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Movement towards Fascism in post-September 11 America

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Title:
Movement towards Fascism in post-September 11 America
Creator:
Barclay, Devon Michael
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Language:
English
Physical Description:
vii, 105 leaves : illustrations ; 28 cm

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords:
Since 2001 ( fast )
Fascism -- United States ( lcsh )
September 11 Terrorist Attacks, 2001 -- Influence ( lcsh )
National security -- United States ( lcsh )
Diplomatic relations ( fast )
Fascism ( fast )
Influence (Literary, artistic, etc.) ( fast )
National security ( fast )
Politics and government ( fast )
Politics and government -- United States -- 2001- ( lcsh )
Foreign relations -- United States -- 2001- ( lcsh )
United States ( fast )
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bibliography ( marcgt )
theses ( marcgt )
non-fiction ( marcgt )

Notes

Bibliography:
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 90-105).
General Note:
Department of Humanities and Social Sciences
Statement of Responsibility:
by Devon Michael Barclay.

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|University of Colorado Denver
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Auraria Library
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All applicable rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier:
57497263 ( OCLC )
ocm57497263
Classification:
LD1190.L58 2004m B37 ( lcc )

Full Text
MOVEMENT TOWARDS FASCISM IN
POST-SEFIEMBER 11 AMERICA
by
Devon Michael Barclay
B.A., University of Colorado at Denver, 2002
A thesis submitted to the
University of Colorado at Denver
in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Humanities
2004


This thesis for the Master of Humanities
degree by
Devon Michael Barclay
has been approved
by
Lucy Ware McGuffe;


Barclay, Devon Michael (MH)
Movement Towards Fascism in Post-September 11 America
Thesis directed by Professor Michael S. Cummings
ABSTRACT
Much has been made of the concept of a national security state since the attacks on
the World Trade Centre and Pentagon on September 11, 2001. However, little research
has been performed as to what changes in this direction actually mean. In this paper, I
argue that the changes in foreign and domestic security policy since 2001 have
endangered democratic processes and moved the United States closer to fascism. The
first chapter searches for a generic concept of fascism that can be used for this
examination, taking care to describe fascism based on structural elements. The second
section examines long-term movements in American society that could have opened the
way for fascist processes, paying particular attention to emergence of the New Right
and to psychological factors related to mass apathy. The concluding section looks at
government policy since September 11 including the War on Terror, USA PATRIOT
Act, National Security Doctrine, school vouchers, and redistricting to examine
structural elements of a possible shift towards fascism as well as long term dangers to
democracy.
This abstract accurately represents the content of the candidates theis. I recommend its
publication.
Signed
Michael S. Cummings
ill


ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
My deepest thanks to professors Michael Cummings, Tony Robinson and Lucy Ware
McGuffey for the quality of their advice during the preparation of this manuscript, and
for their assistance as I worked to clarify the concepts I have used below. Thanks also
to Laci Simity, for reading and commenting on parts of this thesis. Thanks especially to
Jessica Baker, for her continual support and valuable insights as I was writing, and for
no longer voting Republican.


CONTENTS
Figures.....................................................vii
CHAPTER
1. A FASCISM FOR OUR TIME.................................1
Problems In Defining Fascism..........................1
Vulnerability and the Acceptance of Fascist Logic..5
The Revised Concept of the Nation..............7
Fascist Violence as an Organising Principle.....8
Consolidation of Power.........................11
2. POLITICAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS
FOR FASCIST MOVEMENT.....................................15
The Fascist-Minded Citizen...........................15
From Crippled Individuals to Savage Mobs.............20
But It Cant Happen Here.............................24
3. THE EMERGENT FASCIST FRAMEWORK
IN THE UNITED STATES.....................................27
The Pre-September 11 American Public.................27
The Bush Administrations Mass Support...............33
Radicalisation of the Rural Community................37
v


The New Right......................................43
A Fascist Framework?...............................48
4. SEPTEMBER 11 AND THE RISE OF FASCIST VIOLENCE.........54
9/11 Reaction: Invoking the Nation.................54
Fascist Violence...................................57
Violence Against Ideas.............................63
The Permanent Majority.............................66
Some Conclusions...................................70
5. ENDNOTES..............................................74
6. BIBLIOGRAPHY..........................................90
vi


FIGURES
FIGURE
1. Republican Party Support in the 2000 Election By County
vil


CHAPTER 1
A FASCISM FOR OUR TIME
.. .as I survey the entire panorama of contending forces, I can readily
detect something more important [than the current political scene]: the
outline of a powerful logic of events.. .In the United States it points toward
more concentrated, unscrupulous, repressive, and militaristic
control... [which], to preserve the privileges of the ultra-rich, the
corporate overseers, and the brass in the military and civilian order,
squelches the rights and liberties of other people both at home and
abroad. That is friendly fascism.1
Problems in Defining Fascism
Fascism is, as most scholars agree, notoriously hard to define. Indeed, the question as
to which historical regimes were actually fascist is hotly contested. For example, do we
include both interwar Italy and interwar Germany, or is German National Socialism
(Nazism) an entirely different phenomenon?2 What are we to make of Japan, culturally
very different from Italy and Germany, but also commonly associated with fascism and
displaying many of the outward signs?3 Some brutal Latin American regimes Perons
Argentina, for example have been called fascist, and have even modelled themselves
on Mussolinis regime.4 And many, Hannah Arendt among them, have sought a label
that would cover both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.5 While famous scholars
like Renzo de Felice and Ernst Nolte reject the fascism of many candidate regimes,
arguing that fascism can only be discussed in light of interwar Europe,6 this is obviously
1


not a position I hold in this paper. After all, there are monarchies in the Middle East
today. Would one argue that this is the only place and time where a monarchy could
exist?
Monarchies have emerged the world over at ripe moments, just as other systems
of government can also emerge at ripe moments. If we have a solid understanding of
fascisms characteristics and what constitutes a ripe moment, then we should know
where to look for fascism and how to recognise it when it occurs. We have generic
fascism: a characteristic way fascist ideologues diagnose what they see as the current
political and cultural crisis... [remedied by] the utopian vision of an entirely new order.7
While, as a heavily nationalist ideology, fascism should be different in each nation that
adopts it, this opening description should give us firm ground from which to proceed.
I have attempted to circumvent some of the problems mentioned above by
restricting my definitive analysis, to the extent possible, on the one case that virtually
everybody considers fascist: Fascist Italy. I have also had to reorient my definition of
fascism somewhat, incorporating an analysis of how fascist systems emerge in the hope
that this will elucidate what is and is not fascist. I argue that at moments of crisis
particularly where the nation is perceived to be threatened fascistically oriented
elites are able to take power, and with it make policies and changes to the system that
radically alter the societies they govern. As Korten writes, under such circumstances,
the greater the immediacy or urgency [of the perceived problem], the greater the
demand that all available resources be channeled directly toward the attainment of the
2


[solution]. This is sometimes difficult to do while still attempting to maintain truly
democratic institutions.8
There are, of course, practical problems too. One scholar, in warning writers
like me to abandon the concept entirely, laments: full of emotion and empty of real
meaning, the word fascism is one of the most abused and abusive in our political
vocabulary.9 1960s radicals hurled the term about to describe members of the
American establishment and the repressive methods they employed to break the
protests and organisation of radical movements. Meanwhile, establishment figures
themselves used the term as a label for both domestic and international communist
and pinko figures,10 capitalising on fascisms post-war stigma of violence and horror
in an effort to legitimate Americanism and bolster support for their policies.11
Decades of opportunistic usage have made it difficult to write with credibility an
analysis of whether the United States is moving closer to fascism in a contemporary
context. Researchers are justifiably squeamish about describing fascist trends.
Yet, while the dangers in misusing the term are obvious, there are also obvious
dangers in failing to diagnose fascism when it arises. I suspect that few would willingly
support leaders who had been credibly labelled as fascists. Yet an unlabelled elite could
attract mass support in exactly the same way the classic fascists did, all the while hiding
behind the idea that fascism cant happen here.12 A good definition, adequately
accounting for the ripe moments in which fascism emerges, will make it harder for
reckless people to throw the term around, make credible research on such an important
3


topic much more acceptable, and, it is hoped, restore to our political vocabulary a label
that, once applied, demands preventative action and vigorous resistance.
It worth noting before we begin some of the prominent attempts to identify the fascist
framework that have come before this one: Ernst Noltes six-point fascist minimum,
and the tri-partite fascist description advanced by Stanley Payne. Noltes fascist
minimum is worth examining first, if only because Paynes description is essentially an
edition of it. In point form, it reads:
antimarxism
antiliberalism
anticonservatism
the leadership principle
a party army
and the aim of totalitarianism13
Payne agreed that fascist systems had incorporated antimarxism, antiliberalism,
and anticonservatism, but rejected the rest of Noltes points because they were derived
especially from German National Socialism [in a way] that cannot in such simple
formulation be correlated with other varieties of a broader political species.14 He
added categories examining fascisms authoritarian leadership, its allied government-
business corporate structure, its militaristic, expansionist attempt to alter the states
position vis-a-vis other states, and its attempt to inculcate fascist values into the public
culture. He also added a category focussing on fascisms aesthetic elements its
reliance on theatrical symbolism in portraying the leadership and the story of the state,
4


violence, the masculine principle, and a tendency toward a personal style of
command.15
The influence of Noltes ideas particularly as regards the leadership principle
and the aim of totalitarianism is clear when the two are viewed side by side. In
addition, Paynes third category explains fascist presentation rather well a topic we will
touch on below. Yet while both descriptions adequately describe the outward signs and
symbols of some past fascist regimes, they lack a feeling for what fascism was to the
people who supported it. In this sense, neither definition is very useful in holding off
the advance of resurgent movements. Keeping Noltes and Paynes descriptions in
mind, then, the first and second sections of this thesis outline additional areas of
importance and advance my own generic theory of fascism.
Vulnerability and the Acceptance of Fascist Logic
Paxton has written that each national variant of fascism draws its legitimacy.. .not from
some universal scripture but from what it considers the most authentic elements of its
own community identity.16 Another writer remarks that fascism is best described as an
integrated set of concepts that combine[s] antiliberalism and xenophobic forms of
nationalism.17 For his part, Giovanni Gentile, Mussolinis Philosopher of Fascism -
writing what Mussolini considered the record of note on this topic reported that
fascist politics turn entirely on the concept of the national State.18 Considering
nationalisms importance to the doctrine of fascism, we should be unsurprised then if
5


fascism emerges at instances where the national community sees itself as most threatened,
humiliated, weakened or powerless. In this vein, common explanations for the rise of
Nazism in Germany or Fascism in Italy rest upon the conditions following World War I
for Germany, conditions stemming from the Treaty of Versailles. For Italy, the
fascists themselves explained their rise to power in the way the release.. .from the
limits and constraints of wartime discipline [subjected] the political and juridical order
[to] the weight of the popular will,19 as people pressed for a redress of their chaotic
economic situation and fragmented parliamentary system. As studies have shown,
Fascism initially found its popular base among the [most] disillusioned and
impoverished, particularly those living in the hard-hit, veteran-concentrated rural
communities;20 fascism also found an appeal in the divided industrial regions, where it
had a fairly strong tendency to be strongest in the areas in which [the challenges of|
socialism were the strongest.21
Where we find a widespread dread of the groups decadence under the
corrosive effect of individualistic and cosmopolitan liberalism, threatening the
perceived interests of a given community, we should expect an upsurge of support for a
system which justifies.. .action against [that] groups enemies, internal as well as
external.22 Where social conditions enlarge this believing community, we have a
societal space ripe for the emergence of a fascist movement. For reasons elucidated
below, I use the term national community or nation interchangeably with the group
were referring to, or the believing community.
6


The Revised Concept of the Nation
To understand the appeal of the fascist solution, we must first look at the fascists
definition of the nation itself. Their regimes violence, ruthless consolidation of power,
and totalising aspects are interrelated consequences that emerge from this idea.
Most fascisms reject the state-individual relationships of both liberalism and
socialism, in favour of a concept of the nation into which both the state and the
individual collapse. In this sense, fascism is very much like conventional nationalism.
As Gentile wrote, both Nationalism and Fascism place the State at the very foundation
of every individual value and right. For both, the State is not a consequence, but a
beginning.23 However, for Nationalists, the State is conceived of as prior to the
individual.. .For Fascism, on the other hand, the State and the individual are one, or
better, perhaps, State and individual are terms that are inseparable in a necessary
synthesis. This revision to the basic idea of nationalism agrees that all societies
existing on earth are true organisms endowed with life which far transcends that of
individuals and which is sustained for centuries and millennia.24 But fascists go
beyond this notion, however, in making the organic state an ethical imperative, and
insisting that the nation is not a natural existence, but a moral reality. Thus to the
fascist-minded, no one find[s] the nation at birth, everyone must work to create it... [it]
is rather a product of an active will that constantly directs itself towards its ideal.25
7


It is from this concept that Emilio Gentile drew his now famous description of
fascism as a secular religion. He argued that because of its conception that politics
constituted an all-consuming existence, fascism aimed at abolishing the boundaries
between the religious and political spheres.. .As with all romantic nationalism, Italian
nationalism constructed its own symbolic world, giving the idea of the nation a sacred
aura.26 As Mussolini claimed, for us the Nation is not just territory, but something
spiritual.27 Fascists sought not just to break the boundaries between religion and
politics, but to bring politics, seen as inseparable from the state, into every aspect of life.
In turn, religious leaders Catholics, in Italy were early on brought into
accommodation with the fascist regime. They aided the larger project by not only
lending fascism cultural credibility in deeply religious societies, but also by giving the
fascist regime access to an educational system (in the form of Italys widespread
parochial schools) and the moral allegiance of many Italians.
Fascist Violence as an Organising Principle
While nationalisms are real in the sense that people feel them and classify themselves
and others on the basis' of them, it is also true that they are socially constructed and
are not naturally occurring.28 Identification with the nation thus poses one obvious
question: Who is in, and who is out? Under the concept of the organic state, those who
constantly create the state through the direction of their will are its only legitimate
members. All others domestic critics of the state, certainly, but particularly those
8


living outside the perceived territory of the state (often direcdy blamed for the problems
confronting the national community) are enemies of the state, rightly attacked.
Internationally, such an outlook tends to take on Darwinist characteristics: if each
nation is an organism competing for resources and prestige, confrontation between
nations is logical, natural. This obviously increases the need to ready for war.
The process may reinforce the psychic existence of the fascist organism. As
one observer of this phenomenon writes, lurking beneath the surface of every
society.. .is the passionate yearning for a nationalist cause that exalts us, the kind that
war alone is able to deliver. It reduces and at times erases the anxiety of individual
consciousness. We abandon individual responsibility for a shared, unquestioned
communal enterprise, however morally dubious.29 The threat of the other provides
the impetus for unified national sentiment.
The Nazis, famously, extended this logic to a racial war on a global scale. As
Bertram Gross observed, racism allowed Nazi propagandists to tie the struggle for
territorial expansion to the struggle between Good and Evil, between the Master Race
which is the fount of all culture, art, beauty, and genius and the inferior beings.. .who
were the enemies of civilization. Scholars generally argue that in order to wage a war
of conquest or to identify ones group as superior to others, some degree of racism is
required.30 Yet while all ultra-nationalisms are racist in their celebration of the alleged
virtues and greatness of an organically-conceived nation or culture,31 how this identity
manifests itself in terms of what we think of today as racism is less clear.
9


