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Military commericalism and coup behavior

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Military commericalism and coup behavior
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Walker, Matthew E. ( author )
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English
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Coups d'état ( lcsh )
Military policy -- History -- Egypt -- 20th century ( lcsh )
Politics and government -- Egypt ( lcsh )
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bibliography ( marcgt )
theses ( marcgt )
non-fiction ( marcgt )

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When do states experience coup d’états? Previous studies of military intervention have analyzed various social conditions that have been assessed as determinants of coup behavior. Relationships between select social conditions and coup behavior are often determined by how a variable motivates military movement and creates opportunities for intervention. Separately, comparative studies of military behavior during the 2011 Arab uprisings have assessed that the Egyptian armed forces' seizure of the state was motivated by commercial interests, a notion not addressed by previous studies of coup behavior. Military-owned enterprises have become common in states that struggle to provide adequate budgetary support to their armed forces. This study hypothesizes that militaries engaged in commercial activities are more likely to engage in coup behavior than armed forces that derive budgetary support solely from the state. This hypothesis is derived from the assumption that commercial activity expands the institutional interests of the armed forces and, consequently, makes them far more sensitive to socio-economic conditions. Regimes that implement ineffective domestic policy are more likely threatened by military intervention. This study will empirically test the hypothesized relationship between military commercialism and intervention using a similar systems design to select and evaluate cases from a regional sample.
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Thesis (M.A) - University of Colorado Denver.
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Includes bibliographic references
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Department of Political Science
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by Matthew E. Walker.

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Full Text
MILITARY COMMERCIALISM AND COUP BEHAVIOR
by
MATTHEW E. WALKER
B.A., Metropolitan State University of Denver, 2010
A thesis submitted to the
Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Colorado in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Masters of Arts
Political Science Program
2015


This thesis for the Master of Arts degree by
Matthew E. Walker
has been approved for the
Political Science Program
By
Christoph Stefes, Chair
Lucy McGuffey
Sasha Breger Bush


iii
Walker, Matthew E. (M.A., Political Science)
Military Commercialism and Coup Behavior
Thesis directed by Christoph Stefes, Associate Professor
ABSTRACT
When do states experience coup detats? Previous studies of military intervention
have analyzed various social conditions that have been assessed as determinants of coup
behavior. Relationships between select social conditions and coup behavior are often
determined by how a variable motivates military movement and creates opportunities for
intervention. Separately, comparative studies of military behavior during the 2011 Arab
uprisings have assessed that the Egyptian armed forces' seizure of the state was motivated
by commercial interests, a notion not addressed by previous studies of coup behavior.
Military-owned enterprises have become common in states that struggle to provide
adequate budgetary support to their armed forces. This study hypothesizes that militaries
engaged in commercial activities are more likely to engage in coup behavior than armed
forces that derive budgetary support solely from the state. This hypothesis is derived from
the assumption that commercial activity expands the institutional interests of the armed
forces and, consequently, makes them far more sensitive to socio-economic conditions.
Regimes that implement ineffective domestic policy are more likely threatened by
military intervention. This study will empirically test the hypothesized relationship
between military commercialism and intervention using a similar systems design to select
and evaluate cases from a regional sample.
The form and content of this abstract are approved. I recommend its publication.
Approved: Christoph Stefes


IV
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER
I. INTRODUCTION.......................................................1
II. LITERATURE REVIEW.................................................5
2.1 Military-owned Enterprises and Commercial Activities..............5
2.2 Coup Risk.......................................................10
2.2.1 Motivations.............................................11
2.2.2 Opportunities...........................................15
2.3 Coup Proofing Measures and Strategies...........................19
III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK..........................................26
3.1 Two Step Model and Military Commercialism.......................26
3.2 Coup Proofing Strategies and Military Commercialism.............28
3.3 Hypotheses......................................................30
IV. METHODOLOGY.....................................................31
4.1 Model...........................................................31
4.2 Variable Selection and Measure..................................34
4.2.1 Dependent Variable......................................34
4.2.2 Independent Variable....................................35
4.2.3 Constant Variables......................................35
4.2.3.1 Background......................................36
4.2.3.2 Triggering......................................39
4.2.3.3 Coup Proofing...................................41
4.3 Case Selection...................................................42


V
V. ANALYSIS.......................................................45
5.1.1 Constant Variable: Background................................45
5.1.2 Constant Variable: Triggering................................47
5.1.3 Constant Variable: Coup Proofing.............................51
5.2 Independent Variable...........................................53
IV. CONCLUSION.....................................................61
REFERENCES.........................................................66


VI
LIST OF TABLES
TABLE
1. Constant Variable: Background.............................................45
2. Constant Variable: Triggering.............................................47
3. Constant Variable: Coup Proofing..........................................51
4. Independent Variable: Military Commercialism..............................53


1
CHAPTERI
INTRODUCTION
The Arab revolutions of 2011 challenged governments across the Middle East and
North Africa. Though confronted by domestic political crises, leaders in Tunisia (14
January), Egypt (11 February), and Libya (23 August), were indirectly (through lack of
support) and directly challenged by the armed forces charged with the preservation of
their regimes. In sharp contrast, the militaries of Syria, Jordan, and Bahrain supported
and defended their respective regimes against mass protests. What explains this
divergence in outcomes across similar states facing similar circumstances? Researchers
have attempted to explain this behavior by evaluating military structure. However, few
studies have provided sufficient explanation for the actions of armed forces during the
2011 uprisings. In an attempt to explain the motivations of intervening militaries,
comparative studies identified and described the commercial activities of the armed
forces. Specifically, militaries in Egypt and Tunisia owned private enterprises that served
as a source of income and wealth for military personnel. Based on the existence of these
military economic institutions under regimes that were forced to abdicate power, this
study contends that commercial interests challenge the militaries willingness to support
the ruling regime. Moreover, this study further contends that military commercialism
encourages coup behavior.
To test this assessed relationship, this study conceptualizes military
commercialism, the independent variable, as a structural attribute of the state that
enhances the motivations of the armed forces to withdraw their support from the ruling
regime and execute a coup detat, the dependent variable. Additionally, this study


2
contends that military commercialism limits the ruling regimes ability to coopt the
armed forces and, subsequently, challenges the effectiveness of coup proofing strategies
implemented to prevent military intervention.
The study begins by evaluating literature on military commercialism and
intervention. Review of studies on military business and coup risk and proofing reveal
that no study has investigated the possible relationship between military commercialism
and intervention. Studies of military business define military commercialism and describe
military owned enterprises (MOPES) in various cases, however they do not address the
possible political consequences of military involvement in the economy. Similarly, civil-
military studies have not identified nor evaluated military commercialism as a possible
determinant of coup behavior. Finally, studies of coup proofing have considered the
allocation of commercial enterprises to the military as a strategy to coopt the armed
forces and prevent intervention. However, these studies have not considered the possible
political consequences of an enfranchised military.
This study uses concepts identified by coup risk studies to develop theoretical
expectations for military commercialism. Studies of coup risk postulate that militaries
need sufficient motivations and opportunities to launch a coup. This study contends that
ownership of commercial enterprises diversifies the interest of the armed forces and
makes their institution more sensitive to domestic political and economic conditions.
Consequently, enfranchised militaries are more likely motivated to intervene when policy
or domestic conditions threaten the profits of MOPEs.
This study also contends that military commercialism challenges the coup
proofing measures and strategies implemented by the ruling regime. Coup proofing


3
studies suggest that governments allocate resources to the military to ensure their loyalty
and deter coup behavior. Moreover, it is suggested that the enfranchisement of the armed
forces is a coup proofing strategy. This study contends that profits derived from MOPEs
limits the regimes ability to coopt the armed forces and prevent intervention.
With these theoretical expectations, the study investigates the relationship
between military commercialism and coup behavior using a most similar systems design
(MSSD). This method was selected because it controls for social conditions correlated
with military intervention that provide possible alternative assessments that challenge the
relationship being investigated. Similarly, the model is structured to accommodate the
theoretical calculus identified within previous studies, further limiting alternative
assessments. With these controls, the model isolates the independent and dependent
variables for evaluation.
Additionally, MSSD is used to select cases for this study. Modem Egypt and
Syria were chosen as the two cases using independent, dependent, and constant variables.
Egypt and Syria exhibit all social conditions controlled by the study and are diametrically
different with regards to the independent and dependent variables. Specifically, the
Egyptian armed forces were highly involved in commercial activity and launched a coup
during the 2011 uprisings. Conversely, the Syrian military was not involved in
commercial activity and defended the ruling regime during the 2011 uprisings.
Using the cases of modern Egypt and Syria, evaluation of social conditions prior
to and during the 2011 uprisings identifies that military commercialism was significant in
determining military behavior. This study assesses that commercial interests motivated
the Egyptian armed forces to intervene during the 2011 uprisings. Additionally, the study


4
suggests that the significant profits derived from Egyptian MOPEs likely limited the
effectiveness of coup proofing measures and the regimes ability to enact such strategies.
Conversely, analysis of civil-military relations in Syria suggests the that absence of
military commercialism ensured the support of the Syrian armed forces and prevented
challenges to coup proofing strategies.
The identification of this relationship significantly contributes to civil-military
studies. The inclusion of military commercialism as a determinant of coup behavior will
provide more accurate assessments of coup risk. Moreover, its inclusion will likely
encourage more comprehensive examination of specific relationships. Additionally,
military commercialisms incorporation into civil-military studies will encourage greater
reporting on and analysis of military commercial activities, an area of social science that
has not been sufficiently studied.


5
CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature summary is comprised of three selections of comparative studies
for evaluating coup behavior and the commercial activities of the armed forces. First,
this summary reviews comparative studies on MOPEs to establish the scope of military
commercial activity and their socio-economic effects on civil-military relations. Second,
literature on coup risk is evaluated. Coup risk studies identify structural and triggering
conditions that are assessed to be determinants of military intervention. Finally, this
summary reviews studies of coup proofing strategies utilized by civilian leaders to
prevent military intervention. The review of this selection is necessary because each
body of literature does not adequately consider the other. Specifically, comparative
studies of MOPEs do not consider civil-military studies in their analysis of military
behavior. Equally, studies on civil-military relationships do not incorporate military
commercialism in their analyses of coup behavior and proofing strategies. Given this
lack of consideration, this summary identifies where the incorporation of military
commercialism can contribute to each body of study to provide a more reliable analysis
of coup behavior.
Section 2.1 Military-owned Private Enterprises and Commercial Activities
Literature on the commercial activities of the armed forces has largely
established a consensus on what military-owned private enterprises and commercial
activities are. In Brommelhorster and Paes seminal comparative study of military
commercialism, The Military As An Economic Actor, the authors define military


