Denver public schools and decentralization

Material Information

Denver public schools and decentralization an implementation game
Emerson, Kenneth Ronald
Place of Publication:
Denver, CO
University of Colorado Denver
Publication Date:
Physical Description:
xiii, 251 leaves : illustrations, forms ; 28 cm

Thesis/Dissertation Information

Doctorate ( Doctor of Philosophy)
Degree Grantor:
University of Colorado Denver
Degree Divisions:
School of Education and Human Development, CU Denver
Degree Disciplines:
Educational Leadership and Innovation
Committee Chair:
Murphy, Michael J.
Committee Co-Chair:
Muth, Rodney
Committee Members:
Ford, Sharon
Wolf, Kenneth
Robinson, Anthony


Subjects / Keywords:
School-based management -- Colorado -- Denver ( lcsh )
School management and organization ( lcsh )
School management and organization -- Parent participation -- Colorado ( lcsh )
School-based management ( fast )
School management and organization ( fast )
School management and organization -- Parent participation ( fast )
Colorado ( fast )
Colorado -- Denver ( fast )
bibliography ( marcgt )
theses ( marcgt )
non-fiction ( marcgt )


Includes bibliographical references (leaves 238-251).
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree, Doctor of Philosophy, Educational Leadership and Innovation
General Note:
School of Education and Human Development
Statement of Responsibility:
by Kenneth Ronald Emerson.

Record Information

Source Institution:
|University of Colorado Denver
Holding Location:
|Auraria Library
Rights Management:
All applicable rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier:
36465504 ( OCLC )
LD1190.E3 1996d .E44 ( lcc )


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Full Text
Kenneth Ronald Emerson
B. S., State University of New York
at Buffalo, 1963
M. S., University of Southern California, 1971
M. A., Webster University, Saint Louis, Missouri, 1987
A thesis submitted to the
University of Colorado at Denver
in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Educational Leadership and Innovation

1996 Kenneth Ronald Emerson
All rights reserved.

This thesis for the Doctor of Philosophy
degree by
Kenneth Ronald Emerson
has been approved

Sharon Ford

Emerson, Kenneth Ronald (Ph. D., Educational Leadership and Innovation)
Denver Public Schools and Decentralization: An Implementation Game
Thesis directed by Professor Michael J. Murphy
In May 1991, the Denver Public Schools began the transition from
over 100 years of centralized control of the schools to a form of Site-
Governance. The most unusual aspect of this policy change was that it had
been introduced into the Denver Public Schools by an outside actor: Roy
Romer, the Governor of the State of Colorado. Governor Romer had
intervened into the Denver Public Schools contract negotiations with the
local union after seven months of negotiations had failed to produce a
contract and the union had voted to strike. The intervention resulted in the
district and the union accepting a new three-year contract written by the
governor. A key feature in the contract was a mandated change in the way
the schools were to be governed. This study examined in what ways the
implementation of site-governance in the Denver Public Schools was
affected by predictable implementation roadblocks.
Data was collected through interviews with key participants, from
media reports, archival district documents, as well as documents created by
involved community organizations. Transcriptions of interviews conducted
with focus groups individually composed of principals, teachers and
parents as well as transcriptions of interviews with site actors and
community participants and observers also served as data sources for this
The study found that despite an unusual policy origin and initial
acceptance by key implementers, the implementation of the policy was
affected by four predictable factors: (1) divergent interpretations of policy
intent by different actors; (2) perceptions by external actors of a lack of
internal support, and resistance of informal implementers within the
implementing agency to implementation; (3) difficulties with restructuring the
implementing agency to fit the new mode of governance, and; (4) resources

problems. The study also found that despite the negative affects of these
four factors, the implementation process was sustained by strong external
support that came from a well-organized and active constituency.
This abstract accurately represents th^content^ the candidate's thesis. I
recommend its publication.
Signed ^

Appreciation is expressed to those who contributed to this research
project. Several individuals were key in keeping me on track and enthused.
Special thanks goes out to all of them:
Professor Michael J. Murphy, for his counsel, his humor, and his
direction. I consider him a valued friend
Professor Rodney Muth for encouraging me to be a more critical and
insightful researcher.
Professor Sharon Ford for her efforts and encouragement to make
me a better writer.
Professor Kenneth Wolf for teaching me that research can be more
than just a challenge, it can also be fun.
Professor Anthony Robinson for helping me with my writing and for
expanding my interest to include political science.
Professor Nancy Sanders for her continuous encouragement over the
past three years.
Dr. Patricia Baca of the Denver Public Schools, for her openness, her
help in understanding the complexities of a school district, and her
willingness to meet with me despite a tremendously busy schedule.
And, to all the people in the Denver community that took an interest
in what I was trying to do. They made this dissertation possible.
While I am grateful for all the support from these caring individuals, I
am solely responsible for the contents of this dissertation.

1. A CASE OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION............................... 1
Introduction........................................... 1
The Antecedents of the Denver Implementation Case .... 2
Setting of the Study.................................. 10
Evolution of the Study ............................... 11
Rationale for the Study............................... 12
Importance of the Study............................... 12
Rationale for the Study's Framework................... 13
Limits of the Study................................... 15
Definitions of Terms.................................. 16
Conventions .......................................... 18
A Five-part Framework................................. 18
Origin of the Policy............................ 19
Clarity of the Policy .......................... 19
Internal Support for the Policy................. 21
Organizational Structure........................ 23
Resources ...................................... 22
The Research Questions ............................... 23
Summary .............................................. 25
2. LITERATURE REVIEW........................................... 26

Introduction........................................... 26
The Policy Process .................................... 26
The Brewer & deLeon Policy Process Model ........ 28
Dye's Description of a Political Process Model ... 33
Peters' Process Model ........................... 35
Summary Comments on the Three Models ............ 38
Interpretations of Implementation in the Literature ... 39
The Van Meter and Van Horn Approach to
Studying Policy Implementation............. 40
The Nakamura and Smallwood Environmental
Interpretation................................... 42
The Mazmanian and Sabatier Framework for
Implementation............................. 48
The Brewer and deLeon Perspective on
Implementation............................. 52
Bardach's Implementation as a System of Games 56
Commonalities and Summary........................ 62
Decentralization Literature ........................... 66
Origins of Decentralization as a Policy Choice .... 66
What Would a Decentralized System Look Like ... 70
Does it Work? ................................... 71
Summary ............................................... 77
3. METHODOLOGY ................................................. 78
Introduction........................................... 78
Description of the Unit of Analysis: Case Study ....... 81

The Sample......................................... 82
Sampling Issues ................................... 85
Data Collection Methodology ............................. 87
Interviews ........................................ 87
Construction of the Interview Instrument .......... 88
Other Data Sources................................. 92
Data Collection Time Frame......................... 93
Phases of Data Collection.......................... 93
Data Reduction and Data Analysis .................. 94
Data Analysis Approach............................. 96
Summary ................................................. 98
4. FINDINGS ...................................................... 99
Introduction............................................. 99
Organization of the Chapter............................. 100
The Effects of Policy Origin on Implementation ......... 101
District Actors' Interpretation of Policy Origin
Effects on Implementation.................. 102
Union Leadership's Interpretation of Policy Origin
Effects on Implementation.................. 107
Community Actors' Interpretation of Policy Origin
Effects on Implementation.................. 108
The Governor's Staff Interpretation of Policy
Origin Effects on Implementation........... 113
How does the Denver Case Compare with the
Framework?................................. 115

The Effect Policy Clarity on Implementation .......... 116
Interpretation of Policy's Intent by District Actors 117
Interpretation of Policy Intent by Union
Leadership............................... 127
Interpretation of Policy Intent by Community
Actors .................................... 128
How Does the Denver Case Compare to the
Framework?................................. 134
The Effect of Internal and External Support for the Policy
on Implementation ......................... 135
District Actors' Interpretation on the Effects of
Support.................................... 136
District's Support of Decentralization as Viewed
by Outside Actors ......................... 151
How Does the Denver Case Compare to the
Framework? ................................ 158
The Effects of Organizational Structure on
Implementation ............................ 159
Structural Change as Described by the District Actors .. 160
How Does the Denver Case Compare with the
Framework? ....................................... 165
The Effects of Resources on Implementation ............. 167
The District Actors' Perspective on the Effects of
Resources on Implementation................ 168
Perceptions of Those Outside of the District on
the Effects of Resources on

Implementation..................... 171
The Perceptions of Site Personnel as to the
Effect Resources had on the
Implementation Process ............ 173
Perceptions of Principals and Teachers of the
Effect of Resources on
Implementation............... 174
How Well Did the Framework Predict the Denver
Case? ............................. 175
The Effects of Policy Formulation on Implementation ... 176
Summary ............................................. 177
Introduction......................................... 178
The Research Problem ................................ 178
Purpose of the Study................................. 179
Conceptual Framework ................................ 179
Methodology.......................................... 180
Overview of the Conclusions ......................... 181
Summary of Research Findings ........................ 181
Conclusions Pertaining to Research Questions One and
Two...................................... 182
The Effects of Origin on Policy Implementation ... 182
The Effects of Clarity on Implementation ...... 185
The Effects of Internal and External Support on
Implementation........................... 190

The Effect of Organizational Structure on
Implementation............................ 197
The Effects of Resources on Implementation .... 200
Conclusions Pertaining to Question Number 3............ 203
Conclusions and Implications .......................... 204
Conclusions...................................... 205
What are the Implications for Policymakers? .... 207
Implications for Education Reform................ 209
Observations, Speculations, and Suggestions for Further
Study ........................................... 211
Observations Concerning the Study's Framework......... 214
ACTORS 1993-1994 PERIOD........... 221
SUPERINTENDENT 1996 .................. 225
SUPERINTENDENT 1995 .................. 227

I: SAMPLE LETTER............................ 234
J: INTERVIEWS .............................. 236
BIBLIOGRAPHY...................................... 238

Table Page
2.1 Commonalities Between Models and Study Framework........63
3.1 Questions that Focused on Framework Factors.............90

The year 1991 was an extraordinary one for the Denver, Colorado
Public Schools. The district and the union signed a labor contract that
neither had written and commenced to implement a reform that neither had
formulated nor sought. What occurred in May 1991 was a case of
implementation of an educational decentralization policy that had been
formulated and adopted in an unusual manner.
The policy reform began with a breakdown in negotiations between
the Denver Public Schools (DPS) and the local teachers union, the Denver
Classroom Teachers Association (DCTA). The Governor of Colorado
intervened to halt an intended strike action. The labor dispute now became
an arena for making an educational policy choice by an actor outside of the
usual educational environment. What resulted from this unusual intervention
was a school reform policy choice that sought to change the way
educational decisions were made in the schools.
The 1990 -1994 implementation process reveals a school district
populated with a large number of frustrated parents, confused and defensive
administrators, and a community that felt sure that the policy implementation
should have been completed long ago. Could the policy implementation
have been accelerated and accomplished with less frustration and fewer
recriminations? What was it about the policy that caused the implementation

process to be applied the way it was during the first three years?
Depending upon who was asked, it was a case of an overly bureaucratic
school district hesitant to relinquish power to the people, or it was a
community that had misinterpreted what the governor had intended for the
policy to accomplish. How then did the implementation of a seemingly
straight-forward policy get stuck in the slow lane? Had the governor and the
district not foreseen the events that caused the policy to be implemented in
a slow and confusing manner, or was it a case of failing to take into account
the effects of implementation on a policy choice?
This study will observe how the implementation process itself affected
the decentralization effort in Denver. It will show that, while the process of
implementation has been studied for over 20 years, the Denver
decentralization effort quite clearly was affected by implementation factors
that the policy maker did not address in any level of detail.
The Antecedents of the Denver Implementation Case
In August 1990, contract negotiations between the Denver Public
Schools and the Denver Classroom Teachers Association began for a new
contract to replace the one that was scheduled to expire on December 31,
1990. The negotiations became a muddled affair, marked by distrust and
animosity. The resulting negotiations would lead to what Kingdon (1984, p.
21) referred to as a primeval soup that would boil over into an unusual
policy formulation process. As Kingdon describes it, in this soup, a policy
problem, a policy solution, and a receptive political environment came
together quite by chance.
DPS and DCTA locked horns over what would be included and

deleted in the new labor contract. At the core of the negotiation problems
were money and power. The board and the district proposed to give the
teachers more money, but in return, they asked teachers to work a longer
day and give up some of their seniority transfer privileges. The money for
increased pay would come from a reduction in teaching positions (Bingham,
1990a). The removal of transfer privileges gave more power back to
administrators to assign teachers in schools. More troubling for the union
was the board's stance on the teacher work rules in the old contract. The
board sought to eliminate many rigid provisions that prevented any flexibility
by the school board and the district superintendent when dealing with
The board and the district's desire to eliminate rigid specificity was
evident in their version of a new contract. Acting superintendent, Richard
Koeppe, offered the union a streamlined 49-page contract to replace the old
contract that was 148 pages long. Koeppe called the old contract "overly
complex, unwieldy, confusing, and increasingly inoperable" (Bingham,
Going beyond labor issues, the board of education went a step further
and called the old contract an obstacle to progress in the Denver Public
Schools (Bingham, 1990b). As the board saw it, "there was so much
decision-making power in the hands of the teachers now that they have
virtually taken over control of the district." As the board's chief negotiator
said, "By law the board must have the final say [in running the schools]"
(Bingham, 1990b).
The director of the DCTA categorized the district's proposals as an
effort by the school board to make final decisions on everything. From the

perspective of the union, such an attempt by the board and the district ran
counter to everything educational researchers had been learning about the
value of shared decision-making. Teachers saw the new contract as an
effort by the board and the district to throw out all the gains they had made
during the last 23 years of negotiation (Bingham, 1990b).
Negotiations floundered on into December. The negotiating sessions
were marked by distrust and animosity. By mid-December, most observers
believed that the parties had come to an agreement when the teachers'
negotiating team suddenly walked out over differences in how much power
teachers would have in the decision-making process in the schools. (Morson
& Kelly, 1990) Both sides had come to some closure that teachers should
be included in the decision-making process in the schools, but the union
negotiators claimed that the administration would not put the specific
language to that effect into the contract. The Board interpreted the amount
of authority to be given to the sites for decision-making as a Board policy
issue, not a labor issue.
The union was reported as saying that teachers needed more
authority in running the schools because the teachers felt stymied by
constant interference by central administration into the learning process
(Morson, 1990). The union teams' inability to have district and the board put
shared decision-making language into the contract was reported as one of
the catalysts for union negotiators to walk out of the negotiations and call for
a strike vote.
Many in the districts hierarchy felt the union was seeking additional
leverage at the bargaining table by having a strike vote in their pocket.
Union president Rae Garrett conceded that it would be "an extra hammer

