Citation
Exploring member benefits as constraints on nonprofit association leaders in advocacy coalitions

Material Information

Title:
Exploring member benefits as constraints on nonprofit association leaders in advocacy coalitions
Creator:
Carr, Joanne B
Place of Publication:
Denver, CO
Publisher:
University of Colorado Denver
Publication Date:
Language:
English
Physical Description:
xi, 274 leaves : illustrations ; 29 cm

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords:
Nonprofit organizations ( lcsh )
Pressure groups ( lcsh )
Nonprofit organizations ( fast )
Pressure groups ( fast )
Genre:
bibliography ( marcgt )
theses ( marcgt )
non-fiction ( marcgt )

Notes

Bibliography:
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 237-274).
Thesis:
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree, Doctor of Philosophy, Public Administration
General Note:
School of Public Affairs
Statement of Responsibility:
by Joanne B. Carr.

Record Information

Source Institution:
|University of Colorado Denver
Holding Location:
|Auraria Library
Rights Management:
All applicable rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier:
37296159 ( OCLC )
ocm37296159
Classification:
LD1190.P86 1996d .C37 ( lcc )

Downloads

This item has the following downloads:


Full Text
EXPLORING MEMBER BENEFITS
AS CONSTRAINTS ON NONPROFIT ASSOCIATION LEADERS
IN ADVOCACY COALITIONS
by
Joanne B. Carr
B.S., Regis University, 1990
M.P.A., University of Colorado, 1993
A thesis submitted to the
University of Colorado at Denver
in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Public Administration
1996


1996 by Joanne B. Carr
All rights reserved


This Thesis for the Doctor of Philosophy
degree by
Joanne Carr
has been approved
Date

1


Carr, Joanne B. (Ph. D., Public Administration)
Exploring Member Benefits as Constraints on Nonprofit Association Leaders
in Advocacy Coalitions
Thesis directed by Professor Peter deLeon
ABSTRACT
Voluntary associations are an essential, large and growing part of American
society and a significant participant in public policy development, and yet
they have been largely overlooked in public policy studies. This exploratory
research examines the behavior of nonprofit membership organizations in
policy advocacy coalitions, to create a basis for understanding coalition
behavior relative to particular organizational characteristics. It is rooted in a
theoretical framework that combines Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith's Advocacy
Coalition Framework with theories of group formation and group action from
Terry Moe and Robert Salisbury. These theories provide an alternative way
to understand the action of values-based groups that may not be materially
driven, economically rational and self-interested. They often fall outside of
the calculus used to judge success in the marketplace or political arena.
The research examines the relationship between the benefits that nonprofit
membership organizations provide to retain their members, and the
organizations' freedom to act in policy advocacy coalitions. The approach
looks at four factors that are elements of this relationship; member
incentives, the advocacy decision-making process, leader constraints and
advocacy activities. The research looked at nine cases using three distinct
approaches: conducting open-ended interviews with group leaders,
analyzing organizational publications and observing coalition activities. The
data analysis relies heavily on successive, iterative displays of information
gathered, as a way to extract meaning, add dimension to the data, and
suggest avenues for further exploration.
IV


Findings confirm the basic theory that generally there are expressed and
observed constraints on nonprofit leaders representing their groups in
external coalitions. Findings also indicate that member benefits exchanges
are complex, somewhat clumsy and therefore of limited use as a signal for
group coalition behavior. Conversely, the method and degree of member
inclusion in the advocacy decision process, as well as the types of advocacy
activity selected by the group are significant indicators of groups potential
flexibility or rigidity in advocacy coalitions.
This abstract accurately represents the content ol I
recommend its publication.
Signed_
Peter deLeon
v


CONTENTS
Figures.......................................................... ix
Tables.............................................................x
Acknowledgments...................................................xi
1. INTRODUCTION....................................................1
Role of Voluntary Action in American Society.................1
Need for Research on Voluntary Sector Advocacy...............6
Current Perspectives on Voluntary Associations in Policy
Development...........................................10
Public Policy's View of the Voluntary Sector................15
Problem Definition: Applying Public Policy Theory to
Public Interest Voluntary Associations................20
Framework of the Study: Assumptions, Definitions and Terms .... 24
Research Question ..........................................28
Focus of the Study and Organization of the Document.........29
2. PUBLIC INTEREST VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS
IN ADVOCACY COALITIONS......................................33
The Nonprofit Sector........................................33
Definition of Public Interest Voluntary Associations .......38
Govemment/Nonprofit Sector Interaction .....................46
A History of the Advocacy Role of Nonprofit Organizations ..51
Survey of Research..........................................61
Summary.....................................................66
3. LITERATURE REVIEW..............................................67
Introduction ...............................................67
Perspectives on Social Change and Policy Formulation........68
Advocacy Coalition Framework................................76
Theory of Group Formation...................................80
vi


Theory of Voluntary Group Action................................86
Purposive Model Organizations in Advocacy Coalitions .... 88
Solidary Model Organizations in Advocacy Coalitions......90
4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY................................................98
Summary Methodology ............................................98
Conceptual Framework...........................................100
Design of the Study............................................102
Data Collection ...............................................112
Data Categories................................................114
Sampling Frame.................................................117
Measurement and Output ........................................120
Validity, Reliability, Threats and Goodness....................123
5. RESULTS ...........................................................130
How is advocacy embedded in the range and scope of the
organization's activities?...............................142
What is the nature and distribution of member benefits within
the organization?........................................149
What is the nature and range of solidary benefits within the
organization? ...........................................152
Do leaders in nonprofit membership organizations report
constraints on their ability to represent the group in
external coalitions? ....................................156
What is the nature and range of leader constraints?............161
How are advocacy activity decisions made by these public
interest voluntary associations?.........................166
Do members influence advocacy decisions, either through
process or criteria? ....................................166
Are advocacy activity types a good indicator of whether a group
is willing/able to be flexible as a coalition partner?.173
Are solidary benefit exchanges always located where leaders
exhibit coalition flexibility? ..........................174
Are organizational characteristics such as member incentive
exchanges a good indicator of how groups might act in
policy advocacy coalitions?.....................................175
vii


6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS........................................180
Summary of Answers to Questions ...........................180
Findings...................................................187
Member Incentives ...................................187
Advocacy Decision Process ...........................189
Advocacy Activities..................................191
Leaders'Constraints..................................193
Implications for Practitioners.............................194
Implications for Theory ...................................203
Remaining Questions .......................................206
APPENDIX..........................................................211
Illustrations of Sector Models.............................211
Interview Instrument.......................................215
Steps in the Research and Data Analysis Process............221
Zander's Scale.............................................225
Data Documentation Form....................................226
Context Maps...............................................227
BIBLIOGRAPHY......................................................237
viii


FIGURES
Figure
2.1. Public Interest Voluntary Associations ................... 37
3.1. Conceptual Framework...................................... 93
4.1. StudyDesign.............................................. 105
5.1. Context Map (American Solar Energy Society).............. 143
5.2. Incentive Mix............................................ 150
5.3. Zander Score vs Activity Level .......................... 157
5.4. Zander Score Compared to Advocacy Stance ................ 174
IX


TABLES
Table
5.1. Descriptive Frame..................................... 131,132
5.2. Board Involvement in Advocacy ............................ 145
5.3. Member Involvement in Advocacy............................ 145
5.4. Advocacy Frame............................................ 147
5.5. Solidary Benefits Frame .................................. 154
5.6. Interaction With Coalition Partners....................... 158
5.7. Leaders'Constraints Frame ................................ 162
5.8. Personal Factors Influencing Leaders' Coalition Stance... 163
5.9. Who Makes/Controls Advocacy Decision...................... 167
5.10. Criteria Used to Make Advocacy Decision .................. 167
5.11. Advocacy Decision Chart .................................. 168
5.12. Advocacy Decision Typology................................ 171
5.13. Incentive Mix/Coalition Stance Typology................... 177
5.14. Incentive Mix/Coalition Stance Typology, Adjusted......... 178
x


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This study could only have been accomplished with the generous
cooperation of the many individuals who agreed to be interviewed for the
research. In particular, I am grateful to Pat Blumenthal, Richard H. Daley,
Robin Duxbury, Diane Gansauer, Art Hogling, Becky Campbell Howe, Ted
Kauss, Rich Male, Rich McClintock, Jack Mento, Jack Real, Larry Sherwood,
Carrie Warren-Gully, and Molly Williams for their help as the work
proceeded. Thanks to my family whose continued love and support made
this work possible, and especially to Jennifer Anne for her invaluable
assistance as first reader of work in progress, and technical consultant.
And, thanks to Peter deLeon, master of getting it all done.
XI


CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Role of Voluntary Action in American Society
"Voluntary associations" is a term that encompasses a broad variety
of nonprofit membership groups. It is far easier to recognize the importance
of voluntary action and the significance of voluntary association advocacy to
policy development than it is to understand how these organizations
exercise their advocacy role. Because they are sometimes difficult to isolate
for study and because they can be studied from so many different
disciplinary perspectives but are central to none of them, voluntary groups
have been largely neglected in traditional studies of the policy process and
in most organizational studies. This lack of knowledge about how public
interest voluntary associations act in their public policy roles motivates this
research.
That nonprofit associations are important goes without question.
Historians (Herring 1929, Lowenberg 1992, White 1993, Wiggenton 1992),
sociologists (Milofsky 1979) and political scientists (Mahood 1967,
1


Schattschneider 1935, I960, Zisk 1969) usually agree that voluntary action
stands behind many social change movements and major policy
developments. Scholars in the nonprofit sector also have been quick to
point this out (Joseph 1985, O'Connell 1981,1993). Robert Payton notes
that the voluntary tradition is "...not just acts of benevolence; it is also a
powerful lever of social change. It is the voice of discontent and
dissatisfaction as well as the expression of nurture and encouragement."
(1984:27) According to the Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public
Needs, 'There is hardly an area of federal activity-foreign affairs, race
relations, economic policy-in which the primary intellectual paradigms and
consensus building activities have not originated in the private nonprofit
sector." (Filer Commission 1977:103)
In fact, the role and mission of cause-driven voluntary organizations
has been to provide leadership for social change. In this country, it is
nonprofit organizations that initiated the Voting Rights movement, the Civil
Rights movement, Gay Lib, Gray Lib, and the cyclical "anti-alcohol"
crusades that are represented by the nineteenth century Women's Christian
Temperance Union (WCTU) and the present-day Mothers Against Drunk
Driving (MADD). Public interest voluntary associations have worked for
social welfare through the labor union, feminist and environmental
2


movements (Ellis and Noyes 1990, Newman 1973, Ostrander 1984, Pifer
1976). Today, nonprofit organizations are being encouraged to even greater
activism in domestic policy areas such as planning the information highway
(Chronicle of Higher Education. April 13,1994), working for welfare change
(Chronicle of Philanthropy. April 5,1994), and drafting national health care
policy (Speech in Denver, Colorado, by Christine Heenan, White House
Office of Health Policy, 1994), while they continue their activism in
humanitarian foreign policy areas.
Both the size of the voluntary sector and its level of involvement in
policy development are increasing. According to Internal Revenue Service
calculations, by 1995, there were approximately 1.2 million nonprofit
organizations in the United States, including more than 600,000 charitable
501 (c)(3) organizations; for the past several years, their numbers have been
growing at the rate of 25,000 per year. The voluntary sector employs nearly
three times as many individuals as are employed in the federal (civilian)
work force, and considerably more than are employed in the entire U.S.
manufacturing sector (New York Post. Oct. 31,1994).
The voluntary sector in the United States is the largest and most
active among the industrialized nations, and it can be expected to grow as
the nation's diversity increases. Cross-national studies note the degree to
3


which government and voluntary sector are intertwined in various countries
(McCarthy, Hodgkinson and Sumariwalla 1992). The voluntary sector is
found to be largest in more diverse societies, where it plays a more
prominent role in policy advocacy, a phenomenon that feeds upon itself
more diversity establishes more spokespersons, and in turn more voluntary
organizations (Gidron, Kramer and Salamon 1992).
In Colorado, umbrella organizations such as the Colorado Association
of Nonprofit Organizations (CANPO) and the Community Resource Center
(CRC) are helping their members organize for even more effective influence,
with the goal of helping to create public policies based on community (or, in
more skeptical circles, their particular) values. In a survey of CRC's 350
member organizations (60 percent of which are located outside of the
Denver metropolitan area), most grassroots groups report a high level of
commitment to their advocacy role (CRC 1994). All over the state, groups
are working on welfare reform and other issues, but their efforts are diluted
by their geographic isolation. Technology promises to change that by the
end of the decade, creating the potential for an enormous effect on the state
public policy arena from these voluntary associations.
Nationwide, futurists project a growing role for nonprofit
organizations. Some say that these organizations will be representatives of
4


