Citation
Adversaries, psychology, social movements, and world politics

Material Information

Title:
Adversaries, psychology, social movements, and world politics
Creator:
Turtledove, N. L
Place of Publication:
Denver, Colo.
Publisher:
University of Colorado Denver
Publication Date:
Language:
English
Physical Description:
1 electronic file : ;

Thesis/Dissertation Information

Degree:
Master's ( Master of Humanities)
Degree Grantor:
University of Colorado Denver
Degree Divisions:
Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, CU Denver
Degree Disciplines:
Humanities
Committee Chair:
McGuffey, Lucy
Committee Members:
Cummings, Michael
Bookman, Myra

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords:
Enemies -- Philosophy ( lcsh )
World politics -- Philosophy ( lcsh )
Dualism ( lcsh )
Integration (Theory of knowledge) ( lcsh )
Psychology ( lcsh )
Genre:
bibliography ( marcgt )
theses ( marcgt )
non-fiction ( marcgt )

Notes

Review:
Within philosophy we find at least two major paradigms with which it is possible to conceptualize the nature of reality: what I call the dualistic paradigm, and the integrated paradigm. Aspects of these world views are evidenced in the way we "deal" with adversaries, both on a psychological level and in our actions in the world. I argue that not only do these paradigms exist in philosophy and in the-actions of individuals, but they can be discerned in the events of history as well. I suggest that awareness of these paradigms deepens our understanding of history, especially of social movements. I compare and contrast AI Qaeda and Gandhi's campaign for home rule in India, and verify my suggestion that they operate/operated using these different paradigms by analyzing texts of the movements' leaders and the actions of the leaders and the participants.
Bibliography:
Includes bibliographical references.
Thesis:
Humanities
General Note:
Department of Humanities and Social Sciences
Statement of Responsibility:
by Nina Lois Turtledove.

Record Information

Source Institution:
|University of Colorado Denver
Holding Location:
Auraria Library
Rights Management:
All applicable rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier:
861188888 ( OCLC )
ocn861188888

Downloads

This item has the following downloads:


Full Text

ADVERSARIES, PSYCHOLOGY, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS,
AND WORLD POLITICS
By
Nina Lois Turtledove
B.A. Metropolitan State College of Denver, 2005
A thesis submitted to the
University of Colorado Denver
in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Humanities
College of Liberal Arts and Sciences
2011


This thesis for the Master of Humanities
degree by
Nina Lois Turtledove
has been approved by

Date


Turtledove, Nina Lois (M.H., College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Colorado Denver)
Adversaries, Psychology, and Word Politics
Thesis directed by Professor Lucy McGuffey
ABSTRACT
Within philosophy we find at least two major paradigms with which it is possible to conceptu-
alize the nature of reality: what I call the dualistic paradigm, and the integrated paradigm. Aspects of
these worldviews are evidenced in the way we deal with adversaries, both on a psychological level
and in our actions in the world, 1 argue that not only do these paradigms exist in philosophy and in the
actions of individuals, but they can be discerned in the events of history as well. I suggest that aware-
ness of these paradigms deepens our understanding of history, especially of social movements. I com-
pare and contrast A1 Qaeda and Gandhis campaign for home rule in India, and verify my suggestion
that they operate/operated using these different paradigms by analyzing texts of the movements lead-
ers and the actions of the leaders and the participants. I advocate that knowledge of the dualistic and
integrated paradigms is valuable in the formulation of foreign policy in a world that often appears hos-
tile and threatening, and suggest that the practice of using the integrated paradigm to understand the
world facilitates options that can produce a higher degree of peace and freedom .
This abstract accurately represents the content of the candidates thesis. I recommend its publication.
Signed
Lucy McGbfFey


DEDICATION
This work is dedicated to my husband, whose loving support expedited the completion of this
project and facilitated a more ready preparedness to take on what comes next
I also dedicate this thesis to my mother, whose insatiable quest for knowledge and experi-
ences enlivened our home, and inspired me to fry to emulate her richness of spirit. Although she died
much too young, her journey lives on with her daughter, who shares her values and enthusiasm, and
who also strives to make this terrestrial playground a better place through exuberance and love.


ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to acknowledge my husband, Christopher Lawhead, for helping me see the water
of the fishbowl from the perspective of a fish, thereby aiding me in finding the words to address the
paradox that presents itself in this essay.
I extend deep gratitude to Linda Skarrup, who dutifully passed along the teachings of B.K.S
Iyengar, and the yoga masters before him, which have allowed me to experience a great deal of the
material presented here.
I thank all of the teachers, both living and othetwise, who have worked for peace and freedom
from suffering for all sentient beings.


TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER
1. INTRODUCTION....................................................... 1
2. PERCEIVING THE OTHER: DUALISTIC AND INTEGRATED
PARADIGMS IN PHILOSOPHY............................................4
Negative Others...........................................6
The Role of Myth..........................................7
Descartes: Disembodied Intellect..........................9
Critique: Merleau-Ponty..................................14
Response: Embodied Consciousness.........................19
3. DUALISTIC AND INTEGRATED PARADIGMS
IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS.........................................27
Histories of Satyagraha and Jihad......................29
Leaders................................................33
Abdallah Azam......................................33
GandhL.............................................34
Their Texts........................................36
Activities of the Leaders and the Participants..... 46
Jihad..............................................46
Satyagraha.........................................53
4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION......................................59
v.


CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The way a person conceptualizes the nature of reality has a distinct influence on the behavior
of that person. The field of philosophy is abundant with points of view attempting to describe the es-
sence of the human experience in this world. Two paradigms stand out: what I call the dualistic para-
digm, and the integrating paradigm. These two paradigms inform the modes of being of actors in the
world. The dualistic paradigm is linked to the defense mechanisms fight and flight, meanwhile, the
integrating paradigm provides for other options.
These ontological paradigms deal with the nature of existence. Ren6 Descartes posits the
mind and body to be completely separate things. The subject is distinct from the object; the one is ex-
clusive of the other, and the self is cut off from the direct experience of the world. In Phenomenology
of Perception, Maurice Merleau-Ponty argues against this dualism to assert that the subject and object
are intertwined in a reciprocal relationship, that one shapes the existence of the other. In Merleau-
Pontys analysis, the I is shifted from the position of an isolated observer to that of an actor intrinsi-
cally embedded in a world that engages with the agent of action to call forth behavior.
As these two philosophers demonstrate that there are different ways to understand the nature
of reality, they imply that there are different ways to conceptualize our relationship to the other. These
two philosophers/philosophies demonstrate that it is possible to consider the other as something radi-
cally separate from us, or, that it is possible that the other is somehow integrated with our own being.
Thus it follows that the way we conceptualize the nature of reality, whether we think of the other as
separate or integrated, influences the way we deal with our adversaries.
In the shadow of 9/11 with the abiding threat of terrorism or nuclear war, it is relevant to
study the ontological framework behind the actions of actors who seek to drastically change lives and
alter political climates. It is useful to have knowledge of the factors that influence action in the world,
particularly if these actions threaten our well-being or our very survival. This study explores a correla-
1


tion between worldviews and action, between myth and modes of being-in-the-world. In this study, I
argue that there are at least two paradigms with which it is possible to conceptualize the nature of real-
ity, and the relationship between ourselves and others. I show that these paradigms exist in philosophy,
and also, that they exist in history. Particularly, they are played out in the acts of social movements. I
argue that awareness of these paradigms deepens our understanding of histoiy, particularly social
movements.
I will proceed by presenting terminology and concepts relevant to my study. I introduce the
work of psychologist Stephen Gilligan, who discusses modes of being in-the-world, which are based
on dualistic and integrating ontological paradigms. Gilligan acquaints us with the isolated 011611601,
which is a legacy of the dualistic paradigm, which he asserts is associated to the defense mechanisms,
fight and flight. He contrasts this with embodied consciousness, which is made comprehensible
through a discussion of phenomenology, or a study of phenomena as they are experienced. Embodied
consciousness, based on an integrating paradigm, as Gilligan argues, facilitates a third way of doing
things, an alternative to fight and flight, which, he argues, opens us up to new possibilities, including
nonviolent transformation. I demonstrate the Western philosophical underpinnings for Gilligans
analysis of the isolated intellect and embodied consciousness. I find foundations for these concepts in
the works of Descartes Meditations on First Philosophy, in Merleau-Pontys The Phenomenology of
Perception, and in the work of psychologist Marion Woodman as presented in a series of interviews
published in the book Conscious Femininity: Interviews with Marion Woodman. I suggest that aware-
ness of these paradigms deepens our understanding of social movements, enhancing our knowledge of
history.
Then I examine two movements that demonstrate the two worldviews and ways of being-in-
the-world 1 have identified. 1 discuss the forming of A1 Qaeda, which has operated within die frame-
work of a dualistic paradigm, evidenced in one version of jihad, or the fight against enemies of the
religion; and I describe Gandhis campaign for home rule in India, utilizing a nonviolent strategy saty-
agraha, fashioned using the integrating paradigm. Although Cartesian dualism is not inherent in the
2


theoretical background of Islamic cultures, the dualism that frames Descartess thinking is, which Des-
cartes neatly describes. In this chapter I provide the historical context for these two movements, and I
illustrate how these paradigms play out in the writings of their leaders, and in the actions of their
movements.
Finally I present a summary of my findings. I identify these different paradigms in the texts
of the leaders of the movements, and demonstrate that they are reflected in social movements. I find
that awareness of these paradigms and modes of being-in-the-world deepens our understanding of the
social movements and even world politics.
3


CHAPTER 2
PERCEIVING THE OTHER: DUALISTIC
AND INTEGRATING PARADIGMS IN PHILOSOPHY
Luckily, it is not often, if ever, that an enemy appears and threatens us with immediate bodily
harm, even death. In such instances, hardly anyone would doubt the appropriateness of the fight-or-
flight response. However, it seems to be apart of human experience that we encounter adversaries in
other guises as well. Challenges and disturbances that do not immediately threaten our existence both
come from the world outside us, and arise in our inner world of experience.
In The Experience ofNegative Otherness: How Shall We Treat Our Enemies1 psycholo-
gist Stephen Gilligan, Ph.D. argues for an alternative to dealing with our adversaries in lieu of fight
and flight. Fight and flight, the traditional ways of dealing with conflict, he asserts, often merely per-
petuate cycles of violence and human suffering. In fighting, Gilligan writes, we dominate, demonize,
repress, analyze, and/or disassociate. Exhibiting flight, we surrender, have anxiety, paralysis, depres-
sion, and/or take drugs. He posits the possibility of another way of being in the world. Gilligan invites
us to consider that engagement with what he calls a negative other may provide an opportunity for
growth and transformation, particularly if we are able to move past the traditional fight-and-flight re-
sponse.
In this chapter I examine two ontological paradigms sketched out by Stephen Gilligan: a dual-
ist ic paradigm, and an integrating paradigm. His work implies the questions, are we isolated little is-
lands, situated in a world which is exterior to us? Or do we with others form an interrelated whole? Is
it one or the other, or a little bit of both? In the case of the former view, all that we do not identify
with, is other, and exists wholly separate from us and is disconnected from us. In the case of the latter,
1 Stephen Gilligan, The Experience of Negative Otherness: How Shall We Treat Our Enemies?
(2002) Seishindo, under General Articles of Interest for the Seishindo Community
http://www.seishindo.org/articles/st_gilligan2.html (accessed July 6,2009).
4


however, even an adversary has value as an intricate part of the make-up of the universe. In such a
case, the adversary is worthy of respect as an equal, and challenges a person to overcome adversity in a
creative manner. Thus I argue, as does Gilligan, that these paradigms and the experience of them call
forth different types of action in the world with respect to the other.
Gilligan asserts that the dualistic view of the world is associated with what he calls a modem
myth that focuses on a split between the self and others. This dualism is reflected in Cartesian think-
ing, which conceives of a strict separation between mind and body, and between the self and the world.
In such a view, the spiritual (or mental) is distinguished from the physical, self-interest is emphasized
over interconnectedness, reason is glorified over intuition, and science is prioritized over philosophy.
One acts according to what makes rational, practical sense. Gilligan asserts that this approach is not
the only way in which to experience the world, and posits a relevant alternative. Another alternative,
nondualism, acknowledges the worth of practicality, the necessity of survival, and protecting oneself
from harm. Yet it elevates values that are suppressed by this way of thinking. Instead of focusing on
hierarchically arranged dichotomies, an experience of integration puts the mind back into the body
(and enables a return of sacredness to matter). In such a state, the other is not perceived as something
that may want to negates ones existence. Opposites exist in tension with one another; the existence of
one enables the existence of the other. In such an integrated view, space is expanded for values such as
compassion and love. For Gilligan, the concept of the other appears in psychological conversation that
aims to resolve difficulties encountered by people in their lived experience, and he notices different
ways of conceiving of, and relating to the other.
1 begin by explaining the term negative other, followed by a discussion of Gilligans under-
standing of myths as ontological paradigms that influence our actions in the world. I provide the philo-
sophical foundations of the two ways of being in the world described by Gilligan in the works of Ren£
Descartes, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Marion Woodman. I close this chapter by suggesting that an
isolated intellect, based on the dualistic paradigm, and embodied consciousness, based on the integrat-
ing paradigm, can be discerned in the acts of social movements in history.
5


Negative Others
In a discussion of psychotherapy, Gilligan introduces the concept of a negative other, which
he asserts forms the basis for any psychotherapeutic conversation.2 He uses the term to encompass a
broad range of phenomena, experienced both in the outer world and within the interior realm of the
self. An internally experienced negative other may be anger, depression, fear, criticism, an addiction,
or a compulsion. An externa! negative other can appear as a chauvinist boss, a rude stranger, or even a
faceless structure or institution such as the patriarchy, social inequality, racism, the INS, a or a gov-
ernment take-over of health care.
In reference to negative others, Gilligan employs the term demon, noting that everyone has
his or her personal demons. These demons are disturbing; they provoke a sense of horror and aversion.
They possess a demonic quality in that they may possess us, tell us we are worthless or no good, or
induce us to sell our soul or to prostitute ourselves. A negative other is other in that it doesnt fit
with our identity, ideals, values, hopes or plans, and negative because it seems to desire to negate our
presence, our humanness, our integrity, our very lives.3
Not only do all people encounter them in some way during the course of our lives, the idea of
demons has appeared in our religions and myths throughout time. Demons have taken various shapes
in myths: as dragons, serpents, even Satan himself. Despite the evil and danger associated with such
figures, Gilligan maintains that encounters with such entities have been seen as opportunities for a per-
son to grow, to evolve, and to learn how to get through a crisis.
In ancient times, the mythological dragon was not to be killed, but engaged in a way
that would allow the transformation of both die person and the dragon. A dangerous
undertaking, to be sure, for if one slipped, the results were catastrophic. But still, the
relationship with the negative other of the dragon required not violence but intelli-
gence, courage, mid self-transformation.4
2 Gilligan, 1.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., 2.
6


Gilligan uses dragon myths as an example of how our orientation toward the negative other
has shifted throughout history. He asserts that as times and attitudes changed, so did the dragon myth.
While at one time the dragon presented an opportunity to cultivate wisdom and facilitate transforma-
tion creatively, the way in which one was supposed to handle the dragon shifted. When the dragon
myth began to portray events such as St. George slaying the dragon, it indicates that our relationships
to negative others had shifted.5 What is evidenced by this transformation is the role of myth as a re-
flection of a cultural worldview, and a guiding mechanism for action.
The Role of Myth
Gilligan uses the term myth to signify a paradigm used to understand the nature of reality
and to determine appropriate action. The works of authors Mirceau Eliade, Dennis Ford, and Stephen
Larsen contribute to the understanding of Gilligans use of the term. These authors present myth as an
orienting and guiding structure for human beings that works at a pre- or sub-conscious level, determin-
ing and determined by the way we see the world.
Myth, writes Eliade, is a story recounting what happened at the beginning of time. It is a re-
cital of creation, describing a primordial moment. Myths, recounting actions of the gods, become
models for behavior. They provide an opening towards the universal, as opposed to describing
something merely particular and contingent. They imbue peoples lives with meaning, answering the
questions why and how. Eliade points out that myths, as narratives of the sacred, necessarily become
truth statements. Thus a myth, says Eliade, is bound up with ontology; it speaks only of realities, of
what really happened, of what was fully manifested.6
However, the assertion that myths are what really happened causes cognitive dissonance
when we look across cultural boundaries and someone elses myth, defined as a truth statement, ap-
5 Gilligan, 2.
5 Mirceau Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane: the Nature of Religion, trans. Willard R. Trask (San
Diego: Harcourt, Inc., 1959), 95-97, italics original.
7


pears blatantly False. Dennis Ford, P.h.D. takes this up in his book The Search For Meaning (2007), as
he makes the distinction between talking about myth and living within myth. One may speak about
myth, and view it as merely a collection of stories that were once used by people to describe their un-
derstanding of reality, creation, or the world. However, Ford argues, we all live within our own mytho-
logical structure. We all have our own explanation of reality, our own web of beliefs, values, and prac-
tices that we share with other members of our culture. From this perspective, Ford argues, myth is a
paradigm. It is invisible, much as the lenses of eye-glasses are invisible when we look through them.
Myth is a paradigmatic structure for the nature of reality itself, from a particular perspective. It is sim-
ply what is.7
In his book The Shaman s Doorway (1976), Stephen Larsen describes myth as working at the
psychological level, having a socializing and a guiding function. Myths orient people to their culture,
answering the questions Who are we? and What do we do? for them. Myths, he asserts, serve as a
structure that guide a person through various aspects of their life which present existential questions
and crises,8 such as entering adulthood or old age.
It is in this way that Gilligan uses the term myth. For the purposes of his essay, myth is an
invisible force with a largely unacknowledged presence that functions at a level deeper than our con-
scious mind. Working beneath rational processes, it is a truth statement; it is the lens with which we
understand the world. Mythology is an orienting and guiding structure that informs notions of who we
are and how we are supposed to act. Let us now examine the expressions and the development of the
modem myth, as identified by Gilligan.
Gilligan asserts that the core of modem thinking is the disembodied, isolated intellect. In
the modem myth, as interpreted by Gilligan, rationalism is exalted, and the natural world is stripped
of all inherent value. The mind, deemed the sole beacon of intelligence, is charged with monitoring,
7 Dennis Ford, The Search For Meaning (Berkley: University of California Press, 2007), 43.
8 Stephen Larsen, The Shamans Doorway: Opening Imagination to Power and Myth (1976; repr., New
York: Station Hill Press, 1988), 19-22.
8


controlling, and dominating all that it relates to. The negative other, anything outside of our identity
that seems threatening, is framed as an inhuman it that often requires violence to be changed.9
It takes only a moment to observe this way of thinking in our culture. Gilligan describes it further:
The disembodied intellect dictates a mind/nature split in which body is objectified,
the intellect seen as the only valid intelligence, human life is primarily viewed in
utilitarian values (whats in it for me?), spirit and soul and heart-mind are denied,
interconnectedness is rejected, nature is exploited, death is feared above all, material-
ism becomes a cult, relationships are seen in dominance-submission terms, ritual is
ignored, and everything outside the self-identity is seen and feared as an it. In
short, the disembodied intellect leads to a disconnection and a denial of the precious
life of the present moment.10
The last phrase, about the denial of the precious life of the present moment, we will return to later.
But the statement the disembodied intellect leads to a disconnection is a key phrase that brings us to
the next section: I observe that the modem myth is partially the legacy of the philosophy of Descartes,
who posits a particular and hierarchic formulation of the split between the mind and the body, and the
resulting subject-object dichotomy. This schema informs our notion of who we are (defined by Des-
cartes as a thing that thinks). It sets up a framework that informs the actions that we take in response
to others, who, according to Descartes, we can never be sure really exist in the same way that we do.
(I am the subject surrounded by everything else that is exterior to me and my unique subjectivity.)
Therefore, we are as disconnected from others as we are from material things.
A short exposition of Cartesian dualism reflects its influence on the modem myth, illumi-
nates the paradigm underpinning it, and demonstrates how it relates to the treatment of others.
Descartes: Disembodied Intellect
Descartes is a figure who highly prizes the mind and its unique capacity for rationality. Al-
though he writes during the dawn of the scientific revolution, when it comes to sense perception, he is
a skeptic. He observes that the world presents many reasons to doubt what is experienced. Descartes
begins his philosophical meditation by casting into doubt the existence of everything except the exis-
9 Gilligan, 4.
10 Ibid., 4-5.
9


tence of God and die fact that he (the thinker) himself exists. While Descartes does then concede the
objective reality of other objects, his ontology largely cuts the subjects off from the rest of the world,
setting them apart from other human beings.
Descartes is aligned with the classical Platonic ideals that privilege the mind and its capacities
for reason over the body and the bodys proclivities toward the passions of the natural world and end-
less foolery. As Plato says in Phaedo, wisdom is to be attained by separating the mind from the body,
which infects the soul with evils, such as lust, fear, and fantasy. Truth about existence, he claims, is
revealed by pure thought alone. The senses are imperfect, and cannot approach the realm of the truly
real.11
The goal of Descartes is to build a system of knowledge that systematically questions all that
is not completely certain, in an effort to discover what is certain. In his search for truth he rejects any
opinion that was possible to doubt. In his Meditations (1641), he argues that a person can doubt the
existence of all things. He acknowledges that we can be deceived by illusions produced by the senses
(the tower that appears round at a distance is in fact square when seen from up close); and we can be
fooled by dreams (when we are sleeping, what seems real in our dreams is not). To maximize the
range of doubt, Descartes imagines that we are prey to an all-powerful deceiver, an evil genius12 13 that
presents a false world to us, much like what happens in the movie The Matrix.13 Based on this posi-
tion, Descartes sifts through all of his prior beliefs and opinions, using skepticism to identity any cer-
tainty that might be left over.
Supposing that perceptible things may be false, Descartes concludes that the one thing that is
certain is that he himself exists. He reasons that since he is able to persuade himself of something
(even though it may be false), and to doubt almost everything, there can be no doubt that he is thinking
11 Phaedo, in Scott Buchanan, ed. The Portable Plato (New York: The Viking press, 1948).
12 Ren6 Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, ed, J. Cottingham (London: Cambridge University
Press, 1985), 94.
13 This presents another similarity between Cartesian and classical thinking, reminiscent of Platos
analogy of the world being mere shadows on the cave wall.
10


nonetheless, because to doubt is to think. Thus, the thinker necessarily exists. Descartes proclaims
I am, 1 exist, [it] is necessarily true each time I pronounce it, or that I mentally conceive of it.14
Therefore, we can be certain that the subject exists (but at this point, not of much else). Although the
things one imagines to be true may be false, the imagining itself remains real. Having made this in-
sight, Descartes asserts that we have made contact with our true identity. Thinking alone is a faculty
that cannot be separated from me; it is that which composes the I. I am a thing that thinks,15 states
Descartes. This is a thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wills, refuses, which also imag-
ines and feels.16 Thus, in the Cartesian paradigm, we understand and experience ourselves to be a
thinking thing.
As he examines what he thinks that he is, Descartes considers the body. He describes bodies
as extended, having a figure, a motion, and tactile qualities that we can sense. They produce ideas
within our minds which present themselves whether we want them to or not. Bodies are governed by
mechanical laws of cause and effect, sometimes independently of will. The example Descartes gives is
of a person with dropsy, which is a disease that induces a person to drink too much water. The person
feels thirsty, so the person drinks, putting him or herself closer to death, unable to control the impulse
to drink water even knowing that it will be lethal. In other examples, although a person may will to
touch something hot, his or her hand jerks away; a persons heart beats whether we will it to or not.
Thus, the essential features of bodies are that they are material, extended in space, unthinking, and di-
visible. This is opposite to what Descartes describes of the mind, which is unextended, indivisible, and
governed by reason. One question that perplexes Descartes is how these radically different, opposing
substances can possibly interact with one another in the human being.17
14 Descartes, 97.
Ibid., 99.
is Ibid., 100.
17 Ibid., 152-155.
11


Descartes claims that we can never really know things themselves, we only have ideas of
them. This positioning of a subject doubting all but his own existence sets up a model that leaves the
subject in a box congruent with his own mind. The world, and everything in it, is left outside this box,
cut off from the realm of our knowing. He describes ideas as effects somehow transmitted to the
isolated subject by its causes.18 His analogy would be that the I is a pilot in a vessel,19 were it not for
the fact that a person feels pain when kicked, whereas a ships captain does not feel any pain if the ship
were to hit an iceberg or another obstacle. But the ships governing agent, the captain, is isolated in the
cabin from the surrounding ocean in which his ship is afloat, much as Descartes envisions subjects
isolated from the rest of the material world.
Descartes then inquires into whether any of the objects of which he has ideas exist outside of
him in an objective world, since some things seem so very certain and manifest, perceived clearly
and distinctly, such as the earth, the sky, the sun, heat, or a stone.20 In this meditation he reasons that
the thoughts that represent substances, or actual things that play on the senses, contain more objective
reality than those that represent only fantasies or accidents.21 22 23 He states: Now it is manifest by the
natural light that there must at least be as much reality in the efficient and total cause as in its
effect.2223 In other words, Descartes believes that the thing that causes an effect (such as a stimula-
tion of my senses) must be as real as the effect it has caused. Thus, the sun must be as real as the
warmth it has generated on my skin.
18 Descartes, 114.
19 Ibid., 155.
20 There can, actually, be truth found in nature, because God is a perfect being, thus he would not be a
deceiver who would make it impossible for us to know what is real and true, (Descartes, 160).
21 Ibid., 107-108.
22 Ibid., 113.
23 By natural light, Descartes means reason; he is using a strictly mental manner in determining
truth.
12


