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Freedom is the solution

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Freedom is the solution the Muslim Brotherhood and democracy in Egypt
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McDonald, Andrew Albert Louis
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English
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ix, 270 leaves : ; 28 cm

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Since 1981 ( fast )
Democracy -- Egypt ( lcsh )
Democracy ( fast )
Politics and government ( fast )
Politics and government -- Egypt -- 1981- ( lcsh )
Egypt ( fast )
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bibliography ( marcgt )
theses ( marcgt )
non-fiction ( marcgt )

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Includes bibliographical references (leaves 259-270).
Statement of Responsibility:
by Andrew Albert Louis McDonald.

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University of Florida
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Full Text
FREEDOM IS THE SOLUTION: THE MUSLIM
BROTHERHOOD AND DEMOCRACY IN EGYPT
by
Andrew Albert Louis McDonald B.A., University of Colorado Denver, 2008
A thesis submitted to the University of Colorado Denver in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Social Science
2011


This thesis for the Master of Social Science degree by
Andrew Albert Louis McDonald has been approved by
Amin Kazak
Omar Swartz

John G. Whitesides
l)-36r-H
Date


McDonald, Andrew Albert Louis (M.S.S., College of Liberal Arts and Sciences) Freedom is the Solution: The Muslim Brotherhood and Democracy in Egypt Thesis directed by Senior Instructor Amin Kazak
ABSTRACT
This thesis attempts to address the development of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood as a moderate Islamic opposition group within Egypt prior to the Revolution on the Nile in February 2011 and their connection to democracy both before and after Mubaraks ouster. Beginning with a definition of democracy and a brief discussion of the compatibility between Islam and democracy, this thesis then examines the historical development of the Brotherhood into a political opposition group with a moderate Islamic position. This moderate interpretation of Islam allowed the Brothers to create a unique and specific version of Islamic democracy which they espoused as both a critique of the Sadat and Mubarak regimes, but also as a means of establishing their democratic credentials. Largely a qualitative, longitudinal, case study focusing on the group under Hosni Mubarak which draws on the inclusion-moderation hypothesis and Alfred C. Stepans relational theory (2001), this study examines the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood as a force for democracy both before and after the revolution on the Nile in 2011. In doing so, it is the authors hope that some of the major fears and misunderstandings regarding this Islamic group can be assuaged.


This abstract accurately represents the content of the candidates thesis. I recommend its publication. y
Signed
222
Amin Kazak


DEDICATION
I dedicate this thesis to all those that have inspired me to continue the pursuit of knowledge throughout my life; to my mother, Cheryl, who never let me get by with anything but my best; and finally, to my fiancee Tara, without whom none of this would have been possible.


ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
My sincerest thanks to all the members of my committee for their commitment to this project and their belief that I could accomplish the task I set out to achieve. I would especially like to thank John G.Whitesides for not only inspiring this thesis and spending countless hours going over the subject matter, but for exposing me to a globalized world that is so much larger and more complex than I once knew.


TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER
1. INTRODUCTION.................................................1
2. DEMOCRACY DEFINED...........................................14
Islam and Democracy...................................19
A Monolithic Civilization.......................21
Removing the Veil: Secularism and Islamic Democracy.27
Overcoming the Challenges.......................31
Why Democracy?........................................42
Where Do We Go From Here?.............................46
3. WAKING THE SLEEPERS.........................................53
Laying the Foundation.................................54
Persecution...........................................59
Relaxation and Repression.............................70
Concluding Thoughts...................................76
4. RISING OPPOSITION...........................................80
Stepan & Relational Opposition........................82
Five Functions of an Opposition Movement..............87
5. THE MOVE TO MODERATION.....................................122
A Typology of Islamic Groups.........................128
viii


Assessing Moderation....................................132
Playing by the rules..............................132
Cooperation.......................................141
Internal Moderation & Changing Boundaries.........148
Concluding Thoughts.....................................177
6. FREEDOM IS THE SOLUTION.......................................188
A Group Divided.........................................198
Society, Religion, and Popular Support for the Brothers.204
The Muslim Brotherhoods Civil State:
A Democratic Alternative................................210
Concluding Thoughts.....................................234
7. TOWARDS THE LIGHT: THE BROTHERHOOD AND
THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN EGYPT..............................236
APPENDIX
A. TRANSLATION OF TERMS..........................................257
BIBLIOGRAPHY........................................................259
IX


CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The most dangerous period in the life of a nation, and the most deserving of critical study, is the period of transition from one situation to another. It is then that plans for the new period are laid and its guiding principles and policies are drawn up, according to which, the nation will be formed and to which it will adhere.1
-Hasan al-Banna
Standing amidst the protestors in Egypts Tahrir Square on February 10, 2011 following an announcement that Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak would soon address the mass of demonstrators assembled there, a reporter asked Muhammad Abbas, a leader of the Muslim Brotherhoods youth wing, how he was feeling. Nothing is better than this. Nothing in all my life is better than this time, replied Abbas. I cant explain what I feel because its over my imagination. Abbas response illuminates what the mass of protestors, from all walks of life, must have been feeling at that moment. The announcement that Mubarak would finally address the crowds created a belief amongst the demonstrators that Mubarak was about to step down, that their demands would finally be met, that Egypt was taking the first steps on a long journey towards democracy. Yet, as Mubarak began his statement, it instantaneously became clear he had no intention of stepping down that day. As the president proceeded to elaborate on a plan to replace ministers within the
1 Hasan al-Banna, "Towards the Light, ikhwanweb.com, last modified June 13, 2007, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=802&ref=search.php.
1


government, the crowds reacted, holding up their shoes in disgust, as the initial excitement of the moment gave way to disillusionment and frustration at the stubbornness of the Egyptian leader.
For those gathered in the square since the January 25th Day of Rage protests set off a wave of demonstrations across the nation, Mubarak had to go. Protesting against the injustices of a thirty year old regime, the Egyptian people demanded more than mere lip-service to democracy; they desperately wanted a change. Immediately following Mubaraks announcement that he would continue in office, Abbas began to climb a pillar overlooking the masses, clutching a megaphone in one hand, clinging to the pillar with the other. Making his way from the pillar to the adjacent platform he spoke to the demonstrators, the army, and the regime. We dont want more traitors! he cried. In the name of the Revolutionary Youth Council we call upon you [the army] to engage in civil disobedience! As shouts of support echoed through the groups of protestors nearest his position Abbas continued, The army has to choose between the regime and the people! Pausing to catch his breath, Abbas extended his hand, placing it on the shoulder of a man at his side on the platform for balance as he doubled over. It appeared that the emotion of the moment was almost too much to bear. Yet, only a second later Abbas began to rally the crowds, chanting,
2


The army and the people, hand in hand! Within twenty-four hours Mubarak was gone.2
This glimpse into the street demonstrations that swept the whole of Egypt from January 25th until Mubarak stepped down on February 11, 2011 illustrates the monumental importance of this event. For those thousands of men, women, and children gathered in the square, these demonstrations finally gave the people a voice in Egyptian politics. Expressing their dissatisfaction with the regime, their halfhearted concessions, and the limited democracy they controlled, the public mounted such a significant challenge that the regime had no choice but to abdicate power initiating a period of transition. It is important to note that nowhere in the above story is there any reference to the Quran, to Allah, to Islam, or any other religious connotations. Politicized religion remained notably absent from the entire process. Even Abbas, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood made no mention of religion in addressing the crowds, which is indicative of its absence from the whole process.
The people, united in opposition to the regimes undemocratic practices, demanded they be allowed a political voice, the chance to vote, and the ability to participate in a democratic government.
" The Brothers, Frontline, PBS, February 22, 2011, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/revolution-in-cairo/
3


Yet, while the protests themselves may have not exhibited the Muslim Brotherhoods typical shouts and banners proclaiming Islam is the Solution, the role this group will play in the aftermath should not be underestimated. As the Brotherhoods founder Hasan al-Banna said, the period of transition is a dangerous one; a time when the future course of the nation will be determined. The Muslim Brotherhood, as the oldest Arab Islamic group and the strongest opposition force to the Mubarak government, now represents the most well-organized and practiced political group in Egypt. This position raises many important questions such as: In the upcoming transition to democracy what role will the Muslim Brotherhood play? Will the previous regimes rhetoric that they are a radical group finally be proven correct? Will the Brothers use democracy only one time to institute a theocratic regime in the vein of Saudi Arabia or Iran? Or, should the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood be seen as a force for democracy, a moderate organization that respects the will of the people and wants to be included in determining the future of the nation? These are all questions this study seeks to address. Yet, in order to answer these questions there is a need to delve further into the relationship between Islam and democracy as well as the history of the Muslim Brotherhood. This raises deeper, more fundamental questions about the compatibility of Islam and democracy and the role of moderate Islamic groups and the creation of democratic opposition under conditions of authoritarianism. Questions such as: Are Islam and democracy
4


compatible and if so, how? Can moderate Islamic groups be a force for democracy in the Arab world? Are the Brothers actually a moderate force and if so, does the history of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood provide any insight into how they will act without the opposition label? Therefore, the real question which must be asked is: Can the Muslim Brotherhood be seen as a force for democracy in Egypt both prior to, and in the aftermath of, the 2011 revolution on the Nile?
As the most well organized political group in Egypt, and with the recent formation of the Brotherhoods political wing, the Freedom and Justice Party, they will undoubtedly play a role in a new Egyptian government. The group is sure to gain seats in a new parliament, a parliament which will go on to write a new Egyptian constitution. The future of Egypt rests in the balance. Some politicians/policy makers perceive the presence of the Muslim Brotherhood as a threat to the security of the MENA region. They see the group as a supporter of terrorism and a harbinger of a radical Islamic theocracy bent on subjecting the world to extreme interpretations of Islamic sharia law. Understanding the group then, is a task of vital importance. Critically analyzing the extent to which the Muslim Brotherhood represents a moderate opposition force delves into the groups political philosophy, their history, and motivations. Thus, it can also help determine the commitment of the organization to democratic principles. In short, a critical analysis of the Egyptian
5


Muslim Brotherhood aids in establishing whether or not there is reason to fear their pursuit of political power.
Egyptian culture is steeped in religion to be sure. The Muslim Brotherhood, as a religious organization, claims to represent especially the religious sector of society. What will be interesting in the interim, between Mubaraks resignation and the formation of a new government, is the extent to which the Brotherhood clarify their political goals and exhibit their commitment to the will of the people as a whole, who, as the protests in early 2011 clearly illustrate, desire democracy. Looking into the history of the Muslim Brotherhood, assessing their historical development, and the extent to which they have embraced democratic norms while making them compatible with their goal of an Islamic state, provides a good indication of what to expect from the group in the future. This analysis also raises questions about the unity of the group as recent incidents suggest a split along generational and ideological lines. While previous policy debates have reared their head amongst Brotherhood members, the current divisions are apt to become more prominent as the formation of political parties and groups is far less constrained now than in the past. To reiterate al-Banna, the most dangerous period is that of transition. Transition not only for the nation, but for the Muslim Brotherhood as an organization as well. As both the state and the group move into uncharted territory, a critical examination of
6


the Muslim Brotherhoods past provides insight into developments that will surely affect the future.
This study is then extremely relevant in light of these recent developments. Prior scholarship addressed the history of the Muslim Brotherhood, in detail, while many studies proclaim that the Brothers represent a moderate Islamic group. This study seeks to further develop the idea that the Brotherhood represents a moderate Islamic group through the use of theoretical approaches developed by Jillian Schwedler and Alfred C. Stepan. Schwedlers test of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis in Yemen and Jordan provides a series of conditions by which one can ascertain the degree to which an Islamic group has moved toward a more moderate path. Her application of these conditions to groups in the Arab world allows for them to be easily applied to the case of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt through simple transference. Stepans theory of relational opposition, developed in response to the weakening of authoritarian regimes after the collapse of the Soviet Union then, provides a foundation on which to assess the strength of the Muslim Brotherhood as an opposition movement. Taken in tandem, these two theoretical bases exemplify how the Muslim Brotherhood emerged as the single most organized and respected moderate opposition group under the authoritarian regime of Hosni Mubarak. Building on this theoretical foundation the Brotherhood can be seen as creating a strong basis for the future development of democracy, all the while interpreting
7


democratic norms and practices through an Islamic lens. Thus, this study, unlike others which have come before it, seeks to explore the Muslim Brotherhood as a force for democracy and the implications this holds for the future of Egypt.
In looking at the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt on the potential for democracy in that particular state, there needs to be an emphasis on how the group developed as a moderate political force and internalized democratic principles. I argue that through this development they began espousing democratic principles and posed a challenge to the regime. Thus, they evolved into an opposition movement which sought to undermine the authoritarian regime by influencing the power relations in the country and providing a base for democratic participation. Necessarily then, there should be an emphasis on this process which a longitudinal approach provides. Since this study focuses on how past events have shaped the current situation, it needs to be contextualized and specified, hence, the historical method is appropriate. The method most suited to this investigation then is that of a historical process case study.
One of the reasons for selecting this methodology is to avoid the pitfalls of previous work on the compatibility of Islam and democracy. As Islam encompasses such a wide swath of the globe it is impossible to generalize about it as a whole as 3
3 These pitfalls, primarily those in the Orientalist tradition, will be discussed in detail in Chapter 1.
8


orientalist scholars have attempted to do. A significant problem with a large sample in qualitative research, as Mahoney points out, could be instability in the measurement of key variables across diverse contexts. Indeed, the very meaning of the units being analyzed... may change across temporal and spatial contexts, thereby generating heterogeneity and unstable estimates of causal effects.4 By limiting the scope of research, this study is able to focus on a specific group to fully contextualize the subjects environment rectifying the problem of instability. Also, a historical-descriptive case study allows for within-case analysis which can suggest other specific evidence that should be present if the hypothesis is correct.5 This proved to be especially true in this case as the research indicated that the Muslim Brotherhood would pursue a particular course of action when provided the chance to do so. These indications could then be compared to their actions following Mubaraks ouster and the opening of political space in Egypt. As Russell K. Shutt points out, the defining characteristic of historical qualitative research is the focus on the case as a whole -the context and all the intricacies that make up that case.6 In order to effectively
4 James Mahoney, Qualitative Methodology and Comparative Politics, Comparative Political Studies 40, no. 2 (2007): 129.
5 Ibid., 132.
6Russell K Schutt, Investigating the Social World: The process and Practice of Research, 6th ed. (California: Pine Forge Press, 2009), 428.
9


address the questions posed above, a case study appears to be the most effective method.
The first chapter of this study then aims to elucidate a clear definition of democracy which can be utilized throughout as a means of providing a conceptual foundation for further discussion. It is of the utmost importance that a clear definition of democracy is achieved in order to assess the compatibility of Islam and democracy, for without such a definition, no understanding could be reached. Definitions are all so varied and stipulate such a wide array of conditions it would be near impossible to explore the idea that Islam and democracy can be seen as compatible without an exact set of conditions which an Islamic polity must fulfill in order to be considered democratic. Thus, Chapter 1 not only focuses on defining democracy, but also explores the compatibility of the Islamic religion and the necessary conditions for a democracy to flourish based on our definition. In doing so the chapter moves through an analysis of orientalist approaches to Islam and the stipulation that secularism is a requisite condition for democracy to emerge and/or succeed. Finally this chapter examines the reasons many in the Islamic world call for democracy and some potential problems which need to be overcome in order for an Islamic democracy to take root.
Chapter 2 then turns to the history of the Muslim Brotherhood and the development of their ideological platform. As the oldest and most influential Arab
10


