Citation
Managing legitimacy

Material Information

Title:
Managing legitimacy the case of Uganda
Alternate title:
The case of Uganda
Creator:
Lynn, Devin Scott ( author )
Language:
English
Physical Description:
1 electronic file (46 pages) : ;

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords:
Dictatorship -- History -- Uganda -- 20th century ( lcsh )
Politics and government -- Uganda ( lcsh )
Genre:
bibliography ( marcgt )
theses ( marcgt )
non-fiction ( marcgt )

Notes

Review:
Without democratic institutions, what makes a government legitimate? As waves of democratization come and go, authoritarian regimes remain. There are numerous examples of long-lasting authoritarian regimes on the African continent, a fact that the literature on the three pillars of authoritarianism seeks to explain. A primary claim is that regimes are frequently relying less on coercion and more on legitimacy and cooptation to secure political stability. This reliance in turn requires specific tactics, including movement towards a mode of competitive authoritarian that allows greater participation by the populace. ( ,, )
Review:
This paper investigates the means by which the Ugandan government has sought to increase legitimacy in the face of growing political opposition, economic liberalization, globalization forces, and staggering poverty. The internal affairs and policies of the Museveni regime will be analyzed to understand how this particular regime has transformed itself into a competitive authoritarian regime in order to maintain power. Of specific interest are measures that put into place: economic and political decentralization, more democratic institutions, and a greater focus on the rule of law as articulated in the constitution.
Review:
This research will deepen our understanding of the strategies of the Ugandan regime, and in so doing, also the dynamics involved in political stability, legitimacy, and the hybrid regimes.
Thesis:
Thesis (M.A.)- University of Colorado Denver.
Bibliography:
Includes bibliographic references
System Details:
System requirements: Adobe Reader.
General Note:
Department of Political Science
Statement of Responsibility:
by Devin Scott Lynn.

Record Information

Source Institution:
|University of Colorado Denver
Holding Location:
|Auraria Library
Rights Management:
All applicable rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier:
945637742 ( OCLC )
ocn945637742
Classification:
LD1193.L64 2015m L96 ( lcc )

Downloads

This item has the following downloads:


Full Text
MANAGING LEGITIMACY: THE CASE OF UGANDA
By
DEVIN SCOTT LYNN
B.S., Black Hills State University, 2013
A thesis submitted to the
Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Colorado in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts Political Science Program
2015


This thesis for the Master of Arts degree by
Devin Scott Lynn
has been approved for the
Political Science Program
By
Lucy Ware McGuffey, Chair
Sasha Breger-Bush
Thorsten Spehn
Date: November 08, 2015
11


Lynn, Devin Scott (MA, Political Science)
Managing Legitimacy: The Case of Uganda
Thesis directed by Associate Professor Lucy Ware McGuffey
ABSTRACT
Without democratic institutions, what makes a government legitimate? As waves of
democratization come and go, authoritarian regimes remain. There are numerous examples of
long-lasting authoritarian regimes on the African continent, a fact that the literature on the
three pillars of authoritarianism seeks to explain. A primary claim is that regimes are
frequently relying less on coercion and more on legitimacy and cooptation to secure political
stability. This reliance in turn requires specific tactics, including movement towards a mode
of competitive authoritarian that allows greater participation by the populace.
This paper investigates the means by which the Ugandan government has sought to
increase legitimacy in the face of growing political opposition, economic liberalization,
globalization forces, and staggering poverty. The internal affairs and policies of the
Museveni regime will be analyzed to understand how this particular regime has transformed
itself into a competitive authoritarian regime in order to maintain power. Of specific interest
are measures that put into place: economic and political decentralization, more democratic
institutions, and a greater focus on the rule of law as articulated in the constitution.
This research will deepen our understanding of the strategies of the Ugandan regime,
and in so doing, also the dynamics involved in political stability, legitimacy, and the hybrid
regimes.
The form and content of this abstract are approved. I recommend its publication.
Approved: Lucy Ware McGuffey
iii


TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER
I. STATEMENT OI THE PROBLEM..........................................1
II. METHODS...........................................................3
III. LITERATURE REVIEW.................................................7
Three Pillars of Authoritarian Stability.......................7
Legitimacy.....................................................9
Economic Policies in Developing States........................12
Democratization and the Rise of Hybrid Regimes................14
IV. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS..............................................20
Uganda and the NRM Shifting Regime Type.....................20
Economic Considerations of a Competitive Authoritarian Regime.27
Perceptions on the Ground.....................................32
V. CONCLUSION.......................................................36
REFERENCES...........................................................39
IV


CHAPTER I
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Brutal dictators and violent civil war, rampant poverty and widespread
underdevelopment are typical descriptions of any number of countries in Africa. Corrupt
authoritarianism rather than democracy is abundant across the continent despite efforts to
inspire or instill democracy. Waves of democratization come and go with varying degrees of
success. While there are fewer outright authoritarian regimes than in previous decades, there
is still a high concentration of corrupt regimes on the African continent. The current
academic debate sheds light on the internal and external struggles facing African states that
may reinforce authoritarian tendencies leading to the high concentration of authoritarian
regimes. Issues such as internal corruption, globalization, global power divisions and a
history of exploitation give a taste of the long list of problems plaguing the continent. When
understanding a regime, all of the above issues, internal and external, must be considered.
The exploitation of natural and human resources that left many African states with a bare
infrastructure and an unstable elite class following decolonization has had a profound impact
on current African regimes.
The dichotomy of globalization and internal corruption as leading factors for state
failures is important. There continues to be global forces that influence state behavior.
However, this research cannot look at both. As important as the effects of colonization and
globalization are, the main focus of this paper is internal state affairs. This internal analysis
of a regime looks directly at the policies and actions of particular leaders and institutions.
Many African regimes have highly centralized rule, often holding power for decades. Most
1


rulers were not freely elected, meaning that many rulers have come to power via force.
Patronage is the tactic of choice and many dictators rule for decades until death or a coup
detat. These blanket statements do not describe all regimes. What about those that do not
seem repressive and violent? Those more peaceful regimes seem to be relying on soft power
and legitimacy to hold office, showing a profound shift in how a regime maintains power. As
discussed in this research, legitimacy can explain stability without the use of force. Short of
brute force, how do authoritarian regimes stay in power, avoiding failed state status or a
democratic revolution from the masses? More specifically, what tactics does the authoritarian
regime in Uganda use to stay a legitimate ruling power? This research will show through a
case study of Uganda, that the Museveni regime has managed legitimacy using a number of
tactics including decentralization, depoliticization of the opposition, and the creation of
various democratic institutions, effectively moving towards a competitive authoritarian
regime. This paper will begin with a brief discussion of African regimes generally, the
problems of legitimacy, and authoritarianism specific to the post-colonial era. The literature
review looks at authoritarian stability, legitimacy, tactics of staying in power and the rise of
hybrid regimes. The analysis looks in depth at Uganda and its transition to a competitive
authoritarian regime that has effectively managed legitimacy.
2


CHAPTER II
METHODS
This research will use a case study of Uganda, as this particular research is more
concerned with exposing the intricacies of one case rather than theorizing across multiple
cases. With the knowledge from one case study, future research can be done on other
competitive authoritarian regimes based on the framework in this paper. This research looks
at the actions of the regime in connection with the perceptions of the Ugandan citizens. As
the Ugandan regime enacted policies, Afrobarometer worked to gather perception data
covering topics of all areas concerning the Ugandan regime. By understanding what the
regime was doing and what the perceptions were among citizens, the research can offer some
insight into how the regime managed legitimacy over time. As Ugandas central regime made
decisions and implemented policies, the research will analyze the perceptions of citizens as
the policies affected their lives. The analysis conducted on the Afrobarometer survey results
took hours to adequately understand the perceptions that Ugandans have of their government
over time. It should be noted that there are constraints on the perception data as the survey
Afrobarometer used over time did change some. The data is constantly being expanded, but
some trends are difficult to analyze. However, this research shows that perception data is
important when looking at regime legitimacy. In the case study below, a few key variables
were analyzed in relation to the perception data. First, perceptions of the effectiveness, or the
approval ratings, of parliament, the president and local officials provided insight to the
perceptions of effectiveness. This helps measure a key aspect of legitimacy in whether the
government is abiding by the expectations set forth by the population. Pairing this with the
percentage of citizens willing to contact government officials, attend protests, and voting
3


levels, the research can accurately gauge the level of political participation or interest in
Uganda.
In choosing an appropriate case study it was important to assess a few factors. First,
the regime needed to be reasonably classified as a competitive authoritarian regime. Second,
the regime needed to use relatively little repression as a way of staying in power. Thus, the
regime needed to rely primarily on legitimacy and co-optation as way to stay in power.
Third, the regime needed to be in power long enough to get an adequate sense of internal
events over time. Uganda meets all three of the criteria. This research argues that due to the
nature of the local democratic institutions and the parliament, Uganda is a competitive
authoritarian regime. While there is rampant corruption in the presidency, a political avenue
for the opposition exists through the parliament. Uganda has also become more internally
peaceful over time, instead using soft power, most often remaining in Freedom Houses
category of partly free in the recent decade. Finally, it is possible to assess the regime over
time as Museveni and the National Resistance Movement (NRM) have been in power since
1986. This shows various economic cycles, the implementation of SAPs, and the rise of
elections and political parties. Over nearly 30 years, this research can adequately understand
the issues being dealt with by the regime and the tactics being used over time.
The current Ugandan regime has managed legitimacy since 1986 by using a number
of tactics including decentralization, depoliticization of potential opposition, and the creation
of local democratic structures, thus moving towards a competitive authoritarian regime. The
case study shows that these tactics have adequately sustained the regime. These tactics work
when the economy is relatively strong and/or there is a weak political alternative. When the
economy is strong, there are fewer reasons for citizen mobilization against the regime as
4


citizens needs are in large part being met. Politics and economics are explicitly tied together.
As shown in the case study, political stability in part requires economic stability.
To best understand the central argument, a few definitions are in order. Each concept
is discussed in detail in the literature review. The three pillars of authoritarian stability are
legitimacy, co-optation, and repression (Gerschewski 2013). These are the three primary
tools used by an authoritarian regime to maintain power. Each works in conjunction with one
another (Gerschewski 2013). This research looks directly at the legitimacy pillar of
authoritarian stability. For this research, the definition of legitimacy is when a regimes
practices meet the generally accepted standards created by the ruled population by abiding by
the implicit and explicit norms and expectations of the people. A more robust discussion of
legitimacy will follow in the literature review. Key to maintaining legitimacy in the Ugandan
context is decentralization and depoliticization. This research considers the process of
redistributing powers and processes away from the central government as decentralization.
Depoliticization is the process by which a regime disenfranchises citizens or community
organizations.
There is a connection between decentralization and depoliticization and the economy.
Decentralization is not simply political. Many economic and development issues are taken up
at the local levels and funded through central financial transfer as discussed below. The
central government in Uganda provides financing for building infrastructure and poverty
alleviation programs. However, the programs and construction projects were administered at
the local level. In order to co-opt and depoliticize potential opposition groups such as the
Buganda and other regional leaders, the regime needed to strengthen the economy, and give
the regions the resources to do so. This was especially true in particularly poor areas of
5


Uganda, notably in the north. These three tactics are different but work in tandem.
Decentralization not only devolved political power to the districts, but it also shifted specific
economic work to the regional level. At the same time, the creation of democratic structures
at the local and national level gave citizens a much-needed voice in politics. This is directly
related to decentralization, as Local Councils (LCs) were the first form of participatory
democracy at the local level. Parliamentary and presidential elections follow later.
Depolitization works with both a shift to democratic institutions and economic
decentralization in that there was a credible avenue for potential opposition to rise through
the political and/or economic system while still ensuring the NRM was well positioned to
maintain power. By having democratic institutions, the regime was able to give an avenue for
the opposition to gain power. For example, opposition parties gained seats in the parliament,
and exerted some influence over state affairs. Economic decentralization gave some power to
the local institutions, giving citizens an institution to work with directly rather than mobilize
against the central regime.
6


CHAPTER III
LITERATURE REVIEW
There are a few major concepts discussed in the literature review. Those concepts are:
authoritarian stability and legitimacy, economics, and the emergence of hybrid regimes. The
case study is largely based on these overarching concepts. The literature first begins with a
discussion of the three pillars of authoritarian stability to better understand how authoritarian
regimes operate and maintain power. Then, the next section helps narrow the focus of the
research to legitimacy, which is the primary focus of the case study. The definition of
legitimacy from the methods section is explained in detail. Key scholars on legitimacy such
as Gilley, Uphoff, Bratton and Mattes back up the definition as a concept that is constantly
evolving. These scholars also suggest that legitimacy varies based on the context. The
economic section follows, as Brett (1995) argues that regimes must generate enough
economic resources to maintain political support. This is also followed up in the case study,
as the economy and legitimacy in Uganda seem to be intertwined. Finally, the discussion of
competitive authoritarian regimes relates directly to the case study in that this research has
classified the Ugandan government as a competitive authoritarian regime. As this research
argues, the transition to a competitive authoritarian regime is one of the tools used by the
Museveni regime to manage legitimacy. Key scholars such as Howard, Roessler, Levitsky,
Way, Gandhi and Przeworksi are discussed as they explain the rise of hybrid regimes. The
category of hybrid regimes includes competitive authoritarian category.
Three Pillars of Authoritarian Stability
According to one theoretical framework, once in power, a regime must attempt to
stay in power using three primary tactics. Authoritarian regimes have three overarching tools
7


at their disposal for staying in power (Gerschewski 2013). It is important to understand these
three pillars and how they work together in order to understand how an authoritarian regime
operates and to best analyze each pillar individually. Known as the three pillars, authoritarian
regimes consolidate power through legitimacy, coercion and co-optation (Gerschewski
2013). These three pillars work closely together and are often difficult to sort. For an
authoritarian regime to successfully stay in power, it generally uses the three pillars
simultaneously to varying degrees (Gerschewski 2013).
A description of each pillar is as follows. First, legitimacy helps lower the reliance on
the use of force, while ensuring relative popular support for the regime (Gerschewski 2013).
Second, co-optation of elites prevents elite fractures from becoming rivals that could
destabilize or overthrow the government (Gerschewski 2013). Third, coercion is the brutal
attempt of raising the costs of dissent so high that the general population is forced to be
governed (Gerschewski 2013). Some regimes use tactics such as civilian torture, public and
private killings, and/or disappearances.
To understand how each pillar operates, it is important to see some of the key
interactions between the pillars. If a regime is perceived to be legitimate, there will be fewer
reasons for the masses to mobilize. There seems to be a correlation between increased levels
of legitimacy and lower levels of repression. Higher levels of repression can undermine the
regimes legitimacy (Gerschewski 2013). Thus, regimes using legitimacy and co-optation
may not need to use repression as much to stay in power (Gerschewski 2013). On the other
hand, lower levels of legitimacy would require a regime to rely more on repressive behaviors
for stability. Legitimacy and co-optation can reinforce each other (Gerschewski 2013). For
example, in Uganda a reasonable tactic to co-opt the regional elite is through building
8


infrastructure. This sends resources to regional elites looking for cabinet posts or economic
resources. That infrastructure in turn helps legitimize the regime among the general
population by providing essential services and lowering the costs of transportation. Another
effective way to maintain legitimacy and facilitate co-optation, as discussed in the following
research, is by moving towards a competitive authoritarian regime.
Legitimacy
As mentioned in the methods chapter, legitimacy is when a regimes practices meet
the generally accepted standards created by the ruled population by abiding by the implicit
and explicit norms and expectations of the people. This creates the perception of the right to
rule. This perception is not absolute and is in continual flux as current events and decisions
shape future perceptions of legitimacy. Some scholars note that this continual process of
legitimation places some countries in a constant legitimacy crisis (Gilley 2009; Bratton &
Mattes 2001). This definition of legitimacy follows similar ideas in African research by
Oluoch (2009).
Legitimacy is important, but as Gerschewski (2013) mentions, it, until recently, lacks
in the literature (see also Gilley 2009). However, scholars seem to be returning to the
importance of legitimacy in analyzing and understanding regimes. Clearly, this research
agrees and understands the importance of legitimacy, as the concept is a central part of the
paper. Gilley (2009) notes that legitimation is an ongoing process for authoritarian regimes
and causes them to operate in a particular way, saying that legitimacy is important in
understanding regimes and their stability. Uphoff (1989) shows the importance of legitimacy,
saying that legitimacy is strong when citizens have an obligation to obey rather than being
forced to obey via repression. Repression helps raise the cost of rebellion to what Johnston
9


