A developmental perspective on transformative leadership

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A developmental perspective on transformative leadership
Bridle, Susan
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Leadership -- Cross-cultural studies ( lcsh )
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Cross-cultural studies. ( fast )
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non-fiction ( marcgt )
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Includes bibliographical references (leaves 149-154).
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by Susan Bridle.

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Susan Bridle
B.A., University of Colorado at Boulder, 1992
A thesis submitted to the University of Colorado at Denver in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Political Science 2005

This thesis for the Master of Arts
degree by Susan Bridle has been approved by
Michael Cummings

Bridle, Susan (M.A., Political Science)
A Developmental Perspective on Transformative Leadership Thesis directed by Professor Michael Cummings
The most compelling leaders have embodied the culture, values, and ideals of an era, and have been able to profoundly understand and respond to the needs of their times. Views on leadership have evolved through the ages, primarily because notions of leadership are necessarily wedded to a whole constellation of ideas about human nature, the relationship between human beings and a larger Order (be it God, nature, or otherwise defined), and the ideal society. Cultural historians have marked a number of turning points in the evolution of Western thought, an evolution of worldviews that has brought with it a development of ideas about the self, the good, human rights, liberties, and responsibilities, and just governance. Each age has a guiding Zeitgeist, a kind of ideological pulse that transformative leaders have been able to read and respond to. In this thesis I will explore how different visions of leadership have emerged in different eras in conjunction with the emergence of different worldviews and political philosophies. Specifically, I will look at the classically conservative philosophies of ancient China, India, and Greece, and their sage-authoritarian leadership; the liberalism of the modem West and its democratic leadership; contemporary communitarian perspectives with their moral dialogue and deliberative democracy; and the nascent model of integrative and global

thinking. I will assert an evolution of political and leadership philosophies, which I will set in the context of spiral-dynamics theory, a comprehensive theory of human psychological, cultural, and social development. With this foundation, I will develop a model of transformative leadership for our times that builds on the work of leadership studies pioneer James MacGregor Bums and the concepts of second-tier thinking proposed by spiral-dynamics theorists. Second-tier thinking and transformative leadership are approaches to leadership that are integrative, global,
and responsive to the particular needs of the twenty-first century. My exploration of transformative leadership will further elaborate the ideas of spiral dynamics and
incorporate the work of contemporary thinkers in the fields of leadership studies and international development theory. I will also look at how transformative leadership might respond to particular governance challenges in the world today.
This abstract accurately represents the content of the candidates thesis. I recommend its publication.

CHANGING VISIONS OF LEADERSHIP..........................1
A Note about Development Theories....................6
A Model of Individual and Sociocultural Development..9
The Vmemes..........................................16
Second-Tier Thinking and Leadership.................27
3. CLASSICAL VISIONS OF LEADERSHIP........................31
Platos Greece......................................31
Confuciuss China...................................34
Vvasas India.......................................37
The Right Order of All Things.......................39
4. THE LIBERAL SENSIBILITY................................43
The Idea of Liberty.................................45
Rawlss Liberal Principles of Justice...............48
Is Democratic Leadership an Oxymoron?.............54
The Perspective of Eternity.........................61
The Autonomous Self.................................64
The Sanctification of Individualism.................67
Can Communitarianism Take Us beyond Liberalism?.....71

Communitarian Leadership...............................78
Mechanistic and Organismic Metaphors...................86
The Situational/Social-Forces View.....................88
The Traits/Great-Man View..............................91
Synthesizing the Two Approaches........................95
Applying the Insights of Psychology....................99
Transactional and Transforming Leadership.............105
A General Theory of Leadership........................109
Leadership and the Satisfaction of Needs..............114
The Role of Conflict..................................118
Understanding the Dynamics of Change..................121
Second-Tier Leadership: An Integrating Perspective.128
Global Vmeme Currents.................................129
Forcing Democracy: The Parochialism of First-Tier Thinking... 134
Overcoming the Legacy of Colonialism..................142

The ancients, wishing to exhibit goodness throughout the kingdom, first ordered well their own states. To order well their own states, they first brought order into their families. To bring order into their families, they first cultivated their persons.
I must follow my people. Am I not their leader?
Benjamin Disraeli
Human beings have always been keenly interested in leaders and leadership. The most compelling leaders have embodied the culture, values, and ideals of an era, and have been able to profoundly understand and respond to the needs of their times. Clearly, views on leadership have evolved through the ages, primarily because notions of leadership are necessarily wedded to a whole constellation of ideas about human nature, the relationship between human beings and a larger Order (be it God, nature, or otherwise defined), and the ideal society. Cultural historians have marked a number of turning points in the evolution of Western thought, an evolution of

worldviews that has brought along with it a development of ideas about the self,
the good, human rights, liberties, and responsibilities, and just governance. Political scientist Donald Searing writes that each age has its guiding Zeitgeist, a total perspective, the ideology and internal processes of which are givens for a heroic leader (Searing 1969). Each age has a kind of ideological pulse that great leaders have been able to read and effectively respond to.
But more than that, some leaders have also been able, as Hegel asserted, to perceive the ways in which each new era carries forward the unfolding story of human history. Each era flourishes as it transcends the limitations of a preceding era that has exhausted its potential. For Hegel, this is a continuous and unavoidable process of transformation, and great leaderstransformative leadersare those individuals who grasp the changes that must occur in their time and spur them on to realization (Hegel 1837).
In this thesis I will explore how different visions of leadership have emerged in different eras in conjunction with the emergence of different worldviews and political philosophies. Specifically, I will look at the classically conservative philosophies of ancient China, India, and Greece and their sage-authoritarian leadership; the liberalism of the modem West and its democratic leadership;

contemporary communitarian perspectives with their moral dialogue and deliberative democracy; and the nascent model of integrative and global thinking.
I will assert an evolutionary development of political and leadership philosophies, which I will set in the context of spiral-dynamics theory, a contemporary, comprehensive theory of human psychological, cultural, and social development. With this foundation, I will develop a model of transformative leadership for our times that builds on the work of leadership studies pioneer James MacGregor Bums and the concepts of second-tier thinking proposed by spiral-dynamics theorists. Second-tier thinking and transformative leadership are approaches to leadership that are integrative, global, and responsive to the particular needs of the twenty-first century. My exploration of transformative leadership will further elaborate the ideas of spiral dynamics and incorporate the work of seminal thinkers in the fields of leadership studies and international development theory.
Don Beck and Christopher Cowan, authors of Spiral Dynamics: Mastering Values, Leadership, and Change, have elaborated upon the work of their mentor, American psychologist Clare Graves, to develop a comprehensive model for understanding the evolutionary transformation of human values, cultures, and sociopolitical systems. The principal proponents of spiral-dynamics theory, Beck and Cowan have been developing, implementing, and teaching their model of

human development for the past three decades. The model attempts to map and manage increasing levels of complexity in the self and in society, and has been used to effect large-scale systemic change in various sectors and societies around the world, including post-Apartheid South Africa (Beck and Linscott 1991). Spiral dynamics builds on previous work in the field of developmental psychology as well as the ideas of British evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins and Polish-American psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi.
Spiral dynamics argues that our diverse worldviews, our beliefs, and our very identities are represented by eight developmentally ordered Vmemes, or value systems, which apply both to individuals and to entire cultures. While spiral dynamics is a visionary, far-reaching, and integrative theory of human development, incorporating the psychological, social, and cultural dimensions of life, it is still taking shape. Beck and Cowan have focused in recent years primarily in the area of corporate and organizational leadership, and it is in this area that the model is most fully articulated. I will build upon the spiral-dynamics model by identifying how the various political philosophies and associated leadership principles I examine support and also expand the theory.
James MacGregor Bums has also drawn significantly from the insights of developmental psychology, particularly those of Abraham Maslow and Lawrence

Kohlberg, in his formulation of a general theory of leadership. With his distinction between transactional and transforming leadership, and his emphasis on leadership as a relationship that elevates both leaders and followers from lower to higher levels of needs and moral development, Burnss work is an important foundation for my discussion of trasformative leadership.
Responsive, appropriate, and transformative leadership is perhaps more important now than at any other time in history. With more than six billion people competing for scarce resources on an ecologically ravaged planet, a widening chasm between rich and poor, powerful and powerless, and dangerously inflamed ethnic and religious tensions, the stakes have never been higher. With this thesis, I hope to further the discussion begun by spiral-dynamics theorists and by James MacGregor Bums, integrating additional important elements of political philosophy, leadership studies, and developmental and motivational psychology, and beginning to imagine how transformative leadership can respond to the particular governance challenges we face today and contibute to the greater planetary good.

A Note about Developmental Theories
Developmental psychology is the study of the development of various human capacities throughout the human life span. The field examines growth in areas such as kinesthetic skills, affect, conceptual understanding, social-relational skills, moral development, aesthetic sensibility, language acquisition, and personality and identity formation. Most theorists have come to assert that growth and development proceeds in stages. Most familiar is probably Jean Piaget, the pioneer who identified, through extensive research, numerous discrete stages of cognitive development through which, he asserted, all human beings pass. Numerous other theorists and researchers followed, examining other, distinct but often related, human capacities. Lawrence Kohlberg, who examined moral development, Abraham Maslow, who examined needs and motivational development, and Jane Loevinger, who examined ego development, were among the many developmental

theorists who advanced stage conceptions of human development in the second half of the twentieth century, and their theories have been borne out by substantial cross-cultural research (Gardiner and Kosmitzki 2002). The majority of the research has continued to find that each developmental capacity or developmental line tends to unfold sequentially, with each new stage incorporating or building upon the earlier stages, and without skipping stages (Wilber 2000a). Contemporary developmental theorist Ken Wilber notes that the various lines of human development can develop relatively independently of one another: a person can be very advanced in some lines, medium in others, low in still othersall at the same time (Wilber 2000a,
28). Yet if one looks at the stages through which all the developmental lines pass, one can establish a sort of map of the stages of overall human development, with six to nine stages, depending on how many upper or postconventional stages one includes (Wilber 2000a).
Wilber notes that as pluralistic relativism became increasingly popular during 1980s and 90s, developmental theories fell out of favor because they were viewed as offensively universalizing and hierarchical. Pluralists rightly criticized the limitations of universal formalism which, Wilber writes, when pressed into social action produce various types of rigid social hierarchies, mechanistic worldviews that ignore local color, and universalistic pronouncements that violate

the rich differences between cultures, peoples, and places (Wilber 2000b, x). Pluralistic relativism arises from a high level of cognitive development, one that transcends the universal formalism that produces rigid hierarchies and oppressive universalisms, and as such is able to be sensitive to, and critical of, its inadequacies. But, Wilber writes,
pluralistic relativism is not itself the highest wave of development, as numerous studies have consistently shown. When vision-logic [otherwise known as postformal cognitive operations] matures into its middle and late phases, pluralistic relativism increasingly gives way to more holistic modes of awareness, which begin to weave the pluralistic voices together into beautiful tapestries of integral intent. Pluralistic relativism gives way to universal integralism.
Where pluralism frees the many different voices and multiple contexts, universal integralism begins to bring them together into a harmonized chorus (Wilber 2000b, xi).
Wilbers universal integralism approaches human development with a softer and subtler conception of hierarchal and universal principles that recognizes that the deep features of the [developmental] stages are universal but the surface features depend strongly on cultural, environmental, and ecological factors (Wilber 2000a, xviii). In my discussion of human development, I take the same approach.

