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Indonesia's modernization

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Title:
Indonesia's modernization existence of political stability, institutionalization, and socioeconomic development validation of Huntington's thesis
Creator:
Hellman, Robert Paul
Publication Date:
Language:
English
Physical Description:
xviii, 375 leaves : illustrations ; 28 cm

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Subjects / Keywords:
Since 1945 ( fast )
Economic history ( fast )
Political and social views ( fast )
Politics and government ( fast )
Social conditions ( fast )
Politics and government -- Indonesia -- 1966-1998 ( lcsh )
Economic conditions -- Indonesia -- 1945- ( lcsh )
Social conditions -- Indonesia ( lcsh )
Indonesia ( fast )
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bibliography ( marcgt )
theses ( marcgt )
non-fiction ( marcgt )

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Bibliography:
Includes bibliographical references.
General Note:
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree, Master of Arts, Department of Political Science.
Statement of Responsibility:
by Robert Paul Hellman.

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|University of Colorado Denver
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Auraria Library
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All applicable rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier:
25717734 ( OCLC )
ocm25717734
Classification:
LD1190.L64 1991m .H44 ( lcc )

Full Text
INDONESIA'S MODERNIZATION:
i
EXISTENCE OF POLITICAL STABILITY,
INSTITUTIONALIZATION, AND SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
VALIDATION OF HUNTINGTON'S THESIS
by
B.S.
B.G
:S
Robert Paul Heilman
University of Kansas, 1987
University of Kansas, 1987
A thesis submitted to the
i
'
Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Colorado in partial fulfillment
r,:
r '
of thb requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
Department of Political Science
1991


This thesis for the Master of Arts
degree by
Robert Paul Heilman
i
has been approved for the
l'
' Department of
I
j: Political Science
by
Jm W /ff/
Date


Heilman, Robert Paul (M.A., Political Science)
Indonesia's Modernization: Existence of Political
Stability, Institutionalization, and Socioeconomic
I,
I '
Development -- Validation of Huntington's Thesis
Thesis directed by Professor Stephen Thomas
The paper examines Samuel Huntington's thesis that
[:
politicaliinstitutionalization is necessary for modern-
I
I.
ization and that it may be necessary to have authori-
tarian governments to achieve an institutionalized
i;
polity. Huntington's thesis justifies the need for
such governments because of disruptions caused by the
modernization process.
To examine the validity of Huntington's thesis, a
case study of modernization efforts undertaken by
Suharto'sigovernment in Indonesia is utilized.
|
Since Huntington defines modernization as incorpo-
i
rating both socioeconomic development and political
i' ,
modernization, this paper analyzes both areas. To make
i
I'
such an analysis the paper builds an analytical frame-
i
work capable of assessing the crucial aspects of
Huntington's thesis. I
I
i>;


The first part of the analysis addresses political
: 1 i
aspects of Huntington's thesis. It establishes methods
h
of examining efforts to build political institutions
and efforts to encourage popular participation in the
government;process, both areas that Huntington stresses
are indicative of a modern political system. The paper
also establishes a relatively accurate method of deter-
l,
mining levels of political stability.
To undertake such an examination, levels of polit-
ical institutionalization evidenced by organizational
adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence are
examined.) Determinations of political stability are
, j1 i
made by examining national integration and political
legitimacy,.
The Second part of the analysis addresses measure-
ments that; are necessary to determine if socioeconomic
development and social mobilization have occurred in
Indonesia
Soci
oeconomic development and social mobilization
are determined by utilizing the following indices: the
Physical (Quality of Life Index, economic growth, eco-
nomic diversification, income levels, and inflation.
iv


The analytical framework is applied to the Indone
sian case
study by first reviewing historical and
cultural attributes that influence the analysis.
Prom
the analysis in this paper, it appears that
Huntington's thesis is both applicable and valid.
The form and content of this abstract are ap-
'! I i
I
proved. I recommend its publication.
i
Signed
Stephen Thomas I
I
V


I
CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
CHAPTER | ,
1 INTRODUCTION
Case Study Limitations
|
' Case Study Description and
Methodology
' i
Justifying and Limiting the
Case Study Subject
I Justifying the Choice of Indonesia,
the Type of Study, and Limiting
the Scope of the Study
I ,
Indonesia Dictates the Type of
j Approach Best Suited to
1 Its Study
i Basic Geographic and Socioeconomic
Conditions Further Support
the Decision to Use a
i Clinical Case Study
j Basic Political Environment
Summary Review of the
Previous Government
Systems
! Other Limitations of the
j Study
Methodological Framework
I
Conclusion
i
i
xvii
1
2
3
5
5
6
7
9
10
11
12
15
i


2
17
HUNTINGTON'S THESIS
. ] .
j Justification and Development
I of the Thesis
Instability and Lack of
Institutions
| Instability, Social Mobilization,
and Economic Development
i: Disruptions of Traditional
Social Order
i
i Conclusion
3 CONCEPTUAL ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
PART)'I: POLITICS
[Restatement of Huntington's Thesis
[using Huntington's Suggestions for
'j Indicators
I Need for Additional Indicators
| The Need for Justification
| Defining Political Modernization
I
Institutionalization and
: Participation in Political
I' Parties
i
1 Measuring Political Participation
Determining the
Institutionalization
of Organizations
' Limiting the Scope of Organizational
[ Analysis
vii
17
18
19
22
25
27
28
28
29
30
31
34
35
39
48
i


49
Political Instability
j
National Integration
Political Legitimacy
icivic & Praetorian Systems
Determining Which System Exists
, i
Culture
. i
!Conclusion
I
i
' j ,
4 CONCEPTUAL ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK PART II:
ASSESSING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL
MOBILIZATION
Restatement of Huntington's Thesis
iSocial Mobilization and Economic
| i Development
'' I; 1
{{Relationships Between Social
' Mobilization, Economic Development
and Instability
The Indicators of Economic Development
and Social Mobilization
General Limitations of
Socioeconomic Data
Indicators of Socioeconomic
j Development and Mobilization
| Socioeconomic Indicators
! Using GDP
Examining Inputs
Population Growth Rates
49
59
69
70
72
79
80
81
83
86
88
90
99
102
111
118
119
vm


Budget Allocations
120
Conclusion
CASE! STUDY PART I: BRIEFLY INTRODUCING THE
ENVIRONMENT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY OF
INDONESIA
I
I Chapter Methodology
' Limiting the Discussion of Culture
jPhysical Characteristics
;Social Profile
jReligion
i Economic Composition
, Natural Resource Base
jColonial and Historic Attributes
Early Post Independence Period
I
The Old Order Political
Liberal Democracy
Guided Democracy
The Old Order's Legacy
Environment
iThe Old Order and Huntington's Thesis
r
I Cautionary Notes on the Study of
1 Indonesian Culture
!General Cultural Characteristics that
Influence Government Operations
i and Popular Expectations
121
123
123
124
126
126
128
128
129
131
136
143
143
146
150
150
154
155


156
i Concepts of Power and
Legitimacy
^Resistance to Change and Place in the
! Social Structure
j Conclusion
I Implications to Huntington's
' Thesis
CASE!STUDY PART TWO: AN EXAMINATION OF
POLITICAL PARTY INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND
STABILITY
1
i
Restatement of Huntington's Thesis
I
Chapter Methodology
i
Consolidation of Power and Creation of
; a New Government
i
| Gestapu as a Turning Point
i
I Gaining the Presidency
j. Consolidation of Power
II
! Using the Different Groups to
! Eliminate Opposition
' The Final Debate
i
i Using Culture to Gain Power and
Legitimate Leadership
i
Development of a Bureaucratic Polity
I Differences Between the New Order and
Other Military Regimes
162
165
168
169
170
171
174
175
175
177
177
180
181
184
188


191
i
jConsolidation of Power and the
New Order's Bureaucratic Polity --
Implications of Each to
l, Huntington's Thesis
I Institutionalization of Political
| Parties -- The Experiences of
I, Golkar
, I
.Using Election Results to Demonstrate
Institutionalization of the
j Political Process
!The 1971 Elections
! '
J, 1971 Election Results
I The 1977 Elections
I
j The Reorganization of Golkar
The Relationship Between Political
Parties, Golkar and
j the 1977 Elections
I. 1977 Election Results
li (
|The 1982 Elections
f Post 1977 Election Opposition and
' Golkar's Response
j
The Response of Other
j Political Parties
! 1982 Election Results
i !
|The 1987 Elections: Emergence of
a State Party
! Parliamentary Debate
1 Changes in Golkar
194
195
195
198
199
200
203
206
207
208
212
213
215
216
218
xi


220
Sudharmono's Leadership and Staffing
Golkar with Civilians
The Other Parties 222
The Elections 222
Post Election Changes 223
The Institutionalization of Golkar 225
Addressing Huntington's Criteria on
Institutionalization 226
Complexity 227
Adaptability 227
Coherence 228
Autonomy 229
Final Determination of Golkar's
Institutionalization 231
Golkar's Institutionalization --
Implications to
Huntington's Thesis 232
Political Stability 233
The 1974 Riots 233
1977 Election Violence 234
1984 1985 Instances of Sporadic
Violence 235
Secessionist Movements 237
National Integration 238
Legitimacy 245


Conclusion: The Relevance of Indonesia's
Experiences to Huntington's Thesis 248
Consolidation of Power
248
Implementation of an Authoritarian
Regime 249
Development of a Praetorian System 249
Limited Participation
Institutionalization
Political Stability
I
socip,ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL
MOBILIZATION
I
i
! Chapter Methodology
i Indonesia's New Order Socioeconomic
[ Development Program
Repelita I (The First Development
I Plan)
!. Repelita II (The Second
Development Plan)
l.
j Repelita III (The Third
Development Plan)
| i Repelita IV (The Fourth
I Development Plan)
Repelita V (The Fifth
I Development Plan)
f Development Plan Budgets
. i Results of the Development Plans
Socioeconomic Indicators
250
251
253
256
256
258
259
260
261
263
264
264
265
266
xiii


[ Conclusions on the Development
| Program
|Social Mobilization
: Gestapu
! 1974 Riots and the Tanjung Priok
I Affair
' Elections
Social Mobilization in the
I Development Program and
1 Economy
I
! Conclusions on Social Mobilization
I in the New Order --
! Relationship to Huntington's
i Thesis
i
I Conclusion
CONCLUSION
Chapter Methodology
Huntington's Thesis and
r Its Basic Premises
'Review of the Indicators
' Indicators of Political
Modernization and Stability
Indicators of Socioeconomic
Development
!,Applying the Indicators to Indonesia's
New Order
Physical, Social, and
Cultural Environment
274
276
277
278
278
279
280
281
284
284
286
287
287
291
293
294
xiv


f
1 Geographic Environment i , 294
1 Social and Ethnic Composition 295
J Historical Experiences 296
General Cultural Attributes 296
The Indonesian Environment and Huntington's Thesis 298
(Institution Building and Political Stability in the New Order i. Institutionalization of Golkar 299
298
Other Political Parties 303
j Participation 304
(political Stability 306
Integration 307
1 Legitimacy 309
Socioeconomic Development 311
Development Plans I 311
The Indicators 312
Social Mobilization !i . 313
1 jConclusion i 315
i j- APPENDIX ; j
I EVOLUTION OF A DEFINITION OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 317
I'
i
xv


II
325
CALCULATING THE PQLI
III DESCRIPTION OF INFLATION |; r 328
IV RESULTS OF 1955 ELECTIONS 329
V THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF INDONESIA'S GOVERNMENT i, RESULTS OF THE GENERAL ELECTIONS 1971 It 1987 l ' 330
VI 333
VII DEVELOPMENT BUDGET EXPENDITURES | 334
VIII 1 SOCIOECONOMIC INDICATORS 1 : 1 1 340
1 1 i BIBLIOGRAPHY 353
i
I
>
' I
xvi


ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
i
Before beginning the analysis of Huntington's 1968
thesis it j'is appropriate to thank the numerous people
who have been most helpful in this project. I cannot
list them |all. Every effort has been made to cite
' r
those whose works I heavily relied upon. Without the
l .
patience, and tireless proofreading, and constant
! I,
support of my wife, Julie, it is doubtful that I could
ever have finished. Ruth Rosaur provided invaluable
\
assistance on economic issues. I must also thank
Allene Masters and Ambassador Ed Masters. Allene asked
the necessary basic questions and probed my assump-
}
tions. Ambassador Masters graciously allowed me access
to his lihjrary and answered many of my questions on
Indonesia's early development efforts. He also provid-
. I
ed me with invaluable economic data and guidance into
the Indonb^ian polity. To Carl Lande I owe a great
: i.
deal for introducing me to Huntington's work and pro-
viding a preliminary reading list that not only ad-
j
dressed many of my questions but provided the basis of


my research. I am also deeply indebted to Ambassador
Paul Gardner for taking the time to answer my questions
on Indonesian cultural impediments to development and
how they may have been overcome. His book New Enter-
|.
prise in the South Pacific led me to believe that
difficultI socioeconomic problems could be overcome
provided ihat national leaders recognized the existence
of such problems and devise programs with realistic
expectations. I must thank my parents for lending me
their computer when mine decided "give up the ghost" at
j
the most inopportune time and providing much needed
support. (Finally, I must state unequivocally that no
one otherjthan me should share any of the responsibili-
ty for the errors or omissions that I may have made,
nor are tlley responsible for any of my findings.
I
l
I
i
I
r
xviii


CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
I '
The purpose of this work is to examine the validi-
I' !
I
ty of Samuel P. Huntington's thesis, as articulated in
i i
Political Order in Changing Societies. by using the
experiences of Indonesia's New Order as a case study.
i
As such, the emphasis is upon applying Huntington's
i i
I
thesis tojthe Indonesian case, not defending it.
To undertake such an examination an analytical
framework Icapable of applying Huntington's general
thesis to
the Indonesian case study is proposed. The
paper concludes that there is validity to Huntington's
I
assertion]that institutions and authoritarian govern-
i'
ments may be necessary to minimize political instabili-
ty brought about by the process of modernization in the
Third World. However, Huntington's thesis may be too
1 |: ,
simplistic to explain the complexities of the Indone-
sian case[study.


Case Study Limitations
I :
Due to the limitations of case study tests of
i,
general theories, conclusions reached from this paper
cannot necessarily be used to invalidate Huntington's
t
thesis. It is difficult and
i
unwise tolsuggest that a single case study (except when
the case study may be pivotal) is the perfect example
of what the theory attempts to demonstrate. (Verba,
1967) Proving that a country may be the pivotal case
to disprove a general theory is, at best, problematic.
Vast variances may exist that might suggest alternative
interpretations, especially since studies of countries
involve numerous variables and basic assumptions.
(Verba, 1967)
Given,the basic limitations endemic to case stud-
I
ies, the goal of this work is not to unequivocally
prove or disprove Huntington's thesis, but rather to
contribute to the general understanding of the rela-
tionship between government and modernization in such a
way that a definitive proof or disproof may someday be
offered.
I.
2


Case Study Description and Methodology
Case(studies are the most common form of investi-
gation in(political science and they run the gamut from
the most microscopic to most macroscopic. Of these
' }
case studies, the most abundant are those that address
I ,
individual polities that encompass programs, specific
policies,(electoral processes, legislative procedures,
r
and the like.
The case study methodology used in political
science is derived from, and closely related to, medi-
cal and psychological clinical techniques, in that
phenomena are examined in great detail without a great
deal of standardization. (Eckstein, 1975: 81) As
such, the(clinical case studies utilized by political
scientists differ greatly from experimental approaches
undertaken by other branches of science. (Eckstein,
1975: 81) j, I Experimental approaches are conducted with
large samples of variables that can be held constant
and severely restricted through standardization of
data. Just the opposite is true in clinical studies
where the(aim is to capture the essence and particular-
ities through examination of single or small groups
3


without regard to direct and concrete component rela-
tionships. (Eckstein, 1975: 81) Therefore, clinical
I-
studies are intensively rather than extensively orient-
1
ed. (Eckstein, 1975: 81) They concentrate upon the
internal ,clynamics of an identity without regard to
i I
absolute comparability and applicability of findings.
I.
As a;result of this intensity, clinical studies
. i i
are more open ended and flexible at all stages because
data does not have to filtered for standardization.
The flexibility allows relationships to be suggested
when there,are no apparent reasons for data clustering
and associations which, in social science, may result
from somewhat dubious assumptions and beliefs. (Eck-
stein, 1975: 81) Furthermore, flexibility provided by
clinical case studies can explore relationships that do
not lend themselves to the standardizations necessary
for experimentation. Thus, the results from these
clinical case studies can generally be characterized as
narrative'and descriptive, rather than scientific and
i
concrete,I attributes that make them less appropriate to
disproving theories based upon experimental research.
(Eckstein^ 1975: 81-82)
4


Justifying and Limiting the Case Study Subject
b
i
: L,
Ideally, in the examination of Huntington's work
it would !be best to utilize a case study that embodies
I-,
many of the difficulties experienced by developing
countries[while stressing political stability and
modernization -- the attributes central to his thesis.
! i
]J i
Such a case would allow linkages between political
stability^ modernization, and institutionalization to
be examined for relationships that could suggest the
11 ;
validation of Huntington's thesis in the specific
instance being studied.
1
Justifying the Choice of Indonesia, the Type of Study,
j and Limiting the Scope of the Study
To best address these criteria, Indonesia was
il
chosen as|a case study to examine the validity of
Huntington,'s thesis because it appears to embody many
of the problems that face Third World nations. Indone-
sia also litas an authoritarian government, which Hunt-
1 h
ington suggests may be necessary to ensure that stabil-
5


ity is maintained during the modernization process and
the creation of effective institutions.
.1 :
The present government of Indonesia under Suharto
i:
is an authoritarian regime which has made an unequivo-
[ I
cal commitment to both modernization and stability.
Therefore! there is no question about the country's
r
commitment to the attributes central to Huntington's
thesis modernization and stability. Further
I
strengthening the decision to use Indonesia to examine
the validity of Huntington's thesis is that the govern-
ment has been in power for almost a quarter of a cen-
tury withifew challenges to its authority, suggesting
, I
that it enjoys a great deal of legitimacy and support.
I
Since Suharto has been in power for such a long period
of time it'is possible to eliminate the contravening
variablesjbrought about by government transitions from
the analysis.
Indonesia|Dictates the Type of Approach
Best Suited to Its Study
The choice of Indonesia as a case study determined
which type of investigation would be conducted. A
|
clinical case study approach was chosen to examine


Indonesian experiences because it can best capture the
country'sjunique and complicated characteristics.
j .
It is rare to find Indonesia in comparative or
experimental studies. There are three reasons for
this. First, Indonesia is unique in ways that defy
quantification and comparison. Few if any other coun-
tries have the same degree of cultural and ethnic
diversity| that pervades and overlays the national
psyche. Second, there is the parochial nature of most
Indonesianists. (Perhaps only the study of China can
come close to the parochial nature of Indonesian stud-
I
ies.) Finally, the extraordinary degree of politici-
zation of Indonesia watchers, especially since 1965,
il'-
has made it difficult to include this country in cross-
national research. These three reasons make a clinical
approach attractive and an experimental one rather
i
undesirable.
Basic Geographic and Socioeconomic
Conditions Further Support the Decision to
Use a Clinical Case Study
Indonesia is the world's largest archipelago


stretching roughly 5,000 km (3,125 miles) east to west
i
and containing incredible cultural and geographic
1 I "
diversity.' There are roughly 350 ethnic groups speak-
ing 250 mutually unintelligible languages. (Neil,
1973: 8) jlndonesia is the fifth most populous nation
in the world with approximately 174.95 million inhabi-
tants in 1988. (National Development Office, 1991: 16)
The majority, 73 per cent, live in rural areas (World
Development Report, 1990: 31). Of these rural inhabi-
tants, 91 percent can be considered to be living in
poverty. [(World Development Report, 1990: 31). Gener-
i
al income: [levels are also low by world and regional
L
standards.! Per capita GDP in 1988 was $473- (Vital
, ii
Statistics; 1990: 34) At the same time relative rates
of illiteracy are 32.7 per cent, fairly typical of most
low income Third World countries. (Vital Statistics,
1990: 210)1
The country also faced the daunting task of break-
ing away from a form of colonial servitude that did
little to, develop infrastructure components capable of
carrying out the functions of government and overcoming
traditional resistance to change. In fact, Dutch
8


colonialism contributed to traditional resistance to
change. (Geertz, 1963: 80 82)
Basic Political Environment
In tne political arena, stability has been the
( |, i
hallmark of Suharto's regime. This does not imply that
' I
there has been no dissension. There have been few
cases of overt dissent such as several cases of politi-
cal insurrection observed in provinces such as Irian
Jaya and Aceh. There have also been student riots in
1978 and the 1980's against corruption (a systemic
problem throughout Indonesia), violation of democratic
norms, and1 civil rights. (Sundhaussen, 1989: 441 -
442) However, these instances of dissension have been
limited in scope and short-lived.
Due tpo its longevity and stewardship of political
stability this case study is designed to discuss pri-
marily Sunarto's era. The other two Indonesian govern-
: i-
ments are |not included because they were marked by
economic decline and political instability.
9


Summary Review of the
Previous Government Systems
Although Indonesias first governments are not
!
part of this case study, it is necessary to outline
briefly their legacies in order to provide a historical
i'
background for Suharto's government. Indonesia's first
governmental system, known as the Liberal Democracy,
was built
upon a copy of the Dutch Parliamentary sys-
tem. It served to exacerbate existing geographical,
ethnic, and religious cleavages. The Liberal Democracy
period eniled in chaos when faced with revolts through-
I
out the country.
, j, i
The Liberal Democracy was replaced by Sukarno's
Guided Democracy. In the chaos that followed Sukarno
I'
was able to utilize his tremendous charisma and oratory
skills tojabolish the 1950 constitution and reinstate
I i
I.
the 1945 constitution, which had been originally de-
signed as a temporary document. By reinstating the
first constitution Sukarno was able to replace the
I 1
i
elected House of Representatives with a Provisional
People's council which was staffed with presidential
appointees'. These actions allowed Sukarno to
i
10


effectively became a 20th Century Javanese king. His
I !
reign wasjmarked by political instability and economic
disintegration. Ultimately, Sukarno's government came
i,
to an end in the abortive September 1965 coup which may
have left more than 500,000 dead.
The damage and instability of Sukarno's era had a
profound effect upon Indonesia which, when combined
with a general cultural emphasis upon a harmonious
society, can explain why Suharto's New Order stresses
political|stability.
(Geographic, socio-cultural, historic, economic,
and political environment will be discussed in more
details in the following chapters. The discussion
I
above is intended only to demonstrate the country's
I
complexityiand justify the choice of a clinical case
study method and Indonesia as a country to test
Huntington's thesis.)
Other Limitations of the Study
Because the research for this thesis was conducted
I
outside of:Indonesia in the libraries of the Universi-


ties of Colorado and the University of Kansas, it suf-
fers fromj,the limitation that affects all library stud-
ies. Books and newspapers cannot convey the nuances of
political
dynamics and economic development that could
be addressed by being in the country and having access
to the insight of local scholars.
I Methodological Framework
The first step in examining the validity of
Huntington's thesis is to closely review it. Chapter 2
outlines Huntington's thesis in detail and establishes
the areas |that can be used to create an analytical
framework(capable of determining validity in the Indo-
i,
nesian case. The chapter reveals that Huntington's
J, 1
thesis is' closely linked to the definition of moderni-
zation that he employs.
! i
Huntington employs a definition of modernization
i.
that involves political modernization, social mobiliza-
tion, and jieconomic development. The first component,
political ^modernization, though dependent upon the
other two,! is slightly less inclusive and thus will be
i'
dealt with separately in Chapter 3. Chapter 3 estab-
12


lishes the methodology for determining if the compo-
nents of political modernization exist or are being
developed. The chapter utilizes methods suggested by
Huntington to make said determinations, except in cases
where he does not explicitly provide indicators for
attributes that he specifies are important. Therefore,
only thosa indicators not explicitly provided by Hunt-
ington will be defended.
More jdefense of indicators is undertaken in Chap-
ter 4 which addresses measurements of social mobiliza-
i
tion and economic development. The additional defense
is necessary because better methods have been developed
since Huntjington wrote his book and he did not explic-
l
itly state how social mobilization and economic devel-
i
opment should be measured.
By combining the findings from the analytical
framework [established in the two chapters, the validity
of Huntington's thesis can be ascertained. If, for
I
example, institutions are not formed yet there is
i
political [stability, social mobilization, and economic
development then the implication is that the thesis
cannot validly explain the observed results. That is,
i ,
it is not valid in the case studied.
13


