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Does anyone govern?

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Does anyone govern? exploring the urban and rural dynamics of superintendent-school board relations in Colorado
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Exploring the urban and rural dynamics of superintendent-school board relations in Colorado
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Killian, Jerri
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English
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xiv, 261 leaves : illustrations ; 29 cm

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School board-superintendent relationships -- Colorado ( lcsh )
School board-superintendent relationships ( fast )
Colorado ( fast )
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Includes bibliographical references (leaves 245-261).
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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree, Doctor of Philosophy, Public Administration.
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School of Public Affairs
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by Jerri Killian.

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Full Text
DOES ANYONE GOVERN?: EXPLORING THE URBAN AND RURAL
DYNAMICS OF SUPERINTENDENT-SCHOOL BOARD
RELATIONS IN COLORADO
by
Jerri Killian
B.S., University of Phoenix, 1984
M.B.A., University of Phoenix, 1986
M.P.A., University of Colorado 1996
A thesis submitted to the
University of Colorado at Denver
in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Public Administration
1997


1997 by Jerri Killian
All rights reserved.


This thesis for the Doctor of Philosophy
degree by
Jerri Killian
has been approved
by
Peter deLeon


Killian, Jerri (Ph.D., Public Administration)
Does Anyone Govern?: Exploring the Urban and Rural Dynamics of
Superintendent-School Board Relations in Colorado
Thesis directed by Professor Richard J. Stillman
ABSTRACT
Although the education of America's children is a significant political enterprise,
extant literature fails to explain adequately the relationship between politics and
administration in local education governance. Within the theoretical context of
institutionalism, this study adapts and extends two models from the literature in the
council-manager form of municipal governance to examine the nature of
superintendent-school board relations in both urban and rural environments.
The primary purpose of this research is to explore and describe where political
and professional leadership and control is connected and where it is separated in the
processes of urban and rural education governance in Colorado. Additionally,
institutional and environmental factors affecting official behaviors are explored to
further enhance understanding of the political-professional dynamic. A qualitative
research design is employed and includes data collected through field observations,
interviews, questionnaires, and archival records pertaining to the two sample school
districts in El Paso and Teller counties.
Patterns of behaviors emerged among both superintendents and school board
members participating in the study. Principal findings are that superintendents are the
dominant actors in local education governance, board members prefer an actively
political role for their chief administrator, and public participation and influence in the
processes of governance are both low and episodic. Additional findings identify
IV


differences between governance in the rural and urban settings, which are determined to
be more a matter of degree than of kind. Finally, with the present state of institutional
organization identified, speculative conclusions are drawn concerning the likely future
state of institutional reform and its implications for the nature of political-administrative
relations.
This abstract accurately represents the content of the candidates thesis. I recommend
its publication.
Signed
v


ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
It has been my good fortune to have wise and skillful mentors in the
development of this dissertation. Among the persons to whom I am indebted for their
unwavering encouragement and informed guidance are the members of my committee:
Richard J. Stillman, Richard C. Box, Peter deLeon, Kathy J. Boyd, and Deanna H.
Bowman.
I also gratefully acknowledge the school superintendents, board members, and
administrative assistants who willingly contributed their time to participate in this study.
The perceptions, opinions, and insights offered by these individuals contributed
immeasurably to this project and to my understanding of the dynamics inherent to local
governance.
Finally, this effort would not have been possible without the continuing support
of my family and friends. Their patience, tolerance, understanding, compassion, and
enduring belief in me and this research inspired both the beginning and the completion
of this journey. I am eternally grateful to these individuals.


CONTENTS
Page
Figures............................................................... xii
Tables................................................................xiii
CHAPTER
1. INTRODUCTION......................................................... I
The Research Problem............................................... 2
The Purpose of the Study............................................3
The Rationale for the Study........................................ 5
The Significance of the Study.......................................6
Organization of the Thesis......................................... 7
The Research Questions............................................. 9
2. DOES ANYONE GOVERN?................................................. 10
The Role of the Professional Administrator........................ 11
The Legacies of the Progressive Reform Movement.................11
Professionalism and Governance.................................. 12
Professionalism in Local Government .............................. 16
Role: Administrative Discretion and Power....................... 16
Responsibility: Accountability and Community Representation..... 19
Values: Professional Ethos and the Public Interest.............. 21
Some Problems with Professionalism...............................23
Politics and Administration in Education Governance................24
Elite Models of Governance...................................... 25
vii


CHAPTER
Page
Pluralistic Models of Governance.................................28
Theories of Institutionalism and Structuration .....................33
"Old and "New Institutionalism ................................34
Environmental Interaction and Interdependence....................37
History, Political Structure, and Behavior.......................40
Expertise and Decision Making....................................42
Institutional Models of Reform...................................45
Models of Professional Activities and Roles in Local Governance....49
The Dichotomy-Duality Model .....................................49
A Typology of Policy Leadership..................................53
Alternative Models of Roles in Local Governance.................56
Summary ............................................................61
3. A CHRONOLOGY OF INFLUENCES AND
TRENDS IN LOCAL EDUCATION GOVERNANCE..................................66
The Era of Community Control: 1600s-1829 .......................... 67
The Era of the Gentleman Scholar: 1829-1883 ....................... 69
The Era of the Professional Manager 1883-1958 ..................... 72
The Era the Beleaguered Intergovernmental Manager: 1958-1981....... 81
The Era of the Cut-Back Manager: 1981-Present......................87
Summary.............................................................92
The Era of Community Control: 1600s-1829 ....................... 93
The Era of the Gentleman Scholar: 1829-1883 .................... 93
The Era of the Professional Manager: 1883-1958 ................. 94
The Era of the Beleaguered Intergovernmental Manager 1958-1981... 94
viii


CHAPTER
Page
The Era of the Cut-Back Manager: 1981-Present ..................95
4. SOCIO-ECONOMIC-POLITICAL INFLUENCES ON
URBAN AND RURAL EDUCATION GOVERNANCE................................. 98
Urban and Rural Community Characteristics.......................... 99
Institutional and Environmental Influences on
School Board Governance......................................... 103
The Role of Professionalism.................................. 104
The Role of Board-Superintendent Relationships............... 105
Community Politics and Community Support for Education....... 107
Teachers, Professional Organizations, and Collective Bargaining- 109
The Role of Interest Groups.................................. 110
The Role of General Purpose Government....................... 115
Summary ........................................................ 117
5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY.............................................. 119
The Research Propositions....................................... 119
The Research Design............................................. 121
The Case Study............................................... 122
The Research Sample............................................. 123
The Observational Methods....................................... 128
Unobtrusive Observation...................................... 129
In-depth Interviews ..........................................131
Questionnaires............................................... 133
Limitations of the Study........................................ 135
Data Analysis................................................... 136
Superintendent and Board Member Roles.........................137
ix


CHAPTER Page
Institutional Determinants of Roles............................. 140
Environmental Determinants of Roles..............................141
The Current and Future States of Institutional Form..............144
Summary.............................................................145
6. FINDINGS AND INTERPRETATIONS ....................................... 146
The Urban and Rural Settings........................................146
The Actors......................................................... 149
Superintendent and Board Member Roles.............................. 153
Superintendent Roles............................................ 154
Board Member Roles.............................................. 157
Superintendent-Board Role Relations ............................ 160
Roles by Content Area........................................... 165
Roles: A Recapitulation......................................... 173
Institutional Determinants of Roles................................ 174
Internal Conflict............................................... 174
Desires for Career Mobility..................................... 185
Intergovernmental Relations..................................... 186
Institutional Factors: A Recapitulation......................... 188
Environmental Determinants of Roles................................ 189
Community Support for Education................................. 189
Levels of Local Controversy in the Urban Setting................ 197
Levels of Local Controversy in the Rural Setting.................211
Environmental Factors: A Recapitulation......................... 219
The Current State of Institutional Form.............................220
x


CHAPTER
Page
Institutional Form in the Urban Setting.....................220
Institutional Form in the Rural Setting.................... 222
Summary.......................................................223
7. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS .........................227
Summary.......................................................227
Conclusions and Implications..................................230
Future States of Institutional Form.........................231
Implications of Professional Control ...................... 232
The Nonprofit Executive-Board Relationship..................237
The Public Administrator....................................237
Implications for Future Research............................238
Appendix
A. SAMPLE LETTER OF INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE......................240
B. INTERVIEW GUIDE.................................................241
C. SUPERINTENDENT QUESTIONNAIRE ...................................243
D. BOARD MEMBER QUESTIONNAIRE..................................... 244
WORKS CITED
245


FIGURES
Figure Page
2.1. The Dichotomy-Duality Model: Four Dimensions of the
Governmental Process.............................................. 51
2.2. Typology of Roles................................................. 54
5.1. Role Behaviors by Content Area....................................139


TABLES
Table Page
5.1. El Paso/Teller County Unified School Districts
with >300 Student Enrollment, 1996-1997 ............................ 124
5.2. El Paso and Teller County Population Growth, 1990-1996..............126
53. El Paso/Teller County Registered Voters by Party Affiliation
as of November 1992 and November 1994...............................126
5.4. El Paso/Teller County General Election Results
for November 3, 1992 and November 8, 1994...........................127
5.5. El Paso/Teller County General Election Referenda Results
for November 3, 1992 and November 8, 1994...........................128
6.1. Characteristics of Sample Superintendents
and School Board.................................................... 150
6.2. Superintendent Role Behaviors and Levels of Involvement
in the Four Dimensions of Governance Work...........................154
63. School Board Member Role Behaviors and Levels of Involvement
in the Four Dimensions of Governance Work...........................158
6.4. Superintendent/Board Role Behaviors and Levels of Involvement
in the Four Dimensions of Governance Work............................161
6.5. Superintendent Role Behaviors and Levels of
Involvement by Content Area..........................................166
6.6. Board Member Role Behaviors and Levels of
Involvement by Content Area..........................................168
6.7. School Board Voting Behaviors....................................... 175
6.8. Urban/Rural Board Voting Behaviors by
Required/Substantive Votes...........................................177
6.9. Urban School Board Election Results, 1993 and 1995..................192
6.10. Rural School Board Election Results. 1993 and 1995..................194
xiii


Table
Page
6.11. Urban District Referendum Election Results 1995....................196
6.12. Controversial Urban Topics by Media Reports
and influential Participants........................................ 198
6.13. Controversial Rural Topics by Media Reports
and Influential Participants........................................213
i
XIV


CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
It has been suggested that education is one of the most thoroughly political
enterprises in American life despite the traditional myth that matters of education are
separated from matters of politics (Bailey 1962, viii). To the extent this myth
represents an ideal rather than the real world of education, those who understand the
reality have a political advantage in education governance. In a democratic system of
governance, politics is defined as an authoritative allocation of values resulting from
a set of social interactions on the part of individuals and groups (Easton 1965,49-
50). Popular notions of democracy define democratic government as a system in which
public policy decisions are most significantly influenced by the leadership of elected
officials in concert with articulated constituent preferences, rather than by the expertise
of professional administrators (Tocqueville 1945, 1:81).
The policies established by local school boards are the result of governmental
processes: those by which board members are elected (or appointed) into office, those
that reflect the institutionalization of the organization, and those that mobilize individual
citizens, groups, and organizations to influence official actions (Greene 1992). It is the
purpose of this study to identify and describe the relative levels of professional and
political leadership, the institutional and social factors affecting such leadership, and the
likely future state of relations between politics and administration within the institutional
context of school board governance.
1


The Research Problem
School boards are significant governmental units because of their numbers, the
sums of money they raise and spend, and the importance of their programs and
policies. Although school boards are representative bodies, they frequently defer to the
professional expertise of the superintendent and choose the best' educational policies
regardless of community preferences (Greene 1992). Zeigler argued that because of the
conflicts between a reliance on professional expertise and concerns for electoral
accountability, "school boards behave like typical schizophrenics. On the one hand,
they willingly (indeed eagerly) give power away to the experts_____On the other hand,
they espouse an ideology of lay control (1975,8). It appears that school boards
attempt to act as "professional organizations by relying on the expertise of the
superintendent while simultaneously attempting to present an image of democratic
governance.
The literature alternately asserts that school boards are at best non-democratic
and at worst obsolete. The lack of democratic process is defined by inadequate levels
of community representation on the board, insufficient levels of community
participation in the electoral and decisionmaking processes of the board, and the lack of
board responsiveness to community concerns and preferences (Zeigler, Jennings, and
Peak 1974). Obsolescence of the local board of education is largely attributed to the
changing demographics, economics, technologies, political preferences, and diverse
social values of American communities that have collectively outgrown the traditional
institutional arrangement used in education governance for almost two centuries (Finn
1991; Sarason 1995). As a result of these problems, the role of school board
members-what they do and how they do itis ambiguous. The lack of role clarity of
school board members has contributed significantly to the failure in local American
education governance and resulted in over-reliance on the professional administrator in
substantive policy decisions (Task Force on School Governance 1992).
2


The Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this exploratory study is to examine and identify the nature of
the roles assumed by elected school board members and professional administrators,
describe the relative levels of political and professional leadership and control in the
processes of governance, describe the institutional and environmental influences on
official behaviors, and draw speculative conclusions as to the nature of future
institutional reform of school board governance. To accomplish these objectives,
primary emphasis is placed on the internal dynamics that influence the respective roles
of elected and appointed officials and the nature of the political-professional relationship
between them. Secondary focus is placed on the external influences and constraints
imposed on official behaviors by the community environment and intergovernmental
intervention.
School board members are increasingly accused of deferring to the expertise of
the superintendent in matters of substantive policy while simultaneously encroaching on
the administrative responsibilities. Similarly, district superintendents are increasingly
accused of encroaching on the policy responsibilities of the board (Task Force on
School Governance 1992). Shifts in social control, changing public demands and
perceptions of the public interest, intergovernmental intervention, and conflicting role
expectations serve to complicate and blur the processes of local education governance.
Research in local education governance largely describes the behaviors of school
officials as polarized extremes of political (conflictual) or professional (cooperative
deference to administrators) patterns of interaction (Boyd 1976). However, the
institutional and environmental factors affecting official behaviors have not been
sufficiently incorporated into the literature to aid in explaining the reasons for political
or professional control.
Although similar problems exist within the research on city governance,
prescriptions that legitimate administrative discretion are made clear. While some
3


research reports that differences in role expectations between elected and appointed
officials could lead to increased conflict (i.e., Loveridge 1971), others conclude
encroachment into the respective domains of elected and appointed officials is based on
shared values and goals that result in cooperative patterns of interaction (Svara 1985;
1990). Moreover, the council-manager arrangement in city governance is reported to
insulate the council from the pressures of community conflicts and promote
responsiveness to community needs, as determined by city officials, rather than
responsiveness to articulated community demands (Svara 1990,213-4). Thus,
arguments for a legitimate role for active policy leadership by professional
administrators may be found in the literature of city governance.
The findings of these researchers are not wrong; rather, they are incomplete. In
contrast to the cited education researchers, the objective of this study is to examine the
range of behaviors demonstrated by local education officials along a continuum and
within the context of various policy issues confronting the sample school districts. In
contrast to the work of Svara, this study does not presume the needs of a community
are best determined solely by either elected or appointed officials. Rather, it is the full
range of interaction among and between elected school board members, appointed
district superintendents, community interest groups, general purpose government
(local, state, and federal), and local citizens who choose to participate in education
governance that is presumed to influence the political processes that determine local
education policy outcomes and define the democratic processes of education
governance. Moreover, the influences of the institution itself are presumed to aid in
shaping official perceptions, preferences, and actions (March and Olsen 1984; 1989).
Informed by the normative prescription that policy should be separate from
administration (Wilson 1887; Goodnow 1900), and conflicting literature that indicates
this prescription fails to reflect reality; the primary research question examined in this
study is: Does anyone govern in local education?
4


The Rationale for the Study
Literature in the fields of public administration (Mosher 1982, Waldo 1984.
Cooper 1984; 1987, Fox and Cochran 1990, Box 1992; 1993, Jos 1990), local
government (Kammerer 1964, Loveridge 1971, Stillman 1974, Lewis 1982, Fannin
and Hellriegel 1985, Svara 1985; 1990, Nalbandian 1989; 1990; 1991; 1994, Ammons
and Newell 1989), and education governance (Lutz and Gresson 1980; Tucker and
Zeigler 1980; Institute for Educational Leadership 1986; Task Force on School
Governance 1992) simultaneously express concern about the role of professionalism
and its relationship to administrative discretion in the American governmental process
as we approach the 21st century.
The rationale for this study is closely aligned with the thinking that guided a
1977 Public Administration Review symposium focused on the professions in
government. The organizers of the symposium, Frederick C. Mosher and Richard
Stillman, state, it is probably more appropriate to consider professionalism as a
process in a direction rather than a description of a status." They urged the authors to
'place greater emphasis upon the directions and influence in governmental terms of the
field of activity they were describing" rather than "trying to evaluate the field they were
describing against someones criteria of a profession. Among other considerations,
Mosher and Stillman asked that contributors to the symposium address the following:
The degrees of dominance in policy and administration in government organizations,
the influence of professional organizations and unionization, the degree of individual
autonomy on the job, responsiveness to changing scientific knowledge and technology,
expansion of public problems and political pressures, and directions of change and their
impact upon public policy (1977,632).
Moreover, to the extent existing research related to the superintendent-school
board relationship has been characterized by horatory and nontheoretical perspectives"
(Cistone 1982,1638), this study is informed and bounded by the theoretical framework
of "new" institutionalism (March and Olsen 1984; 1989) and the conceptual models of
5