But, she added later that 'it's not a bargaining ploy it's serious"' (Morson,
Whether a strike was a ploy or not will be left for the mystics to
decide. On December 15, 1990, the Denver Classroom Teachers
Association voted overwhelmingly to strike the district. Many teachers
reported that they voted for the strike because they felt ignored by the
school board and the school district in daily school operations. School board
president Ed Gamer responded that the board would replace all striking
teachers. He wanted to make clear to the union that the board would not
back down on demands to end inflexible teacher protection work rules that
the board believed hampered reform (Morson & Kelly, 1990). The board also
intended to take a harsher stand on their position if the union did not stop
applying bandages to the old contract rather than starting with a clean slate
on issues.
Media coverage, by both the Rocky Mountain News and The Denver
Post, portrayed the negotiation process thematically as a school board tired
of iron-clad work rules that allowed administrators no flexibility on personnel
issues, and a distrust by teachers that any contract without specific
provisions concerning teachers' rights would lead to despotism on the part of
the district and the board. This distrust by both parties laid the foundation for
a collapse of negotiations and a call for a strike vote by union leadership.
The strike decision was a risk for the union. Even the union president
conceded that justifying a strike to the public would be difficult (Morson,
1990). The combination of a rocky labor relations past between DPS and the
union and school system that was currently faced with declining test scores
and increasing student drop-out rates caused the community to lose a good

deal of sympathy for the teachers' position. A vitriolic 1969 teachers strike
in Denver had left many community members with a negative view of the
school teachers and of the DPS administrative hierarchy (Stevens,
December 1993).
The strike was scheduled to go into effect the first week of scheduled
classes after the winter holiday break. Sensing that a teachers' strike would
have significant negative effects on students and the community, the
governor threatened to bar the strike using an obscure 1915 labor law as an
entree into the negotiation process. The law allowed the state director of
labor and employment to intervene in a labor dispute if the public interest is
jeopardized. The governor was adamant that he would not allow the dispute
"to interrupt kids' education" (Gavin & Fulcher, 1991).
The governor gave the union and the district until January 5 to
resolve their dispute or he would step in and work out a settlement. This
entree into the negotiation process gave the director of labor and
employment and the governor an opportunity to focus on the labor and the
educational issues. The governor's intervention would take the form of a
series of public hearings to address the central issues in the dispute that
would include teacher transfer policies, collaborative decision-making, length
and content of the workday, and the teacher appraisal process by
administration (Gavin & Fulcher, 1991).
The union scheduled a meeting for Sunday, January 6, 1991 to
decide whether or not to postpone the strike and allow the governor to
hammer out a solution acceptable to both sides. On January 6, the teachers
voted to "postpone" the walkout and return to classes as scheduled on
January 7. By postponing the walkout decision, the union sought to

demonstrate that they were still a cohesive group not intimidated by a 1915
law whose validity they questioned.
Concurrent with the union membership's decision to return to the
classroom was a decision to impose a work slowdown that would affect
activities like grading students' work and participating in special activities and
extracurricular events.
In a speech to the union membership, the governor laid out his plan
to resolve the dispute. Starting January 15, 1991, a series of hearings, to be
conducted by Colorado's Director of Labor and Employment and the State's
Commissioner of Education would begin with the purpose of creating a
contract. The governor said that his goal was to create a contract that did
away with [a] heavily-detailed existing contract that [had] developed during
years of mistrust." Five meetings would be scheduled, each with a separate
agenda. Agenda topics would be: collaborative decision-making, workday
length, teacher transfer policy, appraisal process, and economic issues. At
the end of the hearings, the governor and the Director of Labor would write
and present the new contract to the parties.
The governor pointed out that the process would not be easy and
could take as long as three to four weeks to accomplish. He invited the
teachers to tell him what "one thing" could be done to increase their job
satisfaction, to make them feel more empowered, to increase their
effectiveness in helping children learn, and to identify those things that make
their jobs frustrating. Being party to the decision-making process was what
the teachers sought (Bailey, 1991).
By creating a settlement, the governor was able to address his own
ideas on educational reform. During his tenure as governor, he had been

closely associated with education issues through participation in the National
Governor's Conference on Education, as chair of their standards panel and
chair-elect of the conference. The governor had, early on, characterized
himself as a strong advocate of collaborative decision-making. His desire to
use the contract writing effort as an opportunity to address this interest was
obvious. One consultant to the governor reported, "He (Romer) sees this not
just as negotiation of a contract but as a one-time shot at restructuring the
nature of the Denver Public Schools (Stevens, 1991c).
Besides seeking the input from those within the Denver education
system, the governor also sought advice and counsel from outside the
system. He solicited ideas from myriad sources including educational
experts from the University of Northern Colorado, the Jefferson County
school district, and local as well national business and education
communities (Fitzgerald, December, 1993).
As local hearings and forums progressed, information provided to the
media suggested the new contract would include an expansion of decision-
making power for teachers and parents; whereas, the burdensome detail on
work rules, disliked by the board and the administration, would be deleted
(Stevens, 1991c).
Although outside observers noted that the contract addressed the
collaborative decision-making issues, few specifics were included in the
contract as to the actual power of these groups. Yet, the governor was
reported to have suggested that the groups could be empowered to handle
such decisions as workday length and selection of site personnel. The
governor was also devising ways to change the leadership culture within
DPS' central administration (Fitzgerald, December, 1993 & October, 1995;

Stevens, 1991c), a culture that union members referred to as a "culture of
intransigence" (Fox, November, 1993).
On March 27, 1991, almost 12 weeks after taking over the
negotiations that included six week of public hearings and forums, the
governor detailed his 89 page contract to DPS' central administration and
Denver teachers at Denver's Currigan Exhibition Hall. The heart of the new
contract, collaborative decision-making, significantly (at least on paper)
reduced the power of the central administration by giving decision-making
authority to collaborative decision-making teams in the schools.
Rather than pilot the new concept of collaborative decision-making at
a few schools within the district, which had been recommended to the
governor (Berman, October 1995; Dennis, December 1995; Straface,
December 1995), the contract directed that the process be in-place in ail of
Denver's schools by May 15, 1991 elementary through high school.
Each school's team would be responsible for making decisions that suited its
needs (Abbot, 1991b).
Although the governor had presented his contract, it still needed to be
accepted. Both the teachers and the district were reported to be optimistic
that the new contract addressed their primary concerns. The school board
president commented, "I think that it's [the contract] going to be something
we can live with," and that it would "require us to do some management
adjustments that will be very difficult, but we feel that we can do that. .."
(Abbott, 1991c). Rae Garrett, the union president, reported that teachers
generally liked the contract's provisions and that the union would
recommend the membership approve the contract.
With an eerie sense of the future, Rae Garrett also predicted that the

process outlined in the contract would take two to three years before it
would bring about any noticeable change in the schools (Abbott, 1991c).
Setting of the Study
The first four and one-half years of this reform provided an
opportunity to examine a policy implementation process and determine if this
case of policy implementation has been, and is continuing to be, subject to
the pattern of implementation roadblocks that policy analysts have come
describe as typical and predictable. The case also provided an opportunity
to discover if the implementation process in Denver was affected by an
unusual policy formulation process. It is considered unusual in that it was a
policy mandated on a constitutionally independent entity by an outsider who
had no legal right, a point still debated by some, to intervene. School
districts in Colorado have been identified by the State's Constitution as self-
governing entities.
Data collection for this study began three years after the
decentralization policy was initiated in the Denver Public Schools and
continued into a new contract negotiation. This time frame offered an
opportunity for the decentralization policy to be revisited by the district and
the union. Perceptions of the reform's progress were gathered from
community members associated with the reform's implementation, currently
and formerly involved members of the Denver Public school's staff, and
parents associated with collaborative decision-making councils. Data
collected after the renegotiation period (Fall 1994) allowed those involved to
make an assessment of the preceding three years of implementation

Evolution of the Study
The idea for the study came from working as a research assistant in
a related study. I helped collect data on the Denver decentralization case
that was being used to support two related efforts. The Annie Casey
Foundation was sponsoring a three-year study examining how
decentralization, as an educational reform choice, contributed to improved
educational results in six school districts within the United States. The
Denver reform became part of this study as a result of interest by a member
of the University of Colorado's School of Education and through
sponsorship by the Piton Foundation.
Data collected for the Denver effort showed that there were several
versions of reality operating in the same sphere of implementation activity.
Actors within the school district quite clearly interpreted the decentralization
policy differently than did actors within the school sites and actors in the
community. Denver's case of decentralization also evolved differently from
decentralization efforts in the other study cities and, as a result, motivations
to implement the reform were different. These two conditions created a
question as to whether a policy decision, unique in its origin, once out of the
control of the policymaker can be implemented with a fidelity that represents
the policymakers vision.
To understand the Denver case required that, (a) the policy process
be understood, (b) a model or framework be adopted or developed that
could be used to analyze the implementation process in the Denver case,
and (c) reasons for using decentralization as a policy choice to improve

schools be examined. These three conditions are accommodated within this
Rationale for the Study
The purpose of this study is manifold. First, the study seeks to
determine if the Denver decentralization policy formulation process affected
the implementation process. Second, the study examines whether the
implementation actions by the actors and organizations in the Denver case
differed radically from what policy analysts have suggested will typically
impede policy implementation as originally envisioned by policymakers.
The Denver site-governance reform represents a readily accessible
example of policy implementation that can provide additional empirical data
for the study of policy implementation. The study also provides an
opportunity to document an ongoing case of site-governance as an
educational reform policy choice. The Denver case also shows what
happens to a policy that is formulated then embedded in an instrument that
can be renegotiated by actors other than the original policymaker.
Importance of the Study
This study will contribute to the body of research on policy
implementation. It will examine an example of policy being imposed on a
system by an actor from outside of the system. The data will be collected
from the actual implementing actors, originally and currently, involved with
the implementation effort thus offering an opportunity to examine if actors
and organizations changed over time. This study will also document how
different actors and their individual agendas influenced how a policy has

been implemented in this specific context. The study's data will be useful to
policy analysts for confirming whether they have been successful in
identifying actions and activities expected in the implementation process.
The study's empirical data from this study will also help students of school
reform characterize activities and actions associated with success or failure1
in policy formulation and implementation. And lastly, the study identified
unique aspects of a policy that is entangled in a labor relations contract.
Rationale for the Study's Framework
Over the past two decades, policy analysts have examined the policy
process to understand why policy that is crafted by policymakers is seldom
the policy that is implemented. These examinations resulted in multiple
explanations of the policy process (Brewer & deLeon, 1983; Younis, 1990).
For the most part, these explanations resemble each other significantly.
Because "[ijmplementation is a complex process by which the broad
statement of public policy including goals, objectives, and rough means are
transferred into specific actions" (Brewer & deLeon, 1983, p. 256), it is
important to understand what events and sequences are associated with a
successful implementation process. In 1973, Pressman and Wildavsky
published a landmark study of the policy implementation process. Pressman
& Wildavsky found in their study of the Economic Development
Administration's Oakland Project that the most crucial step or phase in the
policy process was implementation. Subsequently, other policy analysts
:ln this context, success or failure refers only to whether the policy that is
implemented bears resemblance to the policy that was envisioned by the policy maker, not
whether the policy adopted was "right or wrong" for the situation.

(Barrett & Fudge, 1981; Brewer & deLeon, 1983; Dye, 1992; Lindblom &
Woodhouse, 1993; Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1981; Palumbo & Calista, 1990)
focused their attention on the implementation phase of policy-making. The
consensus was that implementation, in terms of its potential impact on a
policy's success, was not clearly understood by policymakers. This lack of
understanding of the role of implementation created or contributed to the
very conditions that made any policy susceptible to modification,
reformulation or extinction by those responsible for implementation.
Another factor that made understanding the implementation phase of
the policy process difficult was that, prior to the 1970s, the entire policy
process was seen by most policymakers as a rational process whose steps
or phases, devolved naturally into the next (Lindblom, 1959). The
implementation process was seen as simply a natural consequence of policy
formulation. Under these circumstances, rational policy formulation and
choice meant identifying the steps necessary to ensure a faithful
implementation of the policy as it was formulated. After the 1970s, policy
analysts began to question whether the process was as rational and
seamless as previously believed. Sharkansky (1978), for example
challenged the idea that policy making was a rational process. Policy
making, from Sharkanskys perspective, was "an ambiguous, complex, and
conflictual process which can not be broken down into neat categories"
(1978, p.7). In other words, faithful, automatic implementation of a policy
could not be considered as a natural consequence of policy making.
Policymakers were being challenged to see implementation as a process
that could inhibit the policy change envisioned by the policymaker.
Richard Elmore (1988), looking back on previous attempts to describe

implementation, concluded that "no single model captures the full complexity
of the implementation process "(p. 129). Without a single model, selecting
one of the existing models opens the possibility of ignoring a factor of
interest. Ultimately, what was done was to identify for use the five most
common characteristics of implementation that were described in some
better known existing frameworks. The five categories used in this study's
framework were derived from the common characteristics of implementation
identified in other policy implementation models ( Bardach, 1976; Brewer
and deLeon, 1983; Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1990; Nakamura and
Smallwood, 1989; and, Van Meter and Van Horn, 1976).
Limits of the Study
This is a Case Study of an incidence of policy implementation.
Studying the implementation of the decentralization of school governance
within the Denver Public Schools offered a unique opportunity to study the
implementation process within a small and defined environment: one school
district. The governance policy change also offered an opportunity to study
the implementation process of an uncomplicated policy (at least it initially
appeared to be uncomplicated) that originated in a somewhat unusual
manner. The Denver decentralization case also provided one additional
opportunity. The data collected in this study, while limited to only one
incidence of decentralization implementation, could be useful for
supplementing a larger on-going study of implementation that is focused on
six cases of implementation. While the foregoing tells what this study is
about, it would also be appropriate to tell what it is not about.
This study is not about whether or not decentralization as an

educational reform has been a success in Denver. The study focus is
confined to the "process" involved in policy implementation. Also, the study
describes the actions taken by implementers, it does not judge the
"correctness" of any actors values or actions. Also, this study is neither an
analysis of the complete policy process, nor an analysis of decentralization
as an effective educational policy. The study describes the overall policy
process and the arguments concerning decentralization only for the purpose
of providing the backdrop against which a study of the implementation phase
of the policy cycle can be examined.
Understanding how organizations, as entities, protect their own
interests and efficacy during change, helps to better understand the
implementation process. However, this study is not about organizational
theory. Organizational theory as it is discussed in the implementation
literature serves only to clarify a facet of implementation strategies or
Since the Denver Public School decentralization process is an on-
going event, the analysis is confined to the period commencing with the
policy initiation process (Fall 1990) to the most recent teachers' contract
(Fall 1994).
Definitions of Terms
During the literature review for this study, it was obvious that policy
analysts chose to define common terms in different ways. The first choice
was to create a definition unique to this study from an amalgamation of
definitions. The second choice was to identify one definition for each term
that would be clear without ambiguity, yet descriptive enough to help to

understand what was occurring in the Denver decentralization effort.
Ultimately, definitions that would help to explain the actions observed in the
Denver case but would not be esoteric to a particular ideology or framework
were chosen. These definitions follow.
Policy: A definite course or method of action selected (as by a
government, institution, group, or individual) from among alternatives and in
light of given conditions to guide and usually determine present and future
decisions. Such a specific decision or set of decisions together with the
related actions to implement them. A project or program consisting of
desired objectives and the means to achieve them (Webster's Third New
International Dictionary, 1971).
Implement: To carry out, accomplish, fulfill (Webster's Third New
International Dictionary, 1971)
Implementation: Implementation is the carrying out of a basic policy
decision, usually incorporated in a statute but which can take the form of
important executive orders or court decisions. Ideally, that decision identifies
the problem(s) to be addressed, stipulates the objective(s) to be pursued,
and in a variety of ways, "structures" the implementation process. The
process normally runs through a number of stages beginning with passage
of the basic statute, followed by the policy outputs (decisions) of the
implementing agencies, the compliance of the target groups whose
decisions, the actual impacts both intended and unintended of those
outputs, the perceived impacts of agency decisions, and finally, important
revisions (or attempted revisions) in the basic statute (Mazmanian &
Sabatier, 1989, p. 20-21).
Implementer: One who implements (Webster's Third New International