the greater number of special interests in a hyperpluralist society (Bell 1973,
Naisbitt 1982, Toffler 1988). In this role as representatives, nonprofit
organizations are deliberately sought out by government to speak for diverse
interests. Both the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) process and the
negotiated rulemaking process are formal contexts where such deliberate
inclusion of diverse interests is mandatory. The communitarian perspective
on nonprofits, that they are a stage to work diverse interests into a
community of interests, is consistent with this role (Bellah et al. 1985,
Etzioni 1991, Kelman 1992). Politicians also use the representativeness
and the diversity of the nonprofit sector to their advantage, as a type of "fire-
alarm oversight mechanism" (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). This
description characterizes the sector as an efficient way to monitor
implementation of the law, since these organizations can be depended on to
challenge any missteps in execution of laws.
In their service role, nonprofit associations are often partners with
government, providing common goods. Such governmental partnerships are
expected to grow as we "reinvent" government and look to increased
decentralization in the future (Osborne and Gaebler 1992, Vice President
Albert Gore's National Performance Review. 1993). A popular viewpoint,
now that Washington is deliberating a new round of social service delivery
5


through block grants to the states, is that the number of nonprofit groups will
increase as they become an alternative delivery system for public goods.
This was the case in the 1980s when the Reagan Administration followed
that pattern, but the growth was almost entirely in the nonprofit health care
sector (Donahue 1989, Salamon 1992, Savas 1990). Peter Drucker (1989)
adds another dimension by suggesting that it is the combination of the
structural changes in the business sector and the downsizing of government
that will drive the growth of the nonprofit sector in the "post-business
society." Others predict major social changes and propose that the twenty-
first century will bring "the end of work" as we have known it, with real
employment expansion only in the voluntary sector (Rifkin 1995).
Notwithstanding these projections for growth of the voluntary sector,
and the continued and expanded involvement of voluntary associations in
policy development, what is critically missing is empirical work on the
performance of voluntary associations as part of an advocacy framework.
Need for Research on Voluntary Sector Advocacy
The nature and effectiveness of public interest voluntary association
advocacy is neither well documented nor understood, even in the face of the
increased visibility of the nonprofit sector, and growing, conflicting pressures
6


for changethose from Congress to limit nonprofit group advocacy, or those
from the private sector to increase the role of voluntary associations in policy
deliberations. General public interest in the activities of voluntary
associations has been increased by recent newspaper stories about
scandals in the sector including the ERA investment scam, the disgrace of
the United Way leadership and the much-heralded series by Philadelphia
Inquirer writers Gaul and Borowski (1993). From the media perspective,
nonprofit organizations are beginning to be perceived as another-and highly
privileged-way of doing business. Professional staff, changes to "fee-for-
service" delivery, greater marketing savvy, and competition with small
businesses in service areas such as entertainment, health clubs and child
care all seem to exaggerate the changed focus of nonprofits from "doing
good" to "doing well." Examples of high salaried executives, corps of
lobbyists and lavish operating styles make nonprofits seem more like
business operations, focusing critical attention on the question of nonprofits'
appropriate role and mission. Answering this question will be possible only
after a more thorough understanding of current nonprofit advocacy behavior
is developed.
As many as twenty years ago, the Yale University Program on
Nonprofit Organizations argued the need for "more research to understand
7


the tie between accountability mechanisms for nonprofit organizations and
democratic theory and practice, case studies on nonprofits' role in
redistributing power and the role that nonprofits do or should play in
legislative and electoral politics" (Simon, Brewster and Lindblom 1975). In
his introduction to the symposium on "Nonprofit Organizations and Public
Policy" published in the recent Policy Studies Review. Robert Lowry added
to the list by including studies on nonprofits' advocacy and service delivery
roles, as well as government regulation of nonprofits (1995). The Nonprofit
Sector Research Foundation at the Aspen Institute (1992), the American
voluntary sector's premier research foundation, includes in its list of critical
research areas four that focus on this relationship: The Nonprofit Sector in a
Democracy, The Role of the Nonprofit Sector in Society, Public
Accountability, and Advocacy. Albert 0. Hirschman suggests that we should
study these types of organizations, which he describes as "...that somewhat
rare bird, an organization where exit and voice both hold important roles," to
learn the dimensions of organizational behavior beyond the
business/marketplace paradigm. He directs us to look for "...groupings from
which members can both exit and be expelled. Political parties and
voluntary associations in general are excellent examples." (Hirschman
1970:77)
8


Clearly, as public interest voluntary associations increase in numbers
and expand their advocacy role and their visibility, an understanding of their
effect on the policy process becomes more critical. Nonprofit organizations
are becoming even more important participants in the policy process. They
are an increasingly large and visible sector of our society (Brudney 1990,
O'Neill 1989 b, Van Til 1988, Weisbrod 1989), are historically and continue
to be important proponents for policy change (Hall 1987a, 1992, Lohman
1992), and are defined by their interaction with government (Billis 1991,
Wolch 1990). For public policy scholars and practitioners, as well as for
leaders in the nonprofit sector as they develop their research agenda, it is
important to understand how public interest voluntary associations operate
in policy subsystems and how the values-based theory of policy learning and
change might be particularly relevant for understanding such values-driven
nonprofit organizations. Theories based on action that is materially driven,
economically rational and self-interested are insufficient for understanding
how public interest voluntary associations act and there is relatively little
research beyond these dimensions to date. Chester Barnard presciently
may have pointed out the reason: the measurable aspects of a situation are
often overemphasized, and the corollary-the not-easily-measured-may be
less emphasized (1938).
9


Current Perspectives on Voluntary Associations in Policy Development
It is difficult to isolate what is meant by voluntary action and more
precisely define the concept of voluntary association. Generally, the
literature of the nonprofit sector describes voluntary associations as service-
providing, voluntary-based and cause-driven (Hall 1992, Van Til 1988). In
the broadest definition, voluntary activities can be contained in many
categories including, "...voluntary associations, social movements, cause
groups, voluntarism, interest groups, pluralism, citizen participation,
consumer groups, participatory democracy, volunteering, altruism, helping
behavior, philanthropy, social clubs, leisure behavior, political participation,
religious sects, etc." (Smith 1972:epigraph) For the purpose of this
research, a working definition of such organizations is that they are
organized, non-governmental, voluntary, membership groups, engaged in
social action that is not directly self-serving.
Perspectives on the voluntary sector come from economics,
sociology, political science, law, social work, management science, and
public policy analysis. While these disciplines present distinctive views of
voluntary action, which are summarized below, there has been little attempt
to develop empirical data that deliberately links voluntary associations in
their public policy role with underlying theory in each of these fields. As a
10


result, we have little basis for an overarching theory of voluntary
associations in policy development.
Economic definitions of voluntary sector activity are based on
concepts of providing public goods and calculations of the opportunity costs
of volunteer labor (Schiff 1990, Skloot 1987, Steinberg 1987, Young 1983).
This view says that the nonprofit sector results from a "failure" of some other
institution. "Market failure" is cited as a cause for nonprofit activity;
nonprofits provide public goods that cannot be provided profitably in the
marketplace (Weisbrod 1977,1986). A slight twist on this economic
argument is the "contract failure" theory; nonprofits arise to provide services
in arenas where the consumer is hindered from making a knowledgeable
choice because of a lack of "perfect information," an underlying assumption
of market exchanges. In cases where all of the details of the exchange are
not known (e.g., buying day care or nursing home care), nonprofits are
judged to be more trustworthy providers of these services because they are
nominally not profit-motivated and are, therefore, assumed to be motivated
only by the desire to provide good service (Hammack and Young 1993,
Hansmann 1987, James 1987).
Sociologists have studied voluntary social movements within the
framework of the larger society, often suggesting a communitarian approach;
11


that nonprofits provide the vehicle for individuals to join in collective action
for the common good (Bellah et al. 1985, Lappe et al. 1994). But, with a few
exceptions (notably Meyer and imig 1993, Rose 1954), these studies are not
particularly careful about distinguishing between individual and group
participants in the movements, and are even less sensitive to distinctions
among types of group participants.
Political scientists study institutions, including interest groups, citizens'
groups, elites and power blocks, but largely from the perspective of how the
"power" of these groups affects public institutions (Reisman 1990, Simon
and Eitzen 1982, Wilson 1981). In a general sense, these institutions are
viewed as operationalizing democracy by serving as advocates for minority
opinions, arguing for change and serving as a watchdog for government.
When nonprofits are included in these studies, there is no indigenous
differentiation among types of nonprofits, a significant conceptual lapse
because in this type of study one cannot put the local soup kitchen and the
National Football League in the same analytic category. Neither sociology
nor political science is overly concerned with the participants in coalitions,
i.e., the specific organizations that are the members of the social movement
or the interest group, but rather place their focus on the aggregate body.
12


The legal approach is rooted in the Internal Revenue Service Code
and flowers in Tax Court case law (Bookman 1992, Brace and Strayer 1987,
Campbell 1990, Clotfelter 1988-89, Estes 1989, Fremont-Smith 1983, Simon
1987). Studies in the tradition of community action and social work have
concentrated on developing histories and case studies, which prove
valuable and interesting but do not necessarily lend themselves to building a
theoretical base (Bloomfield 1994, Gibson 1990, McFarland 1978).
Management studies, when focused on voluntary associations, have
looked inward, principally at the activities of managing the volunteer worker
and board-executive relations (Handy 1991, O'Neill 1989a). Organization
theories study leadership, group process and group motivation, but these
have focused on organizations that are primarily motivated toward economic
or political gains, such as businesses, unions or professional associations.
Although the latter two may be "nonprofit" in form, they are operating to
promote or protect the self-interest of members (Ostrom 1990). The
nonprofit association that is organized from a strictly non-self-interested
basissuch as Greenpeace or the local humane society-is often ignored.
Public policy mainly has focused on the stages heuristic, developing
concepts of the process or cycle of policy formulation and implementation.
But public policy has not focused on how nonprofits figure in these cycles,
13


principally because nonprofits are not identified as having a formal
functional role in the process. As an alternative to the stages concept of the
policy process, some public policy scholars have developed approaches that
define issue networks (Heclo 1978) or policy subsystems (Milward 1978,
Milward and Wamsley 1984) but until quite recently, these studies, too, have
studied issue systems motivated by power or money. In taking this
approach, scholars have essentially ignored the public interest voluntary
association that is not motivated, whether partially or wholly, by either of
these factors.
A promising new approach comes from James Skok (1995) who
suggests combining the functional (stages approach) with the structural
(network approach) into a theory encompassing the full and dynamic context
for policy development as well as the stages in the process. Scholars
working from this perspective-as this research does-will more easily
discern the role of the public interest voluntary association. This approach
encourages exploration of specialized groups of participants and their
relationships in an informal, decentralized and horizontal issue network.
14


Public Policy's View of the Voluntary Sector
With a few notable exceptions, public policy has not been attentive to
the role of voluntary associations. Most often, notions of voluntarism,
voluntary action, or volunteer associations are not even included in
discussions of public policy formulation. This is possibly because of the
discipline's emphasis on neoclassic economics, an approach not
intellectually comfortable with non-self-interested groups.
When it is included in standard public administration texts, the
voluntary sector is usually referenced in one of two limited ways. Either the
sector has an implementation role, serving as an alternative to government
service-delivery, usually in the context of privatization or reducing
government, or the sector is a client or interest to be dealt with by public
managers. For example, Judith Gruber (1987) looks at interest groups-and
specifically, voluntary associations-as clients in her work explaining the
factors that control government bureaucracies. These approaches,
grounded as they are in their interest in the function of public institutions,
see the voluntary private sector as peripheral.
Studies of voluntary associations as the alternative provider of public
goods have been done by Donahue (1989), Graham and Hays (1986),
Straussman (1985), Stokey and Zeckhauser (1978), and Weimer and Vining
15


