in marriage programs compared to the total
number of individuals enrolled in MCS sponsored programs. Measuring the
numbers of two-parent homes versus single parent homes is based on data
from the Administration of Children and Families (ACF) under the US
Department of Health and Human Services from 1997 through 2004.246
Household compositions for two parent and single parent homes from 1997
through 2000 will be compared to compositions from 2001 through 2004.
The ACF sample provides information on all households that have received
welfare assistance of any kind in Arizona for a specific year. In Arizona, two-
parent homes are eligible for welfare benefits as long as the income level of
the home falls under the eligibility guidelines and as long as both parents are
participating in a work-related activity. Two-parent homes are considered
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households where both biological parents are either legally wed or
cohabitating.247
In the Arizona case study a successful marriage program would result in
the increase of two-parent homes over single parent homes and a decrease in
welfare recipients since the establishment of the MCS in 2000. According to
the ACF data, Arizona has had less then a 50 percent increase in two-parent
versus single parent homes since the marriage initiative began in 2000.248
Since the launch of the marriage initiative and the establishment of the MCS
in 2000, Arizona welfare enrollment numbers have actually decreased by 19
percent.249 Single parent homes decreased by 33 percent and two parent
homes decreased by 28 percent.250 Nationally, there has been a reduction in
enrollment numbers since 2000 by 50 percent for single parent homes and 68
percent for two parent homes.251 As mentioned earlier, Arizona is one of a
few states that have implemented marriage initiative programs nationwide.
When comparing the national decrease in caseload size to that of Arizona the
assumption would be that Arizona would have a larger reduction of case load
numbers compared to the national average due to the marriage initiatives goal
to reduce dependence on welfare assistance. However, according to data by
the ACF, Arizonas marriage program has failed to provide a substantial
decrease in welfare rolls since establishing the MCS marriage programs.252
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Similarly, Arizona has failed to increase the number of two parent
families that are receiving any form of government assistance. Single parent
homes were 98 percent of the Arizona caseload prior to the marriage
initiative and are 97 percent of the caseload since the initiative.253 Proponents
of the marriage initiative claim that the reason single parent homes remain
the highest percentage of welfare enrollees is because recipients who do get
married are leaving the system and two parent families that remain on
welfare are in a transitional period from government assistance to self-
sufficiency.254 In the Arizona case study however this does not prove to be
the circumstance. Arizonas two parent families are eligible for welfare
services that include assistance other than cash benefits such as health
coverage or low-income childcare. Welfare families that transition from a
single parent home to a two parent home are likely to utilize welfare services
for at least two years after marrying or moving in together.255 If the Arizona
case study was successful in transitioning single parent homes into two parent
homes there would be data demonstrating an increase in two parent homes
receiving some welfare service and a decrease in single parent homes
receiving assistance. According to data provided by the ACF the largest
recipient of welfare benefits are single parent homes, thus demonstrating that
two parent homes have not increased since the marriage initiative in 2000.
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Summary of the Arizona Marriage Initiative
The Arizona Marriage and Communication Skills commission was
established in 2000 and has been running the marriage initiative in the state
through program approval and funds distribution. Arizona was the fist state to
establish a marriage commission and has had four years of welfare reform
without a marriage initiative and four years with a marriage initiative. Based
on data provided by the ACF, there has been no evidence that marriage
promotion has reduced welfare enrollment numbers in the state since 2000.
Comparing the national reduction in welfare rolls to those in Arizona does
not indicate that marriage promotion has resulted in an increased reduction of
welfare enrollment numbers.
Under the guidelines of the mobilization theory by Steven Nock and the
Feminist Critical Analysis (FCPA) by Kathleen Shaw, the Arizona case will
be examined to determine whether eligibility standards, funding guidelines,
and the likelihood of successful marriage programs will assist welfare women
from exiting the system and securing long-term financial stability that will lift
their families from poverty. Nocks mobilization theory would argue that the
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Arizona marriage commission would successfully reduce the number women
on welfare and assist in removing their families from poverty. According to
the mobilization theory, the Arizona marriage initiative will prove to be
beneficial for welfare women based on the collaboration of professional,
politicians, and religious groups that developed the marriage commission.
Shaw utilizes the FCPA theory to focus on three reform policies in
order to evaluate the impact that welfare reform, combined with marriage
initiatives, will have for women.256 According to Shaw reform policies
surrounding life time limits, mandatory work requirements, and reproductive
manipulation have restricted womens access to education and job training
programs, and created a system of dependence on either the government or a
husband.257 For the purpose of the Arizona case study the FCPA theory will
be reviewed to determine what impact the welfare policy reforms of time
limits, mandatory work requirements, and reproductive manipulation
combined with the marriage initiative will have had for women.
The Arizona Mobilization Effort
According to research presented by Nock (2005) the success of welfare
reform in 1996 was based on a mobilization effort of politicians,
professionals, and religious leaders in the policy reform movement.258 Nock
describes the success of welfare reform and the establishment of PRWORA
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as a result of the collaborative efforts by the above three groups all concerned
with and involved in the welfare community. The motivation to become
involved in welfare reform for each cluster was prompted by concern over
the deconstruction of the family such as rising rates of single parent families,
out-of-wedlock births, and rising divorce rates. These issues initiated a
mobilization effort among professionals, politicians and religious leaders to
become involved in welfare reform.
The mobilization theory claims that policy reform will be most
successful and beneficial for society when collaboration occurs among
politicians, professionals, and religious leaders.259 Through collaborative
efforts, the interests and desired outcomes of one particular faction will not
be the driving force for policy reform. PRWORA was developed based on
these collaborative efforts and under the mobilization theory the policy
reform was successful in meeting the needs of welfare families.
Politicians are the dominant presence in Arizonas marriage initiative.
Outside of the political involvement in social services and welfare programs,
politicians make up the largest majority of the nine-member MCS
commission. Six of the rotating members will always be politicians leaving
two spaces for professional members and one position to be filled by a
marriage expert. In Arizona, the MCS commission distributes marriage
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initiative funds. The commission was developed specifically to oversee the
approval and funding of marriage programs for the entire state.260
Measuring the Mobilization Theory for the Arizona Marriage Initiative
The purpose of the Arizona marriage initiative is to improve the lives of
welfare women by promoting marriage as a means to ending poverty and
dependence on government assistance. Under the guidelines established by
the mobilization theory, Arizona fails to serve welfare women. The MCS
commission was developed through policy reform but is facilitated by a
majority of politicians rather then a collective organization between
professionals and religious leaders. The dominant presence of politicians on
the MCS commission serves the purpose of the state over that of society. In
this regard, the goals of the state are to continue federal funding for welfare
programs. The MCS commission serves the purpose of the state rather then
the purpose of providing assistance to welfare women. MCS approved
marriage programs have yet to demonstrate large participation numbers by
welfare women, hence these programs will have little direct impact of the
lives of welfare women. The MCS political members make up 60 percent of
the commission since the inception of the initiative and yet, the commission
has made no attempt to alter marriage programs to serve the welfare
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community.261 Under these circumstances the Arizona marriage initiative
fails to meet the requirements of the mobilization effort and effectively fails
to serve the needs of welfare women.
Additionally, Arizonas marriage initiative does not meet the
collaborative requirements of the mobilization theory because Arizonas
faith-based communities are not members of the MCS commission which
oversee all marriage promotion projects receiving federal funding.262 There
are nine members on the MCS commission none of whom are required to be
from the faith-based community. Even though religious organizations are
not permanent members of the MCS commission, they do provide the
majority of the marriage programs available in Arizona through MCS
funding.264 Despite this fact, the mobilization theory requires that politicians,
professionals, and religious leaders be involved in policy reform.
Based on the requirements established by the mobilization theory, the
Arizona case study cannot be determined to provide beneficial outcomes for
welfare women. The mobilization theory claims that a collaboration of
politicians, professionals, and religious leaders working towards policy
reform will provide the most successful outcomes. Arizona does not meet the
expectations of the mobilization theory because the faith-based community is
not involved in the approval and funding of marriage programs in Arizona.
While proponents of the Arizona marriage project may claim that the faith-
80


based community is involved in the commission through facilitation of
marriage classes, this does not meet the theory requirements. According to
the mobilization theory, Arizonas marriage project does not provide
necessary services to welfare women because the marriage programs that
have been developed are not done through a collective effort of politicians,
professionals and religious leaders.
Feminist Critical Policy Analysis Theory
and the Arizona Marriage Initiative
According to proponents of the FCPA theory, welfare reform failed to
serve the needs of women due in part because the reform was a gender blind
policy that did not take into account the real life issues facing women in the
welfare community.265 The FCPA theory is used to examine policy reforms
to determine whether any changes or additions will provide more benefit for
society then for the state. According to Shaw, policies that have been
developed which do not provide for the needs of society over the needs of the
state will not be successful policies.266 Under the FCPA theory guidelines,
welfare reform is a failure because the benefits to the state out-weigh the
benefits to welfare families.267 Particularly the FCPA points to the
introduction of time limits, mandatory work requirements, and the
manipulation of reproductive rights as the failure of welfare reform to
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provide beneficial outcomes for welfare women.268 The Arizona marriage
project is an example of welfare reform failing to serve the welfare
community. Based on the FCPA theory, the Arizona marriage project, in
conjunction with mandatory work requirements do not serve the needs of
welfare women but do serve a purpose for the state.
Lifetime Limit of Welfare Receipt
According to federal policy, all welfare recipients are permitted to
receive welfare benefits for a maximum of sixty months.269 The FCPA states
that this life time limit restricts women from attaining quality education and
training that would provide a stable household income. A long-term
education or training certificate cannot be attained because the risk of
exhausting the lifetime limit of welfare receipt is too high for a low- income
family. Supporters of the FCPA theory claim that by using TANF dollars to
fund marriage programs, education and training programs can only provide
minimal opportunities for welfare women. Funding split between training and
education, as in the case of Arizona, results in mediocre training programs
that will only assist women to secure employment in low wage jobs that end
their dependence on welfare but do not end the cycle of poverty. Applying
the FCPA theory to the Arizona marriage initiative, in the case of time limits,
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demonstrates that the Arizona marriage project has a negative impact for
women and actually benefits the state more then the target audience.
Reproductive Manipulation
In addition to mandatory time limits, reproductive manipulation is
another issue that the FCPA claims is a negative result of welfare reform.
Reproductive manipulation occurs under the welfare system when women are
penalized for having more children while on welfare. Penalties may include
less cash benefits or even denial of cash benefits.270 Similarly, welfare
women are provided birth control options through Medicaid services that
would prevent any additional childbirths. Under the Arizona marriage
initiative, reproductive manipulation is present through family planning
workshops and the promotion of saving childbirth until after marriage.271
Marriage promotion in Arizona fails to meet the needs of welfare women
according to guidelines of the FCPA theory because the focus of the initiative
promotes state manipulation of reproductive rights. Marriage programs are
funded through TANF dollars and are used to encourage family planning and
waiting for childbirth until marriage. What the marriage initiative does not
focus on is how to develop healthy families when there are already children
present.272 Proponents of the FCPA theory claim that the Arizona marriage
initiative fails to serve the needs of women by promoting family planning for
83
J
p


marriage rather then addressing the needs of unmarried women with
children.273
Mandatory Work Requirements
The final welfare policy examined under the FCPA principles is
mandated work requirements. Under welfare reform all recipients are
mandated to participate in a work-related activity for a minimum of 32 hours
a week or more depending on the age of the child.274 In Arizona, welfare
recipients are permitted to claim attendance at marriage workshops and
classes as part of the mandated work-related activities.275 This approval
allows women to replace work related activities such as GED preparation and
job searching with time spent in marriage class focusing on communication
and parenting skills. According to supporters of the FCPA theory, this
compromise is depleting the earning potential for women.276
Two of the federal mandates imposed on all states that are significant
for this paper are the requirement to meet a 50 percent federal work
participation rate and to promote healthy marriages. In Arizona these
expectations are met through the marriage initiative. Arizona permits TANF
recipients to claim hours spent in marriage classes as part of their work-
related activities and the MCS was developed to provide marriage classes.277
FCPA supporters argue that Arizona is not considering the impact of
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replacing marriage classes with GED classes for welfare women but rather is
concerned with continued funding.278 Under the FCPA standard which
requires policies that improve the quality of life for women rather then the
state, Arizonas marriage initiative fails. Marriage promotion in Arizona
ultimately serves the betterment of the state rather then the welfare women
participating in workshops and classes.
Summary of the Mobilization Theory and the
Feminist Critical Policy Analysis
According to the mobilization theory and the FCPA theory presented
in this chapter the Arizona marriage initiative falls short of providing
beneficial outcomes for welfare women. The mobilization theory expects that
a collaboration of politicians, professionals and religious leaders will result in
effective policies. In Arizona, the MCS commission oversees all marriage
programs and this group is not a collective formation of the three factions.
According to the guidelines of the mobilization theory, Arizonas marriage
initiative does not provide effective policies for the welfare community.
The FCPA theory focuses on the federal mandate of welfare reform
such as life time limits, reproductive manipulation, and work requirements. In
the Arizona case study the marriage project is developed to meet the federal
guidelines and continues to serve the needs of the state rather than the needs
85


of women. The debate over whether marriage promotion in Arizona will
benefit welfare women failed to meet the standards established by the
mobilization theory and the FCPA theory. When applying either theory to the
Arizona case study, the marriage programs did not serve the needs of welfare
women.
Policy Implications for State Marriage Initiatives
Across the nation, states are required to promote marriage based on
PRWORA requirements. Less then half of states using federal dollars for
welfare agencies currently have marriage commissions responsible for
developing marriage initiatives.279 Under TANF reauthorization in 2006 the
push for marriage promotion has gained momentum and all states will be
competing for funds to support their marriage initiatives. The Arizona case is
one example that states could follow when developing their marriage
programs. However, state politicians are faced with obstacles concerning the
development of marriage initiatives. The largest being that over 75 percent of
Americans do not want the government developing programs to promote
marriage.280 The opposition to government involvement in marriage
programs does not change the fact that over 80 percent of people believe that
divorce rates are too high and there needs to be policies that will help reduce
the rising rate.281 Government leaders are tasked with developing a resolution
86


to high divorces without becoming too much of an advocate for marriage.
Since welfare reform requires all states to promote marriage, research has
been developed to establish the most effective measures to assist states in the
... 282
marriage initiative.
The first measurement to improve the marriage initiative would be to
place on emphasis on combining employment, education and marriage. By
combining the three categories states would be able to address issues that are
largely inhibiting for welfare families. The inclusion of education and
employment training in marriage programs would assist families in learning
how to effectively communicate and deal with common stresses that may
place strain on a relationship.283 Likewise, an inclusion of the three
components would help welfare families develop the necessary skills to
secure employment that could add to a successful transition from TANF.
Current welfare policies suggest that marriage can be a means to reducing
poverty and by combining the marriage initiative with education and
employment advancement, families increase their potential to become self-
sufficient.
Under the same guidelines as combining marriage promotion with
education and employment, the idea of securing a well paying job that pays a
living wage and will provide long term financial security for a family is better
then encouraging welfare recipients to take any paying job just to exit
87


welfare 284 Welfare recipients have a limited amount of time to receive
welfare benefits and the current employment focus for welfare women is on
finding a job that will pay more then a welfare check and will transition the
family off of TANF. The reality of this current expectation is that under-
educated and under-employed welfare women will find employment that
pays low wages which will never successfully transition the family from
poverty. This is where marriage promotion comes in; by adding marriage to
the equation, low paying jobs in a two-income household would be expected
to lift the family from poverty. According to research by Fein if states include
quality education and employment services with the marriage initiative,
families who leave TANF after marrying are less likely to return to the
welfare system and more likely to develop a stable household income.285
The final measurements that would assist states in developing marriage
programs will depend on state legislature. Childcare, economic security and
child support enforcement measures all require legislative recognition.
Childcare proves to be a major obstacle of economic independence for
welfare women. State legislation needs to develop quality and affordable
childcare services that are attractive to women recently exiting welfare.286
While promoting education, employment, and marriage, the state also needs
to provide affordable childcare services that will assist families to exit the
welfare system. Providing quality and affordable childcare to newly married
88