Dictionary, 1971).
Decentralization: Shifting authority for the making of decisions
downward from the topmost levels, or center, of a hierarchy toward the
bottom, or local levels (Bimber, 1993, p. ix.).
Site-Based Decision-making: A form of decentralization. It identifies
the individual school as the primary unit of improvement and relies on the
redistribution of decision making authority as the prime means through which
improvements might be stimulated and sustained (Malen, Ogawa, & Kranz,
The conventions for the spelling of terms will be as follows:
Decision maker.
Site-based decision-making.
A Five-part Framework
Multiple factors can affect the successful implementation of a policy
decision. The following five conditions or factors are most frequently cited in
one guise or another. Reducing the multiple conditions or factors to just five
is not meant to imply that other possible conditions are not important or do
not have an affect on implementation, only that these five conditions or
factors are broad enough to capture and analyze the actions of the key

participants in the Denver case.
Origin of the Policy
Some policy analysts identify origin of the policy as a factor that
affects successful implementation. Policies that originate from outside the
affected organization may lack the goals, objectives, and values of the
organization. Policymakers also fail to understand the complexity of the
organization upon which they are mandating policy change (Barrett & Fudge
1981, p. 15; Brewer & deLeon 1983, p. 214; Laswell 1971, p. 37).
Consequently, the crafted policy may be incomplete. For example,
policymakers frequently impose school policies that were formulated on the
incorrect premise that everyone is in agreement with what schools are
supposed to do, how they are to do it, and who is to do it (Murphy 1990;
Firestone, Fuhrman, & Kirst 1990).
Policies may also originate at the top of the organizational hierarchy,
or as a result of specific innovations from within the organization that
eventually bubbled up to the top of the hierarchy and became policy
(Barrett & Fudge 1981, p. 12; Brewer & deLeon 1983, p. 254). Using
educational reform as an example, Murphy (1990, p. 5) pointed out that the
first wave of the most current educational reform cycle did not work very well
because most choices were made by those furthest away from where the
policy would be implemented.
Clarity of the Policy
Clarity, in terms of goals and objectives of the new policy, was

commonly identified by policy analysts as a factor affecting implementation.
Seeking clarity in goals and objectives in policy formulation is a double-
edged sword. Policies that are crafted in vague or generalized terms usually
have a better chance for adoption, but they often lack the details for efficient
implementation. Edwards & Sharkansky (1978) take this problem a step
further when they say, "[Wjhile vagueness of policy can make changes in
policy difficult, it can also result in changes far greater than anticipated (p.
297). In spite of the difficulties associated with vagueness, policy analysts
suggest that ambiguity is a natural consequence of policy formulation
because, policymakers often lack the expertise to develop and issue all the
details necessary to implement the new policy (Edwards & Sharkansky
1978, p. 299; Peters 1993, p 92). Policy analysts also suggest that
policymakers should focus on the problem of policy implementor discretion
when dealing with the vagueness (Brewer & deLeon 1983). The lack of
specificity in policies allows policy implementers a discretionary freedom that
could wittingly, or unwittingly, alter the policymakers' objectives.
On the other hand, policymakers find that an overly specific policy
prevents the use of the very discretionary power that may be necessary to
adapt polices to the particular needs of those affected by the policy
(Edwards & Sharkansky 1978, p. 298). Policymakers are not omniscient and
can hardly be expected to foresee every unusual circumstance that could
cause policy failure. Being too specific can also cause policy implementers
to become more concerned with following procedure rather than achieving
the stated goals of the policy (Edwards & Sharkansky 1978, p. 299 ). In
addition, voluminous and specific implementation orders tend to confuse,
rather than clarify, implementation. Giving policy implementers discretionary

power to adapt the policy to local circumstances can contribute to successful
policy implementation.
Internal Support for the Policy
Internal support can also have a significant impact on policy success.
Policy analysts caution policymakers that the selection of a policy choice
does not ensure that the choice will be implemented. Policymakers must
understand that during the formulation process not only must policy
implemented know what to do, and have the capability to do it, they must
have the desire to carry out a policy if implementation is to be successful
(Edwards & Sharkansky 1978, p. 308, emphasis added).
Even if policymakers believe an internal will supports the policy
choice, they must also consider inertia. Policymakers must understand that
implementation must be made to happen; implementation is seldom the
result of a series of automatic events (Brewer & deLeon 1983, p. 17).
Policymakers must be aware that institutional inertia will also prevent
implementation from taking hold even after actions are directed. In some
instances, policymakers may have to identify and empower an outside force
to overcome this inertia (Brewer & deLeon 1983, p. 259). Policymakers can
build internal support and collaterally overcome inertia by identifying near-
term benefits for the policy implemented.
One key factor in inducing or maintaining support for a policy choice
is through incentives. Knowing the resistance that policy implemented can
muster against policy implementation, policymaked should insure that the
implementation process contains incentives to implement the policy.
Incentives can be in the form of rewards, such as near-term benefits, or

penalties. Unfortunately, rewards usually require the expenditure of scarce
resources penalties usually do not (Edwards & Sharkansky 1978, p. 310).
Still, considering the use of incentives for implementation at the formulation
stage rather than waiting until after the implementation process stalls out,
can smooth policy implementation.
Organizational Structure
Policy implementation is also affected by the organizational structure
of the targeted organization. Organizations contain many built-in self-defense
attributes (Mouzelis, 1967; Wilson, 1989). A policy that endangers
organizational existence or goals faces considerable resistance.
Policymakers must, especially during the formulation stage, account for the
impact of organizational structure, and change. Policy implementation within
any organization is influenced by the levels of command or hierarchy, by the
effectiveness of organizational communication, and by whether or not the
organization relies on standard operating procedures.
Policies may continually be reinterpreted in organizations that have
multiple levels of management or control. Communication channels within
an organization that flow in only one direction will prevent feedback on
implementation problems. Standard operating procedures (SOPs), although
excellent for conducting recurring or repetitive operations, are not well-suited
for accommodating change, especially change that may not be well-defined
(Edwards & Sharkansky 1978, pp. 314-316). The problem with SOPs is
further exacerbated when communication channels are cumbersome, and
management layers are multifold.

Resources are another common factor that policy analysts have
identified as essential to successful policy implementation. Policymakers too
often craft and adopt a policy choice without considering whether resources
will be available to implement the policy. Not only must they be available at
policy start-up but, reasonable assurance that resources will continue to be
available during the entire implementation process is required (Pressman &
Wildavsky, 1978, p.13). Expertise also needs to be considered. Will the
independent field sites possess the expertise formerly resident at the central
office, or will additional personnel be needed? Will additional funds for
training personnel at the sites on budgeting procedures be necessary? No
matter how thoroughly a policy is planned, failure to consider the impact of
resource shortfalls will cripple policy implementation.
The Research Questions
The five-part framework helps to focus on the key issues of the study:
what did implementers do; why did they do what they did; and were their
actions anticipated? To examine these questions, it was necessary to
determine what the governor actually intended the decentralization of
decision-making to do in the Denver Public School system. The difficulty
with this approach is, of course, that we will never really know what the
governor was thinking, only what people close to him believed he was
thinking. The passage of time has, no doubt, clouded their memories and
perspectives: what is important is that there was some consistency as actors
close to the formulation process described what they "thought" the governor

meant. The ideal candidate to ask of the governor's intention would have
been the governor himself. Unfortunately, the governor was unavailable to
be interviewed for this study. The governors staff provided their best
interpretation of his intentions and actions based upon their working
relationship with him during the policy formulation process.
What the governor is "thought" to have meant is important because it
served as the baseline against which all other actors' interpretations were to
be compared. Comparing how key implementers interpreted the governor's
intent to how those involved with the policy formulation believed it was to be
interpreted provided insight into the key implementers' level of support and
the actions that they took to facilitate or impede the policy's implementation.
Another concern of this study was whether or not the process of
implementing decentralization in the Denver Public Schools would reveal
any implementation factors previously unidentified. There was little evidence
that the actors reacted in ways other than what had been anticipated.
These then are the central questions of this study:
1. How did the key actors in the Denver decentralization reform
understand and implement the contract-based policy of site-based
management and collaborative decision-making in the Denver Public
2. How does the process of implementing the decentralization
of decision-making in Denver compare to and contrast with a generalized
implementation framework?
3. Does the unique formulation of the Denver policy and its
subsequent process of implementation provide new information to policy

makers and education reformers that would help them plan more effectively
for policy implementation?
This framework seeks to identify how the factors commonly
associated with implementation difficulties affected the Denver
decentralization case. What clearly stands out is that those actors
responsible for implementing the policy must agree and want to see the
policy implemented. Additionally, despite support by key implementers for
the policy, all the actors or stakeholders must understand what has to be
implemented. As the literature suggests (Chelf, 1981; Edwards and
Sharkansky, 1978; Lindblom and Woodhouse, 1993), ambiguity in the policy
and directions, gives implementers the discretionary power to implement the
policy as they, not the policymakers, interpret it. Resources and an
organizational structure to support implementation are also equally important
for successful implementation. Although this framework focused on policy
origin, resources, organizational structure, internal support and clarity, it was
apparent that another factor was always present when implementation
actions were examined: external support that was bounded by democratic
process. Indications are that, despite implementation difficulties associated
with these five factors, a democratic process will sustain support from
external as well as internal sources.

The literature review will cover three areas. First, three interpretations
of the policy process will be described. This short overview of the entire
policy process is helpful for understanding implementation as an integral
part of that process. Next, five models of the implementation process that
have been presented in the literature will be described and compared. The
commonalities of these five models for describing the implementation
process will also be addressed. What is of importance is that, despite the
differences in complexity and in the terminology used in the descriptions, the
models are strikingly similar in concept.2 Their differences lie in the level of
detail and focus. Last, a review of the literature pertaining to decentralization
as a policy choice will be addressed. The chapter will conclude with
summary comments.
The Policy Process
The purpose of examining the entire policy process and the
alternative ways of looking at policy origin is to develop ways of thinking
about the implementation segment or phase of the decentralization policy
Alternative methods of dealing with the "how" of policymaking can be found in
game and systems theory. However, these two theories deal heavily with abstractions and
will not be addressed in this study.

reform in the Denver Public Schools. Although policy analysts chose to
break the process into multiple steps, it is basically composed of three
phases; a beginning (policy initiation), a middle (policy implementation), and
an end (termination) (May & Wildavsky 1978, pp. 12-13). The process is not
completed at the termination stage. When the termination phase occurs,
issues and problems that arose during the implementation or evaluation
phases may have started a new policy process (Chelf 1981; Brewer &
deLeon 1983; Peters 1993; Dye 1993). New policy processes occur because
the existing policy may be insufficient, ineffective, or requiring expansion.
New policy cycles may also result from a policy failing to meet the stated
objectives and to live up to the goals and values that had been espoused by
policy formulators. Chelf (1981, p. vii) explains the process in more specific
terms," he policy process refers to all those myriad decisions and events
that go into the formulation and proposal of a policy, its consideration, and
finally its enactment and implementation, or its rejection."
What follows are three explanations or process models, that will be
described in terms of how their steps, phases, or functions relate to policy
initiation (beginnings), policy implementation (middles), and policy
termination (endings). Appendix A provides a matrix comparison of the three
models. When looking at the process through the use of models, it is
important to remember that a model is nothing more than a simplified
representation of some aspect of reality. A model can be a concrete
representation of reality, such as a model airplane. A diagrammatic flow
chart that helps to explain the workings of a computer can also be
considered a model of a process. Lastly, a mathematical representation of a
process can also be considered as a model of a process or event. No

alternative solutions. That there is a problem that requires a solution must be
brought to policymakers' attention. Brewer and deLeon (1983) suggest that
this will usually occur when a tension develops between what is actually
happening in the environment and what is perceived as to what ought to be
happening. Once a problem is recognized it must be considered in some
context. In particular, it must be addressed in relation to whom it affects and
how it affects them. That is, the goals and objectives of those to be affected
by any potential policy must be taken into account before a policymaker can
consider what policy should be adopted. Last, alternative solutions must be
examined for practicability. A policy choice must be technically feasible,
affordable, and available in time to contribute to a problem solution.
Once ideas or proposals for solving the policy problem have
coalesced, policymakers will move into the estimation phase (Brewer &
deLeon 1983, pp. 83-85 ). Estimation is a maturation process of what began
in the initiation stage. The phase is characterized by the assessment of
proposed solutions. Policymakers are looking for plausible solutions to policy
problems. Cost and benefit analyses are conducted and related to goals,
objectives, and previously identified values previously. Once several
solutions are assessed as being plausible the next phase, selection,
During selection, policymakers will deal with identifying the one
solution that will accommodate the goals of as many interested parties as
possible. During this phase, policymakers often discern that it is not possible
to construct a policy that will meet everyone's goals and objectives or to find
a policy that is in line with explicitly stated values. Since the proposal
selected is often predicated on bargaining between interested parties, the