Islamic organization of the 20th century, the history of the Brotherhood is a lengthy one. Rather than attempt to present a detailed and exhaustive account of the organization, this chapter examines three instances, or moments, which played the most significant role in the development of the Brothers ideology. These moments provide insight into both the history and the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood by focusing on the specific circumstances of three pivotal points in the groups history: the founding, their imprisonment under Nasser, and the cycle of relaxation and repression initiated under Anwar Sadat and carried on by Hosni Mubarak.
In Chapters 3 and 4 the Muslim Brotherhood is examined as a moderate opposition force within Egypt. Drawing on the aforementioned theories of Schwedler and Stepan, these chapters seek to explore how the Brotherhood evolved into a moderate political opposition. Chapter 3, in continuing to look at the historical development of the Muslim Brotherhood does so with the aim of analyzing the Brotherhoods development into a significant opposition force particularly under Hosni Mubarak. During this time the Brotherhood sought to cement their stance as an Islamic political opposition group while mounting a sustained critique of the state and creating a viable democratic alternative to the Mubarak regime. Chapter 4 then examines the groups moderation to illustrate that, in many ways the Brothers can be seen as a force for democracy in Egypt, especially since the 1980s. Looking at how the organization has redefined the boundaries of what is acceptable within an Islamic
11


worldview illustrates the difference between the Muslim Brotherhood and more radical groups, while also providing an enlightening discussion of their commitment to democratic principles. Taken together, the groups moderation and ability to solidify their position as an opposition force created a significant democratic challenge to the Mubarak government.
Finally Chapter 5 focuses on the period after Mubarak relinquished power in 2011 providing with-in case evidence to support the proposition that the Muslim Brotherhood is indeed a force for democracy. This chapter explores: 1.) The extent to which the Brotherhood has continued to act as a moderate force in Egyptian politics; 2.) Their political performance in the absence of an opposition label; and 3.) Ongoing developments within the organization as the state continues on a path toward democracy. In looking at the wave of political developments that washed over Egypt after Mubarak left power, the statements of Muslim Brotherhood members, and the actions of the organization we are able to test the theory that the Muslim Brotherhood would remain a powerful advocate for democratic politics even in the absence of an authoritarian ruler and the opposition label. Finally, a concluding section will discuss the implications of this study and highlight important areas ripe for further research.
It is the sincere hope of the author that this writing helps to demonstrate that there is little reason to fear the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood as some scholars and policymakers do. Rather than perpetuating the view that they are a terrorist
12


organization which would seek to reinstate a medieval Caliphate and should therefore be excluded from any political discussion, this study sees the Muslim Brotherhood as a group the international community should engage in political discourse. While they have been connected with radical Islamic and violent extremist movements around the globe, these connections are tenuous at best. In reality the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is a moderate Islamic organization that has espoused a commitment to democracy for the past forty years, yet, they remain misunderstood. This paper seeks to discuss and clarify these misunderstandings, their opposition to terrorism, and their commitment to democracy. Especially today, in light of the recent events in Egypt and the Brotherhoods preeminence on the political scene, it is of the highest consequence that the Muslim Brotherhood is seen for what they are: a moderate Islamic organization that the international community will surely have to engage with in the years ahead.
13


CHAPTER 2
DEMOCRACY DEFINED
Definitions of democracy are almost as varied as the array of scholars who study the topic. This is particularly the case with regard to the compatibility of Islam and democracy. The lack of a clear definition hampers many studies in that it exposes them to criticism on the grounds that certain requisite conditions have not been sufficiently met in order to label a specific polity a democracy. Thus, defining what is meant by democracy is critical to any analysis of the subject. Doing so provides a foundation for the subsequent argument, focuses the discussion, and allows for a definitive judgment as to whether or not a specific polity meets the definitional standard.
Again, definitions are varied, so the theorist must choose between subscribing to a minimalist or maximalist definition. Minimalist definitions are just that they stick to the very basics, the minimal qualifications to be considered a democracy; whereas maximalist definitions take on a series of more explicit requirements that must be fulfilled if a particular polity is to be considered democratic. Robert A. Dahl in his 1971 work Polyarchy provides a seminal maximalist definition encompassing eight necessary institutional guarantees including: freedom to form and join organizations, freedom of expression, right to vote, eligibility for public office, right of political leaders to compete for both support and votes, alternative sources of
14


information, free and fair elections, and institutions that make governmental policies dependant on vote and preference.7 8 He posits that total and absolute responsiveness of the government to the people is the ideal by which democracies can be judged and, if they fulfill all of these conditions all of the time, they can be considered a democracy. Yet, he recognizes that few, if any, governments fulfill all these conditions at all times, proposing instead that most existing democracies are in fact polyarchies which can be judged according to a theoretical scale only as more or less democratic.
On the other hand, well known democratic scholar Seymour Martin Lipset, in a recent book coauthored with Jason M. Lakin, typifies the minimalist tradition defining democracy as: An institutional arrangement in which all adult individuals have the power to vote, through free and fair competitive elections, for their chief
g
executive and national legislature. By emphasizing the competitive nature of elections this definition implies there should be choices among different groups and individuals, without specifying how many, and that they should represent a large majority of the population, but not necessarily everyone. Therefore the key elements of this definition can be reduced to competitiveness or contestation and inclusiveness.
7 Robert A. Dahl. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New York: Yale University Press, 1971), 3.
8 Seymour Martin Lipset and Jason M. Lakin, The Democratic Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2004). 19.
15


It is here a tie to Dahl can be found in that both Lipset and Dahl emphasize the necessity of public contestation and the right of the citizenry to participate. For Dahl, if a society fulfills these two conditions it is considered a polyarchy judged according to his ideal scale. For Lipset however, the presence of these two key principles sufficiently addresses whether or not a polity can be considered a democracy. He acknowledges that this definition is lacking in defining or protecting certain political and civil rights but states a reason for this. The whole point of democracy is to leave outcomes...to the electoral process, thus rendering them uncertain, writes Lipset. Any system that predetermines these outcomes is not democratic.9 Thus, the specifics of how a democracy will appear are left to the constituents within each individual polity.
Lipset does recognize that operationalizing this definition is accompanied by numerous challenges, predominantly, how to determine if an election is competitive. He proposes three conditions that must be met in order for elections to be considered sufficiently competitive. First, there must be a chance the current power holder will lose. Secondly, there must be a minimum of two candidates or groups competing for power which could realistically achieve success. Finally, Lipset states that the current
9 Ibid., 23.
16


power holder and the loser would willingly relinquish their hold on power.10 Stepan and Robertson, seeking to identify whether or not competitiveness is present, add that competition can be identified if the elections are determined to be fair and if the elects of the people fill positions of power in its wake rather than a non-elected group.11 Again, we see the emphasis on competition between several power centers and the importance of the transference of power.
The seeming simplicity of Upsets definition, and the qualifications he places on it in regard to competitiveness, do however require some unpacking. By stipulating that all adults have the right to vote in competitive elections his definition implies that accountability and representation are also key facets of democracy. Competitive elections between more than one individual or group allow people to express their consent and/or disapproval of the power holders actions through a vote. Thus, with their vote they not only participate in the political process, but provide consent for the power holder and their policies, performance, and agenda. If the public becomes dissatisfied there is a mechanism, the vote, which allows for the peaceful removal of public support for an individual or group which must then relinquish their hold on power. It follows then that representation is a key component
10 Ibid., 22.
11 Alfred C. Stepan and Graeme B. Robertson, Arab, Not Muslim Exceptionalism, Journal of Democracy 15, no. 4 (2004): 141.
17


of democracy in that, by voting, people authorize an individual or group to represent them within a government or decision making body. At the same time, through voting, the people are able to hold them accountable for their actions by either consenting to their continued representation or casting a vote for someone else. Thus, as Urbinati and Warren write, Representation serves to unify and connect citizens, while also pulling them out of the immediate present and projecting them into future-oriented perspectives. ~ In other words, representation, while allowing citizens to express their consent and hold individuals accountable, posits a dialogue between what is and what ought to be based on the current performance of power holders and the challenges of competitors.12 13 When we vote, we do two things at once: We contribute to forming a government or opposition, and we seek representation of our positions and preferences.14
If all have the ability to participate in elections, as Lipsets definition states is required for democracy, everyone is involved in the process of formulating a representative body that will be responsive to the needs and demands of the people as long as competitive elections remain in place. This open definition of democracy avoids reducing democracy to a delineated set of institutions and characteristics while
12 Nadia Urbinati and Mark E. Warren, The Concept of Representation in Contemporary Democratic Theory, Annual Review of Political Science 11 (2008): 401.
13 Ibid.. 401-402.
14 Ibid.. 398.
18


at the same time structuring the autonomy of the individual citizen in creating a polity based on their notion of what ought to be.
The implications of this definition for this study are obvious. In assessing the compatibility of Islam and democracy, and the degree to which individuals, movements or groups advocate for both Islamization and democratization, Lipsets definition provides the minimal qualifications necessary that need be fulfilled in order to begin a discussion of how the two can be reconciled. With the foundation of Lipsets definition we can explore the ways in which Islamic groups, like the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, have found compatibility between Islam and democracy based on a broad definition more open to reinterpretation and invention. For the duration of this study then, the word democracy is understood with reference to Lipsets definition which emphasizes contestation and participation.
Islam and Democracy
He who says that democracy is disbelief, neither understands Islam, nor
democracy.15
-Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi
The topic of Islam and democracy has been the subject of a fierce debate in the academic community for the past quarter century with highly respected scholars taking positions either supporting their compatibility or entirely rejecting the idea that
15 Al-Qaradawi cited by Murad Hoffman. ''Democracy or Shuracracy. in John J. Donohue and John L. Esposito, eds., Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives, 2nd ed., (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 296.
19


the two can coexist. While this study is not an analysis of the compatibility of Islam and democracy, a brief discussion of the topic provides insight into how and why groups such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood would call for democracy and how they would reconcile those calls with their primary goal of an Islamic state based on sharia law.16 This discussion entails exploring three subsections of the debate. First, it is necessary to explore the perception of Islam as a monolithic civilization that is assessed as such rather than broken into its component parts. In assessing the possibility of an Islamic democracy an examination of one of the most commonly cited and enduring reasons for the perceived incompatibility between the two, secularism, allows this study to address the primary problems that arise from the assumption that secularism is a necessary condition for the successful functioning of a democracy. Finally, the primary challenges of reconciling Islam and democracy will be explored through an analysis of recent scholarship from both the academic and Islamic perspectives with a particular emphasis on the implementation of sharia law. This focus on sharia is necessary due to the implementation of Islamic law as a signifier of an Islamic state. A state without sharia is merely a state, whereas a state based in the sharia is considered a true Islamic state. Thus, the implementation of sharia represents the primary goal of the vast majority of Islamic movements,
16 I have chosen to spell sharia in this way as this is how the Muslim Brotherhood chooses to spell it in the English language. At several points throughout this study it appears in different spellings within quotations so as to preserve the authenticity of the initial statement.
20


including the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. In order to find areas of compatibility between democracy and Islam, sharia law must be able to ensure both competition and inclusion which, as Lipset stipulated, are necessary for democracy.
A Monolithic Civilization
There has been much debate over the compatibility of Islam and democracy, particularly after the third wave of democratization failed to significantly impact the Middle East.17 18 Many scholars have preferred to place the blame for this lack of democratic development squarely on the shoulders of an Islamic civilizational entity rather than examine particular cases in their specific contexts. Edward Saids influential Orientalism published in 1978 brought to light many of the biases in Western theoretical work. Still, some scholars, referred to as orientalists, continued to advocate the complete incompatibility and the irreconcilable divide that separates Islam and democracy. Yet, there have also been those that advocate for the later contextual approach and have pushed back against this orientalist position. These two viewpoints, and the groups of scholars which subscribe to them, can be categorized as the proponents of orientalism and the dissenters which dispute these orientalist claims.
17 Third wave of democratization is a concept propagated by Samuel Huntington arguing that democracy has experienced three waves, the last of which began around 1974 and continued through the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
18 Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon, 1978).
21


Proponents take the view that Islam, with its belief that religion should permeate every aspect of life and society, can never be reconciled with liberal democracy. Volpi defines orientalism as an approach to Islam that tries to build a comprehensive and systematic picture of an Islamic civilization, with its own logic and system of values and roots this tradition firmly in the positivist social sciences which attempts to discern the object of Islam for systematic study. 19 The most well known advocates of this view are those like Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington who assess all of Islam as one entity without breaking it into individual parts or taking countries, rather than a civilization, as the unit of analysis.20 21 Alfred Stepan summarizes their view writing:
The lack of separation between religion and state is seen as stemming from the Prophet Mohammeds fusion of military and spiritual authority. The lack of space for democratic public opinion in making laws is seen as deriving from the Quran, in which God dictated to the Prophet Mohammed the content of fixed laws that a good Islamic polity must follow. The lack of inclusive citizenship is seen as originating in interpretations of the Quran that argue that the only true polity in Islam is the fused religious-political community of the Ummah, in which there is no legitimate space for other religions.'1
19 Frederic Volpi, Political Islam in the Mediterranean: the view from democratization studies, Democratization 16, no. 1 (2009): 22.
20 See Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong?: The Clash between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East (New York: Perennial, 2002) and Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995).
21 Alfred C. Stepan. Religion, Democracy, and the Twin Tolerations. Journal of Democracy 11, no.
4 (2000): 48.
22