(2011) calls the line of deterrence. This is the amount of repression necessary to deter
citizens from mobilizing against the regime in the context of social movements and
democratization (Johnston 2011). The line of deterrence requires much less repression if the
regime enjoys a higher level of legitimacy (Johnston 2011). This must be understood to
accurately frame the actions and policies of a regime trying to manage legitimacy. From an
efficiency standpoint, political systems should try to gain or maintain legitimacy (Uphoff
1989). The costs of repression are high, and eventually destabilizing. Legitimacy seems to be
more conducive to regime longevity as legitimacy can be more stable than the other two
pillars of authoritarian stability. While there may be short-term losses in managing
legitimacy, the following case study seems to point to legitimacy being a key factor in regime
longevity. In order to analyze legitimacy, the research also points to a number of tangible
actions that regimes can deploy to manage legitimacy.
It is first important to narrow down the scope of legitimacy, to better focus the
analysis. Schatzberg (1993) points to three important aspects of legitimacy in African
politics. He claims that legitimacy may deal more with consumption than political
transformation, leaders are held in a special manner, and there is a sense of unity among
citizens (Schatzberg 1993). To further explain how leaders are held in a special manner,
Schatzberg (1993) compares leaders to a father figure. Leaders should provide goods and
services, and not be challenged often. He argues that democracy may not be key in looking at
political legitimacy, rather if the needs of the people are met, the regime may enjoy
legitimacy (Schatzberg 1993). This is notable because it calls into question the notion that
electoral democracy is the key to a legitimate government, and grants authoritarian regimes
the ability to be legitimate if functioning effectively and/or efficiently. Schatzberg (1993)
10


also suggests that citizen groups may hold leaders in a special manner in the fact that leaders
may never be directly challenged via protest, uprising, or other means. As noted in coming
sections, this particular case study on Uganda suggests that consumption and basic living
conditions are key aspects to political stability, seeming to support part of Schatzbergs
(1993) research. On the same topic, the Ugandan regime occasionally asserts authority under
the auspices of efficiency, playing to the needs of citizens. This is best exemplified when
Uganda recentralized control of Kampala claiming increased efficiency in delivering goods
and services (Muhumuza 2008). Schatzberg (1993) claims that leaders portraying a father-
like relationship with citizens may be more legitimate. The government must work so citizen
needs are met with goods and wellbeing, meaning that efficiency is a key aspect of
maintaining legitimacy. Illegitimate rulers are those that are perceived to overindulge and
have a permanent group of elites (Schatzberg 1993). Unfortunately, this does not explain
how a number of corrupt autocrats are able to stay in power and possible maintain
legitimacy. This seems to be the weakest point of his argument, and is challenged by scholars
such as Gerschewski (2013) that show permanent elite classes may not matter if they are co-
opted successfully.
Legitimacy is increasingly important in the discussion about authoritarian regimes.
This importance is due to the fact that legitimacy may be more efficient than repressive
means of maintaining power. This statement seems to be upheld by Gilley (2009) and Uphoff
(1989). Legitimacy may be best described as an ongoing process. That is true, and can be
seen in the following case study. Current events such as economic crises, war, terrorist
attacks, droughts, etc., may directly affect the current legitimacy of any given regime.
11


Economic Policies in Developing States
Much of the literature on African affairs points to numerous tangible issues such as
poor infrastructure, lack of economic growth, issues with competing ethnic groups and an
unstable elite class as some of the root causes of unrest and authoritarianism across the
continent (Lockwood 2005). Poor economic growth undermines the states ability to co-opt
competing elites that may fracture and challenge the regime. Citizens in African states have
had to overcome a list of issues, many with immediate effects such as debilitating poverty or
civil war with little time or additional resources to focus on democratization efforts.
Economic issues are some of the most dominant issues facing the continent. As noted by
Lockwood (2005), neoliberal policies have continued to reinforce poor economic growth and
powerlessness on the global stage, leaving many African communities vulnerable to
authoritarian regimes. These neoliberal policies were bom out of the Washington Consensus.
In response to the early 1980s debt crisis, the Bretton Woods institutions of the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) created conditional lending in the
form of structural adjustment policies (SAPs). These policies shaped the economic platform
of many developing countries. Scholars such as Sachs (1995) argued in favor of a western
dominated system that was reinforced through conditional lending. SAPs forced concessions
from the debtor governments in exchange for loans. These policies followed a neoliberal
economic model, calling for limited government, privatization of government controlled
industries, reduced welfare, etc. (Noorbakhsh & Paloni 1999; see also Sachs 1995). The
policies were one-size-fits-all, and were not applied based on context (Noorbakhsh & Paloni
1999). This debt relationship between African states and international financial institutions
created a global dependency system, where the global south was, and remains, heavily
12


dependent on much of the global north (Pinkney 2009). This dependency has gotten worse
with the implementation of SAPs (Bradshaw & Huang 1991). Of particular importance of
Eastern Africa, coffee markets are largely controlled in western cities such as London and
New York. This explicitly shows the dependent nature Sub-Saharan Africa countries are on
western nations. The case study supports these claims in that Uganda is dependent on foreign
aid and international financial institutions for a large portion of its annual budget.
Dependency itself is a major issue for these states, but there is also a long list of other issues
stemming from neoliberal policies.
As the following scholars note, there are a list of unintended consequences to
neoliberal policies called for by international financial institutions other than increased
dependency. Lewis (2008) discusses the economic development efforts with little positive
growth or democratization. He notes there is a common assumption that with rule of law,
regimes may perform better and work towards economic growth (Lewis 2008). However,
research has shown that neoliberal economic policies rarely create the lasting economic
growth and reduction of poverty as promised (Lockwood 2005). While states may have
witnessed growing economies, income levels are not rising at a similar pace (Lewis 2008).
This means that the poverty reduction side of economic growth is lacking. Another
consequence of neoliberal economic policies is environmental degradation. Environmental
issues are cast aside in favor of economic growth and debt servicing (Haque 1999; Bello
2009). As environmental degradation causes problems such as drought or flooding, those
living in poverty suffer the most. These people may not have the necessary resources to
handle such events. As states open their economies to the global markets, corporations are
able to enter these states and influence decisions for the sake of investment; again, these
13


policies can be in direct opposition to poverty alleviation and environmental quality. These
issues are not conducive to democratization, as many of the regimes implementing neoliberal
policies happen to be nondemocratic. The pitfalls associated with SAPs are problematic for
authoritarian regimes trying to maintain power.
Democratization and the Rise of Hybrid Regimes
As various regimes have started to rely less on brute force and more on legitimacy
and co-optation, some scholars have discussed a new type of competitive authoritarian or
hybrid regime. This concept has been discussed in the methods section and is central to
understanding the Ugandan regime. This regime type primarily uses soft power as a means
for governing (Levitsky & Way 2002). Competitive authoritarian regimes are those in which
democratic institutions are used as a way to exercise political power (Levitsky & Way 2002,
52). However, Levitsky and Way (2002) also note that these democratic institutions are
constantly under assault from the executive. Elections may not be entirely free or fair, and
the executive branch continues to consolidate power while accepting some limits such as a
constitution or various laws passed by a democratic institution. This shift is both delaying or
avoiding democratization and at times continuing the consolidation of power in the
executive. The initial concessions of power by a central regime may help co-opt elites
looking for increased influence. At the same time, democratic institutions may legitimize the
regime with citizens looking for a democratic transition. Since these hybrid regimes do not
fully transform into a democracy, the central authority may increase its longevity quelling
both elite and citizen unrest.
The rise of hybrid regimes stalled the third wave of democratization (Howard &
Roessler 2006). It seems as though the transition towards a hybrid regime may be a policy
14


concession used to stay in power as suggested by Gandhi & Przeworski (2007). If this is in
fact a concession to assist in legitimizing a regime, the regime may increase its longevity by
transitioning to some kind of hybrid regime. The case study below will show that moving
towards a competitive authoritarian regime can have a positive effect on the stability of the
regime. However, increasingly powerful institutions may ultimately degrade an authoritarian
regime to the point where democratization is able to happen. A constant balance is necessary
in order to keep the regime in power and relatively safe from the forces of democratization
that may arise from democratic institutions that reside within a competitive authoritarian
regime.
This new category of regime introduces various other categories of regimes into the
mix provided by Lewis (2008). Howard & Roessler (2006) argue that these hybrid regimes
are not all making a transition to democracy; rather, these regimes are creating a new space
for themselves in the discussion of regime type. This echoes the argument from Levitsky and
Way (2002) that these new regimes may not be making a transition to democracy, but
prolonging their rule by making internal reforms. If an authoritarian regime feels threatened
or faces growing discontent, moving to a hybrid regime may help prolong the rule of
particular regime. Some of the tactics used within the movement towards a hybrid regime
include: changing or creating a constitution, building democratic institutions and legalizing
political parties. Notice the connection here to strategies of maintaining legitimacy by
opening the political process. Gandhi & Przeworski (2007) note that a tactic used by
autocrats are policy concessions. For example, a regime that allows multiple parties to
participate in the government may be making concessions to appease an opposition party,
and prove its commitment to democratic institutions. This type of maneuver may also
15


institutionalize the opposition, making it harder for them to directly challenge the central
regime leaders.
Inside these new regimes, Munck (2006) notes the two important electoral factors of
contestation and participation. These factors are in relation to democratic institutions.
Elections are not a sure sign of a democracy, although elections are a necessary part of
democracy. When a hybrid regime creates democratic institutions, these institutions may or
may not be entirely free and/or fair. It may also be difficult to definitively say whether an
election is free and fair, unless there is overwhelming evidence of fraud or repression
(Munck 2006). Until there is a strong case for the opposition, the election may be fairly
producing favorable results for the incumbent. Research specific to elections would be better
able to discuss results as well as how free and fair a particular election may be, but those
methods are not within the scope of this particular research. Elections may be an important
aspect of hybrid regimes, but they are one small piece of the overall narrative of such
regimes. In the context of competitive authoritarian regimes, it is sufficient to note that there
are democratic institutions (Bratton & de Walle 1994). However, these democratic
institutions have various levels of contestation and participation among citizens. Note that
democratic institutions in a competitive authoritarian regime are generally encroached upon
by the central regime, and power of such institutions is widely varied (Munck 2006). In
addition to elections, many states choose to write a constitution, working to be a government
based on the rule of law rather than upheld by force.
Brett (1995) argues that democratization must include the neutralization of force in
order to be considered a government by consent. Hybrid regimes can, and do, use force at
times. However, in order to continue to maintain legitimacy, the regime needs to neutralize
16


the military by accepting constitutional restraints (Brett 1995). Without accepting these
limits, the military will be forced to either uphold the regime or will be given an avenue to
credibly challenge the regime through a coup detat (Brett 1995). While accepting some
constitutional restraints, many regimes will still work to consolidate power without the
complete erosion of the constitution. Often referred to as patronage politics, constitutional
manipulation generally serves the interests of the elites and/or the executive office.
Patronage is a way to stay in power and co-opt elites (Arriola 2009). Neopatrimonial
practices are a core feature of African leaders in which the executive uses a number of state
resources to gain the loyalty of the elites and the general population while also controlling
any democratic process (Bratton & de Walle 1994). Depending on the level of opposition,
leaders may have to make more drastic changes to their ruling structure (Gandhi &
Przeworski 2007). For example, local democratic structures or an elected parliament may be
a concession made to slow the threats to a regime. As opposition parties or elites gain power,
there may be an increased need for co-optation. A credible avenue into authority, such as a
parliamentary body could be an appropriate strategy to funnel frustrations away from the
executive and into a different government institution with varying degrees of actual
authority. In the context of competitive authoritarian regimes, parliaments are considered a
credible opening to power for the opposition.
Case (2006) notes the importance of regime manipulation. Depending on the regime's
ability to manipulate institutions skillfully, the regime can survive a legitimacy crisis. If the
regime is unable to manipulate the government structures, the regime may face a limited
existence (Case 2006). There are a number of manipulations regimes can employ such as
limiting civil liberties, co-opting NGOs into the national development scheme, owning the
17


press or providing propaganda, and fragmenting the opposition (Case 2006). Gandhi &
Przeworski (2007) note that successfully institutionalizing the opposition effectively helps an
autocrat stay in power longer. Giving elites or opposition groups input allows them to gain
power without gaining serious power to effectively mount a challenge to the regime. Of
course, this is complicated as there is always the possibility that an institution such as a
parliament will consolidate power against the regime and give them the legal authority to
mount a credible challenge to an autocrat.
Concerning the institution of parliament, opposition parties may effectively help
sustain a dictator's rule by actively participating in a controlled parliamentary setting.
However, as Fish (2006) argues, a strong parliament may lead to further democratization and
degrade the power of the autocrat. By allowing opposition groups to hold credible power
with the platform to influence policy, certain leaders may be able to further democratic
ideals. Levitsky and Way (2002) also note that parliaments may be good avenues for a strong
opposition to gain power. Again, this points to the ability of gaining power through a credible
institution and undermining the legitimacy of the executive office. A tactic to maintain
control over parliament may be through constitutional manipulation (Fish 2006). Forcing
laws, or the ability to dissolve parliament are tactics that the executive may be able to use to
keep the parliament in a relatively powerless position. By circumventing parliament, the
regime may decrease the chances of an opposition party gaining power in the parliament to
exert force on the executive. Anther possible tactic the regime may choose is to decentralize.
Decentralization has been a popular choice of many African regimes.
Decentralization is the process in which powers are devolved from the national level to the
local. The creation of regional or local governance structures is a typical sign of
18


decentralization. In some cases the excuse for decentralization, and later potential re-
centralization, is more efficient delivery of goods and services (Gore & Muwanga 2014).
The idea is that local governments are empowered or perceived as such, and in some cases
the citizens are able to directly elect local officials. This limited democracy is a stark
difference from strict authoritarian states. In some instances similar to Uganda, the local
government is eventually disempowered and relies on the central government for revenue
due to the loss of tax privileges (Cammack et al, 2006). This idea is expanded in the case
study. This disempowerment and reliance shows the continual manipulation required of the
central regime to maintain authority.
These concepts are carried throughout the case study below. Legitimacy is central to
the overall research question. Economic policies and poverty reduction attempts all point to a
regime trying to gain legitimacy among its citizens and maintain the resources for internal
stability and debt maintenance. Meanwhile, the Ugandan regime has transitioned into a more
competitive authoritarian regime. This follows the above discussion of regime manipulation
including building a constitution and the creation of democratic institutions both at the local
and national level. The case study also introduces public perceptions that are able to measure
approval ratings, economic policy perceptions, willingness to protest, etc. Through these
various discussions, the research will tie in to the literature review by supporting some
authors conclusions and perhaps challenging others.
19


