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Community policing and community adjudication

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Community policing and community adjudication toward a theory of organizational co-evolution in criminal justice administration
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Settles, Tanya L
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251 leaves : ; 28 cm

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Justice, Administration of -- United States ( lcsh )
Community policing -- United States ( lcsh )
Police administration -- Citizen participation -- United States ( lcsh )
Community policing ( fast )
Justice, Administration of ( fast )
Police administration -- Citizen participation ( fast )
United States ( fast )
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theses ( marcgt )
non-fiction ( marcgt )

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Includes bibliographical references (leaves 237-251).
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School of Public Affairs
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by Tanya L. Settles.

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Full Text
COMMUNITY POLICING AND COMMUNITY ADJUDICATION.
TOWARD A THEORY OF ORGANIZATIONAL CO-EVOLUTION
IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION
by
Tanya L. Settles
B. S., Metropolitan State College of Denver, 1995
M. P. A., University of Colorado at Denver, 1996
A thesis submitted to the
University of Colorado at Denver
in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Public Affairs
2001


2001 by Tanya Lynne Settles
All rights reserved.


This thesis for the Doctor of Philosophy
degree by
Tanya Lynne Settles
has been approved
Fred Rainguet
Date


Settles, Tanya (Ph.D., Public Affairs)
Community Policing and Community Adjudication: Toward a Theory of
Organizational Co-Evolution in Criminal Justice Administration
Thesis directed by Associate Professor Lloyd Burton
ABSTRACT
This study examines how and why police agencies that engage in community
policing strategies interact with judicial agencies that utilize community
adjudication, including restorative justice, community courts, community
prosecution, and similar tactics. This study investigates the interaction
between community policing and community adjudication to determine
organizational and intergovernmental strategies that permit both types of
agencies to achieve common goals in a way that is responsive to the
communities they serve.
This study used five geographic locations as study sites: Boulder, Colorado;
Portland, Oregon, Santa Clara, California; Woodbury, Minnesota, and the
Navajo Nation in New Mexico, Arizona, and Utah. As this was a qualitative
research effort, data were primarily collected through extensive interviews
and observation.
The findings of this study suggest that there are multiple phenomena that
simultaneously occur. Borrowing the concept of ecological co-evolution from
the natural sciences and interagency cooperation from the discipline of public
administration, a new understanding of criminal justice administration
emerged organizational co-evolution. Therefore, the overarching finding of
this study is that as community policing agencies and courts using
community adjudication strategies interact with one another, each
organization is changed in what appears to be a mutually beneficial way.
One of the results of this interaction is the emergence of a dual-path system
of criminal justice administration that is informal, though complimentary, to
the traditional justice system. Beyond this, it was discovered that this dual-
path system of criminal justice seems to work best when there is little or no
IV


formal policy that guides the process. This, as believed by the practitioners
who participated in this study, assures flexibility and responsiveness in
decision-making based on the individual circumstances associated with each
criminal episode.
To accommodate the need to manage each crime in an individual manner,
and at the same time be attentive to community member needs, each of the
agencies in this study developed informal and reciprocal personal
relationships within and between each type of agency police and court.
The result is a flexible justice system that seems, under certain
circumstances, to improve service to crime victims, community members,
and offenders.
This abstract accurately reflects the content of the candidates thesis. I
recommend its publication.
v


DEDICATION
I dedicate this dissertation to my mother, Cheryl Settles, with deepest thanks,
gratitude, and love for her unfailing support in this and all my endeavors.


ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
There were several people who helped make this study possible. My sincere
thanks must go to my committee chair, Dr. Lloyd Burton, whose guidance
and gentle persuasion helped maintain and narrow the focus of this research.
Dr. Linda deLeon was a source of endless encouragement and constructive
criticism, making time for my occasional monologue of ideas and
philosophical explorations often on a moments notice. My thanks also go to
Dr. Fred Rainguet who helped make me aware of the initial shortcomings of
the research design, and because of his careful critique, helped identify
potential problems in the research early, while they could be addressed
before they were out of hand. Dr. Mary Dodge was especially helpful in her
editorial comments, and for helping to identify potential research locations
based on her impressive knowledge of the criminal justice system outside of
Colorado. Finally, my heartfelt thanks to Dr. Hal Nees, who as the outside
committee member was a constant source of encouragement and
enlightenment both in terms of this research and professional endeavors. My
words do little to express my gratitude and good fortune to work with such a
talented group of people.
This research would not have been possible without the participation of over
two hundred people in five geographic locations who took the time and effort
to aid me in a search for understanding the phenomenon of community
justice. While it is not possible to thank each of them here, I am grateful for
having met them and value their insight. In particular, my thanks must go to
Robyn Gregory of the Multnomah County District Attorneys Office in
Portland, Oregon; Loree Greco of the Boulder, Colorado Municipal Court;
David Hines of the Woodbury, Minnesota Police Department; Chief Justice
Robert Yazzie of the Navajo Nation Tribal Court, and; Mary Pat Panaghetti of
the Santa Clara County Superior Court.
The people mentioned here are in many ways responsible for helping inform
me of the issues of community justice and for providing me with the
intellectual interest and persistence in this topic. They are, however, in no
way responsible for any misinformation or errors in the final product.
Ultimately, as the researcher, I am solely responsible for the contents and
conclusions of this study.


CONTENTS
Figures..................................................xiii
Tables...................................................xiv
CHAPTER
1. INTRODUCTION, PURPOSE, AND SCOPE........................1
The Challenge of Community Justice...................4
Purpose and Scope....................................6
2. COMMUNITY POLICING THEORY..............................13
Criticisms of Traditional Policing..................14
Defining Community Policing.........................16
Evidence of the Successes of
Community Policing............................21
Relationships With Other Justice Agencies...........22
Management and Organizational Structure Issues......25
Line Officer Discretion.......................28
The Organizational Culture of Policing........29
Deficiencies in Community Policing Theory...........31
Problems of Evaluation and the
Measurement of Success........................34
3. COMMUNITY ADJUDICATION.................................41
Criticisms of Traditional Adjudication Processes....42
Punishment in a Retributive World.............45
Defining Community Adjudication.....................47
Types of Community Adjudication Processes...........49
viii


Community Prosecution/Community Sanctioning...50
Family Group Conferencing (FGC) and
Community Conferencing........................52
Circle Sentencing and Peacemaking.............53
Building the Relationship Between Adjudication
and Police..........................................54
Relationships with Other Agencies Interested
in Reducing Crime...................................57
Deficiencies in Community Adjudication Theory.......58
Excessive and Unaccountable Police Power.......60
Conclusion on Community Adjudication................61
4. INTERAGENCY COOPERATION................................67
Formal and Informal Relationships...................69
Communication..................................70
Problem Solving and Decision Making............73
Encouraging Coordination Between Police
and Adjudication Agencies...........................75
Decision Making................................75
Recognizing Interagency Cooperation.................77
5. RESEARCH METHODS.......................................82
Personal Experience and Scholarly Inquiry...........88
Sampling Method.....................................90
Data Collection and Compilation.....................99
Data Analysis......................................102
IX


6. INTERAGENCY COOPERATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL
CO-EVOLUTION BETWEEN POLICE AND COURTS.................103
Association.........................................111
Collaboration.......................................117
Communication.......................................124
Organizational Co-Evolutions Capacity
To Accommodate Interagency Cooperation..............131
7. CONDITIONS PRECIPITATING
CO-EVOLUTIONARY CHANGE.................................134
Portland, Oregon....................................137
Origins of Community Policing................137
Origins of Community Adjudication............138
Early Interactions Between Police and Courts.139
The Current Situation........................140
Boulder, Colorado...................................143
Origins of Community Policing................143
Origins of Community Adjudication............144
Early Interactions Between Police and Courts.145
The Current Situation........................146
Woodbury, Minnesota.................................148
Origins of Community Policing................148
Origins of Community Adjudication............150
The Current Situation........................152
Santa Clara, California.............................153
Origins of Community Policing................153
Origins of Community Adjudication............155
Early Interactions Between Police and Courts.156
The Current Situation........................157
x


Navajo Nation.....................................158
Origins of Community Policing...............158
Origins of Community Adjudication...........159
Early Interaction Between Police and Courts.161
Triggering Events.................................162
8. A DUAL-PATH SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE...............167
Police Perceptions of a Dual-Path System..........170
Police as the Gatekeepers to a Dual-Path System...175
Changing the Role of the Court....................180
Cost Savings and Other Benefits
to the Courts...............................183
Formal Versus Informal Government.................186
Formality...................................188
9. PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS AND TRUST
AS THE KEY TO COMMUNITY-BASED JUSTICE................199
Manifestations of Unmandated Interaction..........206
The Driving Force Behind Community Justice........208
The Hometown Connection.....................211
What Doesnt Work: Pitfalls and Dangers of
Community Justice.................................213
Ix-nay on the Andle-cay...................214
10. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS.................................220
Opportunities for Further Inquiry.................223
Theoretical Implications of Dual-Path
Governance and Organizational Co-Evolution........226
Conclusion........................................226
xi


APPENDIX
A. SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS........232
B. AXIAL AND IN-VIVO CODES....................233
BIBLIOGRAPHY.......................................237
xii


FIGURES
Figure
5.1 Similarities Between Community Policing
And Community Adjudication....................................83
6.1 Association Continuum.........................................117
6.2 Collaboration Continuum.......................................124
6.3 Communication Continuum.......................................130
XIII


TABLES
Table
5.1 Number of Research Participants by Organization
type, Position, and Research Location..........................98
6.1 Association Characteristic 1
Active or Passive Participation on Interdisciplinary Teams......112
6.2 Association Characteristic 2
Lines of Communication Exist Do Not Impede the Efforts
of Other Interested Organizations...............................113
6.3 Association Characteristic 3
Unintended Duplication of Services..............................114
6.4 Association Characteristic 4
Jurisdictions Take Into Account Community Norms,
Preferences, and Values.........................................115
6.5 Estimated Values of Characteristics of Association
According to Location...........................................116
6.6 Collaboration Characteristic 1
Joint Facilitation of Community Justice Efforts.................120
6.7 Collaboration Characteristic 2
Coterminous Informal Policy Practices...........................121
6.8 Collaboration Characteristic 3
Interagency Efforts to Solve Problems in Service Delivery......122
6.9 Estimated Values of Characteristics of
Collaboration by Location.......................................123
6.10 Communication Characteristic 1
Level of Effort to Maintain Communication.......................125
6.11 Communication Characteristic 2
Evidence of Trust Between Organizations.........................126
XIV


6.12 Communication Characteristic 3
Frequency of Informal Contact Between and
Within Organizations........................................127
6.13 Estimated Values of Characteristics of
Communication by Location...................................128
7.1 Triggering Events for Co-Evolutionary
Change in Five Locations....................................163
xv


CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION, PURPOSE, AND SCOPE
In the late 1980's I began a career in criminal justice. Through the
course of the next fifteen years, I came to notice some features of the
criminal justice system that eventually became somewhat troubling to me
and many of my colleagues. Many of those observations, combined with my
academic experiences are represented here.
For the most part, my career has focused on law enforcement. My
own observation (one that is verified by the literature, see Stojkovic, Kalinich,
and Klofas (1998) as an example) is that law enforcement agencies tend to
be quite hierarchical in terms of organizational structure, following an
essentially quasi-military style format. Some believe this to be a remnant of
the view that a scientific management structure is the most effective and
efficient way to deal with large organizations. While there are unquestionably
many advantages to such a structure (such as control and accountability),
organizations with numerous layers of command also tend to stifle innovation
and encourage repetitive behavior, even when the behavior being repeated
does not result in the most promising outcomes. Additionally, consistent with
knowledge about organizational dynamics, change comes slowly, particularly
when power is concentrated and protected among the highest levels of the
hierarchy. In many ways, this research challenges the idea that the best way
to manage police agencies is through strict hierarchical control, and further
1


challenges my own belief that most police departments operate in such a
manner.
While my early career years were focused on policing1,1 have also
had frequent professional contact with courts and other types of adjudicatory
agencies. I have observed that the adversarial nature of the American court
system tends be a zero-sum equation, in which only a certain amount of
justice exists that can be distributed among individuals and groups with
competing claims to legitimacy. Traditionally, legal processes have, by
necessity and nature, been forced to discount witness impressions and
feelings, victim impact, and socio-cultural preferences, all in the pursuit of
successful prosecution2 as the trade-off for living in a liberalist society that is
protective of individual rights and freedoms. Court proceedings are, to the
casual participant, shrouded in secrecy, and legal decision-making takes on
the time-honored tradition of a mystical air of going to an oracle, the outcome
of which is unknown in terms of how the decision was made.
Another observation that was particularly important in forming this
research is that police usually do not coordinate efforts with courts, apart
from the occasional interaction with prosecutors, and only in the pursuit of a
determination of guilt3. Community and victim needs and preferences are all
too often either discounted or ignored entirely. Admittedly, this is not the
intent of the adversarial model, though it is one of the more unfortunate
outcomes.
I have had the privilege of years of observation and participation in
criminal justice administration, the result of which is a well grounded
perception of how things, at least in my own professional context, actually do
work, and some views on how the situation might be improved. I have
participated in a number of programs that attempt community oriented
policing, and have seen first hand the positive effects of community members
2


working in tandem with police. However, I also know that in many ways, it
would seem that the promise of community policing has gone unfulfilled, and
in extreme cases has failed entirely. Furthermore, in observing community
court and community sanctioning proceedings, I have noticed that
satisfaction among both adjudicatory bodies and citizens in terms of outcome
and mutual understanding and respect seems to be improved4. Given these
observations it is my belief that community policing and community
adjudication can and should operate in tandem, particularly where the goals
and approaches are similar, and in fact, to collaborate efforts, one with the
other may ensure the survival and sustainability of each.
Evidence of the efficacy of community policing is sometimes scarce
and anecdotal. In fact, those studies that have undertaken the monumental
task of attempting to evaluate the effectiveness of community policing efforts
have returned fairly dismal results in terms of the traditional markers of
reduction in crime. For some, this begs the question of whether community
policing is not being property implemented, or worse, if it simply doesnt work
in reducing crime (Zhao and Thurman, 1997). Evidence on community
adjudication is far less conclusive because the promise of community and
restorative justice is in its infancy, without any conclusive evidence one way
or the other. A common thread exists, however, in that communities approve
of each type of program and are eager to participate in dealing with crime
and livability issues. The primary focus of this study investigates a single,
crucial link between community policing and community adjudication that of
interagency cooperation and collaboration, though in many ways it was not
possible to dismiss the impact of other aspects of community based justice,
community involvement and participation as a prime example.
3