families will add to the dual income which will stabilize the familys
economic security and independence from government assistance.
Welfare women who are encouraged to participate in marriage programs
need to be screened for economic barriers such as mental or medical health
issues, criminal backgrounds, educational or employment deficiencies or
domestic violence histories.287 Any of these issues are potential barriers to
economic security that will result in continued poverty. Education,
employment, or marriage can resolve poverty if these barriers are present.
States need to provide services that will address these and other issues that
may interfere with the development of economic security. Under the marriage
initiative services could be provided that would coincide with building
relationship skills.
Finally, attention needs to be paid to revising the child support
enforcement system. Cohabitating or romantically involved couples who
receive welfare benefits are required to comply with child support
enforcement.288 Strict child support policies that are expected to provide
incentives for families to marry actually create disincentives of marriage.289
Improved child support policies that focus on improving family relationships
will actually increase the likelihood of couples marrying.290 Child support
policies that include education and job training for fathers as well as
89


addressing relationship skills found in marriage programs will result in an
increase of married families in the welfare system.
Based on the above research and the results from the Arizona case study,
states developing marriage programs need to take several factors into
consideration. As seen in the Arizona case, there needs to be a collaborative
effort amongst politicians, professionals, and religious leaders to ensure that
the marriage initiative addresses the needs and desired outcomes for society
as a whole. Also, promoting marriage development as the sole resolution for
poverty will not provide benefits for women. Working under federal
mandates of time limits, reproductive control, and work-related activities,
marriage programs need to ensure that the focus of welfare programs include
a combination of education, employment, and marriage. States currently
developing marriage programs will benefit from the results of the Arizona
case study as well as outside research on the marriage initiative.
Summary
Welfare reauthorization in 2006 has secured the inclusion of marriage in
the welfare system. As a result, all states will be expected to provide marriage
services for welfare families as a means for self-sufficiency. Welfare dollars
have been allocated for marriage promotion as well as competitive grants
available for funding additional programs.291 The Arizona case study used
90


federal funding starting in 2000 to develop the MCS commission. This
commission has overseen the marriage initiative in Arizona by approving and
distributing funding for all marriage programs in the state. Arizona was the
first state to develop a marriage commission and is only one of less then a
dozen that had any type of marriage program developed.292 This thesis has set
out to debate whether marriage promotion in Arizona has provided beneficial
outcomes for welfare women. According to research presented for this case,
the Arizona marriage project has failed to improve the lives of welfare
women. Supporting evidence such as the lack of welfare women participating
in marriage programs, the failure to develop programs based on a mobilized
effort of politicians, professionals and religious leaders, and the
implementation of gender blind policies such as mandated work-activities
have failed to serve the needs of women. Future state marriage policies need
to focus on three branches for provision of welfare services that include
education, employment training, and marriage promotion.
Marriage as a means to ending poverty will be a permanent provision
of the welfare system until reauthorization in 2010. States will be expected to
develop marriage initiatives that will provide a means to ending poverty for
welfare families. Results from the Arizona study demonstrate that future
policies will need to focus on the welfare community specifically. Failure to
provide marriage services that directly impact welfare families, such as
91


services including education and job training, will only prolong poverty
within the welfare community. Marriage can only be a means of ending
poverty if it serves the needs of the welfare family.
92


Endnotes
1 Gennetian, Lisa A, and Cynthia Miller. How Welfare Reform can affect Marriage: Evidence
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6 Macomber, Jennifer Ehrie, Julie Murray, and Matthew Stagner. Service Delivery and
Evaluation Design Options for Strengthening and Promoting Healthy Marriages
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8 McLaughlin and Lichter.
9 Lisa A. Gennetian and Cynthia Miller, 2004.
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28 Arizona Department of Economic Security, 2004.
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Full Text

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/} f WELFARE REFORM AND THE ARIZONA MARRIAGE INITIATIVE by Nicole Lee-Maki Weller B.A., University of Minnesota, 2000 A thesis submitted to the University of Colorado at Denver in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Political Science 2006

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This thesis for the Master of Arts degree by Nicole Lee-Malci Weller has been approved by

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Weller, Nicole Lee-Maid (M.A., University of Colorado at Denver) Welfare Reform and the Arizona Marriage Initiative Thesis directed by Associate Professor Anna C Sampaio ABSTRACT The 1996 Welfare Reform Act produced a transformed public assistance program for the United States Provisions incorporated into the reform policies included life time limits of welfare receipt, mandated work participation, and marriage promotion initiatives The 1996 Welfare Reform Act expected that by combining time limits, work requirements and marriage promotion welfare enrollment numbers would decrease In 1997, Arizona reformed the previous welfare system to meet the 1996 Welfare Reform Act provisions Since 2000, Arizona has been using federal welfare dollars to promote marriage as a means of reducing dependence on government assistance Using the mobilization theory presented by Steven Nock and the Feminist Critical Policy Analysis theory by Kathleen Shaw, the Arizona case study is examined to determine what impact welfare reform and the marriage initiative have on women. The mobilization theory examines what impact the Arizona marriage initiative has on welfare women when there is a mobilized movement of professionals, politicians, and faith-based leaders The Feminist Critical Policy Analysis examines what impact welfare reform strategies combined with marriage promotion has on women Applying both theories to the Arizona case study

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demonstrates that marriage promotion in Arizona does not have a positive influence for welfare women Utilizing data provided by the Administration of Children and Families to compare enrollment numbers prior to and after the inception of the Arizona marriage initiative also demonstrates that the Arizona case study does not provide beneficial outcomes for welfare women concerning reduction in enrollment numbers. The implications of the Arizona case study can be assessed by states developing marriage initiative programs in accordance with the 1996 Welfare Reform Act. This abstract accurately represents the content of the candidate's thesis. I recommend its publication. Signed

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Table of Contents CHAPTER 1. Introduction ........... .................................. .. ................. ... 7 Supporting the Federal Marriage Initiative ............ ... ... ... .... 10 Opposing the Federal Marriage Initiative ... ................ ... ...... 12 Arizona Marriage Initiative ........ .. ... ... ....................... ... ... 13 Measuring the Arizona Marriage Initiative ........................... 14 Chapter Outline ..... .............................. ...................... 18 Summary .... ..... ................................................... ..... 21 2. Welfare Reform and the Development of the Marriage Initiative ...... 22 Introduction ... .......... ..................................................... 22 Welfare Demographics ................................... ......... ... ... ... 24 Welfare Demographics and Marriage ........ .. ............. ............. 26 Welfare Reform ................................................ ... .......... 28 Eligibility Standards ............................. ... . . ... ... .... 29 TANF Work Requirements ................... ............... .... 30 Marriage Initiative ............................ .. .......................... .. 34 Healthy Marriage Initiative ......... ............... ....... ... .. 35 Summary ...................................................................... 39 3. Mobilization and Feminist Critical Analysis Theories ................... 40 Introduction ...................................... ... .. ................ ..... . 40 Welfare Reform Critiques .......... .. ... .................. .. ....... ........ 41 Mobilization Theory ... .. ................................................ ... 43 Professional Mobilization ......................................... 45 Political Mobilization ...................................... ....... .46 Religious Mobilization ............................................ .48 Mobilization Theory Conclusion ............. ............ ......... .. ..... 50 Feminist Critical Policy Analysis .......... .. ........ ... ............ ..... 51 Life Time Limit ofWelfare Receipt Background ............ 52 Mandatory Work Related Participation ... .. .. .. .............. 56 Reproductive Rights Manipulation ............... ...... ...... .. 57 The FCP A Theory versus Proponents of Welfare Reform ................................... 60 The Arizona Case Study ... ... ............................... .............. 63 v

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4 The Arizona Case Study ...................... ................ .. ....... ...... 65 Introduction ..... ... .... ........ ... .......... .... .... . ...................... 65 Ari M In" .. zona am age tttattve ..................... . ..... . . ..... ....... ... 66 Eligibility Criteria for MCS Programs . ............ ... ........ 70 Funding ofMCS Programs ...... ............ ... . ................. 72 Measuring the Success of the Arizona Marriage Initiative ........ ... 73 Summary of the Arizona Marriage Initiative ......... ................... 76 The Arizona Mobilization Effort ..................... ... . ....... ... ...... 77 Measuring the Mobilization Theory for the Arizona Marriage Initiative ....... .... ............ ...... . 79 Feminist Critical Policy Analysis and the Ari M. I... 8 zona arnage mtlattve.. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. 1 Lifetime Limit of Welfare Receipt ... ... ... ... ... .. . ... . ..... 82 Reproductive Manipulation .......... .. .... .... ............ .... 83 Mandatory Work Requirements .. ........ ... ................ .... 84 Summary of the Mobilization Theory and the Feminist Critical Policy Analysis ...... ... .... ........ .. ..... ........... 85 Policy Implications for State Marriage Initiatives ....... ........... ... 86 Summary ............................. ... ...... .... ............. ....... ........ ........... 90 Endnotes . .... .................. ............... ................... .... ........ ... . 93 Appendix .... .... ....................... .............. .... ...................... 101 A. Arizona Welfare Enrollment Numbers ....................... ........... 1 01 B. Arizona Welfare Enrollment Numbers ............... ............... 102 C. National Welfare Enrollment Numbers ................. ................ 103 D. National Welfare Enrollment Numbers ........ .................... 104 Bibliography .... ... ... .. .... .......... ......... .... .... .. .. .. ... .... .... ...... 1 05 VI

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CHAPTER ONE Introduction Promoting self-sufficiency and limiting the need for government assistance is the purpose of the federally funded welfare system. In the mid-nineties the United States social welfare system was overhauled and entitlement programs that provided financial assistance to eligible individuals were eliminated. New legislation labeled the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) replaced the historical welfare program known as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).1 Under PRWORA basic cash assistance programs such as welfare, food assistance, and Medicaid were now labeled Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF). The key modification for the welfare system was that welfare benefits were no longer available for a lifetime; instead all services were now temporary? Throughout the nation, states and counties changed their existing welfare systems into accelerated career-oriented programs that only permitted sixty months of welfare benefits.3 TANF changed the face of 7

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welfare and enrollment numbers decreased by nearly half in the first three years.4 President Bill Clinton signed PRWORA legislation into law on August 22'ld, 1996 with four goals of the new program Three of the four established goals in PR WORA focused on family formation and marriage as a means to reducing poverty s These goals included promoting marriage to end dependence on welfare, to reduce the number of out-of wedlock births, and to encourage the formation and maintenance of two parent households. 6 According to McLaughlin and Lichter, proponents believed that through marriage, young, single mothers who are receiving welfare benefits will be better able to lift themselves from poverty 7 Benefits of marriage may include an economic advantage of two working parents instead of one, more available resources for childcare, and mental and emotional support from a spouse. 8 The ultimate goal of the marriage initiative was to alter the focus of the welfare system to include the promotion of marriage .9 Welfare initiatives permitted states to develop their own marriage programs in order to promote family rather then welfare as a means for economic survival. 10 Some states placed caps on the number of children eligible for welfare benefits thus eliminating some children from being counted for any cash benefit increases while others enforced stricter work 8

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requirements for mothers receiving welfare benefits 11 States were permitted to use federal funding to sponsor abstinence only education programs to reduce the number of out-of-wedlock births as well as decrease the welfare enrollment numbers. 12 Finally, initiatives were established which rewarded states for increasing the number of two-parent households receiving assistance. Likewise, states were permitted to use federal funding to promote marriage through education programs, presentations, public marketing, marital counseling, and monetary incentives and financial sanction for welfare recipients. 13 Concentrating on the state of Arizona, which has utilized T ANF dollars for marriage programs, this paper will examine whether marriage promotion within the welfare community has provided beneficial outcomes for welfare women. Two theories will be applied to the case study to review what impact welfare reform and the Arizona marriage initiative have had for welfare women in Arizona. The selected theories are the mobilization theory by Stephen Nock and the Feminist Critical Analysis (FPCA) theory by Kathleen Shaw. 14 After reviewing additional theories addressing welfare reform and the marriage initiative, the mobilization theory and the FCP A theory were selected because each theory provides an evaluation of the impact that welfare reform combined with marriage promotion have on women. Data from the Administration of Children and Families (ACF) will 9

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present welfare enrollment demographics from the inception ofTANF in 1997 through 2004.15 To measure the success ofthe Arizona marriage initiative, data reflecting enrollment numbers of single women on welfare will be compared to the numbers of two-parent households receiving welfare The comparison will be based on enrollment numbers from 1997-2000 and from 2001-2004 It is expected that the Arizona marriage initiative will not provide beneficial outcomes for welfare women based on the guidelines of the mobilization theory and FCP A theory as well as the data provided by the ACF. Success of the Arizona marriage initiative will be measured by the number of welfare women participating in marriage programs as well as a significant decrease in welfare enrollment numbers. Supporting the Federal Marriage Initiative Supporters of the marriage initiative believe that marriage programs help establish strong, healthy, families. 16 Some research indicates that not only is marriage beneficial for low income parents, but that children fair better when both parents are present in the home. 17 Likewise, the rising number of unwed mothers, practically one-third of all births, is creating a platform for T ANF reform. 18 Little research has been done to determine the beneficial outcomes that marriage promotion will produce for unwed T ANF 10

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mothers. I will look at the potential outcomes that marriage projects will provide unwed mothers on T ANF. Literature Will be reviewed to determine if federally funded marriage programs will result in welfare women getting married and becoming financially independent, or if marriage promotion in the welfare community will have any beneficial impact for women. Another advantage to promoting marriage in T ANF programs is the increased employment options available. Women who are married will have greater access to childcare. 19 Proponents of the initiative argue that having both parents in the home will allow for reliable childcare thus opening the work schedule for women to take on jobs they might not have been able to do without affordable childcare Additionally, women who are married may have more time and support to pursue training and education that would not be feasible without a second income or childcare. The impact of marriage promotion will be researched to determine if there is any increased employment opportunities for T ANF mothers. Advocates of the initiative expect that through marriage promotion T ANF recipients will be more likely to marry thus increasing their employment opportunities. They claim that employment advancements will reduce the likelihood of returning to federal assistance for family maintenance. I will review whether research supporting a connection between marriage promotion and financial stability is applicable to the Arizona case study 11

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Opposing the Federal Marriage Initiative Controversy surrounding the agenda of marriage for poverty resolution extends to the very beginning ofT ANF in 1996. Many groups feel that T ANF needs to focus on the initial goals of employment and training rather then building the family structure. According to McLaughlin and Lichter, marriage is more likely to occur if a woman is already employed and economically self-sufficient. 20 Their research examined the positive impact that job training and educational opportunities had for women receiving TANF, through an increased potential of desirability to marry. McLaughlin and Lichter noted in their research that marriage is less likely to occur with women who have little or no economic stability.21 Another critique of the marriage agenda is presented by Mark R. Rank who claims that marriage can not be attributed to reducing female poverty, but rather that by improving the labor market, reducing occupational segregation and income disparities, providing child care assistance, and enforcing child support payments, female poverty will eliminate itself 22 Rank notes that marriage is unlikely in welfare households with less then 200/o of welfare mothers marrying in a three year time period. Rank emphasizes the importance of the labor market rather then the marriage market. 23 A similar critique of the marriage market notion by 12

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Sarah Olson suggests that the few welfare mothers who do marry are limited to a low-income marriage market, which continues to perpetuate the cycle of poverty?4 Arizona Marriage Initiative As mentioned above, only a few states have utilized T ANF dollars to develop marriage programs since welfare reform. Alabama, Arizona, Hawaii, Michigan, North Carolina, Okalahoma, Oregon, and Utah have been the pioneers in utilizing T ANF funds for marriage promotion Arizona was the first state to develop a marriage commission funded through the T ANF block grant.26 In 2000, Arizona developed the Marriage Communication and Skills (MCS) commission to oversee all marriage programs within the state?7 Under Arizona policy, any agency, government or otherwise, can apply for and receive T ANF funds to facilitate marriage promotion programs. 28 Arizona was selected as the case study because it was the first state to utilize a commission to approve marriage programs and because ACF welfare demographic data is available four years prior to and after the commission was developed in 2000. There are three established purposes of the MCS?9 The first is to develop a marriage and communication skills curriculum that will focus on building relationships, negotiating and communication skills, as well as 13

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provide information and resources for family law and domestic violence.30 Second is to offer vouchers for low-income families to attend marriage trainings, and third is to create and distribute a handbook about marriage and communication skills.31 The marriage initiative in Arizona is marketing marriage as a means to maintaining society, as promoting happy families, and for raising happy and healthy children. 32 While there is no legislation requiring that T ANF agencies mandate marriage program participation for welfare recipients in Arizona, there are policies written into welfare reform that require T ANF agencies to provide services that will administer relationship and marriage skills development. 33 Based on these policies, Arizona welfare programs encourage T ANF recipients to attend marriage programs by providing vouchers for the training, permitting time in a marriage workshop to count as a work-related activity, and in some instances providing monetary incentives for individuals that attend marriage programs. 34 Measuring the Arizona Marriage Initiative Measuring the success of the Arizona marriage project will be based on an evaluation of three different components. The first measurement is the MCS commission, which will be assessed through the principles of the mobilization and FCP A theories. The influence that the MCS commission has 14