A Model of Individual and Sociocultural Development
The developmental theory that I principally use in this thesis is referred to as spiral dynamics. Originated by Clare Graves in the 1960s, spiral dyamics is an elegant and accessible model of human development that focuses on value systems and worldviews. As such, it is able incorporate elements of cognitive development, needs development, ego development, and moral development in one easy-to-use system. Graves wrote that the psychology of the human being
is an unfolding, emergent, oscillating, spiraling process marked by progressive subordination of older, lower-order behavior systems to newer, higher-order systems as an individuals existential problems change. Each successive stage, wave, or level of existence is a state through which people pass on their way to other states of being (Graves 1981).
Graves identified eight major waves or stages of human existence, and the various stages are defined primarily by the complexity of existential challenges faced. His scheme has been verified by tests on more than fifty thousand people in countries throughout the world (Wilber 2000c, 6). Gravess model is not only a theory of individual development, but also a comprehensive theory of the development of whole cultures and societies.
Don Beck and Christopher Cowan have continued to develop and refine Gravess model, and they have adopted the language of Vmemes, or value

systems, to describe the different developmental waves of worldviews, beliefs, and identities. The concept of memes was first proposed in the mid-1970s by Richard Dawkins, who believed that the evolution of culture should be viewed as independent from genetic or biological evolution. Dawkinss memes refer to specific units of cultural transmission, examples of which include musical genres, clothing fashions, language usage, architectural styles, and holiday customs, to name just a few. What biochemical genes are to the DNA, Beck and Cowan write, memes are to our psychocultural DNA (1996, 30). They refer to Dawkinss memes as little memes, and distinguish them from what they call Vmemesvalue memesor large-scale, core value systems. These act as organizing principles that express themselves through little memes and that are central to the way the mindsets of whole groups of people and even entire cultures are structured. Howard Bloom has written, Like genes, memes do not operate in solo, but interlock in the mosaics that form weltanshauungs, worldviews (Bloom 1995, 131).
Each Vmeme is a center of gravity around which constellates a whole system of values and beliefs. Graves writes:
When the human is centralized in one state of existence, he or she has a psychology which is particular to that state. His or her feelings, motivations, ethics and values, belief systems, conception

of mental health, ideas as to what mental illness is and how it should be treated, conceptions of and preferences for management, education, economics, and political theory and practice are all appropriate to that state (Graves 1981).
Beck and Cowan explain that human thinking and cultures evolve in recognizable packages as the world around us gets more complicated and we try to keep up (Beck and Cowan 1996, 29). At the same time, of course, humans constantly alter their environments, further contributing to its increasing complexity. Clare Graves was a pioneer in seeking to integrate the biological, psychological, and sociological dimensions of human evolution. He argued that the different developmental waves or states do not emerge automatically or inevitably. Rather, they are activated in a dynamic interaction between internal states (psychological, neurological, biological) and external life conditions. Beck and Cown describe four types of features of these life conditions: historic times (location along the overall arc of human evolution), geographic place (the natural and man-made ecology of the individual or group), human problems (the priorities, needs, and concerns of an individual or group, such as survival needs, security, cultural norms and requirements, communication, technology, and unresolved historic issues) and social circumstance (individual, group, and cultural placement within hierarchies of power, status, and influence) (1996, 53-55).

The first six Vmemes in the spiral-dynamics developmental model are subsistence levels and belong to the first tier of human development; the seventh, eighth (and higher levels that will probably emerge in the future) are being levels and belong to the second tier of human development. Hence, second-tier thinking is higher-order thinking and results from having taken the momentous leap from first-tier to second-tier development.
Beck and Cowans approach to understanding human needs, values, drives, and change brings together both the inner psychological, moral, and existential motivations and the external motivators of life conditions in a comprehensive view of human cultural, political, societal, and economic change and development. For spiral dynamics, each Vmeme is an appropriate and evolutionary response to particular life conditions. As life conditions evolve, so do Vmemes; if life conditions regress or become arrested (for example, because of civil wars or economic exploitation), so do Vmemes.
Spiral dynamics is a hierarchical modelit is a model of human development, after allbut it makes clear that one should view the higher Vmemes as adaptive to different, and increasingly complex, life conditions rather than simply as better. As do other models of human development, it asserts that each individual must pass through each successive stage as she climbs the

developmental ladder. Thus, in any society, there will be a distribution of the population through the different developmental levels. Each stage has a necessary place and function. Spiral dynamics is an expression of the universal integralism noted above, and thus seeks to weave into a integrated tapestrythrough a more loosely held nesting of hierarchies and holarchiesall of the various threads respected by pluralism.
Beck and Cowan color-code the eight memes operating on the planet today to simplify discussion and to affirm the value and contribution of each level/color to the whole rainbow spiral. Once again, each Vmeme is adaptive and appropriate to its time, place, and life conditions, and each person must pass through each stage of the developmental sequence, just as we all must complete the grades of elementary school before moving on to middle school and high school.
Spiral dynamics is not a form of cultural relativism. While spiral dynamics asserts that the best Vmeme for any community is the one that is most adaptive for its realities of existence, Graves writes, For the overall welfare of total mans existence in this world, over the long run of time, higher levels are better than lower levels, and the prime good of any societys governing figures should be to promote human movement up the levels of existence (Graves 1996, 294). I should reiterate here the distinction between little memes and Vmemes, or large, meta-memes.

Specific practices within a culture would be considered little memes, while the related Vmeme is the larger organizing principle that shapes the worldview of the culture. The Vmemes are the deep, universal features that define a developmental level, while the little memes are the surface features that depend on cultural, environmental, and ecological factors (Wilber 2000a, xviii).
Beck and Cowan note that the Vmemes themselves are neither positive nor negative, but that each Vmeme can have healthy or unhealthy expressions. They write, The Vmeme that liberates the imagination and dedication of millions on behalf of noble causes and brings ordered purpose to their lives may lock others into militant, fanatical, holy-warfare and ethnic terrorism (Beck and Cowan 1996, 42). Certainly there are abhorrent practices within certain cultures, such as suttee, the ritual burning of widows in India, or trokosi, the ritual sexual slavery of young girls in Ghana. Second-tier thinking would not condone these practices. The goal of spiral dynamics is to promote the well-being of the whole spiral and healthy expressions of all individuals and social systems, at whatever stage they currently exist. Healthy Vmemes, Beck and Cowan write, are those that allow or even facilitate the positive expressions of other Vmemes on the evolving spiral, even though they may be in competition for influence (1996, 42).

Spiral dynamics uses the image of a spiral to chart the emergence of evolutionary stages of psychological and cultural development because, Beck explains,
a spiral vortex best depicts the emergence of human systems, or Vmemes, as they evolve through levels of increasing complexity.
Each upward turn of the spiral marks the awakening of a more elaborate version on top of what already exists, with each Vmeme a product of its times and conditions. These Vmemes form spirals of increasing complexity that exist within a person, a family, an organization, a culture, or a society (Beck 2002).
Also important to the spiral-dynamics model is its assertion that stages of
development alternate between levels with an individual/elite focuswith an
emphasis on I, me, mineand levels with a communal/collective focuswith an
emphasis on we, us, ours. Said slightly differently, the spiral is forged by a
pendulum-like oscillation between Vmemes that promote self-assertion and
Vmemes that promote self-sacrifice. Beck and Cowan use warm colors for the
individualistic Vmemes and cool colors for the communal Vmemes.
The Vmemes are not monolithic. Each individual and society is a mixture of the different Vmemes, with some Vmemes stronger and others weaker, and with certain Vmemes called to the fore in specific circumstances. Beck and Cowan write that since Vmemes are types of thinking nested in us rather than types of us, and since we think about many thingsreligion, family, work, sports, politics, we each

host several different Vmemes, which tend to be activated in different areas of our
lives (Beck and Cowan 1996, 63). If we were to create a Vmeme profile of an individual, we could illustrate the relative strength of the different Vmemes with respect to different life concerns, while at the same time determining the individuals center of gravity, or the Vmeme that predominates. For example, someone who is green-Vmeme dominated may activate the red Vmeme while engaged in sports and retain strong orange-Vmeme values regarding business. Similarly, societies are mixtures of Vmemes, with a range of Vmemes active, but with a center of gravity determined by the Vmeme with the greatest influence. The transitions between Vmeme stages are not rigid, like stairsteps. A higher Vmeme emerges from a lower one not all at once, but gradually, with the new values and worldviews slowing gaining influence as the old ones diminish.
The Vmemes
The first Vmeme, color-coded beige, is the level at which survival needs reign. Thinking is automatic and instinctive, and the structures are loose bands. At this level, there is only the vaguest sense of a distinct self, and food, water, warmth, sex, and safety needs prevail. In the beige zone, Beck and Cowan write, emotions are

few. There is no surplus energy to mobilize into anger or fear, hate or jealousy; practically all resources go to just staying alive day-to-day (Beck and Cowan 1996, 199). Beige is seen in all infants, people suffering from starvation and struggling to meet basic physiological needs, and many of those with Alzheimers disease, senility, or certain other forms of mental illness. Extremes of stressthe nervous breakdown, profound grief, a catastrophe like Rwanda...will trigger regression toward beige for some people (Beck and Cowan 1996, 200). All people enter life, and most people exit, through beige.
Beck and Cowan note that a healthy beige system
intertwines with nature and can access senses that most of us have lost and will not rediscover unless (a) we again confront these life conditions and (b) have the flexibility to downshift to congruence.... After a couple of weeks in the bush, experienced adventurers (and combat veterans) report their senses of hearing and smell heighten markedly. Perhaps this is a latent capacity of the beige mind system that allows humans to compete with animals under beige life conditions (Beck and Cowan 1996, 200).
The second Vmeme, purple, is the level at which human communities form
closely knit tribes. The thinking is animistic and magical. Characteristic beliefs and
actions include obeying the injunctions of spirit beings and mystical signs; showing
allegiance to the chief, elders, and ancestors of the clan; and observing rites of
passage, seasonal cycles, and tribal customs. Purple is seen in superstitious beliefs

or ritualistic behaviors, such as faith in guardian angels, curses, blood oaths, good luck charms, etc. It is strong in Third World settings, and a powerful element in New Age beliefs, athletic teams, even corporate tribes.
Purple is the first of the communal/sacrifice-self Vmemes and the first to deal with forces outside the individual. Purple fosters family, and then clans and tribes to regulate families. A clan or tribe leader maintains order through ascertaining and announcing consensus. The leaders life belongs to and must serve the clan, not vice versa. The successes of these groups in improving chances for survival frees energy for the nascent endeavors of mythology, art, oral history, sport, ritual, and ceremony. The purple Vmeme is heavily laden with such so-called right brain tendencies as heightened intuition, emotional attachments to places and things; and a mystified sense of cause and effect (Beck and Cowan 1996, 205).
The third Vmeme, red, is characterized by egocentrism and impulsivity. Its processes are exploitative and its structures are empires, whether large or small. Its characteristic beliefs and actions include believing that the world is a dangerous jungle, full of threats and predators; striving to break free from domination or constraint; enjoying the present moment without guilt or remorse; seeking to conquer and dominate others; craving respect and attention. Red is seen in the

terrible twos, rebellious youth, feudal kingdoms, warlords, frontier mentalities, exploitative empires, mercenary soldiers, street gangs, epic heroes.
The communal ways of purple offered relative security, and with this need met, the red Vmeme loses some of its fear-based control and frees individualistic energies. Red is the first clearly express-self, I-oriented Vmeme. At first blush, it seems raw, impulsive, and wild; yet it is also liberating and creative (Beck and Cowan 1996, 216). The purple spirits become red gods, reverence for the earth becomes contests with her, harmonizing myths and traditions become legends that extol heroic deeds, vanquishing enemies, and doing the undoable. Red social arrangements are hierarchical, and the leader climbs to the apex of a power pyramid through intimidation, charisma, and physical force. Red spawned the absolute right of monarchs, reciprocal feudalism where knights protected serfs who fed them, a chiefs claim to first night with brides, the right of the hustler to hustle, and repressive colonialism (Beck and Cowan 1996, 217).
When red is supported by a significant purple population, red shamelessly exploits purples superstitions to control the people. Red maintains a system of haves and have-nots. The haves flaunt their victories and contrive to keep the have-nots subservient and needy. The have-a-littles also tend to exploit the have-nots when they can. Organizations and cultures built on red see bribes and kick-backs as

natural ways of doing business. There are requisite payoffs (mordida, baksheesh) for everything. (Beck and Cowan 1996, 224).
Yet while so much of red seems aggressive and exploitative, red, in its healthy form, does meet necessary developmental needs. Reds self-assertive power contributes to a positive sense of control, lets the group break from constraining traditions, and energizes the society to reach for previously unimagined horizons.
The fourth Vmeme, blue, is defined by absolutistic thinking, authoritarian processes, and a sense of purpose. Characteristic beliefs and actions include sacrificing self to a transcendent truth or cause; belief in an Order or Way, based on absolute principles, that determines the proper roles and conduct of all; controlling impulsivity through guilt; advocating laws, rules, and discipline to build character and morality. Blue is seen in Puritan American, Confucian China, Hassidic Judaism, Islamic fundamentalism, Dickensian England, Singapore discipline, codes of chivalry and honor, Boy and Girl Scouts, patriotism.
Beck and Cowan write that the blue Vmeme awakens to stabilize the tumultuous rivalries of red.... Blue movements, whether religious, cultural, or nationalistic, are forged from conditions of chaos, deprivation, and suffering (1996,

231). Individual egos must be quelled by a Higher Authority. The Ten Commandments and other expressions of
absolute thou shalts and thou shalt nots are necessary to introduce order, discipline, meaning, and purpose into the human evolutionary stream. How better could the runaway barbarians, warlords, and soldiers-of-fortune from blood-drenched fiefdoms be bridled? (1996, 230).
Under blue life conditions, people willingly accept authoritarianism for the sake of social order and stability, and submit to right-and-proper social roles, castes, grades, races, classes, seniority levels, or military ranks (1996, 231). For blue, everything has a purpose, place, and a reason. As blue contains the violence of red and develops into healthy institutional forms, it promotes the virtues of self-sacrifice, discipline, accountability, stability, perserverance, and order.
The fifth Vmeme, orange, is characterized by multiplistic thinking, strategic processes, delegative structures, and an achievement orientation. Characteristic beliefs and actions include advocating self-interest and competition; manipulating the earths resources to create and spread wealth and abundance; seeking the good life and affluence; optimism, risk-taking, and belief in technological progress; identifying authority with experience and results rather than with tradition; keeping ahead of the Joneses. Orange is seen in the Enlightenment, laissez-faire capitalism, emerging middle classes, Ayn Rand, Wall Street, Rodeo Drive.

