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An analysis of UN peacekeeping efforts in African civil conflicts

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An analysis of UN peacekeeping efforts in African civil conflicts
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McVey, Kimberley Lynn
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xiii, 153 leaves : ; 28 cm

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Since 1960 ( fast )
Civil war -- Africa ( lcsh )
Civil war ( fast )
Peacekeeping forces ( fast )
Politics and government ( fast )
Politics and government -- Africa -- 1960- ( lcsh )
Africa ( fast )
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bibliography ( marcgt )
theses ( marcgt )
non-fiction ( marcgt )

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Includes bibliographical references (leaves 141-153).
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Department of Humanities and Social Sciences
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by Kimberley Lynn McVey.

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Full Text
AN ANALYSIS OF UN PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS
IN AFRICAN CIVIL CONFLICTS
by
Kimberley Lynn McVey
B. A., University of Colorado, 2003
A thesis submitted to the
University of Colorado Denver
in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Social Science
December 2008


by Kimberley Lynn McVey
all rights reserved.


This thesis for the Master of Social Science
Degree by
Kimberley Lynn McVey
has been approved
by
Barbara^. Walkosz
//-//- eft
Date


McVey, Kimberley Lynn (M.S.S., Social Science)
An Analysis of UN Peacekeeping Efforts in African Civil Conflicts
Thesis directed by Associate Professor Barbara J. Walkosz
ABSTRACT
This research project focuses on the evaluation of several past UN
peacekeeping operations derived during the 1990s, which were launched with
the intent to help alleviate civil conflicts within tribally diverse, newly
independent, or failed African states. A comparison case study of these UN
peacekeeping operations is completed in regards several important identified
variables, including: the nature of the conflict and corresponding mandate, the
amount of resources contributed by the organizing agency, the timing of
operation initialization, and the presence, or lack there of, of consent from the
warring parties and compliance from third party actors. This study attempts to
identify significant relationships between the above-mentioned variables and
the success of the peacekeeping operations, in attempt to answer the
following questions: Are attributes of African civil conflicts, and the contexts in
which they occur, amenable to current UN intervention strategies? And, if not,
how can UN intervention strategies be improved to more effectively address
the nature of African civil conflicts and the contexts in which they occur?
This abstract accurately represents the content of the candidates thesis.
I recommend its publication.
Signed


DEDICATION
I dedicate this thesis to my parents, who gave me an appreciation of learning
and always encouraged me to be the best person I could be throughout life. I
also dedicate this to my brother, Troy, who always supported me
wholeheartedly in all my endeavors. Even though Troy is no longer with us, I
know he would be very proud to see the final completion of this degree.


ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
My thanks to my advisor, Barbara J. Walkosz, for all of her support
throughout my career as a graduate student, and for her special enthusiasm
for, and contribution to this research project. I also wish to thank my additional
two committee members, Jana M. Everett and Virginia Fink, for their valuable
guidance and support throughout this process.


TABLE OF CONTENTS
Tables.........................................................xii
CHAPTER
1. INTRODUCTION................................................1

Problem Statement........................................1
Purpose for Study........................................2
Definitions of Terms.....................................5
2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE........................................9
Historical Context of the UN and Peacekeeping...........10
The UNMaintaining Peace and Security............10
Collective Security in a State System:
The Creation of the UN......................11
The UN Charter
Emergence of Peacekeeping...................13
Reforms and Developments in
UN Peacekeeping.............................15
Changing Nature of Conflicts
and a Changing Political Landscape................22
From Inter-State Conflict to
Intra-State Conflict........................22
From State Sovereignty to
Humanitarian Intervention...................24
From Military Intervention to
Multidimensional Intervention...............26
African Civil Conflicts and UN Peacekeeping.............27
Prevalence of Conflict in Africa..................28
Nature of Civil Conflict..........................30
Ethnic Divisions............................30
Vll


Territory and Resource Disputes............35
Fractured, Failed, and Corrupt States......37
PeacekeepingA Changing Definition...............41
Significant Attributes of Peacekeeping Operations.42
Organizing Agency and Available Resources...42
Timing, Consent, and Third Party Compliance ...48
Operation Mandate..........................57
3. METHODOLOGY, RESEARCH DESIGN AND
DATA COLLECTION............................................63
Methodology............................................63
Nature of the Research...........................63
The Case Study Method............................63
Multi-Case Studies
The Comparative Case Method......................64
Measurement......................................66
Research Design and Data Collection....................67
Research Questions, Propositions and
Unit of Analysis.................................67
Operational Definitions of Variables.............70
Data Collection and Criteria for
Interpreting Findings............................72
4. CASE STUDY RESULTS........................................73
United Nations Angola Verification Mission II
ANGOLA: UNAVEM II (1991-1995)..........................73
Historical Context of ConflictConflict Type.....73
Intervention TypeMandate, Organizing Agency(s),
and Timing of Operation..........................74
Consent and Compliance, Available Resources,
and Mandate Revisions............................75
viii


Operation Outcome: TRANSFERRED TO UNAVEM III...76
United Nations Angola Verification Mission III
ANGOLA: UNAVEM III (1995-1997).......................76
Intervention TypeMandate, Organizing Agency(s),
and Timing of Operation........................76
Consent and Compliance, Available Resources,
and Mandate Revisions..........................77
Operation Outcome: TRANSFERRED TO MONUA........77
United Nations Observer Mission in Angola
ANGOLA: MONUA (1997-1999)............................77
Intervention TypeMandate, Organizing Agency(s),
and Timing of Operation........................77
Consent and Compliance, Available Resources,
and Mandate Revisions..........................78
Operation Outcome: TERMINATED/UNSUCCESSFUL.....78
United Nations Operation in Somalia I
SOMALIA: UNOSOM I (1992-1993)........................79
Historical Context of ConflictConflict Type...79
Intervention TypeMandate, Organizing Agency(s),
and Timing of Operation........................81
Consent and Compliance, Available Resources,
and Mandate Revisions..........................81
Operation Outcome: TRANSFERRED TO UNOSOM II....82
United Nations Operation in Somalia II
SOMALIA: UNOSOM II (1993-1995).......................82
Intervention TypeMandate, Organizing Agency(s),
and Timing of Operation........................82
Consent and Compliance, Available Resources,
and Mandate Revisions..........................82
Operation Outcome: UNSUCCESSFUL................83
IX


United Nations Operation in Mozambique
MOZAMBIQUE: ONUMOZ (1992-1994).....................83
Historical Context of ConflictConflict Type..83
Intervention TypeMandate, Organizing Agency(s),
and Timing of Operation.......................84
Consent and Compliance, Available Resources,
and Mandate Revisions.........................84
Operation Outcome: SUCCESSFUL.................85
United Nations Observer Mission in Rwanda-Uganda
RWANDA/UGANDA: UNOMUR (1993-1994)..................85
Historical Context of ConflictConflict Type..85
Intervention TypeMandate, Organizing Agency(s),
and Timing of Operation.......................86
Consent and Compliance, Available Resources,
and Mandate Revisions.........................87
Operation Outcome: TERMINATED/UNSUCCESSFUL....87
United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
RWANDA: UNAMIR(1993-1996)..........................87
Intervention TypeMandate, Organizing Agency(s),
and Timing of Operation.......................87
Consent and Compliance, Available Resources,
and Mandate Revisions.........................88
Operation Outcome: UNSUCCESSFUL...............90
United Nations Operation in Liberia
LIBERIA: UNOMIL (1993-1997)........................90
Historical Context of ConflictConflict Type..90
Intervention TypeMandate, Organizing Agency(s),
and Timing of Operation.......................91
Consent and Compliance, Available Resources,
and Mandate Revisions.........................91
Operation Outcome: SUCCESSFUL.................92
x


United Nations Operation in the Central African Republic (CAR)
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: MINURCA (1998-2000).........92
Historical Context of ConflictConflict Type.....92
Intervention TypeMandate, Organizing Agency(s),
and Timing of Operation..........................93
Consent and Compliance, Available Resources,
and Mandate Revisions............................93
Operation Outcome: SUCCESSFUL....................93
United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
SIERRA LEONE: UNOMSIL (1998-1999).....................94
Historical Context of ConflictConflict Type.....94
Intervention TypeMandate, Organizing Agency(s),
and Timing of Operation..........................94
Consent and Compliance, Available Resources,
and Mandate Revisions............................95
Operation Outcome: TRANSFERRED TO UNAMSIL........96
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
SIERRA LEONE: UNAMSIL (1998-1999).....................96
Intervention TypeMandate, Organizing Agency(s),
and Timing of Operation..........................96
Consent and Compliance, Available Resources,
and Mandate Revisions............................97
Operation Outcome: SUCCESSFUL....................97
5. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION.................................104
Variable Analysis....................................104
Consent, Compliance, Timing
and Conflict Type...............................105
Organizing Agency in Relation to
Available Resources.............................110
Operation Mandate...............................112
xi


Conclusions and Recommendations..............113
More Effective Negotiations.............113
More Time and Resources.................114
More Dedication.........................115
Suggestions for Future Research..............116
APPENDIX
A. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE CONGO............117
B. COMPLETE LIST OF UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
PAST AND CURRENT (1948-2008)...................121
C. UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
INCLUDED IN THIS STUDY.........................123
D. CURRENT UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN AFRICA...124
E. UN DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
DEFINITION OF MULTIDEMENSIONAL PEACEKEEPING
TASKS..........................................127
F. CASE STUDY QUESTIONAIRE........................131
G. ANGOLA POST-MONUAWITHDRAWL.....................137
H. SOMALIA POST-UNOSOM II WITHDRAWL...............138
I. RWANDA POST-UNAMIR WITHDRAWL...................140
BIBLIOGRAPHY
xii


LIST OF TABLES
Table
3.1 Independent variables and their operational use............71
4.1 Comprehensive summaries of independent variables for all cases 99
xm


CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
Problem Statement
This research project involves an analysis of United Nations (UN)
peacekeeping operations in Africa that derive within the 1990s. The UN has a
long history of peacekeeping in Africa, beginning with the United Nations
Operation in the Congo (ONUC), which lasted from 1960-1964. To date, this
mission is one of the largest UN missions sent to Africa, totaling almost
20,000 maximum designated strength at its peak, and producing a total of
250 fatalities, including both military personnel and international civilians
(UNDPI with the UNDPKO, 2001 h). ONUC was also the first mission where
the UN used force to accomplish its designated task. This early mission is still
known as one of the most controversial (excluding the more recent
catastrophes in Somalia and Rwanda), as it proved to be an ultimate failure,
with the UNs reputation suffering greatly as a result (Adebajo & Landsberg,
2000; Berman & Sams, 2000; MacQueen,1999). Following the termination of
ONUC, the UN chose not to get involved in another African conflict until
almost three decades later. Adebajo and Lansbeg (2000) note, After the
controversies of the Congo crisis, the UN Security Council refused to
intervene in civil wars in Africa, citing the difficulties of keeping peace in the
shadow of a Cold War... (p. 166). For more information about ONUC and the
current UN peacekeeping operation in the Congo (MONUA) see Appendix A.
The failures of ONUC considerably shaped how future UN peacekeeping
operations were designed; however, several of the subsequent UN operations
in Africa have ultimately proven to be failures as well (Bellamy, Williams &
1


Griffin, 2004; Caplan, 2006; Diehl, 2005a; Doyle & Sambanis, 2006;
MacQueen, 2002).
Of the forty-five UN peacekeeping operations established since the
end of the Cold War, nearly half have been in Africa. See Appendix B for a
complete list of UN operations from 1948-2008. Excluding the UN
peacekeeping operations that are currently active in Africa today, all but two
of the UN African operations occurred within the 1990s (ONUC 1960-1964
and ONUB 2004-2006). Of these fifteen missions, twelve were deployed to
address intrastate conflicts within tribally diverse, newly independent, or failed
African States (see Appendix C for a list of these twelve missions). Due to
their representative nature, these twelve operations provide the focus for
analysis in this comparative case studywhich includes a close examination
of the nature of each mission, the context within which each deployed, and
the resulting operational successes and failures. The following questions
guided this analysis: Are attributes of African civil conflicts, and the contexts
in which they occur, amenable to current UN intervention strategies? And if
not, how can UN intervention strategies be improved to more effectively
address these conflicts and the unique context in which they occur?
Purpose for Study
Research has traditionally played a significant role in understanding
and creating effective means of conflict management. Schnabel (2005) notes:
If well understood and utilized there are opportunities for analysts to provide
and recommend solutions to suitable actors who are in a position to initiate
change (p. 29). Several scholars have examined the causes of long-term civil
conflict and others have addressed the many failures of past UN
2


peacekeeping efforts. Osaghae and Robinson (2005) note the particular
appeal of the African region for researchers:
Africa has the uncanny reputation of being the worlds leading theatre
of conflict, war, poverty, disease, and instability. Therefore it is not
surprising that scholars of ethnicity and conflict management regard it
as a major laboratory for experimentation and theory building, (p. 1)
However, even though a lot is known about the various causes of conflicts
tthemselves, they remain intractable and difficult to predict and to deal with
(Osaghae & Robinson, 2005, p. 2).
The complex multitude and changing nature of conflicts today
particularly on the African continentrequire close examination and
continued study to fully comprehend. Osaghae and Robinson (2005) note:
In fact, new and evolving forms and patterns of ethic nationalism and
conflicts that have characterized the post-Cold War period, notably the
upsurge of minority agitations, aggravated politics of difference and
contested citizenship, and the importance of issues of globalization,
resource control, environmental justice, and state reconfiguration have
thrown up new challenges to conventional wisdoms that demand
innovative and alternative prisms and perspectives, (p. 2)
The literature regarding effective, practical, and realistic ways to adjust
peacekeeping efforts to more successfully address the causes of ongoing civil
conflicts is lacking. Gallinetti (2005) cites Premadas (1991) in concluding that
the consequences of unaddressed civil conflicts are considerable:
The internal consequences often are manifested in day-to-day life
within the area that the conflict spansfor example, the loss of homes,
family members, social disintegration, and deprivation of basic human
rights. The external consequences relate to the internationalization of
the ethnic conflict where other states become involved in the conflict,
and this in turn can lead to international power struggles that threaten
world stability, (p. 110)
3


The continuing increase in the complexity of civil conflicts only amplifies the
need for such research. Porter (2005) summarizes the level of effort involved
in understanding such conflicts:
Africa is not a homogeneous continent. As we know, there are massive
political differences within each nation-state with regard to the
historical legacies of colonialism, the effects of post-colonialism, and
conflicts about national identity. Then, there are practical differences in
regions as well as states with regard to levels of economic
development, education, poverty, health, HIV/AIDS and, of course,
violence or stability. Further, even within one nation-state, there are
numerous cultural sensitivities to be aware of.... Accordingly, the
research must always be attuned culturally to the peculiarities of each
region under scrutiny, (p.158)
If the nature of civil conflict in Africa could be understood at this deeper level,
perhaps current peacekeeping methods could be improved to better meet the
needs of these conflicts, or new peacekeeping methods could be developed.
This level of understanding could potentially lead to peacekeeping efforts that
have a more long-lasting effect in regions where there tends to be an ongoing
resurgence of conflict. It is apparent that peacekeeping efforts need to focus
not only on immediate resolve of conflict, but also on continued efforts to
promote developmentpolitical, economic, and socialto achieve any sense
of lasting peace. Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan concludes that:
Development is a human right, and the principal long-term objective of all
countries in Africa. Development is also central to the prospects for reducing
conflict in Africa (1998, p.34).
In summary, a total of ninety-four percent of all armed conflicts fought
in the 1990s were civil wars, with the prevalence of internal conflicts perhaps
most apparent in Africa (Paris, 2004, p.1). By the end of the 1990s, practically
all African states were engaged in some form of internal conflict or another
(Osaghae, 1999, as cited in Porter, 2005). Furthermore, there are eight active
4


UN peacekeeping operations in Africa currently deployed (See Appendix D
for a list of these operations). If a significant relationship between particular
attributes and success can be identified in past missions the implications on
the ability to achieve sustainable peace with current and future peacekeeping
missions could be considerable. The ultimate goal of examining these
relationships in this research project is to positively impact the possibility of
sustainable peace achieved through UN peacekeeping missions in Africa,
and possibly in states enduring civil conflict around the world.
Definitions of Terms
The following definitions apply to important terms referenced in this study:
State Sovereignty: ...the principle of territorial integrity of states that are
legally equal and sovereign participants in the international system and may
not be subject to the law or command of another (Karns & Mingst, 2004,
P-64)
Interstate Conflict: a conflict between two or more independent states
Intrastate Conflict: a conflict between two or more parties within one state
Conflict Prevention: any structural or diplomatic measures to keep intrastate
or interstate tensions and disputes from escalating into violent conflict
(UNDPKO, 2008, p. 94)
Unilateral Intervention: an outside intervention in a conflict or war, which is
organized and carried out by one primary organization
Multilateral Intervention: an outside intervention in a conflict or war, which is
organized and carried out by two or more organizations
Humanitarian Assistance: material or logistical assistance provided for
humanitarian purposes, typically in response to humanitarian crises. The
primary objective of humanitarian assistance is to save lives, alleviate
suffering and maintain human dignity" (UNDPKO, 2008, p. 95)
5


Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs): persons or groups of persons who have
been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual
residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed
conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or
natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an
internationally recognized state border (www.icrc.org)
Refugee: people who are outside their countries because of a well-founded
fear of persecution based on their race, religion, nationality, political opinion
or membership in a particular social group, and who cannot or do not want to
return home (UNHCR definition)
Peace Operations: field operations deployed to prevent, manage, and/or
resolve violent conflicts or reduce the risk of recurrence (UNDPKO, 2008,
p. 98)
United Nations-Led Peace Operation: a peace operation authorized by the
United Nations Security Council and conducted under the direction of the
United Nations Secretary-General (UNDPKO, 2008, p. 99)
Peacemaking: generally includes measures to address conflict in progress
and usually involves diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated
agreement. The United Nations Secretary-General, upon the request of the
Security Council or the General Assembly or at his her own initiative, may
exercise his or her good offices to facilitate the resolution of the conflict.
Peacemakers may also be envoys, governments, groups of states, regional
organizations or the United Nations. Peacemaking efforts may also be
undertaken by unofficial and non-governmental groups, or by a prominent
personality working independently (UNDPKO, 2008, p.17)
Ceasefire: a temporary stoppage of war, which may also be undertaken as
part of a larger negotiated settlement (UNDPKO, 2008, p. 94)
6


Peace Agreement: a formal treaty intended to end or significantly transform
violent conflict (UNDPKO, 2008, p. 97)
Peacekeeping: is a technique designed to preserve the peace, however
fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing
agreements achieved by the peacemakers. Over the years, peacekeeping
has evolved from a primarily military model of observing ceasefires and the
separation of forces after inter-state wars, to incorporate a complex model of
many elements-military, police and civilian-working together to help lay the
foundations for sustainable peace (UNDPKO, 2008, p.18)
Peace Enforcement: involves the application, with the authorization of the
Security Council, of a range of coercive measures, including the use of
military force. Such actions are authorized to restore international peace and
security in situations where the Security Council has determined the
existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.
The Security Council may utilize, where appropriate, regional organizations
and agencies for enforcement action under its authority (UNDPKO, 2008,
P-18)
Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: involves a range of measures targeted to
reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national
capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for
sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding is a complex, long-term
process of creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace. It works
by addressing the deep-rooted, structural causes of violent conflict in a
comprehensive manner. Peacebuilding measures address core issues that
effect the functioning of society and the State, and seek to enhance the
capacity of the State to effectively and legitimately carry out its core functions
(UNDPKO, 2008, p. 18)
7


Sustainable Development: economic growth that helps cultivate positive
human development in areas such as health and education, leads to
improvement of basic infrastructures, and helps foster long-term stability in a
society. The UN has also defined sustainable development as:
Development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs
(http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/)
Sustainable Peace: long-lasting peace, usually fostered through the swift and
successful implementation of a peace agreement and successful progress in
sustainable development
8


CHAPTER 2 REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Both conflict and peacekeeping are two issues that have evolved
considerably throughout history. Therefore, a clear understanding of the
historical context for these issues is important in clarifying perceptions of
these issues today. The current body of literature focusing on peacekeeping
efforts is vast and varied. In order to completely understand the complexities
involved in peacekeeping, one must develop a fundamental understanding of
the historical progression of peacekeeping efforts. The first section of this
chapter will provide a basic background of the United Nations as the primary
international peacekeeping organization, as well as an overview of the
structure of peacekeeping decisions within the United Nations. The section
also addresses and reviews the literature regarding development and
evolution of peacekeeping throughout the years.
While the literature on peacekeeping is abundant, the literature
regarding the causes of conflict is perhaps even more diverse. Daniel and
Hayes (2003) remind us of the importance of considering the cultural and
historical context when analyzing particular conflict situations:
In addition, what worked in a previous case may not apply in another
even if it is similar in many respects....In particular, practitioners have
recorded that understanding the local political dynamic was imperative
in order to avoid unnecessary pitfalls and maximize both popular and
factional support, (p. 210)
In attempt to understand the context of the individual conflicts addressed in
this research project, one must first have a general understanding of the
broader trends of conflict and the significant changes that have occurred in
the political landscape within the last several decades. The second section of
9


this chapter provides a review of the literature regarding general changes that
have occurred with conflict and political landscape. The third section provides
an overview of the literature more specifically addressing the nature and
causes of civil conflict in Africa, as well as an overview of how the definition of
peacekeeping has changed respectively over the years.
Finally, an effective analysis of peacekeeping operations must also be
grounded in clear understanding of the peacekeeping process, as well as
knowledge of peacekeeping operation attributes that have traditionally proven
significant. The final section of this chapter reviews the literature that focuses
on specific attributes of peacekeeping operations, ultimately providing the
variables and framework for the analysis for this case study.
Historical Context of the UN and Peacekeeping
The UNMaintaining Peace and Security
The United Nations has served as the primary universal organization
for international peacekeeping since its inception at the end of World War II:
Indeed, after the end of World War II, the UN was created on the recognition
that national interests and sovereignty of nations were paramount, and the
victors were made guardians of international peace and security (Bariagaber,
2008, p. 837). However, the role the UN has played in international relations
has shifted and changed a great deal in the last several decades. Tardy
(2007) concludes, The ability of the UN to implement the mandate defined in
the Charter has varied throughout time and has been largely dependent on
the international context (p. 50). Furthermore, the UN has faced significant
challenges in its efforts to serve as an adaptive organizationmaking the
necessary changes to more effectively adjust to the changing international
environment. Ahmed, Keating and Solinas (2007) note:
10


Collectively, the UN system has a rich body of experience upon which
to draw in trying to develop a more sophisticated understanding of the
causes of conflict and the remedies to prevent its resumption. The
record of the past five years clearly indicates that the UN has been
learning from its mistakes and is, at the very least, in a position to
determine what does not work. (p. 27)
The following sections detail the role of the United Nations in peacekeeping
and provide a history of the development and progression of changes in
peacekeeping methods throughout the last several decades.
Collective Security in a State System:
The Creation of the UN
The modern state system of today is thought to have originated from
the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which effectively ended the
Thirty Years War (Karns & Mingst, 2004, p. 64). Ever since, the nation-state
has been seen as an independent and sovereign entity, virtually possessing a
monopoly over coercive force within its borders. Karns and Mingst (2004)
note:
The treaty marked the end of rule by religious authority in Europe and
the emergence of secular states. With secular authority came the
principle of the territorial integrity of states that were legally equal and
sovereign participants in the international system. Sovereignty was the
core concept in this state system, (p. 64)
However, as the nature of the political landscape changed over the next few
centuries, and states became increasingly more interdependent, a need
arose for increased avenues for interstate communication and cooperation:
In the nineteenth century, commerce and trade among European
countries and between European states and their colonies expanded.
State-to-state interactions became more frequent and intense. Ideas
for a more international approach to governance were proposed.
(Karns & Mingst, 2004, p. 65)
11


World War I (1914-1918) further established this need for an
intergovernmental organization that would not only assist in areas such as
trade and commerce, but with peace and security issues as welland thus
the idea of collective security was introduced.
The creation of the League of Nations in1919, embodied this new idea
of collective security, with the main objective of preventing future war through
significantly limiting opportunities for individual state aggression. The hope
was that this collective unitywhich would serve as the basis of a new world
orderwould not only help prevent individual aggression, but would also
discourage aggression through bilateral alliances, as had occurred with World
War I (Abbot & Snidal, 2005, p. 36). Miller (2005) concludes:
The all-for-one-and-one-for-all idea of collective security is dazzling in
its simplicity. It asserts that the peace of the international community
can be maintained through a binding, predetermined agreement to
take collective action to preserve it. It says that any illegal threat or use
of force by any sovereign member of the international community
against any otherthat is, aggression, potential or realshould trigger
the combined force of all the rest. (p. 197)
Primarily due to a design flaw and lack of enforcement capacities, the League
of Nations was unable to prevent the occurrence of World War IIultimately
proving a failure in achieving its primary objective (McQueen, 1999). Clinging
to the notion of a multilateral international security, ideas for a new peacetime
organization were discussed during the years of World War II. The Atlantic
Charter of 1941, a joint US and British declaration, served as the foundation
for the Declaration of the United Nations in 1942 (Karns & Mingst, 2004,
p. 98) and the new organization was modeled after the same basic principles
of the League of Nations. The United States (not a member of the former
League of Nations) was the first to ratify the UN Charter in 1945and the
12


organization has served as the central piece of global governance ever
since (Karns & Mingst, 2004, p. 97).
The UN CharterThe Emergence of Peacekeeping
Upon its creation in 1945, the United Nations Security Council, under
Article 24 of the UN Charter, was charged with the primary responsibility of
maintaining international peace and security (Karns & Mingst, 2004, p.110).
The nature of this responsibility has transformed over the years to fit the
needs of the evolving international environment and the changing nature of
conflict as well. Major changes in UN action occurred with the onset of the
Cold War, and the resulting complications the UN Security Council
experienced from two of its mutually hostile permanent membersRussia
and the United States. MacQueen (2002) notes, It was clear by the early
1950s that if the UN was to have any meaningful security role in the Cold War
it would have to be in a form other than conventional collective security (p.
5). The UNs role, therefore, included involvement in local conflicts as a way
to protect international securitywith peacekeeping missions serving as one
primary method of preserving peace and security: Peacekeeping, although
not explicitly provided for in the Charter, has evolved into one of the main
tools used by the United Nations to achieve this purpose (UNDPKO, 2008, p.
13). MacQueen (2002) notes:
In such a situation the UN could provide a convenient neutral force in
containing local conflicts and reducing their capacity to destabilize the
already hostile relations between east and west. Multilateral
intervention by the UN thus came to be accepted by the superpowers
as preferable in some situations to unilateral interference by politically
or historically interested parties, (p. 5)
13


This type of UN involvement is often termed traditional peacekeeping, where
the role of the UN is to help manage a conflict and create conditions in which
the negotiation of a lasting settlement can proceed (UNDPKO, 2008, p. 21).
The first examples of UN military observer missions were in Palestine
in 1948 and in Kashmir in 1949. These missions were initiated to supervise
the peace agreements between Israel and the Arabs in Palestine, and
between India and Pakistan in Kashmir. MacQueen (2002) notes, While
peacekeeping forces as such, these operations were based on methods of
observation and interposition that were to become characteristic of the
peacekeeping model that later emerged (p. 5). The first official UN
peacekeeping operation was developed a few years later to separate warring
parties following the Anglo-French invasion of Egyptcommonly referred to
as the Suez Conflict, the problems seemed to be rooted in post-colonial
adjustment (MacQueen, 2002, p. 5). This successful 1956 mission was
called the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) operationand was later examined
by then-UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjdld to produce a Summary
Study in 1958, which ultimately provided a framework for all future
peacekeeping operations.
Throughout the next two decades following the reports release,
several African states gained freedom and autonomy from their colonial
powers, and as a result, attempted to establish independent governments. As
noted previously, this post-colonial adjustment often led to increased issues
of intrastate conflict in Africa (Karns & Mingst, 2004, p. 100). Several of the
intrastate conflicts within Africa States often lead to a destabilization of
surrounding regions, mainly through the fluctuating refugee populations.
Berman and Sams (2000) note:
The inability of States to put their own houses in order is not simply an
internal matter. The proliferation of rebel movements, small arms, and
14


refugees all adversely affect a States ability to govern, and they
threaten regional security. Intra-State conflicts are spilling over national
boarders with greater frequency and assuming regional dimensions.
(p. 19)
The UNs goal in intervening in these conflicts was to help stabilize and
contain the conflict before it spread to the larger international community
(Bellamy, Williams & Griffin, 2004; Berman & Sams, 2000; Doyle &
Sambanis, 2006; Karns and Mingst, 2004).
Reform and Developments in UN Peacekeeping
From the point of which the United Nations first became involved in
peacekeeping, there have been continual developments and multiple reforms.
As noted earlier, one of the first of these developments was the Summary
Study produced in 1958 by the then UN Secretary General Dag
Hammarskjdldmeant to provide a framework for future peacekeeping
operations. Following the disastrous ONUC operation in the Congo, the
Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations was established by the
General Assembly in 1965with the mandate to conduct a comprehensive
review of all issues relating to peacekeeping (Dag Hammarskjdld Library
(DHL), 2008, General Assembly Documentation: Special Committee on
Peacekeeping Operations ^|1). Following the establishment of this committee,
further significant changes to peacekeeping were not made until after the end
of the Cold War.
Towards the end of the 1980swhen the emphasis and focus on the
war between the bipolar superpowers had lessenedthere was a resurgence
of interest in peacekeeping from the international community. In 1992, then
UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali proposed An Agenda for Peace. This
report initiated several optimistic changes in peacekeeping that included an
15


increase in both number and complexity of peacekeeping operations (Ahmed,
Keating & Solinas, 2007). The United Nations Association of the United
Kingdom (2002) concludes:
Originally, An Agenda for Peace was conceived and written in the
aftermath of the end of the Cold War when the international community
was optimistic that the resulting era of international cooperation would
facilitate its peace activities through the UN. Such optimism was
initially supported by the sudden and vast expansion in the number,
size and scope of UN peace operations. (Definitions, 1f3)
Closely following the release of this important report, An Agenda for
Development was releasedidentifying peace as an essential component
to successful and sustainable development. Ahmed, Keating & Solinas (2007)
note:
At the same time, while making the case for a more conflict-sensitive
approach to development in war-affected countries, An Agenda for
Development also emphasized the need for peacebuilding efforts to
address the underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian
causes of conflict (Secretary-General of the UN 1994, 6). (p.14)
That same year (1992), the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping
Operations (DPKO) was also formeda development that occurred primarily
in response to the increased demand for complex peacekeeping operations.
The United Nations Department of Public Information (UNDPI) (2006) states:
Freed from bipolarization, the Security Council established larger and
more complex UN peacekeeping missions, often to help implement
comprehensive peace agreements between protagonists in intra-State
conflicts. Furthermore, peacekeeping came to involve more and more
non-military elements to ensure sustainability, (p. 5)
The DPKOs responsibilities included taking on the tasks of: determining the
exact force requirements, for seeking necessary contingents and logistical
support, and for appointing a UN force commander from the top officer corps
of a member country (Karrns & Mingst, 2004, p. 309). The DPKO also serves
16


an advisory role to the UN Security Council in assisting them with making
informed decisions regarding peacekeeping, and also assists with the details
involved in the implementation of those decisions.
In addition to the DPKO, the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) was
established in 1992 as well, which, ...primarily through its regional divisions,
is the main support structure for UN preventative diplomacy and currently
provides advice and support to numerous envoys with assignments around
the world... (UNDPI, 2008, p. 5). Just a few of the DPAs responsibilities
include:
...monitoring and assessing global political developments; advising the
U.N. Secretary-General on actions that could advance the cause of
peace; providing support and guidance to U.N. peace envoys and
political missions in the field; and serving Member States directly
through electoral assistance and through the support of DPA staff to
the work of the Security Council and other U.N. bodies. (United
Nations Department of Public Information, 2005a)
At this time, the international community displayed a great enthusiasm for
peacekeeping, which was quite evident in the developments made by its
primary international governing body.
In cases of early UN peacekeeping efforts with intrastate conflicts,
however, simple mediating peacekeeping often developed into the need for
peace enforcement, and efforts to observe state sovereignty proved far more
problematical than in the past (Bellamy, Williams & Griffin, 2004; Doyle &
Sambanis, 2006; Karns & Mingst, 2001; MacQueen, 2002; Schnabel &
Thakur, 2001; Vilmer, 2007; Tardy, 2007). MacQueen (2002) notes, The
blurring of the border between mere interposition and enforcement became
an ever-present problem for peacekeeping operations from the Congo
onwards (p. 11). The international community fell short in its efforts when
member states failed to act on the increasing violence in areas such as
17


Rwanda and Somalia. To make matters even more difficult, the UN remained
crippled by its dependence on contributions from Member States, and was
not well-equipped to provide peace enforcement due to its lack of an
independent standing-army. It appeared that, ...in a number of situations
Member States were not ready to enforce their own decisions (UNDPI, 2006,
p.5). The United Nations Association of the United Kingdom (2002) notes:
The clearest example of this disengagement was the failure of Member
States to offer troops in response to the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, in
which around 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu were killed in a matter of
months (Definitions, 1f8). Ahmed, Keating and Solinas (2007) find that these
failed missions cases where the operation deployed on the basis of an actual
peace to keep, but was woefully ill-equipped and ill-prepared to respond when
the peace collapsed and genocide ensued (p.15). In conclusion, ill-equipped
missions can prove detrimental if promises for protection cannot be supported
by real force (Udombana, 2007, p. 104).
The above-noted failures led the Security Council to develop the
Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations
during the 1994 genocide in Rwandaand issued in a period of great self-
examination by the UN in regards to peacekeeping. In 1995, the Supplement
to the Agenda for Peace was issueda document that demonstrated a
retreat from the enthusiasm expressed in the original report, released in 1992.
This report ultimately criticized the blurring of the distinction between
peacekeeping and peace enforcement and rejected the assumptions that one
could successfully transition to the other (Ahmed, Keating & Solinas, 2007, p.
15). The United Nations Association of the United Kingdom (2002) observes
an overall shift in peacekeeping mentality with this single report:
Doctrine on the role of peacekeeping duly shifted in line with states'
reservations and the later, 1995 edition of Broutros-Ghali's paper,
18


Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, duly redefined peacekeeping,
now highlighting the importance of the consent of the parties to the
presence and mandate of a mission as a prerequisite for its success -
effectively a return to the more restricted, Cold War definition.
(Definitions, 1f8)
At the same time, the DPKO also issued a set of General Guidelines for
United Nations Peacekeeping Operationswhich more clearly defined the
new outlined principles of peacekeeping (Ahmed, Keating & Solinas, 2007, p.
This period of reservation was somewhat short lived, as the Security
Council convened later in 1997 to consider the need for a concerted
international effort to promote peace and security in Africa (Annan, 1998,
p.1). UN Secretary-General at the time, Kofi Annan, notes: The Council
observed that despite the progress achieved by some African States the
number and intensity of armed conflicts on the continent remained a matter of
grave concern, requiring a comprehensive response (1998, p.1). A complete
list of Special Reports from the Secretary-General to the United Nations
Security Council can be viewed at www.un.org/documents/repsc.htm. In
March of 2000, Annan assembled a panel of experts to examine UN peace
operations and identify where and when UN peacekeeping could be most
effective and how it could be improved (UNDPI, 2006, p. 6). This Report
(A/55/305-S/2000/809) later became known as the Brahimi Report. Ahmed,
Keating & Solinas (2007) find, similar to the Independent Inquiry into the
actions of the UN during the Rwandan genocide, this report also
demonstrated that:
...to truly understand what happened and where the failures lay, each
part of the UN System, the Member States, the UN Secretariat, the
men and women in field operations and the countries in question
themselves all had a share of responsibility in the success or failure of
UN peacekeeping operations, (p. 16)
19


The UNDPI (2006) summarizes the Reports findings:
It offered clear advice about minimum requirements for a successful
UN peacekeeping mission. These included a clear and specific
mandate, consent to the operation by the parties in conflict and
adequate resources, both to implement the mandate effectively and
deter potential spoilers, (p. 6)
Today, the Brahimi Report continues to guide the development of UN
peacekeeping operations.
Developments in peacekeeping have continued throughout the
beginning of the twenty first century. In 2005, the United Nations
Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) was established as an additional
intergovernmental advisory body to the UNwhose focus lies specifically on
the task of post-conflict peacebuilding. Current UN Secretary General Ban Ki-
moon states: "By establishing the Commission, Member States of the United
Nations have created an important new structure to support fragile societies
recovering from the devastation of war (UNDPI, 2008b, 1T1). The Department
of Field Support (DFS) was also later developed, in 2007, to assist the
Security Council and the DPKO in the actual field-implementation of
operations. The UNDPI (2008b) explains:
In order to meet burgeoning demands, in 2007 Secretary-General Ban
Ki-moon recommended a realignment of the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations, separating the support side by creating the
Department of Field Support (DFS). This restructuring, approved in
mid-2007 by the General Assembly, marked a pivotal step towards
enabling the United Nations as a whole to meet the increasing
challenges of new peace operations with unparalleled and
unprecedented scope, complexity, and size. (p. 6)
The year 2008 has also brought a proposed overhaul of the DPA, in attempt
to strengthen and reorganize the DPA for a more proactive UN diplomacy in
20


preventing and resolving conflicts (UNDPKI, 2005b, 24 January 2008
Restructuring proposals, peacemaking efforts, highlighted in DPA newsletter).
In addition, the UN Secretariats capacity for intelligence gathering has been
addressed in an effort to improve early warning systems about situations that
might pose a threat to international peace and security. Karns and Mingst
(2004) note, Preventing conflicts is rarely easy, but studies show the
opportunities missed in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo, and Zaire (p.
291). The UN International Court of Justice (ICJ) has also been utilized for
adjudication by providing a pre-existing, internationally recognized third party
to hear-out disputes.
In regards to the developments of actual UN peacekeeping operations,
the UN Security Council continues to hold most of the power in the decision
making process. The Dag Hammarskjold Library (DHL) Research Guide on
Peacekeeping (2008) summarizes:
Through resolutions, the Security Council establishes peacekeeping
operations, determines their mandates (including all required revisions
and extensions thereto) and authorizes the deployment of troops, as
well as any increase or reduction in troop strength as the situation
demands. (Security Council Documentation: Resolutions fl1)
The Security Council must approve any regional efforts of peacekeeping that
involve the use of force, and, in addition, they monitor many methods of
enforcement including the abuse of imposed sanctions (Karns & Mingst,
2004, p. 302). In conclusion, many of the actions in regards to peacekeeping,
and effectiveness of the above addressed committees, institutions, and
departments, are still ultimately limited and controlled by the decisions and
actions of the Security Council.
21


Changing Nature of Conflicts
and a Changing Political Landscape
As prefaced in the preceding section, the nature of conflicts and the
overall international political landscape have changed considerably over the
last several decades. These changes are comprised of several dynamic and
significant shifts, including: from interstate conflicts to intrastate conflicts, from
protection of state sovereignty to the call for humanitarian intervention, and
from unilateral military intervention to multidimensional intervention. All of
these changes have ultimately led to a transformation in how peacekeeping
operations are organized and implemented today.
From Interstate Conflict to Intrastate Conflict
Perhaps one of the most significant changes in the international
political landscape has been the shift in the nature of conflict over the years
(Ahmed, Keating & Solinas; 2007; Annan, 1998; Bellamy, Williams & Griffin,
2004; Berman & Sams, 2000; Collier & Hoeffler, 2002; Diehl, 2005b; Doyle &
Sambinas, 2006; Karns & Minst, 2001 & 2004). Historically, the world
commonly experienced conflicts between the major world powers, wars
between states, or interstate wars. However, political, social, and economic
complexities of contemporary society have brought new challenges to the
international communityand as a result, the nature of conflict itself seemed
to change. Young (2006) notes some examples of these new challenges:
These include the costs and consequences of prolonged state decay,
the possibilities and limits of democratization, novel patterns of internal
wars, the reformulation of ethnicity in the crucible of violence, and the
capabilities and constraints of international intervention in the face of
genocide and protracted civil conflict, (p. 302)
Today, most of the conflicts worldwide are intrastate conflicts, or civil conflicts
between two or more groups within one state or region; furthermore, this type
22


of warfare is particularly common on the African continent. Annan notes,
Since 1970, more than 30 wars have been fought in Africa, the vast majority
of them intra-State in origin (1998, p. 2). The affects of intrastate conflicts
have proven detrimental to the functioning of the society within which they
occur. Oftentimes any preexisting internal infrastructure is destroyed, law and
authority remain unrecognized, and people become displaced from their
homes. Annan (1998) comments on the effects of intrastate conflicts as they
apply to the African continent:
In 1996 alone, 14 of the 53 countries of Africa were afflicted by armed
conflicts, accounting for more than half of all war-related deaths
worldwide and resulting in more than 8 million refugees, returnees and
displaced persons. The consequences of those conflicts have seriously
undermined Africas efforts to ensure longterm stability, prosperity and
peace for its peoples, (p. 2)
Furthermore, intrastate warfare is very different in its description than the
traditional army-versus-army warfare seen in interstate warsboth involve a
battle for political power and control; however, intrastate conflicts involve non-
traditional methods of acquiring that power. Scholars have found the non-
traditional nature of intrastate conflict far more challenging for those seeking
peace; as Paris (2004) notes, Avoiding the problems that marred many
peacebuilding operations in the 1990s will require longer-lasting and
ultimately more intrusive forms of intervention in the domestic affairs of these
states... (p. ix). Porter (2005) further supports this point by highlighting the
complex nature of the underlying causes and consequences of intrastate
conflicts:
There clearly are a host of pressing socio-economic issues that often
are the prime triggers to violent conflict, particularly relating to
economic inequality, poverty, illiteracy, womens subordination, the
exploitation of communities by global multinational companies, and the
Global Norths culpability in providing easy access to small arms.
Then, there are terrible human pains that emerge as a direct
23


consequence of violent ethnic conflict in Africa such as deaths, the
guilt at being alive, war-rape, contracting HIV and then AIDS, children
fathered by rival ethnic groups, the rise in children-headed households,
refugees, displaced persons, memory flashbacks, emotional trauma,
disruption to communities, and an incredible sense of haunting loss.
(P-163)
Peacekeeping methods that attempt to address these types of intrastate
conflicts are also faced with addressing the resulting complexities created by
the conflicts.
From State Sovereignty to Humanitarian Intervention
As noted previously, one of the UNs key founding principles lies with
the duty of helping to protect the sovereignty of emerging states. MacQueen
(2002) comments, If the UN Charter had nothing to say about the specifics of
peacekeeping, it was certainly not silent on the principle of non-intervention,
which was central to the very being of the United Nations (p. 9). UN
involvement in intrastate conflicts, therefore, has proved problematic due to
the specific limitations stipulated by the UN Charter (Karns & Mingst, 2001;
Schnabel & Thakur 2001). Frequently, the UN has continued to rely on the
idea of preauthorized consent by the host-state before initiating a
peacekeeping operation. However, as the nature of warfare has changed,
scholars have noted a significant shift away from the traditional protection of
state sovereignty, to an acknowledged importance of humanitarian protection
of individuals (Diehl, 2005a and 2005b; Karns & Mingst, 2004, Tardy, 2007;
Vilmer, 2007). Vilmer (2007) defines humanitarian intervention as:
...the use of force by a State of a group of States conducting military
intervention in a foreign territory with the aim of preventing or stopping
grave and widespread violations of the most fundamental human rights
on individuals who are not citizens of the intervening State and without
consent of the target State, (p. 207)
24


Historically, the state has been given the ultimate responsibility of providing
protection for its citizens. However, the process of decolonization created
several new fragile States in regions such as Africa, which have often failed to
provide this protection; in some cases the state has failed in its entirety. Ginty
and Robinson (2001) note, ...many states have become weaker. This
operates in the absolute sense, with a number of African and post-Soviet
states suffering from a declining capacity for governance, whether through
conflict, economic impoverishment, corruption, or incompetence (p. 29).
Further supporting this point, Tardy (2007) quotes a statement issued by The
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, that formed
following the failure of the Security Council to act in Kosovo in 2001, In
stating that sovereign states have the responsibility to protect their own
citizens and that if they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility
must be borne by the broader community of states (p. 62). Today, the United
Nations represents this larger community, therefore taking the role of
humanitarian intervener often through the forum of peacekeeping operations.
Because the emphasis on humanitarian intervention is still relatively
new and somewhat contested, several questions have arisen in determining
when and how to intervene. The failure of the UN to prevent genocide in
Rwanda in 1994 proved eye-opening for the international community in this
area. Recommendations were made by an Independent Inquiry in 1999 to:
ensure that the United Nations and the international community could and
would act to prevent or halt any other such catastrophe in the future (UNDPI
with the UNDPKO, 2001 i, Background Summary ^20). However, the reality of
this task has proved more difficult than originally thought. Annan (1998) notes
increased intensity of civil conflict in Africa:
Where there is insufficient accountability of leaders, lack of
transparency in regimes, inadequate checks and balances, non-
25


adherence to the rule of law, absence of peaceful means to change or
replace leadership, or lack of respect for human rights, political control
becomes excessively important, and the stakes become dangerously
high. (p. 5)
Already the international community has evidence of a human catastrophe
similar to that in Rwanda in the case of Darfur, Sudan. The UNDPI (2008)
reports:
This [continued violence] had a direct and negative effect on the
humanitarian situation in Darfur, which continued to be extremely
fragile during the year [2007], characterized by ongoing armed
clashes, continuous displacement, increased violence inside the IDP
[internally displaced persons] camps, and seriously constrained
humanitarian access to a growing number of conflict affected people.
At the same time, violence against humanitarian workers perpetrated
by all parties continues unabated, leading to considerable constraint on
humanitarian access, and more importantly to a significant reduction in
the quality of humanitarian operations that needed supervision and
follow-up. (p. 9)
Although there is a clear acceptance and recognized need for humanitarian
intervention in such conflicts, the reality of providing adequate management
solutions to humanitarian crisis situations still remains relatively unfulfilled
today.
From Military Intervention to
Multidimensional Intervention
As the nature of conflicts has grown in complexity over the years, the
nature of peacekeeping operations has also shifted towards taking a more
multidimensional approach to addressing conflict (Bellamy, Williams, & Griffin,
2004; Berman & Sams, 2000; Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; MacQueen, 1999;
UNDPKO, 2008; Wilson, 2005). This change in approach is particularly
necessary when it comes to addressing conflicts in Africa. Karns and Mingst
(2001) find that, In the first decade of the post-Cold War era, the United
26


Nations has been confronted with a significant change in the types of conflicts
that demand the organizations attention (p. 217). Berman and Sams (2000)
further note, The challenges to African peace and security defy easy
solutions. Many conflicts are multifaceted and deeply entrenched. They
require sustained diplomatic and military engagement to move towards
resolving them (p.21). In the past, UN involvement in peacekeeping
consisted mainly of unilateral military supportto serve as observers to
ceasefires and peace agreement processes. However, as peacekeeping
efforts have evolved to peace enforcement, and in some cases
peacebuilding, the methods of peacekeeping have had to evolve as well. The
UNDPKO (2008) notes: Multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping
operations are deployed as one part of a much broader international effort to
help countries emerging from conflict make the transition to a sustainable
peace (p. 22). See Appendix D for the complete UNDPKO definition of Multi-
dimensional peacekeeping tasks. Wilson (2005) concludes of the broadened
scope and extreme diversity of multi-dimensional intervention methods:
...they seek to address the multidimensional aspects of peace-
brokering, peace-enforcement, peace-maintenance, and peace-
building. These expanded strategies of peace attempt to integrate
everything from macro-economic restructuring to grassroots human-
rights awareness. Recently, we have seen them include military
presence, humanitarian assistance, human-rights advocacy, elections,
macro-economic restructuring, political institution-building, constructive
engagement, and the like, (p.127)
While this type of peacekeeping has successfully contributed to sustainable
peace efforts, it has also proven more difficult to effectively implement.
African Civil Conflicts and UN Peacekeeping
It is argued that peacekeeping efforts will not be effective without first
establishing a clear understanding of the conflict at hand (Adetouan, 2005;
27


Collier & Hoeffler, 2002; Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Osaghae & Robinson,
2005; Paris, 2004; Schnabel, 2005). Adetouan (2005) notes, First, it is
necessary to offer an explanation of the issues involved in the conflict and
violence. It is only on the basis of an adequate explanation of a problem that
we can evolve constructive approaches to solving it" (p. 50). This section
attempts to provide a clearer picture of the nature of civil conflict and the
prevalence of civil conflict in African societies, in relation to the specific
challenges civil conflicts pose for peacekeeping efforts.
Prevalence of Civil Conflict in Africa
One challenge in achieving sustainable peace in African conflicts
involves the nature of the conflicts themselves. As noted previously, most
conflicts today are intrastate conflicts, or civil wars. Collier et al. (2003) note,
In 2001 all but one of the worlds wars were civil wars (p. 93), with the
following definition of civil war: ...when an identifiable rebel organization
challenges the government militarily and the resulting violence results in more
than 1,000 combat-related deaths, with at least 5 percent on each side
(Collier et al., 2003, p.54). As noted previously, due to the frequent complex
nature of internal conflicts, the research has found intrastate conflicts more
difficult for peacekeeping operations to successfully address than interstate
conflicts; furthermore, it is apparent that many conflicts today can be
characterized as having both intrastate and interstate qualities, making them
even more challenging to resolve (Ahmed, Keating & Solinas; 2007; Annan,
1998; Bellamy, Williams & Griffin, 2004; Berman & Sams, 2000; Coleman &
Grene, 2003; Collier et al., 2003; Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Karns & Minst,
2001 & 2004). Coleman & Grene (2003) conclude:
We are rarely faced with purely interstate violence anymore. But
neither are we dealing with internal conflicts. Rather, conflicts today
28


are a confounding mix: their core is essentially internal, but they are
complicated by the cross-border involvement of state or non-state
actors. And their consequences can quickly become international,
because of destabilizing refugee flows as well as factions pursuing
each other regardless of where the border lies. (p. 223)
This confounding mix of internal and cross-border conflict permeates the
African continent. The unpredictability of these conflicts, along with frequent
use of unconventional methods of fightingsuch as guerilla warfare and
insurgencyprove challenging for peacekeepers to address.
The greater part of the literature on intrastate conflict addresses the
conditions contributing to the long-lasting nature of civil conflict, and the
recurrence of civil conflicts in particular areasas is the case with the high
prevalence of ongoing conflict in Africa. Collier et al. (2003) note:
The Middle East and North Africa region has had a stable and high
incidence of civil war since the late 1960s. Perhaps the most disturbing
trend has been the rise in the incidence of violent conflict in Sub-
Saharan Africa.... It is the only region that did not see a decrease in
incidence over the 1990s. (p. 113)
It is evident from the research in this area, that the conflicts themselves often
compound to create further conflict (Collier et al., 2003; Collier & Hoeffler,
2002; Derouen & Barutciski, 2007; Doyle & Sambanis, 2006). Derouen and
Barutciski (2007) note, Structural factors such as resource dependence and
ethnicity that are nearly immutable also impact dynamics, duration and
recurrence [of civil war] (p. 220). Collier et al. (2003) further find, Conflicts
are hard to stop, and what happens during conflict increases both the risk and
duration of subsequent conflict. Countries that have had a war have a two to
four times higher risk of a subsequent war... (Collier et al., 2003, p. 104).
This elevated rate or reoccurrence, by far, characterizes a vast majority of
civil conflicts within several African States. As a result, peacekeeping efforts
must appropriately address the root causes of conflict, in order to successfully
29