Regarding objects exterior to us, argues Descartes, the more knowledge we acquire of some-
thing, the more we can be certain of its true existence. Although we may perceive the sun as an orb
many times smaller than the earth, the more we learn about it through science, the better we understand
its true nature. This guideline includes knowledge of other human beings, as well. He explains: ... we
have more knowledge of those men with whom we have lived a long time than of those whose face
merely we have seen or whose name we have heard, even though they too are not said to be absolutely
known.24 For example, suppose that out of the comer of my eye I see a shape that resembles a human
body. For all I know from this limited encounter, the thing that I saw could have been an illusion, or a
mannequin. However, if I can approach this figure and look into its eyes, shake its hand, and espe-
cially if I can have a conversation that allows me to recognize a humanity similar to my own, this fig-
ure becomes more real to me.
It is apparent that Descartes does not have a satisfactory answer to the question of the subject-
object relationship and the mind-body problem.25 His legacy remains in a dualistic worldview that
posits mind and body, and subjects and objects to be binary pairs in dichotomous and hierarchical rela-
tionships. Cartesian thought expresses a myth that describes an aspect of our existential beingness as
such: we are atomistic individuals situated in a world filled with the potential of causing us harm and/
or deluding us. This view is informed by Greek and Christian worldviews that prioritize matters of
mind and spirit, over body and matter.
Although his ontological paradigm is problematic and has left us with many philosophical
problems,26 such a worldview may help to account for the difficulty of feeling empathy towards some-
one that a person has not met or gotten to know. It may explain why it is easy to be calloused to-
24 Descartes, 176.
25 Descartes asserts that the seat of the soul is the Pineal gland in the brain because it is the only single
part of our brain when all its other parts come in pairs, and that the cause of the motion of the muscles
is due to animal spirits, (Ibid., 368-369).
26 See John Searle, A Dozen Problems in the Philosophy of Mind (New York: Oxford University Press,
2004).
13


wards someone elses hardships or to use violence against an anonymous, faceless enemy. In the Car-
tesian picture of the world, we dont really know if someone is able to feel what I feel. No one else has
access to the private thoughts in my head, as I cannot think or feel what somebody else thinks or feels.
Thus, in this way, we are all not only physically, but also mentally and emotionally cut off from one
another.
Critique: Merleau-Ponty
The work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty outlines a shift in thinking about the human experience.
In Phenomenology of Perception (1945), Merleau-Ponty poses a serious challenge to the traditional
subject-object dichotomy. Like Husserl before him in The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcen-
dental Phenomenology (1936), Merleau-Ponty critiques a scientific method that schematizes subjects
as passively observing an exterior world that acts upon the senses of the subject mechanistically in
terms of cause and effect. He argues that this type of science, especially one that studies human be-
ings, is merely second-hand data, and asserts that there is a more primary, direct experience, a more
poignant reality. Merleau-Ponty develops the Husserlian concept of phenomenology, which he calls a
descriptive psychology, and a return to the things themselves.27 A description of phenomena as
they appear, phenomenology is a study of essences that tries to give a direct description of our ex-
perience as it is, prior to any reflective thinking.28 It is a philosophy that is also a rigorous science,
a style of thinking that seeks to arrive at an understanding of humankind and the world based upon
its facticity.29 Thus Merleau-Ponty seeks to make an essentialist claim as to the nature of existence.
For example, Merleau-Ponty asserts that a hand is not primarily known to us by its anatomy, structure,
27 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (1945; repr., New York:
Routeledge Classics, 2002), ix.
28 Ibid., vii, my italics.
29 Ibid., vii-viii.
14


or make-up. It is rather more intimately known by its ability to grasp things. We understand a hand
through its graspability.
Using a phenomenological method to describe the nature of reality, he posits being-in-the
world', a schema that unites the mind with the body in terms of the habit-body, or lived body, within
which inheres a non-intellectual intelligence that is called forth by the world. With this concept,
Merleau-Ponty connects the psychological and the physiological, describing how the momentary body
(the body at this moment) interacts with the habit-body to create a meaningful expression of the lived
experience.
Merleau-Ponty analyzes patients with brain injuries and anomalies, as well as missing limbs,
and studies particular psycho-physical responses to sensory data. He finds that sometimes the basic
principle of stimulus-response does not explain a phenomenon in the body, therefore putting the
mechanistic model of cause and effect into doubt, at least as far as using it as a law to explain the be-
havior of the body. For instance, sometimes amputees still feel sensations in a phantom limb. A
sensation in a limb that is absent cannot come from a cause acting upon it. There is nothing there to be
affected. An event both psychological and somatic, the phantom limb phenomenon is explained as a
product of internal stimuli such as emotion and memoiy, rather than a response of external stimuli
such as a prick of a needle. Merleau-Ponty concludes that the phantom limb has to do with accep-
tance and refusal, and awareness of the past, and emotion. As the person comes to terms with the
accident and the loss, the phantom limb phenomenon recedes.30
The missing-limb phenomenon presents a scenario in which the psychic and the somatic are
integrated. Merleau-Ponty argues that in our looking at being human, physiology has been incomplete
in that it has excluded the mental, and psychology has been incomplete as it has ignored the physical.
Merleau-Ponty stresses that the physical and the mental are geared into each other. He understands the
body as a working unity. Our memories are not separate from us; they reside in the habit-body. This
habit-body brings knowledge we have in the body to the forefront of our experience and expands our
30 Merleau-Ponty, 89.
15


capacity for self-actualization. Because I have learned to walk and run, I may rely upon that knowl-
edge when I leap and dance. I am able to dance, because walking is not simply an intellectual process.
I do not constantly have to remind myself, Left foot forward, balance. Right foot forward balance.
The knowledge of walking now resides in my body, and I have freed up my consciousness to perform
other more complex tasks that build upon the knowledge of walking. Merleau-Ponty argues that one
does not usually experience the body as an object in an objective space that one has to think about to
manipulate. By integrating memories of movement in the body to form the habit-body, we expand our
experience of being-in-the-world. The body is not a machine or object inhabited by a mental represen-
tation. It is an agent of experience, an expressive space.31 33
Being-in-the-world is the way we use habit to experience our situation in terms of our bodily
skills, abilities, demands, and capacities. The habit-body works with the momentary body, or how I am
in this moment, to engage in a lived experience. To demonstrate how knowledge in the body is distinct
from a purely intellectual construct, Merleau-Ponty gives the example of typing. It is possible to
know how to type without being able to say where the letters which make the words are to be found on
the bank of keys.62 Although I may not be able to recite from memory the order in which the letters
are found from left to right beneath my fingers, when I intend to type a sentence, my fingers know how
to punch out the sentence without intellectual knowledge, and without looking. Habit is neither a
form of knowledge nor an involuntary action... it is knowledge in the hands, which is forthcoming
only when bodily effort is made, and cannot be formulated in detachment from that effort... it is the
body which understands in the acquisition of habit.63
Merleau-Pontys being-in-the-world replaces the dualistic notion of how we experience the
world by conceptually uniting the mind with the body through the lived experience, in which the body
has an inherent intelligence called forth by being-in-the-world. Neither object nor subject is posited,
31 Merleau-Ponty, 169.
32 Ibid., 166.
33 Ibid., 167.
16


he states. There is neither a distinct subject nor a distinct object. In the primary field we have not a
mosaic of qualities, but a total configuration which distributes functional values according to the de-
mands of the whole...34 Subject and object are integrated in a seamless functioning. I am my body, it
is an extension of me.
I cannot understand the function of the living body except by enacting it myself,
and except in so far as I am a body which rises towards the world.35
Merleau-Ponty argues that we do not passively observe the world around us and receive
sense data from the body about the world. Rather, the world calls forth action from us through the
meanings that we have ascribed to it. With the presence of a habit-body cultivated by a tailor, leather
becomes something to be cut up, it is the lining to be sewn.36 The body is not something external
to my thoughts about existence, something to be understood by detached observation. It is through the
body that one understands existence itself, as the world beckons and elicits actions.
The body is no more than an element in the system of the subject and his world, and
the task to be performed elicits the necessary movements from him by a sort of re-
mote attraction, as the phenomenal forces at work in my visual field elicit from me,
without any calculation on my part the motor reactions which establish the most ef-
fective balance between them, or as the conventions of our social group, or our set of
listeners, immediately elicit from us the words, attitudes, or tone which are fitting.37
The body is a potentiality of a certain world which is set into place by the habits that we acquire. Our
habit-body contains the memories of actions and behaviors that can be instantaneously set into motion
as the world presents a familiar set of circumstances. Merleau-Ponty posits that this world is con-
structed through convention; it elicits responses that are appropriate based on norms with which we
have become familiar, implying that there may be options other than those immediately called forth by
habit.
34 Merleau-Ponty, 281, (original italics).
35 Ibid., 87.
ae Ibid., 122.
a7 Ibid., 122.
17


When Merleau-Ponty addresses the philosophical problem of other people, he claims that he
has begun to find a solution to this problem in his new understanding of the body. If one accepts the
notion of being-in-the-world as a total configuration, bodies cease to be merely objects, but mani-
festations of behavior.
... if anothers body is not an object for me, nor mine an object for him, if both are
manifestations of behaviour, the positing of the other does not reduce me to the
status of an object in his field, nor does my perception of the other reduce him to the
status of an object in mine.38
Being-in-the-world is something shared equally by all humans. A person may perceive the body of
another, and may discover in that other a familiar set of intentions and a similar way of dealing with
the world. Henceforth, as the parts of my body together comprise a system, so my body and others
[sic] are one whole, two sides of one and the same phenomenon, and the anonymous existence of
which my body is the ever-renewed trace henceforth inhabits both bodies simultaneously.39
For Merleau-Ponty, language, communication, and, more generally, inter subjectivity are key
in breaking down existing cognitive boundaries between one and the other.
In the experience of dialogue, there is constituted between the other person and my-
self a common ground; my thought and his are interwoven into a single fabric, my
words and those of my interlocutor are called forth by the state of discussion, and
they are inserted into a shared operation of which neither of us is the creator. We
have here a dual being, where the other is for me no longer a mere bit of behaviour in
my transcendental field, nor I in his; we are collaborators for each other in a con-
summate reciprocity.40
This is not so different from Descartess solution to the dilemma of how others can exist in a schema
that posits the thinker as secluded from eveiything else (the more one gets to know others, the more
their authenticity as other thinking things comes to light). Yet Merleau-Ponty reiterates the key differ-
ence between his ontology and the Cartesian cogito. Merleau-Ponty writes, ...[W]hen I reflect on
subjectivity, I find it bound up with that of the body and that of the world ... because my existence as
38 Merleau-Ponty, 411.
38 Ibid., 412.
Ibid., 413.
18


subjectivity is merely one with my existence as a body and with the existence of the world, and be-
cause the subject that I am when taken concretely, is inseparable from this body and this world.41
Merleau-Ponty demonstrates how, in philosophy, we might move beyond the dualistic para-
digm. His manner of conceptualizing reality forms the basis of an integrating paradigm, in which the
mind and the body operate as one unit, where common ground for ourselves, other people, and exis-
tence itself is achieved through communication, and where an intersubjective universe posits reality
not as a mere collection of objects and subjects, but as an interrelated whole. In the myth expressed by
Merleau-Ponty, previously conceived opposites are not in opposition to each other, but are comple-
ments to one another. This ontological shift creates a possibility for a new type of action to be called
forth by the world, as the world is experienced differently.
Response: Embodied Consciousness
We have explored the philosophical aigument against the Cartesian isolated intellect using
Merleau-Pontys concept of being-in-the-world, which is his description of the way we are. Being-in-
the-world suggests a nondualistic aspect of our existential beingness. Psychologists Stephen Gilligan
and Marion Woodman take the idea a step further in positing a mode of being that they call embodied
consciousness. Embodied consciousness is the willful experience of an intelligence within the body,
which is achieved by becoming present to the momentary body, or body of this moment. Unlike being-
in-the-world, embodied consciousness is not a description of our experience in the world. Embodied
consciousness is a practice, and it is prescription. Gilligan suggests that the recognition of somatic
intelligence facilitates a shift in thinking about the nature of reality from a dualistic perspective to a
41 Merleau-Ponty, 475.
19


worldview which links the subject and the object in a complementary, not oppositional relationship,
thus helping resolve confrontation with an adversary.42
First let us access the primary source for the term embodied consciousness. This is found in
Conscious Femininity: Interviews with Marion Woodman (1993). Marion Woodmans concept embod-
ied consciousness is a relating to oneself that integrates our rational, thinking aspect with the body and
its vital impulses, which, she claims, like Merleau-Ponty, have an intelligence of their own. Influ-
enced by Jung, Woodman argues that the side of us that is spontaneous, natural, receptive, and non-
judgmental has been subjugated in a fast-paced, goal-driven, and competitive society ruled by conflict
and dichotomy. She asserts that this type of dominant-submissive living emphasizes intellectual
problem-solving, and has caused a real split inside. It seems that a lot of people are cut off from
the neck, so they talk from the head. Meanwhile, something totally different is going on below the
neck, Woodman says.43 She asserts that this split has resulted in various types of problems psy-
chologists specialize in treating.
For Woodman and Gilligan, embodied consciousness is a slowing down to a more natural
rhythm. Embodied consciousness is facilitated by taking a pause from our busy schedules, habits, and
addictive behaviors, by becoming aware of our existence as it is in the moment. They assert that this
information is useful in its ability to provide an insight into a way of being which is more in harmony
with who we are beneath any of our learned behaviors and culturally acquired worldviews.44
42 While Woodman and Gilligan embrace phenomenology and being-in-the-world, this discussion
highlights the divergence of their thought from Merleau-Pontys. Merleau-Ponty demonstrates the
descriptive value of being-in-the-world, without prescribing a practice such as embodied consciousness
towards a specific goal, and desires to maintain a distinction between fact and intuition.
43 Marion Woodman, Conscious Femininity: Interviews with Marion Woodman (Toronto: Inner City
Books, 1993), 23-25.
44 In our society, argues Woodman, ones soul has often been neglected and silenced through the de-
mands of a materialistic culture and perfectionist parents who do not nurture their children to simply be
themselves. These parents, who were raised in the same way, often raise children to be what they be-
lieve they should be. This glossing over of soul (and the interrupting of a natural being-in-the-world)
perpetuates a cycle of psychological complexes as the authentic child within is repressed. Woodman
describes this loss of soul connection as an anguished condition in which unconscious contents
drive that person, (Woodman, 9).
20


Gilligan argues that embodied consciousness is a technique for breaking some habits that are
not always completely useful to us, such as fight and flight. Fight and flight, the unavoidable and life-
sustaining mechanisms that they are, sometimes backfire, Gilligan argues, causing more harm than
good. Through the lens of the psychologist, Gilligan observes that the fight-or-flight response to nega-
tive others often merely serves to perpetuate cycles of violence and suffering. He asserts that during
confrontations with a negative other, if a one can apply a technique of embodying ones conscious-
ness, one can access a mode of being that can reveal insights into our unconscious motivations, and
can unlock previously unconsidered possibilities for actions. Gilligan argues that if we can see the
world and our situation not from a perspective of the isolated intellect, but through embodied con-
sciousness, we can change the type of behavior that is called forth for the better.
Gilligan describes embodied consciousness as the experience of connecting with a mind/
body center, and a relational field. The mind/body center may be accessed through the activity of
performing arts such as dance, theater, martial arts, and oratorical speaking.45 Gilligan describes the
mind/body center as where dancers dance from, where writers write from, and where political prisoners
engage from.46 He refers to embodied consciousness as the belly mind, whose intelligence is nonin-
tellectual and nonlinguistic;47 48 49 it is an experience of a felt sense of dropping down under the words, in
a balanced, calm, aware connection with oneself and others.4849
Gilligan observes that in psychotherapy, patients bring problems that have a corresponding
location in the body. A feeling of depression, emptiness, or emotional pain can be identified either in
the heart, gut, or the solar plexus region behind the navel. The theoiy is that when one listens to
45 For Woodman this experience is doing what we love, be it gardening, baking bread,
painting...Woodman calls these activities, soul-making, (Woodman, 103).
46 Gilligan, 6.
47 Referred to by scientists as the enteric nervous system, (Gilligan, 7.)
48 Ibid., 5-8.
49 Woodman would add that this experience is where one connects with ones soul, using soul in the
sense of the embodied essence, from the Latin esse (to be), (Woodman, 71).
21


what these feelings are saying, one can bring forth valuable information pertinent to the therapeutic
process.
Rather than regarding these as bad feelings that need to be removed, we become cu-
rious about listening to these felt centers of disturbances as ontological presences,
that is, as the presence of another intelligence that is awakening in [a persons] life...
We see problems and crises therefore as positive events, as heralding the breakdown
of the isolated intellect and the development of a more relational intelligence that is
distributed throughout the mind/body.50
Thus embodied consciousness situates an individual within a larger picture. Rather than utilizing logic,
it relies upon intuition, and facilitates a person to remain connected with him or herself and others dur-
ing conflict.51 52
The mind/body center provides a container for ones experiences, where one can deposit
agitation, anger, depression, or confusion. This activity provides something one can do with these
emotions, which often present themselves as unwelcome and unwanted visitors. The mind/body center
becomes a sanctuaiy where any of these visitors can come, where there is space for them, and where
it is still safe.
If one is able to connect with their mind/body center during a conflict, one is able to notice
where their first attention falls during this time. For instance, if someone is yelling at you, and you
are able to connect to your mind/body center, you could notice if you focus on the person yelling, on a
childhood memory, or on a theoiy or text that says that the yelling is wrong. Gilligan argues that if our
first attention gets stuck on something other than what is contained in the moment, that focal point will
determine the response to the situation. He states that if ones first attention locks onto a text or theoiy,
one can slip into ideology and fundamentalism, as is evident in the launching of violent jihad by Isla-
mists against infidels in their land, in the murders of homosexuals and abortion doctors, and in ration-
alizing war through just war principles. This focus is indicative of isolated intellect.52 But if we can
remain embodied with our consciousness, we are provided with an opportunity to change our perspec-
50 Gilligan, 5-7.
51 Ibid., 7-8.
52 Ibid., 7.
22


tive of the situation and even our response. For instance, if someone is yelling at me, I may feel
threatened, get upset, fight with that person, or run away. But if I remain connected, for example, I
may notice that I am upset because I have been told that yelling is wrong, or I may realize that I am
upset because it reminds me of how my father made me feel two inches tall beneath the bellows of his
voice. If I am able couch my feelings and to experience the moment simply for what it is, aside from
any of my personal associations and/or judgments, all I have is a person yelling. Thus I may be able to
understand that the person yelling may have their own problems that ultimately have little to do with
me. I may be able to abstain from taking the situation personally, and even feel empathy towards that
other person. I may experience that the other is not in opposition to me. In fact, if he or she reveals to
me why I get upset in certain situations, I can learn how to resolve those negative feelings. Thus the
world may begin to appear more collaborative than oppositional.
Related to the experience of embodied consciousness is the relational field, which is the larger
context in which a person lives. It is about joining in an experience of communion with a deeper
wholeness than your individual self. Gilligan asserts that this communion can be felt in different
ways by individuals.
You may know it through walking through the forest and call it nature. You may
know it by joining others in social justice, and call it community. You may know it
through athletic performance, and call it the zone. You may know it through prayer,
and call it God. You may know it from an intimate relationship, and call it love.53
The relational field is similar to Merleau-Pontys postulation of intersubjectivity, or that which unites
us in the reciprocal collaboration of being-in-the-world. Merleau-Pontys example is that of babies,
not observing their own face, who nevertheless open their mouth as their fingers are taken playfully by
the teeth of their guardians, signifying the intersubjective nature of biting. Between my conscious-
ness and my body as I experience it, between this phenomenal body of mine and that of another as I
see it from the outside, there exists an internal relation which causes the other to appear as the comple-
53 Gilligan, 9.
23


tion of the system.54 Gilligan states that sense of completion is not limited to interaction with human
subjects. Our sense of completion inheres with our engagement in other systems, e.g. nature, sports,
art, community, and/or religion.
Gilligan asserts that on the basis of a relational field it is possible to stay embodied during
times of conflict, and not revert to fight-or-flight. Gilligan uses the Japanese martial art aikido as an
example. In aikido, he writes, the goal is not to dominate, but to blend with the enemy in a way that
resolves conflict: one opens ones heart, soul, and mind to an attacker.55 Gilligan posits the aikido
maxim heart to heart, mind to mind, center to center,56 and drop into center, open into field.57 This
maxim sounds counter-intuitive, idealistic, and even impossible in certain, if not most, situations where
there is an actual attacker. However, to say that something is not a habit now, does not mean that it
cannot be in the future, especially if a new technique has been tested and yields satisfactory results.
Although it may not be possible nor suitable for a person to open their heart and mind to someone who
has a weapon trained on his or her child, for instance, such a strategy may be useful in everyday life,
when the attacker is a rude driver, perhaps a political opponent, or a verbally abusive coworker. In
such a situation, opening ones heart and mind to an adversary facilitates empathy that is useful in
deescalating conflict and in perhaps achieving more positive outcomes.
Gilligan continues explaining how to deal with an adversary while remaining connected to the
mind/body center and the relational field:
That is, when youre in a stressful situation, dont fixate on the stressor. Dont give
first attention to the problem. Instead, drop down into your mind/body center as a
base to listen, perceive, relax, and respond; and expand your awareness outward to
connect with a field awareness that is bigger than the stressful event. Now your at-
tention is not trapped on the stressor; its free to receive and give beyond the confines
of the situation. This allows you to respond to conflict not in a dominant-submissive
way, in which someone wins and someone loses, but in a relational way that protects
54 Merleau-Ponty, 410.
55 Gilligan, 3.
56 Ibid., 8.
57 Ibid., 11.
24


both you and the attacker, and seeks to bring a resolution of whatever differences or
agitation is present.58
Additionally, it is important to note that this approach does not assert the collapse of the
autonomous self and the submission to the will of an enemy. Gilligans own example of conflict reso-
lution using embodied consciousness is the Gandhian strategy to transform Indias subjugation by die
British. The principles Gandhi utilizes emphasize the importance of noncooperation with evil, (all
the while treating the enemy with respect). Gandhi also stresses the importance of the ability of people
to rule themselves, spiritually and politically, so as not to merely exchange one form of tyranny for
another. Gilligan advocates (as does Gandhi) for freedom from suffering and violence, and prescribes
embodied consciousness as a way to facilitate this freedom.
Embodied consciousness is a way of being-in-the-world that responds to a myth that posits
interconnectedness. It facilitates the experience of love, which is felt within and extended to others. It
recognizes wisdom within the body, and ceases to relate to the world in purely subjective/objective
terms. In such a world there is space for fight-or-flight and there are additional options, in the cultiva-
tion of another habit-body, based on an integrating paradigm of experiencing the world.
In this chapter I have argued that there are various ways of conceptualizing reality, and of
experiencing and understanding our existential beingness. I have argued that these myths influence the
way we relate to and treat others. A dual is tic worldview separates us from the rest of the world, places
wisdom and the body in opposition to one another, and lends itself to a way of being-in-the-world
characterized by dominance-submission. Here binary pairs are conceived of as being in opposition to
one another: by moving to the right, I negate the left, and by becoming light it ceases to be dark. Al-
ternately, in an integrating worldview, binary pairs such as left and right, light and dark, mind and
body, self and other complement one another and complete each other. Such a view takes into account
that at any given moment on earth, half is lit by the sun while the other rests in darkness. The appear-
ance of such perspective is accompanied by a transformation of relationships and the emergence of a
different mode of being-in-the-world. It is my goal in the next chapter to demonstrate that the dualis-
58Gilligan, 10.
25


tic and integrating myths are operative in the actions of social movements. I explore the myth that
guides the actions that take place, as I demonstrate two different ways of being-in-the-world. I assert
that awareness of the dualistic and integrating paradigms helps deepen our understanding of the ac-
tions demonstrated by these movements.
It can be argued that by making such a distinction between these two worldviews and suggest-
ing the benefits of the integrating paradigm over the dualistic, I am demonstrating the type of dualism
that I am challenging. My response to this suggestion is that we clearly live in a world of dichotomy:
this, that, up, down, left, right, good, bad, joy, and sorrow. Often we learn about something by discov-
ering what it is not. Thus, we also may discover a center, a whole, and equanimity. Both dualism and
integration are valid experiences in the world, and both serve a purpose. What does A1 Qaeda have to
teach us about ourselves? Although they produced inexcusable acts, the motivations behind suicide
bombing can be understood in light of this analysis, and for this reason I reserve the right to withhold
judgment for the purposes of this essay. Here I merely argue that there are options beyond dualism and
reverting to fight-or-flight when we are threatened.
26


CHAPTER 3
DUALISTIC AND INTEGRATED
PARADIGMS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
In the previous chapter I suggested that the ways we respond to negative others are different
ways of being-in-the-worid, which rely upon our orientation to different myths, or paradigms of con-
ceptualizing and experiencing the world. Is the world made up of a bunch of isolated individuals who
continually pose threats to one another and must be dominated? Are we linked in a common humanity
that evokes a sense of compassion and brotherly love? Does it appear to be a little of both? Do we
perceive a negative other as something separate and evil that must be destroyed, or does a negative
other also present an opportunity for growth and development? Are we all exclusively rational beings
locked up in our calculating minds, or can we also get a sense of a mind/body center and a relational
field that connect us to the world and to each other? If a person experiences others in opposition to his
or herself, the dichotomous view that arises has the propensity to lend itself to fight-or-flight. How-
ever, if the self and others are experienced as the completion of a whole, at the very least there appear
to be choices in how to deal with an adversary.
Thus it appears that our way of understanding the world guides our actions; and this fact is
represented in the actions of groups. Two examples are the phenomenon of suicide-bombing that
strives to liberate Muslim lands from foreign interference, and Gandhis campaign to secure home-rule
for the Indian people. The former is violent and reflects a dualistic paradigm, while the latter is non-
violent and reflects the integrating paradigm. The first exemplifies isolated intellect, while the other
27


exemplifies embodied consciousness. I argue that knowledge of these modes of being-in-the-world
deepens our understanding of these two social movements.
Before I enter into a comparative analysis of these movements, as one of these social move-
ments blatantly challenges a commonly held conception of the term, I will take a moment to set forth
a working definition of social movement.
In the introduction to Cultural Politics and Social Movements, a text on social movement the-
ory, Damovsky, Epstein, and Flacks assert that social movements are collective efforts by socially and
politically subordinated people to challenge the conditions and assumptions of their lives. They are
persistent, patterned, and widely distributed collective challenge^] to the status quo, occurring when
participants refuse to accept the boundaries of established institutional rules and routinized roles.
Social movements also challenge cultural categories and social identities, as sub-cultures protest
unfair treatment within society (such as the gay, lesbian, and transgender movement), or argue for so-
ciety to operate with a different set of principles (such as environmentalism and war protest).59 These
are not limited to mass action within a single state. Social movements may appear in a transnational
context. For example, the citizens from many different countries have protested the WTO, environ-
mental degradation, and nuclear energy.
Despite not being seen as an expression of democracy or social justice, suicide bombers seem
to fit the contemporary definition of social movements above. Both jihadi groups and Gandhis
movement represent a persistent, patterned, and widely distributed collective challenge to the status
quo, as participants refuse to accept the boundaries of established institutional rules and routinized
roles, challenging cultural categories and social identities. The participants in these movements
ssMarey Damovsky, Barbara Epstein, and Richard Flacks, Cultural Politics and Social Movements
Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995, vii.
28


have protested or currently protest being treated as second-class citizens in their own countries.
They embody collective efforts by socially and politically subordinated people to challenge the condi-
tions and assumptions of their lives.
Thus, 1 identify Islamist jihad and Gandhian satyagraha to be social movements. These two
movements are expressions of two distinct ways of being-in-the-world. I find two different paradigms
operative: the dualistic paradigm in jihad, and the integrating paradigm in satyagraha. However, I
wish to make clear that I do not believe that the ontological views of people are the sole determinants
of their actions. Even Gandhi holds that the proper response to an adversary varies with the situation.60
1 maintain that the world calls forth behavior. If 1 am about to be attacked, 1 expect that my defense
mechanisms will kick in, and that 1 will identify my attacker as an other that I must defend myself
from. But the action called forth by the world depends upon the habit-body a person has in place. If a
person often experiences the world according to an integrating paradigm, it may facilitate additional
strategies, further possibilities beyond fight and flight, at times when these latter strategies may be
more appropriate for a desired outcome. Still, as one would expect, causes of worldly actions exist out
in the world as world calls forth behavior. What is at issue is which myth guides the action that takes
place. Therefore, next, I acknowledge the different contexts in which jihad and satyagraha take place.
Following this I will examine the movements leaders and the leaders texts, identifying the myth op-
erative therein; and finally, I will describe the actions that took place.
Histories of Satyagraha and Jihad
The turmoil in Indian lands and the territory of Palestine presents at about the same time in
history; coincidentally, Britain was involved in both cases. However, the circumstances of Britains
involvement differ significantly in the two settings, as do the contexts in which satyagraha and jihad
so Mohandas K. Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War, Vol. I, with an introduction by Paul F. Power
(1942; New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1972), 36.
29


begin. British political and economic involvement in India was characterized by Gandhi and Wilson as
a transition of rulership that occurred with tacit approval, while British involvement in Palestine was
military, or dominant-submissive. These historical contexts provide conditions in which distinct ways
of being-in-the-world take shape.
In an era of nation-building accompanying the disintegration of French, British, and Ottoman
Empires, Gandhi led a movement of Indian people towards independence from British rule. The Indi-
ans, according to Gandhi, voluntarily participated in their domination by the British. The Indians were
lured by lucrative trade with the British, and subsequently accepted British culture. With the British
came government jobs, hospitals, schools, railways, British education, the English language, and their
economic system, all of which the Indians accepted. The English have not taken India; we have given
it to them, wrote Gandhi.61 This view is corroborated by Jon E. Wilson, who writes in the article
Early Colonial India Beyond Empire62 that European traders and companies became closely inte-
grated into the networks of local political society, eventually taking over direct functions of the state
themselves, facilitating the East India Companys transition from merchant to ruler.63
The Palestinians were placed under British military rule in the aftermath of World War I,
which had resulted in the defeat of the Ottoman Empire by the Allies. This was a time in which territo-
ries heretofore ruled by Turks were detached and temporarily turned into British or French mandates,
and set on the road to independence.64 However, from the outset, the Arabs were not positioned for
61Mohandas Gandhi, Hind Swaraj, or Indian Home Rule (Ahmedabad, India: Navajivan Publishing
House (Navajivan Mudranalaya 1938), 23.
62 Jon E. Wilson, Early Colonial India Beyond Empire, The Historical Journal, 50,4 (United King-
dom: Cambridge University Press, 2007): 958, http://0-joumals.cambridge.oig.skyline.ucdenver.edu/
action/displayFulltext?type= l&pdftype= 1 &fid=1411968&j id=HIS&volumeId=50&issueId=&aid= 141
1960 (accessed November 28,2010).
63 Ibid.
64 Mutaz Qafisheh, Genesis of Citizenship in Palestine and Israel. Palestinian Nationality during the
Period of 1917-1925, The Journal of the History of International Law, 11,1 (Martinus Publishers,
2009) : 1-36, http://0-web.ebscohost,com.skyline.ucdenver.edu/ehost/pdfViewer/pdfviewer?hid=l 13&
sid=65290344-4fea-4cb0-9afl-lb0a6cf7832d%40sessionmgrl 1 l&vid=2 (Accessed November 28,
2010) .
30


self-determination. There was a presence of a new power in the region, and the attempted balance be-
tween the interests of Arabs against those of an expanding immigrant Jewish population in Palestine
was never achieved.65 The British established through decree an Israeli homeland within the region,66
and Arabs began to fear displacement and domination. In an environment filled with distrust, division,
and competition, riots broke out in Jerusalem,67 and since then, violence has only continued. The Pal-
estinian Question of statehood has yet to be answered at the time of this writing.68 It was this histori-
cal context that gave rise to Abdallah Azzam, who is widely considered to be the Godfather of Ji-
had,69 in not only popular but academic circles, as we shall see.
Neither India nor Palestine is culturally homogenous. Although intertribal conflict is not at all
uncommon in India, it did not prohibitively get in the way of the movement achieving independence.
However, the nation-building of Palestine is defined by othering. Karen Armstrong, in The Battle For
God, writes that nations establish their identity against an other, establishing what they are in contrast
to, what they are not.70 This negation seems to be the case during Palestinian and Indian nation-
building. In both cases, one group positioned itself against the other. In the Palestinian case, Arabs
65 June Sochen, Views of 1920s Palestine, Judaism, vol. 53 issue 1/2 (Winter/Spring 2004): 72,
http://0-web.ebscohost.com.sky line.ucdenver.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfViewer?vid=3&hid=T 12
&sid=12b45c7d-4caf-460a-af48-4cad4510800f%40sessionmgrl 12 (accessed November 1, 2010)
66 Balfour Declaration 1917, The Avalon Project, Yale Law School, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_
century/balfour.asp (accessed November 1,2010).
67 David Schafer, Origins of the Israel-Palestinian Conflict: Seeds of Enmity, The Humanist, vol. 62,
issue 5, (September/October 2002): http://0-web.ebscohost.corn.skyline.ucdenver.edu/ehost/pdfviewer
/pdfViewer?vid=9&hid= 106&sid=ce8541 bb-8c71-4353-a3c4-006897eae300%40sessionmgr 113 (ac-
cessed November 28,2010).
68 Sochen, 71.
69 Dr. Abdullah Azzam, Perspectives on World History and Current Events, http://www.pwhce.org/
azzam.html (accessed May 13,2010).
70 Karen Armstrong, The Battle for God {New Yoric: Alfred A. Knopf, Random House, 2006), 146.
31


were in opposition to Jews; in India, Muslims opposed Hindus. This othering resulted in the violent
break-up of India and Pakistan and Israeli and the Palestine territory. However, this fact brings up an-
other major distinction between the two movements: satyagraha was mass-action for independence,
while jihad occurred during a time of nation building.
The leadership of Gandhi provided an opportunity For the nonviolent movement towards in-
dependence. In certain conditions during a particular historical moment, Gandhi was able to largely
integrate the Indian people, not only with one another, but also, at least in theory, with the adversary.
This integrating myth forms the basis of a being-in-the-world characterized by nonviolent noncoopera-
tion, a certain habit-body that Gandhi wanted the Indian people to cultivate in order to achieve spiritual
and political freedom. However, the Indian people failed to remove violence and oppression from their
society, as perhaps an integrating myth did not take hold, as evidenced by the subsequent violence that
came to pass in nation-building. In contrast, in Palestine, conditions provided for a prevalence of divi-
sion and disintegration. Thus, I argue that modes of being-in-the-world are socially constituted, and
the social and historical context strongly affects our ways of being-in-the-world.
Following this brief discussion of historical context, I describe leaders of the two movements
who, appealing to religion, influence the being-in-the-world of their followers. I look at their texts and
analyze the existential paradigms inherent in the thinking of each, which provides the basis for certain
types of action. 1 demonstrate that the violence of Islamist extremists is linked with a dualistic para-
digm, while Gandhis movement towards independence demonstrates a being-in-the-world based on an
integrating paradigm.
32