(1989) . James L. Perry's Handbook on Public Administration admits no
reference to voluntary action or voluntary associations, but does direct the
reader from an entry for "nonprofit private corporations" to the entries under
"public enterprises." This listing assumes the implementation role for
nonprofit associations; the entries are a series of "how to" manage such a
group (Perry 1990:656). These views of voluntary associations, while useful
as far as they go, seriously underplay the role of the voluntary sector in the
public policy arena.
Classic anthologies in the field contain little direct reference to
voluntary associations. In Lane's Current Issues in Public Administration
(1990) , only one of the thirty-two entries speaks to the presence of voluntary
associations, that entry being E.S. Savas' "On Privatization." Similarly, in
Shafritz and Hyde's Classics of Public Administration (1992), only Chester
Barnard in "Informal Organizations and Their Relations to Formal
Organizations" (1938) recognized voluntary action and its relation to the
formal organization process. In the field's touchstone journal, the Public
Administration Review, only in the last year or two has one seen articles
specifically written about the nonprofit or voluntary association that go
16


beyond the "contracting" concept (Kearns 1994:185-192, Mercier 1994:349-
356, Roberts 1994:221-228, Skok 1995:325-332).
Much of the basic study of public policy formulation also misses the
role of the voluntary sector. Theories of public policy formulation are based
in the approach of describing the stages of the policy process and they
concentrate on the activities in each of these stages, where nonprofit
organizations have little formal role. As a result, there is a pattern of
overlooking the role of voluntary organizations in the policy process. There
have been a few exceptions to this pattern (Brewer and deLeon 1983,
deWitt et al. 1994, Ingram and Smith 1993, Valelly 1993). Ingram and Smith
(1993) have deliberately reframed the policy evaluation discussion for
analysts, by suggesting that "increasing citizen participation" should be
another valid measure of successful policy, thereby expanding the traditional
efficiency and effectiveness yardsticks. Brewer and deLeon propose a role
for nonprofit associations in the initiation and the implementation stages of
policy formulation, and use examples of voluntary action (such as advocates
for the blind obtaining special income tax exemptions) to point out the power
of such groups in policy frameworks (1983:270-271).
Those looking at policy systems have been somewhat more inclusive
of nonprofit associations. Brinton Milward, in his early description of the
17


policy subsystem (1978), briefly notes the role of voluntary groups in his
analysis, but the groups he describes are rooted in "producer/consumer"
model framework, which ignores the purely public interest voluntary
association. Bobrow and Dryzek (1987) also have noted a role for voluntary
groups. They have proposed a number of system conceptsways of looking
at what goes on in policy formulation-including the "Social Structures"
approach that focuses on informal power structures and their deliberate
attempts to promote the influence of grass-roots organizations. Essentially,
the "Smoke Valley" framework, an imaginary case wherein they describe the
differing policy analysis approaches one might use in solving Smoketown's
environmental problem, proposes one clear approach that focuses on the
activity of voluntary associations. This "Social Structures" approach,
however, is not a theory as much as it is a descriptive frame for looking at
policy systems. As such, it is helpful background for constructing a theory of
behavior for these groups.
Relatively few policy scholars have included values-based voluntary
associations in an overall theory of policy formulation. Recently, however,
Paul A. Sabatier and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith (1993) introduced the
Advocacy Coalition Framework, which does provide a foundation for study of
the role of such voluntary associations in policy formulation. The Advocacy
18


Coalition Framework (ACF) focuses on belief systems, their structure, and
their effect on an organization's role in policy subsystems. In its simplest
terms, an "advocacy coalition" is a collection of public and private sector
participants with shared policy beliefs, who work together over sustained
periods of time to achieve policy goals. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith's
research results in twelve hypotheses that frame the behavior of
organizations relative to policy issues, as those issues relate to either the
deep core (most fundamental and firmly held normative beliefs), policy core
(basic strategies for achieving core values within the policy subsystem), or
secondary aspects of the policy frame (tactics).
The ACF approach is very attractive to those interested in the
function of voluntary associations in policy subsystems. Such organizations
are basically cause-driven, i.e., principally rooted in beliefs and values
rather than economic or social interests. ACF calls these groups "purposive
organizations" and proposes that these groups are more steadfast (or
stubborn) in advocacy coalitions. From the perspective of nonprofit
scholarship, Bryson and Crosby (1992) have used the term "regimes" to
indicate the same type of value networks, and focus their prescriptive work
on how these regimes can act to influence public policy.
19


Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, in proposing a distinctive role for
"purposive organizations" in the long-term advocacy coalition, provide a
means to evaluate their participation in policy subsystems. In two of the six
policy subsystem case studies offered in their book, nonprofit organizations
have been identified as the "purposive" or "sectarian" groups in the policy
subsystem. These cause-driven groups are seen to be representing the
extremes on both sides of whatever the policy issue. What the authors
describe as a "values hierarchy," i.e., the group's structure of values, is
hypothesized to be a constraint on organizational action. The
accompanying assumption is that such purposive institutions will be more
stable (or stubborn) participants in advocacy coalitions; they are less
receptive to what the authors call policy learning and change through policy
analysis, and they defend their entire values structure more aggressively.
Problem Definition: Applying Public Policy Theory to
Public Interest Voluntary Associations
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith have taken the first step through their
research on the workings of the Advocacy Coalition Framework, by providing
the simple classification of groups as either "sectarian" or "purposive," and
describing the distinctive behaviors of these non-material groups in
20


coalitions. However, the limitations of their work is that it neither helps us to
predict which groups might truly be purposive, nor helps us to understand
why this might be so. In constructing a model of the policy process that
moves beyond the limitations of ACF and yet works for non-material
organizations, it is necessary to synthesize the ACF with theories of group
formation and group action that fit values-based organizations.
Used together, Clark and Wilson (1961), Salisbury (1969) and Moe
(1980), give us the theoretical basis outlined following. Salisbury's Incentive
Theory of group formation, which draws on Clark and Wilson's theory of
organizational incentives, proposes that solidary and/or purposive incentives
drive individuals to form non-material groups. The member/group
relationship is symbiotic; members form groups to meet their needs, and
groups, especially nonprofit groups, have members to sustain themselves
and provide power, status, legitimacy, and financial support.
Terry Moe explains why member benefits (what is exchanged
between a group and its members), drive group leaders toward particular
behaviors in external interactions. Leaders will act in group-preserving ways
to sustain the group by satisfying members. If material or social rewards will
satisfy members, these are provided. If only purposive rewards will suffice,
21


leaders have no choice but to achieve the cause-related goals that the
group is formed to meet.
By deliberately linking these theories from Clark and Wilson,
Salisbury, and Moe into a continuous base, and applying such expanded
theory, this research proposes a pattern that may help determine which
voluntary associations fit Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith's definition of
purposive groups. These groups might be expected to behave according to
the tenth ACF hypothesis; "Elites of purposive groups are more constrained
in their expressions of beliefs and policy positions than elites from material
groups."(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993:152) A more detailed discussion
of this hypothesis will be offered in Chapter 3.
The driving assumption behind voluntary associations is that to
maintain themselves, organizations must satisfy members' incentives for
becoming and remaining involved. In the case where the incentive for
member involvement is a purely purposive one, that is, to attain some valued
goal, then the group must work toward achieving these goals to keep its
members. There is no alternative option to give material or solidary benefits
instead, such as a union might provide to its members in the form of a better
pay settlement or nicer working conditions (material incentives), or a
neighborhood association might provide in the form of an annual picnic
22


(solidary incentives). According to Moe, keeping goal achievement so
singlemindedly in sight does have an apparent downside, however it
effectively constrains leaders' options for behavior in external coalitions.
A critical assumption is that the activities involved in meeting
members' needs produce observable organizational control structures and
characteristics. People's decisions to become involved in a collective
activity, the organizing efforts of association leaders, resource exchanges
within organizations, the provision of incentives to participants, collective
decisions on the allocation of group resources, and the pursuit of political
goals in the larger society all become the observable characteristics of
organizational control and maintenance structures (Knoke 1990). Such
characteristics of internal behavior in non-material organizations (those in
which one can rule out strictly economic motives) can be classified as
belonging to two categories, either solidary (\.e., satisfying social needs) or
purposive (i.e., linked with members' commitment). It is these organizational
control structures and characteristics that are to be observed in this
research. Their details are discussed further in Chapter 3.
23


Framework of the Study: Assumptions. Definitions and Terms
This research is a test of the power of a combined theory that
includes Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith's Advocacy Coalition Framework,
Salisbury's Incentive Theory, and Moe's work on organizations. It is
designed to explore the role of public interest voluntary associations in
advocacy coalitions. The general objective of this study is to examine
discernible organizational characteristics and exchanges between members
and leaders and relate them to advocacy behaviors of voluntary
organizations. The conceptual framework to be developed suggests that the
interaction between an organization and its members may drive the
organization's behavior as it confronts its external environments, which it
typically does through involvement with others as part of an issue network.
The methodologies used include interviews with group leaders, analysis of
organizational documents and operations, and redundant displays of the
resulting data.
The focus of the research will be on two principal categories of
variables, benefit structures within organizations and organizations' flexibility
in advocacy coalitions. Benefit structures are member incentives provided
to members by the organization. What is being done to satisfy members in
public interest voluntary associations? Or, what benefits keep members in
24


the group? These incentive exchanges can be expected to vary in the
degree to which they may be classified as purposive or solidary (or even
material). If the ACF is correct, then organizations that have principally
purposive benefits to exchange with members will be least flexible in
coalitions.
As a test for possible additional explanatory variables several other
characteristics of organizations will be examined. These include such
elements as the decision process used, and organization funding-elements
that may function as surrogates for solidary member benefits. With respect
to the advocacy decision process, the important concepts are how decisions
are made and by whom. Knoke believes that the degree of inclusion of
members in the decision process can be an indicator of solidary benefits
processes within the organization (1990). Democratic methods of decision-
making allow members to feel "ownership" of decisions, and may give
leaders more room to negotiate in coalitions. In the same way, an
organization whose funding is not dependent on membership fees may have
more ability to ignore member needs. Either of these may function as
alternatives to providing purposive benefits, taking the pressure off leaders
for achieving organizational goals.
25


The second category of variable is the organization's flexibility in
advocacy coalitions. This was examined in two ways. The primary measure
is leaders' expressions of their sense of flexibility or rigidity in external
discussions, i.e., their expressed constraints in representing the
organization's interests in advocacy arenas. Since the need to satisfy
members' objectives is posited to affect leaders' perceptions of their freedom
to negotiate in outside coalitions, it was not necessary to determine whether
they actually acted in a constrained manner, only to know whether they feel
constrained.
A second measure of this same concept (the organization's flexibility
in coalitions) was gathered by ranking the type of advocacy activity the
organization uses. For example, does the organization prefer direct
lobbying, media campaigns, legal action or civil disobedience? This part of
the research used Zander's list of eleven advocacy types (1990) which are
organized according to the degree of aggression or passion in the advocacy
activity. These are elaborated in Chapter 4, Research Methodology.
The sampling frame includes a set of Colorado voluntary associations
that are advocacy organizations, have a membership base, and are not
primarily member-serving. The study design, which consists of a series of
interviews and an examination of texts produced by these selected voluntary
26


associations, proceeded in overlapping, somewhat iterative phases and is
best described as conceptually-driven sequential sampling. Working
definitions of terms used in the research analysis follow;
Public Interest Voluntary Associations are formally organized,
nonprofit, membership organizations. For this study, Colorado-
based organizations that have a history of advocacy, have a
staff director who represents the group in coalitions, and are
involved in environmental or animal rights issues have been
selected as the initial sample.
Members are defined as the sustainers of the group, whether through
financial contributions and/or volunteer activity (McCarthy and
Zald 1973,1977).
Leaders are the senior individuals in the organization who are
responsible for implementing the advocacy program. Usually
this is the Executive Director of the organization, but in some
cases, volunteer staff and board members may be included in
this definition.
Advocacy is the representation of a set of views in the shaping of
public policy.
27