achieve a lasting peace (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002; Doyle & Sambanis, 2006;
and Paris, 2004).
Nature of Civil Conflict
Again, the discourse regarding explanations for the causes of conflicts
is wide and varied. In attempt to further understand the prevalence of conflict
in Africa, the following sections summarize the literature regarding three
primary components that frequently cause civil conflict: ethnic divisions,
territory and resource disputes, and fractured or failed governments. It is
important to note that these three components are often not mutually
exclusive, but rather often contribute to a conflict coincidently.
Ethnic Divisions
The literature reflects the fact that many civil conflicts involve ethnic
disputes between two or more ethnic or tribal groups living in one area
(Annan, 1998; Derouen & Barutciski, 2007; Doyle & Sambanis, 2006;
Gallinetti, 2005; Horowitz, 1985; Reynal-Querol, 2002; Sebahara, 1998).
Gallinetti (2005) notes, The twentieth century has seen a proliferation of
ethnic conflicts on various continents... (p.110). However, many of these
conflicts may not begin with the issue of ethnicity, but rather may become
ethnicized or adopt features that suggest that the conflict revolves around
ethnicity or identity (Ginty & Robinson, 2001, p. 27). Sebahara (1998)
remarks of how these types of conflicts have often intensified the level of
devastation and death, Ethnic conflicts continue to ravage Central Africa,
taking an ever greater toll of human life (p. 93). As a result, understanding
the nature of the civil conflicts also requires an understanding of the nature of
ethnicity and the ethnic division that exists in those societies. Doyle and
Sambanis (2006) note, A variable at the core of both economic and political
30


theories of civil war is the salience of ethnic identity and the degree of ethnic
fractionalization in the society (p. 36). Horowitz (1985) provides one of the
simpler, yet more inclusive definitions of ethnicity, which he finds includes
differences identified by a shared skin-color, language, religion, or some
other attribute of common origin (p. 41). The African continent alone
encompasses literally thousands of different ethnic groups (African Culture
Center USA, n.d.). As an example, Kimenyi & Ndungu (2005) cite the impact
of ethnic divisions in Kenya, The most commonly cited cause of the violence
in Kenya is ethnic cleavage. The country is ethnically diverse, with at least 42
distinct tribal groups and it has been established that ethnic identification in
Africa is very strong (p. 126). As a result of the historical nature of an ethnic
group (in that they often have some shared history), the origins of many
ethnic rivalries frequently date back centuries.
Prior to colonization much of the African population led a nomadic or
tribal existence. During the nineteenth century, however, the European
colonial powers partitioned the continent into relatively arbitrary territorial
units (Berman & Sams, 2000, p. 13)with some of the newly defined
territories encompassing over one-hundred different ethnic groups. Berman
and Sams (2000) note, The colonies that emerged often lacked internal
cohesiveness, and differences and antagonism among various indigenous
groups were frequently exploited and exacerbated (p. 13). When African
States later gained their independence, many were given little guidance by
their former colonial rulers on how to effectively govern their newly
established states (Collier et al., 2003; Ginty & Robinson, 2007; Rouvez,
1993). In addition to lacking an effective government, many of the new states
lacked a sense of nationalism as well (Sambanis, 2005). Berman and Sams
(2000) note, In light of the ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity within
those preordained borders, individual African states have found it difficult to
31


build national identities (p. 15). The combination of lack of cohesive bond
between the people, and lack in centralization of power to a state
governmentcontinues to present many political disputes that are ethnic in
nature.
As noted above, observers find politics and economics to be important
contributing elements to ethnic conflicts in addition to the basic historical and
cultural rivalries (Adebajo & Landsberg, 2000; Collier & Hoeffler, 2002; Ginty
& Robinson, 2001; Reynal-Querol, 2002; Sambanis, 2005). Reynal-Querol
(2002) notes, Ethnicity is at the center of politics in divided societies (p. 29).
In their explanation and definition of ethnic conflict, the International
Encyclopedia of Social Sciences (2008) concludes:
Ethnic affiliations do not necessarily fragment ethnically diverse
societies but the context tends to influence how individuals organize
and define themselves as well as how others regard them. Ethnic
differences can generate ethnic conflict when these differences are
used to promote prejudice and discrimination against a group that has
been marked or stigmatized, flj 1)
Political ethnic divisions become even more problematic in situations where
there is a lack of central state control to insure the needs of all various ethnic
groups are recognized and met. Annan (1998) notes:
In such circumstances, the multi-ethnic character of most African
States makes conflict even more likely, leading to an often violent
politicization of ethnicity. In extreme cases, rival communities may
perceive that their security, perhaps their very survival can be ensured
only through control of State power, (p. 6)
Therefore, the absent existence of state power often contributes to continued
and ongoing ethnic disputes.
Thus, it is apparent that peacekeeping operationsin order to address
ethnic rivalries at their rootmust also address the structure of the society in
conflict, and how the government deals with social, political and economic
32


divisions (Annan, 1998; Bellamy, Williams, & Griffin, 2004; Collier & Hoeffler,
2002; Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Ginty & Robinson, 2001; Paris, 2004;
Schnabel & Thakur, 2001). Keating and Knight (2004) note that in current
missions:
One of the problems that confronts any attempt to reconcile societies
divided by years of bitter conflict is that the institutional procedural
devices for addressing social problemsthe foundational political
culture that sustains societiesare often destroyed or so severely
corrupted that they are effectively inoperable, (p. XL)
In many African countries, failure of the state and lack of political structure
have often led to increased hostilities and unmonitored violence of certain
groups towards others (Berman & Sams, 2000; Caplan, 2006; Collier et al.,
2003; Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Keating & Knight, 2004). This was seen
perhaps most prominently in the case of the Rwandan genocide of the Tutsis
by the Hutus. Multi-ethnic societies that are characterized as having one
larger dominating ethnic group tend to have a greater incidence of conflict
(Collier et al., 2003). Collier et al. (2003) find that in these societies:
...the risk of rebellion is increased by approximately 50 percent....
Presumably, in such societies minorities may reasonably fear that even
a democratic political process will lead to their permanent exclusion
form influence regardless of the electoral system, (p. 57)
The ethnic violence in the Congo provides a prime example of this: ...the
terminal decay of the kleptocratic regime of Mobutu Sese Seko in the early
1990s opened the door to spreading ethnic violence in eastern regions
(Young, 2006, p. 302). Once the state is re-established or re-built following
this kind of historical abuse of one group by another, it becomes necessary to
find a productive manner in which to address certain grievances without
leading to additional violence. There have been a few isolated cases, where
this type of effort has been successful; for example, in South Africa:
33


The objectives of the TRC [Truth and Reconciliation Commission in
South Africa] were to examine each case of human rights and power
abuse, identify the perpetrators, and bring to justice the intellectual
authors of the abuses, and to promote truth and forgiveness through
direct confrontation between victims and perpetrators. (Keating &
Knight, 2004, p. XLVII)
Peacekeeping operations in this sense can provide mediation by trying to
establish a sense of truce and the establishment of a grievance process
between warring parties. Doyle & Sambanis (2006) conclude: If the root
causes of the war are left untreated, and the opportunities for rebellion are left
intact, then the risk of a failure of peace is significant (p. 27). Derouen and
Barutciski (2007) also note the importance of considering refugees when
attempting to address ethnic disputes and grievances. They find, If rivalries
are not addressed at their very core, it is unlikely that we will see a solution to
the problem of PRS [protracted refugee situations] in Africa (p. 222).
Peacekeeping operations, therefore, need to try to establish post-conflict
conditions in which refugees in these African conflicts can become more
successfully and peacefully re incorporated into society.
In conclusion, efforts by the international community have been
unsuccessful in their attempts to erase African ethnic tensions sometimes
dating back centuries. However, it is essential for any peacekeeping mission
to address these tensions in order for the outcome to be successful. Each
side of the conflict needs to be acknowledged. Ahmed, Keating and Solinas
(2007) note the complicated nature of this task:
This explains one of the most important yet challenging roles to be
played by the UN peace operations in post-conflict settings is in
helping to facilitate a genuine national and international consensus
around a common agenda for peace and development, (p. 25)
34


As the next section will show, ethnic divisions are often only intensified when
the important elements of territory and resources become an added factor in
the dispute.
Territory and Resource Disputes
The physical geography of Africa, and the lack of high-quality land and
important resources in certain areas, often transforms both land and
resources into precious commodities essential for survivalmaking territory
and resource disputes common (Annan, 1998; Berman & Sams, 2000; Collier
et al., 2003; Perry, 2007). Perry (2007) notes, To live on the poor and arid
soil of the Saheljust south of the Saharais to be mired in an eternal fight
for water, food, and shelter. The few pockets of good land have been the
focus of intermittent conflict for decades... (1f3). As noted previously, a fragile
and unstable political environment lends itself to complicated contestation of
these commodities. Collier et al. (2003) note, Natural resources are seldom
found uniformly distributed over the entire country, but are usually
concentrated in a particular part of it. The issue then arises as to who owns
the resources, the whole nation or the lucky locality (p. 60). With the lack of
stable government and resulting lack in productive outlets for resolving
disagreements, the risk for conflict only increases (Berman & Sams, 2000;
Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Ginty & Robinson, 2001; Karns & Mingst, 2001;
Sambanis, 2005). Former UN Secretary-General Annan (1998) provides just
one example with the resource of oil: In African communities where oil is
extracted, conflict has often arisen over local complaints that the community
does not adequately reap the benefit of such resources, or suffers
excessively from the degradation of the natural environment (p.7).
Furthermore, increasing drought, decreasing rainfall and increasing
temperatures have created an additional strain on African resources (Perry,
35


2007,1f10). Perry (2007) argues that these changing environmental
conditions have only exacerbated the complex nature of African conflicts:
The UN estimates that the lives of as many as 90 million Africans
most of them in and around the Saharacould be at risk on account
of global warming. Many of Africas armed conflicts can be explained
as tinderboxes of climate change lit by the spark of ancient rivalry. fl|4)
As a result, peacekeeping efforts may need to address efforts towards
sensible land use and water management systems, which would help lessen
this further tension. As Berman and Sams (2000) note, border disputes
further complicate the situation as ...the existence of poorly defined and
controversial borders throughout the continent has contributed to conflicts and
will likely pose greater problems as resources become increasingly scarce
(p.13). In addition, constant fluctuations in refugee populations from war-torn
countries are putting added stress on the already scarce resources of the
countries in which they find refuge (Derouen & Barutciski, 2007; Lischer,
2007). This further strain could ultimately promote conflict in additional
nations, as displaced populations turn elsewhere for available resources.
Constant fluctuation of populations due to wartime displacement and
changing governments, often lead not only to contestation of resources, but a
contestation of land rights as well. Annan (1998) finds, In Rwanda, for
example, multiple waves of displacement have resulted in situations where
several families often claim rights to the same piece of land (p. 7). Doyle and
Sambanis (2006) also find, Where ethnic groups are territorially
concentrated, the risks of civil war should also be greater, and the aims of the
war may focus on achieving greater self-determination or even secession (p.
39). In conclusion, the issues of limited African resources and exploitable land
need to be considered as a part of peacekeeping efforts. The following
36


section will reiterate the before mentioned role fragile African governments
play in contributing to intrastate conflict.
Fractured, Failed, and Corrupt States
Many civil conflicts that involve unconventional methods of fighting,
such as guerilla warfare and insurgency, are often a result of political disputes
arising from a lack of established and stable political control by the state
government (Annan, 1998; Berman & Sams, 2000; Caplan, 2006; Doyle &
Sambanis, 2006; Young, 2006). As noted previously, the European
withdrawal from the continent left many of the newly independent states with
no experience in, or effective means for, self-governing (Berman & Sams,
2000). The resulting lack of prevailing structure quickly led to a deteriorating
sense of order and security in many African states. Rouvez (1993) notes,
French, British, and Belgian possessions in Africa were restored to the
indigenous populations, and a well-established system of control over huge
geographic areas collapsed in a matter of years (p. 27). While the transition
to independence was an important and necessary step for African States,
their former Colonial rulers essentially set many countries up for failure and
civil strife when not properly preparing them for their independence and self-
governance. Collier et al. (2003) cite Hegre and others (2001) as they
conclude:
...newly independent countries have a much higher risk of conflict than
other countries. The very fact that they are new countries with weak
institutions and often with a legacy of decolonization wars makes them
five times more war prone in their first year of independence than
comparable but older countries, (p. 98)
The literature regarding African conflicts has shown that many African nations
appear to confirm this statistic.
37


Several African States, who have been engaged in civil war, can be
characterized as having a fractured or failed central government (Berman &
Sams, 2000; Caplan, 2006; Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Ginty & Robinson,
2001; Reynal-Querol, M., 2002). Doyle & Sambanis (2006) note,
Secessionist civil war will occur with greater probability where institutional
collapse at the center creates a power vacuum that leaders at the periphery
try to fill... (p. 39). This is essentially what happened in Angola with the
withdrawal of the Portuguese authority, which left three contending factions
who attempted to claim control of the country (Williams, 1993). Lewis and
Mayall (2007) note the difficulties also encountered by the Somalis in the
attempt to establish some form of central government, where one previously
failed to exist:
There was, thus, no serious attempt to address and come to terms with
the realities of clan allegiance which had been sharpened rather than
diminished by their encapsulation in the exotic structure of a
centralized state which provided a new and enlarged arena for clan
competition and conflict, (p. 116)
Without a central authority governing and protecting the peoples rights, a
failed sense of personal security often occursleading groups to fight for
control, simply because they believe it is ultimately essential to their survival
(Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Ginty & Robinson, 2001; Horowitz, 1985;
Sambanis, 2005). Doyle and Sambanis (2006) conclude:
Defensive incentives arise in the domestic security dilemma. Under
emerging conditions of anarchy (the collapse of central authority) each
group/faction seeks to arm itself in order to be protected; but, as in
interstate anarchy, each defensive armament constitutes a threat to
other factions, (p. 28)
During the 1990s there was a notable collapse of state authority in Liberia,
Sierra Leone, and the Congo, amongst several others. The most cited state-
38


failure is that of Somalia, with the complete disappearance of the Somali
state in 1991 (Young, 2006, p. 316).
In many African states where a central government does exist, the
government tends to be authoritarian in nature, and often plagued with
political corruption. It has been argued that the authoritarian nature of many
African governments dates back to the earlier years of independence (Annan
1998; Berman & Sams, 2000; Caplan, 2006; Doyle & Sambanis, 2006;
Young, 2006). Annan (1998) notes, Too often, however, the necessary
building of national unity was pursued through the heavy centralization of
political and economic power and the suppression of political pluralism (p. 4)
Political corruption often followed this extreme centralization of political
control Government became bloated, inefficient bureaucracies and
corruption was often rampant and tolerated (Berman & Sams, 2000, p. 16).
Sierra Leone provides a prime example of how government corruption can
lead to extreme economic disparities within the society:
Before the outbreak of its civil war in 1991, Sierra Leone had suffered
from three decades of poor management of its economic resources
and vast disparities in wealth between a corrupt elite in the capital,
Freetown, and impoverished masses in the countryside. (Adebajo &
Landsberg, 2000, p. 175)
Extreme centralization and suppression of pluralism also often leads to the
creation of rebel or insurgence movementswhich serve as an important
component in many civil wars.
In conclusion, much of the literature insists the dynamics of civil
conflicts and warlord politics in Africa need to be addressed, in addition to
efforts to create and stabilize a central state government (Ahmed, Keating &
Solinas, 2007; Annan, 1998; Bellamy, Williams & Griffin, 2004; Caplan, 2006;
Ginty & Robinson, 2001; Schnabel & Thakur, 2001). It is apparent that the
creation of a stable state authority is essential for achieving a sustainable or
39