Because fascist ideology arises within national cultures, it is only where such
elements of heterophobia (fear and hatred of those felt to be different) are already
present in the particular political culture where fascism arises... [that] they will be
incorporated into its myth of national decadence and hence into the policies for creating
the new order. For his part, Gentile thought racism detracted from true fascism, in
that it make the nation into a birthright, rather than an organic whole constandy
created through the peoples will directed through the state.32 A. James Gregor has
argued that, while racism is implicit in fascist ideology, in Italy it emerged in more overt
form as the ideology progressed. It is important to establish, he argues, that race
pride was understood as a new national consciousness... [and that] the term Aryan was
in common usage in Italy and was used to refer to any number of peoples who spoke
one of the related languages designated as Indoeuropean.33 While racism held special
meaning in the creation of the Nazi and Japanese interwar regimes, Italian fascist racism
became more virulent and more specific in its definition of the other over time -
possibly picking up emphasis from the dominance of Nazism on the European
continent Nationalisms [can] vary, thus, between claims to have superseded traditional
identities such as ethnicity by the founding of a true and modem nation, and claims to
national identity and sovereignty rooted precisely in ancient ethnicity.34
In an American context, analysts like Gross have maintained that contemporary
domestic conditions suggest that a resurgent fascism is unlikely to return to the overt
racism seen in the Nazi era. Instead, in a resurgent form of friendly fascism, racism is
10


mote likely to emerge as a set of conflicts among the slobs35 as groups compete for
diminishing economic opportunities. Recent writers have noted the way government
policy might exacerbate intergroup tensions through nurturing group-preference
systems for example, through programmes like Affirmative Action36 or by resorting
to divisive, racial appeals [and] class antagonisms setting black against white or poor
against rich to win elections.37 But it should be noted that today, even these cynical
appeals tend to be grounded in language that exalts the fundamental equality of all
people, and presents its policies as a method of redressing fundamental inequalities in
the system. Overt racism in politics especially domestically, in large democracies
where parties must (at least initially) capture the centre vote has been largely
discredited. When intergroup, racist violence occurs, it is likely to be the act of
reactionary elements in the wider community and receive official condemnation from
policy-making elites. Militarism, however, remains a defining characteristic of fascist
violence.
Consolidation of Power
Fascist violence is not, however, a purely physical phenomenon. Just as militaries exalt
the chain of command and violently punish dissent, highly militarised cultures can also
exalt the chain of command and punish dissent. One defining characteristic of fascistic
and highly authoritarian regimes is their unquestioned hold on power, maintained
through a tightly defended one-party system. This one characteristic is common to
11


most every historical regime that is widely labelled fascist. Fascist regimes wage a war of
ideas and fight vigorously against those ideas (and people) that might subvert their mass
base. In the worst cases, dissenters are persecuted and may disappear generally with
the help of courts whose impartiality is a thing of the past, and from systems where
rights to free speech and assembly have either been revoked or were never firmly
established. Information becomes tightly controlled and political debate is sharply
curtailed or eliminated. Educational and socialisation processes are modified to create
recruits for the regime in future generations.38 The final goal is to subvert all organs of
thought within the state to the directive minority, ultimately embodied in the will of a
single dictator. As Gentile wrote, the necessity of the Fascist Party and all of the
institutions of propaganda and education that foster the political and moral ideals of
Fascism [is in ensuring] that the thought and the will of the solitary person, the Duce,
becomes the thought and will of the masses.39
The successful revocation of political freedom entails a normative shift in the
relationship between the leaders and the led. If one agrees that an emotive appeal to the
national community provides fascisms initial driving support in the mass population
that feelings propel fascism more than thought does40 one can understand the
importance showmanship now takes. When the fascist elite can link symbolic elements
portraying the nation to symbols that benefit fascist policy strong leadership, combat,
and a struggle of the people against the perceived enemy they have produced a
propaganda event which both meets [the partys] own political need for legitimation and
12


responds to the cultural needs of a broad cross-section of the...public41 In this vein, as
one sociologist argues, there was a deeper connection between fascism and form. The
translation of [fascist life] for the masses was Believe, Fight, and Obey a call to action
without an object, to a style of behavior without a goal.. .in Italian fascist society, the
content was secondary because the fascists wished to create a feeling of participation,
not actual participation, in the community.42 One should be unsurprised, then, if the
prevailing public discourse begins to take on a militarist chic in line with the goals and
orientation of the leadership itself. The resultant combination of propaganda images,
militaristic political discourse, and mass-mobilisation gives the fascist regime a
discernible fascist aesthetic.
Thus, we can view fascism as: a highly centralised system of government led by defenders of
an organically conceived national community, who take control of the organs of state at moments when
the nation's identity is in question or threatened, then use violence to defend and expand the national
community against its opponents both within the state and abroad with the aim of sweeping and
pervasive control. We can examine the ideological commitments of leadership figures, and
those who support them, and see whether their views constitute a fascistframework. Most
importandy, we can look at state policy for signs of militarism, suppression of dissent,
control of information, and consolidation of power, as signs of fascist violence perhaps
fascisms most important and prominent defining characteristic. This search is precisely
what I will attempt in the third and fourth sections of this thesis.
13


As Jose Ortega y Gasset pointed out, while it asserts authoritarianism, [fascism]
organises rebellion. It fights against contemporary democracy and, on the other hand,
does not believe in the restoration of any past rule. It seems to pose itself as the forge
of a strong State, and uses means most conducive to its dissolution.. .it is
simultaneously one thing and the contrary, it is A and not A.43 This makes fascism
messy, and perhaps quite unstable, but not hard to spot. Indeed, the instabilities and
dangers inherent in such a system should give us courage to resist its return, rather than
pause in branding a government with its label when the signs are clear.
14


CHAPTER 2
POLITICAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS
FOR FASCIST MOVEMENT
We have now set out those characteristics of violent, repressive government to be
defined as fascism. However, some examination of how systems become fascist seems
in order. What factors make people susceptible to the fascist solution? Considerable
work has been done is this area already within the general rubric of political psychology.
The Fascist-Minded Citizen
Given at least the theoretical possibility that potential fascists are living among us, some
investigation of the specific traits characteristic of those who might support fascist
movement seems in order. As perhaps the most famous study, we could examine
Adorno et. al.s Authoritarian Personality. Based on the assumption that the personality
structure may be such as to render the individual susceptible to anti-democratic
propaganda,44 this work undertaken shortly after the Second World War sought to
determine which factors might have allowed the populace of the Axis countries
(especially Germany) to submit to fascism by interviewing respondents in the United
States. Using a barrage of psychological questions, the researchers were able to score
respondents on an F-scale,45 which represented their propensity to support
15


authoritarian government. Their findings associated scores on the F-scale with anti-
Semitism and racism (a finding whose emphasis links it with a preoccupation with
Nazism rather than what I have looked at as classic fascism). Nonetheless, high F-
scale scores were also linked with nationalism, respect for tough, tireless leaders, and
willingness to support war and repression as state methods to solve national problems
findings that are directly useful for our analysis here.46
It must be noted, however, that in the time since Adorno et. al.s study, the F-
scale has become one of the more contentious issues in social psychology, and a rich
literature has emerged attempting either to debunk or improve upon it. One of the
debunkers, Howard Schuman, attempted to replicate the study through experimental
research in 1992. He argued that Adorno et. al.s F-scale made a poor indicator of
authoritarian characteristics when used across society in general, because lower-educated
respondents tend to be uncritical of sweeping statements and can show deference to
their middle-class interviewers by agreeing with their assertions,47 producing falsely
high scores. At the same time, because agreement with the same items by college
graduates is not confounded with such artifacts or is confounded much less, Schuman
argued that these respondents higher scores did represent a genuine embracing of item
content (e.g., rigid division of the world into good and bad categories) and
therefore predict|] intolerance toward political and social outgroups much as the classic
formulation of authoritarianism claimed.48 Thus, when Gregor a staunch critic of the
psychological theories of fascism asks, if authoritarian trends are the hallmark of
16


the lower classes, why did the middle classes follow the lower classes in supporting
Italian Fascism?,49 the F-scale probably works well, in that it is useful in examining the
consistency of the worldviews of middle-class respondents with potential authoritarian
trends. Schumans results, however, indicate that we may need a more sophisticated
model to predict authoritarian tendencies among the less-wealthy, less-urban, less-
educated population. Fortunately, those who have improved upon Adorno et. al.s
work have covered much of this ground.
The researchers of The Authoritarian Personality were aware that those who
conform most to the culture will be the most prejudiced, according to the deeper
source of the conventionality, or rather the type of broader personality structure within
which it had a functional role.50 They argued that conventionality rooted in
subservience to contemporary external social pressure51 held the greatest risks for
antidemocratic receptivity. Unfortunately, as Rokeach pointed out, anti-democratic
receptivity was defined by and large as prejudice directed against Jews, Negroes,
foreigners and the like...[demonstrating],. .confusion between the generic and the
particular in favour of pointing out the bigotry of right-leaners.52 Acknowledging the
somewhat greater tendency for persons to the right of center to be more authoritarian
than persons to the left of center, Rokeach maintained that when tested for measures
like Dogmatism and Opinionation, the results on the whole show[ed] that
authoritarian left-of-center groups (Communists and religious non-believers) and
authoritarian right-of-center groups (Catholics) [both] score relatively high.53 The
17


question thus becomes not only how ethnocentrically prejudiced a people are, but how
rigid and closed-minded they are in general a characteristic that invokes prejudice
under ripe social conditions among both the right and the left.
The work of O. J. Harvey and the exploratory work of Cummings in this field
show that such rigidity (dogmatism) has predictable political-psychological effects on
the individual, and, similarly to the formulations of Adorno et. al. and Fromm above,
implications on a broad scale for the health of democratic systems. This research
indicates that abusive and traumatic parental relations (including deprivation) can create
the foundations for dogmatism: perhaps.. .to insulate the child against the painful
frustration of seeking an interaction with an environment that is unstimulating or
unresponsive, (or worse yet, hostile) the child set[s] up certain dynamic processes that
become consolidated and ingrained and that tend to persist despite the subsequent
alteration of the environmental situation.54 The accompanying lack of environmental
stimuli leaves the developing mind with litde opportunity to learn how to deal with
complex, multidimensional input. Because a more cognitively complex individual has a
more versatile system for perceiving the behaviour of others than does a less cognitively
complex person,55 we can expect to see in the less-developed individual the same rigid
classification of the world into good and bad categories and inflexible viewpoint (as
a result of an unwillingness to accept new information that challenges the security of the
subjects belief-system) that characterised the fascist and authoritarian individuals
described above. The same lack of stimulation experienced through cultural, rather
18


than parental, deprivation can have the same effects, through the same process.56 As
Harvey writes, it is quite probable.. .that high environmental constancy and simplicity
across time and tasks reduce the greater relative effectiveness of the more abstract
[cognitive] system; indeed, such environmental conditions might even render concrete
functioning more appropriate.57
This is to say, where individuals receive supportive parenting that both provides
stimuli and allows them to evaluate it, and where they are presented with diverse social
information and given formative experience evaluating and integrating it, their cognitive
development will favour a freer-thinking, more open-minded structure. Again, Harvey:
Self or conceptual systems possessed of both high differentiation and
integration of component parts, referred to as being more abstract, were
treated as disposing toward lower stereotypy and greater flexibility in the
face of complex and changing problem situations, toward greater
creativity, explorative behavior, tolerance of stress, and resiliency in
response alien environmental inputs as well as toward greater
independence from social and authority dicta in judgments of situation.
However:
A self system of a low state of differentiation and integration, referred to
as being more concrete in structure, was depicted as disposing its
possessor more in opposite directions; toward stereotypy; dependence on
authority, absolutism, and intolerance; either-or definitions of the world,
avoidance of the novel; and warding off as bad events or inputs that
are only slightly discrepant from the holders narrow latitude of
acceptance.58
Cummings exploratory study sought to empirically verify the research discussed
above, in particular the effects of Rokeachs and Harveys advances in terms broadening
the emphasis to include authoritarian and dogmatic tendencies across the political
19


spectrum. Subjects were tested on a C Scale (Closed-mindedness) to determine the
degree to which indicators of dogmatism and belief-system closure predicted
opposition to political change, support for legal restrictions on deviant behavior, a
favorable attitude toward aggressive police behavior and military action abroad, and
support for existing social, political and economic institutions.59 The C Scale proved to
be a good predictor of these dispositions.60 While subjects that carried high C Scale
scores tended to resist radical movements, they were also basically authoritarian. This
indicates that to the extent authoritarianism is presented as a defence of American
values and institutions, rather than an alternative to them, it has the possibility of
carrying wide support among the closed-minded segment of the population.
From Crippled Individuals to Savage Mobs
Fromms 1964 sketch of the authoritarian process, The Heart of Man: Its Geniusfor Good
and Evil61 describes a kind of worst case psychological scenario. Built mostly from
Fromms own work as a clinical psychiatrist, this work asks: Is man more wolf, or
sheep? Why? Fromms answer is that man is both wolf and sheep, but more likely to
be socially destructive when his worldview is clouded by narcissism, necrophilia, and
what he calls incestuous symbiosis an excessive, identity-crippling attachment to
mother or father. These traits emerge from stunted psychological development, usually
as defences against repressed emotion and a fear of being thwarted.62
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The three destructive components are heavily interrelated, and form what
becomes for Fromm a syndrome of decay.63 For example, Fromm argues that there
is a close affinity between incestuous fixation and narcissism. Inasmuch as the
individual has not yet fully emerged from the mothers womb or mothers breasts.. .he
and his mother (as one) are the object of his narcissism. This retreat, this craving to
return to the womb and to the past is at the same time the craving for death and
destruction.64
Aggression, in this light, can be seen as the result of an unlived and crippled
life, and its necessary result,65 but this explanation only posits that aggression stems
from frustration. As Fromm has argued elsewhere, this frustration could instigate a
number of different responses, only one of them being aggression.66 Because groups
function because they are attractive to members (affective involvement), accomplish
things and solve problems (goal attainment), and provide status for members (ego
involvement)67 mosdy the same unfulfilled needs the individual seeks to address in
retreating into aggression, narcissism and symbiosis the idea that such an individual
might retreat into a group, rather than into his own ego, is logical. As research by
Janowitz & Marvick has found, the individual who is concerned with power and
toughness and who is prone to resolve conflict in an arbitrary manner [aggression and
necrophilia] also has another powerful desire of which he is not fully aware[:] to
submit to other individuals whom he sees as more powerful.68 Such a highly
narcissistic group is eager to have a leader with whom it can identify itself... [and]
21