. I
' I
Such|a determination cannot be made without exam-
ining specific cases, such as the experiences of
Suharto's Indonesia. Chapters 5-7 are designed to
explore the experiences of Indonesia so that a determi-
i
nation ofjthe validity of Huntington's thesis may be
made. The first step in this process, and the subject
of Chapter 5, is an examination the environmental as-
pects of Indonesia that affect modernization. These
include geography, demographic and social profiles,
basic economic structure (resources), and political
culture. j'The latter is somewhat difficult and limited,
for the reasons discussed in Chapter 5. Nonetheless,
it is important because political culture establishes
expectations and norms that underscore political,
social, and economic processes. Therefore, political
culture is ;important because it provides a basis upon
which to draw conclusions from the indicators and
I1.
ultimately; the validity of Huntington's thesis. As a
result, the discussion presented in Chapter 5 permeates
the subsequent chapters.
|i
Chapter 6 applies the discussion presented in
'!1
Chapter 5 jto an assessment of Indonesia's polity. The
14


chapter examines how, and if, Indonesia has developed
effective
stability
institutions capable of ensuring political
and modernization. To undertake such an
examination, the chapter explores the evolution of
I
1 I. i
political, Iparties and organizations (institutions),
especial by'Golkar. It also applies Huntington's indi-
cators to! make a determination as to whether
1 ,
, I
Indonesia's political stability can be attributed to
institutions, the authority of Suharto, or some other
source.
Chapter 7, addresses the degree of economic devel
; 1
opment andsocial mobilization. It applies the econom
ic framework presented in Chapter 4 to Indonesia.
l 1 ;'
Chapter also provides the data to establish whether
Huntingtoriis thesis is valid in the Indonesian case,
the subject of Chapter 8, the final chapter.
Conclusion
The work at hand examines the validity of
Huntington's thesis that the process of modernization
leads to Jolitical instability brought about by the
lack of effective institutions. Huntington's thesis
15


also suggests that authoritarian governments may be
necessaryjto ensure that such institutions are created
so that modernization can be realized.
!'
Due to the complexity of this country no effort
will be made to make the case study an all-inclusive
pivotal work explaining the dynamics of Indonesian
polity and economic development. Furthermore, the
conclusions derived from this case study are not de-
signed to[suggest that Huntingtons thesis is complete-
1 j
ly valid or invalid. The caveat is necessary because
of conceptual difficulties associated with proving that
a clinical country case study embodies the necessary
i
attributes to absolutely prove or disprove a general
thesis based upon an experimental approach. I
I
i,
16
i


CHAPTER 2
j , HUNTINGTON'S THESIS
The purpose of this chapter is to articulate the
portions of Huntington's thesis that will be examined
for validity. To avoid confusion, this chapter draws
ideas and[citations only from Huntington's 1968 work,
i
Political I Order in Changing Societies. with the only
exception being a discussion of social mobilization,
which utilizes Deutsch's formulation. The citations to
Deutsch are included because Huntington directly cites
. I
them in attempting to define and explain social mobili-
zation. Other than the citations to Deutsch, all other
references are only to Huntington and no effort is made
to interpret his work beyond what is necessary to
derive the 1 indicators.
!,
Justification and Development of the Thesis
According to Huntington, in the 20th Century the
principal
locus of political and economic underdevelop-
ment tends'to be the modernizing countries of Asia,


Africa, and Latin America. These are the same regions
that experience relatively high levels of violence and
instability as well as lack of institutionalization.
(Huntington, 1968: 28, 40) The relationship between
lack of modernization and instability forms the basis
of Huntington's thesis. Primary elements of
Huntington's thesis can be found in the following:
[Violence and instability are] in large part the
product of rapid social change and the rapid mobi-
lization of new groups into politics coupled with
the sllpw development of political institutions.
(Huntington, 1968: 7)
Instability and Lack of Institutions
i
i
!
He further states that the experiences of Asian,
i
African, ajnd Latin American countries suggest that
instability results from equality in political partici-
pation grojwing at a greater rate than the art of asso-
ciating together. (Huntington, 1968: 4-5) There-
:i1
fore, the [problem of instability is directly correlated
to the lack of effective government institutions.
(Huntington, 1968: 28)
Institutions are lacking in the Third World be-
18


cause the
chaos of modernization primarily brought on
by social mobilization makes their
I
difficult. (Huntington, 1968: 5)
between the chaos of modernization
: I '
tions can Ibe seen in the following
creation especially
The relationship
and lack of institu-
passage from Hunt-
ington :
Social]1 and economic change -- urbanization, in-
creases in literacy and education, industrializa-
tion, 'mass media expansion -- extended political
consciousness multiply political demands, broaden
political participation. These changes undermine
traditional sources of political authority and
traditional political institutions; they enormously
complicate the problems of creating new basis of
political association and new political institu-
tions combining legitimacy and effectiveness...
The primary problem of politics is the lag in the
development of political institutions behind social
and economic change. (Huntington, 1968: 5)
Instability, Social Mobilization,
and Economic Development
Huntifngton finds that the relationship between the
I
process of modernization and instability is directly
associated to the degree of social mobilization and
economic development. (Huntington, 1968: 40) In
if
I
Huntington!^s formulation there is both a difference and
a dyadic relationship between economic development and
I
social mob'ilization. (Huntington, 1968: 33 34) The
I
19


relationship can be seen in the following:
Povertjy itself is a barrier to instability. Those
who are concerned about the immediate goal of the
next meal are not apt to worry about the grand
transformation of society. They become marginal-
ists 'arid incrementalists concerned simply with
makingi minor but absolutely essential improvements
in the existing situation. Just as social mobili-
zation is necessary to provide the motive for
instability, so also some measure of economic
development is necessary to provide the means for
instability. (Huntington, 1968: 53)
To better understand how Huntington differentiates
] i :
i !
between these two aspects of instability it is neces-
sary to tufn to the definitions of each. Huntington
defines social mobilization by referring to Deutsch's
i
formulation; which is the process by which old econom-
ic, social!, and psychological commitments are eroded
I
and people become receptive to new patterns of sociali-
zation and behavior. (Huntington, 1968: 34) There-
i
fore, social mobilization involves changes in the
aspirations of individuals. (Huntington, 1968: 34)
He defines economic development as the growth in
N
total economic activity that makes social mobilization
possible.1 (Huntington, 1968: 33 34) Modernization
requires jhe realization of both economic development
20


and social mobilization. (Huntington, 1968: 34) (A
further discussion of social mobilization and economic
development is left to Chapter 4.)
I '
The relationship between social mobilization and
economic development and political instability can be
I j
seen by observing economic growth. (Huntington, 1968:
39) At low levels modernization a positive relation-
ship existjs between economic growth and political
instability, at medium levels there is no significant
i
relationship, and at high development levels there is a
negative relationship. (Huntington, 1968: 39 40)
Thus, the
on one han
relationship between poverty and backwardness
d, and instability along with violence on the
other is a't1 best spurious. (Huntington, 1968: 39 40)
Apparently! it is not the absence of modernity but
efforts to| achieve it that produce political disorder.
(Huntingtpjn, 1968: 39 40)
Huntington asserts that the causes for the rela-
tionship between modernization and instability may be
' I 1
attributed to disruptions of traditional social group-
I 1
ings by modernization efforts. (Huntington, 1968: 34)
These disr
uptions are fundamental to political
21


modernization as can be seen in the following passage
from Huntington:
...the most crucial aspects of political moderniza-
tion can be roughly subsumed under three broad
headings. First, political modernization involves
the rationalization of authority, the replacement
of a ljairge number traditional, religious, familial,
and ethnic political authorities by a single secu-
lar, national political authority. This change
implies that government is the product of man, not
of nature or of God, [it is secular] and that a
well-ordered society must have a determinate human
sourcef f final authority, obedience to whose
positive law takes precedence over other obliga-
tions.!. Secondly, political modernization in-
volves! the differentiation of new political func-
tions and the development of specialized structures
to perform those functions... Thirdly, political
modernization involves increased participation in
politics by social groups throughout society.
Modernization in practice always involves change in
and usually the disintegration of a traditional
system!, but it does not necessarily involve signif-
icant movement toward a modern political system.
(Huntington, 1968: 34 35)
Disruptions of Traditional Social Order
r1
Disruptions of the traditional social order, in
part, occur when groups such as the nouveaux riches
i
demand a share of political power and social status
l j
commensurate with their economic power, despite being
imperfectly adjusted and assimilated. (Huntington,
!
1968: 50) jAs modernization continues, the associated
22


of people
ton, 1968:
itated by
economic development creates this new class of wealthy
individuals while simultaneously increasing the number
With diminishing living standards. (Hunting-
I
50) Decreasing living standards are precip-
a general restriction of consumption.
(Huntington, 1968: 50) These problems tend to exacer-
bate regional and ethnic conflicts, especially when one
!'
group is favored over another. (Huntington, 1968: 50)
Restrictions in consumption also precipitate income
which, when combined with increases in
communication, and geographic mobility,
cause dissatisfaction and unrest. (Huntington, 1968:
l
50) | j;
According to Huntington, these attributes cause
I
disruptions due to the process of modernization, not
its lack oif; attainment. In the following, he estab-
inequality
education,
lishes the
is the pro
ty:
The fr
correlations which support the idea that it
cess of modernization that causes instabili-
equency of revolutions ... varies inversely
with the educational level of the society, and
deaths, ;from domestic violence vary inversely with
the proportion of children attending primary
school... During the eight years between 1958 and
1965,1 violent conflicts were more than four times
as prevalent in very poor nations as they were in
23
I