Coalitions are ongoing arrangements for deliberately working together
toward a common goal. They require explicit mutual
agreement among members for coordinating some or all of the
actions of the group (Wilson 1973).
The assumptions listed below and expanded in the following chapters
support the conceptual framework of the research.
Organizations' incentive structures, what is exchanged between the
group and its members, will expose belief systems.
There are discernible differences in non-material organizations.
Differing degrees of social and purposive incentives are mixed in
organizations, and are reflected in incentive structures.
What leaders believe groups must do to satisfy members affects their
behavior when representing the group.
Leaders' statements are good indicators of feelings about flexibility in
external arenas.
Research Question
The expanded theory proposed as a basis for this research combines
the Advocacy Coalition Framework and Incentive Theory with a theory of
28


group action that is appropriate for public interest voluntary associations.
The working hypothesis is that public interest voluntary associations with low
levels of solidary benefits will behave as the "purposive" organizations noted
in the Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith's tenth Advocacy Coalition Framework
hypothesis, i.e., they will be less flexible in advocacy coalitions. Or, stated
conversely, high levels of solidary benefits can undermine commitment to
the voluntary organization's goals.
The purpose of this research generally is to expand developing
theories of the policy process, using organization theories of how groups are
formed and maintained and focusing these toward an understanding of the
public interest voluntary association. From its starting point of examining
member benefit exchanges, the research questions whether these or other
organizational incentive and control systems are good indicators of
organizations external behavior in policy coalitions. The conclusions are
more detailed and strengthened hypotheses about how incentive exchanges
and other factors affect group behavior in advocacy coalitions.
Focus of the Study and Organization of the Document
The general problem addressed by this research is the absence of a
well-developed concept of why public interest voluntary associations behave
29


as they do in policy advocacy. The study combines sociology's interest in
the functions of voluntary associations within the social system with public
policy's interest in the role of the voluntary association in policy
development.
This research observes the intra-group activities or exchanges within
an organization and then uses these observations to approximate the level
of purposive and solidary characteristics within selected public interest
voluntary associations. It was expected that the purposive character of the
organization would be diminished by the level of solidary characteristics
present in the organization, or by the presence of other characteristics that
may function to dampen the intensity of the purposive character of the
group. The research compared these results to the organization leader's
freedom to bargain in advocacy coalitions, exploring the relationship that
these elements may have to each other. If Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith's
hypotheses are correct, then indications of high solidary benefits exchange
within the group will exist in groups where leaders express fewer constraints
on their actions in coalitions. ACF asserts it is the organization's belief
system, with its built-in values hierarchy, that determines organizational
behavior in policy coalitions. Some nonprofit organizations have a values
hierarchy that may be thought of as almost flat, because it includes only-or
30


almost only-the dimension of "achieving the mission." These organizations
may be very rigid members of advocacy coalitions. Others may behave
more like for-profit organizations.
This dissertation is organized in six chapters. Chapter 2 reviews the
theory and history of the voluntary sector in America, with special emphasis
on defining the public interest voluntary association for the purpose of this
research.
Chapter 3 establishes the basis of the study in the theoretical models
of organization formation and action. The chapter includes an integrated
multi-dimensional theory of organizational action that supports an
understanding of how this particular subset of organizations, public interest
voluntary associations, act in advocacy coalitions. The chapter concludes
with a set of questions to be addressed by the display and analysis of
information developed through interviews and document review.
Chapter 4 outlines the methodology used to gather and analyze data
from a group of Colorado voluntary associations that have been active in
advocacy arenas.
Chapter 5 reviews the information gathered from each of the
organizations, presenting extensive data analysis of each category of data.
31


Chapter 6 presents conclusions and implications for further research.
It speaks directly to the role of nonprofits in the policy process, in terms of
both perceived and substantive effects. It contributes to a more generalized
theory of inter-group action, enhancing two significant bodies of scholarship
addressing social change; social movement theory and interest group
theory. It points to further research possibilities, particularly in determining
the potential for manipulating group incentive structures as a way to affect
external group behavior.
32


CHAPTER 2
PUBLIC INTEREST VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS
IN ADVOCACY COALITIONS
The Nonprofit Sector
This discussion is intended to build a concept of the nonprofit sector
as a basis for understanding public interest voluntary associations, the units
within the sector to be examined in this research. In clarifying the concept of
sector, it is helpful to acknowledge a variety of approaches. One can look at
sectors from a structural perspective of who authorizes them (ownership),
who benefits from them (outcomes), or how they function (process). In each
case, one gets different lists of organizations in each sector. Most of the
scholarly work on this issue conceptualizes the sectors as either
"public/private," or uses the three sector model of "business, government
and nonprofit."
Those who use the dual-sector model are not consistent about which
elements (i.e., ownership, outcomes or process) are the deciding factor
relegating nonprofits to either the "public" or "private" side; however, they do
33


capture the sense of action and tension between the sectors (Gamwell 1984,
Paton 1991, Sumariwaila 1983, Weisbrod 1975). (See Appendix A for more
complete explanations and illustrations of various sector models). An
example of a two-sector model based on "outcomes" is Burton Weisbrod's
popular economic model. It casts the nonprofit organization as a quasi-
govemmental (public) agent that satisfies consumer demands for collective
goods, where government is politically unable to do so. He sub-classifies
these groups as "proprietary" nonprofits (clubs, trade associations),
"collective" groups (museums, aid-to-the-poor) and "trust" groups (hospitals,
schools). This model, as with many others that are strictly economics-
based, does not provide enough dimension to easily hold the public interest
voluntary association within it. Nevertheless, these two sector models are
valuable in that they focus less on boundariesand what fits insideand
more on relations across boundaries. Through them, we are confronted with
the porous boundaries that exist between the sectors. David Billis (1991)
called this the "blurring of the sectors," and he and others have looked for
characteristics that will help define what's in and what's out.
The other traditional approach, the three-sector model, is the one
used by Bruce Hopkins in his six editions of The Law of Tax Exempt
Organizations (1992). Business is the first sector, government is the second
34


sector, and the voluntary nonprofit (tax-exempt) sector is the third sector.
This model defines nonprofits as a legal entity, but falls short for researchers
who require more precision in the description. Essentially, Hopkins allows
the authority to define the sector to rest with government through the Internal
Revenue Code, placing the state as a situational precondition of the
nonprofit sector. However, it is important to remember that voluntary
associations existed prior to 1917, when the federal income tax was initiated.
At that time, taxes were applied to the exceptional activity, not the reverse.
When "tax-exempt" activities were first defined in developing the tax code,
they included the religious, charitable and public benefit activities that had
always been in existence (Block 1987).
Jon Van Til (1988) offers an unusual four-sector model of society:
business, government, nonprofit and household sectors. He adds a dynamic
aspect with his model by describing the interdependence of these sectors,
with the household sector serving as the keystone. Households (or
individuals within them) earn money and buy products in the business
sector; form foundations, volunteer and are members of associations in the
nonprofit sector; and support government through voting and paying taxes.
David Horton Smith (1990) extends the modelling concept also, and
presents a five-sector model of society, including the personal sector
35


(families and friendship groups), the business sector, the government sector,
public benefit nonprofits (e.g., American Red Cross) and private benefit
nonprofits (e.g., American Dental Association). Smith's approach divides
what we traditionally think of as the nonprofit sector into smaller pieces
linked to who benefits from the activities of the group. One could argue that
there is no need to be this specific about nonprofits, any more than it is
necessary to separate the business sector into small pieces to reflect the
difference between IBM and the comer grocer as a function of their size or
clientele.
This discussion of sector modelling is helpful for this research as it
builds a concept of where public interest voluntary associations are located
in relation to the government and business sectors, as well as within the
nonprofit sector itself. I use an illustration that is a modification of Victor
PestofFs Triangle," (1991), itself reminiscent of American
economist Kenneth Bouldings earlier work (1973a), to visualize the space
occupied by business, government and the nonprofit sector. The
coordinates locating a particular nonprofit organization within the sector
space can be considered to be a function of how close or distant it is to both
government and business values. An organization with a high focus on
concepts of "earned income" (such as a hospital) would be located along the
36


Public Interest Voluntary Associations
Government
Figure 2.1
nonprofit/business axis closer to the business end (Point A). Likewise, an
organization that exists to carry out a government program and operates
almost entirely on government funding, while "nonprofit" in form, would be
located at Point B, conceptually closer to the government end of the axis.
Some parts of the nonprofit sector work closely with the other two
sectors, but advocacy groups are the opposite. Public interest voluntary
associations whose principal activity is to challenge either government or
business would be located in the apex of the nonprofit corner of the triangle,
farthest from either government or business (Point C).
37


Definition of Public Interest Voluntary Associations
The nonprofit sector has always been with us, providing what David
Horton Smith has called the "social capital" of human society (1973:18).
The literature of the sector generally describes nonprofits as service-
providing, voluntary-based, non-taxable, not-for-profit and cause-driven (Hall
1992, Van Til 1988). But this description, coupled with the wide range of
services that nonprofits provide, makes tighter definition a challenging task.
Nonprofits, for instance, include the community garden club as well as
Smithsonian Museums, mutual insurance companies and day care centers,
churches and chambers of commerce, museums and hospitals, farm
cooperatives and universities, burial societies and labor organizations,
private foundations and nursing homes, social service agencies and art
galleries. Indeed, we can see how nonprofit associations have even had an
effect on national defense policy and foreign policy.
To create order and pattern for discussing nonprofits, scholars have
attempted to create typologies of the nonprofit sector. Salamon and Anheier
(1992) describe the sector as divided into four distinct types: funding
agencies, member-serving groups, social service groups, and churches.
These are arrayed over the Internal Revenue Service' (IRS) classifications
and defined by their service to other groups or individuals. This typology is
38


generally useful as a first step in isolating the type of nonprofits for focus in
this research. However, one can quarrel with these authors over the
creation of a separate classification for churches. These can fit into any of
the other three categories, and the argument for separate classification-that
they are exempt from federal reporting requirements-is not particularly
compelling. Small organizations are also exempt, as well as organizations
that are a part of a larger, national group which files a consolidated IRS
report.
As to Salamon and Anheier's three remaining types, the first of these
is the funding agency, a foundation or fundraising intermediary that exists to
channel resources to service organizations. Examples of such groups are
private foundations such as the Ford Foundation, United Way organizations
and various hospital or university foundations-organizations that operate
much like businesses and have business values. These nonprofits are
outside the defined scope of this research.
The second type is the member-serving class of organization that
exists, in part, to give specific groups a voice in policy. Unions, professional
associations, such as the American Medical Association, and local groups,
such as youth soccer clubs, are some examples. These organizations, too,
are outside the scope of this research.
39


The third type of nonprofit organization exists primarily to serve
others, i.e., to provide goods or services to those in need or otherwise to
promote the general welfare. Included here are the bulk of what we define
as the "charitable" or "social action" nonprofit sector. The type of
organization of interest in this research, the public interest voluntary
association, is part of this charitable, social action nonprofit sector. The
defining characteristics of this group are:
Cause-driven. They should have a clear mission stated in terms of
social change.
Formal. They should be organized and incorporated as an IRS 501
subchapter group.
Member-owned. These groups should be self-governing and should
not have a heavy reliance on funds from potentially controlling
sources other than members.
Member-based. These groups should have an open, non-exclusive
membership.
Voluntary. Participation in the group is non-coerced.
Private. They are not a government agency.
Express ownership of public problems. These groups should be
involved in policy advocacy.
40


These characteristics warrant further discussion, as this work is rooted in
understanding their potential for variation.
Cause-driven groups are "mission oriented. Fulfilling this mission is
the most important reason why the group exists. The strength of the
connection between mission fulfillment and satisfaction of members is one of
the principal factors to be studied in this research. The nature of cause-
driven organizations is that many of them are not pure activist groups, but
they combine activism and action (i.e., programs of service delivery). This
program aspect has the potential for providing alternative benefits to
members that are other than "achieving the mission." For the purpose of
defining the organizations to be studied in this research, it is important that if
service is provided it be in the form of non-divisible collective benefits that
are not distributed directly to members. Service to whom, what services,
and by whom they are delivered are important criteria for many scholars in
defining that public interest voluntary association (Anthony and Verba 1988).
Shafritz and Ott distinguish organizations by who receives the service; there
are general "cause advocacy" groups and particular "case advocacy" groups
(1992). Debra Stone offers the criterion that while the costs of the function
may be either distributed or concentrated, the benefits are diffused (1988).
Bozeman (1989) defines public interest goals as "transitive," i.e., outside the
41


organization. Etzioni distinguishes between "constituency representing" and
"special interest" groups (1991). And Berry describes these benefits as
"...[n]ot selectively or materially benefiting the membership or activists of the
organization (1977:7). As a yardstick to measure public interest voluntary
associations, the "public goods" concept is useful to the extent that if the
group provides services, the services must directly benefit the intended
clients, i.e., not directly benefit the association's membership.
The concept of "formal status" for public interest voluntary
associations is offered to distinguish them from grassroots, non-organized
activity. While the latter is certainly a legitimate form of voluntary sector
advocacy, it does not bend easily to analysis. Formal status through
authorization by IRS designation has the additional benefit of assuring, at
least in terms of legal status, that these are not profit-distributing groups.
This indicator is an important one for determining inclusion of organizations
in the sector. The "non-distribution" doctrine is currently considered to be
the substantial dividing line adhered to in many recent tax court decisions
(Hopkins 1980). Clearly, a "nonprofit" is fundamentally not meant to enrich
anyone. Formal designation indicates that groups are not profit-distributing,
and it is a way to give meaning to the concept of "organizational" position
(differentiated from personal expressions) in advocacy coalitions.
42