alternative solutions. That there is a problem that requires a solution must be
brought to policymakers' attention. Brewer and deLeon (1983) suggest that
this will usually occur when a tension develops between what is actually
happening in the environment and what is perceived as to what ought to be
happening. Once a problem is recognized it must be considered in some
context. In particular, it must be addressed in relation to whom it affects and
how it affects them. That is, the goals and objectives of those to be affected
by any potential policy must be taken into account before a policymaker can
consider what policy should be adopted. Last, alternative solutions must be
examined for practicability. A policy choice must be technically feasible,
affordable, and available in time to contribute to a problem solution.
Once ideas or proposals for solving the policy problem have
coalesced, policymakers will move into the estimation phase (Brewer &
deLeon 1983, pp. 83-85 ). Estimation is a maturation process of what began
in the initiation stage. The phase is characterized by the assessment of
proposed solutions. Policymakers are looking for plausible solutions to policy
problems. Cost and benefit analyses are conducted and related to goals,
objectives, and previously identified values previously. Once several
solutions are assessed as being plausible the next phase, selection,
During selection, policymakers will deal with identifying the one
solution that will accommodate the goals of as many interested parties as
possible. During this phase, policymakers often discern that it is not possible
to construct a policy that will meet everyone's goals and objectives or to find
a policy that is in line with explicitly stated values. Since the proposal
selected is often predicated on bargaining between interested parties, the

process will create winners and losers. Policymakers may have to deal with
ambiguous objectives and contradictory goals. Policymakers may even find
themselves in a position of not choosing and returning to step two. However,
if policymakers can work the proposal through all the necessary
compromises and legitimizing tasks, the selected proposal may become
policy (Brewer & deLeon 1983, pp 181-188). In these three phases -
initiation, estimation, and selection - the Brewer and deLeon model has
accounted for the initiation or "beginnings" stage in the policy cycle.
The "Middle" stage of the macro-view is addressed in the model's
Implementation phase. In this phase, all actions necessary for the
operationalizing of the policy are identified. Here too, like Dye and Peters,
Brewer and deLeon stress that policymakers must develop an understanding
of and appreciation for the conditions that facilitate or stymie policy success.
Brewer and deLeon point out that "[t]o understand how decisions are
carried out and to anticipate institutional effects even beforehand, one must
master the details of ... implementation" (1983, p. 19, emphasis added).
This phase in the policy cycle is of particular interest, because policies may
undergo change. In this part of the model, Brewer and deLeon offer not so
much an algorithm for implementation but a warning to be wary of the
complex interactions that occur during this stage. Policymakers should
concern themselves with organizational theory and the development of
frameworks with which to monitor and direct implementation.
The Brewer and deLeon model is helpful in directing attention to the
concerns of reality and context. The detailed explanation of factors
influencing implementation are particularly valuable and served as a core to
the study framework. The factors are source of the policy, clarity of the

policy, support for the policy, complexity of the administration that
implements the policy, incentives for implemented and resource allocation.
Because the implementation step translates what occurred in the
initiation, estimation, and selection stages, policymakers must assess the
fidelity of that translation. It is in the evaluation stage that questions what
was successful and why, how performance or output can be measured, and
whether criteria used in the assessment were appropriate. Policymakers
must also consider whether evaluations should be internal or external to the
implementing organization.
The last step in the Brewer and deLeon model, termination, deals
with how policymakers should deal with adjusting or terminating policy. As
such, termination is considered to be a distinctive phase in the policy
process cycle. Although terminating a policy program would seem to be a
straight-forward process, Brewer & deLeon are clear in pointing out that
changes and terminations at this stage can be the most difficult to enact
because the policy has created a constituency, individual or organizational,
whose existence depends in some way on policy continuation.
Of particular concern in the termination phase is who will terminate,
and can the policy be rationally terminated? What policymakers and policy
analysts must consider is that, even when a logical rational assessment
shows the policy to be ineffective in terms of cost and benefit, continuation
of the policy is based upon not its cost or benefit but on strong social or
psychological reasons. The difficulty is in knowing when such reasons are
Another factor to be considered at this stage are the levels of
termination: All versus some, versus allowing the policy to continue.

Policymakers may determine that a particular aspect of the policy is worth
continuation and in consequence choose to eliminate all but that particular
aspect. However, in some cases the individual parts of a policy maybe so
closely interlined with one another that policymakers have to no choice but
to continue an entire policy simply to reap the benefits of a particular part.
Brewer and deLeon suggest these kinds of problems can be addressed
through another aspect of termination: decrementation. Decrementing
provides the choice of building up the policy over a time horizon, or phasing
it out over a time horizon. The key element is that this type of termination, a
decremental one, is consciously planned ahead of time.
No matter what form of termination is decided upon in advance,
obstacles will still arise after the policy is put into place. Common obstacles
that policymakers should expect to face include institutional, structural,
political, economic, psychological, ethical, moral, legal and ideological.
Individually and collectively, the obstacles are difficult for any policymaker to
overcome. Policymakers will have to deal with institutions that may have
been created as a result of the policy. These institutions may provide
services that go beyond what the original policy intended and terminating a
policy may also result in the loss of these, now expected and even
depended on, services. Terminating policies can affect the labor force and
policymakers must deal with the consequences of creating a large segment
of unemployed. While it may seem prudent to terminate a policy on purely
economic issues, policymakers may find themselves facing political suicide if
a popular policy is terminated. There may be moral and ethical issues of
having created expectations and then not keeping a promise of fulfilling
those expectations. A grasp of how all these barriers mitigate against

termination provides the insight into understanding why even poor policies
seem to perpetuate themselves.
Dye's Description of a Political Process Model
Dye's model is a synthesis of the policy cycle as a political activity
(1993, pp. 23-24). This political model represents a policy process that
emerged from a pattern of policy activity that was observed over the years.
The pattern is represented in five steps. Dye describes this model as a way
of understanding how policy decisions proceed through a policy cycle. He
also points out that conceptually this process model is an overly simplified
version of "real life" interactions and consequently not helpful in
understanding the "Why" of policymaking; that is, the "who gets what and
why do they get it" kinds of questions (Dye 1993, p. 24). The model
temporarily suspends questions of values in order to focus on process.
In step one, which Dye labels "Problem Identification," problems that
require government intervention for their solution are identified. In this initial
step, problems move from an unclear perception on the part of advocates to
clearly defined objective statements of what problems require policymakers'
Step two involves the formulation of alternative proposals to address
the problem. In this step, policymakers' attention is captured by those
advocating that a policy be enacted. At this juncture, if sufficient pressure is
brought to bear, or if the problem is severe, the problem makes it to the
public agenda. Plausible policy solutions are evaluated, and a policy
proposal is selected. Once selected, the proposed policy will be exposed to
public discussion. This leads to step three, legitimization.

Step three deals with legitimizing the policy proposal by building and
securing political support for a proposed policy solution. Legitimization can
be accomplished in many ways, through legislative action, court action, or
institutional methods by becoming part of the way the institution does
Once a policy has been legitimized, the implementation phase, step
four, of the cycle begins. During this phase, all activities necessary to
incorporate the policy into operations are initiated. Implementation includes
activities such as creating new organizations, passing new laws, budgeting
and allocating resources, and so forth.
The last phase, step five, in Dye's political process model is
evaluation. In the evaluation phase, policymakers seek to discover if the
policy meets expectations. If the evaluation process suggests that it is
neither popular nor effective, the policy may be amended, terminated, or
completely replaced (Dye, 1992, p. 24).
In comparison to the three-part policy process suggested by May and
Wildavsky (1978), Dye (1992) has accounted for the initiation phase with the
Problem Identification, Policy Formulation, and Legitimization steps. The May
and Wildavsky's implementation phase is also called "Implementation" in
Dye's model. The pattern of activity included in May and Wildavskys
termination phase is described as Dye's fifth step: evaluation.
The problem with the Dye political process model is its lack of detail.
Conceptually, the model is nothing more than a descriptive skeleton of the
process. Because the model describes the policy process conceptually,
substantive explanations of how policymakers should deal with the real
world are lacking. Issues relating to values, equity, complexity, and other

real-world problems can be difficult to address with this conceptual model.
However, despite the lack of detail, the model is useful as a template for an
initial understanding of how one could approach the analysis of policy
Peters' Process Model
Peters (1993) describes another way of looking at the policy cycle.
The sequence of the policy process in Peters' description is similar to the
macro-view of May and Wildavsky. It also parallels the structure of Dye's
(1992) political process model. Peters, like Dye, chooses to describe the
process in five steps or phases; however, he uses slightly different
terminology to label the steps: Agenda-Setting, Legitimization,
Implementation, Budget and Allocation, and Evaluation and Policy Change.
Agenda-setting begins the policy process. Peters clearly shows that
agenda-setting is a complex and convoluted task. This step is complicated
by issues such as who is setting the agenda, in what context is the agenda
being set, and whether public or private means will be used (Peters, 1992,
pp. 41-53). Peters' model also discusses the difficulties associated with
putting labels on problems. Agenda-setting is an important first step in the
policy cycle. Problems need to have names attached to them, and values
that they are impacting must be sorted out (Peters 1993, p. 43). Peters is
thorough in explaining that policies get on policymakers' agendas in many
ways. Two of the more common are the result of pressure from organized
groups and by pressure from a powerful elite class of citizens. His
description of the agenda-setting process is helpful in understanding the
complexity and difficulty associated with getting a problem to the agenda.

Unlike Dye, Peters links agenda-setting and policy formulation
together in his initial step. He suggests that the two functions are too closely
intertwined to be considered separate activities. While describing the
formulation process he again covers the "who and the why" of policy origin.
His descriptions are detailed and helpful for understanding the impact of
interest group action on policymakers, the rationale behind the decisions
processes, the decision aids that can be used (such as cost-benefit analysis
and decision analysis models), and key actors, and so forth (Peters, 1993,
p. 61). Although both Dye and Peters have accounted for policy initiation in
the same sequence, Peters' descriptions of this part of the cycle are far
superior in terms of utility
Step two in Peters' model is legitimization. Peters identifies this step
as a critical one in the policy cycle. The public must believe that what
policymakers propose to do is within the bounds of what is considered
constitutional (1992, p. 67). He describes, in great detail, that legitimization
consists of a series of compromises and discusses how policy can be
legitimized by legislative and court actions. It can also be legitimized by
public initiatives (Peters, 1993, pp. 67-81). Peters also describes how the
legitimization step is a psychological one because legitimization is based
upon the majority's acceptance of the appropriateness of government policy
at a specific time and in a specific context. Technically good policies may fail
because legitimacy is a variable not a constant in the process. Again, in
contrast to Dye's model, Peters' comprehensive explanations enhance the
understanding of legitimization.
Implementation is step three in the Peters' model. Peters describes
implementation as the point in the policy cycle where policies succeed or

fail. As Peters points out, policymakers have only recently come to
understand that they must pay careful attention to the processes of this
stage, because "[t]here are so many more ways of blocking intended actions
than there are of making results materialize" (1992, p. 91). implementation,
suggests Peters, should not only be thought of as a step in the process, but
as an issue to be considered during the policy formulation period (Peters,
1992, pp. 91-109). Even when conceptually treating it as just one step in the
overall policy cycle, policymakers must keep in mind that implementation is
affected by political settings, dramatis personae, organizational structures,
communication problems, and policy origins.
Unlike Dye, who treated the implementation step as inclusive of all
activity associated with operationalizing a policy, Peters identifies Budgeting
and Allocation as a separate step. The allocation or withholding of funds can
facilitate or impede all other activity conducted in the prior implementation
phase. Consequently it is helpful for purposes of tracking and controlling to
isolate what can be described as one of the more technical aspects of the
policy cycle.
The last step in the Peters model is evaluation and policy change.
This step coincides with the "endings" in the May and Wildavsky macro-view
and Dye's evaluation stage. In this last step, policymakers try to determine if
the policy has accomplished what it was intended to accomplish. Here, goals
become prominent, because during this phase of the policy cycle goals and
objectives defined during agenda-setting are subject to modification, often for
political reasons. The question of how well values have been supported by
the policy will come under examination during this phase. This stage focuses
on how the politics of evaluation affect values. If, after the evaluation

process is completed, and it is determined that the policy has not met
previously identified goals and objectives, then policymakers will consider
their options to change or terminate the policy.3
Summary Comments on the Three Models
All three process models deal with what May and Wildavsky
categorize as the three phases of the policy cycle: Initiation, Implementation,
and Termination. The process is, however, much more complex than this
macro-view suggests. Reality is difficult to model, even with the most
sophisticated techniques. The policy world deals with wants, needs, values,
technical issues, and myhad other concerns that are in constant flux.
Additionally, issues seldom confine themselves to any one phase or step in
the policy process. The difficulty, then, is that although analyzing the process
in a linear and patterned manner helps reduce complexity, it also obscures.
The realities of policy are that at each stage or function of the process there
will be collisions, intermingling, and shifts in order of events. The policy
process is also one of multiple iterations and re-iterations, stumbling starts
and premature endings. More importantly, policymaking deals with social
issues and, ultimately, people. Issues of values and goals must be
addressed by policymakers at some point in the cycle.
These brief descriptions of stages, phases, and functions of the four
3Peters discusses changing policy in terms of linearity, consolidation, splitting, and
non-linearity. Linear replacement involves one for one substitution of one policy program for
another. Consolidation does what the name implies combining several policy programs into
one program. Splitting is a breaking down of one policy program into several smaller, more
effective and efficient programs (at least policymakers hope that is what will result). Non-
linear termination refers to complex changes in the program, often with entirely new
programs being initiated (Peters, 1993, pp. 161-162).