Other scholars, such as Patricia Crone and Daniel Pipes are all soundly criticized as
neo-orientalists by Yahya Sadowski on the basis of essentialist assumptions that reduce a complex, diverse, and widespread religion to a set of essential characteristics which are seen as matter-of-factly inhospitable to the idea or principles of democracy." A debate over civil society in the late 1980s and early 90s typified their constantly changing approach in the eyes of Sadowski. Initially the Islamic world did not allow a flourishing civil society, seen as a prerequisite for the emergence of democratic tradition claimed the orientalists, yet when academics began to study the strength of Islamic civil society, the argument became that it was too powerful to allow democracy to emerge.22 23
The dissenters on the other hand point out that the orientalist view stems from two faulty assumptions. First, that Muslims around the world share a common, relatively homogonous body of doctrine on a wide array of religious, social, and political matters.24 Secondly, that this doctrine is the sole, or at least the most prominent, factor in shaping Muslim behavior and perception. Most of the earlier
22 See Patricia Crone. Slaves on Horses: The Evolution of the Islamic Polity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980) and Daniel Pipes, Slave Soldiers and Islam: The Genesis of a Military System (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1981).
23 For a comprehensive discussion of this particular debate see: Yahya Sadowski, "The New Orientalism and the Democracy Debate. Middle East Report no. 183 (1993).
24 Yahya Sadowski, Political Islam: Asking the Wrong Questions, Annual Review of Political Science 9 (2006): 216.
23


works from orientalist scholars have these assumptions in common. As more recent works have built upon these foundational texts they symptomatically suffer from the same flawed assumptions. Sadowski, to combat these basic assumptions, points to the divide between Sunni and Shia Muslims, differing national versions of Islam, as well as differences between classes and urban and rural populations in their specific interpretations of the faith.25 Esposito and Voll also point to the variation that exists between specific groups which have vastly different interpretations of Islam along both religious and academic lines. There is much disagreement and debate and the lines of argument parallel the lines of intellectual conflict elsewhere, they write.
They go on to point out that these lines indicate more of a dialogue than a single ideology.26 Voll, in a separate writing, pushes back against the idea that Islam, as a religion, can be viewed as a civilization. Drawing on Wallersteins world systems theory he systematically illustrates through an examination of the history of Islam why it does not fit within Wallersteins interpretation. Islam, proposes Voll, should be characterized instead as an intercivilizational entity, or what he goes on to define as a community of discourse, linked together by common terminology and
* Ibid., 218.
'6 John L. Esposito and John O. Voll. "Islam and the West: Muslim Voices of Dialogue, Millennium -Journal of International Studies 29, no. 3 (2000): 613-614.
24


reference points possessing boundaries, structures, coherence and rules of legitimation.27 28
Alfred C. Stepan in turn puts forth a very convincing argument regarding the compatibility of Islam and democracy. Pointing out that there is a global population of around one billion Muslims, 435 million of which currently reside in democratic states he warns we should beware of assuming that any religions doctrine is univocally prodemocratic or antidemocratic." Stepan posits that there is a notable reliance on a unique set of conditions, such as those present when electoral democracy first arose, to predict whether or not democracy can emerge in a given polity. These unique founding conditions can be recreated or reformulated, he argues, based on the cultural resources available to a given society. Therefore, Islam may give rise to a version of democracy that satisfies the basic conditions of Lipsets definition while it may appear far different from the typical Western liberal conception. Stepan then addresses the issue of secularism stating that one of the major tasks of political and spiritual leaders who wish to revalue democratic norms in their own religious community will be to advance theologically convincing public
27 John O. Voll, Islam as a Special World-System, Journal of World History 5, no.2 (1994): 217-220.
28Alfred C. Stepan. Arguing Comparative Politics (New York: Oxford University Press. 2001), 236. Quote from Stepan. "Religion, Democracy, and the Twin Tolerations. 44.
25


arguments about the legitimate multivocality of their religion.29 In other words, religious leaders that seek to implement a democratic system will need to put forth arguments that express the compatibility between theological doctrine and the principles of democracy. As we will see (in Chapter 4), this is precisely what the leadership of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has attempted to do with Islamic concepts and democratic principles.
This thesis takes the contextual approach of the dissenters in addressing the compatibility of Islam and democracy. Recent scholarship, from both western and Muslim religious scholars, has argued that there are many principles within Islam which can be interpreted as supportive of democracy. While this is no doubt true, it is also the case that these interpretations vary across the Muslim world and, as a result, there can be no single model of Islamic democracy, just as there is no lone model of western democracy. An Islamic democracy would not be a copy of the Westminster one, since the Arab-Islamic world knows its own unique forms of pluralism, confederation, civil society, and distribution of power..., writes, Murad Hofman. After all, even in the West, Westminster only exists in Westminster.30 Each society or culture would draw on their own specific cultural traditions and resources, their
29 Stepan, Religion, Democracy, and the Twin Tolerations, 45.
20 Murad Hoffman, Democracy or Shuracracy, in Donohue and Esposito, eds., Islam in Transition, 302.
26


own interpretations, when crafting a democratic system. Thus, there would be a significant amount of variation across the Muslim world, just as there is in the West. What is important then, is to note that certain stipulations, such as secularism laid down in the Western liberal tradition, may not be necessary in the Muslim world. In fact, drawing from their cultural heritage, individual Islamic polities may give rise to versions of democracy that not only challenge western conceptions but advance democratic theory.
Removing the Veil: Secularism and Islamic Democracy One truth which the orientalist argument correctly identifies and makes abundantly clear is that there is no possible way to separate the spheres of religion and politics in Islam. This impossibility stems from the Prophet Mohammeds fusion of the military and religion, often cited as the primary reason that Islam and democracy are not compatible. Muslims and scholars alike make the argument that Islam represents a complete system, a total way of life, therefore, the separation of religion and politics is an absolute impossibility. How then does one reconcile secular democracy and Islam? As this section will illustrate, Islam proves to be anything but lacking in democratic principles. These principles allow for considerable overlap between Islam and democracy. Yet, as Stepan notes above, an attempted reconciliation will prove to be fruitless if it begins from the false assumption that democracy must be secular. The following discussion highlights the
27