6
business as economic activities falling under the influence of the armed forces
regardless of whether they are controlled by the defense ministry or the various branches
of the armed or specific units or individual officers (Brommelhorster and Paes 2003,
15). Brommelhorster and Paes further define the commercial activities as operations
involving all levels of the armed forces. These range from corporations owned by the
military as an institution, to welfare foundations belonging to different services, to
enterprises run at the unit level and individual soldiers who use their position for private
economic gain (Brommelhorster and Paes 2003, 15). This definition provides a strong
characterization of military business, however, it is limited by its exclusion of members
that participate and benefit from military commercial activities.
In Military Inc., Ayesha Siddiqua (2007) expresses similar criticisms of the
Brommelhorster and Paes conceptualization and defines military business as:
Military capital used for the personal benefit of the military fraternity, especially the
officer cadre, which is not recorded as part of the defense budget or does not follow
the normal accountabilities procedures of the state, making it an independent genre
of capital. It is either controlled by the military or under its implicit or explicit
patronage. (12)
Siddiquas definition accounts for all benefactors of military capital and the purpose of
military commercial activity. Additionally, this definition omits military activity that is
overseen by the defense ministry and, subsequently, the civilian government. This
language excludes defense industries that, although overseen by the civilian institutions,
still personally benefit the military fraternity. An example of this would be the
significant arms trades the Egyptian armed forces engage in throughout the Middle East
and North Africa. Despite this criticism, Siddiqua accurately defines military
commercialism and conceptualizes the independent variable this study intends to


7
evaluate (Siddiqa 2007).
Literature on military commercialism suggests that participation in the
marketplace is a consequence of the states inability to adequately fund the armed forces
(Brommelhorster and Paes 2003; Cheung 2003; Gonchar 2003; Thayer 2003). States that
are unable to sufficiently provide resources to support the military authorize and
encourage the armed forces to participate in the private economy. In The Rises and Fall
of the Chinese Military Business Complex, Cheung describes how the Chinas People's
Liberation Army extensively participated in domestic industries when national defense
spending was relegated to secondary importance (Cheung 2003). Moreover, Thayers
analysis of military commercial activity in Indonesia indicated that limited state
spending necessitated alternative revenue streams in order to preserve the armed forces
(Thayer 2003).
A selection of this literature more specifically notes that military commercial
activity was and remains a system for ensuring welfare for retired military personnel and
their families (Golkar 2012; Siddiqa-Agha 2003). Siddiqa describes how Pakistan's
government and the armed forces established four major foundations for provision of
military welfare services. These foundations engaged aggressively in profit-making
activities that expanded the welfare foundations into major business conglomerates
(Siddiqa 2007). Golkar describes small businesses in Iran that were allocated to Basij
militia members who participated in the Iran-Iraq War as an alternative to traditional
veterans benefits which the regime could not afford. These small businesses evolved
into major enterprises (Golkar 2012).
Military commercialism is assessed to be largely independent of civilian


8
institutional controls. This independence is attributed to weak civilian institutions
incapable of sufficiently auditing and controlling military commercial activities
(Brommelhorster and Paes 2003; Castro and Zamora 2003; Golkar 2012; Thayer 2003).
The literature argues that civilian control is challenged by the political influence of
military capital. Political influence is used to promote policy that advances the
commercial interests of the armed forces and challenges procedures that threaten them
(Brommelhorster and Paes 2003). Golkar identifies how the Basij militia utilized its
military capital to move members into Iranian state apparatuses to enhance institutional
interest. In 2005, militia member Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was appointed to the
presidency. Subsequently, members of the Basij were appointed to influential cabinet
positions and, subsequently, the paramilitarys commercial activities and profits sharply
increased (Golkar 2012). Additionally, the literature suggests that the threat of force
prevents civilian control over military commercialism (Brommelhorster and Paes 2003;
Castro and Zamora 2003; Thayer 2003). This notion is very provocative, however, it is
weakly developed within the military business literature. Moreover, no author explicitly
assesses the possibility of military intervention when civilian leaders challenge the
commercial interests of the armed forces.
Military-owned enterprises are assessed to have significant advantages over
many civilian industries in certain contexts. The armed forces, for the purposes of their
institutional responsibilities, are allocated state resources to include real estate,
manpower, equipment, and a defense budget that are often diverted to engage in
commercial activity. Moreover, the military is granted privileged access to radio
frequencies, airports, ports and transport facilities that enhance the commercial activities


9
of the armed forces (Brommelhorster and Paes 2003; Castro and Zamora 2003; Thayer
2003). Speaking to the matter of manpower, Thayer reports that in 1993, 70 thousand
Vietnamese soldiers (12 percent of the armed forces) were employed full-time in various
commercial enterprises (Thayer 2003). Similarly, in Soldiers as Businessmen: The
Economic Activities of Central Americas Militaries, Arnoldo Brenes Castro and Kevin
Cases Zamora indicated that Honduran armed forces were directed to serve in support of
military commercial activities during the 1990s. Additionally, private enterprises owned
by Central American militaries received exemptions from taxation during this same
decade (Castro and Zamora 2003).
Castro and Zamora assess that the threat of force influences and gives advantage
to military owned enterprises. The authors describe how Central American armed forces
involved in commercial activity do not always uphold business contracts since there is
no force to coerce the military into fulfilling transactions (Castro and Zamora 2003).
Castro and Zamoras research is the only reviewed comparative study that reports the
military threatening the use of coercive force to protect and advance commercial
interests.
Military commercialism is argued to challenge the efficiency and efficacy of the
armed forces (Brommelhorster and Paes 2003; Brooks 1998; Cheung 2003). Militaries
involved in the market place will neglect their primary institutional responsibilities and
allocate effort and resources to increase income derived from private enterprise. Cheung
(2003) identifies that:
At the height of the PLAs involvement in business, it was common for between
20 percent and one third of personnel from grass roots military units, especially
those stationed in coastal regions, to be fully engaged in commercial activities at
any given time. Central orders permitting no more than 5 percent of troops from


10
taking part in sideline production activities were universally ignored. (65)
In Political-Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes, Risa Brooks assesses
that military commercialism and the subsequent corrosion of efficiency is a designed
consequence (Brooks 1998). Threatened civilian leaders permit and encourage military
commercial activities to undermine the military establishments cohesion by creating a
class of military entrepreneurs whose professional links are more likely to be with other
entrepreneurs than with the army they serve, allegiances are divided and the status quo is
reinforced (Brooks 1998, 51). Brooks and Cheung are the only studies that analyze the
impact of military commercialism on the institution of the armed forces. Brooks
analysis further identifies a relationship between military commercial activity and
regime stability (Brooks 1998). However, neither Brooks nor Cheung directly assess a
possible relationship between military commercialism and intervention.
The available literature on military commercialism does not indicate possible
relationships between military commercialism and intervention. A small selection of the
reviewed literature does identify how militaries influence civilian institutions and the
marketplace to protect commercial interests, however, this select literature does not
further assess how greater involvement in the marketplace and the expansion of
institutional interests could possibly encourage coup behavior.
Section 2.2 Coup Risk
Literature on coup risk analyzes social conditions that heighten or lower a civilian
governments risk of military intervention. Social conditions correlated with military
intervention are identified as determinants of coup behavior. Finers contends that


11
militaries need to be motivated to launch a coup (Finer 2002). Most coup leaders suggest
that their seizure of power was motivated by national interests, an ideal based on the
belief that the ruling regime threatened what the military perceived to be the permanent
interests of the state (Luttwak 1979; Nordlinger 1977). All political bodies that make a
claim to power do so in the name of national interest, even when the claim is made for
their own benefit. Unlike other political bodies, the military is well placed to invoke
claims of national interest. Armed forces symbolize independence, sovereignty, and
equality and are identified as an apolitical and nationalistic institution whose sole purpose
is to defend the state. When militaries seize power, this national identity makes their
claim of national interest seem more plausible (Finer 2002). With this consideration, the
reviewed literature analyzes military movements through a rationalist perspective,
suggesting that coups are more often motivated by institutional rather than national
interests.
Section 2.2.1- Motivations
Armed forces are motivated to intervene when the militarys institutional interests
are threatened (Finer 2002; Nordlinger 1977; Perlmutter 1977; Thompson 1976;
Zimmermann 1983). The reviewed literature suggests that militaries are concerned with
the preservation of adequate budgetary support, institutional responsibilities, autonomy in
managing institutional internal affairs, and the continuity of the institution itself (Finer
2002; Nordlinger 1977). Threats to these institutional interests are assessed to motivate
coup behavior.
Adequate budgetary support is assessed to significantly dispose the militaries to
engage in coup behavior. Militaries must secure funding in order to maintain their


12
institutions and fulfill their responsibilities. Insufficient state income presents challenges
to states attempting to maintain budgetary support for the military (Finer 2002;
Nordlinger 1977). When risk of military intervention is perceived as low, civilian
governments pursue policy that cuts funding allocated to national security in order to
preserve subsidies for modernization and social programs. If cuts are perceived by the
armed forces as a challenge to their institution, military leadership will threaten
intervention. When civilian leadership fails to respond to the militarys budgetary
concerns, the armed forces will likely launch a coup. When military intervention is
successful, budgetary adjustments that serve the interests of the armed forces will likely
follow.
The 1966 coup that overthrew Ghanaian leader Kwarne Nkrumah and his single
party regime, the Convention Peoples Party (CPP), was motivated by the militarys
budgetary concerns. Nkrumah and his regime were engaging in infrastructure projects
and establishing political organizations and institutions that voraciously consumed state
income. Consequently, senior officer salaries were significantly reduced and perquisites,
such as utility subsides and travel facilities, were rescinded. The cuts provoked aggrieved
officers to lead the Ghanaian armed forces and police to overthrow the CPP regime and
establish the military-led National Liberation Council. Prior to the restoration of
democratic civilian governance in 1969, the Council restored officer salaries, benefits,
and increased the defense budget by thirty percent. The Ghanaian armed forces again
launched a coup in 1972 when austerity measures reduced the national defense budget by
ten percent and the subsequent economic downturn provoked military budgetary concerns
(Apter 1968; Nordlinger 1977).


13
The relationship between military budgetary interests and intervention is
challenged by Thompsons study, which observed limited correlation between the
defense budget and intervention. Conversely, Thompson observes coups occurring
during years in which defense expenditure increased (Thompson 1980). However,
Thompsons study does not identify how the defense budget was distributed. Coup
proofing literature contends that civilian leaders, threatened by the armed forces, will
allocate funds for the establishment of paramilitary organizations to deter or directly
challenge military movements against the government, which would subsequently
increase defense spending (Albrecht 2015; Janowitz 1964; Quinlivan 1991). Janowtizs
study of coup proofing strategies reported an increase in paramilitary forces in a
sampling similar to that of Thompson's analysis of military grievances (Janowitz 1964;
Thompson 1980).
Analysis of budgetary concerns and coup behavior has not been integrated into
military commercialism. Militaries engaged in commercial activity have more diverse
institutional interests. These institutional interests are more sensitive to and are more
easily threatened by socio-economic conditions. Consequently, armed forces involved in
commercial activity are more likely aggrieved. Conversely, the institutional interests of
militaries funded solely by the state are more insulated from and are less likely to be
challenged by socio-economic conditions. Incorporation of this consideration into
analysis of coup behavior would provide more reliable assessments of military
grievances and motivation.
Armed forces are disposed to coup behavior when civilian leaders trespass into
the internal affairs of the military. According to the reviewed literature, interference by


14
civilian authority is perceived as a threat to the autonomy of the armed forces. (Finer
2002; Nordlinger 1977; Zimmermann 1983). Military autonomy excludes civilian
involvement in shaping the educational and training curriculum, the assignment of
officers to particular posts, the promotion of all but the most senior officers, and the
formulation of defense strategies (Nordlinger 1977, 71). The approval of strategy and
the appointment of military leadership by civilians violate military autonomy, possibly
challenge military effectiveness, and compel the armed forces to military intervention.
The 1952 overthrow of the Egyptian monarchy was motivated by King Farouks
interference in the internal affairs of military. Specifically, in 1948, the king ordered the
Egyptian armed forces to attack Israel despite warnings by military leadership that they
were unprepared for combat. Moreover, the king approved the purchase of defective
weaponry prior to conflict. Concurrent with this direct interference, King Farouk had
appointed and shifted officers based on their loyalties to the regime. These transgressions
into military affairs motivated leaders of the armed forces to participate in the Free
Officers movement, launch a coup, and seize power in 1952 (Nordlinger 1977).
Military entrepreneurship makes civilian intrusions into the internal affairs of the
military more likely. Participation in the economy creates military institutional
responsibilities and interests separate from the primary functions of the armed forces.
Expansion of the institution likely makes the military more sensitive to economic
conditions and policy enacted by the regime. Beyond the expressed provocations of
budgetary concerns, policy that challenges business activities of the armed forces can be
perceived as an intrusion by the regime into the internal affairs of the military.