In European history, the orange Vmeme gained influence with the advent of the Enlightenment. A market economy, faith in the scientific method and technology, and the assertion of individualism and personal autonomy are distinguishing features of orange. Orange promotes a middle class between the haves and have-nots. Beck and Cowan write that freedom from constraints imposed by relations with other people or the limitations that accompany faith in doctrine are central to this Vmemes happiness. When it is strong, the person feelsand sometimes showsgreat anger when external boundaries constrain the complete independence that orange craves (1996, 246).
The orange Vmeme, as the wellspring of modernity, has brought the liberation of individuals, great advances in technology, and the freedom to explore new ideas. However, it has also been the source of life conditions that have led many to question anew the role of government, how billions of people can coexist with a reasonable quality of life, and whether the planet can sustain the levels of consumption that characterize this age (Beck and Cowan 1996, 259).
The sixth Vmeme, green, is the last of the first-tier, or subsistence, Vmemes. It is characterized by relativistic thinking, egalitarian structures, consensual processes, and a communitarian orientation. Characteristic beliefs and actions include seeking peace within the self and exploring, with others, the caring

dimensions of community; spreading the earths resources and opportunities equally among all; and emphasis on feelings and sensitivity. Green is seen in liberation theology, Doctors without Borders, Canadian health care, GreenPeace, deep ecology, Netherlands idealism, sensitivity training.
As orange passes its prime, Beck and Cowan write, many of those who have succeeded start asking, to borrow from Patty Pages song, Is that all there is? Fancy homes, expensive cars, and material abundance may have been achieved, but at a significant price (1996, 261). Green sensitizes people to the enormous inequality and suffering that remains in the world, as well as to the ecological consequences of modernitys striving. Green tends to support the legislation of behavior for the communitys good. Green is a high-level, community-oriented Vmeme, and at its peak, strives to be communitarian, egalitarian, and consensual. The egalitarian and consensual processes of green differ from those of purple in that they are far more flexible than extended-family, kinship-dependent tribal arrangements. Additionally, the self at this stage has achieved a much higher level of cognitive development and ego differentiation.
While green is a very high level of achievement for individuals and communties, spiral dynamics still counts it among the first-tier Vmemes. In his research, Graves began to observe some individuals who exhibited an extraordinary

quality and complexity in decision making and other forms of cognition, and who had other unusual traits as well. He characterized these individuals as having taken a momentous leap to not just another Vmeme stage, but to a new movement in the symphony of history. Beck explains that they
could find more solutions more quickly. They seemed not to be driven by status. There was a dropping away of fear, which is perhaps the most significant marker. Fear seemed to have vanished.... Tribal safety (purple), raw power (red), salvation for all eternity (blue), individual success (orange), and the need to be accepted (green) all diminished in importance. Instead there was a growing curiosity about just being alive in the expansive universe (Beck 2002).
The seventh Vmeme, yellow, the first second-tier, or being, Vmeme, is defined by systemic thinking, interactive structures, and an integrative orientation. Characteristic beliefs and actions include the belief that life is a kaleidoscope of natural hierarchies, systems, and forms; valuing the magnificence of life itself over material possessions; placing highest priority on flexibility, spontaneity, and functionality; promoting knowledge and competency over rank, power, or status; integrating differences into interdependent systems. Yellow is seen in the approaches of Carl Sagan, Stephen Hawking, Peter Senge, W. Edwards Deming, and Fred Alan Wolf; chaos theory; appropriate technology.

At yellow, Beck and Cowan write, the quest for peace of mind continues, but it is no longer a singular objective. The interactive universe is becoming more intriguing than either autonomy or community (1996, 275). But what is most important for our investigation of transformative leadership, yellow (and all second-tier Vmemes) is able to see the legitimacy of all the human Vmemes awakened to date, and recognizes them as forms of existence that have a role and place in the total spiral. Yellow is able to enter the conceptual worlds of the first six Vmemes, and to understand and interact with themwithout necessarily agreeing with them. Yellow then can facilitate creative problem solving and healthy forms of Vmeme expression. While yellow thinkers can work together in groups, they tend to be mavericks who respond to the beat of their own drummer.
The eighth Vmeme, turquoise, is characterized by holistic thinking, global structures, and ecological processes. Characteristic beliefs and actions include affirming that the world is a single, dynamic organism; viewing self as both distinct and a blended part of a larger, compassionate whole; understanding that energy and information permeate the earths total environment; knowing that everything connects to everything else in ecological interdependence. Turquoise is seen in the work of David Bohm, Rupert Sheldrake, Ken Wilber, James Lovelock, and Pierre

Teilhard de Chardin. It is expressed in Mohandas Gandhis ideas of pluralistic harmony.
Turquoise is again a communal/collective Vmeme, and turquoise thinkers realize that the problems facing the world today cannot be resolved by isolated individuals. Turquoise views a world of interlinked causes and effects, collective imperatives, and mutual interdependence.
It is worth noting here some differences between the green, yellow, and turquoise Vmemes in their awareness of, and responsiveness to, ecological interdependence. Sensitivity to ecological interdependence arises at the green Vmeme, but at this stage, a true moral, ethical, and empathetic concern for nature and all of life is just beginning. Green tends, intellectually, to be anti-anthropocentric, and to view humans as a blight on the planet and of no more importance than insects.
With the leap to yellow, the individual is deeply freed from self-concern, enabling a profound understanding of and empathy forspiritually as well as intellectuallythe interdependence of all of life. This experience is powerfully liberating, and enables ones motivations to cease being fundamentally self-centered, as they are at all first-tier stages. Additionally, at yellow, one recognizes that while humans are the cause of enormous environmental destruction, they also

uniquely possess the creativity and intelligence to mitigate or solve these problems, and that attempts to understand the complex miracle of life on this planet must also include an awareness and appreciation of consciousness itself.
The shift to turquoise represents an even deeper understanding of the interdependence and ultimate nonseparateness of all of life. This is a rare spiritual or mystical realization, and the actions of such individuals are spontaneous, unselfconscious manifestations of both compassion and wisdom that reflect, in Buddhist terminology, the knowledge that form is no other than emptiness; emptiness is no other than form.
Second-Tier Thinking and Leadership
One of the most important characteristics that distinguish second-tier thinking (and leadership styles) from first-tier approaches is that first-tier Vmemes see their worldviews and value systems as the right or true way, and tend to impose, often violently, their worldviews, values, and institutions on peoples living within other Vmemes. Second-tier thinkers understand that human life, systems, and institutions exhibit a variety of natural and appropriate hierarchies, and that all Vmemes play an important role and have a right to be. (However, second-tier thinking would not argue that all particular expressions of a Vmeme have a right to be in the same

way.) Second-tier leaders are governed by a commitment to the health and welfare of the human developmental spiral as a whole, rather than a commitment to the interests and values of a preferred Vmeme. Second-tier leaders also seek to promote the healthiest possible growth and adaptation of emerging Vmemes to changing life conditions.
I would assert that a number of the policies that the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and World Trade Organization (WTO) impose on developing nations are examples of inappropriate first-tier leadership. The demand that these countries open themselves up to international markets and unstable capital flows has been in many ways a disaster for the developing world. Here the IMF, World Bank, and WTO are agents of the advanced, industrialized world (orange) myopically imposing its will on poor countries (typically purple, red, or blue). Joseph Stiglitz, former chief economist and senior vice president of the World Bank, is one of the most vocal critics of the Washington Consensus that advocates these policies. His book Globalization and Its Discontents, while asserting that globalization can be a positive force in international development and improving living standards, argues that the World Bank, IMF, and WTO make decisions on the basis of what seemed a curious blend of ideology and bad economics, dogma that sometimes seemed to be thinly veiling special interests (Stiglitz 2002, 27).

Second-tier thinking understands that imposing orange development policies on a red society and economy is harmful; it instead seeks to first promote healthy red economic institutional and economic development, then blue, and then orange, in appropriate stages that are embraced and shaped by the actors involved. This cannot be forced. As former president of the Czech Republic Vaclav Havel writes, when we seek to better the world,
we cannot merely follow the timetable we have set for our influence on the world; we must also honor and respect the infinitely more complex timetable the world has set for itself. That timetable is the sum of the thousands of independent timetables of an infinite number of natural, historical, and human actions (Havel 1997, 107).
He goes on to say that we cannot
nudge history forward in the way a child would when wishing to make a flower grow more quickly: by tugging at it.... Just as we cannot fool a plant, we cannot fool history. But we must water history as well, patiently and every day. We must water it not just with understanding, not just with humility, but with love (Havel 1997, 108).
Second-tier thinking recognizes that each turn of the evolutionary spiral, and the emergence of each new Vmeme, brings both good news and bad news. The good news is that human beings have evolved higher capacities in order to thrive within changing, and increasingly complex, life conditions. The bad news is that as each Vmeme comes into prominence, it creates new problems and challenges, ones that

are often far more destructive than any that emerged from previous Vmemes. The innovation and productivity of modernitys orange Vmeme has created enormous wealth and improved quality of life for many, many people. Yet vast numbers of people have not been invited to the banquet, and consumerism and unsustainable technologies are ravaging the planet. In Chapter 8,1 will further explore spiral dynamics insights into individual and sociocultural change, and some ways that second-tier leadership might, as Havel says, water history, patiently, with understanding, with humility, and with love.

Platos Greece
In the fourth century B.C.E., Platos Republic examined human nature, morality, politics, government, justice, the Good, and leadership. Undergirding the comprehensive philosophy Plato puts forth in The Republic is the belief, common to other classically conservative philosophies, that the entire universe has a divine order, and that each thing has a natural place within this order.
In Platos worldview, human beings are seen as rational animals, who have both animal/instinctual nature and the capacity for reason. Humans are inherently imperfect and cannot ever completely overcome their baser animal natures, but through reason, they can make an effort to know the order of the cosmos and attempt to implement this order. This rationality can be developed only within society.