significant contributions of the debate over the necessity of secularism to democracy and emerging theories which attempt to remove the veil of secularism from democratic theory and account for the obvious influence of religion on politics.
Daniel Philpott points out that the word secular is used in a myriad number of different ways. The term is notoriously shifty, sometimes used descriptively, sometimes predictively, sometimes prescriptively, sometimes ideologically, sometimes implying hostility to religion, sometimes carrying a neutral or positive connotation.31 32 He goes on to distinguish nine separate conceptualizations of the term, two of which are of particular consequence to this analysis. The first is the conception which has come to be taken as a major requisite of democracy, one that promotes the differentiation between spheres of society, yet does not see religions influence as on the decline. The second conceptualization, which he finds throughout political theory, is of the secular as a differentiation between spheres of society and religion that insinuates a progressive decline of the influence of religion on these societal spheres. This idea of the secular and its philosophical implications leads to the notion that as society progresses, the influence of religion on politics will remain in a state of decline. Religions influence will continue to wane as religion
31 Daniel Philpot, Has the Study of Global Politics Found Religion? Annual Review of Political Science 12 (2009): 185.
32 Ibid., 190-191.
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declines overall within society or because of its suppression and continued separation from the realm of politics by political powers. Philpott proposes that historical events, beginning with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and including the development of the state system in the West which subordinated religion under the ruler, the Enlightenment, and the rise of nationalism, all helped to promote the idea that religions influence was on the decline. This idea gained support and grew in influence as the world witnessed the French revolution, reaching its high point, as Timothy Samuel Shah argues, from the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 until the Six Day War between Israel and Egypt in 1967.33 As theorists are influenced by the context in which their theories are produced, the vast majority of political theory which emerged throughout this period came to reflect this conception of the secular.
During this time even the Arab world adopted the idea that secular governments, modeled on Western institutions, should control the state. Egypt under Nasser from the 1950s into the 1970s was a highly secularized society based on nationalism and Arab unity rather than any overarching Islamic identity. Yet, by 1967, the world began to witness the global resurgence of religion. The Six Day War with Israel had a profound effect on the Arab world, greatly diminishing the hope and prestige of secular nationalists like Nasser in Egypt while encouraging a resurgence of Islam in a more overtly political form. As political Islam began its rise, the globe
33 Ibid., 189.
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witnessed the reemergence of religion as an influential aspect of political decision making processes for both individuals and organizations. The Second Vatican Council (1962-65) brought forth a more politically active Catholic agenda. The United States saw the Christian Right emerge as a major political force, while Hindus in India and Buddhists across South and East Asia all began taking a more active role in politics.34 As the above events make abundantly clear, religion played and continues to fill a crucial role in society and therefore both national and international politics. Political theory which ignores the role of religion, or continues to promote the idea that modernity is somehow connected to the diminishing influence of religion, neglects a significant factor which indeed shapes human and institutional action.
Philpotts discussion does two things: 1) It explains why orientalist thought had such a strong foundation initially and gave rise to the faulty assumptions which undergird recent scholarship and the incompatibility of Islam and democracy; and 2) Illustrates that with the resurgence of religion there is a need to craft a new understanding of the role of religion on politics. This second contribution is particularly important in attempting to reconcile Islam and democracy. The acknowledgement that there needs to be a reassessment of secular thought has led to a slew of new theories that seek to explore the distinctiveness of each religion. In
34 Ibid., 190-191.
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viewing each religion as distinct, with its own array of cultural resources and traditions, there can be a reassessment of the necessity of secularism for democracy to flourish in religious societies. While it may appear very different from the Western liberal/secular model, democracy then can be seen as compatible with Islam as long as it fulfills our definitional characteristics. As Volpi points out it has become conceptually hazardous to equate democratization with secularization and westernization.35
Overcoming the Challenges
Volpis warning resonates throughout the Muslim world. Some leaders of Islamic movements have spoken out against Western-style democracy and a parliamentary system of government, write Esposito and Piscatori. Their negative reaction has often been part of the general rejection of European colonial influence, a defense of Islam against further dependence on the West rather than a wholesale rejection of democracy.36 Liberated from the Western idea that in order to achieve democracy you must first have a secular state, Muslims are granted the space to maneuver, to reconceptualize democracy in line with their specific cultural traditions.
35 Volpi, Political Islam in the Mediterranean, 32.
36 John L. Esposito and James Piscatori, "Democratization and Islam. Middle East Journal 45, no. 3 (1991): 434.
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One way to examine how Islam and democracy are specifically compatible is to move into what Frederic Volpi calls the grey areas of democracy in which there is a partial convergence of Islamist and liberal-democratic political agendas. These areas reflect upon the alternative political realities that Islamist movements are constructing, both ideologically and socially, and allow a specifically tailored version of democracy to emerge in each particular polity.' The usefulness of Lipsets definition of democracy is again evident in the fact that he does not delineate necessary institutions but rather the main criteria for establishing a democratic polity. Thus, each polity retains the ability to adapt democracy to societal, cultural, and political specifications.
These constructions then are framed by different staring points and basic assumptions such as those about religious law and the purpose of a state. Bruce K. Rutherford clearly points this out by comparing the view of the state in Western Liberal thought to Islamic conceptualizations. In the Western tradition the state is perceived as maintaining control over a vast amount of resources with the potential to very easily intrude upon individual rights so it must be constrained. In Islamic thought the state is a positive institution that acts in the best interest of the umma (community) through the principles of sharia thus bringing the community together and strengthening its morality, resolving disputes, and both preserving and spreading 37
37 Volpi, Political Islam in the Mediterranean 31-32.
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the faith. One of the preeminent modern Islamic scholars, Abu-L-Ala Mawdudi posits that the Islamic state is positive rather than negative in that the goal of the state is not only the prevention of exploitation but of evolving and developing that well-
TO
balanced system of justice which has been set forth by God... The relationship between the individual and the state then is one of cooperation, whereby both individuals and the state work together to develop pious citizens who ensure that the state continues to effectively direct society according to the tenets of Islam. Thus, as Rutherford writes, ... the metaphor for Islamic constitutionalism is a carefully-maintained path that directs state power toward the transformation of individual Muslims and the creation of a more pious community.38 39 40
Scholars, academic and Islamic both, point to several concepts within Islam that exemplify the compatibility of democracy and religion. First there is tawhid (Unity of God; no God but God) which illustrates the supremacy of God over all, yet also provides for equality before God. This concept provides the basis for Islamic governance which as such is the complete opposite of a secular democracy. In fact Mawdudi posits that as this is the basis of government, an Islamic state would be
38 Abu-L-Ala Mawdudi, Political Theory of Islam, in Donohue and Esposito, eds., Islam in Transition, 266.
39 Bruce K. Rutherford, What Do Egypts Islamists Want? Moderate Islam and the Rise of Islamic Constitutionalism, Middle East Journal 60, no. 4 (2006): 729-730.
40 Ibid., 729.
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described in English as a theocracy. He goes on to point out that The theocracy built up by Islam is not ruled by any particular religious class but by the whole community of Muslims.. .the entire Muslim population runs the state in accordance with the Book.. ,41 Gods absolute sovereignty therefore makes all humans equal before God and creates a barrier to the development of a hierarchical system of governance. Thus, tawhid provides the conceptual and theological foundation for an active emphasis on equality within the political system.42
Khilafah (Caliphate) refers to Islamic history in that the leader of the Muslim community was called the caliph and the system of government the caliphate.43 In the second half of the twentieth century the emphasis for the meaning of this term shifted from that of denoting a successor to mean a representative. Some sections of the Quran identify people as Gods representatives on this earth. The emphasis on representation leads to the logical conclusion that Gods authority of the caliphate is granted to the community as a whole. Again turning to Mawdudi, he stresses the interpretation of the term as viceregency rather than sovereignty. God is the only sovereign, he argues, and it was God that promised the power to rule over the earth... to the whole community of believers. Therefore, there can be no class
41 Mawdudi in John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, Islam and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 23-24.
42 Esposito and Voll. Islam and Democracy, 25.
43 Ibid.,, 23-24.
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divisions or privilege based on status gained through race, birth, or profession nor is there room for a dictator as his authority has been bestowed upon him by his fellow caliphs. Mawdudi also points out that there is no particular privilege granted to people on the basis of sex which also speaks to the equality of rights across genders.44 Again, this interpretation of the Quran promotes the idea of equality amongst people and that all are endowed with the authority to actively participate in governing themselves.45
Minorities are addressed by the commonly referenced Sura 256 in the Quran which states, There shall be no compulsion in Religion.46 This is typically taken to mean that freedom of religion is a direct command from God and thus must be incorporated into any Islamic government. A major justification for allowing the freedom of religion is again presented by Mawdudi who posits that in Islam everyone will answer to God. Hence, all people are free to choose and follow their own path. The leader of an Islamic state, argues Mawdudi, must not interfere with an individuals selection or he himself will be punished by God for this tyranny.47 Yet
44 Abu-L-Ala' Mawdudi, Political Theory of Islam, in Donohue and Esposito, eds., Islam in Transition, 268-270.
45 Ibid., 25-26.
46 As cited in Stepan. "Religion, Democracy, and the Twin Tolerations, 48.
47 Abu-L-Ala Mawdudi, Political Theory of Islam, in Donohue and Esposito, eds., Islam in Transition, 270.
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the most frequently cited terms are the Quranic concepts of shura (consultation), ijma (consensus), and ijtihad (interpretation or reasoning). Some thinkers go so far as to argue that because these principles are the same as those espoused by democracy, Islam is therefore inherently democratic.
The concept of ijtihad holds particular relevance in light of tawhid in that, though Gods laws are supreme over all there are instances where interpretation is allowed, even called for. The need for interpretation is clearly evident in situations where sharia gives a general tenant for behavior but does not address the complexity of todays world. Many Islamic scholars have made the argument that in order to effectively address social evolution, the understanding of sharia also needs to evolve. Fathi Osman, an Egyptian born scholar, nicely summarizes this belief writing, The Quran and Sunna provide the general laws, but the human mind is entrusted with the details and specifics for coping with the unceasing changes in human society. Incorporating the concept of shura (consultation), he continues saying, Human beings know what may be beneficial and fair for a given time and place, and the more people involved in such collective thinking and discretion, the fewer mistakes made.48 Ijtihad then is one mechanism by which sharia can be made applicable to all aspects of life even in situations and societies which are far different than those at
48 Fathi Osman, "Shura and Democracy." in Donohue and Esposito, eds., Islam in Transition, 290.
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the time of sharias conception. Altaf Gauhar, addressing the importance of ijtihad writes, The faith is fresh, it is the Muslim mind which is befogged. The principles of Islam are dynamic, it is our approach which has become static. Let there be a fundamental rethinking to open avenues of exploration, innovation, and creativity.49 Rutherford surveyed the writings of four prominent and influential Egyptian constitutionalist thinkers (Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Tariq al-Bishri, Kamal Abu al-Majd, and Muhammed Salim al-Awwa) in his 2006 analysis that attempts to discern what concepts Islamists see as necessary to an Islamic government. His research concluded that these thinkers all stress that shura is the guiding principle of Islamic governance, and believe that the Quran instructs both leaders, and the people, to consult on issues that are important to the community, particularly whenever the Quran and Sunna are unclear.50 Sharia Law
Sharia is often pointed to as the most significant challenge to Islamic democracy. Sharia is divine law, given to the people from God, and thus representative of his will. Esposito and Mogahed define sharia as an Islamic system
49 Altaf Gauhar in Esposito and Voll, Islam and Democracy, 29.
^ Rutherford, What Do Egypts Islamists Want?" 713.
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of principles that covers all facets of life.51 Ibrahim el-Houdaiby, former member of the Muslim Brotherhood and great grandson of the former murshid (Supreme Guide), writes:
Shariah literally means the way. In an Islamic context, it means the authentic, orthodox Islamic way of living, which is based on the teaching of the Quran and the Sunnah. This way of life does not merely mean laws and regulation adopted and implemented by state institutions, but rather a comprehensive way of life.52 *
As such sharia presents a conflict between the legitimacy and authority of God and that of human beings in the area of representative government and the passing of law.33 Yet, even divine law requires direction by human intervention to address modern issues, so the question arises, how can an Islamist party direct sharia law under a democratic system?
One needs to keep in mind that Islam is beginning from a different place than did the West. Thus the cultural reference points will not always be the same but there is some correlation. Rutherford points out that an Islamic state is not only defined by, but also restricted by law, applied to both the power holder and the citizenry, law which citizens have a role in creating. The sharia is a fundamental constraint on
M John L. Esposito and Dalia Mogahed. Who Will Speak for Islam, World Policy Journal (2008):
48.
52 Ibrahim el-Houdaiby. Applying Shariah, ikhwanweb.com, last modified 2007, http://ikhwanweb.com/print.php?id=14143.
1,3 Husain Haqqani and Hillel Fradkin, "Going Back to the Origins, Journal of Democracy 19, no. 3 (2008): 16.
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state power, which Abu al-Majd argues plays the same role in Islamic legal thought that natural law plays in the American constitutional tradition. It defines the puiposes of state power and delineates it boundaries.54 Thus sharia is seen as a positive thing, not as a barrier to democracy, rather a guarantee that the state clearly follows a set of goals and provides an environment for the people conducive to living out their faith. El-Houdaiby echoes this statement writing, The states role in some cases is merely to present a healthy atmosphere.. .the state should be responsible for creating a fear-free atmosphere; one in which different ideas could be propagated not banned.55 If the state does not meet these conditions, sharia provides the justification for changing power holders, placing the ultimate power with the people by granting them the right to dissent and remove a corrupt ruler from power, though it does not stipulate a mechanism through which to do so.56
Esposito and Mogahed, reporting on six years of data, including over 50,000 interviews, gathered by the Gallup Organization in the Muslim world find that support for sharia law is strong, but also that there are variations in how people want it to be implemented. Some advocate only for laws that stem from and do not violate sharia, others wish simply to pay homage to it as a significant source of Islamic
54 Rutherford, What Do Egypts Islamists Want? 712.
55 el-Houdaiby, Applying Shariah.
?6 See also Sadowski, "Political Islam, 229.
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values, while some even proposed it should be combined with Western law. Again, this illustrates how heterogeneous the Islamic community is, but also depicts how strong an influence religion has on politics for a large majority of the population. Minorities advocated for a theocratic system, but democracy and rights such as freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and freedom of assembly overwhelmingly drew the most support as people proposed that they need not choose between Islam and democracy. Rather, people proposed Muslims could invent them anew, as coexistent elements of an Islamic political system with sharia as a source of law, but not the only one.57
How are these views of an Islamic democracy consistent with el-Houdaibys definition given earlier of sharia as a comprehensive way of life? He answers this question himself by examining how sharia is broken down into three branches,
Akhlaq (ethics), ebadat (rituals), and mo'amalat (transactions). He goes on to state, Ethics and rituals have nothing to do with regulations and political activity, and have nothing to do with the state. He explains these are religious branches which a government cannot implement but rather are regulated by personal choice. Houdaiby points out that an individual may do what he or she pleases as long as it does not harm society and therefore politics should not be involved. In regard to transactions, he sees it as the states responsibility, as presented in sharia law, to uphold an ethical
57 Esposito and Mogahed, Who Will Speak for Islam,- 52 and 54.
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economic system that prohibits monopolies, enforces the zakat (a donation to the poor), and is part of the larger development of a moral and just society. Finally, he uses the influential scholar Qaradawis argument that there are seven pillars of Islam as discerned from sharia. El-Houdaiby then proposes that the state should have a role in four of the seven: human rights, justice for women, building a cooperative world, and the creation of an ethical nation. He believes the state could also play a role in developing the Muslim family, yet it should be substantially smaller than in the first four spheres, while the states impact, if it has any at all, should be the most minimal
CO
in what he deems the primarily preachable and religious spheres.
Other interpretations of sharia focus more on the primary principle of sharia as
being to establish that which is good. Proponents of this view posit that the primary
goal of sharia is to establish justice, or that which is good, above all else. In order to
do so sharia is seen as capable of integrating non-Islamic elements in order to
promote justice and equality among the people. In doing so sharia is then made
compatible with democracy including plural politics and the various human freedoms
the Gallup survey indicated the Muslim world supports. As Ibn Qayim Al-Jawziyah,
one of the main advocates of this view writes:
Some Scholars categorise government into shariah (law) and siyasah (politics) in the same manner as they categorise deen (religion) into shariah
^ el-Houdaiby, Applying Shariah.
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and haqiqah (reality)...but all these categorizations are wrong. Politics, reality, methodology, and reasoning are all categorized into two classes: right and wrong. Shariah accepts and supports all that which is right and opposes and rejects that which is bad or corrupt.59
Sharia then, is a system of law that regulates the conduct of the state and individuals. Through ijtihad, ijma, and shura it can be interpreted and applied based on a collective understanding and consultative decision making process. It prescribes rules for both state and individual conduct but also offers freedoms and protections to individuals from encroachment on personal matters by the state. As el-Houdaiby points out, if matters of religion are removed from the purview of the state, people are free to pursue their own faith, yet are still guaranteed a right to take part in the decision making process in matters that relate to the good of the whole community.
In order to effectively implement sharia though, there is still the need for a state. The next section will address the reason that many Islamists see democracy as the best type of state available to accomplish the implementation of sharia.
Why Democracy?
The Gallup data utilized by Esposito and Mogahed revealed that the vast majority of Muslims want certain freedoms, such as freedom of speech and of the press, that they believe in democracy, and admire the western democratic system. It also revealed that the majority do not believe that democracy and religion must be
5<) As cited by Muhammad Salim Al-Awa, "Political Pluralism From an Islamic Perspective, in Donohue and Esposito, eds., Islam in Transition, 284.
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entirely segregated. For Muslims, greater democratization does not mean secularization... but a synthesis of greater freedoms and the recognition of religious values, wrote Esposito and Mogahed.60 The separation of politics from religion runs contrary to most Islamic thought as politics are connected to issues within the world and it is the duty of a devout Muslim to be an active participant in resolving the issues faced today through a reliance on their faith. Dr. Ahmad al-Malt, a former deputy to the murshid of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt points out politics is a part of Islam, because Islam is concerned with this world and the hereafter. Worldly issues must be addressed as a religious duty.61 Thus to participate in politics is to participate in a system of governance that should produce the most effective form of an Islamic society.
Yet, as Muhammed Salim Al-Awa, a specialist in comparative and Islamic law, points out, at no point in either the Quran or the Sunnah is a system of government prescribed. Hence, Lipsets definition of democracy, along with the ambiguity of the Islamic religious texts on this issue, allow for the invention of new forms of government that can still fulfill the basic conditions of democracy. Al-Awa acknowledges however, that the Islamic texts do in fact stipulate several conditions
60 Esposito and Mogahed, Who Will Speak for Islam, 51-54.
61 Sana Abed-Kotob. The Accomodationists Speak: Goals and Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, International Journal of Middle East Studies 27, no. 3 (1995): 332.
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which must be met in an Islamic state. First, that the community is afforded the opportunity to choose a ruler. Second, that as freedom to choose is one of the fundamental values of Islam, political freedom is therefore simply a branch of this encompassing principle. Finally, three additional principles, equality before the law, enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong, and the accountability of rulers as established by the actions of the Prophet, make up the remaining foundational constraints for a state as prescribed by the Holy Texts.62
Al-Qaradawi saw democracy as the best form of government for pursuing the goals of an Islamic state, yet qualified his belief by proposing that Islam should adopt only the best policies and practices of democracy and adapt them to Islamic principles.63 Fattah and Butterfield see Islamic modernists as advocating for democracy and democratic institutions because they are an efficient means of fulfilling the requirement of shura in Islamic polities. 64 The concept of shura or consultation is necessary for Muslims as it is an edict in the Quran. Rulers must consult with the governed in order for any state to be truly Islamic. Thus, democratic institutions allow for this consultation, as well as for ijma (consensus) in the decision
62 Muhammed Salim Al-Awa, Political Pluralism from an Islamic Perspective, in Donohue and Esposito, eds., Islam in Transition, 283-284.
63 Rutherford, What Do Egypts Islamists Want? 716.
64 Moataz A. Fattah and Jim Butterfield, Muslim Cultural Entrepreneurs and the Democracy Debate, Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies 15. no. 1 (2006): 65.
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making process and in legitimating a power holder. The democratic system has mechanisms in place, such as voting, and decision making bodies such as parliaments, that ensure consultation is carried out and a consensus reached before a law is enacted. The people, through voting for representatives (as discussed earlier), authorize them to speak on their behalf and in doing so also participate in the process of shura fulfilling their duty as khilafah. The vote also ensures that the leader is responsive to the people as they have the ability to withdraw their support, thus ending the leaders hold on legitimate authority and providing a mechanism for the people to reject a ruler that has strayed from the path of Islam.
Esposito and Voll also point out that in the time since colonialism the vast majority of Muslim states have incurred a reign of authoritarian dictators. These dictators came to power under the auspices of nationalism and secularism promising great changes and benefits to the population. After a significant period of time, as these promised benefits continuously failed to appear, the population began to feel disenchanted with the secular, authoritarian style. Hence, authoritarian regimes have been associated with the secular, nationalist past and a failure to develop. Opposition groups, primarily of an Islamist tinge, thus began to advocate for increases in democracy as a way to challenge the authoritarian regimes and demand a return to Islam, seen as a remedy for the ills of following the secular nationalist course. The more Islamic democratization becomes it loses its secular dimensions as it becomes
45