CHAPTER IV
CASE STUDY ANALYSIS
This section is concerned with the Museveni regime. It starts with a brief discussion
of Museveni and the National Resistance Movement coming to power. Initially, the
Museveni regime seemed to fall into the authoritarian trap with few actual reforms being
instituted, despite initial promises to reform. However, as shown in the following paragraphs,
the regime did being to institute reforms including a constitution, local-level democracy, and
an elected parliament. As shown, it was not an easy transition. Along the way, Museveni
fought to consolidate power in the executive office and was able to abolish term limits
among other forms of power consolidation. The case study follows some similar themes in
the literature review. Concerning legitimacy and regime transition, the Museveni regime has
used many of the tactics discussed above such as creating a constitution, introducing local-
level democratic institutions, creating a parliament, etc. The Museveni regime also instituted
various neoliberal reforms as prescribed by international financial institutions as discussed in
the literature review. This regime is not a democracy, but it is not entirely authoritarian.
Democratization has been stalled, and the regime maneuvers discussed below may be key in
avoid outright democratization without the drastic use of force.
Uganda and the NRM: Shifting Regime Type
Since 1986, President Yoweri Museveni has enjoyed relatively stable power over the
country of Uganda. He followed decades of brutally violent dictators that ruled Uganda since
independence, each ruler seemingly more violent than the next. Idi Amin alone killed
thousands of Ugandans for the sake of retaining power. Following Amin, Obote was brutally
violent and overthrown without any sort of democratic transition or aspiration. Museveni
20


reversed this violent trend and has recently relied more on legitimacy and co-optation than
outright coercion, shown through the years of relative peace based on the actions of the
regime. The shift away from violence is indicative of a transformation to a competitive
authoritarian regime as one tactic of maintaining legitimacy. This is not to say that
Musevenis regime is always peaceful, but it does point to the theme of regime change and
movement away from repression as a means of maintaining power in a country historically
used to violence.
In the 1990s, Museveni was one of Africas big men leaders with near absolute
control over Ugandas political process (Moss 2011). This means that Museveni followed the
pattern of typical neopatrimonial regimes in which the executive maintains authority through
personal patronage (Bratton & de Walle 1994). However, the Museveni regime described the
government system as a movement. The single political party was even named the National
Resistance Movement (NRM). As a self-described movement, the government was supposed
to be inclusive and transformative, ushering in a new type of government where everyone
had the chance to succeed. Competition was to be thrown aside, and people were to work
together for the common good of the country. In theory, the NRM argued this would allow
for greater freedom as anyone that wanted to run for political office could without working
through parties and elites (Kasfir 1998). It was supposed to level the playing field, and give a
chance to the disadvantaged. This sort of fairness among all groups was one of the major
selling points being touted by the NRM. This theory of openness was one of the first signs of
a potentially new regime type. The level playing field idea was sold at the local level as well
through a decentralized governance structure as discussed below. As with any other regime,
Museveni and the NRM had to deal with internal issues and divisions facing an impoverished
21


and violent country. To understand these divisions, the research must briefly take a historical
turn.
Prior to colonization, Uganda consisted of various kingdoms that ruled over distinct
regions. For a number of reasons, the regional divisions of the kingdoms never really went
away. Reasons such as differing economic growth patterns, unrest and skepticism sustained
the divisions. Under colonialism, the British used divide and rule tactics to stay in power in
Uganda, choosing the Buganda Kingdom to maintain power over the colony (Nugent 2004).
In turn, the Buganda Kingdom, a southern based power, enjoyed a variety of benefits such as
increased access to economic opportunities, development, education, etc. These benefits
continued in the years following decolonization, as the north was best known for civil unrest
and underdevelopment. The southern regions were better known for stability and increased
economic growth. The NRM, being a southern-based party, was met with skepticism from
the other regions. Due to these divisions, Museveni had to work to co-opt regional, ethnic
and military leaders into the NRM and central government. In order to undermine any
credible opposition and the creation of opposition political parties, there needed to be
adequate co-optation. This was especially true considering many regional leaders were
skeptical of a southern-based government (Kasfir 1998). By co-opting the regional elite and
delaying the formation of political parties, the regime may have prolonged its rule.
It is in part due to these regional divisions that Museveni was able to justify a single-
party state (Kasfir 1998). Regional differences caused deep divisions and mistrust. Initially
the NRM being a southern based militia exasperated ethnic and regional tensions (Kasfir
1998). Mwenda and Tangri (2005) show that overcoming regional and ethnic differences of
elites were handled primarily via co-optation. By being inclusive but not offering real power
22


to other political players, the Museveni regime institutionalized opposition well enough to
not be a major threat. To work with the regions of Uganda, the regime created a decentralized
political structure, which also helped to transform to a competitive authoritarian regime and
maintain legitimacy among the citizens of Uganda.
Museveni chose to decentralize Uganda using a tiered system of governance known
in Uganda as the Local Council (LC) system (Dicklitch 1998). This introduced democracy at
the local level, which proved to be very popular with the local population when first formed
(Dicklitch 1998). The LC system created various levels of government with the lowest level
[of government] in the villages. Representatives at the local level were directly elected by the
citizens they governed. The local council would then assist in creating a higher council and
so on until the district level. The LC system created various levels of accountability between
the local citizens and the central government. LCs were used to deliver goods and services
and even raise taxes. Some other responsibilities of LCs were to maintain infrastructure,
institute a community development plan, ensure adequate education, etc. These
responsibilities were primarily funded through central finance transfers rather than tax
revenue due to the little amount of taxes available in a poor country. One important aspect of
maintaining legitimacy was ensuring that local level democracy functioned well.
Gilley (2009) describes some of the early village elections as being quite fair, with
citizens lining up behind their preferred candidate to avoid voter fraud. It was not an ideal
situation, but a slow introduction to electoral politics. Again, this shows the beginning of a
reform that led to a competitive authoritarian regime. Since the elections were local,
community members could hold LC officials accountable directly. Gilley (2000) notes that it
was relatively easy to voice concerns about LC actions or elections at the local level by
23


speaking directly to the local officials. They could hold a recall election or vote a
representative out at the end of a term. However, any issues above the village LCs were more
difficult to solve by community members due to the indirect nature of the tiered system.
There was no mechanism to recall representatives in higher LCs (Gilley 2009). There was
also no official opposition party, since all Ugandans technically belonged to the NRM. This
significantly reduced the ability of representatives to offer a drastically different vision than
the official NRM stance for the community. While LCs were being created, a constitutional
commission was tasked with the assignment of drafting a constitution.
The constitution was created by a constitution commission that sought input from
regional leaders and citizens to ensure there was a broad sense of inclusivity in the decision-
making process. Kjaer (1999) argues that the 1995 Ugandan constitution was more
innovative than the previous three constitutions in the fact that it diffused powers away from
the presidency. It was also created by a constitutional commission that worked with
communities around Uganda to create a constitution that many felt was more inclusive (Kjaer
1999). By using a constitutional commission, Museveni could initially justify the single-party
movement, as it seemed as though all citizens were being included in the decision making
process. The 1995 constitution was not perfect. In fact, as noted, it did not allow political
parties to operate and it was difficult to politically exist outside the NRM (Kjaer 1999). Since
the constitution allowed only one political party, it took a referendum to change the law. The
outcome allowed multiple parties to exist in Uganda. As noted, there are now various parties
representing interest groups around the country.
Beginning in the early 2000s, internal division of the NRM allowed for greater
flexibility with political parties, while at the same time abolishing presidential term limits.
24


Internal divisions inside the NRM appeared as alternative political parties that formed but
were illegal under the constitution. The various ethnic and regional groups were working
towards becoming political parties. According to the Uganda state website, there are
currently over 25 registered political parties in 2015. In 2005, non-NRM parties were
formally allowed to operate, a right granted through a voter referendum. Until then, Uganda
was officially a single-party government. The fact that the referendum succeeded to allow
multiple parties shows that the general population was discontent with the single party state,
and opposition groups had gained enough power to mount a serious campaign in favor of
legalizing additional parties. This also helped the transition to a competitive authoritarian
regime by providing a key element of competition, however limited. Not only was the
outcome in direct competition with the wishes of the central regime, but it was also decided
through a fairly democratic process. Interestingly, the NRM accepted the results of the
referendum, despite the seeming loss at the polls. The referendum and the creation of a
constitution showed the willingness of the NRM to accept some degree of constraint at the
will of the citizens.
Both the nature of the constitution and the multi-party referendum show the less
repressive side of the regime, pointing to the ability to maintain the legitimacy of the regime.
These two changes also show how the regime has transformed into a competitive
authoritarian regime. The rule of law was introduced with a constitution, and opposition
parties were allowed to operate as political organizations reducing the outright control of the
NRM. The Museveni regime and the NRM no longer had complete control over the
government and lost seats in parliament to representatives from other political parties.
Despite the seeming losses for the NRM, the party remained extremely powerful.
25


With the rise of multiple political parties, opposition to the NRM continues to grow,
but Museveni still has a stronghold on power and now enjoys the constitutional right to serve
for life. Museveni has taken steps to increase the power of the constitution and ensure the
rule of law; however, he also undermines those same institutions and works to make the
presidency more powerful (Kjaer 1999). Museveni ensured the creation of a constitution with
input from all regions of Uganda in 1995 and allowed a multi-party referendum in 2005. A
constitution, the rule of law, multiple parties and democratic institutions are generally not
associated with authoritarian regimes; however, this seems to be some of the tactics used this
particular competitive authoritarian regime to manage legitimacy perceptions. The most
recent constitution in Uganda shows some of the most interesting reforms instituted by the
NRM while maintaining the power of the president.
As positive reforms were instituted, signaling a possible transition to a more open
regime, Museveni recentralized power over Kampala, abolished presidential term limits with
the help of parliament, and suspended LC elections. It is interesting that the first multiparty
election happened in the same year that the constitutional amendment abolishing term limits
was implemented (Gibb 2012). The progress that was made with a constitution, and even the
democratic progress that could have followed, seems to have been weakened by Museveni.
The consolidation of power was assisted with parliament and occasionally Ugandan citizens.
That seems to have allowed the NRM to hold power while making changes that opened the
government to opposition parties. At the same time that Museveni consolidated power, local
level democracy was suspended for years. This undermined one of the unique aspects of
decentralization in Uganda. The political reforms and the consolidation of power both show
the constant tension between opening the political process to maintain legitimacy and
26


controlling the political process to maintain NRM dominance. There are also interesting
tensions between reform, community choice and regime control in the area of the economy.
Economic Considerations of a Competitive Authoritarian Regime
As noted in the literature review, legitimacy is based on the implicit and explicit
norms and expectations of the ruled population. Since the perception data suggests that the
primary issues facing Ugandan citizens were economic concerns, this research had to analyze
poverty reduction and economic policies. The literature review looks at the economy at some
length. Lockwood (2005) talks about the pitfalls of neoliberal policies, the same policies that
Uganda instituted through structural adjustment policies. Not only is the economy central to
ensuring the basic needs of citizens are met, but it is also a key aspect of co-optation and
having the ability to unite various factions of a divided country.
At the local level, villages and LCs gathered to create a community-action plan that
outlined the needs of locals (Francis & James 2003). These plans were supposed to funnel up
into the higher levels of government to help make national development decisions; however,
the actual influence of the LCs is weak (Francis & James 2003). While empowering the LCs,
the NRM also took steps to control the district councils by appointing ministers with powers
to suspend the councils or reverse decisions contrary to the national development plan
(Kasfir 1998). This shows the firm grip on local affairs at the national level, even though
decentralization took place.
This may have also helped the central regime claim to be working on corruption.
When the central regime found corruption at the local level, it was able to take credit for
reducing the amount of corruption when it took action. For example, some district officials
were found to be taking money earmarked for education. This meant that the Ministry of
27


Finance was able to root out corruption at the school district level (Banerjee & Duflo 2011).
To combat this corruption, the Ministry of Finance published the funding levels in
newspapers (Baneijee & Duflo 2011). If the money the school received did not match the
amount published, a school headmaster could send a complaint directly to the ministry
(Baneijee & Duflo 2011). In order for the central regime to control local development
activities, it needed the necessary funding to provide the districts for local development.
Similar to many other poverty-stricken states in the global south, Uganda needed to
turn to international donors to make up enormous budget pitfalls. Without a reliable way to
collect taxes and a poor population, Uganda needed outside money to function. Following the
debt crisis, countries that previously had a steady inflow of funding from donors faced more
restrictions for the funding. However, many of these states still needed money. In the case of
Uganda, these donor funds were needed for central finance transfers as well as funding for
various other aspects of government operations. To stay eligible for international donor
funds, Uganda implemented SAPs.
These policies were the economic theme of the day throughout much of the 1980s and
1990s (Nugent 2004). Created primarily by the Bretton Woods institutions of the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), conditional lending created strict rules in
exchange for funds. These policies emphasized the role of free markets in development
coming from the neoliberal paradigm (Haque 1999; Lockwood 2005). What this meant for a
number of states was the drastic decline in state controlled industry, civil service, and welfare
(Lockwood 2005). Despite the potential negative consequences of SAPs, Museveni still
looked to international financial institutions for funding. There were few choices available to
increase funding without the help of western institutions calling for neoliberal policies. There
28


was also the possibility that international financial institutions would be unable to find a
misuse of the funds due to lacking oversight by many financial institutions (Dollar &
Svensson 2000). The Operations Evaluation Department of the World Bank claimed that
nearly half of the African SAPs were deemed failed (Dollar & Svensson 2000). A review of
SAPs administered to Uganda through the World Bank show failures of both Uganda and the
World Bank. This suggests that Museveni had the ability to use funds in ways that would
benefit the regime without strictly following the agreement with the World Bank.
Despite the noted failures, the international donor community heralded Uganda as a
success, because the government implemented SAPs. The Museveni regime adopted many of
these policies reluctantly as they limited the regimes ability to use patronage politics to
maintain its rule (Mwenda & Tangri 2005). Mwenda & Tangri (2005) report that Uganda
received an average of $500 million each year between 1992 and 1996. This number only
increases after 1996 (Mwenda & Tangri 2005). This funding was crucial in fixing many of
the economic problems happening internally. Again, there are some issues with how well the
regime implemented these programs overall. For example, part of the neoliberal paradigm,
and conditions within SAPs, call on governments to privatize industries. Uganda was
incredibly slow at doing this, and it was not until the late 1990s that privatization picked up.
When an industry or company was privatized, Museveni often used it as a tool of co-
optation, giving deals to party loyalists and elites (Mwenda & Tangri 2005).
As Uganda embraced policies that liberalized trade, price and foreign exchange, the
government was able to get an increase in foreign aid. By adopting SAPs, Uganda restored
external confidence (Fan & Zhang 2008). However, even as the costs of trade were reduced,
internal costs of transportation were high (Fan & Zhang 2008). On top of high transportation
29


costs generally, some regions such as the north struggled even more due to a lack of
infrastructure (Ellis & Bahiigwa 2003). It took centrally funded programs to reduce
transportation costs by building and maintaining infrastructure as mentioned before with
central finance transfers. In addition to high transportation costs, the growth of agriculture
was slow (Fan & Zhang 2008). In a rural, primarily agrarian country, slow growth in the
agriculture sector was problematic. This helped create large amounts of inequality between
urban and rural populations (Fan & Zhang 2008). Again, regional differences exacerbated the
problem, with the northern regions suffering more so than others (Ellis & Bahiigwa 2003). It
is important that the government meets citizens basic needs (Schatzberg 1993). Basic needs
seem to be the implicit and explicit norms required for the definition of legitimacy noted in
the literature review. To combat issues pertaining to poverty, Uganda instituted various
programs administered at the local level.
The Ugandan regime increased spending in the 1990s due to an increase in
international donor funding, even though SAPs generally call for reduced state spending. A
national roads program was introduced that was funded primarily through the central
government. This program was designed to reduce transportation costs in a largely agrarian
economy. This gave farmers the ability to transport goods to the appropriate markets within
Uganda. An increase in education spending was also possible, paving the way for universal
primary education that drastically increased school enrollment (Fan & Zhang 2008). This
was one of the more successful development programs that allowed the central regime to
show tangible outcomes. Both initiatives were important as politics seem to be local, and
tangible outcomes are important.
30