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on welfare women will be evaluated by applying guidelines of both theories to the policies and procedures of the commission. Secondly, the number of welfare women participating in the Arizona marriage project will be determined based on data provided by the Administration of Children and Families from the years prior to and after the inception of the marriage project in Arizona.35 Finally, the potential outcomes impacting Arizona welfare women will be discussed through a review of previous research on welfare reform. Measuring the Arizona MCS commission will begin with an evaluation of the commission development under the guidelines of the mobilization theory. The MCS commission will be assessed to determine whether policies and procedures surrounding marriage promotion occurred through a collaborative effort of politicians, professionals, and religious groups. 36 Based on the mobilization theory, any policy reform that has been developed through collaborative efforts by the above groups will result in positive outcomes for society, and in the Arizona case, for welfare women. The mobilization theory will be applied to the Arizona case study to evaluate the establishment of the MCS commission and to determine what impact the commissions' actions will have on welfare women. Following the application of the mobilization theory, the Arizona case study will be reviewed under the principles of the FCP A theory. Proponents 15

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of the FCP A theory claim that change under welfare reform, such as life time limits for welfare receipt, mandatory work requirements, and the manipulation of reproductive rights have been influenced by the marriage initiative. 37 Motherhood has become a class issue and welfare reform has caused a sharp divide between low and middle-income women. Neither group can really afford to stay at home with the children while depending on only one income: either that of the father or the state. According to FCP A theorists, middle-class women have lost the desire to fight for the rights of all women, including those on welfare, to stay home rather then work. Once middle-class women started to combine full time work with child rearing, any support for welfare women to exclusively raise children and not work was eliminated. The welfare system was developed to train single mothers how to become more like working middleclass which is to have a job, a family and be self-sufficient. 38 FCP A theorists claim that the reform package has created an under class of welfare women who are expected to meet the standards established by middle-class families. 39 In other words, welfare women have had lost the right to be a mother because they had children out-of-wedlock and because the state, instead of the father is supporting the family. The FCPA theory will be utilized to examine what impact welfare reform combined with the marriage initiative has on women. This examination will be applied to the Arizona case 16

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I I study to determine what impact federal reform mandates and the MCS commission have on welfare women in Arizona. The second measurement of success for the Arizona marriage initiative will be based on data provided by the Administration of Children and Families (ACF).40 The ACF has collected data about welfare recipients since 1959 and records the demographics of all welfare families based on information provided by state welfare agencies.41 For the purpose of the Arizona case study, demographic data from 1997 through 2004 will be reviewed to compare the number of single parent homes versus two parent homes. The MCS commission began promoting marriage in 2000 and the data provided by the ACF will offer a before and after account of whether the marriage programs have resulted in an increase of two parent homes and a decrease in single parent homes. The fmal measurement of success will be based on a review of research outlining welfare reform and the marriage initiative. Literature will be examined to determine whether reform policies surrounding education and vocational training and the promotion of marriage will meet the expectations of the four TANF goals. TANF was established to assist families to quickly exit from welfare and into self-sufficiency. By streamlining training programs and supplementing a lifetime of benefits with marriage, T ANF agencies expect that families will be able to exit welfare and become 17

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I i I I I I I i I financially stable. 42 The Arizona welfare system and marriage project will be evaluated through a literature review to evaluate what impact welfare reform and marriage will have on welfare women. Marriage promotion is included within three of the four T ANF purposes The recent reauthorization of welfare in 2006 brings increased expectations that states will use T ANF funding to promote marriage as a means for reducing poverty. Measuring the outcomes in the Arizona case study has critical implications for the recent T ANF reauthorization surrounding the development of marriage programs under TANF guidelines. Measuring the success of the Arizona marriage project will provide states tools for successful distribution ofTANF funds for marriage programs that will provide direct services for the welfare community. Chapter Outline In order to determine whether the Arizona marriage initiative will provide women a means to exiting the welfare system I will provide information describing welfare reform, a review of the selected theories, and a presentation of the Arizona case study. Through these chapters, it is expected that the Arizona marriage initiative will prove to be unsuccessful in assisting women exit welfare through marriage. 18

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I I I I I I I I To begin, a thorough background analysis of welfare refonn and the establishment ofTANF will be presented. Additionally, the implementation of the marriage initiative will be presented with the background of welfare. The chapter focusing on T ANF and the marriage initiative will provide detailed information about the requirements for welfare receipt and how these requirements are connected to the marriage initiative. Following the background of welfare reform and the marriage initiative, a debate between welfare reform implementation and the implications that the refonn policies have for women, one chapter will present the mobilization theory and the FCP A theory. The mobilization theory will be introduced and details will be provided about the relationship between politicians, professionals and religious leaders and why Nock bases his theory on the collaborative efforts of these three groups. The mobilization theory will be discussed in particular concerning the role that the three groups had in reforming welfare and why their involvement resulted in a successful policy change. The principles of this theory will be applied to the Arizona case study to debate whether the MCS commission meets the expectations of the mobilization theory. Following the examination of the Arizona case study under the guide of the mobilization theory, the FCP A theory will be introduced. The FCP A examines the direct impact that refonn changes have on women by focusing 19

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i I I I I I I solely on the impact the policy reform has on gender. This theory is applied to the Arizona case study to determine what impact welfare reform and the marriage initiative will have on women. The FCP A theory looks at three policy changes that developed from welfare reform in 1996. Life time limits of welfare receipt, mandatory participation in a work-related activity, and the manipulation of reproductive rights are the three policies that will be applied to the Arizona case. 43 The FCP A theory will be discussed to evaluate whether Arizona's marriage project is replacing the loss of education and vocational training with marriage. The Arizona case study will be presented after establishing the background of welfare and the marriage initiative and after providing the basis of the mobilization theory and the FCPA theory. The Arizona case review will provide a description of the MCS commission including the relationship of the commission to Arizona's welfare system. The Arizona case study will be debated between the mobilization theory and the FCP A theory to determine whether marriage promotion will benefit welfare women. The last chapter will focus on providing data that is expected to support the hypothesis that marriage promotion within the welfare system does not provide direct benefits to women. 20

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Summary I I I Part of welfare reform in 1996 was the expectation that every five I years T ANF would be reauthorized based on the demands of society. 44 In 2001 T ANF reauthorization was introduced but there was no reauthorization I until2006, but rather a continuation of the system originally proposed in 1996. Current TANF reauthorization includes the four main purposes of T ANF established in 1996 but there is an increased emphasis on the promotion of marriage as a means for reducing poverty. During the first nine years ofTANF, marriage promotion was not strictly enforced and few states utilized the available funding to develop programs focused on marriage. Under the new the reauthorization, marriage promotion has taken the lead as a key factor in reducing dependence on welfare and eliminating poverty. The Arizona case study has been using T ANF dollars to promote marriage since 2000. The purpose of this thesis is to prove that utilizing TANF dollars to promote marriage rather then education and vocational training will not improve the lives of welfare women through successful exit from the welfare system 21

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CHAPTER TWO WELFARE REFORM AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MARRIAGE INITIATIVE Introduction Prior to 1996, the welfare system was considered an entitlement program that was available to .any family needing assistance. Aid to Needy Families with Children (AFDC) was the previous welfare system that provided cash benefits to low income families for an extended period of time with little or no state-imposed requirements on the recipients. 45 With the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in 1996, the United States welfare system was dramatically altered and the result was a work-first program that was focused on improving the lives of welfare families through four main objectives. In order to meet the outcomes of the four objectives, the Temporary Aid to Needy Families (T ANF) system was established to replace the previous AFDC system 22

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I I I I I i j I I I I Welfare reform began with the establishment of four primary goals developed through PRWORA legislation. These goals are "to provide assistance to needy families; end dependence on welfare by promoting job preparation, work and marriage for needy families; prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies; and establish annual numerical goals for preventing and reducing the incidence of these pregnancies and, encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent families "46 Three of the four purposes focus on family formation and marriage as a means to reducing poverty. Although T ANF has been established since 1996 and these goals have been the sole purpose of the welfare system, it was not until the reauthorization ofTANF in 2005 that marriage promotion began to become a central focus for reducing welfare enrollment numbers.47 One of the less then dozen states to promote marriage prior to 2005 was Arizona. In 2000, Arizona established the Marriage and Communications Skills (MCS) Commission to develop and fund marriage programs that would assist lowincome and welfare families develop communication and relationship skills ultimately resulting in marriage and the reduction of welfare enrollment numbers.48 Welfare reform in 1996 introduced the notion that marriage could be a resolution to poverty and that by promoting healthy relationships states could potentially reduce the number of families receiving welfare. 49 This chapter 23

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I I I I I I I I will outline the changes that occurred with the inception ofT ANF in 1996 including the demographics of welfare families, eligibility standards, and work requirements. Following the background discussion, an analysis of the impact that T ANF reform has had on welfare women will be presented and the concept of the marriage initiative will be introduced. The development of the marriage initiative will be examined and the connection between welfare reform and marriage promotion will be presented. Welfare reform and the marriage initiative have had a profound impact on the lives of women and this chapter will provide background information concerning reform policies In the following chapter, welfare reform and the marriage initiative will be examined under the principles of the mobilization theory and the FCPA theory. Welfare Demographics The first indicator of welfare use is the presence of young children. so The most common characteristic of welfare recipients is that they are young, single mothers with children under the age six. s 1 The reality of the welfare system is that the largest percentage of welfare recipients are children. 52 Adults are eligible for assistance only if they have a dependent child. There is a high percentage of current welfare recipients that were raised under the previous welfare program, AFDC. 53 The probability of current welfare 24

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receipt increases if the woman's parent was on welfare, thus demonstrating that poverty and welfare dependence can be cyclical. 54 The duration that a woman receives cash benefits is measured by her education levels, the number and ages of children in the home, and her residence. 5 5 Welfare length increases with lower levels of academic achievements. Individuals with no high school diploma or equivalency will remain on T ANF longer then individuals with a high school education. Individuals with some college or a certificate degree will have the shortest tenure of government assistance. Research has shown that the educational level of an individual can be used as measurement of how long that person will be receiving government assistance. 56 The measurement shows that with more education, the length of welfare use decreases. 57 Higher academic achievements are attributed to an increase in employment opportunities which reduces the need for government assistance. The number and the ages of children in the home also impact welfare duration. Women with young children who require full time childcare are more dependent on assistance when compared to women with children who do not need childcare or only care before and after school. 58 Many states will provide some provision for childcare but this is only available while the woman is participating in a welfare program. Women who begin working and are preparing to exit the system, will be expected to pay for childcare on their 25

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I I I I I own. Women with multiple children requiring full time care struggle to afford the expense under low-income wages. Because of this, women with young children are likely to stay on welfare longer because childcare is not an added expense. 59 Similar obstacles face women with more then one child. With each child requiring care, the cost rises and the chances of becoming financially independent of government assistance decreases. 60 Where a person lives is the final measurement for the duration of welfare use. Individuals living in low-income areas with decreased employment and educational opportunities are more likely to receive government assistance. 61 Despite employment exits from the welfare system, geographical location can influence a family's ability to sustain financial independence. 62 The limitations placed on educational and vocational attainment through welfare reform limits a woman's potential to earn high wages that would allow the family to move out of low income areas. Welfare Demographics and Marriage The relationship between marriage and poverty has been researched to determine what impact marriage promotion will have among low-income women. According to studies by Aassve, the financial stability of women has an impact on their likelihood of marriage. 63 Despite previous assumptions that welfare receipt results in lower incidences of marriage, it is actually the 26

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increase of economic wealth that lowers marriage rates. 64 The more economically independent a woman is, the less likely she will be to marry. 65 Likewise, higher education, higher earnings, and higher work experience also decrease the likelihood of marriage. Economic independence for women is a reason for the decline in marriage rates, not the increase of female poverty and welfare rolls. 66 Women receiving government assistance have long been presumed to avoid marriage in order to receive more cash benefits and to remain eligible under the new T ANF regulations However, research claims that women receiving welfare are not getting married because they have demographic disadvantages for finding suitable marriage partners. 67 These women are living in low-income areas, not working, and have young children. All these factors decrease a woman's opportunity to find a marital partner that will emotionally and financially support the family. A reoccurring critique of marriage promotion programs is that there are not enough marriageable men available for women living in poverty.68 The argument stands that if both partners lack education, work experience, and high wage earning potential I then the family will remain in poverty and subsequently be ineligible for T ANF based on the household income. Women, who are working and I I I earning high wages to support their families, are themselves more attractive marriage partners and have an increased potential to encounter marriageable 27

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men as well. Research has shown that women who fall under the classification of working poor are more likely to marry then those women are not working and are considered poor. 69 Welfare Reform Funding for state welfare programs is based on block grants administered by the federal government. 70 States are given the discretion to spend the block grant in any manner as long as federal guidelines and the four T ANF purposes are met. Specific federal regulations and expectations have been established, and states need to adhere to these regulations to continue funding. The first expectation outlines eligibility for cash assistance. Eligibility requirements have been established by the federal government and cannot be altered based on state discretion. T ANF benefits are distributed based on the number of children in the home, the household income, living expenses of the family, and whether or not both biological parents are living together.71 These are only a small list of eligibility requirements but they are the most relevant for the purpose of the Arizona case study. 28

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Eligibility Standards Adults who do not have a dependent child living with them are not eligible for T ANF assistance and women with no children are eligible only after six months of pregnancy. 72 Living expenses such as rent, utilities, and childcare are considered when establishing eligibility. For example, if a teen mother is living with her parents who pay the rent, utilities, and her childcare, than that teen mother will be denied because she has no personal expenses. 73 Finally, the living situation of the welfare mother and the father of her children are considered for welfare receipt. If the mother is not living with the father of her children then she is more likely to receive welfare benefits than if she was living with him. 74 Benefit approval is higher when both biological parents are not living together because the poverty level of a single parent household is greater then that of a two-parent home. 75 If the mother is living with the father of her children, the household may not even be eligible for welfare benefits. If the household is approved for assistance, both the mother and the father will be expected to participate in work-related programs.76 However, if the mother is living with aman that is not the father of her children, than that man is not required to participate in the T ANF 29

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program but his income is still considered and can be used to deny the family any assistance. 77 There are two main opposing views for the reform welfare system One opposing view is that the strict eligibility requirements are a limitation of access to services that could benefit poor adults?8 By excluding childless adults from welfare assistance will ultimately force these individuals to continue living in poverty.79 The other opposing view considers TANF reform to be promoting out-of-wedlock births and discouraging marriage. 80 These critics claim that providing services only to families with children perpetuates the number of out-of-wedlock births. 81 By requiring families to have children for welfare receipt and enforcing work requirements on both parents if they are living together will only discourage marriage among welfare parents .82 Under either criticism, TANF eligibility requirements are only servicing single parents, which, according to T ANF demographics are primarily young single mothers. 83 TANF Work Requirements Once approved for TANF, .all recipients are expected to participate in activities which require no less then thirty hours a week of participation in a work-related program 84 PRWORA mandates that all recipients be working for their cash benefits in a federally approved program Allowable activities 30

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include a lifetime maximum of twelve months for vocational education, job readiness programs, six weeks a year for job searching, and community service activities. 85 T ANF does not permit welfare recipients to enroll in two or four year degree programs while receiving cash benefits. 86 The 1996 reform policies established welfare systems as work first program that did not allow for longterm training As a result of these reform policies, welfare recipients are not allowed to attend any higher education programs that would enhance their academic careers 87 Academic training that is permitted while receiving welfare benefits include short term certificate programs and preparation for the General Equivalency Diploma (GED).88 Critics of welfare work requirements claim that by removing the opportunity for long-term education women have become disadvantaged in the workforce. 89 Women will exit welfare through low paying jobs that will not provide sufficient incomes to support the family. Welfare work requirements were established to develop working habits that would help families transition from TANF. A part of the work requirement aspect is the notion that welfare families leam how to maintain a full time work week while balancing childcare demands.90 All recipients are expected to participate in weekly, work-related activities which requires reliable childcare. The purpose of mandating work-related activities is that 31