In the myth of the metals, Plato explains that each person has a different nature, likened to the qualities of gold, silver, and bronze or iron. These different natures justify a caste system in which each person has a proper role in the cosmos (and society) to which he or she should conform. Those with primarily gold natures will be the guardians and philosophers; those with primarily silver natures will be involved in the military; those with primarily bronze or iron natures will be husbandmen, shopkeepers, or artisans. Conforming wholeheartedly to ones proper role and telos is Platos understanding of morality.
Unfortunately, the economic self-interest of those in power often influences their political decisions and undermines the proper fulfillment of their duties. The exercise of political power often benefits the ruler(s) rather than the ruled. Poor leadership occurs when a leader is more concerned with his own profit than the welfare of the governed. Thus, for Plato, economic self-interest and political power must be kept separate and not be allowed to work in combination to the disadvantage of the state. Because people who lack the prerequisite gold qualities of leadership (intelligence, integrity, and selfless concern for the greater good) are attracted to political power, only those who possess the proper qualifications and training should be eligible for political office. The health and well-being of the

individual and the statethe realization of the true nature and right order of the individual and the statewill occur only when philosophers are kings.
Good leadership, for Plato, requires that those who are most suited to the task undertake the roles of leadership (the guardians, or those with gold natures). This leadership will ensure the proper ordering of society so that each fulfills his or her proper role. Platos Socrates asserts that potential future guardians of the state can be identified in childhood and be given extensive education and training to prepare them for the role of leadership. This education and training will enlighten them. They will then be like the prisoner who emerges from the darkness of the cave, discovers the truth, and willingly descends again into the cave to serve his fellow citizens chained in the darkness. Socrates suggests that the guardians will act for the greater good and not in self-interest because they have received their illuminationtheir moral and intellectual education and trainingvia the state and feel an obligation to it.
The authority of Platos philosopher-ruler derives from his expertise, and only those who have gold natures and who have undergone the proper training are capable of such expertise. In Platos Vision: The Classical Origins of Social and Political Thought, Irving Zeitlin observes that the primary message of Platos Laws is that

it is only the best men who are capable of true judgement. The true judge must not allow himself to be influenced by the gallery nor intimidated by the clamour of the multitude. Nothing must compel him to hand down a verdict that belies his own convictions.
It is his duty to teach the multitude and not to learn from them (Zeitlin 1993, 165).
The philosopher-ruler is charged with the duty of educating his fellow citizens to fulfill their proper functions so that all may work in concert to preserve the natural order of all things.
Confuciuss China
Confucius set forth a philosophy of political leadership in sixth-century B.C.E. China that has remained influential for 2500 years. He lived during the Chou Dynasty (1100 B.C.E. to 256 B.C.E.), a period marked by a decline in royal authority as political power shifted to the hands of feudal lords. During Confuciuss life, the moral and social order was in a state of decay, and he sought a way to restore cultural and political values and norms. Central to his view was personal and governmental morality and an ethic in which all citizens work to build an ideal society. For Confucius, personal and civic virtue flow from jen, which has been variously translated as love, goodness, and humanity. Jen represents the

finest of human values and virtues, and impels one to be faithful to oneself and others.
Confucius taught that a ruler should govern his subjects by his own example, and that the rulers moral suasion was more important than legalism. Good government should call forth citizens natural morality rather than rely on coercion or force. In the Analects he states:
If the people be led by laws, and uniformity sought to be given them by punishments, they will try to avoid the punishment, but have no sense of shame. If they be led by virtue, and uniformity sought to be given them by the rules of propriety, they will have the sense of shame, and moreover will become good (Legge 1971, ch. 1, v. 3).
Confucius was troubled by his perception that the political institutions of his day had broken down because those who wielded power and secondary positions did so by making claim to titles that they did not live up to. He explains that good government consists in the ruler being a ruler, the minister being a minister, the father being a father, and the son being a son (Legge 1971, ch. 12, v. 11). Each title represents a role in the proper order of society, and behavior should be rectified so that it conforms to the role and the title with which people identify themselves. Confucius believed that this rectification must begin at the very top of the government, because it was at the top that the discrepancy between names and

actualities originates. If the rulers behavior is rectified, then the people beneath him will follow suit. Confucius advises the ruler: If your desire is for good, the people will be good. The moral character of the ruler is the wind; the moral character of those beneath him is the grass. When the wind blows, the grass bends (Legge 1971, ch. 12, v. 19).
Confuciuss philosophical school was continued by his two great followers, Mencius and Hsun Tzu, each representing one side of his philosophy, which can be simply described as optimism and pessimism. They both built upon and expanded his ethico-political system (Fischer-Schreiber et al.1989).
Mencius stressed the innate goodness of human nature. He believed, however, that original human goodness can become depraved through ones own destructive actions or through contact with an evil environment. The role of philosophy, religion, education, and government is to restore the original moral uprightness that has been damaged by the environment. Mencius is sometimes considered an early advocate of democracy because he promoted the role of the people in the state.
Hsun Tzu, in contrast, contended that a person is bom with an evil nature but that it can be regenerated through moral education. He believed that desires should

be guided and restrained by the rules of propriety and that character should be molded by an orderly observance of rites and by the practice of music. This code serves as a powerful influence on character by properly directing emotions and by cultivating inner harmony. As a result, the form of Confucianism practiced by Hsun Tzu and his followers was characterized by a strong emphasis on codes of conduct and ritual.
Confucian China was a classically conservative and prescriptive society that promoted personal and public virtue via propriety, duty, and gracious behavior. Central to its understanding of leadership was the conformity of both rulers and ruled to jen and the Way of Virtue as interpreted by the imperial and noble classses.
Vyasas India
The ancient Indian texts the Ramayana (third century B.C.E., attributed to the mythical Valmiki) and the Mahabharata (second century B.C.E., attibuted to the sage Vyasa) describe a society ruled by righteous kings who themselves conform to, and who promote societys conformity to, the dharma. Dharma, a central idea in Indian philosophy that has different shades of meaning in different contexts, refers to the Way or right order of all things. In traditional Indian political thought, dharma

is believed to be manifest and upheld in society when all members conform to their proper roles, which are regulated by a caste system. In these early works of Indian philosophy, each member of society is enjoined to perform his or her duty with happy spontaneity. Scholar of Indian philosphy P. V. Kane writes that
the conception of dharma was a far-reaching one embracing the whole life of man. The writers on dharmasastra [the law or code of the dharma] meant by dharma not a creed or religion but a mode of life or a code of conduct, which regulated a mans work and activities as a member of society and as an individual, and was intended to bring about...the goal of human existence (Kane 1968-77).
In ancient Indian political thought, the purpose of the state was to reinforce the moral order of society and to promote each persons development within the framework of the duties and goals of his or her caste, and the king was charged with keeping the members of the four castes to their respective duties to maintain the proper order of the society and state (Brown 1953).
Indias fourth century B.C.E. manual of statecraft, the Arthashastra, discusses the rajdharma, the dharma, or duty, of the king. Personal attributes combined with a rigorous training produce the ideal king, who is a sterling example of self-control. The happiness and welfare of the king derive from the happiness and welfare of his subjectswhich, according to the doctrine of dharma, depend on their alignment with the right order of all things, in family, society, and cosmos.

According to early Hindu philosophy, because the world has fallen in to the Kali Yuga, or dark age, in which adherence to the dharma has markedly degenerated and peoples moral weaknesses are exacerbated, the ruler must strive to support and strengthen the dharmic order in all that he does.
The Right Order of All Things
Ancient China, India, and Greece were societies in which a classically conservative worldview prevailed. In classical conservatism, the cosmos has a divine order, and the conformity of each individual thing to its proper role in this order is its purpose and fulfillment. It is also the expression of morality. In this view, moral principles are understood as objectively true, and adherence to these principles is seen to be in the ultimate self-interest of the individual.
Because the right order of the whole is considered to be of superior value to the good of any one of its parts, there is far greater emphasis in classical conservatism on the good of society than on the goodor freedomof the individual. Additionally, these early political thinkers emphasized and valued the differences between people more than their similarities (or fundamental equality). Because different individuals have different natures or propensities, they ought to

develop and express their different natures through different (prescribed) lifestyles and roles. In this view, the existence of different classes or castes is good. People will function best and be happiest when they do that for which they are most suited. There is a symmetry between what is best for the society and what is best for the individual. And society can compel individuals to fulfill their proper function (for their own good and for the good of society). Parenting, education, the arts, economic arrangementsall aspects of life should, in classical conservatism, support the right ordering of society in harmony with the Good, or cosmic order. Any aspect of human life that does not support or conform to this harmony and order should be curtailed. The guiding principle of leadership in classically conservative societies is the conformity of ruler and ruled to the right order of all things.
In the context of spiral-dynamics theory, these societies would be manifestations of the blue (Higher Order) Vmeme. Clearly, one Vmeme can have very different cultural expressions in different regions and time periods. The social systems of ancient China, India, and Greece were appropriate responses to the needs and conditions of the times, and provided meaning, direction, purpose, and order the dominant values of those societies. The Higher Order, variously conceived in each society but seen as absolute and universal, made plain a code of conduct based

on absolute principles of right and wrong. While blue regimes throughout history have been to different degrees benevolent or oppressive, they have all been marked by rigid social hierarchies, emphasis on divinely ordained law, custom, duty, and order, and control through guilt.
Seyla Benhabib notes that ancient and medieval moral systems articulate a set of rules or precepts that can lead man as he is into what he ought to be. In such moral systemswhich spiral dynamics would call blue systemsthe rules that govern just relations among people are embedded in an encompassing concept of the good and the good life. This good life, the telos of humanity, is defined with reference to mans place in the cosmos, and embraces all aspects of life in one conception (Benhabib 1992, 154).
She suggests that this comprehensive and teleological vision of humans within nature was unraveled by modem science, the emergence of capitalist exchange relations, and the subsequent division of the social structure into the separate domains of economy, the polity, civil associations, and the family. Morality is then emancipated from cosmology and from an all-encompassing worldview, and justice alone becomes the center of moral theory (Benhabib 1992, 154). Individuals in a disenchanted universe faced the challenge of creating a legitimate basis for the social order themselvesnot as given from on high, not as derived from myths that

no longer stood up to scientific evidence. And this need very much fueled the shift from the blue to the orange Vmeme.
For all the blue Vmemes strengths in providing an unquestioned moral compass, a sense of human purpose, and orderly social relations, it was a system of dominator hierarchies that people eventually began to rail against as the developmental spiral swung back toward more individualistic imperatives. And so emerged the Enlightenment, and modem liberalism, and the orange Vmeme.

In the classically conservative worlds of Confucius, Plato, and the ancient Indian sage Vyasa, the aims of the society were shaped by a shared, comprehensive conception of the good as an objective, ultimate goal or end for human beings. With the rise of modem science, capitalist economics, and diverse religious cultures having to find a way to live together in shared social arrangements, political philosophers began to realize that claiming one objective end for human life often leads to violent ideological conflicts and the suppression of individual rights and liberties.
Liberal political thought, from the Enlightenment onward, recognized the oppressive hierarchy and inequality in ancient and medieval moral and political systems, and sought to establish a new basis for the well-functioning society.

Liberalism, the political theory and political tradition that has, in one form or another, undergirded modem Western culture for the past several centuries, is generally defined by a few, core features: a commitment to individual liberty; a commitment to the essential equality of persons; the belief that the role of the state is to protect or promote liberty and equality; a commitment to establishing the legitimacy of the state through the consent of the governed (usually through elections); and a commitment to the use of reason, particularly public reasoning, in societal decision-making and governance.
These values of liberalism have been defined and balanced in relation with one another in different ways as the early Enlightenment progressed into modernism and eventually into postmodernism and the particular postmodern backlash occurring in the United States today. Post-revolutionary Americas version of liberalism permitted slavery, and many Western democracies did not enfranchise women until well into the twentieth century. Contemporary western European social democracies strike a different balance between liberty and equality from that in the United Statesthese social democracies are willing to place a greater limit on the freedom to own and amass property in order to achieve greater social equality and security through various forms of economic redistribution. Current legislation against hate speech seeks to place a new and different kind of limit on personal

liberty. And the wall of separation between the spheres of church and state, intended to protect citizens freedom to observe or not to observe religious practices, and requiring the use of public reasoning rather than religious belief to justify public policy, seems to be eroding in the U.S. today with the help of a president who freely uses God-talk in public addresses. In the following pages I will explore some of the guiding principles of political liberalism, and some of the ways in which the understanding of these principles has changed over time.
The Idea of Liberty
The idea of liberty, the very foundation of liberalism, has evolved significantly over the centuries. Liberals have typically maintained that human beings natural state is basic freedom. In his Second Treatise of Civil Government, John Locke wrote that all men are naturally in a state of perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit.. .without asking leave or depending upon the will of any other man (Locke 1689, 287). For early liberal theorists, this fundamental liberty was essential and primary, and thus any political authority or law that limited the liberty of citizens had to be justified. Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Kant, in different ways, worked out social contract theories

that start from a premise of natural human freedom and equality, which citizens then consent to limit for the protections of the state. Locke maintained that only a limited government can be justified, and that the only true function of government is to protect the equal liberty of citizens. Liberal political theory created devices that would protect the individual from oppression by the power of a monarch, religious authority, the aristocracy, or any other individuals.
In his 1958 essay Two Concepts of Liberty, Isaiah Berlin distinguished two conceptions of political liberty that had been operating in liberal thought, which he called negative liberty and positive liberty. Negative liberty is freedom from, or the absence of restraint or coercion by othersessentially Lockean liberty. Positive liberty, Berlin argued, is freedom to, or the ability to pursue and achieve desired goals.
The vision of liberty articulated by seventeenth-century liberal political thinkers was the vision of negative liberty, and while this vision was transformative and far-reaching, it did not, and perhaps could not, anticipate that during the course of the Industrial Revolution, another form of power, capitalistic power, would arise and eventually become even more threatening to real human liberty than monarchal, aristocratic, or religious authority. Capitalistic power, writes James MacGregor Bums, the rapidly growing control of satisfactions and deprivations, centered in the