Svara (1985; 1990) and Loveridge (1971) to explore relations between politics and
administration in local education governance. Thus, a multidimensional approach to
analysis guides the rationale employed in this investigation.
The Significance of the Study
This research advances our knowledge of the processes and behaviors in
governance at the local level and serve to inform democratic debate in several ways.
First, the proposed study combines and extends the theoretical constructs of
institutionalism (March and Olsen 1984; 1989) and structuration (Giddens 1979) to
examine the dynamics in education governance at the local level. Because existing
research applies this theoretical framework to examine the dynamics of governance at
the federal level, the findings of this research may be useful to the actors involved in
and affected by the processes of local governance so as to better understand and
influence local policymaking processes.
Second, this study applies conceptual models previously used to examine
official roles in city government to measure and identify the behaviors of local
education officials. To the extent the polar extremes of political (Iannaccone and Lutz
1970; Boyd 1976) or professional dominance (Kerr 1964; Tucker and Zeigler 1980;
Zeigler, Jennings and Peak 1974; Zeigler, Kehoe, and Reisman 1985) and complete
cooperation (Svara 1985; 1990) do not fully describe the realities of official behaviors,
this study informs and expands our understanding of the actual relationships among
and corresponding actions of elected and appointed officials in local governance.
Third, this study expands our knowledge of the behaviors in the processes of
local governance by providing a balanced interpretation of the behaviors of both elected
and appointed officials in the analysis. Through inclusion of these perspectives, the
role of professionalism may be better understood in local governance. John
Nalbandian put it this way:
6


I am convinced that understanding the next phase in the
development of professionalism in local government requires
insight into the world of the elected official from the elected
official's point of view (1994,535, emphasis in original).
By assessing the extent to which political processes and professional expertise,
respectively, influence the decision-making processes in one area of local governance;
this study may serve as a foundation upon which other forms of local government may
be examined to inform our understanding of the institutional and social factors that
contribute to political and professional leadership in the processes of governance. It is
through an increased understanding of the factors that influence the roles of elected and
appointed officials in local governance that future meaningful research may be
developed and practice may be improved.
Finally, this study seeks to identify the similarities among and differences
between the nature of local education governance in the urban and rural environment.
Since the 1950s, national economic and security interests have largely subordinated the
needs of the rural educational community to those of the urban setting. As such, little
research has been performed to explore the nature of local education governance in the
rural community during the past four decades. Insights gained into the methods for
dealing with the unique issues confronting urban and rural education officials,
respectively, will help to fill this void in the literature and further improve our collective
capacity to improve the practice of local education governance in both environments.
Organization of the Thesis
To explicate the theoretical and conceptual framework of this study and simplify
comprehension of conflicting empirical evidence found in local education governance, a
review of the literature relevant to this inquiry is presented in three separate chapters.
Chapter Two summarizes relevant literature that addresses the unresolved question of
7


who, if anyone, dominates the processes of local education governance. Chapter Three
explores the chronological evolution of relations between politics and administration in
rural and urban education governance. And the current social, political, and economic
influences on school board governance in the 1990s are presented in Chapter Four.
The information presented in Chapter Four serves as a prelude to introduce the
operational constructs defined in Chapter Five. Based on the review of extant literature
from the fields of public administration, municipal governance, and education, Chapter
Five presents the research propositions inherent to this inquiry. Additionally, the
qualitative, exploratory research design, the sample Colorado school districts selected,
the data collection procedures utilized, and the analytic measures employed in this
investigation are presented and described in this chapter.
Chapter Six presents the data relevant to and interprets the meanings of the
research findings of this study. These findings serve to characterize the roles of elected
and appointed officials, assess the nature of institutional and environmental influences
on the processes of local education governance, and describe the current state of
political-administrative relations in the sample urban and rural school districts. A
summary of findings addresses specifically the accuracy of the research propositions
posed in the previous chapter.
Finally, speculative conclusions concerning the future state of institutional
organization in the sample school districts are presented in Chapter Seven. This chapter
and this dissertation concludes with a discussion of the utility of the theoretical and
conceptual models applied in this inquiry and future implications for the study of
relations between politics and administration in local education governance.
8


The Research Questions
As a result of the perceived failure of local school boards to adapt and respond
adequately to the changing political, economic, and social conditions and diverse
educational preferences across the American landscape, four research questions are
relevant to this study of Colorado school boards: 1) Does anyone control local
education governance? 2) Do the relative levels of professional and political leadership
change with the issues under examination, levels of community controversy, and the
participants involved? 3) How does the urban/rurai setting affect the nature of relations
between politics and administration in school district governance? 4) What is the likely
future state of relations between political and administrative control in local education
governance?
9


CHAPTER TWO
DOES ANYONE GOVERN?
The central focus of this dissertation is to examine the extent to which politics
and administration are intertwined and separated within the institutional context of local
school boards. While extant literature acknowledges this question, it does so with little
coherence or comprehensiveness. To overcome this obstacle, Chapter Two presents
and applies theoretical constructs, conceptual models, and empirical evidence from the
fields of public administration, municipal government, and education to explore
political-administrative roles and relations in local governance.
The first section of this chapter identifies and describes three underlying
concepts that are essential to understanding the nature of superintendent-school board
relations in Colorado: (1) the role of the professional administrator in governance, (2)
professionalism in local government, and (3) the influence of social control in
determining the nature of relations between politics and administration in local
education governance. The second section presents the theories of institutionalism
(March and Olsen 1984; 1989) and structuration (Giddens 1979), thereby providing the
broad theoretical context within which the dynamics of local education governance are
explored. The third portion of this chapter presents empirical models of activities and
roles in governance at the local level, with emphasis on Svaras (1985; 1990)
dichotomy-duality model of activities and Loveridges (1971) four-fold typology of
roles in governance. These two models provide the conceptual foundation for
exploring and describing the nature of political and administrative leadership in local
education governance in this study. Finally, this chapter concludes with a summary that
explains the strengths of the theoretical and conceptual framework selected for
application in this dissertation.
10


The Role of the Professional Administrator
The scope and nature of the role assumed by public administrators in the 1990s
are influenced by both the political environment in which they operate and the
professional code of conduct to which they subscribe. The following discussion
examines the role of the public administrator within the context of the legacies of the
Progressive reform movement, which served to strengthen executive capacity, and
within the parameters defined by prescriptions for and descriptions of professionalism
in governance.
The Legacies of the Progressive Reform Movement
The ideals of the Progressive reform movement-eliminating the evils of
political corruption, maximizing the values of community life through public-regarding
leadership rather than the private-regarding ethic of political machines and bosses, and
increasing administrative efficiency-were most enthusiastically supported in the
southern and western regions of the United States at the turn of the 19th century
(Hofstadter 1955,49). The reformers desire to cleanse democracy of political
corruption eventually gave rise to a system of meritocracy that promoted business-like
administrative expertise. The legacies of the reform movement may be found in the
executive positions held by professional administrators in local governance and the
power they possess to shape and influence the public policies within their respective
communities in Colorado.
The relevant themes from public administration that underlie this study begin
with the dichotomous relationship between policy and administration as posited by
Woodrow Wilson (1887) and Frank Goodnow (1900), and adopted by the Progressive
reformers to promote neutral competence and prevent corruption in governments
efforts to carry out *the public will. The moralistic goals of the reform movement to
purify democracy are exemplified in communities across the state of Colorado via
ll


existence of the petition process to nominate political candidates, the power to recall
elected officials, referendum elections to amend the state constitution by popular vote,
the short ballot to simplify the voting process; reducing the influence of specialized
interests and factions through at-large elections, and the separation of local government
affairs from the politics of the state and the nation through utilization of home rule, non-
partisan elections, and by holding local elections at times that differ from those
concerned with state and national positions or issues. In addition, the efforts of the
Progressive reform movement succeeded in strengthening the professional in
government through utilization of the merit system and by imposing the hierarchical
subordination of departments and commissions to senior administrators (Banfield and
Wilson 1963,140-1). It has been argued that such weakening of elected officials
political autonomy while simultaneously strengthening the expert authority of
professional administrators has led to the creation of the professional state (Mosher
1982, 110-42).
Professionalism and Governance
The status professions of medicine, law, and the clergy emerged from the
medieval universities in Europe, whereas the occupational professions developed first
in 19th century England, and then later developed in the United States as a result of the
Industrial Revolution. Although the professions were responsible for determining their
own standards and processes for training and credentialing, the occupational structure
of industrialism ensured a secure and privileged placed in the economic order for
professionals through state sanctioning of exclusionary shelter in the open job market.
Due to the elite status afforded professional actors as a result of their state-sanctioned
protection from occupational competition, their specialized learning, and their
orientation to neutral competency and high ethical standards, the term professions
12


eventually came to include the occupations, in addition to the learned professions of
medieval times (Freidson 1994,16-9).
There are two prevailing views on the status and power of the professions. One
view asserts that professional experts exercise enormous power on both state policy
and on individual welfare through occupational monopoly as a result of exclusionary
employment devices sanctioned by the state. Proponents of this view argue that an
artificial social dependence on professionals exists through which professional actors
control how people perceive problems and determine public policy to resolve them. In
contrast, the opposing view posits that professionals are passive instruments of
money, the state, or individual clients who exercise little or no influence of their own
over the substance and direction of institutional policy or public affairs. Professional
actors in this scenario are characterized as losing both cultural authority and exclusive
jurisdictions of work due to a decline of professional power through processes of
proletarianization, rationalization, bureaucratization, or corporatization (Freidson
1994,31).
These opposing views of the role of the professions in society are similarly
reflected in scholarly research in administrative theory and its focus on the role of the
public administrator. In apparent support of Freidsons (1994,9) statement that
professionalism is both necessary and desirable for a decent society, recent literature
in public administration asserts alternately that professionalism is a positive force for
improving the image of public administration (Rabin 1982), a means to legitimize the
role of the public administrator (Wamsley et al. 1990), and a method for promoting
ethical conduct and serving the public good (Kearney and Sinha 1988). As Mosher
states, In government, the professions are the conveyor belts between knowledge and
theory on the one hand, and public purpose on the other (1982,113).
In concert with the logic of public administration theorists, professional and
professionalism are defined in this study by the level of specialized knowledge and
training, the presence of specific channels of entrance into an occupation, the degree of
13


autonomy granted to make decisions concerning ones job, the degree of individual
identification with ones chosen field, the existence of individual obligation to and
compliance with occupational standards and ethics, and the presence of organized
groups to enhance and protect the occupations within the chosen discipline (Kearney
and Sinha 1988, 571).
Sociological research on professionalism has evolved from a focus on form
(functionalist) to a focus on content (interactionist). Consequently, most of the early
research emphasized the positive roles and accomplishments of the professions while
largely ignoring the social and economic influences on behavior and achievement. In
contrast, more recent scholarly works on professionalism have become increasingly
critical in their evaluations and focus on examining the professions in relation to levels
of political influence exercised, in relation to political and economic elites and the state,
and in relation to the market and class system (Freidson 1994,1-2).
Representing the functionalist perspective, Durkheim (1957) emphasizes the
significance of professional ethics and traits, and presumes that division of labor and
occupational groups represent the moral bases for modem society. According to the
functionalist view, the principles of professionalism are synonymous with the key traits
inherent in individual professional actors; both incorporate the values of altruism,
service, and high ethical standards to promote the common good. The primary function
of the professional organization is that of acting as an intermediary between individual
professionals and the state. Functionalists argue that although professional
organizations may tend to be self-serving, professional actors on the whole provide
necessary services, promote altruistic goals, and act in the public interest.
The more recent interactionist perspectives on professionalism include
structuralism, Weberian thought, and Marxian theory, each viewing the professions as
social actors (Macdonald 1995,4-35). Post-functionalist theorists believe
functionalism asked the wrong questions and attempt to overcome this deficiency by
emphasizing action rather than structure, while exploring what professionals do to
14


create and maintain their special status. Technical, social, cultural, and ideological
factors are considered significant to the actions and interactions of individual actors and
professional groups, how professionals affect and participate in their social world, and
how they develop their careers. Interactionists view social closure as the strategy
employed by professional groups to close access to an occupation, its knowledge, its
education, its credentials, and its markets for services and jobs. Moreover, social
closure, in conceit with the structural features of a bureaucratic, industrialized society,
allows for collective upward social mobility by promoting respectability and prestige
for the professions (Macdonald 1995,50-2). The interactionist perspective
incorporates a more realistic and humanized perspective of professionalism than that of
the functionalists by acknowledging that professional actors are less than perfect human
beings. Thus, the main criticism from interactionists of the functionalist view of
professionalism centers on the argument that ideal types only tell us what professionals
want to be, not what they are.
Changing the direction of the descriptive argument, Freidson suggests a new
theory of professionalism that forsakes the attempt to treat profession as a generic
concept be developed (1994,14). The author argues for the nature of research in
professionalism be changed by focusing on the particular occupations considered
professional, identifying similarities and differences among the actors and groups
within the occupations, and working up to a new theory based upon identified
commonalities across professional occupations.
Developing a new theory of professionalism is beyond the scope of this
dissertation. However, to the extent the roles of professional administrators in
education are compared with and found analogous to the roles of professional managers
in city government (Stillman 1974), the conceptual framework for this study is closely
aligned with and supported by Freidsons (1994) theoretical prescription for analysis.
15


Professionalism in Local Government
Nalbandian (1990,655) identifies three tenets of professionalism to describe the
behaviors of contemporary public administrators in local government: (l) Role, (2)
Responsibility, and (3) Values. The premises upon which Nalbandian builds his
arguments provide the organization for the following discussions on the nature of
power and autonomy assumed in the roles, the levels of responsibility and
accountability to elected bodies and the community, and values that shape the
perceptions and actions of todays public professionals. This section concludes by
addressing some of the more significant implications of professional administration in
governance as we near the end of the 20th century.
Role: Administrative Discretion and Power
Arguments for the legitimacy of administrative discretion are rooted in the
neutral expertise of the public administrator combined with the ability of administrative
processes to protect individual rights (Nalbandian 1990,657). Citing Svara(1985;
1990), Nalbandian argues that politics and administration cannot be viewed as
separate spheres of action in governance, although clearly defined roles for elected and
appointed officials may exist (Nalbandian 1990,655).
To illustrate this point, Nalbandian (1990) reports four basic rationales offered
by city and county managers to justify their discretionist activities in the policy
dimension of governance. First, they tend to view such involvement as a non-political
means to include community interests and ensure processes of rational decision-
making. In the event of a political failure or void created by the governing body,
administrators compensate on behalf of the community will. Second, they seek to
conduct policy-related activities out of public view to protect the public perception of
the governing body. Third, since elected officials determine the acceptable parameters
for administrative discretion, local administrators view themselves as operating within
16


these guidelines. Finally, managers argue their involvement in policymaking is justified
because the elected body is ultimately responsible for the managers actions. If the
council or board does not desire this type of behavior, the manager may be forced to
seek employment elsewhere (Nalbandian 1990,655-6).
As administration has crept into politics, so too has politics encroached into
administration. Citing Sharp (1986) and Thomas (1986), Nalbandian argues that
administrative processes have become systematically responsive to a variety of
community political interests even as managers resist ad hoc interference from elected
leaders and citizens (Nalbandian 1990,656). Although public managers may not
invite the influence of individuals, they are concerned with the protection of individual
rights in their communities. Local law enforcement, local government drug testing
programs, and other legal processes may inadvertently place a premium on economy
and efficiency over the rights of citizens. It is through administrative due process that
potentially negative impacts to individual rights may be mitigated (Nalbandian 1990,
657).
Warning that discretion is not absolute, Fox and Cochran (1990,257)
highlight the nature of internal and external constraints imposed on administrative
discretion. Ethical obligations to serve the values of ones profession, the public
interest, popular sovereignty, accountability, social order, social justice, citizenship
development, political equality, efficiency, and liberty create internally-imposed limits
on administrative discretion, whereas preoccupation with desires for money, prestige,
status, position, and power reflect the external forces that constrain discretionary
behavior and reflect the more negative aspects of professionalism (Cooper 1987,322).
According to Fox and Cochran, institutional complexities and constitutional norms
preclude administrative discretion from becoming absolute. Besides, no one seems to
be asking for that much discretion (Fox and Cochran 1990,266, emphasis in
original).
17


Supporting this view, Box (1992) offers the professional role of the
"interpreter for the local public administrator. Conceptually, this role is strategically
located between the "trustee and the delegate roles as described by Lovrich (1981).
Whereas trustee administrators act in concert with their notions of what is in the public
interest and feel professionally obligated to take action in the event of political void or
failure, the delegate administrator relies on the leadership of elected officials to govern
the community and to provide policy guidance before administrative action is taken.
The trustee administrator may proactively advocate for a particular policy direction,
openly oppose the elected bodys stated position on a given issue, or work directly with
community groups to gamer support for shared views.
Like the trustee, the interpreter feels a professional obligation to act in the event
the community will is misinterpreted or disregarded by the governing body. However,
actions taken by interpreter administrators are more remedial in nature. Interpreters
combine their knowledge of the public interest and will with professional expertise, and
offer this information to the governing body for consideration. The interpreters role
and range of discretion is legitimated by the nature of the employment relationship with
the elected body. Since interpreters see their role as that of a paid professional in the
service of elected officials (Box 1992,328), the natural tendency for conflict between
the governing body and the public administrator may be reduced.
Similarly, avoidance of conflict is a leading theme in the professional ideology
of school superintendents. These public administrators are professionally educated and
scientifically enlightened to pursue more effective and efficient means of social
control in order to eliminate conflict and to establish the harmonious organic
community as a result of the influence of the Progressive reform movement (Karier
1973,306). However, while professional socialization and ideology may influence
conflict avoidance, vulnerability to elected officials who control the employment
contract may be the most significant factor inhibiting political behavior of school
superintendents.
I


