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Norms and values for a public administration ethics

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Norms and values for a public administration ethics
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Goss, Robert Pike
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xi, 425 leaves : illustrations ; 29 cm

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1900 - 1999 ( fast )
Public administration literature -- History -- Colorado -- 20th century ( lcsh )
Professional ethics ( lcsh )
Employees ( fast )
Professional ethics ( fast )
Public administration literature ( fast )
Officials and employees -- Colorado ( lcsh )
Colorado ( fast )
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Includes bibliographical references (leaves 380-425).
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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree, Doctor of Philosophy, Public Administration.
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School of Public Affairs
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by Robert Pike Goss.

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Full Text
NORMS AND VALUES FOR A PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION ETHICS
by
Robert Pike Goss
B.A., Brigham Young University, 1967
M.S., Brigham Young University, 1969
J.D., Georgetown University, 1977
A thesis submitted to the
. University of Colorado at Denver
in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Public Administration
1997


1997 by Robert Pike Goss
All rights reserved.


This thesis for the Doctor of Philosophy
degree by
Robert Pike Goss
has been approved
by
ithryn G. Denhardt


Goss, Robert Pike (Ph.D., Public Administration)
Norms and Values for a Public Administration Ethics
Thesis directed by Professor Robert W. Gage
ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines the importance of career civil servant attributes or values that have
been posited in the public administration literature during the last century, and tests whether there is a
distinct public administration ethics for the career bureaucracy based on those values. The work
reports on normative expectations and public management values among Colorado government
employees, state legislators, and voters. In recognition of the increasing professionalization occurring
within the bureaucracy, the work also empirically tests the separatist thesisthat professions have a
morality or ethics of their own, different from and perhaps inconsistent with the morality or ethics of
ordinary persons or the general public.
Public administration ethics has grown in importance since Watergate and Vietnam, and yet
there is no agreed upon conceptual framework for the field. However, two paradigms or
frameworksa bureaucratic ethos and a democratic ethosare described and tested using 48 public
administration values in this quantitative survey research. The hypotheses and theory testing utilize
both descriptive and inferential statistics, and also apply such techniques to the nature of bureaucratic
accountability.
The dissertation concludes that there are significant importance differences in identified
public administration norms and values among Colorado career civil servants, including differences
based on gender, education and job classification, as well as differences about the persons or groups to
which the career bureaucracy ought to have accountability, and the nature of that accountability.
Moreover, there are substantial and significant differences in the expectations for merit system
employees between the career bureaucracy, on the one hand, and state legislators and voters on the
IV


other. Bureaucrats are not homogenous as a group in terms of their values, nor are bureaucrats just
ordinary citizens. No separate or unique professional public administration ethics was ascertained, but
identifiable values that constitute a contemporary professional public administration ethics are
nonetheless described and ranked. Also explained are public management class values. Further, some
empirical research implications for the politics-administration dichotomy, the tension between
bureaucracy and democracy, and the teaching of public administration ethics are suggested.
This abstract accurately represents the content of the candidates thesis. I recommend its publication.
Signed
v


DEDICATION
I dedicate this thesis to my wife, Connie Kitchen Goss, for her consistent support during these
years of study and research including her understanding of the substantial disruption in family life that
this undertaking demanded from time to time. I also dedicate this work to my mentor, friend and
colleague, Associate Professor E. Sam Overman, who served for a time as Dissertation Committee
Chair until his early and unexpected death. He encouraged this effort from its initial stages, and
reposed confidence in its academic value and timeliness.
i


ACKNOWLEGEMENT
I acknowledge the patience, encouragement and suggestions for improvement given from
Professors Robert W. Gage, Linda M. deLeon, Kathryn G. Denhardt, Kathy J. Boyd, and Lloyd Burton
during these last several years. Their wisdom and experience has truly improved the study and
research reporting.


CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION...................................................................1
Purpose of the Study .........................................................8
Hypotheses and Research......................................................16
Arrangement of the Dissertation..............................................18
2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE.......................................................20
Professional Ethics and Values...............................................20
Public Administration Ethics.................................................25
Public Administration Values................................................ 29
Summary......................................................................35
3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY................................................37
Populations and Samples......................................................37
Instrumentation..............................................................39
Data Collection............................................................:.42
Data Analysis ...............................................................46
Summary......................................................................48
4. RESEARCH FINDINGS..............................................................49
Comparing the Bureaucrat, Legislator, and Voter Survey Groups................50
Normative Statements and Values...........................................50
Primary Accountability Findings...........................................60
Forced Choice Findings....................................................63
Within the Bureaucracy Findings..............................................68
Age of Bureaucrat Respondents.............................................68
Agency of Bureaucrat Respondents..........................................74
Education of Bureaucrat Respondents.................................,.....91
Gender of Bureaucrat Respondents.........................................109
Grade Level of Bureaucrat Respondents....................................115
Job Classification of Bureaucrat Respondents.............................126
Bureaucrat Factor Analysis ..............................................147
Within the Legislator Group Findings........................................151


Gender of Legislator Respondents...............................................162
Political Party Affiliation of Legislator Respondents..........................169
Within the Voter Group Findings....................................................176
Education of Voter Respondents.................................................182
Gender of Voter Respondents....................................................191
Income of Voter Respondents....................................................198
Political Party Affiliation of Voter Respondents...............................204
Individual Value Descriptions and Findings.........................................210
Accountable....................................................................210
Advocate.......................................................................212
Autonomy.......................................................................214
Caring.........................................................................217
Communicative..................................................................218
Compassionate..................................................................220
Competent......................................................................223
Confidentiality................................................................224
Conflict of Interest Avoidance............................................... 226
Consistent.....................................................................228
Courage...................................................................... 229
Courteously....................................................................230
Creative.......................................................................231
Deference......................................................................233
Diligent.......................................................................235
Discretion.....................................................................236
Economical.....................................................................238
Effective......................................................................240
Efficient......................................................................243
Fair...........................................................................244
Honest.........................................................................246
Impartial.................................................................... 247
Independent....................................................................250
Integrity......................................................................251
Justly.........................................................................253
Loyal..........................................................................254


Neutral Competence.............................................................256
Obedient.......................................................................258
Objective......................................................................259
Orderly.......................................................................261
Participation..................................................................262
Politically Aware..............................................................264
Predictable.................................................................. 266
Promise Keeping................................................................268
Protect Individual Rights......................................................269
Prudent........................................................................270
Public Interest...............................................................271
Rational.......................................................................273
Respect.......................................................................:274
Responsible....................................................................275
Responsive.....................................................................277
Serve..........................................................................279
Socially Conscious.............................................................280
Sovereignty of the. People.....................................................283
Stability..................................................................... 285
Tolerance......................................................................286
Trustworthy....................................................................287
Truthful.......................................................................289
Primary Bureaucratic Accountability Findings.......................................290
State Agency Director..........................................................290
Governor.......................................................................292
State Legislature..............................................................294
State Courts...................................................................296
Agency Clientele Groups........................................................299
General Public and Citizens....................................................302
Personal Versus System Accountability..........................................305
5. SUMMARY RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS.....................................................307
Norms and Values of the Colorado State Career Bureaucracy..........................307
Bureaucrat Differences By State Agency.........................................308
Bureaucrat Differences Based Upon Education....................................314
x


Bureaucrat Differences Based Upon Gender...............................'...316
Bureaucrat Differences Based Upon Job Classification.......................317
Accountability Perceptions of the Colorado State
Career Bureaucracy.............................................................320
Age of Bureaucrats.........................................................320
State Agency of Bureaucrats................................................321
Education of Bureaucrats...................................................322
Job Classification of Bureaucrats..........................................323
Normative Value Expectation Contrasts for Bureaucrats With
Legislators and Voters.........................................................324
Colorado Public Administration Values.....................................325
Bureaucratic Values........................................................330
Democratic Values..........................................................333
Colorado Civil Servant Characteristics.....................................335
Accountability Expectations for Bureaucrats
Versus Legislators and Voters.................................................341
A Professional Public Administration Ethics?...................................345
Public Management Values...................................................352
Public Administration Degree Graduate Values...............................353
Empirical Research Implications................................................354
Politics-Administration Dichotomy..............................................354
Bureaucracy and Democracy......................................................355
Representative Bureaucracy.................................................. 358
Theories of Public Administration..............................................359
Teaching Public Administration Ethics..........................................362
Further Research...............................................................364
Summary........................................................................366
APPENDICES
A. QUESTIONNAIRE...................................................................368
B. LEGISLATOR LETTERS TO COLLEAGUES................................................374
C. OVERMAN LETTER TO CIVIL SERVANTS................................................377
D. LETTER TO VOTERS INCLUDING INDUCEMENT...........................................378
BIBLIOGRAPHY...........................................................................380
xi


CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Within the last three decades or so there has been an outpouring of written works on the
subject of ethics, and particularly the ethics of those in government service. Numerous writers have
identified ethical problems in government, called for moral reform and the enactment of ethics laws
and codes, and posited what are or should be the components of a bureaucratic and/or democratic
ethos for public administration. Some have identified one or more ideals or elements of such a moral
guide, hypothesized about a grand theory of administrative ethics and the duties of bureaucrats,
explored subject specific-dilemmas in governmental policies, urged the teaching of ethics within the
schools of public administration and public affairs, and suggested ethical guidance for practitioners in
public management.
Since Watergate and Vietnam the schools of public administration have introduced courses in
ethics, texts for the field have been published, the American Society for Public Administration and
others have promulgated or reissued their codes of ethics, and federal and state governments have
enacted ethics laws; yet government official scandals have continued. Public and private professional
conduct in many fields has been scrutinized and seriously questioned as never before. Ethics in
government has remained a relevant and important subject for public administration practitioners,
academicians, public officials, and the citizenry.
American public administration itself was founded in the late 19th Century on certain moral
principles. These came out of the progressive or moral reform movement which was an effort to
destroy the patronage or spoils system in which victorious candidates made appointments to
government positions based upon political support. The reform movement was a union of civic


leaders and academicians who together established an orientation for public administration, an
orientation stated early in The Study of Administration by Woodrow Wilson (1887). The Wilsonian
management ideology dominated the landscape of public administration for decades and both
practitioners of public administration and teachers in the field accepted the moral or ethical values
underlying that ideologyneutral competence, technical rationality, and efficiency, for example.
Emerging from this conventional management ideology was a doctrine that has had a
profound impact upon early American public administration, and the effects of which continue to this
daythe politics-administration dichotomy. The idea that politics should be separate from
administration, that elected officials should not interfere with the practice of public administration
through use of patronage or favoritism, that there should be no meddling with implementation of the
law, and that administrative experts should be left to do the work of government in a non-partisan
professional manner were among the tenets of this orthodox public administration creed. Process was
emphasized, a science of administration was identified, and a search for laws of administration was
begun. The moral framework for this conventional or orthodox approach to public administration took
on a value-free tone for those having merit or civil service appointments, but the reality was that
even where administrative action was no longer viewed as a part of politics it was not truly value-
neutral. Rather, a bureaucratic value system focusing on making government work had been
substituted for a spoils system wrapped up in the political values of the victors.
As orthodox public administration theory reached new heights following both the Depression
and World War II, some writers began to worry that the bureaucracy was disengaging from the
workings of democratic government, given the growth in its size and scope. Could we truly
disconnect the values and expectations of the citizens and their elected representatives from the values
of those charged with delivering the services and products of government to the people? Where did
governance end or policymaking stop, and administration implementation begin? Is governing really


separate from management? The growth in government at all levels continued, along with the seeming
dependence of citizens on government services, but questions about whether the bureaucracy could
afford to have as its ideology the efficient, effective, and non-partisan delivery of those services in a
business-like manner were debated. The metaphor of an efficient machine to describe the role of civil
servants was attacked, and the notion that bureaucrats were mere cogs of a machine grinding out
products and services useful to citizens was debunked. Instead, the substantial autonomy or discretion
of merit system appointees was emphasized. But where there was administrative discretion available
to public managers, on the basis of what ethics or values framework should such discretion be
exercised by them? Moreover, if there were differences between the judgment exercised by civil
servants and the statements or directions of elected officialsmuch less the views of the publics for
whom services were being performedwhose views were to prevail?
The bureaucracy versus democracy dichotomy was thus added to the politics versus
administration dichotomy as a topic for discourse and study, because the tension between a growing
bureaucracy exercising judgment in ways thought incompatible with democratic ideals elicited
comments from public administration writers. Wrote Waldo, So far did [political scientists writing on
public administration] advance from the old belief that the problem of good government is the problem
of moral men that they arrived at the opposite position: that morality is irrelevant, that proper
institutions and expert personnel are determining (1948, 23). On the side of orthodoxy, on the other
hand, and building on the writings of Wilson, Goodnow, White, Willoughby, Weber, Taylor, Mooney,
and others, Gulick stated that efficiency was the most important value (1937b, 192).
The significantly different responses to the politics-administration and bureaucracy-
democracy dichotomies brought to the fore some fundamental concepts of American democracy
involving checks and balances. Examples include the separation of powers among the three branches
of government, a division of powers between a national government and the several states, and the


specific enumeration of individual rights in a constitutional document to protect individual citizens.
Moreover, there were questions raised about where a growing bureaucracy fit in with these democratic
principles of the separation of powers, sovereignty of the people, a republican form of government,
protection of individual rights, and federalism. To what extent were there checks and balances for the
bureaucracy itself? Did we need constraints upon the bureaucracy because its growth and power
would adversely affect American democracy? Mosher was among the public administration authors
most concerned about the impact of professionalizing the bureaucracy and the possibility that a highly
differentiated body of public employees would not act in the interest of all the people (1968). F.
Rourke was among others setting forth the power of the national bureaucracies through their ability to
cultivate a constituency and their use of technical expertise (1965 and 1969). Even more recent
writers have noted that public administration professionalism in the traditional sense is incompatible
with democratic governance (Perry 1989, 575), and that the average manager is amoral most of the
time (Bowman and Elliston, 1988).
The political approach to public administration came about as a reaction to the early
emphasis given Wilsonian ideology by the writers of orthodoxy. The political school, including
writers like Appleby, Dahl, Waldo and Wildavsky, viewed public administration as an extension of
and inseparable from governance, whereas orthodoxy emphasized the distinction between governance
and management. This democratic paradigm suggested that the political system itself could hold
bureaucrats accountable in political ways (Eimicke 1974) within the great pluralist tradition in the
United States. Redford, for example, identified many devices that allowed persons and groups to
influence both policies and administrative operations in the administrative state and expressed faith in
a workable democracy under American pluralism (1969). Thus, the bureaucracy not only could be
held accountable to the executive and the legislative branches of government, but also to the courts by
petition and appeal (Rabin, Miller and Hildreth 1981; Wise 1989), to special interest groups, to
4


citizens in general, and to all other groups that organized themselves. For this political school, and for
the new public administration school that also developed later, values like citizen participation in
decision-making, advocacy for groups served, social consciousness, equity and fairness,
responsiveness to stakeholders, serving the general public interest, and others were important
underlying values and principles for American public administration.
Evolving from these concerns about reconciling bureaucracy with democracy were a number
of approaches, including some brought on by developments in the new public administration and
public choice theory. These approaches and activities developed within the field of public
administration itself, and within the bureaucracy. The first was an increased sensitivity to the citizens
and stakeholders affected by the services and activities performed by the bureaucracy; client-
centered bureaucracy developed in which human programs aimed at advancing equality and
opportunity were objectives. A second effort was towards greater openness to public participation in
the programmatic decisions and policymaking within the agencies. And a third effort involved
representative bureaucracy (Waldo 1980, 95-96). Under representative bureaucracy the civil
service system itself was to be used to provide opportunities for ethnic, social and other interest groups
to share in the process of governing and, using administrative discretion, in delivering or performing
government services ( Krislov 1974; Kranz 1976: Krislov and Rosenbloom 1981). In other words, the
purposes of government employment were not to be limited to getting things done efficiently,
economically, and effectively. Rather, government employment was itself to be used to reduce
societal conflict and to promote participation by all segments of the population in our democratic
system.
Another response to the bureaucracy-democracy dichotomy was to focus on the
accountability of the bureaucracy. Appleby, for example, discussed the challenges of balancing
administrative responsibility with the several political institutions to which public servants must be
o


accountable (1952). Mainzer identified several political methods of keeping the bureaucracy
accountable through the executive branch, the legislature, political parties, and even interest groups
(1973). Rossum focused on a Constitutional accountability and urged ethical adherence to the
Constitution (1984). Constraints on and changes to the bureaucracy came to include a proliferation of
detailed regulations at all levels of government, court mandates, citizen participation efforts,
promotion of participative management styles, and even advocacy by the bureaucracy itself on behalf
of citizens in the new public administration. Gormley later identified a series of checks of the
bureaucracy composed of catalytic controls, hortatory controls, and coercive controls (1989, 13).
The history of American public administration arguably can be viewed as a clash of ethical
paradigms, expected norms, and enumerated public administration values over the last century, with
some ethical paradigms, some public administration norms, and some values seemingly more
prominent at different periods of time than others, only to be reversed again or added to during a
subsequent period. These ethical patterns, normative expectations, and values have been identified in
the public administration literature; the arguments for many of them have been pressed by particular
writers with an orientation that was orthodox or conventional, behavioral, political, new public
administration, rational, or public choice, perhaps in part because those norms and values provided
support for their ethical framework of expectations for civil servant behaviors and activities.
Since public administration as a discipline or an area of practice has a body of knowledge
derived from many sources (such as political science, economics, sociology, psychology, business,
law, and others), there is no widely embraced or dominant value orientation or ethical framework for
the entire' field. Truly there exists, and has existed, a great diversity of professional and social values
and ethics among public managers (Dunn 1983). In fact, one prominent writer has described the
ethical expectations and behavior of public administration practitioners as chaotic (Waldo 1980,
100).
6