projects its narcissism onto him.69 In these cases, we arrive at leader-worship, but
specifically worship of particularly forceful, charismatic leaders.
This line of reasoning does not, of course, indicate that the leader should be
particularly brilliant or talented in fact, in terms of the libidinal desires satisfied by
belonging to the mass-group, it is better if he is not. As Adomo writes, while
appearing as a superman, the leader must at the same time work the miracle of
appearing as an average person, just as Hitler posed as a composite of King Kong and
the suburban barber.. .Even the fascist leaders startling symptoms of inferiority, his
resemblance to ham actors and asocial psychopaths, is thus anticipated in [Freudian]
theory.70 The inferiority of the fascist leader allows him to gain following not just
from the part of the ego that is narcissistically tied to the leaders force and control,
but also from the remaining, more rational parts. Accordingly, one of the basic devices
of personalized fascist propaganda is the concept of the great litde man, a person who
suggests both omnipotence and the idea that he is just one of the folks, a plain, red-
blooded American, untainted by material or spiritual wealth.71
Wilhelm Reich summed up the process well when he wrote that:
The more helpless the mass-individual has become, owing to his
upbringing, the more pronounced is his identification with the fuhrer,
and the more the childish need for protection is disguised in the form of
a feeling at one with the fuhrer. This inclination to identify is the
psychological basis of national narcissism, i.e., of the self-confidence that
individual man derives from the greatness of the nation. The
reactionary lower-class man perceives himself in the fuhrer, in the
authoritarian state.. .as time goes on, he ceases to realize how completely
he has sunk to a position of insignificant, blind allegiance.72
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As the heightened need for power and sense of weakness.. .drive [the group] to
identify with established authority figures and symbols,73 such subordinatfed] groups
may participate in maintaining a symbolic universe, even if it serves to legitimate their
domination.74
The symbolic universe may also legitimate the domination and repression of
others particularly those that threaten the group. According to Lasswell, as long as
modem technology prevails, society is honeycombed with cells of separate experience,
of individuality, of partial freedom. Concerted action under such conditions depends
upon skilfully guiding the minds of men; hence the enormous importance of symbolic
manipulation in modem society.75 Those who deny the truth of the symbolic-
universe challenge the very ego-identity of the group members who believe: given the
the relationship among collective self-esteem [and] national identity.. .the possibility of
intergroup discrimination, oppression, or violence is always present.76 Individual
responsibility for such discrimination melts away amid perceived duties to the collective
and an absolute obeisance to the authority. According to Redl, the reality of human
unconscious motivation is that the initiatory act [if only giving approval] does in fact
relieve the individual superego of its bothersome task, no matter how irrational this may
seem.77 Intolerance and group violence ensue...
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But It Cant Happen Here
Some would argue that this kind of group-thinking and lack of personal responsibility
are possible results within specific sets of ethical and cultural norms, but that such
behaviour is highly unlikely in a society with the United States emphasis on rugged
individuality, personal salvation, and deeply ingrained respect for constitutional
freedoms, egalitarianism, and the democratic process. As Seymour Lipset remarks:
We are different! America is different! Every country in Europe was
feudal or monarchical. Under feudalism, you were born into a very
strong class system, and Europe still has remnants of that in terms
of the way people treat one another. People came here from
Europe with a very negative opinion of what they left behind, and
they constructed a new society free of the old abuses.78
Lipset, Hartz, and others argue not only that Americas liberal tradition insulates
us from authoritarian government, but that we can find evidence of this in the fact that
It Didnt Happen Hen.79 Comforting as such illusions are, empirical findings show a
much different reality. Americans, like all human beings, are social animals susceptible
to class and situational expectations, and can fall into herd (and mob) mentalities
just as anybody else can. For example, Solomon Asch, in the now famous Conformity
Experiments, presented test subjects with a series of cards with several vertical lines on
each. Respondents were asked to tell the examiner which of the lines was longer only,
before their answer was taken, they heard a series of other respondents (who were, in
reality, paid actors) submit the clearly wrong answer. Test subjects gave incorrect
answers 71% of the time, in agreement with the actors, despite being able to give
correct answers 100% of the time when tested without the actors in the room.80
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In 1963, Stanley Milgram performed a similar test with even more shocking
results. In this experiment, subjects were asked into a laboratory room where a man in
a white lab coat asked them to take part in an experiment on the effects of punishment
in the learning process. Subjects were asked to punish wrong answers (given by an
actor) by using an electric generator to administer shocks ranging in severity from 15 to
450 volts. Switches were marked with phrases like slight shock, danger: severe
shock and XXX. Despite the seemingly trivial nature of the exercise, under the
direction of a supposed authority figure (the man in the lab coat) 65% of all subjects
administered the highest possible voltage XXX at 450 volts. No subject stopped
administering shocks at less than 300 volts.81
Finally, for those who argue that the basic socialisation of U.S. citizens ingrains
respect for constitutional freedoms and democratic rule, the latest World Values Survey
(2000) should give pause. Asked to rate their support for having a democratic
System, 89% of Americans responded with either Very good or Fairly good (the
two favourable ratings on a four-point scale). However, when asked to rate their
support for having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and
elections, one in three Americans responded that they favoured such leadership a
score that puts the U.S. behind such democratic bulwarks as Zimbabwe (27%), Serbia
and China (each at 19%).82 In a similar vein, polls consistendy show that the mass
population has suprisingly weak commitments to the principles of individual liberty,
toleration of diversity, and freedom of expression when required to apply these
25


principles to despised or obnoxious groups or individuals.83 One clear example of this
intolerance comes in the post-September 11 persecution of Bill Maher, host of NBCs
Politically Incorrect, for a comment that the 9/11 hijackers were not cowardly. Faced
with enormous popular pressure (aired mostly on the right-leaning networks such as
Fox) NBC ultimately decided to cancel the show.
26


CHAPTER 3
THE EMERGENT FASCIST FRAMEWORK
IN THE UNITED STATES
With the preceding description of fascism, the psychological foundations of fascist
movement, and evidence that fascism can in fact happen here, it remains to test the
waters of American socio-political life for fascist currents.
This thesis is focussed on fascist movement since September 11, 2001. As of
this writing, any such movement can have occurred only under the leadership of the
Bush Administration. Therefore, the most logical place to conclude our analysis is in
examining the Bush Administrations policies since and responses to these events.
However, before we attempt this examination it seems important to understand the
matrix of forces behind the Bush Administration what population groups constitute its
mass support, and what ideological commitments the administration itself carries.
Unless these constitute a fascistframework, we have little grounds on which to continue.
If they do constitute this framework, such a finding will add greater importance to the
results of our examination of policies and responses.
The Pre-September 11 American Public
If we could point out only one long-term trend in the American electorate since the late
70s, arguably this trend is an overall disengagement from the political process. For
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example, Wattenburg cites the drop in college freshmen who feel that keeping up with
politics [is] an important priority for them: 27% in 1998, compared with 58% in 1970.84
Overall voter turnout figures are just as alarming: turnout rates have fallen from 62% in
1968 to 50% in 2000, a year in which turnout was higher than expected due to the
closeness of the election. Among young people, turnout rates were around 17%.85
These figures are just for the highly publicised general elections in state and municipal
elections, these figures are much lower.
The media are consistendy cited as a significant cause of this disengagement.
Schudson notes that modem journalists see political careers as more oriented to
politics as a game than to politics as policy. The game schema directs attention to
conflicts and a few individuals, not to social conditions and the larger interests
individuals may represent.86 The marked shift towards negative reporting of the
activities of elites like presidents, congresspeople, and celebrities since the 1970s has
doubtless had an effect in terms of worsening the cynicism of the public. As Thomas
Patterson writes in his account of voter apathy, the Vietnam and Watergate era was
not the high mark of critical reporting and public mistrust but, instead, the point of
departure for an increasingly assertive press and an increasingly jaded public.87 While
the decline in public confidence [since Watergate] was not solely attributable to attack
journalism.. .the tone of the news [has been] too negative for too long not to have made
an impression. By choosing to present politicians as scoundrels who do not deserve the
publics trust, the press helped bring about that very opinion.88 Just as importantly,
28


because the modem press claims to be an objective source of information, unlike the
partisan press of the past, any bias in the news section of todays newspapers is
particularly insidious.89 Demonstrating these effects, modem polls consistently show a
lack of faith in federal government as an agency that can help solve peoples problems.
For example, a 1997 poll shows that a majority of Americans (52%) wanted federal
government simply to equip them to solve their own problems 34% wanted
government to stay out of their lives altogether.90
In keeping with the thrust of this paper, it is of high importance for political
behavior research to note that authoritarianism is significantly and directly related to
feelings of political ineffectiveness.91 Non-voting, in this light, should be expected
to be closely linked to authoritarianism since authoritarianism was postulated to be an
expression both of thwarted self-interest and lack of self-confidence. These are the two
underlying facets of individual personality self interest and self-confidence that
receive expression partly through participation in the political process. Janowitz and
Marvicks research confirmed that individuals with high authoritarian scores did vote
significantly less than the rest of the population.92 In the years since the their study,
voter turnout has experienced an overall decline, with much less than half of the eligible
U.S. population voting in most elections today.93 The fact that the Bush Administration
took office in early 2001 under highly questionable circumstances, but without a visceral
public reaction, suggests a lack of personal investment in democracy on the part of the
29


mass population a democratic malaise in the time period immediately preceding
September 11.
While disengagement from and cynicism towards politics could signify, as
Christopher Lasch noted, the citizens growing unwillingness to take part in the
political system as a consumer of prefabricated spectacles, heralding not a retreat
from politics at all but the beginnings of a general political revolt,94 under conditions of
crisis the direction of the revolt could be deeply dangerous. As Korten writes, the
greater the stress, and the less the clarity and general agreement on goals and path, the
greater the compulsion among the group members to give power to a central person
who in essence promises to remove the ambiguity and reduce the stress.95 Laschs
hopeful passage merely underscores the danger, as it stresses that the potential revolt is
taking place in small towns and urban neighborhoods, even in suburbs96 but is, as
such, disorganised and therefore lacking Kortens general agreement on goals and
path.
There is a considerable grassroots movement underway to combat citizen
disengagement from politics from Kids Voting USA, an organisation that integrates
active civic awareness and voter knowledge into classrooms across the country, to the
massive MoveOn.org, which has become a prominent figure in the national political
debate through its network of over two million members and ability to raise millions of
dollars in small contributions.97 However, these groups operate on a massive scale, and
there is often little personal connection among the group members. Overall, the
30


evidence suggests a real closing off of Americas civic communities. For example, the
overall shrinking of membership in community organisations has been well
documented, most famously by Putnam.98 More seriously, civic withdrawal may be
coming to take the form of insularisation and intolerance, demonstrated by the growth
of gated communities and increasingly brutal security tactics in many U.S. cities. Mike
Davis, in City of Quarts has remarked on the growth of both tendencies in
cosmopolitan, progressive Los Angeles: in the wide-open tractlands of the San
Fernando Valley, where there were virtually no walled-off communities a decade ago,
the trend has assumed the frenzied dimensions of a residential arms race as ordinary
suburbanites demand the kind of social insulation once enjoyed only by the rich.99 He
cites a preference of 3-1 for gated communities among home buyers in the region.100
As for security, what homeowners associations contract [for].. .is a complete, systems
package that includes alarm hardware, monitoring, watch patrols, personal escorts, and,
of course, armed response as necessary. Although law-enforcement experts debate the
efficiency of such systems in foiling professional criminals, they are brilliantly successful
in deterring innocent outsiders.101 According to J.P. Freeman, a market analysis firm,
the demand for these systems is expanding quickly.102 In a follow-up in 1992, Davis
wrote that a deepening recession, corporate flight, savage budget cuts, a soaring
homicide rate (despite the black gang truce), and a huge spree of gun-buying in the
suburbs only confirm that social polarization and spatial apartheid are accelerating.103
Such tough fiscal times and the enormous area and lack of manpower has led the
31


LAPD to respond (increasingly) with tough paramilitary methods and high-tech
weaponry104 a trend that is building nation-wide.
Arrests, also, are up nation-wide. The U.S. now has the highest per capita rate
of incarceration in the world, having surpassed peak Russian figures in 2002.105 The
dominance of the issues surrounding racial profiling and the death penalty during the
2000 presidential debate points to a general preoccupation with urban security among
voters nation-wide, not just in L.A.106 And, as Giroux writes, a security movement is
sweeping all aspects of American life, from drug testing in the workplace107 to zero-
tolerance policies in the schools:
as the War on Poverty ran out of steam with the social and economic
crises that emerged in the 1970s, it has been replaced with an emphasis
on domestic warfare... [T]he policies of social investment, at all levels of
government, have given way to an emphasis on repression, surveillance,
and control. Starting with Reagans war on drugs and the privatization of
the prison industry in the 1980s, and escalating to the war on immigrants
in the early 1990s, and the rise of the prison-industrial complex by the
close of the decade, the criminalization of social policy has now become
a part of everyday culture and provides a common reference point that
extends from governing prisons and regulating urban culture to running
schools.108
These trends point to a general feeling among many Americans of personal
insecurity, coupled with political and community withdrawal. The corresponding lack
of political and community commitments, and general atmosphere (or
institutionalisation) of fear, are almost certainly manipulable by the central leadership in
the face of serious crisis.
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The Bush Administrations Mass Support
The Bush Administration acquired power in the 2000 election, one of the most closely
contested in U.S. history. Neither Bushs Republican Party nor the Democrats won a
decisive majority of the vote109 however, there were clear demographic patterns to
both parties support These patterns become clear when one looks at a map of the
2000 election results by county:
Figure 1: Republican Party Support in the 2000 Election by County110
From these maps, we observe little support for Bush in the large metropolitan
areas. This is particularly true in the areas around New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, St
Louis, and the east and west coasts. Instead, the majority of Bushs support comes
from the rural areas of the southern states, Appalachia, and a broad swath of rural
33


territory starting in northern Texas, ranging through Oklahoma, Kansas, up through
Wyoming and Montana and petering back out in the direction of California. Along with
the traditional bible belt, this puts the basis of Bushs popular support in Americas
rural hinterland.
What is it about these regions that caused Bushs popularity there? In the bible
belt, support can be largely explained by Bushs pro-religion electoral campaign,
emphasising his approval for faith-based initiatives, school prayer, and opposition to
abortion.111 Such themes fit in well with the evolving southern strategy the
Republican party has used so effectively in the south since the late 70s.112 In this
strategy, built on the pillars of race, taxes and welfare, anticommunism, and the
religious right, the religious right has become an increasingly important factor and an
accommodated interest group as the other themes have lost national prominence and
appeal, or been accommodated by Democratic party policy.113
A wider-reaching explanation is needed to help explain Bushs support in rural
areas outside of the south. The shoddy economic condition of many of Americas
farming communities in 2000, largely a result of the pressures of global competition in a
world of Clinton-era policies like NAFTA, no doubt played a large role in support for
change. Its a truism in American politics that incumbent parties tend to fare badly in
elections in areas where the economy is hard hit. Scholars like Barber, however, have
noted wider reactionary trends that accompany such negative effects of globalisation.
In Jihad vs. McWorld, while his analysis is focussed largely on the Jihadist reaction
34


coming from the Third World, he notes that similar fundamentalist and nationalist
appeals can also gain a following in the democracies. He writes that the developed
worlds
rather pallid form of Jihad takes two intersecting forms: provincialism,
which sets the periphery against the center; and parochialism, which
disdains the cosmopolitan. Both are hostile to the capital city and all that
it stands for. Both understand decentralized power as less threatening to
liberty and more susceptible to control than central power. Provincialism
shares the democratic spirit of Jefferson.. .and, with Tocqueville,
understands liberty to be an essentially local or municipal function.
Parochialism adds to provincialism a cultural critique[:] modem society
reduced to its slightest particles and thus without communal coherence
because it is without God and without order, without law and without
justice.
Most rural Americans have less education and live at a lower socio-economic
level than their urban counterparts. They also constitute a decreasing percentage of the
population. While they are members of a great society, they are, by virtue of their
diminished numbers, wealth, and education, denied much of the access to power and
privilege enjoyed by a tiny portion of the cosmopolitan urban elite. This elite, and its
norms, have become more and more visible to the non-elite, thanks to the effects of the
mass-media.115 According to two editors of The Economist. Globalization is not only
tightening the worlds economic links. It is also throwing up an increasingly
conspicuous class of people who possess the ideas, connections, and sheer chutzpah to
master the global economy.116 While this small, elite class benefits gready from global
commerce, the passage quoted above makes it clear why the losers under globalisation
would resent being bombarded with elite views and values. And, after all, the new
35


elites are [themselves] in revolt against Middle America/ as they imagine it: a nation
technologically backward, politically reactionary, repressive in its sexual morality,
middlebrow in its tastes, smug and complacent, dull and dowdy.117 As sociologist
Ervmg Goffman wrote, the special situation of the stigmatised is that society tells him
he is a member of the wider group, which means he is a normal human being [on equal
grounds], but that he is also different in some degree, and that it would be foolish to
deny this difference.118 The resultant feelings of frustration and anger, poverty,
unemployment, and a feeling of political helplessness.. .have pushed the geographic
center of the United States a considerable distance to the right.119
As Joel Dyer discovered during his late-90s investigation of Americas rural
communities (discussed below), where the anger isnt being turned inward or against the
family, many rural Americans are turning their anger against the cosmopolitan elites of
the big cities and the perceived protector of their lifestyle and values: the federal
government.120 These comments could probably come from many who live outside of
urban America:
I think after three debates, good people of this country understand there
is a difference of opinion, it's the difference between big federal
government and somebody who's coming from outside of Washington
who will trust individuals.121
Im not for gay marriage. I think marriage is a sacred institution between
a man and a woman and I appreciated.. .the Defense of Marriage Act.122
(In explaining opposition to national hate-crimes legislation:) if you have
a state that fully supports the law, like we do in Texas, we're going to go
after all crime, and we're going to make sure people get punished for the
crime. And in this case, we can't enhance the penalty any more than
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putting.. .thugs to death, and that's what's going to happen in the state of
Texas.123
In fact, they are excerpts from George W. Bushs statements in the 2000
presidential debates. When George W. Bush ran on an anti-big-govemment, anti-
cosmopolitan platform in 2000, it should be unsurprising that he gained a substantial
following in the heartland. Polling data of those who voted in the 2000 election show
that, in line with public sentiment trends quoted above, 40% believed Bush thought
federal government should equip people to solve their own problems; 41% believed
Bush wanted federal government to stay out of peoples lives.124 Such a statement
speaks to a profound desire among Middle Americans to live their lives free of
interference by the global elites who, as writers like Patrick Buchanan have consistently
argued, no longer claim allegiance to the nations of their birth, [yet whose] political
power in Washington has grown commensurate with their financial power.125
Radicalisation of the Rural Community
While comparisons to Jihad126 might reflexively seem farfetched, the only grounds for
thinking so are a kind of it couldnt happen here denial. In explaining the dramatic
rightward swing of rural voters, Joel Dyer writes that lousy economics is [only] one
explanation. The psychological makeup of those who live in the boarded-up towns and
farms along the washboard roads of our backcountry is another.127 Faced with closing
farms, high unemployment and poverty rates, and a sense of being tied to the land that
is being taken away from them, an attitude of desperation is taking hold in many of
37