15
Section 2.2.2 Opportunities
Finer contends that aggrieved militaries need opportunities to launch a coup.
Opportunities are conditions in which militaries, disposed to intervention, have sufficient
prospect to launch a coup and seize power (Finer 2002; Luttwak 1979; Nordlinger 1977).
These conditions are also expressed as regime vulnerabilities that pull militaries towards
interventions that are already being pushed by institutional grievances (Zimmermann
1983).
Beyond being exploitable vulnerabilities in the ruling regime, opportunities are
expressed as social conditions by which coup leaders can legitimize their military
movement. Legitimacy is necessary for convincing members of the armed forces to
participate in a coup. Moreover, legitimacy is necessary for gaining and maintaining the
consent of the populace that the military will govern. Conversely, lack of legitimacy is
what makes a ruling regime vulnerable to military intervention.
Motivated militaries launch coups when civilian governments suffer performance
failures. Opportunities for military intervention arise when civilian institutions are
ineffectively governing the state (Finer 2002; Nordlinger 1977). Studies on authoritarian
stability conceptualize these situations as crises of legitimacy. Legitimacy establishes a
regimes right to political rule and seeks to guarantee active consent, compliance with the
rules, passive obedience, or mere toleration within the population (Gerschewski 2013).
Autocratic regimes, lacking the legitimacy of liberal and democratic institutions, gamer
support through economic performance and addressing demands for socio-economic
development (Geddes 1999).
Consequently, economic decline is a determinant of military intervention.


16
According to the reviewed studies, military movements against governments occur more
frequently during periods of economic decline, stagnation, or inflation than at times of
economic growth (Ames 1977; Fossum 1967; Hoadley 1975; Luttwak 1979; Nordlinger
1977; Thompson 1980; Zimmerman 1983). Ames, Fossum and Needier identify that
military intervention was more likely to occur during periods of economic downturn in
their studies of Latin American coup behavior (Ames 1977; Fossum 1967; Needier
1975). Hoadley identifies that military coups in Asia occurred twice as frequently in the
year following a drop in the total value of exports (Hoadley 1975; Nordlinger 1977).
Finally, Thompson found links between economic downturn and frequency of coups in
Middle Eastern and African states (Thompson 1980).
Attempting to explain this link between economic decline and coup, Nordlinger
suggests that a governments economic record is a critical performance criterion to
which administrative efficiency and efficacy is evaluated. Even when the actual cause
of a downturn is beyond governmental control-a sharp drop in commodity prices on the
international market, for example-the incumbents are often blamed (Nordlinger 1977,
88). Nordlinger further assesses that economic performance failures and the
governments subsequent loss of legitimacy goes a long way in facilitating the
translation of motives into coup attempts (Nordlinger 1977, 90).
The reviewed literature echoes this assessment, contending that economic
downturns are opportunities through which a motivated military can launch a coup with
the greater chance of success. Thompsons study supports this notion, observing in his
sampling an 85 percent success rate during periods of economic downturn. Thus,
Thompson concluded that economic deterioration was highly facilitative for coup


17
success and that economic difficulties should be viewed as conditions promoting regime
vulnerability rather than as direct motivation for the armed forces (Nordlinger 1977;
Thompson 1980). Thompsons assessment, however, does not include the budgetary
consequences of economic downturn.
When military commercialism is incorporated into this analysis, economic
difficulty can further aggravate military institutional concerns that already exist in this
context. As previously expressed, economic downturns could directly affect military
commercial activities and budgets. Reduction in income would likely incite military
grievances against the government, which is assumed responsibility for economic
performance. Consequently, militaries would be motivated and have the opportunity to
launch a coup.
Domestic political crises are identified as significant opportunities for militaries to
launch coups (Finer 2002; Hibbs 1973; Liuwen 1991; Luttwak 1979; Needier 1973;
Nordlinger 1977). When civil institutions have demonstrated their inability to govern,
individuals withdraw their support and socially mobilize to appoint leadership perceived
to be more capable. In authoritarian states, liberal institutional mechanisms for the
transfer of power are non-existent or are fixed for the preservation of the ruling regime.
In such states, individuals engage in activity that directly challenges the ruling regimes
governance. These challenges by the citizenry create initial opportunities for military
intervention. However, coup leaders often recognize that regimes become more
vulnerable as domestic unrest grows (Finer 2002; Liuwen 1991; Nordlinger 1977).
Regimes initially attempt to repress domestic unrest by employing constabulary
security forces. When the internal security forces are unable to counter opposition, the


18
military is directed to re-establish order. Armed forces that respond to such summons
mobilize soldiers to quell disturbances, prevent riots, patrol the cities, guard politically
sensitive buildings, and impose martial laws (Nordlinger 1977). With armed forces well
placed within society and ongoing domestic unrest, a regime is vulnerable to military
intervention. The armed forces of Thailand exploited civil disorder and violence to seize
power in 2014. Prior to the coup, the Thai government, criticized for corruption and
ineffective governance, was paralyzed amidst growing political struggles between its
supporters and opposition organizations. Political struggles escalated into political
violence and the armed forces were mobilized to impose martial law and re-establish
public order. Once the Thai military personnel had established its presence within
society, the military leadership moved forward and seized control of the government.
When incorporating military commercialism, domestic political crises would
likely incite military grievances and motivate the armed forces to launch a coup. There is
likely less consumption of military goods and services, through which the armed forces
are funded, during domestic political crisis. Moreover, military business profits are
likely to be threatened when the armed forces violently repress the populace. As
previously expressed, reduction in profits can illicit budgetary concerns and motivate the
armed forces to launch a coup.
When a military is motivated to intervene and the regime is sufficiently
vulnerable, the armed forces will likely launch a coup and seize control of the state.
Alternatively, if the armed forces are motivated and the regime is not vulnerable, the
military will likely not intervene or will launch a coup with a significantly low chance of
success. Conversely, if opportunities for intervention exist and the military is not


19
motivated, a coup will likely not occur. Finally, if neither social condition exists,
military intervention will very likely not occur.
Section 2.3 Coup Proofing Measures and Strategies
Civilian leaders who perceive that they are at risk of military intervention
implement coup proofing strategies to counter coup behavior and control the armed
forces (Albrecht 2015; Belkin and Schoefer 2005; Brooks 1998; Kamrava 2000; Powell
2012; Quinlivan 1991). Coup proofing is a series of measures actively taken to deprive
the military of both the motives and opportunities to challenge the regime. Leaders use a
combination of inducements and safeguards to give the armed forces a vested interest in
the status quo and make it difficult for them to conspire against the regime by increasing
the costs and risks of doing (Brooks 1998, 19). When the conditions and resources are
available for the implementation of these measures, coups are less likely to occur and less
likely to succeed.
Regimes reduce coup risk by providing benefits to the armed forces. Increasing
perquisites and privileges subsequently increases military support of the ruling regime or
establishes consent or toleration of the status quo (Brooks 1998; Huntington 1985;
Powell 2012). The government provides corporate benefits such as higher military
budgets, weapon supplies, and other material resources for the armed forces.
Additionally, the regime provides private benefits such as higher wages, housing and
utility subsidies, and access to scarce material goods to military leadership. Civilian
leaders employ this form of coup proofing to reduce the militarys disposition towards
intervention, especially when the regime is vulnerable. Huntington encouraged


20
governments to increase the pay and benefits of soldiers and to give them toys to deter
coup behavior (Huntington 1985, 17). Powells quantitative study supports Huntingtons
assessment by identifying a relationship between military funding and intervention.
According to Powell, short term increase in material or financial incentives sends a
clear signal to the armed forces that their interests are being taken into account (Powell
2012, 1036). Moreover, Brooks identifies how Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and his
Baathists regime maintain the loyalty of the Iraqi forces by establishing subsidized
markets and lowered admission requirements to colleges and universities for military
members. Additionally, the regime doubled salaries, lowering the retirement age, and
eased terms of service for all military leadership (Brooks 1998). However, the reviewed
literature does address how cash-strapped governments implement such a coup proofing
strategy.
Only Brooks asserts that governments, with limited resources, gain military
support by permitting and facilitating military participation in the domestic economy
(Brooks 1998). However, Brooks does not investigate the probable negative implications
of military commercialism. It can be contended that increasing funding and allocating
more toys to the armed forces increases the capabilities of the military to seize control
of the government. Similar assertions could be made about military commercialism.
Commercialization diversifies the interests of the armed forces and makes them more
sensitive to the shifts in policy and the marketplace. If conditions are such that the
institutional interests of an enfranchised military is perceived to be threatened, the armed
forces will be motivated launch a coup.
According to the reviewed literature, civilian leaders can effectively reduce the


21
risk of coup by recruiting military personnel from communities with special loyalties to
the regime (Albrecht 2015; Belkin and Schoefer 2005; Brooks 1998; Kamrava 2000;
Powell 2012; Quinlivan 1991). In an attempt to secure the support of the armed forces,
civilian leaders select individuals from the same religious, tribal, ethnic, and/or regional
group for service in the military (Brooks 1998). The select subgroup receives privileges
and appointments to key positions within the armed forces. Appointees are expected to
prevent coup behavior and maintain military support for the regime.
Brooks describes how the Jordanian armed forces are largely recruited from
native East Bank tribes instead of the Palestinian majority. Moreover, Jordanian military
leadership is appointed from rural tribes with which the monarchy has maintained
personal relations. Finally, members of the royal family have held the most pivotal
military positions. Specifically, prior to his ascension to the throne, King Abdullah was
head of Special Operations Command and his uncle, Zeid bin Shaker, served as the
Army Commander-in-Chief (Brooks 1998). Similarly, Quinlivan found that tribal
affiliation was significant in the appointment of military leadership in Saudi Arabia and
Baathist Iraq (Quinlivan 1991).
However, coup conspirators are military officers that are not of senior rank.
According to Luttwak, small assemblies of lower, mid-level military leaders sharing
corporate concerns and political ambitions generally design and lead the armed forces
against the government. This assessment challenges assertions that the appointment of
loyalists to senior levels of military leadership can support a shift toward civilian control
over the armed forces and the prevention of military intervention (Luttwak 1979).
Additionally, assessments of this coup proofing strategy do not take into account the


22
indoctrination and nationalization that often occur in military organizations.
Finer assesses that when appointed to the task of national defense, the armed
forces are indoctrinated with nationalism. This forms a distinct ideology and esprit de
corps that transcends region, class, and cultural interests (Finer 2002). Finers assertion
is complemented by Fairs comparative study of the Pakistani military which analyzes
how a uniform ideology and national identity was established within the Pakistani armed
forces in order to challenge competing cultural identities that prevented cooperation and
threatened effectiveness. Specifically, through diverse recruitment, Pakistans armed
forces developed a national identity, codified religion, and a disdain for India (Fair
2014). Such indoctrination would challenge the coup proofing strategy of selective
recruitment. Moreover, this strategy would be further challenged when the military
fraternity is sustained by the profits of MOPEs and not the state.
Military commercialism arises from a funding crisis during which the
government in unable to adequately support the armed forces. MOPEs fund welfare
programs that support military members and their families and offer post-service
employment (Brommelhorster and Paes 2003; Castro and Zamora 2003; Golkar 2012). It
seems very probable that soldiers recruited for their assessed devotion to the regime
would be more loyal to a military institution that provides services ensuring the well
being of their members and their families. This further challenges the coup proofing
strategy of selective recruitment and expresses an unintended consequence of military
commercialism. The enfranchisement of the armed forces is a coup proofing strategy
that can challenge its very purpose: to counter coup behavior.
Governments also engage in counterbalancing to prevent military intervention.