Ethics in public administration suffers from the absence of a theoretical framework to supply
focus, definition, background, and a common frame of reference for the research and practice
of ethical administration. No paradigm presently exists to provide a shared understanding of
what ethics means when applied to the field of public administration (K. Denhardt 1988, 1).
Perry recognized that there were competing ethical orientations, and even some contradictory ethical
precepts, for practitioners of public administration (1989, 573-4). And Goodsell stated unabashedly
that public administrators were more than technical expertsthey were dealers in values and
continuously making conscious value choices that carry special importance because they affect the
lives of citizens and represent to citizens what their government stands for (1989, 575). Quoting a
discussion at a conference on ethics, authors Wright and McConkie (1988, I) wrote: we dont even
agree on a common set of values upon which our organizational ethics can be based. Truly, similar
statements could be made for many conferences on the ethics of government managers that have been
convened since Watergate. At the same time, there is a broad consensus that we must emphasize the
core ethical values that underlie public service, stated Mark Abramson (Council for Excellence 1992,
2) because the ethical dimensions of a public administrators professional activity are generating
increasing concern (Mertins and Hennigan 1982. 22). An ethical framework that is based on the real-
world practice of public administration and that recognizes the need for public integrity in the exercise
of administrative discretion is truly needed (Dobel 1990a, 354.) If government is to be both
responsive to the peoples will and capable of meeting the challenges of the twenty-first century, it
must have a public service of talent, of commitment, of dedication to the highest ethical standards
(National Commission on Public Service, 1988).
Most of the public administration values enumerated in the literature during the last century
can be associated with a bureaucratic ethos or a democratic ethos. An ethos represents the guiding
beliefs and fundamental ideals of a group. The bureaucratic ethos is defined to be a set of core values
including accountability, neutral and professional competence, efficiency, effectiveness, economy,
impartiality, objectivity, loyalty and obedience to elected officials and superiors, honesty and integrity,
7


consistency and predictability, reliability, diligence, and avoidance of partisanship. Defined in this
manner, public administration ethics is procedural due process, organization ethics, bureaucratic
ethics, structural ethics, and the ethics of neutrality, deference and civility. The democratic ethos, on
the other hand, includes a set of core values like obligation to use administrative discretion to advance
certain social values, political principles, and the public interest. Under this ethos bureaucrats are
responsible for substantive due process, social equity, and must participate in defining, even codifying,
regime values through personal ethics. They have autonomy and professional independence, are
compassionate, caring, and communicative, keep promises, encourage the public and agency clientele
groups to participate, are creative and innovative, socially conscious and politically aware. They seek
justice, fairness, equity and support for individual rights through bureaucratic representation and
affirmative action, and may serve as advocates in their policymaking roles. Defined in this manner,
democratic public administration ethics is systems ethics, the ethics of consciousness, awareness and
affirmative obligation (Gawthrop 1984, 149).
Purpose of the Study
A first purpose of this dissertation research, recognizing the varied ethical frameworks, normative
expectations, and competing values written about by the numerous writers of public administration
literature over the last century, is to explore the current relative importance of specific public
administration norms and values among practitioners of public administration. Some of these values
have been particularly associated with the traditional management ideology of Wilson and the early
public administration reformers, while others are more closely associated with later writers of the
political approach, the new public administration, public choice theory school, or other theorists.
Given the lack of a single described ethical framework for public administration practitioners
identified in modem public administration literature, this dissertation seeks to determine whether some
8


norms and values written about are actually considered of greater or lesser importance for practitioners
today. In particular, this dissertation explores the relative strengths of both the bureaucratic and
democratic ethos, to determine whether one is more dominant. Some writers have expressed their
opinion that the bureaucratic ethos is more prevalent among practitioners (Pugh 1991; Lilia 1981), and
1 expect to find out whether this is so. Notwithstanding the significant literature and opinions by many
writers on the topics of ethical expectations and values for public administrators, a broad study
involving so many of the norms and values offers empirical evidence in support of or questioning the
opinions and conclusions of such writers.
A second purpose of the dissertation research is to test for homogeneity among government
bureaucrats as to the many normative expectations and ethical values to which career civil servants are
supposed to adhere. It is expected that the responses from current public administration practitioners
to these presented norms and values will be quite different among various subsets of such
practitioners. Thus, the bureaucracys view of these norms and values should be neither monolithic
nor uniform, given the varied backgrounds and experiences and work assignments that civil servants
have in government today. In particular, I expect differences among subsets of civil servants based
upon their age, their agency of employment, their education, their gender, their grade level, and their
job classification in the civil service system. For example, I expect greater sensitivity to new public
administration values like compassion and caring, on the part of government civil servants who work
directly with the needs and interests of individuals and groups who are economically disadvantaged,
mentally or physically handicapped, or in need of basic human services than I do for government
personnel who work in agencies like transportation, natural resources, or administrative services. On
the other hand, for bureaucrats in financial services, administrative services, or others, the traditional
public administration values of efficiency and effectiveness should be more important than political
values like client service and responsiveness.
9


These types of observations and differences remain relevant to public administration today.
For example, recently instructions have been given to social services personnel under 1996 national
welfare reform legislation that their job purposes are now to help transition their clients to gainful
employment as soon as feasible, rather than to help prospective and current clients understand their
entitlement to assistance and to provide them income maintenance; during an earlier time some similar
issues and the ethics of social experimentation were explored (D. Thompson 1981). Further,
contemporary efforts to reform immigration law have also brought changes to government personnel
associated with those functions of government, including due process procedures and the rights of
immigrants to administrative hearings, before final disposition of their applications, and the rights of
legal immigrants who are not citizens to food stamps and other welfare benefits, and even public
education opportunities. These recent examples involving public administrator norms and values
illustrate the importance of the values of civil servants, and how sizable a difference they can make in
the successful implementation of statutory policy changes made by elected officials and sought by the
electorate. Thus, understanding differences in ethical values and the norms of different groups of
government bureaucrats may be critical to determining whether particular policy changes will be
workable, or even feasible, or whether those norms and values may be singularly instrumental in the
success of particular governmental programs.
Similarly, I anticipate finding differences in the norms and values of civil servants depending
upon their previous education and trainingthose with a formal educational preparation in public
administration or law, for example, might be expected to be more sensitive to democratic ideals when
compared with those who have received formal education or training as scientists, engineers,
accountants or in math and the computer sciences. Furthermore, given the teaching of ethics in
schools of public administration and public affairs for more than two decades, perhaps this dissertation
research might illuminate the degree to which democratic as compared with bureaucratic or
10


professional ideals might be ascertained from civil servants with such educational background and
training. Not only could such findings be helpful to the teaching of ethics in schools of .public
administration, but these results might help educators improve the ways in which educational
preparation for a particular kind of public service is undertaken, or aid public managers in the
orientation of new employees beginning their employment with an agency. Further, it might represent
good public policy to modify our expectations for the implementation of policies enacted by the
legislature, directed by the executive, or mandated by the courts, to conform to the differences in
norms and values of civil service personnel based upon gender, state agency, or job classification. If
engineers as a group, for example, were less concerned about operating programs within set budgets,
as compared with management personnel or financial services personnel, then it might be advisable to
be more specific in policies, directives or court mandates about cost overruns to them. If males were
less likely than female bureaucrats to apply democratic values to programs where democratic values
were at a premium in terms of both expectations and effectiveness, then male employees might need
greater preparation for their roles. If scientists were significantly more likely not to understand or give
high importance to democratic concepts like sovereignty of the people and protection of individual
rights, then merit system qualifying examinations could be modified to test for that understanding in
order to achieve more satisfactory job performance.
A third purpose of the study is to explore for possible homogeneity in the nature of the
accountability that public administrators have to others. Accountability is one of the values to be
examined for career civil servants, but I not only seek to determine the weight that accountability as
a principle or value has in the minds of practitioners themselves, in comparison with other values for
example, but I seek to determine to what persons or entities such accountability should exist, and
whether that accountability is more personal to the individual civil service employee or whether it is
more organizational for the unit in which the civil servant works. Since the orthodox view of


accountability is generally hierarchical, given that the bureaucracy is viewed as subordinate to ail three
branches of government, and because the political school and new public administration thinking is
that such accountability of the bureaucracy is more directly to the people, I hope to find out the general
nature of the currently prevailing views of merit system appointees on these accountability issues by
means of this empirical research.
I expect there will be fundamental differences in the views of accountability among
bureaucrats themselves, with some more likely to accept hierarchical accountability to the state agency
head and to elected government officials, and others more open to the notion of bureaucrats being
directly accountable to the electorate or to specific agency clientele groups. For example, public
administrators engaged in fee and tax collection might be expected to look to elected officials who
provide them with the legal framework to perform their work, whereas civil servants in fields that are
looked upon with a measure of some political disfavor or distrust by elected officialssay the
environment or welfarecould be expected to emphasize their more primary accountability to the
public at large or to their specific agency stakeholders. Mental health personnel, or prison agency
bureaucrats, who are familiar with the ability of the courts to mandate certain treatment and
expenditures of funds, might be expected to perceive a greater accountability to the judiciary than
other bureaucrats. Further, some civil servants who have received a recent education in mathematics
or economics or anthropology might need some additional new employee orientation to understand the
complexity of the bureaucracys plural accountability, but others with a public policy or legal
education might not need such special training. Moreover, some civil servants with a professional
specialtysuch as science, engineering, business management, accounting or lawmight tend to rely
to a greater extent on the notion of their professional independence, and this might get in the way of
the expectations of elected officials or cabinet rank directors who expect constant feedback for outside
stakeholders. The issue of perceived accountability is important because government employees with


substantial administrative discretion can be expected to consider to whom their hierarchical
accountability is first owed, thus affecting the timing and substance of their decisions.
A fourth purpose of the dissertation research is to test for differences in these same expected
civil servant norms and values between bureaucrats on the one hand, and the public and elected
officials on the other. Not only would such empirical testing reveal splits, if any, between the
perceptions of the general public and their elected officials, and the career civil servants themselves,
on each of the specific norms and values being tested, but the research might reveal distinctions in the
larger ethical paradigms for bureaucrats, elected officials and the public as well; these might include,
comparisons between the bureaucratic ethos and the democratic ethos. In fact, based upon my own
public administration experience in New York, Illinois, Washington, DC, and elsewhere, I expect
differences in the perceptions of these three groups about the proper roles and behaviors of career civil
servants. For example, I believe that government bureaucrats are generally less concerned with some
democratic values like the public interest, protecting individual rights, the notion of sovereignty of the
people, and being politically aware of public issues and the views of elected officials, than either the
public or their elected officials would find desirable. I also believe that many bureaucrats view their
functions of advocacy and compassion, and their duties to be frugal and serve the public, differently
than do both elected officials and the general public. The research may confirm or dispel such
observations. This is important because in our American democracy, with a republican form of
government, we can probably not afford too great a spectrum of differences in perceptions among the
bureaucracy on the one hand, and voters and their elected representatives on the other, in order that our
government be a government of the people, by the people, and for the people.
Similarly, this dissertation research will also serve a fifth purpose of testing for differences in
the views of government bureaucrats on the one hand, and the public and elected officials on the other,
regarding the nature of the accountability value that career civil servants are expected to have. Like


the differences in the views on the value of accountability among government workers themselves
mentioned above, differences in the perception's of bureaucrats, elected officials and the public have
about the nature of any hierarchical accountability, and about the extent to which government workers
have responsibilities to both the general populace and to specific persons and groups that are
stakeholders in particular programs and services that they perform, may legitimize or question the
concerns of the new public administration theorists, or those of the political or orthodox schools, and
other theories of public administration. In their work some years ago on the U.S. Office of Education,
Bailey and Mosher, for example, demonstrated how perceived accountability of the bureaucracy to
various groups helped the agency increase in size and in control over those it served (1968). Pressman
and Wildavsky recounted the failings of policymakers to consider the process of implementation
(1973). In my experience these are not isolated examples of public administration outcome
differences from what may have been first expected by policymakers and citizens. In truth, the nature
of bureaucrats differences in perception about accountability and control account for many of the
successes and failures in public administration, and some of these may well be explained in turn by a
congruence or incongruence of expected norms and values among the parties involved, including the
bureaucracy.
The findings and conclusions from the dissertation research and study should provide a sixth
reason for undertaking this effort, in that they are expected to illuminate and expand our understanding
of whether there is actually a public administration ethics. Concurrent with the public administration
ethics literature of the last twenty-five years, and the increasing professionalization of the public
service for the last several decades, there have been developments in the professional ethics literature
as well, including the articulation of the separatist thesis suggesting that professions have a morality
or ethics of their own, different from and perhaps inconsistent with the morality of ethics of ordinary
persons or the general public. Indeed, the separatist thesis holds that this acquired ethics is role-based
14


and may take precedence over ordinary citizen ethics. Principles, norms and values for individual
professions have been enumerated, described, defended, sometimes ordered, and compared in the
professional ethics literature. However, little empirical research has been done to test whether there is
a separate public administration ethics and, if so, of what elements it may be composed. Given the
fundamentally democratic and representative nature of American government, any separate public
administration ethics would have wide implications for public governance as well as the practice and
teaching of public administration. Thus, I expect in this study to determine whether there is validity to
the separatist thesis. 1 also anticipate identifying the values that, based upon the research findings,
could or should be considered a part of any public administration ethics in the field. These will be
significant contributions to the present chaotic and disjointed public administration ethics literature. If
the values are sufficiently important to the successful running of our governmental agencies, then
larger changes might need to be made in the way delegation to the bureaucracy is handled, or to the
constraints upon and oversight of the. bureaucracy. Correspondingly, if the differences are not
significant, then perhaps the worries over the incompatibility of professionalism in the public service
with our democratic ideals can be dismissed. Are some of the ethical norms and values written about
in either or both the public administration and professional literature unique to the field of public
administration in the United States or Colorado? If so, is the importance of the separatist values so
great as to pose a threat to bureaucrats working within a democracy or values fostered through our
republican form of government? Further, is such a set of professional values most like those that have
been emphasized by the orthodox or traditional writers of public administration, or those from the
political school, the new public administration, or the public choice school? Research such as this
dissertation effort is needed to help fill this empirical gap.
Lastly, a seventh purpose for this study involves eliciting some observations and implications
of the research for the various theories of public administration over the last centuryincluding
15


specific concepts like the politics-administration dichotomy, representative democracy, the tension
between bureaucracy and democracy, and the teaching of ethics or ethical values in public
administration. These and others have been critical subjects for the field over the decades, arguably
central to the public administration literature, and the empirical research represented by this
dissertation is expected to provide helpful observations on such important topics.
In summary, this dissertation will report on the testing of normative statements and the ethical
values proposed for career public servants against the expectations that citizens, their elected officials,
and government employees themselves have for career civil servants, to determine whether the norms
and values held by public servants are different from the norms and values held by the public and/or
their elected officials, and whether they may provide any basis for a separatist professional public
administration ethics. This research will also explore peoples perceptions concerning persons or
groups to which the bureaucracy should be held accountable. In performing this research, I expect to
find out whether there is any primary value orientation for the bureaucracy as a whole, or whether
there are differences associated with particular subsets of bureaucrats, and some hints as to whether
any such value orientation is most like or unlike the various ethical frameworks put forth by the
several theories of pubic administration.
Hypotheses and Research Questions
The norms and values suggested in the professional and American public administration
ethics literature during the 20th Century will be used to test several hypotheses. The well-being of our
democratic systems, participating organizations, clientele served by government agencies, and society
at large are affected by the ethical frameworks and values held by those charged with leading or
guiding our public organizations. The accountability of public administrators to particular public
interest groups, to the general populace, and to constitutionally specified institutions of government,
16


can affect the wise and ethically sound decisions that public managers are increasingly called upon to
make, using their administrative discretion. This dissertation will test the norms and values
enumerated in the U.S. public administration literature during the last hundred years to determine what
differences, if any, exist in the importance of these values among Colorado career civil servants,
elected officials, and citizens. The hypotheses will be:
1. There are significant differences in identified public administration norms and values
among career civil servants themselves.
2. There are significant differences about the persons or entities to which career civil
servants should have accountability, as perceived by career civil servants themselves, and
about the nature of such accountability.
3. There are significant differences between the identified norms and values that career civil
servants should possess, as perceived by public administrators themselves on the one
hand, and the elected representatives of the people and the citizens on the other hand.
4. There are significant differences about the persons or groups to which career civil
servants should have accountability, as perceived by public administrators themselves on
the one hand, and as perceived by the elected representatives of the people and citizens
on the other hand.
5. Because of the wide variation, background and training that individual career civil
servants possess, there is not a separate public administration ethics unique to the field,
but there are identifiable values that constitute a contemporary professional public
administration ethics.
Because of the exploratory nature of this empirical research, it is not expected that definitive
conclusions will be able to be reached for all of the posed hypotheses. For example, there might be
some evidence uncovered that suggests the application of the separatist thesis to the field of public
17


administration, but that does not necessarily mean that I will be able to determine all the components
of such a separatist thesis. Similarly, if differences are found among groups of particular bureaucrats
in the nature of primary bureaucratic accountability to other stakeholders, this may not itself be the
ultimate determiner of whether a particular overarching paradigm exists for all of public
administration in the United States. Nonetheless, empirical research into the above substantial
questions will be helpful to the field of public administration and democratic governance.
Arrangement of the Dissertation
This dissertation will commence in Chapter Two to explore the public administration
literature, as well as the professional ethics literature, for concepts and ethical frameworks to be
applied, and for norms and values to be tested in this dissertation research. I shall also identify groups
to which the bureaucracy could or should be held accountable from such public administration
theories. And I shall group selected values with ethical paradigms identified in the public
administration literature, including those associated with bureaucratic ideals or a bureaucratic ethos
and those associated with political ideals or a democratic ethos.
In Chapter Three the methodology for proceeding with this dissertation research will be
explained, including the research design, and the nature of the populations and samples being drawn.
Also explained will be the survey instrumentation used, the manner in which the response data were
collected, and the manner of the analyses of such data.
In Chapter Four the research survey findings will be presented. First presented will be the
findings associated with the differences between the major groups surveyeda macro view of the
findings. These will include any similarities or differences in the norms and values held by each of the
three major groups surveyed, and the differences if any about their views on primary accountability for
career public administrators. Then I will explore the findings within each of the groups surveyedor
18


micro viewsincluding the norms and values and the primary accountability similarities or
differences. In particular, I will assess such differences in light of the various respondent
characteristics, such as gender, age, education, political party affiliation, and other criteria. Lastly, I
will summarize the results and conclusions of this dissertation research for each of the norms and
values tested thorough the survey instrument, and for each of the persons or groups suggested as those
to whom primary bureaucratic accountability should exist.
In Chapter Five 1 will compare and contrast the findings and reach conclusions for each of the
five stated hypotheses, in the order in which they have been presented above. I will also present some
general conclusions on the dominant bureaucratic ethos and democratic ethos paradigms. The
implications of the dissertation research will be discussed, covering several of the significant concepts
and debates in public administration set forth in this first chapter, including the politics-administration
dichotomy, bureaucracy and democracy, the separatist concept of a professional public administration
ethics, representative democracy, and bureaucratic accountability. And, finally, I will address the
value of further research in this field.
19


CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Two significantly different fields of literature are relevant to this empirical research into the
norms and values of public administrators. First is the literature about professions and particularly
professional ethics. Second is the literature about public administration and specifically public
administration ethics.
Professional Ethics and Values
Individual professions have developed with much time; classic ones, for example, have
included the clergy, medicine and law. But with the industrial and information revolutions came a
multitude of relatively recently defined professions. While no clearly accepted definition of the term
profession exists, professions are nonetheless distinguished from occupations not just by their level of
technical knowledge, competence, and specialized training, but also by a commitment to a set of ethics
and an obligation to serve faithfully (McDowell 1991, 6; Barber 1984, 597; Camenisch 1983, 24;
Vollmer and Mills 1966, 9). There may not exist a set of characteristics of professions which are both
necessary and sufficient, possessed by all professions and only by professions (Bayles 1989a, 7; W.
Moore 1970, 4-5), but there are some characteristics that appear common to many professions and
others which appear central to professions (Kultgen 1988, 60). Features central to professions include
extensive training, a significant intellectual component, the provision of an important service in
society, and perhaps credentialing, while common characteristics include an organization of members,
and autonomy or self-regulation (Bayles 1989a, 8-9; Camenisch 1983, 22-46). It is arguable whether
public administration is yet a profession (Bayles 1989a, 9; McCurdy 1986, 13; Waldo 1980, 61;
Mertins and Hennigan 1982, 8; Chapman 1959; Chandler 1989, 604; Perry 1989, 573; Vollmer and
20