Americas rural communities. The rising suicide and abuse rates in the heartland are
stark illustrations of the effects of this process (suicides surpassed accidents as the
leading cause of farm deaths at some point in the late 80s).128 The studies by Rokeach,
Harvey, and Cummings discussed above indicate that in abusive households or where
exposure to cultural diversity is limited, we can expect to see a population susceptible to
authoritarian and anti-democratic messages. Indeed, the same psychological process is
often invoked as an explanation for radicalism in the Islamic world for example, by
George W. Bush in a recent speech before the National Endowment for Democracy.129
Why would the same forces and dynamics operate differendy in the United States?
In fact, these forces and dynamics are operating in Middle America. Without
trust in the system, there are few avenues through which the populace can seek
solutions to social problems particularly when, under the magnified effects of low
self-esteem and disempowerment, they feel themselves at a loss to create alternative
approaches to political life. Stated conversely, if an individual believes he/she has
multiple action alternatives in political situations, the self-concept of his or her own
political competence is high. [When the self concept is low,] the individual does not
know what to do in such situations.130 When the members of a population are
prevented from actualising what they see as their own potential particularly when the
thwarting carries a perception of injustice the population is likely to embrace
charismatic movements promising to remedy these injustices, capitalising on the
atmosphere of repressed rage. As has been suggested above, a consistent pattern of
38


authoritarian responses can be seen as a mode for the release of tensions created in
persons who have accepted the goals of our society but who find it difficult to adapt to
the democratic processes by which they are achieved.131 We can expect projection of
the denied or disliked aspects of the self upon others (especially inferiors), which
justifies the actualization of denied values (such as aggression and dominance) in order
to contain or control these values as perceived in others, because projected on them.132
In an atmosphere of intense personal and economic frustration (coupled, of course,
with an environment lacking in cultural diversity and holding a high probability of
abuse) Dyers observations offer a first-hand confirmation that Americas rural
heartland has become a fertile recruiting ground for forces of the radical right,
particularly the militia, anti-government, and Christian Identity movements.133
People in these movements have usually been exposed to a high degree of
apocalyptic Christianity. By this, I refer to that fundamentalist interpretation of
Christianity that is focussed on the Book of Revelations, and whose followers hold that
the end days (the time of Tribulation) have either just begun, or are about to begin.134
As scholars have shown, this absolutist belief system encourages high activity forms of
organization, in-group favoritism, and the demonization of all out-groups,135 as
believers seek their own salvation (sometimes through intimidating and thus
converting others) and resisting the temptations of the enemy.
Beyond the clear resemblance of these statements to typical fascist programmes,
psychologically speaking such religious sentiments may themselves be symptomatic of
39


authoritarian tendencies. Under the Freudian conception, the religious impulse comes
from a need to humanise natural forces. In The Future of an Illusion, Freud argues that
this situation is nothing new. It has an infantile prototype, of which it is in fact only
the continuation. For once before one has found oneself in a similar state of
helplessness: as a small child, in relation to ones parents. One had reason to fear them,
and especially ones father; and yet one was sure of his protections against the dangers
one knew.136 Man looks to his religious ideas to provide moral teaching and protection
just as he did with his father, and gives them this character in keeping with the
overpowering impression which those forces make on him.137 From this, we arrive at
what the common man understands by his religion with the system of
doctrines and promises which on the one hand explains to him the riddles of
this world with enviable completeness, and, on the other, assures him that a
careful Providence will watch over his life and will compensate him for any
frustrations he suffers here. The common man cannot imagine this Providence
otherwise than in the figure of an enormously exalted father. Only such a being
can understand the needs of the children of men and be softened by their
prayers and placated by the signs of their remorse.138
Because the psychological analyses are so similar between this description of
needs and those of the narcissist who seeks leadership and identity reinforcement from
an ego-ideal, we can assume the high probability of correlation between the two
personality types. Adorno assumed that this accounted for Freuds shift from the study
of religion in his early writings to the study of narcissism in his later life, as he observed
first-hand the socio-political trends of interwar Europe.139 Indeed, Freud has argued
that the first phases in the domination of the two new substitutive formations for the
father, those of gods and kings, plainly show the most energetic expression of that
40


ambivalence which is characteristic of religion.140 Cummings findings of a strong
correlation between religiosity and dogmatism and those of the Authoritarian Personality
both validated this relationship; the latter found patterns of reaction to the idea of God
and the supernatural that are similar to those found in parent child relationships.. .high
[F scale] scorers [describing] apprehension and submission.141
How do these trends fit an analysis of the Bush Administration? The argument
of the remainder of this thesis is not that the radical forces described above are planning
a coup detat to take over the federal government (though some of the more militant
groups would like to see this happen). Instead, based on the assumption that
movements such as these are making a discernible values impact in rural society, I argue
that these groups are important because of the tipple effects they play on the
Republican Party as it attempts to mobilise and maintain rural support to win elections.
This effect may itself be radicalising on a massive scale.
Thus, beyond the destructive and fascistic direction of many movements in
the radical right, which are dangerous in the hands even of a relative few (Timothy
McVeigh, for instance), one alarming finding of Dyers investigation lies in the growing
connections between the radicals and those in the mainstream. This link takes place on
several levels, but is well illustrated by the burgeoning rightist movement to interpret the
constitution literally:
Many fundamentalist Christians in the movement believe that both the
Bible and the constitution are to be interpreted literally. In fact, I have
41


met a number of antigovemment proponents who have told me that the
Constitution was given to America by God and that violating its literal
interpretation is a sin that will allow the country to be infiltrated by the
forces of evil and eventually overthrown.. .Its in the area of
constitutional debate that the movement has drawn its most significant
mainstream support. From conservative columnists like Thomas Sowell
and George Will, to politicians on the state and national level like Newt
Gingrich, a cry is going out for a return to the constitution.142
This observation infers the existence of a positive-feedback loop between the
mainstream politicians of the right and their most significant blocs of electoral support
(something one would, perhaps, hope for in a representative governmental system).
Based upon current events and public perceptions within these blocs, such a feedback
loop can result in shifts of political discourse; in turn, by the nature of the authoritative
position of politicians, the way subsequent normal events are perceived by the general
public is altered. Under such a cycle, the relative mismatch of the prototype [how
things should be] to perceived reality contributes to citizens beliefs that [government]
is doing a poor job, cannot be trusted, is run by the wrong kinds of people, or passes
misguided laws and is responsible for bad public policies.143 Such a loop explains a
dramatic rightward movement in Republican Party strategy during the Clinton years,
following the significant right-wing insurgency against [Bush] in the 1992 election,
when more radical appeals by Buchanan, Duke, and Perot fractured GOP support.144 It
also explains the Republican Partys surging rural support given the platform they ran
on in the 2000 election. Gone awry, however, the loop illustrates the possibility that a
large-scale, dramatic event could suddenly mobilise public sentiment, in turn
encouraging opportunistic radical movement among the party elite.
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The New Right
As progressive voters in the urban centres withdraw politically (or, as happened in 2000,
vote Green) the rhetoric of both major parties has shifted right in an effort to motivate
and capture the support of swing voters. Democrats can obviously only go so far
right without alienating their traditional union, pro-choice, and minority bases, yet a
dramatic shift left may cost them critical swing votes. The Republicans have found
momentum by swinging further right and running on values platforms. Gold writes
that in terms of rhetoric, Democrats, in many respects, have become more like the
Republicans, though this change has been more apparent in symbols such as the
renewal of the family than in specific policy proposals.145 The Republicans, on the
other hand, have been much more willing to embrace the full agenda of the New
Right145 Owing to its importance to current Republican strategy, and the important
role it now plays as an intersection between radical and mainstream rightist politics, an
analysis of the New Right seems to be in order.
The New Right emerged largely in response to the radical leftist movements of
the 1960s and 1970s, when a whole class of activists drawn from social groups
traditionally antagonistic to the old elite minorities, women, and poor white males (in
the form of former GIs) received access to higher education and economic
advancement. In response to the liberal reform movement they organised, Old Class
activists.. .used their considerable resources and social connections to defend order
and tradition against reform politics.147 Their movement emerged organised around
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the themes of militant anticommunism, capitalist economics, a minimal welfare state,
the rule of traditional elites, and a return to traditional cultural values.148
Members of the New Right were quick to establish a powerful media presence.
As Hardisty writes, the right vilified the mainstream media as liberal and biased against
Conservative and Christian views, and, at the same time, bought into and created
media outlets of their own.149 The result was a gradual, overall rightward shift of the
media to the effect that even PBS a favourite target of right-wing anger to this day -
in fact airs mostly centre- or right-leaning material.150 Fox News, now Americas most
watched,151 is arguably pervasively right-leaning.152 This says nothing of talk radio.
Probably the greatest organising tool of the New Right, however, is its network
of churches and religious organisations. Within a subset of the larger conservative class,
Regnerus et. al note that conservative Protestants developed new (and reversed)
religious responses.. .for engagement with a public sphere deemed hostile to their
values.153 For these activists, who would later make up the evangelical and most vocal
element of the New Right, membership in the New Right represent[ed] a way of
combating more than just specific issues like abortion and the (Equal Rights
Amendment]; it [was] a way of fighting the deeper life style changes that those issues
appear to symbolize.154 The importance of this network has grown as values, rather
than anticommunism or the merits of capitalist economics, have become a central
platform plank in electioneering. As Sorman has argued, the success of groups like the
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Moral Majority cannot be explained except as a part of the persistent and very real
preoccupations of a large part of the population.155
Since the late 1970s, groups like Jerry Falwells Moral Majority have proven
themselves valuable in mobilising political supporters around themes of both national
decadence and communist and secessionary threats. By Sormans account, Falwell is
viewed as a bulwark of the provincial middle classes seeking shelter against the loss of
influence and wealth because of the economic crisis and the aggressive egalitarian claims
of all minorities begun by the blacks.156 People who are listening to the advice of
conservative Christian political organizations, commentators have remarked, are
linked together by a language that depicts America as suffering from moral poverty.157
For these people, even profane issues such as crime rates or taxation or bureaucracy
can come to be understood as political issues of morality.. .makfing] it easier to
understand social disintegration and crime as evidence of moral problems. These moral
interpretations of political issues, not surprisingly, make for much more attentive
listeners to Christian Right voting advice.158
A quick example of this process seems in order. Richard Viguerie publicist
for Reagans presidency bid remarked in 1981 that people from the moderate-liberals
to those furthest right realize that its idle to talk about their goals and ideals unless
Americas survival is assured. And they agree that our survival has become a real
question. How bad off are we? By all standards overall spending, strategic air
weapons, naval forces, ground forces we have fallen far behind the Soviets.159
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Speakers like Jerry Falwell lent credibility to such claims with public announcements (in
this case, in the foreword to the book excerpted above) like this one: at this present
hour, there can be no questioning the retrogression of Americas stability as a free and
healthy nation. In the last several years, Americans have literally stood by and watched
as godless, spineless leaders have brought our nation floundering to the brink of
death.160
The fall of communism at the end of the twentieth century hardly took the wind
out of such groups political sails rather, it seems to have directed their indignation
even more directly against social and values issues in the United States. At the same
time, these groups have now had the time to develop strong organisations and political
networks. Writing in 1996, Ralph Reed, Executive Director of the Christian Coalition,
argued that members of Religious Right groups see themselves as not seeking to win
government goodies or curry favor with politicians... [but] after two generations of self-
imposed retreat from political involvement, they have reentered the public sphere to
deal with a world they see as tom asunder by explicit sex and violence on television,
rampant divorce, skyrocketing illegitimacy, epidemics of crime and drugs, and.. .teen
pregnancy (though this statement didnt stop Mr. Reed from accepting a position as
Southeast Regional Campaign Chairman of the Bush-Cheney re-election campaign161).
They continue, as do the rural voters discussed above, to see their way of life and their
values under assault.162
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This account is not intended to suggest that the forces of the New Right are
without internal rivalries and contradictions. For example, the long-time argument
between universalist Christians and arch-fiscal conservatives periodically threatens to
divide the bloc over the question of entidements charity to the poor in one of the
worlds richest societies. Likewise, the various religious groups sometimes clash with
each other, or with libertarian Republicans, who read into the constitution a rigid
separation between Church and State. However, the polemics of those involved in
these disputes can often serve simply to fill the public space with more of the rhetoric
of frustration and hopelessness from which the New Right movement and, potentially,
more fascistic followers of it, feed. For example, angered at the failure of Jerry Falwells
Moral Majority to block decadent trends during the Clinton years, Cal Thomas and
Ed Dobson broke from the movement and wrote their own lament in 1999. It ends,
grimly, with:
this is still the most decent place on earth to live, and its because of the
church. But were kidding ourselves if we think theres any program, any
third party.. .or anything we can do to straighten things out right now,
because when you have a society that will support Jerry Springer and give
him top TV ratings, when you have a pom industry of 8 billion dollars a
year in the U.S. Im talking about the hard, dirty stuff and kiddy pom
these things we have in the country are beyond repair.163
While even this lament holds up a privileged place for the nation the most
decent place on earth to live the assertion that things are, regardless, beyond repair
necessitates drastic change. The rejection of conventional politics calls for grassroots
movement that advances initially through changed hearts that inevitably must change
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and impact government.164 This leaves room for future mobilisation along, possibly,
more radical tracks.
A Fascist Framework?
The fear among members New Right in the 1960s and 1970s that the nation was
dangerously divided and ready to open the country to secessionary conflict (and
possible domination by external powers) seems at least a rough parallel to Giovanni
Gentiles divided state of the populace after the First World War.165 We have seen
how this fear is manifested in the discourse. But is there a sense in which the
threatened national community is viewed as organic? Is the leadership prepared to
defend and expand it? In short, does the ideology have potential as a fascist
framework?
The interplay of the themes moral decay and physical survival of the nation
seems to combine nationalism with a sense of the community in a characteristically
fascist way especially when viewed in the American context. As Sacvan Bercovitch
writes in The American Jeremiad, the ritual of the jeremiad bespeaks an ideological
consensus in moral, religious, economic, social, and intellectual matters unmatched
in any other modem culture.. .Only in the United States has nationalism carried with it
the Christian meaning of the sacred.166 Bercovitchs analysis traced this culture of
consensus back to the method used by Americas early Puritans to know they had been
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saved in a Calvinist system, and of ensuring that future generations were saved
also.167
Because the New Right comes out of this tradition positing Americanism
against themes of moral temptation and destruction by ungodly forces (like
Communism, but, increasingly, Arabs and other defilers of the sacred community
also168) we can infer the implied existence of a national community along the lines
envisaged by Italian thinkers like Gentile. The idea that the entire community can be
threatened with destruction, based on the sinful acts of a few, seems to itself posit an
organic sense of the community (as well as that communitys exalted place in the eyes of
God). Themes of such destruction and selective chosenness explain, as Karen
Armstrong writes, the early rift between self-identified fundamentalist millenarian
Christians and their evangelical cousins, who fundamentalists viewed as too moderate.
Yet, faced with the secularising revolutions of the 1960s and 1970s, these groups were
all in a weak position and all convinced, sometimes with reason, that the secularists and
liberals wanted to annihilate them169; they all took part in a movement to reshape the
myths and symbols of their [shared] tradition in such a way that [these symbols] became
a persuasive blueprint for action that would compel the people to rise up and save their
faith from extinction.170
Beyond this, some key figures in the movement themselves perceive the
movement as organic. Justin Watson, in his history of the Christian Coalition, argues
that American evangelicalism has possessed unity as an organic movement.. .on the
49