process models suggest that a pattern to understanding the process exists
and is fairly well agreed upon. Although each model labels the core activities
of initiation, implementation, and termination with different terms, the models
are alike conceptually. Consequently, the model which most clearly defines
each step or function is the most useful to understanding the process in its
entirety. So while the study is concerned with only the implementation stage,
it is important to remember, as Brewer and deLeon counsel, "Still, the whole
body must be kept in mind when monitoring the heart, the artery or a vein.
So it is with the policy process" (1983, p. 21).
Interpretations of Implementation in the Literature
In the opening chapter to Implementation and the policy process:
Opening Up the Black Box. Palumbo and Calista (1990) question what is
necessary to ensure that the implementation process puts into place a policy
that maintains the objectives, or more precisely reflects with a great degree
of fidelity what the policymakers intended.
As Palumbo and Calista reviewed the literature seeking an answer to
their question, they concluded that policymaking was kind of a "Black Box"
and that implementation was affected by all of the things in that Black Box.
During their review of the policy research done in the early 1970s, they
came to the conclusion that the research provided a convincing case that
implementation was not an administrative process that followed policy
adoption, but it was, itself, a political as well as administrative process (p. 6-
14). Palumbo and Calista also concluded that implementation should be
looked at as an environment that will contain and perhaps breed conflict.
"Conflict is inevitable because goal modification during implementation is

unavoidable.. "(p. 14). A good deal of the conflict will center on how
implemented choose to interpret and understand what goals are being
pursued, and how to best accomplish them. The Black Box analogy is quite
appropriate, and this appropriateness is made more convincing by the five
explanations of the implementation process that follow. Despite the
variations in the explanations of what goes on in the "box," a common frame
does reveal itself.
What follows is five ways of looking at the implementation phase of
the policy process. Again, while each of the alternative explanations may
use different terminology to describe the implementation process,
conceptually the five explanations deal with similar elements that
policymakers should be aware of, and should anticipate occurring during
policy implementation.
The Van Meter and Van Horn Approach to Studying Policy Implementation
During the mid 1970s, Van Meter and Van Horn (1976) developed a
conceptual framework for studying intergovernmental policy implementation.
Their ultimate goal was to discern what variables in the implementation
process would affect policy performance. Would the policy be implemented
in such a way that it would perform as envisioned by the policy formulators?
What Van Meter and Van Horn conceptualized was a cluster of eight
independent variables (to be iterated below) that would affect how well the
policy would perform, and the dependent variable became policy
performance. Van Meter and Van Horn suggested that the variability of the
implementation process is best thought of in terms of as interactions
between personnel, organizational and political activity, much like Peters

does in 1993. Understanding how these factors operate in concert or in
opposition provide policymakers opportunity to focus on those variables that
will most likely facilitate policy implementation (p. 104).
The Van Meter and Van Horn model is valuable for a study of the
Denver decentralization effort due to the devolution of these three factors,
personnel, political activities, and organizational structure, into eight
identifiable variables: policy resources, policy standards, communications,
enforcement, characteristics of the implementing agency, political conditions,
social/economic conditions, and disposition of the implementers.
What the Van Meter and Van Horn model of implementation
illustrates is how the variables in the implementation process flow and
interact as the process moves toward policy performance (implementation).
Key to understanding the process is seeing that while there are elements of
linearity, that is actions or activities flow one into another, there is also non-
linear and iterative aspects to the process. What is especially helpful to
understanding the implementation process is being able to visualize how
central the two variables, characteristics of the implementing agency and
disposition of implementers, are to achieving policy performance.
The Denver decentralization process can be best explained by
understanding the interactions occurring between the policy formulation and
the ultimate policy performance. The eight variables that Van Meter and Van
Horn identify become a recurrent theme in subsequent models which
suggests that policymakers can consider these variables and the
consequences of their interactions. The clustered variables are designed to
"allow one to chart variations, and then relate them to outcomes. [Which
then]. . can be used to extract a better understanding of the process and of

those factors that facilitate or hinder policy performance" (Van Meter & Van
Horn, 1976, p. 117).
The Nakamura and Smallwood Environmental Interpretation
Nakamura and Smallwood (1980) see the implementation process as
one of three linked environments within the policy process. The two other
environments are Policy Formulation and Policy Evaluation. Communications
and compliance requirements link ail three environments. This linkage
provides for the possibility of feedback, which in turn characterizes their
policy process as cyclical rather than hierarchical. Their description of the
implementation environment is particularly important for this study's focus. In
order to understand the implementation environment as it pertains to this
study, a short explanation of all three environments follows.
In Environment l, aptly named Formulation, "legitimate" policymakers
(usually elected officials) create policy on their own initiative or are
influenced by other powerful non-government actors to create policy that
serves these non-government actors' special interests. The operationalizing
of the policy formulated and selected in Environment I occurs in the
implementation environment, Environment II. Theoretically, actors in this
environment do no more than operationalize the concepts and objectives of
the policy mandated in Environment I. Yet, actors in the implementation
stage "can also be influenced by their own perceptions and/or attempts to
gather support for their implementation efforts" (p. 23). Consequently, the
"legitimized" mandates from the preceding environment can be altered by an
implementation process that is subject to the impact of factors that include
disposition of the implemented, their interactions with one another, and the

environment that exists at the time of implementation (N & S, 1980, p. 23).
The last stage of the Nakumura and Smallwood policy process is
labeled Environment III, Policy Evaluation. This environment is further
described as the "[m]ost amorphous of the three. .. and the actors involved
in evaluation can include policy makers from Environment I, or implementers
from Environment II .. ." ( p. 23). Other actors could include individuals or
groups that had no prior connection with the policy's formulation or
An essential requirement in the Nakamura and Smallwood framework
of the policy process is communications within and between the
environments. Unclear or garbled communications can lead to
misinterpretation of what is to be implemented, and how it is to be
implemented. Nakamura and Smallwood, making reference to Edwards and
Sharkansky (1985), point out that the first requirement for effective
implementation is "(T]hat those responsible for carrying out a decision must
know what they are supposed to do... Orders to implement a policy must
be consistent, clear, and accurate" (Nakamura and Smallwood, 1980, p. 24).
Unclear communications can generate incorrect or inappropriate actions. A
cycle of action/reaction forms a cyclical process that can significantly impede
the implementation process. Unclear communications can also serve the
purposes of implementers as well as those outside of the formal
implementation process. The outsiders who do not support the policy use
lack of clarity as an excuse to interpret the policy as they chose.
Nakamura and Smallwood identified three factors contributing to
policy alteration during implementation. These elements are multiple actors
inside and outside of the implementing organization; the organizational

structure of the implementing agency, including the effect of the bureaucratic
norms associated with the agency; and communications networks and
compliance mechanisms.
Actors operating in the implementation environment can significantly
affect how the policy will be implemented. In the Nakumura and Smallwood
environmental model of policy, actors include policymakers; "formal"
implementers, who are individuals given formal or legal authority to carry out
the implementation of the policy; intermediaries, who are assigned by the
"formal" implementers to carry out specific implementation tasks; lobbies and
other interest groups; the media; and in many cases, the client or recipient
of the policy benefits (Nakamura & Smallwood, 1980, p. 46).
Obviously, policymakers have an opportunity to influence politically
the other actors in the implementation process. Ultimately, the "formal"
actors find themselves acting as facilitator, referees, and coordinators in the
implementation process. The "formal" implementers tools are persuasion,
negotiation, and compromise (p. 47-53). Here, then, much like the Van
Meter and Van Horn framework, actors/implementers can significantly affect
the implementation process.
Both Nakamura and Smallwood and Van Meter and Van Horn focus
on organizational structure and its effect on implementation. Van Meter and
Van Horn suggest that the character of the implementing agency will affect
the implementation process; whereas, Nakamura and Smallwood point out
that the implementation environment is also subject to the ambiguities of an
organization's structure and its norms. What a policy looks like is ultimately
influenced by which organization is chosen, and what methods it uses to
implement policy.

Nakumura and Smallwood suggest that no matter which
organizational model is operative, implemented will be faced with the same
set of organizational issues as they deal with implementation. Implemented
must deal with an organization's internal procedures.
Organizational complexity also affects the implementation process.
Multiple layed for clearing or approving any action increases complexity. In
addition, reliance on subordinate levels to use discretion and an opportunity
for actod form outside the implementation environment to affect the
implementation process increases complexity. The net result is myriad
permutations to the implementation process that can influence
Like Van Meter and Van Horn, Nakamura and Smallwood identify
resources as being a factor that affects implementation. Resources include
dollad, time, staff, and power. Dispensing or withholding resources can
significantly affect policy implementation.
Depending upon the bureaucratic disposition of the organizational
structure toward a policy, organizations and how they are structured can
provide either the stable framework in which implementation can efficiently
be processed, or they can provide a foundation upon which resistance can
be anchored. Formal implemented holding positions of power within an
organization can, through a system of rewards or sanctions, direct actions to
either support or resist a policy's implementation. Yet, because of the
bureaucratic structure within an organization, and because of its internal
norms, intermediary actod can effectively delay, redirect or defeat formal
implemented' actions. This leads to what Nakamura and Smallwood refer to
as the motivations that drive individual actions.

Formal implemented must be aware of individual's motivations within
organizations as well as the organizational norms themselves. Nakumura
and Smallwood focused on the difficulties associated with psychological
motivations by referring to the work of Van Meter and Van Horn. Van Meter
and Van Horn (Nakamura & Smallwood, 1980, p. 57) note that
"implemented may screen out a clear message when the decision seems to
contradict deeply cherished beliefs." These individuals' reactions may vary
depending upon the intensity with which they disagree with the message.
Action or lack of action may be open and defiant, "or surreptitious diversion
and evasion" (p 57). Other motivations that derail implementation may be
linked not to any philosophical disagreement with the policy, but with the
policy's requirement for implemented to change their style or methods of
working within the organization.
Issues of individual motivations as well as issues of bureaucratic
norms will influence how individuals and organizations perceive their roles in
implementation. Citing research in organizational bureaucracy (Blau &
Meyer; Peted & Nelson; Rein & Rabinovitz) Nakumura and Smallwood
conclude that "the political environment [bureaucratic norms] that
characterizes many implementing agencies can often take on a life of its
own that may or may not coincide with the goals of the policy maked who
inhabit Environment I" (p. 58). They further point out that formal
implemented inhabit two worlds: A world of their own pedonal beliefs and
one that is, or can be, influenced by actod in Environment I and other
powerful actod inside and outside of Environment II.

Because they occupy these two worlds, the
formal implementers are involved in a political
balancing act in which they attempt to reconcile
internal agency norms with external pressures
brought to bear on the implementation process by
outside actors. In addition to attempting to move
these actors toward desired policy goals, the
implementers are engaged in the continuous
process of adjusting their own actions to those
goals. (Nakamura & Smallwood, 1980, p. 59)
The last key influence in the implementation environment with which
Nakumura and Smallwood discuss is that of communications networks and
compliance mechanisms. The implementation environment operates within
many organizational settings and structures and is populated with many
diverse actors. In such an environment, communications hold this matrix of
actors and institutions together. Once linked by an accurate and timely
network, resistance to the messages sent is mitigated by compliance
mechanisms. Unfortunately, the key to compliance is either to facilitate
agreement on the policy issue and benefit from a form of voluntary
compliance or to enforce compliance.
Implementation, then, is characterized by Nakumura and Smallwood
as an environment, political in nature, subject to the impact of many
variables. The variables can be categorized as an increasing number of
actors, in and outside of the implementing agency, increasingly complex
bureaucratic structures, the allocation or deprivation of resources, and the
motivations of the individuals in and the norms of the implementing agency.
The implementation environment is also influenced in an interactive and
cyclical manner by its necessary linkages to the policy formulation
environment and the policy evaluation environment.

In terms of taxonomy, the implementation environment is composed
of interacting actors and agencies, communication channels, elements of
organizational control such as resources, operating procedures,
organizational norms and individual actors' motivations and compliance
The Mazmanian and Sabatier Framework for Implementation
In their examination of the policy implementation process, Mazmanian
and Sabatier (1989) suggest that study of the implementation process can
be thought of as a continuum of opposing extremes. At one end of the
implementation continuum are the practitioners who want to know about the
process so they can take the "right" steps during the implementation to
ensure the policy works. If these same practitioners are fortunate enough to
be involved in the formulation stage of the policy, they want to know what
things they should include in the policy design to ensure all policy goals are
obtained. These practitioners seek a template to guide their actions through
all the potential pitfalls, known and suspected.
At the other end of the continuum lies the theorist and social
scientists who understand that there are many things about human nature
that no amount of planning in the formulation stage can overcome in the
implementation stage. They hope for a mitigation of the unalterable facts of
human behavior, organizational dynamics, and technical restraints on the
ability to control the environment. This group focuses on the broader picture,
with a concern for identifying general, rather than specific elements, that
impact implementation.
Mazmanian and Sabatier (1989) conclude that for a framework to

capture accurately the implementation process it must include both
perspectives. The framework must take three things into consideration: (a)
the characteristics of the society in which the implementation will take place;
(b) the range of access points through which policymakers and policy
implemented can influence events, and; (c) an understanding of which
social and institutional groups are or are not amenable to rewards and
sanctions (p, 18-19). Using these three elements, Mazmanian and Sabatier
outline a conceptual framework for studying implementation.
Within their framework, Mazmanian and Sabatier identify three
independent variables that affect implementation^) the tractability of the
problem(s) being addressed; (2) the ability of the statute to structure
favorably the implementation process: and (3) non-statutory variables that
affect implementation. These three independent variables come into play as
they interact with five implementation stages (identified as dependant
variables). While the five stages are depicted as linear, with each stage
affecting the subsequent stage, there can be instances where the process
can become reiterative, (p. 40). Within the Mazmanian and Sabatier model
some elements share common ground with the models of Van Meter and
Van Horn, and Nakumura and Smallwood. Common areas include: clarity of
policy objectives, resources, access by outsiders to the process, media
attention, public support, and attitudes, skills, and commitment of
implementing officials.
While all of these variables are important, clearly stated objectives
are a critical first step. When implemented know what outcomes are
expected and the relative priority of those objectives, the implementation
process is straight forward. Clearly stated objectives and expected outcomes

also facilitate evaluation of whether the outcomes being sought have been
The selection of an agency or implementing official who is committed
to the policy facilitates its implementation. This concept is quite difficult to
apply. Usually, the policy is assigned to an existing agency for
implementation, whose goals and objectives may be at odds with the policy.
Worse yet, the rewards or sanctions that can be applied to the agency may
be limited. Mazmanian and Sabatier point out that the "limited ability of
program designers to assign implementation to agency officials committed to
the program's objectives. . lies behind many cases of failure to achieve
legal objectives" (p. 28).
Formal access by those outside of the implementation agency allows
outsiders, especially those affected by the policy, to challenge the actions of
the implementing agency if they believe agency actions are not in
consonance with the policy objectives. Formal implementers are then faced
with making adjustments to the process. The power of outsiders significantly
redirects the policy process. This outside access can, of course, be a two
edged sword since outsiders can pressure an agency to implement a policy
in ways that may not have been originally intended by policymakers.
Public support, linked with outside access, can kill or sustain a
program. Anthony Downs, quoted by Mazmanian and Sabatier ( p. 31),
points out that:
[Pjublic (and media) attention to many policy issues tends to
follow a cycle in which an initial awakening of public concern is
followed by a decline in widespread support as people become
aware of the costs of 'solving' the problem, as other issues
crowd it of the political agenda, or as scandals arise in
program administration.