I
n
rich
tries
comp a
(Hunti
ations; 87 percent of the very poor coun-
suffered significant outbreaks of violence as
red to only 37 percent of rich countries,
irigton, 1968: 38 40)
Prom: these correlations Huntington concludes that
there is a relationship between modernization efforts,
instability, and violence. (Huntington, 1968: 41) But
once modernization has been achieved, stability re-
turns. (Euntington, 1968: 41) Therefore, efforts are
necessary to moderate or restrict the impacts of mod-
ernization, upon most societies. This is even the case
for countries with fairly complex and adaptable tradi-
tional institutions which also experience decay of
political, jinstitutions, and political community.
(Huntington, 1968: 86)
!' i
Therefore, the problem in Third World countries is
j: i
not to crejate democratic governments but to create
effective (institutions capable of controlling the dis-
ruptions thought about by the process of modernization
and instiljl'ing order. (Huntington, 1968: 8) In many,
I '
if not most, Third World countries elections serve to
enhance di
tear down
i
ton, 1968,:
sruptive and reactionary social forces which
the structure of public authority. (Hunting-
;7) Therefore, the problem with Third World
24


governments is not liberty but creation of legitimate
!!.!!
I,
public order. (Huntington, 1968: 7) It is possible to
; i,
have order without liberty but not liberty without
i |'
order. (Huntington, 1968: 7 -8)
Thus'^'according to Huntington, successful moderni-
zation witjhl minimal instability requires that Third
World countries be able to establish centralized au-
thority capable of simultaneously implementing and
controlling national integration, social mobilization,
economic development, and political participation.
(Huntington, 1968: 86)
Conclusion
Based upon the above arguments, Huntington's
thesis thajt will be examined for validity in the fol-
lowing chapters addresses the need for a government
ensuring stability while pursuing moderniza-
ts. The thesis may simply be stated: mod-
, which entails social mobilization, economic
development, and introduction of a more modern polity,
begets instability when legitimate institutions or
organizations capable of governing do not exist.
capable of
tion effor
ernization


Therefore,!; it may be necessary to have authoritarian
. I,
government^ in the early stages of modernization to
ensure tha,t institutions are created and political
stability can be insured.
i !
In the following two chapters a broad framework of
analysis ijs, developed to examine the validity of
!.
Huntingtori's thesis within Suharto's Indonesia. The
framework
cessful Su
modernizat
i's primarily designed to ascertain how suc-
harto's government has been in achieving
ion while minimizing instability and develop-
ing the institutions that Huntington finds so compel-
ling.
Introduction of the analytical framework begins in
the next chapter with a discussion of the methods that
Huntingtonj: proposes to measure political modernization,
instability, and the existence of effective institu-
!!"1
tions. These are the methods that will be used to
ultimately
i
thesis.
Idetermine the validity of Huntington's
26


I I
CHAPTER 3
CONCEPTUAL ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
PART Is POLITICS
The purpose of this and the following chapter is
to review and, where appropriate, justify the indica-
i.1
tors that will be used to create an analytical frame-
work capab
Huntington
.e of examining the political aspects of
j.
,'s thesis in a fashion applicable to Indone-
sia. In this chapter the emphasis is upon choosing and
justifying indicators to examine the political aspects
of Huntington's thesis.
1
Need for a justification can be attributed to the
complexity
of Huntington's thesis and the fact that he
does not explicitly establish how his thesis should be
applied to individual countries such as Indonesia.
In the process of examining the indicators we
will further explore Huntington's thesis, especially
the areas :that he uses to support his findings. As
such, this chapter is designed to augment the under-
standing of Huntington's thesis provided in Chapter 2
by addressing the specifics of the theory.


: 1 Restatement of Huntington's Thesis
:r
i,
As wej isaw in the previous chapter, Huntington's
thesis stajtes that modernization and instability are
inextricably linked. Instability results from an
absence of
country's
institutions capable of addressing a
changing needs resulting from the process of
modernization. To ensure that effective institutions
are created and stabilization ensured in developing
countries it may be necessary to have authoritarian
governments' in the early stages of modernization.
Using Huntington's Suggestions for Indicators
From Huntington's thesis it is possible to deter-
mine which areas must be addressed in a validation.
Since a clinical approach is being utilized it is not
necessary to force a general standardization of indica-
tors. By not having to standardize it is possible to
convey the;totality of Indonesia's modernization expe-
rience in such a way that may be more capable of vali-
28


dating Huntington's thesis.^-
Whenever possible, methods suggested by Huntington
in Political Order in Changing Societies. to examine
I
political ^instability, political modernization, degree
of institutionalization, social mobility, and economic
devel opmenjt. wil 1 be used. By utilizing his ideas, a
more effecjtive determination of validity of
i";
Huntingtonji's thesis within the case of Indonesia since
1965/66 ma!y be made.
' | i
I Need for Additional Indicators
Unfortunately, Huntington does not address a
number of important aspects in determining political
stability and degree of modernization, though he does
suggest that they should be included in analysis of
Third World polities. Therefore, this chapter endeav-
ors to incorporate other analytical tools appropriate
r
1. As we| saw in Chapter 1, clinical case studies do
not require a standardized data set. By not having to
standardize1it is possible to examine attributes that
do not have a clear reason for data clustering. Fur-
thermore, ,not having to standardize and ensure data
comparability implies that non-quantifiable attributes
may be more easily examined.
29


to evaluation of Indonesia's political modernization
efforts since Suharto's assent to power. In doing so,
efforts airle made to ensure that the analytical frame-
work is ta
ment.
i,lored to Indonesia's sociopolitical environ-
The Need for Justification
In thei instances where Huntington does not suggest
specific indicators that can be used to measure politi-
I' ''
cal, economic, and social phenomena, central to an
examination of his thesis in a specific case, indica-
' j
tors will be suggested to address these issues. Each
time an indicator not suggested by Huntington is pro-
posed, a justification of its use will follow. The
same is true for the instances where the indicators
U '
i'
suggested by Huntington appear to be problematic.
(Cases such as these are more applicable to the follow-
|;
ing chapter where issues of economic development and
social mobilization are addressed in detail.) To
ensure continuity, the justification process is not
i
I
limited topjust this chapter.
30


?
| iDefining Political Modernization
i j,
The first step in analyzing political moderniza-
tion is acceptance of an unambiguous definition that
allows determinations of the degree of modernization to
be made. |According to Huntington, political moderni-
zation is a transitional stage which can be subsumed
j'
under three, broad headings, as the following illus-
trates : j
First,(political modernization involves the ration-
alization of authority, the replacement of a large
number| of traditional, religious, familial, and
ethnicjpolitical authorities by a single secular,
national political authority... Secondly, politi-
cal modernization involves the differentiation of
new political functions and the development of
specialized structures to perform those
functions... Thirdly, political modernization
involves increased participation in politics by
social|groups throughout society. (Huntington,
1968: 34)
There are four phases of party development which
reveal progress toward the three broad headings that
Huntingtoniasserts can indicate modernization. These
!' 1
phases essentially form a continuum from the least to
I' I
most modern phase.
The first phase is development of a factional
31


party system. (Huntington, 1968: 412) It is based
upon traditional patterns of political behavior.
(Huntington, 1968: 412) In this phase, smaller groups
compete against each other through weak, transitory al-
liances and groupings. (Huntington, 1968: 412) These
i.
groupings have little durability and no structure.
(Huntington, 1968: 412)
The njext step along the continuum is polarization.
Ii
(Huntington, 1968: 415) It occurs when politics breaks
out of the closed circle of revolutionary or legisla-
tive factionalism. (Huntington, 1968: 415) As par-
ticipation broadens political parties are formed by the
organized linkage of factions to social forces. These
I
factions b|egin to represent the interests of social
forces. The factions begin to loose their alliances
social causes as their source of legitima-
and take on
cy. (Hunt
ington, 1968: 416 417) The transition
requires that factional political patterns change in
order to encourage leaders to expand participation.
(Huntington, 1968: 416 417)
Expansion is the third step along the continuum of
political modernization. (Huntington, 1968: 417) It
entails party appeals to large masses of the population
32
I


I
through anj effective organization. (Huntington, 1968:
417) In the expansion phase, political leaders are
motivated jto develop popular appeals and to create
organizational bonds necessary to achieve highly de-
sired goals. (Huntington, 1968: 418)
I
The final and most advanced stage of political
modernization is institutionalization. (Huntington,
1968: 419)1 ; In this stage the former political system
is displaced and supplemented by a strong party system,
I
which may exist as either a single or multiple party
system. j
I
According to Huntington, a strong party system can
bring about many of the attributes of a modern polity.
i
In the following passage we can see some of these
attributes!articulated by Huntington:
A strong party system has the capacity, first, to
expand|participation through the system and thus to
preempt or divert anomic or revolutionary political
activity, and, second, to moderate and channel the
participation of newly mobilized groups in such a
manneri; as not to disrupt the system. A strong
party system thus provides the institutionalized
organizations and procedures for the assimilation
of new!groups into the system. (Huntington, 1968:
412)
[
By utilizing
of modernization,
indicators that address the process
as defined by Huntington, it is
l
33


system cat
acceptance
egories with the implicit recognition and
that political systems may defy such rigid
I
classifica
tion and categorization
(Huntington, 1968:
78 79)
!
Categorization of institutionalization is a rela-
tively straightforward process. It is enough only to
determine Whether a system has achieved a high or low
level of institutionalization. (Huntington, 1968: 78-
79) (In addition to categorization it is necessary to
determine jwhether an institution is effective, a topic
that is discussed in greater detail below.) But ad-
dressing and categorizing political participation is
more complex as Huntington indicates in the following:
In terms of participation, it seems desirable to
identify three levels: at the lowest level, par-
ticipation is restricted to a small traditional
aristocratic or bureaucratic elite; at the medium
level, the middle classes have entered into poli-
tics; and in a highly participant polity, elite,
middiei class, and the population at large all share
in political activity. (Huntington, 1968: 78]
Measuring Political Participation
i
j
Thouglii Huntington stresses the importance of
political participation he does not describe how to
35


measure it in great detail. Therefore, it is necessary
to augment
scholars.
his methods with those proposed by other
Political participation can be measured through
the percentage and type of eligible citizens voting.
(Omer, 1983: 15) When utilizing voting data it is
important!^o ascertain how eligibility is determined.
(Raddock, 1986: 10 11) If only the aristocracy and
bureaucratic elite is allowed to vote participation are
not high. The same can be said for eligibility being
|
based upon; land ownership and literacy, if both are
i
low. (Huntington, 1968: 83)
Voter1 turnout is only one aspect of political
i
participation, which should be augmented with an as-
sessment of prospects for majority access to the deci-
sion-making process in an organized fashion. (Hunting-
ton, 1968:, 83) Such participation, in Huntington's
conceptualization, does not imply that the population
is necessarily directly involved in the decision proc-
ess, but rather that there are structures or institu-
I
tions capable of adapting to, channeling, and register-
ing popular demands without subversion. (Huntington,
1968: 81) 1 Therefore, determinations of participa-
36


tion should, incorporate some assessments of political
structures
(Huntington, 1968: 397 398)
In the1'fol lowing passage we can see how Huntington
[
views the relationship between political parties and
^ i
voting. 1 !
I,
The stronger the political parties involved in the
elections, the larger the voting turnout. A half
dozen individual candidates furiously competing
agains^ each other without benefit of party produce
a far smaller turnout of voters than one strong
party i lacking any effective opposition. The 99 per
cent turnouts in communist states are testimony to
the strength of the political parties in those
states!;: the 80 per cent turnouts in Western Europe
are a function of the highly developed organization
of parties there; the 60 per cent turnouts produced
by American parties reflect their looser and less
highly
structured articulated organization,
(Huntington, 1968: 402 403)
i.
Before: moving onto a discussion of effective
i ,i
political party organizations it is necessary to exam-
!
ine other indicators of political participation.
Political participation also involves assimilation
of communal organizations, social classes, and economic
I 1
classes into the polity through involvement in politi-
cal institutions. (Huntington, 1968: 397 398) These
attributes
can be addressed by examining factors such
37


as the ethnic plurality of political parties. (Hunt-
ington, 19J68: 397 398) For such a plurality to
support anki participate in the political process there
j
must be identification with the system by different
groups. (Huntington, 1968: 397 398) Thus, ethnic
plurality in the party system can be used to measure
aggregate participation. It can also be used in making
; I
determinations of involvement in the decision making
process.
Involvement in the decision process may be deter-
mined by observing how much access citizens have to
leaders especially at the micro level. (Raddock, 1986:
'j
32) When there is a great deal of interplay at village
or provincial levels, it can be safely assumed that
participation is relatively high, so long as local
leaders can influence decisions at higher levels.
(Raddock, 1986: 32) Participation cannot be high if
I '
there is little, if any, interaction between high and
lower levels of government. (Raddock, 1986: 32) Such
I.
is the case!: when high-ranking government officials
completely
ignore advice and requests from junior
officials ;and provincial leaders. (Raddock, 1986: 32)
38