hands of private entrepreneurs.. .would have an enormous impact on liberty, one far surpassing that of ecclesiastic and other private powers of the past (Bums 1978, 158). Bums suggests that the era of capitalistic power forced to the surface new questions about the role of government in relation to liberty. These questions
concerned the capacity of people collectively to expand their liberties through the use of governmental power rather than merely to defend their private liberties against it. It was a question of the ability of common as well as uncommon people to use public agencies both negatively to curb the citadels of private power (such as churches, aristocracies, and rural oligarchies that threatened their liberties) and positively to fashion political, economic, and social institutions and processes that could expand their liberty in the broadest sensetheir opportunity to gain education, nutritition, health, employment (Bums 1978, 157).
The concern of liberal political theory with the narrow sphere of negative liberty gradually expanded, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, to include broader considerations of positive liberty, as well as justifications for employing the resources of the state in developing and maximizing real opportunity for all citizens in the arenas of education, housing, health, and employment. However it was the harsh pressures of the Depression that finally brought an American president to articulate a striking redefinition of liberty. Franklin D. Roosevelt offered a new vision of freedom through his proclamation of an economic bill of rights that would supplement the first, or political bill of rights, established a century and a half earlier. Roosevelt asserted that necessitous men are not free men, and that the

second bill of rights would establish a basis on which a new standard of security and prosperity could be assured for all (Roosevelt quoted in Bums 1978, 167).1
The idea of positive liberty was one way to try to recast the tension between formal freedom and equality. Yet promoting positive liberty, through an economic bill of rights that insures some measure of equality of opportunity or equality of condition, entails some economic redistributionand thus some restriction on property rights. The language of positive liberty is not necessarily convincing to those liberals, now often called libertarians, who sanctify private property rights and see social-welfare provisions as a coercive governmental intmsion.
Rawlss Liberal Principles of Justice
While the idea of liberty has changed over the history of liberal thought, it remains in tension with the idea of equality. The renowned twentieth-century political theorist John Rawls worked out a system of principles, procedures, and justificatons whereby both freedom and equality could be protected and promoted, in balance, in
1 Roosevelts bill of economic rights has yet to be recognized by the U.S. government, although many of its features are embraced in constitutions around the world.

a way that shores up the towering edifice of modern liberal-democratic thought. His first principle of justice asserts that the basic task of government is to protect the equal liberty of citizens. Each person, he writes, is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system for all(Rawls 1971, 302). Thus, Rawlss first principle is a principle of formal liberty, and it includes freedom of thought, speech, and conscience; freedom of and from religion; freedom of association; the right to political participation; the right to property; the protection of the liberty and integrity of the person through due process; and the protection through law from attack, abuse, theft, etc.
Rawlss second principle is concerned with equality. It has two distinct parts; the first assures equality of opportunity and access to education, careers, and positions to all citizens; the second is his difference principle, which is a principle of distributive justice that requires that inequalities in wealth and social position within a society be arranged so as to benefit its least advantaged members. Rawls asserts that certain inequalities are unavoidable and are necessary incentives, and that these inequalities can be justified when they create a system of market forces whose productivity and efficiency make the poorest members of society better off than they would be under a more strictly egalitarian system. Beyond this exact measurethe point where additional gains for the more advantaged group no longer

benefit the least advantaged group, even when great gains for the former have only small costs for the latterfurther inequalities are not justified, and justice requires redistribution of resources to strike the optimal balance. Rawlss difference principle attempts to secure equality of opportunity rather than equality of outcome. It also acknowledges differences in desert (with respect to talent, risk, and effort) while acknowledging that many, if not most, differences between people are the result of luck, not desert, and that all successful citizens largely owe their success to the societal arrangements and provisions that have enabled them to flourish (Rawls 2001, 77-79).
Rawls rigidly prioritized these principles of justice; his first principle, the liberty principle, is protected first and foremost. The two parts of his second, or equality principle, come thereafter, in order: equality of opportunity first, then the difference principle. Rawls sought to settle, through the lexical ordering of these principles, the ages-old conflict between the claims of liberty and the claims of equality.
Rawlss A Theory of Justice, published in 1971, was hailed as a work of genius in political philosophy, and at the same time set off a storm of controversy. What troubled some political philosophers at the time was less his presentation and ordering of his principles of justice than his approach to justifying them. Because

Rawls asserted that the reality of conditions and tendencies in the social world was pluralismthat nations are composed of individuals and groups with very different views and values regarding what constitutes a good lifehe proposed an understanding of liberal citizenship and a form of moral reasoning that, he argued, could negotiate and reconcile the diverse interests of inevitable pluralism.
Rawls championed the broad doctrine of liberal neutrality, which specifically avoids defining or dictating the good or the good life. Rawls instead argued, following John Stuart Mill, that in a just state, everyone is guaranteed the freedom to pursue whatever notion of the good life he or she pleases so long as it does not infringe on others freedom to do the same. He argued that the constitution, laws, and institutions of a just state must reflect the recognition that there is a diversity of reasonable conceptions of the good that its citizens might pursue. At the same time, he asserted that while citizens from different cultural or religious backgrounds may have quite distinct views of what characterizes the good, or worthwhile, life, it is possible to come to some common ground about many important issues that pertain to government institutions and public life. This common ground, or overlapping consensus, is the crucial foundation for a national identity and a liberal citizenship that makes room for and protects, yet at

the same time transcends, distinct ethnic, cultural, and religious identities (Rawls 2001, 32-34).
Rawlss vision of the liberal state is founded on his explication of liberal political theory, which he calls justice as fairness. Rawlss standard of justice is justified by an understanding of the self and of moral reasoning that are part and parcel of the liberal tradition. Human beings, he asserts, have two fundamental moral powers: one, the capacity to choose, pursue, and revise a conception of the good and of the good life; and two, the capacity to conceive of and enter into systems of social cooperation that are fair. He also argues that a well-ordered society must enjoy the support of the great majority, ideally all, of its citizens, and so its basic structure must be justified in terms of reasons that all can support; thus, these reasons cannot be derived from any one specific comprehensive moral or religious doctrine.
To achieve this end, Rawls articulated an innovative approach to public reasoning and moral reasoning. He promoted a thought experiment in which rational persons craft a societys social contract and choose its principles of social relationshowever, their choices are subject to certain constraints, and it is these constraints that embody the specifically moral elements of Rawlss approach. The rational calculators would begin their consideration from the original position and

be behind a veil of ignorance. The original position has numerous premises: the rational calculators view all people as free and equal, and as having the two moral powers; they are knowledgeable about human nature and society; they act as trustees for future generations; they apply all principles universally and generically; they accept that there is a plurality of reasonable claims about what constitutes a good life. The veil of ignorance places the rational calculators in a position of ignorance about their own identity, gender, age, social class, assets, history, education, future prospects, and particular religious or moral beliefs and values they dont know what cards theyd be dealt, so to speak, in the society. The veil of ignorance is a device for eliminating hindrances to clear ethico-political perception and consideration. Eliminating knowledge of personal characteristics, Rawls argued, eliminates the possibility of bias in favor of those characteristics and thus enforces the kind of impartiality or disinterestedness that is often held to be integral to a moral perspective. Rawls asserts that under the veil of ignorance, the parties to the social contract will choose to order society so as to maximize the freedom, equality, and practical means for citizens to realize a plurality of convictions about the good. The parties will invariably choose the two principles of justice, Rawls argues, and their priority ordering, and will do so on the basis of public reasoning that can be accepted by all the many and diverse members of society.

Rawlss principles of justice have been attacked from both the left and the right of the political spectrum. Some contemporary thinkers have argued that the philosophy of liberal neutrality has outlived its usefulness, and I will look at this discussion in the next chapter. One concern that I will consider further here, however, is the dilemma that liberal neutrality, and liberal-democratic values generally, pose for political leadership.
Is Democratic Leadership an Oxymoron?
What is the role of leaders and leadership in a society that values above all else the moral autonomy, agency, and freedom of the individual? How do leaders determine the direction of social change (the to where of leadership), how are these aims justified in terms that respect modem societies plurality of values and interests, and what forms of persuasion may be used to influence individuals to align themselves with leaders interests?
While over the past decades theorists have posited a number of approaches to democratic leadership, the notion of democratic leadership remains paradoxical. Should leaders in a democratic state discern where the public wants to go, and facilitate the achievement of the publics goals and preferences? Or should a leader

attempt to push and pull the public toward his or her vision, ideally one that promotes the greater good? Are leaders mirrors of public opinion, or shapers of it? Can they do both?
In From Tea Leaves to Opinion Polls, John Geer examines how the behavior of politicians and the unfolding of political change have been irrevocably altered since the advent of opinion polling in the 1930s. The book describes how politicians informed by opinion polls are able to isolate and target the hot-button issues, and then take and publicize positions that will strengthen their support, while ignoring more complicated or lower-profile areas of public policy. Political columnist Arianna Huffington is even more critical of American political leaders increasing dependence on polling. In her column entitled Partnership for a Poll-Free America, she writes:
It is not pollsters themselves who are toxic. Its not even the way polls unduly influence election outcomes. Or the fact that they dominate the press coverage. No, the greatest threat to the body politic is that polls turn political leaders into slavish followers of the most shallow reading of the electorates whims and wishes.... [T]he political landscape today is littered with politicians who never stop looking over their shoulders at the latest polls and whose motto seems to be Im their leader, I shall follow them. But what we need are political leaders with the wisdom to see what does not show up in the polling data and the passion to work to create the consensus for it (Huffington 1998).

While the advent of modern opinion polling has made it easier for political leaders to read the whim of popular opinion and tack accordingly, this has always been a feature of democratic politics. Political representatives attentive advocacy of their constituents views and concerns can beand has been for centurieseither a virtuous commitment to advancing the will of the people or the most petty opportunism.
Woodrow Wilsons 1890 address Leaders of Men expressed keen insight into the essential challenges of democratic leadership. While at the end of his career he was unable to heed his own sage advice, his clarity on the subject is still illuminating today.
In his contemplation of what is involved in moving a democratic society forward in the progress of politics, he likens society to a living organism, which must grow as a whole and be vital in every part or else be deformed and die. Thus, he asserts, the evolution of its institutions must take place by slow modification and nice all-around adjustment.... No reform may succeed for which the major thought of the nation is not prepared(Wilson 1890,430-431).
Accordingly, one of the central challenges of democratic leadership is not just perception of the thought of the nation, but its interpretation. A democratic

leader must read the common trends of thought and weigh them carefully, testing and evaluating the preparation of the nation for the next move in the advancement of politics. This task requires that the leader be able to distinguish the firm and progressive popular thought from the momentary and whimsical popular mood, the transitory or mistaken popular passion (Wilson 1890,431).
The demagogue and the democratic leader both must read the thought of their constituents in order to stay in power. But, Wilson states,
if you will justly observe the two, you will find the one trimming to the inclinations of the moment, the other obedient only to the permanent purposes of the public mind. The one adjusts his sails to the breeze of the day; the other makes his plans to ripen with the slow progress of the years. While the one solicitously watches the capricious changes of the weather, the other diligently sows the grains in their seasons. The one ministers to himself, the other to the race (1890,433).
Visionaries intent on wholesale tranformation of society will surely be impatient with this prospect of ripening with the slow progress of the years, will surely find this kind of democratic leadership not leadership at all but a frustrating game of compromise and a heavy anchor weighing down the prospects of real change. But Wilson asserts that all growth, like the biological growth of an organism, is a process of compromise, a compromise of the vital forces within the organism with the environmental forces without.

Yet visionary reformers do have an important role in democratic politics. Such men and women are leaders of thought and conscience, who, as Hegel observed, grasp the changes that must occur in their time and find ways to spur them on to realization.While they may not hold political officesor if they do, may not hold them longthey spark vital debate and discussion, and plant the seeds of change that ripen in time. Wilson writes:
Those men who stood alone at the inception of a movement [for social transformation] and whose voices then seemed as it were the voices of men crying in the wilderness, have in reality been simply the more sensitive organs of Societythe parts that first awakened to consciousness of a situation. With the start and irritation of a rude and sudden summons from sleep, Society at first resents the disturbance of its restful unconsciousness, and for a moment racks itself with hasty passion. But once completely aroused, it will sanely meet the necessities of conduct revealed by the hour of its awakening (1890, 435).
In the ancient and medieval worlds, political power lay in the hands of rulers, not leaders. Rulers had the right to command, and subjects the obligation to obey. The primary need of the people was order and security, and obedience was a price that most were willing to pay. The authority of the ruler was legitimated by tradition, religious sanction, or rights of succession.With the rise of the Enlightenment, modernity, and the orange Vmeme, this concept of authority was undermined. Liberty, equality, and the individuals pursuit of happiness, however that may be conceived, became the defining ideas of the new era, and a new means

of legitimating political authority, namely, the consent of the people, came into being.
The challenge of democratic leadership is both to facilitate the achievement of the publics various and diverse goals and interests and to influence and shape the publics conception of these goals and interests. It is a dynamic relationship between leaders and led, which we will explore further in Chapter 7.