Commitment, attitude, and leadership skills of the implementing
officials also play critical roles in the implementation process. Commitment,
in this case, can be closely linked to how successful policymakers were in
assigning the implementation task to an agency aligned with the policy's
objectives. This situation is also linked to how well the policy mandate
defines what the implementing agency should and must do. On the other
hand, no matter how institutionally aligned the agency is with the policy,
there must be leadership present in the agency that will use its resources to
achieve the policy's objectives.
These variables in the five stages of implementation of the
Mazmanian and Sabatier model will affect how the implementation proceeds.
The essential point that Mazmanian and Sabatier make is that no policy is
invulnerable to change or destruction, because too many variables can
come into play. The difficulties in implementation are closely linked to the
fact that it is a dynamic process which will yield to rational and planned
manipulation for only so long.
The interactions of the elements of statutory and nonstatutory
variables make it difficult for policymakers to isolate any one element or
factor as a key to successful policy implementation.Thinking of
implementation as a series of discrete steps flowing one after another can
be deceiving. Of special interest in Mazmanian and Sabatier implementation
process is the identification of how actual impacts of the policy can be
reinterpreted through individual perceptions of those responsible for
implementation and those intended to benefit from the policy's
implementation. Clearly, as the figure suggests, the implementation process
is far from being viewed as uncomplicated.

The capstone of the Mazmanian and Sabatier framework is a focus
on the six conditions that create an effective implementation process. A
policy that seeks to alter substantially the status quo can only be
implemented successfully if it:
1. Provides clear and consistent criteria for resolving goal conflicts;
2. Is linked to a sound theory of cause and effect, while
simultaneously providing the implementing authority to employ that theory;
3. Is structured so as to maximize the probability that the target
group of the policy and those charged with its implementation will act as
4. Has leaders in the implementing agency or agencies who are
committed to the policy, and who have the political leadership and
managerial skills necessary to bring the policy to fruition;
5. Has the support of constituency groups throughout the entire
process, and;
6. Is not replaced over time by conflicting and/or higher priority
policy change.
The Mazmanian and Sabatier framework contains many of the same
factors that affect the implementation process that are found in both the Van
Meter & Van Horn and the Nakamura & Smallwood models. These factors
appear to constitute a core for examining the implementation process. Other
examples supporting this assumption follow.
The Brewer and deLeon Perspective on Implementation
In their explanation of the policy process, Brewer and deLeon (1983)
address implementation as a process of dealing with reality. Linked closely

to this recognition of reality is a necessity to describe a proposed policy in
terms of how it will correct a perceived or actual problem. The task of
implementing the policy must then be assigned to someone who may or
may not understand nor agree with the policy's intent. Resources must also
be identified and allocated. Moreover, before any implementing entity can
act, it must first design the implementing procedures that will produce the
outcomes the policy seeks. These, then, are the realities of policy
implementation (p. 59).
The policy is now subject to many conditions that will affect its
ultimate success. Context must be considered. Also to be considered: who
had a hand in making the policy? What are their interests and goals? How
much power to mandate any particular actions do they have? Will they or
can they provide the resources necessary for implementation? Are they
legitimate policymakers such as legislators or are they special interest
groups seeking to address their own particular agenda? Do they bring
resources to the table? How extensive is the pool of beneficiaries of this
policy? How much pressure can they bring to bear on the implementing
agency? "The determination of 'who gets what and who pays' is always an
important ingredient in the implementation stew" (p. 261).
Brewer and deLeon also address the important reality of the
legislative connection. Knowing who sponsored the policy and how much
support it received is a clue to knowing where implementation impediments
may lie. Impediments include battles over jurisdiction (turf battles in
bureaucratic terms) and resource allocations. The reality of the implementing
agent and the implementing agency must be considered. The agent
implementing the policy may have a different outlook than those formulating

the policy. Worse yet, the agent responsible for implementation may have a
different outlook than the agency that must actually apply the rules
necessary to effect the policy (p. 264-265).
Brewer and deLeon point out that implementation must be thought of
as occurring in context of everyday bureaucratic life. In seeking to isolate the
factors that contribute to implementation problems, they turn to James W.
Fester's (1980) list found in Public Administration: Theory and Practice. In a
somewhat more distilled manner than cited by Brewer and deLeon (p. 265),
Fesler identifies those conditions for successful implementation: (a) able and
committed leadership, (b) clear objectives, and (c) initial success at
implementing the program.
Failure of implementation efforts, addressed by Fesler, is linked to (a)
inertia, (b) lack of leadership, (c) lack of resources. Here, as in the previous
explanations of the implementation process, common factors manifest
themselves: clarity, commitment, and resources. Brewer & deLeon refine
and combine these factors with the "realities" already mentioned and create
a list of factors that will significantly affect the implementation process. Their
list, similar to those already identified in the earlier described frameworks,
contains six factors: (1) Source of policy, (2) Clarity of policy, (3) Support for
the policy, (4) Complexity of the administration, (5) Incentives for
implementers (6) Resources allocation.
A short description of each of the six factors is appropriate. What the
policy intends to address is in many ways influenced by its origin. As Brewer
and deLeon point out, "The significance of the policy source as a factor
influencing implementation is that each policy originator has different roles,
powers, and functions in the government which determine its capacity to

define, select, and execute a particular policy" (p, 266). Since policies that
affect targeted groups can come from many different sources, they could
conflict with existing policies from other sources. Implementing agencies are
often left to their own devices to deal with such discrepancies.
Clarity becomes an issue in implementation, because many policies
are intentionally ambiguous. The policy intent may be clear, but the manner
in which it is to be earned out may be left to the implementing agency. "How
policy is to be translated into actions is usually not specified until much
further down the implementation ladder as one engages in problems of
micro-implementation. . such as the street-level bureaucrats. . the school
room teachers. . (Brewer & deLeon, 1983, p. 288). The problem with clarity
is that the more specific the guidance the more difficult the implementation
due factors such as the lack of specified capabilities or specified resources.
Support for a policy is generally calculated as the policy is formulated.
Few policies make it to the implementation phase without future
implementers and clients believing that the policy addresses their needs.
The difficulty with the support factor is that the clarity issue will arise again.
During the implementation phase, support may wane as implementers and
clients realize that the policy may be all they thought it was. In some
instances, policies have unintended consequences that neither the policy
formulator, the implementers, nor the clients had foreseen. These
consequences may have negative effects and, as such, support will wane.
Often, what will happen is that implementers realize that implementing the
policy may reduce their power, or clients may realize that the policy does
something which they do not subscribe to.
Brewer and deLeon point out that problems in the area of

administrative complexity arise when key implementers are far removed from
where the actual implementation takes place. Multiple levels of authority and
decision-making within an organization create permutations that when
applied in a linear fashion almost ensure that a policy's chance of being
implemented without changes being made expands by the number of
decision points.
Incentives can affect the way implementers approach the
implementation process. Brewer and deLeon suggest that, while positive
incentives would seem to motivate implementation, other things such as the
cost of the incentives, how they are perceived, their life span, and how well
they are communicated will temper their effectiveness. Negative incentives
also are not always effective. Organizational structure and powerful outside
support often can protect implementers against negative incentives.
Resources, well available and under the control of implementers or
policy formulators can also be used to motivate implementation. On the
other hand, even the effects of strong support for the policy by implementers
can be significantly diminished if resources are not available to them. Brewer
and deLeon ( pp. 273-274) suggest that resources play a complicated role in
the implementation process. Their availability and how they are allocated
affect not only the implementation process as a discrete factor but interact
with the other elements that affect the implementation process.
Bardach's Implementation as a System of Games
Bardach (1977) describes implementation as an assembly process
wherein a blueprint is created to make a machine that will produce some
desired policy outcome or output. What is important, says Bardach, is "that

the implementation process be understood, in part at least, as a process of
assembling numerous and diverse program elements" (p. 37). The machine
can be assembled from scratch, or its assembly can be one base upon a
modification of an "earlier" machine that had been built for a similar or near-
similar purpose (p. 36).
Continuing his metaphor of assembling an implementation machine,
Bardach suggests that at a minimum, parts for building the machine should
include accountability: administrative and financial. The machine also needs
parts that represent willing participation of the beneficiaries, funds to achieve
policy outcomes, and innovative capability to design and operate the policy
program. A trouble shooter who will keep the program on track is also
essential. Another important machine part includes strong political support
that sustains and protects the assembly process.
Having identified the essential elements of his machine, Bardach
focused his attention on the circumstances in which it would be used. In his
review of the literature of policy implementation, Bardach found that the
entire policy implementation process is "shot through with gamesmanship"
(p. 55). Essentially, then, to understand implementation is to see it as a
system of games. He postulates that, if policymakers are aware of the extent
of gamesmanship that occurs during the implementation process, they can
design programs that are robust enough to survive the "games." To better
understand how well the metaphor of "games" fits for understanding
implementation, Bardach (p. 56) points out that "control" is at the heart of
implementation and, as such, "control" is best thought of as a game of
strategy and tactics.
The strategy and tactics in Bardach's system of games focuses on

the players in the implementation process and identifies what they regard as
their stakes in the game, what resources they can use in the game, what
rules they chose to play by, and how they will communicate with one
another. Of equal importance in the implementation game is locating those
actors who choose not to play and how to get them to play (p. 56).
Although treating implementation as a system of games helps to
improve understanding of implementation as a senes of interactive activities
controlled by, and sometimes out of the control of, different actors, a down
side to the "Games" approach must be taken into account, because:
The political and institutional relationships in an
implementation process on any but the smallest
scale are simply too numerous and diverse to
admit of our asserting lawlike propositions about
them. It is the fragmentary and disjunctive nature
of the real world that makes a general theory of
the implementation process'. .. unattainable and,
indeed, unrealistic, (p. 57)
Despite Bardach's belief that no universal theory of implementation
exists, he suggests that even the best designed policies will be vulnerable to
games and therefore can be framed accordingly for analysis. Many games
can be, and often are, played, concurrently. The most common games
include: (a) diversion of resources, (b) deflection of goals, (c) dilemmas of
administration, and (d) dissipation of energies. Bardach limits his list to the
four games that can have an adverse affect on the policy assembly process
(p. 66).
In the game of diverting resources, the cost of the resources is
sometimes greater than the value of the service provided. This is what
Bardach refers to as "Easy Money." Program complexity, unclear objectives,

and many other factors often contribute to those funding the program not
knowing how much a service should cost. Consequently, funds are
consumed at rates greater and faster than foreseen, thus limiting the effect
of the policy. The budgeting process within the implementing agency can be
used to facilitate or impede program objectives. The layering of budgets and
budgeting processes can contribute to funds being locked into unproductive
activities, or it can reward outputs rather than outcomes (p. 74). Another
factor in the resources game includes the consumption of sources within the
agency to support its interests in policy outcomes. The implementing agency
is in the "game" for its own interests and will stay in the game as long as
resources are forthcoming.
The game of deflecting goals functions as an opportunity to
renegotiate the intended policy goals by actors who may have been cut out
of, or not satisfied with, the policy formulation process. Goals can be
deflected by trimming them back, distorting them, preventing them from
being reached, and piling on other requirements that eventually destroy their
political support (p. 85).
Administrative Dilemmas include Tokenism whereby the actors who
appear to be complying with or contributing to policy outcomes are only
providing a token contribution. The difficulty with Tokenism is that critical
elements essential to a successful program implementation that are not
forthcoming may not be available from any other source. The appearance of
contributing often causes difficulty for isolating what is really missing. Worse
yet, even if those actors practicing tokenism are identified, they may not be
under the implementers' direct control, and the resource or critical element
may not be available from any other source. Quite clearly, those actors

providing only token contributions may hold a power position that is difficult
to overcome.
Another administrative game that policymakers and policy
implemented must contend with is massive resistance to the policy.
Enforcing sanctions against a few obstructionists is usually not too difficult.
However, sanctioning an entire agency, especially when that agency may be
responsible for providing other essential services, may be problematic. An
even more difficult task is finding the locus of resistance.
Bardach bundles three other administrative problems that are
experienced during the "game" into a category of social entropy. Social
entropy includes non-personal forces of incompetence, variability in the
objects of control, and the problems of coordination (p. 124). Incompetence
speaks for itself. No amount of administrative control can eliminate all the
levels of incompetence that may exist in an organization. The second
problem, variability, will always cause difficulty in controlling implementation.
In the real world, no matter how much you design a system or procedure to
account for difference, difference that has not been accounted for will exist.
The only alternative is to allow for some discretion in the application of
controls in the program. With discretion comes the problem of interpretation
and application (p. 130).
Coordination is another social entopic problem that administrators
must face. It is entopic because coordination can mean many things,
especially as it may be interpreted as what is usually to be expected in a
given situation. Administrators must make a determination of who and how
often others should be consulted or advised. Bardach points out that
coordination should be thought of as the way all activities necessary for

producing an outcome are combined. Bardach focuses on how efficiently
these activities are conducted and completed (p. 133). The mix of people
(their position of power and personality are included in the equation), time
and material combine to make an inestimable number of permutations of
whether coordination will lead to success or failure. Bardach concludes that,
despite hopes to the contrary, "better management" techniques and controls
can not overcome the wide variety of social entropy.
Bardach's last "Game" is the Dissipation of Energies. This is a grab
bag of games that do not fall cleanly into the previous three games. The
theme that ties this collection of grab bag items together is that "individuals,
organizations, and groups waste a good deal of energy avoiding
responsibility, defending themselves against maneuvers by other game-
players, and setting up situations advantageous to their own game-playing
strategies" (p. 148).
Located in the bag of dissipating energies is the game of tenacity:
which actor or actors will have sufficient tenacity to outlast the others'
games? The game of Territory is also found in this bag. The Territory game
involves implementing actor's protecting their own territory while
simultaneously trying to gain a position in a competing actor's territory.
Ultimately these "turf' battles dissipate the energy and resources that were
intended for policy outcomes.
The remaining games found in the grab bag include the "Not Our
Problem" game, the "Odd Man Out" game, and the "Reputation" game. In
the Not Our Problem game, key actors or bureaucracies treat policy
implementation requirements as being too difficult to accomplish or calling
for competencies that they lack. Consequently, they expend their energies

trying to shift the implementation requirements to some other actor or
The Odd Man out game has the actors making a decision as to
whether or not to get involved based upon an assessment of the program's
anticipated success. If they do get involved, they will try to introduce an
option to withdraw when they choose. If the success of the program relies
on their involvement, then automatically a degree of uncertainty is introduced
into the success equation.
The last game is Reputation. If participation will enhance the
reputation of the actor's or a bureaucracy's commitment to the
implementation process is likely. When the Reputation game is played
concurrent with other games then the complexity of energy dissipation is
multiplied many times over. In fact, as Bardach points out, the Reputation
game can be played privately or publicly, it will most often be played
privately when the actors have something to lose, such as status, and
publicly when a Reputation will bolster their personal agenda.
Commonalities and Summary
As pointed out in chapter one, no one agreed upon general theory of
implementation exists, at least so far as taxonomy and terminology are
concerned. The six possible interpretations of the implementation process
that have been described are all different because of focus. Although each
interpretation depicts the implementation process with a different focus and
terminologies, certain factors are present in each. For purposes of clarity a
simplified matrix of the five descriptions is provided in Table 2.1 on the
following page.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Van Matar &Van Horn Hakamura t Smallwood Mazmanizan & Sabatiar Brewer & deLeon Bardach G
Clarity Accounted for In the communications clusters of the model Accounted for In the (unction of internal communications Accounted for in clear ranking of objectives, plus it Is one of (he six necessary conditions for successful implementation. One of the six key factors affecting implementation Not a discrete category, but a necessary element to consider in all "games"
Support A condition found to be necessary in each "Cluster" Addressed by insuring compliance through the application of Incentives and sanctions An element that must be considered when dealing with statutory and non- statutory independent variables A discrete factor affecting the implementation process A necessary 1 consideration in each of I the four main games 1
Oig-Stnichire Addressed In two "clusters" Characteristics of the implementing agency, and the disposition of implementors Addressed in the category of Organizational structures and Bureaucratic Norms (Internal procedures- standard operation procedures. Addressed in considering the effects of statutory and non-statutory variables A discrete factor affecting the implementation process Addressed In the specific game "Oilemmas of Administration"
Roouitcs One of the eight clusters Addressed as an organizational problem, how and who allocates Addressed as an independent variable In the implementation process A discrete factor affecting policy implementation One of the key "Games" played in the | implementation process
Orifla VMth the exception of Brewer and deLeon, origin la not singled out as a discrete element or factor affecting the implementation process. However, because of the unusual origin of the Denver Decentralization policy It Is considered a key factor within this study, especially as it affects the remaining four common factors.