Leaders
Abdallah Azzam
I have chosen to study Abdallah Azzam as a foundational figure for my study of the funda-
mental Islamic movement of suicide bombing. Kepel and Milelli, in Al Qaeda in its own Words, con-
sider him to be the preeminent theoretician of global jihad."11 They credit Azzam, who is an interna-
tional scholar, teacher, theoretician, writer, organizer, and inspirational figure, for bringingy'//?^ to the
forefront of contemporary radical Islam, which sought to vanquish foreign forces from Muslim lands.
Azzam is similar to Gandhi in that both are principal theoreticians working against oppression, and
both rely on religion to structure a strategy to deal with an oppressor. They both use myth to design
action in response to an adversary, and prescribe albeit different ways of being-in-the-world.
Azzam is a scholar of sharia (Islamic law). He debates with other clerics what attitude Mus-
lims ought to take in response to oppressive regimes, which are criticized as un-Islamic by most
Islamists.72 73 By 1984, Azzam becomes an inspirational and internationally renown Islamist figure.
In that year he issued afatwa, or religious proclamation, stating that defending Muslim territories was
1
an individual and collective duty for Muslims across the world in order to reclaim the lands that were
once Muslim but are no longer.71 73 74 His stance is clear: one must violently engage with the adversary, as
determined through the interpretation of sacred texts: the Quran, Hadith, or sayings of the Prophet
Mohammed, and other proclamations of respected religious figures. He operates with a dominance-
71 Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli, eds., Al Qaeda in its own Words, trans. Pascale Ghazaleh
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008), 97.
72 Ibid., 84.
73 Islamism is a diverse phenomenon broadly defined as political Islam, or Islamic activism. Inter-
national Crisis Group, Understanding Islamism, Middle East/North Africa Report, no. 37 (2 Mach
2005), http://merln.ndu.edu/archive/icg/Islamism2Mar05.pdf (accessed November 28,2010).
74 Kepel and Milelli, 92.
33


submission way of being-in-the-world, and formulates the world in dualistic, or us-versus-them, terms,
as he seeks to achieve peace, through war.75
Mohandas Gandhi
A lawyer who spends time in South Africa fighting for racial justice, Mohandas Gandhi, much
like Azzam, finds that he cannot ignore the injustices and oppression imposed upon his people. In the
context of colonial India, Gandhi emerges as a leading political figure in Indian affairs who, through a
program of nonviolence which blends his religious beliefs with a revolutionary strategy, is able to win
concessions from the British, paving the way to Indian independence in 1947.
In Hind Swaraj, Gandhi deeply criticizes the changes Western civilization had brought to In-
dia. Civilization, whose goal is material pleasure and bodily welfare, had actually failed in this
respect, Gandhi argues. Industrialization had created a class of people who toiled in miserable condi-
tions. Miners work dangerously for millionaires, enslaved by temptations of money, he writes.76
Calling it a system of life corroding competition,*77 he laments [Western] civilizations disregard for
religion and morality.78 On this point, he is in agreement with Islamists. Mohammed would call it a
Satanic civilization, Hinduism calls it a black age, writes Gandhi.79 Gandhi, like Gilligan, critiques
the modem myth, which separate[sj the intellect from the present moment of the body, nature, and
life itself.*0 This is a distinction that Azzam does not make, as I demonstrate later. Gandhi wants the
fs Islamic doctrine has divided the world into spheres, the Realm of Peace one in which the divine
principles as put forth by the Prophet Muhammad prevail, and the Realm of War where these princi-
ples have not been established. The Realm of Peace, called dar al-Islam, and Islam, are both de-
scended from the Arabic salaam, or peace, (Lincoln, 33).
76 Mohandas Gandhi, Hind Swaraj, or Indian Home Rule (Ahmedabad, India: Navajivan Publishing
House (Navajivan Mudranalaya 1938), 20.
77 Ibid., 49.
Ibid., 21.
79 Gandhi, Hind Swaraj, 22.
80 Gilligan, 4.
34


Indian people to join him in an effort to drive out the British and their culture in a manner consistent
with what he believed to be the Indians true nature. This is nonviolence, or satyagraha, which he
called soul-force, or love-force.81
Yet, in contrast with Azzam, Gandhi does not rely upon a doctrine held by an exclusive relig-
ion. Thomas Merton, in the introduction to his book Gandhi on Non-Violence, writes of Gandhis ini-
tial repudiation of Indian values and his subsequent attainment of a Western education, by which he,
paradoxically, discovered a universally valid spiritual tradition in Hinduism with the concept of
dharma, or religious duty. Through the reading of Tolstoy, Thoreau, and the New Testament, Gandhi
allegedly finds a Christianity based upon spiritual and religious humanism which opened his eyes to
the forces of wisdom and of love which were ... expressed in the symbols and philosophic language of
his own people.82 In this discovery, he claims to have found a natural religion, or natural law,
which is neither exclusively Eastern nor Western; it is not just Hindu, Christian, or Muslim, but
universal.83 Thus, Gandhi relies upon an experience of integration, not doctrine, to determine what
must be done in response to the adversary.
Gandhi is similar to Azzam in that both figures correlate religious duty with political action.
But for Gandhi, political independence is achieved through spiritual freedom; spiritual freedom is not
achieved through political independence. In contrast to Azzam, Gandhi seeks peace through peace.
As we shall see, satyagraha is not a program of terror. Neither is it framed in dominance-submission
terms, nor is it a program designed to seize power. It is a method to facilitate the transformation of
relationships ending in a peaceful transfer of power.84 But first, let us turn to the leaders texts to
explore the myths through which they conceptualize the nature of reality.
81 Gandhi, Hind Swaraj, 51.
82 Thomas Merton, Gandhi on Non-Violence (New York: New Directions Publishing Corp., 1645,
1965), 4.
88 Ibid., 5.
84 Mohandas K. Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War, 1949, with an introduction by Paul F. Power
(New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1972), 8.
35


Their Texts
Images of Human Nature
It is clear that Azzam is profoundly influenced by religion from the very first sentence in his
fatwa, the Defense of Muslim Territories Constitutes the First Individual Duty,35 and throughout the
whole text.86 This fatwa, or religious proclamation, opens with a prayer and roots the whole project in
religion, which, in part, demonstrates the myth that he has in place.
All praise be to Allah, we praise Allah, we seek His refuge, and seek His forgiveness.
We seek refuge in him from the evil of our own selves and the evil of our deeds.
Whomsoever Allah guides there is none to send him astray and whomsoever Allah
sends astray there is none to guide him...87
In this passage, Azzam reveals his belief that human beings are inherently sinners, and that
they are divided amongst themselves. And did not God check one set of people by means of another,
the earth would indeed be full of mischief... (Quran 2:251) "Azzam writes, positing division and
duality.88 In the opening to the Defense there are those who are guided by God and others who have
gone astray."
Gandhi also writes, as published in the second volume of Non-Violence in Peace and War, of
the duality inherent in human beings:
Man as animal is violent, but as Spirit is non-violent... That is why the prophets and
avatars have taught lessons of truth, harmony, brotherhood, justice, etc all attrib-
utes of ahimsa, (or nonviolence].89
85 Abdallah Azzam,"Defense of Muslim Territories, in Kepel and Mileli, Al Qaeda in its own Words,
trans. Pascale Ghazaleh.
86 I use two versions: one translated in Kepel and Milelliand one from an online source. Throughout
both versions, at times some statements are more clear or demonstrative in one than in the other.
a? Abdullah Azzam, The Defence of the Muslim Lands: The First Obligation After Iman. Re-
ligioscope. www.religioscope.com/info/doc/jihad/azzam_defence_3_chapl.htm (accessed May 13,
2010).
88 Azzam, Al Qaeda in its own Words, 103.
89 Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War 1,311.
36


It is evident that Gandhi subscribes to the familiar distinction between the animal and spiritual compo-
nents of human beings. This worldview is indicative of the dichotomous ontological paradigm that I
have identified previously. Also in this passage, Gandhi reveals his orientation to a religious tradition,
which in no small way guides his actions. But what is significant is that the paradigm within which he
operates, illustrated above, introduces a way to bridge the dualism of human nature. This integration is
made by emphasizing the values truth, harmony, brotherhood, and justice, within all of which inheres a
type of unity. Ahimsa, or nonviolence/love, which all the above are aspects of, represents an integra-
tion of what otherwise could be split or dichotomous. Belief in non-violence is based on the assump-
tion that human nature is in essence one and therefore unfailingly responds to love.90 There is dual-
ism, but at the same time, there is integration. For Gandhi, human beings are the embodiment of spirit,
for whom the supreme law is love.91
God-Image
Azzam and Gandhi also reveal their distinct images of God and the spiritual universe. For
Azzam, God is vengeful and judgmental. God hates those who strut arrogantly in the marketplace;
at night they are cadavers, by day donkeys, knowledgeable in this life and ignorant in the hereafter
{Small Anthology of Authentic Hadith) 1874),92 93 and [ujnless you march forth, He will punish you
with a severe punishment, and will replace you with another people, and you will not harm Him at
all...,m A vengeful and judgmental God must have something dichotomous to judge and be vengeful
against. In the statement I bear witness that there is no Deity but Allah and Mohammed is his ser-
90 Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War I, 175, my italics.
* Ibid., 114.
92 Azzam, Defense of Muslim Territories Constitutes the First Individual Duty, Al Qaeda in its own
Words, 105.
93 Azzam, Join the Caravan, Al Qaeda in its own Words, 113.
37


vant and messenger,94 Azzam insinuates the existence of other gods, while only one is the true God,
and he establishes allegiance to a specific prophet. This ontological orientation posits a divided uni-
verse, where true religion must be separated from the false. This worldview resembles the dualism in
Cartesian thought, where there is only one subject in the world of objects. Further indicating his dual-
istic paradigm, Azzam writes, ...God gave humanity this law and enjoined it to follow this rule (that of
defense)--or in other words, the fight between truth and falsehood-in the interest of humankind, for
the supremacy of truth and the development of the good.. ,95 In the Defense, Azzam indicates that
God is truth.
Alternately, Gandhi explicitly states that, truth is God.96 Throughout his work Gandhi de-
scribes what he considers to be truth, that there is a natural, universal, and superior97 law of
love, which is congruent with his own image of God: that is, of a loving and merciful God. This image
implies unity, not dichotomy. God may be called by any other name as long is connotes the living
Law of Life in other words, the Law and Lawgiver rolled into one.98 Thus, we see that for Gandhi,
that which follows universal laws of truth is Godlike. There is sacredness in life, represented by the
integration of spirit and body in the embodied experience. He does not distinguish one God from an-
other, seeking out that which unites rather than divides. For Azzam, on the other hand, true virtue lies
in the hereafter, further exhibiting dualism in the glorification of pure spirit unencumbered by the
temptations of the world and the delusion of allegiance to other gods. Azzams vision is inherently
dualistic, while Gandhis is integrative.
Azzam, Defence, Religioscope.
95 ibid.
s6 Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War, /, 414.
97 Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War, II, 60.
90 Ibid., 78.
38


Law
Gandhi and Azzam both indicate their views on Law, not just mundane law of societies but
Law that is imbued with cosmic," or larger-than-life significance, that partakes in the very essence of
God.
Gandhi determines love to be a natural law.* 100 If love or non-violence be not the law of
our being, the whole of my argument falls to pieces, he writes.101 To further our existence in this
world populated by many others, it follows we observe principles of nonviolence. Gandhi asserts that
the only way to get out of violence is through nonviolence,102 implying that violence only begets more
violence. Had violence, [or] hate ruled us, we should have become extinct long ago,103 he argues.
Society is held together by non-violence,104 he writes.
Where Gandhi believes the natural, universal, and superior law to be love,105 Azzam em-
phasizes a law of defense. This law (of defense) takes up many pages in the book of God, because
truth cannot do without a force to protect it, he states.106
"Mark Juergensmeyer, in Terror in the Mind of God, (Berkley: University of California Press, 2000),
149, writes about images of cosmic war that relate to metaphysical conflicts between good and evil,
in an exposition of religious terrorism.
100 Merton, 5.
101 Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War, I, 121.
102 Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War, II, 97.
1" Ibid., 266.
104 Gandhi, Non-violence in Peace and War, I, 198. This view is distinct from Thomas Hobbess. For
Hobbes, society is held together with the relinquishing of violence to the sovereign, who holds a mo-
nopoly over coercive power and administers it according to die law. Without such a common power to
keep men in awe they would perpetually be at war, (Hobbes, Leviathan, 1660, Chapter XIII). Ac-
cording to this view, it is not nonviolence that binds society together, it is die fear of violence.
I Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War, 11, 60.
106 Azzam, Defense, Al Qaeda in its own Words, 104, original parenthesis.
39


Azzam explains that Mohammed directed defending the religion through evidence and ar-
gument, or with proof and eloquence.107 [Allah] sent the most blessed of the messengers... to
bring [Ibis religion] victory by the sword and the spear, after He had clearly expounded it with evi-
dences and arguments.108 In die other version of Azzams text, the need to defend the religion was
shown through proof and eloquence. Thus Mohammed appealed to the intellect to rationalize vio-
lence, and Azzam relied upon doctrine to issue the directive, which again is an intellectual activity.
We have seen Gandhis rational argument for nonviolence, but self-admittedly, it is incom-
plete, particularly in the presence of popular rage resulting from being violated.109 Satyagraha tran-
scends the boundaries of the rational. Non-violence, which is a quality of heart, cannot come by an
appeal to the brain,110 that is, the brain alone. Second, Gandhi writes that, whereas violence is a veiy
visible activity with tangible and immediate results, nonviolence is an invisible force; and although
invisible, it exists, he argues, and is more effective than violence.111 112 Third, that nonviolence is supe-
rior, he argues, is proved by demonstration, not argument.m Thus, Gandhi relies upon the experience
of satyagraha more than upon reason to impart what it is.
Gandhi, like Merleau-Ponty (and Husserl before him), critiqued classical science and rational
principles for being incomplete. The type of phenomenology that Merleau-Ponty advocates is espe-
cially valuable in understanding something like satyagraha, or love force. Science can only describe
love by studying the physiological changes in a persons body and the chemistry taking place in the
brain. However, love is not something that knowledge of these bio-chemical processes adequately
107 Azzam, Defense, Al Qaeda in its own Words, 103.
108 Azzam, Defense, Religioscope.
109 Hannah Arendt writes in On Violence, (1969; San Diego: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1970), 110,
that a sense of being violated provides conditions conducive to violence.
110 Gandhi, Non-Vhlence in Peace and War, 1, 276.
m Ibid., 129.
112 Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War II, 60, my italics.
40


imparts. Additionally, he argues that phenomena such as love do not merely exist as states of con-
sciousness in an inner realm, still prejudiced as without extension and accessible to one person
only. The object of psychology, or something like love, is not grasped in some inexpressible coin-
cidence, and is not made known by imparting philosophical intuitions to others.113 Its meaning is
imparted through the experience, which is common to that of others.
It is understood through a sort of act of appropriation which we all experience when
we say we have found the rabbit in the foliage of a puzzle... Once the prejudice of
sensation has been banished, a face, a signature, a form of behaviour cease to be
mere visual data whose psychological meaning is sought in our inner experience,
and the mental life of others becomes an immediate object, a whole charged with
immanent meaning.114
It is through love that Gandhi finds meaning, and through the experience of which he finds
directive for action. He encourages embodied consciousness. He wants his followers to connect with
their Indian souls and superior moral heritage, and to follow his [or her] own inner voice.115 Here,
soul is the awareness of consciousness residing in the body, experienced as connection to the relational
field, that which unites us with the rest of the universe.116 117 Thus, compassion becomes the response
towards fellow human beings, facilitating nonviolent ways of being-in-the-world.
Azzam, like Gandhi, appeals to a religious cultural legacy and its superiority over secularism,
but, in contrast, relies upon doctrine to direct his action: [God] caused this religion to triumph by the
spear and the sword, Azzam writes in the Defense, quoting hadith.ni Doctrine imparts that which
all proper Muslims must do out of duty to the religion. When confronted by the negative other, one
113 Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War II, 60.
Merleau-Ponty, 66.
115 Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War, II, 205.
116 The word soul is used in the above passage in the same sense as it is used by Woodman, to refer to
the meeting-place of mind and body, (Woodman, 8.) This is distinct from another common usage of
the term soul, which conceives it to be as something that is separable from the body.
117 Azzam, Defense, Al Qaeda in its own Words, 103.
41


must go into battle in defense, perhaps not through the sword and the spear, but with kalashnikov rifles
and bombs.
This distinction between Azzams isolated intellect and Gandhis embodied consciousness is
further described in Azzam and Gandhis respective views on virtue.
As the Prophet said in his authentic hadith: The welfare of this community was
bom of abstinence and certainty, and it will end in avarice and hope...118
Upon the surface, Azzams favoring of abstinence over material wealth does not marie much difference
from Gandhian thought. Both Gandhis and Azzams writings praise religious ways of being-in-the-
world; they both extol bravery and criticize cowardice, and they both call their people to fight against
injustice. But Azzam writes, [wjeakness is the loving of life too much and the hatred of war and
death.119 The pursuit of earthly pleasures, or what he calls the loving of life, causes a turning away
from God, which brings forth not only the ire of God but the neglect of duty to the religion.120 As Az-
zam appeals to abstinence, seen in this way, he establishes a confrontational relationship between God
and life. This opposition pits a person against the temptations of the sensual world, against the behav-
ior that the world calls forth. While Gandhi upholds the same virtues,121 he does not demand of any-
one any action that is not in their hearts,122 or inconsistent with what the world called forth for them.
Gandhi asserts that abstinence, rather than being the cause of spiritual purity, is the result of spiritual
experience. {T]he moment one has glimpsed the imperishable Atman {transcendental self] one sheds
118 Azzam, Defense, Al Qaeda in its own Words 105, my italics.
118 Again quoting die Prophet in hadith Azzam, Defense, Al Qaeda in its own Words, 106.
120 [Earlier generations of Muslims] followed their desires and evil of their deeds was made appealing
to them, (Azzam, religioscope).
121 Non-violence is impossible without self-purification, Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War I,
245).
122 ff non-violence does not appeal to your heart, you should discard it, (Ibid., 13).
42


the love of the perishable body...123 124 Satyagraha is not something that is imposed by God, it is the
cultivation of a habit-body based on a spiritual experience. Thus, it is a way of being-in-the-world that
does not rely upon dominance-submission. Satyagraha is a process of educating public opinion such
that it covers all the elements of society and in the end, makes itself irresistible
Azzam asserts that the First individual duty is the defense of Muslim territories, which en-
tails willingness to die for the cause. Gandhi asserts that the satyagrahis duty entails noncooperation
with evil,126 disobeying laws that are morally repugnant,127 and being able to lay down ones life for
what one considers to be right.128 Azzams mode of being-in-the-world is congruent with that which
he perceives to be his duty: defense and war. While Gandhi acknowledges the possibility of violence,
stating that retaliation or resistance unto death is the second best approach,129 he wants to cultivate a
being-in-the-world that is nonviolent and transformative. He writes, [ijmmediately, [when] you get
the conviction that non-violence is the law of life, you have to practice it towards those who act vio-
lently towards you; and the law must apply to nations as to individuals.130
Ends and Means
In Gandhis view, the means are just as important as the ends; the lived experience is as im-
portant as the ideals. Liberty and democracy become unholy when their hands are dyed red with in-
123 Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War I, 335.
124 Dualism surfaces here in Gandhian thought as the perishable is contrasted against the transcen-
dental, illustrating that not even Gandhi can escape the dualism of worldly experience.
125 Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War 11,61, my italics.
126 Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War I, 358.
127 Ibid., 69.
120 Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War II, 59.
129 Ibid., 148.
iso Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War I, 187.
43


nocent blood. 131 Gandhi claims that with war comes moral loss, as well as the poisonous forces of
lying and deception. The aftereffects of war, he conjectures, include the lack of stability in govern-
ment and the absence of satisfaction among the various classes, with each wanting to do better at the
expense of the rest. However, if one is patient and relies on the more slowly acting force of nonvio-
lence, one can achieve peace, stability, and growth.132
Although Azzam and Gandhi both desire independence from foreign influence and oppres-
sion, we can see the importance Gandhi places on the concept offreedom from tyranny, which has in-
dividual and political scope. The ideally non-violent state will be an ordered anarchy, muses
Gandhi.133 134 135 He emphasizes the importance of the development of the individual towards self-rule
through practice, by applying nonviolence to daily occurrences in their lives.134 Satyagraha must be
all-pervasive, and cannot be compartmentalized: I cannot be non-violent about one activity of mine
and violent about others.133
A votary of ahimsa will of course base upon non-violence all his relations with his
parents, his children, his wife, his servants, his dependents, etc. But the real test will
come at the time of political or communal disturbances or under the menace of
thieves.,. Mere resolve to lay down ones life under circumstances is not enough. If
I am a Hindu, I must fraternize with Moslems and the rest. In my dealings with them
I must not make any distinction between my co-religionists and those who might
belong to a different faith. I would seek opportunities to serve them without any
feeling of fear or unnaturalness.136
Thus Gandhi explicitly argues for a being-in-the-world based on integration. He believes that it is only
when people are free on a personal level from tyrants such as fear and hatred that they can be free on a
larger level, politically.
131 Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War /, 357.
132 Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War 11, 56-57.
133 Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War I, 324.
134 Ibid., 129, my italics.
135 Ibid., 110.
133 Ibid., 302.
44


Gandhi argues that a way in which Indians assumed a submissive role in the hierarchical
structure was through fear. Certain tribes within India feared others, and became reliant upon the Brit-
ish who intervened in intertribal tension to keep the peace. Gandhi describes the loss of power that
occurs in such a state of division. We fear Englishmen and we have become slaves, he writes.137
Nonviolence depends upon the relinquishing the fear which accompanies a dualistic worldview. An
integrating view facilitates the formation of a habit-body capable of responding to the world in a non-
violent way. A nonviolent people are not in need of an outside power to subdue them; they become
able to truly rule themselves.
Gandhi and Azzam have very different concepts of the ideal state. Azzam is not an activist
desiring independence in order to establish a democracy. The type of governance Azzam seeks is the-
ocracy, which is distinctly not founded upon the notion of self-determination nor political freedom.
The incessant referencing of sacred text precludes any appeal to the inner voice, and the concept of
human rights is obscured. What is called for is the domination of falsehood in defense of the truth as
stated by doctrine, submission to the power of God, and a posturing in opposition to the other, with
whom one must go to battle with brute force.
As Azzam seeks realms of peace through war {jihad), there is an apparent contradiction or
an inconsistency between the ends and the means. However, although Azzam advocates for a society
based on spiritual values, he envisions a society based on dominance-submission (this dominance-
submission was illustrated in the discussion of abstinence). In such a society that he envisions, women
must be covered, girls do not get educated, and a person can be killed for dishonoring his or her family.
Azzam seeks to protect this type of society from foreign interference by going to war. Formulated
thus, the ends are not inconsistent with the means in jihad. A state ruled by dominance-submission is
fought for using a dominance-submissive strategy.
In this section we have seen how Abdallah Azzam and Mohandas Gandhis ontological para-
digms, or foundational myths, are very different, as are their ways of being-in-the-world. In contrast to
137 Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War, I, 10.
45


the theme of integration and freedom seen in Gandhis work, dominance-submission and dualism are
prevalent in Azzams. In summary, Gandhi, in contrast to Azzam, 1) relies upon the cultivation of a
habit-body consistent with the beliefs and the experiences of an integrating paradigm, which enables
nonviolent response, not behaviors based on a dualistic worldview. 2) Gandhi repudiates the
dominance-submission way of being-in-the-world in favor of spiritual and political freedom: 3) he
teaches embodied consciousness, emphasizing paying attention to an inner sense in determining right
action in favor of the isolated intellect, which may only appeal to reason or doctrine for guidance. If
freedom is the being-in-the-world called forth by Gandhis integrating myth, domination-
submission is the being-in-the-world called forth by Azzams dualistic myth.
In the next section, I discuss the activities of the leaders and the movements. I show how
Gandhis myth, in contrast to Azzams, facilitates a nonviolent transfer of power and the transformation
of relationships: conversion, not destruction.138 139 140 141
Activities of the Leaders and the Participants
Jihad
Azzams mode of being-in-the-world is jihad His goal is to invigorate the ummah, or Muslim
community, to defend itself against falsehood.'against unbelievers. against the tyrant.140 141
Concern for the well-being of the ummah is a crucial religious value in Islam, as discussed by
Armstrong.142 This is the foundation of the movement that inspired Azzam as a youth in Palestine, the
138 Gandhi writes, the satyagrahi believes not in destruction but conversion. Gandhi. Non-Violence
in Peace and War, II, 149, my italics.
139 Azzam. Defense, Al Qaeda in its own Words, 104.
140 Azzam, Join the Caravan, 111.
141 According to Kepel and Milelli. tyrant or taghut is a Quranic term meaning enemy nearby. A
history of the term demonstrates its various meanings throughout time, having meant in pre-lslamic
times it signified a god, while in the Quran it has meant demon, magician, or idols. It is attributed even
to Satan himself. This note additionally demonstrates the influence of myth on action
142 Armstrong, 219.
46