one hand, evangelicals have shared in the American democratic, optimistic,
individualistic, pragmatic, and market-driven ethos. On the other, evangelicals have
resisted dominant culture trends that they felt undercut traditional supematuralistic
understandings of the Bible message.171 He argues that they yearn now for a
restoration of a lost past in which life was better and more godly.172 Such appeals
look back nostalgically to the Puritanical Age, when the Puritans had brought not
democracy to the New World, but a tight government in church and state which
would compel other men to walk in the right way.173 Ralph Reed, the Coalitions
Executive Director, argues that the groups success is a result of supporters for whom
the most important issue is not the economy, stupid but the culture, the family, the
loss of values, a decline in civility, and the destruction of [their] children in this light,
their way of life and their national awareness.
Arthur Schlesinger echoes the Gentilean concept of the nation as a product of
directed will or, rather, lets F. Scott Fitzgerald do it for him when he writes that the
American population has unquestionably grown more heterogeneous than ever in
recent times. But this very heterogeneity makes the quest for unifying ideals and a
common culture all the more urgent. America, Scott Fitzgerald said, is a willingness of
the heart.174 This argument is nationalist, though not ethnically exclusory. Instead,
Schlesinger argues that America needs to consist of one culture, created through the
melting pot, and dismisses ethnic notions. He instead argues that the ethnic upsurge
(it can hardly be called a revival because it was unprecedented) began as a gesture of
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protest against the Anglocentric culture. It became a cult, and today it threatens to
become a counter-revolution against the original theory of America as one people, a
common culture, a single nation.175
If New Right groups see the national community as an organic community, we
still need some sense of their commitment to defend and expand it. The first of these is
a slam dunk the defence of the national community, after all, has always been a
strong topic for the New Right. The movement began with an emphasis on
anticommunism and on preventing secessionary movement. Its members now focus on
saving the unborn and saving the constitution, a document which they perceive, as
Robert Bork writes, as an object of veneration, a sacred text, the symbol of our
nationhood, the foundation of our governments structure and practice, a guarantor of
our liberties, and a moral teacher.176
Richard Neuhaus, a prominent thinker in movement circles, argues that in order
to at once unify the nation and guarantee Americas security against foreign advances, a
sacred canopy based on universalistic Christian values must be extended over the realm
of public discourse, providing a basis of moral assumptions upon which issues can be
democratically settled. For Neuhaus,
one enters the public square,.. .not as an anonymous citizen but as a
person shaped by other sources that are neither defined by nor
subservient to the public square. The public square is not a secular and
morally sterilized place, but a space for conversation, contention, and
compromise among moral actors.. .Within a universe compromised by
fallen humanity, compromise is an exercise of moral responsibility by
persons who accept responsibility for sustaining the exercise that is called
democracy.177
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As for those we might assume would feel threatened by the concept of
Christianised public discourse, Neuhaus argues that those attracted.. .to sectarian
patterns of withdrawal have litde interest in the nation itself anyway. Echoing the
fascist concept of the national community as product of directed will, he asserts that
such people are largely irrelevant to the public ethos. The polls of chief concern to them
is typically that of the small community under the leadership of a guru of their
choice.178 Because they lack membership in the nation in the first place, it is
unnecessary to cater to their preferences in deciding how to organise it.179
The New Right seems equally committed to expanding the community.
Through a network of universities and campus organisations, rightists have recruited a
veritable army of committed activists working on reforms that would help plans like
those of Neuhaus to come to fruition. In studying the New Rights evangelical base,
researchers found that higher education composes for evangelicals a cultural structure
that does not erode the conviction that personal religious faith ought to engage the
public sphere and the broader culture... [instead, it has] raised their public consciousness
and ire as they become newly equipped, by way of education, to mobilize on their
ire.180 These new recruits constitute an energetic and articulate force. Conovers
research on what separates the ideological supporters of a social movement such as
the New Right from those who become actively involved in movement organizations
[generally] concludes that a sense of internal-control and broad-based political
involvement were critical factors in determining which supporters would be
52


mobilized.. .the New Right activists turned out to be those individuals who, relative to
the mere supporters of the movement, felt that they could control their own lives and
were heavily involved in the political system.181
This dynamic base has secured favourable outcomes (and impressive cabinet
positions) in all presidential elections since 1980, excluding the Clinton years. However,
it must be noted that the Clinton administrations actual policies, despite the constant
derision by members of the Right, included a bill providing for federal funds to be
distributed to faith-based charitable organizations and a bill outlawing gay
marriages, along with support of the death penalty and a rejection of most of the
international treaties the Right would have rejected including multilateral efforts like
the International Criminal Court.182 These seem to be adamant appeals to defend the
community, and at least (by their underlying logic) attempts to expand it. Presumably,
any stronger attempt would fit under what weve called fascist violence.. Prior to that
examination of policy, however, it seems that the central ideology of the movement
contains the organic conception of the nation, perception of threat, fear of division, and
commitment to defending and expanding the national community characteristic of an
emergent fascist framework.
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CHAPTER 4
SEPTEMBER 11 AND THE RISE
OF FASCIST VIOLENCE
9/11 Reaction: Invoking the Nation
The American president is at once the living symbol of his nation, and the head of its
ruling party. As such, the president makes a likely person to look to for leadership
when the nation is in trouble, not simply because he has the authority of the state
behind him, but also because in some sense he embodies the state. Without question,
President Bush experienced a marked rally in popularity and support following
September 11. And, as Hetherington and Nelson write, In theoretical terms, what
accounts for.. .the rally effect [is] the constitutional design of the presidency, which
lodges the normally separate roles of chief of government and chief of state in one
office.183 His reaction to September 11, then, is the most obvious place to look for
predictors of movement in the public sphere direcdy afterward.
Unsurprisingly, the presidents initial reaction played upon themes of national
unity and strength in a bid to comfort the nation and allay feelings of panic.184 What is
surprising, however, is the speed with which the sentiments of moral stability and
leadership gave way to wartime rhetoric and invocations of culture change. Bushs
speech of the evening of 9/11 began by citing that a great people has been moved to
defend a great nation, and ended with invocations of remarkably sectarian prayer:
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Tonight, I ask for your prayers for all those who grieve, for the children whose worlds
have been shattered, for all whose sense of safety and security has been threatened. And
I pray they will be comforted by a power greater than any of us, spoken through the
ages in Psalm 23: Even though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I fear
no evil, for You are with me.185
While the prayer may or may not bring comfort to most Americans, the rhetoric
of the prayer serves to offer further legitimation to the president and to his consolidate
support. The sentence is structurally ambiguous: read one way, it implies divine
sanction and protection; read another, it invokes oneness with presidential authority.
Set in its sociopolitical background, the quotation of the passage itself serves to mobilise
Bushs evangelical supporters. Of course Bush, like most Americans, was no doubt
deeply shaken by the events of the day, and it would be natural for him to appeal to his
faith at a time of crisis. But it should also be borne in mind that presidential speeches
are rarely crafted by the president alone; they are written and revised, especially at
important times like this, over and over by a team of writers and strategists who are
trained to bear these issues in mind.
And indeed, evangelical forces of the New Right were quick to seize on the
opening to explain September 11 as Gods punishment for Americas culturally
decadent tolerance of all things liberal, from homosexuality to abortion. Evangelicals
like Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson and Anne Graham Lotz reflected this thinking when
they declared that God had removed his protection and blessing from America and
55


allowed the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks because Americans had displeased him.186 The
language of cultural crisis no doubt struck a chord somewhere in the Administration:
four months later, it resurfaced openly in George Bushs State of the Union Address,
combined with rabid militarism:
For too long our culture has said, If it feels good, do it Now America
is embracing a new ethic and a new creed: Lets roll. In the sacrifice of
soldiers, the fierce brotherhood of firefighters, and the bravery and
generosity of ordinary citizens, we have glimpsed what a new culture of
responsibility could look like. We want to be a nation that serves goals
larger than self. We've been offered a unique opportunity, and we must
not let this moment pass.. .This time of adversity offers a unique
moment of opportunity a moment we must seize to change our
culture. Through the gathering momentum of millions of acts of service
and decency and kindness, I know we can overcome evil with greater
good. And we have a great opportunity during this time of war to lead
the world toward the values that will bring lasting peace.187
According to this speech, the terrorists with whom America was at war were
coming to know the meaning of American justice, and the charities and faith-based
groups were doing a fine job of patching up the national fabric and restoring national
unity.188 It is a set of themes that would come to be invoked time and time again,
notably in the run-up to the war with Iraq. A year later, president Bush ended his next
State of the Union Address with We Americans have faith in ourselves, but not in
ourselves alone. We do not know we do not claim to know all the ways of Providence,
yet we can trust in them, placing our confidence in the loving God behind all of life, and
all of history. May He guide us now. And may God continue to bless the United States
of America.189
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Fascist Violence
Militarism in an advanced industrial state, particularly one like the United States, doesnt
require a massive mobilisation of the public unless it asks them, as Secretary Rumsfeld
and others did, to go shopping and increase tax revenues.190 As a purely volunteer
force, the United States military is one high-tech, well-oiled, heavily-funded killing
machine, capable of dealing with multiple major engagements and possessing the
preponderance of the worlds military muscle. Most analysts agree that in terms of
conventional fighting capabilities, the United States is virtually invulnerable.191
Accounting estimates of federal budget expenditures routinely put U.S. military
spending at around 50% of the budget, once trusts like social security are removed and
the percentage of the deficit incurred through military borrowing is properly assigned.192
Nor is the less-than-judicious use of force something new. The Clinton
Administration, for example, was responsible for the bombings of numerous countries
- Iraq, Somalia, Serbia, and Sudan to name just a few, with the campaign against Serbia
having taken place under especially questionable circumstances.193 Clinton, however,
engaged in military interventions largely as an amoral servant of corporate
power.. .unlike Bush he was not a fanatic. Bush and his closest advisers, the architects
of his foreign policy (Vice President Cheney; Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld;
Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith, No 2 and 3 at the Pentagon; the disgraced but still
influential Richard Perle; Elliot Abrams, director of Middle East Affairs at the National
Security Council, and their many ideological cousins at right-wing think-tanks arrived
in office with a much different vision.194
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This vision is comprised of two somewhat contradictory strands: Fortress
America isolationism, which takes strength from a conviction of national superiority
and [a] faith in the countrys ability to protect itself from attack195; and Captain
America zeal, which seeks to redeem the world through the destruction of enemies,
acknowledging, as Jewett has written, that such an important mission tends to fuse
secular and religious images in a way analogous to jihad.196 Uniting the two strands are
an elevation of the national interest and a corresponding casting aside of international
laws and norms.
Such thinking is exemplified by some of the writings of Samuel Huntington.
For example, in expanding on his famous Clash of Civilisations hypothesis, Huntington
writes that the United States should
abandon the illusion of universality and.. .promote the strength,
coherence, and vitality of its civilization in a world of civilizations. The
interests of the West are not served by promiscuous intervention into the
disputes of other peoples. In the era that is dawning, primary
responsibility for containing and resolving regional conflicts must rest
with the leading states of the civilizations dominant in those regions.197
Unfortunately, post-September 11, Huntingtons ideas (which focus on Western, not
American exceptionalism) have been used by demagogues to in fact launch a clash of
civilisations of potentially epic proportions: a unilateral decision made to draw lines in
the sand, to undertake crusades, to oppose their evil with our good, to extirpate
terrorism and, in Paul Wolfowitz's nihilistic vocabulary, to end nations entirely in
favour of a dichotomy of us and them.198 This is made all the more dangerous by
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the sense of national interest perceived by the forces of the religious right, and the
policy-makers themselves.
In a recent study, Christopher Gelpi and Peter Feaver examined the differences
between elite veteran policymakers and elite nonveteran policymakers in respect to their
relative probabilities of escalating international conflicts to the use of force, and to war.
Outside of a Cold War context, with the U.S. as a major power, the researchers found
that personalities matter and can be decisive in certain cases. .. .We can identify
consistent civilian and military tendencies in policymaking.. .elite civilians with military
experience behave like Colin Powells and elite nonveterans are like Madeleine
Albrights at least when it comes to opinions on the use of force.199 Considering the
low degree of actual combat experience that typifies Bushs cabinet, the hawkishness is
predictable. However, it is also directable in dangerous directions, thanks to these
chickenhawks underlying ideology and the ideology of their supporters.
According to many adherents of the strand of apocalyptic Christianity discussed
above, the second coming of the Messiah cannot occur until Israel is controlled by the
Jews. Today, such views are most strongly held in Israel by right-wing political parties,
and in America by Jewish supporters of the Israeli settlement movement and evangelical
Christians, who have found common cause with the hard-line aspects of the pro-Israel
lobby people like the extreme Islamophobe Daniel Pipes200, whom president Bush
recently appointed to the board of the U.S. Institute for Peace,201 and the hard-liners of
the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA) and the Center for Security
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Policy (CSP).202 As Vest writes, just as was the case two decades ago, dozens of [such
think tank] members have ascended to powerful government posts, where their
advocacy in support of the same agenda increased military spending and support for
Lukidnik Israel continues.203 Under the influence of these groups, both within the
US administration and the think tanks that feed it ideas, catastrophic developments.. .fit
into a broader plan to completely remake an unruly Middle East with Israel as the
dominant local power, under overall US hegemony.204
In this vein, September 11 proved to be an excuse for military operations in Iraq
and increased military aid to Israel that had been in the planning stages for decades.
According to published reports by Dreyfus and Vest, the Iraq war was hardly based on
urgent national defence, and is much more the story of a close-knit team of ideologues
who spent a decade or more hammering out plans for an attack conceived largely as
a way of undermining Arab resistance to Israeli foreign policy who used the events
of September 11, 2001 to set it into motion.205 As part of the process, only weeks
after 9/11, the Bush administration set up a secret Pentagon unit to create the case for
invading Iraq through the production of selective and misleading intelligence
analyses.206 This department operated in the background as the United States engaged
in a headlong rush to war in Afghanistan (a target much more plausibly linked to
September 11), all the while readying the populace for wars of regime change across
the Middle East and elsewhere. Demonstrating that [e]thnicity can serve as a focal
point, facilitating convergence of individual expectations, and hence can be useful as a
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mobilization strategy, 207 Bushs rhetoric that the region was a breeding ground for
terrorism, possibly with the aid of state-provided weapons of mass destruction, was
quickly gobbled up by the mainstream media, and the War on Terror (the term
crusade having been recalled very quickly) rallied the populace. While we were
admonished to recognise Islam as a peaceful religion and, even within the language of
the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act, to respect Muslims in our neighbourhoods, the United States
went to war against an axis of evil, occupied Afghanistan, deployed troops near Iran,
Iraq, and Syria, and threatened to attack Indonesia.208
One remarkable corollary to this policy was that the war also served to rally
many of the elites who, under the pluralist model of democracy, should have served to
moderate the temper of the political scene. The war on terror was of course touted as
just. But, as one analyst has written, though it is still possible to fight in self-defense,
the character of terrorism and counterterrorism in the present military-technical context
makes it extremely difficult to fight a just counterterror war.. .the cause of self-defense
is just, but that is where justice in the U.S. counterterror war has reached its limit.209
Nonetheless, the easy melding of the term just war with currents in American socio-
political identity proved a powerful current. As Schildkraut wrote, [ejarly
investigations into post-9/11 rhetoric suggest.. .that there has indeed been a remarkable
change in the conceptions of national identity that shape elite discourse.210 At the
same time, in the mass population, the same forces that originally animated the New
Right came out with a vengeance: according to symbolic politics research on racial
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discourse.. .lingering ethnoculturalism [from the 60s], combined with the powerful
incorporationist messages coming from elite sources.. .lead to contradictory impulses
and to more support for ethnocultural practices than elites have been advocating.211
As part of an accompanying overall realignment of foreign and security policy,
post-September 11 U.S. policy powered along in the hard-line direction... [the
administration] pushed through huge budget increases for military spending and military
supplies for allies old and new.. .and went on to alter military doctrine to permit
preemptive strikes, first use of nuclear weapons, and regime change on these and other
adversaries.212 This stance is fully articulated in 2002s National Security Strategy of the
United States of America. Based on the logic of necessary self-defence, the National Security
Strategy argues that in a world where shadowy networks of individuals can bring great
chaos and suffering for less than it costs to purchase a single tank, and where they are
organised to penetrate open societies, it has become necessary to use doctrines of
pre-emption to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to
threaten or use weapons of mass destruction.213 In thus pitting the vulnerable, open
societies against terrorists whose capabilities depend on the support of rogue states,
the doctrine implicitly argues that the existence of closed societies anywhere in the
world constitutes sufficient threat for the use of force, and that independent evil
doers could be anywhere. This stance would seem to necessitate greater co-operation
among the open societies, embodied in a multilateral approach to solving problems
acknowledging, as Churchill once remarked, that states seeking safety cannot work on
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the natrow margins of the balance of power. Preponderance, not balance, must be their
goal.214 It instead urges a distinctly American internationalism based on temporary,
bilateral military agreements and ad-hoc coalitions with designated friends,215 keeping
open the idea that these friends could become evil enemies later a process that has
already occurred with both Saddam Hussein and Usama bin Laden.
Violence Against Tdeas
As Benjamin Barber writes, President Bush sought vengeance on states that harbored
terrorism. This impelled him into a strategy that targeted Afghanistan and Iraq (and
perhaps in time North Korea and Syria and Iran)... [even while] terrorists have
continued to roost in England and Germany and in New England and New Jersey and
Florida as well.216 These states, too, must be counted if the logic is to be consistent
The power of the USA PATRIOT Act217 extended the War on Terror in just such a
way. But precisely in this context, the USA PATRIOT Act presents an alarming
possibility of public repression. The bill was passed under frenzied circumstances, just
as an anthrax scare prevented Congresspeople from going to work. Thus, the final
language of the law was written behind closed doors by a small group of
Administration officials and members of Congress,218 preventing serious reflection on
its consequences until well after the Act was passed. While there is now talk of
repealing all or part of this law, there is also talk from hardliners like Attorney General
Ashcroft about extending its provisions.219
63