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recipients will be more prepared to exit welfare through employment if obstacles such as childcare have already been stabilized.91 Women with childcare arranged prior to employment are less likely to lose their jobs and return to welfare assistance because of childcare issues. 92 While some states may provide childcare, the federal government does not mandate that childcare provisions be provided through the welfare system. 93 Women with children requiring care are not exempt from the mandated work requirements and will have to pay for childcare services on their own. This can deter women from applying for assistance because they will not be able to afford childcare which is needed to participate in the mandated welfare work requirements 94 T ANF work requirements allow minimal exemptions for work activities if the family has mental health and medical emergencies, domestic violence circumstances or life obstacles such as homelessness and transportation issues.95 For example, in circumstances where there is a medical emergency or domestic violence, a welfare recipient is temporarily exempt from participating in a work related activity. However, states are motivated to have recipients participate in work activities based on federal requirements and will often place a time limit on exemptions from work that range from six weeks to six months. 96 32

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Each state is expected to demonstrate that a minimum of 50 percent of welfare recipients are participating in a monthly work-related activity. 97 If a recipient is not participating in an activity, and is not meeting the required monthly work hours, the state receives a penalty. 98 Continued federal funding for T ANF programs is partly based on the total percentage of welfare recipients that are participating in the monthly work activity.99 If the state fails to meet the monthly participation rate they can be subject to a loss of funding for the T ANF programs and are expected to use state dollars to make up the difference. Since states do not want to lose federal funding for welfare programs, T ANF agencies have been established to assist recipients meet the required participation hours in a month. These agencies are state and county specific and are developed to provide services to welfare families based on PRWORA guidelines. As long as the state meets federal expectations for distributing welfare funds, the state can mandate that welfare families cooperate with the T ANF agencies as part of their work requirements. 100 Currently, agencies across the country are beginning to develop marriage promotion programs that would be used towards the recipients required work activities. The 1996 Welfare Reform Act included marriage promotion as a means for reducing poverty and recipients participate in marriage programs can use that time towards the states 50 percent participation requirement. 33

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Marriage Initiatives Marriage promotion is listed as the fourth T ANF purpose as a means for ending dependence on government assistance. The marriage initiative is a federally funded policy that provides $150 million dollars for marriage promotion, over five years, based on competitive grants. 101 The federal government has established eight allowable activities that can be funded through the grant. These include providing marriage education classes, workshops, budgeting courses, job and career development, premarital education, research programs and project development.102 There is no restriction on what population is served under this funding. 103 Promoting healthy marriages through federal funding is not limited to welfare recipients despite the fact that the funding comes from welfare dollars. 104 There are four main budgeting requirements for states receiving federal dollars for T ANF. 105 The first requires that states match at least fifty percent of federal funding for all marriage projects. However, instead of using funds from other state programs, the state is allowed to earmark incoming T ANF funds, provided by the federal government, to meet the fifty percent requirement.106 The federal government will accept this state contribution and 34

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provide the remaining funds needed for marriage promotion. What happens in this scenario is the depletion of funding for existing T ANF programs such as job training, childcare, and education. Thus, all funding of marriage promotion is likely to come from federal dollars that have been allocated for T ANF programs There is no federal limit on using T ANF funds to support marriage promotion programs. 107 The second spending requirement is that states spend at least $100 million per year on marriage promotion projects. 108 These projects cannot be linked to any existing T ANF programs which do not primarily promote marriage. Funding for these annual projects come from the fifty percent funding and matching requirement developed by the federal government. The third requirement expects that states will spend a minimum of $20 million per year on fatherhood programs. 109 Fatherhood initiatives can be tied into the second requirement as long as marriage promotion is the priority. The final expectation is that states will develop technical language which establishes concrete goals for promoting marriage. 110 As mentioned above, marriage promotion does not need to be focused on the welfare population. Healthy Marriage Initiative Marriage promotion has been a part of the TANF legislation since it's inception in 1996, however, up until the 2006 welfare reauthorization there 35

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have only been a few states that with developed marriage projects or that have provided incentives for marriage within the T ANF system. The current administration has taken steps to ensure that marriage promotion under T ANF is utilized by all states receiving federal dollars for welfare programs. 111 One such development is the Healthy Marriage Initiative (HMI) that focuses on early intervention, voluntary participation, and targeting both men and women regardless of economic backgrounds to meet the expectations of the T ANF guidelines surrounding marriage promotion. 112 The HMI is based on the belief that there is no shortage of marriageable men, that marriage reduces out-of-wedlock childbirth, that marriage can lift a woman from poverty, and that instances of domestic violence are more likely to occur in cohabitating relationships rather then in stable marriages. 113 On the surface, the HMI was establish to address the questions of how marriage can improve the physical and emotional health of men and women, why married couples are economically more stable, why children of married parents are more successful in academic programs, and why the prevalence of domestic violence and child abuse are less likely in married couples then in comparable relationships. 114 Initial welfare reform in 1996 focused on congressional findings which declared that the foundation of a successful society is marriage.115 The marriage promotion clause included in the TANF 36

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I I i I system was established to further promote the betterment of society, the family, and children. According to the HMI, the welfare system has been responsible for the decline in marriages, the increase in out-of-wedlock births, and the increase in divorce rates.116 Welfare penalizes recipients for marrying the biological parent of the child by decreasing monetary grants to the family and increasing expected work participation hours. The current welfare system has over 70 means tested programs that continuously award single parents.117 Programs such as food assistance, Medicaid, housing subsidies, and cash assistance provide assistance based on the number of adults in the home. The presence of both biological parents reduces the amount of services available to a single parent. The HMI has been modeled to improve family relationships so dependence on government assistance programs will be less likely. Any participation in HMI sponsored programs is purely voluntary. 118 This ensures that only couples interested in marrying will participate in marriage programs and prevents forcing participation of unwilling couples into a legal commitment. HMI programs have been developed from existing marriage skills curriculum that would be altered to meet the needs of participants in the program. Key components ofHMI programs would be aimed at reducing domestic violence factors, increasing employment 37

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opportunities for low-income families, and intervening in high-risk relationships. 119 Although funding for the HMI comes from block grants for T ANF programs, the welfare population would not be the sole audience. Working under the assumption that welfare mothers have already experienced failed relationships, the HMI intends to focus on young adults prior to the development of negative assumptions about failed relationships and a reduced desire for marriage. 120 Early prevention and isolation imposed by poverty and single parenthood is the primary focus of the HMI. 121 Intervention prior to conception will help reduce out of wedlock births and increase the sustainability of healthy marriages. Intervention is achieved through using federal funding to refer adults into life-planning workshops that include marriage promotion, relationship training and discussing the benefit of delaying childbearing until stable marital relationships can be developed. According to the Fragile Families Survey, there is a "magic moment" at the time ofbirth when both parents are open to the idea ofmarriage.122 Under the right guidance and mentoring, new parents are more likely to consider marriage. According to supporters of the HMI, if marriage does not precede conception, at least it can occur after birth. 123 Although not ideal under the HMI goals and mission, marriage after conception can still promote the well being for the child and both parents. 38

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Summary The 1996 Welfare Reform Act replaced a previous system of life time cash benefits and introduced the T ANF system which provided temporary aid to needy families. This system required all welfare recipients to participate in work-related activities which would provide the tools necessary to exit welfare. Included in welfare reform was the introduction of the marriage initiative. This initiative was added to the PRWORA legislation as a means for reducing poverty. The expectation of the marriage initiative was to promote marriage in conjunction with training and education to reduce welfare enrollment numbers. Few states have utilized federal dollars to promote marriage. Arizona was the first state to develop a marriage commission and has had marriage programs since 2000.124 The next chapter will review the critiques of welfare reform and introduce the theories that will be applied to the Arizona case study to examine what impact welfare reform and the marriage initiative have had on women. 39

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CHAPTER THREE MOBILIZATION AND FEMINIST CRITICAL ANALYSIS THEORIES Introduction Marriage and welfare are two social institutions that have been transformed over time through changes in public policy. Historically, welfare and marriage have not been viewed as mutually exclusive but recent legislation has connected marriage to welfare as a means for reducing poverty among single parents. 125 The 1996 Welfare Reform Act introduced the notion of marriage as a means for reducing poverty. Combined with life time limits of welfare receipt and mandated participation in work-related activities, marriage promotion has been added to welfare's goals for reducing poverty.126 Similarities between welfare and marriage include an association of values, norms, and standards. Literature has shown that both marriage and welfare can have a profound impact on a person's life, either positive or negative. 127 Using theories presented by Stephen Nock and Kathleen Shaw, 40

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this chapter will overview current debates in social science literature regarding the impact of marriage promotion for welfare women. Both the mobilization theory by Nock and the Feminist Critical Policy Analysis (FCPA) theory by Shaw discuss the effect of welfare reform and the marriage initiative on women. Nock's mobilization theory will be reviewed to determine what outcomes marriage promotion has for women when welfare policies are established through a collaborative movement. The Feminist Critical Policy Analysis theory presented by Shaw will be reviewed to determine what the outcomes of marriage promotion, through welfare reform policies, has on women. The mobilization and FCP A theory will be applied to the Arizona case study to evaluate what impact marriage promotion has had to on welfare recipients in Arizona. Prior to presenting the theories, a brief description of the critiques surrounding welfare reform will be identified. Welfare Reform Critiques Despite initial success of the reform system, two leading views of opposition to welfare reform have risen from groups both in support of and against cash benefits programs. To begin, the opposition of pro-family organizations have long claimed the welfare system promotes out-of-wedlock childbearing. 128 Pro-family organizations attack T ANF eligibility policies 41

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which require that the biological father of the children not be present in the home.129 If the father is living with his children, TANF programs can impose different penalties on the family. The cash benefits may be reduced based on the father's income or the father may be required to participate in work related activities each month. 13 Failure to comply with the work activities could result in the case being denied or closed. Anti-TANF, pro-family activists also claim that T ANF encourages women to have more children because each additional child will increase the monthly cash benefit. 131 Proponents of the marriage initiative claim that current welfare policies deter recipients from developing relationships with the father of their children because of the potential financial sanctions for the family.132 The second opposition view point comes from feminist groups which claim that welfare reform has restricted women's access to education, high paying jobs, and financial independence.133 Feminist opponents of welfare reform claim that by removing access to education and training programs, the state has pushed women into financial dependency on the state or on a husband. 134 Welfare women who were dependent on the government for support will now become dependent on male partners to support their family; since their earning potential has been diminished. Women are forced into low paying jobs to exit welfare, which does not successfully lift a family from poverty. While any exit from welfare through employment is considered a 42

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success, without quality education and job training, women will still have to depend on the government, or a husband, to support her family.135 Critics of both the T ANF system and the marriage initiative believe that welfare is supplementing marriage for education and job training. 136 Instead of providing job skills to become financially independent of the welfare system, T ANF is providing relationship skills that will assist women to secure economic freedom through marriage. Regardless of the critiques surrounding welfare reform, the system will remain the same until reauthorization is introduced in 20 I 0. Two theories have been selected to examine what impact welfare reform and the marriage initiative have had on women. In particular, these theories will be applied to the Arizona marriage initiative to determine how marriage promotion in the welfare community has influenced the lives of women. Mobilization Theory Beginning with the potential influence that welfare reform and the marriage initiative will have for women is an examination of research presented by Steven Nock. Nock is credited with having founded a school of thought regarding administration, know as the mobilization theory.137 Utilizing three different movements by professionals, politicians, and faith-based groups, Nock developed a theory to explain why reform policies are, or 43

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are not, successful in serving the needs of society .138 For the purposes of welfare reform and the marriage initiative, Nock applied the mobilization theory to explain why both welfare reform and the marriage initiative have had a positive impact for women. 139 According to Nock . research showing that marriage is good for adults and children, (and) strengthening marriage has become a goal ofboth public and private initiatives in recent years."140 Based on this growing interest in marriage, the mobilization theory was developed to describe successful processes that result in policy reforms that benefit society as a whole. Proponents of the theory claim that varying demands from society, force changes in policies which impact the well-being of the general public.141 Nock, describes three essential movements that result in successful policy reforms. 142 These three movements are organized and mobilized movements of professionals, politicians, and religious organizations.143 Advocates assert that the success of the 1996 welfare reform can be explained as a collective effort of community leaders and politicians working together to improve the welfare system. This chapter will review the literature focusing on the mobilization theory and apply the tenets of the theory to the Arizona marriage initiative. The Arizona case study will be examined under the principles of the mobilization theory to determine whether the marriage initiative has provided 44

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beneficial outcomes for welfare women, specifically reducing in poverty levels Professional Mobilization The first mobilization effort was the organization of professionals Social scientists, practitioners, and working professionals are some of the categories that Nock includes in his description of the professional category These individuals became involved in the marriage initiative when society began to adapt the social acceptance of previous marital norms.144 Professionals began to notice changes in the social acceptance of relationship norms that altered society's perception of marital values. Increases in cohabitating couples, out-of-wedlock births, divorce rates, and single parent homes motivated professionals to become involved in the marriage initiative The transition of relationship norms directly impacted the professional organizations through economic outcomes. The financial stability of the home improves when there are two working adults supporting the family. 14s With the transformation of family demographics, professionals began to notice that the labor market was also transforming Unemployment rates were impacted by rises in divorce, career opportunities for teen parents were restricted based on education and work experience, and there was an increase in welfare enrollments The professional community was concerned about the 45

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I i I I I I I I I I I I change in family dynamics that could have a potential influence on the labor market.146 Professional communities began to organize under a goal to explain what the social ramifications of changing family dynamics would have on the economy as well as the future of marriage. Additionally, the professional mobilization movement also examined what social aspects were influencing the transformation of family demographic. The mobilization of professionals resulted in an onset of healthy relationship workshops, marriage counseling sessions, and educational classes that focused on marriage, the family, and parenting 147 Fatherhood programs, pregnancy prevention, and child support enforcement services were also developed by the professional community as a means to supplement relationship and marriage programs.148 Political Mobilization While professionals were mobilizing to develop services aimed at promoting relationship and marriage skills, political leaders at the federal level were assembling to implement public policies that would establish marriage as a means to reducing poverty among the welfare community.149 At the state level, politicians were launching marriage initiatives focused on improving family relationships. In one such instance, the state of Oklahoma, a pioneer in marriage promotion, used federal funding from AFDC to launch 46

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I I I I I I I I I I I marriage initiatives aimed at reducing the states' divorce rate.150 Using federal welfare dollars to fund marriage programs was seen as an innovative initiative that would prove influential during welfare reform in 1996. Oklahoma was a prototype in the development the marriage initiative due in part to the states ability to endorse marriage and reduce divorce rates.151 While Oklahoma was the first state to use federal funding for marriage promotion, other states were developing marriage initiatives that aimed to strengthen the family in similar ways. One such example was the establishment of covenant marriages across the nation that made divorce more difficult to obtain. 152 Following the model set by states such as Oklahoma, the federal government became involved in the marriage initiative though welfare reform legislation. In 1996 the Personal Responsibility Work Opportunity and Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) was signed into law which completely altered the federal welfare system.153 Subsequent chapters will detail the transformation ofthe social welfare system and the role of marriage in this reform. As for the role of the federal government in welfare reform, the mobilization theory states that the federal government recognized that the rise of out-of-wedlock births and single parent homes correlated to the increase of welfare recipients 154 Attention quickly shifted to improving the welfare system in order to reverse the staggering statistics. Politicians began to 47

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examine the previous welfare system, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), to determine the connection between the decay of marriage in society and the increase of out-of-wedlock births. Through this collaborative effort to resuscitate decaying family values, politicians introduced the notion of welfare reform that included a marriage initiative. Religious Mobilization The final mobilization effort presented by Nock, impacting welfare reform and the marriage initiative occurred among the faith based organizations. According to Nock, conservative Protestants have a strong influence over family matters and politics and for the purpose of the religious movement, it is Protestant beliefs that are being imposed.155 Religious groups became involved in welfare reform after they began to see the deterioration of traditional, conservative family values. Faith based groups argued that after World War II values such as marriage, marrying into the same religion, or waiting until marriage for childbearing were a strong influence on society. 156 Social movements were influenced by the ideals of family. During the 1970's and 1980's faith-based organizations began to witness the declining influence of family on society. The demands and expectations of society were influencing family values and social acceptance of family roles were changing. As such, religious attendance began to decline, people were 48

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getting married later in life, or not at all, there was an increase in cohabitating couples, and people of different faiths began to marry one another Religious leaders connected the growing influence of society of non-traditional families, such as single parent homes, or a rise in divorced homes, with the decline of family values. 157 According to religious critics, society's altering perception of marriage included the acceptance of cohabitation, premarital sex, and non-marital childbearing. Likewise, concern was growing among religious leaders regarding the narrowing wage gap between genders and the flight of women from the home and into the labor force. 158 Patrick Jennings argues that traditionally, individuals who strongly identify with a religious affiliation are more conservative and bear stereotypical family values. 159 Thus the increase of women forfeiting child rearing to leave the home and enter the work force went against traditional gender roles. While there was concern over women giving up child rearing to work, there was even greater alarm over the increase of women receiving welfare. Religious leaders saw the increase of welfare rolls just as damaging to family values as the rise in working mothers.160 They argue that the rise of welfare recipients was the result of pre-marital sex and out-of-wedlock births and that the faith-based community was provoked by this decline in family values to organize and become involved in policy reform. 49