Muslim Brotherhood.143 Protecting the Muslim community against the spiritual and political chal-
lenges it faces as the result of foreign interference is to be done through waging jihad, which is com-
monly defined as holy war, as indicated by Bruce Lincoln in his book, Holy Terrors.144 However
(and this is something written about by Lincoln as well), Kepel and Milelli note that jihad is an Islamic
concept that has greater depth than merely engaging an exterior enemy in military warfare:
The term jihad literally means effort, or striving, implicitly in the name of Islam.
Although some exegetes have distinguished the greater jihad (waged on oneself, in
order to improve oneself morally and religiously) from the lesser (carried out
against pagans and unbelievers, or those who reject Muslim rule), since the classical
era the term has generally been taken to mean efforts Muslims make to propagate hie
faith. Even then, however, jihad does not necessarily have a military sense: it can
mean jihad of the tongue (al-jihad bil-lian), designating the obligation to enjoin
good and forbid evil...145
What Kepel and Milelli make evident is that jihad has its place within the inner life of a per-
son, as Gandhi emphasized the importance of self-purification.146 Kepel and Milelli claim that a leg-
acy of Azzam is that he emphasized lesser jihad over the greater, that is, he prioritized the battle
with external enemies rather than the struggle with internal demons, but this is a debatable assess-
ment. As indicated by the Final Instructions to the Hijackers of September 11, found in the luggage
of Mohamed Atta, self-purification was highly important in the preparation for the attack. These in-
structions describe a precise list of not only the physical but the inner purifications that the jihadi
must perform the night before. The hijackers were to not only shave excess hair from the body, wear
cologne, and shower, but [cjompletely forget something called this world, [or this lifer]. The time
for play is over...147 In other words, the world must not induce the hijacker to engage with it, neither
in play nor in the love of life. We see dominance-submission is evident in these jihadi instructions,
t43 Kepel and Milelli, 83.
144 Bruce Lincoln, Holy Terrors: Thinking About Religion after September 11, (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2003), 33.
145 Kepel and Milelli, 296-297.
146 Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War, /, 245.
147 Appendix A, Final Instructions to the Hijackers of September 11, Lincoln, 93-98, my italics.
47


where the spirit is placed in opposition to the world, where God is in opposition to life. This animosity
toward life is consistent with Azzams image of human nature, which posits human beings to be sin-
ners. Dominance-submission is more obvious in the acts of September 11, which are an overt display
of force on behalf of those engaged in jihad
The issue weighing on Islamists such as Azzam is non-Muslim political and military power in
traditionally Muslim lands.348 Grievances include the injustices done to the Palestinian people as well
as Soviet or American presence in Afghanistan, and have included British interference in Egyptian
politics and the impoverishment of the Egyptian people by the secular regime.349 Azzam prefers a
military to a revolutionary approach in his desire to establish an Islamic state.350 While a revolution
takes place within a state; Azzams vision is pan-lslamic. He desires the reclamation of Muslim lands,
transcending the boundaries of the new states carved out of the former Ottoman empire in the political
upheaval following the first World War.353
In his military strategy, Azzam chose Afghanistan as the nucleus for a war against the enemies
of Islam. Not only were Afghanistans borders open at that time, providing easy access for waves of
volunteer fighters, but there was a war already raging in Afghanistan (against the Soviets) that was an
essentially Islamist war.148 149 151 1S2 Azzam acclaims the struggle going on in Afghanistan for the Islamist purity
accompanying its political goals. The mujahedeen had formulated clearly their desire for theocracy:
Article 2 of the charter of the Islamic Union of Afghan Mujahedeen, according to Azzam, asserts:
Our goal derives from His word, none can command except God; and so absolute sovereignty be-
148 International Crisis Group. Understanding Islamism. Middle East/North Africa Report, no. 37 (2
March 2005) http://merln.ndu.edu/archive/icg/Islamism2Mar05.pdf (accessed November 28,2010).
149 Armstrong, 219.
iso Kepel and Milelli, 99.
151 Ibid.
152 Azzam, Defense of Muslim Territories, Al Qaeda in Its Own Words, 108.
48


longs to the Lord of the world, (Quran, 12:67).153 "When sovereignty is attributed to someone or
something other than God, such as the nation or a political party, society becomes un-Islamic, because
this situation grants decision-making and legislative power to authorities other than God alone, [Sayyid
Qutb]. 154 Azzam, thus, insists on allegiance to Gods power alone. He approves of the mujahedeen
because they had refused assistance from secular sources, unlike the Palestinians. Things are differ-
ent in Palestine, writes Azzam in the Defense, where all sorts of people have taken over the leader-
ship: some sincere Muslims, but others are communists, while others still are simple Muslims. The
banner they raised was that of the secular state.155 Thus, he demonstrates that the means are as impor-
tant in the struggle against oppression as the ends.
Azzam was a principal recruiter for the effort of jihad in Afghanistan. He organized Arab
fighters and solicited funds for the war effort. He appealed to peoples sense of duty towards religion
and proper conduct, to mens sense of virility and capacity for action, to the negative consequences of
non-action, to the ideals of justice, and to the idea of the omnipotence of God. Azzam played upon
peoples fears of the consequences of their sins in neglecting their religious duties, conjuring up the
image of the vengeful and judgmental God.
Azzam was instrumental in framing the ideological principles and practical considerations for
a cult of martyrdom as the ultimate form of devotion to God.156 Talal Asad addresses this point in
On Suicide Bombing, (2007). He writes that although what is called shuhada in Arabic is defined as
martyrdom, which is connected to the ritual of sacrifice, this definition does not account for the fact
that there occurs a violent attack in which a life is taken from the enemy. It is a political expression
153 Azzam, Defense of Muslim Territories, Al Qaeda in Its Own Words, 108.
154 Kepel and Milelli, 301.
155 Azzam, 108.
153 Kepel and Milelli, 100.
49


that has personal motive. As such, he calls the act of suicide bombing more of a triumph than a
sacrifice.157
Anat Berko discusses this phenomenon extensively in her book Path to Paradise: The Inner
World of Suicide Bombers and Their Dispatchers, in which she interviews would-be suicide bombers
and dispatchers. Consistent with Asads analysis, she calls suicide bombing a hero cult.158 Posters
of the shaheeds are mounted on the streets in Palestine portraying them in macho poses, illustrating
that although the shaheeds sacrifice their lives in the performance of their duty, they are rewarded
with enormous status within their society. It seems as though, through shuhada, they have found a way
to become empowered.
Berko claims to have observed a chafing in what she calls an often harsh and oppressive Pal-
estinian society, where honor is revered, strict codes of conduct are to be adhered to, and death is dealt
as punishment more freely than in more liberal societies. She illustrates a segment of Arab society that
is not only politically oppressed, but whose culture is oppressive. According to Islamic law, a woman
can be killed if she is seen in the company of unrelated men, because she has dishonored her family. A
way for her to reclaim her honor is to become a shaheeda, rather that suffer the humiliation she would
have brought upon herself and her family otherwise.159
Further illustrating the empowering nature of shuhada, Berko asserts that some shaheeds,
perhaps unconsciously, found that becoming a martyr was a way to reclaim their manhood in a situa-
tion that made them feel impotent or castrated.
It is as if [male terrorists] are trying to tell the world that they have proven their po-
tency as males who can fight and preserve their honor. Dispatchers and suicide
bombers all spoke about masculinity. That might be a hint that deep within the Pal-
estinian soul, the Israeli occupation is perceived as a form of castration, and only
157 Talal Asad, On Suicide Bombing (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 49.
158 Anat Berko, Path to Paradise (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2007), 10.
159 Ibid., 1-8.
50


active fighting can return the masculinity snatched from them, and they are relating
to the land as a woman that had been raped and defiled.160
These statements illustratey/AaJ as a mode of being-in-the-world that is reacting to disempowerment
The world is experienced a certain way, and calls forth a fight-or-flight response.
One young girl, Nazima, had just wanted military training. She lied to her father about where
she was going, apparently more afraid of being found out to be in the company of unrelated men than
of being involved in military activities.161 Nazimas particular concern indicates that some rules of
religion could be fore-gone in order to engage in jihad, and this selectivity begins to illustrate a disso-
nance between the goal and the manner in which it is achieved.
Berko observes that religion combines with nationalism to produce a fertile medium for
terrorism to spring forth.162 Berko finds that the people she interviews are generally not religious
fanatics, although religion played a fimdamental part in preparing them for the operation.163 The main
issue as described by the people interviewed is not their differences in their religions nor their
secularisms.164 The issue is often presented itself as stolen lands,165
Dispatcher Saleh explains, the conflict is between nations, not people.166 He sees one na-
tion competing with another on a political, not on a personal level. He describes a scenario of dispar-
ity: The Jews have water, electricity, a sewer system, the Arabs dont. Although he had no issue
with the Israelis personally, he was moved to violence by the inequities between nations.167
iso Berko, 48.
161 Ibid., 3-4.
162 Ibid., 9.
163 Ibid., 8-9.
iw Mahmoud, a dispatcher, notes that in Spain, Jews and Muslims lived together. Throughout history
there was peace between Jews and Arabs, they are cousins, (Ibid, 23).
165 Ibid., 23.
166 Ibid., 15.
167 Ibid., 18.
51


Dispatcher Abdallah had worked with Israelis at the time he joined the militant movement.
At the same time I started doing military work [i.e., when he joined the terrorist organization] I knew
Jews, I worked with Jews... I never thought of hurting them, and if someone else wanted to hurt them,
I would try to prevent it.168 This concern for his Jewish friends validates the point of view that Des-
cartes and Merleau-Ponty came together on, that knowing someone makes them more real. The ex-
perience of intersubjectivity gives authenticity to the existence of another. If someone actually knows
the other person, has experience of him or her, the more human that person becomes. As this other
overcomes objectification, it becomes more difficult to treat him or her with violence.
Abdallah indicates a sentiment of vengeance (against Israelis he does not know) in his motive
to become involved in jihad He was highly critical of the treatment of Palestinians at checkpoints,
where he said he was treated like a dog.169 That he choses this specific expression is indicative of
just how great an insult he experienced to his humanity. He not only feels insulted but dehumanized,
even demonized. 170 He feels reduced below the level of an object, and in Gilligans language, feels
negated. What Abdallah is looking for is a way to restore his faith and his honor, something to return
to him the experience of being human, that is, valid as a subject in the eyes of another.171 The world,
as he experiences it, calls forth defensiveness. Furthermore, acting vengefully conforms to the image
of God described by Azzam, and as such, is a paradigmatic model for behavior.
I have just demonstrated that for jihadis, the world appears in dualistic terms. 1) Both Azzam
and the participants in the movement formulate a distinct enemy. 2) They act defensively against this
enemy using brute force, clearly demonstrating a dominance-submissive way of being-in-the-world.
3) The directives for action are obtained by way of isolated intellect. 4) While the importance of the
168 Berko, 31.
Ibid., 33.
170 According to hadith, dogs, are unclean, could annul prayer, were demons when ferocious, particu-
larly black dogs, who should be killed, according to Mohammed. Silas, Muhammad and the Dogs,
Answering Islam, http://www.answering-islam.org/Silas/dogs.htm (accessed October 12, 2010).
171 Berko, 33.
52


purity of jihad is emphasized by Azzam, some participants did not act out of duty to the religion but for
personal motives, and some were willing to overlook some religious rules in order to achieve their
goal.
Jihad is similar to Gandhis movement in that it is a response to oppression and seeks em-
powerment through a willingness to make the ultimate sacrifice. However, Gandhis movements ac-
tivities are vastly different from the jihadi i. because they have different myths in place. In the next
section, I describe satyagraha in action.
Satyagraha
Satyagraha is Gandhis mode of being-in-the-world, which encompasses ahimsa, or nonvio-
lence as spiritual love, that which he finds to be the universal spiritual value of concern for the well-
being of others.172 It is a holding on to Truth, and it expands to the political realm to refer to a
method of resistance to injustice.173 Again, this emphasis on truth resembles Azzam upon the surface,
but Gandhi does not envision a violent struggle. Gandhis satyagraha, or nonviolence, is soul-
force,174 175 and entails civil disobedience, nonviolent resistance, and non-cooperation with eveiything
humiliating.173 Within a particular historical context, satyagraha, as it was executed, accomplished
one of Gandhis goals: that is, an independent India.
Contrary to the connotations of the term passive resistance and the negative non of non-
violence, Gandhi emphasizes that satyagraha is an intensely active force.176
It does not mean meek submission to the will of the evil-doer, but it means putting
ones whole soul against the will of the tyrant. Working under this law of our being,
it is possible for a single individual to defy the whole might of an unjust empire to
172 Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War, I, 113.
173 Merton, 4-5.
174 Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War, II, 35.
175 Ibid., 53
176 Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War, 1, 129.
53


save his honour, his religion, his soul, and lay the foundation for that empires fall or
its regeneration.177
Thus, like Azzam, Gandhi appeals to the larger-than-life significance of the actions that were required
to combat oppression in order to restore a peoples honor. However, satyagraha is not deployed to
seize power or to force the enemy into submission. Rather, it is a distinct type of empowerment. Az-
zam states that God has power over all things,178 and jihad is an expression of this message. It is
through embodying the essence of God (in the case of jihad, vengeance, judgement, and domination)
that one becomes empowered. However, satyagraha relies upon the transformation of relationships.179
Its aim is conversion, not destruction,180 and this is done through the embodiment of mercy and love.
Gandhi saw an opportunity to act nonviolently for home rule in March, 1930. He chooses the
salt tax to rally around because taxing something that everyone needs is seen as particularly onerous
and exploitative.181 He announces that he and his volunteers would march from his ashram to the sea
to obtain their own salt, in blatant violation of the law. Along the way, he gathers increasing publicity
and exposure. He urges the leaders of the villages to quit their government jobs to end their coopera-
tion with the British.182 He asserts the importance of not hating the British; regarding them he is al-
ways respectful.183 As I have described, Gandhi does not blame the British for Indian subservience,
177 Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War, I, 2.
i7e Azzam, Al Qaeda in its own Words, 103.
179 Thomas Merton, Gandhi on Nonviolence, 25-31, my italics.
teo Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War, II, 149,
181 Steve York, producer and director, "India: Defying the Crown, documentary, (Princeton, NJ: Films
for the Humanities and Sciences, 2000).
182 Ibid.
183 Gandhi, Hind Swaraj, 36,88-89.
54


accepting responsibility for the situation on behalf of his own people.184 He explicitly refuses the term
enemy185 and explains the principles of nonviolence.186
When Gandhi performs public civil disobedience, he defies Britains authority. The govern-
ment is drawn into a stand-off with the Indian people. As Gandhi introduces the second step of his
campaign, which is to seize a salt-works plant, new repressive measures are introduced (more opportu-
nities for civil disobedience). Gandhi is arrested, which had the effect he desired: civic life in India
comes to a standstill. When Gandhis followers raid the salt-works plant, the British are left with two
choices. They can do nothing and demonstrate their impotence, or they can demonstrate their power
through force. They choose the latter, and unleash a wave of brutality against the protesters. The In-
dian protesters do not defend against the steel-tipped clubs, and this ruthlessness is recorded by jour-
nalists in some 2000 newspapers worldwide. Even though they did not fight back, or perhaps for that
reason, the British lost their power.187
A combination of factors provided for the emergence of satyagraha and the achievement of its
goals, including the following: 1) The humiliation felt by the Indian people towards their oppression
was providing fuel for action. 2) Gandhi becomes a leader of the movement. He is looked up to, and
reportedly possesses charisma and a saintly quality. 188 If the mind/body center is where speakers
speak from, and writers write from, given the success of Gandhis speeches, as the thousands of Indi-
ans that participated in Gandhis campaign would endure arrests and severe beatings without defending
themselves, it is likely that Gandhi practices the embodied consciousness that he preaches. It seems as
though satyagraha had made itself irresistible. 3) Demonstrating an understanding of psychology,
Gandhi took advantage of the British concept of fair play, knowing that the British would not resort
184 Gandhi, Hind Swaraj, 23.
185 in the dictionary of satyagraha, there is no enemy, (Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War, I,
216).
186 Gandhi, Hind Swaraj, 36, 88-89.
187 York,
188 Ibid.
55


to the forceful oppression of a nonviolent people, especially in the light of the observance of an inter-
national community. 4) Gandhi was able to demonstrate to the world the oppression of the Indian peo-
ple and the lack of legitimacy of the British government, as the people withdrew their tacit consent to
British rule. Doing so he was able to win international support for his cause.189 These factors are
unique to a specific historical context, and combined to enable a successful liberation of India from
foreign interference.
Gandhian activist Narendra Desai reveals in an interview some of the aspects of Gandhis
campaign for home rule from the perspective of a participant. He describes how the campaign ignited
a nationalistic upswell.190 Although I have demonstrated a connection between nationalism and vio-
lence, during the movement for Indian independence violence was largely abstained from, as Gandhi is
able to unify the Indian people in a common cause.
Desai, who was a secret messenger during the Quit India campaign,191 provides insight re-
garding to what degree the individuals involved in the movement shared Gandhis convictions. Writ-
ing about the latter parts of the insurgency, Desai reports that among some of the insurgents, some vio-
lence against property was permitted, as long as it did not hurt anybody. Independent of Gandhis vi-
sion, the insurgents took to activities such as blowing up bridges and government offices.192 This re-
port by Desai exemplifies that not all participants in the movement acted nonviolently at all times, and
were not able to completely abstain from othering the British. Desai demonstrates that the participants
in Gandhis movement did not fully embody the values of nonviolence and love toward the other, as
Gandhi envisioned. However, at some point, says Desai, we did realize this enterprise of burning
189 York.
Rita Kothari, An Interview with Narendra Desai, a Gandhian Activist. Interventions: Interna-
tional Journal of Postcolonial Studies, 3, no. 3 (2001): 439,
http://0-web.ebscohost.com.skyline.ucdenver.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfViewer?vid=4&hid=12&sid=083
d9dc6-fcc3-4092-8204-0e305e4248a5%40sessionmgrl3 (accessed May 30,2010).
191 Ibid., 440.
192 Ibid., 442.
56


bridges and the rest of it had limitations. It was not possible to do it without hurting people and it was
not very effective, either. The project of raising consciousness was much more long-lasting.193 In this
statement, Desai indicates that for some, the understanding of the superiority of nonviolence was based
upon rational observation, not experience.
Thus there is evidence that the goal of the participants in the campaign for home rule fell short
of Gandhis more complex vision of home rule based on self-rule of spiritually enlightened people who
have the lived experience of an integrating worldview. Gandhi, who promised the nation,in Desais
words, had provided the faith needed to obtain independence, 194 if not an all-encompassing para-
digm shift. Thus, there is evidence of the dualistic paradigm in the writing of Desai on behalf of some
of the participants. This return to a dualistic paradigm perhaps sheds light on why the movement ulti-
mately failed to create a peaceful, unified nation. The dualistic view seems to endure in India, as a
culture free from violence and oppression has not taken hold. Yet, in the historical moment, by using
nonviolence called forth by an integrating paradigm, a people are transformed from a subservient class
into a free people, creating a situation whereby the power of an oppressive government is transferred to
the people themselves.
After studying Gandhis movement, I argue that it demonstrates elements of the integrating
paradigm, formulated clearly in Gandhis strategy. Gandhis strategy: 1) does not formulate the con-
cept enemy. 2) It repudiates the dominance-submission way of being in the world, depending upon a
transfer of power and the transformation of relationships; 3) prescribes the practice of embodied con-
sciousness in emphasizing paying attention to an inner sense in determining right action, relying upon
the cultivation of a habit-body consistent with the beliefs and the experiences of an integrating para-
digm; and 4) although Gandhi emphasized a purity of the movement in absolutely conforming to non-
violent principles, some participants nevertheless acted violently, placing more importance on political
independence than on spiritual freedom. Thus, much like m jihad the movement was not made up
193 Kothari, 444.
is4 Ibid., 445.
57


entirely of spiritually-motivated people. However, Gandhis leadership did succeed in producing a
movement of people who had sufficiently disciplined their reactions to violence, abstaining from re-
turning blows or engaging in defense mechanisms when threatened, which was able to facilitate a
transformation of power and a transformation of relationships.
58


CHAPTER 4
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In this paper I have discussed two modes of being-in-the-world influenced by two myths with
which a person may conceptualize the nature of reality. Descartes, Merleau-Ponty, and Marion Wood-
man have provided an illustration of these paradigms in philosophy and psychology; Abdallah Azzam
and Mohandas Gandhi have demonstrated them in their writings and practices. The actions of their
respective social movements reflect the inherence of these myths, as a particular world calls forth a
certain type of behavior.
Both Gandhi and Azzam display a deep religiosity. They are similar in that both take a stance
against oppression and encourage the giving of ones life out of adherence to ones principles, for jus-
tice and for truth. They both seek empowerment where power has been lost. However, the two leaders
of the movements I have studied are obviously different in that one encourages confronting an enemy
with violence, while the other suggests engaging an adversary with nonviolence. What helps us under-
stand the nuances between the two movements and modes of being-in-the-world is the identification of
the dualistic and the integrating worldviews operating therein.
Azzam and Gandhi have different views on human nature, the image of God, spiritual law,
and duty. Azzam demonstrates a dualistic ontological paradigm in his writings, which is characterized
by a split between self and other and between subject and object, whereby there is spirit versus body,
and truth versus falsehood. Azzam imagines God to be vengeful and judgmental, and this image re-
flects a corresponding model of behavior. He believes that human beings are inherently sinners, and
uses us-versus-them language in the discussion thereof. Azzam describes a law of defense to protect
truth against falsehood. Such a dualistic worldview naturally provides for a defensive posture. This
mode of being is exemplified by the acts of war suicide bombers take against the enemy.
59


Gandhi believes that human beings are the embodiment of spirit, ruled by a universal law of
love and nonviolence. For Gandhi, this law is truth, and this truth he imagines to be God. His loving
and merciful God-image and view of human nature are integrative, as for him the world is experienced
in unifying terms. Such an experience of the world calls forth loving and nonviolent behavior. Gandhi
describes the duty to cease cooperation with everything degrading, to embody the traditional moral
principles of love and nonviolence to achieve self-rule, spiritually and politically.
Azzam and Gandhi also have different views of the ideal state. Azzam would have theocracy,
whereby Muslims submit to the will of God living in congruence with the truth revealed in scripture
(isolated intellect), within subsequent realms of peace. Gandhi subscribes to anarchy, wherein free,
spiritually enlightened, communal individuals coexist peacefully in their society, ruling themselves by
paying heed to their inner voice (embodied consciousness) which, by nature of the inherent truth, is
God. Both would have a spiritually-based society, but Azzam seeks it through dominance-submission,
while Gandhi through freedom.
Unfortunately, dominance-submission has not yet yielded realms of peace in the Arab world;
and after independence, the type of society that Gandhi envisioned also did not take hold. Yet, despite
the ultimate failure of Gandhis movement to produce a peaceful, unified state in India, one cannot
dismiss the success of nonviolence in obtaining a transfer of power from the British to the Indian peo-
ple. A movement based upon integrative principles was able to demonstrate to the world that the In-
dian people had withdrawn their consent to British rule, as their interests were no longer being suffi-
ciently addressed. Although nonviolence may not be possible at all times, in this particular historical
context, it incited the British to abandon their rulership, a choice the British administrators determined
to be the better alternative. Thus the Indians obtained their political freedom and won the removal of
an unwanted presence from their land.
To argue that one worldview and one way of being-in-the-world is better than the other, I
would commit the same kind of dualism that I would subordinate. Therefore, I refrain from doing so.
I maintain that there are at least two ways of experiencing the nature of reality, and awareness of these
60


dualistic and integrating paradigms has much to offer in the attempts to understand history, especially
social movements.
The understanding of the dualistic and integrating paradigms may also be useful in the field
of international relations. This knowledge may be valuable to the strategists in Washington who have
the responsibility to formulate foreign policy in an often hostile world that is made up of many diverse
nations, representing myriad cultures and interests. I have described the benefits of the embodying
ones consciousness during conflict, which provides the perspective of interconnectedness: we all share
this one world. For these strategists, it is worthwhile to understand the concept of the world calling
forth behavior. The understanding of being-in-the-world yields the insight that people become defen-
sive and violent in a world experienced in terms of dominance-submission, and that lasting peace can
rarely be achieved through force.
Perhaps the only difficulty in allowing for an integrating view is the overcoming of our fear of
the other in a world that in many ways calls forth materialism, consumerism, defensiveness, fight-and-
flight, and the isolated intellect. It is possible that only by willingly engaging in an embodied con-
sciousness practice, do we have any hope of expanding beyond dualism and violence in the world and
within ourselves.
61


BIBLIOGRAPHY
Arendt, Hannah. On Violence, San Diego: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1969, 1970.
Armstrong, Karen. The Battle for God New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Random House, 2006.
Asad, Talal. On Suicide Bombing. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.
Balfour Declaration 1917. The Avalon Project, Yale Law School, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th
century/balfour.asp (accessed November 1,2010). ~
Berko, Anat. The Path to Paradise: The Inner World of Suicide Bombers and Their Dispatchers. Trans-
lated by Elizabeth Yuval. Westport: Praeger Security International, 2007.
http://0-ebooks.abc-clio.com.skyline.ucdenver.edu/print.aspx?isbn=9781567207057
&id=C9446-2155 (accessed May 11,2010).
Buchanan, Scott, ed. The Portable Plato. New York: The Viking press, 1948.
Damovsky, Marcy, Barbara Epstein, and Richard Flacks. Cultural Politics and Social Movements.
Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995.
Descartes, Rene. Meditations on First Philosophy. Edited and translated by Cottingham, J. London:
Cambridge University Press. 1985.
Dr. Abdullah Azzam. Perspectives on World History and Current Events, http://www.pwhce.org
/azzam.html (accessed May 13,2010).
Ford, Dennis. The Search For Meaning. Berkley: University of California Press, 2007.
Gandhi, Mohandas K. Non-Violence in Peace and War. Vol. I and Vol. II. Introduction by Paul F.
Power. New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1972. First published 1942 and 1949, respectively.
--------------------. Hind Swaraj or Indian Home Rule. Edited and published by Jitendra
T. Desai. Ahmedabad, India: Navajivan Publishing House (Navajivan Mudranalaya), 1938.
Gilligan, Stephen The Experience of Negative Otherness: How Shall We Treat Our Enemies?
Seishindo (2002). http://www.seishindo.org/articles/st_gilligan2.html (accessed July 6,2009).
International Crisis Group. Understanding Islamism. Middle East/North Africa Report, no. 37 (2
March 2005). http://merln.ndu.edu/archive/icg/Islamism2Mar05.pdf (accessed November 28,
2010).
Juergensmeyer, Mark. Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence. 3rd ed. Berk-
ley: University of California Press, 2000.
Kepel, Gilles, and Jean-Pierre Milelli, eds. AJ Qaeda in Its Own Words. Translated by Pascale
Ghazaleh. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008.
62


Kothari, Rita. An Interview with Narendra Desai, a Gandhian Activist. Interventions: International
Journal of Postcolonial Studies, 3, no. 3 (2001): 439-445. http://0-web.ebscohost.com.sky
Iine.ucdenver.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=4&hid=12&sid=083d9dc6-fcc3-4092-8204-0e305e
4248a5%40sessionmgrl 3 (accessed May 30,2010).
Larsen, Stephen. The Shaman s Doorway: Opening Imagination to Power and Myth. With a forward
by Joan Halifax. New York: Station Hill Press, 1988. First published by Harper & Row, 1976.
Lincoln, Bruce. Holy Terrors. Thinking About Religion after September 11. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2003.
Mirceau, Eliade. The Sacred and the Profane: the Nature of Religion. Translated by Willard R. Trask.
San Diego: Harcourt, Inc., 1959.
Merieau-Ponty, Maurice, Phenomenology of Perception. Translated by Colin Smith. New York:
Routeledge Classics, 2002. First published in 1945 by Editions Gallimard.
Merton, Thomas, ed. with introduction. Gandhi on Nonviolence. New York: New Directions Publish-
ing Corporation, 1964.
Qafisheh, Mutaz. Genesis of Citizenship in Palestine and Israel. Palestinian Nationality during the
Period of 1917-1925. The Journal of the History of International Law, 11, no. 1 (Martinus
Publishers, 2009): 1-36. http://0-web.ebscohost.com.skyline.ucdenver.edu/ehost/pdfviewer
/pdfviewer?hid=l 13&sid=65290344-4fea-4cb0-9afl- Ib0a6cf7832d%40sessionmgr 111&
vid=2 (Accessed Nov-ember 28,2010).
Schafer, David. Seeds of Enmity: Origins of the Israel-Palestinian Conflict. The Humanist,
62, no. 5 (September/October 2002): 9-15. http://0-web.ebscohost.com.skyline.ucdenver.edu
/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=9&hid= 106&sid=ce8541 bb-8c71-4353-a3c4-006897eae300
%40sessionmgrl 13 (accessed November 28,2010)
Silas. Muhammad and the Dogs. Answering Islam. http://www.answering-islam.org/Silas/dogs.htm
(accessed October 12,2010).
Stem, Jessica. Denial. New York: Harper Collins, 2010.
Wilson, Jon E. Early Colonial India Beyond Empire. The Historical Journal, 50,4. (United King
dom: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 957-258. http://0-joumals.cambridge.org.skyline.
ucdenver.edu/action/displayFulltext?type= 1 &pdflype= 1 &fid= 1411968&jid=HlS&voIumeId
=50&issueld=&aid=1411960 (accessed November 28,2010).
Woodman, Marion. Conscious Femininity: Interviews with Marion Woodman. Toronto: Inner City
Books, 1993.
York, Steve, producer and director. India: defying the Crown. Documentaiy. Princeton, NJ: Films
for the Humanities and Sciences, 2000.
63


Full Text

PAGE 1

ADVERSARIES, PSYCHOLOGY, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, AND WORLD POLITICS By Nina Lois Turtledove B.A. Metropolitan State College of Denver, 2005 A thesis submitted to the University of Colorado Denver in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Humanities College of Liberal Arts and Sciences 2011

PAGE 2

This thesis for the Master of Humanities degree by Nina Lois Turtledove has been approved by Myra Bookman

PAGE 3

Turtledove, Nina Lois (M.H., College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Colorado Denver) Adversaries, Psychology, and Word Politics Thesis directed by Professor Lucy McGuffey ABSTRACT Within philosophy we fmd at least two major paradigms with which it is possible to conceptu alize the nature of reality: what I call the dualistic paradigm, and the integrated paradigm. Aspects of these worldviews are evidenced in the way we "deal" with adversaries, both on a psychological level and in our actions in the world. I argue that not only do these paradigms exist in philosophy and in the -actions -of individuals, but they can be discerned -in the events of h-istory -as well. I suggest that -aware ness of these paradigms deepens our understanding of history, especially of social movements. I com pare and contrast AI Qaeda and Gandhi's campaign for home rule in India, and verify my suggestion that they operate/operated using these different paradigms by analyzing texts of the movements' lead ers and the actions of the leaders and the participants. I advocate that knowledge of the dualisti-c and integrated paradigms is valuable in the formulation of foreign policy in a world that often appears hos tile and threatening, and suggest that the practice of using the integrated paradigm to understand the world f-a-cilitates Qptions tha-t -can produ-ce -a higher degree Qf pea-ce and freedWl. This abstract accurately represents the content of the candidate's thesis. I recommend its publication.