The left hand column of Table 2.1, on the preceding page contains five
categories, chosen arbitrarily, that, with some cognitive manipulations,
capture the common factors identified in the five models. Actors and
motivations are intentionally absent. The role of actors and what motivates
them is woven throughout the other five categories, and as such, are best
covered in the context of those categories. Clearly, in terms of consensus,
all five interpretations addresses clarity.
Van Horn and Van Meter choose to do so in their "communications
cluster." Bardach (1977) does not identify clarity as a separate and distinct
issue in his "system of Games" metaphor, but he clearly alludes to the
necessity for clarity in all four games. Nakamura and Smallwood (1980)
include the requirement for clarity in internal procedures and
communications networks. Mazmanian and Sabatier (1989) deal with clarity
in two ways: first under the independent variable, precision and clear
ranking of objectives, and second, one of the six conditions that are
necessary for successful implementation. Brewer and deLeon (1983) identify
clarity as one of their six factors or conditions affecting the implementation
Resources are also a common factor in each interpretation. Van
Horn and Van Meter identify resources as one of their eight clusters, and
resources is one of Bardach's "games." Mazmanian and Sabatier identify
resources as a independent variable, as well as one of the essential
conditions for success, while Nakamura and Smallwood deal with it as an
organizational problem in their policy implementation environment. Brewer
and deLeon treat it as one of their six steps for successful implementation.

Choosing internal and external support for the policy as a category for
the matrix of common factors required collapsing many conditions or factors
into each of the implementation interpretations. This was done arbitrarily to
keep the matrix from becoming overly complex. Bardach deals with support
in each of the four "games," while Mazmanian and Sabatier address support
both in statutory and non-statutory independent variables. The issue of
support in the Van Horn and Van Meter model is not isolated as a distinct
cluster but considered as an element within each cluster. In the Nakumura
and Smallwood implementation environment, support is addressed in the
areas of compliance, incentives, and sanctions. Support is also a specific
element identified by Brewer and deLeon that will have a significant effect
on the way a policy will eventually be implemented.
Organizational structure was chosen as a common factor because the
interpretations addressed it in many overlapping ways. The matrix is helpful
in tracing the locus of organizational issues in each interpretation. Nakamura
and Smallwood suggest that organizational structure and bureaucratic norms
heavily influence the implementation process. Brewer and deLeon discussed
it in complexity of administration. Bardach had the "game" Dilemmas of
Administration, and Mazmanian and Sabatier covered it in both statutory and
non-statutory variables. Van Horn and Van Meter label organizational
structure as a factor in at least two clusters: characteristics of the
implementing agencies, and Dispositions of implementers.
The category Origin of the Policy is less easily identified as a
common factor in the six interpretations of implementation. Brewer and
deLeon are alone in choosing it as a discrete category. Despite the difficulty
in terming it as a common factor, it has been included so as to address the

somewhat unique origin of the policy that is being used in this case study.
Decentralization Literature
Decentralization has been applied as an educational reform policy
since the early 1980s (Murphy, 1990) and has met with varying success.
The literature on decentralization of decision-making deals with describing its
history as a policy choice, what a decentralized environment looks like, or
should look like, and addresses the level of success the policy has enjoyed.
Section three will provide an over view of what the literature reveals about
these three areas.
Origins of Decentralization as a Policy Choice
Cuban (1990) traced the history of centralization versus
decentralization over 100 years. What he found was a cycle of control that
ranged from uncontrolled localism to centralization of power into the hands
of a small number of professionals. This cycle repeated itself over and over
again. The shifting of control was generally based upon legitimacy for control
over schools. Local control was seen, by some, as democratic and
responsive to the needs of local constituents. Local control was seen by
others as inefficient and corrupt.
As recently as the last 30 years, the concept of local control has
come and gone at least twice. In the 1960s, it again gained considerable
momentum during the civil rights period. By the mid-1970s, enthusiasm for a

local control policy had again lost momentum. It was replaced during the
1980s with efforts to control and improve schools with state level mandates
and legislation such as improving teacher competency and establishing
minimum standards for students. By the mid-1980s, assessments of school
systems found that state-led, top-down approaches to improving schools had
failed to bring about any significant improvement in student performance.
What brought the focus back to the site level was:
[First]. . research literature on the individual school as the
unit of change and, second, by corporate executives who
pointed to their organizations, where decision making occurred
at the site at which products were made or services delivered.
(Cuban, 1990).
Expanding on the corporate connection, Murphy (1990), referring to
recent research efforts by organizational analysts on modern organizational
theory, summarizes their findings. The more effective organizations had
decentralized operations. Essential decisions were made by those closest to
the customers; management's role was to empower, not control, its work
force; and the work force was recast as partners in the enterprise, not as
property of the enterprise (pp. 13-14). What occurred then was a "paradigm
shift" by school reform proponents. Schools would improve because power
would shift from state and districts to legitimate stakeholders: teachers and
parents (Murphy, 1990).
Although in the early 1980s the stage was once again set for
decentralization, the question of whether it was supported by good theory
remained. Murphy (1991) identifies what he considers to be two "Classical"
arguments that support a decentralization policy; political and economic
theory. The political science argument is based on idea that government is

more responsive to constituents' demands and interests when its operations
are directly connected to the people it serves (Murphy, 1991) The political
perspective sees decentralization providing for:
1. an expansion of involvement in the democratic process.
2. a feeling of ownership in the schools.
3. a strengthening of mutual trust between the school staff and the
4. an increase of organizational accountability to the clients.
Murphy says that proponents of decentralization see the process as
increasing knowledge, access, and participation in schools. The end result of
all of this would be a school site that is more accountable and a more
efficient operation that produces better educational outcomes (pp. 1-4).
Economic arguments for decentralization are built upon the concept
1. competition makes for better end products.
2. it offers greater choice in the market place.
3. ineffective and inefficient programs fade away due to non-selection
or low use
4. resources are more efficiently allocated.
These four elements represent the positive reasoning for adopting
decentralization. Another and perhaps stronger economic motivation was
stated in A Nation At Risk, a report prepared by the National Commission on
Excellence in Education (1983). A Nation at Risk reported that despite
manifold efforts by states and school districts to raise the level of student
performance, performance had declined to such a degree that America's
pre-eminence as the worlds technological and economic powerhouse had

been eclipsed by other nations. Finn and Rebarber (1992) echoed a similar
theme when looking back at what had driven reform in the 1980s, "Weak
education was seen as a major impediment to our [America's] international
competitiveness, a threat to our standard of living and our place in the
world" (p. 176).
Closely linked to the economic argument are school site related
issues. Demographics of schools have changed significantly over the last 20
years. At-risk students now account for fully one-third of the student
population, while the economy urgently needs highly-skilled graduates.
"These conditions are exerting a tremendous force on schools to be more
effective for at-risk youth" (Murphy, 1991, p. 8). Murphy argues that the
evidence is in that just demanding better schools using top-down mandates
has failed to produce sufficient numbers of highly-skilled graduates. Another
school-related issue is the public's weariness of non-responsive school
bureaucracies. Seven commonly cited criticisms of school bureaucracies are
that they ( pp. 10-11):
1. limit initiatives at the site of delivery.
2. block learning.
3. fail to serve the needs of teachers.
4. as their priority, set the continuation of their own existence over the
fundamental purposes of education.
5. divert attention away from the core technology of schooling.
6. remain inflexible to the changing needs of students.
7. are a barrier to parental and citizen involvement in the schooling
Raywid (1991) provides additional insight into the problems of

bureaucracies. She points out that evidence has been building over the past
30 years that bureaucracies are .. inefficient and ineffective (the two
primary grounds for its alleged superiority specifically being efficiency and
effectiveness)" (p. 153). She says that bureaucracies have also been
characterized as inhumane, unresponsive to their clients, and impervious to
change (Her criticisms parallel those cited by Murphy, 1991, pp. 10-11). This
is certainly not a vote of confidence to perpetuate bureaucracies existence,
and most especially in something as important as the education of America's
future generations.
What Would a Decentralized System Look Like?
Currently, several descriptions of decentralization exist in the
literature, some are lengthy and full of details (Hannaway, Camoy, 1993;
Brown, 1990; Elmore, & Associates, 1990; Murphy, 1990 & 1991) while
others are broad based generalized concepts. Education Research
Consumer Guide (1993) referred to Site-Based Management as a strategy
to improve education by transferring significant decision-making authority
from state and district offices to individual schools.
Malen, Ogawa, and Kranz (1990) describe school-based management
as "a form of decentralization that identifies the individual school as the
primary unit of improvement and relies on the redistribution of
decision-making authority as the primary means through which
improvements might be stimulated and exchanged" (p. 290). Regardless of
their length or level of detail, the essence of each is captured as follows:
Decentralization is a way of giving schools more, and in many cases, initial,
power over budgeting activity, curriculum design, and personnel issues at

the school site (Clune, 1990). Still, despite this devolvement of these
activities to the sites, schools are still expected to operate within specific
federal and state guidelines (Raywid, 1990, p. 156).
Another common feature associated with decentralized schools is the
establishment at each site of some sort of committee or council that is
charged with soliciting inputs from parents and staff. Their inputs can provide
information for decision-making either by the council or by some other
designated actor, such as the principal or committee chair. Variations as to
the amount of authority site councils would or should have also exist. For
instance, are the councils actual decision-making bodies or merely advisory
to the principal, and do the councils have actual authority to appoint staff
(Raywid 1990, p. 157)? The primary purpose of these councils is to create
an environment of involvement in those decisions that affect the school site.
When the committees or councils have formal authority vested to them, they
are thought to be both autonomous and accountable. Autonomy gives site
participants a greater opportunity to influence decision-making.
Accountability requires councils, in general, and professional staff in
particular, to be more responsive to the local school community (Malen,
Ogawa, & Kranz, 1990, p. 290).
Does it Work?
A review of the literature suggests that politics, leadership, and
organizational structure often impeded effective implementation of
decentralization. Challenge to the economic rationale of decentralization was
not as obvious. Empirical research done prior to 1990 revealed that schools
involved in site-based decision-making more often than not focused on

administrative, "feel good" issues rather than substantive changes in the way
schools approached issues of teaching and learning (David, 1989, p. 51).
Where schools were making significant progress a common theme was
apparent: leadership and support from the district. This leadership and
support manifested itself in four ways by:
1. providing knowledge and skills to the sites.
2. motivating principals to provide site leadership.
3. providing the resources and the time for school sites to acquire the
knowledge and develop the skills and knowledge to operate
4. compensating the staff for the extra effort that site management
Ultimately, says David (1989, p. 50), it is the leadership, support, and
culture of the district, not operational details, that will have a greater impact
on the success of school-based management. And, it must also be
understood that "implementing school-based management involves a lot of
pieces and takes a long time, from 5-10 years... "(p. 50).
Six months after David's article appeared, Malen, Ogawa, and Kranz
(1990) reported that "after reviewing 200 documents describing current and
previous attempts to use site-based management.. ."(p.30), a variety of
factors had been identified that prevents site-based management from
fulfilling its promises. Malen et al, report that proponents of site-based
management suggest that schools will improve in at least six ways if
site-based management is adopted. Malen et al, (1990) suggest the
research evidence does not support the proponents' hypothesis that the six
improvements would actually occur. The refutation by Malen et al, of

decentralization's proponents six predictions are addressed as follows:
1. Proponents' argue that site participants exerting influence on
school policy decisions is discounted. Research evidence suggests that
policy is rarely affected. Little impact is attributed to three factors. First, site
participants rarely address central issues,. Their activities are characterized
as listening, advising and endorsing decisions others have already made.
Second, principals were found to have virtual control of the proceedings, and
third, professional-patron influence is operative in that teachers will follow the
principal's lead, as will parents follow the lead of the principal and the
2. The second factor enunciated by proponents as resulting from
site-management is an enhancement of employee morale and motivation.
Here again, Malen et al, suggest that the evidence is to the contrary.
Although morale and motivation initially are enhanced, eventually the effect
fades. Fading is attributed to several factors (p. 54): (a) the time consuming
characteristics of the process; (b) the confusion, anxiety and contention
associated with defining roles; (c) the dissonance resulting from competition
between the demands of the process and the demands of teaching; (d) the
complexity of problems that must be solved; (e) the resentment if
participants perceive that they are exerting little impact; (6) the frustration
with the lack of resources.
3. Proponents claim that the quality of planning will improve under
site-management, because it benefits from the expertise and interactions of
participants. Not so, say Malen et al, (1990), "In most instances, site
participants do not have time, technical assistance, or logistical support to
carry out the full range of planning activities . ." (p. 54).