23
Regimes initiate and exploit divisions within the armed forces to establish rival
organizations that check and balance one another (Brooks 1998) (Powell 2012)
(Quinlivan 1991) (Belkin and Schoefer 2006) (Janowitz 1964) (Kamrava 2000).
Moreover, civilian regimes establish state paramilitary organizations to deter and
challenge military movements against the government and limit the involvement of the
armed forces in the mitigation of domestic crises (Brooks 1998) (Kamrava 2000)
(Quinlivan 1991) (Janowitz 1964). Jannowitz found that as paramilitary force levels
increased, the frequency of military intervention decreased (Janowitz 1964). Nordlinger
explains that paramilitary forces penetrate the military as political officers for the
purpose of deterring conspiracy and identifying conspirators (Nordlinger 1977).
Similarly, Mendee and Brooks assess that paramilitary forces operate as intelligence
organizations and clandestinely monitor and collect information on military leadership
that could possibly challenge the regime (Nordlinger 1977) (Mendee 2013). Paramilitary
forces are also utilized to purge coup-conspirators or military leaders that could
challenge the regime. These studies challenge Nordlinger and Finers assertion that
militaries are motivated to intervene when governments establish functional rivals
(Nordlinger 1977) (Finer 2002). However, assessments of counterbalancing do not
evaluate the expense of establishing paramilitary organizations and the possibility of a
heightening of coup risk. The allocation of funds for establishing and supporting an
internal security institution would likely divert resources from the armed forces,
provoking budgetary concerns and threatening institutional interests. Alternatively,
given the profitability of MOPEs, it is probable that enfranchised militaries would have
the resources and the capability to co-opt paramilitary organizations and prevent their


24
forces from challenging military movement against the government.
The reviewed literature has not adequately investigated possible relationships
between military commercialism and intervention. Comparative studies on MOPEs has
looked specifically at conditions for and causes of commercial activity, the scope of
military business, and socio-economic impact. These comparative studies do not address
how the commercialized militaries impact civil-military relations and coup behavior.
Studies on coup behavior identify and investigate determinants of military intervention
and establish a theoretical calculus for analyzing military movements against the
government. However, no study of coup behavior has integrated nor contended for the
inclusion of military commercialism. Research on coup proofing strategies is the only
reviewed body of literature that has considered military commercialism. These studies
investigate how commercialization placates military corporate interest. However, these
studies have not assessed or investigated how military commercialization challenges
coup proofing strategies.
Lack of literature on military commercialism and intervention is likely due to the
rate at which relevant fields were developed. The preponderance of research on civil-
military relations and coup-risk were developed during the 1950s-1970s. This was
largely due to the proliferation of coups in new and developing states. However, analysis
of coup behavior tapered off at the end of Cold War. Contemporary studies on military
intervention have been re-appraisals of previous hypotheses using more advanced
methods and more comprehensive data. Conversely, studies of military commercialism
are far less developed due to the lack of reliable data on MOPEs. Based on this
assessment, military commercialism has likely been overlooked by research on coup


25
behavior.


26
CHAPTER III
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Section 3.1 Two Step Model and Military Commercialism
When incorporating into the framework of Finers two-step model, military
commercialism very likely increases a regimes risk of intervention. When the armed
forces become owners, managers, and operators of private enterprises, they undertake a
secondary role as an institution. While maintaining the primary function of defense, the
armed forces assume responsibility for managing business activities that subsidize
military expenditures. Armed forces, dependent on this supplementary income, are very
likely sensitive to the economic policies and performance of the ruling regime. A change
in policy or performance that threatens or is perceived to threaten the commercial
interests of the armed forces would likely provoke the armed forces to launch a coup.
Military entrepreneurship makes civilian intrusions into the internal affairs of the
military more likely. Participation in the economy creates military institutional
responsibilities and interests separate from the primary functions of the armed forces.
Expansion of the institution likely makes the military more sensitive to economic policy
enacted by the regime. Beyond the expressed provocations of budgetary concerns, policy
that challenges business activities of the armed forces can be perceived as an intrusion by
the regime into the affairs of the military.
The armed forces economic influence could be used to generate opportunities for
intervention. As an economic actor, the armed forces could possibly manipulate social
conditions to create crises of legitimacy in which a coup could be launched. Specifically,
a military could possibly utilize their control of domestic industries to trigger an


27
economic downturn. Moreover, the armed forces could exploit their economic influence
to coerce domestic and international businesses to participate in this economic
subversion. A recession would create a legitimacy crisis for the ruling regime in which
motivated militaries would have an opportunity to launch a coup.
Military business activities can also be utilized to encourage opposition
movements against the regime. Participation in the domestic economy creates networks
between militaries and opposition groups. When motivated to launch a coup, the armed
forces can allocate resources and give reassurances to embolden and encourage
opposition groups to openly challenge the ruling regime. Public acts of political and
social dissent could possibly mobilize other elements of the population to participate.
Escalation and subsequent acts of repression by the regime would create a legitimacy
crisis in which the armed forces could intervene.
Participation in the private economy likely reduces military effectiveness.
Traditionally, military resources are directed to fulfill their functional responsibilities of
deterring external threats to the state and enforcing the governments political and
strategic objectives. However, when the armed forces undertake a secondary role as an
economic actor, military resources are redirected to enterprise. Instead of formulating
strategy and maintaining combat readiness, soldier entrepreneurs are participating in the
management and operation of businesses. Such activity very likely reduces military
effectiveness and the armed forces ability to successfully engage in conflict. As
previously expressed, defeat in war can create legitimacy crises and make the regime
vulnerable to military intervention.


28
Section 3.2 Coup Proofing Strategies and Military Commercialism
Military commercialism can reduce the effectiveness of coup proofing strategies.
The enfranchisement of the armed forces is a strategy to deter coup behavior. In addition
to placating budgetary concerns, private enterprises are allocated to the military as
perquisites and privileges to ensure the loyalty of the armed forces. Armed forces are less
inclined to challenge a civilian government that enriches their institution. However, the
influence of perquisites and privileges over the military is limited when profits derived
from MOPEs are greater than what the government is capable of delivering.
Consequently, as military commercialism increases, the governments ability to coopt
armed forces through perquisites and privileges decreases. Alternatively, civilian
leadership can implement policy that protects the financial interests of the armed forces
and creates a favorable environment for their commercial activities. When civilian
leadership is incapable of making these policy concessions, the military may be moved to
threaten intervention.
Military commercialism can challenge the effectiveness of the selective
recruiting. To ensure the loyalty of the armed forces, civilian leaders recruit or conscript
soldiers and appoint military leaders from groups with special loyalties to the regime.
This loyalty can be initially challenged by military indoctrination, encouraging loyalty to
the institution. However, this institutional allegiance can be more greatly fortified when
militaries are engaged in commercial activity. Military commercialism arises from
funding crises during which the government is incapable of adequately funding the armed
forces. Subsequently, MOPEs fund the military operations and welfare programs that
support the armed forces and their families. Additionally, MOPEs provide employment


29
for discharged and retired members of the military. Consequently, armed forces, recruited
based on special loyalties to the regime, can become more devoted to the military
institution that ensures their well-being. Moreover, the armed forces will hold contempt
for the civilian regime when it directly challenges or cannot provide a favorable
environment for the militarys commercial activities.
Military capital derived from commercial activity can be used to challenge
counter-balancing strategies. Civilian regimes establish and exploit preexisting divisions
within the military to prevent coup behavior, giving favor to certain elements of the
armed forces to ensure their loyalty and willingness to challenge coups. However, this
counterbalancing strategy is ineffective when the ruling regime does not have the
resources to coopt these elements of the armed forces. Moreover, the effectiveness of this
strategy is challenged when militaries have the resources, derived from MOPEs, to ensure
the allegiance of it members. Similarly, military capital can also challenge the
effectiveness of paramilitary organizations created to counter coup behavior. Specifically,
armed forces intent on seizing power can use their resources to coopt state paramilitary
and police organizations, gaining their support or willingness to not challenge the coup.
The implementation of coup proofing strategies can encourage the
commercialization of the armed forces. Perquisites and privileges, the exploitation of
internal divisions within the armed forces, and the creation of paramilitary organizations
place greater demand on state resources. These large financial obligations can possibly
produce an inadequate defense budget and rouse military corporate concerns. When
civilian leaders are unable to finance growing security expenditures, an alternative


30
strategy to placate the armed forces is implemented. The strategy is often the allocation
of commercial enterprise to the armed forces.
Section 3.3 Hypotheses
Based on the conceptualized complications that arise from enfranchisement of the
armed forces, this study hypothesizes that military commercialism is a significant
determinant of coup behavior. MOPEs diversify and expand the interests of the armed
forces, making them more easily threatened by commercial challengers, a mutable
economic environment, and the policies of the ruling regime. Additionally, militaries can
use their commercial influence to challenge the ruling regime by manipulating the
domestic political environment. Moreover, military commercialism undermines strategies
implemented by the regime to counter coup behavior. Subsequently, military
commercialism increases the motivations of the armed forces to launch a coup and makes
them more capable to intervene.