lasting peace in a countryand, as a result, peacekeeping efforts in Africa
should focus on helping to restore this central state authority in the countries
in which they intervene (Ahmed, Keating & Solinas, 2007; Caplan, 2006;
Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Jeong, 2005; Paris, 2004; Young, 2006). Doyle &
Sambanis (2006) note, Just as civil wars are usually about failures of
legitimate state authority, sustainable civil peace relies on its successful
reconstruction (p. 28). Furthermore, state decay and the collapse of states in
Africa, when coupled with pressure to democratize, acts to trigger violent
struggles over definitions of identity, citizenship, and indignity (Young, 2006,
p. 301). Caplan (2006) discusses the importance of implementing follow-up
measures and post-withdrawal of international forces, in countries where
there is a lack of strong political control by the host government. It is essential
for peacekeeping efforts to address the condition of the state government in
the country in which they are intervening, in order to insure that conflict in the
future will be limited or prevented.
In summary, the complex nature of civil conflicts today, demands a
continued examination of evolving societal dynamics in war-torn societies, as
well as continued research on the multiple issues surrounding conflict and
peacekeeping. Osaghae and Robinson (2005) conclude:
In fact, the new and evolving forms and patterns of ethnic nationalism
and conflicts that have characterized the post-Cold War period, notably
the upsurge of minority agitations, aggravated politics of difference and
contested citizenship, and the importance of issues of globalization,
resource control, environmental justice, and state reconfiguration have
thrown up new challenges to conventional wisdoms that demand
innovative and alternative prisms and perspectives, (p. 2)
The nature of conflict itself frequently has a significant impact on the
successfulness of the peacekeeping efforts attempting to resolve it. The
following section details the developments and transformations in
40


peacekeeping that have occurred in the last few decades as a result of the
new challenges presented by the increased complexity and presence of civil
conflicts.
PeacekeepingA Changing Definition
As mentioned previously, peacekeeping efforts in Africa have
continued to develop and change within the last couple of decades (Ahmed,
Keating & Solina 2007; Bellamy, Williams & Griffin, 2004; Diehl, 2005a, Doyle
& Sambanis, 2006; Karns & Mingst, 2004). Part of the current debate around
peacekeeping efforts involves defining exactly what peacekeeping entails.
Olonisakin (2000) notes, In a new era where the features of many conflicts
have deviated from those where this type of peacekeeping was effectively
applied, a certain degree of confusion presently surrounds the meaning of
peacekeeping (p. 8). Over the years, the task of preserving peace and
security has surfaced in many different forms and stages, including: conflict
prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and
peacebuilding (see the operational definitions included in chapter one, for
the UNDPKOs official definitions of these various stages). Furthermore,
many times these stages remain indistinguishable as they frequently coincide
rather than occur consecutively:
In practice, the temporal boundaries between peacekeeping and the
related notions of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peace-
building are not always apparent. The once-clear distinction between
peacekeeping operations and enforcement actions has also become
blurred. (Berman & Sams, 2000, p. 23)
Similar to the literature on conflict, the current body of literature
focusing on peacekeeping efforts is wide-ranging. The following section
addresses the various attributes of peacekeeping operations that, from the
41


literature, appear to be integral components in the examination and
evaluation of peacekeeping efforts.
Significant Attributes of Peacekeeping Operations
Adetouan (2005) cites Burton (1990) in noting, After an explanation of
the problem of conflict is given, the second concern is to find the nature of a
constructive approach to the problem... (p. 50). This section of the literature
review provides an overview of the key components of peacekeeping efforts,
which ultimately serve as variables impacting the successfulness of the
peacekeeping operation. Central concepts from this literature were utilized to
create a list of attributes of peacekeeping missionsthat proved significant
for multiple scholarswhich, are further applied as a framework for analyzing
specific peacekeeping missions in Africa. The attributes that will be discussed
in the following section include: organizing agency, available resources,
timing of mission, consent of warring factors, third party compliance, and
mandate type.
Organizing Agency and Available Resources
Organizing Agency. The first factor identified as influential to the
success of peacekeeping missions is organizing agencyor the agency
conducting the peacekeeping operation (Boulden, 2006; Diehl, 2005; Bush,
2004; Duward, 2006; Labonte, 2004; Neethling, 2004). Diehl (2005a) poses
the important question: From an analytical point of view, does it make a
difference if a peacekeeping operation is conducted by the UN, a regional
organization, or a multilateral grouping? (p. 245), and concludes that success
of certain types of organizing agencies depends on the situation. It is strongly
contended that the organizing agency of a peacekeeping operation is
significant because it ultimately determines the political will supporting the
42


operation, the level of commitment to the operation, and the interests that
operation will serve (Annan, 1998; Berman & Sams, 2000; Boulden, 2006;
Durward, 2006; Karns & Mingst, 2001; Neethling, 2004; Souare, 2006).
Annan (1998) notes, Unless there is adequate international support for
peace efforts it may be impossible in some situations to maintain the
momentum for peace (p.11).
International organizing agencies. By far, the United Nations serves as
the leading agency in international peacekeeping operations today (Diehl,
2005; Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Karns & Mingst, 2001 & 2004;
MacQueen,1999 & 2002; Mayall, 2007; Schnabel & Thakur, 2001). The UN
categorizes peacekeeping as an issue falling within the matter of international
peace and security. Therefore, the Security Council serves as the primary
body within the organization for decisions regarding peacekeeping
ultimately determining which missions will be initiated and what the official
implemented mandates will be (UNDPI, 2006). However, the UNand more
specifically the Security Councilhas been frequently criticized a lack in will
and commitment to issues that are not of interest to its primary governing
states (Boulden, 2006; Bush, 2004, Neethling, 2004; Souare, 2006). Souare
(2006) notes, ...the United Nations, like any other international institution for
that matter, reflects the interests of its powerful members (p.31). Even
though the developing world often dominates the Councils agenda, the
developing states continue to lack representation within the permanent
membership. Former UN Secretary-General Annan (1998) notes the effect
this has had on many Africa nations and their view of the UN: Throughout the
continent, the perception of near indifference on the part of the international
community has left a poisonous legacy that continues to undermine
confidence in the organization (p. 5). Boulden (2006) concludes, For the
conflict situations falling below the Security Council radar, the Council is a
43


distant and disengaged entity whose decisionmaking is based on a double
standard that is contrary to the universality of the Charters expressed ideals
(p. 419). There are strong limitations, therefore, placed on the actions the UN
can take as an organizing agency, due to its reliance on the perceived
interests of the dominant powers.
In addition to the resistance to intervene, the absence of political will
and interest also can contribute to insufficient or unsuitable peacekeeping
actions, when an organization does choose to intervene (Annan, 1998;
Boulden, 2006; Bush, 2004, Karns & Mingst, 2001; Souare, 2006; Tardy,
2007). Bush (2004) observes how the interests of the powerful states are not
always appropriately aligned with the needs of the less powerful:
...we are beginning to see the rise of a phenomenon that could be
called the commodification of peacebuildinginitiatives that are
mass-produced according to blueprints that meet Northern
specifications and (short term) interests, but that appear to be only
marginally relevant to or appropriate for the political, social, and
economic realities of war-prone societies, (p. 24)
Harold Johnson, Associate Director of US International Relations and Trade
Issues, provided testimony before the Committee on International Relations in
1997, regarding recommendations for UN peacekeeping reform. He states,
We concluded that the organizational limits of the United Nations put at risk
the success of such missions (US House of Representatives, 1997, p.1). He
was referring to the number of more complex missions employed after the
Cold War, which required the use of force to restore peace and security in an
area, as well as several follow-up measures needed to help with rebuilding
war-torn societies. In these cases the UN remains limited as an organization
that depends on contributions of forces from its sovereign member states
which are not always willing to provide it.
44


Regional organizing agencies. In addition to determining what UN
peacekeeping operations to initiate, the Security Council must also approve
any regional efforts of peacekeeping that involve the use of force, and monitor
methods of enforcement including the abuse of imposed sanctions (Karns &
Mingst, 2004). Within the past couple of decades, there has been a recent
trend towards regional organizations assuming added responsibility in
peacekeeping and taking on a more active role in regional conflicts (Berman
& Sams, 2000; Karns & Minst, 2001; Neethling, 2004; Souare, 2006). Berman
and Sams (2000) find that African organizations are no exception to this
trend: Partly in response to perceived Western indifference, African States
have begun to exhibit a growing willingness to intervene in African conflicts
(p. 41). It is noted that African organizations also have an easier time
intervening in conflicts to an extent, due to the fact that state sovereignty is
not viewed as sacrosanct, as is often the case with the UN (Berman &
Sams, 2003, as cited in Bariagaber, 2008, p. 842). In regards to this trend for
increased involvement by regional organizations, Neethling (2004) notes,
...the trend is of special significance in Africa since non-consensual
peacekeeping is likely to remain the most prevalent form of peacekeeping on
the continent (p. 63). Ahmed, Keating and Solinas (2007) further conclude:
By 1996, as political efforts to build up regional institutions were
already intensifying, attention turned to replacing UN peacekeeping
with regional organizations and ad hoc coalitions, mandated by the
Security Council, which were assumed to be better equipped and
politically prepared to use force to deal decisively with potential
spoilers and stabilize a fragile peace, (p. 15)
Multilateral operations with more than one organizing agency. As note
previously, the increased complexity of conflicts today often requires
45


innovative peacekeeping efforts, sometimes supported by multiple actors.
Bariagaber (2008) finds:
It is now widely accepted that effective solutions to these issues
require the combined efforts of states, nongovernmental organizations,
intergovernmental organizations, and others. Each of these entities
may be more suited to deal with one issue compared with others, (p.
838)
As a result, peacekeeping efforts today are often a combination of efforts
made by regional organizations in cooperation with international organizations
such as the United Nations. The UNDPI (2008a) notes, Enhancing strategic
partnerships with multilateral and regional organizations has become a high
priority for the burden-sharing of peacekeeping (1f60). Bariagaber (2008) also
finds that specific regional involvement in regional operations helps provide
legitimacy for UN efforts in those regions:
...the role played by the African-led missions is widely recognized as
having been critical in making UN interventions more
conducive....Therefore, recent developments in Africa encouraged the
UN to work in tandem with the AU and other regional organizations,
because the likelihood of successful outcomes of peace endeavors in
Africa increases when authentically African partners are involved in
peace processes, (p. 842)
The joint United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), serves
as one current example of such cooperation. Other examples of regional
cooperation with the UN include the joint UN-EU effort in establishing the
elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2007), and the close
cooperation between the UN and NATO in Afghanistan and Kosovo (UNDPI,
2008a, 1f60). African regional organizations cited as most influential in
peacekeeping efforts include: the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the
African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States
46


(ECOWAS), the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), and the
Southern African Development Community (SADC) (Berman & Sams, 2000).
Available Resources. Scholars have found that the issue of
resourcesincluding the designated amount of monetary funds, military
(armed and/or unarmed) and civilian personnelremains closely related to
the nature (size, structure, membership, etc.) of the organizing agency. It has
been argued that the success of peacekeeping missions depends on the
organizing agency possessing the appropriate resources for tasks such as
armament, providing troops and logistical support for troops, and helping build
infrastructure (Bellamy, Williams & Griffin, 2004; Boulden, 2006; Diehl, 2005;
Neethling, 2004; Udombana, 2007). Udombana (2007) comments, A promise
of protection becomes destructive where real force is not available to back up
the offer (p.104). The complex nature of African conflicts, and the crucial
peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts needed to effectively resolve conflict
in a sustainable manner, can prove quite costly and require a great amount of
resources. Furthermore, is apparent that many African states and African
regional organizationsalthough certainly willingoften lack appropriate
resources and materials to address the relative complexities of conflicts on
their continent (Bariagaber, 2008; Berman & Sams, 2000; Daudelin, 2004;
Diehl, 2005a; Neetling, 2004). Berman and Sams (2000) find that this
insufficiency in means has had a significant impact on the peacekeeping
operations accordingly:
African peacekeeping capabilities, however, have lagged behind their
willingness to intervene. The various peacekeeping initiatives have
suffered from political, financial, administrative, logistical, as well as
command and control problems.... (p. 7)
The humanitarian challenges created from many of these conflicts often prove
too extensive and expensive for regional organizations resolve on their own,
47


The cost of humanitarian interventions makes them totally dependent on the
will and interests of a few countries, namely the United States and those in
the European Union (EU) (Daudelin, 2004, p.12). The majority of the
literature concludes that the fate of any intervention ultimately lies in the
hands of the West, because it is these states who possess the adequate
resources to produce successful outcomes (Berman & Sams, 2000; Boulden,
2006; Daudelin, 2004; Duward, 2006; Neethling, 2004).
In conclusion, there appears to be lack of connection between those
experiencing most of the conflicts (such as in Africa) and those who possess
the resources to address them. The resources needed are often not available
in the regions that need help, primarily due to the economic relationship those
countries have with the North, which often dates back to the days of
colonialism.
Timing, Consent, and Third Party Compliance
Timing of Mission. The concept of timing is significantly addressed
within the literature on peacekeeping. The research supports the following
conclusion: successful peacekeeping depends on the timing of the
peacekeeping mission in relation to the stage of conflict (Annan, 1998;
Bellamy, Williams & Griffin, 2004; Daniel & Hayes, 2003; Diehl, 2005a; Doyle
& Sambanis, 2006; Karns & Mingst, 2001 & 2004; Paris, 2004). There are
thought to be four basic options for mission initiation: before the violence
starts, during the conflict, post ceasefire (after a ceasefire has been reached),
and post peace treaty (after a peace treaty has been signed) (Diehl, 2005a,
p.247). Various UN peacekeeping missions have been deployed at all of
these points.
48


Before the violence starts. Even though the least frequently used of the
four timing options, the research shows the most effective time to initiate
peacekeeping is before the violence starts (Annan, 1998; Diehl, 2005a; Karns
& Mingst, 2004; Labonte, 2004; Schnabel & Thakur, 2001). In this sense the
mission truly is an effort of peacekeeping rather than peace-making or
peace-building. This concept of conflict prevention dominates the literature
on peacekeeping, as early peacekeeping efforts have ultimately proven more
efficient and cost effective: The costs of waiting tend to be much higher than
those for preventative action (Karns & Mingst, 2004, p. 290). Former UN
Secretary-General Annan (1998) concludes: Whether the response involves
diplomatic efforts, a peacekeeping deployment or humanitarian intervention,
the sooner action is taken the more effective it is likely to be (p.8).
There is a certain recognition from the international community of the
value of preventative measures, which has been demonstrated partially by
efforts to: increase the UN Secretariats capacity for intelligence gathering on
situations that might threaten international peace or produce humanitarian
disasters... (Karns & Mingst, 2004, p. 291). However, these efforts have
continued to be undermined by the Security Council members unwillingness
to act on recommendations. Labonte (2004) finds:
Increasingly, failure of the state apparatus to ensure basic social
provisions to its citizens serves to fuel a spiral of deprivation and
volatility that, in turn, can perpetuate protracted social conflict and
regional instability. And yet, while the development of operational
prevention strategies has gained currency as a viable response to
complex emergencies, the actual implementation of such strategies,
especially those involving the use of force, remains rare (p. 53).
Lack of preventative action appears to also be linked to a number of
additional constraining factors, including: political interests, lack of available
49


resources, the nature of the mandate, and the norms of sovereignty and
nonintervention state consent (Labonte, 2004, p. 55).
During the conflict. Contrary to preventative action, the majority of the
literature concludes that success is least likely when initiated during the
conflict (where violence often continues to ensue) (Daniel & Hayes, 2003;
Diehl, 2005a; Karns & Mingst, 2001; Schabel & Thakur, 2001). The
complexities of the conflicts at this stage are often challenging to address:
Appropriately labeled complex contingencies, these interventions
were fraught with difficulties, the least of which was securing the
cooperation of the indigenous groups or factions completing for control
of parts or all of the country where the intervention was taking place.
(Daniel & Hayes, 2003, p. 201)
Diehl (2005a) offers a similar conclusion as he comments on a typical
peacekeeping operations initiated at this stage, ...it is generally ill equipped
to be thrust in the middle of active hostilities; it generally does not have the
capacity to suppress military conflict and may even be limited in its ability to
defend itself (p. 248). Entering a state mid-conflict also may jeopardize the
missions perceived neutrality (Bariagaber, 2008; Daniel & Hayes, 2003;
Diehl, 2005a; OConnor, 2001; UNDPI, 2006; UNDPKO, 2008). Bariagaber
(2008) notes, ...the UN has done its best to be, or appear to be, impartial
when intervening in the past. Recently, however, it has gradually abandoned
any resemblance of impartiality (Bariagaber, 2008, p. 833). Daniel & Hayes
(2003) further comment, Maintaining a perception of impartiality can be
particularly difficult if sanctions or coercion are applied against only one party,
and special efforts may have to be made in this regard (p. 213).
In conclusion, a lack of perceived neutrality may lead to resentment
from the warring parties and the creation of further management issues for
the operation. Despite the consensus around the multiple complications often
50