a popular, and more truly democratic movement, write Esposito and Voll. In this way the pressures for democratization in the Islamic world reinforce and give added strength to the Islamic resurgence.65 Democratization then, in this sense, represents a path to a more religious and less secular state as a reaction to the failure of Western backed secular and typically authoritarian governments.
Where Do We Go From Here?
Even in light of the above discussion there are several questions that immediately spring to mind when discussing the possibility of an Islamic democracy. Most deal specifically with the potential actions of an Islamic government. Yet, that is precisely what they are potential actions. Even in the West there is no guarantee that parties which assume power will carry out their initial promises or that their actions will not vary greatly from their rhetoric. Haqqani and Fradkin point to the historical legacy of Islamist thought as a burden to future revision as there is a strong history and dependence on tradition which permeates Islam as a religion. They go on to pose many popular questions regarding Islamist groups commitment to democratic principles pointing out that, while the above does represent a revision of Islamic thought, most of this revision has taken place under the constrained conditions of authoritarian regimes. They therefore question whether or not it can be taken at face
65 Esposito and Voll, Islam and Democracy, 16.
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value or is merely a form of posturing to ensure their continued survival under conditions of repression.66 While we cannot sufficiently assuage all fears in regard to the actions of Islamic governments we can do two things.
First, we can critically examine the argument or position of Islamic groups.
As we have seen, the removal of secularism as a precondition for democracy encouraged the growth of new political theories by both Islamists and academics. Islamists, eager to highlight the Islamic traditions that are essentially democratic or which can be seen as hospitable to democratic institutions, have produced an astounding amount of writing on the compatibility of democracy and Islam. Each of these writings offers a unique perspective on areas of compatibility, proposals for how a state could be organized, and/or the combination of sharia and democratic law. These writings provide valuable models by which to assess a groups commitment to democratic principles in whether or not their conception echoes that of these other scholars or builds upon previous models. Thus, the scholars provide a discussion of areas to look at when analyzing an Islamic group and their proposed path forward. While Islamic writings, especially in case studies of distinct groups, are highly important, so are the new theories. These theories provide a theoretical foundation upon which a study of an Islamic group or groups can be constructed. Using the methods proposed in previous theoretical work the strength of an Islamic groups
66 Haqqani and Fradkin, "Going Back to the Origins, 16.
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commitment to democratic principles can be empirically tested based on established conditions that have been utilized in other areas of research or in assessing other groups. Thus stronger conclusions can be drawn based on previous experience.
Secondly, we can examine the historical record of Islamic groups participation in elections to get a sense of how these groups have fared in elections or once they obtained power. Alfred C. Stepan provides a convincing rebuttal to the popular one vote, one time or free-election trap accusation leveled by many intellectuals critical of Islamist participation in democracy, Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington in particular. He finds that the 1996 election in Bangladesh yielded only three seats for the Islamic Party. Five elections in Pakistan saw the most popular Islamist party, the IJI, initially succeed but then relinquish power, retaining only two seats by 1997. S.V.R Nasr concludes that the open nature of elections in Pakistan encourages the flowering of diversity of Muslim political expression and prevents the reduction of the political discourse to revivalism versus secularism.67 In the case of Turkey, after an Islamist Prime Minister came to power in 1996 and was accused of violating Turkeys secular constitution, he resigned. In examining cases in Bangladesh, Turkey, and Pakistan, Stepan is able to refute the one vote, one time hypothesis writing, ...Huntingtons implication that elections in
bl Nasr in Stepan, "Religion, Democracy, and the Twin Tolerations, 5 I.
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T
predominantly Islamic countries will lead to fundamentalist majorities who will use their electoral freedom to end democracy gets no support from our analysis of electoral and political behavior in the worlds three largest Islamic countries.68 Here, Stepan provides just one illuminating example of how utilizing the historical record can in fact overturn some of the major challenges put to the idea of an Islamic democracy.
The challenge in attempting to accomplish these two tasks is one of selection. While the Muslim world is rife with possibilities for exploring Islamic groups compatibility with democracy, attempting to do so on a wide scale does not allow for the attention to detail or context that is necessary for a complete and thorough analysis. Thus, this study will attempt to analyze one particular group, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, due to their notoriety on the international level. They are well recognized as the first modern Islamic group and have had, without a doubt, the most profound impact on the Islamic movement of any organization in the Arab world in the 20th century. As previously stated, the writings of the actors themselves are incredibly important to accomplishing our first task of critically examining their position. In addition to having a substantial history the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is also a prolific organization which makes available a wide array of
68 Stepan, Religion, Democracy, and the Twin Tolerations," 50-5 1.
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information through scholars and on their English language website (www.ikhwanweb.com).
There is also the challenge of selecting appropriate theories by which to test each unique group or organization as there are a veritable buffet from which to choose. Two newly emerging theories are of particular importance to this studys attempt to accomplish the critical task of assessing the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhoods commitment to democracy. First, we will look at Alfred C. Stepans relational approach to opposition groups in authoritarian regimes. This theory proposes that, as an opposition group develops, it seeks to change five power relationships under an authoritarian regime through the execution of five specific tasks.69 Secondly, Jillian Schwedler draws on the inclusion-moderation hypothesis to examine Islamic groups and the extent to which political inclusion pushes them in the direction of a more moderate path and can lead these groups to internalize democratic principles.70 Both of these theories can then be applied directly to the case of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in a qualitative case study to determine whether or not this specific group has experienced moderation and developed democratic positions through their opposition to the authoritarian regime in Egypt.
69 Stepan, Arguing Comparative Politics.
70 Jillian Schwedler. Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
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As for the second task, examining the historical record, being one of the oldest Islamic organizations, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood possesses a rich history which is helpful in tracing their development. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood also attracts a significant amount of academic attention, due to their status as an influential group, which has generated a considerable account of the organizations history. By examining the previous academic work on this group, in conjunction with important documents from within the organization, an in-depth analysis of their historical evolution and record with democracy can be achieved. This historical analysis then lends itself to both a historical and more current application of the above theories in that it provides instances of key ideological development and of historical evolution which can be used to establish the groups path toward moderation and development as a major oppositional force to the authoritarian Egyptian state.
This first chapter provides an exploration of the definition of democracy provided by Lipset; an investigation into the primary areas of compatibility between democracy and Islam; an understanding of how new political theories have come to emerge that grant religion its due allowing for an assessment of its impact on the political process; and an awareness of the necessity of examining both the argument/position of an Islamic group and their historical record to achieve an understanding of that groups commitment to democracy. Equipped with these foundational tools, the rest of this study will attempt a critical examination of the
51


Egyptian Muslim Brotherhoods historical moderation and development as a democratic opposition. This examination then lends itself to an exploratory survey of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhoods goals and continued commitment to democracy, not as an opposition group but a major political player, in the aftermath of the 2011 Revolution on the Nile.
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CHAPTER 3
WAKING THE SLEEPERS
History is who we are and why we are the way we are.
-David McCullough
One cannot claim to understand the present without first examining the past. History is what shapes us. It provides a frame of reference from which our current perceptions, ideologies, and actions emerge. This statement holds true for groups as well as individuals. As one of the oldest Islamic movements, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is no different. Some theorists have looked at this as a blessing. The lengthy history of the Brotherhood has given it time, to evolve, to grow. Others see it as a curse. The title of Alison Pargeters 2010 work, The Muslim Brotherhood: The Burden of Tradition, implies that this history is something to be overcome, to be dealt with, in becoming a modern, moderate Islamist movement. This study takes the first view, that history is replete with instances from which to learn and that all are capable of growth and change.
Thus, there is a real need to examine the history of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt to understand the degree to which the group has evolved. Rather than provide a comprehensive history of the organization this study emphasizes three instances, or
53