Concepts of "member-owned" and "member-based" have been addressed
by David Billis (1992) and Taylor and 6 (1994). Billis contends that
organization theory has been insufficiently applied to understanding the
managerial and organizational issues in the third sector. Therefore, he
formulates a nonprofit definition from the organizational perspective,
proposing that such associations rely on concepts of membership and voting
to control them. The stakeholder configuration is such that the members are
the owners. This concept of owner/member is one of the dimensions
defining public interest voluntary associations for this research. An
important amplification of the "member" category is that its basis must be
open and inclusive. In defining "issue groups," Tesh describes them as
having "...open or nonexclusive membership and bas[ing] their appeals for
support in terms of "moral" convictions about the righteousness of its
policies."(1984:29-31)
The designation of the group as "voluntary" refers to the fact that the
organization should be the child of spirit, not law or necessity. These are
the groups that engage in "what one is neither made to or paid to do."(Smith
1973:387) This concept of "voluntary" is large enough to include also the
idea of "voluntary action," wherein volunteers provide services as part of the
activities of the organization. While some scholars place a high value on
43


such voluntary action in defining nonprofit organizations, it is not considered
essential for this research. Organizations without volunteers in the service
sense can still be considered "voluntary." It is not the fact of "using
volunteers to deliver services" that makes a group voluntary, rather, it is the
fact that the group's act of organizing itself was non-coerced, not required. It
was voluntary.
For U.S. nonprofits, their distance from government is important to
their status as fundamentally "private" organizations. The relationship
between the nonprofit and government sectors in this country has been
characterized as uneasy and conflict-ridden, very much in contrast to the
situation in many European countries where government directly supports
nonprofits, including their advocacy role (McCarthy et al. 1992). It is this
distance between the two sectors in the U.S., which can be jeopardized if
organizations become dependent on government funding, that gives public
interest voluntary associations here the latitude to challenge government.
Recently, scholars have begun to consider this political role of nonprofits in
more depth.
The final, important aspect of defining public interest voluntary
associations is their advocacy role. Wolch (1990) argues that among the
most significant roles of nonprofits are advocacy, social innovation, and to
44


"watch government." Schene points out the importance of the role of
nonprofits in involving citizens in the public agenda of the community. A
major function of nonprofits is "to continue to influence the national agenda
on public policy." (1992:218)
This list of organizational characteristics (cause-driven, formal,
member-owned and member-based, voluntary, private and involved)
ignores some approaches that have been used in defining voluntary
associations because they are not considered helpful for the present
research. For example, the California SIC project takes a no-nonsense
business-approach by classifying nonprofit groups according to their
program area, for example, health, environment and education (Smith 1992).
It is valuable for certain types of comparisons (e.g., comparisons of for-profit
hospitals versus not-for-profit hospitals' patient care days). But this
classification is not helpful here because subject area is relatively sterile for
distinctions among nonprofits. Consider the difference between two "health
care" organizations: one a storefront operation that provides free childhood
immunizations in the inner city, and the other a successful research hospital
with a national reputation. In almost every aspect other than that they are in
the health care business, these are different-size, budget, activity,
geographic locus of operations, staffing, management and control structure,
45


and certainly organizational culture. The differences within SIC category
can be very large.
But how does understanding these characteristics of public interest
voluntary associations help us? The value of identification and definition is
twofold; it provides a temporary foundation on which to rest present
research, and searching for definition helps us to develop a sense of the
core values and beliefs of the nonprofit advocacy sector. Now that we have
developed a concept of the nonprofit sector and defined public interest
voluntary associations as a starting point for this research, the following
section relates the scope and development of govemment/nonprofit sector
interaction.
Govemment/Nonprofit Sector Interaction
The relationship between nonprofit organizations and government
can be demonstrated and understood in several ways, such as through
regulation, contracting and advocacy. The regulatory interface is easiest to
see. Particularly in the last decade, there has been a considerable increase
in the regulation of nonprofits by government at all levels, such as has not
been seen since the 1950s. States require a greater degree of reporting,
charities must register before soliciting funds, and many state and local
46


governments are looking closely at nonprofit activities and property in an
effort to find taxable resources. At the federal level, the Treasury
Department and Congress are each looking to tighten operating rules for
nonprofit organizations, especially in the area of the advocacy and lobbying
roles of these groups (Istook Amendment 1995). Fueling these moves
toward more restrictions on voluntary association activity is one of the
underlying, unanswered questions for America; what is the "proper role for
voluntary private action in our society?
For the most part, studies of nonprofit interaction with government
have concentrated on the contracting role that nonprofits engage in for
government. This role, which represents a complete turnaround of
government policy from the New Deal in the 1930s, was enthusiastically
promoted in the 1960's Great Society. During that latter era, when the
model favored moving social service delivery into the community by
"contracting-out" to community agencies, many nonprofit service groups
were bom to meet the growing need. While there are still those who argue
for reinventing government by continued contracting-out of government
service delivery, recent studies have suggested that this approach is a
failure, when viewed from either side of the contract. On the public policy
side, scholars have begun to identify the "hollow state" that results when
47


government loses control of service provision (Milward and Provan 1993).
On the nonprofit sector side, the parallel phrase is "shadow state," signifying
the loss of public-serving soul that nonprofit causes suffer when they
become contractors to government (Wolch 1990).
The advocacy interaction, however, has been more difficult to
understand, perhaps because it is so difficult to measure. What we are
really talking about is influence, persuasion, and the power of ideas. Social
science provides us with a rich historical and anecdotal record of the
advocacy role of voluntary nonprofit organizations. Although the story is
sometimes romanticized, it is clearly correct that the nonprofit sector has
been at the forcing edge of the social change movements in our country's
history. The civil rights movement, the feminist movement, child labor laws
and the union movement in the workplace, and the environmental movement
all have their roots not in the "voice of the majority" heard through the voting
process, nor in the market place where "economic man" acts to maximize his
self interest, but through the advocacy and activism of citizens in voluntary
associations. It is worthwhile to note that these underlying social roles of the
voluntary sector have endured over time, even though the dimensions of the
sector and the nature of its members may have changed (Filer Commission
1975).
48


Of particular interest is the direction of the interaction between
nonprofits and government. For most of its history, nonprofit organization
advocacy has moved social concerns toward the public sphere, for attention
and eventual government solution. Historically, in America and in social
democratic countries today, the nonprofit sector's role in public policy has
been served at the "problem identification" stage of policy formulation. Most
often, the result of these efforts has been the passage of new laws, or the
establishment of a government program or agency to implement policy
dealing with the problem (Percy 1989, Stivers 1995). The Abolition
Movement resulted in the Emancipation Proclamation. The Women's
Suffrage Movement resulted in the Nineteenth Amendment to the
Constitution. The Civil Rights Movement resulted in the Civil Rights Act.
And the Environmental Movement resulted in the Environmental Protection
Agency. The Ladies Aid Society lobbied for better nutrition for school
children and today we have a federal school lunch program. Once an issue
was brought to public attention, a government function or department was
created to take care of it. Many of the issues first raised through voluntary
sector activism now have a federal, state or local government agency in
control.
49


Indications are that another type of interaction between government
and nonprofits is now becoming more visible and more important to the
public policy community. Scholars have suggested reframing the policy
analyst's approach in determining "good" policies, to include another valid
measure of successful public policy"increasing citizen participation"
(deLeon 1992, Ingram and Smith 1993, Majone 1988, Reich 1988).
Involvement of citizens through nonprofit organizations can be an important
piece of this measure. The communitarian movement identifies the nonprofit
sector as part of the environment for active citizenship, enabling policy to
develop not in the "marketplace" but in an arena that functions more like a
"public square." Nonprofits are finding their way to the table as partners in
the development of social policy. An often cited example of this type of
advocacy involvement is the Community Action Programs of the 1960s, but
the model continues to function even in recent applications such as the use
of immigrant advocacy groups as part of the immigration and Naturalization
Service' immigrant amnesty program (Gonzalez-Baker 1993).
In this discussion of govemment/nonprofit sector interaction, it is
worth noting that the nonprofit sector, through private foundation funding,
may have had an enduring effect on the discipline of public administration
itself. Foundation funding may be the reason for the endurance of one of
50


the most significant divisions in the field, the politics/administration
dichotomy. Aiisdair Roberts has argued that the growth of public
administration as a discipline depended on maintaining the
politics/administration dichotomy (1994). The very language of the
"politics/administration dichotomy" allowed private foundation support of
government commissions, such as the Gulick and Brownlow Commissions,
which received Rockefeller, Ford and Spelman Foundation dollars
(O'Connell 1987). Foundations could clearly pronounce this work as "non-
political," supporting only the "administrative" side of government, and not
promoting a particular social agenda. Public Administration, for obvious
reasons, agreed with the distinction.
A History of the Advocacy Role of Nonprofit Organizations
While there has always been voluntary sector activity in America
(e.g., the grassroots activism of the Sons of Liberty and the Minutemen in
the American Revolution) the growth of nonprofit advocacy organizations as
a distinct type has been most pronounced since the middle of the nineteenth
century. The stage was set for growth through the activities of the "Great
Awakening." This evangelical movement in the first two decades of the
nineteenth century in America grew out of the diminishing influence of
51


traditional elites, an expanding "tradesman" class, and the gradual
resettlement of the population into Midwestern towns. The force behind the
movement was a combination of Methodist, Baptist and Presbyterian
religious leaders and members of the new class of merchants and
professionals. These evangelists were moved by a passion to promote the
power of individual action for personal betterment, "clean living" and the joy
of intellectual pursuits. They produced a complex culture of organizations
including hospitals, orphanages, libraries, colleges, homes for the aged, and
professional societies throughout the country. The tactics used in
establishing these organizations served as models for the advocacy
movements that followed. The Great Awakening boosted the country's
revivalist spirit, increased its capacity for broad social movements and
taught citizens the power of zeal.
As a result of this lesson, during the middle period of the nineteenth
century, the Abolition Movement, the Womens' Christian Temperance
Movement (WCTU) and the Women's Suffrage Movement all reached
maturity, with much of the energy behind all three movements coming from
upper middle class white women (Costain and Costain 1983, Evans and
Boyte 1986, McCarthy 1994, Odendahl 1990, Scott 1993). Whereas trade
unions played a pivotal role in the formation of the European welfare state, it
52


was womens' voluntary groups that raised these issues in the United States
(Skocpol 1992).
The Temperance Movement, often considered the first large
organized social movement in America, crusaded against "demon alcohol."
Early on, this could be roughly translated to mean "alcohol consumed by
immigrants whose drunkenness left impoverished families in its wake."
Since the crusade ignored upper class alcohol consumption, immigrant
groups looked at the white, protestant middle class temperance crusaders
as little more than bigots. These WCTU crusaders were moral reformers,
not anti-drink; they were mostly trying to raise what they perceived to be the
moral level of the immigrant populations by giving them a native-born, white
protestant ideal to live up to. As was the case with most social action
groups, the Temperance Movement was based on a combination of service
and advocacy, providing support for fatherless families, as well as preaching
against drink. Eventually, the WCTU was taken over by a more radical (or,
some would say, more committed) element who preached prohibition, not
temperance, declaring all alcohol consumption undesirable, and escalating
the stakes until the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment (Sills 1957). It is
interesting that in the history of this movement, we can see different
behaviors and policy development positions demonstrated when the
53


organization was either service-oriented or advocacy-oriented. These
differences in organizational behavior are the focus of this research.
The Women's Suffrage Movement, initiated in 1848, periodically
turned its attention to other causes, which had the effect of allowing only
sporadic progress on the issue of womens' rights for decades. For example,
the Movement was temporarily halted to allow organizing efforts to turn to
the abolition issue immediately prior to and during the Civil War. Only after
the war did suffragettes resume their initial efforts, re-energized as new
states entered the Union with "votes for women" as part of their
Constitutions. In 1919, after the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment,
crusaders celebrated with the formation of the League of Women Voters in
1920. But, at the same time, they turned their activism away from the issue
of women's rights-taken in a broader sense than just voting-and
concentrated on workplace issues and child welfare (O'Neill 1989b).
During the Civil War, one of the most visible service and advocacy
groups was the United States Sanitary Commission, a private organization,
despite its name. The Commission, a precursor of the American Red Cross,
collected and delivered hospital supplies and provided nursing care to
soldiers during the war, and after the war worked to provide relief for the
large population of newly freed slaves. The concept of a public health
54