The Challenge of Community Justice5
Criminal acts have been traditionally dealt with through two very
distinct processes: policing (as an executive function) and adjudication (as a
judicial function). In recent years, community approaches to the delivery of
government services have gained political saliency in a number of different
areas such as education (Gibson, 2000) and human services (Murphy,
1999). Criminal justice administration is no different, as law enforcement and
other justice agencies have, to varying degrees, engaged in working with
communities to address crime and justice issues. Community oriented
policing (COP) is founded on the idea that police establish effective working
relationships with the community that serve to play an important role in
reducing crime and promoting security (Moore, 1992; Skolnick and Bayley,
1986; Sparrow, Moore and Kennedy, 1990). For the last twenty-five years a
number of different strategies have been utilized by different departments to
at least partially implement community policing, including problem oriented
policing, team policing, and a variety of special community relations units
(Moore, 1992). More recent inquiry into community oriented policing
suggests, however, that community policing does not exist within a vacuum.
In order to be most effective, community policing cannot be viewed as a
technique, or simply an effort in community relations that masquerades
traditional, reactive policing strategies. It must exist as an organizational
belief structure for policy setting and management decision-making
(Trojanowicz, Kappeler, Gaines, and Bucqueroux, 1998).
One of the hallmarks of community policing is in its intended outcome.
While police effectiveness is traditionally evaluated according to quantifiable
4


outcomes such as arrest statistics, evaluation within community policing
agencies is more focused on citizen satisfaction and improvement in quality
of life (Hahn, 1998). One of these evaluation anchors include reductions in
crime, though this is no longer the exclusive focus. One of the most effective
methods for engaging in ongoing, collaborative efforts with the community is
to encourage decentralized organizational structures that work with, not (as
in some cases of traditional policing) against communities to achieve
common goals (Skolnick and Bayley, 1986). However, a greater focus in
community policing theory seems to be on changing the organizational
culture of policing, rather than an at least equal emphasis on methods to
encourage community partnership (Moore, 1992).
Although community oriented policing helps determine how offenders
are apprehended, community adjudication provides a mechanism for trying
and sentencing offenders within the context of the community. By contrast,
traditional court processes focus almost entirely on the offender, and often
neglect the role of the victim and community. Community adjudication
approaches have been described in a number of ways and exist in a number
of formats, but similarly to community policing, each is based on the idea that
to best address crime issues and solve livability problems, it is necessary for
government to partner with communities to repair harm.
These methods include restorative justice and the multitude of
community adjudication hybrids that exist, including community courts and
community prosecution efforts. Howard Zehr (1995) notes that crime is a
violation of people and relationships, and creates obligations to make things
right. He also asserts that justice involves the victim, offender, and
community in a search for solutions to promote repair and reconciliation.
Others view community adjudication differently, more as a process than a
philosophy (Cragg, 1992) not unlike the traditional court system. The general
5


purpose of such approaches is to repair the harm that was done and to take
steps to prevent it from occurring again with the community as a partner in
ensuring success. An important aspect of community adjudication is that the
victim, offender, and community all have equal status with the role of
government being removed from the focal point and serving a role of
facilitation more than anything else (Van Ness and Strong, 1997).
These similarities problem solving, prevention of harm, and
reparation of harm through community partnership, and improving livability
factors in neighborhoods are themes in both community policing and
community adjudication. These similarities form the foundation for this
research; that is, that each of community policing and community
adjudication are similar enough in purpose that it is a logical next step to
inquire into the relationship between the two, since the sustainability of
community justice may well involve a cooperative effort between police and
the courts.
Purpose and Scope
The overarching purpose of this research was to preliminarily
investigate whether community policing could be blended with community
adjudication, under what circumstances this relationship might be possible,
and whether there might be some policy or administrative benefits or,
alternatively, risks to a cooperative relationship between the two. This idea
was originally conceived because of a growing interest among scholars that
recognized that these two concepts community oriented policing and
community adjudication are not dissimilar in terms of theoretical foundation
6


and goal (Karp, 1998). Both seek, at some level, to bring communities into
partnership with criminal justice agencies through similar processes
(Bazemore, 2000; Greene, 2000; Karp and Clear, 2000). However, it seems
that at an operational level, community oriented policing and community
adjudication are worlds apart, and despite their common goals of community
partnership, rarely are they integrated into a system of community-based
criminal justice administration. This study seeks takes preliminary steps in
creating a new theory of community based criminal justice delivery by looking
at the relationship between community policing and community adjudication
in terms of how these agencies do and do not coordinate efforts and
cooperate with each other to achieve similar goals.
To accomplish this task, several steps were taken, the results and
interpretation of which are represented here. The first among these steps
was to become immersed in the theoretical and practical aspects of
community policing and community adjudication processes. Consistent with
this, Chapter 2 discusses the relevant literature that pertains to community
based policing and Chapter 3 explores the theory of community adjudication
in its many forms and the practical applications thereof.
Early in the research process, it became clear that the relationship is
one that is fundamentally based on the idea of interagency cooperation, or
the notion that two or more agencies seek to achieve together what they
cannot achieve singularly. With this theme in mind, the fourth chapter
discusses the contributions of a relatively small, but very important aspect of
public management that is concerned with how and why government
agencies may be encouraged to coordinate efforts even when there is no
formal mandate to do so. In public administration, the theoretical construct of
interagency cooperation comes closest to possibly explaining why or why not
community-oriented policing agencies cooperate and coordinate efforts with
7


community adjudication-type programs, even when both approaches operate
within the same jurisdiction. The framework of interagency cooperation has
not been often used to explain links between criminal justice administrative
approaches, and in fact, is more often used an explanatory lens for
transportation issues in large cities. In spite of this difference, the
fundamental premise of interagency cooperation theory remains a valuable
contribution to this study.
Having completed a thorough review of literature, the next step was to
identify those jurisdictions or geographic locations where both community
policing and community adjudication exist. In some cases, the literature
helped inform me of where these phenomena were occurring, in other cases,
I sought the expert help of scholars in this area of public administration.
Criteria were developed that allowed me to search a National Institute of
Justice database that categorizes attributes of community policing to ensure
that policing agencies collaborate to some extent with other government
agencies, in addition to some other criteria that are considered to be
hallmarks of community policing. Pairing the police agency with a court was
in some ways more difficult, because it involved consultation with experts,
reviews of literature, and direct contact with court officials to determine
whether a community adjudication program of some type existed in the
jurisdiction. In total, five locations within the United States were identified for
purposes of this study where both community policing and community
adjudication exist Those locations include: Portland, Oregon; Boulder,
Colorado; Woodbury, Minnesota; Santa Clara, California, and; the Navajo
Nation in New Mexico, Utah, and Arizona. Chapter 5 provides greater detail
as to how sites were selected for participation in this study.
Once viable research sites were identified, extensive field work
ensued which included the collection of qualitative data through a series of
8


site visits resulting in primary data collection and personal interviews, and
follow up phone conversations and electronic mail exchange. Where
possible, data were collected in person. Data collection efforts at each site
lasted a period of approximately seven to ten days total through a series of
in-depth open-ended interviews until saturation was reached the point
where no new meaningful data were being obtained. All of the data were
collected between October 2000 and August 2001.
In analyzing data, a modified grounded theory approach was used.
Analysis was aided with the use of N-Vivo", a non-numerical relational
database software program. Discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, this
method allowed for the fracturing of data and reassembly into a new theory
about how police agencies and court systems can cooperate within the
context of community.
Once data were collected, the next step was to view each of the five
research locations to discern the historical context of community justice in
each of these jurisdictions. Chapter 7 describes how each of these
community justice programs evolved and under what circumstances
interagency cooperation may occur between police and the courts. Chapter
6 discusses how interagency cooperation between organizations can be
recognized and evaluates each of the research sites according to three
continua thought to be indicative of interagency cooperation. Chapter 6
provides support for the explanatory framework of ecological co-evolution
can describe how criminal justice organizations may change as a result of
changing environments and prolonged exposure to one another. The result
is the theory of organizational co-evolution, or the idea that prolonged and
continual interaction between two or more organizations can result in
beneficial changes in the organizational structure, scope, and purpose of
each.
9


Once the organizational relationships were understood, I was able to
develop another theory as a result of this study. The notion of a dual-path
criminal justice system suggests that in many ways, police and courts have
worked together in a largely informal way to develop an alternative, yet
complimentary system of criminal justice administration. This theory is
discussed in detail in Chapter 8. Finally, Chapter 9 is elaborates on how the
personal relationships between organizational actors in the criminal justice
system are important to creating and supporting the dual-path system.
10


Notes
I have worked as line-level personnel in law enforcement in varying
capacities including communications, crime prevention, victims' assistance,
patrol, and investigations. Later I worked as a policy advisor to the Colorado
General Assembly in evaluating state crime and justice programs. Most
recently I have worked as a consultant and professor of criminal justice.
2 A great deal of the restorative justice literature notes that the
alienation of victims is the fundamental deficiency of the traditional justice
system. Howard Zehr, in Changing Lenses discusses this occurrence at
great length, noting that traditional justice systems, characterized by
retribution and its adversarial nature, discourage the victim from being
involved in any meaningful and impacting way. Further, Zehr finds that crime
victims suffer from feelings of shame and blame, partially due to how the
traditional system works, and partially because of personal loss for which
there is little compensation or recovery. Restorative justice theory expands
Zehr's initial work to include community with the realization that direct victims
are not the only people impacted by crime. Later works, such as Van Ness
and Heetderk-Strongs work, Restoring Justice expanded restorative theory
to include all of these stakeholder groups and to differentiate restorative
justice from the traditional retributive justice system by focusing on restoring
all of the people involved in the crime to their original position, or as close as
possible, before the criminal event.
3 Determining guilt, and the subsequent punishment, of offenders has in
recent years become the all-important focus of the justice system. The
recent advances of get tough policies on crime have done little but to
overcrowd prisons and clog the justice system to a point where capacity is
exceeded and the idea of a speedy trial has long been abandoned. Paul
Hahn (1998) has advanced the idea that the traditional justice system and
legislatures with all the get tough posturing has done little but mandate
lengthy prison sentences and extraordinarily harsh penalties without the
outcomes that were initially envisioned. He found that any positive effects
were negligible, and uses this as the foundation for his idea of a community
11


based justice system with the three pillars of community, police, and judicial
sentencing.
4 Of course, this evidence is also anecdotal, which is not to say that it is
without value. In talking with courts and police throughout the course of this
research, this idea was further enforced. Of course, there is a natural bias in
this conclusion: though I made concerted efforts to seek out people who do
not necessarily agree with the concept of community justice, most of the
people with whom I had contact were advocates of a community based
justice system on some level.
5 The term community justice is used here to denote all of the justice
activities that occur within the context and with the collaboration of
communities. This term is becoming widely accepted as the umbrella for
each of the separate theories of community policing, community adjudication,
community sanctioning, community court, and of course, restorative justice.
The term has been advocated by Todd Clear and David Karp in their
anthology, Community Justice (1999) and by Gordon Bazemore in his more
recent work, including an ongoing research project that surveys a variety of
successful community-based programs across the United States.
12


CHAPTER 2
COMMUNITY POLICING THEORY
Community policing tends to view effective crime fighting as a means
for allowing communities to flourish and work with the police in identifying
neighborhood norms and values. Community policing as an idea also seeks
to provide a venue to accomplish this partnership by working with and
directing police efforts. The emphasis is on making the police more effective
in dealing with neighborhood crime and livability issues to respond to the too
often cited criticisms of police as being ineffective, inefficient, and insensitive
(Greene, 2000). Community policing differs from the alternative viewpoint of
police as being autonomous units with only secondary sensitivity to
community desires because the first priority is seen as responding to criminal
events as they happen (Greene, 2000).1
Community policing is not a panacea to all that troubles police
agencies. In the last several years, it has been determined that in some
ways, particularly in regard to reducing crime, community policing has been
somewhat ineffective (Zhao and Thurman, 1997). In other ways, it has
generated a renewed interest in problem solving and participatory
democracy, which in itself is certainly valuable, but not without its own set of
obstacles and challenges particularly where implementation is involved.2
This chapter reviews the literature on surrounding community policing
theory with an emphasis on a few key areas that are of particular relevance
to this study:
13


> Defining community policing;
> Determining how and when agencies that use community-policing
philosophies coordinate with other justice system agencies;
> Examining certain management issues related to the administration of
community policing.
> Exploring the deficiencies and limitations of community policing.
To best understand community policing, it is important to first have a
clear view of the criticisms of traditional policing3 strategies.
Criticisms of Traditional Policing
Though it is certainly possible to go about the work of community
justice without community policing, community justice advocates are quick to
point out some of the deficiencies and failures of traditional policing models.
Even still, it is important to remain mindful that what is called traditional
policing here, also known as reform era and professional policing, is a
significant departure and improvement from the political era of policing that
was predominant prior to the Progressive movement in the United States
(Kelling and Moore, 1988). The criticisms of traditional policing are
presented here as a basis for comparison and to recognize the continual
evolution of policing strategies.
Critics of traditional policing are quick to note that it is based on a
retributive justice system that is reactive and narrowly focused on crimes that
have already occurred. It is far less oriented toward preventing crime, and
thus preventing harm, than it is reacting to it through the enforcement of
14


existing laws (Greene, 2000). Police have a tendency to believe that the
effectiveness of incapacitation and deterrence are reasonable responses to
crime, though a number of studies have demonstrated that these measures
have little effect on controlling crime problems and deviance. In short, at the
heart of what police do is immediately arrest and temporarily incarcerate
those suspected of committing crimes (Moore, 1992). Any other activities
are seen as social work, to be avoided if at all possible, because to engage
in non-crime fighting activities detracts from real police work (Hahn, 1998;
Kelling, 1999). In spite of this belief, researchers found that retributive,
traditional policing with an emphasis on patrol and criminal investigation were
ineffective in controlling crime to any great extent (Hahn, 1998; Greenwood,
Chaiken, and Petersilia, 1977).
Rules and policies are a cultural priority because the method of police
work is characterized by proscriptive policy with supreme accountability to
the law with police administration existing to create these directives and
statements (Trojanowicz, et al, 1998). These elaborate policies and
procedures are the equivalent of standing orders that define the parameters
of conduct for all officers. One of the most important jobs of line supervisors,
such as corporals and sergeants, then becomes to ensure that line-level
officers follow these rules (Moore, 1992).
Collaborative linkages with other agencies are poor and intermittent, if
they occur at all (Green, 2000). Beyond this, the relationship between the
police and other public agencies are often characterized by conflicting
priorities, because in a traditional environment, the highest response priority
is given to crimes of high value such as bank robberies and crimes that
involve violence as opposed to identifying the problems that trouble the
community most (Trojanowicz, et al, 1998).
15