PAGE 4

DEDICATION This work is dedicated to my husband, whose loving support expedited the completion of this project and facilitated a more ready preparedness to take on what comes next. I also dedicate this thesis to my mother, whose insatiable quest for knowledge and experi enlivened our home, and inspired me to try to emulate her richness of -spirit. Although -she died much too young, her journey lives on with her daughter, who shares her values and enthusiasm, and who also strives to make this terrestrial playground a better place through exuberance and love.

PAGE 5

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to acknowledge my Christopher for helping me see the water of the fishbowl from the perspective of a fish, thereby aiding me in finding the words to address the paradox that presents itself in this essay. I extend deep gratitude to Linda Skarrup, who dutifully passed along the teachings ofB.K.S Iyengar, and the yoga masters before him, which have allowed me to experience a great deal of the material presented here. I thank all of the teachers., both living and otherwise who have worked for peace and freedom from suffering for all sentient beings.

PAGE 6

TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 1 2. PERCEIVING THE OTHER: DUALISTIC AND INTEGRATED PARADIGMS IN PHILOSOPHY ................................................................... 4 Negative Others ......................................................................... 6 The Role of Myth ....................................................................... 7 Descartes: Disembodied Intellect. ................................................... 9 Critique: Merleau-Ponty ............................................................. 14 Response: Embodied Consciousness .............................................. 19 3. DUALISTIC AND INTEGRATED PARADIGMS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS .............................................................. 27 Histories of Satyagraha and Jihad ........................................... 29 Leaders ....................................................................... 33 Abdallah Azam ............................................................... 33 Their Texts .............................................................. 36 Jihad ................................................................................... 46 Satyagraha ___ --------.. -............................................ 53 4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ....................................................... 59 v.

PAGE 7

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION The way a person conceptualizes the nature of reality has a distinct influence on the behavior of that person. The field of philosophy is abundant with points of view attempting to describe the es sence of the human experience in this world. Two paradigms stand out: what I call the dualistic para digm, and the integrating paradigm. These two paradigms inform the modes of being of actors in the world. The dualistic paradigm is linked to the defense mechanisms fight and flight, meanwhile, the integrating paradigm provides for other options. These ontological paradigms deal with the nature of existence. Rene Descartes posits the mind and body to be completely separate things. The subject is distinct from the object; the one is ex clusive of the other, and the self is cut off from the direct experience of the world. In Phenomenology of Perception, Maurice Merleau-Ponty argues against this dualism to assert that the subject and object are intertwined in a reciprocal relationship, that one shapes the existence of the other. In Merleau Ponty's analysis, the I is shifted from the position of an isolated observer to that of an actor intrinsi cally embedded in a world that engages with the agent of action to call forth behavior. As these two philosophers demonstrate that there are different ways to understand the nature of reality, they imply that there are different ways to conceptualize our relationship to the other. These two philosophers/philosophies demonstrate that it is possible to consider the other as somethin_g radi cally separate from us, or, that it is possible that the other is somehow integrated with our own being. Thus it follows that the way we conceptualize the nature of reality, whether we think of the other as separate or integrated, influences the way we deal with our adversaries. In the shadow of 9/11 with the abiding threat of terrorism or nuclear war, it is relevant to study the ontological framework behind the actions of actors who seek to drastically change lives and alter political climates. It is useful to have knowledge of the factors that influence action in the world, particularly if these actions threaten our well-being or our very survival. This study explores a correla-1

PAGE 8

tion between worldviews and action, between myth and modes of being-in-the-world In this study, I argue that there are at least two paradigms with which it is possible to conceptualize the nature of real ity, and the relationship between ourselves and others. I show that these paradigms exist in philosophy, and also, that they exist in history. Particularly, they are played out in the acts of social movements. I argue that awareness of these paradigms deepens our understanding of history, particularly social movements. I will proceed by presenting terminology and concepts relevant to my study. I introduce the work of psychologist Stephen Gilligan, who discusses modes of bein_g in-the-world, which are based on dualistic and integrating ontological paradigms. Gilligan acquaints us with the "isolated intellect," which is a le_gacy of the dualistic paradi_gm, which he asserts is associated to the defense mechanisms, fight and flight. He contrasts this with "embodied consciousness," which is made comprehensible through a discussion of phenomenology, or a study of phenomena as they are experienced Embodied consciousness, based on an integrating paradigm, as Gilligan argues, facilitates a "third way" of doing things, an alternative to fight and flight, which, he argues, opens us up to new possibilities, including nonviolent transformation. I demonstrate the Western philosophical underpinnings for Gilligan's analysis of the isolated intellect and embodied consciousness. I find foundations for these concepts in the works of Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy, in Merleau-Ponty's The Phenomenology of Perception, and in the work of psychologist Marion Woodman as presented in a series of interviews published in the book Conscious Femininity: Interviews with Marion Woodman. I suggest that aware .ness of tbe.se paradigm.s deepe.ns our understanding of .sodaJ movements., enb.anc.ing our .knowJedge of history. Then I examine two movements that demonstrate the two worldviews and ways of being-in the-world 1 have identified. 1 discuss the forming of Al Qaeda, which has operated within the framework of a dualistic paradigm, evidenced in one version of jihad, or the fight against enemies of the religion; and I describe Gandhi's campaign for home rule in India, utilizing a nonviolent strategy saty agraha, fashioned using the integrating paradigm. Although Cartesian dualism is not inherent in the 2

PAGE 9

theoretical background of Islamic cultures, the dualism that frames Descartes's thinking is, which Des cartes neatly describes. In this chapter I provide the historical context for these two movements, and I illustrate how these paradigms play out in the writings of their leaders, and in the actions of their movements. Finally I present a summary of my fmdings. I identify these different paradigms in the texts of the leaders of the movements, and demonstrate that they are reflected in social movements. I find that awareness of these paradigms and modes of being-in-the-world deepens our understanding of the social movements and even world politics. 3

PAGE 10

CHAPTER2 PERCEIVING THE OTHER : DUALISTIC AND INTEGRATING PARADIGMS IN PHILOSOPHY Lucidly, it is nQt Qften, if tlla,t -an -and bodily hann, even death. In such instances, hardly anyone would doubt the appropriateness of the fight-orflight response. However it seems to be a part of human experience that we encounter adversaries in other guises as well. Challenges and disturbances that do not immediately threaten our existence both come from the world outside us, and arise in our inner world of experience. In "The Experience of 'Negative Otherness': How Shall We Treat Our Enemies"1 psychologist Stephen Gilligan, Ph.D. argues for an alternative to dealing with our adversaries in lieu of fight and flight. Fight and flight, the traditional ways of dealing with conflict, he asserts, often merely perpetuate cycles of violence and human suffering. In fighting, Gilligan writes, we dominate demonize, repress, analyze, and/or disassociate. Exhibiting flight, we surrender, have anxiety, paralysis, depression, and/or take drugs. He posits the possibility of another way of being in the world Gilligan invites us to consider that engagement with what he calls a ''negative other" may provide an opportunity for growth and transfonnation, particularly if we are able to move past the traditional fight-and-flight response. In this chapter I examine two ontological paradigms sketched out by Stephen Gilligan: a dualis tic paradigm, and an integrating paradigm. His work implies the questions, are we isolated little islands, situated in a world which is exterior to us? Or do we with others form an interrelated whole? Is it one or the other, or a little bit of both? In the case of the former view, all that we do not identify with, is other, and exists wholly separate from us and is disconnected from us. In the case of the latter, 1 Stephen Gilligan, "The Experience of Negative Otherness: How Shall We Treat Our Enemies?" {2002) Seishindo, under General Articles oflnterest for the Seishindo Community http://www.seishindo.org/articles/st_gilligan2.html (accessed July 6, 2009). 4

PAGE 11

however, even an adversary has value as an intricate part of the make-up of the universe. In such a case, the adversary is worthy of respect as an equal, and challenges a person to overcome adversity in a creative manner. Thus I argue, as does Gilligan, that these paradigms and the experience of them call forth different types of action in the world with respect to the other. Gilligan asserts that the dualistic view of the world is associated with what he calls a "modem myth" that focuses on a split between the self and others. This dualism is reflected in Cartesian think ing, which conceives of a strict separation between mind and body, and between the self and the world. In such a view, the spiritual (or mental) is distinguished from the physical, self-interest is emphasized over interconnectedness, reason is glorified over intuition, and science is prioritized over philosophy. One acts according to what makes rational, practical sense. Gilligan asserts that this approach is not the only way in which to experience the world, and posits a relevant alternative. Another alternative, nondualism, acknowledges the worth of the necessity of survival, and protecting oneself from harm. Yet it elevates values that are suppressed by this way of thinking. Instead of focusing on hierarchically arranged dichotomies, an experience of integration puts the mind back into the body (and enables a return of sacredness to matter). In such a state, the other is not perceived as something that may want to negates one's existence. Opposites exist in tension with one another; the existence of one enables the existence of the other. In such an integrated view, space is expanded for values such as compassion and love. For Gilligan, the concept of the other appears in psychological conversation that aims to resolve difficulties encountered by people in their lived experience, and he notices different ways of conceiving of, and relating to the other. 1 begin by explaining the term negative other, followed by a discussion of Gilligan's under standing of myths as ontological paradigms that influence our actions in the world. I provide the philo sophical foundations of the two ways ofbeing in the world descnoed by Gilligan in the works of Rene Descartes, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Marion Woodman. I close this chapter by suggesting that an isolated intellect, based on the dualistic paradigm, and embodied consciousness, based on the integrat ing paradigm, can be discerned in the acts of social movements in history. 5

PAGE 12

Negative Others In a discussion of psychotherapy, Gilligan introduces the concept of a "negative other," which he asserts forms the basis for any psychotherapeutic conversation. 2 He uses the term to encompass a broad range of phenomena, experienced both in the outer world and within the interior realm of the self. An internally experienced negative other may be anger, depression, fear, criticism, an addiction, or a compulsion. An external negative other can appear as a chauvinist boss, a rude stranger, or even a faceless structure or institution such as the patriarchy, social inequality, racism, the INS, a or a gov-emment take-over of health care. In reference to negative others, Gilligan employs the term "demon," noting that everyone has his or her personal demons. These demons are disturbing; they provoke a sense of horror and aversion. They possess a demonic quality in that they "may possess us, tell us we are worthless or no good, or induce us to sell our soul or to prostitute ourselves." A negative other is other in that it "doesn't fit with our identity, ideals, values, hopes or plans," and negative because it seems to desire to "negate our presence, our humanness, our integrity, our very lives."3 Not only do all people encounter them in some way during the course of our lives, the idea of demons has appeared in our religions and myths throughout time. Demons have taken various shapes in myths: as dragons, serpents, even Satan himself. Despite the evil and danger associated with such figures, Gilligan maintains that encounters with such entities have been seen as opportunities for a per son to grow, to evolve, and to learn how to get through a crisis. In ancient times, the mythological dragon was not to be killed, but engaged in a way that would allow the transfonnation of both the person and the dragon. A dangerous undertaking, to be sure, for if one slipped, the results were catastrophic. But still, the relationship with the ''negative other'' of the dragon required not violence but intelli gence, courage, and self-transfonnation.'"' 2 Gilligan, I. 31bid. 4 Ibid, 2. 6

PAGE 13

Gilligan uses dragon myths as an example of how our orientation toward the negative other has shifted throughout history. He asserts that as times and attitudes changed, so did the dragon myth. While at one time the dragon presented an opportunity to cultivate wisdom and facilitate transformation creatively, the way in which one was supposed to handle the dragon shifted. When the dragon myth began to portray events such as St. George slaying the dragon, it indicates that our relationships to negative others had shifted. 5 What is evidenced by this transformation is the role of myth as a reflection of a cultural worldview, and a guiding mechanism for action. The Role of Myth Gilligan uses the term "myth" to signify a paradigm used to understand the nature of reality and to determine appropriate action. The works of authors Mirceau Eliade, Dennis Ford, and Stephen Larsen contribute to the understanding of Gilligan's use of the term. These authors present myth as an orienting and guiding structure for human beings that works at a preor sub-conscious level, determining and determined by the way we see the world. Myth, writes Eliade, is a story recounting what happened at the beginning of time. It is a "recital of creation," describing a primordial moment. Myths, recounting actions of the gods, become models for behavior. 1bey provide an "opening towards the universal," as opposed to describing something merely particular and contingent. They imbue people's lives with meaning, answering the questions why and how. Eliade points out that myths, as narratives of the sacred, necessarily become truth statements. Thus a myth, says Eliade, is "bound up with ontology; it speaks only of realities, of what really happened, of what was fuJly However, the assertion that myths are what "really" happened causes cognitive dissonance when we look across cultural boundaries and someone else's myth, defmed as a "truth statement," ap-s Gilligan, 2. 6 Mirceau Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane: the Nature of Religion, trans. Willard R. Trask (San Diego: Harcourt, Inc.,l959), 95-97, italics original. 7

PAGE 14

pears blatantly false. Dennis Ford, P.h.D. takes this up in his book The Search For Meaning (2007), as he makes the distinction between talking about myth and living within myth. One may speak about myth, and view it as merely a collection of stories that were once used by people to describe their understanding of reality, creation, or the world. However, Ford argues, we all live within our own mythological structure. We all have our own explanation of reality, our own web of beliefs, values, and practices that we share with other members of our culture. From this perspective, Ford argues, myth is a paradigm. It is invisible, much as the lenses of eye-glasses are invisible when we look through them. Myth is a paradigmatic structure for the nature of reality itself, from a particular perspective. It is simply what is. 7 In his book The Shaman s Doorway ( 197 6), Stephen Larsen describes myth as workin_g at the psychological level, having a socializing and a guiding function. Myths orient people to their culture, answering the questions Who are we? and What do we do? for them. Myths, he asserts, serve as a structure that guide a person through various aspects of their life which present existential questions and crises, 8 such as entering adulthood or old age. It is in this way that Gilligan uses the term myth. For the purposes of his essay, myth is an invisible force with a largely unacknowledged presence that functions at a level deeper than our conscious mind. Working beneath rational processes, it is a truth statement; it is the lens with which we understand the world. Mythology is an orienting and guiding structure that informs notions of who we are and how we are supposed to act. Let us now examine the expressions and the development of the "modern myth," as identified by Gilligan. Gilligan asserts that the core of modern thinking is the "disembodied, isolated intellect." In the "modem myth," as interpreted by Gilligan, rationalism is exalted, and the natural world is stripped of all inherent value. The mind, deemed the sole beacon of intelligence, is charged with monitoring, 7 Dennis Ford, The Search For Meaning (Berkley: University of California Press, 2007), 43. 8 Stephen Larsen, The Shamans Doorway: Opening Imagination to Power and Myth (1976; repr., New York: Station Hill Press, 1988), 19-22. 8

PAGE 15

controlling, and dominating all that it relates to The negative other, anything outside of our identity that seems threatening, is framed as "an inhuman 'it' that often requires violence to be changed.'09 It takes only a moment to observe this way of thinking in our culture. Gilligan describes it further: The disembodied intellect dictates a mind/nature split in which body is objectified, the intellect seen as the only valid intelligence, human life is primarily viewed in utilitarian values (what's in it for me?), spirit and soul and heart-mind are denied, interconnectedness is rejected, nature is exploited, death is feared above all, material ism becomes a cult, relationships are seen in dominance-submission terms, ritual is ignored, and everything outside the self-identity is seen and feared as an 'it'. In short, the disembodied intellect leads to a disconnection and a denial of the precious life of the present moment.10 The last phrase, about "the denial of the precious life of the present moment," we will return to later But the statement "the disembodied intellect leads to a disconnection" is a key phrase that brings us to the next section: I observe that the modem myth is partially the legacy of the philosophy of Descartes, who posits a particular and hierarchic formulation of the split between the mind and the body, and the resulting subject-object dichotomy. This schema informs our notion of who we are (defined by Descartes as a "thing that thinks"). It sets up a framework that informs the actions that we take in response to others, who, according to Descartes, we can never be sure really exist in the same way that we do. (I am the subject surrounded by everything else that is exterior to me and my unique subjectivity.) Therefore, we are as disconnected from others as we are from material things. A short exposition of Cartesian dualism reflects its influence on the "modern myth," illuminates the paradigm underpinning it and demonstrates how it relates to the treatment of others. Descartes: Disembodied Intellect Descartes is a figure who highly prizes the mind and its unique capacity for rationality. Al though he writes during the dawn of the scientific revolution, when it comes to sense perception, he is a skeptic. He observes that the world presents many reasons to doubt what is experienced. Descartes begins his philosophical meditation by casting into doubt the existence of everything except the exis9 Gilligan, 4. 10 Ibid., 4-5. 9

PAGE 16

tence of God and the fact that he (the think-er) himself While Descartes does then concede the objective reality of other objects, his ontology largely cuts the subjects off from the rest of the world, setting them apart from other human beings. Descartes is aligned with the classical Platonic ideals that privilege the mind and its capacities for reason over the body and the body's proclivities toward the passions of the natural world and "endless foolery." As Plato says in Phaedo, wisdom is to be attained by separating the mind from the body, which "infects the soul with evils," such as lust, fear, and fantasy. Truth about existence, he claims, is revealed by pure thou,ght alone. The senses are imperfect, and cannot approach the realm of the truly real.11 The goal of Descartes is to build a system of knowledge that systematically questions all that is not completely certain, in an effort to discover what is certain. In his search for truth he rejects any opinion that was possible to doubt. In his Meditations (1641), he argues that a person can doubt the existence of all things. He acknowledges that we can be deceived by illusions produced by the senses (the tower that appears round at a distance is in fact square when seen from up close); and we can be fooled by dreams (when we are sleeping, what seems real in our dreams is not). To maximize the range of doubt, Descartes imagines that we are prey to an all-powerful deceiver, an "evil genius"12 that presents a false world to us, much like what happens in the movie The Matrix. 13 Based on this posi tion, Descartes sifts through all of his prior beliefs and opinions, using skepticism to identify any certainty that might be left over. Supposing that perceptible things may be false, Descartes concludes that the one thing that is certain is that he himself exists. He reasons that since he is able to persuade himself of something (even though it may be false), and to doubt almost evetything, there can be no doubt that he is thinking 11 "Phaedo," in Scott Buchanan, ed. The Portable Plato (New York: The Viking press, 1948). 11 Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, ed, J. Cottingham (London: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 94. 13 This presents another .similarity between Cartesian .and classical thinking, reminiscent ofPlato'.s analogy of the world being mere shadows on the cave wall. 10

PAGE 17

nonetheless, because to doubt is to think. Thus, the thinker necessarily exists. Descartes proclaims ... I am, I exist, [it] is necessarily true each time I pronounce it, or that I mentally conceive of it."14 Therefore, we can be certain that the subject exists (but at this point, not of much else). Although the things one imagines to be true may be false, the imagining itself remains real. Having made this in sight, Descartes asserts that we have made contact with our true identity. Thinking alone is a faculty that cannot be separated from me; it is that which composes the I. "I am a thing that thinks,"15 states Descartes. This is a thing that "doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wills, refuses, which also imag ines and feels."16 Thus, in the Cartesian paradigm, we understand and experience ourselves to be a thinking thing. As he examines what he thinks that he is, Descartes considers the body. He describes bodies as extended, having a figure, a motion, and tactile qualities that we can sense. They produce ideas within our minds which present themselves whether we want them to or not. Bodies are _governed by mechanical laws of cause and effect, sometimes independently of will. The example Descartes gives is of a person with dropsy, which is a disease that induces a person to drink too much water. The person feels thirsty, so the person drinks, putting him or herself closer to death, unable to control the impulse to drink water even k:nowin_g that it will be lethal. In other examples, althou_gh a person may will to touch something hot, his or her hand jerks away; a person's heart beats whether we will it to or not. Thus, the essential features of bodies are that they are material, extended in space, unthinking, and di visible. This is opposite to what Descartes describes of the mind, which is unextended, indivisible, and governed by reason. One question that perplexes Descartes is how these radically different, opposing substances can possibly interact with one another in the hwnan being. 17 14 Descartes, 97. 15 Ibid., 99. 16 Ibid., 100. 17 Ibid., 152-155. 11

PAGE 18

Descartes claims that we can never really know things themselves, we only have ideas of them. This positioning of a subject doubting all but his own existence sets up a model that leaves the subject in a box congruent with his own mind. The world, and everything in it, is left outside this box, cut off from the realm of our knowing. He describes ideas as effects somehow "transmitted" to the isolated subject by its causes.18 His analogy would be that the I is a "pilot in a vessel,"19 were it not for the fact that a person feels pain when kicked, whereas a ship's captain does not feel any pain if the ship were to hit an iceberg or another obstacle. But the ship's governing agent, the captain, is isolated in the cabin from the surrounding ocean in which his ship is afloat, much as Descartes envisions subjects isolated from the rest of the material world. Descartes then inquires into whether any of the objects of which he has ideas exist outside of him in an "objective world," since some things seem so "very certain and manifest," perceived "clearly and distinctly_," such as the earth, the sky_, the sun, heat, or a stone. 20 In this meditation he reasons that the thoughts that represent substances, or actual things that play on the senses, "contain more objective reality" than those that represent only fantasies or accidents.21 He states: "Now it is manifest by the natural light that there must at least be as much reality in the efficient and total cause as in its effect."2223 In other words, Descartes believes that the thing that causes an effect (such as a stimulation of my senses) must be as real as the effect it has caused. Thus, the sun must be as real as the warmth it has generated on my skin. 1s Descartes, 114. 19 Ibid., 155. 20 There can, actually, be truth found in nature, because God is a perfect being, thus he would not be a dec-eiver who would mak-e it impossible for us to know what is r-eal and 160). 21 Ibid., 107-108. 22 Ibid._, 113. 23 By "natural light," Descartes means reason; he is using a strictly mental manner in determining truth. 12

PAGE 19

Regarding objects exterior to us, argues Descartes, the more knowledge we acquire of some thing, the more we can be certain of its true existence. Although we may perceive the sun as an orb many times smaller than the earth, the more we learn about it through science, the better we understand its true nature. This guideline includes knowledge of other human beings, as well. He explains: ... we have more knowledge of those men with whom we have lived a long time than of those whose face merely we have seen or whose name we have beard, even though they too are not said to be absolutely known."24 For example, suppose that out of the comer of my eye I see a shape that resembles a human body. For all I know from this limited encounter, the thing that I saw could have been an illusion, or a mannequin. However, if I can approach this figure and look into its eyes, shake its band, and especially if I can have a conversation that allows me to recognize a humanity similar to my own, this flgure becomes more real to me. It is apparent that Descartes does not have a satisfactory answer to the question of the subjectobject relationship and the mind-body problem. 25 His legacy remains in a dualistic worldview that posits mind and body, and subjects and objects to be binary pairs in dichotomous and hierarchical relationships. Cartesian thought expresses a myth that describes an aspect of our existential beingness as such: we are atomistic individuals situated in a world fllled with the potential of causing us harm and/ or deluding us. This view is informed by Greek and Christian worldviews that prioritize matters of mind and spirit, over body and matter. Although his ontological paradigm is problematic and has left us with many philosophical problems, 26 such a worldview may help to account for the difficulty of feeling empathy towards some one that a person has not met or gotten to know. It may explain why it is easy to be "calloused" to-24 Descartes, 176. 25 Descartes asserts that the seat of the soul is the Pineal gland in the brain because it is the only single part of our brain when all its other parts come in pairs, and that the cause of the motion of the muscles is due to animal spirits, (Ibid., 368-369). 26 See John Searle, A Dozen Problems in the Philosophy of Mind (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). 13

PAGE 20

wards someone else's hardships or to use violence against an anonymous, faceless enemy. In the Cartesian picture of the world, we don't really know if someone is able to feel what I feel. No one else has access to the private thoughts in my head, as I cannot think or feel what somebody else thinks or feels. Thus, in this way, we are all not only physically, but also mentally and emotionally cut off from one another. Critique: Merleau-Ponty The work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty outlines a shift in thinking about the human experience. In Phenomenology of Perception (1945), Merleau-Ponty poses a serious challenge to the traditional subject-object dichotomy. Like Husserl before him in The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (1936), Merleau-Ponty critiques a scientific method that schematizes subjects as passively observing an exterior world that acts upon the senses of the subject mechanistically in terms of cause and effect. He argues that this type of science, especially one that studies human bein_gs, is merely second-hand data, and asserts that there is a more primary, direct experience, a more poignant reality. Merleau-Ponty develops the Husserlian concept of phenomenology, which he calls a "descriptive psychology," and a "return to the 'things themselves'. ''27 A description of phenomena as they appear, phenomenology is "a study of essences" that tries to give a "direct description of our experience as it is," prior to any reflective thinking. 28 It is a philosophy that is also a "rigorous science," a "style of thinking" that seeks to arrive at an understanding of humankind and the world based upon its "facticity.'29 Thus Merleau-Ponty seeks to make an essentialist claim as to the nature of existence. For example, Merleau-Ponty asserts that a hand is not primarily known to us by its anatomy, structure, 21 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (1945; repr., New York: Routeledge Classics, 2002), ix. 28 Ibid., vii, my italics. 29 Ibid., vii-viii. 14