Due to various investments such as the Plan for the Modernization of Agriculture,
agriculture productivity increased and assisted in reducing rural poverty rates (Fan & Zhang
2008). Yet, there were large regional differences as those in the north did not see much wage
growth while citizens in central Uganda witnessed the majority of the overall wage growth
(Fan & Zhang 2008). The regional divides emerged as violent groups primarily located in the
north as well. External donors largely funded the Plan for the Modernization of Agriculture.
This was a decentralized plan that would increase the efficiency of transportation. The
decentralized plan fits into the overall national development and political plan. There was
very little local input into the policy, as the funding was primarily through central finance
transfers. This shows the heavy control over policy and local initiatives from the central
government due to financing of projects.
The vast majority of budgets at the district level come from the central government
(Francis & James 2003). During any given year, 80 percent of central finance transfers were
conditional (Francis & James 2003). Since these funds were conditional, they reduced the
ability of the districts to accomplish goals created at the local level (Francis & James 2003).
The LCs were then forced to conform to the national development plan in order to receive
funds. This is important as many of the programs, such as the Plan for the Modernization of
Agriculture, were decentralized in nature. Much of the implementation fell to the districts.
This also restricted the ability of LCs to influence the national development plan. Originally,
LCs were supposed to present local development needs to the central government to work
together in creating a national development plan. Instead, local officials are generally
powerless and district officials rarely have any more authority than local citizen groups.
While decentralization may be the tactic of choice, a highly centralized structure balances
31


out, or trumps, local input in policies. This is in part due to the fact that a large portion of
Ugandas national budget is from international financial institutions and donors. These funds
help create the conditions which are passed along to the district officials. Again, there is
tension between localizing politics and development with control by the central regime. To
best understand how these policies affected citizens, the research now turns to Afrobarometer
perceptions.
Perceptions on the Ground
As mentioned in the methods and literature review, legitimacy is based on
perceptions of implicit and explicit norms that come from the ruled population. Therefore, it
is important that the research look at perceptions to guide the focus. That said, this research
has focused on the economy and government reforms. It is also important to note the changes
that have taken place within the country over the nearly three-decade rule of Museveni. As
discussed in the literature review competitive authoritarian regimes may create democratic
institutions. These perceptions help understand the effectiveness of those democratic
institutions. As it seems that legitimacy is connected, to some degree, to the economy, these
perceptions help to identify successes and failures of the neoliberal policies and poverty
reduction strategies implemented by the Museveni regime.
On the ground, neoliberal economic policies have had a number of effects. In the
most recent Afrobarometer survey in 2011/2012, 43% of respondents said the countrys
economic condition was very bad. An additional 31% of respondents said that the countrys
economic conditions were fairly bad, leaving very few people perceiving the economy as
doing well. This has not always been the case. At the peak of public perception in 2001, 48%
of citizens thought the economic condition was fairly good. This is to be expected as the
32


Ugandan economy as a whole has gone through various boom and bust cycles over the past
two decades. The Ugandan economy seems to follow the commodities market closely. When
the commodities market drops around 2008, public perception of the economy fell, as the
Ugandan economy is highly dependent on the commodities market. Since the economy
consistently rates as one of the most important issues for Ugandans, perception of the
Museveni regime and Ugandan government overall seem to depend on a strong economy.
This is shown by performance ratings of Museveni. As the economy performed poorly, the
performance rating of Museveni declined. In the 2011/2012 survey, 38% of Ugandans either
strongly disapproved or disapproved of the presidents performance. At the same time 59%
either approved or strongly approved of the presidents performance. This is down 7% from
the previous survey in 2008/2009. This shows the potential connection between the economy
and the performance perception of Museveni. If this line of connection holds, it seems that a
stable economy will assist Museveni in maintaining a stable regime. As neoliberal policies
took away economic protections and safety nets for many workers and farmers, there were
fewer resources available to mitigate economic downfalls. Therefore, many Ugandan citizens
did not have a safety net to fall back on when the economy stumbled. This means that
citizens feel the downfall of the economy more, and basic needs may not be adequately met.
This seems to be demonstrated as over 50% of Ugandans in the 2001, 2005, and 2009
Afrobarometer survey consistently agree that government policies have hurt most people
while helping few. There was a 9% increase between 2005 and 2009 of Ugandans that
believed government policies hurt most people while helping few. It should be noted that
there is limited data on this particular question, so further research will be necessary when
more Afrobarometer results are made available. Perhaps if basic needs are no longer being
33


met, the government may lose legitimacy. In this case, it seems as though people become
discontented with Musevenis performance when the economy enters a recession and basic
needs are jeopardized. If basic needs must be met for the NRM regime to be legitimate, it
seems as though SAPs may have a delegitimizing effect on the regime over time, as
economic safety-nets are disbanded and the economy contracts. This, of course, may take
years before realized and short-term regime fixes are no longer possible. On top of the
amount of time it may take SAPs to hurt citizens, Ugandan citizens seem unwilling to
protest. As noted, this will require additional research, as Afrobarometer data is made
available in the coming years.
According to Afrobarometer results in 2002, 2009, and 2012, over 60% of
respondents said they would never attend a demonstration or protest. This is important in
looking at the level of discontent in the country and to gauge the perception of the
effectiveness of existing institutions. There are a few possible explanations for this such as
the potential for repression against a protest or a genuine willingness to work with existing
institutions. There is also the issue of mobilizing a largely rural population. With a large
number of people living in rural areas, mobilizing is difficult and may be costly if they need
to travel a long distance to reach a large town or the capital city of Kampala. For a time
though, it seems that there was a willingness to work through the electoral process as
Afrobarometer results show voter turnout rates around 70% until the most recent election in
2011. Voting is optional, so in order for such a high number of citizens voting, there must
have been some faith in the electoral process. It is interesting how the regime was able to sell
democracy to citizens and see actual participation via voting. This participation in democratic
institutions is one seemingly important aspect of competitive authoritarianism. There was an
34


even higher number of those that voted in the 2011 election. This comes after continued
NRM successes in elections, and a sharp downturn in the commodities market.
Kasfir (1998) notes that the indirect representation through the LC system did not
allow community members the ability to recall some of the upper levels of council officials.
Thus, citizens had to work with local officials to solve problems. This disconnected feel is
shown through the unwillingness of citizens to contact government officials at the national
level. In Afrobarometer results, respondents consistently report never contacting a member of
parliament. In the 2011/2012 survey, only 2% of respondents reported contacting a member
of parliament often and only a total of 20% reported ever contacting a member of parliament
even though there is very little risk in doing so. This suggests that politics in Uganda is
highly localized.
There are a few key pieces of information to note in relation to the perception data.
Voter turnout is high, meaning that citizens are engaging in the electoral process. There
seems to be high voter turnout, paired with an unwillingness to contact elected officials.
Perhaps this shows an evolving disconnect over time. It will be interesting to see Musevenis
approval rating in the next round of surveys as his rule is nearing 30 years, and elections
happening in Eastern Africa may change the political landscape.
35


CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
This case study of Uganda has shown that the Museveni regime has managed to stay
in power using various tools as discussed in the literature. It seems that Museveni has been
able to adequately manage legitimacy to extend the longevity of his rule. With the creation of
democratic structures such as LCs and parliament, the Museveni regime has transformed
from a strictly authoritarian regime into a competitive authoritarian regime. As noted,
elections are not entirely indicative of democracy, but a credible institutional avenue for the
opposition to gain power via elections is present. These democratic institutions and the
effective decentralization of government operations seem to have helped Museveni and the
NRM manage legitimacy and maintain power. First, the democratic institutions of LCs and
parliament allowed the regime to claim that democratization was indeed underway. While
not entirely free or fair, even Museveni must stand for an election every five years.
Opposition parties have been allowed to organize and even name candidates to the
presidential race. Parliament numbers show that the opposition is gaining seats, and routinely
stymies Musevenis legislative plans. However, this credible opposition has increased
Musevenis legitimacy by providing some competition in the context of a competitive
authoritarian regime. Of equal importance is the decentralization piece of the puzzle.
Legitimacy, as Afrobarometer survey results suggest, rests on the efficient delivery of goods
and services with special attention to the economy. Decentralization allowed the regime to
funnel funding to local projects, continuing the strong local aspect of politics and
development. Infrastructure, education and poverty alleviation programs were all
36


administered at the local level. The funding however came from the central government,
ensuring local programs followed the national development model.
There is a theme of tension in this case study. On one side, there is more competition
and an opening to democratic institutions. This is shown with the multi-party referendum, the
creation of parliament, and a constitution that initially limited executive power. These actions
are a distinct movement away from a strictly authoritarian regime. There are also poverty
alleviation and education programs that work to show tangible benefits in meeting the needs
of society. Agriculture, education and infrastructure programs have positively helped the
regimes legitimacy. However, on the other side of this tension there is erosion of the
constitution, most notably shown by the elimination of presidential term limits. The Kampala
district has been recentralized under the control of the central government. Districts are
forced to conform to the national development plan through the heavy use of central finance
transfers. This is the authoritarian side. While these tensions seem to be at odds, it also seems
to be working. The regime works to maintain legitimacy while ensuring it can manage any
credible opposition vying for serious power within the country.
There are a number of avenues for future research on this topic. One particular focus
of future research will be the global influences facing the Ugandan regime. As international
financial institutions or donors have an active interest in stability, regime actions may change
accordingly. Could the international community drive the transition to competitive
authoritarian regimes? The global context is an unavoidable and powerful topic to explore.
This research does not suggest that Museveni can maintain power forever. There are
real struggles ahead. As the economy continues to stagnate following the 2008 economic
turmoil and a national election coming in 2016, the Museveni regime may be on shaky
37


ground. The central regime is exerting control over the districts through various mechanisms
as noted above. Is that a sign of weakness? Possibly. The next test will be during the 2016
election cycle. If an opposition party can credibly challenge the regime, while pointing to
economic downfalls of the Museveni regime, the government may be in trouble. A peaceful
transfer of power is of utmost importance. Will Museveni step away from office peacefully?
Will Ugandan citizens have enough proof of voter fraud or suppression to directly challenge
Museveni? These questions will be asked in the coming year. As for now, it seems as though
Museveni has set an example for maintaining legitimacy, avoiding outright democratization
and finding space as a competitive authoritarian regime in a globalized context where
citizens are more connected and informed as ever.
38


REFERENCES
Afrobarometer. 2012. Round 5 Afrobarometer Survey in Uganda. Wilsken Agencies Limited
& the Centre for Democratic Governance.
http://www.afrobarometer.org/files/documents/summary results/uga r5 sor.pdf.
Ahaibwe, G. 2013. Halting and Reversing the Spread of HIV/AIDS in Uganda: President
Museveni Publically Tests for HIV. Brookings.
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/africa-in-focus/posts/2013/ll/15-museveni-
publi call v-tests-for-hiv-ahaib we.
Allen, T. & Heald, S. 2004. HIV/AIDS policy in Africa: what has worked in Uganda and
what has failed in Botswana? Journal of International Development. 16(8): 1141-
1154.
Arriola, L. 2009. Patronage and Political Stability in Africa. Comparative Political Studies.
42(10): 1339-1362.
Bangura, Y. 1991. Authoritarian Rule and Democracy in Africa: A Theoretical Discourse.
The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.
Baneijee, A. & Duflo, E. 2011. Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight
Global Poverty. New York: Public Affairs.
Bello, W. 2009. The Food Wars. New York: Verso.
Bradshaw, Y.W. & Huang, J. 1991. Intensifying Global Dependency: Foreign Debt,
Structural Adjustment, and Third World Underdevelopment. The Sociological
Quarterly. 32(3): 321-342.
Bratton, M. & de Walle, N. 1994. Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in
Africa. World Politics. 46(4): 453-489.
Bratton, M. & Mattes, R. 2001. Support for Democracy in Africa: Intrinsic or
Instrumental? British Journal of Political Science. 31(3): 447-474.
Brett, E.A. 1995. Neutralising the Use of Force in Uganda: The Role of Military in
Politics. The Journal of Modern African Studies. 33(1): 129-152.
Case, W. 2006.Manipulative Skills: How do Rulers Control the Electoral Arena? In
Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition. Boulder: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, Inc., 95-112.
Cammack, D. et al. 2007. Working paper 2: Neopatrimonial Politics, Decentralization and
Local Government: Uganda and Malawi in 2006. The Advisory Boardfor Irish Aid.
39


De Walle, N.V. 2003. Presidentialism and clientelism in Africas Emerging Party System.
The Journal of Modern African Studies. 41(2): 297-321.
Dicklitch, Susan. 1998. The Elusive Promise ofNGOs in Africa: Lessons from Uganda. New
York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Dollar, D. & Svensson, J. 2000. What Explains the Success of Failure of Structural
Adjustment Programs? The Economic Journal. 110: 894-917.
Ellis, F., Bahiigwa, G. 2003. Livelihoods and Rural Poverty Reduction in Uganda. World
Development. 31(6): 997-1013.
Fan, S. & Zhang, X. 2008. Public Expenditure, Growth and Poverty Reduction in Rural
Uganda. African Development Review. 20(3): 466-496.
Fish, S. 2006. Creative Constitutions: How Do Parliamentary Powers Shape the Electoral
Arena? In Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition.
Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 181-197.
Francis, P. & James, R. 2003. Balancing Rural Poverty Reduction and Citizen Participation:
The Contradictions of Ugandas Decentralization Program. World Development.
31(2): 325-337.
Freedom House. 2014. Freedom in the World. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/2014/uganda#.VFlLFvTF9pc.
Gerschewski, J. 2013. The three pillars of stability: legitimation, repression, and co-optation
in autocratic regimes. Democratization. 20(1): 13-28.
Gandhi, J. & Przeworski, A. 2007. Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats.
Comparative Political Studies. 40(11): 1279-1301.
Gibb, R. 2012. Presidential and parliamentary elections in Uganda. Electoral Studies.
31(2): 458-461.
Gilley, B. 2009. The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy. Columbia
University Press.
Gore, C. & Muwanga, N. 2014. Decentralization is Dead, Love Live Decentralization!
Capital City Reform and Political Rights in Kampala, Uganda. International Journal
of Urban and Regional Research. 38(6): 2202-2216.
Haque, M. 1999. The fate of sustainable development under neo-liberal regimes in
developing countries. International Political Science Review. 20(2): 197-218.
Howard, M. & Roessler, P. 2006. Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive
Authoritarian Regimes. American Journal of Political Science. 50(2): 365-381.
40


Johnston, H. 2011. States and Social Movements. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Kasfir, N. 1998.No-Party Democracy in Uganda. Journal of Democracy. 9(2): 49-63.
Kjaer, M. 1999. Fundamental change or no change? The process of constitutionalizing
Uganda. Democratization. 6(4): 93-113.
Levitsky, S. & Way, L. 2002. The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism. Journal of
Democracy. 13(2): 51-65.
Lewis, P. 2008. Growth Without Prosperity in Africa. Journal of Democracy. 19(4): 95-
109.
Lockwood, M. 2005. Will a Marshall Plan for Africa Make Poverty History? Journal of
International Development. 17: 775-789.
Michael, Sarah. 2004. Undermining Development: The Absence of Power Among Local
NGOs in Africa. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Moss, Todd. 2011. African Development: Making Sense of the Issues and Actors. Boulder:
Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Muhumuza, W. 2008. Pitfalls of Decentralization Reforms in Transitional Societies: The
Case of Uganda. Africa Development. 33(4): 59-81.
Munck, G. 2006. Drawing Boundaries: How to Craft Intermediate Regime Categories. In
Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition. Boulder: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, Inc, 27-40.
Mwenda, A & Tangri, R. 2005. Patronage Politics, Donor Reforms, and Regime
Consolidation in Uganda. African Affairs. 104(416): 449-467.
Nugent, P. 2004. Africa Since Independence. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Noorbakhsh, F. & Paloni, A. 1999. Structural Adjustment Programs and Industry in Sub-
Saharan Africa: Restructuring or De-industrialization. The Journal of Developing
Areas. 33: 549-580.
Oloka-Onyango, J. New Breed Leadership, Conflict, and Reconstruction in the Great
Lakes Region of Africa: A Sociopolitical Biography of Ugandas Yoweri Kaguta
Museveni. Africa Today. 50(3): 29-52.
Oluoch, LO W. 2009. Legitimacy of the East African Community. Journal of African
Law.53(2): 194-221.
Patterson, A. 2006. The Politics of AIDS in Africa. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
41