Traditional policing models have attempted to measure success,
among other factors, according to measurable reductions of primarily eight
crimes4: murder, rape, robbery, assault burglary, larceny, arson, and auto
theft. While there is no debate that the reduction in the frequency of these
crimes is of great importance, to base a departments efficacy on these
crimes tends to ignore other types of crimes that have a tremendous impact
on both direct victims of crime and their communities (Sparrow, Moore, and
Kennedy, 1990). Traditionally, community interaction with the police is
limited to calls for service when a crime has either been committed or is
imminent (Buerger, 1998), which has had the effect of moving policing from
preventing the horrible things and behaviors that people do to one another to
simply enforcing existing laws with little regard for proactive prevention.
Defining Community Policing
Given these criticisms of traditional policing, community policing has
emerged as the most recent in a long string of reform efforts5, resulting in
what has come to be known as the era of community policing (e.g., Kelling
and Moore (1988) in their policing classification strata cited in Hahn, 1998)6.
In its most general form, community oriented policing (COP) is founded on
the idea that police should establish effective working relationships with the
community and others who can serve to play an important role in reducing
crime, identifying and solving problems, and promoting security (Moore 1992;
Skolnickand Bayley, 1988; Sparrow, Moore and Kennedy, 1990; Hahn,
1998; 74; Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1994). Consistent with this
objective, there are several interrelated goals and strategies:
16


> Replace the hierarchical, para-military organizational arrangement
with one that is more team-focused;
> Remove police officers from working as principally isolated agents of
the police organization and move them into teams consisting of other
law enforcement officers;
> Integrate these police teams into multi-disciplinary teams with
representation from other justice agencies, such as District Attorneys
Offices and Departments of Probation and Parole.
> Create mechanisms to encourage direct contact and collaboration with
community members (Hahn, 1998).
Some scholars suggest that this move to refocus policing on
community needs is a direct response to the policing reform measures that
were fast becoming viewed as inconsistent with basic democratic values of
American culture (Zhao and Thurman, 1997). Others suggest that
community policing has emerged as the law enforcement analogue to
creating more responsive, client-oriented, and quality driven government that
has become popular in recent years (Buerger, 1998).
There is not a single, unifying definition of community policing
(Trojanowicz, et al, 1998), though any number of policing agencies across
the United States proclaim that they are practicing it In contrast to traditional
policing, community policing is marked by efforts that call for the community
to work with the police to identify crime problems, and prevent criminal
episodes with the goal of negating the need for active calls to service in at
17


least some cases, primarily because criminal events were prevented from
occurring at all (Buerger, 1998). Beyond this, one of the more recent
advances in community policing is to work to restore the victim, family, and
community back to functioning at the level it was before the crime7 (Kelling,
1999). In this way, community policing is not glamorous of flamboyant.
Major criminal events that culminate in SWAT team maneuvers, car chases,
and other types of high profile activities are often covered by media;
community policing efforts such as education or activities for at-risk youth are
not. The long-term effects of each may well be equally dramatic, however
(Trojanowicz, etal, 1998).
Other hallmarks of community policing include a shifting of the focus
of policing from the enforcement of laws to proactive community building
through crime prevention efforts and a greater emphasis on order, fear of
crime, and quality of life and livability issues (Greene, 2000). Further, there
is a change in accountability from traditional policing values removes the total
focus on the letter of the law to one of being accountable to local, community
needs even to the extent that the community works with police to set the
crime policy agenda and evaluation of policing efforts (Trojanowicz, et al,
1998).
For the last twenty-five years a number of different strategies have
been utilized by different departments that have contributed to the evolution
of community policing, including problem orisnted policing, team policing,
and a variety of special community relations units (Moore, 1992), though
none of these approaches fully encompasses community policing
philosophies. More contemporary work in community oriented policing
suggests, however, that community policing does not exist within a vacuum.
In order to be most effective, community policing cannot be viewed as a
technique, or simply an effort in community relations that masquerades
18


traditional, reactive policing strategies. It must exist as an organizational
belief structure for policy setting and management decision-making
(Trojanowicz, et al, 1998). To accomplish this, policing agencies have, in the
last twenty years, begun moving toward a more community-based model of
justice (Rosenbaum, 1994; Moore, 1992; Bred and Erickson, 1998; Hahn
1998, Trojanowicz, et al 1998). Through the advent of community-oriented
policing strategies, law enforcement agencies are taking a more proactive
position in identifying potential crimes before they occur, prindpally through
collaborative efforts between police and communities (Aragon and Adams,
1997; Clairmont, 1991), though professional and collegial links with other
justice system agencies cannot be overlooked.
One of the most fundamental tenets of community policing is that it is
based on the philosophy that the police and the community work together to
solve problems, resulting in ties with the community that seek to eliminate the
them-versus-us" mentality that can characterize traditional reactive policing
policy (Bred and Erickson, 1998; Stojkavovic, Kalinich, and Klofas, 1998;
Wyckoff, 1988). These efforts have resulted in a rich body of literature and
research that describes the relationships between police departments and
members of the community when community-policing models are
implemented. Community polidng implementation can be manifested in
several different ways, including personnel assignments, organizational
structure, deployment approaches, operational strategies, patrol modes,
geographic boundaries and parameters, and not least of which, degree of
involvement with citizens and community groups (Gianakis and Davis, 1998).
Because defining community policing is an ambiguous endeavor at
best, it is helpful at this point to identify those markers of community policing
that were of particular interest and value to this study. Though more detail is
19


provided in Chapter 5, these are the generally accepted trademarks of the
community policing philosophy:
> Community policing, and community justice in general, refers to those
variants of crime prevention activities that include the community in
their processes and set the improvement of community quality of life
as a goal (Karp and Clear, 2000).
> At the foundation of community policing is an organizational and
procedural focus on problem solving through the strategic
incorporation of community involvement (Skolnick and Bayley, 1988;
Skogan, 1997).
> A primary goal of community policing is an increased emphasis on
addressing livability, or social disorder problems, such as
homelessness, prostitution, graffiti, and public drinking under the
theory that by addressing these relatively minor crimes, the more
serious offenses will not have an opportunity to flourish (Kelling and
< Wilson, 1982; Kelling and Coles, 1998; Karp and Clear, 2000).
> Line officers are not seen as being bureaucrats, but more as
knowledgeable people whose experience and education make them
specialists in problem solving (Karp and Clear, 2000).
> Evaluating effectiveness is more focused on citizen satisfaction of
police services and the determining whether solutions to problems
identified by citizens are found, and whether viable linkages between
communities and other justice agencies are made (Greene, 2000).
20


Less emphasis is on arrest rates, response time, and the number of
calls for service as indicators of success (Karp and Clear, 2000).
Evidence of the Successes of Community Policing
Examples of successful community policing efforts are abundant. In
one instance, Saad and Grincs (1993) study of community policing in
Hayward, California noted that officers felt the community had gained a
better understanding of the role of police, which in turn led to a more realistic
expectation of what police could actually accomplish. Officers became more
knowledgeable about the community and were more empathetic toward
neighborhood residents problems. Similarly, it was found that officers
assigned to New Yorks Community Police Officer Program (CPOP) had
changed their attitudes toward community residents. An important reason
this occurred was because officers were more exposed to the good people
of the community and they got to know neighborhood residents as individuals
and their interaction with citizens was not limited to crisis situations (McElroy,
Cosgrove, and Saad, 1993; Lurgio and Skogan, 1994).
New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani has supported a zero-tolerance
policy toward livability and quality of life offenses, to include public drinking,
illegal peddling, panhandling, prostitution, loitering, and even the most minor
acts of vandalism on the belief that these minor offenses eventually
contribute to more serious types of crime. Though it is clearly recognized
that there is a distinct qualitative difference between loitering and capital
murder, Giuliani believes that they are along the same continuum
(Harcourt,1999). This approach, though, is not without its criticisms, as some
21


have hypothesized that the zero-tolerance approach has resulted in
unwarranted discretion at the line level resulting in instances of police
brutality, particularly where the commission of minor crimes is concerned
(Lyons, 1999).
Relationships With Other Justice Agencies
Regardless of the face of community policing, as Lyons (1999) and
Green (2000) point out, those policing agencies that embrace the community
policing philosophy, in addition to forming partnerships with the community
and its citizens, also form coalitions and partnerships with other agencies
that seek to achieve similar overarching goals. Working with communities is
not the private purview of police; other government agencies also have a
legitimate interest in working with community members and groups, often for
similar reasons as the police. Therefore, it seems reasonable to expect that
police in a community policing environment will seek out and create
relationships with other government entities.
For purposes of this study, this aspect of community policing is
extremely important, for it is this ability to link with other justice organizations
that allows the objectives of community policing to operate in a
complementary way to other justice agencies namely courts, district
attorneys, and service organizations.8 This relationship between police and
other interested government-based justice agencies is a complex one. One
of the key elements of community policing is the ability to mobilize agencies
other than police in addressing community needs, but proper planning and
22


I
implementation may act as a barrier to forming these requisite relationships
(Gianakis and Davis, 1998).
Much has been written in studies about the relationship between
police and the community, which largely ignores another crucial question:
what of the relationship between police and other justice-service agencies?
One study by Maguire, Kuhns, Uchida, and Cox (1997) noted that 80 percent
of non-urban police agencies developed partnerships with other government
agencies to resolve crime problems. Though the literature is in agreement
that in order for community policing to be effective, affiliations with other
government agencies must be formed, the literature does little to address
how this relationship might look and operate.
There are some exceptions to this general observation, however. For
example, a study of a sample of North Carolina communities found that the
goals of community policing are not dissimilar from those of community
development planning, and in fact that the position descriptions between city
planners and police officers were strikingly similar. Police in two cities,
Asheville and Greensboro, were key in facilitating community revitalization by
engaging citizens in active planning roles both in terms of crime prevention
and community development efforts. Beyond rallying community efforts, the
police were also active in planning activities with the Community
Development Office because it was found that the police were in an excellent
position to dearly identify a full range of problems experienced by
neighborhood residents (Rohe, Adams, and Arcury, 2001).
In another dty, Portland, Oregon, the community policing philosophy
has been extended to responding to cases of domestic violence and abuse.
The Police Bureau, under the general direction of a 1990 policy decision to
refocus on community polidng philosophies, identified certain crime issues in
the dty, one of which was, and remains, domestic violence. Thus, the
i
23


I
Domestic Violence Reduction Unit, or DVRU, was formed. Slightly earlier, in
1989, the Multnomah District Attorneys Office worked with approximately
twenty-five other government offices, service agencies, and community
members to form the Family Violence Intervention Steering Committee. The
police bureau joined this team during the 1989 transition period to community
policing, and since then has worked with the multi-agency Domestic Violence
Intervention Steering Committee to address policing, prosecutorial, and
adjudicatory strategies to address domestic violence within the city (Jolin and
Moose, 1997).
Government agencies are not the only organizations interested in
assuring community safety. Thus in the view of some observers, coalition-
building should not be limited to loose organizations of community members
and justice agencies. As an example, police in Seattle, Kansas City, and
New York City have successfully linked with Community Development
Corporations (CDCs) to identify social problems and solutions such that real
estate development could occur (Geller, 1998). A key to forming these
relationships has involved releasing the traditional policing idea that
inappropriate and integrity risks are high when police collaborate with outside
agencies and organizations for problem solving. In addition, it is thought it is
important that all of the stakeholders to agree on problem solving strategies
and protocols and ground rules for participation in the reciprocal relationship.
It is also imperative that police are willing to shift roles and think outside the
box, though a Kansas City Police supervisor commented that this idea is
much like encouraging a cat to think outside the box (Geller, 1998).
24


Management and Organizational Structure Issues
The structure of contemporary police organizations is a remnant of the
reforms of the Progressive Era, beginning in the 1930s and climaxing in the
1950s, with paramilitary structure (primarily because it was thought this to be
the best way to manage large public organizations) and deliberate isolation
from citizens to prevent corrupt contact with citizens and conflicts of interest
(Lyons, 1999; Hahn, 1998). Though the intent of reducing corruption by such
tactics as continually rotating beat assignments, is certainly admirable, too
often the end result has been that a wedge was driven between the
community and police, a division further complicated by technological
advances such as patrol cars and radio communication (Bureau of Justice
Assistance, 1994; Stojkovic, Kalinich, and Klofas, 1998).
Police cars and radio communication are not the only changes to have
taken place in policing. David Bayley (1998) identified what he sees as being
the most significant changes in American policing over the course of the last
several decades, including:
> Police at all ranks are smarter, better informed, and intellectually more
sophisticated than ever before;
> Police executives are more ambitious than in previous years, with
each wanting to leave a legacy of their tenure;
> Evaluation of effectiveness and availability of information has become
increasingly important;
25


> Standards of police conduct have improved, and irrespective of media
reports of police brutality, police treat the public more fairly and
equitably than in past years;
> The work of police has become more intellectually demanding and
requires extensive specialized knowledge;
> Civilian review of police discipline has gradually become more
accepted and serves the purpose of validating the quality of police
performance.
Though Bayley was commenting on the evolution of policing over the
last thirty years, a period of time that coincides with Kelling and Moores Era
of Community Policing, Bayley does not attribute these improvements to the
advent of community policing alone, though the philosophies associated with
community policing have certainly bore some impact10 (Bayley, 1998).
With these changes in the policing environment, other changes must
also occur, and with community policing, the largest organizational change
involves decentralizing authority for the police organization in such a way that
two main goals are supported; (1) police officers have maximal discretion in
doing their work; and (2) that legitimacy for police no longer comes from a
centralized power structure alone, but also from the community through a
cooperative relationship with the community. As such, police departments
across the country have found themselves in a strange sort of paradox; if
traditional organizational structure is a hindrance to implementing community
policing, then those agencies that implemented community policing would
report a decentralization of the agency (Trojanowicz, et al, 1998).
26


However, this does not appear to be the case, in fact, most
departments that report implementing community policing also report that
they did little to change their pre-COP organization (Maguire, 1997), in spite
of advice that a decentralized command structure is an essential element of
community policing (Skolnick and Fyfe, 1995). Critics suggest that this
means that community policing has not been fully embraced by these
agencies (Trojanowicz, et al, 1998), though a simpler explanation might be
that the departments merely created an organizational hybrid that blended
together community policing philosophies with the centralized power
structures and hierarchies that many policing agencies are hesitant to
abandon. Even among those agencies that have successfully implemented
community policing, there is some evidence that the principles least likely to
have been implemented involve those that are related to organizational
change, specifically the evaluation process, expectations of line officers,
integration of the entire agency into community policing, and the
development of a department-wide strategy (Bred and Erickson, 1998).
Successful police reform may well rely upon innovative processes that can
adapt to change, and it has been theorized that one way to achieve this
would be to reduce administration and decentralize authority (Jones, 1998).
In a National Institute of Justice database that catalogs over ninety
attributes of community policing, only three focus on decentralizing the
organizational structure, and those are related to the decentralization of
specific work units (field services, investigations, crime analysis) and one
other addresses whether management is supportive of well-intended risk
taking by line level officers (National Institute of Justice, 1997), another
indicator of a decentralized management structure and an important facet of
community polidng (Bred and Erickson, 1998).
27