PAGE 21

or make-up. It is rather more intimately known by its ability to grasp things. We understand a hand through its graspability. Using a phenomenological method to describe the nature of reality, he posits being-in-the world: a schema that unites the mind with the body in terms of the habit-body, or lived body, within which inheres a non-intellectual intelligence that is called forth by the world. With this concept, Merleau-Ponty connects the psychological and the physiological, describing how the momentary body (the body at this moment) interacts with the habit-body to create a meaningful expression of the lived expenence. Merleau-Ponty analyzes patients with brain injuries and anomalies, as well as missing limbs, and studies particular psycho-physical responses to sensory data. He fmds that sometimes the basic principle of stimulus-response does not explain a phenomenon in the body, therefore putting the mechanistic model of cause and effect into doubt, at least as far as using it as a law to explain the be havior of the body. For instance, sometimes amputees still feel sensations in a "phantom limb." A sensation in a limb that is absent cannot come from a cause acting upon it. There is nothing there to be affected. An event both psychological and somatic, the phantom limb phenomenon is explained as a product of internal stimuli such as emotion and memory, rather than a response of external stimuli such as a prick of a needle. Merleau-Ponty concludes that the phantom limb has to do with "accep tance and refusal, and awareness of the past, and emotion." As the person comes to terms with the accident and the loss, the phantom limb phenomenon recedes. 30 The missing-limb phenomenon presents a scenario in which the psychic and the somatic are integrated. Merleau-Ponty argues that in our looking at being human, physiology has been incomplete in that it has excluded the mental, and psychology has been incomplete as it has ignored the physical. Merleau-Ponty stresses that the physical and the mental are geared into each other. He understands the body as a working unity. Our memories are not separate from us; they reside in the habit-body. This habit-body brings knowledge we have in the body to the forefront of our experience and expands our 3o Merleau-Ponty, 89. 15

PAGE 22

capacity for self-actualization. Because I have learned to walk and run, I may rely upon that knowl edge when I leap and dance. I am able to dance, because walking is not simply an intellectual process. I do not constantly have to remind myself, Left foot forward, balance. Right foot forward, balance. The knowledge of walking now resides in my body, and I have freed up my consciousness to perform other more complex tasks that build upon the knowledge of walking. Merleau-Ponty argues that one does not usually experience the body as an object in an objective space that one has to think about to manipulate. By integrating memories of movement in the body to form the habit-body, we expand our experience of being-in-the-world. The body is not a machine or object inhabited by a mental represen tation. It is an agent of experience, an "expressive space.''31 Being-in-the-world is the way we use habit to experience our situation in terms of our bodily skills, abilities, demands, and capacities. The habit-body works with the momentary body, or how I am in this moment, to engage in a lived experience. To demonstrate how knowledge in the body is distinct from a purely intellectual construct, Merleau-Ponty gives the example of typing. "It is possible to know how to type without being able to say where the letters which make the words are to be found on the bank of keys.'>32 Although I may not be able to recite from memory the order in which the letters are found from left to right beneath my fmgers, when I intend to type a sentence, myfingers know how to punch out the sentence without intellectual knowledge, and without looking. "Habit is neither a form ofknowledge nor an involuntary action .. it is knowledge in the hands, which is forthcoming only when bodily effort is made, and cannot be formulated in detachment from that effort ... it is the body which 'understands' in the acquisition ofhabit.''33 Merleau-Ponty's being-in-the-world replaces the dualistic notion ofhow we experience the world by conceptually uniting the mind with the body through the lived experience, in which the body has an inherent intelligence called forth by being-in-the-world. "Neither object nor subject is posited," s1 Merleau-Ponty, 169. 32 Ibid., 166. 33 Ibid., 167. 16

PAGE 23

he states. There is neither a distinct subject nor a distinct object. "In the primary field we have not a mosaic of qualities, but a total configuration which distributes functional values according to the de mands of the whole ... "34 Subject and object are integrated in a seamless functioning. I am my body, it is an extension of me. "I cannot understand the function of the living body except by enacting it myself, and except in so far as I am a body which rises towards the world."35 Merleau-Ponty argues that we do not passively observe the world around us and receive sense data from the body about the world. Rather, the world calls forth action from us through the meanings that we have ascribed to it. With the presence of a habit-body cultivated by a tailor, leather becomes something 'to be cut up,' "it is the lining 'to be sewn'."36 The body is not something external to my thoughts about existence, something to be understood by detached observation. It is through the body that one understands existence itself, as the world beckons and elicits actions. The body is no more than an element in the system of the subject and his world, and the task to be performed elicits the necessary movements from him by a sort of re mote attraction, as the phenomenal forces at work in my visual field elicit from me, without any calculation on my part the motor reactions which establish the most ef fective balance between them, or as the conventions of our social group, or our set of listeners, immediately elicit from us the words, attitudes, or tone which are fitting. 37 The body is a potentiality of a certain world which is set into place by the habits that we acquire. Our habit-body contains the memories of actions and behaviors that can be instantaneously set into motion as the world presents a familiar set of circumstances. Merleau-Ponty posits that this world is constructed through convention, it elicits responses that are appropriate based on norms with which we have become familiar, implying that there may be options other than those immediately called forth by habit. 34 Merleau-Ponty, 281, (original italics) 35 Ibid., 87. 36 Ibid., 122. 37 Ibid., 122. 17

PAGE 24

When Merleau-Ponty addresses the philosophical problem of other people, he claims that he has begun to find a solution to this problem in his new understanding of the body. If one accepts the notion of being-in-the-world as a "total configuration," bodies cease to be merely "objects," but manifestations of behavior . . if another's body is not an object for me, nor mine an object for him, if both are manifestations of behaviour, the positing of the other does not reduce me to the status of an object in his field, nor does my perception of the other reduce him to the status of an object in mine. 38 Being-in-the-world is something shared equally by all humans. A person may perceive the body of another, and may discover in that other a familiar set of intentions and a similar way of dealing with the world. "Henceforth, as the parts of my body together comprise a system, so my body and other's [sic] are one whole, two sides of one and the same phenomenon, and the anonymous existence of which my body is the ever-renewed trace henceforth inhabits both bodies simultaneously."39 For Merleau-Ponty language, communication, and, more generally, intersubjectivity are key in breaking down existing cognitive boundaries between one and the other. In the experience of dialogue, there is constituted between the other person and myself a common ground; my thought and his are interwoven into a single fabric, my words and those of my interlocutor are called forth by the state of discussion, and they are inserted into a shared operation of which neither of us is the creator. We have here a dual being, where the other is for me no longer a mere bit of behaviour in my transcendental field, nor I in his; we are collaborators for each other in a consummate reciprocity.40 This is not so different from Descartes's solution to the dilemma of how others can exist in a schema that posits the thinker as secluded from everything else (the more one gets to know others, the more their authenticity as other thinking things comes to light). Yet Merleau-Ponty reiterates the key difference between his ontology and the Cartesian cogito. Merleau-Ponty writes, ... fW]hen I reflect on subjectivity, I fmd it bound up with that of the body and that of the world ... because my existence as 38 Merleau-Ponty, 4 I 1 39 Ibid., 412. 40 Ibid., 413. 18

PAGE 25

subjectivity is merely one with my existence as a body and with the existence of the world, and be cause the subject that I am when taken concretely, is inseparable from this body and this world.''41 Merleau-Ponty demonstrates how, in philosophy, we might move beyond the dualistic para digm. His manner of conceptualizing reality forms the basis of an integrating paradigm, in which the mind and the body operate as one unit, where common ground for ourselves, other people, and exis tence itself is achieved through communication, and where an intersubjective universe posits reality not as a mere collection of objects and subjects, but as an interrelated whole. In the myth expressed by Merleau-Ponty, previously conceived "opposites" are not in opposition to each other but are compte..: ments to one another. This ontological shift creates a possibility for a new type of action to be called forth by the world, as the world is experienced differently. Response: Embodied Consciousness We have explored the philosophical argument against the Cartesian isolated intellect using Merleau-Ponty's concept of being-in-the-world, which is his description of the way we are. Being-in the-world suggests a nondualistic aspect of our existential beingness. Psychologists Stephen Gilligan and Marion Woodman take the idea a step further in positing a mode of being that they call "embodied consciousness." Embodied consciousness is the willful experience of an intelligence within the body, which is achieved by becoming present to the momentary body, or body of this moment. Unlike being in-the-world, embodied consciousness is not a description of our experience in the world. Embodied consciousness is a practice, and it is prescription. Gilligan suggests that the recognition of somatic facilitates a shift in thinking about the nature of reality from a dualistic perspective to a 41 Merleau-Ponty, 475. 19

PAGE 26

worldview which links the subject and the object in a complementary, not oppositional relationship, thus helping resolve confrontation with an adversary. 4 2 First let us access the primary source for the term embodied consciousness. This is found in Conscious Femininity: Interviews with Marion Woodman (1993). Marion Woodman's concept embodied consciousness is a relating to oneself that integrates our rational, thinking aspect with the body and its vital impulses, which, she claims, like Merleau-Ponty, have an "intelljgence" of their own. Influenced by Jung, Woodman argues that the side of us that is spontaneous, natural, receptive, and nonjudgmental has been subj\lgated in a fast-paced, goal-driven, and competitive society ruled by conflict and dichotomy. She asserts that this type of dominant-submissive living emphasizes intellectual problem-solvin g, and has caused a "real split inside." "It seems that a lot of people are cut off from the neck, so they talk from the head. Meanwhile, something totally different is going on below the neck," Woodman says.43 She asserts that this "split" has resulted in various types of problems psychologists specialize in treating. For Woodman and Gilligan, embodied consciousness is a slowin_g down to a more natural rhythm. Embodied consciousness is facilitated by taking a pause from our busy schedules, habits, and addictive behaviors, by becoming aware of our existence as it is in the moment. They assert that this information is useful in its ability to provide an insight into a way of being which is more in harmony with who we are beneath any of our learned behaviors and culturally acquired worldviews. 44 42 While Woodman and Gilligan embrace phenomenology and being-in-the-world, this discussion highlights the divergence of their thought from Merleau-Ponty's. Merleau-Ponty demonstrates the descriptive value of being-in-the-world, without prescribing a practice such as embodied consciousness towards a specific goal, and desires to maintain a distinction between fact and intuition. 43 Marion Woodman, Conscious Femininity: lnte111iews with Marion Woodman{TorootQ: Inner-City Books, 1993), 23-25. 44 In our society, argues Woodman, one's "soul" bas often been neglected and silenced through the demands of a materialistic culture and perfectionist parents who do not nurture their children to simply be themselves. These parents, who were raised in the same way, often raise children to be what they believe they should be. This glossing over of soul (and the interrupting of a natural being-in-the-world) perpetuates a ill the Woodman describes this loss of soul connection as an "anguished condttton m whtch unconscious contents "drive" that person, (Woodman, 9). 20

PAGE 27

Gilligan argues that embodied consciousness is a technique for breaking some habits that are not always completely useful to us, such as fight and flight. Fight and flight, the unavoidable and life sustaining mechanisms that they are, sometimes backfire, Gilligan argues, causing more harm than good. Through the lens of the psychologist, Gilligan observes that the fight-or-flight response to nega tive others often merely serves to perpetuate cycles of violence and suffering. He asserts that during confrontations with a negative other, if a one can apply a technique of "embodying one's consciousness," one can access a mode of being that can reveal insights into our unconscious motivations, and can unlock previously unconsidered possibilities for actions. Gilligan argues that if we can see the world and our situation not from a perspective of the isolated intellect, but through embodied consciousness, we can change the type of behavior that is called forth for the better. Gilligan describes embodied consciousness as the experience of connecting with a "mind/ body center_," and a "relational field." The mind/body center may be accessed through the activity of performing arts such as dance, theater, martial arts, and oratorical speaking. 45 Gilligan describes the mind/body center as where dancers dance from, where writers write from, and where political prisoners engage from. 46 He refers to embodied consciousness as the "belly mind," whose intelligence is nonintellectual and nonlinguistic;47 it is an experience of "a felt sense of dropping down under the words, in a balanced, calm, aware connection with oneself and others.'"'849 Gilligan observes that in psychotherapy, patients bring problems that have a corresponding location in the body. A feeling of depression, emptiness, or emotional pain can be identified either in the heart, gut, or the solar plexus region behind the navel. The theory is that when one "listens" to 45 For Woodman this experience is doing what we love, be it gardening, baking bread, painting ... Woodman calls these activities, "soul-making," (Woodman, 103). 46 Gilli. 6 gan, 47 Referred to by scientists as the enteric nervous system, (Gilligan, 7 ) 48 Ibid., 5-8. 49 Woodman would add that this experience is where one connects with one's soul. using soul in the sense of the "embodied essence," from the Latin esse (to be), (Woodman, 71 ). 21

PAGE 28

what these feelings are "saying," one can bring forth valuable information pertinent to the therapeutic process. Rather than regarding these as bad feelings that need to be removed, we become cu rious about listening to these felt centers of disturbances as ontological presences, that is, as the presence of another intelligence that is awakening in fa person's] life ... We see problems and crises therefore as positive events, as heralding the breakdown of the isolated intellect and the development of a more relational intelligence that is distributed throughout the mind/body. so Thus embodied consciousness situates an individual within a larger picture. Rather than utilizing logic, it relies upon intuition, and facilitates a person to remain connected with him or herself and others during conflict. 51 The mind/body center provides a "container'' for one's experiences, where one can deposit agitation, anger, depression, or confusion. This activity provides something one can do with these emotions, which often present themselves as unwelcome and unwanted visitors. The mind/body center becomes a sanctuary where any of these "visitors" can come, where there is space for them, and where it is still safe. If one is able to connect with their mind/body center during a conflict, one is able to notice where their "ftrst attention" falls during this time. For instance, if someone is yellin g at yot4 and you are able to connect to your mind/body center, you could notice if you focus on the person yelling, on a childhood memory, or on a theory or text that says that the yelling is wron_g. Gilligan argues that if our ftrst attention gets stuck on something other than what is contained in the moment, that focal point will the response to the situation. He states that if one's first attention locks onto a text or theory, one can slip into ideology and fundamentalism, as is evident in the launching ofviolentjihadby Islamists against infidels in their land, in the murders of homosexuals and abortion doctors, and in ration alizing war through "just war'' principles. This focus is indicative of isolated intellect. 52 But if we can remain embodied with our consciousness, we are provided with an opportunity to change our perspecso Gilligan, 5-7. 51 Ibid., 7-8. 52 Ibid, 7. 22

PAGE 29

tive of the situation and even our response. For instance, if someone is yelling at me, I may feel threatened, get upset, fight with that person, or run away. But if I remain connected, for example, I may notice that I am upset because I have been told that yelling is wrong, or I may realize that I am upset because it reminds me of how my father made me feel two inches tall beneath the bellows of his voice. If I am able "couch" my feelings and to experience the moment simply for what it is, aside from any of my personal associations and/or judgments, all I have is a person yelling. Thus I may be able to understand that the person yelling may have their own problems that ultimately have little to do with me. I may be able to abstain from taking the situation personally, and even feel empathy towards that other person. I may experience that the other is not in opposition to me. In fact, if he or she reveals to me why I get upset in certain situations, I can learn how to resolve those negative feelings. Thus the world may begin to appear more collaborative than oppositional. Related to the experience of embodied consciousness is the relationalfield, which is the larger context in which a person lives. It is about "joining in an experience of communion with a deeper wholeness than your individual self." Gilligan asserts that this communion can be felt in different ways by individuals. You may know it through walking through the forest and call it nature. You may know it by joining others in social justice, and call it community. You may know it through athletic performance, and call it the zone. You may know it through prayer, and call it God. You may know it from an intimate relationship, and call it love. 5 3 The relational field is similar to Merleau-Ponty's postulation of intersubjectivity, or that which unites us in the reciprocal collaboration of being-in-the-world. Merleau-Ponty's example is that of babies, not observing their own face, who nevertheless open their mouth as their fingers are taken playfully by the teeth of their guardians, signifying the intersubjective nature of'biting.' "Between my conscious ness and my body as I experience it, between this phenomenal body of mine and that of another as I see it from the outside, there exists an internal relation which causes the other to appear as the compte53 Gilligan, 9 23

PAGE 30

tion of the system.''54 Gilligan states that sense of completion is not limited to interaction with human subjects. Our sense of completion inheres with our engagement in other systems, e.g. nature, sports, art, community, and/or religion. Gilligan asserts that on the basis of a relational field it is possible to stay "embodied" during times of conflict, and not revert to fight-or-flight. Gilligan uses the Japanese martial art aikido as an example. In aikido he writes, the goal is not to dominate, but to "blend" with the enemy in a way that resolves conflict: one opens one's heart, soul, and mind to an attacker. 55 Gilligan posits the aikido maxim "heart to heart, mind to mind, center to center,"56 and "drop into center, open into field."57 This maxim sounds counter-intuitive, idealistic, and even impossible in certain, if not most, situations where there is an actual attacker. However, to say that somethin_g is not a habit now, does not mean that it cannot be in the future, especially if a new technique has been tested and yields satisfactory results. Although it may not be possible nor suitable for a person to open their heart and mind to someone who has a weapon trained on his or her child, for instance, such a strategy may be useful in everyday life, when the "attacker'' is a rude driver, perhaps a political opponent, or a verbally abusive coworker. In such a situation, opening one's heart and mind to an adversary facilitates empathy that is useful in deescalating conflict and in perhaps achieving more positive outcomes. Gilligan continues explaining how to deal with an adversary while remaining connected to the mind/body center and the relationalfield : That is, when you're in a stressful situation, don't fixate on the stressor. Don't give first attention to the problem. Instead, drop down into your mind/body center as a base to listen, perceive, relax, and respond; and expand your awareness outward to connect with a field awareness that is bigger than the stressful event. Now your at tention is not trapped on the stressor; it's free to receive and give beyond the confmes of the situation. This allows you to respond to conflict not in a dominant-submissive way, in which someone wins and someone loses, but in a relational way that protects 54 Merleau-Ponty, 410. 55 Gilligan, 3. 56 Ibid., 8. 57 Ibid., ll. 24

PAGE 31

both you and the attacker, and seeks to bring a resolution of whatever differences or agitation is present. ss Additionally, it is important to note that this approach does not assert the collapse of the autonomous self and the submission to the will of an enemy. Gilligan's own example of conflict resolution using embodied consciousness is the Gandhian strategy to transform India's subjugation by the British. The principles Gandhi utilizes emphasize the importance of noncooperation with "evil," (all the while treating the enemy with respect). Gandhi also stresses the importance of the ability of people to rule themselves, spiritually and politically, so as not to merely exchange one form of tyranny for another. Gilligan advocates (as does Gandhi) for freedom from suffering and violence, and prescribes embodied consciousness as a way to facilitate this freedom. Embodied consciousness is a way ofbeing-in-the-world that responds to a myth that posits interconnectedness. It facilitates the experience of love, which is felt within and extended to others. It recognizes wisdom within the body, and ceases to relate to the world in purely subjective/objective terms. In such a world there is space for fight-or-flight and there are additional options, in the cultiva tion of another habit-body, based on an integrating paradigm of experiencing the world. In this chapter I have argued that there are various ways of conceptualizing reality, and of experiencing and understanding our existential beingness. I have argued that these myths influence the way we relate to and treat others. A dualistic worldview separates us from the rest of the world, places wisdom and the body in opposition to one another, and lends itself to a way of being-in-the-world characterized by dominance-submission. Here binary pairs are conceived of as being in opposition to one another: by moving to the right, I negate the left, and by becoming light it ceases to be dark. Al ternately, in an integrating worldview, binary pairs such as left and right, light and dark, mind and body, self and other complement one another and complete each other. Such a view takes into account that at any given moment on earth, half is lit by the sun while the other rests in darkness. The appear ance of such perspective is accompanied by a transformation of relationships and the emergence of a different mode of being-in-the-world lt is my goal in the next chapter to demonstrate that the dualisSSGilligan. 10. 25

PAGE 32

tic and integrating myths are operative in the actions of social movements. I explore the myth that guides the actions that take place, as I demonstrate two different ways of being-in-the-world. I assert that awareness of the dualistic and integrating paradigms helps deepen our understanding ofthe ac tions demonstrated by these movements. It can be argued that by making such a distinction between these two worldviews and suggest ing the benefits of the integrating paradigm over the dualistic, I am demonstrating the type of dualism that I am challenging. My response to this suggestion is that we clearly live in a world of dichotomy: this, that, up, down, left, right, good, bad, joy, and sorrow. Often we learn about something by discov ering what it is not. Thus, we also may discover a center, a whole, and equanimity. Both dualism and integration are valid experiences in the world, and both serve a purpose. What does AI Qaeda have to teach us about ourselves? Although they produced inexcusable acts, the motivations behind suicide bombing can be understood in light of this analysis, and for this reason I reserve the right to withhold judgment for the purposes of this essay. Here I merely argue that there are options beyond dualism and reverting to fight-or-flight when we are threatened. 26

PAGE 33

CHAJYI'ER3 DUAUSTIC AND INTEGRATED PARADIGMS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS In the previous chapter I suggested that the ways we -respond t-0 negative others a-re -different ways of being-in-the-world, which rely upon our orientation to different "myths," or paradigms of conreptualizing and experiencing the world. Is the world made up of a bunch-Of isolated indivi-duals who continually pose threats to one another and must be dominated? Are we linked in a common humanity that ev-okes a sense -Of -compassion and br-Otherly love? Does it appear -to be a littl-e of both? Do we perceive a negative other as something separate and evil that must be destroyed, or does a negative other also present an -opportunity f-or -growth and -deve-lopme-nt? Are we aU ex-dusive1y rat-iona1 bein-gs locked up in our calculating minds, or can we also get a sense of a mind/body center and a relational field that -connect us t-o the w-orld and t-o each other? If a person experiences others in -opposit-ion t-o his or herself, the dichotomous view that arises has the propensity to lend itself to fight-or-flight. However, if the -self and -other-s are experienced as the <;-ompleti-on -of a wh-ole, at the very kast there appear to be choices in how to deal with an adversary. Thus it appears that -our way -of understanding the world guides -our acti-ons; and thi-s fact i-s represented in the actions of groups. Two examples are the phenomenon of suicide-bombing that -striv-e-s t-o li-berate Muslim -land-s fr-om foreign interfer-ence, and -Gandhi '-s -campai-gn t-o -secure home-rule for the Indian people. The fonner is violent and reflects a dualistic paradigm, while the latter is nonviolent and t"efiects the -integrating paradigm. The fii"St .exemplifies isolated -inteUect, while the -Othcr 27

PAGE 34

exemplifies embodied consciousness. I argue that knowledge of these modes of being-in-the-world deepens -our understanding -of these tw-o socia-l movements. Before I enter into a comparative analysis of these movements, as one of these "social movements" blatantly (;hallenges a (;ommonly held (;OOception -of the term I will take a moment t-o set f-orth a working definition of "social movement." In the intr-oduction t-o Cultural Politics and Social Movements, a text oo social movement theory, Darnovsky, Epstein, and Flacks assert that social movements are "collective efforts by socially and politkaHy subordinated people to (;hallenge the oonditioos and assumptions of their lives." They are "persistent, patterned, and widely distributed collective challenge[s] to the status quo," occurring when "participants refuse to accept the boundaries of established institutional rules and routinized roles." Social movements also challenge "cultural categories'' and "social identities," as sub-cultures protest unfair .tr.eatment within society (such as the gay, lesbian, and transgender movement), or argue for society to operate with a different set of principles (such as environmentalism and war protest).59 These are not limited to mass act-ion within a sin-gle state. Social movements may appear in a transnat-ional context. For example, the citizens from many different countries have protested the WfO, environmental-degradation, and nuclear energy. Despite not being seen as an expression of democracy or social justice, suicide bombers seem to fit therontempornry -definition of social movements above. Bothjihadi groups and Gandhi's movement represent a "persistent, patterned, and widely distributed collective challenge to the status -quo," as "participants refuse to accept the botmdaries of established institutional rules and routinized roles," challenging "cultural categories" and "social identities." The participants in these movements 59 Marcy Damovsky, Barbara Epstein, and Richard Flacks, Cultural Politics and Social Movements., Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995, vii. 28 I -

PAGE 35

have protested or currently protest being treated as "second-class citizens" in their own countries. They embody efforts by socially and politkally subordinated to the tions and assumptions of their lives." Thus, I identify Islamist jihad and Gandhi an satyagraha to be social movements. These two movements are expressions of two distinct ways of being-in-the-world. I find two different paradigms operative: the dualistic paradigm in jihad, and the integrating paradigm in satyagraha. How-ever, I wish to make clear that I do not believe that the ontological views of people are the sole determinants of their actions. Even Gandhi holds that the proper response to an adversary varies with the situation 60 I maintain that the world calls forth behavior Ifl am about to be attacked, I expect that my defense mechanisms will kick in, and that I will identify my attacker as an "other'' that I must defend myself from. But the action called forth by the world depends upon the habit-body a person has in place. If a person often experiences the world according to an integrating paradigm, it may facilitate additional strategies, further possibilities beyond fight and flight, at times when these latter strategies may be more appropriate for a desired outcome. Still, as one would expect causes of worldly actions exist out in the world as world calls forth behavior. What is at issue is which myth guides the action that takes place. Therefore, next, I acknowledge the different contexts in which jihad and satyagraha take place. Following this I will examine the movements' leaders and the leaders' texts, identifying the myth operativ-e therein; and finaUy, I will describe the actions that took place. Histories of Satyagraha and Jihad The turmoil in Indian lands and the territory of Palestine presents at about the same time in history; coincidentally Britain was involved in both cases. However, the circumstances ofBritain's involvement differ significantly in the two settings, as do the contexts in which satyagraha andjihad so Mohandas K. Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War, Vol./, with an introduction by Paul F. Power (1942; New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1972), 36. 29

PAGE 36

begin. British political and economic involvement in India was characterized by Gandhi and Wilson as a transition of rulership that occurred with tacit approval, while British involvement in Palestine was military, or dominant-submissive. These historical contexts provide conditions in which distinct ways of being-in-the-world take shape. In an era of nation-building accompanying the disintegration of French, British, and Ottoman Empires, Gandhi led a movement of Indian people towards independence from British rule. The Indians, according to Gandhi, voluntarily participated in their domination by the British. The Indians were lured by lucrative trade with the British, and subsequently accepted British culture. With the British came government jobs, hospitals, schools, railways, British education, the English language, and their economic system, all of which the Indians accepted. "The English have not taken India; we have _given it to them," wrote Gandhi.61 This view is corroborated by Jon E. Wilson, who writes in the article "Early Colonial India Beyond Empire"62 that "European traders and companies became closely integrated into the networks of local political society, eventually taking over direct functions of the state themselves," facilitating the East India Company's "transition from merchant to ruler.'163 The Palestinians were placed under British military rule in the aftermath of World War I, which had resulted in the defeat of the Ottoman Empire by the Allies. This was a time in which terri tories heretofore ruled by Turks were detached and temporarily turned into British or French mandates, and set on the road to independence. 64 However, from the outset, the Arabs were not positioned for 61Mohandas Gandhi, Hind Swaraj, or Indian Home Rule (Ahmedabad, India: Navajivan Publishing House (Navajivan Mudranalaya 1938), 23. 62 Jon E. Wilson, "Early Colonial India Beyond Empire," The Historical Journal, 50, 4 (United King dom: Cambridge University Press, 2007): 958, http://O-journals.cambridge.org.skyline.ucdenver.edu/ action/displayFulltext?type= 1&pdftype= 1&fid= 1411968&jid=IDS&volumeid=50&issueld=&aid= 141 1%0 (accessed November 28, 2010). 63 Ibid. 64 Mutaz Qafisheh, "Genesis of Citizenship in Palestine and Israel. Palestinian the Period of 1917-1925 The Journal of the History of International Law, 11, 1 (Martmus Publishers, 2009): 1-36, 113& sid=65290344-4fea-4cb0-9afl-l b0a6cf7832d%40sesstonmgrlll&vtd=2 (Accessed November 28, 2010). 30

PAGE 37

self-determination There was a presence of a new power in the region, and the attempted balance betw-e-en the inter-ests -of Arabs against those -of an -expanding immigrant J-ewish population in Palestine was never achieved.65 The British established through decree an Israeli homeland within the region, 66 and Arabs began to fear displacement and domination. In an envir-onment filled with distrust, division, and competition, riots broke out in Jerusalem,67 and since then, violence has only continued. The "Pal -estinian Question" -of -statehood has yet to be an-swered at the time -of thi-s writing.68 It was thi-s cal context that gave rise to Abdallah Azzam, who is widely considered to be "the Godfather of Ji had,"69 in not -only popular but academic drdes, as we -shaH -see. Neither India nor Palestine is culturally homogenous. Although intertribal conflict is not at all uncommon in India, it did not prohibitively get in the way of the movement achieving independence. However, the nation-building of Palestine is defmed by othering. Karen Armstrong, in The Battle For writes that natioos establish their identity against an other, establi-shing what they are in -contrast to, what they are not.1 This negation seems to be the case during Palestinian and Indian nationbuilding. In both Q!Ses, ooe -group positioned itself against the other. In the Palestinian case, Arabs ss June Sochen, "Views of 1920s Palestine," Judaism, vol. 53 issue 112 (Winter/Spring 2004): 72, http:/ /O-web.ebscohost.com.skyline.ucdenver.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&hid= 112 &sid=l2b45c7d-4caf-460a-af48-4cad4510800fll/o40sessionmgrll2 (accessed November 1, 2010) 66 "Balfour Declaration 1917 ," The Avalon Project, Yale Law School, http://avalon.law.yale edu/20th eenturylbalfour.-asp November l, 2ete). 67 David Schafer, "Origins of the Israel-Palestinian Conflict: Seeds of Enmity," The Humanist, vol. 62, issue 5 (September/October 2002): http://O-web.ebscohost.com.skyline.ucdenver.edu/ehost/pdfviewer /pdfvi;wer?vid=9&hid= 1 06&sid=ce8541 bb-8c71-4353-a3c4-006897eae300%40sessionmgr 113 (accessed November 28, 2010). 68 Sochen, 71. ss "Dr. Abdullah Azzam," Perspectives on World History and Current Events, http://www.pwhce.org/ azuun.html (accessed May 13, 2010). 10 Karen Armstrong, The Battle for God (New York: Alfred A. Random House, 2006), 146. 31