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Mobilization Theory Conclusion Consistent with the values and goals of religious groups, faith based leaders wanted to ensure that any refonns made to the welfare system included the underlying principles of religion; such as, marriage prior to pregnancy, both biological parents raising children, and a decline in teenage pregnancies .161 Because of this, the faith-based community collaborated with professionals and politicians to examine the social indicators that were causing marriage to deteriorate This collaboration resulted in the establishment ofPRWORA which was supported by professionals, politicians, and religious leaders. PRWORA refonned the welfare system and introduced the notion of marriage as a means to reducing poverty. The 1996 welfare refonn was a collaborative effort by the three groups to develop a system that would serve the purposes of each population while also providing positive outcomes for society. Therefore, the marriage initiative incorporated into the 1996 Welfare Refonn Act was a direct result of collaboration among three different factions. According to professional communities would benefit from government programs that were promoting marriage since this population would become service providers for marriage programs. 50

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I I I I I I i I I Politicians were satisfied with the promotion of marriage as a means to reducing the welfare rolls which would ultimately reduce dependence on government assistance by low income families. Finally, religious leaders pleased with the idea that family values, such as marriage, were becoming a focal point for welfare as a means for lifting families from poverty. For example, three of the four goals of welfare reform which focused on ending poverty were focused on family formation and marriage promotion.162 Feminist Critical Policy Analysis According to proponents of the mobilization theory, welfare reform and the marriage initiative provide beneficial outcomes for welfare women due to the collaboration of politicians, professionals, and religious leaders. 163 In contrast, social scientists of Feminist Critical Policy Analysis (FCPA) contend that the replacement of education and training with marriage promotion under the 1996 Welfare Reform Act has had a substantially negative impact on welfare women.164 Within the 1996 Welfare Reform ACT, the FCP A identifies three major policy changes that produce destructive outcomes for women. These three policies are a life time limit of welfare receipt, mandated work -related activities, and a state-imposed manipulation of reproductive rights. 165 FCP A proponents explore whether 51

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I I I I I I I I I I I marriage promotion, under the guidelines of welfare reform, will benefit welfare women as a means of lifting families from poverty. Essentially FCP A advocates question any action by politicians and policies aimed at individual_s who are not represented in the decision making process. 166 FCP A proponents claim that any policies created by the state are developed to sustain and maintain the wellbeing of society as whole. According to the guidelines of the FCPA theory, welfare reform in 1996 did not address the particular needs of welfare women dependent on government assistance to support their families. Specifically authors such as Lichtenwalter and Nam deduce that the welfare policies life time limits and work requirements have a negative impact on women 167 The following I will review these three central critiques of welfare reform as developed in the literature of the Feminist Critical Policy Analysis Life Time Limit of Welfare Receipt Background Welfare reform in the late nineties included a complete overhaul of the previous Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) system. Entitlement rights to cash benefits no longer existed and instead a life time limit for cash benefit receipts was established 168 Shaw uses the FCP A theory to demonstrate how time limit regulations on welfare receipt are the result of increasing welfare rolls in the nineties. States were recording large 52

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I I i I I I I I enrollment numbers of young, single women applying for cash benefits during this decade. In an attempt to reduce the numbers and reverse the trend, time limits were introduced into the 1996 reform package titled PR WORA. 169 Prior to states were encouraged to experiment with the welfare system to determine the best practice, for reducing families on cash assistance. According to the mobilization theory, a collective effort to improve the welfare system introduced the federal government with the notion of time limits for welfare receipt.170 PRWORA adopted the time limit mandate and placed a sixty month limit for welfare receipt for persons receiving assistance regardless of individual circumstances or situations 171 The Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF) time clock started ticking when an individual received their first cash benefit and continued ticking for every month of subsequent payments Since T ANF funds are dispensed in block grants, states are allowed to flex the T ANF clock in some manners such as pausing the clock if an individual is complying with their work activities.172 However, as long as an individual is receiving benefits, their clock is running. The clock follows a person from state to state and is irreversible. There are no exceptions for medical or mental health emergencies, there is no break from the clock if an individual starts working and is still receiving cash benefits Lastly, there is no distinction between a twenty-four year old mother with four children and a 53

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forty-year-old mother with one child, both have sixty months on the clock. Once the sixty allowed months are exhausted there is no opportunity to renew the clock and start over. There are opportunities to request additional months, but this requires of work during the sixty-month time frame as well as extensive applications, interviews, and letters of recommendations to acquire an extension of time. 173 According to Shaw, time limits and the T ANF clock do not take into consideration obstacles which women on welfare face on a daily basis. Lack of education and job training, minimal or any work experience, medical and mental health disabilities, unstable housing, infant children, domestic violence, and criminal backgrounds are a few of the common obstacles reported by welfare recipients. Proponents of the FCP A theory claim that time limits do not allow for trained agencies to address these issues and prepare a woman to become self-sufficient.174 Restrictions on education and job training are considered to have the largest impact on women. 175 Education is not always necessary for employment but it is essential in securing and maintaining employment that will support a family.176 Shaw maintains that time limits on welfare do not allow a welfare mother to earn a two or four year degree or even enroll in a long-term certificate program. Welfare was revised to be a work first system that would not financially support a family while the mother is earning her degree, even if it was a two-54

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year degree program.177 FCP A advocates note that time limits on welfare receipt ultimately remove poor women from academic and vocational advancement programs, thus perpetuating the cycle of poverty for previous recipients of welfare benefits. 178 In addition, Shaw argues that limited access to education and vocational training results in social isolation. Shaw utilizes the FCP A theory to conclude that without time to earn a degree or adequate job training, women will be limited in their career opportunities Restrictions on career choices force women into female dominated employment such as domestic services and childcare services. The time limits policy requires women to find employment quickly, and without education, in order to stop the T ANF clock. While this policy immediately reduces welfare enrollment, in the long term it can actually result in a repetitive cycle of entry and exit from the welfare system. Shaw asserts that the time limits policy did not consider the needs ofwomen to be trained for careers that will provide long term job security or that will provide sufficient salaries to raise a family. Proponents of the FCP A theory, believe that the time limit policy reflects the needs of the state, which is to reduce the number of welfare enrollees and decrease the long-term dependence of government assistance. 179 55

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j I I I I I I I Mandated Work-Related Participation Another refonn issue that the FCPA theory addresses is the PRWORA policy demanding all welfare recipients be placed into work related activities no less then thirty-two hours a week and not exceeding forty hours a week .180 This policy was developed in response to politicians that wanted to remove the stigma of welfare as a system where the recipient does not work or participate in programs but is still getting paid by the government.181 As the numbers of mothers participating in the paid workforce rose in the 1980's and 90's, the expectation grew that welfare mothers would also be required to work rather then receive life time benefits. This thought process led to the time limits policy as well as the required participation in work-related activities. 182 The presumption was developed based on the idea that if non-welfare mothers were able to work and raise children then welfare mothers would be able to do the same thing. 183 Overall, women are expected to contribute to the paid labor force as well as maintain the home and there is no exception for poor and unwed mothers. The end of maternal propriety for women was developing as women were joining the workforce and sharing the household responsibilities with their 56

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I I I I spouses 184 Only women who came from high-income households that could afford only one income were given the choice to work or stay home. Proponents of the mandated work requirements philosophy explain that the system will assist single parents in adjusting to a full time work schedule while facing real life issues such as childcare, stable housing, as well as mental and medical health situations .185 Proponents of the FCPA theory claim that the work first philosophy was developed without considering the needs of welfare women. In fact, FCP A advocates maintain that the policy is completely gender blind and by extension is negligent to women's specific needs; that is there is no mention of women as the primary recipient of welfare benefits and how the work participation policy will impact these women.186 The policy does not address any of the needs that may cause women to lose a job or leave a job such as childcare, domestic violence, the birth of a child, or mental and medical health problems Reproductive Rights Manipulation The final policy reform addressed by the FCP A is the manipulation of reproductive rights that are implied under PRWORA. In order to reduce the number of out-of-wedlock births and decrease the number of children living in poverty, welfare policy has attempted to control the sexual and reproductive actions of recipients receiving government assistance. 187 57

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I I I I I I I Attempts to control reproductive activities of welfare women include providing no or low cost birth control, providing surgical sterilization procedures through Medicaid, or imposing financial sanctions for women who have children while receiving welfare.188 Similarly, agencies providing welfare services will coordinate with public health departments to educate welfare clients about birth control methods, sexually transmitted disease, and other pregnancy prevention related topics. 189 According to Aassve, multiple children can be an economic burden on a family and this impact is even greater for single parents. 190 One of the greatest expenses for families is the cost of childcare.191 Based on research provided by Boris and Kleinberg, if childcare becomes too expensive for a single working mother to afford, she is left with few choices but to quit her job and apply for TANF.192 TANF programs will provide childcare subsidies or low-income childcare while recipients are participating in work related activities. This is one expense that the welfare system is expected to cover. The other cost is the increase in cash benefits when a welfare woman has another child. Families are eligible to receive an increase in cash benefits when a baby is born. Critics of the welfare system claim that the cost of providing childcare and additional cash benefits is reason enough to control the sexual and reproductive activities ofwelfare women.193 According to proponents of the FCP A theory reproductive manipulation in the welfare 58

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population can be seen as a punishment on welfare women for having multiple children while living in poverty. 194 Instead of distinguishing the economic causes of poverty, reproductive control policies are identifying outof-wedlock births as the root of poverty. As indicated by the FCP A theory, reproductive manipulation is a gender blind policy that pushes family planning rather than gender specific education and job training as a means for reducing poverty. The FCPA theory examines three policies developed under PRWORA that have affected women's lives. Life time limits of welfare receipt, mandated work-related participation and reproductive manipulation are identified as having the largest impact on welfare women. 195 According to Shaw, these policies have limited access to educational and vocational opportunities which have been proven to be tools for reducing poverty 196 Applying the FCP A theory to welfare reform proves that the marriage initiative has been developed to replace the lost economic potential for welfare women. 197 Under the life time limit of welfare receipt, women are restricted from attending degree programs which would exhaust their sixty month T ANF clock. This restriction limits women from attending any long-term certificate program that would provide them the necessary skills to acquire a well-paying job that would improve the household's economic status. Although 59

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employment is possible without higher education or advanced job training, it is unlikely to provide enough financial security for a single mother to exit welfare and provide for her family without any assistance from government programs. 198 Moreover, the gender gap in pay equality will continue since jobs in domestic services fields are typically occupied by women and do not require education or employment skills. 199 Childless men and married fathers, who have had the opportunity to pursue higher education and extensive job training, will continue to dominate in positions of high paying wages or in executive positions. 200 Finally, through reproductive manipulation the government is attempting to control who has the right to reproduce based on economic standards. By providing birth control and surgical sterilization, the welfare state has declared that welfare women are not capable of raising children and until they either employed or married, they should be provided any means available, to limit child bearing.201 The FCPA Theory versus Proponents of Welfare Reform Proponents of the marriage initiative claim that the economic shortcomings resulting from time limits of welfare receipt are outweighed by the economic advantages present in marriage. 202 They maintain that marriage brings the addition of two incomes, housing security, emotional support and the sharing of household responsibilities. Proponents of the FCP A theory 60

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disagree with the policy to limit receipt of welfare to only sixty months. They argue that the time limitation forces welfare women to secure low-paying jobs that will stop the T ANF clock but will not lift the family from poverty. And although some welfare women may marry to end the T ANF clock and exit welfare, they may be entering abusive relationships putting themselves and their children in danger.203 According to Lichter, Batson, and Brown, similar benefits provided women such as time limits of welfare receipt and mandated work-related participation requirements, marriage can also provide beneficial outcomes. 204 Welfare women are provided an opportunity to participate in work-related activities that mimic a forty-hour work week while raising a family. Welfare reform provides women the skills needed to maintain full time employment and raise a family. Marriage promotion is included to ease the burden of doing this alone as well as increasing the betterment of the family. Not surprising, proponents ofFCPA theory do not believe that mandated work participation will assist women in improving their family's situation They contend that work requirements focus solely on working and do not address challenges to single parents that may interfere with employment. 205 Shaw claims that women on welfare who exit from the system without marrying are not given the life skills needed tomanage a family and a career. 61

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Finally, proponents of the marriage initiative claim that sexual and reproductive manipulation will assist welfare women's exit from TANF and becoming self-sufficient. 206 State control over sexual activity will lower the number of children a woman has while receiving welfare as well as promote family planning that will be crucial to the financial stability of the family. By promoting birth control, they argue that the state can reduce the number of children living in poverty as well as assist families from returning to poverty after securing employment. Aassve presents the idea that additional child births are a leading cause for women returning to welfare. 207 When women have to take unpaid maternity leave or are faced with unstable childcare options, they are likely to return to welfare for assistance 208 Proponents of the marriage initiative claim that marriage will provide two adults to support the family when additional children are born. For instance, while the mother is on maternity leave the father can still financially support the family. 209 Supporters of the FCP A theory claim that while additional children may increase financial tension for a family it is not reason enough to promote marriage over education and training. Families are as likely to return to welfare after losing a job from inadequate education or skills as they are to return after the birth of a child. 210 62

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The Arizona Case Study Using guidelines established by the mobilization theory and the FCPA theory, welfare reform and the marriage initiative will be applied to the Arizona case study. The state created a Marriage and Communication Skills (MCS) commission in 2000 to approve, maintain, and distribute funding for marriage projects throughout the state. 211 Arizona was the first state to use federal welfare dollars to support a marriage program and is considered a pioneer in promoting marriage as a means to ending poverty.212 In chapter four there is further discussion surrounding the background of the Arizona MCS as well as an examination of the marriage project under the principles of both theories presented in this paper. Each theory presents an opportunity to demonstrate whether marriage promotion in Arizona will produce positive or negative outcomes for welfare women. These outcomes are identified as economic stability and independence from welfare assistance. First, the mobilization theory will be applied to the Arizona case to determine whether welfare reform and the marriage initiative were developed through a collaborative effort of professionals, politicians, and faith-based leaders. Based on the guidelines of 63

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the mobilization theory, polices that have been developed with a cooperative work from the three above groups will result in positive outcomes for the applicable parties. 213 I expect that the mobilization theory will uncover Arizona s failure to develop a marriage commission based on the requirements of the mobilization theory thus failing to meet the needs of welfare women. Once establishing that the Arizona MCS commission failed to develop a collaborative group based on the requirements of the mobilization theory, the FCPA theory will be applied to analyze whether the combination of federal welfare reform mandates and the Arizona marriage initiatives are presenting positive or negative outcomes for welfare women. Welfare recipients in Arizona are subject to time limits, mandated work related activities and reproductive manipulation?14 Likewise, welfare recipients are also eligible to participate in any marriage program that has been approved by the MCS. 2lS This chapter will provide research that supports the FCP A theory that welfare reform mandates which require marriage as a replacement for education and training will not improve welfare women's economic stability nor will it increase independence from government assistance 64

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CHAPTER FOUR THE ARIZONA CASE STUDY Introduction Previous chapters discussed literature surrounding welfare refonn and marriage promotion through an analysis of two theories. The Feminist Critical Policy Analysis (FCP A) theory presented by Shaw and the mobilization theory presented by Nock. These theories were selected to detennine what value marriage initiatives would provide for female recipients of welfare. The marriage initiative was included in the 1996 Welfare Refonn Act which drastically altered the United States welfare system by changing the previous entitlement program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), into a temporary, work-first program.216 The revised program established in 1996 was now labeled Temporary Aid to Needy Families (T ANF) and promoted employment and marriage as a means to resolving poverty.217 65

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This chapter will focus on the Arizona marriage initiative which was established in 2000, four years after welfare refonn The Marriage and Communication Skills commission was developed in Arizona to facilitate the approval, funding, and review of all marriage programs receiving welfare dollars. 218 The Arizona case provides four years data surrounding the impact of marriage promotion prior to and after the implementation of the states' marriage initiative. This chapter will analyze data provided by the Administration of Children and Families to detennine any impact that marriage promotion has had on welfare women concerning welfare receipt. The FCPA theory by Shaw and mobilization theory by Nock will be applied to the Arizona case study to review what impact welfare reform and the Arizona marriage initiative have had for welfare women in Arizona. The chapter will conclude with discussion on the potential implications that the Arizona marriage initiative will have on a national level. Arizona Marriage Initiative In 2000 Arizona became the first state to directly appropriate T ANF funds for marriage classes and has since allocated over one million dollars annually from the T ANF block grant to fund the Marriage and Communications Skills Commission (MCS), which awards grants and vouchers to agencies providing marriage and pre-marital workshops?19 This 66