Line Officer Discretion
Organizational and managerial support of controlled risk taking brings
to light one of the most fundamental processes in community policing the
encouragement of increased line-level officer discretion (Bred and Erickson,
1998). Recent research has confirmed what many people working in law
enforcement and the criminal justice system have known for years that the
idea that police make arrest dedsions simply on the basis of whether a law
has been violated is not accurate, in spite of what police leaders had for a
generation led the public to believe was not necessarily reflective of practice
(Kelling 1999). Police agencies have, and continue to, encourage a great
deal of latitude in decision-making, a facet of traditional policing that can be
broadened and used at great utility for community policing approaches. At
the core of this idea of expanded police discretion11 is the role of the
Community Polidng Officer, or CPO. Known by other titles, such as
Neighborhood Liaison Officer (NLO), the CPO has been defined as a new
breed of line officer, one who works as a link between the department and
the people of the community; one who is freed from the constraints of the
patrol car; an officer who actively and continuously seeks partnership with
the law-abiding community to identify crime problems and craft unique and
creative solutions for change (Trojanowicz, et al, 1998). As Green (2000)
notes, the traditional roles of individual police officers become larger and
more complex, and there is a high level of discretion at the line level along
with higher degrees of accountability to the community and organizational
leaders.
28


In a similar vein, the police organization itself becomes more
decentralized at the same time building strong links to the community in
terms of policy setting and direction (Green, 2000; Trojanowicz, et al, 1998;
Lyons, 1999). Large departments, such as the New York Police Department
(NYPD) are experimenting with private-sector management techniques that
serve to build guidelines, rather than prescriptive rules, about officer behavior
and decision making, thus increasing line officer discretion while at the same
time encouraging accountability and control at the organizational level12
(Kelling, 1999).
Others have noted that there are benefits to encouraging line level
discretion. Sparrow, Moore, and Kennedy (1990) discuss their idea of street-
level innovation that would require that individual officers take advantage of
their discretion to be creative in inventing solutions to problems before them.
Also noted, however, is that most police innovations have been focused on
administrative matters that lead to what is believed to be effective control,
eliminating corruption, and seeking productivity gains, which has had the
effect of severely limiting opportunities for officers to act in ways that
maximize line officer discretion.
The Organizational Culture of Policing
Bred and Erickson (1998) found that three fundamental principles of
organizational culture exist that lay the groundwork for successful community
oriented policing. First, police departments must develop a department-wide
strategy to implement community oriented policing that includes participation
from all members of the agency. Though often echoed by other researchers
29


(Greene, 2000 as an example), this step is often neglected. Members of the
organization that are excluded from the planning processes are more likely to
perceive COP as simply another public relations program instituted by the
chief or other policing executive figure for political reasons or simply as a
nuisance. The second principle requires the integration of all divisions and
individuals into the COP process. Community oriented policing is not
manifested as a series of special units that work in isolation from the rest of
the department. Agencies that create specially defined work groups
dedicated solely to community policing typically also create hard feelings and
misunderstandings among other department personnel, especially those in
patrol.
The third principle involves providing training to all department
personnel regarding the philosophy, strategies, and duties associated with
community oriented policing. Community oriented strategies differ
fundamentally from traditional policing, and compel officers to look at the
profession of policing in a different way. Officers who do not understand
COP are resistant to change. Policing agencies have, in the last twenty
years, begun moving toward a more community-based model of justice
(Rosenbaum, 1994; Moore, 1992; Bred and Erickson, 1998). Through the
advent of community-oriented policing strategies, law enforcement agencies
are taking a more pro-active position in identifying potential crimes before
they occur, principally through collaborative efforts between police and
communities (Aragon and Adams, 1997; Clairmont, 1991).
However, to get to the organizational change necessary to fully
appreciate Bred and Ericksons principles, some changes in police culture
must be addressed. With traditional polidng, as with the professionalization
of law enforcement, certain values remain pervasive. One of these values is
particularly troubling from the standpoint of encouraging reform. Within the
30


culture of policing, aside from what the official policy might state, there is a
belief that police are the only real crime-fighters and that other agencies and
associations, to include community, are at best amateur and at worst, are
engaging in play. Similarly, the organizational culture and values of
traditional policing would suggest that members of the public are
unsupportive of police and only desire contact with police when they have
been victims of a crime or are involved in some other type of incident to
which the police may respond (Sparrow, Moore, and Kennedy, 1990).
Deficiencies in Community Policino Theory
Even given that the literature suggests reciprocal relationship between
the police and the community when community-based policing models are
implemented, there are major impediments to implementing community
oriented policing. Typically these barriers exist because of the nature of the
relationship between police and citizens, or because of the way the programs
are implemented. As an example of the latter, officers typically hear about
new programs when the programs are announced by high-level
administrators. The result is that officers feel that most of these initiatives are
adopted without their input or prior acceptance. These actions are
detrimental to encouraging agency-wide philosophical changes in policing
strategies (Trojanowicz, et al, 1998). Additionally, some researchers stress
that officers tend to be rather dubious of programs in which civilians played a
major role in the development or planning, and resent citizens being
consulted about internal police matters (Lurigio and Skogan, 1994).
However, a great deal of the community crime prevention literature clearly
31


calls for high levels of cooperation and communication between community
members and police, as well as between police and other government
service agencies (Trojanowicz, et al, 1998).
Community policing is not without its criticisms, however. The rhetoric
of community policing would seem to predict that by police agencies aligning
themselves with communities, legitimate crime problems can be more
proactively solved because a new basis for community norms, values, and
preferences will be established and enforced by the police. However, a
significant problem emerges, in that legitimate crime prevention efforts can
be undermined by the difficulties associated with finding a community with
whom the police may align. Buerger (1998) notes that these types of
community organizations are difficult to form and in most cases only consist
of a small minority of the entire population of a community. So the question
then becomes one of who, or what, constitutes community? There are
identifiable differences between targets of community groups that are
respectable, those that are marginally respectable (such as owners of adult
entertainment establishments), and those among the community who entirely
lack respectability, the criminal population. Given this level of disparity, it is
essential to resolve this imprecision in defining community before engaging
in meaningful community policing efforts (Buerger, 1998).
This particular issue is also addressed in a wider sense by noting that
unequal distributions of political power can lead to the stigmatization of some
groups, while benefiting others (Schneider and Ingram, 1997). Because of
this inequitable power distribution, some groups interests are more clearly
represented in the policy agenda. Specifically pertaining to this issue, while
criminals are clearly often members of the community, they would not,
according to Schneider and Ingram, likely be deserving of political power and
the benefits that would be associated with more a more positive social
32


construction. Advantaged populations are more likely to get their issues on
policy agendas because of the reciprocal relationship with government
officials who by virtue of aligning themselves, benefit from the appearance of
enlightenment (Schneider and Ingram, 1997). This is but one explanation for
why police may be more likely to align themselves with select members of a
community, as well as providing an explanation for police officers views of
citizens in general. This is consistent with Aragon and Adamss (1997)
observation that traditional policing tends to view citizens as being
untrustworthy, and thus difficult to form collaborative relationships.
This gap between the community with whom the police are most
likely to have ongoing contact and the real community has been identified
by several scholars. For example, Fielding (1995) argues that the
neighborhood people with whom police agencies work are actually
associations that lay some particular claim or interest to crime issues.
Therefore, to give particular attention to these associations violates the factor
of inclusiveness that is more realistically featured in community ties.
Therefore, the risk of further marginalizing the weaker members of a
community runs high, and the police, despite their best intentions, actually
may be catering to the needs of an exclusive class simply because these are
the voices that are heard when it comes time to set the law enforcement
agenda. Even when police agencies actively solicit and encourage
participation from community members who are part of this marginalized
class, such as renters (as opposed to homeowners), people who live in low-
income areas, and individuals who reside in high-crime areas, the work of
partnering with community leaders has been described as difficult, time
consuming, and resource-draining (Grinc, 1998).
Another key barrier to community policing lies within the restructuring
of the relationship between police and community in general. In traditional
33


policing scenarios, there is a great deal of distrust between police and
citizens. Therein lies the paradox of community policing there are benefits
to the implementation of such models that by their nature require a
cooperative effort between the police and community, yet the distrust
between what are often perceived as being diametrically opposed groups
prohibits the type of collaboration that is necessary for community based
policing to flourish. This problem acts as one, though not necessarily the
only, barrier to effective implementation of such programs. It should be
noted, though, that a number of studies have indicated that community
policing strategies have the potential to effect changes in officers attitudes
toward citizens, which aids in mending the chasm between police and
community (Wyckoff, 1988; Gianakis and Davis, 1998; Bred and Erickson,
1998, as examples).
Problems of Evaluation and the
Measurement of Success
Critics of community policing claim that the evidence of the
effectiveness of community polidng is anecdotal and scarce, and what does
exist is by some standards inconclusive and is conceptually confusing in
theory and practice (Wyckoff, 1991; Gianakis and Davis, 1997). Others have
noted that community policing lacks a single, standard definition
(Trojanowicz, et al, 1998; Gianakis and Davis, 1997, Fielding, 1995) thereby
making it inordinately difficult to establish whether in fact community polidng
exists within organizations at all. To complicate matters, apart from some
positive anecdotes about the efficacy of community policing, we really don't
34


have any evidence that it works at all because the evaluation of community
policing does not fit into those standards that are based upon measurable
program outputs.
For decades, the efficacy of police agencies has been measured in
terms such as the number of arrests for Part One crimes as cataloged and
tracked by Uniform Crime Report statistics, the number of calls for service
received, and the number of cases cleared by arrest or exception (Alpert and
Moore, 1993; Maguire and Uchida, 2000). Because these performance
measures are focused on the traditional policing values of crime fighting, the
problem of performance evaluation of community policing agencies becomes
apparent simply stated, justice professionals have struggled for nearly a
decade to identify and compile the markers that indicate success in
community policing.
For some, community policing is described as a necessary evil in the
multitude of governmental circumlocations to disguise police coercion in a
costume of community involvement and participation (Klockars, 1991),
though opinions as this seem to be the minority. More often, critics of
community policing find it to be either ineffective or neutral in terms. I would
suggest that when the traditional performance measures of reductions in
crime, cases cleared, and similar measures are used then these statements
may well hold some truth. However, the fundamental tenet of community
policing is to change the police organization and role of the law enforcement
official. Therefore, to measure the performance of the community policing
organization by the standards of traditional policing runs the risk of using the
wrong unit of analysis for evaluation. Recognizing this, community policing
scholars have developed alternate methods of evaluation (Maguire and
Uchida, 2000) including:
35


> Survey measures of fear reductions in neighborhoods and
communities;
> Use of public places (measures of volume in places such as libraries,
meeting halls, and churches, synagogues, and other places of
worship;
> The number and nature of linkages between police and the
community;
> Use of satisfaction surveys among community members at large and
those who interacted with the police agency in some capacity (Green,
2000; Maguire and Uchida, 2000).
Community policing is not an either-or' proposition: to engage in
community policing methods does not necessarily require an abandonment
of traditional policing values. The police, after all, are still and always will be,
the police (Kelling, 1999). One thing we do know for certain is that
community policing is generally viewed as a positive activity by the people it
is designed to serve, which in and of itself is certainly of some value.
On the question of where community policing will go from here, ideas
are as elusive as finding a consistent definition of what constitutes
community policing in the first place. The bottom line on community policing
is that the term community policing means very different things to different
people and agencies. In some cases, community policing is viewed as
instituting foot and/or bicycle patrols, or programmatic changes such as the
implementation of Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE) and
Neighborhood Watch, or even the designation of a specific office for
36


community policing. (Maguire, Kuhns, Uchida, and Cox, 1997). Yet others
believe that community policing involves addressing specific livability issues
related to blight and social demise (Kelling and Cole, 1996).
The broad definition of community policing used for this study is
focused on the idea that first and foremost, community policing requires (1)
forming partnerships with community members and constituent groups, (2)
necessitates a restructuring of the organization with a focus on
decentralization and providing enhanced line officer discretion, and (3)
requires the creation of formal and informal relationships with other
government agencies with similar missions and goals. The next chapter
explores community-based adjudication to describe and explain by
comparison how these fundamental tenets of community policing are not
entirely dissimilar from those of community adjudication.
37