periods, and explores their impact on the groups development.71 First, the founding in 1928 of the Muslim Brotherhood by Flassan al-Banna, provides a glimpse into the conditions which gave rise to the organization and under which their initial agenda developed. Second, an examination of the period of repression under Nasser illuminates how conflict and a more radical ideology developed from an organization in crisis. Finally, a brief account of the continuous cycle of relaxation and repression under both Sadat and Mubarak is insightful insofar as it helps to explain how the modern Brotherhood came to be viewed as a moderate organization and the largest opposition group to authoritarian rule in Egypt. It is important to note though, that while the organization developed, their mission remained the same. As the quote at the beginning of this chapter makes abundantly clear, the Muslim Brotherhood has always sought to awaken the sleepers to reinvigorate the spirit of Islam within society. Above all else, this single desire has directed the action of the Brotherhood since its inception.
Laying the Foundation
Many Muslims who are occupied by the affairs of the world and are distracted from worshiping and obeying God are like people who are fast asleep while a fire is coming closer to them and will devour them if they do not wake up. Among those sleepers are some people who are awake and watching the scene but are incapable of keeping the fire away from the sleepers. Thus duty
71 For an historical account of the Muslim Brotherhood to the 1960s see: Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969).
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requires them to awaken the sleepers so that they will realize the situation and move away from the fire...
-Mustafa Mashhur72
Beginning in the 1870s the British took a great interest in Egypt as the Suez Canal linked their colonial empire together. A vital passageway from the Mediterranean to British colonial possessions in Asia, the British were determined to increase their control over this most important asset. In 1875 they did just that, becoming the largest shareholder in the Suez Canal Company and further increasing their interest in controlling all of Egypt. By 1879, with French collusion, they began to consolidate their control over the Egyptian territory, suppressing rebellions that threatened their hold on Suez in 1882 and marching on to Cairo. Ruling Egypt as a veiled protectorate from 1882 until 1914, Egypt maintained some political control over their territory, yet the economy served primarily British interests. In order to consolidate British control over the territory they needed to construct a modern state as an administrative realm the integrity of which was contingent upon the introduction of standardized legal codes capable of uniformly addressing issues that fell outside the purview of shari'a.73 Thus, the British introduced a system of secular law to Egypt as a 5,000 man occupation army backed their take-over of every
72 Mustafa Mashhur. The Call to God in: Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt (New York: Columbia University Press. 2002), 144.
73 John Calvert, Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical lslamism (New York: Coulmbia University Press. 2010), 31.
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governmental ministry and department except for those concerning religion.74 In 1914, with the outbreak of World War I the British further entrenched themselves establishing full control over all of Egypts political and economic institutions. By 1919 elite Egyptians inspired by the Wilsonian rhetoric of self-determination, and the general population increasingly dissatisfied with their position, began to rebel against British rule and Egypts status as a protectorate. In 1922 with the support of Commissioner General Lord Allenby, Egypt received their independence. Unfortunately he himself, writes Dietmar Rothermund on Allenby, demonstrated only two years later that this independence was a sham, and put in place draconian measures to restore law and order after the murder of the British Commander.75 This independence reserved to the British the right to secure the Suez Canal and their interests in the Egyptian state as well as the right to defend Egypt against foreign aggression until such a time as they saw fit.76
Outside of Egypt, with the end of World War I, the Ottoman Empire was dissolved. The Ottoman Empire had been the seat of the Caliphate, a governing body for Islam, so its dissolution held particularly harsh ramifications for the Islamic
74 Ibid., 35.
75 Dietmar Rothermund. The Routledge Companion to Decolonization (New York: Routledge, 2006), 113.
76 Calvert, Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical lslamism, 53.
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world. Having just witnessed what they perceived as the occupation of the Caliphate and its eventual destruction by the West, the Islamic worlds criticism of Western policies and institutions increased. With the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire came the creation of the Turkish nation which officially abolished the Caliphate.
Abolition of the Caliphate in 1924 by the newly established Turkish nation brought the caliphate issue to a head, as many leaders in the Muslim world vied for the title.77 78
For the Brotherhoods founder, Hassan al-Banna, these factors all played into his early education and political development. Greatly influenced by the 1919 revolt against the British and the subsequent occupation of his home town, he rapidly developed the view that the British represented a hegemonic power that needed to be resisted. He saw in their domination of Egypt both a political and cultural threat that would destroy Egyptian heritage and replace it with Western secular, modern values. As Rupe Simms writes, British imperialism had ruined Egypt on a grand scale: the British way of life violated the teachings of the Quran, the British forces destroyed the authority of the state, and the British capitalists subverted the viability of the economy. The impact of the dissolution of the Caliphate can clearly be seen in al-
77 John L. Esposito, Islam and Politics, 4lh ed. (New York: Syracuse University Press. 1998), 72.
78 Rupe Simms, Islam is Our Politics: A Gramscian Analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood (1928-1953)," Social Compass 49, no. 4 (2002): 570.
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Bannas letter to King Faruq of Egypt in 1947 entitled Towards the Light with his emphasis on Islamic unity and the call for practical and serious consideration concerning the departed Caliphate.79 Drawing on ideas previously expounded by Rashid Rida, these developments were a direct challenge to Islamic society and the root cause of economic, political, and social ills loosed in Egypt by the British colonial power. Convinced that only through a return to Islam (by following the Quran and Sunnah of the Prophet) could the Muslim world be awakened from its lethargy and decline al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood (Jama at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun) in 1928.80 81
The Brotherhood focused on reform from below, that is, reforming society by transforming individuals through education focused on social and moral issues and improving individual welfare. As Vidino writes, Al-Banas message called for the establishment of an Islamic state through Islamization from below, a slow process
that saw the creation of a purely Islamic system of government as the natural
81
consequence of the peaceful Islamization of the majority of the population. Therefore, the Brothers took it upon themselves to establish education and welfare
79 Hassan al-Banna, Towards the Light, (1947), ikhwanweb.com, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=802&ref=search.php.
80 Esposito, Islam and Politics, 137.
81 Lorenzo Vidino, Egyptian Crosscurrents. HSPI Issue Brief 09, The George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute, 2, www.homelandsecurity.gwu.edu.
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projects such as hospitals, local schools, and social clubs that would help individual people, while at the same time spreading the Islamic message of the group through discussion as they provided necessary services to the population. As Leiken and Brooke wrote, At its beginning the Brotherhood differed from earlier reformers by
combining a profoundly Islamic ideology with modern grass-roots political
r">
activism.
Persecution
And I have not surrendered my weapon If the armies of darkness encircle me,
I believe that the sun will still rise I will avenge my Lord and my religion I will stand firm on my way to victory Or I shall return to the Paradise of God.
-Sayyid Qutb
By the late 1930s the Muslim Brotherhood had developed a military wing, Nizam al-Khass, as did many organizations of the time period worldwide. From the time of their inception throughout the 1940s they committed numerous acts of violence, many directed against the British, which culminated in an associated members 1948 assassination of Egyptian Prime Minister Nuqurashi. In retaliation for this attack in February 1949, not three months after the Prime Ministers death, 82 83
82 Robert S. Leiken and Steven Brooke. The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood,' Foreign Affairs 86, no.2 (2007): 108.
83 Both the Wafd Party and the Watanist (nationalist) party in Egypt had formed secret underground organizations prior to the creation of the secret apparatus by the Muslim Brotherhood. See: Calvert. Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism, 119.
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Hassan al-Banna was killed by police forces and the Muslim Brotherhood incurred the wrath of the government. Al-Bannas death, as the founder and charismatic ideological leader of the Brotherhood, resulted in a fierce competition for power within the organization between the Nizam al-Khass and a more moderate faction. Al-Banna did not leave an appointed successor and this only increased both factions claims to represent the true direction of the group. As Pargeter notes, Whilst al-Banna had struggled to contain the different elements within the Ikhwan, his charisma, as well as his having founded the movement, had enabled him to have some sort of authority over the organization.84 Hassan el-Houdaiby, supported by the moderate faction, became the next murshid of the Brothers, although the Nizam believed he would acquiesce to their political aims. With no indisputable successor and little agreement on the future path the Brotherhood would pursue, a further development served to increase divisions already beginning to appear.
In 1952 Gamal Abdel Nasser, a general in the Free Officers Coup, overthrew the government of Egypt and secured Egyptian independence. In the build up to the coup the Muslim Brotherhood officially sanctioned the actions of resistance fighters in the Canal Zone which continuously hampered British efforts to secure the canal. Just seven days before the Free Officers forced King Faruq into exile on July 26,
84 Alison Pargeter. The Muslim Brotherhood: The Burden of Tradition (London: Saqi Books, 2010),
31.
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members of the Free Officers met with members of the Muslim Brotherhood at the
home of one, Sayyid Qutb, not officially a member of the Brotherhood at this point, but an intermediary between the two groups. The Officers requested the help of the Muslim Brotherhood in securing the streets of Cairo until they could successfully assume control, an offer which the Brothers readily accepted as they believed that, under their influence, the Free Officers movement would function as the vehicle of the Islamic resurgence. In the immediate aftermath of the successful coup both groups praised the other for their role. In one particular instance members of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Sayyid Qutb, still not officially a member, attended a lecture at the Free Officers Club and the subsequent social gathering during which Nasser took to the podium and publicly commended the organization for their role while extending an offer of protection from personal enemies to Qutb.85 86 Yet by the end of 1952 relations between the two groups began to sour as the Brotherhood increasingly pushed the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) to establish an Islamic state while criticizing some of Nassers political maneuvers. Qutb, who had initially taken a position within the government, resigned from this post and refused several ensuing offers to take up others. Officially joining the Muslim Brotherhood
85 Calvert, Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism, 180-181.
86 Ibid., 183.
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in 1953, Qutbs membership is viewed as a statement of solidarity with the Islamic objectives of the group and an outward display of many Islamists frustrations with the chosen path of the regime. As John Calvert writes, Qutb saw the widening chasm between the RCC and the Brotherhood as presaging a political showdown, and he wanted to mark out clearly his position on the side of virtue.87
By 1954 it became clear that Nasser had no intention of instituting sharia and thereby making Egypt an Islamic state as the Brotherhood thought he would. Thus, while the Brothers held high hopes as Nasser took power, by 1954 it was clear they desired two entirely different states in the wake of the coup. Nassers political dream was of pan-Arab socialism, modern, egalitarian, secular, and industrialized, in which individual lives were dominated by the overwhelming presence of the welfare state, writes the Pulitzer Prize winning Lawrence Wright. The Islamists wanted to completely reshape society form the top down, imposing Islamic values on all aspects of life.. ,88 Nassers pursuit of a secular nationalist agenda only increased resentment and resistance by the Brothers which eventually prompted Nasser to view them as more of an obstacle to be overcome than an ally. In the aftermath of a Brotherhood members attempt to assassinate Nasser and to clear the path for the full
8/ Ibid., 186.
88 Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Vintage Books, 2007), 32.
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implementation of his nationalist program, Nasser declared the Brotherhood illegal, disbanded the organization, and arrested the majority of its leaders and members. He did not stop at arrests, but rather sought to destroy the organizations ability to communicate by placing members in separate prisons across Egypt and enforcing strict travel restrictions so as to prevent anyone that fled the country from returning. This repression resulted in a fallow period for the Brotherhood, writes Pargeter, and the movement was effectively stymied during the second half of the 1950s and
89
throughout the 1960s due to the fact that so many Ikhwani had been imprisoned.
The Brothers wounds throbbed with fateful questions: How could those who stood shoulder to shoulder with us against the British and the king now set their dogs on us? Can those tormenting devout Muslims really be Muslims themselves? Sayyid Qutb.. .produced an answer that would echo into the twenty-first century...
While in prison, the ideological confrontation between factions within the Brotherhood took shape. Sayyid Qutb, imprisoned along with most of the Brotherhood, began to develop an increasingly radical ideology. Prior to his time in prison Qutbs writings indicate that he subscribed to the idea, common within the Muslim Brotherhood, that politics would prove to be an effective mechanism through 89 90
89 Pargeter, The Muslim Brotherhood, 34.
90 Leiken and Brooke. "The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood. 110.
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which change could be produced.91 Yet by the 1930s the situation in Palestine and international support for the Jewish migration led him to believe that force, or direct action, as used by the Zionist settlers, was the only language understood by the West. The only language the modern world understands is the one used by the Jews, namely force.92 During his time in prison, Qutbs position would continue to evolve, solidifying into an ideology which would present a significant challenge to both the state and the Muslim Brotherhood.
The horrors experienced by Qutb and the rest of the Muslim Brothers in Egypts prisons are illustrated in several telling examples and help to illuminate the context in which his writings took shape. During Qutbs preliminary trial he raised his shirt for the court revealing the marks of the torture he endured just prior to being led into the courtroom saying, Nasser has applied to us in jail the principles of the revolution.93 John Calvert writes, Guards suspended prisoners with their arms tied behind their heads, beat them with clubs, or subjected them to the viciousness of attack dogs, before going on to describe how the wails and despairing cries of prisoners could regularly be heard throughout the prison.94 At one time, subjected to
91 Calvert, Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism, 2.
92 Qutb in Calvert, Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism, 122.
93 Calvert, Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism. 194.
94 Ibid., 197.
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hard labor, imprisoned Muslim Brothers learned of a plot by the guards to execute them after taking them to a stone quarry to work. Knowing this they refused to leave their beds. Twenty-one were shot dead in their cells.95 These experiences are what turned Qutb from advocating Islam as a way to ensure social justice, to a means of arguing the illegitimacy of the state. Qutbs analysis, unquestionably influenced by the horrors he witnessed in detention, is that the situation is so dire that Muslims cannot and should not wait....Therefore the only solution lies in the concepts of takfir and jihad.96
Qutb as a result of these experiences became dissatisfied with the slow pace of Islamization advocated by Supreme Guide Houdaiby, whom he initially supported, and by 1957-58 he began to develop a more radical ideology, advocating a far quicker approach to the Islamization of society. In prison he began to read about the idea of jahiliyya (ignorance- the period before the Prophet) which deeply impacted his thinking on society and the current regime. He proposed first, that Muslims are only accountable to God and the system of sharia, whereas worldly rulers merely usurped the sovereignty of God and concerned themselves with issues of the world rather than the divine. He then applied the idea of jahiliyya to these rulers and the entire world,
95 Ibid., 202.
96 Vidino, Egyptian Crosscurrents, 4.
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denouncing the modern age as devoid of Islam. Thus, Qutb created an urgent need for reform and the necessity of a vanguard of Islamists to create an Islamic world through jihad.
Qutb spent much of his time in prison in the Liman al-Turra prison hospital, the center of a developing communication network to continue the ideological debate within the Brotherhood over a moderate or more radical approach. There he could discuss ideas which then spread as prisoners returned to other facilities or back into the larger prison population. Women also played a vital role in disseminating information beyond the prison walls. The Muslim Sisters would visit imprisoned members of the Brotherhood and communicate with others both on the outside and those held in other prisons. At the center of this new communication network stood Sayyid Qutb, a man whose beliefs and writings quickly gained a following particularly amongst the younger members of the Brotherhood. As his ideas energized the Brotherhood yet again, Nasser, feeling more comfortable in his leadership position after the Suez crisis, began to release Brothers with lesser sentences. The ideas of Qutb served to connect these newly released members beyond the prison walls who coalesced around the more radical approach to social and political reform. Barbara Zollner writing on Qutb notes, His thought laid the
91 For a discussion see: Barbara Zollner. Prision Talk: The Muslim Brotherhood's Internal Struggle During Gamal Abdel Nassers Persecution. 1954 to 1971, International Journal of Middle East Studies 39 (2007): 411-433.
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groundwork for the regrouping of the Brothers outside the prison environment... It is not surprising then that el-Houdaiby and the leading circle did not object to Qutbs
98
ideas because a restoration of the Brotherhood was in their interest.
As the Brothers began to reorganize, a new group within the Brotherhood labeled Organization 1965, formed outside the prison walls based on Qutbs philosophy. This group eventually approached Qutb about becoming their spiritual leader, an offer he ultimately accepted. Qutb, still in prison, wrote Maalimfi al-Tariq (Milestones) presumably as a guide or instructions for members of this new group, offering a clear and emphatic rejection of the current state while advocating jihad as the most effective means of resistance and as an Islamic duty.
Still, there was no objection from the moderate murshid Houdaiby to this more radical approach.
While the extent to which this group advocated violence is not clear, there is a scholarly consensus that they most likely condoned the use of violence to achieve their objectives. A successful attempt to secure both funding and weapons from Saudi Arabian connections would seem to support this conclusion. The development of Organization 1965, uncovered by the state only months after Qutbs release from prison in 1965, led to a further wave of repression by the Nasser regime which again arrested and tried Qutb, eventually sentencing him to death. The time has come, 98
98 Zollner, Prison Talk." 417.
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said Qutb at the beginning of his trial, for a Muslim to give his head in order to proclaim the birth of the Islamic movement. As he received his death sentence he proclaimed, Thank God! I performed jihad for fifteen years until I earned this martyrdom. On August 29, 1966 Qutb achieved the status of a martyr after being hanged in the early morning hours." At this point, a debate within the Brotherhood began anew over the groups stance toward the state and the path they should take to achieve their goals as many Brothers found themselves back in prison.
The divide that had already begun to appear widened into a chasm separating the radical Qutbists and the old guard, led by murshid Houdaiby. Houdaiby distanced himself from Organization 1965 which further infuriated members of that group as they felt betrayed by both the state initially and now by their own parent organization. The radicals then adopted the idea of an irreconcilable division between Islam and jahiliyya, Muslim and kafir (nonbeliever) and fully embraced the concept of revolutionary Islamist activism as the true expression of religious duty, writes Zollner.99 100 These radicals defined themselves as representatives of the true Islam, Qutbs vanguard, in opposition to Houdaibys organization emphatically rejecting the approach of working within the system.
99 As cited in Wright. The Looming Tower. 36.
100 Zollner, Prison Talk, 420.
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Houdaiby, in response to this developing radical trend, wrote Du at la Qudat (Preachers not Judges), as an outline of the Muslim Brotherhoods moderate path and beliefs. While there is the argument that Houdaiby was not the author, and that the book is not a direct response to Qutb, it undoubtedly represents the more moderate approach of the Muslim Brotherhood under Houdaiby and a rejection of the more radical splinter groups arising out of Qutbs vision. In it the author takes a position against takfir (unbelief) claiming only God can judge and that Islamic law is flexible and interpretable by people as they are endowed with reasoning from God. As long as the interpretation does not violate any Quranic principles it is a legitimate interpretation and open to debate or implementation. Thus, the moderate approach advocates working within the political system and within legal rulings laid down by the regime rather than a wholesale rejection of it.101 Tilmisani, assuming the position of Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood upon Houdaibys death in 1973, downplayed the radical elements of Qutbs thought while drawing attention to his desire for an Islamic state and an increased role for religion. The Muslim Brothers either ignored Qutb or explained him away, writes Calvert, preferring to focus on his solid contributions to Islamic thought rather than on his contributions to
101 Ibid., 421-426.
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radicalism.102 In a recent article in The Economist, the author stresses that since the Muslim Brotherhood emerged from prison in the 1970s they have repeatedly and vehemently renounced the violence that Qutb espoused for political ends.and also points out that, while the Brotherhood may still find inspiration in the memory of Qutb as an advocate for the cause of greater Islamization, this memory is not the same as adhering to a radical ideology.103
The editor of Du at la Qudat, eloquently summarized the conflict which
occurred within the organization during these years and the patent rejection of
developing radical ideologies and splinter groups by the Brotherhood.
It was when the Brothers had to suffer in their prison cells and detention camps that some chose to pronounce unbelief on Muslims or to doubt the truth of their belief in Islam....Master Hasan Ismail al-Hudaybi,...gave in response to the thesis [of takfir] a comprehensive answer, which shaped the path of the Muslim Brothers, determined their method, and laid down their mission. We are preachers, but we are not judges....104
Relaxation & Repression
The third instance or phase that had a significant effect on the development of the Muslim Brotherhoods ideology can be referred to as the cycle of relaxation and repression. President Anwar Sadat came to power in 1970 and almost immediately
102 Calvert, Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism, 279-280.
103 Which Way Now: The Muslim Brothers New Leader, The Economist, January 23, 2010.
104 In Zollner, Prison Talk, 411.
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became known as the believer President for the prayer marks on his forehead and Islamic rhetoric which he used to consolidate his position and in the wake of the 1973 victory over Israel in the Yom Kippur War. He continuously stressed the importance of Islam in all areas of life and could often be seen leaving Mosques after daily prayers. During the initial years of his reign many of the Muslim Brotherhood members that had been imprisoned under Nasser were released and more returned from exile. .. .Sadat offered the Muslim Brothers a deal, says Wright. In return for their support against the Nasserites and the leftists, he would allow them to preach and advocate, so long as they renounced violence.105 The Muslim Brotherhood, allowed to publish for the first time since the Nasser initiated repression, began publishing a magazine, al-Dawa, and embarked on a return to prominence within Egyptian social life while becoming increasingly involved in politics. Yet, as Sadat increased the public role of religion, the calls for sharia and an Islamic state returned. By 1977 Islamic groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood, began to express their frustration at the regimes reluctance to further Islamize society. That same year Sadat instituted his al-infitah, or open-door economic policy which resulted in economic hardship for many, further increasing resistance. Sadat simultaneously created outrage in the Islamic world due to Egypts role in the Camp David Accords and a peace treaty with Israel.
105 Wright, The Looming Tower, 46-47.
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During this time the Islamic world was caught in the throes of an Islamic resurgence, typically labeled the rise of Political Islam. By 1975 the benefits promised by the secular nationalist regimes had failed to materialize and disenchantment had reached a fever pitch as the resurgence of Islam in its political form gave voice to this disappointment.106 Political Islam represented a direct challenge to the existing status quo write Esposito and Voll. This was a challenge to political systems, socio-economic institutions, and to their moral and intellectual foundations.107 In order to challenge these Western imports, the Brothers returned to what they had initially done, creating a system of social services that emphasized Islamic values. Through these networks they attracted large numbers of adherents either because of the ideology, or simply because individuals needed the services the group provided. With this burgeoning support the Brothers could again begin their call for an Islamic society, even as they were attempting to Islamize from below. The Brotherhood was able to attract a large middle class following during this time as the infitah policies of Sadat mainly withdrew social services aimed at them and the lower classes. Umar al-Tilmisani, the new murshid of the Muslim Brotherhood reenergized the organization and attracted many university students (though not as
106 Sadowski, Political Islam, 222.
107 Esposito and Voll, Islam and the West, 615.
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many as some more radical organizations) to its cause through an active engagement in educational services and on campuses across the country. After Sadats relaxation of relations with the Muslim Brotherhood beginning in 1970 and the leadership of Tilimsani, the third Supreme Guide of the Brotherhood, the organization evolved into a moderate group bent on pursuing their social agenda through existing institutions and staying the moderate political course. The Brothers, writes Esposito, clearly opted for sociopolitical change through a policy of moderation and graduation which accepted political pluralism and parliamentary democracy, entering into alliances with secular political parties and organizations as well as acknowledging the rights of Coptic Christians.108 109