Research concerned with the roles and relationships between elected and
appointed officials in local governance frequently include the concepts of conflict over
power, and cooperation due to clear role definitions and/or shared role expectations.
For example, Svara (1985,230) found that conflict is not inevitably the underlying
condition in local governance. Finding high levels of cooperation among city
managers and councils in North Carolina, Svara argues that it is possible to balance
discretion and control for both elected and appointed officials when a framework that
clarifies the appropriate divisions of responsibility is identified and supported by the
actors involved. In contrast, Loveridge (1971) found divergent expectations of roles in
his study of city managers in the San Francisco bay area. While many managers
viewed themselves performing as active participants in policy formation, many city
council members expected their administrators to perform in a more technicai sphere of
responsibility. Loveridge cautioned that such differences in role expectations could
result in increased levels of conflict.
Responsibility: Accountability and Community Representation
Following the logic of Friedrich (1940), Nalbandian (1990,657-8; 1991,70)
argues that contemporary managers must broaden their base of legitimacy as they
expand their role in the processes of governance. In addition to accountability to
elected officials, the author urges public administrators to perform with a sense of
accountability to citizens in the local community. Acting with accountability to both sets
of values will, in large part, determine the professional success of the public manager.
Similarly, Cooper (1984) suggests a cooperative, horizontal relationship for the public,
elected officials, and appointed administrators to ensure the perspectives and
preferences of both the citizens and the governing body are adequately represented in
the processes of governance.
As a means to distinguish between accountability to the elected body and
accountability to the community, two role types are identified: the realist and the idealist
19


(Nalbandian 1990,657). The realist manager is described as being accountable to the
governing body, possessing power derived from expertise, experience, and relations
with the governing body, and responding to the desires of council due to their control
over the employment contract. The realist manager is primarily focused on what he or
she can accomplish in relation to the preferences of council. Because the realist
supports the desires of council, the managers legitimacy depends upon the level of
credibility afforded the governing body by the community.
Aligned with the realist perspective, Moe (1984) perceives the role of delegate
as most appropriate for professional public administrators. Rooted in principal-agent
theory, Moes rationale is that citizens are the principals of elected officials, elected
officials are the principals of appointed administrators, and administrators are the
principals of organizational subordinates. Thus, in this authors view, professional
administrators are solely accountable to the governing body and act as its agents while
carrying out their prescribed duties.
On the other hand, the idealist or discietionist manager is described as being
accountable to the values expressed by both the community and council, possessing
power rooted in a balance between efficiently managing technical matters combined
with genuine concern for equity in community representation and individual rights, and
responding out of a shared sense of commitment to the council, the community, and the
public good. The idealist manager is willing to accept a broader policy role if the
elected body fails to act in the public interest. As such, increased professional
discretion and authority are legitimated for the idealist in cases of political void or
failure (Nalbandian 1990,657; Frederickson 1982,502). According to Nalbandian
(1990), the idealist administrator represents the current trend in the role behaviors of
city managers.
20


Values; Professional Ethos and the Public Interest
When performing as Nalbandians (1990) "idealist, the contemporary public
administrator uses his discretion to identify and carry out that which is in the public
interest when the elected body or the public at large fails to act. He must, therefore,
possess knowledge of the public good and be able to identify, understand, and work
with the conflicting values which define every community and its political culture
(1990,658). Thus, professional education and training must develop ones ability to
gain knowledge of the public will and the public interest. Moreover, education of
public professionals must facilitate administrators ability to educate citizens, superiors,
and peers about the issues that concern them (Fox and Cochran 1990,263).
Professional ethics must be taught and developed via the educational processes of
public managers to ensure the discretionary powers of the idealist administrator are
applied to promote the public good and to guard against the use of such discretion to
promote solely self-serving means or ends.
In the absence of direct community participation or action by the governing
body, idealist administrators must act to represent individual and collective concerns in
the community. When citizens or public employees seek legal redress for inequitable
treatment or inadequate services, administrative means may be employed to deal with
these grievances. The more effective these mechanisms become, the more citizens
and employees are likely to utilize such avenues, thereby making these administrative
instruments more powerful in the process. The idealist public manager promotes social
equity by ensuring the equal distribution of public goods and services to groups, rather
than individuals, in the community and conducting an evaluation of fairness or justice
on that basis (Nalbandian 1990,660). This requires that individual administrators
develop and sustain a strong sense of internal moral judgment and character as they
actively participate in the policy dimensions of local governance. They must
... recognize the moral implications of administrative
discretion, understand the demands of the organization,
21


hierarchical superiors, interest groups, elected officials,
professional codes, and the public, and [be| able to reach
some judgment as to the relevance of each to a particular
decision in a particular circumstance (Jos 1990,239).
The professional role of the idealist or discretionist manager, with variation, is
widely accepted by scholars in public administration. As previously noted, Lovrich
(1981) uses the term trustee to identify those administrators acting in accord with
their views of the public good. Similarly, in a comparison of Platos polis and the
discretionist school of thought in public administration, Fox and Cochran (1990) use
the term guardians to describe professional administrators who are cognizant of the
public will and are willing to act in ways that are consistent with the public interest. In
calling for the refounding of public administration, Wamsley et al. (1990,47) define the
Public Administrator as one who possesses the ability to act in a professional manner
with regard to core competencies and occupational standards, demonstrates
commitment to service, possesses values that allow for the broadest possible definition
of the public interest with which one is entrusted, and complies with the constitutional
order while performing ones duties. Moreover, Wamsley et al. (1990) argue for a
status for The Public Administration that is on par with the political and judicial
branches of government.
Rohrs (1978) concept of regime values is another method by which knowledge
of the public good may be achieved by the professional administrator. The principles
inherent in the founding of the nation and subsequent interpretations through processes
of constitutional law as administered by the Supreme Court are the bases upon which
actions taken to serve the public interest are informed (Fox and Cochran 1990,260).
The 1954 Brown v. Board of Education Supreme Court decision, which stated the
doctrine of separate but equal had no place in public education, and the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, which forced state and local educational agencies to comply with
legislation pertaining to school desegregation (Mosher 1977a, 111-4), are two cases in
point.
22


Some Problems with Professionalism
The professional public administrator is uniquely capable of affecting
representation of community values, individual rights, and social equity in local
governance through active participation in the policy process. The professional
manager weighs the frequently conflicting demands of the community against each
other and compares them to existing priorities to determine which demands will be met.
By exploiting their technical expertise and adding their professional orientation to
rational decisions, the administrator may actively influence public policy while
performing in ways that are consistent with popular notions of American democracy
(Bollens and Ries 1969,48).
However, Cigler (1990) asserts that a paradox of professionalism now exists,
for as professionalization of public administrators and administrative discretion have
increased since the 1950s, the levels of acceptance and respect for public institutions by
both citizens and elected officials have decreased during the same period. Relatedly,
Box (1993) argues that resistance to professionalism in local government is largely due
to individual fears of reduced access to and influence in community governance. How
to resolve the intellectual crisis in public administration~the need to reconcile
increased reliance on bureaucratic, professional expertise in determining public
purposes with democratic values (Ostrom 1969,5-1L)is one of the most pressing
challenges facing practitioners and scholars alike in public administration in the 1990s.
Excessive professional idealism to be clever, wise, and good (Schubert 1957.
354) in determining and serving the public interest, and a paternalistic approach that
may reduce the potential empowerment of citizens and groups to act in their own best
interests are two prevailing threats to increased professional discretion. While there is
no clear solution to the former, save improved education and working smarter (Fox and
Cochran 1990,266-7), paternalism may be overcome through the establishment of
horizontal relationships of authority that facilitate the administrators power with
rather than power over citizens in the community (Cooper 1984, 143). Should
23


I
attempts to overcome the threats of excessive idealism and paternalism fail, the final
blow to administrative discretion by public professionals is likely come in the form of
reintroducing the separation between politics and administration in governance to
prevent professional control of politics (Fox and Cochran 1990,266-8).
The implications noted to exist in professional public administration hold true in
education governance as well. The following discussion examines the relations
between professionalism, community power, and school district governance.
Politics and Administration in Education Governance
According to Rosenbloom (1983), three distinct approaches to research in
public administrative theory focus on the managerial, political, and legal aspects of
administration. The central themes in the literature concerned with education
governance mirror these three research streams. Although the significance of the public
administrators professional expertise and its relation to political influence differs within
each of these conceptual research streams, this similarity in the literature highlights the
analogous nature of the professions of school superintendency and public management.
The first research orientation in education governance presents a focus on the
service function of government whereby administrative processes are developed and
maintained to provide the activities and resources necessary to meet publicly perceived
needs. The second research approach addresses the political function of education
governance whereby conflicts between competing coalitions over matters of social
significance are managed and disputes are resolved. The third research orientation
focuses on the causes and nature of state and federal intervention to manage and settle
disputes that have arisen due to public controversy over ideological assumptions and
aspirations identified to exist at the local level.
In the service or managerial function, expertise is highly valued and tends to be
the dominant factor in dealing with substantive questions of school district curriculum,
funding, and personnel. However, because the very nature of political disputes tends
24


t
to challenge the legitimacy of professional expertise and its ability to act as the dominant
force in deciding matters of social welfare, such expertise is regarded as less influential
in studies of the political role of educational government. Finally, technical expertise is
least relevant to and least influential in research focused on examining the nature of the
intergovernmental system and its ability to resolve educational disputes through
legislative mandates or the courts. While a concentrated focus on this third research
stream is outside the scope of this study, the impacts of federal and state government on
the dynamics of local education governance are addressed later in this dissertation.
The following discussions examine the political and managerial functions of
education governance within the context of social control. Because the nature of
political-administrative relations in local education governance is likely to be influenced
by the nature of governance in the community at large, the role of the professional
administrator is explored through empirical research of local governance depicting
social control possessed by either an elite community power structure or pluralistic
community coalitions.
Elite Models of Governance
It is part of the American democratic commitment that government is to be
government of, by, and for the people. However, not all people or groups participate
in governmental activities equally. A review of the literature reveals the recruitment
process for school board members frequently results in class bias with participants
disproportionately drawn from professional occupations, older age categories, and
higher socioeconomic status (Counts 1927; Zeigler, Jennings, and Peak 1974; Cistone
1975).
Class models are predicated on the assumption of oligarchical elites who share a
distinct set of ideologies, values, patterns of interaction, and lifestyles that, along with
their resources for power, produce a configuration of political power (Warner, Meeker,
and Eells 1960). In this study, elites are defined as
I
25


a narrow group of people sharing sufficient amounts of a
unique resource (be it social standing, monetary resources,
crucial information and skills, or a strategic position in society)
and possessing mutually compatible goals and perceptions
[who] exercise a preemptive degree of control over the policy
outcomes of the American political arena (Waste 1987, 45).
Most studies of education and power have found that public education is controlled by
the upper and middle socioeconomic classes, whereby the interests of these classes
have been promoted to the detriment of the lower socioeconomic strata (e.g., Lynd and
Lynd 1929; Warner 1949; Vidich and Bensman 1958).
Similar findings emerge from studies of community power structure. For
example, Dahls (1961) classic study of New Haven reported that school board
decisions were made by coalitions of upper- and middle-class individuals seeking to
promote their interests and values. Hunters (1953) classic study of governance in
Atlanta did not specifically address schools. However, this study identified a relatively
small group of socioeconomic elites influencing local policy formulation and outcomes
disproportionately. Although Dahls (1961) focus on community pluralism differs
significantly from Hunters (1953) elite ruling class, to the extent the research
participants in both studies are identified as belonging to the upper or middle socio-
economic strata, it may be argued that both studies are predicated on class models of
governance.
In the absence of social stratification within homogeneous communities,
Iannaccone and Lutz (1970) found that when middle-class school boards are politically
overturned, the root of conflict is primarily due to differences between rural middle-
class and suburban middle-class values. Thus, in addition to social class, community
type has analytical significance to understanding behaviors in governance.
Emphasizing the professional-political relations between the school board and
the superintendent, education research includes the elite-arena model applied by Lutz
and Gresson (1980). Elite school boards are characterized as relying heavily on the
superintendent for advice, seeking consensus on issues before them, and rejecting the
26


notion of representing specific constituencies. In contrast, arena boards rely less on the
superintendent, split their votes at public meetings, and board members represent
specific segments of the public when expressing their preferences. These researchers
report the majority of school boards lean toward the elite characterization due to their
substantial dependence on professionalism and a strong desire to avoid conflict.
The distinction between professional and political orientations has also been
expressed by school board members themselves. The report of the Institute for
Educational Leadership (IEL) reveals the majority of American school board members
view themselves as trustees of the public interest and rely on the superintendent to
develop the agenda, recommend policy for board consideration and adoption, and
operate the district. A minority of board members emphasize accountability to their
constituents, nor are they reported to interfere in the management of the district (1986,
17). Thus, self-reported roles of school board members support Lutz and Gressons
(1980) elite model of governance.
One of the better known models attributing power to an elite class was
developed by Mills (1959). Mills argues that a powerful configuration of military,
industrial, and religious leaders dominates all national decisions. More specifically,
given the authors perception of decreasing influence of the clergy in American society,
this model attributes power to the military-industrial complex and highlights the
undemocratic aspects of such a power elite. Any class power model may be deemed
undemocratic if it attributes almost total power to an elite group. Not only is the power
elite described by Mills representative of undemocratic governing processes, but control
by an elite class may be perceived as being dangerous to the public at large.
It may be difficult to reject Mills notion entirely given that the National Defense
Education Act of 1958 includes the word defense in legislation pertaining to
education, and given numerous recent disclosures about the intrusive, unethical, and
potentially dangerous actions of the Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence
gathering organizations both at home and abroad. However, the utility of Mills theory
27


of the power elite is limited by its failure to consider other categories of sociological
knowledge (Etzioni 1967.830) in its attempt to explain sociopolitical control.
Although most social class models are not as narrow or centralized as Mills
notion of the power elite, they generally fail to recognize the potential or actual power
of the middle and lower classes in American society. For example, recent support for
ebonies (an attempt to recognize inner city jargon as an official second language) in
California school districts located in Oakland and Los Angeles would be difficult to
explain without acknowledging the power of the lower socioeconomic classes in those
communities (Associated Press 1997, A3).
Finally, Hunters (1953) monolithic elite was comprised of forty reputed
community influentials who utilized either overt or covert power to control social, civic,
governmental, and business decisions in Atlanta. The reputational approach used in
this study presumes the existence of covert power and guarantees the discovery of a
power elite as a byproduct of the method. Whether or not one chooses to actively
(overtly) influence a decision, ones reputation covertly influences the decision.
Because individual reputation is presumed an inherent consideration in the political
decision-making process, those persons with historical credibility and influence affect
decision outcomes in their favor (Ricci 1970b, 156-9). However, since leaders cannot
always act autonomously but must frequently obtain the cooperation of other groups,
the power elite of the reputational approach shares some of the characteristics, under
certain conditions, of the pluralist coalitions (Ricci 1970a, 211).
Pluralistic Models of Governance
The concept of pluralism is historically found in Madisons Federalist Pacers 10
and 51 (1787) that argued for a form of government that protected the public interest
against factional control through a system of checks and balances. The work of
Tocqueville (1835; 1840) also urged caution against the tyranny of the majority
28


through the use of sound legal systems and widespread public affiliation with political
processes (Waste 1987, 3-4).
Theories of factional politics reflect tractable community participants insofar as
factions are perceived to cross class and issues boundaries. Factional groups differ
from formally organized interest groups, as they may also include temporal coalitions
that are formed by uniting a wide range of individuals with a common interest for the
sole purpose of influencing a single issue (Zeigler, Jennings, and Peak 1974). For
example, a religious group formed in opposition to including Darwins theory of
evolution in school curriculum may be comprised of individuals from the upper,
middle, and lower socioeconomic strata. This group may include laborers, business
owners, and professionals, all of whom share profound religious convictions that
determine their position on the issue. As such, factional models of pluralism are
closely aligned with the focus of modem or orthodox pluralist theorists who sought
to understand and describe broadly the general processes of group interaction in
American governance (Waste 1987,6-13).
Zeigler, Jennings, and Peak (1974) provide a model of factional politics in
which two options are considered in analyzing education governance at the local level:
(a) mass support, the active or apathetic community support for school district
governance; and (b) organizational intensity, created by active community attempts to
influence or make demands upon the school board. Factional conflicts in the larger
political system increased conflicts within the educational system, but superintendents
were found lacking in the resources needed to sufficiently control such disputes
(Zeigler, Jennings, and Peak 1974,97-117).
To characterize the nature of modem pluralist activity within an institutional
context and within democratic societies, Dahl and Lindblom (1953) developed a
fourfold typology of social control: (1) polyarchy-control of leaders, (2) bargaining-
control among leaders, (3) hierarchy-control by leaders, and (4) the price system-
control of and by leaders. Systems of governance may be classified as leaning toward
29