Notes
This is not to imply that police are wholly unconcerned with the effect
of crime on victims and communities. It is highly improbable that any police
officer or agency would make the statement that the needs of crime victims
are unimportant. However, this is to make the assertion that the traditional
role of the police was, and in many cases still is, to respond to crime through
an enforcement of current laws that in most cases results in the
apprehension of the wrong-doer. Simply, put, it was not viewed as being the
responsibility of the police to attend to the needs of victims and communities,
regardless of how important those needs may be or the empathy felt by
individual officers and agencies. It is suggested here, additionally, that the
adversarial nature of the criminal justice system, including prosecution and
sentencing, further served to alienate victims. With this in mind, however, it
is ill-advised and illogical to place the blame on police entirely for what many
community justice theorists see as the principal shortcoming of the traditional
justice system.
2 One of those challenges is that tough police officers see community
policing as being soft on crime, a perspective that according to Kelling
(1999) has prevented many departments from attempting to get police rank
and file to embrace community policing philosophies. Community policing is
viewed as being proactive and preventative, a stark contradiction to passive
and reactive crime fighting that requires patrol officers, in a marked and
powerful patrol car, to receive a call for service, attend to the matter as
quickly as possible so that the officer can return to service to deal with
another incident. It is very much akin to putting out fires rather than
stopping them from happening in the first place.
3 The term traditional policing* is used here to describe what Kelling ,
and Moore defined as the Reform Era of Policing. Origins of the Reform Era
are closely linked replacing the Political Era of policing that dates from the
early 1840s to the early 20th century. The Political Era is so named because
of the close, often inappropriate, ties between police and politics. The
Political Era was marked by severe corruption in police departments across
many municipalities across the United States. Reform Policing, also called
Professional Policing, was a reaction to the abuses of the Political Era, and
focused on strict para-military hierarchical structures, clear delineations of
38


position and duty, and the institutionalization of such policies that prohibit
graft and the implementation of severe penalties for misconduct to include
termination and criminal prosecution (Hahn; 1998).
4 These eight crimes constituted Part I of the Uniform Crime Report
(UCR) which has recently given way to a new national database tracking
system called NIBERS. In spite of the change in name, the eight crimes that
most departments use to evaluate their performance remain the same.
5 This statement regarding police reforms is not intended to be
confused with the Reform Era as noted by Kelling and Moore. It is used
more to describe change and evolution in policing, and should not be
construed to imply that community policing is in effect an extension of the
Reform Era.
6 The Era of Community Policing is the third of three eras of policing
identified by Kelling and Moore. Also known as community empowerment
policing and problem solving policing, it is marked by a concerted effort to
form relationships and partnerships by police agencies with communities to
identify and address specific crime issues and quality of life factors (Hahn,
1998)
The Community Policing Era, according to Hahn (1998) began in the early
1980's and peaked by about 1988. However, others have traced community
policing to as early as 1969 (Zhao and Thurman, 1997).
7 As a side note, the goal of restoring community, victims, and families
after a criminal event is highly consistent with the goals of restorative justice,
and in fact it appears to be an example of where the restorative justice
literature is beginning to blend with existing community policing theories.
8 This concept, police agencies and other interested government
agencies is more fully explored in Chapter 4 which explores how the idea of
interagency coordination is an appropriate public administration conceptual
framework for explaining how and why police and adjudicatory agencies may
relate to one another.
9 Portland, Oregon is one of the five sites visited for this study. During
the course of data collection interviews, it was found that the Police Bureau s
39


participation on the District Attorneys Domestic Violence Steering Committee
was, and remains, unmandated by any form of policy.
10 Bayley continues to note that he finds that he is not convinced that the
strategic changes called for by community policing theory have been
widespread, nor is he convinced that these new changes are new in any
respect. This writing further suggests that research on policing has either
been ineffective and largely ignored by police agencies themselves, or
worse, the alternative that inaccurate research has had dramatic effects on
policy, leading him to the conclusion that the link between policy and
research is, indeed, very weak.
11 Or at least the recognition by the public that police discretion not only
exists, but can be used in beneficial ways. An underlying current of
community policing is one of improving the capacity for trust between police
and communities. It is suggested here that one way to do this is to
encourage controlled, justifiable discretion by officers.
12 An example of a private-sector technique being used in police
agencies is an interactive control mechanism, COMPSTAT. First described
by Robert Simon at the Harvard Business School, COMPSTAT combines
management, supervisory, and peer control into a process that focuses the
midlevel manager (such as a Lieutenant) around specific law enforcement
problems at the smallest organizational level, usually a precinct).


CHAPTER 3
COMMUNITY ADJUDICATION THEORY
The question of how best to manage criminal defendants once they
are apprehended is a question policymakers have addressed in the United
States for over two centuries. The methods and approaches have
changed over the decades in accordance with public perceptions and
political ideologies. One new trend for the early 21st century seems to be
a loose collection of models generally termed here community
adjudication1. Included among these strategies are restorative justice, so
termed because it seeks to return or restore the victim and community to
their state prior to the criminal event. Other community adjudication
approaches include community prosecution, community court, and
community sanctioning strategies, each of which operate within some
context of community, and to varying degrees are based upon restorative
principles and directly involve victims and community members.
A common thread, though, is that in each of these models and
approaches, ongoing and meaningful community participation is central.
Advocates of community adjudication ask that communities think of
punishment in a more holistic and pragmatic way that includes stopping
the practice of punishment and engaging in something totally different
(Doyle, 1995). Accomplishing this goal, however, can be a rather lofty
ideal considering the number of conditions that must be met in order to
fulfill the requirements of community adjudication. These conditions
include ongoing community support and participation, changes in the role
41


of government, and, at least theoretically, the active involvement of the
offender in the reparative process (Van Ness and Strong, 1997; Cragg,
1992; Hahn, 1998; Umbreit, 1994).
This chapter reviews the literature on community adjudication theory.
An emphasis is placed on areas of particular relevance to this study
including:
> The theoretical and practical difficulties associated with defining
community adjudication;
> A discussion of how and when community adjudication programs
form cooperative relationships with other government agencies;
> The transformation of the role of the court when community
adjudication processes are implemented;
> An exploration of the deficiencies and limitations of community
adjudication.
Similar to the discussion in Chapter 2 on the criticisms of traditional
policing, to best understand the rise of community adjudication, it is
imperative to first discuss what many feel is wrong with traditional court
processes and punishment.
Criticisms of Traditional Adjudication Processes
The criminal justice system in the United States has been called the
most inegalitarian structure in our society, in spite of all its good intentions
in codifying procedure and holding sacred the Constitution (Delgado,
42


2000). Attempts at reforming adjudication processes and penal law have
resulted in greater uniformity and predictability in sentencing, but at the
cost of longer prison terms and a proliferation of mandatory and repeat
offender offenses, as well as unprecedented growth in prison populations
(Kadish, 1999).
The manner by which criminal events are currently dealt with is
based on a system of retribution and vengeance, and it has been argued
that we have failed disastrously (Kadish, 1999; Delgado, 2000; Dubber,
1999a; Dubber 1999b; Doyle, 1995). This is not to suggest that we have
not, in our history, tried other approaches to managing criminal episodes
that have occurred and prevent recidivism. Early in American history,
circa 1790, punishment became less brutal and was replaced with the
penitentiary model advanced by Quakers in Philadelphia as a response to
the cruelty of punishment. Quakers believed that criminals were the
product of a bad moral environment, and with time for contemplation and
penitence (thus penitentiary), the idea of saving offenders from
dehumanizing punishment and the opportunity for rehabilitation became
prevalent.
As time went on, it was determined that isolation and contemplation
did little to alleviate, deter, or solve criminal activity and victimization, and
subsequent attempts at reformation went parading by, including hard
work, discipline and training, and eventually medical and psychological
treatment, each with disappointing results (Van Ness and Strong, 1997).
Since the mid 1970s, policymakers have concluded that nothing works
and that rehabilitation is an impossible goal, the pursuit of which is
ineffective and wasteful (Martinson, 1974; Skolnick, 1994; Dubber,
1999a). Since that time, penal policy has focused more on determinations
of guilt and lengthy prison sentences that serve to reduce the emphasis on
43


rehabilitation and refocus greater energy and resources toward
incapacitation (Van Ness and Strong, 1997; Kadish, 1999; Shichor, 1997).
Given this background, there are at least two prominent criticisms
of the traditional, adversarial court process that relate to this study. First,
victims of crimes often experience extreme frustration with the court
process, and it is noted among the restorative justice and community
adjudication literature that there is a need to heal victims through some
process other than protracted and adversarial court processes (Davis,
Lurigio, and Skogan, 1997). Second, the retributive justice system
through the highly punitive conventions of the last thirty years have done
little to hold offenders accountable for their crimes and provide them with
more acceptable and alternative behaviors to prevent further victimization
(Van Ness and Strong, 1997). By examining each of these criticisms, the
deficiencies of the traditional justice system become clearer.
In criminal law, crime is defined as being an offense against the
state, where the state is defined as the victim rather than the individual
upon whom the crime was perpetrated. As a result, victims are
consistently left out of the process and their needs and wishes are often
disregarded (Zehr, 1995). Overtime, victims have become an invisible
and often forgotten part of the criminal justice system (Evans, 1998). By
1996, though, this trend began to reverse itself and a total of more than
30,000 statutes at the municipal, state and federal level provide basic
victim rights and services (Seymour, 1996). The advent and use of victim
impact statements, court ordered restitution, and the implementation of
victim compensation funds are certainly part of this trend, but the role of
the victim as an active participant remains largely unchanged (Whitely
1998). Overall, there is little or no acknowledgement of the impact that the
crime had on the victim because ours is fundamentally an offender-state
44


centered system. Victims roles in criminal proceedings have been
described as that of a backup a compelling witness waiting in the wings
as a threat in the event plea-bargaining breaks down (Kelly and Erez,
1997). Though there are some changes to the ability of the courts to
safeguard and protect victims (largely brought about by dissatisfaction
with the courts to help victims of crime), the rights of the accused are
tantamount to any rights afforded to those who are victimized2 (Kaukinen
and Colavecchia, 1999). Generally speaking, participants in the justice
system often feel dissatisfied with the outcome of the adjudicated claim
and frustrated by the process itself (Bonsignore, Katsh, d'Errico, Pipkin,
Arons, and Rifkin, 1998).
In some cases, the effects of get-tough* crime laws also adversely
affect the victim, a good example being sex offender legislation that is
nearly always oriented toward stranger crime, though most sex crimes are
actually committed by family members or acquaintances of the victim
(Simon 1999). Indications are that this relationship between the state and
offender that largely ignores the victim, may prove to have extraordinarily
negative impacts, both psychologically and financially on the direct victim
and family members (Resick and Nishith, 1997).
Punishment in a Retributive World
Punishment, particularly in the last thirty years, has focused on
repressive and punitive sanctions allegedly designed to punish and
incapacitate criminals (Van Ness and Strong, 1997). In part, this is
because of failures of policy designed to rehabilitate offenders, followed
45


closely by the policy directive that nothing works (Martinson,1974;
Gibbons, 1999)3. As a result, punishments have become increasingly
harsh and punitive, and what many scholars consider draconian
legislation, three-strikes laws as an example, become pervasive among
state legislatures (Gibbons, 1999). Such laws are designed with the intent
to wage war on crime and to answer public demand to get tough on
crime, particularly in those cases involving violent or repeat offenders.
Such laws have actually achieved little more than crowding prisons,
sentencing less serious offenders, and have led to what Shichor (1997)
refers to as a widespread McDonaldization of United States sentencing
policy4.
As a frequently cited example of the failure of such laws, consider
the so-called war on drugs. Intended to eradicate large-scale dealing
and trafficking activities, the end result of these laws was that by 1997
sixty percent of all federal prisoners were incarcerated for drug-related
offenses. Much of this activity did not arise from large-scale drug activity,
but from ordinary street crimes (Kadish, 1999)5. The language used to
describe these new trends in drug sentencing policy is not unlike the
language used in three-strikes legislation justification.
The new trend in penology and sentencing is characterized by talk
of probability and risk of criminal episodes and after the fact remedies
(Hahn, 1998), rather than prevention and new objectives and techniques
that concentrate on offenders as an aggregate group rather than as
individuals committing crimes against other individuals (Shichor, 1997).
These trends have tended to coincide with a movement that is largely
political in nature. Often fueled by grassroots campaigns of concerned
citizens, frequently after highly publicized criminal events, politicians back
46


citizens in an attempt to outdo their opponents in the tough-on-crime
competition.
This, according to some (Dubber, 1999a as an example), has led to
an unnecessary and irrational proportion of sentencing statutes that
require courts to incarcerate defendants with little room for judicial
discretion. This focus on retributive justice has had little effect on
improving the overall outcomes of the criminal justice system relative to
reductions in episodes of crime. It also has failed to result in the justice
system building trust among citizens, neighborhoods, and communities
(Van Ness and Strong, 1997).
Defining Community Adjudication
Defining community adjudication is at least as difficult as defining
community policing. According to some community justice advocates,
practitioners, and theorists, it defies definition, and is based more upon
principles and ideas than a program or model (Pranis, n.d.). For purposes
of this study, the restorative justice literature is viewed as the starting point
for understanding the principles of community adjudication, though not all
of the community adjudication approaches use each of the principles to
the fullest extent.
Common definitions of restorative justice are focused on four
fundamental tenets. First, ideally the community adjudication concept
represents a paradigmatic shift from retributive, punishment-oriented
correctional models toward methods that restore peace, compensate
victims, and focus on solutions identified by the community itself thereby
47


restoring the emotional and material losses of victims and communities
(Bazemore, 2000; Bazemore and Schiff, 1996; Galaway and Hudson,
1990; Zehr, 1995; Umbreit, 1997). Second, decision-making within
restorative justice is redistributed to victims (when victims are integrated
into the model)6 and the community through more active involvement in
the justice process. Third, offenders are held directly accountable for their
acts against the people and communities they have violated and in the
process healing for the offender is encouraged. And fourth, the role of
government is significantly changed from that of primary victim to
facilitator in the reparative process7 (Van Ness and Strong, 1997; Umbreit,
1997; Benzvy-Miller and Schacter, 2000).
As alluded to in the criticisms of the traditional retributive approach,
restorative justice also requires that crime be viewed as something more
substantial than law breaking or an offense against government (Van
Ness and Strong, 1997). As Zehr (1995) points out, crime is a violation of
relationships and people, even to the extent that it is a manifestation of a
ruptured relationship between the victim and offender, even when the two
individuals had no prior relationship a relationship that is almost always
necessarily hostile. Therefore, the paradigmatic shift that is discussed
really moves the focus from crimes as behaviors and offenses against the
state to problems between individuals, and it is on this level that crime is
most appropriately dealt. Restorative theorists have not agreed upon how
to facilitate this goal, though they are generally divided across two fronts.
The first group focuses their attention on the empowerment of the victim
as the individual who has suffered the most damage, and who is therefore
central to the model (Zehr 1995; Pranis, 1997 as examples). The second
group envisions an equal distribution of interests and power among the
victim, community, and offender; and seeks a balance of the needs of
48


these three parties (Bazemore, 1998; Van Ness and Strong, 1997; Hahn,
1998; Bazemore and Umbreit, 1994).
Types of Community Adjudication Processes
To varying extents, the four foundations of community adjudication
hold true for all of the types of community adjudication processes
considered in this study. In many ways, they can be seen as hierarchical
according to the number and extent that each of the four foundations are
applied. At the top of this hierarchy is restorative justice, which seeks to
fully and completely satisfy to the greatest extent possible each of the four
fundamental cornerstones of restorative justice. Lower down on the
hierarchy, but based on the principles of restorative justice, follow
community sanctioning, community courts, and community prosecution.
Not all of the approaches to community adjudication use all of the
four principles, and some emphasize certain interests over others. Pure
restorative justice views victim, offender, and community as being on
equal ground, each individual or group having legitimate interests. Victim
Offender Mediation (VOM) is focused more on mediating the differences
and interests of the victim and offender exclusively (Umbreit 1994).
Community sanctioning, community sentencing, and community
prosecution focus more on the interests of neighborhoods relative to how
offenders should be prosecuted and sentenced (Holder, 2000; Coles and
Kelling, 1999; Ritter and Motika, 1999; Weinstein, 1998). What really ties
each of these ideas together is how government agencies work with
communities and in some cases, with each other. The following sections
49


detail those community adjudication approaches and strategies
encountered during this study, and how each of the approaches can
integrate communities and neighborhoods into decision-making. It is by
no means intended to be exhaustive of all the ways restorative and
community justice are manifested, but purely illustrative and indicative of
the types of community adjudication encountered in this study.
Community Prosecution and
Community Sanctioning8
Perhaps one of the best examples among the community
adjudication literature regarding the integral involvement of communities
into the justice system is community prosecution and sanctioning
strategies. Barbara Boland (1998) defines community prosecution as
more than anything a local political response to grass-roots public safety
concerns of neighborhoods as expressed by those who live in the
neighborhoods9. Often community prosecution strategies emerge when
citizens fear for their personal safety and have a general sense that the
criminal justice system fails to adequately respond to concerns about
livability and quality of life issues such as vandalism, prostitution, graffiti,
code enforcement, and public nuisance abatement (Ritter and Motika,
1999). Citizen participation often takes the form of neighborhood groups
and community associations who work with the prosecutors office and
courts to identify specific crime problems and concerns (Boland, 1998).
Often, certain prosecutors are designated as neighborhood prosecutors
who work directly with citizens in identifying the crime agenda and
50


formulating policies to guide the governments response to crime and
livability issues (Holder, 2000; Boland, 1998).
However, as community policing looks and feels different for every
agency that has implemented it, so to with community prosecution.
According to the United States Department of Justice, community
prosecution requires that prosecutors be proactive in law enforcement, no
matter how small or large, and that they should seek to establish
partnerships with the community and law enforcement to this end (Holder,
2000). George Kelling and Katherine Coles comment that they see
community prosecution as a natural outgrowth of community policing and
is in many ways the next step to dismantling the old criminal justice
paradigm that is more concentrated on processing cases than preventing
crime. As such, prosecutors are redefining their traditional mission of
effective processing of cases to one that is more focused on the
prevention of crime (Kelling and Coles, 1999).
To this end, community prosecution has been described as being
the partner to community policing (Weinstein, 1998). As police form
partnerships with communities to identify and solve crime problems, so do
community prosecution strategies, most often addressing less serious
crimes such as prostitution, that threaten the livability of neighborhoods
(Weinstein, 1998).
51