Mills, 4), but it is clear that the public service has at least undergone increasing professionalization and
is becoming more like a profession (Mosher 1982, 142; Waldo 1980, 60; Kaufman 1984, 56; Mosher
and Stillman 1982, 631-32; Burke and Pattenaude 1988, 225-26; McCurdy 1986, 13). Some have
termed public administration a supraprofession (Mertins and Hennigan 1982, 14).
Ethics is a "system or code of conduct based on universal moral duties and obligations which
indicate how one should behave; it deals with the ability to distinguish good from evil, right from
wrong and propriety from impropriety" (Josephson 1989, 2; Ruggiero 1992, 4). Professional ethics can
be viewed as a system of norms, meaning how things "should" or "ought to" be (Bayles 1989a, 17).
This is different than seeking to describe by empirical evidence how people actually behave, a process
sometimes referred to as "descriptive ethics" favoring the perspective of the non-judgmental observer
most commonly associated with ethical or moral relativism (Josephson 1989, 5). Descriptive ethics
does not lend itself to a comparison of behavior patterns in ethical terms (Bayles 1989a, 18). Rather,
professional ethics is a normative ethics, concerned with the discovery and application of moral norms
or standards that help us distinguish right from wrong; it is based upon a bedrock premise that people
ought to do what is right and avoid what is wrong (Josephson 1989, 5). While universal norms apply
to all people, role-related norms apply to people in particular capacities, including professional roles
(Bayles 1989a, 17; Goldman 1980, 1-6; McDowell 1991, 27; Camenisch 1983, 47-76). Ethical
relativism does not maintain merely that people have different sets of beliefs and norms, but that these
different beliefs can all be correct; and it makes meaningful ethical disagreement impossible (Bayles
1989a, 18). Ethical relativism is not accepted by many authors (Bayles 1989a, 18, Goldman 1980),
but moral absolutism (if defined as meaning that circumstances make no difference at all in the
application of principles) is similarly not accepted (Ruggiero 1992, 105).
Professional ethics can be properly analyzed only against a set of social values and a
conception of the general role of that profession in society (Bayles 1989a, 5; Camenisch 1983, 3, 8;
21


Labacqz 1985, 58). The role must be examined from the viewpoint of citizens or the average members
of the society (Bayles 1989a, 5). Laymen typically judge the behavior of professionals by applying
ordinary moral categories and principles to assess the conduct of those professionals (Goldman 1980,
1). Citizens need good reasons to accept the professional ethical norms that regulate individual
professions (Bayles 1989a, 5) because the conduct of professionals is judged by them on the basis of
their "ordinary ethics," while charges of misconduct in the professions are defended by appeal to
special professional goals, norms and roles (Goldman 1980, 1).
The culture of a profession consists of its values, norms, and symbols (Vollmer and Mill
1996, 16). Values are core beliefs or desires which guide or motivate attitudes and actions. Some
values such as the importance persons attach to honesty, fairness and loyalty are ethical in nature
because they are concerned with the notion of moral duty; they reflect attitudes about what is right,
good or proper rather than what is pleasurable, useful or desirable. The notion of a common morality
known to all humans has a long history in Western thought (Outka & Reeder 1993, 3) and a valid
normative basis for a universalistic morality is argued to exist (Gewirth 1986, 286). A study of
history, philosophy and religion reveals a strong consensus as to certain core ethical values which
transcend cultures and time to establish ethical norms and standards of moral conduct essential to the
ethical life (Barry 1979; Beauchamp and Bowie 1983; Josephson 1988b; Solomon and Hanson 1985;
Guy 1991, 193; Ruggiero 1992, 18). They include, for example, trustworthiness, integrity, fairness
and caring. It is the universality of such ethical principles and values which gives support to the
notion of a common morality or moral absolutism, a view that there are eternal principles that exist
beyond time and are always and everywhere applicable (Josephson 1989, 2; American Society for
Public Administration 1989, 102).
Any defense or justification of the acts or behavior of professionals is first to professional
norms, then to the social or other values which may support the professional norms, and lastly to more
79


general ethical theories (Bayles 1989a, 19). Occasionally, specific examples illustrating such a defense
or justification and appeal to such professional standards as can be supported by the citizens is cited
even in the public administration ethics literature (D. Thompson 1985, 558). Norms themselves can be
justified by their being acceptable to reasonable people or ordinary citizens expecting to live in a
society in which the norms operate, and often this acceptability depends upon the social values
reasonable people have (Bayles 1989a, 19; Camenisch 1983, 50-56). The notion of ethics becomes
meaningful only as one begins to specify the values considered to be intrinsic to ethics and morality
(Josephson 1989, 4).
One application of justification of professional ethics in public administration was developed
by Grosenick (1991) using the Bayles (1989b) material and drawing also upon the Leys (1947) and
(Scott and Hart 1979) written works, resulting in a classification system which is based upon behaviors
that are guided by specific behavioral rules, legal statements, ethics pronouncements, social values
descriptions, and ethical theory specifications. He noted Bayles insistence that professional norms be
consistent with universal behavioral norms, without exception.
There are a number of general views or theses about professional ethics (Burke and
Pattenaude 1988, 229-33). One is that there is a single encompassing framework, that of "ordinary
morality" which includes professional ethics, so that the latter is not distinguished from the former
(Goldman 1980; Veatch 1972, 531-559; and Williams 1985, 259-69); this suggests the possibility of a
common morality or even moral absolutism. A second thesis has been labeled the "separatist thesis"
(Gewirth 1986; B. Freedman 1981, 626-30; Wasserstrom 1983, 25-37; Overman and Foss 1991, 131-
146). This dissertation explores the application of the separatist thesis to public administration. A
third is a pluralist or "political approach" suggesting that there is no unified or single moral authority
such that each group, professions included, might have its own group ethics, if it has the necessary
political will and power. Taken to its extreme this approach can lead to ethical relativism, since such a


political approach arises from the idea that each person has an inherent moral right to decide what is
right and wronga truism, but it does not lead to the conclusion that such "personal ethics" systems
are equally ethical, even if all persons are morally autonomous (Josephson 1989, 5).
Individual professions are expected to have a morality or ethics of their own attached to their
professional roles (B. Freedman 1978; Gewirth 1986, 282; Camenisch 1983, 6; P. G. Brown 1986, 59).
Fundamental values and norms of each profession differ (Goldman 1980, 2). If professional norms are
independent of universal norms and social values, then they can require or permit conduct completely
different from, or even inconsistent with, that of nonprofessionals; they constitute a distinct ethical
system alongside of, and perhaps taking precedence over, the universal ethical system (B. Freedman,
1978). It is this "separatist thesis" that assumes that a specific profession has an identifiable set of
ethical principles which is unique, and clearly different from the morality or ethical positions held by
ordinary persons or the public in general (B. Freedman 1978; Overman and Foss 1991, 133). The
strong version of the separatist thesis is a form of ethical relativism (Bayles 1989a, 21), but others take
the position that some appropriate limits exist on professional practice (Gewirth 1986; Burke and
Pattenaude 1988; Camenisch 1983, 53-62), a view that there might be diverse traditions, beliefs and
opinions about morality within a society, but that this does not preclude widely shared agreement on
the morality of certain basic practices (American Society for Public Administration 1989, 102).
The essence of this professional morality involves the idea that professionals are more
constrained by their professional values than they would be were they not professionals, because their
professional ethics places professional values at a higher position in the ethical hierarchy (B. Freedman
1978; Camenisch 1983, 14; Wasserstrom 1979, 332). Professional morality commits one to a different
ordering of values from the very outset; thus, the difference between professional and ordinary
morality is the way professionals resolve value conflicts (B. Freedman 1978). Principles, norms and
24


values consistently appear in the professional ethics literature, including the various codes of
professional conduct or responsibility (Gorlin 1994).
Public Administration Ethics
Within the last two decades in the field of public administration there has been an outpouring
of written works on the subject of ethics, particularly the ethics of persons who govern or are in the
public service. For example, major works offering applied ethical guidance to practitioners and
students have been authored by Rohr (1978), Cooper (1990; 1991) and Kathryn Denhardt (1988), and
two others have been edited by Bowman (1988 with Elliston; 1991). Some of these applied ethics
publications were stimulated by the interest of the American Society for Public Administration
(ASPA) and the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration (NASPAA)
which, following the increasing concern with ethics after Watergate, placed greater emphasis on
professional standards and ethics in public service (Mertins and Hennigan 1982; Richter 1990). But
ethics and moral virtue are themes which have been present throughout the history of public
administration (K. Denhardt 1991, 92).
Insofar as American public administration is concerned, our first U.S. President, George
Washington, resolved that good government would be the result of the fitness or moral character of
those who governed (Wright 1988, 8; Rosenbloom 1989, 184). Declared Washington to the first
Congress, The foundation of our national policy will be laid in the pure and immutable principles of
private morality . . (J. Richardson 1896, 1:52-53). Fitness to Washington did not mean technical
competence; generally such competence was not then recognized as a prerequisite for selection at all.
Instead, fitness of character was the standard for appointment, centering on personal integrity and
standing in the community (White 1948, 259). But this government by gentlemen (Mosher 1982, 8)
came to a close with Jacksonian Democracy, and the spoils system itself was in turn displaced by a
later moral reform movement and the birth of public administration as a discipline.


During the period of public administration orthodoxy when reform of the spoils system was
being sought, Woodrow Wilson (1887) and Frank Goodnow (1900) wrote that there was a science of
public administration. It was to be value-neutral and based upon technical competence. The
distinction between politics and administration fit nicely with the idea of scientific management (F.
Taylor 1967). Governments were to be run like businesses; a metaphor for efficiency was the
machine. These writings, and those of Willoughby and Gulick cited efficiency as the clear objective
and criterion of public administration. In fact, for Gulick and others efficiency was the preeminent
value of administration; In the science of administration, whether public or private, the basic good
is efficiency (Gulick 1937b, 192). Wrote Mosher: A neutral, efficient civil service was viewed as not
merely desirable; it was essential to democracy itself (Mosher 1982, 6-7).
In turn the value-free nature of public administration was challenged by Waldo, who showed
in The Administrative State that the orthodox approach was inherently opposed to the separation of
powers and other aspects of American democracy (Rosenbloom 1989, 496). For Waldo the attempt to
limit the focus of public administration to technical matters was futile, because questions of value arise
in the relationship of administrative practice and democratic theory (R. Denhardt 1984, 65). Simon
(1946) described the principles of administration as recognized by Gulick, Urwick, and Willoughby
as proverbs, but he substituted rational action or rationality as a value in a later work (1956). Simon
argued that facts and values could be logically separated (1957a, 45). While Simon challenged the
idea of a science, unlike Waldo he did not challenge the central notion of efficiency. Rather, it fell to
Robert Dahl to explicitly note that efficiency was a value and had to compete with other public
administration values like individual responsibility and democratic morality (1947 ). Dahl argued that
public administration was distinguished from business administration in general by its concern with
ethical questions and political values. And Paul Appleby wrote that public administration was more a
26


matter of governing and less a matter of administration or management, and that political values
should predominate (1949).
But it was the new public administration that most clearly challenged the largely value-
free public administration written about earlier. Marini (1971) and Frederickson (1980) and others
demanded relevance for public administration, and the values of social equity and participation. This
new public administration was explicitly normative, and recognized that values and norms occupy a
premier role that guides the direction and sets the agenda for the scientific study (Wamsley 1976,
393-394). Applying John Rawls Theory of Justice (1971), David Hart argued not for impartial
administration, but differential treatment to reach social equity (1974). Marini himself stated his wish
for a proactive administrator (1971) in public management.
Public administration writers have defined ethics in different ways. Rohr, writing for
bureaucrats (individuals appointed by merit who hold their positions independent from the electoral
process), defines ethics broadly, equivalent to morals and virtues, a manifestation of human excellence
(Rohr, 1978, 2-3). Ethics is the way we practice our values, a guidance system to be used in making
decisions (Bowman 1991, 2). Ethics involves applying principles so that we might order our values in
particular situations; when two or more values make conflicting claims on our conduct, ethical
reflection helps us decide the paramount value in that particular context (Mertins and Hennigan 1982,
22). Ethics are considered by Rosenbloom (1989, 464) to be an internal or personal check on public
administrators keeping their public trust, compared with accountability serving as an external check.
Administrative ethics represent the formal and informal restraints that give legitimacy to the actions of
an administrator (Wright 1988, 2). Ethics involves thinking systematically about morals and conduct
and making judgments about right and wrong, but what makes ethics so important to public service is
that it goes beyond thought and talk to performance and action (Lewis 1991, 3). The role of the public
administrator is that of a fiduciary for the citizenry, with obligations to pursue the public interest, use
27


the authorizing processes and procedures, and enhance professional excellence in the public service
(Cooper 1987, 323-324). Government officials should observe higher ethical standards in the making
of policy than business executives would have to adhere to (Appleby 1952). The role of a public
administrator carries a kind of moral weight not found in private sector counterparts roles (Stewart,
1985, 489). The role of the executive is to manage the values of the organization (Barnard 1968, 1).
The public administrator is an ethical agent in his or her work setting (Stewart 1985, 495; Stewart and
Sprinthall 1991, 1). Government must emphasize the core values that underlie public service (Council
for Excellence, 2).
The role for the bureaucrat or career administrator has changed during the present century in
three important ways. First, the administrator has become a policy-maker; second, the public began to
demand both more responsiveness and responsibility from the administrator; and third, a
professionalization of the bureaucracy has occurred (K. Denhardt 1988, 60). In fact, the possibility of
an administrative ethics was argued to be dependent upon rejection of what was termed the "ethic of
neutrality" and the "ethic of structure" in favor of the ability of a public administrator to serve as a
policymaker, to be a moral agent and make judgments, and even to be an advocate (D. Thompson
1985, 556). Beyond Watergate, it has been these changesthe tensions between democratic rule and
professional expertise and discretionthat have heightened the ethical dilemmas for public
administration.
A review of the public administration literature over the last half century suggests two
dominant traditions or paradigms for public administration ethicsa bureaucratic ethos and a
democratic ethos. This dichotomy is sufficiently broad to fit with many of the ethical frameworks
cited by writers, and is not inconsistent with them. Edwards and Galloway (1981) identified
democratic values and bureaucratic values in their work involving the professional values of city
managers. The bureaucratic and democratic ideals clearly noted and described by K. Denhardt (1989)
28


are built upon an earlier dichotomy enunciated by Lilia (1981). However, the bureaucratic-democratic
ethos dichotomy has even deeper roots than these authors. Pugh connects the bureaucratic ethos
which he defines as including the five basic concepts of efficiency, efficacy, expertise, loyalty, and
accountabilitywith Weber and his model of bureaucracy, with Wilson and the politics-administration
dichotomy, with Taylor and scientific management, and with the works of Goodnow and Willoughby
who found the ethos consistent with the study of comparative administration and the application of
rationalism (1991, 10-11). Pugh cites the origins of this ethos as the municipal and progressive reform
movement, social Christianity, and scientific management. Pugh, Lilia and others believe it is the
dominant paradigm for American public administration.
The democratic ethos, on the other hand, includes the fundamental concepts of regime values
as described by Rohr (1978), citizenship as described by Frederickson and Hart (1985) and Cooper
(1991; 1984), public interest as described by Lippman (1955, 42), and social equity as described by
Rawls (1971) and the proponents of the new public administration. Most public administration ethics
writers have been drawn to this ethical framework, and much effort has been expended to build it up
by contrasting it with the bureaucratic ethos or framework. This democratic framework has several
origins and thus requires a thorough grounding in history and political philosophy (Pugh 1991, 15-17;
Lilia 1981).
Public Administration Values
Values have received much attention in the recent literature of public administration
(Rokeacb 1970 and 1973; Sikula 1973; Rohr 1978; Edwards, Nalbandian and Wedel 1981; Mertins
and Hennigan 1982; Gawthrop 1984, 137-162: R. Denhardt 1984; Frederickson and Hart 1985, 547-
553; McCurdy 1986, 64; Abbasi and Hollman 1987; K. Denhardt 1988; J. P. Burke 1985, 1989;
Richter, Burke and Doig 1990; Jennings 1991.65: Cooper 1987, 1990 and 1991; Lewis 1991; Council
29


for Excellence 1992; Daniel and Rose 1991, 438; and deLeon 1994). For example, when public
administrators assume their roles, they begin to act out their objective and subjective expectations in
the form of particular decisions, organizing them around a set of values and principles that guide
specific, personal, individual responses to the generalized objective definition of the role, or a structure
of subjective responsibility that is the counterpart of the objective responsibility imposed from outside
ourselves (Cooper 1990, 74). Values influence and shape both our goals and our patterns of activity,
often making conflicting demands upon our behavior because they relate to roles which are not always
consistent and congruent (Mertins and Hennigan 1982, 22; Sikula 1973, 17). They affect the makeup
of public policy (Edwards, Nalbandian and Wedel 1981, 127).
The values contained in the public sector are often dependent upon what approach is taken to
public administrationmanagerial, political, or legal (Rosenbloom 1989); Rosenbloom asserts that
from the civil service reform movement to the early 1930s there was an emphasis upon the
professional values of civil servants, but that by the 1940s there had been a change to introduce
political or democratic values into public administration, and that by the mid-1970s we had an
introduction of legal or constitutional values as well. He suggests that we have now moved to an
inner check on public administrators and a greater sense of professionalism through the use of codes
of ethics, for example (Rosenbloom 1989, 482-483). In an earlier period this same inner check was
advocated as a way to assure that actions by public administrators would conform to democratic values
(Gaus 1936); Gawthrop suggested movement toward an antiopatory consideration of issues within
the context of ones individual conscience (1977). A value is an imperative to action (Rokeach 1976,
160), a determinant of both attitude and behavior (157), and a center of theoretical attention across
many disciplines (158). In a later work Milton Rokeach further defined value:
[A value is] an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is
personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of
existence. A value system is an enduring organization of beliefs concerning preferable modes
of conduct or end-states of existence along a continuum of relative importance [1973: 5].
30


Values become even more important as public administrations zone of administrative discretion has
expanded because of the growth in specialization and technical knowledge, which lay persons cannot
understand, and they become highly relevant when administrators advocate for groups which may
not be fully involved in the policy or decision-making process (deLeon 1994, 136). In fact,
professions themselves can be thought of as frameworks of specialized skills, knowledge, and values
(Edwards, Nalbandian and Wedel 1981, 124).
The moral foundations, virtues, ethical characteristics and attributes desirable in public
administrators have been described by many. Wilson enumerated efficiency and trustworthiness, but
he also emphasized two types of administrative responsibility for civil servantsto elected officials
and to the public interest (1887). L. White identified efficiency (1926, 2), justice, liberty, obedience
(1948, 10) and impartiality (1948, 13). Barnard identified communication, participatory management
and compassion (1964). The Carl Friedrich and Herman Finer debate illustrated an objective
responsibility, or accountability to democratically elected officials, and an internal, subjective or moral
responsibility (Friedrich 1972 and Finer 1941), but the debate was also concerned with administrative
discretion and autonomy. Bailey suggested optimism, courage, and fairness tempered by charity
(1964). Appleby noted the importance of administrative discretion (1949, 7). Argyris (1973)
identified effective leadership. Golembiewski argued for an administrative morality or ethics that
required a connection between theoretical objectivity and the practice of public administration, and the
values of open communication, innovation and discretion, and shared responsibility (1977). P. G.
Brown posited truthfulness, tolerance, fidelity to law, rhetorical ability, and the virtues of
managementintelligence and open-mindedness (American Society for Public Administration 1989,
103). An ASPA publication identified responsibility, accountability, commitment, responsiveness,
involvement in the political process, avoiding conflicts of interest and confidentiality, and it identified
principles like justice, freedom honesty, beauty, order, loyalty, equality, and equity (Mertins and