oligarchy when they are comprised of a single, elite power structure that controls
decisions and seeks self-serving outcomes or leaning toward polyarchy when issue-
specific, ever-changing, pluralistic coalitions control decisions. Such coalitions
manifest when competing individuals and subsystems possess some power, but not
sufficient power to rule. The composition of these coalitions change depending upon
the particular issue at hand. When any one coalition gains enough power, a decision
pertaining to the issue under examination is made in their favor (Polsby 1970, 179-85).
According to Waste (1987), pluralism is defined as the view that public policy in
America is the result of a tug of war-often ending in a delicate balance of compromise-
between various interest groups (Waste 1987,3).
Following the logic of the institutional pluralists and their quest to clarify the
vagaries concerning group activities inherent in modem pluralism (Waste 1987, 15),
Tucker and Zeigler (1980) found that school boards operate according to one of two
predominant styles: hierarchical or bargaining. In the hierarchical style, the school
superintendent is the key decision maker because of his or her professional expertise in
matters of education, whereas school boards act less as decision-making bodies and
more as communications links between the superintendent and the public (Tucker and
Zeigler 1980,6). When school districts operate according to the bargaining style,
administrators, board members, parents, and community groups participate in school
governance. Each of the actors has important resources and bargaining is necessary to
reach decisions. Consequently, policies reflect both the preferences of the community
and the recommendations of the superintendent. Although the findings of these
researchers were mixed, results support a pluralistic model of governance whereby
episodic conflict is resolved by means of bargaining between political and professional
preferences (Tucker and Zeigler 1980,137-9).
lannaccone and Lutz (1970) applied an ideal model of community types (Becker
1950) to analyze the processes by which school board decisions are made. "Sacred
school boards tend to operate in private sessions, value traditional methods of doing
30


things, and they avoid change. Decisions are usually made in informal sessions
between the school board and superintendent, held out of the public view, and
consensus is usually reached among participants. However, to placate democratic
notions and demands, decisions are formally enacted in public meetings, usually by
unanimous vote. As such, sacred boards are aligned with the pluralistic bargaining or
hierarchy models previously noted. On the other hand, secular school boards tend to
value change, invite public participation, and decisions affecting the district are made in
public forums where power and influence are visible. Thus, secular school boards
lean toward the pluralistic model of polyarchy. These researchers found the sacred
model described the majority of school boards in their study and report that due to an
over-reliance on the professional expertise of district superintendents, school board
members become increasingly isolated from the community over time.
Significantly, Iannaccone and Lutz (1970) found shifts in the balance of
community power evident in communities experiencing substantial social and economic
change. Such socioeconomic change resulted in electoral conflict within a few years,
the defeat of at least one board member which eventually changed the dynamics of
control on the board, the subsequent termination of the superintendent, and the hiring
of a new superintendent who shared the values of the new school board. Thus, while it
may appear the community is dominated by a particular coalition or groups of
coalitions, a change in socioeconomic composition is likely to result in shifts in
community power, and this may lead to significant impacts on local policymaking
processes. The findings of this research highlight the significance of Polsby's (1980,
113) assertion that the first and most basic presupposition of the pluralist approach is
that nothing categorical can be assumed about power in any city.
The Iannaccone and Lutz (1970) study highlights the processes by which policy
decisions serve to maintain the existing policymaking system above all else. It also
highlights the incremental nature of educational policymaking, which is the
predominant pattern found in the policy processes of general purpose government as
31


well (Lindblom 1968). Moreover, this study emphasizes the importance of time in
analyzing how changes in the pluralistic community produce changes in education
governance.
Utilizing issue analysis as the primary methodological approach in his study of
New Haven, Dahl (1961) found dispersed inequalities that resulted in power shifting
from one oligarchy to another. Moreover, different power groups were found to be
involved in different issue areas, thus, providing evidence of a shift from oligarchy to a
coalition of power groups--or polyarchy-controlling decisions in public education,
political nomination, and urban renewal in this city. In contrast to Hunters (1953)
reputational approach, issue analysis does not presume the use of covert power,
discovery of a power elite, or rely on a single method of data collection. It includes
utilization of historical information and observation of current issues. Its fundamental
technique is the direct study of particular issues being decided and examination of the
processes used to decide those issues.
Dahls (1961) application of issues analysis methodology has received critical
scrutiny in the years following publication of his New Haven study, with some authors
perceiving his work to be rooted in democratic elitism (e.g., Domhoff 1983,
Bachrach and Baratz 1970, Waste 1987). Dahl's critics aver that careful selection of the
issues to be studied is of critical importance in using the issue analysis approach. By
limiting the scope of decision making to safe issues and providing something less
than objective criteria in evaluating his findings (Waste 1987), Dahl (1961) is accused
of neglecting one entire face of power (Bachrach and Baratz 1970a, 190-1).
Relatedly, Bachrach and Baratz have argued that power and influence are
sometimes exercised to prevent issues from being addressed by governing bodies,
policy formulators, and decision makers (1970b, 43-6). Thus some ideas, petitions, or
debates are never brought to the fore. Referring to this as the nondecision process,
these authors assert that
32


nondecision-making is a means by which demands for change in the
existing allocation of benefits and privileges in the community can be
suffocated before they are even voiced; or kept covert; or killed before
they gain access to the relevant decision-making arena; or, failing all
these things, maimed or destroyed in the decision-implementing stage
of the policy process (Bachrach and Baratz 1970b, 44).
The nondecision operates much like a covert veto, effectively rejecting some
interest, notion, or value without stating the rejection or the reasons for it.
Consequently, use of the nondecision allows for avoiding overt conflict and
controversy. Relatedly, Easton (1965, Chap. 8) has posited that political systems have
gatekeepers or systemic mechanisms to control what becomes visible, and
Schattschneider (1960) and Kingdon (1984) have argued that ability to control the
agenda is an important consideration in the study of power and influence in
governance.
The use of systematic means to gain or maintain control in the processes of
governance is a key feature of the theories of institutionalism and structuration. The
theory of institutionalism considers the interdependence of the individual, the
institution, and the environment as the key to understanding dynamics in governance
(March and Olsen 1984; 1989). Rooted in the conceptual parameters of
institutionalism, the theory of structuration focuses primarily on how organizations
within a given field tend to become more structurally similar over time, although such
similarities may not create or result in systematic efficiency (Giddens 1979). Thus, in
addition to questions of social control, the dynamics between politics and
administration in governance has also been explored from an institutional perspective.
Theories of Institutionalism and Structuration
Institutional literature combines key elements from traditional political theory
and the value it places on popular sovereignty, modem economics and its concern with
how to organize or structure work for maximum efficiency, and behavioralism and its
33


focus on actual performance. To the extent local education governance in the United
States has been largely controlled by school boards and the superintendents they hire
for more than 150 years, school boards clearly qualify as an American institution.
Similarly, the nature of changes in the roles, responsibilities, and practices of school
board members and administrators combined with ever-increasing public dissatisfaction
with K-12 education over time implies an institutional emphasis on organization over
other factors, or behavioral institutionalism, as a means for adaptation and survival.
The following discussion explicates the theories of institutionalism and
structuration, with the former analytically viewed herein as the common thread that
links the past, present, and potential future states of local education governance. This
discussion includes examination of: (1) the old and new approaches to the theory of
institutionalism, (2) institutional-environmental interaction and interdependence, (3) the
influence of institutional history and structure on political-administrative behaviors, (4)
the role of expertise in and the processes of institutional decision making, and (5) the
nature of institutional reform.
Old and New Institutionalism
According to Selznick (1996), institutionalism at its core is defined as "the
emergence of orderly, stable, socially integrating patterns out of unstable, loosely
organized, or narrowly technical activities (Broom and Selznick 1955,238, cited in
Selznick 1996,271). An institutions ability to adapt to new demands and situations is
rooted in infusion with value beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand.
However, as Selznick (19%) points out, formal structure, informal norms, selective
recruiting processes, institutional rituals, shared ideologies, and the effects of history
also play significant roles in affecting the processes of institutional adaptation. In
explaining the entrenched nature of the behaviors of institutional actors. Selznick states:
Institutionalization constrains conduct in two main ways:
by bringing it within a normative order, and by making it
hostage to its own history (19%, 271).
34


"Old institutionalism concentrated on examining the dynamics of "internalized
sociological sensibility (Selznick 1996,273) by focusing primarily on institutional
competence and character determined by the constrained, aggregate behaviors of
institutional actors. While internal dynamics occupy a significant place in the "new"
theory of institutionalism, a major shift in focus is undertaken by examining factors
beyond individual characteristics and historical effects in relation to adaptive
institutional processes. DiMaggio and Powell put it this way:
The new institutionalism in organization theory and
sociology comprises a rejection of rational-actor models,
an interest in institutions as dependent variables, a turn
toward cognitive and cultural explanations, and an interest
in properties of supraindividual units of analysis that cannot
be reduced to aggregations or direct consequences of
individuals attributes or motives (1991,8).
Political models of rational competition and temporal groups view decision
making as a function of the interaction between participating actors, events, and the
environment in which they exist. In both models, decision-making processes result in
choices that are environmentally constrained; thus, order is not dependent upon the
characteristics or processes of the institution (March and Olsen 1989, 14). In contrast,
new institutionalism asserts that political action is standardized through institutional
routines, and values and beliefs are institutionalized through the development of shared
perceptions and interpretations among organizational actors. Consequently, the extent
to which rational competition and the random confluence of people, problems, and
solutions are optimized is significantly reduced.
Giddens ontological framework for understanding issues of institutional
analysis, power, and social change posits that the processes of structuration create
changes that make institutions within a specific organizational field more similar in
terms of rules and resources, culture, and output without making them necessarily more
efficient (Giddens 1979,76-81). Giddens' structuration theory refers to a social
system in terms of the surface patterns of interdependent interactions among actors or
35


groups created by circular, causal processes of feedback and reflexive self-regulation'*
that result in ritualistic and symbolic social practices (Giddens 1979,78). To
distinguish between a system and structure, the author refers to the rules and resources
organized as properties of social systems in defining the latter (Giddens 1979,66).
Thus, processes of structuration reflect the intrinsic relation between agency and
institutional power whereby structure is both the means for and outcome of social
actions over time (Giddens 1979,4-5). The interactive and interdependent nature
between and among society, social actors, and social institutions inherent in
structuration theory is closely aligned with the central themes presented in new
institutionalism. From both perspectives, political institutions are sources of order and
stability in an interactive world that might otherwise appear quite chaotic (March and
Olsen 1989,53).
According to March and Olsen (1984; 1989), new institutionalism is based
upon three central premises: (l) Political institutions and the environment in which they
exist are interactive and interdependent, (2) the historical political structure of an
institution determines the behavior of the institution and the individuals within it, and
(3) politics and governance are significant social rituals rooted in expertise and decision
making processes (Boyd 1991,10). Thus, an institution is viewed as the
intermeshing of three systems: the individual, the institution, and the collection of
institutions that can be called the environment (March and Olsen 1989,57). Focusing
on the nature of political institutions, the authors summarize these concepts by stating:
Political actors are driven by institutional roles, as well as
or instead of, by calculated self-interest; politics is organized
around the construction and interpretation of meaning, as
well as or instead of, making choices; routines, rules, and
forms evolve through history-dependent processes that do not
reliably and quickly reach unique equilibria; the institutions of
politics are not simple echoes of social forces; and the polity is
something different from, or more than, an arena for competition
among rival interests. In short, the organization of political life
makes a difference, and institutions affect the flow of history
(March and Olsen 1989. 159).
36


Institutions in governance are suffering from eroding public confidence and
trust. Newspaper, radio, and television frequently report the (real or perceived) failures
of educational governance and federal, state, and local government across the nation.
Consequently, criticisms of public institutions are rooted in the perceptions that they are
incompetent and rigid because they cannot adequately respond to social changes and
demands, too interventionist and powerful because desired levels of decentralized
autonomy and social-institutional-political horizontal relations are lacking, and they
have lost their central direction and sense of purpose because they are captured by
special interests and fail to serve society at large (March and Olsen 1969,96-7). The
following discussion considers, within the context of new institutionalism, how
attempts at comprehensive institutional reform take place and are influenced by internal
and external factors.
Environmental Interaction and Interdependence
Most institutional change occurs as a result of organizations relating to changes
in the environment in which they exist. When the rate of institutional change matches
that of the environment, adaptive strategies are most likely to result in successful
reform. However, simultaneous dynamic social and institutional change can make the
process of collective choice appear unclear. In this scenario preferences, perceptions,
and values are in flux; new technologies are not adequately understood; and problems,
people, alternatives, solutions, and outcomes all interact in ways that make
relationships and conclusions uncertain (March and Olsen 1989, 11-2). Individuals
may fight to participate in decision making processes and then fail to exercise that right
to any significant degree (Olsen 1976).
In a review of relevant literature, March and Olsen (1989,61-4) provide a
summary of six adaptive processes useful to interpret change in institutional settings.
First, variation and selection are processes of procedural evolution whereby the duties,
obligations, roles, rules, and criteria of appropriateness for a given event will, over
37


time, contribute to institutional success and survival. Second, problem solving is
viewed as a process of rational choice under conditions of risk whereby alternatives are
evaluated in terms of anticipated consequences for stated goals. Third, experiential
learning is a process of trial and error whereby rules that have led to past success are
retained and rules that have proven unsuccessful are abandoned. Fourth, conflict is
managed through bargaining, negotiation, and coalition such that preferences and
relative degrees of power possessed by participants determine outcomes. Fifth,
contagion is a process by which the behaviors or beliefs of one institution may be
found attractive and be imitated by, and thus spread to, other institutions through
contact between them. This mimetic form of isomorphism is a key feature in
institutionalism as described by DiMaggio and Powell (1991). Finally, turnover is a
process of regeneration in which new members with different values, abilities, and
goals are introduced and the mix of participants change as a result of either institutional
needs or specific strategies.
Adaptations in the processes of selection, problem solving, experience, conflict,
contagion, and turnover make incremental change possible and are useful in evaluating
the degree of success or failure of organizational innovations attempted by political
institutions. However, because institutional rules and routines possess some degree of
ambiguity that can be manipulated, the six aforementioned adaptive strategies fail to
control adequately the direction and extent of institutional reform. Therefore, March
and Olsen (1989) propose three adaptive strategies to exploit the incompleteness of
stable processes and aid in reducing chaos by maintaining control over the nature and
degree of institutional change. Incremental adaptation to dynamic problems with
available solutions is the basis for long-term institutional reform-not intentions, plans,
or decisions based on stable, unchanging perceptions. Citing Szanton (1981,24), the
authors note that from this view, governance becomes less a matter of engineering than
of gardening (March and Olsen 1989,94).
38


The first prescribed method for intentionally controlling change is to gain
control over attention. The rules employed, the actions taken, the values considered,
the mobilization of participants, the opportunities perceived, the linkages between
problems and solutions, and the worldview adopted each impact the level of attention
devoted to a given change initiative. Rather than viewing power based on the
possession of resources as the primary influence on institutional processes and
outcomes, contemporary theories of institutionalism view the manner in which
opportunities, problems, solutions, and participants are connected as the predominant
force in determining the ends and means of public policy (March and Olsen 1976,
Chap. 3). Because of the chaotic and uncertain nature of these forces coming together,
it is essential that clarity of focus be harnessed and controlled if the institution to
successfully adapt to ever-changing demands (March and Olsen 1989,61-2).
Second, a prescription for utilizing solution-driven problem solving is offered
as the means by which control is gained in response to the unanticipated consequences
of learning, problem solving, contagion, conflict, selection, and turnover. Changes are
transformed during change. Preferences and objectives may change as a result of
behaviors or institutional drift. A sense of complacency with established beliefs and
practices may inhibit change. Balancing the trade-offs between expertise and
democratic representation of various interests results in episodic conflict. Almost any
solution can be linked to any problem, provided they become known at approximately
the same time. Thus, because of the indeterminacy of change, innovation appears to be
driven more by solutions than by problems (March and Olsen 1989,62-3).
Third, exercising control over "broad systems of meaning is essential to
sustaining institutional change. Institutional definitions of legitimate authority,
behavioral norms, and interpretations of actions and events are based upon collective
notions of the way things are. Through symbolic rituals and behaviors, governance
legitimizes social values and institutions (Giddens 1979,101-3). While it is difficult to
change one's ideology or consciousness, an interpretive structure is essential to
39
I


establishing collective understanding of institutional problem solving, conflict,
contagion, and turnover (March and Olsen 1989,63-4).
In addition to utilizing and exploiting existing systems to facilitate change,
institutional transformation may occur as a result of radical shock." This adaptive
process utilizes structural change to force a significant and permanent realignment of
existing political arrangements and systems, thereby replacing one institutional system
with another. Such transformation is usually prompted by the historical success or
failure of prior outcomes. The initial structural change is easier to accomplish than is
controlling new processes and relationships that develop as a result of the new
institutional arrangement. Consequently, the effects of reorganization are uncertain and
theoretical prescriptions for institutional design are conflicted (Simon 1947).
Institutional change as a result of radical shock is difficult to implement and control
because changes in structure are frequently resisted, corrupted, or otherwise frustrated
by institutional actors (March and Olsen 1989,64-5).
History. Political Structure, and Behavior
Institutionalism views organizations as being comprised of collections of
standard operating procedures and structures that serve to define and defend values,
norms, interests, identities, and beliefs. March and Olsen argue that political
institutions define the framework within which politics takes place (1969,18). Order
is brought to political processes through systems of institutional rules and procedures
that standardize organizational norms and behavioral routines over time (Weber 1946,
Giddens 1979, March and Olsen 1989). Domains of responsibility and relationships
among roles are clearly defined by these networks of rules. Institutional role
prescriptions influence practices, rules, and resources; rules and resources influence
role prescriptions and practices; and practices influence rules, resources, and role
prescriptions (Giddens 1979,116-8). Although links between relatively independent
40


spheres of institutional responsibility are often suppressed (Cyert and March 1963),
competent leadership may serve to create trust and span these boundaries.
Additionally, institutional rules serve to reduce ambiguity and uncertainty by
determining what action is appropriate in response to a given conflictuai event (Allison
1971). Risks and consequences are more easily assessed through the application of
rules that match a situation to an appropriate institutional role, and that have been
applied to similar situations in the past (March and Olsen 1989,21-38). For example,
in a study of educational decision making, Tyack (1976) found the actions taken by
local school administrators to be both consistent and reliable as a result of
adherence to standard operating procedures that defined the roles and responsibilities of
superintendents and district staff, and reflected historical experience and learning from
previous conflicts. Moreover, institutional networks of rules are enforced by
professional standards and norms in concert with public expectations of professional
demeanor and expertise, although a sharp division of labor between specialists and
policy makers is impossible to sustain overextended periods of time (March and Olsen
1989, 30).
Institutional stability and coherence are developed through structures of
meaning that shape political thought and constrain political action. Political actors must
be knowledgeable about the social systems they constitute and reproduce through their
actions (Giddens 1979.248-53). The expectations, values, and preferences of political
actors evolve via historical experience and a collective desire for cognitive
consistency over time (March and Olsen 1989,41). Thus, to the extent individuals are
integrated into this institutional organization of belief and trust others with whom they
have contact, March and Olsen argue they will: (a) see what they like because they see
what they want to see, (b) like what they see because they align their preferences with
their perceptions, (c) like what the others in the system like, and (d) see what the others
see (1989,44-5).
41