31
CHAPTER IV
METHODOLOGY
This section explains the research methodology and model used to test the
relationship between military commercialism and intervention. This study uses the
qualitative design of most similar systems. In this design, cases are selected that are as
similar as possible with the exception of the phenomenon being investigated. Using this
model, this study selects countries that are similar in a number of specified variables,
constant variables, and different with regard to only two aspects, the independent variable
being investigated and the dependent variable.
Section 4.1 Model
The Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) has the advantage of controlling for a
large number of extraneous variables. Studies of coup-risk have identified a significant
number of social conditions correlated with military intervention (Belkin and Schoefer
2005; Zimmermann 1983). These determinants must be controlled in the selected cases to
prevent false causal inferences. Additionally, MSSD has the benefit of permitting in-
depth research and analysis. Evaluating military movements against the government
demands the evaluation of concepts like institutional grievances and legitimacy that could
not accurately be analyzed and assessed by alternative designs.
MSSD also accommodates coup-risk theories and controls for them as intervening
variables. Coup-risk studies claim that military movements against the government occur
when the armed forces are motivated to launch a coup and have opportunities to intervene
(Finer 2002; Hibbs 1973; Huntington 1985; Luttwak 1979; Nordlinger 1977;
Zimmermann 1983). Motivated militaries without sufficient opportunity are less likely to


32
intervene and/or will launch an unsuccessful coup. Similarly, armed forces with sufficient
opportunity to seize power but no motivation are very unlikely to intervene. The inter-
play between these two sets of variables is controlled for as an intervening variable.
Similarly, coup-risk studies postulate that there are background conditions that
predispose political systems to higher risk of military intervention, irrespective of the
motivations and opportunities (Belkin and Schoefer 2005; Finer 2002; Fossum 1967;
Hibbs 1973; Hoadley 1975; Londregan and Poole 1990; Zimmermann 1983). This
predisposition is controlled as an intervening variable as well.
The most common criticism of MSSD is that there are too many variables and not
enough cases. MSSD necessitates the selection of cases whose extraneous variables can
be controlled. The models rigidity subsequently constrains case selection. A solution to
this issue is to reduce the number of variables, redefining them into broader concepts, and
increasing the number of cases. This solution, however, possibly leads to false inferences.
Alternatively, models that use fewer cases and more variables avoid the possibility of
false inferences, but receive the censure of being descriptive and not confirmatory of a
theory. This critique, common of Small-N research designs, assesses value without
considering purpose. In this study, MSSD is used to investigate the significance of a
variable not addressed by previous studies of various designs. Identifying significance of
military commercialism in a limited number of cases will likely encourage the inclusion
of this new variable into greater and more complex research designs. This possible
consequence is what makes MSSD a model of value irrespective of the number of cases
and variables.
Perception bias is a probable weakness of MSSD. Researchers using this model


33
determine which variables are similar between cases and which are not. A variable
perceived to be similar between cases in one study might be perceived differently in
another. This weakness is a strong criticism of this design and is unavoidable; however,
this study has limited the impact perception bias by using a large selection of sources to
direct analysis and assessments of controlled variables. The impact of perception bias is
further limited in the treatment of the constant variables. Unlike complex variations of
MSSD, this study treats variables dichotomously. Variables are assessed on whether they
were evident or not in the selected case. Attributing value to variables, i.e. assuming the
influence of one is greater than another, very likely increases the influence of perception
bias. Alternatively, evaluating variables dichotomously possibly limits accuracy, as some
variables are perhaps more influential in some cases than others. In this study, the
measure of variables is not so easily assessed due to limited data. For example when
assessing the variable of coup proofing, cases are analyzed on whether or not strategies
have been implemented to avert military intervention. Influence of strategy cannot be
evaluated based on the size of paramilitary forces, as there has not been research that has
correlated paramilitary size to effectiveness in the mitigation of threats to the regime by
armed forces. There is limited data on bribes distributed to influential military officers
and limited information on the clandestine actions of internal intelligence organizations
that monitor military organizations. What is known is whether or not they have occurred
in a particular case.
Selection bias is another probable weakness of MSSD. A researcher using this
model could possibly choose cases and variables that support his or her hypothesis while
selectively omitting those that do not. Additionally, a researcher using MSSD could


34
selectively choose sources and data that support his or her analysis. The influence of
selection bias is likely based on how the study was derived. If the study is inductive, the
identification and selection of variables may possibly be biased. If deductive, variables
and cases will possibly be selected based on the desired outcome of the study. The study
limits the influence of this bias by allowing case selection to be focused by the
independent, dependent, and control variables.
Section 4.2 Variable Selection and Measurement
This section identifies and defines the dependent, independent, and constant
variables used with this studys MSSD. The variables are described and the method of
measurement is explained. Additionally, variables selected for the study are explicated.
Those that were not selected for the study are identified and their omission is explained.
Section 4.2.1 Dependent Variable
Military intervention is the dependent variable for this study. In Coup D etat: A
Practical Handbook, Luttawak defines a coup as the infiltration of a small but critical
segment of the state apparatus, which is then used to displace the government from its
control of the remainder (Luttwak 1979, 27). Since this study is evaluating civil-military
relations, only coups by armed forces are evaluated. Additionally, neither coup attempts
nor coup plots are analyzed. Either incident demonstrates that the necessary social
conditions for successful intervention were not present or that coup proofing strategies
had effectively mitigated the military movement. The dependent variable is measured
dichotomously using Center for Systemic Peaces Dataset on Coup-Behavior from 1946-
2014 and Global Instances of Coups 2011 Dataset to identify whether military


35
intervention occurred in the selected cases (Luttwak 1979; Powell and Thyne 2011;
systemicpeace.org 2014).
Section 4.2.2 Independent Variable
Military commercialism is the independent variable for this study. Military
commercialism is defined as the economic activities falling under the influence of the
armed forces used for the organizational benefit of the military fraternity, which is not
recorded as part of the defense budget or does not follow the normal accountability
procedures of the state. These activities range from corporations owned by the military as
an institution, welfare foundations belonging to different services, and enterprises run at
the unit level (Brommelhorster and Paes 2003; Siddiqa 2007). This study does not
analyze activity within the underground economy, such as the smuggling and trafficking
of illicit goods or banditry, such as extortion and theft. Both forms of illicit economic
activity have limited benefit to the military fraternity and would very likely not dispose
the armed forces to launch a coup. Additionally, data on military participation in the
underground economy is very limited and unreliable. The independent variable is
measured dichotomously using secondary analysis of MOPEs to determine whether the
variable is present.
Section 4.2.3 Constant Variables
Control variables for this study were selected through the consideration of theory and
social conditions correlated with military intervention as identified in the reviewed
literature. Control variables correlated with military intervention are categorized into two


36
sets of variables: structural determinants and triggering conditions. This study controls
for the following structural determinants: strength of civil society, regime legitimacy,
past history of coups, and participation in war and military defeat.
Section 4.2.3.1- Constant Variables: Background
Strength of civil society is a structural determinant that affects a political system's
risk of intervention. States with strong civil society are at low risk of military
intervention. Conversely, states with weak civil society are at high risk of military
intervention. Civil society strength has been measured in previous studies by the number
of voluntary nongovernmental organizations within a society that has specialized
functions and provide meaning, resources, and strategies for coping with social problems
(Belkin and Schoefer 2005; Fossum 1967; Hibbs 1973; Hoadley 1975; Putnam 1967;
Zimmermann 1983). These organizations including political parties, trade unions, and
voluntary associations serve as a powerful safeguard against military intervention by
directly challenging military movements to seize power.
In this study, strength of civil society is measured by determining whether the
selected cases are autocratic or democratic states. Authoritarian governments enact policy
that restrict political and civil rights and, subsequently, prevent the formation of
organizations that would possibly challenge the ruling regime. Conversely, democratic
states permit and demand the creation of political and social organizations that participate
in governance. Subsequently, democratic states are assessed to have stronger civil
societies than autocratic states (Finer 2002; Fossum 1967; Hibbs 1973; Hoadley 1975;
Linz 1978; Putnam 1967; Welch 1967; Zimmermann 1983). In this study, political


37
system type is determined by Polity IVs Political Regime Characteristics reporting
(systemicpeace 2014). Countries with political systems identified as open anocracy,
democracy, or full democracy are assessed to have strong civil societies. Countries with
political systems identified as closed anocracy or autocracy are assessed to have weak
civil societies.
Regime legitimacy is another background condition that impacts risk of military
intervention. Legitimacy establishes a government's right to political rule and seeks to
guarantee active consent, compliance with the rules, passive obedience, or mere
toleration within the population (Gerschewski 2013, 18). In this study, legitimacy is
measured by identifying whether the political system within the selected case is
illegitimate or not. Legitimacy is macro-systemically determined by whether the selected
cases political systems are democratic or authoritarian. Democracies are assessed to be
more legitimate as a result of their appointment by popular vote (Gerschewski 2013).
Conversely, autocracies lack true liberal and democratic institutions to legitimize their
right to rule. However, autocratic regimes can legitimize their right to rule through strong
economic performance and by addressing demands for socio-economic development
(Geddes 1999). Measuring this variable dichotomously likely limits the studys ability to
account for this alternative process of gamering legitimacy. However, the studies does
account for economic decline/crisis and political domestic crisis as constant variables.
Subsequently, it can be assumed that the regime is illegitimate if the selected cases are
authoritarian and are suffering domestic economic and political crises. Political system
type is determined in this study by using Polity IVs Political Regime Characteristics
reporting (systemicpeace.org 2014). States with political systems identified as open


38
anocracy, democracy, or full democracy are assessed as legitimate. Conversely, countries
with political systems identified as closed anocracy or autocracy are assessed to be
illegitimate.
Past history of coups is the third background determinant of military intervention.
There is significant empirical evidence that the likelihood of military intervention is
severely increased if coups have occurred in the past (Zimmermann 1983). Coups have a
powerful symbolic impact by legitimizing extra constitutional methods as acceptable
mechanisms for political transitions (Belkin and Schoefer 2005). Moreover, military
intervention undermines civilian institutions that traditionally prevent and/or challenge
coups. This study uses the Center for Systemic Peace dataset of all coup-behavior from
1946-2014 to determine whether the selected cases have had incidents of military
intervention (systemicpeace.org 2014).
The final background determinant that increases a political system's risk of
military intervention is participation in war and military defeat. Military intervention is
correlated with regime-performance during conflict. Specifically, if states suffer high
casualties during conflict or if a government initiates inter-state conflict and is defeated,
the armed forces will very likely launch a coup against the government. Empirical
evidence indicates that coups typically follow within two to three years of conflict
(Belkin and Schoefer 2005; Bueno de Mesquita, Silverson, and Woller 1992). This
structural determinant is measured using data from the Correlates of War Projects War
Database. The Correlates of War Projects datasets on non-state, intra-state, and extra-
state wars are used to determine whether conflict occurred in the selected cases prior to
military movements against the government (correlatesofwar.org 2014).