With increasing political participation and in-
volvement in the decision making process there is a
need to expand complexity, autonomy, adaptability, and
I !
coherence jb-f institutions to ensure that stability is
i
maintainedj. (Huntington, 1968: 79) Essentiality the
need for expansion implies further institutionaliza-
l \- i
tion. (Huntington, 1968: 79)
Institutionalization, in Huntington's definition,
is the projcess by which organizations become institu-
tions. (Hjuntington, 1968: 12) It is the process by
j
which organizations and procedures acquire value and
the hallmarks of institutions. (Huntington,
1968: 12)1 Therefore, to more completely evaluate the
validity ojf Huntington's thesis in the specific case of
Indonesia it is necessary to address the institutional-
ization process of organizations.
I '
stability,
Determining the Institutionalization of Organizations
According to Huntington, the level of institution-
r
alizationiof a political system may be defined by
specific attributes that are measurable. (Huntington,
1968: 12) | These attributes include adaptability,


complexity
1968: 12),
; autonomy, and coherence. (Huntington,
Organizational Adaptability. Adaptability is a
crucial component of the institutionalization process,
! ''
for it is necessary if an organization is to survive
I 11,
long enough to become an institution. In order to
I
confront changing environments, organizations must be
adapt and not be set in their ways. (Huntington, 1968
P
15-16) Rigid organizations are less likely to survive
because they cannot be modified to meet changing de-
mands brought on by a dynamic environment. (Hunting-
ton, 1968: 15) (Exceptions to the need for adaptabili
ty can be found in static environments.)
Adaptability must not be confused with specifici-
ty. Highly developed organizations, those further
along the continuum toward institutionalization, are
functional
ton, 1968:
y more adaptable, not specific. (Hunting-
15) According to Huntington, the relation-
ship between adaptability and institutionalization can
be seen in
the following:
Institutionalization makes the organization more
than simply an instrument to achieve certain pur-
poses | Instead it leaders and members come to
value it [the organization] for its own sake, and
it develops a life of its own quite apart from the
; I ,
40


specific functions it may perform at any given
time. [The organization triumphs over its function.
(Huntington, 1968: 15)
i j, .
The institutionalization of an organization may be
I
measured by examining the ability to survive. Survival
[ r
is the ability to weather attacks while maintaining
policy and!1eadership continuity, garnering local
support, and obtaining financial backing. (Phillips,
1969: 123) The ability to withstand attacks is diffi-
cult to analyze because it exists in many forms:
efforts to|change leadership, reorganization, drastic
i,
budget cuts, limitations in administrative and program
discretion!1 and the like. (Huntington, 1968: 245;
h
Phillips, 1969: 120) But the longer an organization is
in power the more likely it is to survive through a
specified period of time. (Huntington, 1968: 13)
Another method of measuring adaptability is the
generational age of its leaders. (Huntington, 1968:
14) As long as the original leaders are in power the
ability toadapt is in doubt. (Huntington, 1968: 14)
i .
As we can see in the following passage, Huntington
asserts that adaptability and survival is better as-
sured whezJ there are transitions in leadership:
The more often the organization has surmounted the
41


problem of peaceful succession and replaced one set
of leader by another, the more highly institution-
alized it is. (Huntington, 1968: 14)
! i
Finally, adaptability may be measured in function-
al
terms.
(Huntington, 1968: 15)
To utilize this form
of measurement it is necessary to determine whether an
i-
organization had modified its function to accommodate
environmental changes. (Huntington, 1968: 15) For an
example of[functional adaptability we can turn to an
example provided by Phillips, which more clearly artic-
ulates the concept than those provided by Huntington.
Land-grant universities in the United States vivid-
ly illustrate institutional flexibility and growth.
When fiirst established by the Morrill Act of 1862,
land-grant universities were chartered to primarily
meet tlie needs of domestic agriculture. As they
discovered the sole concentration upon agriculture
was too constrictive these institutions grew and
branched out into other fields. Over the years
these institutions have grown exponentially, diver-
sifying in the process so that today colleges of
agriculture comprise a relatively small segment of
these great universities. (Phillips, 1969: 172)
Organizational Complexity. Organizational com-
! 1
plexity and institutionalization are directly related.
(Huntington; 1968: 17) Complexity entails multiplica-
tion and differentiation or organizational subunits
both hierarchically and functionally. (Huntington,
1968: 18) [The organizational complexity can also bee
42


seen in the ability of an organization to secure and
maintain loyalties. It is thus directly related to the
number and
related.
must be ab
functional
variety of subunits to which its members can
J(Huntington, 1968: 18) Furthermore, an
organization that is differentiated can better adjust
itself to ;those that have only a single purpose.
(Huntington, 1968: 18)
Therefore, measures of organizational complexity
e to indicate the degree of hierarchical and
differentiation as well as increases in the
same. It is possible to observe and measure organiza-
tional differentiation through the number of different
the organization has. (Huntington, 1968:
18) Organizations that carry out a number of differ-
ent tasks are more highly institutionalized than those
that only address one or a few. (Huntington, 1968: 18)
, jl
Differentiation in the hierarchy of an organiza-
tion may be observed through leadership patterns. When
I f
an organization is more highly institutionalized,
roles that
1eadership
as well as
power flows in both directions horizontally
vertically. (Huntington, 1968: 18; Phil-
lips, 196?': 121-122) Highly institutionalized organi-
zations have the ability to accurately assimilate and
I
43


act upon self-criticism. (Phillips, 1969: 121-122)
The institutionalized organization is also able to
transfer information from one department to the next
i.
horizontally rather than vertically. Furthermore, it
' i
I
is able toj continue operations with major structural
, i
changes when there is a leadership transition. (Phil-
lips, 1969!: 121-122)
Therefore, the extent to which these characteris-
tics exist' can be used as a measurement of organiza-
tional complexity.
: I
Autonomy. Organizational autonomy from ambient
social forces may be used to measure institutionaliza-
tion (Huntington, 1968: 20) An organization that is
the instrument of a social group, whether it be a clan,
family, orjclass, lacks institutionalization because it
!
is subordinate. (Huntington, 1968: 20)
Autonomy may be determined by the degree of free-
dom an organization has from its environment. (Hunt-
ington, 1968: 21) It can also be measured through
sourcing of funding.
j
Funding is also one of the most tangible and
easily identifiable indicators of success. Within any
44


analysis of' funding, the nature of timing and level
should be addressed. Adequate funding can realisti-
I'
cally be expected only when the organization is well
i i
accepted by important segments of the community or when
, I
it provides an opportunity for political manipulation.
(The latter clearly is not a positive attribute and
should notjbe considered as an indicator of a success.)
It iSj crucial to include assessments of domestic
and local financial support, for foreign funding cannot
I
continue indefinitely. Furthermore, foreign funding
usually has numerous conditions^- which limit policy
i. '
makers' options. (Phillips, 1969) Domestic involve-
ment in funding increases commitment to the organiza-
tion which, is instrumental to the success of its pro-
I
grams. ; |
In addition to funding, organizational autonomy
!
can be measured through direct involvement in the
organization by politicians and government bureaucrats.
Ii i
j.
(Huntington, 1968: 21)
i
1 Foreign funding with conditionalities is frequent-
ly known as tied funding. It is tied in the sense that
future funding is based upon performance of certain
duties or obligations.


I
Organizations may also be susceptible to extra-
national forces as the following passage demonstrates:
. i,
I |
Political organizations and procedures that are
vulnerable to nonpolitical influences from within
the society are also usually vulnerable to influ-
ences from outside the society. They are easily
penetrated by agents, groups, and ideas from other
political systems. Thus a coup d'etat in one
political system may easily "trigger" coup d'etats
by similar groups in other less developed political
systems. (Huntington, 1968: 21; see also Hunting-
ton, 1962: 44-47)
i
Independence from these forces may be measured by
I
r1
the existence of a complex organizational structure
which filters out many of the desires for absolute
power in leaders. (Huntington, 1968: 21) Thus, the
complexity of the structure acts as a check to abuses
and concentration of power. Further indications or
r
measures or power may be fund in the existence of close
linkages between social groups and government bureau-
1!
crats and the organization. If the organization is so
I
closely linked to these entities that it shares the
same leaders and sources of funding then it cannot be
i
considered jautonomous.
Coherence. The last area that can be used to
measure the institutionalization of an organization is
the degree|of coherence or unity demonstrated. An
46


organization that is more unified and coherent tends to
' |
enjoy a greater degree of institutionalization.
(Huntington; 1968: 22) To be effective, and thus
institutionalized, organizations must, at a minimum,
demonstrate enough coherence to complete their tasks
'j'
without breaking apart. (Huntington, 1968: 22) To
demonstrate.the point Huntington utilizes the following
passage from David Rapoport which examines effective
military organizations:
The sustaining sentiment of a military force has
much in common with that which cements any group of
men engaged in politics -- the willingness of most
individuals to bridle private or personal impulses
for the sake of general social objectives. Com-
rades must trust each other's ability to resist the
innumerable temptations that threaten the group's
solidarity; otherwise, in trying social situations,
the desire to fend for oneself becomes overwhelm-
ing. (Rapoport, 1962: 79 as cited in Huntington,
1968: 23)
Organizational coherence can be measured by exam-
11
ining the discipline demonstrated by members. (Hunt-
ington, 19,68: 23) It can also be measured by the
ability tojformulate non-conflicting policies while
also preventing internal dissension from destroying the
organization. (Huntington, 1968: 22)
47


Limiting the Scope of Organizational Analysis
Huntington does not utilize the above-mentioned
indicators I of organization institutionalization to
examine any organizations other than political parties.
Therefore,I in the effort to examine the validity of
I' !
Huntington's thesis, we will not expend the analysis
; I'
beyond these parameters. The only organizations that
will be examined for institutionalization will be
political parties.
In I
As we(.have seen numerous times above, Huntington's
1 i
thesis is laased upon the relationship between institu-
tions and political stability. Therefore, to assess
the validity of Huntington's thesis in Indonesia it is
! i'l
necessary to determine whether political stability, or
the lack thereof, can be attributed to Suharto's au-
thoritarian! government or the existence of political
institutions (parties).
Despite its importance Huntington does not give
adequate guidance on how to determine the existence or
I '
measure the,influences of political instability, though
j i'
he does provide an analysis of its causes.
48


Political Instability
!/' ,
Political stability is somewhat difficult to
define because of its cultural specificity. For exam-
ple, in Indonesia, societal values stress consensus
I.'
building with social and political harmony. (Raddock,
1986: 10) I!
The causes of political stability are manifold and
I* 1
can probably best be attributed to the existence of a
I
socially legitimate political system that allows for
the realization of change without self-destructing.
(Huntington, 1968: 39 92) Perhaps Adam Smith said it
best in 1776:
. r
Little else is requisite to carry a state to the
highest degree of opulence from the lowest barba-
rism, but peace, easy taxes, and tolerable adminis-
tration of justice, all the rest being brought
about Toy the natural course of things.
National Iritecration
Political stability is inextricably tied to na-
tional integration and the inability to quell revolu-
tionary tendencies, for no country can possibly have a
i'i
stable political environment when it is struggling to
49