Key to fascist violence, in its organic concept of the nation, is the idea that
repression of elements that are critical of (cancerous to) the nation is justified. When
this concept is carried into the general public, it can lead to an atmosphere of paranoia
and witch-hunting, deeply dangerous to the open expression of ideas that is a necessary
condition of democracy. As Howard Zinn remarked shortly after September 11,
phrases such as the one Bush used.. .either you are with us or you are with the
terrorists are rather terrifying. It means that if youre not supporting the government,
youre an enemy of the government. All of this produced a kind of hysteria, which
leads to what I think can only be described as a lynch spirit.220 Such a lynch spirit was
clearly in play when the Immigration and Naturalization Service launched a highly
selective round-up of thousands of Muslims who had overstayed visas or were
otherwise in the country illegally, subjecting many of them to deportation and
interrogation by the FBI.221 A similar disregard for traditional norms like due process
and the presumption of innocence can be seen in the holding of more than 650 people
at a U.S. military camp in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where key administration figures like
Donald Rumsfeld said that detainees may be held indefinitely, even if eventually
charged and acquitted though they are currently not allowed access to legal counsel
or even informed of the reasons they are being held.222
While the USA PATRIOT Act is ostensibly aimed at giving authorities the
powers they need to combat domestic terrorism, the concept of domestic terrorism
on which the law depends is amazingly broad. As Nancy Chang of the Center for
64


Constitutional Rights writes, the new crimes wide ambit covers any acts dangerous to
human life that are a violation of the criminal laws, if they appear to be intended.. .to
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion and if they occur
primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.223 These broad criteria
can easily be extended to acts of civil disobedience like sit-ins or protests that could
block city streets; likewise, protesters who clash with authority forces could almost
certainly meet this definition of domestic terrorism. Such people can, theoretically,
be held at camps like Guantanamo if the government determines that [they are] a
continuing threat.224
The new authorities granted by the USA PATRIOT Act make it easier for the
government to conduct surveillance, listen in on conversations, obtain sensitive
financial, student and medical records and otherwise track the daily activities of
individuals.225 The threat has, by almost all accounts, increased with the decision to
allow the CIA to, once again, compile dossiers on ordinary Americans and then
through new information sharing provisions distribute that information through the
law enforcement and intelligence communities.226 While widespread examples of
abuses of this power are, as yet, hard to come by and, indeed, support for the
sweeping provisions of the PATRIOT Act is now beginning to wane227 the potential
for abuse remains. On top of this danger, while a study in the Summer of 2002 found
that overall.. .Americans support the protection of civil liberties in the face of the
external threat, it remains unclear what might happen to the support for civil liberties
65


if another major attack on America were to occur, such as a chemical, radiological, or
biological attack. Further events may also occur that give some people pause about how
secure they are, or how able the government is to protect their rights while fighting or
suppressing the terrorist threat.228
The Permanent Majority
Along with the physical violence of the Bush Administrations post-September 11
policies and tactics for repressing dissent, an alarming amount of damage has been done
in this time to the competitive power of the opposition in Americas two-party system.
This trend threatens to make democracy itself a victim of the War on Terror.
For instance, the Republican Party has taken steps to institutionalise its majority
in the United States House of Representatives, pushing forward plans to redistrict
congressional districts in Colorado, Pennsylvania, and Texas. While redistricting was
mandated in these states because of population changes noted in the last census, in
Colorado redistricting had already occurred, and the new districts had been used in an
election cycle. Regardless, the Republican-controlled state Senate voted 18-12 to
replace the 2002 map with one that loads Republican voters into the evenly split 7 th
Congressional District, and also increases the Republican majority in the close 5th
District229 This Republican attempt at gerrymandering was overruled by the Colorado
Supreme Court, though the case has been appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
66


In. Texas, the plan can be directly tied to U.S. House majority leader Tom
DeLay, and to his plans to solidify the Republicans national hold on power.
Alarmingly, these moves have been couched as a patriotic part of the War on Terror:
DeLay testified to the Democratic House Redistricting Committee that the districts
should be drawn so Republicans could win the two new seats [granted by the revised
census figures,] plus six seats held by Democrats. He couched it as a patriotic move for
President Bush, admonishing members of the committee to remember that your vote
will not simply count for Texas. The decisions you make carry implications for our
entire nation. And the way you resolve this duty will mean critical ramifications for the
Bush administration.230
Some would charge that such gerrymandering is part of politics as usual,
noting that redistricting shenanigans happen all the time under the leadership of
administrations from both major parties. This wave is different in at least three ways.
First, it is receiving aid from the Homeland Security department, which has attempted
to locate dissenters and subject them to pressure from Republican lawmakers.231 It is,
in this sense, being treated as part of the War on Terror. Second, in each case
redistricting is occurring outside of the standard ten-year cycle, putting it at odds with
state constitutions and making it a more opportunistic process than usual. And third,
whereas gerrymandering used to be an art, improvements in computer technology,
election databases, and voter registration have made redistricting a science whereby
67


outcomes can now be more reliably predicted232 it is thus more dangerous to true
democratic competition than the previous, clumsy gerrymanders of yesteryear.
The 2002 midterm elections may, in this context, represent the beginning of an
unsettling trend. Unlike most midterm elections, when the presidents party tends to
lose seats in Congress, the Republicans were able in 2002 to gain seats to acquire a
majority in the House. As James Campbell writes, some portion of the Republican
2002 gain reflected the [earlier] reapportionment and redistricting that generally favored
Republicans.233 The creation of such safe seats poses a serious risk to democracy as
weve known it In tightly contested political races, candidates have an incentive to
move towards the center and attempt to capture the moderate vote. In one-sided races,
the key to victory involves motivating turnout of the party faithful. In America, the
standard way of doing this is to swing further to the left or the right leading to more
partisan campaigns, and, once candidates are elected, a less effective, less co-operative
Congress.234 This situation serves only to further encourage a jaded attitude towards
politics on the part of moderates, shrinking turnout overall, while motivating the most
vocal, radical, and reactionary segments of the population. Obviously it does little to
support the free and open exchange of ideas most would associate with healthy
The administration is also acting to broaden the influence of its interest groups in the
school system. Since September 11, the Bush Administrations No Child Left Behind
68


Act is working to Christianise and militarise the public schools of the nations poorest
districts. The legislations main thrust is to identify failing schools through state-level
standardised testing; parents of children attending a school that has fallen below
improvement thresholds for two consecutive years are then offered the option of
transferring to another public school in the district which may include a public charter school
- that has not been identified as needing school improvement.235 Schools that
continue to need improvement for five years must then be restructured either by
reopening.. .as a charter school, replacing all or most of the school staff or turning
over school operations.. .to the state or to a private company with a demonstrated
record of effectiveness.236 Because parochial schools are eligible to bid (and have a
strong history of doing so), this process could ultimately have the effect of dramatically
increasing the reach of fundamentalist education throughout the lower-income
communities of the country.
The No Child Left Behind Act holds one more troubling, little-reported clause:
all high schools are now obligated to provide the Pentagon with the names, addresses
and phone numbers of their juniors and seniors. Any school that refuses to comply with
these provisions of the No Child Left Behind Act and this year's National Defense
Authorization Act stands to lose all federal funding.237 Schools are also obligated to
host ROTC programmes at the militarys request. This same provision of the No
Child Left Behind Act is being used to gain access to the country's top universities and
law schools, which previously had not allowed a military presence on campus because of
69


their policy of not doing business with organizations that discriminate on the basis of
sexual orientation.238 Both trends point to an alarming extension of the militarys
recruitment efforts, and increasingly heavy-handed efforts to enlist poor and minority
students who typically go to the schools that depend on federal funding. One wonders
what all these new recruits might be needed for.
Some Conclusions
Fascist movement rarely happens overnight. In Italy, it took the fascist movement
almost a decade to take power,239 and this at a time of enormous social upheaval.
Moreover, Italian fascism probably had its roots in the nationalist sentiments that had
favoured Italian intervention in the First World War,240 and many trace the origins of
the doctrine even further back as an extreme manifestation of a much broader and
more comprehensive [cultural] phenomenon that had its roots in the rebellion against
the Enlightenment and the French Revolution which swept across Europe at the end
of the nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth.241 Likewise, fascist
progress in the United States would almost certainly take time to gather momentum and
require a fertile matrix of psychological and social factors.
Yet, the findings on the preceding pages indicate that many of these
psychological and social factors are already in place. I have presented evidence that
there is a core ideology among administration officials and their allies in the New Right
that closely fits a fascist framework. Making this framework more dangerous,
70


sociological data shows a retreat from civic and political engagement on the part of
Americas more urban, cosmopolitan, and liberal population. Rightist groups in
Americas heartland are mobilising and radicalising on issues other than tolerance and
love for their neighbour, and major party platforms are being skewed further right.
In refutation of those who hold that Americas historically liberal, democratic
tradition will provide shelter from these currents, the studies of Asch, Milgram, and
Inglehart demonstrate the willingness of Americans to follow wrongheaded, intolerant
policies and decisions from authority figures on the flimsiest reasoning. The public
acceptance of many of the Bush administrations post-September 11 policies mirrors,
and brings into contemporary relevance, these findings.
The lightning passage of repressive laws like the USA PATRIOT Act and the
speed of the United States headlong rush into endless war suggest how quickly a more
thoroughgoing fascist transformation could take place, and how susceptible the
American public may have already become to fascist violence and herd mentality.
The moves of the right to broaden its public reach through the means of socialisation
schools and universities and to institutionalise its current congressional majority point
to the future difficulties our society may face undoing these policy changes,
decentralising power, and creating a more tolerant, progressive society after the War on
Terror has passed and a measure of rationality returns.
It might yet be argued that the United States has reached the apogee of its
current movement towards fascism. For many, the horror and shock experienced with
71


September 11 is beginning to fade, and a more critical stance has been taken towards
the Bush administration. For example, polls on September 11, 2003, showed approval
for the president falling, dropping his overall job rating back to prewar levels.242 These
figures have since fallen below 50%. The War on Terrorism may itself prove
unsustainable, as the mounting costs of the occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq begin to
frustrate the American public, and the debate over the justification for the war in Iraq -
imminent threat from Iraqs weapons of mass destruction plays more heavily against
the Bush administration.243 Even the USA PATRIOT Act could face repeal as
legislators take a more reflective stance,244 a public coalition emerges, and the danger of
terrorism fades more and more into memory.
The possibility that president Bush could be defeated in the 2004 elections is
quite real, as I write this, according to a recent poll by the Gallup Agency, CNN, and
USA Today: as reported, even before the Democratic Party opposition had selected a
candidate, the Democratic contenders would run no worse than even with Bush [in an
election held in September, 2003] if the polls margin of error of 3.5 percentage points is
taken into account.245 This description doesnt make much of comparisons to II Duce,
or the Fuhrer who would probably not have allowed this kind of poll to be
conducted, and, if they had, would never have allowed such results to be reported.
With these points conceded, our investigation has nonetheless shown that a
fascist framework is increasingly coming to permeate the highest reaches of power, and
bubbles just beneath the surface in parts of the wider societys discourse. If the forces
72


of the New Right and its allies in the Republican party have failed in their fascistic
vision for the country or, perhaps closer to the truth, are finding that vision less
palatable for now they have still succeeded in expanding their share of social power,
and have laid the foundations for considerable modifications in the social infrastructure.
These changes suggest that the fascistically motivated policy movements of the future
could face greatly diminished opposition opposition that was scant enough this time
around. Over and above all of this, there is the continued and immediate threat of
another terrorist attack especially as our actions in Iraq, and our inactions in the
Israeli-Palestdnian dispute, continue to alienate and threaten the Arab and Muslim world.
Such an event holds out the possibility of setting the entire September 11 process in
motion again. How American society and its democratic institutions would withstand
the reaction to a second such catastrophe is a real, and sobering, question.
73


ENDNOTES
1 Gross, Bertram. 1980. Friendly Fascism: The New Face of Power in America. Boston, South End Press, 161
2 See Gregor, A. James. 1997. Interpretations of Fascism. New Brunswick & London: Transaction
Publishers, 34-35 for a discussion; scholars like Gregor (and Organski) argue that Nazism was more
racially motivated than nationalistic, and was therefore not truly a fascist system but instead a kind of
expansionistic xenophobia.
3 Teeling, William. A background to recent events in Japan. 1936. International Affairs (Royal Institute of
International Affairs 1931-1939) 15:3,374-394; see also Minear, Richard. 1980. Cross-Cultural Perception
and World War II: American Japanists of the 1940s and Their Images of Japan. International Studies
Quarterly 24:4, 555-580.
4 Argentina is a particularly interesting case, as Organski included it as part of his syncratic fascist
systems (see Organski, A.F.K. 1965. The Stages of Political Development. New York: Alfred Knopf, 150),
though he ruled out German National Socialism. Other Argentine scholars among them Jose Luis
Romero, George Blanksten, Arthur Whitaker, and Peter Smith all trace Perons ideological inspiration
back to Mussolinis Italy (Lewis, Paul. 1980. Was Peron a fascist? An inquiry into the nature of fascism.
The Journal of Politics 42:1, 242-243.
5 See Arendts famous Origins of Totalitarianism, San Diego, New York & London: Harcourt (1968) which
discounts Italian fascism as mere thuggery, but links German Nazism and Soviet Communism into a
larger totalitarian phenomenon.
6 Lewis, Paul. op. at.
7 From the preface, discussing definitional approaches: Ed. Griffin, Roger. 1995. Fascism. Oxford: Oxford
Readers.
8 Korten, David. 1962. Situational determinants of leadership structure. The Journal of Conflict Resolution
6:3,229
9 Allardyce, Gilbert. 1979. What fascism is not: thoughts on the deflation of a concept. The American
Historical Review, 84:2,388
10 Leffler, Melvyn. 1994. The Specter of Communism: The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1917-
1953. New York: Hill & Wang, 129.
11 See Passmore, Kevin op cit, 11; see also Comstock, Craig. 1971. Avoiding pathologies of defense. In
Sanctionsfor Evil: Sources of Social Destructiveness, eds. Sanford, Nevitt & Craig Comstock. Berkeley, San
Francisco: The Wright Group, Jossey-Bass Inc. Publishers, 292-293.
12 See Sinclair Lewiss 1935 dystopian classic It Can't Happen Here.
74