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commission was created under recommendation of the Arizona Department ofEconomic Security (DES) and was expected to implement the marriage initiative through T ANF funding. The DES delegates all federal expectations for marriage promotion to the MCS commission. The MCS is divided into three components: one part is the Marriage and Communication Skills Program which focuses on developing curriculum centered on relationship, communication, and negotiation skills. The second component focuses on administering vouchers for low-income couples to attend marriage programs and the third component focuses on creating and distributing the Arizona Marriage Handbook to pre-marital couples. 220 The MCS is composed of nine members. The commission has two house members, two senate members, one representative from the governor's office, the director of the department of economic security, one member from the media, an expert from a marriage and family education center, and one marriage and family law attorney. 221 There are five purposes of the MCS commission222 : 1. The first is to review plans that are submitted to the DES by community-based organizations to participate in marriage and communication skills programs as well as recommend community-based organizations that are eligible for funding under the T ANF grant. 67

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2. The second purpose is to review all renewal applications and make recommendations for continuation or termination to the DES. 3. The third is to develop a marriage handbook available free of charge to all applicants of marriage licenses This handbook must include information about communication skills, shared parenting responsibilities, child support enforcement, domestic violence and child abuse resources, and information concerning family law such as divorce and alimony processes. 4 The fourth purpose is to develop qualifications for persons interested in starting a marriage program and develop a training seminar for organizations selected to run a marnage program. 5 The fifth purpose requires the MCS to review and evaluate all existing marriage programs that receive T ANF funds. The MCS was established in 2000 based on two core beliefs The first was that marriage will benefit the state economy. The MCS used research from the Heritage Center that showed that children raised in married homes are less likely to live in poverty when compared to children raised in single parent homes or cohabitating homes. 223 By promoting marriage throughout the state, Arizona was attempting to reduce child poverty as well as developing strong, healthy families The second belief was that children in Arizona will benefit when their parents are married.224 Research from the Heritage Center (2004) states that 68

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academic achievements are higher for children raised by both biological parents as compared to children raised by single parents or cohabitating couples. 225 Children from married homes are less likely to have juvenile delinquency issues and are more likely to contribute to the community through employment, volunteerism, and social activism. 226 Arizona established the MCS based on expectations from the welfare reform package in 1996 and based on research that demonstrated marriage would benefit a society through economic advances and improved child welfare 227 On average, Arizona has between seven and eleven counties that are providing marriage programs. The availability of services within a particular county varies depending on the calendar of classes. For example, one program may not be available in one a particular county if the program is a short-term class offered only once or twice a year. The marriage programs are facilitated by non-government agencies which have been approved by the MCS. The programs are 100 percent funded through the Arizona TANF block grant. 228 Some of the agencies that have been approved to provide services include the Lutheran Social Ministry of the Southwest, Catholic Social Services, and the Jewish Family & Children's Services of Southern Arizona 229 Each organization offers services in more then one county. The largest contractor is the Lutheran Social Ministry that provides marriage classes in seven counties at any point during the calendar year 69

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The services provided by Arizona marriage programs include counseling, marriage resource information, and education focused on healthy relationships and marriage. 230 These services are based on curriculums that provide pre-marital couples skills and information that are needed to maintain a marriage. Marriage programs in Arizona utilize more common marriage curricula such as Pre-Marital Relationship Enhancement Program (PREP) and Practical Application oflntimate Relationship Skills (PAIRS).231 These curricula are based on collaboration between community and religious leaders working together with mentor couples. The majority of curriculum developed has been created for a mainstream audience, which has primarily been white, middle-to-upper class, couples. 232 As a result, adaptations of the marriage curriculum have occurred, which attempt to address the specific needs of low-income families or teen parents. Under these circumstances, the material presented in the core curriculum remains the same, but the focus is altered to meet the needs of the audience. Eligibility Criteria for MCS Programs Federal policy for welfare reform mandates that the marriage initiative target all pre-marital couples with no restriction on income levels or welfare receipt. Unlike cash and food assistance programs that require families to be 70

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below 150 percent of the federal poverty level, marriage programs do not require couples to provide verification of the household income.233 Arizona created the MCS to meet the expectations of federal policy concerning marriage promotion. The MCS allocates funding for marriage programs under a competitive grant process. Any state agency, community organization, or religious group can apply for and receive funding for a marriage program. Currently in Arizona there are seven counties that have been approved through the MCS to run marriage programs with funding from the TANF grant.234 There are fees for each class depending on the workshop. According to MCS guidelines, couples are expected to pay 15 percent of the program fee and the state covers the remainder.235 Low-income families that cannot afford the fees are given state issued vouchers to attend programs free of cost. Vouchers are administered through welfare offices and are eligible to any family whose income is below 150 percent of the federal poverty level. 236 On an annual average, over five hundred couples attend a T ANF funded marriage program. 237 Only 5 percent of participating couples are attending through a welfare voucher program. 238 Participation in marriage programs by welfare recipients is completely voluntary in Arizona. 239 Welfare eligibility standards do not require that a recipient attend a marriage program to receive cash benefits. 240 Mentioned earlier was that welfare reform requires all recipients to participate in a work 71

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related activity These activities range from short-term education or internships Another allowable activity that would count as a work-related activity is attending marriage classes or workshops. T ANF recipients that receive vouchers and participate in marriage programs are able to use those hours of attendance as part of their required monthly activities .241In Arizona, participation in marriage programs that count towards monthly work activities can also provide monetary rewards to the welfare recipient.242 Recipients that meet the required work hours in a month are eligible to receive monetary incentives. To continue federal funding for welfare programs states are required to demonstrate that a minimum of 50 percent of welfare recipients are complying with their work activities Failure to meet this 50 percent requirement can result in states losing federal funding for welfare programs. 243 Funding ofMCS Programs Under federal guidelines funding for marriage initiatives comes directly from the states' T ANF block grant. The MCS funding in Arizona is divided into four parts. 244 At least one million of the grant is used for marriage education classes that are facilitated by community-based programs. A quarter of a million is used on a media campaign aimed at promoting abstinence only and abstinence until marriage programs. And a quarter of a 72

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million is equally divided to provide vouchers to low-income families to attend marriage courses as well as funding for a marriage handbook that will be distributed free of charge to all persons applying for a marriage license. 245 Measuring the Success of the Arizona Marriage Initiative Success of the marriage initiative will be based on two outcomes. The first is a comparison of two-parent households prior to and after the inception of the MCS commission. The second measure of success is the percentage of welfare women participating in marriage programs compared to the total number of individuals enrolled in MCS sponsored programs. Measuring the numbers of two-parent homes versus single parent homes is based on data from the Administration of Children and Families (ACF) under the US Department ofHealth and Human Services from 1997 through 2004.246 Household compositions for two parent and single parent homes from 1997 through 2000 will be compared to compositions from 2001 through 2004. The ACF sample provides information on all households that have received welfare assistance of any kind in Arizona for a specific year In Arizona, two parent homes are eligible for welfare benefits as long as the income level of the home falls under the eligibility guidelines and as long as both parents are participating in a work-related activity. Two-parent homes are considered 73

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households where both biological parents are either legally wed or cohabitating. 247 In the Arizona case study a successful marriage program would result in the increase of two-parent homes over single parent homes and a decrease in welfare recipients since the establishment of the MCS in 2000. According to the ACF data, Arizona has had less then a 50 percent increase in two-parent versus single parent homes since the marriage initiative began in 2000.248 Since the launch of the marriage initiative and the establishment of the MCS in 2000, Arizona welfare enrollment numbers have actually decreased by 19 percent.249 Single parent homes decreased by 33 percent and two parent homes decreased by 28 percent.250 Nationally, there has been a reduction in enrollment numbers since 2000 by 50 percent for single parent homes and 68 percent for two parent homes. 251 As mentioned earlier, Arizona is one of a few states that have implemented marriage initiative programs nationwide. When comparing the national decrease in caseload size to that of Arizona the assumption would be that Arizona would have a larger reduction of case load numbers compared to the national average due to the marriage initiatives goal to reduce dependence on welfare assistance. However, according to data by the ACF, Arizona's marriage program has failed to provide a substantial decrease in welfare rolls since establishing the MCS marriage programs. 252 74

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I I Similarly, Arizona has failed to increase the number of two parent families that are receiving any form of government assistance. Single parent homes were 98 percent of the Arizona caseload prior to the marriage initiative and are 97 percent of the caseload since the initiative 253 Proponents of the marriage initiative claim that the reason single parent homes remain the highest percentage of welfare enrollees is because recipients who do get married are leaving the system and two parent families that remain on welfare are in a transitional period from government assistance to self-sufficiency.254 In the Arizona case study however this does not prove to be the circumstance. Arizona's two parent families are eligible for welfare services that include assistance other than cash benefits such as health coverage or low-income childcare Welfare families that transition from a single parent home to a two parent home are likely to utilize welfare services for at least two years after marrying or moving in together?55 If the Arizona case study was successful in transitioning single parent homes into two parent homes there would be data demonstrating an increase in two parent homes receiving some welfare service and a decrease in single parent homes receiving assistance. According to data provided by the ACF the largest recipient of welfare benefits are single parent homes, thus demonstrating that two parent homes have not increased since the marriage initiative in 2000. 75

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I I I I I I I I Summary of the Arizona: Marriage Initiative The Arizona Marriage and Communication Skills commission was established in 2000 and has been running the marriage initiative in the state through program approval and funds distribution. Arizona was the fist state to establish a marriage commission and has had four years of welfare reform without a marriage initiative and four years with a marriage initiative. Based on data provided by the ACF, there has been no evidence that marriage promotion has reduced welfare enrollment numbers in the state since 2000. Comparing the national reduction in welfare rolls to those in Arizona does not indicate that marriage promotion has resulted in an increased reduction of welfare enrollment numbers. Under the guidelines of the mobilization theory by Steven Nock and the Feminist Critical Analysis (FCPA) by Kathleen Shaw, the Arizona case will be examined to determine whether eligibility standards, funding guidelines, and the likelihood of successful marriage programs will assist welfare women from exiting the system and securing long-term financial stability that will lift their families from poverty. Nock's mobilization theory would argue that the 76

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Arizona marriage commission would successfully reduce the number women on welfare and assist in removing their families from poverty. According to the mobilization theory, the Arizona marriage initiative will prove to be beneficial for welfare women based on the collaboration of professional, politicians, and religious groups that developed the marriage commission. Shaw utilizes the FCP A theory to focus on three reform policies in order to evaluate the impact that welfare reform, combined with marriage initiatives, will have for women. 256 According to Shaw reform policies surrounding life time limits, mandatory work requirements, and reproductive manipulation have restricted women's access to education and job training programs, and created a system of dependence on either the government or a husband.257 For the purpose of the Arizona case study the FCPA theory will be reviewed to determine what impact the welfare policy reforms of time limits, mandatory work requirements, and reproductive manipulation combined with the marriage initiative will have had for women. The Arizona Mobilization Effort According to research presented by Nock (2005) the success of welfare reform in 1996 was based on a mobilization effort of politicians, professionals, and religious leadersin the policy reform movement.258 Nock describes the success of welfare reform and the establishment ofPRWORA 77

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as a result of the collaborative efforts by the above three groups all concerned with and involved in the welfare community. The motivation to become involved in welfare reform for each cluster was prompted by concern over the deconstruction of the family such as rising rates of single parent families, out-of-wedlock births, and rising divorce rates. These issues initiated a mobilization effort among professionals, politicians and religious leaders to become involved in welfare reform. The mobilization theory claims that policy reform will be most successful and beneficial for society when collaboration occurs among politicians, professionals, and religious leaders. 259 Through collaborative efforts, the interests and desired outcomes of one particular faction will not be the driving force for policy reform. PRWORA was developed based on these collaborative efforts and under the mobilization theory the policy reform was successful in meeting the needs of welfare families. Politicians are the dominant presence in Arizona's marriage initiative. Outside of the political involvement in social services and welfare programs, politicians make up the largest majority of the nine-member MCS commission. Six of the rotating members will always be politicians leaving two spaces for professional members and one position to be filled by a marriage expert. In Arizona, the MCS commission distributes marriage 78

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j I I I I I I initiative funds. The commission was developed specifically to oversee the approval and funding of marriage programs for the entire state 260 Measuring the Mobilization Theory for the Arizona Marriage Initiative The purpose of the Arizona marriage initiative is to improve the lives of welfare women by promoting marriage as a means to ending poverty and dependence on government assistance Under the guidelines established by the mobilization theory, Arizona fails to serve welfare women. The MCS commission was developed through policy reform but is facilitated by a majority of politicians rather then a collective organization between professionals and religious leaders. The dominant presence of politicians on the MCS commission serves the purpose of the state over that of society. In this regard, the goals of the state are to continue federal funding for welfare programs. The MCS commission serves the purpose of the state rather then the purpose of providing assistance to welfare women. MCS approved marriage programs have yet to demonstrate large participation numbers by welfare women, hence these programs will have little direct impact of the lives of welfare women. The MCS political members make up 60 percent of the commission since the inception of the initiative and yet, the commission has made no attempt to alter marriage programs to serve the welfare 79

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community. 261 Under these circumstances the Arizona marriage initiative fails to meet the requirements of the mobilization effort and effectively fails to serve the needs of welfare women. Additionally, Arizona's marriage initiative does not meet the collaborative requirements of the mobilization theory because Arizona's faith-based communities are not members of the MCS commission which oversee all marriage promotion projects receiving federal funding. 262 There are nine members on the MCS commission none of whom are required to be from the faith-based community. 263 Even though religious organizations are not permanent members of the MCS commission, they do provide the majority of the marriage programs available in Arizona through MCS funding. 264 Despite this fact, the mobilization theory requires that politicians, professionals, and religious leaders be involved in policy reform. Based on the requirements established by the mobilization theory, the Arizona case study cannot be determined to provide beneficial outcomes for welfare women. The mobilization theory claims that a collaboration of politicians, professionals, and religious leaders working towards policy reform will provide the most successful outcomes. Arizona does not meet the expectations of the mobilization theory because the faith-based community is not involved in the approval and funding of marriage programs in Arizona. While proponents of the Arizona marriage project may claim that the faith80

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based community is involved in the commission through facilitation of marriage classes, this does not meet the theory requirements According to the mobilization theory, Arizona's marriage project does not provide necess8!1' services to welfare women because the marriage programs that have been developed are not done through a collective effort of politicians, professionals and religious leaders. Feminist Critical Policy Analysis Theory and the Arizona Marriage Initiative According to proponents of the FCPA theory, welfare reform failed to serve the needs of women due in part because the reform was a gender blind policy that did not take into account the real life issues facing women in the welfare community. 265 The FCPA theory is used to examine policy reforms to determine whether any changes or additions will provide more benefit for society then for the state. According to Shaw, policies that have been developed which do not provide for the needs of society over the needs of the state will not be successful policies. 266 Under the FCPA theory guidelines, welfare reform is a failure because the benefits to the state out-weigh the benefits to welfare families. 267 Particularly the FCP A points to the introduction of time limits, mandatory work requirements, and the manipulation of reproductive rights as the failure of welfare reform to 81

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provide beneficial outcomes for welfare women. 268 The Arizona marriage project is an example of welfare reform failing to serve the welfare community. Based on the FCP A theory, the Arizona marriage project, in conjunction with mandatory work requirements do not serve the needs of welfare women but do serve a purpose for the state. Lifetime Limit of Welfare Receipt According to federal policy, all welfare recipients are permitted to receive welfare benefits for a maximum of sixty months. 269 The FCP A states that this life time limit restricts women from attaining quality education and training that would provide a stable household income. A long-term education or training certificate cannot be attained because the risk of exhausting the lifetime limit of welfare receipt is too high for a low-income family. Supporters of the FCPA theory claim that by using TANF dollars to fund marriage programs, education and training programs can only provide minimal opportunities for welfare women. Funding split between training and education, as in the case of Arizona, results in mediocre training programs that will only assist women to secure employment in low wage jobs that end their dependence on welfare but do not end the cycle of poverty. Applying the FCP A theory to the Arizona marriage initiative, in the case of time limits, 82