Hennigan 1982). Following MacIntyre's work on virtue, Cooper wrote about benevolence, courage,
rationality, fair-mindedness, prudence, respect for law, honesty, self discipline, civility,
trustworthiness, respect for colleagues, responsibility' for the practices, and independence (1987). He
later argued that responsibility was the key attribute of public administrators (1990) and even later that
civic virtue was the central character trait for public administrators (1991, 169). Cooper has since
added public-spiritedness, prudence, and substantive rationality as corollary virtues as well (1991,
163-167). Dobel has identified prudence or prudential judgment (Dobel 1990b, 21). Dwivedi
articulated acceptance of public administration as a calling or vocation, genuine care for fellow
citizens, and acceptance of service as primary moral obligations (ASPA 1989, 103). Fleishman urged
selflessness (primarily motivated by the public good, not self-interest or the interests of those who will
benefit by the sacrifices of others (1981).
Those of the new public administration called for social equity, community consultation
and participation, equality, open communication, fairness, justice, responsiveness, and even advocacy.
Rohr suggested "regime values", meaning a discrete set of values in the Constitution or enunciated by
the U.S. Supreme Court such as property, equality, freedom and others (Rohr 1978). Frederickson and
Hart noted patriotisman understanding of, and belief in, the American regime valuesand
benevolenceextensive and non-instrumental love of fellow citizens (1985). Krislov and
Rosenbloom, building upon the ideas of Kingsley (1944), Long (1952), and Van Riper (1958), argued
for melding independent bureaucratic political authority with representative republican government
notions into representative bureaucracy, which to them meant representative in terms of personnel,
structure, responsiveness to political authorities, and interaction with the public (Krislov and
Rosenbloom 1981). They also built on the ideas Kranz who suggested that the values of
accountability, answerability, responsibility and responsiveness could best be handled by a
representative bureaucracy (1976, 75), and one actively involved with participatory government. K.
32


Denhardt suggested that the moral foundation of public administration consists of three elements:
honor, benevolence and justice (Denhardt 1991, 92). York Willbern proposed six levels of morality:
basic honesty and conformity to law, conflict of interest avoidance, service orientation and procedural
fairness, an ethics of democratic responsibility, an ethics of public policy determination, and an ethics
of compromise and social integration (1984, 102). Worthley and Grumet identified the values of the
rule of law, accountability, efficiency, responsiveness, competence, objectivity, confidentiality and
fairness (1983, 60-61). Goodsell suggested values like equality, justice, honesty, fairness, and the
protection of individual rights (1989, 576-577). Jennings and others identified the common good and
the public interest as obligations and responsibilities owed by public managers (Jennings, Callahan,
and Wolf 1987, 6). Justice is identified by others as well (Hart 1974; Henry 1975; Pops 1991, 261 -
285). W. Sullivan identified justice, dignity, fellowship and social interdependence as the elements of
civic virtue (1986). Frederickson identified efficiency, expediency, economy, order and predictability
as values of public administration in the past (1989). Guy created the acronym CHAPELFIRZ to stand
for caring, honesty, accountability, promise keeping, pursuit of excellence, loyalty, fairness, integrity,
respect for others, and responsible citizenship (Guy 1991, 193-200). The Council for Excellence in
Government identified the core values that underlie public service, including serving the public
interest and performance with integrity; additional values identified were courage, loyalty, respect for
authority, technical expertise, responsiveness, and confidentiality (1992).
It is obvious that the literature of public administration contains a large number of values
associated with the roles of civil servants. Professional codes of ethics, developed by public
practitioners and educators in the field, have also offered useful guidance about the characteristics that
public administrators should have. The ASPA moral principles adopted December 6, 1981 included
sovereignty of the people, efficient and effective management, keeping the public trust, avoiding
conflicts of interest, and sensitivity to the qualities of justice, courage, honesty, equity, competence
j j


and compassion (Mertins and Hennigan 1982, 41). The first ASPA Code of Ethics was adopted three
years later on April 8, 1984, and ASPAs Code of Ethics and Implementation Guidelines was adopted
by the ASPA National Council March 27, 1985. The Code of Ethics was revised in 1994 and now.
includes member obligations to serve the public interest, respect the Constitution and the law,
demonstrate personal integrity, promote ethical organizations, and strive for professional excellence;
within each of these five overarching statements are explanatory obligations and specific statements
involving service, the public interest, citizen participation, compassion, fairness, responsiveness,
courage, confidentiality, truthfulness, honestly, avoiding conflicts of interest, respect, responsibility,
avoiding partisanship, efficiency, effectiveness, open communication, creativity, loyalty,
accountability, and competence. There have also been other codes of ethics, including the
International City Management Association (ICMA), the National Contract Management Association
(NCMA), and individual governments have also often adopted some (U.S. Code of Ethics, 1980), for
example, and they too enumerate particular norms and values for civil servants.
In answer to the question about whether bureaucrats have norms, values or ethics different
than those of citizens and others, there have been some studies providing guidance. One was by G.
Lewis (1990, 220-227). Using the General Social Surveys of 1982 and 1988 his study compared the
political, social, and personal attitudes of the general public with those of public administrators. He
concluded that public managers and professionals differed significantly from ordinary people on 35 of
65 questions asked, although most of the differences were relatively small. His findings supported to a
degree the statement made by Goodsell that bureaucrats are really just ordinary people (1983, 12).
Another study by Wynia revealed that senior-level federal officials held attitudes alien to democracy,
particularly outside of social agency settings (1974, 162). And a slightly earlier study suggested that
Federal government executives held values different from other private sector managers, employees,
and elected officials (Sikula 1973), and that these differences were particularly noted for groupings of
34


values which the author termed integrity values, competency values, and initiative values. The
Sikula research involved use of the Rokeach Value Survey in which both terminal values and
instrumental values were used to identify underlying value structures that could be considered
aggregated representations of the professions to which the individuals in the survey belonged
(Edwards, Nalbandian and Wedel, 129-30). Edwards, Nalbandian and Wedels work concluded that
the values expressed by members of the professions surveyed (public administration, social welfare,
law, and business) were extensive and profound (1981). Englands study (1967) of the U.S.
population and Schillings work involving city managers also suggested a clash of values, noted L.
deLeon (1994, 141). In fact, deLeons work summarized the decade or two of literature on
professional values by stating that there was remarkable consistency of values among groups surveyed,
using the Rokeach Terminal Values and Instrumental Values scales (Rokeach 1973) and the
Professional Values scale (Galloway 1976). Further, her article went on to compare three groups in
Colorado governmentmanagers, analysts, and politiciansusing the Professional Values scale
developed by Galloway. This scale included several of the same values the author derived from the
public administration literaturesuch as effectiveness, efficiency, participation, and public interest
and many others that were akin to otherspracticality, innovation, equity, comprehensiveness,
scientism, and empathy. She concluded that the differences in professional values among the three
groups were the result of self-selection, and not professional socialization in either graduate school
programs or on-the-job.
Summary
Both the professional ethics literature and the public administration literature have identified
the importance of expected roles, and behavioral norms and values. This history of public
administration as a discipline includes much explicit values debate, and includes even more implicit


discussion of norms and values as a part of the several theories of public administration. I am left to
/
explore empirically the nature of the public administration values and expected norms, and whether
there exists an identifiable public administration ethics in a manner similar to other professions, and
whether it is composed mostly of those values a part of the bureaucratic paradigm or those constituting
a democratic ethos. I am also left to wonder whether some values are more important in public
administration than others and, if so, which ones. This dissertation embarks on such research for these
issues.
36


CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
Accepted public administration norms and values, primarily taken from the American public
administration literature of the last century, have been empirically tested using three groups of
Colorado respondents: (1) government career civil servants; (2) elected representatives of the people;
and (3) registered voters. Each of these three groups have been provided the same questionnaire so
that differences in their responses could be compared and measured. In selecting Colorado instead of
the entire United States as the location for this empirical research and testing of American public
administration norms and values, it is understood that Colorado is not a microcosm of the U.S.
Certainly the results in Colorado may not mirror results in the whole nation. But Colorado had the
research attributes of proximity, availability, economy and practicality for such a research undertaking
for this author.
Populations and Samples
The bureaucrat group was composed of Colorado State government career civil servants
ranging from grade level 92 to grade level 107. These grade levels in the Colorado merit system
correspond to the mid and senior grade-level positions of GS 13 through 18 in the U.S. civil service
system. The choice of career civil servants was made in order to exclude political appointees who
might have short-term views of norms and values of career bureaucrats or who might have an outside
or non-governmental perspective.
With the assistance of the Colorado Department of Personnel, an agency which administered
overall personnel policies, a complete list of all grade level 92 through 107 career appointees was
37


developed, listed in alphabetical order by last name. The list of such civil servants totaled 3895. In
order to keep the questionnaire research within budget, it was estimated that only twenty percent of the
entire population could be surveyed. Therefore, a number between one and five was picked by the
chairman of the dissertation committeeit turned out to be fourand each fifth name on the list
beginning with name four was surveyed. This random process produced a sample size for the
bureaucrat group of 778 civil servants.
In contrast with the bureaucrat group, which consisted of a one-fifth sample from the whole
population of career government employees in those grade levels working in Colorado government,
the state legislator group population was small enough for the entire population to be surveyed. In the
Colorado Legislature there were 35 Senators and 65 Representatives, or a total of 100 state legislators.
The size of legislator group was therefore 100 persons.
The registered voter group was a sample population of all registered voters in Colorado.
Since only adults were intended to be surveyed, and since a random process of selecting those adults
throughout Colorado was desired to be used, the voter registration list was used as a proxy for the
general adult population in the state. The use of such a list also enabled me to use some known
respondent characteristicssuch as gender, party affiliation, and incomethat otherwise might have
had to be requested from the respondents in the survey instrument itself, likely reducing the response
rate to the survey. The assistance and help of the International Center for Administration and Policy, a
part of the University of Colorado at Denver, Graduate School of Public Affairs, was solicited since
that Center had access to the entire voter rolls in the State as a database. A random sample of 250
persons on the voting list was selected. The size of the voter group sample population was thus 250
voters.
38


Instrumentation
Although a review of the literature identified a number of survey instruments (Rokeach Value
Survey, Edwards Survey), no known research has assessed the norms and values of the public
administration literature for the last century. Previous instruments like the Defining Issues Test (Rest
1974, 494) and the Values Orientation Questionnaire (Green and Haymes 1973, 213) and others were
reviewed and assessed as well, to be sure that time and resources were use wisely, and to determine if
perhaps greater reliability and validity could be had through their use. Both of these, for example, had
been standardized and widely used (Dye and Stephenson 1978, 341), but they were not workable to
test for a public administration ethics comparing these three groups. Also reviewed was the instrument
used by Wynia when he surveyed attitudes of higher federal executives and found a large number of
them held attitudes alien to democratic ideals (1974, 162). Existing instrumentation could not be used
to assess the large number of public administration values identified, nor the persons or groups to
whom bureaucrats ought to be accountable, in the research undertaken.
Since the review and assessment did not identify an existing instrument that could be used in
this research, a new instrument was developed for this study, one that could be used with all three
groupsColorado career civil servants or bureaucrats, Colorado State legislators, and Colorado voters
or the public. The instrument consisted of two parts. Part I employed declarative statements
representing norms or expectations about government career public servants. Each of the statements
was affirmative or positive in its declaration. Each of the normative statements used one of the values
taken from the public administration literature during the last century. A total of 48 values were
selected, representing a wide swath of equal numbers of both bureaucratic and democratic values that
have appeared in the literature. Moreover, each of these values was defined briefly in the survey
instrument itself, in order that the respondents would all have a common definition of the value
39


meanings. Each declarative statement always began with the following phrase: A career public
administrator should ... A copy of the survey instrument in found at Appendix A.
For each of these 48 normative statements, the respondents were asked to state the degree to
which they agreed with or disagreed with the specific statement. A Likert scale from 1 to 9 was used,
with 1 representing strongly agree, 3 representing agree, 5 representing no opinion, 7
representing disagree, and 9 representing strongly disagree. Each of the survey respondents was
asked: Please place a numeric value from 1 through 9, taken from the following nine point scale,
next to each of the statements made below for career public administrators working in the executive
branch of state government.
Also included in Part I of the survey instrument was one question that explored the nature of
accountability as a value. While the first normative statement in the instrument was A career
public administrator should be accountable (Responsible for government program decisions the
administrator makes), knowing the nature of the person or entity to whom the public administrator
should be accountable was also desirable. Thus, the final question in Part I was another declarative
normative statement, as follows: A career public administrator should be primarily accountable to .
. . Instructions to respondents for this question were as follows: Please rank from 1 to 6 the
following six persons or groups (in order of the most important to least important) in response to the
statement about a career civil servant in the executive branch of state government. This question was
designed to test whether accountability should be primarily to the state agency director, the governor,
the state legislature, the state courts, the agency clientele groups, or the general public and citizens.
Part II of the questionnaire was generally designed to compare and contrast one or more of
the values tested for in Part I. Even after review and initial testing of the instrument among employees
at a non-profit organization, among academics, and among several research and testing experts, there
was still some concern that Part I might not produce sufficient differences in the 48 variables for the
40


three groups of respondents. Since the respondents could agree to all of the seemingly positive
declarative and normative statements in Part I, it was determined desirable and necessary to force
respondents to rate some values above or below others in importance. It was intended initially to
provide some gradation among values if Part I responses did not illustrate such gradation. A couple of
the questions in Part II were also intended to ascertain more general differences among the three
groups. For example; question seven sought to force a choice between the groups listed regarding the
last question of Part I on accountabilityspecifically, to weigh or to test personal accountability
against system accountability. Another question, question three, sought to contrast the different
group responses to the ranking of serving agency clientele groups against the more general public
interest. Part II of the questionnaire is found in Appendix A.
With any new survey instrument, of course, issues of validity and reliability exist. During the
development and use of this instrument, a number of steps were taken to provide reasonable levels of
assurance for validity and reliability. First, I consulted with three experts in consumer and education
research, beyond the Chair of the Dissertation Committee, in developing the questionnaire; these
individuals develop, administer and analyze research survey results from existing and new
instrumentation as an integral part of their professional work activities in corporate, consumer and
educational consulting. Second, I pre-tested the instrument on employees of a non-profit organization,
and made modifications in the instrument, in consultation with the above research experts. One of the
changes made was to define the meaning of the values being tested as explained previously. The
questionnaire used in the survey for each of the three groups surveyed contained the exact same short
definition of the values being asked about; this modification was made to help all respondents have an
identical meaning to the terms being surveyed. Third, I constructed the instrument so that Part II
would act to some extent as a cross-check for Part I; Part II was also intended to provide an internal
check on the validity of the survey instrument itself. If the ranking of the values in this part of the
41


questionnaire was different or significantly different that those produced from Part I, the questionnaire
used might be suspect. The results from the survey confirm generally that the responses from Part I
and Part II are consistent. Fifth, in some cases there are similar terms, or terms that at least have
somewhat similar meanings, used in the instrumentexamples are autonomy and independent, or
stability and consistency, or honest and integrity. Again, the results from the instruments use
suggests no incompatibility in answers. Sixth, on the survey of votersgenerally considered the least
sophisticated of the groups insofar as these particular values are concernedI first tested 12 of the 48
values by using a telephone survey, to be sure that they would work before sending the same
instrument in the mail to these same respondents. Lastly, as I will report more completely below, the
respondents from both the bureaucrat and legislator groups were representative of the population
universes, as measured by the respondent characteristics available to me. Thus, while there is no
certainty with respect to validity and reliability issues on this new instrument, reasonable precautionary
measures were first taken, the instrument was tested, and modifications were adopted.
Data Collection
Exploration of the means of surveying Colorado government career civil servants or
bureaucrats, with the assistance and database maintained by the Colorado Department of Personnel,
was begun during Fall 1993 and continued into early 1994. Exploration of the means of surveying
Colorado voters was begun in Spring 1994, with the help of the International Center for
Administration and Policy. While an exploration of challenges associated with the distribution and
data collection of these two groups of bureaucrats and voters was underway, the legislators group was
actually surveyed first.
A principal concern in using the survey instrument with all 100 state legislators was an
anticipated low rate of return. Colorado legislators are citizen legislators, and have full-time jobs in


addition to their service as representatives of the people in the legislative branch of government.
Therefore, while they were out of legislative session, it was thought a good time to survey them,
especially during a non-election year, in late Fall 1993.
In order to improve upon what was expected to be a relatively low response rate on returning
the completed survey instruments, the assistance of several of the legislative leadersSenators Tilman
M. Bishop (President Pro Tern) and Regis Groff in the Senate, and Representatives Peggy Kearns
(Assistant Minority Leader) and Paul Schauer in the House, were enlisted to write letters of
endorsement of the value of the survey to the members of the Senate and House themselves, in
addition to the surveys value to the public administration community more broadly. Their cover
letters also encouraged their legislative colleagues to complete and return the surveys. Three of the
four leaders approached agreed to write such letters. These letters appear as a part of Appendix B.
With these letters written and in hand, the author sent out the survey instrument to all legislators in
early December 1993. Self-addressed, postage-paid return envelopes were provided in the mailing. A
second effort to increase legislator responses went out again in early January 1994, and a final one a
month later. Ultimately, the response rate for all legislators was 46 percent, considered a good
response rate for this type of research.
A breakdown of these legislator responses is as follows: 30.4 percent of the respondents were
female compared with 35 percent of the legislators being female; 63 percent of the respondents were
from the chamber of the House of Representatives compared with 65 percent of the legislators being
from that chamber; and 41.3 percent of the respondents were Democrats compared with 47 percent of
legislators being Democrats. In general, the responses received were generally representative of those
sent out to the whole group of 100 legislators in terms of the characteristics of chamber, party, and
gender. Each of the individual responses to the survey instruments were entered into a Microsoft
Excel database created for that purpose. The author had previously entered into the database the
43