Pinkney, R. 2009. NGOs, Africa and the Global Order. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Rice, X. 2011. Ugandan leader wins presidential election rejected as fraudulent by
opposition. The Guardian.
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/2Q/ugandan-leader-wins-presidential-
election.
Sachs, J. 1995. Consolidating Capitalism. Foreign Policy. 98: 50-64.
Schatzberg, M. 1993. Legitimacy and Democratization in Africa. International African
Institute. 63(4): 445-461.
Uphoff, N. 1989. Distinguishing Power, Authority and Legitimacy: Taking Max Weber at
his word by using Resources-Exchange Analysis. Polity. 22(2): 295-322.
Verwimp, P. 2001. The political economy of coffee, dictatorship, and genocide. European
Journal of Political Economy. 19: 161-181.
World Bank Group. 2001. Uganda: Policy, participation, people. World Bank Operations
Evaluation Department. https://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/Data/reports/214 uganda.pdf.
World Bank Group. 2014. Uganda Data. http://data.worldbank.org/country/uganda
42


Full Text

PAGE 1

MANAGIN G LEGITIMACY: THE CASE OF UGANDA By DEVIN SCOTT LYNN B.S., Black Hills State University, 2013 A thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Colorado in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Political Science Program 2015

PAGE 2

ii This thesis for the Master of Arts degree by Devin Scott Lynn h as been approved for the Political Science Program By Lucy Ware McGuffey, Chair Sasha Breger Bush Thorsten Spehn Date: November 0 8 2015

PAGE 3

iii Lynn, Devin Scott (MA, Political Science) Managing Legitimacy: The Case of Uganda Thesis directed by Associate Professor Lucy Ware McGuffey ABSTRACT Without democratic institutions, what makes a government legitimate? As waves of democratization come and go, authoritarian regimes remain. There are numerous examples of long lasting authoritarian regimes on the African continent, a fact that the literature on the three pillars of auth oritarianism seeks to expl ain. A primary claim is that regimes are frequently relying less on coercion and more on legitimacy and cooptation to secure political stability. This reliance in turn requires specific tactics, including movement towards a mode of competitive authoritari an that allows greater participation by the populace. This paper investigates the means by which the Ugandan government has sought to increase legitimacy in the face of growing political opposition, economic liberalization, globalization forces, and stagge ring poverty. The internal affairs and policies of the Museveni regime will be analyzed to understand how this particular regime has transformed itself into a competitive authoritarian regi me in order to maintain power. Of specific interest are measures t hat put into place: economic and political decentralization, more democ ratic institutions and a greater focus on the rule of law as articulated in the constitution. This research will deepen our understanding of the strategies of the Ugandan regime, and in so doing, also the dynamics involved in political stability, legitimacy, and the hybrid regimes. The form and content of this abstract are approved. I recommend its publication. Approved: Lucy Ware McGuffey

PAGE 4

iv TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 1 II. METHODS ...3 III. LITERATURE REVIEW .7 Three Pillars of Authoritarian Stability..7 Legitimacy..9 Economic Policies in Developing States ..1 2 Democratization and the Rise of Hybrid Regimes ....14 IV. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS .... 20 Uganda and the NRM Shifting Regime Type 20 Economic Considerations of a Competitive Authoritarian Regime ..27 Perceptions on the Gro und ...... ..... .32 V. CONCLUSION .. .36 REFERENCES .39

PAGE 5

1 CHAPTER I STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM Brutal dictators and violent civil war, rampant poverty and widespread underdevelopment are typical descriptions of any number of countries in Africa. Corrupt authoritarianism rather than democracy is abundant across the continent despite efforts to inspir e or instill democracy. Waves of democratization come and go with varying degrees of success. While there are fewer outright authoritarian regimes than in previous decades, there is still a high concentration of corrupt regimes on the African continent. Th e current academic debate sheds light on the internal and external struggles facing African states that may reinforce authoritarian tendencies leading to the high concentration of authoritarian regimes. Issues such as internal corruption, globalization, gl obal power divisions and a history of exploitation give a taste of the long list of problems plaguing the continent. When understanding a regime, all of the above issues, internal and external, must be considered. The exploitation of natural and human reso urces that left many African states with a bare infrastructure and an unstable elite class following decolonization has had a profound impact on current African regimes. The dichotomy of globalization and internal corruption as leading factors for state f ailures is important. There continues to be global forces that influence state behavior. However, this research cannot look at both. As important as the effects of colonization and globalization are, the main focus of this paper is internal state affairs This internal analysis of a regime looks directly at the policies and actions of particular leaders and institutions. Many African regimes have highly centralized rule often holding power for decades. Most

PAGE 6

2 rulers were not freely elected, meaning that many rulers have come to power via force. Patronage is the tactic of choice and many dictators rule for decades until death or a coup d'ÂŽtat. These blanket statements do not describe all regimes. What about those that do not seem repressive and violent? Those more peaceful regimes seem to be relying on soft power and legitimacy to hold office, showing a profound shift i n how a regime maintains power As discussed in this research, legitimacy can explain stability without the use of force. Short of brute force, h ow do authoritarian regimes stay in power, avoiding failed state status or a democratic revolution from the masses? More specifically, what tactics does the authoritarian regime in Uganda use to stay a legitimate ruling power? This research will show thro ugh a case study of Uganda, that the Museveni regime has managed legitimacy using a number of tactics including decentralization, depoliticization of the opposition, and the creation of various democratic institutions, effectively moving towards a competit ive authoritarian regime. This paper will begin with a brief discussion of African regimes generally, the problems of legitimacy, and authoritarianism specific to the post colonial era. The literature review looks at authoritarian stability, legitimacy, ta ctics of staying in power and the rise of hybrid regimes. The analysis looks in depth at Uganda and its transition to a competitive authoritarian regime that has effectively managed legitimacy.

PAGE 7

3 CHAPTER II METHODS This research will use a case study of Uganda as t his particular research is more concerned with exposing the intricacies of one case rather than theorizing across multiple cases With the knowledge from one case study, future research can be done on other competitive authoritarian re gimes based on the framework in this paper. This research looks at the actions of the regime in connection with the perceptions of the Ugandan citizens. As the Ugandan regime enacted policies, Afrobarometer worked to gather perception data covering topics of all areas concerning the Ugandan regime. By understanding what the regime was doing and what the perceptions were among citizens, the research can offer some insight into how the regime managed legitimacy over time. As Uganda's central regime made decis ions and implemented policies, the research will analyze the perceptions of citizens as the policies affected their lives. The analysis conducted on the Afrobarometer survey results took hours to adequately understand the perceptions that Ugandans have of their government over time. It should be noted that there are constraints on the perception data as the survey Afrobarometer used over time did change some. The data is constantly being expanded, but some trends are difficult to analyze. However, this rese arch shows that perception data is important when looking at regime legitimacy. In the case study below a few key variables were analyzed in relation to the perception data First, perceptions of the effectiveness, or the approval ratings, of parliament, the president and local officials provided insight to the perceptions of effectiveness. This helps measure a key aspect of legitimacy in whether the government is abiding by the expectations set forth by the population. Pairing this with the percentage of citizens willing to contact government officials, attend protests, and voting

PAGE 8

4 levels, the research can accurately gauge the level of political participation or interest in Uganda. In choosing an appropriate case study it was important to assess a few factors. First, the regime needed to be reasonably classified as a competitive authoritarian regime. Second, the regime needed to use relatively little repression as a way of staying in power. Thus, the regime needed to rely primarily on legitimacy and co optation as way to stay in power. Third, the regime needed to be in power long enough to get an adequate sense of internal events over time. Uganda meets all three of the criteria This research argues that due to the nature of the local democratic institu tions and the parliament, Uganda is a competitive authoritarian regime. While there is rampant corruption in the presidency, a political avenue for the opposition exists through the parliament. Uganda has also become more internally peaceful over time, ins tead using soft power, most often remaining in Freedom House's category of partly free in the recent decade. Finally, it is possible to assess the regime over time as Museveni and the National Resistance Movement (NRM) have been in power since 1986. This shows various economic cycles, the implementation of SAPs, and the rise of elections and political parties. Over nearly 30 years, this research can adequately understand the issues being dealt with by the regime and the tactics being used over time. The c urrent Ugandan regime has managed legitimacy since 1986 by using a number of tactics including decentralization, depoliticization of potential opposition, and the creation of local democratic structures, thus moving towards a competitive authoritarian regi me. The case study shows that these tactics have adequately sustained the regime. These tactics work when the economy is relatively strong and/or there is a weak political alternative. When the economy is strong, there are fewer reasons for citizen mobiliz ation against the regime as

PAGE 9

5 citizens' needs are in large part being met. Politics and economics are explicitly tied toget her. As shown in the case study political stability in part requires economic stability. To best understand the central argument, a f ew definitions are in order. Each concept is discussed in detail in the literature review. The three pillars of authoritarian stability are legitimacy, co optation, and repression (G erschewski 2013). These are the three primary tools used by an authoritari an regime to maintain power. Each works in conjunction with one another (Gerschewski 2013). This research looks directly at the legitimacy pillar of authoritarian stability. For this research, the definition of legitimacy is when a regime's practices meet the generally accepted standards created by the ruled population by abiding by the implicit and explicit norms and expectations of the people. A more robust discussion of legitimacy will follow in the literature review. Key to maintaining legitimacy in the Ugandan context is decentralization and depoliticization. This research considers the process of redistributing powers and processes away from the central government as decentralization Depoliticization is the process by which a regime disenfranchises citizens or community organizations. There is a connection between decentralization and depoliticization and the economy. Decentralization is not simply political. Many economic and development issues are t aken up at the local levels and funded through central financial transfer as discussed below. The central government in Uganda provides financing for building infrastructure and poverty alleviation programs However, the programs and construction projects were administered at the local level. In order to co opt and depoliticize potential opposition groups such as the Buganda and other regional leaders, the regime needed to strengthen the economy, and give the regions the resources to do so. This was especia lly true in particularly poor areas of

PAGE 10

6 Uganda, notably in the north. These three tactics are different but work in tandem. Decentralization not only devolved political power to the districts, but it also shifted specific economic work to the regional level At the same time, the creation of democratic structures at the local and national level gave citizens a much needed voice in politics. This is directly related to decentralization as Local Councils (LCs) were the first form of participatory democracy at the local level. Parliamentary and presidential elections follow later. Depolitization works with both a shift to democratic institutions and economic decentralization in that there was a credible avenue for potential opposition to rise through the politi cal and/or economic system while still ensuring the NRM was well positioned to maintain power. By having democratic institutions, the regime was able to give an avenue for the opposition to gain power. For example, opposition parties gain ed seats in the pa rliament, and exert ed some influence over state affairs. Economic decentralization gave some power to the local institutions, giving citizens an institution to work with directly rather than mobilize against the central regime.

PAGE 11

7 CHAPTER III LITERATURE REVIEW There are a few major concepts discussed in the literature review. Those concepts are: authoritarian stability and legitimacy, economics, and the emergence of hybrid regimes. The case study is largely based on these overarching concepts. The literature first begins with a discussion of the three pillars of authoritarian stability to better understand how authoritarian regimes operate and maintain power. Then, the next section h elps narrow the focus of the research to legitimacy, which is the primary focus of the case study. The definition of legitimacy from the methods section is explained in detail. Key scholars on legitimacy such as Gilley, Uphoff, Bratton and Mattes back up t he definition as a concept that is constantly evolving. These scholars also suggest that legitimacy varies based on the context. The economic section follows, as Brett (1995) argues that regimes must generate enough economic resources to maintain political support. This is also followed up in the case study, as the economy and legitimacy in Uganda seem to be intertwined. Finally, t he discussion of competitive authoritarian regimes relates directly to the case study in that this research has classified the U gandan government as a competitive authoritarian regime. As this research argues, the transition to a competitive authoritarian regime is one of the tools used by the Museveni regime to manage legitimacy. Key scholars such as Howard, Roessler, Levitsky, Wa y, Gandhi and Przeworksi are discussed as they explain the rise of hybrid regimes. The category of hybrid regimes includes competitive authoritarian category Three Pillars of Authoritarian Stability According to one theoretical framework, once in power, a regime must attempt to stay in power using three primary tactics. Authoritarian regimes have three overarching tools

PAGE 12

8 at their disposal for staying in power (Gerschewski 2013). It is important to understand these three pillars and how they work together i n order to understand how an authoritarian regime operates and to best analyze each pillar individually. Known as the three pillars, authoritarian regimes consolidate power through legitimacy, coercion and co optation (Gerschewski 2013). These three pillar s work closely together and are often difficult to sort. For an authoritarian regime to successfully stay in power, it generally uses the three pillars simultaneously to varying degrees (Gerschewski 2013). A description of each pillar is as follows. First, legitimacy helps lower the reliance on the use of force, while ensuring relative popular support for the regime (Gerschewski 2013). Second, co optation of elites prevents elite fractures from becoming rivals that could destabilize or overthrow the governm ent (Gerschewski 2013). Third, coercion is the brutal attempt of raising the costs of dissent so high that the general population is forced to be governed (Gerschewski 2013). Some regimes use tactics such as civilian torture, public and private killings, a nd/or disappearances. To understand how each pillar operates, it is important to see some of the key interactions between the pillars. If a regime is perceived to be legitimate, there will be fewer reasons for the masses to mobilize. There seems to be a correlation between increased levels of legitimacy and lower levels of repression. Higher levels of repression can undermine the regime's legitimacy (Gerschewski 2013). Thus, r egimes using legitimacy and co optation may not need to use repression as much t o stay in power (Gerschewski 2013). On the other hand, lower levels of legitimacy would require a regime to rely more on repressive behaviors for stability. Legitimacy and co optation can reinforce each other (Gerschewski 2013). For example, in Uganda a re asonable tactic to co opt the regional elite is through building

PAGE 13

9 infrastructure. This sends resources to regional elites looking for cabinet posts or economic resources. That infrastructure in turn helps legitimize the regime among the general population b y providing essential services and lowering the costs of transportation. Another effective way to maintain legitimacy and facilitate co optation, as discussed in the following research, is by moving towards a competitive authoritarian regime. Legitimacy As mentioned in the methods chapter legitimacy is when a regime's practices meet the generally accepted standards created by the ruled population by abiding by the implicit and explicit norms and expectations of the people. This creates the perception of th e right to rule. This perception is not absolute and is in continual flux as current events and decisions shape future perceptio ns of legitimacy. Some scholars note that this continual process of legitimation places some countries in a constant legitimacy crisis (Gilley 2009; Bratton & Mattes 2001) This definition of legitimacy follows similar ideas in African research by Oluoch (2009). Legitimacy is important, but as G erschewski (2013) mentions, it, until recently, lacks in the literature (see also Gille y 2009) However, scholars seem to be returning to the importance of legitimacy in analyzing and understanding regimes. Clearly, this research agrees and understands the importance of legitimacy, as the concept is a central part of the paper. Gilley (2009) notes that legitimation is an ongoing process for authoritarian regimes and causes them to operate in a particular way, saying that legitimacy is important in understanding regimes and their stability. Uphoff (1989) shows the importance of legitimacy, say ing that legitimacy is strong when citizens have an obligation to obey rather than being forced to obey via repression. Repression helps raise the cost of rebellion to what Johnston