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I I' i I demonstrates that the Arizona marriage project has a negative impact for women and actually benefits the state more then the target audience. Reproductive Manipulation In addition to mandatory time limits, reproductive manipulation is another issue that the FCP A claims is a negative result of welfare reform. Reproductive manipulation occurs under the welfare system when women are penalized for having more children while on welfare. Penalties may include less cash benefits or even denial of cash benefits .270 Similarly, welfare women are provided birth control options through Medicaid services that would prevent any additional childbirths Under the Arizona marriage initiative, reproductive manipulation is present through family planning workshops and the promotion of saving childbirth until after marriage. 271 Marriage promotion in Arizona fails to meet the needs of welfare women according to guidelines of the FCP A theory because the focus of the initiative promotes state manipulation of reproductive rights Marriage programs are funded through TANF dollars and are used to encourage family planning and waiting for childbirth until marriage. What the marriage initiative does not focus on is how to develop healthy families when there are already children present. 272 Proponents of the FCP A theory claim that the Arizona marriage initiative fai1s to setve the needs of women by promoting family planning for .. ,.;, : ; ; 83 "' ::. .c-

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marriage rather then addressing the needs of unmarried women with children. 273 Mandatory Work Requirements The final welfare policy examined under the FCP A principles is mandated work requirements. Under welfare reform all recipients are mandated to participate in a work-related activity for a minimum of32 hours a week or more depending on the age of the child. 274 In Arizona, welfare recipients are permitted to claim attendance at marriage workshops and classes as part of the mandated work-related activities .275 This approval allows women to replace work related activities such as GED preparation and job searching with time spent in marriage class focusing on communication and parenting skills According to supporters of the FCPA theory, this compromise is depleting the earning potential for women. 276 Two of the federal mandates imposed on all states that are significant for this paper are the requirement to meet a 50 percent federal work participation rate and to promote healthy marriages In Arizona these expectations are met through the marriage initiative. Arizona T ANF recipients to claim hours spent in marriage classes @.5 part of their work. related activities and the MCS was developed t o provide marriage classes.277 FCP A supporters argue that Arizona is not considering the impact of 84

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replacing marriage classes with GED classes for welfare women but rather is concerned with continued funding. 278 Under the FCP A standard which requires policies that improve the quality of life for women rather then the state, Arizona's marriage initiative fails. Marriage promotion in Arizona ultimately serves the betterment of the state rather then the welfare women participating in workshops and classes. Summary of the Mobilization Theory and the Feminist Critical Policy Analysis According to the mobilization theory and the FCP A theory presented in this chapter the Arizona marriage initiative falls short of providing beneficial outcomes for welfare women. The mobilization theory expects that a collaboration of politicians, professionals and religious leaders will result in effective policies. In Arizona, the MCS commission oversees all marriage programs and this group is not a collective formation of the three factions. According to the guidelines of the mobilization theory, Arizona's marriage initiative does not provide effective policies for the welfare community. The FCP A theory focuses on the federal mandate of welfare reform such as life time limits, reproductive manipulation, and work requirements In the Arizona case study the marriage project is developed to meet the federal guidelines and continues to serve the needs of the state rather than the needs j 85

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of women. The debate over whether marriage promotion in Arizona will benefit welfare women failed to meet the standards established by the mobilization theory and the FCPA theory. When applying either theory to the Arizona case study, the marriage programs did not serve the needs of welfare women. Policy Implications for State Marriage Initiatives Across the nation, states are required to promote marriage based on PRWORA requirements. Less then half of states using federal dollars for welfare agencies currently have marriage commissions responsible for developing marriage initiatives?79 Under T ANF reauthorization in 2006 the push for marriage promotion has gained momentum and all states will be competing for funds to support their marriage initiatives The Arizona case is one example that states could follow when developing their marriage programs. However, state politicians are faced with obstacles concerning the development of marriage initiatives. The largest being that over 75 percent of Americans do not want the government developing programs to promote marriage. 280 The opposition to government involvement in marriage programs does not change the fact that over 80 percent of people believe that divorce rates are too high and there needs to be policies that will help reduce the rising rate.281 Government leaders are tasked with developing a resolution 86

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to high divorces without becoming too much of an advocate for marriage. Since welfare reform requires all states to promote marriage, research has been developed to establish the most effective measures to assist states in the marriage initiative. 282 The first measurement to improve the marriage initiative would be to place on emphasis on combining employment, education and marriage. By combining the three categories states would be able to address issues that are largely inhibiting for welfare families. The inclusion of education and employment training in marriage programs would assist families in learning how to effectively communicate and deal with common stresses that may place strain on a relationship.283 Likewise, an inclusion of the three components would help welfare families develop the necessary skills to secure employment that could add to a successful transition from TANF. Current welfare policies suggest that marriage can be a means to reducing poverty and by combining the marriage initiative with education and employment advancement, families increase their potential to become self sufficient. Under the same guidelines as combining marriage promotion with education and employment, the idea of securing a well paying job that pays a living wage and will provide long term financial security for a family is better then encouraging welfare recipients to take any paying job just to exit 87

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welfare. 284 Welfare recipients have a limited amount of time to receive welfare benefits and the current employment focus for welfare women is on finding a job that will pay more then a welfare check and will transition the family offofTANF. The reality ofthis current expectation is that undereducated and under-employed welfare women will find employment that pays low wages which will never successfully transition the family from poverty This is where marriage promotion comes in; by adding marriage to the equation, low paying jobs in a two-income household would be expected to lift the family from poverty According to research by Fein if states include quality education and employment services with the marriage initiative, families who leave T ANF after marrying are less likely to return to the welfare system and more likely to develop a stable household income. 285 The final measurements that would assist states in developing marriage programs will depend on state legislature Childcare, economic security and child support enforcement measures all require legislative recognition. Childcare proves to be a major obstacle of economic independence for welfare women. State legislation needs to develop quality and affordable childcare services that are attractive to women recently exiting welfare. 286 While promoting education, employment, and marriage, the state also needs to provide affordable childcare services that will assist families to exit the welfare system. Providing quality and affordable childcare to newly married 88

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families will add to the dual income which will stabilize the family's economic security and independence from government assistance. Welfare women who are encouraged to participate in marriage programs need to be screened for economic barriers such as mental or medical health issues, criminal backgrounds, educational or employment deficiencies or domestic violence histories. 287 Any of these issues are potential barriers to economic security that will result in continued poverty Education, employment, or marriage can resolve poverty if these barriers are present. States need to provide services that will address these and other issues that may interfere with the development of economic security. Under the marriage initiative services could be provided that would coincide with building relationship skills. Finally, attention needs to be paid to revising the child support enforcement system. Cohabitating or romantically involved couples who receive welfare benefits are required to comply with child support enforcement. 288 Strict child support policies that are expected to provide incentives for families to marry actually create disincentives of marriage. 289 Improved child support policies that focus on improving family relationships will actually increase the likelihood of couples marrying. 290 Child support policies that include education and job training for fathers as well as 89

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addressing relationship skills found in marriage programs will result in an increase of married families in the welfare system. Based on the aboye research and the results from the Arizona case study, states developing marriage programs need to take several factors into consideration. As seen in the Arizona case, there needs to be a collaborative effort amongst politicians, professionals, and religious leaders to ensure that the marriage initiative addresses the needs and desired outcomes for society as a whole. Also, promoting marriage development as the sole resolution for poverty will not provide benefits for women. Working under federal mandates of time limits, reproductive control, and work-related activities, marriage programs need to ensure that the focus of welfare programs include a combination of education, employment, and marriage. States currently developing marriage programs will benefit from the results of the Arizona case study as well as outside research on the marriage initiative. Summary Welfare reauthorization in 2006 has secured the inclusion of marriage in the welfare system. As a result, all states will be expected to provide marriage services for welfare families as a means for self-sufficiency. Welfare dollars have been allocated for marriage promotion as well as competitive grants available for funding additional programs. 291 The Arizona case study used 90

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federal funding starting in 2000 to develop the MCS commission. This commission has overseen the marriage initiative in Arizona by approving and distributing funding for all marriage programs in the state. Arizona was the first state to develop a marriage commission and is only one of less then a dozen that had any type of marriage program developed.292 This thesis has set out to debate whether marriage promotion in Arizona has provided beneficial outcomes for welfare women. According to research presented for this case, the Arizona marriage project has failed to improve the lives of welfare women. Supporting evidence such as the lack of welfare women participating in marriage programs, the failure to develop programs based on a mobilized effort of politicians, professionals and religious leaders, and the implementation of gender blind policies such as mandated work-activities have failed to serve the needs of women. Future state marriage policies need I to focus on three branches for provision of welfare services that include I I education, employment training, and marriage promotion. Marriage as a means to ending poverty will be a permanent provision of the welfare system until reauthorization in 2010. States will be expected to policies will need to focus on the welfare community specifically. Failure to provide marriage services that directly impact welfare families, such as 91

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services including education and job training, will only prolong poverty within the welfare community. Marriage can only be a means of ending poverty if it serves the needs of the welfare family. 92

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Endnotes 1 Gennetian, Lisa A, and Cynthia Miller "How Welfare Reform can affect Marriage : Evidence from an Experimental Study in Minnesota." Review of Economics of the Household 2 (2004 ): 275-301. 2 Lisa A Gennetian and Cynthia Miller, 2004. 3 Lisa A Gennetian and Cynthia Miller, 2004. 4 Vicki Lens, "T ANF: What Went Wrong and What to Do Next," Social Work 47 (2002): 3. 5 Vartanian, Thomas P. and Justine McNamara. "The Welfare Myth: Disentangling the Long-term Effects of Poverty and Welfare Receipt for Young Single Mothers." Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare 31.4 (2004): 105-140. 6 Macomber Jennifer Ehrle Julie Murray, and Matthew Stagner. "Service Delivery and Evaluation Design Options for Strengthening and Promoting Healthy Marriages" 7 Dianne K. McLaughlin and Daniel T Lichter, "Poverty and the Marital Behavior of Young Women," Journal of Marriage and the Family 59 (1997): 3. 8 McLaughlin and Lichter 9 Lisa A Gennetian and Cynthia Miller, 2004. 10 Lisa A Gennetian and Cynthia Miller, 2004. 11 Lisa A Gennetian and Cynthia Miller, 2004. 12 Lisa A Gennetian and Cynthia Miller, 2004. 13 Lisa A Gennetian and Cynthia Miller, 2004. 14 Nock, Steven L. "Marriage as a Public Issue The Future of Children 15. 2 (2005): 1332 Shaw, Kathleen "Using Feminist Critical Policy Analysis in the Realm of Higher Education: The case of Welfare Reform as Gendered Educational Policy." The Journal of Higher Education 75.1 (2004) 56-79. 15 Administration of Children and Families. http : //www.acf.hhs.gov/acf disclaimers.html 2004. 1 6 Remez, L. "Married Mothers Fare the Best Economically, Even if they were Unwed at the Time they gave Birth." Family Planning Perspectives 31.5 (1999): 258-259 17 Daniel T Lichter and Martha L. Crowley, "Welfare Reform and Child Poverty: Effects of Maternal Employment, Marriage and Cohabitation," Social Science Review 33 (2004): 3. 18 Lichter and Crowley 19 Aubhik Khan, "Why are Married Women Working More? Some Macroeconomic Explanations," Business Review (2004) : Q4. 20 McLaughlin and Lichter. 21 McLaughlin and Lichter. 22 Mark. R Rank, "The Formulation and Dissolution of Marriages in the Welfare Population," Journal of Marriage and the Family 49 (1987) : 15-20. 23 Mark R Rank, 1987. 24 Sarah Olson, "Marriage Promotion, Reproductive Injustice, and the War Against Poor Women of Color, Dollars and Sense 257 (2005): 5. 25 Lisa A Gennetian and Cynthia Miller 2004. 26 Arizona Department of Economic Security "State of Arizona Marriage Handbook." P. 3orglstatefed/welfarelstrength htm 2004. 27 Arizona Department of Economic Security, 2004. 93

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28 Arizona Department of Economic Security, 2004. 29 National Conference of State Legislatures, 2005. 30 National Conference of State Legislatures, 2005 31 National Conference of State Legislatures, 2005. 32 National Conference of State Legislatures, 2005. 33 Arizona Department of Economic Security, 2004. 34 Arizona Department of Economic Security, 2004. 35 Administration of Children and Families, 2004. 36 Steven Nock, 2005. 37 Kathleen Shaw, 2004. 38 Edin, Kathryn and Joanna M Reed. "Why Don't They Just get Married? Barriers to Marriage among the Disadvantaged." The Future of Children 15.2 (2005): 117-137 39 Kathleen Shaw, 2004. 40 Administration of Children and Families, 2004 41 Administration of Children and Families, 2004 42 McLaughlin; Diane K. and Daniel T. Lichter. "Poverty and the Marital Behavior of Young Women." Journal of Marriage and Family 59.3 (1997) 582-594. 43 Kathleen Shaw, 2004. 44 Kathryn Edin and Joanna M. Reed, 2005. 45 Fitzgerald, John M. and David C. Ribar. "Welfare Reform and Female Headship." Demography 41.2 (2004): 189-212. 46 Macomber, Jennifer Ehrle, Julie Murray, and Matthew Stagner. "Service Delivery and Evaluation Design Options for Strengthening and Promoting Healthy Marriages" 47 Remez, L. "Married Mothers Fare the Best Economically, Even if They Were Unwed at The Time they gave Birth'' Family Planning Perspectives 31.5 (1999): 258-259. 48 Arizona Department of Economic Security. "State of Arizona Marriage Handbook." P. 3orglstatefed/welfare/strength.htm 2004. 49 Goldstein, Joshua R and Catharine T. Kenney, "Marriage Delayed or Marriage Forgone? New Cohort Forecasts of First Marriage for U. S. Wome!!," American Sociological Review 66 (2001) 506-519. 50 Jennings, Patrick K. "What Mothers Want: Welfare Reform and Maternal Desire." Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare 31.3 (2004): 113-130. 51 Patrick K. Jennings, 2004. 52 Patrick K. Jennings, 2004. 53 Patrick K. Jennings, 2004. 54 Patrick K. Jennings, 2004. 55 Patrick K. Jennings, 2004. 56 Patrick K. Jennings, 2004. 57 Melendez, Edwin, Luis Falcon, and Josh Bivens. "Community College Participation in Welfare Programs: Do State Policies MatterT' Community College Journal of Research and Practice 27 (2003): 203-223 .. 58 Lichter, Daniel T. and Martha L. Crowley., "Welfare Reform and Child Poverty: Effects of Maternal Employment, Marriage and Cohabitation." Social Science Research 33.3 (2004): 34-45. 59 Daniel T. Lichter and Martha L. Crowley, 2004. 60 Daniel T. Lichter and Martha L. Crowley, 2004. 61 McLaughlin, Diane K. and Daniel T. Lichter. "Poverty and the Marital Behavior of Young Women." Journal of Marriage and the Family 59.3 (1997): 582-594. 62 Diane K. McLaughlin and Daniel T. Lichter, 1997. 94

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63 Aassve, Arnstein. ''The Impact of Economic Resources on Premarital Childbearing and Subsequent Marriage among Young American Women." Demogrnphy 40. 1 (2003): 105-126. 64 Arnstein Aassve, 2003. 65 Arnstein Aassve, 2003. 66 McLaughlin, Diane and Daniel T. Lichter. "Poverty and the Marital Behavior of Women." Journal of Marriage and the Family 59. 3 (1997) 582-594 67 Diane McLaughlin and Daniel T. Lichter, 1997. 68 Edin, Kathryn and Joanna Reed. "Why Don't They Just Get married? Barriers to Marriage among the Disaclvantaged." Future of Children 15.2 (2005): 117-13 7. 69 Diane McLaughlin and Daniel T. Lichter, 1997. 70 John M Fitzgerald and David C. Ribar, 2004. 71 John M Fitzgerald and David C Ribar, 2004. 72 Jobn M David C Ribar, 2004 73 Olson, Sarah.. "Marriage Promotion, Reproductive Injustice, and the War Against Poor Women of Color.'' Dollars and Sense 257(2005): 14-21. 74 John M Fitzger8Id and David C. Ribar, 2004 75 Arnstein Aassve, 2003. 76 Katluyn Edin and Joanna Reed, 2005. 77 Kathryn Edin arid Joanna Reed, 2005. 78 Sarah Olson, 2005. 79 Sarah Olson, 2005. 80 Sarah Olson, 2005. 81 Jarchow, Courtney. "Strengthening Marriage and Two-Parent Families." National Conference of State Legislatures February (2003): 1-15 .. 82 Courtney Jarchow, 2003. 83 Bitler, Marianne P., et al. "The Impact of Welfare Reform on Marriage and Divorce." Demography 41.2 (2004): 213-236 84 Marianne Bitler, 2004. 85 Marianne Bitler, 2004. 86 Marianne Bitler, 2004. 87 Edwin Melendez et al, 2003. 88 Edwin Melendez et a1, 2003. 89 Edwin Melendez et al, 2003. 90 Daniel T. Lichter and Martha L. Crowley, 2004. 91 Daniel T Lichter and Martha L. Crowley, 2004. 92 Daniel T Lichter and Martha L. Crowley, 2004 93 Daniel T. Lichter and Martha L, Crowley, 2004. 94 Daniel OJ'. Lichter and Martha L. Crowley, 2004 95 Marianne Bitler, 2004. 96 Marianne Bitler, 2004. 97 Marianne Bitler, 2004. 98 Marianne Bitler, 2004 99 Marianne Bitler,2004. 100 Marianne Bitler, 2004 .. 101 M. Robin Dion, 2005. 102M. Robin Dion, 2005. 103 M. Robin Dion, 2005. 104M Robin Dion, 2005. 95