known characteristics of each of the state legislators, like current occupation, gender, party affiliation,
chamber and district before any data from the survey was received.
The bureaucrat group was the next one surveyed in early Spring, 1994, after the database of
all 778 in the sample of career civil servants in Colorado State government had been provided by the
Colorado Department of Personnel and entered into the same Excel database. Characteristics known
for each of these bureaucrats included full name, grade level, job classification, job title, and state
agency. An April 2, 1994 cover letter from Associate Professor E. Sam Overman of the University of
Colorado at Denver, Graduate School of Public Affairs, was developed to increase the rate of
responses from the career bureaucrats, lending additional credence to this research effort. That letter
may be found in Appendix C.
Only one survey wave was necessary to produce for the bureaucrat group a response rate of
almost 50 percent. A total of 33 of the responses from bureaucrats were incompleterespondents
often forgetting to complete the entire Part II, for example. These were returned with a request that the
respondent fill out the remaining questions in the survey instrument, and all but a few actually did so.
Total responses were 380, but of these returned, five had the identifying number of the questionnaire,
that made it impossible to connect the specific response to the respondent characteristics data, cut out
using scissors. These respondents may not have believed the assurance of privacy contained in the
letter accompanying the survey instrument. Three of these five were entered into the Excel database,
but they were not used in any tallies calling for respondent characteristics; two were not used because
of incomplete answers to Part II. Yet the rate of response was still 48.6 percent, or 378 of the sample
778 population.
The known characteristicsgender, job class, agency in which employed, and grade level of
positionof the bureaucrats sent the survey instrument were compared with those same characteristics
of the bureaucrats responding, as a check on the validity of the sample responding. For gender, the
44


total group sent the survey instrument was 31.2 percent female and 68.8 percent male; those
responding with completed instruments were 31.3 percent female and 68.7 percent male. Similarly,
the percentage of those surveys sent out compared with those actually returned were compared using
the grade level, agency employed, and classification statistics. Each of these three characteristics
likewise showed only small differences.
The registered voter group was the last group to be surveyed. In some ways it was also the
most problematical. Consultations with several professional research practitioners noted that the level
of sophistication of the survey instrument might be an impediment to getting good responses from
voters. It was thought, for example, that respondents might not understand the meaning of values like
discretion or autonomy. Because of this concern about a possible lack of some contextual
understanding of the instrument on the part of the voter respondents, it was determined to survey first
by telephone for a selected set of values, for the length of the entire survey instrument did not lend
itself to full telephone survey work. A small number of the 48 values12 in allwere chosen
because they represented a good mix of bureaucratic and democratic values, and because they
appeared to be among those producing initial differences in the responses from the groups of
legislators and bureaucrats. The telephone survey was administered by the International Center for
Administration and Policy during October 1994 to a total of 250 registered voters, randomly selected
to represent a cross-section of those listed on the voter rolls. Because some persons were not at home
when called a first and second time, their names were replaced in the group of 250 by going to other
names beyond the first 250 on the same listing. In this telephone survey a total of 250 persons
responded and the results were analyzed.
The initial telephone response from these 250 voters suggested that the same written survey
instrument could be used for the registered voters as worked previously for bureaucrats and legislators.
Accordingly, in January 1995 these same 250 registered voters were sent a written follow-up survey


prepared by me. but mailed through the International Center for Administration and Policy, that
mentioned the survey they took earlier by telephone, and requested their help in completing the written
survey and returning their entire survey response. Of the 250 responses collected by telephone on 12
of the values, only 76 sent back completed written survey responses. Even these were partly induced
to do so by an offer to each respondent to send to a charity of their choosing SI 0.00 for each response
received, or to send them $10.00 in a check for a survey instrument returned. A copy of the
accompanying letter may be found in Appendix D. Thus, the response rate for 12 of the variables in
Part I was 100 percent, but the response rate on the rest of Part I and all of Part II was 31.3 percent of
the 250 total sample population.
Data Analysis
As discussed under Data Collection, data for 12 of the normative statements were collected
both by telephone survey of 250 voters and from 76 of those same voters by survey instrument two
months later. After consultation with several professional research practitioners, it was concluded to
ignore the smaller number of responses from the same 76 voters in favor of the larger number of
phone responses for those identical questions. This meant that for all questions other than these 12
normative statements from 250 respondent voters, responses would only have been received from as
many as 76 voters. Thus, the data in this dissertation presented are those of 250 voters for only 12 of
the questionsthose dealing with accountable, advocate, compassionate, competent,
confidentiality, economical, impartial, politically aware, predictable, protect individual
rights, public interest, and trustworthyand as many as 76 for all others.
The Excel databases containing the legislator, bureaucrat and voter responses were imported
into SPSS for Windows Release 6.0 software, to permit better manipulation and analyses of the data.
Each normative statement was analyzed, and the responses from each of the three groups was
46


compared, using both the Mest and the technique of elementary analysis of variance (ANOVA).
Similarly, the questionnaire statement on primary accountability was handled the same way, as were
each of the responses to the forced choice questions.
The total responses from the bureaucrats were also analyzed using Mest and ANOVA
techniques for age expressed in decades, state agency in which employed, highest education degree
earned, subject of highest education degree earned, gender, grade level, Colorado Department of
Personnel job classification, and the authors job classification. Responses from legislators were
analyzed using the t-test and ANOVA techniques for age expressed in decades, highest education
earned, gender, and political party affiliation. Responses from voters were analyzed using the /-test
and ANOVA techniques for age expressed in decades, whether they had an undergraduate college
degree or not, subject of college degree, gender, household income, and political party affiliation. For
each of these respondent characteristics, the standard deviations for each value were compared.
In additional to the statistical tests explained above, the means from each of the normative
statements for each of the three groups surveyed were ranked from highest to lowest in importance,
and then compared among or within the three groups. Also ranked were the standard deviation scores
from each of the 48 values for each of the three groups surveyed. Separate rankings were also
performed for each of the three group responses to the primary accountability questions, and then
these were compared between and among the three group responses so that a relative importance could
be determined for each of the possible six answers to the question.
Next, two indices were created using the data. A total of 24 of the 48 normative statement
values were categorized as part of the bureaucratic ethos and a composite score providing equal
weight for each of those 24 values was developed. Similarly, the other 24 of the 48 values were
categorized as part of the democratic ethos set and a combined score or index reflecting an equal
47


weighting of those 24 values was developed. This creation of the two indices permitted a comparison
of responses between the bureaucratic and democratic ethos sets of values.
Lastly, factor analysis was performed only for the 48 values from the bureaucrat group; this
was because the responses for the legislator and voters were too small in number to permit this
techniques to be used.
Summary
Both quantitative and qualitative analyses were performed on 48 normative value answers,
the six primary accountability answers, and the ten forced choice answers for each of the three groups,
and within each of the three groups, based upon known or collected respondent characteristics.
Bureaucratic and democratic ethos indices were developed and subjected to the same quantitative
analyses techniques. Factor analysis was also performed on the 48 normative values for bureaucrats
only. Such analyses produced findings set forth in Chapter Four.
48


CHAPTER FOUR
RESEARCH FINDINGS
The findings from the survey are presented in six sections. First, a report of the findings
comparing the survey results from each of the three groups surveyed in Coloradobureaucrats,
legislators, and votersis made. The second through fourth sections present a detailed analysis of the
findings within the bureaucrat, legislator and voter group surveys respectively. Fifth, the findings are
summarized and reported by value for each of the 48 values individually. Sixth, the findings are
summarized on the basis of to which persons or entities bureaucrats have primary accountability, and
whether that accountability is personal or system-wide in nature.
Due to the large amounts of data collectedfrom 48 normative statements with values,
primary accountability questions, and forced choice comparisonsfrom the three major groups
surveyed, somewhat different respondent characteristics for each of these groups, as well as the several
different statistical tests that have been run, the above simplified and logical presentation of the
findings will be made. The reader may note that the presentation of the findings in this manner does
not clearly track the stated hypotheses put forth in Chapter One, because the presentation of much of
the data relates to more than one of the hypotheses. Moreover, the illustration of the findings
presented in this manner more easily provides an understanding for the comparisons and conclusions
to be raised in Chapter Five for each of the 48 values, as well as comparisons and conclusions to be
drawn between the three group surveys, within the survey of bureaucrat respondents, the two ethos
indices, the factor analysis, and even more general'implications.
49


Comparing the Bureaucrat. Legislator, and Voter Survey Groups
Part I of the survey instrument consisted of two elements, one dealing with the 48 normative
statements and values, and a second on the findings of the single normative statement about primary
accountability for career public administrators. Part II of the survey instrument dealt with forced
choice questions. Each of these two parts are reported below separately.
Normative Statements and Values
Each of the three groupsbureaucrats, legislators, and votersresponding to the survey had
different mean scores for each of the 48 normative statements containing a specific value. The means
of the 48 values were ranked for each of the three groups separately, with the values receiving the
highest importance listed first. Table 4.1 displays the rank-ordered value means within each of the
three groups, listed by quartile of importance to that group.
Among all three groups surveyed there was general agreement that nine values
accountable, competent, conflicts of interest avoidance, honest, integrity, respect,
responsible, trustworthy, and truthfulwere the premier values in the survey, because they
appeared in the top quartile for each of the groups. Similarly, for each of the groups the following ten
values were among those ranked the lowest in importance: advocate, autonomy, compassionate,
deference, independent, obedient, orderly, politically aware, predictable, and socially
conscious. These values appeared in the lowest quartile of rankings for each of the groups.
Major rank-order differences in importance, defined as five or more places, between
bureaucrats and legislators included 18 values listed in Table 4.2 below that bureaucrats ranked higher
or lower than legislators. This ordinal analysis, to be combined with other more sophisticated
statistical techniques presented below, suggests the scope and depth of paradigm differences between
the bureaucracy on the one hand, and legislators or voters on the other.
50


Table 4.1
RANK-ORDERED VALUES AND MEANS FOR EACH SURVEY GROUP
RANK ORDER BUREAUCRATS MEAN LEGISLATORS MEAN VOTERS MEAN
1. Honest 1.2376 Honest 1.0222 Honest 1.1842
2. Competent 1.2768 Conflict of Interest Avoid 1.0889 Trustworthy 1.2080
3. Integrity 1.3605 Integrity 1.1136 Competent 1.3120
4. Trustworthy 1.3816 Truthful 1.1556 Truthful 1.3421
5. Truthful 1.3921 Trustworthy 1.2444 Integrity 1.4474
6. Conflict of Interest Avoid 1.3969 Responsible 1.3182 Accountable 1.4800
7. Responsible 1.5459 Competent 1.3222 Responsible 1.4868
8. Promise Keeping 1.5587 Promise Keeping 1.3261 Conflict of Interest Avoid 1.5526
9. Communicative 1.5640 Effective 1.3636 Respect 1.5658
10. Accountable 1.5654 Respect 1.3964 Rational 1.5789
11. Respect 1.5801 Courteously 1.4091 Justly 1.6053
12. Effective 1.5853 Accountable 1.4091 Fair 1.6316
13. Confidentiality 1.6562 Economical 1.4545 Effective 1.6533
14. Justly 1.7389 Serve 1.4773 Economical 1.6560
15. Courteously 1.7415 Individual Rights 1.5000 Efficient 1.6579
16. Rational 1.7507 Efficient 1.5000 Serve 1.6579
17. Efficient 1.7624 Communicative 1.5333 Promise Keeping 1.7105
18. Economical 1.7755 Sovereignty 1.5349 Communicative 1.7368
19. Diligent 1.8016 Justly 1.5556 Diligent 1.7763
20. Fair 1.8277 Responsive 1.5909 Objective 1.7895
21. Responsive 1.9711 Fair 1.5909 Public Interest 1.8000
22. Impartial 2.0104 Rational 1.6818 Courteously 1.8026
23. Creative 2.0287 Impartial 1.6818 Individual Rights 1.8080
24. Objective 2.0314 Confidentiality 1.7556 Impartial 1.8240


RANK ORDER BUREAUCRATS MEAN
25. Discretion 2.0733
26. Serve 2.1050
27. Individual Rights 2.1339
28. Courage 2.1619
29. Caring 2.1723
30. Consistent 2.1806
31. Stability 2.2152
32. Public Interest 2.3588
33. Prudent 2.3753
34. Participation 2.4500
35. Tolerance 2.6115
36. Loyal 2.6571
37. Sovereignty 2.6605
38. Neutral Competence 2.691 1
39. Independent 2.8407
40. Compassionate 3.0026
41. Socially Conscious 3.0159
42. Predictable 3.0361
43. Advocate 3.1102
44. Politically Aware 3.1129
45. Autonomy 3.1237
46. Orderly 3.2755
47. Obedient 3.9500
48. Deference 4.5984
Table 4.1 (Cont.)
LEGISLATORS MEAN VOTERS MEAN
Objective 1.7727 Prudent 1.8289
Diligent 1.7907 Responsive 1.9342
Courage 1.8636 Caring 1.9868
Stability 1.8837 Consistent 2.0132
Prudent 1.9773 Stability 2.0132
Consistent 1.9773 Confidentiality 2.0160
Loyal 2.0889 Courage 2.0263
Discretion 2.0909 Discretion 2.0789
Neutral Competence 2.1111 Participation 2.0921
Creative 2.1364 Sovereignty 2.1711
Public Interest 2.2093 Loyal 2.1842
Caring 2.2444 Tolerance 2.2500
Participation 2.2667 Politically Aware 2.2880
Tolerance 2.4773 Neutral Competence 2.2895
Predictable 2.4889 Creative 2.3553
Politically Aware 2.5000 Independent 2.3684
Orderly 2.7045 Orderly 2.4868
Socially Conscious 2.8864 Socially Conscious 2.6184
Independent 3.1818 Compassionate 2.6960
Obedient 3.2273 Advocate 3.0080
Compassionate 3.2889 Autonomy 3.3289
Deference 3.8182 Obedient 3.5526
Autonomy 4.3488 Deference 3.8421
Advocate 4.5333 Predictable 4.0000


Table 4.2
RANK-ORDER IMPORTANCE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN
BUREAUCRATS AND LEGISLATORS
Bureaucrats Higher Than Legislators
Advocate
Caring
Communicative*
Compassionate
Competent
Confidentiality*
Creative*
Diligent
Discretion*
Justly
Rational
Bureaucrats Lower Than Legislators
Economical
Protect Individual Rights
Loyal
Neutral Competence
Orderly*
Serve*
Sovereignty of the People
*Appears in both Tables 4.2 and 4.3.
Major rank-order importance differences (five or more places) between bureaucrats and
voters included the 15 values listed in Table 4.3 below that bureaucrats ranked higher or lower than
voters.
Table 4.3
RANK-ORDER IMPORTANCE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN
BUREAUCRATS AND VOTERS
Bureaucrats Higher Than Public
Communicative*
Confidentiality*
Courteously
Creative*
Discretion*
Promise Keeping
Predictable
Responsive
Bureaucrats Lower Voters
Fair
Orderly*
Politically Aware
Prudent
Public Interest
Rational
Serve*
* Appears in both Tables 4.2 and 4.3
Comparing the ordinal rankings in both Tables 4.2 and 4.3 above, it is noted that for four of
the surveyed values (communicative, confidentiality, creative, and discretion) bureaucrats
have ranked them at least five places higher than both legislators and voters. Similarly, two other
values (orderly and serve) were ranked at least five places lower by bureaucrats compared with
53


both legislators and voters. These major ordinal differences in six values have been asterisked in the
tables, and are simply noted here, prior to presenting findings based upon tests of statistical
significance.
Application of a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the 48 values for each of the
three groups, using the discriminating Student-Newman-Keuls (SNK) test, illustrated significant
differences at the .05 level. Bureaucrats were significantly different than legislators on 31.25 percent
or 15 of the 48 values, including conflicts of interest avoidance, deference, honest, integrity,
obedient, orderly, serve, advocate, autonomy, courteously, politically aware, protect
individual rights, prudent, responsive, and sovereignty of the people. Bureaucrats were
different than voters on 27.1 percent or 13 of them, including conflicts of interest avoidance,
deference, loyal, orderly, predictable, serve, trustworthy, compassionate,
confidentiality, independent, politically aware, protect individual rights, prudent, public
interest, and sovereignty of the people. Legislators, on the other hand, were different than voters
on only 10.4 percent or five of the 48 values.
An identical ANOVA was also applied to the 48 values for each of the three groups, but using
a less discriminating test, the Least Significant Difference (LSD) test, and additional differences
among the surveyed groups were identified at the .05 level. Bureaucrats were significantly different
than legislators on 39.6 percent or 19 of the values. These included all of the values identified under
the SNK test above and, in addition, the four values of loyal, neutral competence, truthful, and
compassionate. Bureaucrats were significantly different than voters on a total of 15 or 31.25 percent
of the values. All of the values identified under the SNK test above are included, plus the two values
of creative and participation.
The 48 values tested were segregated into those associated with the bureaucratic ethos and
those with the democratic ethos and an index or composite value was developed consisting of all the
54


associated values of that specific ethos. Application of a one-way ANOVA on both the bureaucratic
index and the democratic index, each containing 24 of the values, illustrated differences. Among the
three groups surveyed, bureaucrats provided the lowest composite score for each of the two indices in
comparison with the scores provided by legislators and voters. Bureaucrats were significantly
different in their responses than both legislators and voters on the bureaucratic index, but there were
not significant differences between any of the survey groups on the democratic index. These findings
are set forth in Table 4.4 below.
Table 4.4
SURVEY GROUP VALUE DIFFERENCES
(ONE-WAY ANOVA)
VALUES
Bureaucratic Values
Accountable
Competent
Conflicts of InterestAB
Consistent
Deference AB
Diligent
Economical
Effective
Efficient
Honest A
Impartial
Integrity AB
Loyal
Neutral Competence D
ObedientA
Objective
Orderly AB
Predictable ^
Rational
Responsible
Serve AB
Stability
Trustworthy A
Truthful D
Bureaucratic Index AB
BUR LEG
MEAN MEAN
1.5654 1.4091
1.2768 1.3222
1.3969 A 1.0889 ^
2.1806 1.9773
4.5984 AB 3.8182 A
1.8016 1.7907
1.7755 1.4545
1.5853 1.3636
1.7624 1.5000
1.2376 A 1.0222 A
2.0104 1.6818
1.3605 A 1.1136 ^
2.6571 * 2.0889
2.6911 D 2.1111
3.9500 A 3.2273 A
2.0314 1.7727
3.2755 AB 2.7045 A
3.0261 A 2.4889 B
1.7507 1.6818
1.5459 1.3182
2.1050 AB 1.4773 A
2.2152 1.8837
1.3816 A 1.2444
1.3921 D 1.1556
2.1578 AB 1.7823 A
VOTER P
MEAN VALUE
1.4800 .4984
1.3120 .8486
1.5526 B .0062 **
2.0132 .3707
3.8421 B .0016 **
1.7763 .9706
1.6560 .1235
1.6533 .1761
1.6579 .1652
1.1842 .0476 *
1.8240 .1533
1.4474 0 .0497 *
2.1842 A .0085 **
2.2895 .0283 *
3.5526 .0134 *
1.7895 .0951
2.4868 B oooo ***
4.0000/^ .0000 ***
1.5789 ^ .JZJJ
1.4868 .1831
1.6579 B .0003 ***
2.0132 .1103
1.2080 A .0402 *
1.3421 .1027
1.9695 0 0002 ***
55