4. Another claim that the authors challenge is that site-management
will lead to instructional improvement. Although there have been a wide
range of activities initiated in the name of instructional improvement, "there
is little evidence that it [site-management] stimulates the development or
enhances the implementation of major instructional changes" (Malen et al.,
1990, p. 55).
5. Site-management will enable schools to replicate the
characteristics of effective schools because of their greater autonomy. The
authors argue that there is no "clear evidence" that autonomy leads to an
effective school. In some cases where site participants attempted to develop
school improvement plans that would address the elements of effective
schools, their efforts were blocked by a myriad of constraints such as state
and district regulations, higher priorities and other pressures (Malen, et al.,
1990, p. 56).
6. Proponents claim that site-management will improve student
achievement. From an educational reform perspective this factor would
seem to be the overriding concern of any reform effort. Here again,
according to Malen et al, the evidence from two systemic studies does not
seem to support the hypothesis that improved achievement will result from
site-management. As Malen et al, point out, "While there are exceptions on
both ends of the spectrum (a few schools improve and a few decline), these
studies conclude that most schools maintain their previous level of
performance. Student achievement does not appear to be either helped or
hindered" (p. 59).
Malen et al, conclude with a caution that perhaps site-management is
not an effective approach to education reform and that educators and policy

makers should "carefully consider whether they wish to invest in a reform
strategy that has not been able to achieve its objectives ..." (p. 59).
However, in a final grasp of optimism, they suggest that with sufficient time
and attention to those factors that have, so far, inhibited success, site-based
management could become an effective approach to education reform.
In his Balancing Control and Autonomy in School Reform: The
Politics of Perestroika. Boyd (1990) identifies the focus of site-based
management to be politics rather than education (p. 92). Further, despite the
politics, he noted that educators will still call the shots about what happens
within the system. Boyd sees school-based management working well only
when "it is linked to a well-designed strategic plan, to comprehensive and
focused efforts to improve instruction ..." (p. 94). From the opposing
perspective, Torres (1992), commenting on reform in the 1980s noted,
"Simply involving more or different people did not necessarily improve the
quality of decision making, even though it enhanced ownership" (p. 47.)
Levine, Lowe, Peterson, & Tenorio (1995), citing Malen and Ogawa
(1988), that "citizen involvement in school-based management usually will
remain perfunctory and ineffective" ( Male et al., p.92), suggest that schools
can improve only with parental involvement because:
Unless we draw on the strengths and power of parents and
community members, school reform will, at best, be limited to
superficial efforts designed to cover up rather than resolve the
crisis in education, particularly the crisis of inequality." (p. 236)
Despite this call for involvement, Levine et al, (1990), also warn that the
politics of parental involvement has a down side as well because:

[S]ome of the most successful parent organizing projects are
led by arch-conservatives with an agenda that runs counter to
the values of multiculturism, equity, tolerance, and respect for
children as people capable of learning to think critically and
make their own decisions, (p. 316)
The jury is still out as to whether current reform efforts such as
site-based management can be the catalyst for real change within the
schools. Fullan and Miles (1992) asserted that there are multiple reasons
why reforms fail, but a prime reason is that, "Schools and districts are
overloaded with problems and ironically, with solutions that don't work" (p.
745, emphasis added).
From an educational perspective, the literature and studies available
prior to the governor's intervention,4 seem to suggest that as a theory for
school improvement, decentralization had not yet proven itself. The literature
suggests that despite continual reminders that reforms fail to build on past
successes and avoid past errors, most reformers proceed pell mell into
quick fix changes. In "On Taking School Reform Seriously," Goodlad (1992)
[T]hat quick fixes guarantee an inadequate agenda of possible
reform. Reforms that are inappropriately structured and hastily
implemented fail. The school setting is almost immune to
reform that lacks coherency and commitment, (p. 238)
It is premature here to suggest that the governor's decision to
mandate decentralization was premature, only that the literature counsels
against quick fixes. Earlier in Chapter Two, it was noted that policy analysts
4 At the risk of getting ahead of the data, one of justifications that the governor used in adopting
decentralization was that the research indicated that decentralization would lead to better schools and
betfe performing students.

have suggested that a policy has an easier road to implementation if the
policy is linked to a valid theory of cause and effect.
In an overview of the literature on policy as a process and
implementation as a distinct step in the process, we find that there are
multiple interpretations of what occurs during the policy process. We also
find that policy analysts choose to describe the implementation process with
varying degrees of detail and inclusiveness. Despite these multiple
interpretations, we also find that there is more commonality amongst the
interpretations than there is disparity. Therefore, capturing the most salient
of factors from each of the interpretations provides for a generic framework
with which we can examine implementation with some degree of confidence.
The review of the literature on decentralization as a policy choice
suggests that there is no consensus that decentralization will ensure greater
parent involvement or improved performance from students. What the
literature does suggest is that a buy-in by those in charge of administering
schools is a necessary factor in the decentralization process. A failure to
secure that buy-in will almost certainly ensure implementation difficulties.

This is a qualitative case study that examines the implementation
process. The subject of the study is the implementation of a school site
governance policy in the Denver Public Schools (DPS) that was crafted by
the State Governor. The period under study is from Fall 1990 to the Fall
1994. Data collected and used in this study was collected over a period of
two years. During the first year and a half, as the concept for this study was
being formulated, data were collected over a range of issues that related to
decentralization efforts in Denver. Ultimately, the data suggested that the
implementation process was a core issue in establishing decentralized
governance in the Denver Public Schools.
Because this study sought to make sense out of why the Denver
implementation process proceeded the way it did for over three years, a
qualitative approach was chosen. Qualitative methods were used in this
study to capture the multiple versions of how the decentralization policy was
understood and was implemented by the numerous actors involved. As
Patton (1990) says, the role of qualitative research is not to find the truth,
but to identify patterns in an event based upon an analysis and an
"interpretation" of those patterns. Patton argues that making sense out of the
world requires information, and not just any old information, but true and
useful information. While truth or fact is attenuated by the experiences and

perceptions of the observer," the truth value of our information is best
measured by criteria of usefulness in predicting and explaining our
experience in the natural world" (Pelto and Pelto, 1978: cited in Patton 1990,
p. 272).
Studying the Denver decentralization implementation process using
qualitative methods was also based upon the guidance found in Miles and
Huberman (1994). Miles and Huberman suggest that qualitative research is
a proper methodology when the research deals with:
1. Collecting data in a "real life" situation or environment.
2. Gaining an overview of the context under study.
3. Capturing data on the perceptions of local actors from the actors
themselves and from observers of the actors.
4. Identifying themes that may be present in the data that is collected.
5. Interpreting the actions actors take in relation to the problem and
its context.
6. Identifying a theory or an internal consistency for what is found in
the study.
7. Non-standardized data collection instruments.
8. Analyzing data with words and the words are based on
observations, interviews, or documents.
With the exception of item number 7 (non-standard data collection
instruments) in the Miles and Huberman list of reasons for using qualitative
methods, the Denver study closely parallels the Miles and Huberman
prescription. Marshall & Rossman (1989, pp. 9-10) also recommend
qualitative research as an appropriate methodology for analyzing the
complex interactions of multiple actors during an event. The opportunity to

collect data through observation, participation when possible, and from the
setting, communications, culture and symbols of an organization that can
provide a diverse opportunity for understanding and analyzing an event.
The approach, then, taken for this study was to examine the actions
of individual actors and organizations involved in the implementation and
how they reacted to and acted in the implementation process. During the
literature review, certain recurring themes about the implementation process
became evident. These themes then were collapsed into five major factors
that seemed to continually impact how policy was implemented: (a) origin of
the policy; (b) policy intent and clarity; (c) internal and external support; (d)
organizational structure of the implementing agency; (e) resources. These
five factors areas then became the template for a study of the Denver case.
The study began with a review of the newspaper articles and
editorials written during the period of time that led up to the policy being
formulated. Articles written during the implementation process were also
reviewed so as to build an understanding of how on-going implementation
events were being perceived and reported. Two local daily Denver
newspapers were used for this review, The Denver Post and the Rocky
Mountain News. During the Fall of 1990, these two newspapers covered the
deteriorating negotiating process between the local Denver Teachers
Association (DCTA) and the Board of Education. This review helped to
establish three things. First, what activities in the Denver School district
precipitated the policy that would eventually be put into place by the
governor: a case of understanding policy origin. Second, reviewing the
articles also helped to establish an independent sense of what precipitated
the policy formulation against which the perceptions of the actors involved in

the implementation process could be compared. And third, the review helped
to identify actors and organizations that could provide first hand data on the
implementation process.
Description of the Unit of Analysis: Case Study
The Denver Public School district was established by the State
Constitution in 1902.5 The boundaries of the district, the city and the county
are co-terminus. Like many other large urban school districts, Denver
operated under a court-ordered integration plan : Keves v. the Denver
School Board. 1974. The resulting court order required that the Board take
steps to implement a more equitable and integrated educational opportunity
for an ethnically and economically diverse population. A subsequent fallout
of the court order was busing to achieve an integrated schools environment
(Murphy, 1992).
During the 1990-1991 school year the schools operated with a budget
of 313 million dollars. Colorado Revised Statute (CRS) 22-32-108 gives legal
and operational control of the district and its budget to a seven person
elected school board. Categorically the school board:
1. Adopts school policy and prescribes rules and regulations.
2. Has fiduciary responsibility for the district.
3. Employs the superintendent and approves employment of all
4. Approves employees' salaries and benefits.
3Source of data describing the Denver Public Schools comes from Facts and
Figures 1990-1991. published and distributed by the Public Information Office, Denver
Public Schools, 900 Grant Street, Denver, Colorado 80203.

5. Sets policy which determines educational standards and goals and
approves curriculum.
The Sample
The Denver case served as an opportunity to identify if the actions
that policy analysts have described as being expected during the policy
implementation process did occur in the Denver case. In the words of
Marshall & Rossman (1989), a case of a larger phenomena previously
described and to be expected (p.12).
Miles and Huberman (1994) point out that how you sample will
ultimately place limits on the conclusions that you draw and how confident
you and others can be about those conclusions (p. 27). Conceptual
questions can also drive how the sample is chosen. If you are concerned
with specific constructs, as in this case the factors typically associated with
the implementation process, then your sample would include a need to see
those constructs in different places, at different times, with different actors.
The concern with the sample is with "the conditions under which the
construct or theory operates, not with the generalization of the findings to
other settings"(p. 29). In this study, data were collected directly from key
actors. Data were also collected from documents that they created or that
were created as a result of their actions such as community or media
reports. During data collection, an effort was made to document each actor's
impressions of how others involved in the implementation process acted.
The sample groups for this study consisted of actors from the
governor's staff, representatives from within district administration,
representatives from the Denver Classroom Teachers Association

leadership, representatives from the school sites, including principals,
teachers, and parents; representatives from community organizations
actively involved with the policy's implementation; and from media
representatives. Data from two anonymous sources within the central
administrative offices were also included in this sample. The data were
considered to be reliable and relevant to this study, because both sources
were closely connected with the implementation process. Both sources held
senior level positions within the central office, and their request for
anonymity was based upon maintaining a neutral relationship with the new
Policvmaker(s). To establish a baseline for what the governor's intent
was for the decentralization policy to accomplish, members of the governor's
staff who were involved in some way with the crafting of the policy and could
reasonably speak as to what the governor had intended with this policy were
interviewed. The sample included an education policy assistant and the
governors Director of Labor relations and Management. These individuals
were chosen because of their direct involvement with advising the governor
and their involvement in putting the policy into words, that is, creating the
formal contract between the district and the DCTA.
Formal Implementer(s). Policy implementation literature speaks to the
impact of actors and organizations on the implementation process. In
particular, the literature identifies the roles of "formal" and "informal" actors.
Formal actors are described as those individuals who have been charged to
implement the policy and will be held accountable by policymakers to

implement the policy. Informal actors are those individuals who are necesary
to the implementation process but not formally responsible to the
policymaker. In the Denver case, the school board and the superintendent
were formally responsible for implementing the policy. As mentioned in
Chapter One, an unusual aspect of the Denver case was that the policy was
embedded in a labor contract. Once the contract was signed by the
participating parties, the district and the DCTA, the governor held no
statutory leverage over either party.
As the school board and the superintendent represented the formal
implementers' roles, actors chosen from these groups were selected on the
basis of their direct involvement in the implementation process. The sample
included two members of the Board of Education and the superintendent of
schools who was in office during the study period. As a signatory to the
contract, the union by default was agreeing to implement decentralization;
consequently, representatives from the Denver Classroom Teachers
Association were also interviewed.
Informal Implementer(s) within the District Administration. Since the
focus of this study is implementation, it was also necessary to identify a
sample of key actors from the implementing organization who had been
charged, bv the formal implementor, to take the necessary administrative
steps to implement the policy within the district. The sample included two
central figures from within the district administration: the deputy
superintendent and an assistant superintendent who was given the task to
oversee the implementation activity. These figures are considered to be key
actors, because they were in a position to describe how the central

administration acted in an organizational sense. By selecting these actors it
was also possible to develop a sense of how they interpreted the policy
intent, the directions and intentions of the formal implementers, and the
intentions of the other informal actors within and outside of the central
Other Informal Implementer(s). Within the school site environment,
data were culled from earlier interviews on decentralization that had been
conducted in 11 Denver Public Schools. There was interview material
available from 11 principals, 30 teachers and approximately 22 parents.
Data were also collected from newspaper articles and from individuals
representing community organizations.
Sampling Issues
Sampling for the study was done in two ways. First, a form of theory-
driven sampling was employed. Theory-driven sampling is another name for
qualitative sampling that "up front" seeks just that information that directly
confirms or denies the elements of the study's framework (Miles &
Huberman, 1994. p. 27). For this study, samples were drawn from a field of
actors who were in organizational positions to confirm or deny that the five
factors of the implementation framework (origin of the policy, clarity of intent
of the policy, support for the policy, effect of organizational structure on the
policy, and the effect resources had on implementation of the policy) were
operative in the Denver case. Second, some of the conditions of "within-
case" sampling were used. With the case under study, a decision was made
to identify specific actors based upon their relationship to the case and then

to select other informants related to the case, but with a different perspective
or role. Strauss and Corbin (1990) say purposefully looking for data bearing
on specific categories of data related to a case provides an advantage to the
researcher. "That is, you deliberately choose sites, persons, documents" (p.
183). The sampling used in this study can also be considered purposeful,
because the sample was made based upon a priori knowledge of what key
actors were expected to be involved. As Miles and Huberman (1994) have
pointed out, "Sampling like this ... puts flesh on the bones of the general
constructs and their relationships" (p. 27).
To expand the sample, a small amount of "reputational" or
"snowballing" was used. With reputational or snowballing, a respondent is
asked to name someone else who may be able to contribute information,
and if that individual is named often, then an interview is sought with the
named individual. Because the formal implementer pool was small to begin
with, the snowball method did not expand the list of formal actors
significantly. The method was a little more helpful in expanding the list of
informal actors.
Interview data and documentation collected during earlier research on
a related study was reviewed and data relevant to the five implementation
factors being explored was extracted. Of particular value was data collected
during the parallel study. Because of the familiarity with the data, I was able
to focus attention on the material related to the case study with little

Full Text


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