The social reality is that the political institution is reacting to its environment at
the same time the environment is adapting to the institution. Powerful actors and
groups may influence the environment such that political action is taken at the expense
of other individuals or groups involved in or affected by the political process (Giddens
1979, March and Olsen 1989). However, ignoring the preferences or demands of
others can lead to long-term institutional failure due to a diminished capacity to learn
from experience through adaptation over time. On the other hand, actions taken as a
result of beliefs about the environment can create the environment. Thus, in this
scenario, institutional perception becomes social reality (March and Olsen 1989,47-8).
The dynamics that create such objective reality and generate the desire for
collective cognitive and affective consistency also leads to symbolism in institutional
decision making processes (Giddens 1979,190-2; March and Olsen 1989,49-50). In
an effort to legitimize political decisions, symbolism serves to communicate three
primary objectives. First, the process of political choice is designed to symbolize that it
"reflects planning, thinking, analysis, and the systematic use of information. In
short, the choice is perceived to be made intelligently. Second, care is taken to reflect
that the process is democratic through consideration of the concerns and preferences of
interested parties. Finally, sensitivity to notions of political responsibility require that
the political system appears to be controlled-appropriately controlled-by its leadership.
Arguing that perceptions of political legitimacy frequently depend as much on intentions
as on results, March and Olsen conclude that such [symbolic) rituals confirm that
human institutions are manifestations of the intelligent control of human destiny
through intentional action (1989,50).
Expertise and Decision Making
Within political institutions, policymakers seek competence in professional
expertise. But political actors must trust professional advisors if their expertise is to be
utilized in developing policies that serve the common good (Benveniste 1972). Such
42


trust among elected and appointed officials is developed through means of similar value
systems and personal styles that significantly reduce suspicions of self-interest and
facilitate ease of understanding one another (Giddens 1979, 103; March and Olsen
1989,32). Moreover, it is essential for the expert to maintain professional integrity by
offering policy guidance without political intent if trust is to be sustained between
political and administrative institutional actors. While political manipulation may be
achieved through expert advice, professionals utilizing such tactics enter a dangerous
game in which they honor sophistication at the expense of wisdom (March and Olsen
1989,31).
In contrast to the invisible hand of competition through which decisions are
made in rational actor models (March and Olsen 1969,16), the garbage can model more
accurately describes decision making in complex, unstable, and ambiguous
organizations (Cohen, March, and Olsen 1972). These organized anarchies or
"loosely coupled systems (Weick 1976) are beset by uncertainty that surfaces in three
principal ways. First are problematic preferences, the inconsistent and ill-defined
preferences that decision makers frequently possess. Decision makers are as likely to
discover their goals through action as they are to understand them prior to choice.
Second, organized anarchies have unclear means-ends nexus. Linkages between
problems, processes, and solutions are frequently not questioned or explored.
Organizational participants gain knowledge by trial-and-error learning, but without clear
understanding of underlying causes. Third, organized anarchies are characterized by
fluid participation and frequent interaction. Decision-making participants come and go
from the decision process with their involvement depending upon energy, interest, and
other demands on their time (Cohen, March, and Olsen 1972). Such loose coupling is
evident when organizational elements affect each other suddenly (rather than
continuously), occasionally (rather than constantly), negligibly (rather than
significantly), indirectly (rather than directly), and eventually (rather than immediately)
(Weick 1982,380).
43


Within this organizational context, the garbage can model calls attention to the
importance of chance in describing the random meeting of four streams: (1) choices-
occasions which call for a decision; (2) problems-concems of people within and
outside the organization; (3) solutions-answers looking for problems; and (4)
participants-people with busy schedules who might pay attention. Thus, decision
making occurs within a random coming together of choices looking for problems,
problems looking for choices, solutions looking for problems to answer, and decision
makers looking for something to decide (Cohen, March, and Olsen 1972).
Within political institutions, change is driven more by solutions than by
problems. Arguing that resolution of problems is not the most common style of
making decisions," March and Olsen assert that choices are made only when there are
no problems attached to them (1989,13). Moreover, decisions in the institutional
model tend to have an unclear character in contrast to the clearly defined beginning and
end points of the rational and political models. Garbage can participants wander in and
out of the decision process. When demands imposed on the institution increase
significantly, problems are less likely to be solved because decision makers are more
likely to shift from one problem to another more frequently (March and Olsen 1989,
13-4). The sharply honed goals assumed by the political model, and even the more
vague objectives of the boundedly rational perspective (Simon 1947), are missing from
garbage can decisions in political institutions. Individuals and groups are uncertain
about what they want, have a propensity to change their minds frequently, and goal
clarity is impeded by the constantly changing nature of the actors participating in the
decision process. Decisions made within the context of the garbage can are not the
result of analysis by rational individuals or the power of a coalition, but rather are the
result of a random confluence of events, opportunities, and personalities.
However, like Schattschneider (1960), March and Olsen argue that political
institutions increase their capability by reducing comprehensiveness through ignoring
44


or suppressing some social participants, problems, views, or values (1989, 17). Thus,
within the context of political institutions,
decision making becomes an occasion for exercising problems
and solutions more than connecting them, for displaying
decision making more than profiting from it, and for exhibiting
virtue more than using it (March and Olsen 1989,13).
The garbage can decision process within political institutions allows for the
application of old solutions to new problems. Within this theoretical framework,
decisions rely on historical experience and professional expertise to produce alternatives
that are used to identify problems and specify needs. In efforts to minimize political
and economic risk, facilitate ease and timeliness of decision making, and in attempting
to justify decisions as being rational, institutions may choose to rely on tried and true
solutions as the primary method for social problem identification and needs assessment.
At its worst, application of the garbage can model to political institutions could lead to
the creation of social problems to apply known solutions.
Because professional expertise and institutional action influence the nature of
interests and preferences, the outcomes of governance influence reputations and
expectations, and unanticipated social consequences are generated as a result of
institutional processes of control; new institutionalism posits an autonomous role for
political institutions. From this theoretical point of view, institutions are viewed as
political actors rather than simple mirrors of social forces (March and Olsen 1989,
18).
Institutional Models of Reform
The ideology of democracy expects elected leaders to design institutional
arrangements to facilitate serving the public interest in an efficient and effective manner.
To the extent significant changes in institutional form may affect the exercise of public
45


authority and power, potentially alter the values of the governing body, influence the
course of discourse and conflict, and change the nature of access to pursue various
interests (Poggi 1978,97); "changes in administrative structures or procedures can
been seen as challenging elements of the core system of meaning, belief, interpretation,
status, power, and alliances in politics" (March and Olsen 1989, 112). In explaining
the significance of comprehensive reform of political institutions, March and Olsen
assert that
institutional reform involves issues of the proper role of the
state and politics in society, the ethical base and legitimacy of
government, and the appropriate priorities for the public agenda.
In a modem era of administrative institutions, therefore, we
should not be surprised if comprehensive administrative
reorganization is treated... as a fundamental change for which
substantial consensus is required (1989, 112).
To aid in evaluating the past, present, and potential future states of organization
in political institutions, March and Olsen (1989,112-6) offer a typology of institutional
form: (1) the corporate-bargaining state, (2) the sovereign state, (3) the institutional
state, and (4) the supermarket state. The following describes the characteristics of each
institutional category and the catalysts that spark reform within each institutional model
as they relate specifically to school boards.
The corporate-bargaining state of institutional organization is characterized by
an "administrative culture within which superintendents, teachers, district staff, and
organized interests are the main participants. The views and behaviors of education
professionals are shaped by the organizations to which they belong, the tasks for which
they are responsible, and the parts of the environment with which they interact
Technical, rather than ideological, issues dominate the school board agenda.
Consequently, the political process is relatively stable, conflict is low, and cooperation
and compromise are the means by which minor disputes are resolved. The catalyst for
reform of the corporate-bargaining school board is found in political struggles over
control in response to changing "constellations of interests, resources, and alliances.
46


Because institutional reform "must reflect the heterogeneity of interests, beliefs, and
power that surround public policymaking (March and Olsen 1989, 113), elections,
intergovernmental relations, professional organizations, specialized expertise, and
interest group activity each may provide impetus for reform of the corporate-bargaining
school board.
In the sovereign state of institutional form, the school board is responsible for
acting as the architects of society; to shape society to the political preferences, plans,
and visions of a good society as a result of the legitimacy and authority granted
through popular elections (March and Olsen 1989,113). Thus although citizens are
voters, they are subordinates of the governing board. Similarly, superintendents,
teachers, and district staff act without discretion and simply implement the goals and
programs as specified by the board. In the sovereign state, the governing body is
relatively autonomous in its ability to make choices. Thus, education governance in
the aforementioned Era of Community Control is closely aligned with the sovereign
model of school board reform. Reform of the sovereign school board is likely to occur
as a result of changes in political leadership due to elections or changes in powerful
political coalitions.
The institutional state is described as "a political and moral order due to long-
lasting standard operating procedures reflecting values, beliefs, and principles that are
shared by most of the [institutional) population (March and Olsen 1989,113). Thus,
majority public opinion does not necessarily dictate education policy, as board members
are obligated to apply standards and make decisions that benefit the school district at
large. The primary task of the governing board is to ensure autonomy of the school
district and maintain political stability. However, while the authority of the governing
body in the institutional state is viewed as preeminent, the actions of board members are
constrained by rules of law, the inherent rights and duties of American citizens, and the
resistance of education professionals to easily accept encroachment into what they
consider professional domain. Developing the institutional state of organizational form
47


is a long-term process that evolves through the gradual adaptation of institutional
practices and structures in response to changing notions of problems, solutions, and
meaning. Change in organizational form occurs as a result of evolution rather than as a
result of transformation. Thus, reform efforts merely formalize events that have
already occurred and serve to facilitate the maintenance, development, and
transmission of cultural norms and beliefs (March and Olsen 1989, 114).
In sharp contrast to the administrative culture of the corporate-bargaining
state, the supermarket state is characterized as a service culture where market-based
competition for educational goods and services generates flexibility, adaptability, and
innovation. Professional educators and district staffs are expected to adapt readily to
changing needs and circumstances, and to perform in the most effective and efficient
manner possible. Citizens in the community are viewed as consumers or clients who
may shop around for the best local education provider. School board performance is
assessed and survival is determined by measures of flexibility, economy, and efficiency
in the supermarket model of institutional form. As such, who makes decisions in the
supermarket state is determined by possession of professional knowledge, specialized
expertise, and possession of other necessary information relative to specific
circumstances. Reorganization of the supermarket-oriented school board is predicated
on the failure to perform in a responsive, effective, and economically efficient fashion
as determined by the parents of children enrolled in district schools.
To the extent local citizens can control education decisions by purchasing
desired services, market mechanisms in education are gaining popular appeal in the
1990s. The growth of charter schools, private schools, and home schooling --
previously addressed only in terms of market-based theory by Friedman (1962) and
Jencks (1972)--are increasingly challenging the public education system to be more
responsive to the needs and preferences of citizens in local communities as they concern
the education of Americas children. For example, a recent comparative analysis of
public and private schools reports that private schools are better able than public
48


schools to produce effectiveness in local education due to differences in social control.
Chubb and Moe found that American public schools are controlled by the
institutionalized "hierarchic system of democratic politics whereas private schools are
influenced by autonomous actors responding to market demands (1990,23-4). Citing
the benefits of autonomy versus bureaucracy, the authors conclude that due to
differences in institutional settings, the goals are more clear, the requirements are more
rigorous, the professional relationships are more harmonious, and the emphasis on
academic achievement is greater in private schools than in schools within the public
education system (Chubb and Moe 1990,99).
Models of Professional Activities and Roles in Local Governance
The preceding discussion examined the institutional influences on and
implications of the ensuing struggle between politics and administration in local
governance. Within that context, the following discussion examines empirical evidence
of role behaviors reported and demonstrated by public administrators in local
government, with emphasis on Svara's(1985; 1990) dichotomy-duality model of
governance work and Loveridges (1971) typology of roles in local governance.
The Dichotomy-Duality Model
Svara (19%, 1-2) recently argued that the popular interpretation of the
dichotomous reform model of political and administrative roles in governance is
actually an "aberration, a misconception "associated with the dominant concepts of
orthodox public administration [developed] during the 1920s and 1930s. Svara
argues the true intent of the reform movement was to empower public administrators to
exercise discretion on behalf of the common good, interpret and respond to public
opinion, and provide an unbiased link between the political and professional spheres in
governance as they attempt to fulfill their obligation to execute public law (Svara 19%,
3-5).
49


Reflecting this philosophy, Svara's dichotomy-duality model (1985; 1990)
identifies four dimensions of the governmental process and identifies the areas in which
political and professional responsibilities are separate, and where they are connected .
According to the author, determining the mission of the organization is a political
responsibility to be undertaken by elected officials. The work included in the policy
and administration dimensions of the model are viewed as being shared, to some
extent, between elected and appointed officials. The management function in
conducting government business is deemed to be the responsibility of the professional
administrator and, as such, is perceived to be separate from the processes of
governance (see Figure 2.1). In the words of Svara explaining the application of the
dichotomy-duality model to examine relations between politics and administration in
governance:
... In studying the governmental process one examines how
elected and appointed officials interact with each other.. .to
make decisions concerning mission, policy, administration, and
management. External influences will not be ignored. The inputs,
particularly pressures from elements of the.. .population are crucial
to understanding the behavior of officials. The consequences of
outputs-the impact of official actions-must be considered as well.
The emphasis, however, is on what officials do (Svara 1990,8).
According to Svara, the concept of mission refers to a collection of broad
decisions and approaches that determine purpose, direction, and organization ... and
thereby create the framework within which other more specific choices are made"
(1990, 15). In accordance with the American system of democratic governance, the
elected body is generally expected to determine the scope of activities for the public
organization although conflicting demands and priorities may complicate this process.
Within the realm of local education, school board members are tasked with this
responsibility (Colorado Association of School Boards [CASB| 1993,9).
50


Figure 2.1
The Dichotomy-Duality Model: Four
Dimensions of the Governmental Process

Mission
Policy /
Goal setting; determining purpose and direction
of the school district; deciding on scope of
services provided by the district
\
Policy
V
Creating programs; approving the budget
devising/changing plans for curriculum
proficiency, etc.; developing projects
:V
Governance
Administration
Implementing policy; developing
program regulations; delivering services
to public; undertaking projects
/
Administration
Management
Operations; systems for control and
coordination of staff; systems and
procedures for personnel, finance,
purchasing, and information processing
Management
Source: Adapted from Svara (1990,14)
51