Genuine leadership in the twenty-first century will require, among other things, intellectual leadership. Leadership-studies pioneer James MacGregor Bums writes that an intellectual is
a person concerned critically with values, purposes, ends that transcend immediate needs. By this definition the person who deals with analytical ideas and data alone is a theorist; the one who works only with normative ideas is a moralist; the person who deals with both and unites them through disciplined imagination is an intellectual.... Intellectual leaders deal with both analytical and normative ideas and they bring both to bear on their environment (Bums 1978, 141).
Some intellectual leaders influence the worldviews and values of their times, and are able to affect the thinking and actions of politicians. At its best, intellectual leadership is transforming leadership. It stimulates public consideration and dialogue about what matters most, and this stimulus, perhaps more than anything, sparks real change in our social and political arrangements.

In this chapter I will explore the work of some key intellectual leaders of communitarian thoughta contemporary political philosophy that opposes many aspects of liberalismand show how the debate between liberalism and communitarianism has furthered our understanding of the good life and the good society.
The Perspective of Eternity
What upset many, especially postmodern, thinkers about John Rawlss approach was its universal pretensions. Rawls described the original position as an Archimedean point from which the structure of a social system could be evaluated, a position that allowed one to view the human condition from the perspective of eternity (Rawls 1971, 587)2. Communitarians in particular have criticized the universal standard of justice employed by Rawls and the liberal political tradition. Daniel Bell observes that communitarians argued that the standards of justice must be found in the forms of life and traditions of particular societies and hence can vary
2 However, in subsequent books Rawls backed off the universalism of his theory and instead suggested that, rather than being the best provision for sociopolitical arrangements in general, it was the best account of modern liberal political cultures in particular.

from context to context, and notes that several prominent communitarian writers in the 1980s asserted that moral and political judgments necessarily depend on the interpretive framework and language of reasons within which people experience their world (Bell 2005). Several communitarian thinkers argued for a pluralism that would respect and be willing to learn from non-liberal societies. Michael Walzer, arguing that societies must be evaluated according to their own shared understandings of justice, suggested that the Indian caste system, with its integrated social meanings, may be just in this sense (Walzer 1983, 313).
Michael Cummings is among those who raised concerns about communitarians sliding down the slippery slope of cultural relativism. He raises questions about Walzers approach, whereby anything goesanything is just so long as people in a society live in a way faithful to the shared understanding of the members.... Confronted, for instance, with the traditional Ghanaian system of Trokosi, or ritual sexual slavery of young girls atoning for their adult relatives sins, Walzer would ask how faithfully its practitioners were following understandings shared with other Ghanaians (Cummings 2001, 121).
Daniel Bell observes that while the communitarian plea for liberal thinkers to eschew universal arguments founded exclusively in the Western political tradition was compelling, communitarians were hard pressedparticularly in their early

essays during the 1980sto offer convincing examples of non-liberal alternatives for modem societies. However, Bell suggests that the rapid economic development of several East Asian societies in the past two decades does offer persuasive arguments for cultural particularism that is distinct from Western-style liberalism (Bell 2000, Ch. 1). He argues that in these societies, cultural factors have a tremendous influence on the prioritizing of rights, the justification of rights, and the moral foundations for distinctive political arrangements and practices. He suggests that while U.S. citizens are more willing to sacrifice social and economic rights when they conflict with civil or political rights, Chinese citizens are more willing to sacrifice civil or political rights when they conflict with social or economic ones. The moral language shared by East Asian communities, he says, relies on the Confucian heritage and appeals to the value of community above the value of individual autonomy. And these cultural factors express themselves in distinctive political practices and institutions, such as the duty to care for elderly parents, a duty that East Asian social and economic arrangements must facilitate.

The Autonomous Self
Communitarianism tends to define itself in opposition to liberalism in three distinct but related ways. The first is the criticism of liberalisms assumption of universalism, noted above. The second is the debate over whether the self can be viewed in any meaningful way apart from its particular, and socially embedded, characteristics, values, and goals. The third is a more concrete criticism of the atomism, alienation, and anomie of modem liberal societies, and a championing of the intrinsic value of community, with practical proposals for shoring up the various institutions of community within society.
Michael Sandel is one of the best-known proponents of the second criticism. The liberal tradition has viewed the self as essentially autonomous, and capable of independently evaluating, choosing, and revising its values, moral commitments, and life goals. It is for this reason that the liberal tradition has sought to protect and promote the liberty of the individual to choose and pursue her particular ends. Liberal theorists including John Rawls and Robert Nozick posit an autonomous self that has a reality prior to social context, and that has motivations and the capacity to choose apart from social context. Sandel, however, has argued that
the vaunted independence of the deontological subject is a liberal
illusion. It misunderstands the fundamentally social nature of

man, the fact that we are conditioned beings all the way down.
There is no point of exemption, no transcendental subject capable of standing outside society or outside experience (1998, 20).
He also asserts that the self is a concatenation of various contingent desires, wants,
and ends with no clear unity and with no subject independent of its contingent
wants and aims (1998, 20). Sandels self is a radically situated subject that is fully
conditioned by desires and experiences embedded in a social contextwhich he
distinguishes from modern liberalisms nonsensically disembodied, disembedded, or
unencumbered self.
Communitarians argue that we ordinarily think of ourselves as members of a particular family, community, religion, or nation, and as bearers of a collective history, and these social identities and experiences cannot be separated from the self without doing violence to the self. Bell suggests that some attachments are so essential to our identity that they cannot be set aside, and that attempts to do so are likely to cause serious psychological damage (Bell 2005). Some feminist thinkers argue, for example, that the experience of giving birth and the attachment of the mother-child relationship are so deeply constitutive of a womans identity that any attempt to separate or abstract from them profoundly disturbs psychic equilibrium.
Stephen Carter and Michael Perry, who question modem liberalisms requirement of an unbreachable wall between church and state, have similar

concerns. The insistence that people speaking and acting in the public sphere set aside or bracket their religious convictions forces, they say, a separation not just of church and state, but of church and self. Perry writes:
Ones basic moral/religious convictions are (partly) self-constitutive and are therefore a principal groundindeed, the principal groundof political deliberation and choice. To bracket such convictions is therefore to bracketto annihilate essential aspects of ones very self (Perry 2000, 137).
While most liberals dont actually argue that individuals can stand
completely outside of their social context, the liberal valuation of choice,
communitarians argue, neglects the extent to which individuals horizons of choice
are determined by their social experience. Far from acting in ways designed to
realize an autonomously arrived-at-life-plan, Bell writes,
vast areas of our lives are in fact governed by unchosen routines and habits that lie in the background. More often than not we act in ways specified by our social background when we walk, dress, play games, speak, and so on without having formulated any goals or made any choices. It is only when things break down from the normal, everday, unchosen mode of existence that we think of ourselves as subjects dealing with an external world, having the experience of formulating various ways of executing our goals, choosing from among those ways, and accepting responsibility for the outcomes of our actions. In other words, traditional intentionality is introduced at the point that our ordinary way of coping with things is insufficient (Bell 2005).

The qualified view of the liberal self acknowledges that large areas of our lives are dictated by unchosen habits and routines, and unchosen socioeconomic horizons, yet still asserts that self-reflection and choice are possible. Modified liberalism grants that ones social world may determine the range of conceivable values and life goals, but maintains that the individual nevertheless chooses from within this range, and this choice is intrinsically valuable. The best life is still a chosen life, even if choices are made within an unchosen framework.
Yet many communitarians question whether individual choice is intrinsically valuable, and suggest that in cases where communal attachments conflict with our interests in leading freely chosen lives, individual freedom of choice should not automatically win out. This concern leads us to the third communitarian criticism of liberalism, a practical critique of the negative social and psychological consequences of the sanctification of individualism in contemporary Western cultures.
The Sanctification of Individualism
Liberalism, as discussed in the previous chapter, has taken the position that the state must remain neutral with respect to different conceptions of the good, asserting that

the role of the state is not to advance any particular scheme of values and ends, but to protect the freedom and equality of human beings and provide a safe space in which each individual can formulate and live out his or her own conception of the good life. Yet is it actually possible to remain truly neutral? Many would assert that public policy cannot remain absolutely indifferent with respect to different conceptions of the good because any particular system of social and economic arrangements and institutions must necessarily both rely upon and promote some contestable scheme of values. Liberalisms neutrality in fact champions individualism. And in the U.S. today, part and parcel of this individualism is a particular constellation of values about the good life that is diffused throughout the culture via the many institutions of socialization. These values include personal achievement and distinction, competitiveness, independence, materialism, and consumerism (orange Vmeme values). And while these values can have productive forms, they also have extremely destructive manifestations.
Modem liberal cultures are plagued by the erosion of communal life in an increasingly fragmented society. Daniel Bell writes that the institutions and practices of liberalism have contributed to such modem phenomena as alienation from the political process, unbridled greed, loneliness, urban crime, and high divorce rates (Bell 2005). Along with the cult of the individual have come

increased pressure and competition to distinguish oneself and get ahead, and growing isolation and alienation as people pursue professional and personal goals at the expense of communal interests and duties, often cutting ties with families and geographic, religious, and ethnic communities. Liberal individualism has also led to widespread conspicious consumption and consumerism. Zygmunt Bauman writes that individual needs of personal autonomy, self-definition, authentic life, or personal perfection are all translated into the need to possess, and consume, market-offered goods. However, he asserts that this constellation is
intrinsically inadequate and self-defeating, leading to momentary assuagement of desires and lasting frustration of needs.... The market feeds on the unhappiness it generates: the fears, anxieties, and sufferings of personal inadequacy it induces release the consumer behavior indispensable to its continuation (1987, 122).
Amitai Etzioni, one of the most prominent spokespersons for communitarian
politics, argues that Americans have become disturbingly self-centered and duty-
adverse, and no longer see their own lives as bound together with the good of the
community. Today, he observes, most Americans are solely concerned with
personal interests and advancement, resulting in the unraveling of the social
networks that give our lives both meaning and support. Continuing down this path,
he writes,

you will end up dressing for dinnerwith your TV set; talking your problems overwith your cat; and discovering that your phone rings no better on the hook than off it. If you go out into the world watching out for Numero Uno, who do you think all those you run into will be watching out for? How well will you like the resulting dog-eat-dog world? Have you seen the mysterious hand that is supposed to see to it that, as we each pull the blanket our way, we all remain covered? (Etzioni 1983).
Etzioni notes that modem Americans are quick to defend their rights, but seem to forget that rights entail responsibilities. As one example, he writes that a survey of young Americans found that most rank trial by jury high among their rights. However, few indicated a willingness to serve on a jury (Etzioni 1986). Etzioni argues that people who claim rights must be willing to balance them with responsibilities to help othersall citizens must make some sacrifices, take care of their responsibilities, and do their share. For Etzioni, what we need is a revival of the idea that small sacrifices by individuals can create large benefits for all.
Etzioni and other political communitarians argue that we must correct the imbalance between rights and responsibilities. The way to do so, they suggest, is to cease to focus so intently on rights while promoting a civic culture of social virtue that bolsters families, schools, neighborhoods, and national public life. Their proposals are more pragmatic than rigorously philosophical. Michael Cummings observes that while Etzioni argues that modem societies must establish a different, and more community-supporting, scheme of values, for the most part, he and other

communitarians do avoid any systematic answer to just that question. Etzionis new golden rule amounts to little more that the truism that individual autonomy must be balanced by social responsibility (Cummings 2001, 129).
Communitarian public policy recommendations include establishing a basic living minimum for all citizens and limiting inequabty, basic universal health care, gun control, environmental protection, restorative justice, stricter divorce laws, empowered regulatory agencies, early childhood education, better language and citizenship education for immigrants, a task force to study how to solve the countrys childcare dilemmas, mandatory national service, civic education, public political campaign financing, and better job training/retraining programs. These and many other policy changes, they suggest, would foster a political culture in which all persons are treated with respect and dignity as part of a social web that includes all.
Can Communitarianism Take Us beyond Liberalism?
Communitarianism has defined itself in contrast to liberalism, both in terms of its philosophical foundations and its practical manifestations in the modem West. But is communitarianism truly a viable alternative to liberalism?