Table 4.4 (Cont.)
VALUES BUR LEG VOTER P
Democratic Values MEAN MEAN MEAN VALUE
Advocate ^ 3.1102 A 4.5333 AB 3.0080 B .0000 ***
Autonomy AB 3.1237 A 4.3488 AB 3.3289 B .0010 ***
Caring 2.1723 2.2444 1.9868 .4486
Communicative 1.5640 1.5333 1.7368 .2450
Compassionate AD 3.0026 AD 3.2889 2.6960 A .0447 *
Confidentiality A 1.6562 A 1.7556 2.0160 A .0149 *
Courage 2.1619 1.8636 2.0263 .2009
Courteously * 1.7415 A 1.4091 1.8026 .0690
Creative D 2.0287 D 2.1364 2.3553 D .0782
Discretion 2.0733 2.0909 2.0789 .9948
Fair 1.8277 1.5909 1.6316 .1765
IndependentAD 2.8407 A 3.1818 2.3684 ^ .0477 *
Justly 1.7389 1.5556 1.6053 .3327
Participation D 2.4500 D 2.2667 2.0921 .1001
Politically Aware AB 3.1129 AB 2.5000 A 2.2880 B .0000 ***
Promise Keeping D 1.5587 1.3261 1.7105 .0627
Individual Rights ^ 2.1339 ^ 1.5000 A 1.8080 B .0014 **
Prudent ^ 2.3753 AB 1.9773 A 1.8289 B .0006 ***
Public InterestA 2.3588 A 2.2093 1.8000 A .0000 ***
Respect 1.5801 1.3864 1.5658 .3735
Responsive A 1.9711 A 1.5909 A 1.9342 .0552
Socially Conscious 3.0159 2.8864 2.6184 .2171
Sovereignty of People ABC 2.6605 1.5349 AC 2.1711 BC .0000 ***
Tolerance 2.6115 2.4773 2.2500 .1828
Democratic Index 2.3458 2.2166 2.2581 .3548
A Significant differences using both SNK and LSD tests.
B Significant differences using both SNK.-and LSD tests.
c Significant differences using both SNK and LSD tests.
D Significant differences using LSD test.
* Significant differences at the .05 level.
** Significant differences at the .01 level.
*** Significant differences at the .001 level.
The substantial number of statistically significant differences in value preferences, presented
in Table 4.4, between bureaucrats on the one hand, and legislators and voters in Colorado, on the other
hand, lends credence to the third hypothesis presented in Chapter One, that there are significant
differences between the identified norms and values that career civil servants should possess, as
perceived by public administrators themselves on the one hand, and the elected representatives of the
56


people and citizens on the other hand. It is also noted that there are more significant differences
between bureaucrats and the other two groups for the values tested than there are involving either
legislators and voters as groups. Further, there are also a greater number of statistical differences
found for all the groups among the values classified as democratic values than those classified as
bureaucratic values.
Now that the two classes of values, bureaucratic and democratic, have been identified, I
return to the ordinal analyses of findings in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 and restate that all of the values
(communicative, confidentiality, creative, and discretion) that bureaucrats ranked five or
more places higher than both legislators and voters, are democratic values, and that the two values that
bureaucrats ranked lower than both legislators and voters (orderly and serve) are bureaucratic
values. This suggests that the bureaucrat respondents are more democratic and less bureaucratic
in their preferences than either the legislators or the voter respondents.
A review of the data from Table 4.4 also illustrates that for each of the three groups, the
democratic index score was always lower than the bureaucratic index score. Further, in Table 5.5
below it is noted that the average ranking of the bureaucratic ethos values that constitute the
bureaucratic index is 20.25 for bureaucrats, 19.5 for state legislators, and 21.42 for voters in Colorado;
these compare with democratic index rankings of 28.75 for bureaucrats, 29.5 for legislators, and 27.58
for voters. These findings suggest that, in general, bureaucratic values are held to be of higher
importance than democratic values, for all three groups surveyed.
The data from each of the three surveyed groups were analyzed using standard deviations
from the means for each of the 48 values. Standard deviations are a measure of how much the
responses vary from the mean or, in other words, how much group solidarity or consensus, if any,
exists in the responses. Table 4.5 below contains the standard deviations for each of the values. The
most consensus in responses from bureaucrats occurs among the following ten values, in order:
57


honest, competent, truthful, integrity, trustworthy, communicative, conflicts of interest
avoidance, responsible, effective, and promise keeping. Legislator solidarity in responses
occurs most for the following values, in order: honest, integrity, conflicts of interest avoidance,
truthful, effective, promise keeping, responsible, respect, trustworthy, and competent.
Values with the most response unity from voters, in order, are: honest, responsible, truthful,
rational, respect, efficient, fair, justly, integrity,: and objective. Only two of the top ten
consensus values of bureaucrats, only two of the top ten values of the legislators, and only three of the
top ten values of the voters, come from the democratic ethos grouping; the dominant consensus values
derive from the bureaucratic ethos values.
On the other hand, values that had the greatest disagreement in responses from among the
three surveyed groups were predominantly those from the democratic ethos set. Bureaucrat responses
to the following ten values, in order, produced the largest standard deviations: deference,
autonomy, advocate, independent, socially conscious, politically aware, neutral
competence, obedient, compassionate, and predictable. Legislator responses producing the
greatest standard deviations in answers included the following values, in order: advocate,
autonomy, compassionate, independent," deference, socially conscious, orderly,
tolerance, participation, and obedient. Voter lowest consensus scores appeared for the
following values, in order: predictable, advocate, autonomy, deference, compassionate,
politically aware, obedient, socially conscious, confidentiality, and independent. Thus, for
bureaucrats, 60 percent of the top ten values where there was the greatest disagreement in responses
were from the democratic ethos set. For legislators it was 70 percent, and for voters 70 percent.
These findings extend those presented earlier suggesting that the Chapter One number three
hypothesisthat there are significant differences between the identified norms and values that career
civil servants should possess, as perceived by public administrators themselves on the one hand, and
58


the elected representatives of the people and citizens on the other handby illustrating a greater
variation in the importance of democratic values than in bureaucratic values among each of the three
groups. These findings also support hypothesis number onethat there are significant differences in
identified public administration norms and values among career civil servants themselvesby
indicating that a greater importance exists in bureaucrat respondents for democratic values than for
bureaucratic values, but also for legislator and voter respondents. It is noted that the democratic index
scores for all of these three groups were always higher than were the same group scores for the
bureaucratic index. This means that each of the three groups had greater consensus on the relative
importance of bureaucratic values than on the democratic values, on the average.
Table 4.5
STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF ALL VALUES
FOR EACH SURVEY GROUP
VALUES BUREAUCRATS LEGISLATORS VOTERS
Bureaucratic Values SCORE RANK SCORE RANK SCORE RANK
Accountable .9353 13 .8441 19 1.3147 29
Competent .6154 2 .6670 10 1.1116 24
Conflicts of Int. .8149 7 .3582 J 1.2044 26
Consistent 1.2555 26 1.0227 23 1.2165 27
Deference 1.9984 48 2.1379 44 2.0916 45
Diligent .8606 11 .9401 22 .8884 11
Economical .9581 14 .7299 11 1.3716 33
Effective .8499 9 .5743 5 .9226 13
Efficient .9591 16 .7924 14 .8255 6
Honest .5953 1 .1491 1 .5354 1
Impartial 1.3918 1.0515 26 1.5960 35
Integrity .7330 4 .3210 2 .8702 9
Loyal 1.6169 38 1.6212 35 1.3437 31
Neut. Comp/q 1.7580 42 1.4337 i ^ JJ 1.6151 37
Obedient 1.7495 41 1.7235 39 1.9001 42
Objective 1.1243 21 1.0968 29 .8991 10
Orderly 1.4945 35 1.9239 42 1.3316 30
Predictable 1.6339 39 1.6462 36 2.4396 48
Rational .9588 15 .8289 18 .7876 4
Responsible .8183 8 .6013 7 .7393 2
Serve 1.3316 30 .7921 12 .9173 12
Stability 1.2122 25 1.0284 24 1.0262 17
Trustworthy .7367 5 .6451 9 1.0397 19
Truthful .7275 J .4240 4 .7403 o J
Bureaucratic Index Avg. 1.1303 20.25 .9731 19.5 1.1970 21.42
59


Table 4.5 (Cont.)
Democratic Values
Advocate 1.8633 46 3.0045 48 2.1322 46
Autonomy 1.9689 47 2.4190 47 2.1441 47
Caring 1.3071 29 1.3677 32 1.0391 18
Communicative .8060 6 .8146 15 1.0629 21
Compassionate 1.6609 40 2.2726 46 2.0129 44
Confidentiality 1.2628 27 1.4795 34 1.8562 40
Courage 1.1779 24 .8238 17 1.1311 25
Courteously .9700 17 .8161 16 .9801 16
Creative 1.1194 20 1.1121 30 1.3634 32
Discretion 1.1409 23 1.0958 28 1.0679 22
Fair 1.1356 22 1.0414 25 .8301 7
Independent 1.8300 45 2.2441 45 1.7727 39
Justly .9946 18 1.2350 31 .8498 .8
Participation 1.3707 32 1.8141 40 1.0605 20
Politically Aware 1.7668 43 1.6833 37 2.0013 43
Keep Promises .8507 10 .5983 6 1.0932 23
Individual Rights 1.3690 31 .7924 13 1.5636 34
Prudent 1.2991 28 1.0888 27 .9293 . 14
Public Interest 1.4486 34 1.6982 38 1.6032 36
Respect .8985 12 .6182 8 .8220 5
Responsive 1.0101 19 .8441 20 .9569 15
Socially Conscs. 1.7929 44 1.9674 43 1.8688 41
Sovereignty 1.6041 37 .8823 21 1.3104 28
Tolerance 1.5291 36 1.8488 41 1.6583 38
Democratic Index Avg. 1.3407 28.75 1.3984 29.5 1.3796 27.58
Primary Accountability Findings
The survey instrument asked each respondent to rank which entities or individuals to which
he or she believed public administrators should be primarily accountable. Possible answers included
the state agency director, the governor, the state legislature, the state courts, the agency
clientele groups, and the general public or citizens. Each of the three groupsbureaucrats,
legislators, and voterssurveyed responded by giving a different ranking of these six individuals or
entities as answers, as illustrated in Table 4.6 below, listed in their order of importance. For each of
the three groups the the general public and citizens response was ranked first, suggesting a general
consensus among the groups as to the relative importance of the general public as the entity to whom
60


bureaucrats should be primarily accountable. Thereafter, there was little in common among the survey
rankings. Of particular note is the much higher ranking given by bureaucrats to serving the agency
clientele groups, compared with lower importance ranking given to the agency clientele groups by
both legislators and voters. This finding suggests a major difference between bureaucrats on the one
hand, and legislators and voters on the other hand, and supports hypothesis number fourthat there
are significant differences about the persons or groups to which career civil servants should have
primary accountability, as perceived by public administrators themselves on the one hand, and as
perceived by the elected representatives of the people and citizens on the other.
Table 4.6
RANK-ORDER DIFFERENCES
AMONG ENTITIES
TO WHOM BUREAUCRATS ARE ACCOUNTABLE
RANK ORDER BUREAUCRATS LEGISLATORS VOTERS
1. General Public General Public General Public
2. Agency Director Governor Legislature
3. Agency Clientele Agency Director Agency Director
4. Governor Legislature State Courts
5. Legislature Agency Clientele Governor
6. State Courts State Courts Agency Clientele
In addition to the above ordinal importance rankings for these groups, several tests of
statistical difference were performed with the data. A one-way ANOVA was undertaken, based upon
the surveyed group, to determine the degree to which the responses were significantly different among
groups, using the Student-Newman-Keuls test. Each of the six categories manifested some significant
differences among the groups, as illustrated in Table 4.7. A similar ANOVA was performed using the
Least Significant Difference test, with no change in results. It is apparent that bureaucrats were the
most different of the three groups because of the greater number of significant differences that exist
compared with legislators and voters. Moreover, for four of the six answers bureaucrats provided the
61


highest or lowest scores of all of the three groups. These findings support hypothesis number four that
there are significant differences about the persons or groups to which career civil servants should have
accountability, as perceived by public administrators themselves on the one hand, and as perceived by
the elected representatives of the people and citizens on the other.
Table 4.7
GROUP DIFFERENCES FOR
THE PERSON OR ENTITY TO WHICH BUREAUCRATS SHOULD BE
PRIMARILY ACCOUNTABLE
TO WHOM ACCOUNTABLE
State Agency DirectorABC
Governor AC
State Legislature ^
State Courts BC
Agency Clientele Groups ^
General Public and Citizens B
BUR LEG
MEAN MEAN
2.5729 AB 3.0349 AC
3.8130 A 2.9773 AC
4.1313 AB 3.6163 A
4.5650 B 4.6860 c
3.4881 AB 4.4302 A
2.4615 B 2.2093
VOTER MEAN P VALUES
3.6711 BC .0000 ***
3.8289 c .0009 ***
3.4737 B .0001 ***
3.7105 BC .0000 ***
4.3618 .0000 ***
1.9474 .0442 *
A Significant differences between Bureaucrats and Legislators using SNK and LSD tests.
B Significant differences between Bureaucrats and Voters using SNK and LSD tests.
c Significant differences between Legislators and Voters using SNK and LSD tests.
* Significant differences at the .05 level.
** Significant differences at the .01 level.
*** Significant differences at the .001 level.
An analysis of the standard deviations for the primary accountability answers among the three
survey groups revealed that the greatest lack of consensus within each of the groups occurred for the
question regarding the agency clientele groups," except for legislators who had a greater lack of
consensus for the question on the state agency director. For the questions dealing with the state
agency director and the governor, the bureaucrats had more consensus in their answers than did
legislators and voters. However, it was the legislators who had the most unity in their responses for
the other four questions. The large variance from each of these three groups for the agency clientele
62


groups is interesting because it may imply a continuing lack of agreement for a premise underlying
the new public administration in serving and even advocating on behalf of identified populations.
Conversely, the relative consensus among all three groups surveyed about the three state
constitutionally-based entities of governor, state legislature, and state courts lends support for
orthodoxy and even the political school approach emphasizing hierarchical accountability for the
bureaucracy.
Table 4.8
SURVEY GROUP STANDARD DEVIATIONS
FOR PRIMARY ACCOUNTABILITY QUESTIONS
ACCOUNTABLE BUREAUCRAT LEGISLATOR VOTER
TO WHOM SCORE/RANK SCORE/RANK SCORE/RANK
State Agency Director 1.3700 J 1.7403 6 1.5178 3
Governor 1.3621 2 1.3933 3 1.5949 4
State Legislature 1.3151 1 1.2191 i 1.2594 1
State Courts 1.5037 4 1.2957 2 1.4125 2
Agency Clientele Groups 1.7626 6 1.5833 5 1.8268 6
General Public & Citizens 1.7172 5 1.4930 4 1.6157 5
Forced Choice Findings
An analysis of the forced choice questions also showed significant differences among the
groups surveyed, and these are presented in Table 4.9. Of the 10 forced choice questions, half
illustrated significant differences at the .05 level, using the Student-Newman-Keuls test. Using the
Student-Newman-Keuls test, bureaucrats were significantly different from legislators on three
questions; they gave significantly greater weight than did legislators to serving agency clientele
interests compared with the general public interest. They also gave significantly greater weight to
effectiveness compared with economy, and they assessed greater worth to competence in
comparison to trustworthiness than did legislators.
63


Bureaucrats were also significantly different from voters on three of the forced choice
questions. Compared with voters, bureaucrats assessed significantly greater worth to autonomy
compared with deference, to agency clientele interests compared with general public interest,
and to effectiveness compared with economy. Again, of all the three groups, bureaucrats were the
most different as illustrated by these forced choice questions, meaning there were more numerous
significant differences for bureaucrats than for either of the other two groups.
Using the Least Significant Difference (LSD) Test, a similar ANOVA was performed. The
LSD Test illustrated only three more differences than did the ANOVA using the Student-Newman-
Keuls Test. Such differences included bureaucrats being significantly different than voters on neutral
competence versus political awareness, and creativity versus predictability. Also, one more
significant difference between legislators and voters was illustratedon the question comparing
personal accountability versus system accountability.
These findings are interesting in a number of respects. They are consistent with the findings
from Tables 4.7 and 4.8 that bureaucrats are different than both legislators and voters in the way they
view the ideal of career public administrators obligations to serve agency clientele interests, in
relation to broader citizen and the general public interest. Concepts underlying the new public
administration appear to have greater credibility among Colorado public administrators than with
elected officials or registered voters. The findings also suggest a significant difference between
bureaucrats on the one hand, and legislators and voters on the other, about the importance of frugality
for those in the public service. It may be that a private-sector or public choice model, where there
are truly bottom-line considerations, exists in the minds of voters and legislators in Colorado; these
groups attach more importance to the value of economical as they view the activities of career public
servants, when compared with how actual practitioners of public administration see it. Possibly the
bureaucrats have a public sector paradigm in which effectiveness is significantly more important, to be
64


judged through the political process. As Appleby put it so simply, public administration is about
governance.
Lastly, virtues or values associated with most professionscompetence and autonomy
are given greater weight by the practitioners of public administration in Colorado than by two of the
groups to whom the bureaucracy is accountablevoters and legislatorswhen compared with
trustworthiness and deference for example. These findings are not inconsistent with the separatist
thesis or the notion of a professional ethics for public administration.
A review oTthe standard deviations for the forced choice question responses illustrates that
each of the survey groups appears to have the most consensus in their answers to the questions
comparing effectiveness and economy, and competence and trustworthiness, and the least
consensus dealing with the comparisons between impartiality and social consciousness, personal
accountability and system accountability, and creativity and predictability. These findings
extend the understood differences between bureaucrats on the one hand, and legislators and voters on
the other hand, and illustrate that they are broadly held as to effectiveness being of relatively greater
importance compared with economical to bureaucrats, and competence of relatively greater
importance to bureaucrats in comparison with trustworthiness when compared with the responses
from legislators and voters. These findings support hypothesis number fourthat there are significant
differences about the persons or groups to which career civil servants should have accountability, as
perceived by public administrators themselves on the one hand, and as perceived by the elected
representatives of the people and citizens on the other.
65


Table 4.9
BUREAUCRAT, LEGISLATOR AND VOTER GROUP DIFFERENCES
USING ONE-WAY ANOVA FOR
FORCED CHOICE QUESTIONS
VALUE COMPARISON BUR LEG PUB PVALUE
Autonomy v. Deference A MEAN 4.5591 A MEAN 4.8889 MEAN 5.0395 A .0147 *
Compassion v. Objectivity 6.0184 6.0222 5.7763 .3841
General Public Interest v. Agency Clientele Interests ^ 4.7034 AB 3.2889 A 3.7237 B .0000 ***
Neutral Competence v. Political Awareness D 3.8251 D 4.3636 4.0658 .0557
Effectiveness v. Economy AB 4.5486 AB 5.1111 A 4.8684 B .0011 **
Competence v. Trustworthiness ^ 5.0600 A 5.6364 AB 5.0263 8 .0045 **
Personal Accountability v. System Accountability D 4.6553 4.2000 4.9211 .0906
Fairness v. Responsiveness 4.4827 4.3409 4.2368 .2420
Creativity v. Predictability D 4.0237 D 4.3556 4.4342 .0331 *
Impartiality v. Social Consciousness 4.0000 3.7778 4.0658 .6247
A Significant differences between Bureaucrats and Legislators using SNK and LSD tests.
B Significant differences between Bureaucrats and Voters using SNK and LSD tests.
c Significant differences between Legislators and Voters using SNK and LSD tests.
D Significant differences using LSD test only.
* Significant differences at the .05 level.
** Significant differences at the .01 level.
*** Significant differences at the .001 level
66