system grew as a result of the Commission's advocacy for decent systems
for sanitation and care of the sick, advocacy based on the experience
gained in making military camp and hospital improvements.
This blend of action and advocacy, the combination of the practical
and the political, characterizes these early social action agencies (Bremner
1960,1964, O'Neill 1989b, Rabinowitz 1992, Shultz 1924, Skocpol 1992).
All these movements had adopted the organizing tactics of the Great
Awakening, particularly in holding revival meetings and marches, and using
traveling proselytizers to organize meetings in small towns. At the turn of
the century, social activism reached a new high with the campaigns for child
welfare legislation, and the union and welfare reform movements. Cities had
their social reform groups, such as Jane Addams' Hull House in Chicago.
They organized to clean up government and the workplace through the
Progressive Movement. This nineteenth century wave of activism generally
was action-oriented, looking for practical outcomes. Volunteers became
involved in service-delivery, which satisfied their sense of "getting something
done," and in many cases diverted attention from the need for policy
change.
Although the volunteer nonprofit service sector continued to be active
during the first third of the twentieth century, its role seems to have
55


diminished because of the overwhelming significance attached to the
Federal government's growing role as the social problem solver (Ellis and
Noyes 1990). Against this background the particular activities of
philanthropic foundations should be noted. Foundation grants during this
period had a profound effect on the growth of the social sciences. Large
foundations such as Sage, Carnegie, Ford and Rockefeller, formed around
the turn of the century, were increasingly taking an ideological position in
opposition to "big government." Much of their funding, whether for health
care, education or social science scholarship, generally supported social
change and was intended to counter the socialist (and anti-business)
tendencies that foundations saw in "big government." On the opposite side,
supporters of "big government" viewed these business/philanthropic
dynasties as nothing more than the redemptive spending arm of corrupt big
business.
After World War II, public attention directed toward foundations was
essentially an attack on liberal internationalism, disguised as anti-communist
rhetoric. The Carnegie Foundation and others were caught up in the
McCarthy hearings, in large part because of their support of programs
promoting international peace. They were assumed to be "soft on
Communism." Their support of "internationalist" policies in an isolationist
56


America was considered suspect. (Alger Hiss, who was investigated by the
House Committee on Un-American Activities and the Senate Internal
Security Sub-Committee in the 1950s, was President of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace.) The story of the 1950s and 1960s was
one of pressure on private foundations to stay out of such programs with a
"political" cast (Levy 1987). As foundations were scared away from anything
that seemed like advocacy, the stage was set for the growth of other
nonprofit organizations specifically chartered for social activism. We should
recognize three demonstrations of this growth.
In the period immediately before Worod War II, some Member Benefit
Organizations (MBOs) changed their central purpose and transformed
themselves into social and political advocacy groups. The Grange evolved
from a farmers cooperative into an advocacy organization, working in
Washington to establish the farm price subsidies still in effect today. Also,
workingmen's associations that had previously functioned as relief agencies
providing benefits to families of injured or sick workers, changed to a more
activist form and became the unions we are more familiar with.
A second demonstration of this growth of advocacy groups is to be
found in the general growth in the sector. As the growth of government
spending on social issues expanded in the 1960s and early 1970s, the
57


nonprofit service sector grew because government contracted with
nonprofits to implement many of the social programs designed by the Great
Society (Salamon 1987). These organizations, blending service with
activism, included the many neighborhood housing groups that proliferated
during the period as the Model Cities Program grew. Recalling the
McCarthy hearings of the 1950s, Dr. William Sloan Coffin spoke about the
challenges of this particular blend of advocacy and action in a speech at
Outward Bound; "Feed the hungry, and you are called a hero. But if you
question the reason for their poverty, you might be called a Marxist."
And finally, adding most to the growth of advocacy organizations
during the period were new groups that organized specifically to provide
advocacy for unrepresented groups or the for the "common good." The
period of the 1950s and 1960s marked the growth of the Civil Rights
Movement, including the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC),
the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) as well as various student
organizing groups. The 1960s saw the birth of many of the advocacy
organizations we recognize today. The National Organization of Women,
Zero Population Growth, the Children's Defense Fund, Friends of the Earth,
the Natural Resources Defense Council, and the Sierra Club all developed
58


during this period (Berger 1980, Omstein and Elder 1978, Pertschuk 1982,
Walker 1983).
The growth period of "movement politics" and community
organizations continued into the 1970s, when Common Cause was
established to pursue honesty and efficiency in government, and Ralph
Nader's Public Citizen Foundation was formed to address consumer issues
(Boyte 1980, Edwards 1994, Gardner 1972). Older organizations such as
Consumers Union rediscovered activist roots; the League of Women voters
became more activist (Berry 1984, Miller 1983). The Sierra Club is a
particularly interesting story because it demonstrates the evolution of a
501(c)(3) charitable organization into a 501(c)(4) political action organization
as it took on an enlarged advocacy role during this period. In 1966, the IRS
revoked the Sierra Club's charitable (tax deductible) status because of the
Club's challenge to the proposed construction of a dam that would have
flooded part of the Grand Canyon. The club's activities (mostly newspaper
ads and chain-letter writing) were not considered public education, but
politicking (Wilson 1981).
A clear pattern of development of nonprofit advocacy organizations
emerged. 'The arrival of citizen groups presented in Washington truly a
new phenomenon. Some 76% of citizen groups and 79% of welfare groups
59


located in Washington had come into existence since 1960-yet by 1980
they were one half of all political interest groups in Washington and 30% of
these had formed since 1975 (Petracca 1992:16)." The "traditional"
nonprofits such as family service agencies, child guidance clinics,
orphanages, and settlement houses, which dominated through the early
1900s until the 1960s, developed an increasingly activist profile at this time,
while maintaining a strong service component. (This dual role is described
by Van Til (1990) as a source of ambiguity for nonprofit groups).
Beginning in the 1980s, however, we began to see the growth of more
groups that were predominantly activist organizations. There are
community-based shelters for victims of family violence, rape crisis centers,
and homeless shelters (Smith and Lipsky 1993). The gay and lesbian rights
movement, the environmental movement, the anti-nuclear groups and
political campaign finance reform activists have also stepped to the front
working for policy change. And, most recently, the echo of the particular
combination of religious, social and political activism that was evident during
the Great Awakening can be heard in the present-day "Christian Right" and
"Family Values" organizations that are among the newest and most vocal
nonprofit advocacy groups.
60


Survey of Research
What does current research tell us about public interest voluntary
associations in their advocacy activities? A general overview of
professional groups and research organizations in the nonprofit area
indicates that their advocacy priorities include developing and promoting a
policy framework (particularly a tax policy framework) at the Federal level to
implement the government's expressed intention to promote voluntary
initiative (Berry 1994, Cigler 1994, Gies 1988, Hodgkinson 1988, Magat
1988). Other studies include a survey of nonprofit human service and arts
organizations which found that while only four percent of the organizations
are advocacy-only groups, about one-fourth of all nonprofits take part in
advocacy activities to some extent (Salamon, Musselwaite and DeVita
1986). These organizations report advocacy activities that include research,
information development, information sharing, identification of public
problems, and work with the press.
More focused studies of organizations involved in policy change have
concentrated on types of advocacy action used (Zander 1990), studies
relating efforts to types of outcomes (Clotfelter 1992, Colwell 1993), what
types of organizations get involved in advocacy (Heinz et al. 1993,
Scholzman 1994), and what organizations exit advocacy coalitions (Gray
61


and Lowery 1995), and studies of the effects of advocacy on members and
groups (Almond and Verba 1963, Heimovics etal. 1995). Jacqueline Scott
(1992) looked at the importance of policy activities to leaders, whether
voluntary sector leaders perceive their policy future to be interconnected
with the political and social environment of the country, and examined
commonly held values about what constitutes the "common good."
In a recent symposium on nonprofit organizations and public policy,
Shaffer and College presented work that is important to this research
because it uses some of the same markers to understand the behavior of
environmental nonprofits in policy coalitons. Shaffer and College used
decision-making style and membership activities to classify groups as either
centralized interest groups or decentralized community organizations. They
looked at effectiveness of each type of group in various policy arenas
(1995).
Another subset of research examines nonprofits and their effect in
policy arenas. Steven Rathgeb Smith examined the effect that lobbying by
nonprofit providers has on legislators involved in oversight of government
agencies that monitor the performance of nonprofit service providers. He
found that professional associations of nonprofit contractors in the areas of
mental health, health care and welfare are relatively powerful political actors
62


(1993). In a similar vein, Peter Dobkin Hall provides a detailed historical
account of the impact of philanthropy on the formation of public health
policy, concluding that private voluntary organizations were decisive in
identifying the need for and creating such policy (1987b). But an alternative
proposition about the power of nonprofits in the policy arena comes from
James Tober (1984), who suggests that Congress views environmental
groups with skepticism if they do not have genuine membership support, i.e.,
if the groups are staff driven. There is still no conclusion about how well
nonprofits are able to get the ear of powerful lawmakers.
Other research includes prescriptive works, such as Bryson and
Crosby's Leadership for the Common Good (1992), which tells nonprofits
how to get into public policy development. And, there is a relatively good
array of descriptive works and case studies around specific issues or
organizations (Clark 1966, Clark and Creedon 1987, Hall 1987, Zald 1970).
Some of these deserve special discussion as they contain useful insights
that help with present research.
Studies of the type and strength of member benefits have confirmed
that members of public interest voluntary associations are not primarily
motivated by material or solidary incentives. Tillock and Morrison's 1976
study of Zero Population Growth looked at member benefits and found that
63


supporters of the organization were indifferent to these selective incentives
(i.e., rewards that were personal, whether material or solidary). Furthering a
moral vision was the members' sole concern. Faich and Gale (1971) looked
at the Sierra Club members' interest in club services. Their study indicated
that large numbers of members did not take advantage of club services,
therefore, also indicating indifference to selective member incentives. The
present research will push further into the question of member indifference
to other-than-purposive incentives, by looking at evidence of actual incentive
exchanges, rather than relying heavily on members' statements.
Regarding this issue of incentive exchanges, there is also the area of
leaders' attitudes toward the exchange. Do leaders feel under pressure
when the only member exchange possible is in the purposive range? Over
time, groups may show a drift toward providing a wider incentive mix, as a
way to make "goal attainment" a less important target. To examine this
phenomenon, Mayer Zald (1970) conducted the YMCA study. He looked at
the evolution of group goals over time, finding evidence that as the
organization expanded its operation to allow a greater emphasis on
providing service to members, there was a corresponding shift away from
emphasis on the original mission of the organization. In the case of the
YMCA, the original mission of providing support and Christian values
64


training for young men has changed. The organization now provides fitness
classes, and functions more like a health club rather than "in loco parentis."
For the present research, a series of questions will be asked of leaders to
determine how much pressure they are under to deliver purposive rewards
to members. The research will look for indications that leaders want to add
solidary or material incentive exchanges within their organizations.
One of the most helpful studies in setting a basis for this research is
Knoke and Wood's work on commitment in voluntary associations (1981).
They sampled a set of social influence nonprofit organizations to learn how
members' attachments to such organizations were formed and maintained.
Knoke and Wood determined that three incentive (or control) situations were
correlated to high levels of member commitment to the group: purposive
incentives, involvement in the decision-making, and a local chapter status
for the group. Their research suggests the possibility that leaders may be
able to involve members in the decision-making process in a setting where
they feel they have an effect on decisions-as a trade-off for purposive goal
attainment.
65


Summary
This section shows how public interest voluntary associations are
important participants in American policy change, but there are still
questions to be answered regarding how these groups act in their policy
roles. The research cited here, as well as other general work on the origins
and maintenance of voluntary associations (Berry 1977, Moe 1980,
Salisbury 1969, Verba, Scholzman and Brady 1995, Wallace 1983), and the
research to be reviewed in the following chapter all help to connect the
elements of nonprofit organization maintenance with their behavior in
advocacy coalitions. This is an important step in developing a more precise
list of research questions about these organizations in their policy roles.
Such a list is presented at the end of Chapter 3.
66