PAGE 14

10 (2011) calls the line of deterrence. This is the amount of repression nece ssary to deter citizens from mobilizing against the regime in the context of social movements and democratization (Johnston 2011) The line of deterrence requires much less repression if the regime enjoys a higher level of legitimacy (Johnston 2011) This must be understood to accurately frame the actions and policies of a regime trying to manage legitimacy. From an efficiency standpoint, political systems should try to gain or maintain legitimacy (Uphoff 1989). The costs of repression are high, and eventua lly destabilizing. Legitimacy seems to be more conducive to regime longevity as legitimacy can be more stable than the other two pillars of authoritarian stability. While there may be short term losses in managing legitimacy, the following case study seems to point to legitimacy being a key factor in regime longevity. In order to analyze legitimacy, the research also points to a number of tangible actions that regime's can deploy to manage legitimacy. It is first important to narrow down the scope of legit imacy, to better focus the analysis Schatzberg (1993) points to three important aspects of legitimacy in African politics. He claims that legitimacy may deal more with consumption than political transformation, leaders are held in a special manner, and there is a sense of unity among citizens (Schatzb erg 1993). To further explain how leaders are held in a special manner, Schatzberg (1993) compares leaders to a father figure. Leaders should provide goods and services, and not be challenged often. He argues that democracy may not be key in looking at pol itical legitimacy, rather if the needs of the people are met, the regime may enjoy legitimacy (Schatzberg 1993) This is notable because it calls into question the notion that electoral democracy is the key to a legitimate government, and grants authoritar ian regimes the ability to be legitimate if functioning effectively and/or efficiently. Schatzberg (1993)

PAGE 15

11 also suggests that citizen groups may hold leaders in a special manner in the fact that leaders may never be directly challenged via protest, uprising or other means As noted in coming sections, this particular case study on Uganda suggests that consumption and basic living conditions are key aspects to political stability seeming to support part of Schatzberg's (1993) research On the same topic, th e Ugandan regime occasionally asserts authority u nder the auspices of efficiency, playing to the needs of citizens. This is best exemplified when Uganda recentralized control of Kampala claiming increased efficiency in delivering goods and services (Muhumu za 2008). Schatzberg (1993) claims that leaders portraying a father like relationship with citizens may be more legitimate. The government must work so citizen needs are met with goods and wellbeing, meaning that efficiency is a key aspect of maintaining l egitimacy. Illegitimate rulers are those that are perceived to overindulge and have a permanent group of elites (Schatzberg 1993). Unfortunately, this does not explain how a number of corrupt autocrats are able to stay in power and possible maintain legiti macy This seems to be the weakest point of his argument, and is challenged by scholars such as G erschewski (2013) that show permanent elite classes may not matter if they are co opted successfully Legitimacy is increasingly important in the discussion a bout authoritarian regimes. This importance is due to the fact that legitimacy may be more efficient than repressive means of maintaining power. This statement seems to be upheld by Gilley (2009) and Uphoff (1989) Legitimacy may be best described as an on going process. That is true, and can be seen in the following case study. Current events such as economic crises, war, terrorist attacks, droughts, etc., may directly affect the current legitimacy of any given regime.

PAGE 16

12 Economic Policies in Developing Stat es Much of the literature on African affairs points to numerous tangible issues such as poor infrastructure, lack of economic growth, issues with competing ethnic groups and an unstable elite class as some of the root causes of unrest and authoritarianism acr oss the continent (Lockwood 2005). Poor economic growth undermines the state's ability to co opt competing elites that may fracture and challenge the regime. Citizens in African states have had to overcome a list of issues, many with immediate effects such as debilitating poverty or civil war with little time or additional resources to focus on democratization efforts. Economic issues are some of the most dominant issues facing the continent. As noted by Lockwood (2005), neoliberal policies have continued t o reinforce poor economic growth and powerlessness on the global stage, leaving many African communities vulnerable to authoritarian regimes. These neoliberal policies were born out of the Washington Consensus. In response to the early 1980s debt crisis, the Bretton Woods institutions of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) created conditional lending in the form of structural adjustment policies (SAPs). These policies shaped the economic platform of many developing countries. Scholars such as Sachs (1995) argued in favor of a western dominated system that was reinforced through conditional lending. SAPs forced concessions from the debtor governments in exchange for loans. These policies followed a neoliberal economic model, calling for limited government, privatization of government controlled industries, reduced welfare, etc (Noorbakhsh & Paloni 1999 ; see also Sachs 1995 ). The policies were one size fits all, and were not applied based on context (Noorbakhsh & Paloni 1999). This debt r elationship between African states and international financial institutions created a global dependency system, where the global south was and remains heavily

PAGE 17

13 dependent on much of the global north ( Pinkney 2009) This dependency has gotten worse with the implementation of SAPs (Bradshaw & Huang 1991). Of particular importance of Eastern Africa, coffee markets are largely controlled in western cities such as London and New York. This explicitly shows the dependent nature Sub Saharan Africa countries are on western nations. The case study supports these claims in that Uganda is dependent on foreign aid and international financial institutions for a large portion of its annual budget. Dependency itself is a major issue for these states, but there is also a lo ng list of other issues stemming from neoliberal policies. As the following scholars note, there are a list of unintended consequences to neoliberal policies called for by international financial institutions other than increase d dependency. Lewis (2008) discusses the economic development efforts with little positive growth or democratization. He notes there is a common assumption that with rule of law, regimes may perform better and work towards economic growth (Lewis 2008). Howe ver, research has shown that neoliberal economic policies rarely create the lasting economic growth and reduction of poverty as promised (Lockwood 2005) While states may have witnessed growing economies, income levels are not rising at a similar pace (Lew is 2008). This means that the poverty reduction side of economic growth is lacking. Another consequence of neoliberal economic policies is environmental degradation. Environmental issues are cast aside in favor of economic growth and debt servicing (Haque 1999; Bello 2009). As environmental degradation causes problems such as drought or flooding, those living in poverty suffer the most. These people may not have the necessary resources to handle such events. As states open their economies to the global mark ets, corporations are able to enter these states and influence decisions for the sake of investment; again, these

PAGE 18

14 policies can be in direct opposition to poverty alleviation and environmental quality. These issues are not conducive to democratization, as m any of the regime s implementing neoliberal policies happen to be nondemocratic. The pitfalls associated with SAPs are problematic for authoritarian regimes trying to maintain power. Democratization and the Rise of Hybrid Regimes As various regimes have started to rely less on brute force and more on legitimacy and co optation, some scholars have discussed a new' type of competitive authoritarian or hybrid regime. This concept has been discussed in the methods section and is centr al to understanding the Ugandan regime. This regime type primarily uses soft power as a means for governing (Levitsky & Way 2002). Competitive authoritarian regimes are those in which democratic institutions are used as a way to exercise political power (L evitsky & Way 2002, 52). However, Levitsky and Way (2002) also note that these democratic institutions are constantly under assault from the executive. Elections may not be entirely free or fair, and the executive branch continues to consolidate power whil e accepting some limits such as a constitution or various laws passed by a democratic institution. This shift is both delaying or avoiding democratization and at times continuing the consolidation of power in the executive. The initial concessions of power by a central regime may help co opt elites looking for increased influence. At the same time, democratic institutions may legitimize the regime with citizens looking for a democratic transition. Since these hybrid regimes do not fully transform into a dem ocracy, the central authority may increase its longevity quelling both elite and citizen unrest. The rise of hybrid regimes stalled the third wave of democratization (Howard & Roessler 2006). It seems as though the transition towards a hybrid regime may b e a policy

PAGE 19

15 concession used to stay in power as suggested by Gandhi & Przeworski (2007). If this is in fact a concession to assist in legitimizing a regime, the regime may increase its longevity by transitioning to some kind of hybrid regime. The case study below will show that moving towards a competitive authoritarian regime can have a positive effect on the stability of the regime. However, increasingly powerful institutions may ultimately degrade an authoritarian regime to the point where democratization is able to happen. A constant balance is necessary in order to keep the regime in power and relatively safe from the forces of democratization that may arise from democratic institutions that reside within a competitive authoritarian regime. This new cat egory of regime introduces various other categories of regimes into the mix provided by Lewis (2008). Howard & Roessler (2006) argue that these hybrid regimes are not all making a transition to democracy; rather these regimes are creating a new space for themselves in the discussion of regime type. This echoes the argument from Levitsky and Way (2002) that these new regimes may not be making a transition to democracy, but prolonging their rule by making internal reforms If an authoritarian regime feels th reatened or faces growing discontent, moving to a hybrid regime may help prolong the rule of particular regime. Some of the tactics used within the movement towards a hybrid regime include: changing or creating a constitution, building democratic instituti ons and legalizing political parties. Notice the connection here to strategies of maintaining legitimacy by opening the political process Gandhi & Przeworski (2007) note that a tactic used by autocrats are policy concessions. For example, a regime that al lows multiple parties to participate in the government may be making concessions to appease an opposition party, and prove its commitment to democratic institutions. This type of maneuver may also

PAGE 20

16 institutionalize the opposition, making it harder for them to directly challenge the central regime leaders. In side these new regimes, Munck (2006) notes the two important electoral factors of contestation and participation. These factors are in relation to democratic institutions. Elections are not a sure sign of a democracy, although elections are a necessary part of democracy. When a hybrid regime creates democratic institutions, these institutions may or may not be entirely free and/or fair. It may also be difficult to definitively say whether an election is free and fair, unless there is overwhelming evidence of fraud or repression (Munck 2006) Until there is a strong case for the opposition, the election may be fairly producing favorable results for the incumbent. Research specific to elections would be bet ter able to discuss results as well as how free and fair a particular election may be, but those methods are not within the scope of this particular research. Elections may be an important aspect of hybrid regimes, but they are one small piece of the overa ll narrative of such regimes. In the context of competitive authoritarian regimes, it is sufficient to note that there are democratic institutions (Bratton & de Walle 1994) However, these democratic institutions have various levels of contestation and par ticipation among citizens. Note that democratic institutions in a competitive authoritarian regime are generally encroached upon by the central regime, and power of such institutions is widely varied (Munck 2006). In addition to election s many states choo se to write a constitution, working to be a government based on the rule of law rather than upheld by force. Brett (1995) argues that democratization must include the neutralization of force in order to be considered a government by consent. Hybrid regimes can, and do, use force at times. However, in order to continue to maintain legitimacy, the regime needs to neutralize

PAGE 21

17 the military by accepting constitutional restraints (Brett 1995). Without accepting these limits, the military will be forced to either u phold the regime or will be given an avenue to credibly challenge the regime through a coup d'ÂŽtat (Brett 1995). While accepting some constitutional restraints, many regimes will still work to consolidate power without the complete erosion of the constitut ion. Often referred to as patronage politics, constitutional manipulation generally serves the interests of the elites and/or the executive office. Patronage is a way to stay in power and co opt elites (Arriola 2009). Neopatrimonial practices are a core fe ature of African leaders in which the executive uses a number of state resources to gain the loyalty of the elites and the general population while also controlling any democratic process (Bratton & de Walle 1994). Depending on the level of opposition, le aders may have to make more drastic changes to their ruling structure (Gandhi & Przeworski 2007). For example, local democratic structures or an elected parliament may be a concession made to slow the threats to a regime. As opposition parties or elites ga in power, there may be an increased need for co optation. A credible avenue into authority, such as a parliamentary body could be an appropriate strategy to funnel frustrations away from the executive and into a different government institution with varyin g degrees of actual authority. In the context of competitive authoritarian regimes, parliaments are considered a credible opening to power for the opposition. Case (2006) notes the importance of regime manipulation. Depending on the regime's ability to man ipulate institutions skillfully, the regime can survive a legitimacy crisis. If the regime is unable to manipulate the government structures, the regime may face a limited existence (Case 2006). There are a number of manipulations regimes can employ such a s limiting civil liberties, co opting NGOs into the national development scheme, owning the

PAGE 22

18 press or providing propaganda, and fragmenting the opposition (Case 2006). Gandhi & Przeworski (2007) note that successfully institutionalizing the opposition effec tively helps an autocrat stay in power longer. Giving elites or opposition groups input allows them to gain power without gaining serious power to effectively mount a challenge to the regime. Of course, this is complicated as there is always the possibilit y that an institution such as a parliament will consolidate power against the regime and give them the legal authority to mount a credible challenge to an autocrat. Concerning the institution of parliament, opposition parties may effectively help sustain a dictator's rule by actively participating in a controlled parliamentary setting. However, as Fish (2006) argues, a strong parliament may lead to further democratization and degrade the power of the autocrat. By allowing opposition groups to hold credible power with the platform to influence policy, certain leaders may be able to further democratic ideals. Levitsky and Way (2002) also note that parliaments may be good avenues for a strong opposition to gain power. Again, this points to the ability of gaini ng power through a credible institution and undermining the legitimacy of the executive office. A tactic to maintain control over parliament may be through constitutional manipulation (Fish 2006). Forcing laws, or the ability to dissolve parliament are tac tics that the executive may be able to use to keep the parliament in a relatively powerless position. By circumventing parliament, the regime may decrease the chances of an opposition party gaining power in the parliament to exert force on the executive. A nther possible tactic the regime may choose is to decentralize Decentralization has been a popular choice of many African regimes. Decentralization is the process in which powers are devolved from the national level to the local. The creation of regional or local governance structures is a typical sign of

PAGE 23

19 decentralization. In some cases the excuse for decentralization, and later potential re centralization, is more efficient delivery of goods and services (Gore & Muwanga 2014). The idea is that local gove rnments are empowered or perceived as such, and in some cases the citizens are able to directly elect local officials. This limited democracy is a stark difference from strict authoritarian states. In some instances similar to Uganda, the local government is eventually disempowered and relies on the central government for revenue due to the loss of tax privileges (Cammack et al, 2006). This idea is expanded in the case study. This disempowerment and reliance shows the continual manipulation required of the central regime to maintain authority. These concepts are carried throughout the case study below. Legitimacy is central to the overall research question. Economic policies and poverty reduction attempts all point to a regime trying to gain legitimacy amon g its citizens and maintain the resources for internal stability and debt maintenance. Meanwhile, the Ugandan regime has transitioned into a more competitive authoritarian regime. This follows the above discussion of regime manipulation including building a constitution and the creation of democratic institutions both at the local and national level. The case study also introduces public perceptions that are able to measure approval ratings, economic policy perceptions, willingness to protest, etc. Through these various discussions, the research will tie in to the literature review by supporting some authors' conclusions and perhaps challenging others.