The policy dimension in the work of governance is defined as the processes of
creating and approving or rejecting program proposals. The decisions made in the
policy dimension are shaped by the parameters defined by the mission and are
considered mid-range in scope (Svara 1990, 15). Examples of policy decisions made
in local education governance include the approval of line-item budgets, deciding the
pupil/teacher goals for district schools, and deciding which extracurricular activities to
offer students.
Administration, the last dimension included in Svara's definition of governance,
refers to the actual implementation of policy decisions. Implementation includes
making the arrangements necessary to deliver the services and operate the programs so
they are consistent with the intended purposes of approved policies. As Majone and
Wildavsky (1973) argue, implementation shapes policy. Therefore, the extent to which
members of the district staff correctly interpret and apply the values of local citizens and
make incremental adjustments to modify policy in its implementation may serve to
reduce conflict within the district. In explaining how the dimensions of policy and
administration are, to some extent, shared between elected and appointed officials in
local governance, Svara states, "the purpose of programs does not originate in
administration, although purpose is shaped by it" (1990, 16). Examples of
administration in school districts include selecting textbooks to use in the school
system, deciding where to deposit school system funds, and investigating citizen
complaints.
Although the management dimension of the governmental process is no less
significant than the other dimensions, it is considered to be apart from the processes of
governance in Svaras model. The management function is primarily concerned with
the acquisition, development, and evaluation of personnel; financial control and
information systems; and procedures for performing specific tasks. By successfully
acquiring, developing, and controlling resources, the management function can serve to
ensure that established institutional goals are met (Svara 1990, 17). Examples of the


management dimension of work within the local school system include hiring and
conducting performance evaluations of district staff, authorizing specific expenditures
from allocated funds, and acquiring the tools to measure student proficiency.
Application of the dichotomy-duality model allows for analysis of board
member and superintendent behavior along a continuum in which mid-range policy and
administration are viewed as predominantly shared activities between the elected and
appointed officials in local education governance. In other words, this conceptual
model provides the basis for examining the actual spheres of responsibility and
identifying the respective roles demonstrated by school board members and district
superintendents.
However, while the dichotomy-duality model is helpful in differentiating
between predominantly political and professional spheres of responsibility within
political institutions, it fails to consider adequately the institutional and social forces
driving such behaviors. By calling 'for a model which clearly formulates the
boundaries of administrative action and the interdependent relationship between
administrators, elected officials, and the public in a later effort (Svara 19%, 2), the
author appears to realize the level of over-simplification inherent in his previous
attempts to fully explain the nature of interaction in local governance via application of
the dichotomy-duality model alone.
A Typology of Policy Leadership
Based upon the self-perceptions of city managers in the San Francisco Bay
area, Loveridge (1971,53-9) identified four predominant policy roles that describe
corresponding levels of perceived leadership in governance: Political Leaders, Political
Executives, Administrative Directors, and Administrative Technicians (see Figure 2.2).
Loveridge argues that due to professional ethos and similar patterns of education,
socialization, and professional recruitment, most city managers identify with one or
another of the four roles described in his typology.
53


Figure 2.2
Topology of Roles
Political Leaders
Change agents; broadest view of policy role; political
readiness to act as an advocate on behalf of good
government and the public interest; active in policy
Political
Roles
Political Executives
V
Policy innovators; pragmatic approach; willing to take
mid-level risk in influencing policy decisions;
tempered political readiness to lead publicly
Administrative Directors
Defers to educational expertise in policy decisions;
reluctant to act as an innovator or open leader,
tension between activism and restraint; only
active in policy decisionsbehind the scenes
^Non-Political
Roles
Administrative Technicians
Narrow policy role with emphasis on administrative
or maintenance functions; assume subordinate,
advising role; curators of established goals
separation of policy and administration
te, i
: /
Source: Adapted from Loveridge (1971)
54


Political Leaders view themselves as policy change agents who are more than
willing to advocate actively on behalf of the public interest and, to that end, assume the
broadest perspective of their role in the policy arena. Loveridge asserts that Political
Leaders are willing to gain support for broad program initiatives by soliciting issue-
specific votes from members of the governing body. As such, the role of the Political
Leader is closely aligned with the mission dimension in the dichotomy-duality model of
governance.
Political Executives also believe they should actively participate in the policy
process, but tend to do so to a lesser degree than Political Leaders. The behavior of
Political Executives is tempered by prior experience or the political environment that
usually results in a reluctance to take significant risks. Political Executives tend to take
a more pragmatic and less altruistic view of their role as compared to that of Political
Leaders. The Political Executive-type correlates with the policy dimension of
governance in Svara's model.
Loveridges description of Administrative Directors reflect a sense of
ambivalence in the policy arena. Although these managers generally support the notion
that administrators should be active in the policymaking process, they tend to focus on
the factors that constrain their ability to do so. Consequently, Administrative Directors
are reluctant to act as policy innovators or open leaders and, as such, are aliped with
the administration function in Svaras model.
The least politically-oriented role identified in this study is that of the
Administrative Technician. The role perception of this group is most closely aligned
with the politics-administration dichotomy insofar as Administrative Technicians
assume a very narrow policy role characterized by a focus on managerial functions. As
the curators of established goals," Administrative Technicians advise in policy matters
but are unlikely to propose change. Consequently, Administrative Technicians correlate
with the management dimension of the governance process in the dichotomy-duality
model.
55


Loveridge's (1971) role typology, in concert with Svara's (1985; 1990)
dichotomy-duality model, serve as useful tools to analyze the behaviors and identify the
predominant roles of elected board members and superintendents, respectively, in
school district governance. However, to the extent these models focus on describing
what officials do, but largely ignore how or why they embrace such behaviors within
the context of different problems or circumstances, additional insight is required to
adequately assess the nature of the relationship between politics and administration in
local education governance.
Alternative Models of Roles in Local Governance
Similar to the focus provided by Loveridge (1971) and Svara (1985; 1990), the
research performed by Banfield and Wilson (1963) centers on the patterns of
cooperation and conflict in the interactions between city managers and their councils,
and produced a typology of council-manager relations. At one end of the continuum,
the manager has considerable strength because there is virtually no community
conflict and almost every matter is routine (Banfield and Wilson 1963,177). At the
other end, there is no clear majority nor is there a stable, ruling community faction and
high levels of conflict exist. Thus, the authors argue that city managers must find ways
to convince individual members of council to cooperate with them by supporting their
positions (Banfield and Wilson 1963, 180).
Moreover, Banfield and Wilson (1963) describe an ideal model of local politics
that supports a pluralist form of governance. According to them, a machine
system is based upon the notion that individuals and groups seek specific, material
rewards that benefit them (private-regarding), while a reform system is based upon the
premise posited by the Progressive reform movement that individuals and groups seek
generalized, nonmaterial rewards that benefit the public at large (public-regarding). The
conclusions reached by Banfield and Wilson indicate the material rewards sought by
lower socioeconomic classes of the machine represent private-regarding behaviors
56


while the service motive of the middle and upper classes is public-regarding (1963,
329-32). While these arguments may lend support to notions of a ruling economic
elite, these arguments suggest that both groups seek what they need most (Maslow
1970,53-66). The poor desire material inducements they are lacking while the
wealthy, already possessing material satisfaction, seek public prestige.
Ammons and Newell (1989) surveyed 527 mayors and city managers to study
how they perceived their roles based on time spent performing political (providing
community leadership and interaction), policy (setting the council agenda, policy
initiation and formulation, and council relations), and managerial (budgeting, staffing,
and supervision) activities. The operational definitions used in this study were the
same as those used by Wright (1969, cited in Ammons and Newell 1989,66), with the
exception of Newell and Ammons addition of council relations to measure the policy
role. A comparison of the results of these two studies, performed twenty years apart,
reveals dramatic changes in the self-perceived role of city managers.
Interestingly, the perceptions of the management role of city managers remained
relatively constant, with 37% in 1965 and 38% in 1985. However, in Wrights 1965
study, 33% of the respondents reported the political role as being most important;
whereas in Ammons and Newell's 1985 research, this number decreased to only 6%.
Most significantly, perceptions of the policy role experienced the most change with
22% reporting this as the most important part of their job in 1965, whereas 56%
perceived the policy role to be predominant twenty years later (Ammons and Newell
1989,65-7). Although Ammons and Newell do not attempt to explain fully the reasons
for such dramatic change in city managers perceptions of their role in the policy
process, they do suggest a dependence on the contingency factors of environment, the
nature of the job, individual personality and style, and the situation (1989.68).
Using a contingency typology of policy roles that 'conceptualizes the roles that
a city manager performs in city policymaking as being determined by the characteristics
57


of the situation, Fannin and Hellriegel (1985, 215) developed five policy roles that are
dependent upon the respective degrees of political competition (level of interest group
and/or individual conflict) in the community, and task anaiyzability (the extent to which
a problem can be solved by scientific or professional processes) present.
The first four role types characterized by Fannin and Hellriegel (1985) are
closely aligned with the city manager roles described by Loveridge (1971). However,
one substantive difference exists between the role definitions in these two models.
Fannin and Hellriegels (1985,216-7) model includes the role of the Policy Non-Actor,
who is described as simply not participating in the policymaking process, thus leaving
it completely to the elected body. To the extent the literature in education governance
contradicts the likelihood of such a role for school district superintendents, the role of
the Policy Non-Actor is excluded from application in this study.
In a nationwide study using factor analysis of survey data, Lewis (1982, 139-
40) identified five major areas of activity and produced seven role behavior profiles for
city managers. The five operational constructs developed by Lewis are: consults with
council, policymaking, performs extra-official contacts, speaks out on controversial
community issues, and resists council involvement in administration.
While Lewis seven-fold role typology provides a useful explanation of role
behaviors adopted by administrators in local governance, the author explicitly correlates
five of his seven role types to the Loveridge (1971) typology to explain and support his
findings (1982,146-58). Of the remaining two profiles, Lewis Near Boss
corresponds roughly to Loveridges Political Executive due to the perception of
expected political leadership and the high-risk nature of their role, and the 'Team
Moderate is closely aligned with Loveridges Administrative Director due to the
ambivalent nature of the policy role described by the author (Lewis 1962,154-7).
The main distinctions between the Lewis (1982) and Loveridge (1971) role
typologies do not reside in the substantive descriptions of administrators' tasks or
behaviors in the policy process, but rather in the size of the cities in which they reside.
58


their levels of education, and the perceived expectations of their role by the elected
body. Rather than relying upon self-reported perceptions, expectations, or associated
demographic data, role identification is determined in this study by the actual actions
performed by school district officials. Thus, for purposes of role definition, a
comparison of the Lewis (1982) and Loveridge (1971) role typologies reveals
distinctions without difference.
Support for a narrow initial focus in determining roles in the processes of
governance is found in the work of Kammerer (1964). Without definitional exactness
and specificity, Kammerer (1964) asserts that researchers of governance run the risk
of being
... burdened with such meaningless intellectual baggage as the terms
of leader, planner, expert, representative, and spokesman. These
terms tell us nothing about roles because they never get to the
point of specifying over what or whom, under what circumstances
and with what limitations, when, and where the subject of study is
a leader or spokesman. One may start to define roles with an
enumeration of tasks and then move on to the range of powers
associated with performance of tasks, or what is normally called
administrative discretion. It is also necessary to relate role
behavior to the situation within which roles are played (Kammerer
1964,422-3, emphasis in original).
Kammerer (1964) constructed the conceptual categories of routine, adaptive,
and innovative decisions within which the levels of actual administrative discretion
afforded ten city managers in Florida were examined. Role behaviors were analyzed
within the context of each citys political style (monopolistic or competitive) and
institutional-structural factors (elected vs. appointed mayor, departmental independence
from managerial control, and ward elections vs. elections at large). The author found
the levels of discretion afforded city managers severely limited in all cities that had
popularly elected mayors due to conflicting role expectations among these two actors.
While the mayor-city manager relationship is not analogous to the nature of the
school board-superintendent relationship; Kammerers (1964) findings, like those of
Lewis (1982), may imply that when the majority of the board desires a superintendent
59


who does not actively lead or participate in substantive policy matters, they will seek
the means to achieve that objective.
Based upon in-depth interviews and recent publications on the nature of city
management, Nalbandian (1989,271) concludes that city managers frequently act as
"brokers of community power whereby "the idea of the local government professional
as a formally insulated administrative expert whose policy involvement is limited to
advising a governing body has given way to the role of... [negotiating] community
interests and [building] policy consensus (Nalbandian 1990,654). Citing Hale
(1989), the author asserts 37% of the contemporary city manager's time is spent
sharing knowledge, educating, negotiating or brokering among various groups, and
instigating communication by linking people (Hale 1989,174, cited in Nalbandian
1989, 272).
Further support for the broker role of city managers is gleaned from the
findings of Wheeland (1994). Based on case studies and surveys of three city
managers reputed to be "the best in their field (1994,282), the author reports these
managers spend considerable time personally working with the council, mayor, staff,
and citizens to help lead city governance, although they prefer to delegate responsibility
for building such intergovernmental networks (1994,300).
Moreover, Wheeland (1994) found many of the analogies used to describe the
role of city managers in scholarly literature rejected by his research participants. The
"puppet on a string characterization (Ammons and Newell 1989) is rejected because
managers believe they have control over their work. The "politician for hire (Long
1965) analogy is rebuffed due to administrative nonpartisanship that precludes
managers from representing any one community faction. Rejection of the "neutral
managerial expert role (Svara 1969) is due to the active role assumed by city managers
in the policy process. Because they do not have the "full score to the "civic
symphony and cannot, therefore, be the central actor in governance, the "orchestra
conductor" (Chandler 1985) characterization is also rejected (Wheeland 1994,291).
60


Three popular analogies believed to describe more accurately the roles assumed
by the city managers participating in the Wheeland (1994) study are the "head coach"
(Banovetz 1990), "comprehensive professional leader (Svara 1989), and "professional
diplomat (Stillman 1974). It is significant that all three preferred role descriptions
include some form of team-building with key institutional and community actors to
facilitate the processes of local governance (Wheeland 1994,291-2).
While the broker role, and its implications for activity in the political arena by
professional administrators, may be increasing among city managers, there is nothing
in current literature of local education governance to indicate this role is also assumed
by school district superintendents. This potential void in the literature deserves and
receives further attention in this dissertation.
Summary
The primary shortcomings of extant research in education governance are due to
the piecemeal approach and limited scope within which policymaking processes have
been explored. Although research in the dynamics of local education governance
include a combination, to some extent, of the political and managerial perspectives, they
tend to focus more heavily on one or the other in their analyses. The political
perspective largely ignores the tendency of bureaucratic structure to blur conflicts
among and between social classes and reinforces the notion that education is insulated
from general purpose politics. The managerial perspective, rooted in the notions of the
Progressive reform movement, is heavily dependent on analyzing the formal
organizational structures and ideological assumptions that created it. Additionally, the
nature of institutional dependence on historical events is not sufficiently considered in
research that attempts to explain the reasons for incremental shifts in control of
education governance at the local level. Thus, the answer to the question, "Does
anyone govern? remains unclear.
61


It appears erroneous to assume that administrators either simply propose policy
recommendations that reflect local values or that they formulate policy based, solely or
largely, on professional values. As March and Olsen argue,
... it seems unlikely that a theory of governance can
represent or improve the phenomena of governing
without including the ways political institutions, rhetoric,
and the rituals of decisions facilitate the maintenance and
change of social values, and the interpretation of human
existence (1989, 94).
Research on school boards needs to move beyond a reliance on either the reputational
approach of the elites or the issue-based participation approach of the pluralists if we
are to understand the range of official behaviors and the dynamics that create them
within local education governance.
Theories of institutionalism and structuration provide a broad context within
which a more holistic examination of the dynamics of school board governance may be
explored. These theories posit that political life is ordered by three processes: (l)
education through rules and the communication of meaning, (2) indoctrination through
socialization and the exercise of power, and (3) experience through the evaluation and
judgment of conduct (March and Olsen 1989, Giddens 1979). Institutional rules and
structures transcend individual needs and may protect against or transform social
influences through education. The logic of appropriateness dictates institutional
response in a specific situation, determines the institutional role being fulfilled, and
identifies the obligations of that role in the given situation. While the theoretical models
of structuration and institutionalism allow for order, stability, and predictability, they
also afford the opportunity for institutional flexibility and adaptability through the
legitimation of expert advice in response to changing demands. The logic of rationality,
consequentiality, or individual will may be used to justify actions after the fact;
however, conflict is best resolved through open discourse rooted in trust (March and
Olsen 1989, 147-9; Giddens 1979, 145-50). Institutions educate citizens by helping
62


them understand the institutional reasons for behavior through sharing knowledge of
the behavioral rules and the moral and intellectual virtues of the governing body. Thus,
in more autonomous institutions, professional administrators are likely to adopt the role
of educator by promoting and accepting changing ideologies, redefining meanings, and
generating commitments to transform the preferences of both leaders and followers
(Selznick 1957).
The process of indoctrination deals with the duties and rights associated with
role relationships. The respective roles of citizens, public administrators, and
elected leaders in the political process are determined through shared meanings,
preferences, and assumptions about the obligations each role has to the other roles. In
less autonomous institutions, the professional administrator acts as a broker by
providing information, identifying possible coalitions, and facilitating logrolling (March
and Olsen 1989,163). To the extent professional standing, reputation, knowledge of
alternatives, and attention to issues are affected by the institutional distribution of
resources, the distribution of institutional power also affects the power of political
actors, which in turn affects the political process and institution. Structural domination
is achieved through the unequal distribution of resources and may result in the capacity
to transform outcomes so as to match the preferences of dominating actors (Giddens
1979,92-3). However, a balance between institutional autonomy and desires for
popular control can work successfully because of the institutional limits imposed by
rules and the need for mutually trusting roles among institutional actors (Giddens 1979,
March and Olsen 1989).
Theories of institutionalism and structuration view experience as the history-
dependent intertwining of stability and change. A shared history, valued way of life,
definition of the common good, and a common understanding of the rules for
appropriate behavior and morality are evolved over time and based on prior action.
However, because institutional adaptation tends to lag behind environmental change
and institutions gain competence within existing norms, the disparity between
63


incremental efforts to adapt to ever-changing social demands and social expectations for
institutional change increases (March and Olsen 1989, 168). Thus, a narrow focus on
technical competencies leads to institutional stability while simultaneously creating
instability in political leadership.
For example, while members of an elected school board may be replaced and
internal processes may change as a result of political discontent, the institution of
school boards is likely to remain in tact Prior experience of the institution itself is
likely to inform new institutional structures, roles, and rules. Although adaptation
is slow and such radical change leads to uncertainty, the social desire for change
counterbalances institutional stability and forces new learning (Giddens 1979,114;
March and Olsen 1969,169). In summarizing these theoretical concepts, March and
Olsen argue that
political institutions simplify the potential confusions of action
by providing action alternatives; they simplify the potential
confusions of meaning by creating a structure for interpreting
history and anticipating the future; and they simplify the
complications of heterogeneity by shaping the preferences of
participants (1989,172).
The Svara (1985; 1990) and Loveridge (1971) models of city manager activities
and roles are relevant to the study of local education governance because the council-
manager and school board-superintendent arrangements share many characteristics that
result in analogous, if not similar, roles for the city manager and district superintendent
(Stillman 1974; Zeigler, Kehoe, and Reisman 1985). Moreover, the dichotomy-duality
model (Svara 1985; 1990) and the four-fold role typology (Loveridge 1971) are
particularly well-suited for application in this study because, in combination, they best
provide the conceptual and analytic foundation for exploring and describing the nature
of relations between politics and administration in local education governance. The
dichotomy-duality model articulates four specific dimensions of governance and
management work that allows for specificity in examining and classifying the
64


governance and management behaviors of superintendents and board members alike.
Alternative models of governance fail to distinguish adequately between the work of
policy shaping (Mission), policy making (Policy), and policy implementation
(Administration). Loveridges typology identifies two political and two non-political
role behavior classifications that are well aligned with the logic of the Svara model.
The combination of these two models allow for definitional "specificity and exactness"
(Kammerer 1964,422) in examining where politics and administration are intertwined,
where they are separate, and who, if anyone, dominates in the processes of school
district governance.
Finally, research in local education governance has been primarily focused on
the urban setting since the 1950s and, consequently, has largely ignored exploring the
governance dynamics in rural communities. To help fill this void in the literature and to
more specifically address the question of who, if anyone, dominates in the processes of
governance, this study explores relations between politics and administration in school
board governance from both the urban and the rural perspective. In describing the
historical evolution of relations between politics and administration in local education
governance in urban and rural communities, Chapter Three provides a foundation for
understanding whether and how the nature of the environmental setting may affect
superintendent-board member roles and relations while simultaneously providing
additional support for the theoretical and conceptual framework of this study.
65