created by initiating peacekeeping efforts during an active conflict, it is usually
when the conflict is at its worst that the public finally calls for it to be
addressed at the international levelas history has revealed. Daniel & Hayes
(2003) note, In the first half of the 1990s, civil conflicts and man-made
humanitarian disasters proved so disturbing that outsiders felt compelled to
intervene (p. 201). Furthermore, the longer a conflict lasts, the worse it tends
to get, and as a result: ...the longer the duration of a war, the greater the
chance of an outside power intervening to end it (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006,
p. 44). Several UN peacekeeping operations in Africa fit the description
aboveinitiated during violent conflicts, often with the primary goal of
providing humanitarian aid. UN missions in Somalia (UNOSOM I and
UNOSOM II), Rwanda (UNOMUR AND UNAMIR), and the current missions in
Sudan (UNAMID and UNMIS) provide just a few examples of cases deployed
under such conditions. Despite the fact that past efforts of intervention at this
stage of conflict have failed immensely, members of the international
community often feel compelled to act, merely because they feel they can not
afford not to.
Post ceasefire. The majority of traditional UN peacekeeping operations
were deployed following a ceasefire agreement, before a peace-treaty had
been signedwith the intent to help keep the peace until a resolution could
be reached (Diehl, 2005a; Paris, 2004; UNDPI, 2006; UNDPKO, 2008). Paris
(2004) notes, Most, however, were deployed in the immediate aftermath of
civil wars with the goal of preventing a recurrence of violence (p. 2). Clearly,
there are certain advantages for the organizing agency with this stage of
intervention: Beyond the greater ease of keeping the peace, the financial and
troop requirements are significantly less than those required in the previous or
later phases of conflict (Diehl, 2005a, p. 249). However, as noted previously,
51


with the increased complexity of conflicts, peacekeeping missions have had
to expand from the original notion of traditional peacekeeping to methods
more multilateral in nature. Ahmed, Keating and Solinas (2003) note that with
a vast majority of UN peacekeeping operations, ...a fragile peace continues
to hold thanks in good part to the presence of UN peace operations and their
partners, but the prospects of a return to conflict remain reasonably high were
they to depart (p.23). In conclusion, post ceasefire peacekeeping efforts are
most effective when followed by post-peace treaty peacebuilding efforts.
Post-peace treaty. The research finds that post-peace treaty
involvement, while not the best timing, is somewhat optimal due to the evident
positive relationship between the signing of a peace agreement, and the
chances for achieving sustainable peace (Ahmed, Keating & Solinas, 2007;
Bellamy, Williams & Griffin, 2004; Caplan, 2006; Daniel & Hayes, 2003; Doyle
& Sambanis, 2006; Jeong, 2005). In this context, the peace agreement
represents a willingness and desire from the warring parties to cooperate;
Doyle and Sambanis (2006) note, A first positive sign for peace is the signing
of a peace treaty by all or most of the factions involved in a civil
war....Peacekeeping will only work where there is a peace to keep, where the
parties perceive an incentive to collaborate (p. 46-50). Peacekeeping at this
point in the process, post peace treaty, is many times referred to as
peacebuilding, often involving the facilitation and implementation of the
peace agreement and supervision of democratic elections (Bellamy, Williams
& Griffin, 2004; Berman & Sams, 2000; Caplan, 2006; Doyle & Sambanis,
2005; Jeong, 2005; UNDPKO, 2008). While the UN has been relatively
successful with the aforementioned tasks, in operations where the host state
has failed completely, the task of nation-building has proved more daunting
as these types of peacebuilding operations are often both time-consuming for
52


the organizing agency, and exhausting of available resources. Caplan (2006)
comments on the importance of various stages of involvement, and the timing
of the exit following a post-peace treaty mission: ...a poorly conceived exit
strategy can jeopardize the achievements of an international administration
and imperil the viability of the new state or territory (p. 254). Furthermore, a
non-timely withdrawal of a peacebuilding mission, before the country is fully
rehabilitated, can prove detrimental for the chances of achieving a
sustainable peace: ...in many instances success was being proclaimed
prematurely and that the absence of conflict during a peacekeeping
deployment was not the same as a self-sustaining peace process (Ahmed,
Keating & Solinas, 2007, p. 14). Caplan (2006) also concludes that specific
mandated time limitations, and pressures from both donors and local forces,
can put added strain on the process. This view is further supported by Daniel
& Hayes (2003):
Finally, hurried attempts by international-community representatives to
forestall additional deaths from hunger and disease can lead them to
implement solutions that benefit obstructionist leaders and thus
contribute to continued problems in the long run. (p. 207)
In summary, it is clear that post peace-treaty peacebuilding efforts need to be
long-lasting, with underlying grievances and institutional failures addressed, in
order to achieve this lasting peace and prevent a recurrence of war (Doyle &
Sambanis, 2006, p. 46).
In conclusion, it is apparent that the timing of mission initiation can be
highly influential in the successfulness of the outcome; timing, therefore,
should at least be considered in the analysis. However, even with the above
mentioned points taken into consideration, successfulness in regards to
timing may also vary significantly with differing context and circumstances. As
Ahmed, Keating and Solinas (2007) note, The instrument that had been
53


successfully engaged in a particular set of circumstances could and should
not have been assumed to be applicable in a totally different context (p. 15).
Consent of Warring Factions. The literature reveals consent as yet
another defining factor in the success of peacekeeping missions (Annan,
1998; Daniel & Hayes, 2003; Derouen & Barutciski, 2007; Diehl, 2005a; Doyle
& Sambanis, 2006). Consent means the peacekeeping operation has
approval of all warring factions involved (Diehl, 2005a, p. 251), and is viewed
as one of the most important criteria because it helps protect the
peacekeepers lives and gives them legitimacy. Former UN Secretary-
General Annan concludes, Cooperation by the parties and their willingness
to work towards peace can sometimes be nurtured by the international
community if it is able to assist with short-term stability while providing
positive inducements for longer-term reconciliation (1998, p.8). As noted
previously, the requirement for consent from the host state (a more limited
definition than the one listed above) in a peacekeeping operation originates
from the UN Charter, and the desire of the organization to protect state
sovereignty. As Harold Johnson, Associate Director of US International
Relations and Trade Issues, comments in his review of UN Peacekeeping
(1997):
The U.N. operations continued to rely on the consent of the warring
parties to conduct the operation....These actions partly reflect the
U.N.s fundamental organizational principle of ensuring that the
sovereignty of its members is respected at all times. (US House of
Representatives, p.6)
Consent is also necessary to ensure that peacekeeping missions remain
neutral in regards to the parties involved, as neutrality is a key defining
concept of peacekeeping (Bellamy, Williams & Griffin, 2004; Doyle &
Sambanis, 2006; Karns & Mingst, 2004; UNDPI, 2006; UNDPKO, 2008).
54


Diehl (2005a) comments, Host state consent can be seen as potentially
detrimental in an internal conflict if such consent causes the peacekeeping
force to be perceived as less than impartial (p.252). In conclusion, neutrality
of a peacekeeping operation allows the operation to play a more successful
mediating role.
In addition to the reasoning for consent listed above, there is a concern
that if consent is not obtained from all warring factions, the chances for the
operation to receive resistance increases (Daniel & Hayes, 2003; Diehl,
2005a; Mayall, 2007). Daniel and Hayes (2003) note, The sine qua non for
preempting obstructions is being credible to and receiving the respect of
indigenous leaders and peoples; anything less invites opposition (p. 212).
Mayall (2007) further finds that an absent agreement to a peacekeeping
operation ultimately equals a lack of committed desire to achieve peace:
If the issue of sovereignty imposed constraints upon the UNs ability to
act decisively, the absence of a peace to which the conflicting parties
were seriously committed undermined the organizations ability to
achieve its stated objectives, (p. 21)
This appeared to be the case in Rwanda, when radio broadcasts were used
to inhibit the peacekeeping mandate by promoting hatred and violence
towards the operation (Diehl, 2005a, p. 252). Furthermore, as important as
consent is, there are very few examples of peacekeeping operations that
have been able to successfully obtain consent from all parties involved.
While the UN has remained committed to the consent requirement, it
has increasingly made exceptions in situations presenting humanitarian
crises. Following the controversial NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999, an
Independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
(ICISS) was established. This commission instituted six criteria for military
55


intervention with the purpose of human protection. These criteria address:
large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or
not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state
neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or large scale
ethnic cleansing, actual or apprehended, whether carried out by
killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape (CISS 2001a: 32).
(Karns & Mingst, 2004, p. 287)
Therefore, in the cases such as mentioned above, the UN does not need
consent of the host state before intervening. These types of cases are
becoming more and more prevalent with the nature of intrastate conflict
today. However, the research continues to show that entering a conflict
without the consent of one or more of the warring factions, reduces the
chances of success for that peacekeeping operation.
Compliance From Third Parties. In addition to acquiring consent of the
host state and warring factions involved, research suggests that those
initiating peacekeeping efforts should also consider any and all additional
parties potentially affected by the conflictincluding those not directly
involved in the conflict, and parties outside of the state. The literature reflects
the fact that these third parties might have an interest in the conflict outcome
and therefore present additional potential for interference (Daniel & Hayes,
2003; Diehl, 2005a; Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Derouen and Barutciski, 2007;
Karns & Mingst, 2001; Mayall, 2007). Mayall (2007) has written, There is little
that the UN, or any other intervening force, can do without the cooperation of
the local population (p. 24). Diehl (2005a) finds that with intrastate conflicts
involving multiple actors and/or a lack of official state control, obtaining
consent and third party compliance may be one in the same. Certainly, the
presence of multiple actors in a conflict decreases the success for
peacekeeping missions due to the presence of a larger pool of potentially
56


divergent preferences (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006, p.100). Diehl (2005a)
concludes:
A potential disturbing trend in post-Cold War peacekeeping is the
movement toward peacekeeping operations in venues with large
numbers of third parties, most notably internal conflicts....as the
number of parties in a situation increases, the greater likelihood that
there will be incompatible preferences for which there is no solution
(indeed, a stalemate can occur with as few as three actors), (p. 256)
Derouen and Barutciski (2007) also find that if all parties interests are not
considered in the peacemaking process, the risk for an increased number of
protracted refugees later increases. In summary, without the consent of all
parties affected, and all the various interests underlying the conflict
addressed, peacekeeping efforts may remain futile.
Operation Mandate
The literature regarding UN peacekeeping also includes a significant
focus on the careful establishment of the operation mandate (Bellamy,
Williams & Griffin, 2004; Berman & Sams, 2000; Caplan, 2006; Clapham,
2000; Diehl, 2005a; Doyle & Sambinas, 2006; Mayall, 2007). Clapham (2000)
defines a mandate as: the essential base on which any peacekeeping or
peacemaking mission must depend (p. 34). The mandate provides legitimacy
to the mission and also defines the goals of the operation, and the resources
that will be designated accordingly. As Mayall (2007) notes, Before the UN
can intervene, the Security Council must draw up a mandate specifying the
objectives of the operation and the means to be employed (p. 17). The
nature of a mandate can be quite complex; in regards to the peacekeeping
mandate, Diehl (2005a) suggests asking several important questions: is it
clear?, is it consistent with the force sent to achieve it?, is it appropriate
(meaning does it address the main issues of the conflict at hand)?, and is
57


there an end in sight? (pp. 256-260). It is questions like these that help
determine if the peacekeeping operation will be able to successfully achieve
the goals of the mandate, and ultimately establish a sustainable peace. The
research finds that the more of the above questions that are answered no,
the less likely the peacekeeping operation will be successful (Bariagaber,
2008; Caplan, 2006; Clapham, 2000; Diehl, 2005a; Doyle & Sambanis, 2006;
Mayall, 2007; Neethling, 2004; Olonisaki, 2000).
Much of the literature acknowledges the complicated nature of
designing a satisfactory mandate for any given peacekeeping operation
(Bariagaber, 2008; Clapham, 2000; Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Mayall, 2007).
Mayall (2007) concludes:
...the construction of a mandate presents formidable problems at the
best of times. On the one hand it must be sufficiently flexible to allow
for inevitable changes in the situation on the ground; on the other it
must be sufficiently precise to prevent the UN form becoming
embroiled in the conflict and hence unable to fulfill its role as an
impartial umpire. The penalties for not getting the mandate right can be
high.... (p.17)
As noted previously, the UN peacekeeping operation in the Congo (ONUC), is
frequently cited as a prime example of having an ill-equipped operation
mandate that ultimately contributed to the failure of the operation (Adebajo &
Lansberg, 2000; Bariagaber, 2008; Berman & Sams, 2000; MacQueen, 1999;
Mayall, 2007). As suggested by Diehls questions earlier, crafting a
satisfactory mandate requires the consideration of many factors. First, the
mandate must be clear. Mayall (2007) finds that if a mandate is not specific, it
is subject to interpretation and disagreement (p. 17). Strategic objectives also
have to be determined (what is the intervention intended to accomplish), and
the issue of sovereignty addressed: who holds it, and on what grounds is it to
be either upheld or superseded? (Mayall, 2007, p. 17). Finally, the organizing
58


agency must also determine what resources and forces will be needed to
successfully accomplish the designated task, and if those resources are
available.
As noted previously, traditional peacekeeping operations were
designed to help monitor ceasefires so that a relative peace could be
maintained throughout the peace agreement process (Bariagaber, 2008;
Clapham, 2000; Diehl, 2005a; UNDPI, 2006). The UN defines the goals of
traditional peacekeeping as follows, UN peacekeeperssoldiers and military
officers, police and civilian personnel from many countriesmonitor and
observe peace processes that emerge in post-conflict situations and assist
conflicting parties to implement the peace agreement they have signed
(UNDPI, 2006, p. 2). Often mandates for these operations include tasks such
as: monitoring a ceasefire, supervising elections, offering humanitarian
assistance, verification of arms control, disarming of factions and protection of
civilians (Diehl, 2005, p. 258). Olonisakin (2000) notes:
Peacekeeping cannot, by itself, terminate, or resolve a conflict. Rather,
it is intended to maintain an atmosphere in which a settlement can be
achieved, especially in conflicts where destructive conflict behaviour
has set in, or is imminent, (p. 6)
Peacekeeping operations were originally designed to serve this very limited
role, and had access to few UN resources accordingly.
As noted previously, the role of peacekeeping operations and the
nature of involvement have expanded greatly over the years to address the
growing complexity of conflicts. This shift has created the need for an even
closer examination of operation mandates. Doyle and Sambanis (2006)
conclude there is a need for, ... a model for the interaction between
peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding that highlights the
importance of picking good strategies that develop out of proper
59


understanding of the conflict at hand, and furthermore that, successful
implementation of a narrow peacekeeping mandate is not sufficient for a
successful peace process (p. 27). Furthermore, due to the exclusion of
peacekeeping operations in the original UN Charter, there are no prior
standards for dealing with complex conflicts. As a result, the newer
multidimensional peacekeeping operations were often based on weak,
inappropriate, or unclear mandates that did not address the causes of the
conflict, and were frequently ill-equipped with the necessary forces to achieve
the desired outcomes. It is apparent that in recent years, the UN has begun to
make some progress with successfully reinventing appropriate mandates:
...the UN has expanded its scope of activities to include state reconstruction,
combatant reintegration, border patrols, mining clearance, and other activities
deemed necessary for sustainable peace (Bariagaber, 2008; p. 833).
Bariagaber (2008) also finds mandates have become more flexible to the
needs of the individual conflicts: Lately, however, various mandates have
been progressively revised and expanded to meet the needs on the ground
(p. 834). However, many scholars conclude that the difficult nature of
mandates, combined with the even more complex nature of conflicts today,
demands continual attention from the UN in order to ensure more successful
outcomes of future operations (Bariagaber, 2008; Caplan, 2006; Clapham,
2000; Diehl, 2005a; Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Mayall, 2007; Neethling, 2004;
Olonisaki, 2000). Diehl (2005a) notes:
Similarly, those peacekeeping operations most different from traditional
operations tend to have or are likely to have great difficulties. In large
part, this is because the forces are ill-designed to carry out the tasks
required of them. For example, nation-building is a multi-faceted
enterprise that cannot be achieved or imposed through the application
of military force, (p. 258)
60


For example, in such cases involving intrastate conflict where the central
state has failed, mandates need to involve the task of developing government
infrastructureessentially rebuilding and reestablishing the stateand need
to be equipped with the designated resources to accomplish this task.
In addition to objectives and designated resources, one final issue
related to mandates is that of time commitment. As previously mentioned,
while some peacekeeping missions are considerably long-term (spanning
over decades), the lack of success and costliness of many of these missions
has led to the call for more short-term involvement by the UN (Berman &
Sams, 2000; Caplan; 2006; Neethling, 2004). Neethling (2004) notes, As a
result of serious setbacks in a number of cases, the UN retreated from its
earlier ambitious vision for peacekeeping developed towards the end of the
Cold War (p. 50). Many of these conflicts were viewed by the international
community to be too complex to solve in their entiretysituations in which
there appears to be no end in sightand involvement in the conflict appears
therefore useless. Harold Johnson notes the views of the US Permanent
Representative to the UN, during his testimony before the US House of
Representatives Committee on International Relations (1997):
She said that the international community simply can not afford to
maintain operations where the disputants commitment to overcoming
obstacles is in question, where there is no discernable progress toward
resolution, and where no end is in sight, (p. 7)
Much of the research concludes that this shift towards short-term commitment
by peacekeeping operations has ultimately hurt the chances of achieving
successful outcomes (Bariagaber, 2008; Caplan; 2006; Clapham, 2000;
Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Mayall, 2007). Caplan (2006) finds, Mandated time
limitations and pressures from either donors or the local population to transfer
authority quickly may not allow sufficient time for the recruitment and training
61


that is needed to build local capacity (p. 254). In conclusion, to successfully
resolve complex conflicts in a manner that will lead to the existence of
sustainable peace, it is necessary for a peacekeeping mandate to: effectively
address the type of conflict, designate appropriate resources to implement the
goal at hand, and designate an appropriate timeline for achieving the
mandates overall purpose and goals.
In summary, this chapter has provided an overview of the literature
addressing the nature of and developments in civil conflict and UN
peacekeeping. Several variables have been identified from this review of
literature, as influential to the success of peacekeeping operationsthe
conflict type, organizing agency, available resources, timing of the operation,
presence of consent, lack of third party interference, and the nature of the
operation mandate. The following chapter will summarize the methodology
and research design used to explore any potential relationships existing
between the above-mentioned variables, and the outcome of the twelve
identified past UN peacekeeping operations in Africa.
62


CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY, RESEARCH DESIGN
AND DATA COLLECTION
Methodology
The Nature of the Research
This research project can be characterized as both exploratory and
descriptive-exploratory research (Schutt, 2006). It is exploratory in that it
explores the nature of peacekeeping operations in relation to specific African
civil conflicts. It is descriptive-exploratory in that it seeks to describe various
aspects of the conflicts and associated peacekeeping operations, and explore
potential relationships evident between the individual variables and the level
of success achieved by each operation. The research is not based on a
specific hypothesis, nor does it attempt to identify causal mechanisms; rather,
the focus is simply on identifying potentially important relationships between
the variables that appear significant in multiple cases. A qualitative
comparison case study is used to explore these potential existing
relationships.
The Case Study Method
As noted above, this research project uses the case study method as
the primary method of research. Yin (2003) provides the most comprehensive
text on the case study methodidentifying two major components. The first
component deals with the deliberate study of a phenomena within its
contextual conditions: A case study is an empirical inquiry that: investigates a
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (Yin,
63


2003, p. 13), an important quality of the method if the researcher suspects the
context influential to the phenomena being studied. The second component
deals with the presence of multiple influential variables, and the holistic nature
of the research method. Yin (2003) notes:
The case study inquiry copes with the technically distinctive situation in
which there will be many more variables of interest than data points,
and as one result, relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data
needing to converge in a triangulation fashion, and as another results
benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide
data collection and analysis, (p. 13)
In this sense, the case study is not merely a data collection method or a
design feature, but rather serves as a comprehensive research strategy (Yin,
2003). Schutt (2006) concludes:
Case study is not so much a single method as it is a way of thinking
about what qualitative data analysis can, or perhaps should focus on.
The case may be an organization, community, social group, family, or
even an individual and, as far as the qualitative researcher is
concerned, it must be understood in its entirety, (p. 292)
The effort to understand what happened in these cases, helps the
researcher gain a better understanding of why things happened as they did
(Schutt, 2006, p. 348).
Multi-Case StudiesThe Comparative Case Method
In political science, multi-case studies are frequently used to explore
the nature of complex world issues; researchers use the comparative case
method in what is often referred to as a collective case study (Yin, 2003,
p.14). Bennett and Elman (2007) note, The prominence of qualitative
methods [and case study methods in particular] in IR thus reflects these
methods advantages in studying complex and relatively unstructured and
infrequent phenomena that lie at the heart of the subfield (p. 171). The goal
64


of a multi-case study is not to provide a sampling or to produce a replication
of findings; rather, the researcher simply looks for patterns in the data, to the
extent of which the presence or absence of certain factors in different cases is
related to similar or different outcomes. The question that guides the research
in these instances is: Are the same types of relationships between variables
identified in multiple cases? (Yin, 2003). Yin (2003) concludes:
If all the cases turn out as predicted, these 6 to 10 cases, in the
aggregate, would have provided compelling support for the initial set of
propositions. If the cases are in some way contradictory, the initial
propositions must be revised and retested with another set of cases.
(p. 47)
The overall purpose of a multi-case study, therefore, is to describe and
compare multiple cases in order to hopefully provide insight into an important
issue (Mahoney, 2007, p. 162).
The holistic nature of the case study approach, and its particular
emphasis on the importance of contextual factors, make it an especially
appealing method for this research project. Gerring (2004) notes, Case
studies enjoy a natural advantage in research of an exploratory nature (p.
349). The complexity of both phenomena being studiedAfrican civil conflicts
and UN peacekeepingalso makes the case study approach fitting. Yin
(2003) states, ...the distinctive need for case studies arises out of the desire
to understand complex social phenomena. In brief, the case study method
allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of
real-life events... (p. 2). As noted previously, case studies are also useful for
studies that involve multiple variables, as this study does. Collier, Hoeffler and
Sambanis (2005) find that, Case studies can also help us distinguish among
several competing mechanisms (p. 23). Furthermore, this method can
enhance a researchers overall understanding of a subject without the
creation of a specific hypothesis. Rubaie (2002) concludes, It encourages
65


researchers to focus on the entire context and to be open to multiple,
interacting influences (p. 32). This study attempts to identify some potential
reasons for why several past UN peacekeeping operations in Africa have
failed; and also identify how current operations could potentially be improved
to become more amenable to African conflicts. As Yin (2003) finds, In
general, case studies are the preferred strategy when how or why questions
are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and
when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life
context (p. 1).
Measurement
When choosing a research method and developing a research design,
researchers also need to consider the measures they will take to ensure that
their results are both valid and reliable (Miller & Salkind, 2002; Schutt, 2006;
Yin, 2003). Yin suggests the three tests of: construct validity, external validity,
and reliability, as the most important tests for ensuring quality research
results with descriptive and exploratory case studies (2003, p. 34).
Yin (2003) defines construct validity as: establishing correct
operational measures for the concepts being studied (p. 35). Schutt (2006)
notes that construct validity also falls under the larger category of
measurement validity, and is frequently used with research designs that are
slightly more subjective in nature. Schutt states:
Measurement validity can also be established by showing that a
measure is related to a variety of other measures specified in a theory.
This validation approach, known as construct validity, is commonly
used in social research when no clear criterion exists for validation
purposes. (2006, p. 120)
Yin (2003) suggests using multiple sources of evidence and the establishing a
clear chain of evidence, in order to ensure the construct validity test is
66