13 Nolte, Ernst. 1968. The Crisis ofUberalSystems and the Fascistic Ideology, Munich., 385. Reprinted in Payne,
Stanley. 1980. Fascism: Comparison and Definition. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 5-6.
14 Payne, Stanley op cit., 6
15 Ibid. 7
16 Paxton, op. cit., 3
17 From the Introduction, Braun, Aurel & Stephen Steinberg (eds). 1997. The Extreme Right: Freedom and
Security at Risk. Boulder & Oxford: Westview Press, 2
18 Gentile, Giovanni. 2002. Origins and Doctrine of Fascism: with selectionsfrom other works, tr. A. James
Gregor. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 25
15 Ibid. 14
20 Wellhofer, E. Spencer. 2003. Democracy and fascism: class, civil society, and rational choice in Italy.
American Political Science Review 97:1,104.
21 Syzmanski, Albert. 1973. Fascism, industrialism and socialism: the case of Italy. Comparative Studies in
Society and Histoty, 15:4,399.
22 Paxton, op. cit., 6
23 Gentile, Giovanni. Origins and Doctrine, op. cit., 25
24 The Italian Nationalist Association [which, after merging with the Fascist party, played a key role and
appointed Federzoni and Rocco to high office in the partys formative stages]. 1920. The nationalist
blueprint for a new Italy. IlNasfionalismo, Rome: ANI. Reprinted in Ed. Griffin, Roger op. cit.., 38
[emphasis mine]
25 Gentile, Giovanni, from What is Fascism, reprinted in Gregor, A. James (tr.) Origins and Doctrine of
Fascism, op. cit., 47
26 Gentile, Emilio. 1984. Fascism as political religion. Journal of Contemporary History, 19:4 (Reassessments
of Fascism), 230-231
27 Mussolini, Benito. October 24 1922. The Naples Speech. Reprinted in Ed. Griffin, Roger, op. cit., 44.
28 Searle-White, Joshua. 2001.The Psychology of Nationalism. Palgrave, 72.
29 Hedges, Chris. 2002. War is a Force That Gives Us Meaning. New York: PublicAffairs, 45.
30 See Duster, Troy. 1971. Conditions for guilt-free massacre. In Sanctions for Evil., eds. Sanford, Nevitt &
Craig Comstock, op. cit., 25-36; see also Staub, Ervin. 1989. The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Ethnic Conflict
and Other Group Violence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 121-123 for an examination of how
75


ideas in the Nazi regime moved from preservation of the race to eugenics and finally violence, allowing
individuals to act without specific state sanction.
31 ed. Griffin, Roger op. cit. p. 7
32 These ideas are explained in Gentiles War and Fate, reprinted in Origins and Doctrine of Fascism, tr. Gregor
op. cit.., 251.
33 Gregor, A. James. 1969. The Ideology of Fascism: the 'Rationale of Totalitarianism. New York and London:
The Free Press and Collier-Macmillan Limited, 247
34 Calhoun, Craig. 1993. Nationalism and ethnicity. Annual Review of Sociology, 19:3, 211.
35 Ibid., 308
36 an effect foreseen by Gross, but discussed with more focus in Cummings, Michael. 2001. Beyond
Political Correctness: Social Transformation in the United States Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
50-52.
37 Dye, Thomas and Harmon Ziegler. 2000. The Irony of Democracy: an Uncommon Introduction to American
Politics 6* edition. New York, London & Sydney: Harcourt Brace Publishers, 16.
38 Thinkers like Marinetti and Bottai, Italian fascists, planned a radical reorganisation of the school system
to create a society permanently mobilised for war for example, by replacing traditional academic
education with practical and technical training both in workshops and on farms... [and] itinerant schools
schools where travel itself provides the foundation for education [with] schooling in physical courage
and patriotism. (Marinetti, Giuseppe. The Florence Address (1919) in Schnapp, Jeffrey (ed.) A Primer
of Italian Fascism University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln and London: 2000. p. 271.) Such reforms were
intended to ruralise the population (which would make it more patriotic), increase the food supply, and
add to the fertility rate, making Italy into a war machine. These plans never fully came to fruition, and
instead the Duce had to settle for a tighdy controlled network of state and parochial schools (which
nonetheless rigidly extolled the party line). See the bibliography for citations.
39 Gentile, Giovanni. 2002. Origins and Doctrine of Fascism: with selectionsfrom other works, tr. A. James
Gregor. Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick and London, 28-29
40 See Paxton, Robert. 1998. The five stages of fascism. The Journal of Modem History, 70:1,6. Paxton, for
his part, disagrees with the attempt to derive a fascist minimum at all, regarding this as an error in trying
to treat generic fascism in a static manner (9). Regardless, he lists his own 7-point fascist minimum on
the same page.
41 Stone, Marla. 1993. Staging fascism: the exhibition of the fascist revolution. The Journal of Contemporary
History, 28:2, 216.
42 Berezin, Mabel. 1994. Cultural form and political meaning state-subsidized theatre, ideology, and the
language of style in fascist Italy. The American Journal of Sociology, 99:5,1280.
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43 Gasset, Jose Ortega y. 1927. Sobre elFascismo. Quoted in Passmore, Kevin. Fascism: a Very Short
Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press, 1.
44 Adomo, T.W., Else Frenkel-Brunswick, Daniel Levinson & R. Nevitt Sanford. 1950. The Authoritarian
Personality. New York: Harper & Brothers, 7.
45 Ibid., 242
46 Ibid., 266ff
47 Schuman, Howard with Lawrence Bobo and Maria Krysan. 1992. Authoritarianism in the general
population: the education interaction hypothesis. Social Psychology Quarterly 55:4,384.
48 Ibid., 384-5.
49 Gregor, A. James. Interpretations of Fascism. Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick & London: 1997. p.
74
50 Adomo, T.W., Else Frenkel-Brunswick, Daniel Levinson & R. Nevitt Sanford. The Authoritarian
Personality. Harper & Brothers, New York: 1950. p. 229-230
51 Ibid.
52 Rokeach, Milton. 1960. The Open and Closed Mind: Investigations into the Nature of Belief Systems and Personality
Systems. New York: Basic Books, 15.
53 Ibid. 129 note the selection of left-right authoritarian groups.
54 Ainsworth, Mary. 1966. Reversible and irreversible effects of maternal deprivation on intellectual
development In Experience, Structure & Adaptability, ed. Harvey, O. J. New York: Springer Publishing
Company, 153.
55 Bieri, James. 1966. Cognitive complexity and personality development. In Ibid., 15.
56 McVicker Hunt, J. 1966. The psychological basis for using preschool enrichment as an antidote for
cultural deprivation. In Ibid., 235-276.
57 Schroeder, Harold and O. J. Harvey. 1963. Conceptual organization and group structure. In Motivation
and Social Interaction: Cognitive Determinants, ed. Harvey, O. J. New York: The Ronald Press Company, 134.
58 Ibid.
59 Cummings, Michael. 1974. Dogmatism, Ideology and Political Behavior. Doctoral Dissertation. Stanford:
Stanford University, 68.
60 Ibid.
77


61 Fromm, Erich. 1964. The Heart of Man: Its Geniusfor Good and Evil. New York, Evanston, and London:
Harper and Row Publishers.
62 Fromm, Heart of Man, 75
Ibid., 108
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid., 32-33
66 Fromm, Erich. 1973. The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness. New York, Chicago and San Francisco: Holt,
Rhinehart & Winston, 66.
67 Druckman, Daniel. 1994. Nationalism, patriotism, and group loyalty: a social psychological perspective.
Mershon International Studies Review 38:1,45.
68 Janowitz, Morris and Dwaine Marvick. 1953. Authoritarianism and political behavior. Public Opinion
Quarterly, 17:2,185.
69 Fromm, Heart of Man, op. cit.., 87.
70 From the chapter titled Freudian Theory and the Pattern of Fascist Propaganda, Adorno, Theodor.
1991. The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture. London: Routiedge, 122.
71 Ibid.
72 Reich, Wilhelm. 1970. The Mass Psychology of Fascism, tr. Vincent R. Carfagno. New York: Farrar, Straus
& Giroux, 63.
73 Inglehart, Ronald and Scott Flanagan. 1987. Value change in industrial societies. The American Political
Science Review 81:4,1315.
74 Lears, T. J. Jackson. 1985. The concept of cultural hegemony: problems and possibilities. The American
Historical Review 90:3, 573.
75 Lasswell, Harold. 1941. The garrison state. The American Journal of Sociology, 46:4, 458-459.
76 Spinner-Halev, Jeff and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse. 2003. National identity and self-esteem. Perspectives on
Politics 1:3, 525.
77 Redl, Fritz. 1971. The superego in uniform. In Sanctions for Evil Sources of Social Destructiveness, eds.
Sanford, Nevitt & Craig Comstock op. cit., 95.
78 Goode, Stephen. 11 December 2000. Americanism according to Professor Lipset. Interview. Insight on
the News. Accessed online at
<> May 9,2004.
78


79 Lipset, Seymour and Gary Marks. 2000. It Didnt Happen Here: Why Socialism Failed in the United States.
New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
80 Asch, Solomon. 1952. Social Psychology. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.
81 Milgram, Stanley. 1963. A behavioral study of obedience, journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 67,
371-378.
82 From the World Values Survey, Reprinted in Inglehart, Ronald. 2003. How solid is mass support for
democracy and how can we measure it? PS: Political Science and Politics, 36:1, 53.
83 Dye, Thomas and Harmon Ziegler. The Irony of Democracy: an Uncommon Introduction to American Politics, op.
cit., 18.
84 Wattenburg, Martin. 1998. Should election day be a holiday? The Atlantic Monthly, October, 42.
85 Figures are based on the turnout percentages among the population eligible to vote. See Leip, David,
cited below.
86 Schudson, Michael. 2000. Is journalism hopelessly cynical? In Principles and Practice of American Politics:
Classic and Contemporary Readings, eds. Kernel], Samuel and Steven Smith. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 744.
Adapted from an earlier article (1999), Social origins of press cynicism in portraying politics. American
Behavioral Scientist 42:6, 999-1008.
87 Patterson, Thomas. 2002.The Vanishing Voter. Public Involvement in an Age of Uncertainty. New York:
Vintage Books, 79-80.
88 Ibid., 81.
89 Kahn, Kim and Patrick Kenney. 2002. The slant of the news: how editorial endorsements influence
campaign coverage and citizens views of candidates. American Political Science Review 96:2, 382.
90 Penn, Shoen and Berland Associates. 1997. Which of the following is closest to your own thinking
about the proper role of the federal government? Poll data. Roper Center, University of Connecticut:
July 23-27.
91 Janowitz & Marvick, op. cit., 197.
92 Ibid., 199
93 Bergman, Michael. February 27, 2002. Registered Voter Turnout Improved in 2000 Presidential Flection, Census
Bureau Reports. U.S. Census Bureau Public Information Office. Accessed October 16, 2003
http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2002/cb02-31.html>>
94 Lasch, Christopher. 1978.The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations New
York: W.W. Norton & Company, 15.
95 Korten, op. cit., 230.
79


96 Lasch, op. cit.
97 Membership figures according to MoveOn.orgs website, as of March 5,2004.
98 Putnam, Robert. 2000. BowlingAlone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon
& Schuster.
99 Davis, Mike. 1990. City of Quarts; Excavating the Future in Los Angeles. New York: Verso, 246.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid., p. 250
102 See J.P. Freeman. 2000. The U.S. Integrated Security Systems Market Report. Newtown: J. P. Freeman, Inc.
Note: I have not, as of this writing, read the full report but only the abstract available on the company
website, http://www.jpfreeman.eom/mktreport.htm#report8>> (Accessed March 1,2004).
Funding limitations for this research prevented my acquiring such a cosdy document (US$2000 for hard
copy).
103 Davis, Mike. 1992. Urban Control: The Ecologii of Fear. Westfield: Open Media. Part of the Open
Magazine Pamphlet Series, published online: see <<
http://www.huzzam.com/etext/davmurbancont/index.html for a copy (Accessed March 1, 2004).
104 Krupa, Frederique. 1993. Los Angeles: Buying the Concept of Security. Masters Thesis. Berkeley: University
of Berkeley. http: / /www.translucency.com /frede /lagc.html (Accessed February 10,2004).
105 The Sentencing Project. 2003. U.S. Prison Populations: Trends and Implications. Washington: The
Sentencing Project, 1.
106 See citations for the 2000 Presidential debates, below.
107 For a really excellent discussion of the criminalisation of workers and the disempowering effects of
mandatory workplace drug testing, see Ehrenreich, Barbara. 2001. Nickel and Dimed: On (Not) Getting By in
America. New York: Metropolitan Books, 124-129.
108 Giroux, Henry. 2001. Public Spaces, Private Lives: Beyond the Culture of Cynicism. Lanham, Boulder, New
York and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 39.
109 Indeed, there is real question as to whether the Bush Administration won the election at all his
challenger, Albert Gore, won die majority of the popular vote but was narrowly defeated by the margin of
electoral votes in states carried. Due to voting inaccuracies in Florida, it is possible that Gore in fact won
that state and its electoral votes, and therefore won the election. The map in figure 1 reflects the (Bush
Administrations) official election results, rather than any recounted or contested votes.
110Leip, David. 2004. DaveLeip's Atlas ofU.S. Presidential Elections. http://www.uselectionatlas.org>>
Accessed February 28, 2004.
80


111 New York Times. The 2000 Campaign; Transcript of Debate Between Vice President Gore and
Governor Bush. The New York Times. New York Times Company, New York: October 4, 2000. p: A30
1,2 For an excellent history of the origins of the southern strategy, see Murphy, Reg and Hall Gulliver.
1971. The Southern Strategy. New York: Charles Scribners Sons.
113 Aistrup, Joseph. 1996. The Southern Strategy 'Revisited: Republican Top-Down Advancement in the South.
Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 51.
114 Barber, Benjamin. 1995. Jihad vs. McWorld: Terrorisms Challenge to Democracy. New York & Toronto:
Ballantine Books, 169-170.
115 Schwalbe, Michael with Sandra Godwin, Daphne Holden, Shealy Thompson and Michele Wolkomir.
2000. Generic processes in the reproduction of inequality: an interactionist analysis. Social Forces 79:2, 422.
116 Micklethwait, John and Adrian Wooldridge. 2000. A Future Perfect: The Challenge and Hidden Promise of
Globalisation. New York: Crown Business, 229.
117 Lasch, Christopher. 1995. The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal ofDemocracy. New York and London: W.
W. Norton & Company, 6.
118 Goffman, Erving. 1963. Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity. New York, London, Toronto,
Sydney, Tokyo, Singapore: Simon & Schuster Inc., 123.
119 Dyer, Joel. 1997. Harvest of Rage: Why Oklahoma City is Only the Beginning. Boulder & Oxford: Westview
Press, 13.
120 Ibid.
121 New York Times. October 18,2000. The 2000 Campaign; Exchanges Between the Candidates in the
Third Presidential Debate. New York Times Company, New York, A26.
122 New York Times. October 12,2000. The 2000 Campaign; 2nd Presidential Debate Between Gov.
Bush and Vice President A1 Gore. New York Times Company, New York, A22.
123 Ibid.
124 Penn, Shoen and Berland Associates. Which is closest to George W. Bush's view on the role of the
federal government? Poll data. Roper Center, University of Connecticut: November 11-12,2000.
125 Buchanan, Patrick. 1999. A Republic, Not an Empire: Reclaiming Americas Destiny. Washington, DC:
Regnery Publishing, 347.
126 Used in this sense to refer to the kind of militant-fundamentalist reaction that is occurring in some
predominantly Islamic countries and regions, and is so popularly abused in the mass media. The author
understands that some theological interpretations of what Jihad means vary greatly from this popular
(mis)use of the term.
81


127 Dyer, Joel. op. cit., 26.
128 see the National Mental Health Associations Report of the National Action Commission on the Mental Health
of Rural Americans, Alexandria (1988).
129 Bush, George W. President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and Middle East: Remarks by the
President at the 20* Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy. Office of the Press
Secretary, November 6, 2003. Accessed online at
< >. February 10, 2004.
130 Krampen, Gunter. 1991. Political participation in an action-theory model of personality: theory and
empirical evidence. Political Psychology 12:1, 7.
131 Janowitz & Marvick. op. cit., 199.
132 Eckhardt, William. Authoritarianism. Political Psychology 12:1, 111.
133 Dyer, Joel. op. cit. p. 227
134 The growing popularity of this movement can be seen in the perennial best-seller status of the Left
Behind non-fiction novels LaHaye and Jenkins series, based on the book of revelation, that had sold
over 50 million copies in 2002 (ABC News. Up Close: Jerry Jenkins, Author of a Series of Novels Called
Left Behind. American Broadcasting Company, New York: July 30,2002)
135 Tourish, Dennis and Tim Wohlforth. 2001. Prophets of the Apocalypse: White Supremacy and the Theology if
Christian Identity. Jersey City: The Ross Institute. Accessed online at:
http://www.rickross.com/reference/chtistian identity/christianidentityl9.html>> February 16, 2004.
136 Freud, Sigmund. 1961. The Future of an Illusion, tr. James Strachey. New York and London: W. W.
Norton & Company, 21.
137 Ibid.
138 Freud, Sigmund. 1961. Civilisation and Its Discontents, tr. James Strachey. New York and London: W. W.
Norton & Company, 22.
139 Adomo, Theodor. 1991. The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture. London: Roudedge, 115.
140 Freud, Sigmund. 1918. Totem andTaboo: Resemblances Between the PsychicLives ofSavages and Neurotics, tr. A.
A. Brill. New York: Vintage Books, 194.
141 Cummings, op. cit., 66; Adomo et. al. The Authoritarian Personality, op. cit., 517.
142 Dyer, op. cit., 162.
143 Kimball, David and Samuel Patterson. 1997. Living up to expectations: public attitudes toward
congress. The Journal of Politics 59:3, 702.
82