39
Section 4.2.3.2- Constant Variables: Triggering
The second set of variables this study controls for are triggering variables. These
constant variables are divided into two subsets, motivations and opportunities. The first
subset, motivations, is comprised of two variables: military grievances and contagion
from other regional coups. Military grievances arise when the institutional interests of the
armed forces are threatened (Finer 2002; Nordlinger 1977). This study looks at several
indicators to measure the variable. First, the study reviews secondary studies and
literature that analyze the selected cases military movement and identifies possible
motivations. Second, the study uses the International Institute for Strategic Studies
(IISS) Military Balance to observe possible reductions in force levels and defense
budgets in years prior to military intervention in the selected cases (iiss.org 2012).
Inadequate budgetary support impacts all institutional interests and has been assessed to
be a significant condition for disposing the armed forces to launch a coup. Finally, the
study also uses IISS Military Balance to analyze whether new military branches or
paramilitary organizations were created prior to the coup. The creation of new military
and paramilitary organizations would divert funding from the conventional armed forces
and would likely provoke military budgetary concerns and institutional grievances. Using
these indicators, the variable is measured dichotomously based on the assessment of
whether military grievances were present or not.
The second variable in the motivation subset is the causal effect of coup
occurrence. Comparative studies contend that the likelihood of a coup becomes
significantly greater in a state where the armed forces have observed successful coup-


40
making activities in neighboring states or regions (Belkin and Schoefer 2005; Bueno de
Mesquita, Silverson, and Woller 1992; Hibbs 1973; Londregan and Poole 1990;
Zimmermann 1983). This variable is dichotomously measured using the Center for
Systemic Peaces dataset of coup-behavior from 1946-2014 (systemicpeace.org 2014).
Using this dataset, the study identifies whether military intervention occurred in
neighboring states or regions during the year of or the year prior to the selected cases
military movement.
The second subset of triggering variables is opportunities. These are social
conditions that give the armed forces the greatest opportunity to launch a coup against the
ruling regime. This subset is comprised of two social conditions that create significant
opportunity for military intervention. The first variable is economic decline/crises
mentioned above. Comparative studies suggest that the armed forces will launch a coup
when the economic condition of the polity deteriorates (Ames 1977; Fossum 1967;
Hoadley 1975; Janowitz 1964; Londregan andPoolr 1990; Luttwak 1979; Needier 1973;
Nordlinger 1977; Zimmermann 1983). This study measures economic decline/crises by
reviewing secondary analysis of the economic environment prior to and during military
intervention in the selected cases.
The second variable in the opportunity subset is domestic political crises.
Comparative studies suggest that armed forces are likely to launch a coup against the
government when the political situation has deteriorated and the ruling regime is
incapable of maintaining public order (Finer 2002; Hibbs 1973; Luttwak 1979;
Nordlinger 1977; Zimmermann 1983). Moreover, the armed forces are well placed within
society to participate in a coup when the military is mobilized to establish public order


41
during a domestic crisis. This variable is measured by reviewing secondary analysis on
the domestic situation prior to and during military intervention in selected cases.
This study considers the calculus between the sets of variables and treats these
relationships as intervening variables to further control. Structural determinants and
triggering causes must occur jointly in order to precipitate a coup. Moreover, the military
needs to be motivated and have sufficient opportunity to launch a coup. The absence of
any set of constant variables prevents the isolation of the independent and dependent
variable being investigated. Consequently, this study controls for the calculus between
structural and triggering variables and the calculus between the subsets of triggering
variables.
Section 4.2.3.3- Constant Variables: Coup Proofing
The final set of constant variables in this study is coup proofing strategies and
measures. Comparative studies contend that when regimes perceive that their government
is at risk of military intervention they will implement strategies to prevent coup behavior
(Albrecht 2015; Belkin and Schoefer 2005; Brooks 1998; Kamrava 2000; Powell 2012;
Quinlivan 1991). Specifically, regimes stack the armed forces with members loyal to the
regime, increase military perquisites and privileges, and create rival military and
paramilitary organizations to deter and challenge military movements against the
government (Brooks 1998). This variable is measured dichotomously using secondary
analysis that identifies coup proofing strategies and mechanisms in selected cases. The
assessment does not take into account the type, variety, or number of coup proofing
strategies implemented as there is no study that suggests a certain type of strategy or


42
number of mechanisms is more effective than another. Additionally, the IISS Military
Balance is used to identify the presence of paramilitary organizations within the selected
cases.
The constant variables for this study were selected based on corroboration,
appraisal, and ability to measure. Social conditions identified in peer-reviewed literature
and appraised by further studies that use diverse methodologies were selected.
Conversely, studies that were not corroborated nor appraised were not selected. Social
determinants and conditions such as the existence of external threats, foreign veto power,
national security doctrine, and military size, cohesiveness, and popularity are not well
developed or very compelling and, subsequently, were not selected for this study.
Additionally, variables were also omitted based on difficulties in measurement and low
reliability. Specifically, officer class composition, political culture, and personal
grievances are very difficult to measure (Belkin and Schoefer 2005; Zimmermann 1983).
Section 4.3- Case Selection
This section explains the method in which cases were selected for this study. MSSD
requires the selection of at least two cases that have similar variables with exception of
the independent and dependent variables. One country was selected that exhibited the
independent variable, military commercialism, and the dependent variable, military
intervention. A second country was selected that exhibited neither the independent nor
dependent variables. Both selected countries shared the studys selected constant
variables.
Case selection was initially driven by the independent variable. Comparative


43
studies on MOPEs are limited, directing country selection to Latin America and the
Middle East and North Africa. Selection was then concentrated using the independent
variable: incidents of military intervention. Using the Center for Systemic Peaces dataset
of coup-behavior from 1946-2014 and secondary sources, incidents of military
intervention between 1995-2014 in Latin America and the Middle East and North Africa
were analyzed (Luttawak 1971; Rutherford 2013; systemicpeace.org 2014). Selection
was limited to this period to reduce the possible influence of variables associated with
Cold War politics.
Selection was narrowed further by the control variables. Specifically, the constant
variable of contagion was used to further analyze and narrow the selection pool. Between
1995-2014, a preponderance of sequential coup activity occurred in the Middle East and
North Africa. During this period, military intervention occurred in Tunisia and Egypt and
military movements arose in Libya that overthrew ruling regimes in 2011. Moreover,
there were coup attempts in Turkey, Bahrain, and Iraq between 2010-2012. Of the
incidents military intervention, Egypt is the only case that has been interpreted as a
military coup by the Center for Systemic Peaces dataset of coup-behavior and Powell
and Thynes Global Instances of Coups 2011 Database (Powell and Thyne 2011;
systemicpeace.org 2014). Additionally, military commercialism was a structural
condition in Egypt, based on available information. Finally, Egypt exhibits all constant
variables in the study and was therefore selected as a case.
The second case was chosen using the controlled structural variables. The
selection pool was comprised of 16 states in the Middle East and North Africa that did
not have incidents of military intervention in 2010-2012 nor the social condition of


44
military commercialism. Countries that had strong civil societies were further omitted
from selection. Using Polity IVs Political Regime Characteristics reporting from 2011,
countries identified as open anocracies (Algeria), democracies (Lebanon), full
democracies (Israel and Turkey) or under military occupation (Iraq) were omitted from
selection (systemicpeace.org 2014). Additionally, countries that had no previous
incidents of successful military intervention (Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia,
United Arab Emirates, and Yemen) were omitted as well. (Special Note: North Yemen
had incidents of military intervention. However, since unification, no coups have
occurred in Yemen prior to 2011).
The remaining possible cases, Oman, Qatar, and Syria, were evaluated for
selection using controlled triggering variables. Specifically, the countries were evaluated
on whether there were opportunities, i.e. domestic political and economic crises, for
military intervention. Qatar was omitted, as it did not have either type crisis during 2011.
Oman had protests and riots during 2011, however, the ruling regime expeditiously
implemented social programs to appease public grievances and prevent domestic crises.
Alternatively, the ruling regime in Syria responded to protests with violent repression
which escalated into a domestic political crises, and eventually civil war. In addition,
Syria exhibited all selected constant variables. Therefore, it was selected as the second
case for the study.


45
CHAPTER V
ANALYSIS
On 11 February 2011, the regime of Hosni Mubarak abdicated and the Egyptian
armed forces seized control of the state after 18 days of political demonstration and
domestic unrest. Similar uprisings arose in Syria in January 2011. Converse to events in
Egypt, the Syrian armed forces did not engage in coup behavior and violently repressed
demonstrations against the regime and continue to challenge opposition organizations
that wage war against the Syrian regime.
Section 5.1.1 Constant Variables: Background
Table 1: Background
Cases
Case 1: Egypt Case 2: Syria
Constant Variables
Past Coups 1 1
Authoritarian State 1 1
Participation in War/Military Defeat 0 0
Egypt and Syria had structural conditions that increased their states susceptibility
to military intervention. Both cases have experienced military intervention prior to 2011.
Egypt had a coup in 1952 when the armed forces, led by the Free Officers, overthrew the
monarchical government of King Farouk I and seized control of the state. Syria
experienced eight coups between 1949 and 1970. Specifically, coup behavior began in
1949 and, successively, military movements continued with coups occurring in 1951,


46
1954, 1961, 1963, 1966, and 1970. The coup of 1970 empowered the Baathist
government under the leadership of the Assad family, which was the ruling regime in
2011 and continues to hold power in Syria.
Egypt and Syria are assessed to have weak civil societies and illegitimate regimes.
In 2011, Polity IV had identified Egypts political system as a closed anocracy and Syria
as an autocracy, both forms of authoritarian governance (systemicpeace.org 2014).
Similarly, Freedom Houses Freedom in the World 2011 country reporting assessed that
the societies of Egypt and Syria were not free, due to serious infractions on civil and
political rights (freedomhouse.org 2011). Based on the evaluations of Polity IV and
Freedom House, it is assessed that Egypt and Syria had weak civil societies prior to and
during 2011. Moreover, it is assessed that the authoritarian regimes of both states were
illegitimate. This assessment is further supported by economic declines in both states
during 2011, which is analyzed in the opportunities variable sub set.
Neither Egypt nor Syria had participated in conflict and, subsequently, did not
suffer high casualties or military defeat prior to 2011. Egypt and Syria have histories of
regional conflict, with both states participating in the Arab-Israeli conflict (1948), Six
Day War (1967), and the Yom Kippur War (1973). Separately, Egypt participated in the
Sinai War (1956) and the War of Attrition (1969-70). Syria participated in the War over
Lebanon (1982). The most recent conflict that both states participated in was the Gulf
War (1991), serving as members of the United States coalition. Despite ongoing tensions
and minor confrontations with Israel, neither Egypt nor Syria has participated in a
conflict that would have been a determinant of coup behavior in 2011.


47
The structural determinants that predisposed political systems to military
intervention are evident in Egypt and Syria. First, the cases had weak civil societies due
to the civil and political repression of autocratic governance. Additionally, both states
authoritarian governments are assessed to be illegitimate. Finally, the cases had
successful coups in the past. Egypt and Syria are assessed to be at high-risk of military
intervention with the presence of these structural determinants. This assessment is
maintained despite both states not suffering defeat or high casualties in a conflict, which
would only further heighten either states high coup risk.
Section 5.1.2 Constant Variables: Triggering
Table 2: Triggering
Cases
Case 1: Egypt Case 2: Syria
Variables
Military Grievances 1 1
Contagion from other region coups 1 1
Domestic Political Crisis 1 1
Economic Crisis or Decline 1 1
The armed forces of Egypt and Syria very likely had grievances against the ruling
regime. Militaries that launch a coup are assumed to hold grievances against the
government. This assumption holds in the case of the 2011 coup in Egypt. Conversely,
discerning military grievances in cases in which coups did not occur is difficult.


48
However, there are indicators that suggest military grievances were held by the Syrian
armed forces.
Desertion and defection is a strong indicator of military grievances. In 2011, an
estimated 10,000 members of the armed forces deserted the Syrian military; an estimated
2,000 of these deserters had formed the Free Syrian Army to challenge the ruling regime;
and between 2011-2013, 83 senior military leaders deserted the Syrian military or
defected to the Free Syrian Army (aljazeera.com 2013; Taylor 2014). IISS reported that
as result of defections, desertions, and casualties, the nominal pre-war strength of the
army had likely been reduced by half between 2011-2013 (globalsecurity.org 2014). The
defections and desertions of Syrian soldiers indicate significant grievances. Additionally,
defections, desertions, and casualties threaten the survival of the military institution and,
subsequently, provoke military grievances.
The militaries of Egypt and Syria observed successful military interventions in
neighboring states and regions. On 14 January 2011, Tunisian president Zine el Abidine
Ben Ali abdicated power following ten days of protests and unrest. Prior to abdication,
the Tunisian president had ordered the armed forces to violently repress protestors. The
Tunisian Army Chief of Staff, General Rachid Anman, refused the order and requested
that the president leave the country. This refusal to execute the orders of regime
leadership has been assessed as a military movement against the government.
Specifically, the Tunisian armed forces executed military intervention by arbitrating the
transition of power. Such a military movement against a ruling regime likely encouraged
coup behavior in neighboring states.