Daniel Bell reflects that the whole liberal-communitarian debate about the
autonomous versus the radically embedded self was somewhat misconceived. Even if we grant that individuals sense of self is deeply embedded in social experience, this fact does not in itself sabotage liberal political thought and institutions. He writes:
Rereading some of the communitarian texts from the 1980s, there seems to have been an assumption that once you expose faulty foundations regarding the liberal self, the whole liberal edifice will come tumbling down. The task is to criticize the underlying philosophy of the self, win people to your side, and then we can move on to a brand new communitarian society that owes nothing to the liberal tradition. This must have been an exhilarating time for would-be revolutionaries, but more level-headed communitarians soon realized that overthrowing liberal rights was never part of the agenda.... Liberals were wrong to think they needed to provide iron-clad philosophies of the self to justify liberal politics, and communitarians were wrong to think that challenging those foundations was sufficient to undermine liberal politics (Bell 2005).
Communitarian policy prescriptions, in fact, tend to rest on a foundation of firmly established political and civil liberties. While most communitarians assert that we have a compelling interest in living vital communal lives, and that this may require public policy that promotes, or at least does not dissolve, communal attachments, they realize that some communal attachments may be antagonistic to other citizens and may need to be changed. Additionally, most of us are members of multiple communities and have mutliple social roles and responsibilities, and these

commitments often must be weighed against each other. Our duties to the communities of family, work, school, church, neighborhood, and social, civil, or activist organizations compete for our time at the very least, and on occasion we may find the values and goals of our various communal attachments in tension. While we live together in a society shaped and held together by shared values and goals, the state still needs to protect the individuals ability to shape, pursue, and revise his or her own particular prioritizing of those values and goals.
Michael Cummings, in his book Beyond Political Correctness, addresses the issue of the core values that are promoted in U.S. civic culture, and proposes a way to get beyond liberalism and communitarianism. He points out that the political left has largely remained loyal to liberalisms commandment of liberal neutrality, largely for the classic, and important, reasons of protecting liberty and equality while at the same time feeling increasingly uncomfortable with the rising materialistic value hegemony of the postindustrial West. Progressives often hesitate to promote particular values through public policy because such value prescription can be a slippery slope; stricter divorce laws may stanch the rising tide of broken families, but it may also trap women in abusive marriages. Cummings instead suggests promoting what he calls synergistic values, which preserve and protect

freedom and equality while minimizing the alienation, keep-ahead-of-the-Joneses competitiveness, and other social ills of an atomistic culture.
[S]ynergistic values...are goods, or desired conditions, whose attainment by one person increases the likelihood of their attainment by others. This synergistic effect is the opposite of the zero-sum condition in which one persons gain is another persons loss. The collective effect of synergistic values is that citizens have a stake in one anothers successes rather than their failures (Cummings 2001, 93).
Synergistic values include such goods as knowledge, art, familial commitment, friendship and love, craftsmanship, and the simple pleasures of such activities as cooking and eating, sports, and walks in nature. Synergistic values stand in stark contrast to the entropic values of power, status, and wealth that pervade U.S. culturevalues that are win-lose rather than win-win.
Cummings notes that [synergism] begins, first, with the recognition that a wide variety of value preferences is consistent with human nature and with the requirements of a healthy and viable society (2001, 96). At the same time, however, he asserts that
synergists.. .do not begin with the naive assumption that political and social institutions can or should be neutral about what constitutes a good life. Unlike entropic values, synergistic values can help constitute a good life in which all members of society can share. They also make an optimal balance between freedom and equality easier to achieve (2001, 105).

In contrast to Rawlss approach, which posits a fundamental foundation of (and delicate balance between) freedom and equality, upon which each individuals construction of the good life can be built, for Cummings, the foundation must be synergistic values, upon which the good society is builta good society that protects and promotes the freedom and equality of the individual.
Unlike straight liberal justice, the liberal-synergistic umbrella starts with synergistic values as the proper foundation of society and then insists on the kind of libertarian-egalitarian social justice that protects citizens from threats to their synergistic value pursuits.
These pursuits cannot trump justice, because any condition that systematically and unfairly subjects one person to another is entropic, not synergistic.... Cross-culturally, this umbrella of prohibition would permit a range of formulas, depending on the relative importance accorded various forms of liberty and equality (Cummings 2001, 121).
Rather than solely attacking liberalism as anathema to the vital bonds of shared meaning and values, contemporary communitarian sympathizers such as Cummings do well to embrace a revised vision of liberalism that preserves liberalisms core commitments to individual freedom and human equality and at the same time affirms the good of community. For, I would argue, the U.S. is not yet ready to go beyond liberalism in the sense of abandoning or taking for granted liberalisms core commitments. Daniel Bell once wrote that there is no need for communitarians to worry about state coercion in public policy designed to foster community, because basic civil and political liberties are taken as self-evident

truths in liberal democracies (Bell 1993, 229). I question whether this claim is true. Rogers Smith argues that liberalisms triumphs have been hard won, and that we should in no way take for granted the hegemony of liberalism. Liberal-democratic values, Smith asserts, historically have been at a decided disadvantage in mobilizing popular support (Smith 1993). Current challenges facing the United States, including attacks on civil liberties, inflamed ethnic tensions, and a resurgence of Christian fundamentalism, as well as a yawning chasm of socioeconomic inequality, reveal that liberalisms struggles are far from over.
Peter Berkowitz observes that the communitarian critique of liberalism focused attention on the need to balance rights talk with commitment to responsibility and duty, the content of character, and promoting communties that cultivate individuals who not only are able to pursue their own interests and cooperate for mutual advantage, but also are capable of rich and sustaining friendships, family lives, and other communal attachments. While this is a worthy achievement, he writes that it is high time that the communitarian critique of liberalism be seen for what it has been at its bestin Michael Walzers felicitous phrase, a communitarian correction of liberalism, that is, a form of criticism generated by and especially pertinent within a liberal framework (Berkowitz 1995).

To put Berkowitzs point in the language of spiral dynamics, is communitarianism (or the green Vmeme) a thoroughly distinct, comprehensive political philosophy and value system, or is it better understood as a refinement of liberalism (or the orange Vmeme)? Developmental psychologist Jenny Wade, who supports the spiral-dynamics model generally, argues that, from her interpretation of her extensive research, what spiral dynamics refers to as the orange and green Vmemes are not two different stages of development, but in fact are two different paths through one stage of development (Wade 1996). She suggests that the path from blue (conformist/absolute moral order) to yellow (authentic/integrative structures) may be either individualistically oriented (orange) or communally oriented (green). Wades fifth stage of development is thus called achievement/affihative, and represents one orange/green stage through which the self passes on the way to second tier. (Wade focuses on stages of self development specifically, and not sociocultural development, but she acknowledges spiral dynamics conflation of the stages of self and sociocultural development with its Vmemes.)
I find Wades argument quite interesting, particularly with respect to the development we now see in East Asia. As Bell has argued, these societies are demonstrating real alternatives to Western-style liberalism, with a more

communally oriented prioritizing of rights and duties as they proceed through rapid modernization. Identifying the different, emerging sociocultural expressions of the orange and/or green Vmemes is clearly a very fruitful area for further research. For the purposes of this paper, however, I will continue to speak about the orange and green Vmemes as distinct developmental stages. As mentioned previously, the Vmemes are deep structures whose surface features can look very different, depending on cultural, environmental, and other factors.
Communitarian Leadership
How is communitarian leadership different from democratic leadership? As a matter of essential principles, there is not much difference. However, at the level of practice, communitarian thinkers, particularly the political communitarians, seek to seek to forge a far more participatory democratic processone that can be called communitarian, or simply more democratic. Deliberative democracy and moral dialogue are two related approaches to communitarian political participation. Leadership in these practices, as in democratic leadership generally, is both to facilitate the achievement of citizens goals and interests and to influence and shape citizens conception of these goals and interests. However,

communitarian leadership also tries, as much as is feasible, to facilitate consensus. It also strives to foster active participation in the political process from as large and as diverse a group of citizens as is possible.
Deliberative democracy seeks to strengthen citizens voices in public policy making by actively including people of all races, classes, ages, and geographic regions in deliberations that directly affect public decisions. Deliberation is an approach to decision making in which citizens consider relevant facts from multiple points of view, converse with one another to consider critically the options before them, and widen their perspectives, opinions, and understandings. Deliberative democracy requires that representative groups of ordinary citizens have access to balanced and accurate information, that they have sufficient time to explore the intricacies of issues through discussion, and that their conclusions are constructively focused and related to policy making and the governing process. Advocates assert that this kind of public deliberation can have many benefits within society. Among the most common claims are that public deliberation results in better policies, superior public education, increased public trust, and reduced conflict when policy moves to implementation. Numerous forums for deliberative democracy have been tested in recent years, including citizens juries, study circles, planning cells, national issues forums, the twenty-first-century town meeting, internet blogs,

consensus conferences, choice work dialogues, public conversations, and scenario workshops (Deliberative Democracy Consortium 2005).
The Deliberative Democracy Consortium is an organization that brings together practitioners and researchers to further the nascent, broad-based movement to promote and institutionalize deliberative democracy at all levels of governance in the United States and around the world. It argues that
the outcomes of deliberation result in qualitatively better, more lasting decisions on policy matters. Participation in such forums is central to democratic renewal. Essentially, our view is that democratic deliberation is a powerful, transformational experience for everyone involvedcitizens and leaders alikewhich can result in attitudinal shifts toward the institutions and practice of democracy overall (Deliberative Democracy Consortium 2005).
Amitai Etzioni seeks to promote communitarian changes in our political
culture through what he calls moral dialogue. These changes are based on values
which, to acquire social significance and actually change the political culture, must
be embraced by a considerable number of citizens. Moral dialogue, Etzioni explains,
is a process by which people engage in deliberations that involve not merely facts,
logic, reasoning, and rational exchanges, but also intensive discussions in which
their normative commitments are engaged (Etzioni 2000). He gives as examples
dialogues in American society about race, class, and gender relations, and our
obligations to the environment. He notes that while moral dialogues such as these

tend to lack focus and continue endlessly, they are crucial in fostering new shared moral understandings.
[Moral dialogue is] fuzzy in the sense that one cannot determine a priori with any precision when the process will be completed, which values will prevail, or which new public policies will be endorsed. In effect, one can predict only that the process often will be disjointed, emotive, repetitive, and meandering. But these are all earmarks of processes that truly engage a mass of people in examining, redefining, and redirecting their values and moral commitmentsearmarks of moral dialogues, essential for truly endorsed social change (Etzioni 2000).
Communitarian politics, Etzioni argues, should be based on a soft moralism that relies on persuasion rather than coercion. Social norms, he states, should be promoted through moral dialogue rather than legislation, through social incentives rather than legal ones. He writes:
[Governments do best when they resist the rush to legislate good behavior. When there is a valid need to modify behavior (say, to encourage saving water during a drought), the state should realize that relying on informal, community-based processes (members chiding each other and appreciating certain forms of conduct) is preferable to relying on the law. Legislation numbs the moral conscience (2001, 26).
Etzioni maintains that moral dialogue is crucial in fostering a political culture that recogizes that the good society should not be based on greater and greater wealth, but a major and broadly based upward shift on the Maslovian scale (2001, 111). Etzioni also observes that in order to meet the social and environmental

challenges of our times, such a shift will be required. When people become more interested in the higher, self-actualization needs, they place lesser demands on the environment, and, he writes, such a new set of priorities may well be the only conditions under which those who are well endowed would be willing to support serious reallocation of wealth and power, as their personal fortunes would no longer be based on amassing ever larger amounts of consumer goods (2001, 112).
Communitarian leadersleaders of the processes of deliberative democracy and moral dialoguecan also be called collaborative leaders. Collaborative leaders convene, energize, facilitate, focus, and sustain discussion. They model ways in which people can work together constructively and creatively to address complex public concerns. They seek to bring together diverse and inclusive groups of people in an open process that considers a broad spectrum of information and that will bring about a shared understanding of problems and concerns. And they seek to foster the kind of interactions from which a deeper sense of connectedness and community can grow.
Don Beck and Christopher Cowan note that the green (or communitarian) Vmeme strives to bring diversity together into community.
Whereas blue categorizes people into groups by ethnicity, age,
gender, language, religion, etc., and orange sorts people vertically

according to socioeconomics and their status in some pecking order, green believes in bringing diverse people together so long as they are willing to share the experience (1996, 268).
This value is one of the green Vmemes greatest blessings. Greens curses, however,
include endless group processing that, in giving equal time to every viewpoint and
emotional reaction, may never reach actionable decisions; political correctness;
and a strong aversion to any forms of ranking or hierarchy. These can be real
impediments to effective leadership.