PAGE 38

were in opposition to Jews; in India, Muslims opposed Hindus. This othering resulted in the violent br-eak-up-of India and Pakistan and Israeli and the Pal-estine territ-ory. How-ev-er, thi-s fact bring-s up an other major distinction between the two movements: satyagraha was mass-action for independence, whil-e jihad oc-curr-ed during a time -of nation =building. The leadership of Gandhi provided an opportunity for the nonviolent movement towards in dependence. In certain conditions during a particular historical moment, Gandhi was able to largely integrate the Indian people, not only with one another, but also, at least in theory, with the adversary. This integrating myth forms the basis of a being-in-the-world characterized by nonviolent noncoopera tion, a certain habit-body that Gandhi wanted the Indian people to cultivate in order to achieve spiritual and political freedom. However, the Indian people failed to remove violence and oppression from their society, as perhaps an integrating myth did not take hold, as evidenced by the subsequent violence that came to pass in nation-building. In contrast, in Palestine, conditions provided for a prevalence of divi sion and disintegration. Thus, I argue that modes of being-in-the-world are socially constituted, and the social and historical context strongly affects our ways of being-in-the-world. Following this brief discussion of historical context, I describe leaders of the two movements who, appealing to religion, influence the being-in-the-world of their followers. I look at their texts and analyze the existential paradigms inherent in the thinking of each, which provides the basis for certain types of action. I demonstrate that the violence oflslamist extremists is linked with a dualistic para digm, while Gandhi's movement towards independence demonstrates a being-in-the-world based on an integrating paradigm. 32

PAGE 39

Leaders Abdallah Azzam I have chosen to study Abdallah Azzam as a foundational figure for my study of the funda, mental Islamic movement of suicide bombing. Kepel and Mile IIi, in At Qaeda in its own Words, con sider him to be the "preeminent theoretician of global jihad. "71 They credit Azzam, who is an intema-tiona} scholar, teacher, theoretician, writer, organizer, and inspirational figure, for bringing jihad to the forefront of contemporary radical Islam, which sought to vanquish foreign forces from Muslim lands. Azzam is similar to Gandhi in that both are principal theoreticians working against oppression, and both rely on religion to structure a strategy to deal with an oppressor. They both use myth to design action in response to an adversary, and prescribe albeit different ways ofbein_g-in-the-world. Azzam is a scholar of sharia (Islamic law). He debates with other clerics what attitude Muslims ou_ght to take in response to oppressive regimes, which are criticized as un-Islamic by most Islamists. 72 73 By 1984, Azzam becomes an inspirational and internationally renown Islamist figure. In that year he issued afatwa, or religious proclamation, stating that defending Muslim territories was an individual and collective duty for Muslims across the world in order to reclaim the lands that were once Muslim but are no longer.74 His stance is clear: one must violently engage with the adversary, as determined through the interpretation of sacred texts: the Quran, Hadith, or sayings of the Prophet Mohammed, and other proclamations of respected religious figures. He operates with a dominance-11 Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli, eds., AI Qaeda in its own Words, trans. Pascale Ghazaleh (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008), 97. 72lbid., 84. 73 Islamism is a diver.se phenomenon broadly defined as "political or "Islamic activism." Inter national Crisis Group, "Understanding lslamism," Middle East/North Africa Report, no. 37 (2 Mach 2005), http://merln.ndu.edu/archive/icg/Islamism2Mar05 .pdf (accessed November 28, 201 0). 74 Kepet and Mitetti, 92. 33

PAGE 40

submission way of being-in-the-world, and fonnulates the world in dualistic, or us-versus-them, tenns, as he seeks to achieve peace, through war. 75 Mohandas Gandhi A lawyer who spends time in South Africa fighting for racial justice, Mohandas Gandhi, much like Azzam, fmds that he cannot ignore the injustices and oppression imposed upon his people. In the context of colonial India, Gandhi emerges as a leading political figure in Indian affairs who, through a program of nonviolence which blends his religious beliefs with a revolutionary strategy, is able to win concessions from the British, paving the way to Indian independence in 1947. In Hind Swaraj, Gandhi deeply criticizes the changes Western civilization had brought to India. "Civilization," whose g-oal is material pleasure and "bodily welfar-e," had actually failed in. this respect, Gandhi argues. Industrialization had created a class of people who toiled in miserable conditions. "Miners work dangerously for millionaires, enslaved by temptations of money," he writes. 76 Calling it a system of"life corroding competition,'m he laments [Western] civilization's disregard for religion and morality. 78 On this point, he is in agreement with Islamists. "Mohammed would call it a Satanic civilization, Hinduism calls it a black age," writes Gandhi. 79 Gandhi, like Giiiigan, critiques the "modem myth," which "separatefs] the intellect from the present moment of the body, nature, and life This is a distinction that Azzam does not make, as I demonstrate later. Gandhi wants the 15 Islamic doctrine bas divided the world into spheres, the "Realm of Peace" one in which the divine principles as put forth by the Prophet Muhammad prevail, and the "Realm of War" where these princi ples have not been established. The "Realm of Peace," called dar al-Islam, and Islam, are both de scended fi'om the Arabic salaam, or "peace," (Lincoln, 33). 76 Mohandas Gandhi, Hind Swaraj, or Indian Home Rule (Ahmedabad, India: Navajivan Publishing House (Navajivan Mudranalaya 1938), 20. n Ibid., 49. 78 Ibid., 21. 79 Gandhi, Hind Swaraj, 22. eo Gilligan, 4. 34

PAGE 41

Indian people to join him in an effort to drive out the British and their culture in a manner consistent with what he believed to be the Indians' true nature. This is nonviolence, or satyagraha, which he called soul-force, or love-force. 81 Yet, in contrast with Azzam, Gandhi does not rely upon a doctrine held by an exclusive religton. Thomas Merton, in the introduction to his book Gandhi on Non-Violence, writes of Gandhi's initial repudiation of Indian values and his subsequent attainment of a Western education, by which he, paradoxically, discovered a "universally valid spiritual tradition" in Hinduism with the concept of dharma, or religious duty. Through the reading of Tolstoy, Thoreau, and the New Testament, Gandhi allegedly finds a Christianity based upon "spiritual and religious humanism" which "opened his eyes to the forces of wisdom and of love which were .. expressed in the symbols and philosophic language of his own people.'>B2 In this discovery, he claims to have found a "natural religion," or "natural law," which is neither exclusively Eastern nor Western; it is not just Hindu, Christian, or Muslim, but universal. 83 Thus, Gandhi relies upon an experience of integration, not doctrine, to determine what must be done in response to the adversary. Gandhi is similar to Azzam in that both figures correlate religious duty with political action. But for Gandhi, political independence is achieved through spiritual freedom; spiritual freedom is not achieved through political independence. In contrast to Azzam, Gandhi seeks peace through peace. As we shal1 see, satyagraha is not a program of terror. Neither is it framed in dominance-submission terms, nor is it a program designed to seize power. It is a method to facilitate the ''transformation of relationships ending in a peaceful transfer ofpower."84 But first, let us turn to the leaders' texts to explore the myths through which they conceptualize the nature of reality. s1 Gandhi, Hind Swaraj, 51. a2 Thomas Merton, Gandhi on NonViolence (New York: New Directions Publishing Corp., 1645, 1965), 4. 83 Ibid., 5. 84 Mohandas K. Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War, 1949, with an introduction by Paul F. Power (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1972), 8. 35

PAGE 42

Their Texts Images of Human Nature It is clear that Azzaro is profoundly influenced by religion from the very first sentence in his fatwa, the "Defense of Muslim Territories Constitutes the First Individual Duty,'o85 and throughout the whole text. 86 This fatwa, or religious proclamation, opens with a prayer and roots the whole project in religion, which, in part, demonstrates the myth that he has in place. All praise be to Allah, we praise Allah, we seek His refuge, and seek His forgiveness. We seek refuge in him from the evil of our own selves and the evil of our deeds. Whomsoever Allah guides there is none to send him astray and whomsoever Allah sends astray there is none to guide him ... 8i In this passage, Azzam reveals his belief that human beings are inherently sinners, and that they are divided amongst themselves. "And did not God check one set of people by means of another, the earth would indeed be full of mischief ... (Quran 2:25 I)," Azzam writes, positing division and duality. 88 In the opening to the "Defense" there are those who are guided by God and others who have gone "astray." Gandhi also writes, as published in the second volume of Non-Violence in Peace and War, of the duality inherent in human beings: Man as animal is violent, but as Spirit is non-violent... That is why the prophets and avatars have taught lessons of truth, harmony, brotherhood, justice, etc -all attrib utes of ahimsa, {or nonviolence]. 89 as AbdallahAzzam,"Defense of Muslim Territories," in Kepel and Mileli, AI Qaeda in its own Words, trans. Pascale Ghazaleh as I use two versions: one translated in Kepel and Milelli'and one from an online source. Throughout both versions, at times some statements are more clear or demonstrative in one than in the other. Sr Abdullah Azzaro, "The Defence of the Muslim Lands: The First Obligation After Iman." Re ligioscope. www.religioscope.com/info/doc/jihad/azzam _defence _3 _chap l.htm (accessed May 13, 2010). SSAzzam, AI Qaeda in its own Words, 103. 89 Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War I, 311. 36

PAGE 43

It is evident that Gandhi subscribes to the familiar distinction between the animal and spiritual components of human beings. This worldview is indicative of the dichotomous ontological paradigm that I have identified previously. Also in this passage, Gandhi reveals his orientation to a religious tradition, which in no small way guides his actions. But what is significant is that the paradigm within which he operates, illustrated above, introduces a way to bridge the dualism of human nature. This integration is made by emphasizing the values truth, harmony, brotherhood, and justice, within all of which inheres a type of unity. Ahimsa, or nonviolence/love, which all the above are aspects of, represents an integra-tion of what otherwise could be split or dichotomous. "Belief in non-violence is based on the assumption that human nature is in essence one and therefore unfailingly responds to love."90 There is dualism, but at the same time, there is inte_gration. For Gandhi, human bein_gs are the embodiment of spirit, for whom the "supreme" law is "love.'>91 God-Image Azzam and Gandhi also reveal their distinct images of God and the spiritual universe. For Azzam, God is vengeful and judgmental. 'God hates those who strut arrogantly in the marketplace; at night they are cadavers, by day donkeys, knowledgeable in this life and ignorant in the hereafter' (Small Anthology of Authentic Hadith) 1874),''92 and "[u]nless you march forth, He will punish you with a severe punishment, and wil1 replace you with another people, and you will not hann Him at all ... A vengeful and judgmental God must have something dichotomous to judge and be vengeful against. In the statement "I bear witness that there is no Deity but Allah and Mohammed is his seroo Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War I, 175, my italics. 91 Ibid., 114. 92 Azzam, "Defense of Muslim Territories Constitutes the First Individual Duty," AI Qaeda in its own Words, 1-05. 93 Azzam, "Join the Caravan,'' AI Qaeda in its own Words, 113. 37

PAGE 44

vant and messenger,''94 Azzam insinuates the existence of "other'' gods, while only one is the true God, and he establishes allegiance to a specific prophet. This ontological orientation posits a divided uni verse, where true religion must be separated from the false This worldview resembles the dualism in Cartesian thought, where there is only one subject in the world of objects. Further indicating his dual istic paradigm, Azzam writes, ... God gave humanity this law and enjoined it to follow this rule (that of defense)--or in other words, the fight between truth and falsehood--in the interest of humankind, for the supremacy of truth and the development of the good ... '9s In the "Defense," Azzam indicates that God is truth. Alternately, Gandhi explicitly states that, truth is God. 96 Throughout his work Gandhi de scribes what he considers to be truth, that there is a "natural," "universal," and "superior''97 law of love, which is congruent with his own image of God: that is, of a loving and merciful God. This image implies unity, not dichotomy. "God may be called by any other name as long is connotes the living Law of Life-in other words, the Law and Lawgiver rolled into Thus, we see that for Gandhi, that which follows universal laws of truth is Godlike. There is sacredness in life, represented by the integration of spirit and body in the embodied experience. He does not distinguish one God from an other, seeking out that which unites rather than divides For Azzam, on the other hand, true virtue lies in the "hereafter," further exhibiting dualism in the glorification of pure spirit unencumbered by the temptations of the world and the delusion of allegiance to other gods. Azzam 's vision is inherently dualistic, while Gandhi's is integrative. 94 Azzam, "Defence," Religioscope. 95 Ibid. 96 Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War, I, 414. 97 Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War, II, 60. 98 Ibid., 78. 38

PAGE 45

Law Gandhi and Azzam both indicate their views on Law, not just mundane law of societies but Law that is imbued with cosmic,99 or larger-than-life significance, that partakes in the very essence of God. Gandhi determines love to be a "naturallaw."100 "If love or non-violence be not the law of our being, the whole of my argument falls to pieces," he writes. 101 To further our existence in this world populated by many others, it follows we observe principles of nonviolence. Gandhi asserts that the only way to get out of violence is throu,gh nonviolence, 102 implying that violence only begets more violence. "Had violence, [or] hate ruled us, we should have become extinct long ago,"103 he argues. "Society is held together by non-violence,"104 he writes. Where Gandhi believes the natural, universal, and "superior'' law to be love, lOS Azzam emphasizes a law of defense. "This law (of defense) takes up many pages in the book of because truth cannot do without a force to protect it," he states.I06 99Mark Juergensmeyer, in Terror in the Mind of God, (Berkley: University of California Press, 2000), 149, writes about images of"cosmic war'' that ''relate to metaphysical conflicts between good and evil, in an exposition of terrorism. 100 Merton, 5. 101 Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War, I, 121. 102 Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War, II, 97. 103 Ibid., 266. 104 Gandhi, Non-violence in Peace and War, I, 198. This view is distinct from Thomas Hobbes's. For Hobbes, society is held together with the relinquishing of violence to the sovereign, who holds a mo nopoly over coercive power and administers it according to the law. Without such a common power to keep men in "awe" they would perpetually be at war, (Hobbes, Leviathan, 1660, Chapter Xlll). Ac c;ording w this view, it is tlQt no'TWWlence that bmds SQClety together, it is the fear of 105Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War, II, 60. 1os Azzam, "Defense," AI Qaeda in its own Words, 104, original parenthesis. 39

PAGE 46

Azzam explains that Mohammed directed defending the religion through "evidence and ar gument," or with "proof and eloquence."107 "[Allah] sent the most blessed of the messengers ... to bring [this religion] victory by the sword and the spear, after He had clearly expounded it with evidences and arguments."108 In the other version of Azzam's text, the need to defend the religion was shown through "proof and eloquence." Thus Mohammed appealed to the intellect to rationalize violence, and Azzam relied upon doctrine to issue the directive, which again is an intellectual activity. We have seen Gandhi's rational argument for nonviolence, but self-admittedly, it is incomplete, particularly in the presence of popular resulting from being violated.109 Satyagraha transcends the boundaries of the rational. "Non-violence, which is a quality of heart, cannot come by an appeal to the brain,"110 that is, the brain alone. Second, Gandhi writes that, whereas violence is a very visible activity with tangible and immediate results, nonviolence is an invisible force; and although invisible, it exists_, he argues, and is more effective than violence.111 Third, that nonviolence is "superior," he argues, is proved by demonstration, not argument. 112 Thus, Gandhi relies upon the experience of satyagraha more than upon reason to impart what it is. Gandhi, like Merleau-Ponty (and Husserl before him), critiqued classical science and rational principles for being incomplete. The type of phenomenology that Merleau-Ponty advocates is espe cially valuable in understanding something like satyagraha, or "love force." Science can only describe love by studying the physiological changes in a person's body and the chemistry taking place in the brain. However, love is not something that knowledge of these bio-chemical processes adequately 101 Azzam, "Defense," AI Qaeda in its own Words,103. 1os Azzam, "Defense," Religioscope 109 Hannah Arendt writes in On Violence, (1969; San Diego: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1970), 110, that a sense of being violated provides conditions conducive to violence. 110Qandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War, I, 2'76. 111 Ibid., 129. 112 Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War II, 60, my italics. 40

PAGE 47

imparts. Additionally, he argues that phenomena such as love do not merely exist as states of con sciousness in an inner realm, still prejudiced as "without extension" and "accessible to one person only." The "object of psychology," or something like love, "is not grasped in some inexpressible coin cidence," and is not made known by "imparting philosophical intuitions to others."IIJ Its meaning is imparted through the experience, which is common to that of others. It is 'understood' through a sort of act of appropriation which we all experience when we say we have 'found' the rabbit in the foliage of a puzzle... Once the prejudice of sensation has been banished, a face, a signature, a form of behaviour cease to be mere 'visual' data whose psychological meaning is sought in our inner experience, and the mental life of others becomes an immediate object, a whole charged with immanent meaning. 114 It is through love that Gandhi fmds meaning, and through the experience of which he fmds directive for action. He encourages embodied consciousness. He wants his followers to connect with their Indian souls and superior moral heritage, and to "follow his .[or her] own inner voice."115 Here, soul is the awareness of consciousness residing in the body, experienced as connection to the relational .fieJd, that which unites us wjth the rest of the universe, 116 compassjon becomes the response towards fellow human beings, facilitating nonviolent ways of being-in-the-world. Azzam, like Gandhi, appeals to a religious cultural legacy and its superiority over secularism, but, in contrast, relies upon doctrine to direct his action: "[God] caused this religion to triumph by the spear and the sword," Azzam writes in the "Defense," quotin_g hadith. 111 Doctrine imparts that which all proper Muslims must do out of duty to the religion. When confronted by the negative other, one 11a Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War II, 60. 114 Merleau-Ponty, 66. 11s Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War, II, 205. 11s The word soul is used in the above passage in the same sense as it is used by Woodman, to refer to the "meeting-place" of mind and body, (Woodman, _8.) is distinct from another common usage of the term "soul," which conceives it to be as somethmg that 1s separable from the body. 111 Azzam, "Defense," AI Qaeda in its own Words, 103. 41

PAGE 48

must go into battle in defense, perhaps not through the sword and the spear, but with kalashnikov rifles and bombs. This distinction between Azzaro's isolated intellect and Gandhi's embodied consciousness is further described in Azzaro and Gandhi's respective views on virtue. "As the Prophet said in his authentic hadith: 'The welfare of this community was born of abstinence and certainty, and it will end in avarice and hope' ... "118 Upon the surface, Azzam's favoring of abstinence over materlai weaith does not mark much difference from Gandhian thought. Both Gandhi's and Azzaro's writings praise religious ways ofbeing-in-the world; they both extol bravery and criticize cowardice, and they both call their people to fight against injustice. But Azzaro writes, "I w ]eakness is the loving of life too much and the hatred of war and death."119 The pursuit of earthly pleasures, or what he calls "the loving of life," causes a turning away from God, which forth not only the ire of God but the neglect of duty to the religion. 120 As Azzam appeals to abstinence, seen in this way, he establishes a confrontational relationship between God and life. This opposition pits a person against the temptations of the sensual world, against the behav ior that the world calls forth. While Gandhi upholds the same virtues, 121 he does not demand of anyone any action that is not in their hearts, 122 or inconsistent with what the world called forth for them. Gandhi asserts that abstinence, rather than being the cause of spiritual purity, is the result of spiritual experience. "{T}be moment -one bas -glimpsed the imperishable Atman {transcendental self] -one sheds 11a Azzam, "Defense," AI Qaeda in its own Words 105, my italics. 11.9 Again quoting the Prophet in hadilh Auarn, AI Qaeda in iiS own Wort&, 106. 120 "[Earlier generations of Muslims] followed their desires and evil of their deeds was made appealing to religiosoope). 121 "Non-violence is impossible without self-purification," Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War I, 245). 122 "If non-violence does not appeal to your heart, you should discard it," (Ibid., I 3). 42

PAGE 49

the love of the perishable body ... 123 124 Satyagraha is not something that is imposed by God, it is the cultivation of a habit-body based on a spiritual experience. Thus., it is a way that does not rely upon dominance-submission. is a process of educating public opinion such that it covers all the elements of society and in the end, makes itself irresistible."125 Azzam asserts that the frrst individual duty is the "defense of Muslim territories," which entails willingness to die for the cause. Gandhi asserts that the satyagrahi 's duty entails noncooperation with evil, 126 disobeying laws that are "morally repugnant,"1 2 7 and being able to lay down one's life for what one considers to be right.128 Azzam's mode of being-in-the-world is congruent with that which he perceives to be his duty: defense and war. While Gandhi acknowledges the possibility of violence, stating that "retaliation or resistance unto death is the second best approach,"129 he wants to cultivate a being-in-the-world that is nonviolent and transformative. He writes, "[i]mmediately, [when] you get the conviction that non-violence is the law of life, you have to practice it towards those who act violently towards you; and the law must apply to nations as to individuals."130 Ends and Means In Gandhi's view, the means are just as important as the ends; the lived experience is as important as the ideals. "Liberty and democracy become unholy when their hands are dyed red with in-123 Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War I, 335. 124 Dualism surfaces here in Gandhian thought as the "perishable" is contrasted against the ''transcen dental," illustrating that not even Gandhi can escape the dualism of worldly experience. 12s Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War II, 61, my italics. 128 Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War/, 358. 127 Ibid., 69. 128 Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War II, 59. 129 Ibid., 148. 130 Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War I, 187. 43

PAGE 50

nocent blood "131 Gandhi claims that with war comes moral loss, as well as the "poisonous forces of lying and deception." The aftereffects of war, he conjectures, include the lack of stability in government and the absence of satisfaction among the various classes, with "each wanting to do better at the expense of the rest." However, if one is patient and relies on the more slowly acting force of nonvio lence, one can achieve peace, stability, and growth. 132 Although Azzam and Gandhi both desire independence from foreign influence and oppression, we can see the importance Gandhi places on the concept of freedom from tyranny, which has individual and political scope. "The ideally non-violent state will be an ordered anarchy," muses Gandhi.133 He emphasizes the importance of the development of the individual towards self-rule through practice, by applying nonviolence to daily occurrences in their lives. 134 Satyagraha must be "all-pervasive," and cannot be compartmentalized: "I cannot be non-violent about one activity of mine and violent about others."135 A votary of ahimsa will of course base upon non-violence all his relations with his parents, his children, his wife, his servants, his dependents, etc. But the real test will come at the time of political or communal disturbances or under the menace of thieves . Mere resolve to lay down one's life under crrcumstiuices iS not enough. If I am a Hindu, I must fraternize with Moslems and the rest. In my dealings with them I must not make any distinction between my co-religionists and those who might belong to a different faith. I would -seek opportunities to serve them without any feeling of fear or unnaturalness."136 Thus Gandhi explicitly argues for a being-in-the-world based on integration. He believes that it is only when people are free on a personal level from tyrants such as fear and hatred that they can be free on a larger level, politically. 131 Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War I, 357. 132 Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War ll, 56-51. 133 Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War I, 324. 1341bid., 129, my italics. 135 Ibid., 110. 136 Ibid., 302. 44

PAGE 51

Gandhi argues that a way in which Indians assumed a submissive role in the hierarchical structure was through fear. Certain tribes within India feared others, and became reliant upon the Brit ish who intervened in intertribal tension to keep the peace. Gandhi describes the loss of power that occurs in such a state of division. "We fear Englishmen and we have become slaves," he writes. 137 Nonviolence depends upon the relinquishing the fear which accompanies a dualistic worldview. An integrating view facilitates the formation of a habit-body capable of respondin,g to the world in a non violent way. A nonviolent people are not in need of an outside power to subdue them; they become able to truly rule themselves. Gandhi and Azzam have very different concepts of the ideal state. Azzam is not an activist desiring independence in order to establish a democracy. The type of governance Azzam seeks is the ocracy, which is distinctly not founded upon the notion of self-determination nor political freedom. The incessant referencin_g of sacred text precludes any appeal to the "inner voice," and the concept of human rights is obscured. What is called for is the domination of falsehood in defense of the truth as stated by doctrine, submission to the power of God, and a posturin_g in opposition to the "other," with whom one must go to battle with brute force. As Azzam seeks "realms of peace" through war (jihad), there is an apparent contradiction or an inconsistency between the ends and the means. However, although Azzam advocates for a society based on spiritual values, he envisions a society based on dominance-submission (this dominance submission was illustrated in the discussion of abstinence). In such a society that he envisions, women must be covered, girls do not get educated, and a person can be killed for dishonoring his or her family. Azzam seeks to protect this type of society from foreign interference by going to war Formulated thus, the ends are not inconsistent with the means in jihad. A state ruled by dominance-submission is fought for using a dominance-submissive strategy. In this section we have seen how Abdallah Azzam and Mohandas Gandhi's ontological para digms, or foundational myths, are very different, as are their ways of being-in-the-world. In contrast to 137 Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War, I, 10. 45

PAGE 52

the theme of integration and freedom seen in work, dominance-submission and dualism are prevalent in Azzam's. In summary Gandhi, in contrast to Azzam, 1) relies upon the cultivation of a habit-body consistent with the beliefs and the experiences of an integrating paradigm, which enables nonviolent response, not behaviors based on a dualis tic worldview. 2) Gandhi repudiates the dominance-submission way of being-in-the-world in favor of spiritual and political freedom; 3) he teaches embodied consciousness emphasizing paying attention to an inner sense in determining right action in favor of the isolated intellect which may only appeal to reason or doctrine for guidance If "freedom" is the being-in-the-world called forth by Gandhi s integrating myth. dominationsubmission" is the being-in-the-world called forth by Azzam 's dualistic myth. In the next section, I discuss the activities of the leaders and the movements I show bow Gandhi s myth, in contrast to Azzaro s facilitates a nonviolent transfer of power and the transformation of relationships: conversion not destruction 1 3 8 Activities of the Leaders and the Participants Jihad Azzam s mode of being-in-the-world is jihad His goal is to invigorate the ummah, or Muslim community to defend itself against ''falsehood,"139 against "unbelievers. against the tyrant.140 1 4 1 Concern for the well-being of the ummah is a "crucial'. religious value in Islam, as discussed by Ann strong. t42 This is the foundation of the movement that inspired Azzaro as a y outh in Palestine the 1sa Gandhi writes the satyagrahi believes not in destrvction but conversion Gandhi, Non-Violence in P eace and War, II, 149 m y italics. 139 Azzaro Defense ," AI Qaeda in its own Words, 104 140 Azzaro "Join the Caravan ,' 111. w According to Kepel and Milelli or is a Quranic _term A history of the tenn demonstrates its vanous _mearungs throughout pre-Islamic times it signified a god, white in the Quran It bas meant demon, magtcJaD or idols It JS attributed even to Satan himself. This note additionally demonstrates the influence oo "action ."' 142 Armstrong 2 19 6