PAGE 24

20 CHAPTER IV CASE STUDY ANALYSIS This section is concerned with the Museveni regime. It starts with a brief discussion of Museveni and the National Resistance Movement coming to power. Initially, the Museveni regime seemed to fall into the authoritarian trap with few actual reforms being instituted, despite initial promises to reform. However, as shown in the following paragraphs, the regime did being to institute reforms including a constitution, local level democracy, and an elected parliament. As shown, it was not an easy transition. Along the way, Museveni fought to consolidate power in the executive office and was able to abolish term limits among other forms of power consolidation. The case study follows some similar themes in the literature review. Concerning legitimacy and regime transition, the Museveni regime has used many of the tactics discuss ed above such as creating a constitution, introducing local level democratic institutions, creating a parliament, etc. The Museveni regime also instituted various neoliberal reforms as prescribed by international financial institutions as discussed in the literature review. This regime is not a democracy, but it is not entirely authoritarian. Democratization has been stalled, and the regime maneuvers discussed below may be key in avoid outright democratization without the drastic use of force. Uganda and t he NRM: Shifting Regime Type Since 1986, President Yoweri Museveni has enjoyed relatively stable power over the country of Uganda. He followed decades of brutally violent dictators that ruled Uganda since independence, each ruler seemingly more violent th an the next. Idi Amin alone killed thousands of Ugandans for the sake of retaining power. Following Amin, Obote was brutally violent and overthrown without any sort of democratic transition or aspiration. Museveni

PAGE 25

21 reversed this violent trend and has recent ly relied more on legitimacy and co optation than outright coercion, shown through the years of relative peace based on the actions of the regime. The shift away from violence is indicative of a transformation to a competitive authoritarian regime as one t actic of maintaining legitimacy. This is not to say that Museveni's regime is always peaceful, but it does point to the theme of regime change and movement away from repression as a means of maintaining power in a country historically used to violence. In the 1990s, Museveni was one of Africa's "big men" leaders with near absolute control over Uganda's political process (Moss 2011). This means that Museveni followed the pattern of typical neopatrimonial regimes in which the executive maintains authority through personal patronage (Bratton & de Walle 1994). However, the Museveni regime described the government system as a movement. The single political party was even named the National Resistance Movement (NRM). As a self described movement, the government was supposed to be inclusive and transformative, ushering in a new type of government where everyone had the chance to succeed. Competition was to be thrown aside, and people were to work together for the common good of the country. In theory, the NRM arg ued this would allow for greater freedom as anyone that wanted to run for political office could without working through parties and elites (Kasfir 1998). It was supposed to level the playing field, and give a chance to the disadvantaged. This sort of fair ness among all groups was one of the major selling points being touted by the NRM. This theory of openness was one of the first signs of a potentially new regime type. The level playing field idea was sold at the local level as well through a decentralized governance structure as discussed below. As with any other regime, Museveni and the NRM had to deal with internal issues and divisions facing an impoverished

PAGE 26

22 and violent country. To understand these divisions, the research must briefly take a historical t urn. Prior to colonization, Uganda consisted of various kingdoms that ruled over distinct regions. For a number of reasons, the regional divisions of the kingdoms never really went away. Reasons such as differing economic growth patterns, unrest and skepticism sustained the divisions. Under colonialism, the British used divide and rule tactics to stay in power in Uganda, choosing the Buganda Kingdom to maintain power over the colony (Nugen t 2004). In turn, the Buganda Kingdom, a southern based power, enjoyed a variety of benefits such as increased access to economic opportunities, development, education, etc. These benefits continued in the years following decolonization, as the north was b est known for civil unrest and underdevelopment. The southern regions were better known for stability and increased economic growth. The NRM being a southern based party, was met with skepticism from the other regions Due to these divisions, Museveni had to work to co opt regional, ethnic and military leaders into the NRM and central government. In order t o undermine any credible opposition and the creation of opposition political parties, there needed to be adequate co optation. This was especially true considering many regional leaders were skeptical of a southern based government (Kasfir 1998) By co opting the regional elite and delaying the formation of political parties, the regime may have prolonged its rule. It is in part due to these regional div isions that Museveni was able to justify a single party state ( Kasfir 1998). Regional differences caused deep divisions and mistrust. Initially the NRM being a southern based militia exasperated ethnic and regional tensions (Kasfir 1998). Mwenda and Tangri (2005) show that overcoming regional and ethnic differences of elites were handled primarily via co optation. By being inclusive but not offering real power

PAGE 27

23 to other political players, the Museveni regime institutionalized opposition well enough to not be a major threat. To work with the regions of Uganda, the regime created a decentralized political structure, which also helped to transform to a competitive authoritarian regime and maintain legitimacy among the citizens of Uganda. Museveni chose to decent ralize Uganda using a tiered system of governance known in Uganda as the Local Council (LC) system (Dicklitch 1998) This introduced democracy at the local level, which proved to be very popular with the local population when first formed (Dicklitch 1998). The LC system created various levels of government with the lowest level [of government] in the villages. Representatives at the local level were directly elected by the citizens they governed. The local council would then assist in creating a higher coun cil and so on until the district level. The LC system created various levels of accountability between the local citizens and the central government. LCs were used to deliver goods and services and even raise taxes. Some other responsibilities of LCs were to maintain infrastructure, institute a community development plan, ensure adequate education, etc. These responsibilities were primarily funded through central finance transfers rather than tax revenue due to the little amount of taxes available in a poor country. One important aspect of maintaining legitimacy was ensuring that local level democracy functioned well. Gi lley (2009 ) describes some of the early village elections as being quite fair, with citizens lining up behind their preferred candidate to avoid voter fraud. It was not an ideal situation, but a slow introduction to electoral politics. Again, this shows the beginning of a reform that led to a competitive authoritarian regime. Since the elections were local, community members could hold LC off icials accountable directly. Gilley (2000) notes that it was relatively easy to voice concerns about LC actions or elections at the local level by

PAGE 28

24 speaking directly to the local officials. They could hold a recall election or vote a represent ative out at t he end of a term However, any issues above the village LCs were more difficult to solve by community members due to the indirect nature of the tiered system. There was no mechanism to recall representatives in higher LCs (Gilley 2009) There was also no official opposition party, since all Ugandans technically belonged to the NRM. This significantly reduced the ability of representatives to offer a drastically different vision than the official NRM stance for the community. While LCs w ere being created, a constitutional commission was tasked with the assignment of drafting a constitution. The constitution was created by a constitution commission that sought input from regional leaders and citizens to ensure there was a broad sense of in clusivity in the decision making process. Kjaer (1999) argues that the 1995 Ugandan constitution was more innovative than the previous three constitutions in the fact that it diffused powers away from the presidency. It was also created by a constitutional commission that worked with communities around Uganda to create a constitution that many felt was more inclusive (Kjaer 1999). By using a constitutional commission, Museveni could initially justify the single party movement, as it seemed as though all cit izens were being included in the decision making process. The 1995 constitution was not perfect. In fact, as noted, it did not allow political parties to operate and it was difficult to politically exist outside the NRM (Kjaer 1999). Since the constitution allowed only one political party, it took a referendum to change the law. The outcome allowed multiple parties to exist in Uganda. As noted, there are now various parties representing interest groups around the country. Beginning in the early 2000s, inte rnal division of the NRM allowed for greater flexibility with political parties, while at the same time abolishing presidential term limits.

PAGE 29

25 Internal divisions inside the NRM appeared as alternative political parties that formed but were illegal under the constitution. The various ethnic and regional groups were working towards becoming political parties. According to the Uganda state website, there are currently over 25 registered political parties in 2015 In 2005, non NRM parties were formally allowed to operate, a right granted through a voter referendum. Until then, Uganda was officially a single party government. The fact that the referendum succeeded to allow multiple parties shows that the general population was discontent with the single party state and opposition groups had gained enough power to mount a serious campaign in favor of legalizing additional parties. This also helped the transition to a competitive authoritarian regime by providing a key element of competition, however limited. Not onl y was the outcome in direct competition with the wishes of the central regime, but it was also decided through a fairly democratic process. Interestingly, the NRM accepted the results of the referendum despite the seeming loss at the polls The referendum and the creation of a constitution showed the willingness of the NRM to accept some degree of constraint at the will of the citizens. Both the nature of the constitution and the multi party referendum show the less repressive side of the regime, pointing to the ability to maintain the legitimacy of the regime. These two changes also show how the regime has transformed into a competitive authoritarian regime. The rule of law was introduced with a constitution, and opposition parties were allowed to operate as political organizations reducing the outright control of the NRM. The Museveni regime and the NRM no longer had complete control over the government and lost seats in parliament to representatives from other political parties. Despite the seeming losses for the NRM, the party remained extremely powerful.

PAGE 30

26 With the rise of multiple political parties, opposition to the NRM continues to grow, but Museveni still has a stronghold on power and now enjoys the constitutional right to serve for life. Museveni has taken steps to increase the power of the constitution and ensure the rule of law; however, he also undermines those same institutions and works to make the presidency more powerful (Kjaer 1999). Museveni ensured the creation of a constitution with input f rom all regions of Uganda in 1995 and allowed a multi party referendum in 2005. A constitution, the rule of law, multiple parties and democratic institutions are generally not associated with authoritarian regimes; however, this seems to be some of the tac tics used this particular competitive authoritarian regime to manage legitimacy perceptions. The most recent constitution in Uganda shows some of the most interesting reforms instituted by the NRM while maintaining the power of the president. As positive r eforms were instituted, signaling a possible transition to a more open regime, Museveni recentralized power over Kampala, abolished presidential term limits with the help of parliament and suspended LC elections. It is interesting that the first multipart y election happened in the same year that the constitutional amendment abolishing term limits was implemented (Gibb 2012). The progress that was made with a constitution, and even the democratic progress that could have followed, seems to have been weakene d by Museveni. The consolidation of power was assisted with parliament and occasionally Ugandan citizens. That seems to have allowed the NRM to hold power while making changes that opened the government to opposition parties. At the same time that Museveni consolidated power, local level democracy was suspended for years. This undermined one of the unique aspects of decentralization in Uganda. The political reforms and the consolidation of power both show the constant tension between opening the political p rocess to maintain legitimacy and

PAGE 31

27 controlling the political process to maintain NRM dominance. There are also interesting tensions between reform, community choice and regime control in the area of the economy. Economic Considerations of a Competitive Auth oritarian Regime As noted in the literature review, legitimacy is based on the implicit and explicit norms and expectations of the ruled population. Si nce the perception data suggests that the primary issues facing Ugandan citizens were economic concerns this research had to analyze poverty reduction and economic policies. The literature review looks at the economy at some length. Lockwood (2005) talks about the pitfalls of neoliberal policies, the same policies that Uganda instituted through structural ad justment policies. Not only is the economy central to ensuring the basic needs of citizens are met, but it is also a key aspect of co optation and having the ability to unite various factions of a divided country. At the local level, villages and LCs gath ered to create a community action plan that outlined the needs of locals (Francis & James 2003). These plans were supposed to funnel up into the higher levels of government to help make national development decisions; however, the actual influence of the LCs is weak (Francis & James 2003). While empowering the LCs, the NRM also took steps to control the district councils by appointing ministers with powers to suspend the councils or reverse decisions contrary to the national development plan (Kasfir 1998) This shows the firm grip on local affairs at the national level, even though decentralization took place. This may have also helped the central regime claim to be working on corruption. When the central regime found corruption at the local level, it was able to take credit for reducing the amount of corruption when it took action. For example, some district officials were found to be taking money earmarked for education. This meant that the Ministry of

PAGE 32

28 Finance was able to root out corruption at the school district level (Banerjee & Duflo 2011) To combat this corruption, the Ministry of Finance published the funding levels in newspapers (Banerjee & Duflo 2011). If the money the school received did not match the amount published, a school headmaster could s end a complaint directly to the ministry (Banerjee & Duflo 2011). In order for the central regime to control local development activities, it needed the necessary funding to provide the districts for local development. Similar to many other poverty strick en states in the global south, Uganda needed to turn to international donors to make up enormous budget pitfalls. Without a reliable way to collect taxes and a poor population, Uganda needed outside money to function. Following the debt crisis, countries t hat previously had a steady inflow of funding from donors faced more restrictions for the funding. However, many of these states still needed money. In the case of Uganda, these donor funds were needed for central finance transfers as well as funding for v arious other aspects of government operations. To stay eligible for international donor funds, Uganda implemented SAPs. These policies were the economic theme of the day throughout much of the 1980s and 1990s (Nugent 2004). Created primarily by the Bretto n Woods institutions of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), conditional lending created strict rules in exchange for funds. These policies emphasized the role of free markets in development coming from the neoliberal paradigm (Haque 1 999; Lockwood 2005). What this meant for a number of states was the drastic decline in state controlled industry, civil servic e, and welfare (Lockwood 2005). Despite the potential negative consequences of SAPs, Museveni still looked to international financ ial institutions for funding. There were few choices available to increase funding without the help of western institutions calling for neoliberal policies. There

PAGE 33

29 was also the possibility that international financial institutions would be unable to find a misuse of the funds due to lacking oversight by many financial institutions (Dollar & Svensson 2000) The Operations Evaluation Department of the World Bank claimed that nearly half of the African SAPs were deemed failed (Dollar & Svensson 2000). A review of SAPs administered to Uganda through the World Bank show failures of both Uganda and the World Bank. This suggests that Museveni had the ability to use funds in ways that would benefit the regime without strictly following the agreement with the World Ba nk. Despite the noted failures, the international donor community heralded Uganda as a success because the government implemented SAPs. The Museveni regime adopted many of these policies reluctantly as they limited the regime's ability to use patronage p olitics to maintain its rule (Mwenda & Tangri 2005). Mwenda & Tangri (2005) report that Uganda received an average of $500 million each year between 1992 and 1996. This number only increases after 1996 (Mwenda & Tangri 2005). This funding was crucial in fi xing many of the economic problems happening internally. Again, there are some issues with how well the regime implemented these programs overall. For example, part of the neoliberal paradigm, and conditions within SAPs, call on governments to privatize in dustries. Uganda was incredibly slow at doing this, and it was not until the late 1990s that privatization picked up. When an industry or company was privatized, Museveni often used it as a tool of co optation, giving deals to party loyalists and elites (M wenda & Tangri 2005). As Uganda embraced policies that liberalized trade, price and foreign exchange, the government was able to get an increase in foreign aid. By adopting SAPs, Uganda restored external confidence (Fan & Zhang 2008). However, even as the costs of trade were reduced, internal costs of transportation were high (Fan & Zhang 2008). On top of high transportation

PAGE 34

30 costs generally, some regions such as the north struggled even more due to a lack of infrastructure (Ellis & Bahiigwa 2003). It took centrally funded programs to reduce transportation costs by building and maintaining infrastructure as mentioned before with central finance transfers. In addition to high transportation costs, the growth of agriculture was slow (Fan & Zhang 2008). In a ru ral, primarily agrarian country, slow growth in the agriculture sector was p roblematic. This helped create large amounts of inequality between urban and rural populations (Fan & Zhang 2008). Again, regional differences exacerbated the problem, with the nor thern regions suffering more so than others (Ellis & Bahiigwa 2003). It is important that the government meets citizen's basic needs (Schatzberg 1993). Basic needs seem to be the implicit and explicit norms required for the definition of legitimacy noted i n the literature review. To combat issues pertaining to poverty, Uganda instituted various programs administered at the local level. The Ugandan regime increased spending in the 1990s due to an increase in international donor funding, even though SAPs gene rally call for reduced state spending. A national roads program was introduced that was funded primarily through the central government. This program was designed to reduce transportation costs in a largely agrarian economy. This gave farmers the ability t o transport goods to the appropriate markets within Uganda. An increase in education spending was also possible, paving the way for universal primary education that drastically increased school enrollment (Fan & Zhang 2008). This was one of the more succes sful development programs that allowed the central regime to show tangible outcomes. Both initiatives were important as politics seem to be local, and tangible outcomes are important.