49
Following the abdication of President Ben Ali, the Egyptian military withdrew its
support from the ruling regime, pressuring President Hosni Mubarak to abdicate power
25 January 2011, and established the Supreme Council of Armed Forces. In February,
members of the Libyan armed forces and opposition groups initiated a military movement
against the regime of Colonel Muammar Gadhafi, which resulted in the execution of the
leader and members of his regime. Military intervention and the abdication of the ruling
regime in Tunisia likely encouraged the Egyptian military forces seizure of power.
Successful intervention by the armed forces in Tunisia and Egypt likely inspired the
military movement in Libya that overthrew the ruling regime there. These regional
military movements were likely observed by Syrian armed forces, yet a coup was not
launched against the ruling regime.
The armed forces of Egypt and Syria had sufficient opportunities for launching a
coup. Egypt and Syria, as well other non-oil producing states in the Middle East and
North Africa, were enduring poor socio-economic conditions. High commodity prices
due to the 2008 economic crises made basic items, especially foodstuffs, more expensive.
A youth bulge in the Middle East and North Africa had created a gap between
mobilization and assimilation. Consequently, unemployment in Egypt and Syria was
estimated at 25 percent in 2011 (Lesch 2013; Rutherford 2013). Additionally, reduction
in market subsidization and the suspension of social programs had increasingly pressed
40 percent of the Egyptian population into poverty (Rutherford 2013). In Syria,
ineffective agricultural policy and a four-year drought had reduced domestic food
production and forced farming communities to migrate to urban areas. Subsequently,
food prices and unemployment greatly increased in Syria (Lesch 2013). Concurrently,


50
social media and web-based news groups increasingly reported government corruption
and the profligate lifestyles of the ruling regime and social elite in Egypt and Syria. These
conditions de-legitimized the governance of the Egyptian and Syrian regimes and created
opportunities for intervention by the armed forces.
Poor socio-economic conditions prompted domestic political crises, which created
even greater opportunities for military intervention in Egypt and Syria. Beginning 25
January 2011, millions of Egyptians turned out in major urban centers to protest the
regime of President Hosni Mubarak and the National Democratic Party. By the 26
January 2011, the protests had overwhelmed local police and internal security forces and
the military was bidden to reestablish public order on 28 January 2011. Despite
intervention by the paramilitary forces, protests continued until 11 February 2011, when
Hosni Mubarak abdicated power and the military assumed complete control of the state.
Following the abdication of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, protests erupted across
Syria in March 2011. Demonstrations grew and intensified after local police opened fire
on protestors in Deraa, Syria. Multiple media sources reported hundreds of thousands of
Syrians participating in demonstrations across the country by July 2011. Converse to the
events in Egypt, the police, internal security, and armed forces attempted to repress
demonstrations violently. Consequently, opposition organizations militarized and Syria
descended into a state of civil conflict that continues to date. Despite having not launched
a coup, the Syrian armed forces had and continue to have opportunities to intervene and
seize control of the state and yet have not attempted to do so.
The militaries of Egypt and Syria were both motivated to intervene and had
sufficient opportunities to launch a coup, based on the parameters for these variables


51
established by the existing literature on coups. The armed forces of Egypt and Syria are
assessed to have had military grievances that would dispose them to launch a coup.
Additionally, the armed forces observed successful military movements in neighboring
states that would encourage coup behavior. Concurrently, both states were suffering
economic decline and domestic political crisis that provided sufficient opportunities for
military intervention. The observance of both variables fulfills the theoretical calculus
assessed to precede successful military intervention.
Section 5.1.3 Constant Variables: Coup Proofing
Table 3: Coup Proofing
Cases
Case 1: Egypt Case 2: Syria
Variables
Rival Military and Paramilitary Organizations 1 1
Perquisites and Privileges 1 1
Stacking 1 1
The ruling regimes of Syria and Egypt had implemented strategies and
mechanisms to prevent coup behavior. The government stacked their militaries with
soldiers with special linkages to the regime to ensure loyalty. In Syria, the ruling regime,
led predominately by Alawis, recruited largely from an Alawi minority. At times, 90
percent of senior military officers were Alawis, who comprise only 10-12 percent of the
population of Syria (Brooks 1998; Taylor 2014). Conversely, the Egyptian armed forces


52
were conscripted from a population of largely Sunni Muslims and, subsequently, had no
exploitable special connections to the ruling regime (Brooks 1998; Quinlivan 1991).
However, the Egyptian government implemented training that established a strong notion
of professionalism and nationalism amongst the Egyptian armed forces that is assessed to
have ensured loyalty to the ruling regime.
In both cases, the ruling regimes established rival military and paramilitary
organizations to counter balance the armed forces and deter coup behavior. In Syria, the
Assad regime established paramilitary organizations known as Defense Companies -
and stationed them in the capital and charged them with the defense of the regime
(Brooks 1998; Quinlivan 1991). Similarly, the ruling regime in Egypt used the Egyptian
Central Security Forces as a coercive force in domestic politics, deterring military
movement and preventing opportunities for intervention. Additionally, the Egyptian
Internal Intelligence Service, Mukhabarat, had been used to identify domestic opposition
and military personnel that presented challenges to the regime (Brooks 1998).
The regimes of Egypt and Syria used perquisites and privileges to ensure the
loyalty of senior military leadership. In both cases, military officers received
disproportionately high wages, housing and transport subsidies, and access to scare
consumer goods, higher-quality medical care, and transport facilities. In Egypt, senior
military leaders were promised political appointments following their retirement from the
armed forces. In Syria, the regime provides significant material perquisites and privileges
to individual military officers (Brooks 1998; Quinlivan 1991).


53
Section 5.2 Independent Variable: Military Commercialism
Table 4: Military
Commercialism
Cases
Case 1: Egypt Case 2: Syria
Variables
Structural 1 1
Triggering 1 1
Counterbalancing 1 1
Independent 1 0
Dependent 1 0
The cases are dissimilar in how their militaries participated in economic activity.
In Egypt, the military was and continues to be very involved in commercial activity.
Following the signing of the Camp David Accords in 1978, Egyptian presidents Anwar
Sadat and Hosni Mubarak initiated programs to transition the armed forces into domestic
industry. The Egyptian armed forces assumed ownership of three major enterprises:
National Service Projects Organization (NSPO), Arab Organization for Industrialization
(AOI), and the National Organization for Military Production (NOMP) (cmi.no 2013;
carnegieendowment.org 2014; Frisch 2015; Kandil 2012).
Established in 1979, the NSPO was operated with the intent to limit military
dependence on the private market for supplies. By 2011, the NPSO was composed of 10
companies that engaged in the production of agricultural goods (bakeries, fisheries, cattle
lots and dairy, vegetable, and fruit farms) and household goods (clothing, stationary,


54
recreational equipment, pharmaceuticals, and construction materials). Additionally,
NSOP was engaged in many service industries; managing petrol stations, cafeterias, and
household cleaning and tourism services (carnegieendowment.org 2014;
globalsecurity.org 2015; jadaliyya.com 2011).
Prior to the NSPO, the AOI was established in 1975 in partnership with Saudi
Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for the development and production
of military armaments, munitions, and supplies. Following the signing of the 1978 Camp
David Accords, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and UAE withdrew from the partnership and
relinquished ownership to the Egyptian armed forces. In 2011, AOI was composed of
nine companies that manufactured military products (missiles, armored personnel
carriers, aircraft, et cetera), satellites, automobiles, and personal electronics (laptop
computers, monitors, and televisions). Concurrently, AOI had engaged in infrastructure
projects; constructing and operating water treatment facilities and railroads, as well as the
development and manufacturing of renewable energy equipment and complexes
(aoi.com.eg 2015; carnegieendowment.org 2014; egyptindependent.com 2012).
NOMP was established for the production of military armaments, munitions, and
equipment for the Egyptian armed forces. By 2011, NOMP factories were manufacturing
medical and machining equipment, batteries, and household appliances in addition to
military goods. Concurrently, similar to AOI, NOMP had engaged in infrastructure
projects, constructing and renovating roads, bridges, ports, hospitals, and schools
(camegieendowment.org 2014; egyptindependent.com 2012).
In addition to operating these major enterprises, the Egyptian armed forces had
engaged in the sale and development of land across Egypt. The military had constructed


55
and managed resorts near the Red Sea and suburban communities. Additionally, the
Egyptian armed forces sold military property for the development of urban areas near
Cairo and the expansion of the Suez Canal (camegieendowment.org 2014;
egyptindependent.com 2012).
Conversely, the Egyptian military commercialism differs significantly from the
Syrian armed forces. The militarys involvement in the Syrian economy was an informal,
un-institutionalized, and patrimonial system. Military personnel were recipients of
material favoritism on an individual basis rather than as a corporate body, as in Egypt
(Brooks 1998, 59). Consequently, the Syrian armed forces did not acquire commercial
enterprises as an institution, nor as a fraternity.
This difference is significant in determining coup behavior. Egypt and Syria had
similar determinants in 2011. Specifically, both cases maintained structural conditions
that increased the states susceptibility to coups. Additionally, Egypt and Syria had similar
social conditions that motivated coup behavior and provided opportunities for military
intervention. Finally, the regimes of both cases implemented similar coup proofing
strategies to prevent intervention. However, in Egypt, the military was involved in
commercial activity, the ruling regime was overthrown, and the military seized power in
2011. Conversely, the Syrian armed forces were not engaged in commercial activity and
did not launch a military movement against the government. Evaluation of these cases
indicates that military commercialism was significant in determining a regimes risk of
intervention in 2011.
Military commercialism was a structural and organizational condition that
affected the variability and measure of other social conditions. Specifically, commercial


56
interests possibly intensified the motivations of the Egyptian armed forces and likely
limited the effectiveness of coup proofing strategies and mechanisms implemented by the
ruling regime.
Domestic socio-economic conditions could have provoked the budgetary concerns
of the armed forces and motivated the military to launch a coup. In 2011, 25 percent of
the population was assessed to be unemployed and 40 percent were assessed to be in
poverty in Egypt (Rutherford 2013). These social conditions very likely affected the
profitability of military commercial activity, 40 percent of which was geared to the
domestic market place (cmi.no 2013; camegieendowment.org 2014). Moreover, it can be
assumed that a domestic political crisis, such as the 2011 uprising, would further threaten
the profitability of military commercial activity, disrupting regular consumerism and
preventing the contracting of public works. This decrease in profits provoked the
Egyptian militarys budgetary concerns and possibly motivated the armed forces to
launch a coup and establish a government that could more effectively manage the
economy and, subsequently, support the corporate interests of the armed forces.
Commercial interests likely affected the Egyptian armed forces willingness to
repress the civilian population during the 2011 uprisings. It can be assumed that the
armed forces would be reluctant to violently repress a population who directly consumed
military goods and services or were employed by military-owned enterprises. NSPO,
AOI, NOMP, and other military owned businesses employ over 100,000 non-military
personnel and produce goods and provide services directly consumed by the populace
(cmi.no 2013; carnegieendowment.org 2014). A conscientious consumer would be less
likely to purchase personal electronics produced by AOI or an automobile manufactured