By 1979, Sadat recognized that the Muslim Brotherhood represented a legitimate challenge to his regime. He noted that the organization resembled a state within a state, and as such had to be dealt with.110 To do so Sadat declared the spheres of politics and religion separate and began a more stringent repression of the Muslim Brotherhood in an attempt to secure his power and silence the calls for further social Islamization. He, like those before him, again turned to the prisons as a way to eliminate opposition arresting many of the Brotherhoods members and
108 Pargeter, The Muslim Brotherhood, 44.
109 John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? 3ld ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 140.
110 Cantori in Esposito, The Islamic Threat, 245.
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outlawing all of their publications. This development resumed tensions within the Brotherhood over adopting a more radical approach. The decision by the Brotherhoods leadership to stay the course and continue down the moderate path initiated an exodus of the more radicalized members who left to form their own splinter groups, such as Ayman al-Zawahiri who would go on to lead the group extremist al-Jihad before aligning with Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. As Wright points out, Although their goals were similar to those of the mainstream Islamists in the Muslim Brotherhood, they had no intention of trying to work through politics to achieve them.111
In 1981 Sadat was assassinated by a member al-Jihad, one of these splinter groups, and Mubarak rose to power. Immediately after assuming power Mubarak instituted a state of emergency law which would remain in place for 29 years. Under this law anyone the regime deemed a threat to the state or national security could be arrested and imprisoned without warrant or trail while the law also placed restrictions on the freedom to assemble and instituted curfews and restricted freedom of movement within the country. Anyone imprisoned under the law would not face trial or appeal the decision for six months and would only be released with
111 Wright, The Looming Tower, 50.
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presidential approval.112 113 Yet, Mubarak relaxed the states approach to religion, releasing many of the imprisoned Brothers and attempting to more specifically differentiate between extremist groups which posed a direct challenge to the state and more moderate religious groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Mubarak recognized the strength of the Brotherhood and tried to position the group as a supporter of the regime and an ally against extremism. The Brothers took advantage of this political opening to enter into elections, in which only parties could participate. They ran candidates in both 1984 and 1987 by forming alliances with the Wafd party, and the Labor and Liberal Parties respectively. The Brotherhood had debated forming a political party but decided against it in an effort to maintain their
1 1 3
support base as a social organization working within the political system.
In the 1980s the Brotherhood leadership emerged from their imprisonment.. .as a respectable opposition group that had demonstrated its ability to stand up to a pharaoh without resorting to terrorism. It had established its credentials as a moderate Islamic organization, publicly eschewing violence and working within the system. The Brotherhoods ideology and political strategy were thus transformed to incorporate parliamentary democracy and political pluralism.114
The success of the Muslim Brotherhood at the polls again signaled to an
Egyptian leader that the Brotherhood represented a potential challenger to his sole
112 Emergency Law, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, carnegieendowment.org, http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2010/09/09/emergency-law, (accessed 5/12/2011).
113 Pargeter, The Muslim Brotherhood, 45.
114 Esposito, Islam and Democracy, 252-253.
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possession of power. To mitigate this challenge Mubarak first amalgamated the Brotherhood and extremist groups that had embarked on a terrorist campaign in the country attacking tourist attractions and Copts. Then, following in the tradition of those before, Mubarak instituted a crackdown on extremists, of which the Brothers were now considered a part, and imprisoned members and leaders alike. Since then there has been a continual pattern of repression and relaxation whenever the political situation has called for it. For example in the early 1990s the Brothers, locked out of Egyptian politics, began to run in Professional organization elections and eventually came to control the most powerful syndicates in Egypt. Subsequently, Mubarak changed the rules governing the election process in these organizations and instituted governmental oversight thereby barring the Brothers from participating. This pattern can also be observed in both the 2000 and 2005 parliamentary elections and the immediate aftermath with the Brotherhood making significant gains (especially in 2005) followed by a period of harsh repression including arrests, harassment, and military tribunals.
Concluding Thoughts
These three instances illustrate the changes the Muslim Brotherhood endured over their lengthy history. Their founding, arising in response to British imperialism and the import of Western institutions, helps to explain their resistance to Western institutions and their initial trepidation towards all things Western, including
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democracy and pluralism. Thus, their rejection of these things should be seen more as a rejection of Western hegemony and of foreign interference than of democracy.
The second instance is arguably the most important in that it especially illuminates the groups stance toward violence. Not only does it show how vehemently the majority of the group rejected the use of violence to achieve political goals, it explains that members of the group who chose to advocate those views became upset with the Brotherhood for not supporting their pursuits. Thus, one of the major criticisms still leveled at the organization today, that it is a supporter of terrorism and violence, is debunked. However it is important to attach a caveat to that statement in that the Muslim Brotherhood does believe that violence is objectionable except in cases of occupation. In the case of Palestine then, as the Palestinian territories are perceived to be occupied by a Zionist force, the Muslim Brotherhood is supportive of defensive violence. Still, the discussion of Qutb illustrates a distinct break with the more radical elements within political Islam.
The third instance helps to explain how the Brotherhood appears today. The link between them and the extremists, exaggerated by Mubarak to repress the organization, still hampers the organization today, while the strategy of relaxation and repression persisted until Mubaraks ouster in 2011. By opening political space in which the Brotherhood could participate, the regimes of Sadat and Mubarak allowed them to enter into politics. In order to do so, the Brotherhood had to reposition
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themselves as political actors, as well as a social organization, in order to maintain their support base while expanding their role. By participating in the political system the Brothers came into contact with other organizations and modified their positions to appeal to a broader spectrum of the population.
These three instances in the Muslim Brotherhoods ideological development have had a profound impact on the organization, their strategies, and their stance as an opposition group. Founded on opposition, their refusal to accept Western intrusion on the life of Egypt, has important implications for how they operate today. While they have explicitly stated multiple times that they are willing to open dialogue with foreign powers, they have also made quite clear their stance on Egypt as a sovereign political entity which is entitled to independence on pursuing polices that are in the nations best interest. Therefore, while they are willing to communicate with others, they are not willing to sacrifice Egypts interest to the interests of foreign powers.
The split between the Qutubists and the more mainstream Muslim Brotherhood also illustrates the degree to which the group has refuted violence and accepted the moderate course. It was during this time that the path the Brotherhood would pursue became firmly implanted within the groups leadership; a path that espoused the pursuit of Islamization from below, a continuation of the founder Hassan al-Banas vision for the organization and for Egypt. The third phase provided the stage on which this political and societal strategy would play out. In standing against both the
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Sadat and Mubarak regimes the Brothers gained important political experience, knowledge that would prove extremely useful in the long run, and refined their moderate position while multiple violent outbursts, such as the assassination of Sadat and the massacre of tourists by a radical Islamic organization at Luxor, reiterated just how counterproductive strategies of aggression proved to be. These developments contributed to the solidification of their position as a leading opposition movement within Egypt. These three instances are of the utmost importance when attempting to discern the goals and objectives of the Muslim Brotherhood today. The subsequent chapter will discuss in more detail the processes of moderation and relational opposition through which the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood both challenged the autocratic Mubarak regime and internalized the necessary principles to put forth a democratic alternative.
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CHAPTER 4
RISING OPPOSITION
April, 2008. Workers at one of Egypts largest textile mills flooded toward the gates of the factory after a visit from the Prime Minister himself who thanked them for not going on strike and promised each worker an extra months wages. Yet, as one employee, electrician Masoud Hafez lamented, even with an extra months pay (around $46 US) it would still be difficult to buy bread for his children. As inflation in the country rose to over twelve percent in February 2008, Egyptian citizens increasingly relied on bread subsidized by the government: But corruption and inefficiency still conspire to make the flat, round loaf, costing five piasters (one American cent), increasingly scarce.115 In the two months prior to April, eleven people died as a result of gathering in increasingly long bread lines, leading to the Presidents use of the army to both bake and dispense additional bread. With bread lines as the backdrop and the army baking and distributing loaves of bread, the Muslim Brotherhood, preparing to run candidates in the upcoming local council elections, faced severe governmental repression as a result of their success as an opposition force. Several candidates suffered disqualification by the political regime which ignored the courts ruling to reinstate them. Others, over 800 others to be more
115 Not by bread alone, The Economist, April 12, 2008.
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precise, were simply arrested. Of the initial 5,000 candidates the Muslim Brotherhood put forward in elections for over 52,000 seats, only twenty remained by April 8th the day of the elections.116
In the end the ruling party won over 90 percent of the 52,000 seats mentioned above in elections where they ran uncontested. This is just one instance which elucidates the repression the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood faced, especially in the run up to elections. It also highlights the hold on power the Mubarak regime had for over two decades. This election, coming only three years after the 2005 electoral success of the Brotherhood, meant that the Brothers represented the most significant opposition force to the Mubarak regime. If they had been allowed to run all 5,000 of their intended candidates they may well have secured that position politically, but with only twenty still around by election day the Brothers decided to boycott the election to protest the gross injustice perpetrated by the state. This excerpt provides us with a glimpse into the tactics used by the regime to repress any oppositional force. Yet, the Brotherhoods boycott of the election, as the most prominent opposition group, illustrates their skill at political maneuvering as well. By boycotting the election and publicizing their reasons for doing so arrests, scare tactics, a regime acting in defiance of court rulings the Brotherhood exposed these violations to the
116 Description of event based on report in the article Not by bread alone, The Economist, April 12, 2008.
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public and the international community and in doing so increased the costs of repression faced by the regime. We will see that, as Alfred C. Stepan argues, this is but one of five crucial tasks an opposition movement seeks to accomplish.
Stepan & Relational Opposition
In the 1970s the Egyptian political regime began what has been labeled in this study as a cycle of relaxation and repression. President Anwar Sadat, in his search for political allies against the Nasserites and the Leftists, relaxed restrictions against the Muslim Brotherhood and other political organizations creating a measure of political space in which they could maneuver. Toward the end of Sadats rule he began to again repress the Muslim Brotherhood through the use of the coercive apparatus, arresting and trying many of its members and leaders in military courts. When Mubarak came to power, in order to stem the tide of radicalism and violent Islamist extremism, he again relaxed the political constraints placed on the Brothers to gain a moderate ally in the fight against the terrorists. Mubarak, at this time, saw the Brothers as a moderate group that could provide a voice to Islamist political desires and therefore, cut off support for the more radical groups. The Brotherhood took advantage of this space and entered into the elections of 1984 and 1987 through alliances with established political parties and achieved significant success with members of the organization gaining seats in the national parliament. They began publishing newspapers and magazines, participated in local and national elections,
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and secured a foothold in professional syndicates, university faculty clubs, and student groups. In doing so the Muslim Brotherhood undoubtedly established themselves as the best organized and most widespread opposition group to the regime.
Sheri Berman sees this situation as creating a peculiar kind of stalemate in which the existing regime retains political power while ceding substantial control over the societal and cultural spheres to the revolutionary challenger.117 If this situation is viewed as a stalemate then what is the political function of the opposition? Is it to simply maintain their position as an opposition group with a limited amount of control over society and culture? Based on the original goals of the Muslim Brotherhood one would presume this control would represent a significant step toward the Islamization of society from below. The original goal of the Muslim Brotherhood centered on the creation of an Islamic state, based on sharia, and created through the gradual transformation of individuals into more devout and pious Muslims. Yet, if Bermans statement about a peculiar stalemate is correct and the Brotherhood achieved a measure of control and autonomy when it comes to their societal programs, why did they not extricate themselves from the increasingly complex game of politics? After all, it is in the realm of politics where the Brothers
117 Sheri Berman, Islamism, Revolution, and Civil Society, Perspectives on Politics 1, no.2 (2003): 258.
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faced the most severe repression. As the example at the beginning of this section illustrates, in the build up to elections hundreds of Brothers had been arrested and imprisoned. If they achieved even a limited amount of control over culture and society then why did they not choose to focus solely on their primary task of Islamizing society? This section will argue that the answer lies in the Brotherhoods internalization of democratic principles. It is important to revisit the definition of democracy as An institutional arrangement in which all adult individuals have the power to vote, through free and fair competitive elections, for their chief executive and national legislature.118 While there are obvious differences between the Brotherhoods conception of democracy and the typical western liberal model, if we take Lipsets definition of democracy and analyze the statements and actions of the Muslim Brotherhood against it, the group clearly fulfills the main conditions necessary to be considered a democratic force. If we return to Bermans proposition then, that the situation between the Muslim Brotherhood and the state represented a type of stalemate, we should consider that the Muslim Brotherhoods internalization and support of democratic politics pushed them to continue to advocate for further reform both from below, and at the pinnacle of Egyptian political power.
Alfred C. Stepan provides a conceptual framework through which we can analyze the Muslim Brotherhood as a political opposition movement and explore how
118 Lipset and Lakin, The Democratic Century, 19.
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their actions helped to alter the relationship between the opposition, supporters, and the regime itself.119 120 Yet, before we delve into this discussion it is necessary to attach a disclaimer to this section. In light of the events of January and February 2011 it is of the utmost importance to note that, while the Muslim Brotherhood clearly represents an opposition force, they must not be seen as the only one. Rather they were one group out of many that opposed the rule of Mubarak and protested against the many injustices faced by the Egyptian people, not least of which can be seen as the lack of democracy especially as it relates to the legislature and the office of president. That being said, examining their role in years prior to the overthrow of the Mubarak regime is necessary to understanding their attachment to democratic norms and principles and how they helped to erode support for the Mubarak regime. Again, this is not to say that the Brotherhood represents the only actor, rather, that as an opposition movement, they played a very significant role in the years prior to Mubaraks eviction from power.
Stepan begins by proposing that within any authoritarian polity there exist five core groups bound together by relationships of domination. In order to understand how an opposition operates within an authoritarian polity it is necessary to begin with an examination of where the opposition stands in regard to these other
119 Stepan, Arguing Comparative Politics, 158-166.
120 Ibid., 160.
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groups. The first group comprises the regime supporters, those loyal to the regime and who often hold a position of some power within it. These are the people that stand to benefit from a continuation of authoritarian rule and openly support the regime and its policies. Second there is the coercive apparatus (the police force, military, secret police, etc.) which enables the regime to continuously maintain power. Following this coercive apparatus are the passive supporters, active opponents, and finally the passive opponents. As Stepan sees it, The task of the active democratic opposition is to change the relations among all the component parts of the authoritarian system in such a way as to weaken authoritarianism while
i i
simultaneously improving the conditions for democratization. In a situation where the regimes authority is eroding, Stepan proposes that the core supporters will fragment allowing a resurgence of a more active opposition and, unless this opposition poses a direct threat to the military establishment, or the coercive apparatus, their support for the regime will also begin to wane. As a result passive supporters will begin to move towards the passive opposition while those that do still support the regime will distance themselves from positions within it in order to preserve their political credentials. As this process unfolds the active opposition will again increase its activity and begin to experience a swelling of their ranks as *
1:1
Ibid.
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previously passive opponents merge into their camp. If it performs its multiple functions well, writes Stepan, the active democratic opposition can exacerbate discord among the authoritarians, as well as prepare the indispensible foundations for a democratic successor regime.122 123
While the argument can be made that any opposition movement seeks to alter the relationships existent under authoritarianism in this same way, if they do not provide a democratic alternative, one authoritarian system will be replaced by another. Thus, a key to our examination is establishing the democratic credentials of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Five Functions of an Opposition Movement
If the primary goal of an opposition movement is to challenge the regime and alter these so called relationships of domination how does the opposition accomplish this task? Stepan argues that the opposition must perform five functions to present an effective challenge to the regime while at the same time preparing a path for successful democratization. He begins by positing that the first task set before an opposition is to remain independent of the regime. ~ If the regime is able to co-opt the opposition then that opposition has ceased to exist as such while the regime has
122 Ibid., 162.
123 Ibid.
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taken a step toward securing hegemonic power and eradicating any challenge to its authority. In remaining independent the opposition provides the public with an independent source of information that contests the regime. Lipset sees communication as one of the primary contributions of opposition writing, Opposition actually serves as a communication mechanism, focusing attention on societal and governmental problems.124 If the opposition is able to remain independent of the regime they are able to enhance communication by providing dialogue that runs counter to official statements by the regime.
In this way the opposition also seeks to provide those that are not represented in traditional political avenues with a source of representation; it publicizes itself as the voice of the voiceless. Nadia Urbinati and Mark E. Warren discuss this idea, labeling groups that seek to accomplish this task as self-authorized representatives comprised of unelected leaders that speak for groups that do not possess formal representation.125 They argue that when electoral politics fails to sufficiently represent the population, self-authorized representatives serve the crucial function of popularizing these unrepresented views, ideas, and criticisms. The collectivities representatives seek to influence are increasingly diverse: not only governments and
1-4 Seymour Martin Lipset. The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited: 1993 Presidential
Address, American Sociological Review 59, no. 1 (1994): 9.
125 Urbinati and Warren, "The Concept of Representation, 403.
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power holders but also public discourse and culture..they write. Not only do they have the potential to compensate for electoral inflexibilities providing high levels of targeted, information-rich representation but they also function in areas where no electoral democracy exists.126 Thus, in a way the Muslim Brotherhood serves a democratic representative function through disseminating the views of those typically barred from entering into the political system. Under the Mubarak regime, as the story at the beginning of this section makes plainly clear, the ruling party- the National Democratic Party (NDP) dominated elections and the representative bodies within Egypt by an overwhelming majority. The Muslim Brotherhood then filled the representational void created by the disproportionate results of elections that are clearly neither free nor fair. The Brotherhood then is an independent entity, separate from the regime, which has taken up the task of representing its members otherwise barred from participating in the political life of Egypt.
If the opposition can successfully maintain its independence from the regime, Stepan argues, it must then focus its attention on increasing the ranks of the passive opposition. This function can be accomplished in two distinct ways: First, by contesting the legitimacy of the regime; and second by securing and insulating what he refers to as zones of autonomy or political parties, unions, and other institutions
126 Ibid.. 404.
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of civil society.127 In order to accomplish the first task the opposition needs to develop a critique of the regime around which the population is able to unite. For the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, basic needs claims, such as bread and necessities, proved to be the most effective avenue for arguing the legitimacy of the regime while providing them with a platform from which they could disseminate their message.
Davut Ates argues that, beginning in the 1970s, infitah created new economic openings for members of the Muslim Brotherhood and their typically middle class ranks. As economic liberalization took hold, both private and foreign investment increased, credit was extended to Egypt following the Camp David Accords, and the private sector began to play an increasing role in the Egyptian economy. Ates sees this development as benefitting many within the Muslim Brotherhood as the organization typically maintained a predominantly middle class membership. He also points out that many of the Muslim Brotherhood leaders who fled the country under Nassers persecution had developed successful business ventures in other countries and now, allowed to return, brought a degree of wealth and investment to the country. The policy of infitah and the interests of the middle-class members of the MB were complimentary and mutually supportive, writes Ates, creating an environment in
7 Stepan, Arguing Comparative Politics, 162.
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1 ">Q
which they began to establish businesses and social institutions. Samya Said Imam in a study titled Who Owns Egypt?, argues that since the late 1980s eighteen families, eight of which are associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, have dominated the Egyptian economy, while around forty percent of all economic undertakings have been controlled by Muslim Brotherhood interests.128 129 This statement illustrates the success experienced by the Muslim Brotherhood during infitah and the continued liberalization of the economy under Mubarak.
Radical groups also began to emerge in this period, and in Ates view, gained strength through the hardships that typically accompany economic liberalization. These radical groups appealed to the certain sectors of society and gained strength due to the perceived failure of the state to insulate its population against the stresses of a liberal and integrated world economy.130 Yet Ates mistakenly points to these economic successes as weakening the Muslim Brotherhood and increasing radicalism in society. While radicalism undoubtedly increased this should not be seen as a direct result of the Muslim Brotherhoods pursuit of economic gain nor as an indicator of the Brothers losing a support base. In many ways the organizations the Muslim
128 Davut Ates, Economic Liberalization and Changes in Fundamentalism: The Case of Egypt, Middle East Policy XII, No. 4 (2005): 137.
129 In Wickham, Mobilizing Islam, 97.
130 Ibid., 138 & 141.
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Brotherhood developed during this time helped to provide a safety net against the hardships of economic openness faced by the lower-middle class. It is in this area, in the sphere of social services, that the Muslim Brotherhood was able to mount one of the most successful critiques of the regime.
As Lipset points out, economic liberalization often leads to the creation, or further development, of a middle class which is typically thought of as the harbinger of opposition movements.131 132 Thus, Ates misses the critical impact of economic liberalization in Egyptian politics by assuming that liberalization detracted from the Muslim Brotherhoods base of support and directly increased a radical element. It would be better to see the burgeoning middle-class within the Muslim Brotherhood as preparing the way for a strengthened opposition movement and creating an implicit critique of the regime by distributing social services normally under the purview of the state but which they failed to provide to those in need. Ates himself wrote, Informal operations are a way of compensating for the failure of the public sector and central government to provide necessary goods and services. Thus, this economic opening, which Ates correctly argues had benefitted the Muslim
131 Seymour Martin Lipset, Reflections on Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy," Journal of Democracy 4, no. 2 (1993): 52.
132 Ates, "Economic Liberalization, 140.
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Full Text