met (p. 35). Using multiple sources of evidence helps encourage convergent
lines of inquiry" (Yin, 2003, p. 36); for this project, the extensive review of
important literature addressing conflict and peacekeeping, proved key in
determining the appropriate measurement tools that could be used to
evaluate the established variables.
Research Design and Data Collection
Yin (2003) notes, Every type of empirical research has an implicit, if
not explicit, research design. In the most elementary sense, the design is the
logical sequence that connects the empirical data to a studys initial research
questions and, ultimately, to its conclusions (p. 20). Again, being the primary
expert on the case study approach, Yin finds five components absolutely
essential to include as a part of the research design when using the case
study method. These components include: the research question(s),
propositions, unit(s) of analysis, the logic linking the data to the propositions,
and the criteria for interpreting the findings (Yin, 2003, p. 21). Those five
components, as applied to this research project, are discussed below, along
with an explanation of the data collection and analysis process.
Research Questions, Propositions and Unit of Analysis
As stated in the introduction, the primary research questions that
guided this study are: Are attributes of African civil conflicts, and the contexts
in which they occur, amenable to current UN intervention strategies? And if
not, how can UN intervention strategies be improved to more effectively
address these conflicts and the unique contexts in which they occur? In order
to more efficiently address these questions Yin (2003) suggests the
researcher develop propositions to help direct attention to more specific
issues necessary to examine within the larger scope of the study (p. 22).
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Propositions can be derived from the issues identified as important or relevant
in previous research, and they also help the researcher narrow their focus as
to what should be analyzed for each case (Yin, 2003, p. 23). In case study
research, the proposed propositions ultimately serve as the independent
variables of analysis; the propositions used to evaluate the peacekeeping
operations included in this study, as identified in the review of literature,
include: the nature of the conflict or the conflict type, the operation mandate,
the organizing agency, the designated resources, the timing of initiation, and
the presence of consent from the warring factors and third parties involved.
These variables are examined as they relate to both the initially perceived
level of success for the operation, and present indicators of sustained or
lasting peace as well.
Individual UN peacekeeping operations serve as the unit of analysis for
this study. In cases where multiple peacekeeping operations were established
consecutively to address the same conflict, the operations are analyzed
together as a unit. The UN peacekeeping operations included in this study
consist of all operations in Africa that were either initiated or concluded within
the 1990s, and whose primary goals were to address issues civil conflict
within a country. By this definition, operations such as UNAVEM Iwhich had
the primary goal of ending Cuban occupation of Angolaand UNTAGwhich
had the primary goal of ending South African occupation of Namibiahave
been excluded from this study, as they can be characterized more as
interstate conflicts moreso than intrastate conflicts. Rather than a sample, the
collection of cases included in this study represent a census of all UN
peacekeeping missions in Africa, addressing civil conflicts, during the
particular decade when peacekeeping was most prevalent in that region. See
Appendix C for a complete list of UN operations analyzed in this study.
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By examining specific peacekeeping operations, one can gain a basic
understanding of the individual African conflicts and the unique contexts
within which they occur. This information is included for each conflict, and is
presented in the case study results chapter under the title historical context
of conflict; this information can also be used to understand the UNs
reasoning for initiating a peacekeeping operation for that conflict. By
examining individual operations one can also identify specific UN intervention
strategies used in each case. Finally, by examining the course and
completion of individual operations, one can also gain a sense of the UNs
perceived success" for each operation. The UN documents containing
information on each peacekeeping operation, often classify the operation as
either completed or terminated." If an operation is classified as completed,
the operation is viewed as having been "successful" in achieving the goals
designated by its mandate. In some cases, there are multiple noted
modifications or additions to the mandate, which, generally indicate the
operation was "successful, but with some difficulty, or partially successful."
Operations that are terminated include operations that are ultimately
unsuccessful in achieving their mandates.
The measurement of perceived success serves as an indicator for
the level of initial successin other words, did the operation appear
successful upon its initial completion? The "sustainable peace" measurement,
however, looks at the situation further out to determine if those initial
achievements were effective in establishing evidence of long-lasting peace in
that society.
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Operational Definitions of Variables
The following operational definitions apply for the variables addressed in this
study:
Conflict Type: the nature and causes of the conflictis the conflict a result of
a historical ethnic rivalry, a dispute over territory or resources, a political
dispute, or combination of multiple factors?
Organizing Agency: the agency or agencies in charge of organizing and
implementing the peacekeeping operationis the operation organized by an
international, regional or local organization, or, is it a multilateral operation
involving multiple organizing agencies?
Available Resources: the designated amount of monetary resources available
to complete the operation, and the designated amount of personnel and
military forces available to complete the operationis it a large-scale or
small-scale operation?
Timing of Operation Initiation: the point at which the operation is initiated, in
relation to the stage of the conflictis the operation initiated before the
conflict starts, during the conflict, after a cease-fire has been reached, or after
a peace-treaty has been signed?
Consent and Third Party Compliance: agreement from the host government,
all warring factions, and any affected third parties, to have peacekeeping
forces presentdoes the operation have support from the local population?
Mandate: the essential base on which any peacekeeping or peacemaking
mission must depend (Clapham, 2000, p. 34); provides legitimacy, defines
the goals of the operation, and determines resources that will be designated
accordinglydoes the mandate meet the needs of the specific conflict and
context, is it clear with a particular end in sight, is it well equipped to achieve
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its goals, and do the strategic objectives incorporate any measures to help
ensure a sustainable or long-lasting peace?
See Table 3.1 below for a summary of the independent variables and their
operational use in this study.
Table 3.1 Independent variables and their operational use
Independent Variable Operational Use
Conflict Type *Ethnic Dispute over Resources or Territory Political Economic (usually as a result of one of the aforementioned issues)
Organizing Agency Unilateral or Multilateral International Regional Local
Available Resources Monetary (Authorized Amount) Personnel/Forces (Maximum Authorized or Maximum Deployed)
Timing Before Conflict StartsPreventative During ConflictPeacemaking Post Cease-FirePeacekeeping Post Peace TreatyPost-Conflict Peacebuilding
Consent And Third Party Compliance Host Government Consent (Yes or No) Consent of All Warring Factions (Yes or No) Third Parties Present? Needs and Concerns of Third Parties Addressed? Compliance or Interference?
Mandate Clear? Appropriate? (does it meet the needs of the specific conflict and context?) Sustainable? (do the strategic objectives incorporate any measures to help ensure a sustainable or long-lasting peace?) Well Equipped? (Resources, Forces and Timeframe)
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Data Collection and Criteria for Interpreting Findings
Yin (2003) finds there are six primary sources of evidence that one can
use when completing a case study, including: documentation, archival
records, interviews, direct observations, participant-observation, and physical
artifacts (pp. 85-96). Documentation and archival records from the UN
Documentation CentreSecurity Council Resolutions, Security Council
Secretary General Reports, Security Council Presidential Statements,
Security Council Meeting Reports, and Security Council Mission Recordsas
well as documents prepared by the UN Department of Public Information
(DPI) in cooperation with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
regarding individual peacekeeping operations, provide the principal evidence
for this research project.
As mentioned previously, background information for each conflict was
first collect, to develop and provide a base understanding of the nature of the
conflict and the context in which it occurred. Multiple UN documents were
then examined for any information pertaining to each of the independent
variables, for each of the twelve casessee Appendix E for a copy of the
case study questions used to collect the data for this study. Table 4.1 (located
at the conclusion of Chapter 4) was used to summarize and organize the data
from all of the cases, and ultimately provides a comprehensive summary of
the independent variables for all cases. The results for each of the twelve
cases, in relation to each of the independent variables and perceived level of
success, are all presented in Chapter 4Case Study Results. A further
analysis and discussion of the case study results is later presented in
Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 4 CASE STUDY RESULTS
This chapter presents the results, case by case, for each of the UN
peacekeeping operations included in this study. The variables prefaced in
Chapter Four serve as a framework for reporting the case findings and a
basic description of each conflict is also provided to supply context. The
cases are presented in chronological order according to the date in which the
UN peacekeeping operation was initiated. Operations occurring within the
same country, pertaining to the same or similar conflict, are presented
consecutively. Information pertaining to the independent variables for all of
the cases has also been summarized and presented in Table 4.1, which is
located at the conclusion of this chapter. In addition, due to the complexity
and duration of the situations in Angola, Rwanda and Somaliafurther
information regarding the situations post-UN withdrawal has been included in
the Appendix. Unless otherwise noted, all data and information reported in
this chapter has been compiled from UN Department of Peacekeeping
Operations records, which can all be found at www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko.
United Nations Angola Verification Mission II
ANGOLA: UNAVEM II (1991-1995)
Historical Context of ConflictConflict Type
The country of Angola has been emerged in political conflict for
decades. Upon its independence from Portugal in 1975, two of the primary
resistance groups that had fought to end colonial rulethe Popular
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Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), led by Jose Eduardo Dos
Santos, and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA), led by Jonas Savimbibecame engaged in a prolonged battle for
political control of Angola. The fighting between these two groups continued
for over fifteen years, partly sustained by foreign military support from the two
major superpowers: the US (and South Africa) backing UNITA and the Soviet
Union (and Cuba) backing the MPLA.
As the Cold War came to a close and the world focus began to shift
away from the bilateral battle of the superpowers, the wider international
community became involved in efforts to negotiate a peaceful settlement
between UNITA and the MPLA. As the result of a regional peace agreement
originally designed to bring independence to the South African protectorate
of South West Africa (Namibia)Angola, South Africa and Cuba signed the
Namibian Accords, which called for the withdrawal of all Cuban troops from
Angolan territory (Hill, 2004, p. 28). The first UN mission in Angola,
UNAVEM I (a unilateral operation) was created in 1989 to monitor this
internally-brokered regional peace agreement to withdraw Cuban and South
African troops from Angola. This first mission was considered a success.
Intervention TypeMandate, Organizing Agency(s),
and Timing of Operation
Following the removal of foreign troops from Angola, there was an
attempt to end the long-standing political conflict between the Angolan
Government [controlled by the MPLA] and UNITA (UNAVEM II Background,
p. 1). In April 1990, the two warring parties began a series of negotiations,
supported and monitored by members from the larger international
communitythese negotiations eventually resulted in the signing of the
Bicesse Accords in May of 1991. The Peace Accords included a ceasefire
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agreement and fundamental principles for establishing a peace in Angola.
With a ceasefire in place, the second UN mission in Angola, UNAVEM II (also
a unilateral operation), was approved in May of 1991 to assist with
implementing the terms of the Peace Accords (UNAVEM II Background p. 2).
Military observers were first deployed to assist with monitoring the ceasefire
and to verify that the joint monitoring groups (consisting of equal
representatives from the Angolan Government and UNITA) carried out their
responsibilities. The mission also assisted with monitoring the neutrality of the
Angolan police; and the UN Security Council later enlarged the UNAVEM II
mandate to include the responsibility of verification of presidential and
legislative elections as well.
Consent and Compliance, Available Resources,
and Mandate Revisions
While both parties originally consented to the Peace Accords (as well
as to UN presence and assistance in Angola) there was, in due course, a
failure in full compliance from both parties to the terms of the agreement.
Total expenditures for the mission amounted to 175,802,600 dollars, and
between October of 1994 and February of 1995, a total of 590 UN forces
were deployed. However, the peace process continued to be delayed, and
trust between the two parties deteriorated. Complaints from UNITA of
systematic irregularities and fraud with the electoral process led to further
tensions and resumed hostilities between the two groups (UNAVEM II
Background p. 5). The UN launched renewed efforts of mediation, adjusting
and extending the UNAVEM II mandate on multiple occasions; however, the
issue of achieving national reconciliation proved most difficult.
A comprehensive peace agreement was finally reached in October of
1994, which resulted in the Lusaka Protocol being signed on 20 November
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1994 (UNAVEM II Background p. 8). The UNAVEM II mandate was once
again adjusted to assist with the initial stages of the Lusaka Protocol peace
agreement. The military situation in Angola remained tense and the ceasefire
fragileand the humanitarian situation also proved grim as the Secretary
General reported dramatic escalation in the number of serious violations of
humanitarian law (UNAVEM II Background p. 11).
Operation Outcome: TRANSFERRED TO UNAVEM III
In February 1995, all responsibilities of UNAVEM II were transferred to
UNAVEM III, which was established to monitor and verify implementation of
the Lusaka Protocol (per Resolution 976 (1995)).
United Nations Angola Verification Mission III
ANGOLA: UNAVEM III (1995-1997)
Intervention TypeMandate, Organizing Agency(s),
and Timing of Operation
The establishment of UNAVEM III, a unilateral effort, was authorized
on 8 February 1995 to assist the parties to restore peace and achieve
national reconciliation on the basis of the Peace Accords, the Lusaka Protocol
and relevant Security Council Resolutions (UNAVEM II Background p. 10)
with a new ceasefire and peace agreement in place, the UN was optimistic.
The new missions tasks included: assisting with the implementation of the
Peace Accords, monitoring the newly established ceasefire, assisting with the
disarmament and demobilization of UNITA forces, and providing humanitarian
assistance to the people of Angola.
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Consent and Compliance, Available Resources,
and Mandate Revisions
UNAVEM III ultimately attempted to set up and implement a specific
timetable for the completing of multiple tasks that were agreed upon as part of
the peace agreement; however, neither side was cooperative in implementing
the agreement and the peace process once again became delayed
(UNAVEM III Background p. 2). Total expenditures for this operation
amounted to 752,215,900 dollars, and a total of 4,175 UN forces were
deployed. UNAVEM Ills mandate was extended on multiple occasions as a
result of the problems encountered and lack of cooperation from those
involved.
Operation Outcome: TRANSFERRED TO MONUA
As UNAVEM Ills mandate neared expiration, its goal of helping to
achieve national reconciliation in Angola had not been reached. In June of
1997, the Security Council decided to establish the United Nations Observer
Mission in Angola (MONUA), which would replace UNAVEM III, effectively
terminating the UNAVEM III mandate (per Resolution 1118 (1997)).
United Nations Observer Mission in Angola
ANGOLA: MONUA (1997-1999)
Intervention TypeMandate, Organizing Agency(s),
and Timing of Operation
The final UN peacekeeping operation in Angola, the United Nations
Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA), was established on 30 June 1997 to
assist the Angolan parties in consolidating peace and national reconciliation,
enhancing confidence-building and creating an environment conducive to
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long-term stability, democratic development and rehabilitation of the country
(MONUA Mandate p.1). This unilateral operation was ultimately initiated
during a time of continued conflict between the Angolan Government and
UNITA forces, with the goals of: establishing and monitoring a renewed
ceasefire, disarming and demobilizing UNITA forces, implementing the Peace
agreement, and assisting with democratic development in Angola.
Consent and Compliance, Available Resources,
and Mandate Revisions
In the weeks and months following operation initiation, the peace
process continued to be delayed due to UNITAs failure to cooperate; the
situation in Angola remained critical with the Secretary General reporting that:
Deep animosity and distrust persisted between the Government of Angola
and UNITA (MONUA Background p. 7). The missions mandate was
extended on multiple occasions in attempt to reach its objectives; and the UN
also imposed economic sanctions on UNITA in an attempt to gain
compliance. The UN spent a total of 293.7 million dollars on the operation,
and deployed 3,568 total forces to Angola during this phase of UN
involvement in the country. However, violence ensued and the peacekeepers
safety became increasingly compromised. The dialogue between the Angolan
Government and UNITA eventually ceased, and full-scale war had returned to
Angola by 1998 (Adebajo & Landsberg, 2000, p. 170).
Operation Outcome: TERMINA TED/UNSUCCESSFUL
The UN ultimately recognized its inability to carry out the tasks
designated in MONUAs mandate, and the Angolan Government also
considered that conditions for maintaining a MONUA presence had ceased
to exist (MONUA Background p. 7). The UN eventually withdrew the mission
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from Angola upon the expiration of its mandate in February of 1999, and
began the technical liquidation of MONUA and its predecessorswhose
combined presence in Angola spanned a period of almost 10 years...
(MONUA Background p. 7). The human rights component remained active
during liquidation phase, and the Untied Nations Office in Angola (UNOA)
was established on 15 October 1999 to further assist Angola with the peace-
building process and oversee issues of human rights protection (per
Resolution 1268 (1999)). See Appendix G for further information regarding
Angolas progress proceeding MONUAs withdrawal.
United Nations Operation in Somalia I
SOMALIA: UNOSOM I (1992-1993)
Historical Context of ConflictConflict Type
Due to its proximity to the Suez Canal and key trade routes, the
territory now known as Somalia, has historically experienced longtime conflict
over political control. The area was of European interest as early as the mid-
1800s, and later during the Cold War the major superpowers disputed claims
over the territory (MacQueen, 2002, p. 199). Following the period of
decolonization, Somalia finally gained independence as a state in 1960;
however, uniting all Somalis under a single government proved a difficult task.
In addition, Somalias irredentist claims in regards to territories on the
Kenyan, Ethiopian and Djibouti borders, also help to spur a high level of
antagonism between Somalia and its neighbors (Berdal & Economides, 2007,
p. 100). Primarily nomadic herdsman living in a semi-arid desert environment,
Somalis were also accustomed to fighting for land and access to pasture and
water.
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The new state of Somalia achieved limited democratic stability upon its
independence; however, the elected government was soon overthrown by a
military coup led by General Muhammad Siyad Barre in 1969 (MacQueen,
2002, p. 200). Berdal and Economides (2007) note of this transition, ...it also
involved Somalia more deeply in the Cold War rivalries than previously, and,
by giving the regime access to plentiful and relatively sophisticated military
supplies, contributed over the longer term to the destruction of the state (p.
110). Historical clan rivalries in the area further contributed to the intense
nature of the conflict and the eventual overthrow of Siyad Barre in 1991. Clan
allegiance in Somalia continues to prove problematic even today: Their un-
centralized political organization belonged to the type classified by political
anthropologists as a segmentary lineage system where political identity and
loyalty are determined by genealogical closeness and remoteness (Berdal &
Economides, p.114).
Having successfully overthrown Siyad Barre, the two leaders of the
United Somali Congress (USC) Hawiye opposition movementMohamed
Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohammedexperienced great difficulty in
reaching agreement on how to share power over their newly awarded
territory. As a result, brutal Violence erupted in Mogadishu and surrounding
areas, agricultural regions were destroyed, and death and starvation ensued:
...the realities of clan allegiance which had been sharpened rather than
diminished by their encapsulation in the exotic structure of a centralized state
which provided a new and enlarged arena for clan competition and conflict
(Berdal & Economides, 2004, p. 116).
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Intervention TypeMandate, Organizing Agency(s),
and Timing of Operation
The continued state of conflict throughout 1991 led to increasing
starvation in Somaliaultimately prompting the involvement of the UN, ICRC
and other NGOs, in attempt to provide humanitarian assistance to the people
of Somalia. Even though fighting continued in the Somali capital of
Mogadishu, by January of 1992 all faction leaders, with the exception of
General Aideed, had expressed support of a ceasefire and consented to a UN
presence in hopes of facilitating national reconciliation (UNSOM I
Background, p.2). The first United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I)
was deployed in April of 1992, with the mandate of monitoring the ceasefire
and providing humanitarian assistance to the people of Somalia. The
operation was multilateral, as the UN operation was supported by multiple
regional organizations as well: the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the
League of Arab States (LAS), and the Organization of Islamic Conference
(OIC).
Consent and Compliance, Available Resources,
and Mandate Revisions
The UN provided peacekeepers to help protect food convoys;
however, food shipments were continually blocked by two primary warlords in
MogadishuAli Mahdi and Aideedand several thousands of Somalis died
of starvation or became refugees (Adebajo & Landsberg, 2000, p. 171). The
UN designated a total of 42.9 million dollars and 947 total forces towards the
operation, which continued to experience multiple difficulties in implementing
its original mandate, including a lack of cooperation from the multiple factions
involved. UNOSOM I responsibilities were eventually transferred to a UN
Task Force (UNITAF) in December of 1992, which was formed to help
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facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid; this operation was often refered to
as Operation Restore Hope.
Operation Outcome: TERMINATED and
TRANSFERRED TO UNOSOMII
After two UN-led peace conferences, agreements were signed but
never fully implemented. In May of 1993, UNITAF became UNOSOM II.
United Nations Operation in Somalia II
SOMALIA: UNOSOM II (1993-1995)
Intervention TypeMandate, Organizing Agency(s),
and Timing of Operation
As mentioned earlier, UNITAF became UNOSOM II in May of 1993.
This new mission attempted, with further support from the OAU, LAS, and
OIC, to continue efforts made by UNOSOM I in providing humanitarian
assistance and monitoring the ceasefire. UNOSOM II was also to provide
assistance with disarmament of warring factions and facilitation for the
national reconciliation process.
Consent and Compliance, Available Resources,
and Mandate Revisions
On multiple occasions, the operations progress was delayed as
Aideeds fighters continually demonstrated noncompliance with the terms of
the ceasefire and also frequently committed numerous acts of resistance and
violence towards peacekeepers. Furthermore, with the collapse of the central
government in Somalia, there was no fundamental authority with which to
negotiate. The UN operation continued to experience difficulties with
implementing its mandate, and as a result, the mandate was renewed and
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extended on multiple occasions. Total expenditures for the mission reached a
record 1.6 billion dollars and a total of 28,000 UN forces were authorized and
deployed. In June of 1993, the UN Security Council passed a resolution that
called for Aideeds capture, an effort that: ...went disastrously wrong when
the Rangers became caught in a firefight with Aideeds men, resulting in the
death of eighteen American soldiers and about one thousand Somalis, mostly
civilians (Adebajo and Landsberg, 2000, p. 172).
Operation Outcome: MANDATE ENDED/UNSUCCESSFUL
Shortly after the failed attempt to capture Aideed, all peacekeepers were
withdrawn from Somalia. UNOSOM Ms mandate expired in March 1995, and
was not renewedthe mission was unsuccessful in achieving its mandated
tasks. See Appendix H for further information regarding Somalias progress
proceeding UNOSOM Ms withdrawal.
United Nations Operation in Mozambique
MOZAMBIQUE: ONUMOZ (1992-1994)
Historical Context of ConflictConflict Type
A few years following its independence from Portugal, Mozambique
was engaged in a complex civil political war: Between 1975 and 1990, the
Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) government and the
Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) rebels were locked in a brutal
civil war (Adebajo & Lansberg, 2000, p. 167). The RENAMO rebels were
supported by South Africas apartheid regime. Informal negotiations between
the RENAMO and FRELIMO (the current independent government of
Mozambique) began in 1988, facilitated by the Community of Sant Egidio, a
Catholic international lay association. By 1989, members of Southern Africas
Frontline States (FLS) were involved with the support of other major
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international actors, such as the US and UN. The first of a series of direct
meetings between FRELIMO and RENAMO took place in 1990; through
further talks, a Joint Verification Committee was established, and in 1991 the
two warring parties signed the Basic Principles of the Mozambican Peace
Agreement (Adebajo & Landsberg, 2000, p. 167). At this point the UN
became officially involved.
Intervention TypeMandate, Organizing Agency(s),
and Timing of Operation
The UN operation in Mozambique was initiated as part of the
Mozambican Peace Agreement, which incorporated terms for implementing a
ceasefire; the operations mandate included the tasks of: monitoring the
ceasefire, disarming and demobilizing forces, and assisting with nation-
building and the holding of national elections (ONUMOZ Background
Summary p. 1). ONUMOZ also launched a humanitarian assistance
programme to: ...help the 3.7 million people displaced by war to resettle in
the communities (ONUMOZ Background, p. 1). Although the UN unilaterally
organized the operation, the OAU was involved as well, by serving on the
Supervisory and Monitoring Commission established to help guarantee
implementation of the Peace Agreement.
Consent and Compliance, Available Resources,
and Mandate Revisions
All parties involved in this conflict had consented to the UNs presence
in Mozambique for the purposes of implementing the Mozambican Peace
Agreementand there were no necessary mandate revisions made. Total
expenditures for the UN operation in Mozambique amounted to 486.7 million
dollars and a total of 8,563 UN forces were deployed.
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Operation Outcome: SUCCESSFUL
Although the mission experienced several difficulties, by 1994 it was
successful in demobilizing more than 76,000 soldiers from both sides,
resettling over 75 percent of internally displaced persons (IDPs), and
facilitating the countrys first multiparty elections. This UN peacekeeping
operation is viewed as one of the few successful cases, as Adebajo and
Landsberg (2000) note, The international communitys role was decisive in
brining an end to Mozambiques war" (p. 167).
United Nations Observer Mission Rwanda-Uganda
RWANDA/UGANDA: UNOMUR (1993-1994)
Historical Context of ConflictConflict Type
Rwandas history has been plagued with ethnic division; MacQueen
(2002) notes, The origins of Rwandas contemporary ethnic division date
from the fifteenth century (p. 60). The Tutsis (a minority immigrant group)
established their own monarchial system, based on a feudal lordship of the
Tutsis over the Hutus, early on. This social structure endured for years and
was made even more rigid by European colonial forces that later controlled
the region. In 1919, following the end of World War I, Rwanda became a
mandate territory of the League of Nations under the administration of
Belgium (www.rwandagateway.org). The Belgian colonialists relied on
already-established Tutsi aristocracy to enforce Belgian policies. When the
Tutsis began to call for independence, the Belgians transferred their support
to Hutus. In 1959, anti-Tutsi violence erupted following the assault of Hutu
politician, Dominique Mbonyumutwa. Shortly thereafter Rwanda gained
independence from Belgium in 1962, and became under control of a Hutu-
dominated government. Ethnic tension continued to present complications
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following Rwandan independence, with both inter-ethnic as well as intra-
ethnic conflicts continuing throughout the following decades.
In October of 1990, the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), a group of
minority Tutsi refugee warriors (supported by the Ugandan government),
invaded Rwanda from Uganda. As a result of this attack, all Tutsi inside the
country were collectively labeled as accomplices of RPF (UNAMIR
Background p. 2). In addition, members of the opposition parties were also
accused of betraying their country due to their opposition to the Government
in power and their attempts to enter into a dialogue with RPF (UNAMIR
Background p. 2). Rwandas government at that time was ruled by Juvenal
Habyarimana, and continued to be Hutu-dominated.
Intervention TypeMandate, Organizing Agency(s),
and Timing of Operation
Several ceasefire agreements were put into place after the outbreak of
fighting in 1990. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) first supplied a 50-
member Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG I) in July of 1993; however,
hostilities soon resumed between the Rwandan government and the
Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), further interrupting the negotiating process
between the two governments of Rwanda and Uganda. At this point, both
state governments asked for UN assistance in establishing the facts of the
situation and in monitoring the common border to prevent military use of it. As
a result of this request, the UN Security Council authorized the establishment
of the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR), which
was launched on the Uganda side of the common border.
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Consent and Compliance, Available Resources,
and Mandate Revisions
As noted above, both the Rwandan and Ugandan governments
consented to the UNs presence in the region. A total of 81 military observers
were deployed. However, as a result of the changing nature of the conflict
and the increasing existence of a humanitarian crisis in Rwanda, UNOMURs
tasks had to be adjusted and military observers reassigned. The operations
total expenditures amounted to 2.3 million dollars. In time, an additional UN
operation (UNAMIR) was established to address the mounting problems in
the region. The military observers of UNOMUR eventually came under
command of this new mission.
Operation Outcome: TERMINA TED/UNSUCCESSFUL
As the situation further declined it appeared UNOMURs original
mandate was somewhat irrelevant, and UN Security Council Resolution 928
(20/6/94) endorsed the decision to close UNOMUR. The mission officially
coming to a close in September of 1994.
United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
RWANDA: UNAMIR (1993-1996)
Intervention TypeMandate, Organizing Agency(s),
and Timing of Operation
Occurring more or less consecutively with the progression of
UNOMUR, the Organization of Africa Unity (OAU) arranged peace talks in
Rwanda, which eventually led to a comprehensive peace settlement in
August of 1993 (Adebajo & Landsberg, 2000, p. 173). The UN Assistance
Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) was established to help implement the
87