57
by NOMP if they, their family, or their neighbors had been victims of violent repression.
Moreover, they would be less likely to consume services provided by uniformed military
personnel. Military leadership likely measured this consideration when they were
directed by the regime to restore public order in January 2011.
The Egyptian armed forces were likely concerned about future regime leadership
and the preservation of military-owned enterprises. In the decade prior to the coup in
2011, the military distanced itself from civilian elites over disagreements on socio-
economic development. Within the Egyptian regimes single party, the National
Democratic Party, a faction of businessmen and liberal economists that had begun to
implement economic reforms that challenged the militarys commercial activities. A
member of this faction was Gamal Mubarak, son of the ruling regimes leader, President
Hosni Mubarak. The president had formerly served in the armed forces and was a senior
military leader before assuming the presidency and was deeply involved in preserving the
interests of the military fraternity. Conversely, Gamal Mubarak had never served in the
armed forces. Instead of military service, Gamal had worked in the western financial
industry, being employed by Bank of America and a private equity firm. When he
returned to Egypt, Gamal joined the ruling regime and began a political rise that had been
perceived as a grooming process for future ascension to the presidency. This dynastic
succession was further perceived after the president failed to fulfill his promise to appoint
the vice president as his successor (alarabiya.com 2012; Frisch 2015; lemonde.fr 2010).
The initial implementation of neo-liberal economic reforms and the perceived
succession of Gamal Mubarak to the presidency at the head of a pro-business faction
likely threatened the corporate interests of the armed forces. Greater liberalization of the


58
Egyptian economy would very likely change an environment that favored the commercial
activities of the armed forces. Threatened by the possibility of reform, the Egyptian
military was likely motivated to seize power so they could appoint a leader and establish
a government that would support the corporate and commercial interests of the armed
forces (Frisch 2015).
Military commercialism likely limited the effectiveness of regime coup proofing
strategies in Egypt. Beyond being a method of subsidization, military participation in the
marketplace has been suggested to be a privilege granted by the regime to encourage the
loyalty of the armed forces. Moreover, it is argued that a partnership develops between
military business and the regime that implements policy in support of the armed forces
commercial activities. Subsequently, the regime is able to exploit this partnership to
maintain control over the military, which is subjugated by their commercial interests.
This strategy and appraisals of its effectiveness are inaccurate. As previously assessed in
this study, military commercialism expands the corporate interests of the armed forces
and ties them to the economy. Consequently, military corporate interests are more easily
threatened due to an increased sensitivity to policy and performance.
The profits of military commercial activity likely limited the regimes capability
to distribute perquisites and privileges and, subsequently, their effectiveness in
maintaining the loyalty of the armed forces. It is unknown exactly how much income the
Egyptian armed forces derived from their commercial activities. Information revealing
income is often dated, disparate, and unreliable. Moreover, MOPEs are neither taxed nor
audited in Egypt, which limits public records maintained by the state. Military
representatives have proclaimed that the armed forces control 5 to 20 percent of the


59
economy (camegie-mec.org 2015; Frisch 2015). Comparative studies assess that the
Egyptian armed forces control 33 to 45 percent (www.merip.org 2012; wikileaks.org
2013), while pressing reporting suggests that military controls 40 to 60 percent of the
economy in Egypt (aljazeera.com 2013; atlanticcouncil.org 2014;
carnegieendowment.org 2014). In 2011, Egypts GDP was approximately 236 billion
U.S. dollars (kushnirs.org 2013). Based on this value, the Egyptian forces controlled
approximately $11.8 to $141.6 of the Egyptian economy. Using estimates of 33 to 45
percent, the military controlled $77.8 to $106.2 billion United States dollars of the
Egyptian economy in 2011. In comparison, the SIPRI database reported Egypts total
military expenditures at $25.4 billion (indexmundi.com 2014). Based on these
estimations, the Egyptian armed forces controlled at least $50 billion. It seems very
unlikely that the regime would have competitive resources and capabilities to coopt the
Egyptian armed forces considering this large income and the states budgetary
constraints. The regime could have used economic policy concessions as perquisites and
privileges to afford the loyalty of the Egyptian military. However, policy concessions
would have likely increased the financial and institutional autonomy of the military and
further limited the regimes ability to coopt the armed forces.
Military commercialism likely limited the effectiveness of counterbalancing
strategies. Concurrent with the regimes inability to effectively distribute perquisites and
privileges, the collective benefit of commercial activity probably strengthened the
community of the military fraternity and likely limited the regimes ability to create and
exploit cleavages within the military institution. Conversely, it is possible that the
Egyptian armed forces were capable of distributing perquisites and privileges to coopt


60
regime and internal security leadership to prevent challenges by paramilitary
organizations to military interventions. The commercial activities of the armed forces in
Egypt benefited the entire military fraternity. Active and retired senior military leadership
and enlisted or conscripted personnel collectively benefited from the commercial activity
of the Egyptian armed forces.


61
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
This study tested the significance of military intervention on coup behavior. To test this
relationship, an MSSD was used to control for social conditions identified and
corroborated by reviewed literature as determinants of military intervention. Specifically,
structural variables/background conditions that predisposed states to military intervention
were treated as constant variables. Moreover, the study controlled for social conditions
assessed to trigger military movements. Additionally, this study controlled for coup
proofing strategies and mechanisms implemented by regimes of the selected cases. These
constant variables isolated the relationship between military commercialism and
intervention.
Selected constant, independent, and dependent variables were used to select cases
and to analyze the relationship between military commercialism and intervention. Egypt
and Syria were selected as the best cases for observing the hypothesized relationship
using this variable-driven selection model. This study proceeded by analyzing and
dichotomously evaluating selected variables; and, significance was identified. In Egypt,
the armed forces maintained large private enterprises and seized power during the 2011
uprisings. Conversely, the Syrian military was not involved in commercial activity and
did not launch a coup during the 2011 uprisings or during the civil conflict that had
followed in the successive years.
Based on the observed relationship and further analysis of the selected cases, this
study makes the assertion that military commercialism is a determinant of coup behavior.
Moreover, this study makes the contention that military commercialism intensifies


62
variables that trigger coup behavior. The relationship between military commercialism
and intervention reinforces the assertion that armed forces are disposed to intervention
when their institutional interests are threatened. Analysis of the Egyptian armed forces
suggests that military ownership of private enterprises expands the institutional interests
of the armed forces. When the commercial activities of the armed forces are challenged,
the institutional interests of the military are threatened as well.
Moreover, the expansion and diversification of military corporate interests makes
the armed forces more sensitive to changes in socio-economic conditions and,
consequently, likely more motivated to launch a coup. Military institutional interests are
less likely to be threatened when budgetary support is derived from the state. Coup
behavior is provoked when the state fails to adequately support the armed forces.
Conversely, the state or a capricious marketplace can threaten the institutional interests of
militaries whose budgets are subsidized or wholly derived from commercial activities.
Consequently, the institutional interests of militaries are more easily threatened when
they are involved in the domestic economy and coups are more likely to occur.
This study also contends that military business challenges the effectiveness of
coup-proofing strategies and mechanisms. Military capital derived from commercial
activity very likely limits the effectiveness of perquisites and privileges distributed by the
regime to ensure the loyalty of the armed forces and to create and exploit inter-service
rivalries. Additionally, this study assesses that the corporate benefits of commercial
activity strengthens the military community and prevents the creation and exploitation of
inter-service rivalries.


63
Military business activities could possibly be utilized to encourage opposition
movements against the regime. Participation in the domestic marketplace creates
networks between militaries and opposition groups. When motivated to launch a coup,
the armed forces could allocate resources and give reassurances to embolden and
encourage opposition groups to openly challenge the ruling regime. Public acts of
political and social dissent could possibly mobilize other elements of the population to
participate. Escalation and subsequent acts of repression by the regime would create a
legitimacy crisis in which the armed forces could intervene.
The relationship between military commercialism and intervention and the
assessments of this study should be further researched. As previously expressed, military
commercialism has not been examined by previous studies as a determinant of coup
behavior. The MSSD was a strong model for identifying the significance of a variable,
however, the model has several limitations that affect the generalizability of its
conclusions. Specifically, the MSSD in this study limited analysis to two cases in a
limited timeframe. This small sampling was effective in controlling variables and
preventing false inferences. However, the small sampling limited observations to the
select cases, a region, and a timeframe. To overcome these limitations and further test
military commercialism as a determinant of coup behavior, this study could be replicated
using different cases from a variety of regions. Therefore, military commercialism should
be incorporated into models that use a large sampling to make more generalizable and
reliable evaluations. A Large N quantitative model could test the relationship between
military commercialism and intervention in a greater number of cases and would reliably
determine the generalizability of the observed relationship.


64
Sub-relationships of military commercialism and intervention should be further
researched as well. This study assessed that military commercial activity increased the
institutional interests of the armed forces. This relationship could be analyzed by
identifying incidence of military intervention that coincided with decline in the profits of
military-owned private enterprises. Alternatively, analysis of public statements by coup
conspirators and survey of coup participants could determine whether the commercial
interest of the armed forces was a determinant of military intervention. Such research
could possibly discern more reliably whether military commercial interests motivate coup
behavior.
This study also assessed that military capital-derived commercial activity
challenges the effectiveness of coup proofing strategies. This assessment could be further
researched by evaluating coup success rates in cases where regimes had implemented
coup-proofing strategies and the military was involved in commercial activity. Moreover,
military commercialisms effect on specific coup proofing strategies could be evaluated
as well. The results of such research could possibly indicate which coup proofing
strategies are most challenged by military capital and, conversely, which are most
resilient and effective.
Further study should also investigate the possibility of militaries using capital to
create opportunities to launch coups. Contingent on the scope of commercial activity,
militaries likely have the capability to manipulate social conditions to create
opportunities. In-depth analysis of domestic industry during periods of economic
downturn prior to intervention would reveal whether armed forces have used military
capital in this manner. Such a relationship would challenge the two-step model paradigm


65
by suggesting the military needs only sufficient motivation and socio-economic influence
to challenge a ruling regime.
Prior to further research, greater information on military commercialism is
necessary. As observed in the reviewed literature, there are very few studies on the
economic activities of the armed forces. This lack of research is likely to due to the fact
that these commercial activities are structured as private enterprises that are not obligated
to release information. Moreover, the availability of information is likely affected by the
surreptitious nature of military commercialism. Additionally, military entrepreneurship is
a relatively new phenomenon and, consequently, is under-researched. Finally, the scarcity
of research is possibly due to the lack of emphasized significance. Research that has
correlated military commercialism with political phenomenon has been limited.
Therefore, correlation with coup behavior will encourage greater study of military
commercialism. Establishing military commercialism as a determinant of coup behavior
in cases in which research is available will encourage the collection of information for the
evaluation of cases.
Establishing the relationship between military commercialism and intervention
will develop existing analyses and assessments of coup behavior. This study identified
military commercialism as a determinant of intervention during the events of the 2011
uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa. Concurrently, it identified military
commercialism as a significant variable for evaluating coup behavior. Identifying
determinants of coup behavior supports reliable explanatory analysis of military
intervention. Additionally, it enables more reliable evaluation of coup risk and predictive
assessments of military intervention.


66
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