I
I
II
I
hold itself together. (Huntington, 1968) For this
reason, national integration is one of the most compel-
ling problems confronting developing countries such as
Indonesia -- how best to bind together the various
regions anc^ diverse peoples into a wel1-functioning and
interdependent whole. (Drake, 1989: 1)
Cohesive forces are vital both to ensure the con-
tinued! existence of the nation-state as one politi-
cal entity and give political stability, and to
enable[ieconomic development to take place. For
without some measure of integration, both human and
material resources that are needed to raise living
standards must be diverted instead toward coping
with the centrifugal forces of regional disaffec-
tion or rebellion. The success of a country's
economic development also depends to a considerable
extent .on the strength of its integrative, cohesive
bonds, so that the almost inevitably spatial impact
of development of development does not unduly
exacerbate regional differences and tensions and
lead to disintegration....
National integration is a multidimensional, com-
plex, land dynamic concept, involving a great varie-
ty of interlocking elements that operate separately
to someiextent but yet are also interacting, cumu-
lative and generally mutually reinforcing. In-
deed, integration is a holistic concept in which
the totality of the separate aspects is greater
than tbe sum of the different parts. (Drake, 1989:
2) !
Part of the complexity in national integration
stems from;the manner in which its different components
i j i
are intertwined and operating at different levels. i
50
i
I


(Drake, 1989: 3) Increased integration at one level
might cause disintegration or less cohesion at another.
(Drake, 1989: 2) For example, the integration within
I
powerful Indonesian families is vividly contrasted by
the hostility between powerful families. Along the
same lines) in rural areas life may be integrative at
When irural peasants are brought into close contact
i
in urban settings the disintegrative influences of
regionalism such as social and ethnic differences may
and the modern, urban culture are likely. These clash-
!
es result from the establishment of artificial borders
1. Here i!t is clear that isolated villages and commu-
nities form1 stereotypes that serve to build village
cohesivenesjs while at the same time disaggregating
residents firom the greater whole of the nation.
the local Level, utilizing mutual assistance groups
which serve to strengthen neighborly bonds; but at the
same time accentuating the exclusion of a few individu-
I
als. (Drake, 1989: 3)
I
be accentuated especially if home villages have minimal
contact with outside communities^.
When rural areas are isolated, clashes among
regional, ethnic, and cultural practices
r
! ,
i
i
51


and cultural/linguistic overlays1. They can also be
I,
I t.
traced to efforts by newly emergent countries to create
strong nation-states out of diverse groups. When faced
with modern institutions, laws, and cultures these
groups attempt to maintain their traditional ethnic and
religious identities. (Scott, 1976) The conflict can
i | .
cause the polarization of a country with urban centers
|
in on camp|and traditional, rural communities in the
other,
In
such an environment dissatisfaction, such as
the inequities between rich and poor, can create seri-
ous problems. (Raddock, 1986: 11 12)
Since[these problems are clearly visible in the
cities, where most development planners and resources
L
are located; attention is frequently given to moderni-
I
zation programs in urban areas. The resulting dispro-
portionate' [investment is designed to relieve degenera-
tive political pressures in capital cities, where the
1. In most cases these problems may be attributed to
the policies of former colonial masters, who arbitrari-
ly created boundaries to suit their needs.
52


problem ispmost evident.^ Unfortunately policies
designed to cure these problems only serve to attract
further rural-urban migration and through cumulative
causation,|increase the degree of primacy and vulnera-
!'
' j I
bility of capital cities to political pressures and
; I
infighting! (Todaro, 1976) Ultimately the gap between
I
rural and ljirban area widens, creating a vicious circle
j
that is extremely difficult to break. (Todaro, 1976)
Therefore one of the primary concerns facing a govern-
ment such as Suharto's is to increase the levels of
' I
integration between rural and urban areas to stem the
crushing tide of country-to-city migration while also
I :
improving urban integrative functions. (Berry, 1972)
The magnitude and manner in which a government
approaches-the problems of integration provide a means
of assessing national cohesiveness. (Drake, 1989) By
association it also provides insight into the degree of
political stability. When engaging in any examination 1
1. The capital cities in most Third World countries
are a magnet, attracting countless people from rural
areas. Thejy generally are also the only place that
development planners and influential politicians see
the pervasi
ve problems of underdevelopment and its
associated:condition poverty, first hand.
53


of national,integration, extreme caution is necessary
because many seemingly integrative forces may have
'I
paradoxical effects as the following passage demon-
strates (Drake, 1989: 4).
For example, increased commonality in one sociocul-
tural jelement, such as the ability to speak a
common j;ilanguage, may throw into relief other dif-
ferences such as religion, way of life, or social
status! Even such commonalities as religion,
language, and culture may vary in importance in
different national contexts. Thus, linguistic
differences create a barrier to national unity in
Belgium but not in Switzerland, in India but not in
Tanzania. Religious differences cause few tensions
in the |;United States, but are a potent disintegra-
tive foice in Northern Ireland and Lebanon. Fur-
thermore, sociocultural features may not necessari-
ly be critical in and of themselves, but may assume
disproportionate importance when they reinforce
other differences such as the actual or perceived
distribution of power or economic disparities.
(Drake, 1989: 4)
Due to these paradoxes there are no absolutes in
i': '
determining1 inational integration. (Drake, 1989: 4)
Therefore, judgments on the degree of a country's
1
cohesivenesjs must be made on bases of relativity.
(Drake, 1989: 4) That is, if there are a great number
of the facf'ors associated with integration present,
then the likelihood that the nation will enjoy a
cohesive environment is greater.
National integration is dependent upon a balance
54


among four
principles: historical-political; sociocul
tural; interactive; and economic components, all oper-
ating in a
dynamic equilibrium. (Drake, 1989: 2)
These components provide a starting point from which to
begin an analysis of national integration.
r
Sociocultural and political components can clearly
i
be seen injthe common cultural, historic, and political
experiences that are part of a shared national herit-
age. When there exists a great body of shared national
r
heritage the likelihood of integration is great because
citizens have a cultural or historical foundation upon
which to base national identity. Heritage also pro-
vides citizens with a sense of unity and distinction
I -
from surrounding states. National heritage can be seen
..!
through a common language, shared religious practices,
r
and the ability to join organizations that share in
national activities.
I,
l i' i
Second, interaction is increased when a nation's
!
diverse sociopolitical groups interact with one anoth-
er. High
is a great
levels of interaction can be seen when there
deal of movement, communication, and trade
between different provinces, particularly with those
l,1
55


differing'cultures and geographical barriers such as
3
large bodijss of water, mountain ranges, or vast dis-
tances between them. (Raddock, 1986: 21 24) Since
I'l
: l (
these components are closely intertwined, it is possi-
ble to simultaneously examine them by observing the
degree of air, land, and sea transport; radio, tele-
|'j
phone, andjtelevision coverage; and inter-province
migration. : (Drake, 1989: 2)
Third! and finally, economic interdependence and
some degree of parity in regional economic development
are fundamental to national integration. (Drake, 1989:
2) Perceptions that standards of living are improving
and there is some equitable distribution in the loca-
: Ij 1
tion of new industrial projects may be more meaningful
.| I
to the cause of national integration than economic
growth per jse. When there is unbalanced growth in one
!
region or a group of people appears to disproportion-
ately benefit, the result can be disintegration. (May,
i',
1981: 147) j
Perceptions that standards of living are improving
can be documented through utilization of basic socioec-
onomic indicators. (Todaro, 1989) (These are dealt
with in mor|e detail in the following chapter.)


Evidence of developmental parity can be found in
the distribution and magnitude of development projects
combined with migration patterns. The cause of inte-
gration is
not aided when projects are confined to a
few provihces or municipalities leading to rural in-
migration. (Todaro, 1976)
When examining this facet of integration it must
be realized that no modernization program can be abso-
lutely equitable in distributing projects, there simply
is not enough funding and other resources to do so.
(Phillips,
I
sources do
industrial
1969) Furthermore, natural and human re-
not allow such a luxury. To be efficient,
i'
projects must be situated in close proximity
to transportation links so that raw materials may be
efficiently and cheaply moved in and finished goods-1-
out. In addition, manpower requirements and return on
investment
completely
)requirements also tend to work against
I
equitable distribution of projects. These
1. In keeping with economic convention, finished
goods include semi-finished goods and services that are
transported'to another facility for completion.
57


factors may be taken into account by matching the type
of project
to the ext
; with its resource needs (human and natural)
ractive return^- that it provides the communi-
i '
ty. The extractive return can be determined through
return on
investment combined with where these returns
end up. How does the local community benefit from the
project?
and, if so
Do any of the returns end up in local hands
i, how are they distributed?^ Is a majority
of the worjk force imported and where do the
goods/servjices end up?
:r;.
Once jthe degree of national integration for a
country hats;. been established other factors influencing
1. Extractive return may be thought of as what a
project giyes back to the community based upon what is
taken fromj.it. For instance, a project that takes
vital water resources from a farming community, return-
ing polluted effluent that ruins fields and generally
makes the area uninhabitable without providing any
positive benefits such as employment or goods/services
may be said to have a negative extractive return. On
the other:hand, a project such as a simple textile mill
that provides employment and minimal disruption in the
local environment (both social and physical) may be
said to haye a positive extractive return.
2. When jthe returns are not invested in local commu-
nities political uprisings may result. In Lhokseumawe,
Indonesia there has been unrest since the 1970s over
perceived Uneven distribution of economic opportunities
generated;by natural gas and related industries.
I
58


political Istability may be addressed. These factors
are strongly influenced by political and social cul-
ture. (Huhlt.ington, 1968) The factors may possibly
even const
disorder.
itute constraints against upheaval and social
, Ultimately these characteristics essential-
ly define jwhat a society considers legitimate govern-
i
ment.
Legitimacy
Political
Legitimacy is fundamental to any assessment of
political jinstabi 1 ity, for without it, an administra-
tion does jnot have the support necessary to rule in
peace. A jcrisis or absence of legitimacy occurs when
the very form, procedures, and institutions of a gov-
ernment fail to either establish credibility or lose
trust aftejr, a prolonged series of failures. In short,
legitimacyi is the acid test of government.
' I I
There is no single or necessarily direct manner in
which to measure legitimacy, for it cannot meaningfully
be quantified or addressed by individual attributes.
Therefore,! it is necessary to address the question of
legitimacy! through examination of related factors. Of
59


these, no
systems
force is more subversive to a political
legitimacy than the reversal of popular reform
measures.^ (Huntington, 1968: 10) Government deci-
sions to revise popular reforms, for whatever reason,
can act as a catalyst to mob violence and even social
revolution!.? (Huntington, 1968: 31)
!
Reversal of reform measures creates frustration by
subjecting citizens to the psychologically disturbing
condition of losing what they once had. Never to have
experienced "progress" is less emotionally disturbing
I
than to halve undergone a major unexpected setback.
T
(Huntington, 1968: 12) This setback is especially
difficult
when expectations of economic and social
rewards arje extremely high. (Huntington, 1968: 12)
1. Thesej measures frequently include reforms in land
tenure, political participation/representation, or
economic programs. Reforms in the economic area might
include establishment of farm subsidy programs or a
free mar ke't.
2. In some cases the governments legitimacy may not
be undermijned to the point of collapse by reversal of
popular pr'ogram. Reversal of some programs may be
necessary jin difficult financial times such as a reces-
sion. In jthese times it may be possible to externial-
ize difficulties may be able to either externalize or
through some other method convince citizens that pro-
gram curtalilment is absolutely necessary.
60