PAGE 53

Muslim Brotherhood 143 Protecting the Muslim community against the spiritual and political chal lenges it faces as the result of foreign interference is to be done through wagingjihad, which is com monly defined as "holy war," as indicated by Bruce Lincoln in his book, Holy Terrors. I However (and this is something written about by Lincoln as well), Kepel and Milelli note that jihad is an Islamic concept that has greater depth than merely engaging an exterior enemy in military warfare: The term jihad literally means effort, or striving, implicitly inJhe name of Islam. . Although some exegetes have distinguished the '"greater jihad" (waged on oneself, in order to improve oneself morally and religiously) from the "lesser'' (carried out against pagans and unbelievers, or those who reject Muslim rule), since the classical era the term bas generally been taken to mean efforts Muslims make to propagate the faith. Even then, however, jihad does not necessarily have a military sense: it can mean "jihad of the tongue" (al-jihad bil-lian), designating the obligation to "enjoin good and forbid evil" ... 145 What Kepel and Milelli make evident is that jihad has its place within the inner life of a per son, as Gandhi emphasized the importance of self-purification. 146 Kepel and Milelli claim that a legacy of Azzam is that he emphasized "lesser" jihad over the "greater," that is, he prioritized the battle with external enemies rather than the struggle with internal "demons," but this is a debatable assess-ment As indicated by the "Final Instructions to the Hijackers of September 11," found in the luggage of Mohamed Atta, self-purification was highly important in the preparation for the attack. These instructions describe a precise list of not only the physical but the "inner'' purifications that thejihadi must perform the night before. The hijackers were to not only shave excess hair from the body, wear cologne, and shower, but "[c]ompletely forget something called ''this world," [or "this life"]. The time for play is over ... 147 In other words, the world must not induce the hijacker to engage with it, neither in play nor in the love of life. We see dominance-submission is evident in thesejihadi instructions, 143 Kepel and Milelli, 83. 144 Bruce Lincoln, Holy Terrors: Thinking About Religion after September II, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 33. 145 Kepel and Milelli, 296-297. 146 Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War,/, 245. 147 Appendix A, "Final Instructions to the Hijackers of September II," Lincoln, 93-98, my italics 47

PAGE 54

where the spirit is placed in opposition to the world, where God is in opposition to life. This animosity toward life is consistent with Azzam's image of human nature, which posits human beings to be sin ners. Dominance-submission is more obvious in the acts of September 11, which are an overt display of force on behalf of those engaged in jihad The issue weighing on Islamists such as Azzam is non-Muslim political and military power in traditionally Muslim lands.148 Grievances include the injustices done to the Palestinian people as well as Soviet or American presence in Afghanistan, and have included British interference in Egyptian politics and the impoverishment of the Egyptian people by the secular regime.149 Azzaro prefers a military to a revolutionary approach in his desire to establish an Islamic state. 150 While a revolution takes place within a state; Azzam's vision is pan-Islamic. He desires the reclamation of Muslim lands, transcending the boundaries of the new states carved out of the former Ottoman empire in the political upheaval following the first World War.151 In his military strategy, Azzaro chose Afghanistan as the nucleus for a war against the enemies of Islam. Not only were Afghanistan's borders open at that time, providing easy access for waves of volunteer fighters, but there was a war already raging in Afghanistan (against the Soviets) that was an essentially Islamist war. 152 Azzam acclaims the struggle going on in Afghanistan for the Islamist purity accompanying its political goals. The mujahedeen had formulated clearly their desire for theocracy: Article 2 of the charter of the Islamic Union of Afghan Mujahedeen, according to Azzaro, asserts: 'Our goal derives from His word,' 'none can command except God; and so absolute sovereignty be-148 International Crisis Group. ''Understanding Islamism." Middle East/North Africa Report, no. 37 (2 March 2005) http://merln.ndu.edu/archive/ic_g/Islamism2Mar05.pdf(accessed November 28, 2010). 149 Armstrong, 219. 150 Kepel and Milelli, 99. 151 Ibid. 1s2 Azzam, "Defense of Muslim Territories," AI Qaeda in Its Own Words, 108. 48

PAGE 55

longs to the Lord of the world,' (Quran,12:67)."153 "When sovereignty is attributed to someone or something other than God, such as the nation or a political party, society becomes un-Islamic, because this situation grants decision-making and legislative power to authorities other than God alone, [Sayyid Qutb]." 154 Azzaro, thus, insists on allegiance to God's power alone. He approves of the mujahedeen because they had refused assistance from secular sources, unlike the Palestinians. "Things are differ ent in Palestine," writes Azzaro in the "Defense," "where all sorts of people have taken over the leader ship: some sincere Muslims, but others are communists, while others still are simple Muslims. The banner they raised was that of the secular state."155 Thus, he demonstrates that the means are as impor tant in the struggle against oppression as the ends. Azzam was a principal recruiter for the effort of jihad in Afghanistan. He or_ganized Arab fighters and solicited funds for the war effort. He appealed to people's sense of duty towards religion and proper conduct, to men's sense of virility and capacity for action, to the negative consequences of non-action, to the ideals of justice, and to the idea of the omnipotence of God. Azzam played upon people's fears of the consequences of their sins in neglecting their religious duties, conjuring up the image of the vengeful and judgmental God. Azzam was instrumental in framing the ideological principles and practical considerations for a "cult of martyrdom" as the ''ultimate fonn of devotion to God."156 Talal Asad addresses this point in On Suicide Bombing, (2007). He writes that although what is called shuhada in Arabic is defmed as "martyrdom," which is connected to the ritual of sacrifice, this definition does not account for the fact that there occurs a violent attack in which a life is taken from the enemy. It is a "political expression" 153 Azzam, "Defense of Muslim Territories," AI Qaeda in Its Own Words, 108. 154 Kepel and MiieUi, 301. 1ss Azzam, 108. 156 Kepel and Milelli, 100. 49

PAGE 56

that has "personal motive." As such, he calls the act of suicide bombing more of a triumph than a sacrifice.151 Anat Berko discusses this phenomenon extensively in her book Path to Paradise: The Inner World of Suicide Bombers and Their Dispatchers, in which she interviews would-be suicide bombers and dispatchers. Consistent with Asad's analysis, she calls suicide bombing a "hero cult."l58 Posters of the shaheeds are mounted on the streets in Palestine portraying them in macho poses, illustrating that although the shaheeds sacrifice their lives in the performance of their "duty," they are rewarded with enormous status within their society. It seems as though, through shuhada, they have found a way to become empowered. Berko claims to have observed a chafmg in what she calls an often harsh and oppressive Palestinian society, where honor is revered, strict codes of conduct are to be adhered to, and death is dealt as punishment more freely than in more liberal societies. She illustrates a segment of Arab society that is not only politically oppressed, but whose culture is oppressive. According to Islamic law, a woman can be killed if she is seen in the company of unrelated men, because she has dishonored her family. A way for her to reclaim her honor is to become a shaheeda, rather that suffer the humiliation she would have brought upon herself and her family otherwise. 159 Further illustrating the empowering nature of shuhada, Berko asserts that some shaheeds, perhaps unconsciously, found that becoming a martyr was a way to reclaim their manhood in a situa tion that made them feel impotent or castrated. It is as if [male terrorists] are trying to tell the world that they have proven their po tency as males who can fight and preserve their honor. Dispatchers and suicide bombers all spoke about masculinity. That might be a hint that deep within the Pal estinian soul, the Israeli occupation is perceived as a form of castration, and only 157 Talal Asad, On Suicide Bombing (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 49. 1ss Anat Berko, Path to Paradise (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2007), IO. 159 Ibid., 1-8. 50

PAGE 57

active fighting can return the masculinity snatched from them, and they are relating to the land as a woman that had been raped and defiled. t6o These statements illustrate jihad as a mode of being-in-the-world that is reacting to disempowerment. The world is experienced a certain way, and calls forth a fight-or-flight response. One young girl, Nazima, had just wanted military training. She lied to her father about where she was going, apparently more afraid of being found out to be in the company of unrelated men than of being involved in military activities.161 Nazima's particular concern indicates that some rules of religion could be fore-gone in order to engage in jihad, and this selectivity begins to illustrate a dissonance between the goal and the manner in which it is achieved. Berko observes that religion combines with nationalism to produce a "fertile medium" for terrorism to spring forth.162 Berko finds that the people she interviews are generally not "religious fanatics," although religion played a fundamental part in preparing them for the operation.163 The main issue as described by the people interviewed is not their differences in their religions nor their .secuJarisms_ 164 The j_s_sue j_s often presented jtself as .stoJen Jands, 165 Dispatcher Saleh explains, "the conflict is between nations, not people."166 He sees one nation competing with another on a political, not on a personal level. He describes a scenario of disparity: "The Jews have water, electricity, a sewer system, the Arabs don't." Although he had no issue with the Israelis he was moved to violence by the inequities between nations. 167 100 Berko, 48. Hrl Ibid., 3-4. 1 6 2 Ibid., 9. 163 Ibid., 8-9. 164 Mahmoud, a dispatcher, notes that in Spain, "Jews R?d lived together. Throughout history there was peace between Jews and Arabs, they are cousms," (Ib1d, 23). 165 Ibid., 23. 1ti6 Ibid.' 15. 167 Ibid, 18. 51

PAGE 58

Dispatcher Abdallah had worked with Israelis at the time he joined the militant movement. "At the same time I started doing military work {i.e., when he joined the terrorist organization] I knew Jews, I worked with Jews ... I never thought of hurting them, and if someone else wanted to hurt them, I would try to prevent it."168 This concern for his Jewish friends validates the point of view that Des cartes and Merleau-Ponty came together on, that knowing someone makes them more "real." The experience of intersubjectivity _gives authenticity to the existence of another. If someone actually knows the other person, has experience of him or her, the more human that person becomes. As this other overcomes objectification, it becomes more difficult to treat him or her with violence. Abdallah indicates a sentiment of vengeance (against Israelis he does not know) in his motive to become involved injihad He was highly critical of the treatment of Palestinians at checkpoints, where he said he was treated like a "dog."169 That he choses this specific expression is indicative of just how great an insult he experienced to his humanity. He not only feels insulted but dehumanized, even demonized. 170 He feels reduced below the level of an object, and in Gilligan's language, feels negated. What Abdallah is looking for is a way to restore his faith and his honor, something to return to him the experience ofbeing human, that is, valid as a subject in the eyes ofanother.171 The world, as he experiences it, calls forth defensiveness. Furthermore, acting vengefully conforms to the image of God described by Azzarn, and as such, is a paradigmatic model for behavior. I have just demonstrated that forjihadis, the world appears in dualistic terms. 1) Both Azzarn and the participants in the movement formulate a distinct enemy. 2) They act defensively against this enemy using brute force, clearly demonstrating a dominance-submissive way of being-in-the-world. 3) The directives for action are obtained by way of isolated intellect. 4) While the importance of the 1ss Berko, 31. 169 Ibid., 33. 110 According to hadith dogs, are unclean, could annul prayer, were demons when ferocious, particu larly black dogs, who should be killed, to Silas, "Muhammad and the Dogs," Answering Islam, http://www.answerin_g-Jslam.or_g/Silas/dogs.htm (accessed October 12, 2010). 111 Berko, 33. 52

PAGE 59

purity of jihad is emphasized by Azzam, some participants did not act out of duty to the religion but for personal motives, and some were willing to overlook some religious rules in order to achieve their goal. Jihad is similar to Gandhi's movement in that it is a response to oppression and seeks em powerment through a willingness to make the ultimate sacrifice. However, Gandhi's movement's activities are vastly different from the jihadi :S, because they have different myths in place In the next section, I describe satyagraha in action. Satyagraha Satyagraha is Gandhi's mode of being-in-the-world, which encompasses ahimsa, or nonviolence as spiritual love, that which he fmds to be the universal spiritual value of concern for the well-being of others.172 It is a "holding on to Truth," and it expands to the political realm to refer to a method of resistance to injustice.173 Again, this emphasis on truth resembles Azzam upon the surface, but Gandhi does not envision a violent struggle. Gandhi's satyagraha, or nonviolence, is "soulforce,"174 and entails civil disobedience, nonviolent resistance, and "non-cooperation with everything humiliating."l75 Within a particular historical context, satyagraha, as it was executed, accomplished one of Gandhi's goals: that is, an independent India. Contrary to the connotations of the term "passive resistance" and the negative "non" of "non violence," Gandhi emphasizes that satyagraha is "an intensely active force."176 It does not mean meek submission to the will of the but it means putting one's whole soul against the will of the tyrant. Working under this law of our being, it is possible for a single individual to defy the whole might of an unjust empire to 112 Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War, I, 113. 173 Merton, 4-5. 174 Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War, IL 35. 175 Ibid., 53 176 Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War, I, 129. 53

PAGE 60

save his honour, his religion, his soul, and lay the foundation for that empire's fall or its regeneration. t77 Thus, like Azzam, Gandhi appeals to the larger-than-life significance of the actions that were required to combat oppression in order to restore a people's honor. However, satyagraha is not deployed to seize power or to force the enemy into submission. Rather, it is a distinct type of empowerment. Az-zam states that" ... God has power over all things,"178 and jihad is an expression of this message. It is through embodying the essence of God (in the case ofjihad, vengeance, judgement, and domination) that one becomes empowered. However, satyagraha relies upon the transformation of relationships. 119 Its aim is conversion, not destruction, 180 and this is done through the embodiment of mercy and love. Gandhi saw an opportunity to act nonviolently for home rule in March, 1930. He chooses the salt tax to rally around because taxing something that everyone needs is seen as particularly onerous and exploitative. 181 He announces that he and his volunteers would march from his ashram to the sea to obtain their own salt, in blatant violation of the law. Along the way, he gathers increasing publicity and exposure. He urges the leaders of the villages to quit their government jobs to end their coopera tion with the British.1 82 He asserts the importance of not hating the British; regarding them he is always respectfui.1 83 As I have described, Gandhi does not blame the British for Indian subservience, 177 Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War, I, 2. 11a. Azzam, Al Qaeda in its awn Words, 103. 179 Thomas Merton, Gandhi on Nonviolence, 25-31, my italics. 1eo Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War, II, 149, 1s1 Steve York, producer and director, "India: Defying the Crown," documentary, (Princeton, NJ: Films for the Humanities and 2000). 182 Ibid. t83 Gandhi, HindSwaraj, 36,88-89. 54

PAGE 61

accepting responsibility for the situation on behalf of his own people.I84 He explicitly refuses the term "enemy"185 and explains the principles of nonviolence.l86 When Gandhi performs public civil disobedience, he defies Britain's authority. The govern ment is drawn into a stand-off with the Indian people. As Gandhi introduces the second step of his campaign, which is to seize a salt-works plant, new repressive measures are introduced (more opportunities for civil disobedience). Gandhi is arrested, which had the effect he desired: civic life in India comes to a standstill. When Gandhi's followers raid the salt-works plant, the British are left with two choices. They can do nothing and demonstrate their impotence, or they can demonstrate their power through force. They choose the latter, and unleash a wave of brutality against the protesters. The Indian protesters do not defend against the steel-tipped clubs, and this ruthlessness is recorded by journalists in some 2000 newspapers worldwide. Even though they did not fight back, or perhaps for that reason, the British lost their power.187 A combination of factors provided for the emergence of satyagraha and the achievement of its goals, including the following: 1) The humiliation felt by the Indian people towards their oppression was providing fuel for action. 2) Gandhi becomes a leader of the movement. He is looked up to, and reportedly possesses charisma and a "saintly quality." 188 If the mind/body center is ''where speakers speak from, and writers write from," given the success of Gandhi's speeches, as the thousands of Indi ans that participated in Gandhi's campaign would endure arrests and severe beatings without defending themselves, it is likely that Gandhi practices the embodied consciousness that he preaches. It seems as though satyagraha had made itself"irresistible." 3) Demonstrating an ooderstanding of psychology, Gandhi took advantage of the British concept of"fair play," knowing that the British would not resort t84 Gandhi, Hind Swaraj. 23. 1as "In the dictionary of satyagraha, there is no enemy," (Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War,/, 216). 186 Gandhi, Hind Swaraj, 36, 88-89. 187 York, 188 Ibid. 55

PAGE 62

to the forceful oppression of a nonviolent people, especially in the light of the observance of an inter national community. 4) Gandhi was able to demonstrate to the world the oppression of the Indian peo ple and the lack of legitimacy of the British government, as the people withdrew their tacit consent to British rule. Doing so he was able to win international support for his cause. 189 These factors are unique to a specific historical context, and combined to enable a successful liberation of India from foreign interference. Gandhian activist Narendra Desai reveals in an interview some of the aspects of Gandhi's campaign for home rule from the perspective of a participant. He describes how the campaign ignited a nationalistic upswell.190 Although I have demonstrated a connection between nationalism and violence, during the movement for Indian independence violence was largely abstained from, as Gandhi is able to unify the Indian people in a common cause. who was a secret messenger during the Quit India campaign, 191 provides insight regarding to what degree the individuals involved in the movement shared Gandhi's convictions. Writing about the latter parts of the insurgency, Desai reports that among some of the insurgents, some violence against property was permitted, as long as it did not hurt anybody. Independent of Gandhi's vision, the insurgents took to activities such as blowing up bridges and government offices. 192 This report by Desai exemplifies that not all participants in the movement acted nonviolently at all times, and were not able to completely abstain from othering the British. Desai demonstrates that the participants in Gandhi's movement did not fully embody the values of nonviolence and love toward the other, as Gandhi envisioned. However, at some point, says Desai, ''we did realize this enterprise of burning 189 York. 100 Rita Kothari, "An Interview with Narendra Desai, a Gandhian Activist Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies, 3, no. 3 (2001): 439, . . http://O-web.ebscohost.com.skyline ucdenver.edu/ehost/pdfvtewer/pdfvtewer?vtd=4&htd=l2&std=083 (accessed May 3Q, 2QlQ). 191 Ibid., 440. 192 Ibid., 442. 56

PAGE 63

bridges and the rest of it had limitations. It was not possible to do it without hurting people and it was not very effective, either. The project of raising consciousness was much more long-lasting."I93 In this statement, Desai indicates that for some, the understanding of the superiority of nonviolence was based upon rational observation, not experience. Thus there is evidence that the goal of the participants in the campaign for home rule fell short of Gandhi's more complex vision of home rule based on self-rule of spiritually enlightened people who have the lived experience of an integrating worldview. Gandhi, who "promised the nation,"in Desai's had "provided the faith" needed to obtain 194 if not an all-encompassing para-digm shift. Thus, there is evidence of the dualistic paradigm in the writing of Desai on behalf of some of the participants. This return to a dualistic paradigm perhaps sheds light on why the movement ulti mately failed to create a peaceful, unified nation. The dualistic view seems to endure in India, as a culture free from violence and oppression has not taken hold. Yet, in the historical moment, by using nonviolence called forth by an integrating paradigm, a people are transformed from a subservient class into a free people, creating a situation whereby the power of an oppressive government is transferred to the people themselves. After studying Gandhi's movement, I argue that it demonstrates elements of the integrating paradigm, formulated clearly in Gandhi's strategy. Gandhi's strategy: I) does not formulate the con cept enemy. 2) It repudiates the dominance-submission way of being in the world, depending upon a transfer of power and the transformation of relationships; 3) prescribes the practice of embodied con sciousness in emphasizing paying attention to an inner sense in determining right action, relying upon the cultivation of a habit-body consistent with the beliefs and the experiences of an integrating para digm; and 4) although Gandhi emphasized a purity of the movement in absolutely conforming to non violent principles, some participants nevertheless acted violently, placing more importance on political independence than on spiritual freedom. Thus, much like in jihad, the movement was not made up 193 Kothari, 444. 194 Ibid., 445. 57

PAGE 64

entirely of spiritually-motivated people. However, Gandhi's leadership did succeed in producing a movement of people who had sufficiently disciplined their reactions to violence, abstaining from re turning blows or engaging in defense mechanisms when threatened, which was able to facilitate a transformation of power and a transformation of relationships. 58

PAGE 65

CHAPTER4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION In this paper I have discussed two modes of being-in-the-world influenced by two myths with which a person may conceptualize the nature of reality. Descartes, Merleau-Ponty, and Marion Wood man have provided an illustration of these paradigms in philosophy and psychology; Abdallah Azzaro and Mohandas Gandhi have demonstrated them in their writings and practices. The actions of their respective social movements reflect the inherence of these myths, as a particular world calls forth a certain type of behavior. Both Gandhi and Azzam display a deep religiosity. They are similar in that both take a stance a_gainst oppression and encourage the _givin_g of one's life out of adherence to one's principles, for justice and for truth. They both seek empowerment where power has been lost. However, the two leaders of the movements I have studied are obviously different in that one encourages confronting an enemy with violence, while the other suggests engaging an adversazy with nonviolence. What helps us under stand the nuances between the two movements and modes of being-in-the-world is the identification of the dualistic and the integrating worldviews operating therein. Azzam and Gandhi have different views on human nature, the image of God, spiritual law, and duty. Azzam demonstrates a dualistic ontological paradigm in his writings, which is characterized by a split between self and other and between subject and object, whereby there is spirit versus body, and truth versus falsehood. Azzam imagines God to be vengeful and judgmental, and this image re flects a corresponding model of behavior. He believes that human beings are inherently sinners, and uses us-versus-them language in the discussion thereof. Azzam descnoes a law of defense to protect truth against falsehood. Such a dualistic worldview naturally provides for a defensive posture. This mode of being is exemplified by the acts of war suicide bombers take against the enemy. 59

PAGE 66

Gandhi believes that human beings are the embodiment of spirit, ruled by a universal law of love and nonviolence. For Gandhi, this law is truth, and this truth he imagines to be God. His loving and merciful God-image and view of human nature are integrative, as for him the world is experienced in unifying terms. Such an experience of the world calls forth loving and nonviolent behavior. Gandhi describes the duty to cease cooperation with everything degrading, to embody the traditional moral principles of love and nonviolence to achieve self-rule, spiritually and politically. Azzaro and Gandhi also have different views of the ideal state. Azzam would have theocracy, whereby Muslims submit to the will of God living in congruence with the truth revealed in scripture (isolated intellect), within subsequent "realms of peace." Gandhi subscribes to anarchy, wherein free, spiritually enlightened, communal individuals coexist peacefully in their society, ruling themselves by paying heed to their "inner voice" (embodied consciousness) which, by nature ofthe inherent truth, is God. Both would have a spiritually-based society, but Azzam seeks it through dominance-submission, while Gandhi through freedom. Unfortunately, dominance..:submission has not yet yielded realms of peace in the Arab world; and after independence, the type of society that Gandhi envisioned also did not take hold Yet, despite the ultimate failure of Gandhi's movement to produce a peaceful, unified state in India, one cannot dismiss the success of nonviolence in obtaining a transfer of power from the British to the Indian peo ple. A movement based upon integrative principles was able to demonstrate to the world that the In dian people had withdrawn their consent to British rule, as their interests were no longer being suffi ciently addressed. Although nonviolence may not be possible at all times, in this particular historical context, it incited the British to abandon their rulership, a choice the British administrators determined to be the better alternative. Thus the Indians obtained their political freedom and won the removal of an unwanted presence from their land. To argue that one worldview and one way of being-in-the-world is better than the other, I would commit the same kind of dualism that I would subordinate. Therefore, I refrain from doing so. I maintain that there are at least two ways of experiencing the nature of reality, and awareness of these 60

PAGE 67

dualistic and integrating paradigms has much to offer in the attempts to understand history, especially social movements. The understanding of the dualistic and integrating paradigms may also be useful in the field of international relations. This knowledge may be valuable to the strategists in Washington who have the responsibility to formulate foreign policy in an often hostile world that is made up of many diverse nations, representing myriad cultures and interests. I have described the benefits of the embodying one's consciousness during conflict, which provides the perspective of interconnectedness: we all share this one world. For these it is worthwhile to understand the concept of the world calling forth behavior. The understanding of being-in-the-world yields the insight that people become defen sive and violent in a world experienced in terms of dominance-submission, and that lastin_g peace can rarely be achieved through force. Perhaps the only difficulty in allowing for an integrating view is the overcoming of our fear of the other in a world that in many ways calls forth materialism, consumerism, defensiveness, fight-and flight, and the isolated intellect. It is possible that only by willingly engaging in an embodied con sciousness practice, do we have any hope of expanding beyond dualism and violence in the world and within ourselves. 61

PAGE 68

BffiLIOGRAPHY Arendt, Hannah. On Violence. San Diegtx Harcourt Brace & Company, 1969, 1970. Armstrong, Karen. The Battle for God New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Random House 2006. Asad, Talal. On Suicide Bombing. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007. "Balfour Declaration 1917 The Avalon Project, Yale Law School. http://avalon.law.yale edu/20th (accessed November 1 2010). Berko, Anat. The Pa_th to Paradise: The Inner World of Suicide Bombers and Their Dispatchers. Translat-ed by Ehzabeth Yuvat Westport: Praeg-er Security Int-ematiooal, 2007. http: / /0-ebooks.abc-clio.com.sky line. ucdenver.edu/print.aspx?isbn=9781567207057 &id=C9446-2155 (accessed May 11, 2010). Buchanan, Scott, ed. The Portable Plato. New York: The Viking press, 1948 Damovsky, Marcy, Barbara Epstein, and Richard Flacks. Cultural Politics and Social Movements. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995. Descartes, Rene. Meditations on First Philosophy. Edited and translated by Cottingham, J. London: Cambridge University Press. 1985 "Dr. Abdullah Azzam." Perspectives on World History and CUITent Events. http://www.pwhce.org /azzam.html (accessed May 13, 2010). Ford, Dei:ii:iis. The Search For Meaning Berkley: University ofCalifol'Iiia Press, 2007. Gandhi, Mohandas K. Non-Violence in Peace and War. Vol. I and Vol. ll. Introduction by Paul F. Power. New York: Garland Publishing Inc. 1972. First published 1942 and I 949 respectively. ----------------. Hind Swaraj or Indian Home Rule. Edited and published by Jitendra T. Desai. Ahmedabad, India: Navajivan Publishing House (Navajivan Mudranalaya), 1938. Gilligan, Stephen "The Experience of Negative Otherness: How Shall We Treat Our Enemies? Seishindo (2002). http://www.seishindo.org/articles/st_gilligan2.html (accessed July 6 2009). International Crisis Group. "Understanding Islamism." Middle East/North Africa Report no. 37 (2 March 2005). http://merln.ndu.edu/archive/icgllslamism2Mar05.pdf(accessed November 28 2010). Juergensmeyer, Mark. Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence. 3rd ed. Berk ley: University of California Press, 2000. Kepel, Gilles, and Jean-Pierre Milelli, eds. AI Qaeda in Its Own w_ords .. Translated by Pascale Ghazaleh. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard Umvers1ty Press 2008. 62

PAGE 69

Kothari, Rita. "An Interview with Narendra Desai, a Gandhian Activist." Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies, 3, no. 3 (2001): 439-445. http://O-web.ebscohost.com.sky lme.ucdenver.edulehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=4&hid=l2&sid=083d9dc6-fcc3-4092-8204-0e305e 4248a5o/o40sessionmgrl3 (accessed May 30, Larsen, Stephen. The Shamans Doorway: Opening Imagination to Power and Myth. With a forward by Joan Halifax. New Y-ork: Station HHl Press, l988. First published by Harper & Row, 1-976. Lincoln, Bruce. Holy Terrors: Thinking About Religion after September 11. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003. Mirceau, Eliade. The Sacred and the Profane: the Nature of Religion. Translated by Willard R. Trask. San Diego: Harcourt, Inc., 1959. Phenomenology of Perception. Trail$lat-ed by {;QHn Smith. YQrk: Routeledge Classics, 2002. First published in 1945 by Editions Gallimard. Merton, Thomas, ed. with introduction. Gandhi on Nonviolence. New York: New Directions Publish ing Corporation, 1964. Qafisheh, Mutaz. "Genesis of Citizenship in Palestine and Israel. Palestinian Nationality during the Period of 19l7Q 1925." The Journal of the History of International Law, H, no. l (Martinus Publishers, 2009): 1-36. http://O-web.ebscohost.com.skyline.ucdenver.edu/ehost/pdfviewer /pdfviewer?hid=l13&sid=65290344-4fea-4cb0-9afl-l b0a6cf7832d%40sessionmgrlll& vid=2 (Accessed Nov-ember 28, 2010). Schafer, David. "Seeds of Enmity: Origins of the Israel-Palestinian Conflict." The Humanist, 62, no. 5 (September/October 2002): 9-15. http://O-web.ebscohost.com.skyline.ucdenver.edu /ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=9&hid=1 06&sid=ce8541 bb-8c71-4353-a3c4-006897eae300 %40sessionmgr113 (accessed November 28, 2010) Silas. "Muhammad and the Dogs." Answering Islam. http://www.answering-islam.org/Silas/dogs.htm (accessed October 12, W l 0). Stern, Jessica. Denial. New York: Harper Collins, 2010. Wilson, Jon E. "Early Colonial India Beyond Empire." The Historical Journal, 50, 4. (United King dom: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 957-258. http://O-journals.cambridge.org.skyline. ucdenver.edu/actionldisplayFulltext?type= 1&pdftype= I &tid= I41I968&jid=HIS&volumeld =50&issueld=&aid= 1411960 (accessed November 28, 20 I 0). Woodman, Marion. Conscious Femininity: Interviews with Marion Woodman. Toronto: Inner City Books, 1993. York, Steve, producer and director. '1ndia: defying the CrownY Documentary. Princeton, NJ: Films for the Humanities and Sciences, 2000. 63