Table 4.10
GROUP STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR
FORCED CHOICE QUESTIONS
VALUE COMPARISON Autonomy v. Deference BUREAUCRATS SCORE/RANK 1.4141 6 LEGISLATORS SCORE/RANK 1.5407 7 VOTERS SCORE/RANK 1.3802 3
Compassion v. Objectivity 1.3925 5 1.4379 5 1.4569 5
General Public Interest v. Agency Clientele Interests 1.7118 9 1.5019 6 1.6541 7
Neutral Competence v. Political Awareness 1.5016 7 1.6295 8 1.6357 6
Effectiveness v. Economy 1.0315 1 1.1721 2 1.4454 4
Competence v. Trustworthiness 1.1113 2 1.1632 1 1.1192 1
Personal Accountability v. System Accountability 1.7599 10 1.7658 9 1.6554 8
Fairness v. Responsiveness 1.2205 n J 1.2930 J 1.1647 . 2
Creativity v. Predictability 1.3341 4 1.3510 4 1.7308 9T
Impartiality v. Social. Consciousness 1.5631 8 1.9759 10 1.7308 9t
T Means tie.
67


Within the Bureaucracy Findings
I now turn to the findings of the survey from only the bureaucrat respondents. The responses
to the survey questions by Colorado career government civil servants were compared based upon a
number of specific respondent characteristics, including age, agency in which employed,
education including highest degree earned and subject of highest degree, gender, grade
level, and job classification. Findings of bureaucrat group responses based upon these six
characteristics are set forth in this section.
Age of Bureaucrat Respondents
Bureaucrat survey responses were categorized on the basis of age, expressed in decades.
Table 4.11 illustrates that on only one of the values was there a significant difference among
bureaucrat respondents on the basis of their age. Bureaucrats in their fifties assessed significantly
greater worth to the characteristic of orderly than did bureaucrats in their thirties and forties. In
other respects no significant differences were found based upon the age of the respondents, indicating
that the age decade of bureaucrat respondents does not appear correlated with any particular answers
to the normative statements containing the values.
68


Table 4.11
BUREAUCRAT GROUP VALUES
BASED UPON AGE DECADE OF RESPONDENTS
ONE-WAY ANOVA
VALUES TWENTIES 1 THIRTIES FORTIES FIFTIES SIXTIES
Bureaucratic Values MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN
Accountable 1.0000 1.5467 1.6514 1.3883 2.000
Competent 1.0000 1.2933 1.2898 1.2427 1.4286
Conflicts of Interest 2.0000 1.4267 1.4148 1.3786 1.3571
Consistent 3.0000 2.2667 2.2686 1.9612 2.2143
Deference 6.0000 4.3200 4.6989 4.7228 4.0000
Diligent 5.0000 1.8933 1.8011 1.7573 1.7143
Economical 2.0000 1.8000 1.7784 1.8252 1.7143
Effective 1.0000 1.5541 1.6057 1.5922 1.5714
Efficient 4.0000 1.6400 1.8068 1.6990 1.9286
Honest 1.0000 1.2000 1.2614 1.2427 1.2857
Impartial 4.0000 2.1867 2.0114 1.8252 1.9286
Integrity 3.0000 1.4324 1.3448 1.3010 1.5000
Loyal 2.0000 2.6667 2.7543 2.5437 2.2143
Neutral Competence 3.0000 2.7162 2.6250 2.7670 2.6429
Obedient 3.0000 4.0000 3.9886 3.9412 3.5714
Objective 1.0000 24757 2.0795 1.9806 1.7143
Orderly An 7.0000 3.3533 A 3.4773 B 2.8544 AB 2.6429
Predictable 5.0000 3.1600 3.0227 2.9709 2.6429
Rational 4.0000 1.8133 1.7273 1.7670 1.6429
Responsible 4.0000 1.5467 1.5682 1.4854 1.5714
Serve 3.0000 1.9333 2.1193 2.2136 1.7143
Stability 7.0000 2.2267 2.3352 1.9709 2.0714
Trustworthy 4.0000 1.3333 1.4000 1.3592 1.3571
Truthful 1.0000 1.4000 1.3714 1.4369 1.4286
Bureaucratic Index 3.2833 2.1821 2.1824 2.1046 2.1065


Table 4.11 (Cont.)
VALUES TWENTIES 1 THIRTIES FORTIES FIFTIES SIXTIES
Democratic Values MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN
Advocate 1.0000 2.8533 3.1829 3.2353 3.0000
Autonomy 1.0000 3.0946 2.9543 3.4412 3.2143
Caring 3.0000 2.2800 2.2159 2.0971 2.2857
Communicative 1.0000 1.4800 1.6193 1.5340 1.8571
Compassionate 3.0000 3.0400 2.9659 3.1471 2.7857
Confidentiality 1.0000 1.7467 1.6839 1.4854 2.2143
Courage 5.0000 2.3067 2.0966 2.1359 2.2143
Courteously 3.0000 1.6933 1.7386 1.7961 1.7143
Creative 1.0000 2.1067 2.0398 1.9515 2.2143
Discretion 4.0000 1.9867 2.1761 2.0194 1.9231
Fair 1.0000 1.9067 1.7898 1.8155 2.0714
Independent 7.0000 2.9067 2.7330 3.0874 2.0714
Justly 2.0000 1.7467 1.7955 1.6699 1.6429
Participation 5.0000 2.2973 2.6114 2.3725 2.0714
Politically Aware 7.0000 3.2568 3.2045 3.0588 2.2143
Promise Keeping 3.0000 1.5200 1.6364 1.4854 1.4286
Individual Rights 2.0000 2.2000 2.2330 2.0194 1.7143
Prudent 3.0000 2.4667 2.3807 2.3981 2.2143
Public Interest 3.0000 2.4000 2.3807 2.3465 1.9286
Respect 1.0000 1.4667 1.6250 1.63 11 1.3571
Responsive 6.0000 1.8400 2.0057 2.0097 1.8571
Socially Conscious 1.0000 3.3200 2.9885 3.0196 2.2143
Sovereignty of the People 7.0000 2.6486 2.8239 2.4369 2.0000
Tolerance 3.0000 2.4933 2.6477 2.6602 1.0714
Democratic Index 3.8333 2.3363 2.3608 2.3752 2.0990
1 There was only one respondent for the Twenties group.
A Significant differences at the .05 level using the Student-Newman-Keuls test.
^Significant differences at the .05 level using the Student-Newman-Keuls test.


The age of bureaucrat respondents does seem related to opinions about to which entities
and individuals bureaucrats should have primary accountability. The older respondentsthose forty
and olderbelieve that career government administrators should be primarily accountable to the state
agency director, while those under 40 years of age believe primary accountability should be to the
general public and citizens, suggesting a possible inverse correlation between the length of time a
bureaucrat serves in a government agency and his or her view about the importance of serving first the
general public or citizens. Those in their sixties also ranked the agency clientele groups lowest,
whereas those younger than 60 years of age selected the agency clientele groups as third in
importance. This finding suggests an inside government focus for career civil servants the longer
they have been in government service. For all the age groups, except for those in their thirties, the
governor is viewed as more important than the legislature in terms of bureaucrat primary
accountability. These findings are illustrated in Table 4.12 below.
Table 4.12
RANK-ORDER DIFFERENCES
AMONG AGE DECADE OF BUREAUCRATS
FOR
ENTITIES TO WHICH BUREAUCRATS SHOULD BE PRIMARILY ACCOUNTABLE
RANK
ORDER THIRTIES FORTIES FIFTIES SIXTIES
1. General Public General Public Agency Director Agency Director
2. Agency Director Agency Director General Public General Public
3. Agency Clientele Agency Clientele Agency Clientele Governor
4. Legislature Governor Governor State Legislature
5. Governor Legislature Legislature State Courts
6. State Courts State Courts State Courts Agency Clientele
71


Bureaucrats in their forties and fifties were significantly more likely to believe that the
governor was the person to whom bureaucrats should have some primary accountability than were
bureaucrats in their thirties. Bureaucrats in their thirties were significantly more likely to believe that
the general public and citizens should be the group to which bureaucrats should be primarily
accountable than were bureaucrats in their forties. These findings are illustrated on Table 4.13. Also,
older bureaucrats were less likely to place the general public and citizens first than were their
younger counterparts. These findings suggest that there may be some culturalization occurring within
the bureaucracy over timerepresenting a more government-like or inward focus for accountability
for the bureaucracy the older a bureaucrat and perhaps the longer he or she serves in government.
Table 4.13
PRIMARY ACCOUNTABILITY OF BUREAUCRATS BASED UPON
AGE OF BUREAUCRAT RESPONDENTS
TO WHOM ACCOUNTABLE THIRTIES FORTIES FIFTIES SIXTIES
State Agency Director 2.6301 2.5914 2.5097 2.4286
Governor AB 4.2055 AB 3.6886 A 3.7816 B 3.7500
State Legislature 4.1370 4.1857 4.0728 3.8214
State Courts 4.8356 4.5829 4.3447 4.0357
Agency Clientele Groups 3.1712 3.4543 3.7039 4.3214
General Public and Citizens A 2.0205 A 2.5314 A 2.6456 2.6429
A Significant differences at the .05 level using the Student-Newman-Keuls test.
B Significant differences at the .05 level using the Student-Newman-Keuls test.
No significant differences were found, based on the age of bureaucrat respondents, to any of
the forced choice questions. These findings are illustrated in Table 4.14 below.
72


Table 4.14
BUREAUCRAT GROUP DIFFERENCES
USING ONE-WAY ANOVA BASED ON AGE DECADE OF RESPONDENTS FOR
FORCED CHOICE QUESTIONS
VALUE COMPARISON Autonomy v. Deference TWENTIES MEAN 7.0000
Compassion v. Objectivity 5.0000
General Public Interest v. Agency Clientele Interests 7.0000
Neutral Competence v. Political Awareness 4.0000
Effectiveness v. Economy 5.0000
Competence v. Trustworthiness 3.0000
Personal Accountability v. System Accountability 8.0000
Fairness v. Responsiveness 5.0000
Creativity v. Predictability 3.0000
THIRTIES MEAN 4.4459 FORTIES MEAN 4.5739 FIFTIES MEAN 4.5049 SIXTIES MEAN 4.6154
5.9589 5.9091 6.2843 5.7143
4.5541 4.8352 4.6373 3.7857
4.0267 3.8182 3.7087 4.0000
4.5753 4.5000 4.6117 4.5000
4.9167 5.0838 5.1165 5.3077
4.3973 4.7371 4,5631 5.0000
4.5833 4.4509 4.5343 3.7857
3.9452 4.0230 4.1359 4.0000
3.8919 4.0690 3.9320 4.1429
Impartiality v. Social Consciousness
5.0000


Agency of Bureaucrat Respondents
Collection of the bureaucrat survey data permitted classification of responses based upon the
state agency, department, or unit employing the respondent. The agency classifications used were
those 23 generally utilized by the Colorado Department of Personnel for such purposes, and were as
follows:
Department of Administration
Department of Agriculture
Department of Corrections
Department of Education
Governors Office
Department of Health
Department of Higher Education
Department of Transportation
Department of Institutions
Judicial Branch
Department of Labor
Department of Law
Legislative Branch
Department of Local Affairs
Department of Military Affairs
Department of Natural Resources
Department of Personnel
Department of Public Safety
Department of Regulatory Agencies
Department of Revenue
Department of Social Services
Department of State
Department of Treasury
The number of bureaucrat survey responses from some of the smaller agencies or departments
was low enough to require dropping them from the final analysis. However, there were significant
differences noted in the responses from bureaucrats employed in many agencies regarding some of the
48 values and normative statements. Those differences included the following:
Department of Institutions bureaucrats rated the value of advocate significantly higher than did
bureaucrats in the Departments of Revenue, Natural Resources, Transportation, Social Services,
and Health. This value of advocacy associated with the new public administration appears to be
part of the culture within the Department of Institutions, an agency serving those who are mentally
ill or otherwise in need of care, and this may not be surprising, but this value does not show up in
other agencies like the Department of Social Services in Colorado where it might also be
expected.
74


Department of Revenue bureaucrats rated the value of caring significantly lower than did the
respondents from the Departments of Institutions and Social Services, and the Judicial Branch;
employees from the latter agencies could be expected to assess caring as an important value
given their clientele, whereas Revenue employees deal largely with the broad group of taxpayers,
motor vehicle owners, and others providing revenue and payments to Colorado government.
Department of Institutions bureaucrats, and those from the Judicial Branch, rated the value of
compassionate significantly higher than did the respondents from the Department of Revenue.
In addition, the Department of Institutions respondents rated this same value significantly higher
than did those from the Department of Transportation. Here again, the value of compassion
associated with the new public administration shows up in the respondents from Department of
Institutions, but not in other respondents from agencies like Social Services or Labor, for example,
where it might be expected.
Department of Labor bureaucrats rated the value of courage significantly higher than the did
respondents from the Departments of Natural Resources and Regulatory Agencies.
Department of Social Services bureaucrats assessed the value of diligent significantly higher
than did the respondents from the Departments of Corrections, Revenue, and Natural Resources.
This finding is surprising and reflects favorably upon the professionalism of staff in that agency.
Departments of Labor and Social Services bureaucrats rated the value of discretion significantly
higher than did the respondents from the Departments of Revenue and National Resources. The
need for prudential judgment and discretion in cases within Labor and Social Services appears to
have heightened the sensitivity of those agency employees for this specific value.
The Department of Labor bureaucrats rated the value of economical significantly higher than
did the respondents from the Departments of Revenue and Transportation, and the bureaucrats of
the Department of Social Services rated the same value significantly higher than did employees
75


from the Department of Transportation. Given the stereotypes often portrayed of the bureaucracy,
perhaps this finding is surprising. Yet my state government experience in Illinois and New
Yorkwith the Labor and Social Services agenciessupports the notion that during these many
years of significant scrutiny of operations like welfare and job training, there has been an
increasing sensitivity to economy and frugality within these agencies.
The Department of Natural Resources bureaucrats rated the value of independent significantly
lower than did the respondents from the Departments of Regulatory Agencies, Revenue, and
Health. The latter agencies regulate occupations, professions, and oversee entities for the benefit
of the general public health and safety; historically, personnel in such functions have recognized
their need to be sufficiently independent of the groups overseen and regulated. In contrast, the
relationship of the Natural Resources agency with its clientele is more of a service or even a
partnership. This finding is not surprising.
The Department of Natural Resources bureaucrats rated the value of neutral competence
significantly lower than did the respondents from the Departments of Labor, Revenue, Social
Services, and Health. This could be interpreted as relative sympathy for public environmental
consciousness.
The Department of Revenue bureaucrats rated the value of participation significantly lower than
did the respondents from the Departments of Health, Natural Resources, Social Services, and
Institutions. In addition, the bureaucrats from the Department of Regulatory Agencies also rated
this value significantly lower than did those bureaucrats from Health, Natural Resources and
Social Services. The care with which the Department of Regulatory Agencies must deal with its
regulated groups, and the revenue collection functions of the Department of Revenue on behalf of
the whole citizenry, makes this finding unsurprising.
76


The Department of Corrections bureaucrats rated the value of responsive significantly lower
than did the respondents from the Departments of Labor and Social Services.
The Department of Revenue bureaucrats rated the value of socially conscious significantly
lower than did those working in the Departments of Labor, Social Services, and Institutions. In
addition, the respondents from the Department of Natural Resources were also significantly lower
in their assessment of this value than were the bureaucrats in the Departments of Labor and Social
Services. The culture at the Departments of Labor, Social Searches, and Institutions suggests the
importance of this new public administration and political school value.
Department of Revenue bureaucrats rated the value of tolerance significantly lower than did
those from the Departments of Higher Education, Social Services, Institutions, and the Judicial
Branch.
Table 4.15 illustrates these findings, which support hypothesis number onethat there are significant
differences in identified public administration norms and values among career civil servants.
77


Table 4.15
BUREAUCRAT GROUP VALUES
BASED UPON THE STATE AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT.OF RESPONDENTS
ONE-WAY ANOVA
VALUES ADMIN AGRI CORR HEALTH HIGHED TRANS INSTI JUDIC
Bureaucratic Values MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN
Accountable 2.2500 1.6000 1.8000 1.5385 1.9444 1.6667 1.4211 1.5000
Competent 1.4167 1.2000 1.3500 1.2642 1.2778 1.4167 1.2632 1.1364
Conflicts oflnterest 1.3333 1.0000 1.4500 1.4528 1.4444 1.5000 1.6316 1.5000
Consistent 2.5833 1.8000 2.3000 2.0943 1.7222 2.0833 1.9737 2.4545
Deference 5.3333 3.6000 4.9000 4.4528 3.8889 5.3611 4.2368 4.0476
Diligent ABr 2.0000 1.8000 2.2500 A 1.8491 1.5000 2.0000 1.8158 1.7273
Economical ABC 1.9167 1.4000 1.7500 1.9811 1.8333 2.1667 AB 1.7105 1.6818
Effective 1.5833 1.4000 1.8500 1.6154 1.5556 1.7222 1.5789 1.5000
Efficient 1.6667 1.4000 2.0000 2.0000 1.8333 1.8056 1.7632 1.5909
1 lonest 1.0000 1.2000 1.3000 1.1132 1.2778 1.3889 1.2632 1.1364
Impartial 1.6667 1.6000 2.5000 2.2264 2.0000 2.1111 1.9737 2.0909
Integrity 1.0833 1.2000 1.4500 1.3462 1.4444 1.3429 1.5263 1.2727
Loyal 3.0833 2.0000 2.5000 2.7736 2.1667 2.8333 2.4211 3.1905
N. Competence ABCD 2.1667 1.4000 2.9500 2.4906 A 2.6667 3.1111 2.7105 2.5909
Obedient 4.1667 2.6000 4.4000 3.9623 3.1111 4.2500 4.0000 3.9048
Objective 1.9167 1.4000 2.2500 2.0755 2.0000 2.1111 2.0526 1.9091
Orderly 3.2500 2.4000 3.0500 3.5660 2.8889 3.0556 3.0263 3.3636
Predictable 3.7500 2.2000 3.4500 3.0377 2.5556 2.7222 3.1053 2.5455
Rational 1.8333 1.4000 1.8000 1.8868 1.5294 2.0833 1.7568 1.2727
Responsible A 1.5000 1.4000 1.8000 1.6415 1.3529 1.9444 A 1.5676 1.3636
Serve 1.5000 2.2000 2.4000 2.2075 1.7641 2.0556 2.1351 2.2727
Stability 2.0000 1.6000 2.5500 2.2642 1.7647 2.4167 2.0541 2.0909
Trustworthy 1.2500 1.4000 1.5263 1.4906 1.2941 1.3611 1.5676 1.2273
Truthful 1.1667 1.4000 1.5263 1.3774 1.2941 1.3611 1.6216 1.2273
Bureaucratic Index 2.2496 1.6917 2.3438 2.1844 1.9367 2.3128 2.1778 2.0473