Nowhere are the expectations higher than with rural
migrants c
areas poor
rowding in squalid urban slums. In these
housing conditions and social services
combined with excessive population density and growing
political
Given
jawareness create a volatile mixture,
this volatility, it is necessary to examine
l;
' i'1
the prospects for organized mass violence developing
into a rebellion. (Huntington, 1968: 32) These pros-
pects may be seen in the activities of associations,
political parties, student groups, and unions. (Hunt-
ington, 1968: 32) Only the best intelligence can
accurately
predict when one of these groups acting
alone or in a coalition can gather enough strength to
topple a political system.
Such intelligence requires objective analysis of
i ;
the coordination between groups, external forces, such
as foreign
it should 1
history of
1986: 24)
governments or interests. To be effective
include the following attributes. First, a
violence within the country. (Raddock,
Second, the extent to which a country's
economic, social, and human rights conditions have
deteriorate^ to a point where they can no longer be
61


I
tolerated^,), (Raddock, 1986: 25) If there is no alter-
i
native party or organization to step in under these
(i
circumstances, a power vacuum will be created leading
to civil disorder and chaos. (This is one of the
primary components in Huntington's thesis.) Third,
effective analysis of political stability should also
address the!; existence of organizations predisposed to
leading or manipulating violent demonstrations and
i.
riots. Fourth, the ability of police forces to contain
disruptions;without resorting to coercion or other
illegitimat^ means is an important component of politi-
cal stability. Fifth, predisposition and history of
,j
foreign intervention should be included in an analysis
of political stability. Finally, the focus of disor-
derly acts r- are they targeted toward inciting a
revolution?! (Raddock, 1986: 25) 1
1 Deteriorating social and economic conditions can
be seen in inadequate supply of basic essentials such
as food, fue,l, housing, and potable water. They are
generally abbompanied by hyper-inflation, increasing
unemployment:, and reduced purchasing power. Frequently
corrosive cpfruption coincides with the existence of
deteriorati.n'g social and economic conditions. When it
becomes institutionalized, corruption becomes a way for
the poor to redistribute their meager earnings to the
wealthy. It is also seen as a way for the wealthy to
avoid legal and social redistribution mechanisms.
I
62


One of; the most visible reactions to these condi-
tions usually can be found in the number of military
coups. In mhny Third World countries no group other
than the military has sufficient resources and organi-
zational ability to oppose an entrenched leadership.
(Huntington;:1968: 3 24) The existence of coups can
provide some, indication of political instability.
(Raddock, 1986: 28) As with other such tests, it is
]
not absolute, for in some countries, such as Algeria,
I
. |. '
political change is routinely brought about by military
, ! r
coups. In these cases there is, ironically, some
stability in instability, owing to the fact that the
coups can restore order by deterring or at least mini-
mizing social unrest. (Raddock, 1986: 28)
When analyzing the influences of military coups,
some key questions need to be asked, such as: Does the
military, or any part of it, see itself as having
political responsibilities? (Raddock, 1986: 28) For
example, when a military sees itself as having politi-
r
cal responsibilities, commanders are inextricably
intertwined^with the nation's polity. They hold top
positions and are frequently consulted on major deci-
63


sions.
In Indonesia military service is often prereq-
uisite for high government service. (Sundhaussen, 1978)
, 'I I
The military also carries out vital civil functions.
i.:
(Sundhaussen, 1978: 100)
r
There1are several other factors that must also be
examined wijthin the context of analyzing military
coups. First, the political, social, and economic
'] i.
conditions that could cause a military coup. (Raddock,
I i
1986: 27) It is especially important to determine
whether these are the same as for the general popula-
tion. (Raddpck, 1986: 28) If not, than the causes of
coups may bS; within the military establishment itself.
Within this
er are whet
context, the important questions to consid-
er the military has enough prestige, mobil-
! I
ity (particularly for junior officers attempting to
, i'
advance), pay, and other benefits. (Raddock, 1986: 28)
The military can also provide other indicators of
political instability. These can be used in a somewhat
, i;
more refined; approach to examining political stability.
In this approach it is important to not only know that
' i. ;
there is conflict between junior and senior military
officers, biijt the origins of the conflict and how view-
points diff
er. (Raddock, 1986: 30)2
64


i
ii1
On the! Icivi 1 ian side, it is crucial to look beyond
I !]-'
differing political parties and interest groups to the
ii!
factions within them. (Raddock, 1986: 33) Not all can
j<:
!|j 1
be identified because some are not represented by
HI !'
formal groups. Furthermore, allegiances within fac-
Jj
tions may viary and there may be some crossover to other
"i' ,
' |J
groups. (Raddock, 1986: 33) (Factional alliances are
! I
an important attribute of Indonesian politics.) Within
'1
a factionalj!j [polity it is necessary to derive the link-
ages between! party and factional affiliations and the
' 1 1
.*1 :
country's leadership core. (Raddock, 1986: 33)
i :
Factibrls and affiliations can be determined by
; Ii !
observing hifow top officials interact with each other
and promote!;[subordinates. Close attention must be paid
to efforts
by aspiring politicians and technocrats to
enter the inner circles of government. When success-
. j|:
ful, it is: [necessary to determine how and why they
1'
succeeded.' 'When making such a determination it also
if
necessary t'o observe how these politicians and techno-
ill
crats affiliated with older and more prominent leaders
iji
as well as [which factions they joined. Finally, if
ill
factions orj] affiliations are the only tried and proven
65


,1' I
i I,
means for political advancement, their support base
' (: p
and reasonslj, f or success should be examined. If success
is due to ail; charismatic leader or elite core the abili-
?!
ty of this system to transfer power to succeeding
generations|i must be assessed. (Raddock, 1986: 7)
"{l
Countries with authoritarian regimes and charis-
, ?!
matic leadejrs find it very difficult to ensure smooth
!'' I
transition, jojf power, especially when the leadership
l'1 I
does not ha'v'e support of elite groups. (Raddock, 1986:
i i '
' i' |,
8) The problem is made worse when a leader establishes
|! 1
himself (or; {herself) on the bases of self-eminence and
ii |
charisma iri; an environment marked by an absence of
institutionalized procedures for succession. In these
countries political stability can be measured in terms
of power tijlalnsitions.
Even ijlf the political dynamics do not hinge upon a
i: \
single leader or decision-making core, the support of
' '! f
the masses i'for a country's leadership decisions need to
'
be appraised. (Raddock, 1986: 20) Such an appraisal
:i!
may be madeiby observing the number and frequency of
' !'
riots, work; j stoppages, and strikes. If these events
i1
begin to include not only members of a disenfranchised
I. .
ii :
66


middle clasp, but also a peasant class that is barely
. I'
surviving then political instability is very likely.
At firjst glance, it appears to be relatively easy
!!' !'
to identifyjthe poorest members of a society. But how
' l|. ;
are they distinguished from those that lost what they
ii: |
had or ever! [individuals with high expectations? The
i,!
v |
first step /is to identify efforts by the government to
!; i'
jl j
improve the;/conditions of a specific constituency.
i
Then the extjent that the political leadership has
ji i1
developed a consensus among elites to sustain the
!'1.
: \
continuity llof reform from one administration to the
|!
next must be determined. Finally, an understanding of
I;1 i
the groups '/expectations for beneficial change must be
considered,.! | Those with high expectations can be iden-
'1
tified when there is evidence of continued government
;i' i
efforts to (/improve their living conditions. When
1. The ml/ddle class, when it exists, can be pivotal
in developing countries suffering from economic and
social deterioration. It can be a source of tremendous
instability;;,1 because usually the dissatisfied, revolu-
tionary "cdjunter-elite" is drawn from the educated,
frustrated; [young members of the middle class. Fur-
thermore ,tj:he middle class usually harbors some of the
greatest hopes for advancement which are ruined when
the economic; and social environment of a country dete-
riorates. !'!
67
l! !


|i t
efforts to improve living standards have clearly been
S!
sustained for some period of time, it can be assumed
that expectations are high.
Instability may also be evident through turmoil in
i,
the electoral process. When instability exists parties
. I. '
change and candidates are cycled rapidly through the
government in what appears to be a vain effort to find
i; l
leaders capable of solving problems quickly and pain-
lessly. Ultimately, such an environment creates a
political pliralysis that is self-defeating.
Policies cannot be implemented because programs do
i' f
;i:i
not have enough continuity or time or to become effec-
tive. The situation continues to stagnate and citizens
i
!
demand action, or at least to know why no improvement
takes place.1 1 Ultimately even more instability is
' i: :
created.
To analyze the relationship between participation,
institutionalization and stability Huntington suggests
that two permutations be examined -- praetorian (bu-
reaucratic polities) and civilian systems. (Hunting-
ton, 1968: 8
0)
|i ,
68


Civic &. Praetorian Systems
r
In praetorian systems there are low levels of
institutionalization and high levels of participation.
(Huntington, 1968: 80 81) A few vocal and charismat-
ic social l|eaders have an inordinate amount of influ-
ence upon the policy making process. (Huntington,
1968) Therje is little infrastructure to coordinate the
J-i !
participation and in such an environment policies and
procedures cannot withstand leadership transitions.
L
(Huntington;*,1968) The level of participation exceeds
the level of institutionalization and stability is
difficult. | (Huntington, 1968: 398) In such systems
there is either virtual anarchy or enormous power in
the hands of a select few. (Huntington, 1968: 398) As
i ,
we can see I'n the following quote from Huntington the
i
result is an unstable environment:
The patjterns of political participation are neither
stable n;'or institutionalized; they may oscillate
violently between one form and another. As Plato
and Aristotle pointed out long ago, corrupt or
praetorian societies often swing back and forth
between1 despotism and mob rule. (Huntington, 1968:
82) !
Praetorian politics contrast with civic politics
69


I'11
-- systems
80) Civic
characterized by a large ratio of institu-
tionalization to participation. (Huntington, 1968:
politics have stable patterns of institu-
tional authority appropriate to the general level of
political participation. (Huntington, 1968: 82) At
all levels
political institutions are strong enough to
provide a basis for legitimate political order and a
process by
information can flow in and out. (Hunting-
ton, 1968:182)
. t(
In the following passage we can more clearly see
the relationship, as expressed by Huntington, between
; i'
institutionalization and civic politics, that ensures
political
.egitimacy:
The distinguishing characteristic of a highly
institutionalized polity in contrast, [to less
institutionalized praetorian systems] is the price
it places on power. In a civic polity, the price
of authority involves limitations on the resources
that may be acquired, and the attitudes that power
wielder^ may hold. (Huntington, 1968: 83)
Determining1; Which System Exists
By using the characteristics of civic and praeto-
rian politics it is possible to determine which system
70


;! i
exists iris |:a country at a particular time. Once such a
determination is made it is also possible to observe
I
progression from a less to more advanced systems, if
, i
such a transition is observable and possible.
h >
Since praetorian and civic systems can be distin-
' jl I
guished bjjj the degree of participation, involvement in
the decision making process, and institutionalization,
, ,i
ii
these attributes provide a means by which to make a
determination of which system exists in a particular
country al't a specific time. (Huntington, 1968: 80)
In making a determination of which system exists
'
at a particular time it is necessary to understand the
; i
dynamics,that allow such a system to exist. These
dynamics ^re known as culture, which as the definition
below indicates are the set of rules that govern social
interaction within a society. Huntington does not
directly [address the issue of culture, though he does
acknowledge that is plays an important role especially
in determining resistance to change and political
legitimacy. (Huntington, 1968: 35, 327-328)
71