CHAPTER THREE
A CHRONOLOGY OF INFLUENCES AND
TRENDS IN LOCAL EDUCATION GOVERNANCE
Consistent with the historical dependence of roles, rules, and rituals as posited
by the theory of institutionalism (March and Olsen 1984; 1989), the following
discussion presents an historical chronology of the major influences on and trends in
local American governance and provides a foundation for understanding the evolution
of politics-administration relations in local education. Five periods mark this evolution:
The Era of Community Control (1600s-1829), The Era of the Gentleman Scholar
(1829-1883), the Era of the Professional Manager (1883-1958), the Era of the
Beleaguered Intergovernmental Manager (1958-1961), and the Era of the Cut-Back
Manager (1981-Present). To the extent historical periods are primarily identified and
characterized by the role of the chief administrator in local education governance, this
chapter examines the evolutionary roles of school boards and superintendents in the
American system of public education with particular emphasis on the nature of the
superintendency. In addition, this chapter distinguishes between the nature of the
problems confronting local education in the urban and rural setting, respectively, and
correlates shifts in the nature of local education governance to those experienced in
municipal government.
There are obvious similarities between the structures and processes of education
governance and general purpose (federal, state, and local) government as they exist
today. Both governing arrangements have experienced the influences of changing
social ideologies that have transformed them over time, virtually all political
representatives are elected into offices of governance, public administrators are hired as
a result of their perceived professional expertise, and governing bodies are responsible
66


for deciding and implementing policies perceived to serve in the public interest.
Writing about the nature of educational administration. Mosher states:
One may draw ready parallels between educational administrators
and other public managers in the larger aspects of their work. They
all head up agencies or substantial subagencies that provide specialized
and expert services; they operate with public funds and legal authority;
they conform to the dictates of their own professional standards and
ethics (1977b, 651).
The dates used to identify historical eras are not intended to delineate periods of
time sharply and distinctly; rather, they are estimates of the beginning and ending
periods of major trends although actual periods may overlap considerably. A summary
of the major influences and trends that characterize each historical era follows this
discussion.
The Era of Community Control: 1600s -1829
Prior to the beginning of Jacksonian Democracy and the growing popularity of
its egalitarian philosophy, issues concerning American education were limited, private,
and locally focused (Mosher 1977a, 106). Similarly, until the early 1800s, community
governance reflected the values of the early New England colonists who placed
responsibility and authority for administration of all aspects of community life,
including the education of children, in the town selectmen. Communities were
comprised of several farms dispersed over a large geographic area and were formed by
individuals with common beliefs, values, interests, and behavioral standards. Given
their religious convictions, the New England colonists were committed to having their
children become intimately familiar with the lessons to be learned from the Bible.
Thus, due to the religious nature of influential community members, it has been posited
that life in these covenanted towns were, in fact, governed by an elite of religious
leadership. In contrast, cumulative towns were comprised of diverse individuals
67


with a variety of interests." However, such diversity did not preclude the wealthier
members of the community from gaining social control, as socioeconomic elites
frequently dominated governing bodies in the American colonies (Box 1996,87).
The mandate for compulsory education in America began with a Massachusetts
law passed in 1642, which required parents to send their children to elementary school
(Task Force on School Governance 1992,41). Due to the high degree of inconsistency
in public education as a result of laissez-faire localism, efforts to promote public
instruction and to promote uniformity in programs and goals among existing schools
were undertaken by the states. A national concern for education is evidenced by the
federal lands granted to the states for educational purposes, beginning with the Land
Ordinances of 1785 and 1787. However, when a national movement to provide
elementary education at public expense developed during the early 1800s, citizens in
local communities were expected to provide the necessary resources (Mosher 1977a,
106). Gilland (1935) describes the simplistic nature of administering public education
in America during this period:
The schools were of the local type and were administered by the
entire community in town meetings or by the representative officers
of the local communities. The management of the local community
schools was a simple matter. A crude schoolhouse was built or an
existing building was utilized, a [school] master was hired, and fuel
was provided. The remaining administrative duties, if any, were
performed by the master. The results achieved in the school by the
master were judged by the local community (Gilland 1935,6).
These common schools" served to promote the values of the agrarian
communities of the day by espousing the philosophy of intradependence":
Intradependence speaks of dependence within a place, dependence
on the land and dependence on the good will and wisdom of the
people with whom the land is shared. The greater the intradependence,
the greater the sense of community (Theobald 1997,15).
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This communal orientation began to shift toward more "individually oriented
thinking about dignity, freedom, rationality, and democracy during the 17th century.
Influenced by scientific reductionism promoted by the works of Francis Bacon and
Rene Descartes, the primacy of self-interest as argued in John Lockes Second Treatise
on Government, and the benefits of national economic development through individual
pursuits as promulgated by Adam Smiths The Wealth of Nations, modem liberal
thought began to erode the communal worldview of American society (Theobald 1997,
Chap. 1).
The Era of the Gentleman Scholar 1829 -1883
Whereas social identity had largely been based upon the work one performed to
contribute to community welfare prior to the early 1800s, work came to be narrowly
viewed as the instrumental means by which to acquire individual wealth during this
century. The nation was expanding west throughout the middle years of the 19th
century and people were no longer physically connected to one place-one community.
This shift from a rural to a more urban (or national) worldview necessitated structural,
procedural, and administrative order to compensate for the social disruption created by
a lack of social identity, obligation, and allegiance tied to the local community
(Theobald 1997,73). As Theobald (1997,85) explains:
Bom as the country was during the Enlightenment, mechanisms
used to check regal power were employed... in great measure.
One such mechanism was institution building. Associations of
manufacturers, guilds, commerce groups, stock companies, boards
of trade, and the like were created to facilitate political and economic
change to the advantage of those seeking power. The early national
period in our history was marked by a plethora of institution building,
whether it was Henry Clay striving to create a commercial
infrastructure of roads, canals, and bridges; Horace Bushnell calling
for a system of playgrounds and city parks; Catherine Beecher
building a following to advocate temperance and Sunday schools; or
Horace Mann drawing up plans for tax-supported common schools.
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The first comprehensive plan for a state school system was presented to the
Virginia Assembly in 1779 by Thomas Jefferson. However, it was not until 1837 that
the first state board of education was established, again in Massachusetts. Such
legislative action has been cited as the beginning of a special governmental status for
education (Campbell 1965,50-1).
Although the actual date of establishing many of the first superintendencies is
open to question due to several false starts, the period between 1837 and 1840 is
generally accepted as the timeframe in which the early role of the superintendent began
to emerge (Gilland 1935,15). By the late 1830s, the growth and complexity of school
governance resulted in the practice of hiring superintendents becoming widespread.
However, school board members generally retained authority for ail substantive policy
and key management decisions, thus clearly separating the powers and responsibilities
between the board and the superintendent, and reflecting the national model of
governance in so doing.
Boards, or committees, of local citizens were responsible for building the
schools, hiring the teachers (frequently as a direct result of board members receiving
political favors), selecting the books, and otherwise managing the education of children
in the agrarian communities, or wards, across America. The tasks of the schools were
clearly defined and the duration of formal schooling for children averaged
approximately five years. As communities and schools grew in size, school boards
often recruited citizens to serve on subcommittees that were designed to handle specific
administrative tasks. When they found they required assistance in overseeing the daily
operations of the schools, superintendents were appointed to supervise both the
teachers and the students (Cuban 1976,112). Thus, early superintendents had little or
no responsibility for business management of the school system, the operation or
maintenance of school buildings, or financial management of public education funds.
The early superintendents perceived themselves as scholars and viewed the
professional status of their positions comparable to that of attorneys, ministers, or
70


doctors, despite the fact that many of them had not graduated from college (Griffiths
1966, 16-7). At the direction of the local school board, superintendents'
responsibilities were primarily instruction-oriented, i.e supervising and visiting
schools to ensure the prescribed course of study is followed, holding regular meetings
with teachers, and conducting studies of other school systems (Gilland 1935,73-4).
The early superintendents were expected to interest themselves in education rather than
in the financial or business aspects of the school system (Griffiths 1966, II). It was a
rare occurrence for these Gentleman Scholars to assume an active role with the board
or exercise personal leadership within the context of the ward system. This effort to
limit the responsibilities of the first school superintendents to matters concerned only
with curriculum and instruction may be construed as an early attempt to respond to the
rising need for specialized expertise in the administration of public education.
By 1860, most states had become actively involved in education and had
established guidelines for teacher selection, school financing (largely through federal
land-grant funds), programs of instruction, and various administrative functions.
However, state departments of education served a largely clerical function as local
control of schools was preeminent (Tyack and Cummings 1977,58). Similarly,
although the U.S. Office of Education was established in 1867, its creation was largely
a symbolic representation of the federal governments concern for education, as it was
granted authority to do little more than collect statistical data and disseminate
information (Mosher 1977a, 107).
During the time that Jacksonian Democracy and its egalitarian philosophy were
gaining significant popularity and pressure on local government was growing as a
result of increasing populations and increasing demands for public services (Mosher
1982,64-6), structural, procedural, and administrative modifications occurred in
American governance. In local education, superintendents were hired to coordinate and
monitor the delivery of educational programs. Although many of these Gentleman
Scholars had little or no formal training, the early education administrators perceived
71


themselves as intellectuals. In municipal governance, by 1850 "virtually all cities in the
United States operated under some variation of the mayor-council plan (Rice 1977.
xi). Under this structural arrangement, city councils began appointing citizens with
specific areas of expertise to serve on committees and assist in administering specific
city functions. Experiments with the commission plan were also tried, whereby an
individual member of the city council was held responsible for a department of local
government, but this structure of city governance was never widely adopted (Rice
1977, xiii-xiv). Finally, the end of the period of the Gentleman Scholar as the
administrator of government business is marked by the establishment of the Civil
Service Commission, and its emphasis on meritocracy, via the passage of the Pendleton
Act in 1883.
The Era of the Professional Manager: 1883 -1958
By 1883, perceptions of patronage and corruption were increasing as
inefficiency and a lack of coordination in all forms of governance became more
apparent, and citizens became increasingly concerned about government operations.
Like other forms of government, local school boards came under scrutiny as
Progressive reformers sought to protect education governance from political spoils
systems and professional business leaders sought to create efficient administrative
processes. The moral imperative to protect public service from evils is evidenced in
the broader context of civil service reform with the passage of the Pendleton Act in
1883 and subsequent implementation efforts designed to separate politics from
administration in American governance (Mosher 1982,66-73).
Progressive reformers changed the decision-making structure of education
governance by replacing existing school board members in seeking the moral
imperative of insulating education from local political spoils. To gain public support for
this change, reformers argued for citywide elections to replace the ward system by
stating the educational interests of the entire community rather than those of individual
72


wards would be better served. However, since average citizens were largely excluded
from the centralized, citywide elections due to their lack of bases for power, limited
ability to obtain newspaper coverage, and insufficient financial resources, members of
these reform boards were frequently members of the industrial and professional elite.
In this newly centralized system of governance, the leadership role of school
superintendents was significantly strengthened by being closely aligned with that of
business executives and, consequently, the decision-making responsibilities of the
board began to diminish. Administrative subcommittees were substantially reduced, if
not totally eliminated, and the agenda and most other substantive initiatives were turned
over to the superintendent. As Mosher (1982,74) asserts, the doctrine of separation
of policy from administration, which lent support to the ideal of a politically neutral
civil service, could equally rationalize the development of a highly specialized,
technically competent administration. Efforts to promote such political neutrality and
technical competence in educational administration were well underway by 1883, and
characterize the strengthened capacity of the Professional Manager in local education
governance.
The confluence of urban growth, the influx of immigrants, the industrial
revolution, and an increasing belief in the notion of scientific management resulted in
sweeping education reforms at the tum of the century. Across the country, individuals
from the emerging professional and business classes began to change the nature of local
education and education governance. Believing the most educated members of society
were best able to determine the public interest, these professional and social elites also
believed they possessed the knowledge required to determine the educational needs and
goals of Americas children and the goals of the educational system itself (Spring 1984.
404-5). Consequently, the school was reconceptualized as not only a place for
academic learning, but as a social institution. Cremin (1961) describes the implications
of this newly comprehensive approach to public education:
First, it meant broadening the program and function of the school
to include direct concern for health, vocation, and the quality of
73


family and community life. Second, it meant applying to the
classroom the pedagogical principles derived from new scientific
research in psychology and the social sciences. Third, it meant
tailoring instruction more and more to the different kinds and classes
of children who were being brought within the purview of the school-----
Finally, Progressivism implied the radical faith that culture could be
democratized without being vulgarized, the faith that everyone could
share not only in the benefits of the new sciences but in the pursuit of
the arts as well (C re min 1961, vii and ix).
Rural schools were viewed by the industrialists of this period as a source for
providing future scientists who could refine technological capital as well as a stable,
compliant force of human capital. Thus, the values of efficiency, specialization, and
professionalism were inherent in the teachings of the reconceptualized public schools at
the turn of the 19th century. To the extent the focus of the American public education
system served primarily to address the needs of the urban industrial setting, rural
communities resisted such shifts in the teachings of their local schools. Thus, rural
schools seemingly substituted some agrarian tenets to replace the values of the
powerful urban industrialists when finally forced to adopt the common school
concept (Theobald 1997,86).
Informed by business-industrial pressures and the need to appease their critics
in order to maintain their positions, superintendents began to respond to demands for
efficiency in school administration. Speeches for reform were given at educational
conferences, reports about actions taken were presented by local schools, and
committees were formed to study how to improve efficiency in school operations. In
addition, an expert commission was formed for the sole purpose of determining how to
slow the rate of urban emigration by rural youth, thereby ensuring the future of the
"great agricultural class in American society through social engineering (Theobald
1997, 104). Two significant innovations occurred as a result of these activities: the
introduction of the platoon system and a new emphasis placed on accounting methods
in education (Griffiths 1966, 23-7).
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The platoon system enriched academic programs by including art, music,
industrial education, and nature studies into the curriculum. Thus, the needs of both
the urban, industrial community and the agrarian, rural community were believed to be
met through comprehensive curriculum. Schools were designed to include
auditoriums, gymnasiums, laboratories, and playgrounds as integral parts of the
educational environment. Half the students could use traditional classrooms while the
other half occupied the aforementioned facilities, and students would move from one
teaching station to another throughout the school day. As such, only half the classroom
space would be required for any given school. The platoon system was widely adopted
as it commended itself to city boards across the country as a device for being
progressive and saving money at the same time (Cremin 1961, 155). As previously
noted, rural boards adopted and adapted the common school approach after an initial
period of significant resistance.
As superintendents sought to provide new school buildings for increasing
populations in the early 1900s, they introduced new accounting procedures and actively
sought public support for their new ventures (Gilland 1935,262-3). The emphasis
placed on improving accounting methods included the preparation of records, reports,
and the introduction cost accounting in public education. Uniformity of methods for
reporting educational histories of children and improved financial management was
urged as a result of the growth of the profession of education in concert with public
demands for complete information concerning public institutions. Application of cost
accounting methods to schools was deemed necessary to determine the costs of
education and to establish standards for reducing costs, thereby demonstrating
efficiency. Consequently, annual reports prepared by superintendents and submitted to
local school boards were made public, complete with detailed financial data, graphs,
and charts (Griffiths 1966,23-7).
Additionally, educational efficiency experts were hired by local school boards to
develop standardized tests and rating scales to measure student achievement, establish
75