Table 4.15 (Cont.)
VALUES LABOR LOCAL INTRES PUBSAF REGAC REVEN SSERV PVALUE
MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN
Bureaucratic Values
Accountable 1.3333 1.4000 1.6591 1.5833 1.6875 1.4000 1.3556 .5444
Competent 1.0556 1.4000 1.3182 1.2500 1.1250 1.5667 1.1556 .5787
Conflicts of Interest 1.1111 1.4000 1.3864 1.2500 1.3125 1.3333 1.2222 .2709
Consistent 1.5000 3.0000 2.4091 2.1667 2.3125 2.5517 2.2889 .2850
Deference 4.1765 4.4000 4.6136 5.6667 5.2500 4.8333 4.2667 .1002
Diligent Anc 1.5000 2.0000 1.9773 B 1.5833 1.7500 2.1000 c 1.4000 ADC .0140
Economical ^ 1.1667 AC 1.8000 1.7273 1.5833 1.8125 2.2000 c 1.4667 B .0252
Effective 1.1667 2.0000 1.7273 1.3333 1,6875 1.6667 1.3864 .5500
Efficient 1.1667 1.8000 2.0000 1.5000 1.8125 1.9000 1.5333 .2021
Honest 1.2778 1.4000 1.2955 1.1667 1.6250 1.2667 1.1313 .5492
Impartial 1.2778 1.8000 2.2273 1.8333 1.6250 1.8333 2.1111 .6934
Integrity 1.2222 1.6000 1.4545 1.5833 1.3125 1.2759 1.2889 .9517
Loyal 2.0556 3.0000 2.9318 2.4167 2.4375 2.3000 2.8444 .5455
N. Competence AUCD 2.0556 3.6000 3.6691 ABCD 2.0833 2.1250 2.3667 c 2.4889 D .0114
Obedient 3.8889 3.4000 3.8864 3.5833 4.3125 3.8214 4.0667 .8331
Objective 1.5556 2.8000 2.3409 1.8333 2.0625 2.0000 1.9333 .7455
Orderly 2.7778 3.4000 3.6818 3.0833 3.2500 3.4833 3.3778 .6917
Predictable 3.0000 3.0000 3.5455 2.5833 2.7500 3.4333 2.8444 .3934
Rational 1.4444 1.8000 1.9545 1.9161 1.5625 1.8333 1.4889 .1420
Responsible A 1.1111 A 1.8000 1.6591 1.2500 1.5000 1.5333 1.3778 .1217
Serve 1.7222 2.0000 2.4318 1.9167 1.9375 2.2333 1.9111 .8089
Stability 1.7778 2.0000 2.5455 2.1667 2.0000 2.6000 2.1313 .3638
T rustworthy 1.1667 1.6000 1.3864 1.4167 1.4375 1.3333 1.2444 .8956
Truthful 1.2778 1.4000 1.3636 1.5000 1.5000 1.3000 1.4667 .9319
Bureaucratic Index 1.8347 2.2567 2.3691 2.0229 2.0958 2.1861 2.0566 .1542


Table 4.15 (Cont.)
VALUES ADMIN AGRI CORR HEALTH HIGHED TRANS INSTI JUDIC
Democratic Values MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN
Advocate ABCDE 3.6667 4.6000 3.1000 2.7885 A 3.1111 3.4167 B 1.8158 ADCUE 3.1429
Autonomy 2.8333 3.6000 3.1000 2.7647 3.8889 3.3333 3.0541 3.0455
Caring ABC 2.5000 2.4000 2.1500 2.2830 1.6111 2.5556 1.6579 A 1.8636
Communicative 1.5800 1.4000 1.9000 1.5094 1.5556 1.7222 1.5000 1.5455
Compassionate ABC 2.8333 3.2000 3.7000 3.0000 2.6111 3.5556 A 2.2632 AB 2.2273
Confidentiality ABCD 1.6667 1.0000 1.9000 1.5472 A 1.3333 2.4444 ABCD 1.3947 B 2.0476
Courage AB 2.4167 1.8000 2.5000 2.0755 1.8333 2.2778 2.0000 1.8182
Courteously 1.9167 1.4000 2.3000 1.7358 1.5556 1.8611 1.5526 1.5909
Creative 2.1667 2.4000 2.5000 2.1321 2.0556 2.2222 1.7105 2.1364
Discretion AIICD 2.2500 2.0000 2.3500 2.2800 1.8824 2.1667 1.9211 1.6818
Fair 1.7500 1.4000 2.4500 1.8491 1.9444 1.9167 1.6316 1.5000
Independent A11C 1.9167 1.6000 3.6000 2.5660 A 3.2778 2.9444 2.7368 2.5455
Justly 2.0833 1.4000 1.8000 1.8491 1.6111 2.0000 1.6316 1.5000
Participation ABCBEFG" 3.1667 1.8000 2.9500 1.9615 Al> 2.7778 2.4167 E 2.3421 F 2.5238
Politically Aware 3.2500 3.0000 3.6000 3.1321 3.3889 2.9722 3.0789 3.2381
Promise Keeping 1.2500 . 1.2000 1.6500 1.5660 1.3333 1.5556 1.5526 1.4545
Individual Rights 1.6667 3.4000 2.1500 2.3396 2.0000 2.5000 1.8919 1.4545
Prudent 2.0833 2.0000 2.1500 2.5094 2.3529 2.5833 2.3514 2.2727
Public Interest 2.2500 2.4000 2.4500 2.2885 2.7059 2.0833 2.4595 3.0476
Respect 1.6667 1.6000 2.0000 1.7358 1.2353 1.7500 1.5676 1.3182
Responsive AB 2.0000 1.8000 2.7000 AB 2.0189 2.0000 2.2778 1.9730 1.6818
S. Conscious ABCDE 3.4167 3.2000 3.8000 c 3.1698 2.7059 3.1429 2.3784 c 2.2857
Sovereignty of People 2.5833 3.2000 2.8000 2.6981 2.3529 2.8056 2.5135 2.8182
Tolerance ABCD 3.1667 3.0000 3.3500 2.7358 1.9412 A 2.8611 2.2703 B 1.9545
Democratic Index 2.3493 2.2983 2.6867 2.3123 2.2371 2.5174 2.1429 2.1363


Table 4.15 (Cont.)
VALUES LABOR LOCAL INTRES PUBSAF REGAG REVEN SSERV PVALUE
MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN
Democratic Values
Advocate ABCUE 3.2778 2.8000 3.4545 C 3.5000 3.6250 3.6667 D 2.9778 E .0250
Autonomy 3.0556 2.0000 3.4318 3.8333 2.6875 3.0333 2.9778 .7286
Caring ABC 1.8889 2.0000 2.3864 2.0833 2.0000 2.9667 ABC 1.8667 c .0177
Communicative 1.2222 1.4000 1.7727 1.5833 1.3750 1.6667 1.4222 .6131
Compassionate ABC 2.4444 2.2000 3.3636 2.6667 2.9375 3.8667 BC 2.8409 .0065
Confidentiality ABCU 1.0000 c 2.0000 2.0909 1.5000 1.6875 1.4667 1.3409 .0070
Courage AB 1.3889 AB 2.8000 2.7045 A 2.0833 2.9375 B 2.0667 2.0000 .0053
Courteously 1.5000 1.6000 1.9545 1.5833 1.8750 1.8000 1.5111 .2294
Creative 1.5556 2.2000 1.9773 2.4167 2.0000 2.1000 1.7556 .4543
Discretion ABCD 1.3889 AB 2.0000 2.5000 AC 2.4167 1.6875 2.5667 BD 1.6444 CD .0050
Fair 1.5000 1.8000 2.0682 1.6667 1.5000 1.8000 1.7556 .4445
Independent A,,c 2.7778 2.4000 3.8864 ABC 3.2500 1.9375 B 2.4000 C 2.8222 .0106
Justly 1.3889 1.6000 1.9773 1.5833 1.3750 1.7333 1.6889 .4307
Participation ABCDEFG" 2.4444 2.4000 2.0682 BG 2.0000 3.3750 ABC 3.4828 DEFG" 2.1333 CH .0002
Politically Aware 2.4444 3.0000 3.3636 3.4167 2.8750 3.8276 2.4444 .4068
Keep Promises 1.2222 1.6000 1.7955 1.4167 1.5625 1.9667 1.4667 .3599
Individual Rights 1.6667 1.8000 2.4318 1.5833 2.5000 2.2667 1.9556 .0746
Prudent 2.0000 2.2000 2.7273 2.0000 2.1875 2.8667 2.1333 .5294
Public Interest 1.8333 3.2000 2.4773 2.0833 2.1875 . 2.4000 2.1778 .6394
Respect 1.1111 2.2000 1.7045 1.4167 1.4375. 1.5333 1.5111 .2111
Responsive 1.5294 A 2.4000 2.1136 1.5833 1.7500 1.9667 1.7111 B .0743
S. Conscious 1.9444 AD 2.8000 3.6364 AB 3.5833 2.9375 3.9655 UE 2.2444 BE .0006
Sovereignty of People 2.1667 3.0000 2.6818 2.0000 2.6250 3.2759 2.4222 .7775
Tolerance ABCD 2.1111 2.2000 2.7273 3.0833 2.3125 3.5667 ABCD 2.1313 .0007
Democratic Index 1.9924 2.2483 2.5983 2.2701 2.3693 2.6489 2.1396 .0294
A through I I Significant differences at the .05 level using the Student-Newman-Keuls test.


!
A comparison of the rankings of the answers given by respondents from the various state
agencies indicates differing views about the primary accountability of bureaucrats. Respondents
from the Departments of Administration, Agriculture, Corrections, Health, Higher Education,
Transportation, Institutions, Public Safety, and Regulatory Agencies believe primary accountability
should be to the general public and citizens. Respondents from the Departments of Labor, Local
Affairs, National Resources, and Revenue, along with the Judicial Branch, believe primary
accountability should be to the state agency director. Generally, respondents from the various
departments selected the agency clientele groups as the third entity to which primary
accountability should be had by bureaucrats; exceptions to this generalization included the
Departments of Corrections and Regulatory Agencies respondents who believed the agency clientele
groups should be sixth or last, and Revenue respondents who thought they should be fifth or next to
last. Finally, most of the respondents of agencies believed that the governor was owed greater
accountability by bureaucrats than was the legislature, and the legislature more than the state
courts. These findings suggest a general consensus among bureaucrats about the three individuals or
entities to whom they should be primarily accountable, and may be found in Table 4.16 below.
82


Table 4.16
RANK ORDERED BUREAUCRAT RESPONSES
BASED ON AGENCY OF RESPONDENTS FOR
TO WHOM ACCOUNTABLE
ONE-WAY ANOVA
TO WHOM ACCOUNTABLE ADMIN AGR1 CORR HEALTH HIGHED
MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN
State Agency Director 2 2 2 2 2
Governor 4 * 5 3 4 4
State Legislature 4 * 3 * 5 5 5
State Courts 6 6 4 6 6
Agency Clientele Groups 3 3 * 6 3 3
General Public and Citizens 1 1 1 1 i
TO WHOM ACCOUNTABLE TRANS INSTI JUDIC LABOR LOCAL
MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN
State Agency Director 2 3 1 1 1
Governor 3 4 6 4 4 *
State Legislature 5 5 5 5 4 *
State Courts 6 6 4 6 6
Agency Clientele Groups 4 2 o J 3 2 *
General Public and Citizens 1 1 2 2 2 *
TO WHOM ACCOUNTABLE NTRES PUBSAF REGAG REVEN SSERV
MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN
State Agency Director 1 1 * 2 1 2
Governor 4 3 3 4 5
State Legislature 6 5 4 3 4
State Courts 5 6 5 6 6
Agency Clientele Groups 3 3 * 6 5 3
General Public and Citizen Tie 2 1 * 1 2 1


An illustration of the significant differences, based upon the department or agency of the
respondent, to the question associated with primary accountability, is contained in Table 4.17 below.
For only two of the six questions surveyed were there significant differences at the .05 level using the
Student-Newman-Keuls Test. Those differences included the following:
The Department of Corrections bureaucrats rated significantly higher than Departments of Labor
and Health employees a primary accountability to the state courts. In addition, the Judicial
Branch respondents rated significantly higher a primary accountability to the state courts than
did Health Department employees. In my view, this is because of the proximity of the state courts
to the Judicial Department, and the power and effect of state courts upon the persons dealt with by
the Corrections Department, the personnel of which might naturally feel an obligation to be
accountable to those entities that provide them with such persons to control or oversee.-
Department of Revenue bureaucrats rated significantly higher than Department of Natural
Resources bureaucrats a primary accountability to the state legislature. My experience with
state legislatures generally throughout the U.S., based upon eight years of service with the
National Conference of State Legislatures, and with the Colorado Legislature in particular,
suggests that a continuing major focus of the legislative sessions is on money issues, and the
legislatures working relationship with a revenue collection agency, compared with a revenue
expenditure agency, would be positive and thus influence the Department of Revenue personnel to
reply in this fashion.
In general, the major finding here is one of similarity among the bureaucrat respondents, no
matter in what agency they are employed.
84


Table 4.17
BUREAUCRAT RESPONSES BASED ON STATE AGENCY OF RESPONDENTS FOR
PRIMARY ACCOUNTABILITY ONE-WAY ANOVA
TO WHOM ACCOUNTABLE ADMIN AGRI CORR HEALTH HIGHED
MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN
State Agency Director 2.5833 2.6000 3.1053 2.6415 2.8235
Governor 4.3333 4.0000 3.2632 3.5472 4.0000
State Legislature A 4.3333 3.8000 3.6842 4.3774 4.1176
State Courts ABC 4.3750 4.4000 3.5789 AB 5.1226 AC 4.3529
Agency Clientele Groups 3.2500 3.8000 4.3158 3.1509 3.0000
General Public and Citizens 2.1250 2.4000 3.0526 2.1604 2.7059
TO WHOM ACCOUNTABLE TRANS INSTI JUDIC LABOR LOCAL
MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN
State Agency Director 2.3714 2.8514 2.3636 2.2500 1.6000
Governor 3.7286 4.0405 4.4545 3.4167 3.8000
State Legislature A 4.0714 4.0676 4.2727 4.6944 3.8000
State Courts ABC 4.8714 4.6081 3.8636 c 5.2778 B 5.4000
Agency Clientele Groups 3.7571 2.7973 3.6136 2.7500 3.2000
General Public and Citizens 2.2000 2.6351 2.6591 2.6111 3.2000
TO WHOM ACCOUNTABLE NTRES PUBSAF REGAG REVEN SSERV
MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN
State Agency Director .2.2045 2.2500 2.6875 2.4828 2.9091
Governor 3.7727 4.0000 3.2500 3.7586 4.0682
State Legislature A 4.7045 A 4.1667 3.5000 3.5517 A 3.9091
State Courts ABC 4.5909 4.3333 4.5000 4.3103 4.3864
Agency Clientele Groups 3.5000 4.0000 4.5625 4.2759 3.3864
General Public and Citizen 2.2273 2.2500 2.5000 2.5172 2.5682
A'hroushC significant differences at the .05 level using the Student-Newman-Keuls test.


The forced choice questions also revealed significant differences based upon the state agency
of the bureaucrat respondents, including the following:
Department of Revenue bureaucrats were significantly more likely to give greater weight to the
value of objectivity, and the Department of Institutions significantly more likely to rate higher
the value of compassion, when comparing those two values. While this finding is not surprising
it does support, like so many other findings, the first hypothesis that there are significant
differences in identified public administration norms and values among career civil servants
themselves.
The Department of Institutions bureaucrats were significantly more likely to rate higher the value
of agency clientele interests in comparison with general public interest, than the bureaucrats
from the Departments of Regulatory Agencies, Revenue, and Transportation.
The Department of Corrections bureaucrats were significantly more likely to rate higher the value
of economy in comparison with effectiveness, than were the Judicial Branch employees
(composed of many Public Defenders) when comparing the two values of effectiveness and
economy. This finding reflects the very nature of the functions that public defenders and
correctional personnel perform, with respect to those charged with or found guilty of felonies.
The Department of Institutions bureaucrats were significantly more likely to highly assess the
value of social consciousness in comparison with impartiality, than were the employees at the
Departments of Natural Resources and Revenue. In addition, the bureaucrats at the Department of
Social Services were also significantly more likely to rate higher the value of social
consciousness than were the employees at the Department of Natural Resources, in comparing
these same two values. If there were only two state agencies that could be expected to be more
aware of social conditions and circumstances of their agency clientele, and thus rate high the new
86


public administration value of social consciousness, it would be both of these agencies that deal
with a special clientele with particular needs.
These and earlier reported findings under Agency of Bureaucrat Respondents illustrate the
many and important differences among the bureaucracy based upon the department or agency in which
the civil servant works. The ideal career civil servant is seen somewhat differently within each
agency, depending upon that agencys culture and expectations.
87


Table 4.18
BUREAUCRAT CROUP DIFFERENCES BASED ON STATE AGENCY OF RESPONDENTS
USING ONE-WAY ANOVA FOR FORCED CHOICE QUESTIONS
VALUE COMPARISON Autonomy v. Deference ADMIN MEAN 4.5833 AGRI MEAN 5.6000 CORR MEAN 4.6000 HEALTH MEAN 4.8113 HIGHED MEAN 4.8824
Compassion v. Objectivity A 6.2500 6.7500 6.1500 5.9808 5.8333
General Pub Interest v. Clientele Interests A,!C 5.0000 3.8000 4.7000 4.6604 4.6111
Neutral Competence v. Political Awareness 4.3333 3.2000 4.3000 3.9434 3.4444
Effectiveness v. Economy A 4.7500 4.5000 5.1500 A 4.4906 4.3333
Competence v. Trustworthiness 5.0000 4.5000 4.9500 5.1569 5.2778
Personal Accountability v. System Accountability 4.9167 6.0000 5.0000 4.6604 5.1111
Fairness v. Responsiveness 4.2500 5.0000 4.4500 4.7925 4.2222
Creativity v. Predictability 3.4167 4.2500 3.9500 4.0377 4.1667
Impartiality v. Social Consciousness ABt 3.7500 3.2500 3.4000 4.2800 3.8333


Table 4.18 (Cont.)
VALUE COMPARISON Autonomy v. Deference TRANS MEAN 4.2778 INSTI MEAN 4.6316 JUDIC MEAN 4.5000 LABOR MEAN 4.9444 LOCAL MEAN 4.8000
Compassion v. Objectivity A 5.8611 5.5000 A 5.6364 6.2222 6.0000
General Pub Interest v. Clientele Interests AIit 4.1944 A 5.6579 ABC 4.8636 5.2778 5.2000
Neutral Competence v. Political Awareness 3.9167 3.9211 3.5909 3.6667 4.6000
Effectiveness v. Economy A 4.8056 4.5000 4.0455 A 4.6667 3.6000
Competence v. Trustworthiness 5.1944 4.9459 4.8947 5.0588 5.5000
Personal Accountability v. System Accountability 4.8611 4.6579 4.3333 4.7778 4.4000
Fairness v. Responsiveness 4.1667 4.7162 4.4211 4.7222 4.8000
Creativity v. Predictability 4.5556 3.8947 4.2381 4.0000 3.8000
Impartiality v. Social Consciousness AliC 3.9444 4.7105 AB 4.5238 4.5556 4.4000