I
Culture
I --------
Culture can cause the resistance to change that
Huntingtori; found at the heart of political instability.
It can also provide some illumination on aspects of
social mobilization such as changes in attitudes and
expectations.
r .
Analysis of culture are difficult to address for
several reasons. First, cultures are, almost by
i', i *
'ii,
definition, specific. Their intrusion into discussions
[;
forces an Uncomfortable compromise between universali-
j
ties and particulars, between general laws and anec-
dotes. Se;cond, and linked to the idea of cultural
differentiation, is the concept of cultural differenti-
ation, that worth of cultures might be different, a
I' \
i
perception that can all too readily be twisted into
abnormal denigration or 'a priori' condemnation of
I '
cultural tjrjaits and people who display them.
(O'Malley,! 1988: 327) To avoid such pitfalls this
examination of Javanese and Indonesian culture attempts
i, i
to exclude | judgmental comments and only attempt to
I
articulate observations of cultural attributes. In
72


order to undertake such a task it is necessary to
clearly define what is meant by culture. To do this we
turn to a definition utilized by R. Keesing.
Keesirig defines culture as being what an individu-
al
al understands about the guidelines that others within
the same group follow. Thus, culture is basically the
rules by which a society lives. (Keesing, 1973: 73-97)
That is, culture is a society's ordered system of
values and symbols that regulate life. To this defini-
I" ;
tion JamesISpradely adds the following clarifying
statement :!,,
Important to this definition is the idea that
culture is a kind of knowledge, not behavior. It
is in [people's heads. It reflects the mental
categories they learn from others as they grow up.
It helps them generate behavior and interpret what
they experience. (Spradely, 1987: 12)
Thus,. culture dictates how people interpret their
environment and interactions with each other. In
effect, it!1 'is the binding element tying individuals
together through integrated patterns of thought, commu-
ii1
nication, and behavior. For these reasons it is a cru-
cial element in determining societal basis of legitima-
'ii, \
cy and acceptance of change -- the very attributes upon
which Huntington basis his thesis


I
Rejection of development and modernization ef-
|, '
forts, as in the Chinese case, can be traced to the
all-inclusive nature of these social transformations.
Development and modernization are multifaceted process-
es involving changes in some of the most basic areas of
Is .
I I
human thought and activity. These bring about far-
reaching transformations of economic, social, and
i,
political^structures of production, distribution, and
consumption within modernizing countries. In the
' J
process, traditional social, economic, and psychologi-
I
cal commitments are eroded or broken down. They are
replaced with new patterns of socialization and behav-
ior (Deutsch, 1961: 494) which are a consequence of
increased communications, education, and urbanization.
With,the introduction of these modern attributes
J
the traditional fabric of societies begins to change.
(Huntington, 1968: 35) Questions about traditional
methodologies and values are raised. Until a new
'll 1
culture^- emerges, a void develops where these new ideas 1
1. The new culture does not have to mean complete
abandonment of the old. Development success stories
such as Japan clearly illustrate that modern ideas can
74


and institutions are not fully accredited and yet
J.| ;
traditional methodologies are questioned. (Huntington,
1968: 35) ;;
Within such an environment it is impractical to
v
examine cultural influences within the context of
I. ;
development planning without focusing upon specific
elements and reactions in relation to economic policies
and decisions. Focusing upon individual components of
culture and not dealing with the holistic concepts of
I'
culture lacks some of the glamour of grand theorizing,
but it is undoubtedly a more effective method of meas-
uring significant influences.
The cultural attributes that we will examine are
those that deal with change, perceptions of just and
legitimate leadership, and notions of self.
To address these cultural attributes we will
examine how a society historically defines and portrays
l
just leaders. We will also examine how the individual
!' 1
. .Continued. .
be assimilated into the traditional culture, creating a
new culture in the process. The notion that moderniza-
tion and development necessitate wholesale adoption of
Western culture is fundamentally flawed, for as anthro-
pologists!'! conti nue to make clear, there is no one
Western culture.
75


views him/herself in relation to the society or cosmos.
r'
Positioning of self is a useful determination of self-
esteem and individual actions in Indonesia. (Erring-
I
ton, 1989) The other and final area of cultural analy-
sis that we will undertake is attitudes toward the
h
abandonment of traditional security or safety methods.
(Scott, 1 ?|7 6: 19-20)
Traditional safety mechanisms are evident in
traditional views toward risk^, which can be seen
I ,
, t
through traditional disaster relief policies (for
events such as catastrophic crop failures), and provi-
i'
sion of minimum income levels. (Scott, 1976)
In traditional societies peasants are risk averse.
I
They seek props and methods which provide the greatest
rate of return on their labor, and most importantly,
least risk. (Scott, 1976: 4) Where these objectives
clash, thei peasant will usually choose traditional and
1. By inference, views toward risk can indicate will-
ingness to1;.iaccept change. As mentioned above, moderni-
zation efforts bring about change and with any change
there is sbjme degree of risk. According the adversion
to risk brings about instability and thus necessitating
institutions or authoritarian leadership to offset the
resulting [instability.
76


perceptively least risky venture, especially if he is
close to the margin for failure. This can be seen in
."i;
the following statement by Joy:
l1' 1
l '
Subsistence farmers may resist innovation because
it means departing from a system that is efficient
in miriimizing the risk of catastrophe to one that
significantly increases risk. (Joy, 1969: 377-
378) !'!
The tolerance for risk here depends upon how
closely peasant resources skirt basic subsistence
needs. (Scott, 1976: 19-20) Thus, according to Scott:
Given i,a choice, the peasant preferred a system of
tenancy or dependency in which the landlord/patron
protected his tenant/client against ruin in bad
years land an officialdom which, at the very least,
made allowances in periods of dearth. These elites
should ideally assume a protected role akin to
village patterns of sharing. To the extent that
the peasant could actually structure his relations
with llandowners and with the state ... he did move
the relationship in this direction. (Scott, 1976:
19-20)j
These traditional security measures insured that
I
peasants had what amounted to subsistence income lev-
els. In most developing countries maintenance of
I
minimum subsistence incomes does not always occur --
especially in areas that utilize capitalist labor
i
77


markets ; Relative preferences for security over
income might be measured by acceptance of lower wages
I ,
for increased security. It can also be seen in resist-
ance to change and innovation.
j;
The resistance to change driven by a desire for
security is greatest in traditional and transformation-
al, preindustrial societies. In these societies mini-
mum income levels have social and cultural implica-
tions. To be a fully functioning member of these
;l '
societies individuals and households need a minimum
j
level of Resources to discharge ceremonial and social
obligations while continuing to cultivate and feed
themselves. Palling below this level increases the
risk not only of starvation but also of dislocation.
(Scott, 1976) 1 2
1. In countries that utilize centrally planning
models of jdevelopment the situation may be no better.
For proof of this one has only to examine Vietnams
situation ,in the 1980s or Chinas during the "Great
Leap Forward" (late 1950s). Both of these countries
suffered terribly because minimum subsistence levels
could not be maintained due to poor planning and infra-
structure bottlenecks.
j
2. For further illumination of the characteristics of
preindustri.al societies see: Heilbroner, 1980= 7.
78


Conclusion

The process of determining a methodological frame-
.!
work for determining if Huntington's thesis that polit-
I
ical institutions and stability are necessary for
,ii
political modernization requires a multivariate exami-
nation. In making such a validation the factors that
Huntington defines as being necessary for political
I' !
modernization must be addressed. These include politi-
cal participation, institutionalization, political
stabi 1 ity,:
and culture. In the preceding pages we have
careful ly !,reviewed the indicators that can address
i''1
these issues with respect to Indonesia's modernization
efforts. ",
1
Political aspects of modernization are not the
only attributes that must be addressed in trying to
t
examine the validity of Huntington's thesis in Indone-
sia since 1966. Economic development and social mobi-
lization must also be taken into account. The next
chapter examines these attributes of modernization
within the context of Huntington's thesis.
79


CHAPTER 4
CONCEPTUAL ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK PART II:
,!| ' ASSESSING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
AND SOCIAL MOBILIZATION
' 'iir
The purpose of this chapter is to assess aspects
of economic development and social mobilization ap-
plicable to the formulation of a conceptual model
i 1
i
capable of determining the validity of Huntington's
ij
thesis iri [Indonesia. In proposing the analytical
framework,; Huntington's definitions of economic devel-
I
opment and; social mobilization are used to suggest
indicators capable of addressing these nonpolitical
ii
aspects of Huntington's thesis.
Economic development and social mobilization are
essential to understanding and determining the validity
I
of Huntington's thesis in Indonesia because Suharto's
i i
government bases its legitimacy upon economic develop-
ment and slocial mobilization. (O'Malley, 1988: 342)
Furthermore, legitimacy, as we saw in the last chapter,
is an important component of political stability and
therefore addresses the basis of Huntington's thesis.


I
i
'! Restatement of Huntington' s Thesis
Huntington's thesis is based upon the relationship
between modernization and instability resulting from
the process of social mobilization and economic devel-
i.'
opment. The fundamental assertion in this thesis is
I :
that political instability results from a lack of
i|
institutions. To build these institutions and thus
achieve stability Huntington asserts that authoritarian
regimes may be necessary to encourage the creation of a
supportive;environment.
Before it is possible to suggest indicators to
analyze the aspects of Indonesia's social mobilization
and economic development, it is necessary to examine
Huntington's definition of modernization and focus upon
linkages between political instability, economic devel-
opment, social mobilization, and institutions. Hunt-
,1 :
ington defines modernization as being more than just a
political ^phenomenon. It is a multifaceted process
that involves changes in all areas of human activity
and thought. (Huntington, 1968: 32) According to
Daniel Lerner, whom Huntington cites, modernity is a
81


process with its own distinctive quality which entails
systematic,"urbanization, industrialization, seculari-
zation, democratization, education, [and] media partic-
ipation."
(Lerner: 438, cited in Huntington, 1968: 32)
These attributes, as can be seen in the following
ji".
passage, have historically been:
so highly associated as to raise the question
whether they are genuinely independent factors at
all --l suggesting that they went together so regu-
larly [because, in some historical sense, they had
to go together. (Lerner: 438, cited in Huntington,
1968: 32, italics in original)
The rmiiltifaceted nature of Huntington's conceptu-
alization of modernization includes psychological
factors which directly relate to social mobilization.
j ,
Huntington! ; outlines the relationship in the following:
At thfipsychological level, modernization involves
a fundamental shift in values, attitudes, and
expectations. Traditional man expected continuity
in nature and society and did not believe in the
capacity of man to change and control either.
Modern; man, in contrast, accepts the possibility of
change1 and believes in its desirability. He has,
in Lerner's phrase, a "mobile personality" that
adjusts to changes in his environment. These
changes typically require the broadening of loyal-
ties and identifications from concrete and immedi-
ate groups (such as the family, clan, and village)
to larger and more impersonal groupings (such as
class |and nation). With this goes an increasing
reliance on universalistic values rather than of
, i11
82


t
r
i1 i
11
i !
ascription in judging individuals. (Huntington,
1968: 32)
According to Huntington, the shift in values
brought on by modernization also entails an expansion
of knowledge about the ambient environment and a diffu-
I
sion of such knowledge throughout society. (Hunting-
ton, 1968: 33) Diffusion of knowledge takes place
through increased literacy, mass communications, and
education: It also results from demographic changes.
In the demographic sense, modernization entails in-
creases in!occupational, vertical, and geographical
mobility, particularly the rapid growth in the ratio of
urban to rural population. (Huntington, 1968: 33)
Furthermore, demographic modernization is marked by
increases'in life expectancy and decreased infant
mortality resulting from improved health care.
(Huntington, 1968: 33) These changes result in social
mobilization.
i
Social Mobilization
and Economic Development
Social mobilization tends to cause supplementation
of the family and other diffuse groups with more spe-
1 83