fact-finding bureaus to identify and evaluate best practices of the day, and develop and
administer school surveys to assess the quality of educational staff and services as well
as the efficiency with which these services were provided (Griffiths 1966,27-30). The
use of outside experts to measure the efficiency of educational administration clearly
addresses the demand for professional, business-like competence in the superintendents
of this period.
To achieve the goals of informed and impartial educational administration, and
influenced heavily by their faith in scientific rationality, reformers sought increased
independence from local political entities and an increased role for the superintendent to
provide executive leadership. As boards increasingly relied on the professional skills
of their superintendents, the corporate image of organization spread rapidly. Emphasis
on professionalism in education during this time is further evidenced by the founding of
the National School Board Association in 1940 and significant membership growth in
the American Association of School Administrators, although it was founded in 1865.
Through the latter, superintendents were able to share practices and ideas, and establish
a common basis for compiling and reporting data on school membership. More
significantly, superintendents played a large role in developing a true profession of
educational administration by contributing to scholarly literature that portrayed the
superintendency as a professional and specialized role dependent on business-like
competence (Griffiths 1966,23-7).
Whereas the early superintendent identified with the image of the scholar, the
superintendent at the turn of the 20th century embraced the image of the professional
businessman (Reller 1935,296). The business executive-type image served to
strengthen the role of the school superintendent during the first half of the 20th century
since this image reflected the values and behaviors desired by the public at large and.
perhaps more importantly, reflected the beliefs of influential professional elites who
overwhelmingly comprised local boards of education-and employed school
superintendentsacross America (Callahan 1962,6-8).
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By the early 1920s, scholars began to view administration as a "learned
profession.'1 Consequently, certification by examination of school superintendents was
widely adopted by the states, although some states required a Master's degree in lieu of
certification (Griffiths 1966,35). The curriculum offered at leading universities, such
as Teachers College, Columbia, the University of Chicago, Stanford, and Harvard
University reinforced the image of the efficient, business-like superintendent by
espousing the management and business philosophy of the day (Griffiths 1966,31).
As a result of growing professional expertise in the superintendency, the school board
eventually came to be viewed as a buffer between the public and the professional
education administrator, providing little more than a rubber stamp for official district
actions determined by elites:
The School Board as a representative form of government came
to mean representation of the views and values of the financial,
business, and professional communities (Spring 1984,405).
American society was becoming increasingly urbanized and business and labor
organizations were growing more influential. By 1933, secondary schools were added
to the public education system, and governing bodies in state and local education began
to reflect the bureaucratization and professionalization of federal agencies. However,
public education remained largely immune from the federal centralization effects felt by
interstate commerce, banking, and labor organizations. In fact, the reform values of
efficiency and neutral expertise served to reinforce the separation of local educational
agencies from those of general purpose government as the focus on delivering
educational services shifted from a consumer orientation to that of a social institution
designed to better serve the public interest (Cremin 1961, vii-ix). Although significant
emphasis was placed on fiscal management in education as a result of reform and
business values, the extent of federal funding for education at this time was limited to
categorical cash grants to the states for vocational training as provided in the Smith-
Hughes Act of 1917 (Mosher 1977a, 107).
77


Three additional forces combined to affect the professionalization and
centralization of local governance during the era of professionalism" (Box 1996,88).
First, the national government assumed responsibility for some functions and
policymaking powers previously residing with state and local governments. For
example, federal grants were made to fund the building of state highways, but
constraints accompanied such grants relative to the specific planning, reporting, and
quality standards imposed. Second, functional bureaucracies began to emerge as
neutrally competent professionals attempted to make rational decisions by incorporating
techniques inherent in the scientific management movement. Third, the federal
government was granted the authority to collect income taxes by constitutional
amendment in 1913, thus providing a source of national revenue that is controlled and
allocated by decisions made at the federal level (Mosher 1977a, 107).
In contrast to the laissez-faire policy role of the federal government in the
aforementioned eras, by the early 1900s unabashed government support for industrial
expansion resulted in policies reflecting the philosophy of corporate liberalism" that
severely affected the rural family farmer. For example, the combination of policies
established by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, corporate philanthropy, and
agricultural research performed by land grant universities afforded the creation of a
national farmers association tailored to empower only the nation's largest and most
successful farmers. With emphasis almost exclusively on profit and efficiency, the
creation and success of the American Farm Bureau Federation condemned family
farming to the gradual... takeover by corporate farming interests (Theobald 1997,
109).
In addition, the effects of post-World War I economics further contributed to the
decline of rural farm communities. Because European and Russian farmers left their
fields to fight in World War I, the prices for American agricultural commodities reached
new heights. Seeking to increase capacity and productivity to meet demand between
1914 and 1920, American farmers went heavily into debt to acquire more land and new
78


innovations in machinery. However, as foreign production resumed at the end of the
war, prices for American produce dropped drastically. Consequently, mass
foreclosures of family farms resulted in a 6% (two million people) decline in the
American rural population between 1916 and 1929 (Theobald 1997,109-10).
The economic depression of the 1930s and America's involvement in World
War II in the 1940s influenced significantly the centralized role of the federal
government in its efforts to provide leadership to a nation struggling for stability, and
lead to further reduction in the rural population. New forms of intergovernmental
cooperation emerged as the scope of federal programs expanded to include social
welfare, war-time rationing, and military conscription. However, the legislative intent
of such programs focused on defining the necessary fiscal provisions and controls
rather than on facilitating successful implementation (Wright 1974,7-9). Thus, serious
problems of implementation were realized at the state and local levels.
Although education at first remained largely unaffected by the sweeping
changes taking place in the role of federal government, direct aid to schools soon
became necessary in those districts struggling with the sudden increase of industrial and
military installations needed to support World War II and the Korean war. The children
of persons employed by the industrial-military complex attended urban public schools.
However, these federal installations were not taxed and thus provided no revenue to the
local school districts in which they resided. To overcome this problem, Congressional
approval for grants to such urban school districts were characterized as peacetime
subsidies in lieu of taxes (Mosher 1977a, 110).
In rural communities, the farm population actually grew as the nation's
agricultural policies became a focus of the federal government. However, the farmers
of the 1930s and 1940s were frequently tenants of the large insurance or banking firms
that had previously foreclosed on their mortgages. In efforts to ease the national
hunger experienced during the economic depression and to slow the demographic
emigration from rural farms in the Midwest to cities on the West Coast, price supports
79


for agricultural products were implemented as part of Roosevelts New Deal initiatives.
However, money was tight, surpluses grew, prices for agricultural commodities
remained low, and the plight of the rural community continued through the 1930s.
Rural farmers became more optimistic as World War II broke out in Europe, and by the
early 1940s "the United States was well poised to become the worlds breadbasket once
again(Theobald 1997, 111).
The influences of the Progressive reform movement and the industrial
revolution also led to increased centralization, professionalization, and efficiency in city
governance and administration in the early 20th century. Centralized administrative
power in the hands of an elected mayor and at-large elections to mitigate the potential
influence of neighborhood groups grew in popularity. Professionalization of city
governance is represented by the application of the corporate model with initiation of
the council-manager plan in 1909 at Staunton, Virginia. The council-manager structure
of governance utilizes the business model of an appointed, professional, general
manager accountable to the elected members of city council for the administration of
city business (Box 19%, 88). The emphasis on professionalism in municipal
governance during this time is further evidenced by the founding of the International
City/County Management Association (ICMA) in 1914.
The "transactional politics of self-interest resulting in Progressive era reforms
in governance produced stronger executive capacity of public administrators to ensure
efficiency, professionalism, and accountability that became the desired norms in
American governance during the first half of the 20th century (Newland 1989,259).
While governmental policies focused on the nation's economic interests combined with
the industrial revolution to create and benefit the urban way of life across America, such
benefits were frequently realized at the expense and to the detriment of the rural
community and its values (Theobald 1997).
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The Era of the Beleaguered Intergovernmental Manager 1958 1981
Efforts to preserve the autonomy of state and local school administration
became evident in the decade immediately following the end of World War II. While
proponents of federal aid to education sought to create or increase instructional
uniformity, racial integration, and the separation of church and state in schools across
the nation, opposition to these combined objectives was strong and widespread across
American localities fearful of federal intervention. The passage of the National Defense
Education Act in 1958 signaled a national response to the need for increasing the
nation's scientific and technical capacity, and provided for the construction of schools
and supplementing the salaries of teachers through categorical grants. Thus, despite
efforts to the contrary, public education became embroiled in the influences and
processes of intergovernmental relations imposed upon other social service agencies for
more than twenty years (Mosher 1977a, 106-11).
The decade of "Creative Federalism between 1958 and 1968 is characterized
by two major national policy emphases: improving the quality of life in urban-
metropolitan regions and disadvantaged segments of American society. The tools of
program planning, project grants, and public participation were widely employed as
strategies for building consensus for the Great Society programs. However, increased
professional discretion and complex administrative processes combined to fragment the
grant structures and corresponding popular support (Wright 1974,10-1).
By the late 1950s, public confidence in school boards and school administrators
decreased significantly in a watershed period of counterreforms (Kirst 1984,41). The
1957 Soviet launch of the Sputnik satellite prior to American entry into space resulted in
educators being accused of having failed students in this country, especially in the
sciences and math. However, the structure of education governance remained
unchanged until the 1960s, when the civil rights movement gave a powerful voice to
minorities and the politically disenfranchised members of American society. It is during
81


this time that a number of developments caused the policymaking power of the board
and, to a lesser extent, its chief administrator to weaken.
Prior to I960, the federal government played a relatively minor role in the
development of education policy. Though proponents of federal involvement had
fought for more than 20 years to expand federal interest in public education, the control
of education policy remained largely with state and local governments. However, in
seeking to focus attention on disenfranchised members of society, federal government
decisions began to impact significantly local education governance. The 1954 Brown
v. Board of Education Supreme Court decision, which stated the doctrine of separate
but equal had no place in public education as determined by the equal protection
provided for in the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, raised doubts about the
ability of affluent Caucasians on school boards to represent the needs and concerns of
minorities in the cities. Additionally, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 resulted in escalated
racial tensions in many communities when the availability of federal funds forced state
and local educational agencies to comply with legislation pertaining to school
desegregation (Mosher 1977a, 111-4).
As part of President Lyndon Johnsons Great Society social agenda, between
1960 and 1970, the federal government launched an extraordinary number of new
initiatives that increased the number of federal education programs from 20 to 130,
many designed to equalize educational opportunity for poor and disadvantaged
students. By 1976, federal expenditures on elementary and secondary education had
increased from approximately half a billion dollars to $4 billion, over half for programs
to promote equal educational opportunity (Graham 1984).
Passage of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA)
exemplifies this federal commitment to education. What most distinguished the new
federal role and what eventually made federal involvement so controversial, however,
was not primarily the large number of new programs or the scope of the financial
commitment, but rather the purpose of the new federal programs and the regulatory
82


efforts to ensure they were fulfilled. The federal government was given a powerful
new role in defining the educational priorities of the nation and federal policy became a
central focus for the struggles over access to and quality of public education in
America. The influence of the states increased in tandem with the increased federal role
in education, as the states were made responsible for implementing and monitoring the
federal legislation. Thus, the ESEA and Title I specifically extended federal and state
involvement much more directly into aspects of educational decision-making once
considered the exclusive arena of local educators and administrators (Edelman 1973,
Bailey and Mosher 1968, McLaughlin 1975).
It has been posited that development of the ESEA, and the Great Societys
education programs in general, can be attributed to the conjunction of post-World War
II social changes with changes in national politics. These arguments suggest an elite-
sponsored effort to promote increased federal involvement in education was supported
by a number of reports that portrayed American schools and students as failing to meet
the needs of national economic and security interests (Armbruster 1977). Through
documentation of declining student performance on aptitude and cognitive tests, reports
chronicled results which indicated low achievement of American students relative to
their international peers across a variety of subjects (National Commission on
Excellence in Education 1983). A Nation at Risk (1983) revealed that school dropout
rates were increasing after many years of decline. Private business employers and
military representatives added to this negative view of public education by complaining
about high school graduates who were insufficiently prepared to assume basic
responsibilities in the workplace or in their communities. Moreover, many reports
drew connections between the problems of public education and Americas decline and
future role in the global economy.
The 1960s also realized the development of professional organizations and
collective bargaining for teachers to gain more of a voice in education policy, which
grew out of increasing teacher militancy during this decade. This rebellion created a
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division between teachers and superintendents, as these two groups of professionals
had much the same educational perceptions and experiences in the past; they had
attended the same teachers colleges, belonged to the same professional organizations,
and most superintendents had performed as teachers and principals prior to accepting
responsibility for school district administration (Rosenthal 1969,19-20). Similarly, in
many urban educational systems, large staffs of district administrators were able to
develop their own bases of influence and become active participants in shaping key
policy decisions. These professional experts also possessed the knowledge and skills
required to take advantage of the increased state and federal activity in education by
generating grant proposals and influencing district policy decisions (Gittell 1967,245-
6).
These intergovernmental and professional power struggles in local education
resulted in creating significant and far-reaching social implications. For example, in
1968, the state of New York attempted an experiment whereby control of schools in
Brooklyn was to be transferred from a centralized Board of Education to local school
boards representing various districts to better meet the needs of poor and minority
students. This effort was viewed as a means to eliminate the patronage and corruption
known to exist within the centralized board. In citing the "early role in the deterioration
of relationships between blacks and Jews, the New York Times later characterized
this battle over school decentralization and the subsequent union-led teachers' strikes as
a symbol of hifalutin good intentions gone awry-an effort
to transfer power from a hidebound bureaucracy back to the
people that turned into a political and educational disaster.
... It seemed the worst of times. Pickets and the police
ringed schools as onetime allies in the civil rights struggle
shrieked accusations of racism and anti-semitism at each
other.... In the end, this struggle had nothing to do with
education; it was all politics and money (Kifner 1996, E5).
This effort to achieve district governance guided by community involvement in
New York failed miserably. The central Board of Education refused to relinquish
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control to local schools and public perception that people in the district were being
"used and manipulated contributed significantly to social unrest. The legacy of such
attempts to "cleanse New York City education of its poisons was undone in December
19%, as the state legislature finally passed a measure that officially granted power to
hire and fire educational staff members to New York school districts chief
administrators (Kifner 19%, E5).
To counter centralized attempts at governance through the programs of
Johnson's Great Society initiative, President Nixon sought to decentralize federal
power by strengthening state and local governmental authority through a paradigm of
"New Federalism in the 1970s. Although a Democratic Congress combined with
federal agencies and their supporting interest groups to resist the transitions in authority
and power to subnational governments, state and local governments realized significant
increases in federal grant expenditures and a corresponding increase in subnational
responsibility and authority for putting them to good use. Additionally, many
communities changed from at-large to districtwide school board elections during the
1970s. This decentralized shift in governance structure was, in part, a response to the
"white flight that took place in urban centers across America and to reassure minorities
that their interests would be adequately represented by the boards elected to govern in
matters of education (Mosher 1977a, 111-4).
The social turbulence of the 1960s and 1970s served to politicize education
governance and weaken the authority in local school governance. Highly publicized
conflicts of local education professionals struggling against a variety of powerful
interest groups combined with increased federal involvement in education to promote
the image of the beleaguered superintendent (Boyd 1976). Heightened community
conflict in part motivated by the civil rights movement, the political agenda of the Great
Society, and increased district pluralism opened the local system to a host of new
influences intervening on behalf of the disadvantaged and disenfranchised members of
American society. Because board members frequently empathized with one or another
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of the causes of specialized interest or community groups, the power of the district
administrator was limited (Gittell 1967,245-6).
As a result of increased federal intervention, reforms to governance structure,
and increasing professionalization of educational administration, school boards became
increasingly detached from the daily responsibilities, knowledge, and operations of the
schools in their respective districts, especially those in urban populations (Kirst 1984,
40). Thus, a significantly more active federal role beginning in the 1950s combined
with the confrontation politics of the 1960s and 1970s to result in a substantially less
influential role for locally elected school board officials and severely weakened the
superintendent's ability to influence policy decisions in local education governance.
Between the 1950s and the 1970s, a combined focus on national security and
economic interests again subordinated the needs of the rural community to those of
urban residents. In the post-World War II non-farm economic boom of the 1950s,
agricultural concerns appeared to be of little import to the American public. Although
the federal government implemented policies to subsidize farmers for not growing
crops on some of their acreage in an effort to reduce agricultural surplus, profit margins
remained too thin for most fanners to survive. Like the 1920s. during the 1960s,
another mass exodus from rural American farm communities was realized. However,
this time rapid technological advances enabled the remaining farmers (often agricultural
conglomerates) to compensate for the loss of millions of their colleagues through
increased efficiency and productivity. During the 1970s, globalization created
increased foreign demand, especially from the Soviet Union, for American agricultural
products. In 1972, the agricultural surpluses that had existed since the 1950s were
depleted. Consequently, prices for farm products and farm land skyrocketed. To
further increase their capacity to produce in this boom time, farmers again went into
debt to acquire additional land.
Consistent with the cyclical nature of events in rural America, by 1981 "farmers
went out of business at a rate that approached the figures for the 1960s." Realizing the
86


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