Family Group Conferencing (FGC1 and
Community Conferencing
Conferencing has its roots in New Zealand10 and Australia. Though
there are differences in strategy, the core idea remains the same: to
divert offenders from court and keep them out of institutions, incorporate
reintegrate shaming11, and convene impacted participants to include the
victim(s), victim supporters, offender(s) and supporters, and interested
community members (Tittle, 2000; Braithwaite, 1994; Braithwaite, 1993;
Braithwaite, 1989). Conferences are generally facilitated by one of three
parties an agency outside the governmental structure, such as a non-
profit organization (Braithwaite, 1994), a representative of the police
department (Umbreit and Pranis, 1996; Morris and Maxwell, 1998), or a
court official (Bazemore, 2000).
FCC and community conferencing are similar in many ways to
victim-offender mediation efforts, but include a wider group of participants
(Van Ness and Strong, 1997), though the participants are limited to those
entitled to attend (Morris and Maxwell, 1998). Because of these attributes
that serve to involve government, community, victim, and offender, the
conferencing/ reconciliation movement is the most consistent with
restorative justice, whereas in victim offender mediation, the focus in on
victims and offenders to the exclusion of neighborhoods.
Van Ness and Strong (1997) recommend that restorative justice as
a form of community adjudication builds on the strengths of community
and the government together, though they do not differentiate between
which branches and agencies of government are involved (see also Zehr
52


and Mika, 1997). This is key to expanding the role of both community and
government.
Circle Sentencing and Peacemaking
In the United States, circle sentencing seems to occur less
frequently than other forms of community adjudication, and there is some
evidence that they are ineffective in many jurisdictions, primarily because
of the time required to complete the sentencing circle process; they are
also complicated to facilitate. And while they truly encompass the
restorative philosophies, circles tend to open the mediation effort to
anyone who is willing to attend, whether directly affected by the criminal
episode or not. As such, though they were experimented with widely in
western states because of the Native American influence and in north
central states (Canadian aboriginal influences) circle sentencing as a
preferred method is waning (Nancy McCreight, MA, personal
communication June 2001). Circle sentencing generally takes its form
from certain key elements of talking circle traditions. Anyone interested in
the crime is able to attend and participate, and each person takes turns
talking, usually through the passing of a sacred or other type of object that
also passes the power to speak; without the object, participants are
expected to remain silent. The goals of sentencing circles are aligned with
other community justice approaches (Ulrich, 1999). However, among
those decisions rendered by community adjudication processes, the
method that is tested in the courts is related to sentencing circles because
of the tendency of the circles to recommend sanctions that are
53


inconsistent with existing law (State of Minnesota v Signe Elissee
Pearson)'2.
Peacemaking refers specifically to the community adjudication
approach in the Navajo Nation, and in fundamental ways is very akin to
circle sentencing. Each participant in a Navajo Peacemaker process is
entitled to speak for as long as he or she wishes and emotional
contributions are as important as fact-based assertions (Ulrich, 1999).
Community values are central to this process, and an agreement must be
consistent with these values while at the same time be acceptable to the
participants (Yazzie, 1994).
Building the Relationship Between
Adjudication and Police
Similar to the community oriented policing literature, community
adjudication literature acknowledges that communities should have an
active, participatory role in determining criminal sentencing (Van Ness,
1990; Van Ness and Strong, 1997; Bazemore, 2000, Zehr, 1995; Umbreit,
1994, Ulrich, 1999). Among the benefits of community-government
partnerships are increased accessibility of justice services to all citizens,
increased flexibility of service delivery, and the encouragement of
informality in decision making processes (Bazemore and Griffiths, 1996;
Van Ness and Strong, 1997; Umbreit, 1994).
In the literature it is also common to note the coterminous and
symbiotic relationship between formal and informal community systems
(Bazemore and Griffiths, 1996). It has been found that small-scale,
54


community specific models have provided the most promise of being
successful (Bazemore and Griffiths, 1996; La Prarie, 1999). However, the
specificity and size of the programs is important to consider. It is essential
that each of these programs be exceptionally well oriented toward
particular community needs and norms.
For example, sentencing circles have proven very effective among
aboriginal Canadian peoples, as well as among Native Americans of the
Southwest (La Prarie, 1998; La Prarie, 1999; Bazemore and Griffiths,
1998; Ulrich, 1999). However, this particular method would not likely be
well received in Vermont, where Community Reparative Boards composed
of local citizens make decisions regarding the sentencing of non-violent
offenders (Bazemore and Griffiths, 1996). More recent efforts in
community adjudication bring courts, prosecution units, and defense
teams to local neighborhoods (Bazemore and Griffiths, 1996; Hahn, 1998;
Clear and Karp, 1998; Boland, 1998). In general, the model used is
specific to the cultural context within which it arises.
Of course, a key in making community justice work is to involve
communities in decision making, which is more easily said than done. In
line with this, Kay Pranis (n.d.) strongly suggests that it is shortsighted,
and undermines community justice, to discount community ownership and
support. In some cases, community justice has almost exclusively existed
with only community support. An example of this is the Takoma Coalition
in Washington D.C. where neighbors, without government intervention,
successfully identified severe livability issues including prostitution and
drug trafficking, and developed a non-violent approach to relocating
offenders out of the neighborhoods (Goldsmith-Hirsch, 1998) without the
use of government resources.
55


In the view of some advocates, restorative justice should not start
at the top and trickle down to the community, but should grow from the
opposite direction, and should further be reflective of the community it is
intended to benefit. The process should also consist of participants from
throughout the political spectrum and be representative of all points within
(Pranis, n.d.). It is grounded in the democratic process; that is, decision
making is devolved, citizens are interested and empowered to act in
concert with government, and community involvement is emphasized in
order to maintain participation, recruit new participants, and offer a
significant, important role for community in exchange for this heightened
level of participation (Karp and Clear, 2000).
Specific strategies include building community support and capacity
across all levels of stakeholders, from grassroots community groups up
through and including the government structure. That support may come
from any variety of places churches, civic groups, college and high-
school classes, or directly from policy makers (Pranis, n.d.). Secondary
strategies include creating links between people with common interests
such as neighborhood organizations and associations. Once these links
are made, it is essential for governments to be prepared to provide the
technical support to develop and deliver services consistent with
community requirements (Pranis, n.d.).
56


Relationships with Other Agencies
Interested In Reducing Crime
In promoting justice, government has the important role of being
responsible for preserving order, which extends beyond promoting public
safety (Van Ness and Strong, 1997). With this in mind, it is also important
that courts and other justice professionals are expected to play a low key
role in most approaches, but particularly with conferencing strategies
(Moms and Maxwell, 1998). Conferences and other methods are
intended to be flexible and responsive to all involved, and therefore it is
essential that government always understand and accept their roles, even
when it means selectively relinquishing control of the outcome when
appropriate (Morris and Maxwell, 1998).
Karp and Clear (2000) identify a community justice framework that
goes significantly beyond responding to criminal events as they occur as
in the traditional system. They note that crime should be viewed in the
context of social conditions that place individuals at risk for a multitude of
social problems, including drug use, prostitution, unemployment, and
school failure, and therefore requires responses that are preventive and
outside the normal scope of the criminal justice system (Karp and Clear,
2000). One way to approach this is through seeking out and developing
connective links with other government agencies that specialize in these
areas (Karp and Clear, 2000). One way to achieve this goal is to
decentralize the criminal justice system, which can be achieved in a
number of different ways. For example, in addition to reporting to
supervisors, who in turn report to higher level supervisors as in a
57


traditional hierarchical structure, some agencies have experimented with
staff reporting to citizen groups in addition to the traditional hierarchy
(Karp and Clear, 2000).
Deficiencies in Community Adjudication Theory
As with community policing, there can be problems in establishing
the necessary partnerships and implementing community adjudication
programs. There are a number of concerns regarding the widespread
implementation of community adjudication processes, most of which are
speculative because even well established programs have been in place
less than a decade. The truth is, we dont know what might happen with
any of these models. Concerns about these programs run the gamut from
fears that the efforts and practices may be ineffective in that there may be
no benefit to victims of crime or the crime rate in the long run (Braithwaite,
1999) ; or worse, to fear that it serves to further victimize victims (Delgado,
2000) . Concerns have also been expressed that issues of multi-
culturalism and pluralism will serve to complicate the communication
process that is essential to any of the community adjudication processes
(Office of Justice Programs, 2000; Umbreitand Coates, 1998).
While it is impractical to discuss in detail all of the potential
problems that may arise with community adjudication, two are of
significant concern to this study. First is the issue of whether participants,
who are presumably representative of the community, are able to set
aside their own feelings and perceptions and act on behalf of the
community. If participants are unable to accurately reflect community
58


norms, preferences, and values, the risk of compromising key components
of community adjudication is exacerbated. The second concern is that
community adjudication processes can extend police power, compromise
the separation of powers13, and result in inconsistent and arbitrary
responses to criminal events.
The first concern considered here is that of participants are not
being truly representative of the community due to self-selection into the
process (Hahn, 1998). A similar challenge is establishing sufficient
community-government linkages that secure the increased levels of
community involvement necessary for the efforts to be successful. In
some cases, this could mean encouraging communities to determine what
services are needed or desired (Van Ness, 1990). Some communities
may simply be unwilling to accept responsibility for allowing offenders to
participate in a reparative process due to some inherent risks to the
community14. It should also be noted though that when communities are
presented with full sets of options and alternatives, their choices tend to
be toward those methods that encourage restoration and rehabilitation
(Umbreit, 1994; Van Ness and Strong, 1997).
One approach to overcoming these barriers is to increase
community education, as it has been noted that education is very
influential in creating a sufficient amount of support (Van Ness and Strong,
1997; Umbreit, 1994; Goldsmith-Hirsch, 1998; Boland, 1998; Pranis,
1997). Community attitudes toward crime unquestionably drive
responses, including the degree to which communities participate in
adjudication and sanctioning. Not surprisingly, Americans in general tend
to fear crime, are exasperated and have lost confidence in the criminal
justice system, and are aware of the way attributes of offenders have
changed (Pranis, n.d.). As such, it is imperative to generate a more
59


educated and aware polis (Evers, 1998). An interesting phenomenon in
the community adjudication literature is the number of references that
suggest that when citizens are presented with a full array of alternatives
that address responses to crime and criminality, most support methods
that are dually focused on punishment as well as rehabilitation and
reparation (Cragg, 1992; Van Ness and Strong, 1997; Umbreit, 1994;
Hahn, 1998 as examples). But this again is complicated by the idea that
the people who are most actively involved in community adjudication are
representative of neighborhoods who by their very nature have less to fear
and have a greater level of engagement with their government
(Braithwaite, 1999; Bennett, 1998; Goldsmith-Hirsch, 1998; Chavis, 1998).
All of these circumstances, while damaging on their own, can
contribute to a loss of vision. Programs can become preoccupied with
maintaining fiscal and structural capacity such that they no longer have
sight of the underlying values and principles of restorative justice (Umbreit,
1994). Worse, some theorists note that by building a restorative system
on the coattails of the retributive system, the same as it is intended to
supplant, may become nothing more than a way of perpetuating existing
power structures of the traditional system through an eventual reflection in
policy (Tracy, 1998).
Excessive and Unaccountable Police Power
Some critics of community adjudication theory (such as Sandor
(1993) and White (1994)) have particular concern with strategies that are
facilitated by the police, which is becoming increasingly common in the
60


I
United States, Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom (Braithwaite,
1999). To this end, an early report about the experiences of the
Woodbury, Minnesota Police Departments efforts in restorative justice
notes that the officers facilitating the mediations act, and for all intents and
purposes are, prosecutors (Umbreit and Fercello, 1997). A concern to
critics of this method is the idea that police, as the gatekeepers to the
community adjudication process slam the door on restorative justice
because of abusive and indiscriminate police practices that limit the
participation of any of the concerned parties (Braithwaite, 1999).
One issue that cannot be overlooked is that of whether community
adjudication is appropriate for all crimes. One of the leading proponents
of restorative justice, Mark Umbreit (1997), has commented that there are
certain types of serious crime for which community adjudication may be
inappropriate particularly sexual and domestic abuse cases (Evers,
1998).
Conclusion on Community Adjudication
Given the multitudinous forms and models of community
adjudication, each with a different emphasis depending on the needs and
wishes of the community, it seems reasonable to look toward a flexible
framework that would allow courts, police, and other interested agencies
to work together to satisfy the desires of the community provided that
doing so is both feasible and realistic. While police and courts have not
traditionally made a concerted effort to coordinate efforts, given that there
are similarities between the goals of community policing and community
61