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105 Fein, David J. "Married and Poor: Basic Characteristics of Economically Disadvantaged Couples in the U.S." Supj)Orting Healthy Marriage Evaluation March 2003. 106 David J. Fein, 2003. 107 David J. Fein, 2003. 108 David J. Fein, 2003. 109 David J. Fein, 2003. 110 David J. Fein, 2003. 111 David J. Fein, 2003. 112 David J. Fein, 2003. 113 David J. Fein, 2003. 114 David J. Fein, 2003. 115 Macomber, Jennifer, Julie Murray, and Matthews Stagner. "Service Delivery and Evaluation Design Options for Strengthening and Promoting Healthy Marriages" US Department of Health and Human Services, 2002. 116M Robin Dion, 2005. 117 John M Fitzgerald and David C. Ribar, 2004. 118 Jennifer Macomber et al, 2002. 119 Jennifer Macomber et al, 2002. 120 Jennifer Macomber et al, 2002. 121 Jennifer Macomber et al, 2002. 122 Heritage Foundation. "Welfare Reform and the Healthy Marriage Initiative." The Heritage Foundation February 10, 2005. 123 Heritage Foundation, 2005. 124 Arizona Department of Economic Security "State of Arizona Marriage Handbook." P. 3orglstatefed/welfare/strength.htm 2004. 125 Aassve, Arnstein. "The Impact of Economic Resources on Premarital Childbearing and Subsequent marriage Among Young American Women." Demograj!hy 40.1 (2003): 105-126 126 Fitzgerald, John M. and David C. Ribar. "Welfare Reform and Female Headship." Demography 41.2 (2004): 189-212. 127 Carlson, Marcia, Sara McLanahan, and Paula England. "Union Formation in Fragile Families." Demography 41.2 (2004) : 237-261. 128 Courtney Jarchow, 2003. 129 Courtney Jarchow, 2003. 130 Courtney Jarchow, 2003. 131 Courtney Jarchow, 2003. 132 Dion, M Robin. "Healthy Marriage Programs: Learning What Works." Future of Children 15.2 (2005) : 139-156 133 Sarah Olson, 2005. 134 Lewant, Sherry "Testimony of NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund on 'Welfare Reform Reauthorization."' United States Finance Committee March 12, 2003. 135 Olson, Sarah. "Marriage Promotion, Reproductive Injustice, and the War Against Poor Women of Color." Dollars and Sense 257 (2005): 14-21. 136 Sarah Olson, 2005. 137 Noclc, Steven L "Marriage as a Public Issue." The Future of Children 15.2 (2005): 13-32 138 Steven Noclc, 2005. 139 Steven Nock, 2005. 140 Steven Nock, 2005. 96

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141 Steven Nock, 2005. 142 Steven Nock, 2005. 143 Steven Nock, 2005. 144 Steven Nock, 2005. 145 Arnstein Aassve, 2003. 146 Steven Nock, 2005. 147 Steven Nock, 2005. 148 Steven Nock, 2005. 149 Steven Nock, 2005. 150 Jarchow, Courtney. "Strengthening Marriage and Two Parent Families." National Conference of State Legislatures. February 2003. 151 Courtney Jarchow, 2003. 152 Courtney Jarchow, 2003. 153 Marcia Carlson et al, 2004. 154 Steven Nock, 2005. 155 Steven Nock, 2005. 156 Stephen Nock, 2005. 157 Steven Nock, 2005. 158 Steven Nock, 2005. 159 Patrick Jennings, 2004. 160 Steven Nock, 2005. 161 The Heritage Foundation. "Welfare Reform and the Healthy Marriage Initiative." http://www.heritage.org/researchlwelfare/tst021005a.cfm?renderforprint=1 2005. 162 Marcia Carlson et al, 2004. 163 Steven Nock, 2005. 164 Shaw, Kathleen. "Using Feminist Critical Policy Analysis in the Reahn of Higher Education : The case of Welfare Reform as Gendered Educational Policy The Journal of Higher Education 75.1 (2004) 56-79. 165 Kathleen Shaw, 2004 166 Kathleen Shaw, 2004. 167 Lichtenwalter, Sara. "Gender Poverty Disparity in US Cities: Evidence Exonernting Female-Headed Families." Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare 32.2 (2005): 75-97. Nam, Yunji. '"The Roles of Employment Barriers in Welfare Exits and Reentries after Welfare Reform: Event History Analyses." Social Seryice Review 76.4 (2005): 603-41 168 Bitler, Marianne, Jonah B. Gelbach, Hilary W. Hovanes, and Madeline Zavodny. "The Impact of Welfare Reform on Marriage and Divorce." Demography 41.2 (2004): 213-236 169 Marianne Bitler, et aL 2004. 170 Steven Nock, 2005. 171 Patrick Jerutings, 2004. 172 Marianne Bitler, et aL 2004. 173 Marianne Bitler, et aL 2004. 174 Kathleen Shaw, 2004. 175 Marianne Bitler, et aL 2004. 176 Arnstein Aassve, 2003. 177 Patrick Jemtings, 2004. 178 Kathleen Shaw, 2004. 179 Kathleen Shaw, 2004. 180 Patrick Jemtings, 2004. 97

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181 Macomber, Jennifer, Julie Murray, and Matthew Stagner. "Service Delivery and Evaluation Design Options for Strengthening and Promoting Healthy Marriages." U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Washington D.C. (2005). 182 Jennifer Macomber et al. 183 Knieser, Thomas. "Getting into Poverty Without a Husband, and Getting Out, With Out Without." The American Economic Review 78.2 (1988): 86-90. 184 Lichter, Daniel and Martha Crowley. "Welfare Reform and Child Poverty: Effects of Maternal Employment, Marriage and Cohabitatimt" Social Science Research 33.3 (2004): 33-44. 185 Marcia Carlson et al, 2004. 186 Kathleen Shaw, 2004. 187 Kathleen Shaw, 2004. 188 Kathleen Shaw, 2004. 189 Yunji Nam, 2005. 190 Arnstein Aassve, 2003 191 Yunji Nam, 2005. 192 Boris, Eileen and S.J. Kleinberg. "Mothers and Other Workers: Re-conceiving Labor, Maternlism, and the State." University Press 15.3 (2003): 90-117. 193 Kathleen Shaw, 2004. 194 Kathleen Shaw, 2004. 195 Kathleen Shaw, 2004. 196 Zhan, Min and Shanta Pandey. "Economic Well-being of Single Mothers: Work First or Postsecondaxy Educationr' Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare 31.3 (2004): 87-112. 197 Kathleen Shaw, 2004. 198 Min Zhan and Shanta Pandey, 2004. 199 Min Zhan and Shanta Pandey, 2004. 200 Min Zhan and Shanta Pandey, 2004. 201 Kathleen Shaw, 2004. 202 The Heritage Foundation, 2004. 203 NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund. "Looking for Love in all the Wrong Places." http://www.nowldef.org/html/issues/weVmarriagepromotion.shtnl 204 Lichter, Daniel T., Christie D. Batson, and J. Brian Brown., "Welfare Reform and Marriage Promotion: The Marital Expectations and Desires of Single and Cohabitating Mothers." Social Service Review 78.1 (2004): 19-29 205 Kathleen Shaw, 2004. 206 Supporting HMl. 207 Arnstein Aassve, 2003. 208 Min Zhan and Shanta Pandey, 2004. 209 The Heritage Foundation, 2004. 210 Kathleen Shaw, 2004. 211 Arizona Department of Economic Security. "State of Arizona Marriage Handbook." P.3org/statefed/welfare/strength.htm 2004. 212 Arizona Department of Economic Security, 2004. 213 Steven Nock, 2005. 214 Arizona Department of Economic Security, 2004. 215 Arizona Department of Economic Security, 2004. 216 Lichter, Daniel T., Christie D. Batson, and J. Brian Brown. "Welfare Reform and 98

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' I I Marriage Promotion: The Marital Expectations and Desires of Single and Cohabitating Mothers." Social Service Review 78.1 (2004): 19-29. 217 Daniel T. Lichter, Christie D. Batson, and J. Brian Brown, 2004. 218 Arizona Department of Economic Security "State of Arizona Marriage Handbook." P 3org/statefed/welfare/strength.htm 2004 219 Arizona Department of Economic Security, 2004. 220 Arizona Department of Economic Security, 2004. 221 Arizona Department of Economic Security, 2004. 222 Arizona Department of Economic Security, 2004. 223 The Heritage Foundation "Welfare Reform and the Healthy Marriage Initiative." http://www.heritage.org/researchlwelfare/tst021005a.cfm ?renderforprinF 1 2005. 224 Arizona Department of Economic Security, 2004. 225 The Heritage Foundation, 2005 226 The Heritage Foundation, 2005. 227 Gennetian, Lisa and Cynthia Miller. "How Welfare Reform can Affect Marriage: Evidence from an Experimental Study in Minnesota Review of Economics of the Household 2 (2004) 275301. 228 Arizona Department of Economic Security, 2004. 229 Arizona Department of Economic Security, 2004. 230 Arizona Department of Economic Security, 2004. 231 Dion, Robin M "Healthy Marriage Programs : Learning what Works." The Future of Children 15.2 (2005): 139-156 232 Dion, Robin M, 2005. 233 Arizona Department of Economic Security, 2004. 234 Arizona Department of Economic Security, 2004. 235 Arizona Department of Economic Security, 2004. 236 Arizona Department of Economic Security, 2004. 237 Arizona Department of Economic Security, 2004. 238 Arizona Department of Economic Security, 2004. 239 Lichter, David, Christie Batson, and J. Brian Brown. "Welfare Reform and Marriage Promotion: The Marital Expectations and Desires of Single and Cohabitating Mothers." Social Services Review 78.1 (2004). 240 David Lichter, Christie Batson, and J. Brian Brown, 2004. 241 The Heritage Foundation, 2005. 242 Arizona Department of Economic Security, 2004 243 Coontz, Stephanie and Nancy Folbre. "Marriage, Poverty and Public Policy." Council on Contemporary Families Conference Apri12002. 244 Olson, Sara. "Marriage Promotion, Reproductive Injustice, and the War Against Poor Women of Color Dollars and Sense 257 (2005). 245 Arizona Department of Economic Security, 2004. 246 Administration of Children and Families, 2006. 247 David Lichter, Christie Batson, and J. Brian Brown, 2004. 248 Administration of Children and Families, 2006. 249 Administration of Children and Families, 2006. 250 Administration of Children and Families, 2006. 251 Administration of Children and Families, 2006. 252 Administration of Children and Families, 2006. 253 Administration of Children and Families, 2006. 99

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254 Sarah Olson, 2005. 255 Lisa Gennetian and Cynthia Miller (2004). 256 Kathleen Shaw, 2004. 25 7 Kathleen Shaw, 2004. 2 58 Noclc, Steven L. Marriage as a Public Issue." The Future of Children 15.2 (2005) : 13-32. 259 Steven Noclc, 2005. 260 Center for Arizona Policy, 2002 261 Arizona Department of Economic Security, 2006 262 Arizona Department of Economic Security 2004. 263 Arizona Department of Economic Security, 2004. 264 Arizona Department of Economic Security, 2004. 265 Kathleen Shaw, 2004 266 Kathleen Shaw, 2004. 267 Kathleen Shaw, 2004 268 Kathleen Shaw, 2004. 269 Fitzgerald, John M. and David C Ribar. "Welfare Reform and Female Headship." Demography 41.2 (2004): 189-212 270 Stephanie Coontz and Nancy Folbre 2002. 271 Kathleen Shaw, 2004. 2 72 Administration for Children and Families, "Healthy Marriage Missions," http : www.acf.gov/healthymarriagelfunding/activities html 273 Kathleen Shaw, 2004 274 Lichter, David and Martha Crowley. "Welfare Reform and Child Poverty: Effects of Maternal Employment, Marriage, and Cohabitation." Social Science Research 33. 3 (2004): 1-11. 275 Kathleen Shaw, 2004. 276 Kathleen Shaw, 2004. 277 Lisa Gennetian and Cynthia Miller (2004 ). 278 Kathleen Shaw, 2004. 279 Jarchow, Courtney. "Strengthening Marriage and Two Parent Families National Conference of State Legislatures February 2003. 280 Courtney Jarchow, 2003. 281 Courtney Jarchow, 2003. 282 Lisa Gennetian and Cynthia Miller (2004 ). 283 Fein, David J. "Married and Poor." U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 2003. 284 David Fein, 2003. 285 David J. Fein, 2003. 286 Leiwant, Sheny. "Testimony of NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund on Welfare Reform Reauthorization'." Hearing on Welfare Reform Reauthorization. March 12, 2003. 287 Sheny Leiwant, 2003. 288 John Fitzgerald and David C. Ribar, 2004. 289 McLanahan, Sam. "Diverging Destinies: How Children are Faring Under the Second Demographic Transition." Demography 41.1 (2004) : 607-627 290 Sara McLanahan, 2004. 291 American Public Human Services Association. "Budget Reconciliation Act: Implementation and Authorization Dates January 2006. 292 Courtney Jarchow, 2003. 100

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APPENDIX A Arizona Welfare Enrollment Numbers Arizona TOTAL TWOONETOTAL FAMILIES : PARENT PARENT RECIPIENTS : FAMILIES FAMILIES 1997 ... ?1 ..... 780 138,683 1998 606 24,778. 100,216 ........... 1999 --__ }?,_S.?? __ ; 541 89,097 : ------' 2000 !. --589 : 17,?8.? 84,458 .............. .. Sum }55,?-J? 2,515 105,030 412,454 ... --""-"'"'' Average 629 26,258 103,113 ARIZONA WELFARE ENROLLMENT NUMBERS PRIOR TO ARIZONA MCS 4.1 101

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Arizona 2001 2002 2003 2004 Sum Average APPENDIXB Arizona Welfare Enrollment Numbers TOTAL TWOONETOTAL FAMILIES PARENT PARENT RECIPIENTS FAMILIES FAMILIES 34,760 .. .. 123,863 419 443 : O : . . -I 387 : j-. \ 69,761 .... -.... -... ... 17,440 .. 85,190 94,026 116,478 111,046 406,740 101,685 ARIZONA WELFARE ENROLLMENT NUMBERS AFTER THE ARIZONA MCS 4.2 102

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APPENDIXC National Welfare Enrollment Numbers us TOTAL TWOONETOTAL FAMILIES PARENT PARENT RECIPIENTS FAMILIES FAMILIES 1997 3, 740,]79 : : : 1998 3' 05(),}3 5 2,197, _!l? :_.. 8,347,136 1999 _!0?,3!Q_ i '-2000 2,215,388 --------------------! : 1,408,427 ?,778,034 ... -----------------t""' Sum 11,559,971 477,755 7,576,888 31,325,510 2,889,993 119,439 _7,831,377 NATIONAL WELFARE ENROLLMENT NUMBERS PRIOR TO THE ARIZONA MCS 4 3 103

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us APPENDIXD National Welfare Enrollment Numbers TOTAL TWOONETOTAL FAMILIES PARENT PARENT RECIPIENTS FAMILIES : FAMILIES ; ----------------j--------------?,103,852 -L 36,645 1,167,657 4,931,082 33,413 ii8,254T i -----------------------f-----------------------...... -----. 153,738 3, 785,358 : 20,102,396 --------------------------------------+---------------------------2,038,226 _ NATIONAL WELFARE ENROLLMENT NUMBERS AFTER THE ARJZONAMCS 4.4 104

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