144 Phillips, Kevin. 1993. Boiling Point: Democrats, Republicans, and the Decline of Middle-Class Prosperity. New
York: Random House, 242.
145 Gold, Howard. 1992. Hollow Mandates: American Public Opinion & the Conservative Shift. Boulder, San
Francisco and Oxford: Westview Press, 46.
146 Ibid.
147 Guth, James and John Green. 1990. Politics in a new key: religiosity and participation among political
activists. The Western PoliticalQuarterly 43:1,175.
148 Dortien, Gary. 1993. The Neconservative Mind: Politics, Culture, and the War of Ideology. Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 8.
149 Hardisty, Jean. 1999. Mobilsing Presentment: Conservative Resurgencefrom the John Birch Society to the Promise
Keepers. Boston: Beacon Press, 45.
150 Droteau, David, William Hoynes, and Kevin Carragee. 1993. Public television and the missing public: a
study of sources and programming. Extra! 6:6, Cited in Hardisty, Jean op. cit., 244.
151 See Cuprisin, Tim. April 13 2003. Fox News Scores Big in Ratings War. Milwaukee: Milwaukee
Journal-Sentinel.
152 See Franken, Al. 2003. Lies and the Lying Liars Who Tell Them: A Fair and Balanced Look at the Right. New
York: E. P. Dutton.
153 Regnerus, Mark with David Sikkink and Christian Smith. 1999. Voting with the Christian right:
contextual and individual patterns of electoral influence. Social Forces 11 A, 1394.
154 Conover, Pamela, op. cit., 646.
155 Sorman, Guy. 1984. The Conservative Revolution in America, tr. Jane Sorman. France: Fayard, 101.
156 Ibid.
157 Regnerus, Mark with David Sikkink and Christian Smith. 1999. Voting with the Christian right:
contextual and individual patterns of electoral influence. Social Forces 11 A, 1394.
158 Ibid., 1394-1395.
159 From his chapter Our Primary Goal: Military Superiority. Viguerie, Richard. 1981. The New Right:
Were Ready to Lead rev. ed. Falls Church: The Viguerie Company, 109-110.
160 Falwell, Jerry. Introduction to Viguerie, Richard. The New Right: Were Ready to Lead rev. ed. The
Viguerie Company, Falls Church: 1981
161 According to campaign website, << www.georgewbush.com Accessed March 1, 2004.
83


162 Reed, Ralph. 1996. Active Faith: How Christians are Changing the Soul of American Politics. New York: The
Free Press, 5.
163 Thomas, Cal and Ed Dobson. 1999. Blinded by Might: Can the Religious Right Save America? Grand Rapids:
Zondervan Publishing House, 276.
164 Ibid., Bookjacket.
165 Gentile, Giovanni. Origins and Doctrine of Fascism, op. cit., 1.
166 Bercovitch, Sacvan. 1978. The American Jeremiad. Madison and London: University of Wisconsin Press,
176.
167 Ibid., 63: we can trace from 1662 the secularizing movement that was eventually to extend the
prerogatives of visible sainthood to the entire American electorate.
168 For just one example, see Bennett, William. 2003. Why We Fight: Moral Clarify and the War on Terrorism.
Washington, DC: Doubleday Broadway. Though the author ultimately concludes that the Arab-Muslim
world constitutes a fundamental threat to the United States, and has always been attempting to destroy it,
he also documents some wonderful post-9/11 statements that are indicative of the trend. For example,
Franklin Graham, the son of Billy Graham and the head of the Billy Graham Evangelistic Association,
proclaimed Islam a very evil and wicked religion and Saxby Chambliss, a Republican Congresswoman
from Georgia, proposed that we let the local sheriff arrest every Muslim that crosses the state line (83-
84).
169 Armstrong, Karen. 2000. The Battle for God. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 235.
170 Ibid.
171 Watson, Justin. 1997. The Christian Coalition: Dreams of Restoration, Demands for Recognition. New York: St.
Martins Press, 10.
172 Ibid., 89.
173 Armstrong, Karen, op. cit., 273.
174 Schlesinger, Arthur. 1998. The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society, rev. ed. New York
and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 24.
175 Ibid., 49.
176 Bork, Robert. 1990. The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the haw. New York: The Free Press,
351.
177 Neuhaus, Richard. 1994. The Naked Public Square. 2nd edition. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing
Company, 128.
178 Ibid., 145.
84


179 Ibid.
180 Regnerus, Mark and Christian Smith. 1998. Selective deprivatization among American religious
traditions: the reversal of the great reversal. SocialForces 76:4,1364.
181 Conover, Pamela. 1993. The mobilization of the new right: a test of various explanations. The Western
Political Quarterly 36:4, 645.
182 Moore, Michael. 2001. Stupid White Men.. .and Other Sony Excusesfor the State of the Nation! New York:
Regan Books, 210-211.
183 Hetherington, Marc and Michael Nelson. 2003. Anatomy of a rally effect: George W. Bush and the war
on terrorism. PS: Political Science and Politics 36:1,38.
184 .. .even if the long-term strategy now seems to favor creating an ongoing sense of emergency,
complete with colour-coded terrorist alerts on the morning news.
185 Bush, George W. September 11,2001. Televised Address. Statement by the President in His Address
to the Nation. Washington, DC: Office of the Press Secretary.
186 Parker, J. Michael. April 12,2003. The almost chosen; U.S. patriotism, piety linked. San Antonio:
San Antonio Express-News, 7B.
187 Bush, George W. January 29,2002. The Presidents State of the Union Address. Office of the Press
Secretary, Washington, DC. '
188 Ibid.
189 Bush, George W. January 28, 2003. President Delivers State of the Union. Washington, DC:
Office of the Press Secretary.
190 See Clark, Wesley. 2001. Waging Modem Wan Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat. New York: Argos
Press. See also Skocpol, Theda. 2002. Will 9/11 and the war on terror revitalize American civic
democracy? The American Political Science Review 35:3, 538 after 9/11, with limited U.S. military quotas
filled, volunteers were turned away. To be sure, President George W. Bush sporadically called on
Americans to volunteer in their communities. But his appeals seemed largely symbolic, not connected to
vital wartime activities, even as Bush administration officials visibly puzzled over what to do with
volunteers.
191 Hirsch, Michael. 2003.The Age of the Uberpower, From At War With Ourselves: Why America is
Squandering Its Chance to Build a Better World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 9.
192 War Resisters League. 2004. Where Your Income Tax Money Really Goes: The United States Federal Budgetfor
Fiscal Year 2005. New York: War Resisters League. Similar findings exist for fiscal years 2003 and 2004,
and are projected for the coming decades unless military spending drastically ramps up. This may be
likely, given that the costs of invading and occupying Iraq and Afghanistan currendy take up 3% of the
budget.
85


193 See Layne, Christopher. 20 May, 1999. Blunder in the Balkans The Clinton Administration's Bungled War
Against Serbia: CATO Policy Analysis No. 345. Washington, DC: CATO Policy Institute.
194 Farber, Seth. 2003. Distributed via Mailing List. The Bush Cabal and the Specter of Fascism An Argument
for the Green Safe States Strategy. New York: New York City Greens. The author maintains that these people
are insane.
195 Graebner, Norman. 1970. Americas twentieth-century search for world order. The National War College
Forum (Winter 1970), 37.
196 Jewett, Robert and John Lawrence. 2003. Captain America and the Crusade Against Evil: TheDilemmaof
Zealous Nationalism. Grand Rapids and Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 5-6.
197 Huntington, Samuel. 1996. The west: unique, not universal. Foreign Affairs (November-December
1996), 28-46.
198 Said, Edward. 2003. The Clash of Ignorance. Zmag, accessed online at <<
http: / /www.zmag.org/saidclash.htm March 1, 2004.
199 Gelpi, Christopher, and Peter Feaver. 2002. Speak softly and carry a big stick? Veterans in the political
elite and the American use of force. American Political Science Review 96:4, 791.
200 Pipes consistently argues that the solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict lies in psychologically
crushing the Palestinians, and runs Campus Watch, an organisation that keeps track of anti-Zionist
teachers and students in American universities (see citation under Scherer, below).
201 Scherer, Michael. 2003. Daniel Pipes, Peacemaker? Mother Jones, May 26.
202 Vest, Daniel. 2002. The Men from JINSA and CSP. The Nation, August 15.
203 Ibid.
204 Abunimah, Ali. 3 October, 2002. Yearning for world war IV: the Israel-Iraq connection. The Electronic
Intifada. Accessed online at << http: / /electronicintifada.net/v2/article759.shtml >> March 2,2004.
205 Dreyfus, Robert and Jason Vest. 2004. The Lie Factory. Mother Jones, January-February 2004.
206 Ibid. This agency had the ominous title The Office of Special Plans.
207 Varshney, Ashtuosh. 2003. Nationalism, ethnic conflict, and rationality. Perspectives on Politics 1:1, 88.
208 Perlez, Jane. February 3,2002. A Nation Challenged: Asian Militants New York: The New York Times,
A13; and, for the backlash (which perhaps forestalled U.S. action against terrorist targets in that
country) Antara. January 11,2002. U.S. to Suffer Most if it Attacks Indonesia, says Vice President.
Financial Times, Jan. 11. 2002.
209 Crawford, Neta. 2003. Just war theory and the U.S. counterterror war Perspectives on Politics 1:1,20.
86


210 Schildkraut, Deborah. Are we all Americans now? Conceptions of American national identity and
reactions to 9/11. The Political Psychologist: The Newsletter of the Political Psychology Section of the American Political
Science Association 7:2,20.
211 Ibid.
212 Feffer, John (ed.). 2003. Power Trip: U.S. Unilateralism and Global Strategy After September 11. New York,
London, Toronto and Melbourne: Seven Stories Press, 16-17.
213 Ibid., 14
214 The remark comes from a speech given at Fulton, Missouri, on March 5,1946, and is quoted in Waltz,
Kenneth. 1954. Man, The State, and War. a Theoretical Analysis. New York: Columbia University Press, 222.
215 National Security CounciL September, 2001. National Security Strategy of the United States of America.
Washington, DC: National Security Council, 6. These friends countries like Pakistan, Turkey,
Zimbabwe, as well as traditional European and Pacific allies may or may not meet a real definition of
open societies. Instead, they generally fit a pattern of holding open markets receptive to American
goods and culture; there are on one side of a presumed conflict between the market-oriented societies
and those holdout"' states that have eschewed democracy or defied the world community in other ways
(see Barber, citation 210). The National Security Strategf s parallel goals of bilateral military co-operation and
bilateral trade agreements, in this light, seem clearly aimed at the traditional fascist goal of altering the
nations privileged position vis-a-vis other nations.
216 Barber, Benjamin. 2003. Fears Empire: War, Terrorism and Democracy. New York and London: W. W.
Norton & Company, 24.
217 The acronym stands for Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (the author can only assume that the acronym was made up after the
legislation was tided).
218 American Civil Liberties Union. 2003. Insatiable Appetite: The Governments Demandfor New and Unnecessary
Powers After September 11. rev. ed. New York: American Civil Liberties Union, 4.
2,9 See The U.S. Department of Justice. 2003. The USA PATRIOT Act Preserving Life and Liberty.
Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice.
220 Zinn, Howard. 2002. Terrorism and War. ed. Anthony Amove. New York, Toronto, London and
Sydney: Seven Stories Press, 57.
221 Many of these detainees had still not received any rights to contact with outside groups or officials in
2002, in blatant disregard of constitutional protections and INS regulations: Human Rights Watch.
February 8,2002. United States: Incomplete Access to Sept. 11 Detainees. INS Limits Tour for Human Eights
Groups. New York: Human Rights Watch.
222 Quoted by Anthony Romero, Executive Director of the ACLU at a luncheon, January 14,2004.
87


223 Chang, Nancy. 2002. Silencing Political Dissent: How Post-September 11 Anti-Terrorism Measures Threaten Our
Civil Liberties. New York: Seven Stories Press, 112.
224 Remarks by Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Secretary of State, quoted by Anthony Romero op. cit.
225 American Civil Liberties Union. 2003. Insatiable Appetite: The Governments Demandfor New and Unnecessary
Powers After September 11. rev. ed. New York: American Civil Liberties Union, 12.
226 Ibid.
227 A bipartisan movement is currendy underway in the House to try and restrict some of the provisions
of the Patriot Act, and the ACLU and Conservative League have recendy joined forces to rally their
supporters against the legislation. See Pierce, Greg. October 21, 2003. Strange Bedfellows. The
Washington Times, A6.
228 Davis, Darren and Brian Silver. 2002. Civil liberties vs. personal security: public opinion in the context
of the terrorist attacks on America. The Political Psychologist: The Newsletter of the Political Psychology Section of the
American Political Science Association 7:2,11.
229 Richardson, Valerie. May 7,2003. GOP Lawmakers Pushing Plan to Redraw Voting Districts;
Colorado Senate OKs Bill with Nationwide Implications. The Washington Times, A9.
230 Ratcliffe, R.G. October 10,2003. Plan shuffles millions of Texans: DeLays Investment Pays Off.
The Houston Chronicle, Al.
231 Castro, April. May 28,2003. Investigation Links Texas Probe to Federal Anti-Terrorism Agency.
Austin: Associated Press and Local Wire.
232 Comments about Congressional Redistricting. Narr. Sam Hirsch. The Diane Rehm Show. National
Public Radio. Washington: KCFR, Denver. December 4,2003.
233 Campbell, James. 2003. The 2002 midterm election: a typical or an atypical midterm? PS: Political Science
and Politics 36:2, 203.
234 Hirsch, Sam. op. cit.
235 U.S. Department of Education, Office of the Secretary, Office of Public Affairs. 2003. No Child Left
Behind: A Parents Guide. Washington: U.S. Department of Education, 11. [Emphasis in the original]
Because the parents most-involved in their childrens lives (and therefore, quite likely, of the highest
scoring students) will be the ones most inclined to take up this offer, the Act has the potential to
undermine any improvement in already challenged schools.
236 Ibid.
237 Bleifuss, Joel. January 6,2003. No Child Left Unrecruited. In These Times. Washington, DC:
Institute for Public Affairs.
238 Bishop, Derek. November 16,2002. No Child Left Behind and Military Recruitment. Letter to the
editor, published in the two daily newspapers in Hawaii.
88


239 See Griffin, Roger (ed.) op. cit. His sources trace Mussolini (and his associates) public actions to before
1914, while the fascist regime formally took power in 1922.
240 Gentile, Giovanni. 2002. The Divided Spirit of the Italian People Before the First World War. In
Origins and Doctrine of Fascism: with selectionsfrom other works, tr. A. James Gregor. New Brunswick and
London: Transaction Publishers, 5.
241 Stemhell, Zeev. 1994. Fascism as an alternative political culture. In The Birth of Fascist Ideology, tr. David
Maisel. Princeton: Princeton University Press, From the foreword.
242 The Associated Press & Local Wire. September 12, 2003. Bushs Approval Rate Drops to Prewar
Level.
243 Priest, Dana and Walter Pincus. June 7, 2003. Bush Certainty on Iraq Went Beyond Analysts Views
The Washingfon Post, A1.
244 Lochhead, Carolyn. September 25,2003. Democrats seek rollback of Patriot Act. The San Francisco
Chronicle, A4.
245 West, Paul. September 23,2003. Support For Bush Falls To 50% in Poll; Economy, Iraq Are Factors;
If Election Held Now, Clark Would Defeat President. The Baltimore Sun, A3.
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