CHAPTER 3
LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
The goal of this dissertation is to develop an understanding of the
relationship of member benefits to the advocacy flexibility exhibited by
Colorado public interest voluntary associations. The literature review relates
specific organizational characteristics-those that provide benefits to
members-to nonprofit groups' stated willingness to bargain in a policy-
making arena, and to the advocacy activities chosen by these organizations.
The research is based on combining theories of organizational formation
and action with the Advocacy Coalition Framework theory of the policy
process.
This chapter begins with a discussion of current perspectives on
social change, followed by consideration of the major theories of the policy
process and the extent to which public interest voluntary associations have
been considered in the development of these theories. This review will
67


make it clear that an insufficient theoretical basis exists for understanding
how public interest voluntary associations function in an advocacy role.
The research then examines the principal organization behavior
theories as they relate to group formation and maintenance. Factors such
as the external situation itself, the effect of charismatic leaders and the effect
of funding sources have been examined in relation to group formation
(Jenkins 1983, McAdam 1982, McCarthy and Zald 1973,1977). While these
are important in understanding why groups form, they are less helpful in
predicting behavior. This research examines the effects of members'
motivations for joining groups on the group's options for external behavior.
In a membership-based organization, members' needs may be the prime
determinants of group activity.
Perspectives on Social Change and Policy Formulation
Lacking monarchs, dictators, charismatic leaders, or regular
revolutions, how do Americans change social policy? Americans have
always tended to handle public business directly and spontaneously, a fact
that was noted by Alexis deTocqueville in his well known observations on
the American character and habits (two volumes, 1835,1840). He described
the American faith in equality, exhibited through their tendency to join civic
68


associations as a way of activating American democracy. He believed that
next to the right of acting for himself, the most natural privilege of man is that
of combining his exertions with those of his fellow creatures, and of acting in
common with them. These associations led directly, he argued, to a shared
democratic system.
Whether or not one accepts deTocqueville's argument that civic
association and democracy are linked, it is certainly true that the story of
American policy change is the story of group action. Social change
percolates through our society, largely the result of the actions and
interactions of interest groups working to influence political decision-makers.
This scheme can be contrasted with political process in much of Europe,
where interest group representation is built into the politics. In France, for
example, an Economic and Social Council exists within the governmental
framework to represent the most important economic and social pressure
groups within the nation. The Council has consultative and advisory powers
on pending legislation. Italy accomplishes much of the same formal
inclusion of diverse social opinions through its multiple political parties. So
much organized participation of interests is included in European political
systems that some scholars have judged the American lack of similar
accommodation as evidence that Americans are not as politically active as
69


Europeans. Writing during World War II, Gunnar Myrdal (1944) is typical of
the scholars of the period who pronounced Americans as lacking the skills to
organize and pool risks for a common goal, principally because interest
groups were not as automatic or visible in the government process as they
were in Europe.
Generally, theories of social change and organizational action are
grounded in rational concepts of self interest, mathematical game theory,
political science concepts of collective action, or an analysis of human
relations (Allison 1971, Gawthorp 1970, March and Olsen 1989, Morgan
1986, Robertson and Tang 1995, Thompson 1967). Public policy scholars
have sought to understand social change and the policy formulation process
either by composing an order and rationality to the process or by
recognizing the creative disorder and trying to understand instead the
motivation or behavior of its various participants. Most familiar of the former
type of theory is the "stages" heuristic that breaks the process into a
sequence of phases, following a pattern generally outlined as initiation,
estimation, selection, implementation, evaluation and termination (Brewer
and deLeon 1983, Jones 1977). This orderly approach has allowed a
valuable body of knowledge to develop around each of these stages,
increasing our understanding of the parts of the process, although perhaps
70


at the cost of grasping the whole. But using the stages model makes it
difficult to identify specifically nonprofit organizations in the mix of policy
actors, because they do not typically play a formal role, for example, as a
political decision-maker.
As an alternative, the policy subsystem approach describes and
models the components of the policy process (Dye 1981, Polsby 1984).
This approach acknowledges complexity in the process and attempts to
understand its elements, whether they are individual actors, groups,
decisions or policy impacts. In 1978, Brinton Milward described the "policy
subsystem," including such components as actors, time, authority structures
and multiple government levels. Heclo's "issue network" approach also
recognizes the multiple forces at work in policy formation (1978), but his
concept is larger than the policy subsystem frame because it includes
externalities, i.e., what is waiting to join the "subsystem." By listing
everything as a separate category, Heclo increases the units of analysis and
adds so much detail that it is difficult to conceptualize the role of specific
participants in the process. Kingdon's "policy soup" (1984) includes the role
of ideas, analysis, problems, solutions, political opportunity and interest
groups, with political decision-makers themselves remaining outside the
soup pot.
71


if we look from a sociologists' perspective, studies of social change
have been directed toward "social movements," which arise out of conflict-
of-interest. Movement behavior is analyzed as a rational response to the
costs and benefits of different courses of action. The success of movements
is determined by political processes and strategic factors (Domhoff 1990,
Kitschelt 1993, Larana et al. 1994, McCarthy and Zald 1973,1977, Rochon
and Mazmanian 1993, Salisbury et al. 1992). Importantly, these studies
have a definition of social movements that includes a shared-values base,
raising the issue and thereby pointing toward consideration of the role of
values-based organizations. Are these congeries a special set of actors in
social change? This research proposes that they are, because the rational,
self-serving calculus designed to support most decision process research is
not effective in understanding this particular type of group.
All of these policy subsystem models are challenged by Robert
Nakamura's short term view of policy coalitions, when he notes that "Policies
attract coalitions and these dissolve when laws are passed" (1987:185). To
the extent that it is accepted, this limited-time concept of policy development,
focused as it is on passing legislation, is a political science model (e.g., Dahl
1961). It does not allow one to develop the character of the participants but
concentrates on how power is used to make laws.
72


Another alternative in understanding policy formulation is examining
the discrete elements of policy subsystems. Studies have been done on
leaders, outcomes and policy situations. The body of research on
individuals as political leaders includes works on the modem American
presidency such as Neustadt's on-going analysis (I960), which concluded
that presidential power is the "power to persuade," and describes presidents
as working to influence groups. Other leadership studies (Cronin 1975,
Galbraith 1983, Smith 1988, Waterman 1989) generally agree that powerful
individuals work through groups, rather than directly, to change policy.
These point right back to the study of groups as a way to understand policy
development. And the study of groups or organizations, which is a relatively
new field itself, is only recently moving beyond the economic-based
paradigm to study organizations that are values-based or "responsibility-
based" (Drucker 1993).
Theodore Lowis benchmark theory of policy-making outcomes (1964,
1969) attempts to de-mystify the political process and its participants. He
classifies all policy by its economic outcome, as either distributive (wherein
certain private interests receive benefits, i.e., no "losers" are identified), re-
distributive (wherein benefits are supposed to move from the "haves" to the
"have-nots") and regulatory (wherein policy is crafted in such broad terms
73


that winners and losers do not easily self-identify into interests). He notes
that it is in the re-distributive types of policy making-where winners and
losers are pitted against each other-that public interest voluntary
associations are most likely to be involved, as representative voices for the
under-represented.
The effect of situation and external stimuli on policy-making is
undeniable; no one can underplay the effect of Sputnik on American
education and research policy beginning in the late 1950s. In a broad
characterization of situation, Hayes labels situations as "conflict intense" or
"conflict-free" and suggests that the special domain of activist groups is the
former (1977). A more complex property-space typology is constructed by
Polsby (1984), with space for interest group involvement defined for
"incubated" policy, i.e., developed over a long period of time. Interestingly,
Polsby's incubated policy frame corresponds to Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith's Advocacy Coalition Framework (see below).
Political scientists most often examine issue networks and the
process of policy formulation from the perspective of who has power and
how it is used, referring to the study as "interest group" theory. This
approach looks at elite control versus pluralism, considers means for
incorporating individual interests and values into the policy process, and
74


studies organizational rules, procedures, and the broader socioeconomic
environment to understand the motivations underlying policy formation. This
study of interest groups is a classic preoccupation of political science.
The basic tension in the democratic system is defined as that
between elites and pluralists, between power concentrated or widely
dispersed. The opposing opinions are embodied in two well-known works
on the political aspects of policy formulation; David Truman's study of
interest groups cites these groups in a positive light as a foremost
expression of the American political character (1951), whereas Robert
Dahl's studies of American pluralism debunk interest groups as nothing
more than organized elite power (1961,1967,1982). Whether in critical
analysis of power blocks (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, Lowi 1969,
Schattschneider 1960) or the traditional pluralist theory that supports these
groups, implicit in each view is a role for nonprofit organizations in policy
formation.
However, all of these broad approaches, while useful in recognizing
unique elements, sacrifice the ability to construct a working model of the
policy process. They are important to the discussion here because they
support the policy subsystem concept used in Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith's
75


Advocacy Coalition Framework. The ACF definition provided by Sabatier
and Jenkins-Smith follows:
An advocacy coalition consists of actors from a variety of
government and private organizations at different levels of
government who share a set of policy beliefs and seek to
realize them by influencing the behavior of multiple
governmental institutions overtime (1993:25).
For the purpose of this study, the key points are that policy is
developed through the balancing of interests, which are often brought to the
table by interest groups. Many of these groups are nonprofit organizations
(although not all nonprofit organizations are interest groups). Public interest
voluntary associations are particularly active in this arena because their
general reason for being is to change policy. However, in most formal
studies of social change, nonprofits' role is assumed but never highlighted.
Advocacy Coalition Framework
Policy is the result of organized group conflict (whether we call it an
issue network, social movement or policy subsystem) and the organizing
mechanism in this conflict is the coalition. Paul A. Sabatier (1988,1992,
1993) and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith expanded the policy subsystem concept
into the concept of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) by adding the
basic assumption that coalitions are built around hierarchical belief systems,
76


and the structure of this hierarchy will help to differentiate the way groups
act in advocacy coalitions. Membership in the ACF for any given policy
issue-area is fundamentally values-based. Common beliefs (e.g., the
capitalist belief in the free market) rather than common interests (e.g.,
protecting tax advantages) are the glue that holds coalition members
together. Beliefs are arranged hierarchically, from the most profound level
of "deep core beliefs," through the middle range of "policy core beliefs," to
the functional level of "secondary aspects." Deep core beliefs relate to how
one values such fundamental elements as "freedom" or "the nature of man."
Policy core beliefs relate to how one believes these values should be
managed (e.g., Does government have a role in managing them?).
Secondary aspects are on the level of tactics or strategies for actualizing the
first two levels. An organization's resistance to change is related directly the
perceived level of threat to deep core beliefs, and to how strongly these
deep core beliefs are held. Members in a nonprofit environmental
organization, as an example, might be acting on deep core beliefs that place
a relatively high value on non-human life forms, e.g., the health of the earth
or the rights of future generations. At the level of policy core beliefs they
may hold that government must play a strong role in protecting the
environment. And at the secondary aspects level they may identify
77


"strengthening the EPA" as an appropriate process for accomplishing their
goals.
ACF theory draws a large frame around policy development.
Conceptually, it includes coalition members at varying governmental levels
and watches changes in policy positions of coalition members over decades.
However, it still allows focus on the players. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith
examined the behavior of coalition members in six policy subsystems over
time, and concluded with a set of hypotheses that suggest the fundamental
role that an organizations' values hierarchy plays in determining behavior in
advocacy coalitions. Included is the tenth ACF hypothesis:
Elites of purposive groups are more constrained in their
expressions of beliefs and policy positions than elites from
material groups. (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993:152).
The essential difference being established by Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith is between material and non-material groups. Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith's research proposes that "purposive" groups in advocacy coalitions
(i.e., those whose values do not include a significant material dimension)
may be the more stable members of coalitions over time, because they are
singularly focused on achieving purposive goals. (These may also be
considered the more stubborn members of coalitions, depending on one's
78


perspective.) It thus implies a role for public interest voluntary associations
in advocacy coalitions and supplies an attractive frame for study of
nonprofits' advocacy. Because the hypotheses arising from ACF expose
organizational values as motivators, this theory is usefully applied to public
interest voluntary associations whose central organizing motive is reported
to be social purpose rather than material benefit.
The non-material groups to be examined for this research will be a
specific, formalized type of nonprofit organization, the public interest
voluntary association as defined in the previous chapter. In these groups,
the membership is involved to dispense general public benefits. The
concept of "public interest" is admittedly a slippery one, which I propose to
hold steady for the purpose of this research by defining it as a common
interest, not divisible and not directly beneficial to any member of a group
engaged in securing such interest. (It is not important whether those outside
the organization consider the "public interest" to be correctly defined by the
group.) These groups should be the most extreme form of the purposive
model that Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith define. Arguably, these groups are
values-driven organizations, formed precisely because of belief systems.
These groups have belief system structures (the "values hierarchy" that ACF
describes) that emphasize abstract beliefs (mission, core values) rather than
79