I
adjudication opportunities exist for coordination to occur. The next
chapter examines the concept of interagency cooperation why it may
occur and what it looks like when it does. Also documented are the
purported benefits of encouraging government justice agencies to work
together in very informal ways to establish links to one another, to better
provide the level of service that communities are coming to expect and
demand.
!
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Notes
The term community adjudication is not one widely encountered in
existing literature. Its use in this study is a strategic one that is related to
the original scope and intent of this research that at least initially
differentiates between enforcement and judicial activities. Originally, it
was planned to investigate the links between community policing and
restorative justice. However, during the literature review and some
preliminary fieldwork, it was soon discovered that there were significant
limitations to looking only at restorative justice as a theoretical construct.
Most significantly, looking at restorative justice singularly caused some
conceptual and practical difficulties for the research. First, restorative
justice in and of itself unnecessarily limits the number and type of
programs that exist which seek to adjudicate offenders within the context
of community simply stated, to look only at restorative justice processes
largely ignored an entire compliment of community based programs that
were later determined to be complimentary and meaningful to the study.
Second, and on a more practical level, it was found that finding research
sites where both community policing and restorative justice programs
existed sufficient to provide some level of generalizability proved daunting.
Therefore, to ensure that this study remained rich in resources and
perspectives, the original notion of viewing restorative justice singularly
with community policing was abandoned for the more fruitful community
adjudication.
2 This is not to imply that the needs and interests of victims of crime
should supercede the rights of offenders and suspects of crime, lest in our
zeal we lose sight of the Constitution. However, I believe that the authors
contention is that the needs and interests of victims should be on equal
grounding with the accused.
3 Howard Zehr as an early proponent of restorative justice as a way
to, at least in some ways, address what are perceived to be the
deficiencies in retributive justice, also commented that the popular idea of
nothing works is not entirely accurate. In Changing Lenses. Zehr notes
that while attempts at reform have resulted in some very unexpected
consequences, it is important to bear in mind that justice system reform
63


has been used for purposes much different that what were originally
conceived a more humane response to corporal and capital punishment.
4 Shicor notes that McDonaldization" of public policy is based on a
scientific, positivist approach to public policy and management that is
proscriptive and follows the ideas of Max Weber.
5 Street drug use, distribution, and trafficking are excellent examples
of the types of livability and quality of life issues that are often confronted
under community policing approaches (see Chapter 2). The high
incidence of small-time drug offenders crowding prisons at the federal
level may be further evidence that community policing strategies may be
key in effecting change in the overall administration of the justice system.
6 Not all community adjudication models incorporate the role of the
victim. Restorative justice, the ideal approach to community justice, is
based on the idea that victims, offenders, and community negotiate an
agreement from a position of equality, at least insofar as the reparative
process is concerned. By contrast, community courts, community
prosecution, and community sanctioning boards often times do not involve
the victim in the adjudication process.
7 Some have opined that the concept of restoration should not be
limited to just the criminal justice system, but should be extended to
government in general. Benzvy-Miller and Schacter (2000) note that by
the time the justice system is called upon, it is often reacting to failed or
inadequate policies in other areas such as health care, social welfare,
housing, and others. They argue that to take a more proactive and
community based approach to government in general would also serve to
prevent crimes from occurring.
8 I define community prosecution as being different from restorative
justice for the principle reason that frequently, direct victims of the crime
are not involved in the decision making process that seeks to hold the
offender accountable for the offense. However, others, such as Ritter and
Motika (1999) and Weinstein (1998) see community prosecution as being
founded on, and a hybrid of restorative justice. Some of the goals remain
essentially the same: the court system partnering on some level with
communities to identify crime problems, to hold offenders accountable for
their actions in creative and meaningful ways, and to work with
64


prosecutors to change the role of government to some extend insofar as
the criminal justice system is concerned.
9 Susan Weinstein (1998) echoes this definition, and in addition
notes that it fundamentally involves law enforcement that involves both
traditional and non-traditional approaches.
10 It is in New Zealand, based on Maori tribal principles, that the term
family group conferencing emerged (Braithwaite 1994). It is a way to
address what were perceived to be failures of the traditional court system,
particularly where juveniles are concerned, an emphasize the role of
family and community as related to deviant behavior. Family group
conferencing was legislated in 1989 and is now the norm for processing all
juvenile cases in New Zealand (Umbreit and Zehr, 1999).
1 Reintigrative shaming requires an understanding of the relationship
between crime and social control and argues that the shaming of criminal
acts as inappropriate and unacceptable behaviors is central. It is
important to recognize that it is the behavior that is shamed, and not the
person who engaged in the behavior. Doing so ensures that it is possible
to reintegrate deviant offenders back into the community once redress and
apology is made. Some argue that those cultures and societies that focus
on reintegrative shaming as the primary method of justice delivery (as
compared to retribution-oriented punishment) experience lower rates of
crime, thereby encouraging the offender to restructure social ties, whereas
stigmatization and social rejection only serve to encourage continued
criminal behavior.
2 The issue of law in this case was whether the district court was in
error in staying adjudication of the charges against Pearson. After several
sentencing circle meetings, the circle recommended the stay of
adjudication and that Pearson be required to pay restitution, obtain credit
counseling, perform volunteer work, and participate in follow-up circles.
The circles convened without the participation of the prosecution, who
appealed on the grounds that the circles returned a decision, supported by
the District Court, that was inconsistent with existing state law. The
Appellate Court agreed, noting that the sentencing circle had no authority
65


to assign a stay of adjudication as a sanction for a felony and reversed
and remanded, State of Minnesota v. Pearson, 609 N. W. 2d 630 (2000).
According to Doug Johnson, the county attorney for Washington County,
Minnesota and the prosecutor for this case, the Defendant has appealed
to the Supreme Court for the State of Minnesota. The case has been
heard, but no decision has yet been rendered (as of August 1,2001). Mr.
Johnson noted that in those cases where sentencing circles are used as
an alternative to traditional prosecution and adjudication where charges
have been formally filed, there is an uncomfortable tendency to create
recommendations that are inconsistent with state law (Personal
communication, June 2001).
13 The issue of separation of powers is discussed in greater detail in
Chapter 4, Interagency Cooperation, and therefore is only mentioned
here.
To successfully reintegrate the offender into the community
necessarily requires placing the wrong-doer in direct contact with the
community, and sometimes, the victim. Restorative justice programs
frequently attempt to control by placing limits upon the types of reparative
efforts in which offenders may participate.
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CHAPTER 4
INTERAGENCY COOPERATION
Interagency cooperation has been defined as an unmandated effort by
at least two agencies to coordinate their activities to achieve that which
cannot be achieved individually (Thomas, 1997). It should not be confused
with interagency committees because of one key difference: Interagency
committees, differently from true interagency cooperation, are managed and
imposed by management from the top-down but provide little more than the
appearance of coordination. In other words, interagency committees are
imposed by a management structure, and therefore are mandated, and
therefore fail to achieve the key differentiating effect of voluntary
participation. As Harold Seidman and Robert Gilmour noted, Interagency
committees are the crabgrass in the garden of government institutions.
Nobody wants them, but everybody has 'em (Thomas, 1997). As an
example, police and court organizations tend to centralize decision-making to
the top of the organizational structure, even in those circumstances where
there are efforts to coordinate with one another (Stojkovic, Kalinich, and
Klofas, 1998; Neubauer, 1994). Any authority that drifts away from the
centralized structure is seen as being negative and representative of a loss
of control, and therefore inefficient (Stojkovic, Kalinich, and Klofas, 1998;
Moose and Jolin, 1994)1.
The crabgrass movement is the model that seems to be most often
applied in government settings, and is usually seen as an alternative to strict
policy regulation (Lambright, 1997). As envisioned by Lambright,
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interagency committees are formed by top-level management as a result of
common interests and the need to attain certain goals.2 As popular as formal
interagency committees are, there are alternatives that are explored on a
less frequent basis. One of those ideas is that of interagency cooperation.
There is not an over-abundance of accounts of true interagency
cooperation3, though what we do know looks promising, and if widely
accepted would fundamentally change the way we think of bureaucratic
institutions. Published studies on interagency cooperation tend to focus on
public transit and transportation, with only a few references to criminal justice
administration4. Interestingly, though it was not planned, the two principal
interagency cooperation studies are in part based on findings in the Bay Area
and South Bay Area of Northern California (Chisholm, 1987) and in the
Minneapolis-St. Paul Area in Minnesota (Bendor, 1985). In discussing the
Bay Area Transit system, Chisholm (1989) notes that the system itself, which
crosses jurisdictional lines and boundaries, has no legal standing as an
organization as it has no board of directors, no employees, and no ability to
levy taxes. However, what makes the system work is what he calls a
shadowy, elusive system of informal channels, behavioral norms, and
agreements (p. 97). This study was originally, and remains, at least
partially based on the idea that it is this elusive and shadowy element of
government that makes community justice work in the manner that it does.
Working from a similar idea5, Bendor (1985) makes a compelling
argument for governmental redundancy, an idea that is antithetical to
everything many people have come to believe about how public agencies
should operate a government option that is based on what he terms
parallel systems which, on the face, smacks of inefficiency, inequity, and
back alley decision making to the detriment of citizens, communities, and of
course, taxpayers. For those organizations well steeped in the traditional
68


public administration and organizational theory writings of Weber (1938),
Simon (1946), Taylor (1912), Barnard (1938), and others, the idea of
encouraging, to any extent, redundancy in government, is almost laughable,
and is certainly uncomfortable.
Through an examination of the value of each informal and formal
organizational and policy arrangements based principally on the findings of
Chisholms and Bender's work, the framework by which individuals from
different organizations are able to lay claim to identical or similar policy
decisions becomes more evident. This idea is what pulls together the efforts
of policing and adjudication within the context of community.
Formal and Informal Relationships
Communication in a classical Weberian organization, particularly in
law enforcement agencies and other paramilitary types of organizations,
tends to occur according to a strict chain-of-command model. In 1922, Max
Weber noted that hierarchy and authority require a system of supervisor-
subordinate relationships where directions float from the top of the
organizational structure down which is the basis for establishing legitimacy.
A problem with the classical bureaucratic model is that the division of labor
advocated by Weber and Taylor causes problems for the executive because
they may lack the expertise required to make fully informed decisions, while
at the same time causes problems for the staff and personnel because while
they have the expertise to solve problems and make decisions, they lack the
formal authority to do so. Ultimately, it is the executive who makes the final
69


choice the individual with the least expertise, but the most authority
(Bendor, 1985).
Another criticism of formal processes in government organizations is
that they tend to be time consuming with inconclusive results. Therefore,
Chisholm (1989) proposes that true coordination is sometimes obtained only
by going outside the formal process. Formal routines can take on a life of
their own and convert from instrumental devices to valuable organizational
entities resulting in goal displacement and creating a gap between formal
authority to make a decision and the capacity to make the decision
(Chisholm, 1989). Informal agreements and coalitions have a tendency to
protect individuals and sub-groups against the intrusion of formal
organization. Roethlisberger and Dickson (1975) found this to be true in the
Hawthorne studies in1939 at the Western Electric Company in Chicago, thus
the formation of the human relations school of management with Elton Mayo
(1960). Robert Merton (1985) similarly connected the existence of the
informal organization to failures of the official political structure to achieve its
intended goals and noted that personal relationships can substitute for
structurally required relationships, resulting in a subversion of the latter.
Communication
Citing Chester Barnards 1938 The Functions of the Executive.
Chisholm finds that informal organizations provide mechanisms for effective
communication within the organization, thereby improving the ability of formal
organizations to be part of an effective system for cooperation and
coordination6. Informal agreements, beyond providing effective coordination,
70


also tend to be flexible and adaptive as unforeseen circumstances arise,
certainly more so than where an environment that is not supportive of
informal networks and channels exists (Chisholm, 1989). Perhaps more
important is that strict reliance on formal channels does not encourage the
transfer and sharing of reliable information, and in many cases may work
against this goal.
Additionally, formal communication can tend to be cumbersome, and
in the case of downward communication, it tends to be overused, is often
unclear and ambiguous, and sends a strong message to line-level personnel
that they are inferior to higher level executives (Stojkovic, Kalinich, and
Klofas, 1998) which can damage moral and relationships within the
organization. Chisholm argues that informal channels, by their nature and
foundation on reciprocity and mutual trust provide a substantially adequate
mechanism to effectively deal with the problems associated with the formal
channels of communication.7 He further notes that informal lines of
communication work more quickly than do formal lines that are time
consuming because of procedural constraints and ambiguity about who is
responsible for problem solving. In fact, one of the principle reasons informal
mechanisms develop is because the formal system is too slow to be useful (p
65).
In response, Chisholm proposes that informal channels of communication
are developed for four primary reasons: 1
1. The formal channel could and would work, but is too sluggish.
2. The formal channel is completely blocked by a variety of factors,
such as organizational politics or the person designated as the
decision-maker, who is working at a pace too slow for an effective
decision.
71


3. Formal channels do not exist in a form appropriate to the problem
for which a solution is sought. This is an inevitable occurrence, but
one that cannot be predicted.
4. Anomaly is always a problem. The formal channel and the people
working within it have no prior experience with the situation,
leading to an organization that wings if rather than seeks out
information from those with expertise.
These problems can lead to jurisdictional fragmentation, in turn leading to
inefficient use of resources, lost opportunities, and useless conflict. The
cause is faulty organization, characterized by competing interests, lack of
connectivity and coordination, and rivalry (Chisholm, 1989). Further, when
information is not exchanged in at all, particularly in an informal way, work
and information would be distributed slowly with a high number of
transactions, and certain tasks would not get done at all (Chisholm, 1989).
Chisholm proposes that the best way to solve this problem is to
encourage on an organizational level that individuals follow the norm of
reciprocity. This would suggest two minimal requirements: First, people
should help those who have helped them. Second, people should not injure
those who have helped them. It is Chisholms contention that people in
organizations pay attention to this norm and that the importance of
obligations incurred, especially those in regard to maintaining informal
relationships is adhered to. For example, a police officer may forward
information to a parole officer over lunch about a clients conduct with the
hope and expectation that the parole officer will reciprocate (Stojkovic,
Kalinich, and Klofas, 1998). In this way, the exchange of information helps
both parties achieve their legitimate interests and contributes a justice
system that is more efficient and effective through a sense of trust and the
72


promotion of a cooperative attitude (Cole, 1983). Therefore, individuals
should be encouraged to seek relationships and resources outside of the
confines of the agency itself to find better ways to solve problems.
Interestingly, this is a common principle goal between community policing
and community adjudication, a similarity that comes to bear when trying to
explain how and why these agencies, seemingly working within the same
system, can become fragmented and separated from each other.
Problem-Solvino and Decision Making
Additional to greater ease in the facilitation of communication, informal
organizational features can develop in order to compensate for failures
resulting from maladaptation to the formal system it is a more efficient way
of dealing with anomalous problems that the system was not designed to
handle (Chisholm, 1989). Further, if problems of interdependence can be
dealt with individually and as they arise, consistency becomes less of an
issue. Informal channels are best described as links between pairs of
individual people, though it can also occur between groups of people with
similar characteristics as the network expands (Chisholm, 1989), an
observation that makes it entirely possible for interagency cooperation to
occur on several levels ranging from healthy working relationships between
people across organizational boundaries to those relationships within the
organization itself. Bendors (1985) work in advocating redundancy also
finds that that interdependency between people and groups serves to
exponentially increase the capacity for productivity and reliability.
73