Leadership has been one of historys most compelling preoccupations. Every cultures traditional myths and stories have told of the talents, ambitions, and shortcomings of chiefs, kings, prophets, or rulers, and have considered these leaders rights, privileges, duties, and obligations. Yet for all this interest and examination, political leadership is a term that remains very difficult to pin down. James MacGregor Bums has written that leadership is one of the most observed and least understood phenomena on earth (Bums 1978, 2). Leadership scholar Bernard Bass writes that leadership is still variously thought of as
the focus of group processes, as a personality attribute, as the art of inducing compliance, as an exercise of influence, as a particular kind of act, as a form of persuasion, as a power relation, as an instrument in the attainment of goals, as an effect of interaction, as a differentiated role, and as the initiation of structure (Bass 1990, 20).

While voluminous research and theorizing over the past few decades have examined the many dimensions of leadership Bass mentions above, two approaches to a general understanding of leadership remain particularly informative, in the field of leadership studies generally, and for the discussion that takes place in this thesis. One is the traits approach to leadership, which emphasizes the qualities that undergird leadership skills; the other is the situationist approach, which emphasizes the political environment the leader faces, the economic or ideological context, and the attitudes and expectations of followers (Bums 2003, 10). Alternatively, one can distinguish these two approaches with the answer to the question, Do leaders change history? One side asserts that history is shaped by a few outstanding individuals, while the other insists that history constitutes a great tide of events that inevitably sweeps us all along in its wake (Kellerman 1986, 3). Similarly, Sidney Hook makes a distinction between the event-making man whose actions, which are the expression of outstanding intelligence, will, and character and not accidents of position, significantly influence the course of important eventsand the eventful manwho happened to be involved in the sweeping events at an historic crossroads but did not actually determine its course. In Hooks categorization, the eventful man is less important than the unfolding circumstances. The possibility of dramatic action has already been prepared for by

the direction of antecedent events, he writes. The event-making man, in contrast, not only meets a fork in the historical road but also helps to create it (Hook 1943).
Mechanistic and Organismic Metaphors
As noted above, advocates of the traits, or great-man, view of leadership emphasize the role of extraordinary individuals who have bent historys course to their own will, and look at the special attributes of these leaders. Advocates of the situationist, or social-forces, view emphasize the role of the many social, hereditary, cultural, and environmental contexts in which we are all embedded, and look at the influence of multiple layers of situations, including the political environment the leader faces, the economic or ideological context, and the attitudes and expectations of followers.
Donald Searing attempts to clarify the discussion about these opposing viewpoints by examining how each perspective involves a particular image or metaphor of man and society. The great-man perspective, he argues, emerges from a mechanistic view, while the social-forces perspective emerges from an organismic view (Searing 1969).

The mechanistic model, Searing writes, is associated with the belief that human beings and human society have a relatively constant and unchanging nature. Individuals and societies are composed of discrete parts linked together in stable relationships of attraction, repulsion, and the like. Analogies from Newtonian mechanics and Enlightenment clockwork are common, and institutional aspects of social and political structure are emphasized. Society is viewed as an aggregate of its partsand is viewed as equal to, but no more than, the sum of its parts. Priority is given to the part rather than the whole (Searing 1969).
The organismic model instead depicts society not as an aggregate of discrete parts but as a systeman integrated whole rather than a sum of component parts. Searing writes, Its partsinstitutions and individualsare, in fact, derived from the whole and can only be understood and explained in terms of their relations to the complete social matrix. The parts cannot function in tasks beyond those assigned by the whole, for they are not integumented entitites (1969). The individual units are seen in terms of their adaptation to the interrelated whole. Society evolves and adapts in relation to its environment, and the individuals and institutions within society evolve and adapt in harmony with the larger societal organism.
Searing suggests that these models and images are revealed in the language used by social scientists: For example, metaphors such as balance and friction

are associated with a mechanistic image, while stasis, adaptation, and health are associated with an organismic image (Searing 1969).
Leadership theorists have come to acknowledge that both the traits and situationist models serve a valuable role in studying leadership. Different models do seem to apply best to different historical contexts. In some situations great men are important, and mechanistic models are most appropriate. In other situations social forces prevail, and organismic models are most reliable. One must choose which model is most appropriate for a given context, and in reality, most incidences of social change are informed by facets of both approaches.
The Situational/Social-Forces View
The great-man theory, which viewed the leader as a hero, and the history of the world as the biography of great men (Carlyle 1840), came under attack by commentators such as Herbert Spencer who argued that, under closer examination, the great-man theory breaks down completely (Spencer 1873). For Spencer, societies evolve in a progressive, gradual manner, and no single political actor can alter the course of this development (1873). Those whom we would call great men, and the societal changes we would attribute to them, Spencer asserts, are the

products of the societies that gave them birth. Along with the whole generation of which he forms a minute part, Spencer writes,
along with its institutions, language, knowledge, manners, and its multitudinous arts and appliances, he is a resultant of an enormous aggregrate of forces that have been co-operating for ages.... If there is anything like a real explanation of these changes, it must be sought in that aggregate of conditions out of which both he and they have arisen (1873).
Spencer proposed three explanations for what he argued was an entirely misguided belief in the great-man theory: the universal love of personalities; the pleasant news that, to understand the course of civilization, you have only to read diligently the lives of distinguished men; and the relative ease with which we can interpret events through the actions of a visible few (Spencer 1873).
Situational theorists advanced the view that leaders emerge as a result of time, place, and circumstance. Hegel (1837) saw the great man as an expression of the needs of his times. Eben Mumford (1909) argued that the leaders who emerge depend on the abilities and skills required at the time to solve the prevailing social problems. For situationalists, the great man not could not be other than he was or do other than he did, because he was entirely shaped and directed by his historical environment. Bass notes that the great-man/situationalist debate is an ancient one. He writes:

The great-man theorists believed that it was all a matter of personality and personality developmentthat Alexanders and Caesars would surface no matter what conditions surrounded them.
The situationalists thought otherwise. For instance, they sought to identify those states of affairs that gave rise to the emergence of the man on the white horse, the dictator who appears following revolutionary upheaval, chaotic politics, social and economic distress, and the weakening of traditional institutions (Bass 1990,
Donald Searing observes that studies that focus on the role of various social forces emphasize the interrelatedness of historical phenomena and analyze human action from the perspective of the whole or contextual situation. The whole system, Searing writes, is casually dominant over the parts (leaders in this case) because these leaders are well integrated with, and structured by, the whole (Searing 1969).
For those who advocate an extreme situational or social-forces perspective, leaders are no more than agents or catalysts of larger group processes. Some assert that leadership in fact resides in the group or community, and is given to leaders only when they put forth programs that the group is willing to follow (Hocking 1924). Searing observes that for others, leaders are
little more than ciphers in an inevitable historical progression. Although Hegel, Spencer, and Marx each identified different mainsprings within the historical process, they all agreed that individual leaders were unable to manipulate the controls. At most, no leader was more than a catalyst for events; events which, from

their deterministic perspectives, would have occurred with or without these heroic personalities (Searing 1969).
Numerous authors have written historical analyses of the formative
situational contexts in which various leaders operated. One is Erik Eriksons
examination of the life and times of Martin Luther. Erikson depicts Martin Luthers
relevant context as a Zeitgeist that was taking hold across almost all of Europe.
Erikson argues that it was a blossoming of ideas that had the most significant impact
on the unfolding of the Reformationa societal shift of worldviews at the level of
Hegels ideologiesand he presents Luthers role as an aqueduct for the ideas of
the times (Erikson 1962).
The Traits/Great-Man View
Would the October Revolution have succeeded if Lenin had not reached Finland Station? For Thomas Carlyle, could we have asked him about these world-changing events, the answer would have been, Certainly not. Carlyle asserts that history is the story of the accomplishments of great men:
Universal History, the history of what man has accomplished in this world, is at bottom the History of the Great Men who have worked here.... All things that we see standing accomplished in the world are properly the outer material result, the practical

realization and embodiment, of Thoughts that dwelt in the Great Men sent into the world: the soul of the whole worlds history, it may be considered, were the history of these (Carlyle 1840).
Carlyle argues passionately that some men are manifestly superior to all others, and
that it is these Nietzschean characters who quite rightly become our leaders.
Carlyles leader is a grandiose, mystical hero and muscular creator of history.
Bernard Bass writes that for advocates of the great-man approach, history is shaped by the leadership of great men. Without Moses, the Jews would have remained in Egypt. Without Winston Churchill, the British would have given up in 1940 (Bass 1990, 37).
Numerous historical analyses have focused on the role of great men. Historian Robert Tucker, for example, has argued that at least in some cases, individuals indeed have a prominent role in political outcomes. Tucker asserts that the terror programs and foreign aggression of Nazi and Stalinist totalitarianism were the direct result of Hitlers and Stalins paranoid personalities. Their policies, he writes, were ad hoc techniques applied by psychotically motivated leaders during militant phases of the two movement-regimes (Tucker 1965), and were the consequence of these leaders particular characters. Tucker criticizes the early view that these regimes were the inevitable product of totalitarian polities, insisting that this perspective overlooks the important personal factor in the dynamics of

totalitarianism. For the same reason, Tucker argues that terrorizing policies should not automatically be seen as recurrent evolutionary phases in totalitarian political systems (Tucker 1965).
If leaders are endowed with special attributes, as Carlyle and other great-man theorists suggest, it would behoove us to identify these traits. Bass (1990, 38) observes that S. C. Kohs, K. W. Irle, L. L. Bernard, W. V. Bingham, O. Tead, D. P. Page, and C. E. Kilboume, writing in the 1920s and 1930s, were the most influentional early character-traits theorists. While the extreme version of the trait theory has fallen into disfavor and has been modified by situationist and more interactive perspectives, leadership traits are still seen to be of paramount importance in the study of leadership and management. Studies of leadership traits have examined a wide range of factors, a sampling of which include: physical characteristics such as height, technical skills, task motivation and application, social and interpersonal skills, emotional balance and control, administrative skills, intellectual skills, decisiveness, assertiveness and aggressiveness, willingness to assume responsibility, ethical conduct and personal integrity, maintaining teamwork and a cohesive group, ability to communicate, physical energy, maintaining performance standards, creativity and independence, conformity, and nurturant behavior (Bass 1990, 85). Bass suggests that the results of these studies make it

reasonable to conclude that personality traits differentiate leaders from followers, successful from unsuccessful leaders, and high-level from low-level leaders (1990, 87).3 However, he notes that the conclusion that personal characteristics are a differentiating factor in leadership does not represent a return to the pure trait
An important area of research into the significant traits of leadership has attempted to distinguish leaders from managers. Abraham Zalezniks Managers and Leaders: Are They Different? argues that managers and leaders are indeed different: they tend to have different attitudes toward goals, different conceptions of work, different ways of relating with others, and different senses of self (Zaleznik 1977). For Zaleznik, leadership involves persuasive efforts to change the way people think and act, while management orchestrates mutually sympathetic, collective action. Personal talent and personality are primary in leadership; technique and problem solving are primary in management. The management style is to work together with others for incremental change within an evolving, accepted framework or institution; the leadership style is to question received understanding and practices and to look for alternatives that are outside the box. Management tends to reconcile differences and promote stability; leadership tends to introduce turbulence. A few key distinctions that Zaleznik makes between leaders and managers include: Managers tend to adopt impersonal, dispassionate attitudes toward goals, while leaders have a personal and very active attitude toward goals. Managers tend to view work as an enabling process involving some combination of people and ideas interacting to establish strategies and make decisions (1977); they negotiate and bargain. Leaders, in contrast, work to develop fresh approaches to long-standing problems and are willing to take greater risks. Managers seek compromises, reconcile differences, establish a balance of power, and are concerned with the decision-making process. Leaders are committed to ideas rather than processes, and tend to attract strong feelings of identity and difference, or of love and hate (1977). Managers tend to have gone through a path of personal development in which, through socialization, they have been prepared to guide institutions and to maintain the existing balance of social relations. Leaders tend to have gone through a path of personal development in which, through mastery of significant personal struggles, they are impelled to seek psychological and social change.
Another important, more recent area of scholarship about the traits of effective leaders and managers, which reflects spiral dynamics second-tier thinking and processes, is the work of Peter Senge and Margaret Wheatley. Senge, the founder and director of the Sloan School of Management at MIT, advocates systems thinking and creating learning organizations (Senge 1994). Wheatley, author of the acclaimed Leadership and the New Science: Discovering Order in a Chaotic World (1999) explores the implications of quantum physics and chaos theory for organizational practices and leadership principles.

Full Text


Spiral Dynamics: Mastering VaLues, Leadership, and Change,


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Making Democracy Work,

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