PAGE 35

31 Due to various investments such as the Plan for the Modernization of Ag riculture, agriculture productivity increased and assisted in reducing rural poverty rates (Fan & Zhang 2008). Yet, there were large regional differences as those in the north did not see much wage growth while citizens in central Uganda witnessed the majo rity of the overall wage growth (Fan & Zhang 2008). The regional divides emerge d as violent groups primarily located in the north as well External donors largely funded the Plan for the Modernization of Agriculture This was a decentralized plan that woul d increase the efficiency of transportation. The decentralized plan fits into the overall national development and political plan. There was very little local input into the policy, as the funding was primarily through central finance transfers. This shows the heavy control over policy and local initiatives from the central government due to financing of projects. The vast majority of budgets at the district level come from the central government (Francis & James 2003). During any given year, 80 percent of central finance transfers were conditional (Francis & James 2003). Since these funds were conditional, they reduced the ability of the districts to accomplish goals created at the local level (Francis & Ja mes 2003). The LCs were then forced to conform to the national development plan in order to receive funds. This is important as many of the programs, such as the Plan for the Modernization of Agriculture, were decentralized in nature. Much of the implement ation fell to the districts. This also restricted the ability of LCs to influence the national development plan. Originally, LCs were supposed to present local development needs to the central government to work together in creating a national development plan. Instead, local officials are generally powerless and district officials rarely have any more authority than local citizen groups. While decentralization may be the tactic of choice, a highly centralized structure balances

PAGE 36

32 out, or trumps, local input in policies. This is in part due to the fact that a large portion of Uganda's national budget is from international financial institutions and donors. These funds help create the conditions which are passed along to the district officials. Again, there is tension between localizing politics and development with control by the central regime. To best understand how these policies affected citizens, the research now turns to Afrobarometer perceptions. Perceptions on the Ground As mentioned in the methods and literature review, legitimacy is based on perceptions of implicit and explicit norms that come from the ruled population. Therefore, it is important that the research look at perceptions to guide the focus. That said, this research has focused on the econo my and government reforms. It is also important to note the changes that have taken place within the country over the nearly three decade rule of Museveni. As discussed in the literature review competitive authoritarian regimes may create democratic instit utions. These perceptions help und erstand the effectiveness of tho se democratic institutions. As it seems that legitimacy is connected, to some degree, to the economy, these perceptions help to identify successes and failures of the neoliberal policies and poverty reduction strategies implemented by the Museveni regime. On the ground, neoliberal economic policies have had a number of effects. In the most recent Afrobarometer survey in 2011/2012, 43% of respondents said the country's economic condition was very bad'. An additional 31% of respondents said that the country's economic conditions were fairly bad', leaving very few people perceiving the economy as doing well. This has not always been the case. At the peak of public perception in 2001 48% of ci tizens thought the economic condition was fairly good'. This is to be expected as the

PAGE 37

33 Ugandan economy as a whole has gone through various boom and bust cycles over the past two decades. The Ugandan economy seems to follow the commodities market closely. W hen the commodities market drops around 2008, public perception of the economy fell, as the Ugandan economy is highly dependent on the commodities market. Since the economy consistently rates as one of the most important issues for Ugandans, perception of the Museveni regime and Ugandan government overall seem to depend on a strong economy. This is shown by performance ratings of Museveni. As the economy performed poorly, the performance rating of Museveni declined. In the 2011/2012 survey, 38% of Ugandans either strongly disapproved or disapproved of the president's performance. At the same time 59% either approved or strongly approved of the president's performance. This is down 7% from the previous survey in 2008/2009. This shows the potential connection between the economy and the performance perception of Museveni. If this line of connection holds it seems that a stable economy will assist Museveni in maintaining a stable regime As neoliberal policies took away economic protections and safety nets for many workers and farmers, there were fewer resources available to mitigate economic downfalls. Therefore, many Ugandan citizens did not have a safety net to fall back on when the economy stumbled. This means that citizens feel the downfall of the economy more, and basic needs may not be adequately met. This seems to be demonstrated as over 50% of Ugandans in the 2001, 2005, and 2009 Afrobarometer survey consistently agree that government policies have hurt most people while helping few. There was a 9% incr ease between 2005 and 2009 of Ugandans that believed government policies hurt most people while helping few. It should be noted that there is limited data on this particular question, so further research will be necessary when more Afrobarometer results ar e made available. Perhaps i f basic needs are no longer being

PAGE 38

34 met, the government may lose legitimacy. In this case, it seems as though people become discontented with Museveni's performance when the economy enters a recession and basic needs are jeopardize d. If basic needs must be met for the NRM regime to be legitimate, it seems as though SAPs may have a delegitimizing effect on the regime over time, as economic safety nets are disbanded and the economy contracts. This, of course, may take years before rea lized and short term regime fixes are no longer possible. On top of the amount of time it may take SAPs to hurt citizens, Ugandan citizens seem unwilling to protest. As noted, this will require additional research, as Afrobarometer data is made available i n the coming years. According to Afrobarometer results in 2002, 2009, and 2012 over 60% of respondents said they would never attend a demonstration or protest. This is important in looking at the level of discontent in the country and to gauge the percep tion of the effectiveness of existing institutions. There are a few possible explanations for this such as the potential for repression against a protest or a genuine willingness to work with existing institutions. There is also the issue of mobilizing a l argely rural population. With a large number of people living in rural areas, mobilizing is difficult and may be costly if they need to travel a long distance to reach a large town or the capital city of Kampala. For a time though, it seems that there was a willingness to work through the electoral process as Afrobarometer results show voter turnout rates around 70% until the most recent election in 2011. Voting is optional, so in order for such a high number of citizens voting, there must have been some fa ith in the electoral process. It is interesting how the regime was able to sell democracy to citizens and see actual participation via voting. This participation in democratic institutions is one seemingly important aspect of competitiv e authoritarianism. There was an

PAGE 39

35 even higher number of those that voted in the 2011 election This comes after continued NRM successes in elections, and a sharp down turn in the commodities market Kasfir (1998) notes that the indirect representation through the LC system did not allow community members the ability to recall some of the upper levels of council officials. Thus, citizens had to work with local officials to solve problems. This disconnected f eel is shown through the unwillingness of citizens to contact government officials at the national level. In Afrobarometer results, respondents consistently report never contacting a member of parliament. In the 2011/2012 survey, only 2% of respondents rep orted contacting a member of parliament often and only a total of 20% reported ever contacting a member of parliament even though there is very little risk in doing so. This suggests that politics in Uganda is highly localized. There are a few key pieces o f information to note in relation to the perception data. Voter turnout is high, meaning that citizens are eng aging in the electoral process. There seems to be high voter turnout, paired with an unwillingness to contact elected officials. Perhaps this shows an evolving disconnect over time. It will be interesting to see Museveni's approval rating in the next round of surveys as his rule is near ing 30 years, and elections happening in Eastern Africa may change the political landscape.

PAGE 40

36 CHAPTER V CONCLUSION This case study of Uganda has shown that the Museveni regime has managed to stay in power using various tools as discussed in the lit erature. It seems that Museveni has been able to adequately manage legitimacy to extend the longevity of his rule. With the creation of democratic structures such as LCs and parliament, the Museveni regime has transformed from a strictly authoritarian regi me into a competitive authoritarian regime. As noted, elections are not entirely indicative of democracy, but a credible institutional avenue for the opposition to gain power via elections is present. These democratic institutions and the effective decentr alization of government operations seem to have helped Museveni and the NRM manage legitimacy and maintain power. First, the democratic institutions of LCs and parliament allowed the regime to claim that democratization was indeed underway. While not entir ely free or fair, even Museveni must stand for an election every five years. Opposition parties have been allowed to organize and even name candidates to the presidential race. Parliament numbers show that the opposition is gaining seats, and routinely sty mies Museveni's legislative plans. However, this credible opposition has increased Musev eni's legitimacy by providing some competition in the context of a competitive authoritarian regime. Of equal importance is the decentralization piece of the puzzle. Le gitimacy, as Afrobarometer survey results suggest, rests on the efficient delivery of goods and services with special attention to the economy. Decentralization allowed the regime to funnel funding to local projects, continuing the strong local aspect of p olitics and development. Infrastructure, education and poverty alleviation programs were all

PAGE 41

37 administered at the local level. The funding however came from the central government, ensuring local programs followed the national development model. There is a theme of tension in this case study. On one side, there is more competition and an opening to democratic institutions. This is shown with the multi party referendum, the creation of parliament, and a constitution that initially limited executive power. Th ese actions are a distinct movement away from a strictly authoritarian regime. There are also poverty alleviation and education programs that work to show tangible benefits in meeting the needs of society. Agriculture, education and infrastructure programs have positively helped the regime's legitimacy. However, on the other side of this tension there is erosion of the constitution, most notably shown by the elimination of presidential term limits. The Kampala district has been recentralized under the contr ol of the central government. Districts are forced to conform to the national development plan through the heavy use of central finance transfers. This is the authoritarian side. While these tensions seem to be at odds, it also seems to be working. The reg ime works to maintain legitimacy while ensuring it can manage any credible opposition vying for serious power within the country. There are a number of avenues for future research on this topic. One particular focus of future research will be the global i nfluences facing the Ugandan regime. As international financial institutions or donors have an active interest in stability, regime actions may change accordingly. Could the international community drive the transition to competitive authoritarian regimes? The global context is an unavoidable and powerful topic to explore. This research does not suggest that Museveni can maintain power forever. There are real struggles ahead. As the economy continues to stagnate following the 2008 economic turmoil and a national election coming in 2016, the Museveni regime may be on shaky

PAGE 42

38 ground. The central regime is exerting control over the districts through various mechanisms as noted above. Is that a sign of weakness? Possibly. The next test will be during the 2016 election cycle. If an opposition party can credibly challenge the regime, while pointing to economic downfalls of the Museveni regime, the government may be in trouble. A peaceful transfer of power is of utmost importance. Will Museveni step away fro m office peacefully? Will Ugandan citizens have enough proof of voter fraud or suppression to directly challenge Museveni? These questions will be asked in the coming year. As for now, it seems as though Museveni has set an example for maintaining legitima cy, avoiding outright democratization and finding space as a competitive authoritarian regime in a globalized context where citizens are more connected and informed as ever.

PAGE 43

39 REFERENCES Afrobarometer. 2012. Round 5 Afrobarometer Survey in Uganda Wilsken Agencies Limited & the Centre for Democratic Governance. http: //www.afrobarometer.org/files/documents/summary_results/uga_r5_sor.pdf Ahaibwe, G. 2013. "Halting and Reversing the Spread of HIV/AIDS in Uganda: President Museveni Publically Tests for HIV." Brookings. http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/africa in focus/posts/2013/11 /15 museveni publically tests for hiv ahaibwe Allen, T. & Heald, S. 2004. "HIV/AIDS policy in Africa: what has worked in Uganda and what has failed in Botswana?" Journal of International Development. 16(8): 1141 1154. Arriola L. 2009. "Patronage and Political Stability in Africa." Comparative Political Studies. 42(10): 1339 1362. Bangura, Y. 1991. "Authoritarian Rule and Democracy in Africa: A Theoretical Discourse." The United Nations Research Institute for Social Developm ent. Banerjee, A. & Duflo, E. 2011. "Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight Global Poverty." New York: Public Affairs. Bello, W. 2009. The Food Wars. New York: Verso. Bradshaw, Y.W. & Huang, J. 1991. "Intensifying Global Dependency : Foreign Debt, Structural Adjustment, and Third World Underdevelopment. The Sociological Quarterly. 32(3): 321 342. Bratton, M. & de Walle, N. 1994. "Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa." World Politics. 46(4): 453 489. Bratton, M & Mattes, R. 2001. "Support for Democracy in Africa: Intrinsic or Instrumental?" British Journal of Political Science. 31(3): 447 474. Brett, E.A. 1995. "Neutralising the Use of Force in Uganda: The Role of Military in Politics." The Journal of Modern African Studies. 33(1): 129 152. Case, W. 2006."Manipulative Skills: How do Rulers Control the Electoral Arena?" In Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 95 112. Cammack, D. et al. 2007 "Working paper 2: Neopatrimonial Politics, Decentralization and Local Government: Uganda and Malawi in 2006." The Advisory Board for Irish Aid.

PAGE 44

40 De Walle, N.V. 2003. "Presidentialism and clientelism in Africa's Emerging Party System." The Journal of Modern African Studies 41(2): 297 321. Dicklitch, Susan. 1998. The Elusive Promise of NGOs in Africa: Lessons from Uganda. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Dollar, D. & Svensson, J. 2000. "What Explains the Success of Failure of Structural Adjustment Prog rams?" The Economic Journal. 110: 894 917. Ellis, F., Bahiigwa, G. 2003. "Livelihoods and Rural Poverty Reduction in Uganda." World Development. 31(6): 997 1013. Fan, S. & Zhang, X. 2008. "Public Expenditure, Growth and Poverty Reduction in Rural Uganda." African Development Review. 20(3): 466 496. Fish, S. 2006. "Creative Constitutions: How Do Parliamentary Powers Shape the Electoral Arena?" In Electoral Authoritarianism : The Dynamics of Unfree Competition Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 181 197. Francis, P. & James, R. 2003. "Balancing Rural Poverty Reduction and Citizen Participation: The Contradictions of Uganda's Decentralization Program." World Developmen t 31(2): 325 337. Freedom House. 2014. "Freedom in the World." http s://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom world/2014/uganda#.VF1LFvTF9pc Gerschewski, J. 2013. "The three pillars of stability: legitimation, repression, and co optation in autocratic regimes." Democratization. 20(1): 13 28. Gandhi, J. & Przeworski A. 2007. "Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats." Comparative Political Studies. 40(11): 1279 1301. Gibb, R. 2012. "Presidential and parliamentary elections in Uganda." Electoral Studies. 31(2): 458 461. Gilley, B. 2009. The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy. Columbia University Press. Gore, C. & Muwanga, N. 2014. "Decentralization is Dead, Love Live Decentralization! Capital City Reform and Political Rights in Kampala, Uganda." International Journal of Urban and R egional Research. 38(6): 2202 2216. Haque, M. 1999. "The fate of sustainable development under neo liberal regimes in developing countries." International Political Science Review. 20(2): 197 218. Howard, M. & Roessler, P. 2006. "Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes. American Journal of Political Science. 50(2): 365 381.

PAGE 45

41 Johnston, H. 2011. States and Social Movements. Cambridge: Polity Press. Kasfir, N. 1998."No Party Democracy in Uganda." Journal of Democracy. 9(2): 49 63. Kjaer, M. 1999. "Fundamental change or no change? The process of constitutionalizing Uganda." Democratization. 6(4): 93 113. Levitsky, S. & Way, L. 2002. "The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism." Journal of Democracy. 13(2): 51 65. Lewis, P. 2008. "Growth Without Prosperity in Africa." Journal of Democracy. 19(4): 95 109. Lockwood, M. 2005. "Will a Marshall Plan for Africa Make Poverty History?" Journal of International Development. 17: 775 789. Michael, Sarah. 2004. Undermining Development: The Absence of Power Among Local NGOs in Africa Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Moss, Todd. 2011. African Development: Making Sense of the Issues and Actors. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Muhumuza, W. 2008. "Pitfalls of Decentr alization Reforms in Transitional Societies: The Case of Uganda." Africa Development. 33(4): 59 81. Munck, G. 2006. "Drawing Boundaries: How to Craft Intermediate Regime Categories." In Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition. Boul der: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 27 40. Mwenda, A & Tangri, R. 2005. "Patronage Politics, Donor Reforms, and Regime Consolidation in Uganda." African Affairs. 104(416): 449 467. Nugent, P 2004. Africa Since Independence. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Noorbakhsh, F. & Paloni, A. 1999. "Structural Adjustment Programs and Industry in Sub Saharan Africa: Restructuring or De industrialization." The Journal of Developing Areas 33: 549 580. Oloka Onyango J. "New Breed' Leadership, Conflict, and Reconstruction in the Great Lakes Region of Africa: A Sociopolitical Biography of Uganda's Yoweri Kaguta Museveni." Africa Today. 50(3): 29 52. Oluoch, LO W. 2009. "Legitimacy of the East African Community". Journal of African Law. 53(2): 194 221. Patterson, A. 2006. The Politics of AIDS in Africa. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

PAGE 46

42 Pinkney, R. 2009. NGOs, Africa and the Global Order. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Rice, X. 2011. "Ugandan leader wins presidenti al election rejected as fraudulent by opposition." The Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/20/ugandan leader wins presidential election Sachs, J. 1995. "Consolidating Capitalism." Foreign Policy. 98: 50 64. Schatzberg, M. 1993. "Legitimacy and Democratization in Africa." International African Institute. 63(4): 445 461. Uphoff, N. 1989. "Distinguishing Power, Authority and Legitimacy: Taking Max Weber at his word by using Resources Exchange Analysis." Polity. 22(2): 295 322. Verwimp, P. 2001. "The political economy of c offee, dictatorship, and genocide." European Journal of Political Economy. 19: 161 181. World Bank Group. 2001. Uganda: Policy, participation, people. World Bank Operations Evaluation Department. https://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/Data/reports/214_uganda.pdf World Bank Group. 2014. "Uganda Data." http://data.worldbank.org/country/uganda