I
I
In terms of decision-making, Chisholm (1989) found that it is important
to establish mechanisms for decision making that are continuous, stable, and
long-lasting. Effective coordination always depends, to some extent, on
developing informal norms and values through group and individual
interactions, even when such actions are entirely social8. Personal loyalties
to personnel from other organizations develop over long periods of time
because of the nature of the close working relationship. These
characteristics tend to strengthen the cohesion between the organizations.
They also promote the development of normative standards and in some
ways alters the informal structures of each organization (Chisholm, 1989).
Apart from the reciprocal relationships between individuals, Chisholm
(1989) also finds that open systems encourage the discovery of linkages
between an organization and its environment making external forces that
affect an organization's behavior the same factors that describe
interdependence. Therefore, just as living creatures seek to explore their
environments, even when a certain amount of risk exists, so do
organizations. In Chisholm's view, eventually organizations and the people
within them become interdependent upon one another. As such, he
proposes two basic premises of interdependence: First organizations are not
autonomous entities, and second, the organization cannot be analyzed as a
closed-system, and that in sense, there is no such thing as a closed system.
According to Chisholm, the most common definition of interdependence is
that it occurs naturally when a variety of forces beyond the control of the
organizations immediately involved come together to cause them to become
connected. Artificial interdependence occurs as a result of deliberate efforts
of some outside party to link organizations for the same purposes as its own
even when there are few if any similar interests.
i
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Encouraging Coordination Between
Police and Adjudication Agencies
One problem that public agencies have faced in efforts in interagency
coordination and cooperation is that cooperation is forced from the top down.
Thomas notes that this is fairly consistent with traditional public
administration theories (Thomas, 1997). Efforts at community policing that
have failed are also implemented from the top down, and just as top-down
approaches in community policing are often viewed as symbolic, so are
efforts in interagency cooperation seen as struggles for political control rather
than a means to coordinate activities for common gain and benefit (Thomas,
1997).
Decision Making
There has been a limited amount informal experimentation with
interagency cooperation among criminal justice agencies, most notably in the
area of livability issues in the United States. However, generally these
accounts do not seem to tie the efforts of law enforcement agencies together
with the endeavors of court systems, either within or outside the context of
community justice. Further, an interesting occurrence is that the findings
stemming from these experiments seldom find a way to the more mainstream
scholarly literature. Instead, these efforts are documented by line-level staff
or managers within the agencies themselves in such publications as The FBI
Law Enforcement Bulletin and Corrections Today.
75


As an example, Neighborhood Service Teams in Gariand, Texas are
comprised of a variety of municipal agencies and work in partnership with
citizens. Consistent with Thomass definition of interagency cooperation,
coordination between agencies is encouraged, but is not required, among
some fifteen agencies including police and fire departments. The
Neighborhood Service Teams are primarily charged with tackling livability
issues such as overt prostitution, zoning violations, and other factors leading
to neighborhood deterioration (Barber, 1996).
In a similar way, livability issues in Virginia Beach, Virginia were
addressed through an interagency effort. However, interagency coordination
did not occur until after community policing strategies succeeded in
managing the criminal elements contributing to the deterioration of a
neighborhood. In this way, while interagency coordination occurred in such a
way that the efforts of the community policing units were integral to triggering
the interagency coordination, the cooperative effort itself did not involve law
enforcement (Smith, 1993). One explanation for this occurrence may be that
criminal justice agencies tend to not have clearly developed goals, and
frequently the various agencies, including police, courts, probation, and
corrections, do not communicate with one another (Myers, 1994).
Where interagency cooperation among justice agencies is limited if
not virtually non-existent in the United States, Great Britain and Australia
have been more successful. In Australia, interagency cooperation (or,
amalgamation) is encouraged on the basis that to do so improves the
efficiency and effectiveness of government service delivery and more closely
aligns policy objectives with managerial approaches (Craswell and Davis,
1994). Over that past decade, emerging contemporary thought has posited
that the most effective delivery of crime prevention emphasizes the
cooperation of state agencies with communities at the local level. Thomas
76
i


(1997) suggests that this idea was largely initiated by Geoffrey Pearson
(1983), who theorized that two dominant perspectives exist within the
literature. The first approach, benevolent approaches to interagency
coordination, assumes unproblematic consensus among the acting agencies
and that multi-agency cooperation is perceived as intrinsically good. In
contrast, the conspiracy approach emphasizes the coercive nature of certain
of the acting agencies, thus making interagency cooperation inherently bad
(Sampson, et al, 1989). In later years, scholars challenged this framework
as false and misleading because Pearson's focus on whether interagency
cooperation was good or bad failed to account for all factors that may
influence whether interagency cooperative efforts are implemented. Some of
these factors include interactive exchanges between state agencies, local
agencies, and communities, economic circumstances, the level of complexity
in terms of organizational structure among those agencies attempting to
coordinate their efforts, and the use and diffusion of power (Crawford and
Jones, 1995).
Recognizing Interagency Cooperation
With all of this in mind, it seems that in addition to the basic premises
of the norm of reciprocity, communication, and changes in decision making
with respect to interagency cooperation, there emerges a more precise way
of evaluating whether interagency cooperation occurs that helps to identify to
what extent interagency cooperation is occurring between two or more
agencies.
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It is proposed here that there are actually three component parts of
interagency cooperation. The first component is that of association, which
suggests a tacit understanding between organizations, but the actors do not
actively pursue the relationship. In other words, though the relationship
exists that permits cooperation to occur, the relationship is not necessarily an
active one. For example, agencies may cooperate with one another in the
sense that they do not impose barriers or impediments upon one another,
though they are neither required nor do they engage in continual and
ongoing participatory forms of cooperation. Association, therefore, does not
prohibit cooperation, nor does it fully satisfy the requirements of Thomas
(1997) definition that suggests greater activity between agencies.
Characteristics of association may include:
> Participation on interdisciplinary teams;
> Lines of communication that do not impede the efforts of other
organizations;
> Unintended duplication of services
The second component of interagency cooperation, collaboration, is
defined here as being a more active form of engagement that relies upon the
prolonged and continual interaction between agencies and individuals.
Collaboration may take the form of interagency committees, though would
not necessarily be not limited to this form. For purposes of Chisholms and
Bendors definition, collaboration would entail the active deployment of the
norm of reciprocity. Characteristics of collaboration include:
> Joint facilitation of community adjudication efforts;
> Coterminous informal policy practices;
78


> Interagency efforts to solve problems in service delivery.
Communication is the third component of interagency cooperation,
and was discussed at relative great length in an earlier section of this
chapter. Characteristics of communication include:
> Concerted efforts toward maintaining continual communication;
> Communication occurs on both formal and informal basis;
> Evidence of trust between organizations;
> Frequent informal contact between and within organizations;
> Evidence of the norm of reciprocity.
These are the criteria used in this study to determine if in fact
interagency cooperation occurs, and to what extent within each of the
jurisdictions included in this study engage in mutually beneficial efforts.
Additionally, it would seem that interagency cooperation cannot be
considered a binomial variable; that is, it either exists or it does not. Rather,
there are varying degrees of cooperation as there are varying degrees of
each of these criteria, association, collaboration, and communication that
ultimately provide the basis for recognizing interagency cooperation and
evaluating whether interagency cooperation has any effect on linking
community policing to community adjudication.
79


Notes
Stojkovic, Kalinich, and Klofas (1998) in describing the effects of
drifting authority by stating that organizations that experience diminished
centralized authority suffer from much leakage of formal authority into the
informal ranks among officers. It is likely that the Chisholm (1987), Thomas
(1997), Bendor (1985), and others would likely disagree with the negative
terms used by the authors here.
2 Lambright cites the case of the Committee on Environment and
Natural Resources which was comprised by top level managers from the
National Science Foundation, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
during the Bush Administration in 1985. While Seidel would argue that the
interagency committee model is not optimal, this seems to be one example of
a successful effort.
3 This would make sense if Thomas definition is applied; using the
unmandated effort idea which suggests that that the interaction between
groups is more informal. Because the literature that discusses, examines,
and documents interagency cooperation is sparse, this does not necessarily
imply that the occurrence of interagency cooperation is also sparse.
4 An example of an exception is the case of the multi-jurisdictional effort
relative to domestic violence that brought together the police, courts,
prosecutors, service agencies, and communities in Portland, Oregon as
noted in Chapter 3.
5 The book, Parallel Systems, is Bendors doctoral dissertation. It is no
surprise that the book is similar in idea to Chisholms interagency
cooperation, as Chisholm worked with Bendor in the completion of his
dissertation work.
6 For purposes of this discussion, there is an important distinction
between the concepts of organization and system. Organization refers to
a single entity, which may or may not have component parts while system
refers to a complex, interrelated structure that is comprised of a multitude of
organizations, or as Chisholm (1987) notes, system implies an
80


interrelatedness of parts such that each can only be comprehended in terms
of the others (p 5).
7 While some may have concerns that an informal communication
structure may lend itself to gossip and the transference of inaccurate or
inappropriate information, Stojkovic, Kalinich, and Klofas (1989) note that
these issues tend to arise when information from the top of the organizational
hierarchy is ambiguous and insufficient to allow line level staff and personnel
to make well-informed decisions, meaning that the more negative attributes
of informal communication are a natural by-product of inadequate
hierarchical information exchanges.
8 Chisholm (1987) also noted that informal communication tends to be
more direct than formal communication because the latter is more laborious
and circuitous.
81


CHAPTER 5
RESEARCH METHODS
This research seeks to answer a number of questions about
community-based justice, but the overarching research question is, What is
the nature of the relationship and interaction between community oriented
policing and community adjudication insofar as interagency cooperation is
concerned in communities in which both programs are being administered?
Along these lines, a series of secondary questions were addressed that
include:
> Is cooperation between the two processes largely formal,
informal, or some combination of formal and informal factors?
Can or should this relationship be arranged along a continuum, and to
what extent is formality a factor in effective cooperative relationships?
This question is a key component of this research, given that the
public administration construct applied here questioned whether the
interagency cooperation idea was the appropriate way to identify and
test the links between community policing and community
adjudication.
> What or which agency drives the cooperative process to the
extent that cooperation exists? Is the cooperative process driven
by one agency more so than the other? Is it possible that some
82


external force drives interagency cooperation, such as the influence of
neighborhood organizations or community advisory boards?
> What or which agency or group Is responsible for crafting public
policy or making management decisions concerning community
justice processes? For example, is decision making a joint effort
between all interested stakeholders, or does one agency or group
have a disproportionate amount of influence in decision-making?
Because of the significant similarities between community policing and
community adjudication, it is reasonable to begin a discussion of methods
through an operational comparison between the two philosophies. As the
respective reviews of literature illustrated, these similarities can be
summarized as follows:
Figure 5.1
Similarities Between Community Policing and
Community Adjudication
> Focus is on addressing minor criminal events with the idea that doing
so will prevent or ameliorate major criminal events as predicted by
Kelling and Wilsons (1986) Broken Windows analogy.
> Each type of agency forms partnerships with community members to
solve crime problems
> Each type of agency engages in interagency cooperative agreements
with other similarly situated and interested agencies.
> Efforts focus on prevention of future criminal events, and therefore are
not reactive in terms of enforcement or juridical strategies (e.g.,
proactive policing and non-adversarial judicial proceedings).______
83


These four principal characteristics are, at least for purposes of this
study, considered to be indicative of community justice efforts. Additionally,
these similarities formed the basis for the evaluation of candidate research
sites.
This research originally focused on a single aspect of community-
based justice administration the relationship between the governmental
agencies charged with implementing these programs. However, during
fieldwork a secondary, but equally important question emerged related to the
sustainability of community justice cooperation. While certainly both
community policing and community adjudication involve the integral
components of community, victim, and offender, the literature suggests that
one of the greatest impediments to either of these approaches lies within the
organizations themselves and their respective ability, or inability, to adapt to
a community-based form of government. That is, the degree to which these
programs are successful seems to be directly related to the organizational
culture and structure that implements them. Therefore the original scope of
this study, the investigation of the relationship between police and courts in
the context of community justice, was expanded to also include the effect of
this relationship. That is, to what extent may interagency cooperation
impede or encourage the sustainability of community policing and community
adjudication?
This study was inductive, qualitative and theory building rather than
theory testing in nature. Five research sites representing diversity in size of
jurisdiction, geographic location, cultural attributes, and political
environments were included in the research design. At each site, police
departments operate within an environment of community policing, and court
systems utilize aspects of community adjudicatory processes. In each of the
84


cases, to varying degrees, the community policing programs and community
adjudication programs reported cooperating with one another.
The general methodological approach followed modified grounded
theory as set forth by Strauss and Corbin (1997). The reason for choosing a
modified grounded theory approach is that while the community justice
literature infers that some relationship may exist between community based
policing and community adjudication, a theory that links these ideas has not
yet been developed. By definition, a grounded theoretical approach is
theory-building rather than theory testing in nature. Hence, the intention
underlying this choice of methods was to discern whether any theoretical
linkages between these two program areas could in fact be discovered.
While a number of qualitative methods can be used to this end, a modified
grounded theory approach was selected in part because it requires
identifying, understanding, and describing the links and similarities between
phenomena, which is a key component to this research design.
Grounded theory, in its purest form as originally introduced by
Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss in the publication Discovery of Grounded
Theory (1967), calls for the researcher to enter the project with no set
hypotheses, values, or ideas about how the phenomenon is shaped or
works. Instead, research starts with non-categorical observation that
emphasizes respondents ability to portray in their voice the phenomenon
being studied. From these observations, the researcher develops descriptive
categories that eventually become the basis for additional observation. This
process continues until the researcher can draw some theoretical
conclusions about the meaning and process of the phenomena observed.
In designing this research, I found that it useful to work within a
framework that allowed me to acknowledge those values and beliefs I had
(and in some cases still have) about the possibility of community justice
85


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