immediate economic or political interests of members. ACF argues it is the
system of beliefs and interests-and whether they are short-term interests or
deeper core values-that organizations bring to advocacy coalitions and
which underlie their behavior in such coalitions.
The ACF view of non-material, "purposive" groups in policy systems
provides a starting point from which to examine the behavior of public
interest voluntary associations in the policy process, but it is not sufficient.
The theory does not help to distinguish what is, in fact, a "purposive" group
from one that may claim to be, and it offers little help for understanding why
purposive groups behave as they do.
Theory of Group Formation
While ACF offers a conceptual basis for an examination of public
interest voluntary associations in policy subsystems, it still leaves many
unanswered questions. Values hierarchies and the structure of
organizational belief systems themselves may, indeed, be related to how
organizations receive and process information (organizational learning) and
whether they will change their positions in advocacy coalitions over time.
But values hierarchies are difficult to identify, except indirectly, or, after the
fact. Here is where a theory of group formation is helpful. Understanding
80


how and why individuals form organizations and how these organizations
are maintained helps to describe organizational belief system structures.
Consistent with David Knoke's (1990) multi-level conceptual model, this
research assumes that if we understand why groups form and how they are
maintained, we can see implications for their external behavior, including
how they behave in coalitions.
Individuals join groups to create strength in numbers to pursue
common goals. We are most familiar with this argument when tied to
economic or political goals. Groups of individuals achieve power, defend
threatened interests and receive economic benefits through collective action
(Dahl 1967). Until Mancur Olsen's challenge in 1965, collective action was
universally accepted as a logical formula for attaining material goals that
were beyond the reach of individual action. Olsen exposed the soft side of
these assumptions with his descriptions of the particular problems caused by
collective goods, free-riders and members who by their relative size or
importance have a disproportionately large effect on the group.
A more complex theory of collective action deliberately seeks to
address the voluntary association. Elinor Ostrom (1990) proposes
Institutional Rational Choice (IRC) to explain how voluntary associations,
such as trade groups or professional associations, may override the free-
81


rider problem. Using a logic still based on material incentives (and correctly
so, because members join these types of organizations to obtain material
benefits), she argues that rational individuals understand that acting singly
they do not maximize total benefits, and so they join groups, sacrificing small
individual gains for their share of larger collective gains. They are acting to
overcome what has been called the "tragedy of the commons." Edella
Schlager (1993) has incorporated Ostrom's IRC concept into her argument,
stating two of the major shortfalls of the ACF; it lacks a theory of group
formation and a theory of action. She proposes IRC as a theory of group
formation, and seeks to extend it to voluntary associations. While this
approach is useful in adding dimension to the ACF, its application is limited
to describing the formation of the specific type of voluntary association that
pursues the self-interest of its members. This is how Ostrom correctly
applied her theory in the first place. It would be a mistake, however, to try to
extend it to all voluntary associations, and, as shown below, it fails when
applied to public interest voluntary associations.
Generally, organization theory is grounded in understanding the
economic or political self-interest of members. This leads to an incomplete
and inadequate explanation of group behavior when considering public
interest voluntary associations. Theories based on action that is materially
82


driven, rational, and self-interested are by definition insufficient for
understanding how public interest groups form. Individuals' motivations for
joining such organizations are essentially defined as non-material; people
have "feelings" as well as self-serving "interests" and can be seen to act in
political and social ways upon the former. It is necessary, then, to use an
alternative theory of group formation to model the formation of public interest
voluntary associations. Robert Salisbury (1969) provides just such an
alternative basis for understanding why individuals join groups, by proposing
an Incentive Theory that builds on Peter B. Clark and James Q. Wilson's
(1961) typology of incentive structures for members within groups. Salisbury
proposes that the material, solidary, and purposive/ideological incentives
that Clark and Wilson identify as motivators within groups can also explain
why individuals form groups.
A note on terminology is important here. Clark and Wilson use the
terms, "material, solidary and purposive." Salisbury uses "material, solidary
and ideological" to refer to the same groupings. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith
use "purposive" to include all organizations that are non-material (whether
solidary or ideological/purposive). For clarity, I will use the terms "material,
solidary and purposive" in their separate and distinct meanings as Clark and
Wilson have used them. I will use "non-material" only when referring to the
83


ACFs combined meaning of solidary or ideologicai/purposive, distinguishing
material from all non-material organizations.
Terry Moe further defines and distinguishes the two general types of
non-material inducements for joining groups.
Solidary incentives are intangible values of a social nature,
including such rewards as friendship, conviviality, and status...
Purposive incentives are intangible benefits such as feeling
good about achieving collective benefits, or even the
satisfaction of contributing time, money or effort in support and
pursuit of a goal (1980:117-118).
Salisbury's incentive theory argues that in return for being part of the
organization, members receive-either singly or in combination-material
benefits, the benefits of belonging, or the satisfaction of achieving a valued
goal. With the last two elements, Salisbury has presented a theory of group
formation for nonprofit voluntary organizations that includes a model based
on non-material values. It can be applied to voluntary associations that
nominally function in the public interest, and it helps to further define the
non-material groups in Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith's Advocacy Coalition
Framework.
Further ACF definition is important because Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith's model of non-material groups is presently very broad, and this
breadth frustrates the formation of a group action theory for public interest
84


voluntary associations in advocacy coalitions. Non-material groups must be
disaggregated to the degree possible, and further distinguished based on
the principal linkages that exist between the members and the organization.
The "ideal type" of public interest voluntary association would be one
whose members' motivations for joining the group are cause-driven. In this
organization, the satisfaction members gain from association with the
organization is measured wholly by the achievement of the "good" they
seek. To the extent that the group is providing solidary benefits and the
members are accepting these in lieu of organizational goal achievement, an
alternative type of non-material organization is evident, one whose members
are somewhat satisfied by simply belonging to the group.
This distinction leads toward an examination of the role that these
incentive exchanges within the group structurewhether purposive or
solidary-may have in affecting or determining the actions of the group itself
in its external relations. It is recognized that members motivations for
joining the group will generally be neither pure nor singular. Nevertheless,
they will be reflected in the incentive systems that organizations put in place
to attract and retain members. These incentive systems will be indicators of
whether a group is principally purposive, or whether significant solidary (or
even material) characteristics are present, potentially undermining the
85


strength of group members' commitment to core values, incentive systems
are important indicators of organizational belief systems, that hard-to-
characterize element that Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith argue is the basis for
group action.
Theory of Voluntary Group Action
To develop a theory of action for public interest voluntary
associations in advocacy coalitions, it is necessary to propose a theory that
links the group's belief system, exhibited through its internal incentive
structure, with external group behaviors. Terry Moe uses the Clark and
Wilson typology of "material, solidary and purposive" incentives to model an
institution's internal dynamics, which provides a basis for making this
connection. Moe builds on Salisbury's Incentive Theory by focusing on the
dynamics between leadership and internal processes of organizations. He
specifically includes "voluntary associations for the public good" in his work
(1980). In a pure model, these organizations would have members who
belong to the group not for material or even for solidary reasons, but to work
for a cause. National organizations such as the Women's Christian
Temperance Union, Earthwatch, the American Civil Liberties Union, Young
Life, and the American Red Cross have provided examples of groups whose
86


members are moved to work for a better society through providing advocacy
for clean living, clean air, individual liberties, Christian education for youth,
and disaster relief.
In the case of the advocacy role of groups such as these, Moe agrees
with the Sabatier/Jenkins-Smith proposal that their advocacy positions will
be less flexible than economic organizations' positions. It is the potential for
further refinement of the behavioral hypothesis for non-material voluntary
groups that is interesting here. This research hypothesizes initially that
incentive structures will be correlated with certain group behavior in
advocacy coalitions. To the extent that public interest voluntary associations
operationally are able to sustain members by offering solidary benefits
instead of achieving group goals, their leaders have alternatives and may be
freer to bargain in advocacy coalitions. The intensity of members' idealism
may be compromised by the presence of solidary (or even material) reward
structures. The existence of an undertow of solidary benefits within
purposive organizations must be considered when modeling the behavior of
non-material organizations in policy subsystems.
This dissertation examines the advocacy behaviors of a group of
Colorado public interest voluntary associations, looking for differences in
advocacy behaviors related to the organizations' incentive mix. An
87


explanation of how these models, purposive and solidary, might function at
their extremes, i.e., "ideal types," follows. One needs to recognize that
these are analytic categories only; no group is wholly one or the other. The
underlying assumption is that the purity of the Purposive model, as
described by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, is undermined by increasingly
high levels of Solidary model characteristics. It is worth examining both
models in some detail.
Purposive Model Organizations in Advocacy Coalitions
Moe (1980) argues that cause-driven individuals join public interest
voluntary associations when their beliefs are consistent with the
organizations' belief systems or values hierarchy. Once this relationship is
established, a sort of implicit contract exists between members and the
organization. According to Moe, and supported by ACF, leaders in such
values-based organizations are less able to deviate from or compromise
these agreed-on values or goals in external situations. Lacking tangible
material or solidary incentives to exchange with members, leaders must
concentrate on providing member benefits by holding steadfastly to the
organization's goals. There is no way leaders can satisfy their members
except to help the organization achieve its defined and collective vision.
88


When non-material, purposive incentives are the basis for
membership, the result should be stronger leader adherence to group goals.
Should the leader deny the members representation of these goals in
external forums, small splinter groups may form and secede from the group
because, lacking material rewards, these goals are the only bond that keeps
members in the organization. Thus, members' purposive incentives in
joining and maintaining groups will affect the groups internal dynamics as
weli as have a limiting effect on the group's leader in representing the group
to external audiences. Leadership is much less flexible in its expression of
the group's bargaining position.
Approaching this issue from another perspective, psychologist Alvin
Zander (1990), who has contributed to the literature on voluntary community
action groups, agrees with these contentions. Consonant with the research
by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith and Moe, Zander argues that cause-driven
groups stick to their core values. In their external relations, they deliberately
try to develop policy subsystems large enough and strong enough to
formulate and implement policies that are consistent with their belief
systems. In choosing advocacy actions, they select those that do not
encourage negotiation or allow flexibility.
89


Full Text

PAGE 1

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 2

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 3

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 4

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 5

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 6

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 7

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 8

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 9

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 10

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 11

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 12

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 13

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 14

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 15

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 16

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 17

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 18

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 19

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 20

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 21

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 22

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 23

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 24

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 25

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 26

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 27

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 28

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 29

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 30

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 31

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 32

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 33

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 34

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 35

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 36

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 37

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 38

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 39

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 40

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 41

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 42

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 43

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 44

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 45

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 46

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 47

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 48

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 49

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 50

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 51

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 52

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 53

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 54

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 55

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 56

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 57

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 58

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 59

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 60

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 61

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 62

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 63

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 64

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 65

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 66

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 67

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 68

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 69

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 70

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 71

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 72

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 73

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 74

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 75

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 76

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 77

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 78

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 79

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 80

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 81

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 82

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 83

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 84

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 85

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 86

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 87

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 88

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 89

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 90

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 91

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 92

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 93

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 94

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 95

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 96

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 97

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 98

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 99

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 100

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 101

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 102

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 103

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 104

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 105

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 106

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 107

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 108

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 109

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 110

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 111

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 112

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 113

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 114

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 115

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 116

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 117

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 118

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 119

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 120

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 121

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 122

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 123

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 124

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 125

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 126

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 127

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 128

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 129

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 130

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 131

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 132

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 133

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 134

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 135

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 136

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 137

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 138

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 139

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 140

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 141

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 142

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 143

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 144

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 145

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 146

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 147

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 148

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 149

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 150

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 151

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 152

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 153

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 154

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 155

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 156

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 157

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 158

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 159

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 160

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 161

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 162

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 163

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 164

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 165

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 166

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 167

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 168

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 169

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 170

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 171

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 172

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 173

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 174

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 175

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 176

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 177

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 178

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 179

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 180

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 181

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 182

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 183

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 184

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 185

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 186

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 187

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 188

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 189

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 190

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 191

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 192

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 193

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 194

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 195

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 196

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 197

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 198

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 199

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 200

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 201

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 202

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 203

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 204

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 205

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 206

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 207

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 208

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 209

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 210

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 211

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 212

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 213

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 214

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 215

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 216

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 217

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 218

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 219

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 220

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 221

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 222

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 223

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 224

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 225

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 226

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 227

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 228

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 229

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 230

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 231

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 232

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 233

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 234

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 235

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 236

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 237

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 238

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 239

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 240

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 241

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 242

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 243

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 244

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 245

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 246

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 247

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 248

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 249

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 250

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 251

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 252

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 253

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 254

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 255

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 256

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 257

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 258

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 259

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 260

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 261

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 262

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 263

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 264

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 265

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 266

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 267

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 268

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 269

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 270

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 271

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 272

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 273

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 274

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 275

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 276

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 277

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 278

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 279

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 280

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 281

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 282

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 283

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 284

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PAGE 285

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.