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--J FREEDOM IS THE SOLUTION: THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND DEMOCRACY IN EGYPT by Andrew Albert Louis McDonald B.A., University of Colorado Denver, 2008 A thesis submitted to the University of Colorado Denver in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Social Science 2011

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This thesis for the Master of Social Science degree by Andrew Albert Louis McDonald has been approved by Amin Kazak Omar Swartz ... Ji;Jt------------....... JI-1t-1l Date

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McDonald, Andrew Albert Louis (M.S.S., College of Liberal Arts and Sciences) Freedom i s the Solution : The Muslim Brotherhood and Democracy in Egypt Thesis directed by Senior Instructor Amin Kaz a k ABSTRACT This the s is attempts to address the development of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood as a moderate Islamic opposition group within Egypt prior to the Revolution on the Nile in February 2011 a nd their connection to democracy both before and after Mubarak's ouster. Beginning with a definition of democracy and a brief di s cussion of the compatibility between Islam a nd democracy this thesi s then examine s the historical development of the Broth e rhood into a political oppo s ition group with a moderate I s lamic position. This moderate interpretation of I slam allowed the Brothers to create a unique and specific version of Islamic democracy which they e s pou s ed as both a critique of the Sad a t and Mub a rak regime s but also a s a means of establishing their democr a tic credentials. Largely a qualitative, longitudinal, case s tudy focu s ing on the group under Ho s ni Mubarak which draw s on the inclu s ion moderation hypothe s i s and Alfred C. Stepan's relational theory (2001), thi s s tudy examines the Egyptian Muslim Broth e rhood as a force for d e mocracy both before and after the revolution on the Nile in 2011. In doing s o it is the author's hope that some of the m ajor fears and mi s understandings regarding this Islamic group can be assuaged.

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This abstract accurately represents the content of the candidate's thesis. I recommend its publication. Amin Kazak

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DEDICATION I dedicate this the sis to all those th a t have in s pired me to continue the pursuit of knowledge throughout my life; to my mother, Cheryl, who never let me get by with a nything but my best; and finally, to my fiancee Tara, without whom none of this would have been possible.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT My sincerest thanks to all the members of my committee for their commitment to this project and their belief that I could accomplish the task I set out to achieve. I would especially like to thank John G.Whitesides for not only inspiring this thesis and spending countless hours going over the subject matter, but for exposing me to a globalized world that is so much larger and more complex than I once knew.

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T ABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................... 1 2. DEMOCRACY DEFINED ............................................................ 14 Islam and Democracy ......................................................... 19 A Monolithic Civilization .......................................... 21 Removing the Veil: Secularism and Islamic Democracy ...... 27 Overcoming the Challenges ........................................ 31 Why Democracy? ..................................... .............. ........................... 42 Where Do We Go From Here? .... ....... ............................................. .46 3. WAKING THE SLEEPERS ......................................................... 53 Laying the Foundation ....................................................... 54 Persecution ..................................................................... 59 Relaxation and Repression ................................................... 70 Concluding Thoughts ......................................................... 76 4. RISING OPPOSITION ............................................................... 80 Stepan & Relational Opposition ............................................ 82 Five Functions of an Opposition Movement. ............................. 87 5. THE MOVE TO MODERATION ................................................. 122 A Typology of Islamic Groups ............................................ 128 V1ll

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Assessing Moderation ................................... .. ................. l32 Playing by the rules ............................................... 132 Cooperation ....... .......... ....... ........... ............... ..... 141 Internal Moderation & Changing Boundaries .................. 148 Concluding Thoughts ... ....................... ............................... 177 6. FREEDOM IS THE SOLUTION .................................................. 188 A Group Divided ............................................................ 198 Society, Religion, and Popular Support for the Brothers ............... 204 The Muslim Brotherhood's Civil State: A Democratic Alternative .. ........ ........................... ..... ........................ 21 0 Concluding Thoughts ....................................................... 234 7 TOWARDS THE LIGHT: THE BROTHERHOOD AND THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN EGYPT ................................. 236 APPENDIX A. TRANSLATION OF TERMS ...................................................... 257 BIBLIOGRAPHy ............................................................................. 259 IX

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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION The most dangerous period in the life of a nation, and the most deserving of critical study, is the period of transition from one situation to another. It is then that plans for the new period are laid and its guiding principles and policies are drawn up, according to which, the nation will be formed and to which it will adhere. I -Hasan al-Banna Standing amidst the protestors in Egypt's Tahrir Square on February 10,2011 following an announcement that Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak would soon address the mass of demonstrators assembled there, a reporter asked Muhammad Abbas, a leader of the Muslim Brotherhood's youth wing, how he was feeling. "Nothing is better than this. Nothing in all my life is better than this time," replied Abbas. "I can't explain what I feel because it's over my imagination." Abbas' response illuminates what the mass of protestors, from all walks of life, must have been feeling at that moment. The announcement that Mubarak would finally address the crowds created a belief amongst the demonstrators that Mubarak was about to step down, that their demands would finally be met, that Egypt was taking the first steps on a long journey towards democracy. Yet, as Mubarak began his statement, it instantaneously became clear he had no intention of stepping down that day. As the president proceeded to elaborate on a plan to replace ministers within the 1 Hasan al-Banna, ''Towards the Light," ikhwanweb.colll, last modified June 13,2007, http;llwww.ikhwanweb.comiarticle.php?id=802&ref=search.php. 1

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government, the crowds reacted, holding up their shoes in disgust, as the initial excitement of the moment gave way to disillusionment and frustration at the stubbornness of the Egyptian leader. For those gathered in the square since the January 25th Day of Rage" protests set off a wave of demonstrations across the nation, Mubarak had to go. Protesting against the injustices of a thirty year old regime, the Egyptian people demanded more than mere lip-service to democracy; they desperately wanted a change. Immediately following Mubarak's announcement that he would continue in office, Abbas began to climb a pillar overlooking the masses, clutching a megaphone in one hand, clinging to the pillar with the other. Making his way from the pillar to the adjacent platform he spoke to the demonstrators, the army, and the regime. "We don't want more traitors!" he cried. "In the name of the Revolutionary Youth Council we call upon you [the army] to engage in civil disobedience!" As shouts of support echoed through the groups of protestors nearest his position Abbas continued, "The army has to choose between the regime and the people!" Pausing to catch his breath, Abbas extended his hand, placing it on the shoulder of a man at his side on the platform for balance as he doubled over. It appeared that the emotion of the moment was almost too much to bear. Yet, only a second later Abbas began to rally the crowds, chanting, 2

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"The army and the people, hand in hand!" Within twenty-four hours Mubarak was gone.This glimpse into the street demonstrations that swept the whole of Egypt from January 25th until Mubarak stepped down on February 11, 2011 illustrates the monumental importance of this event. For those thousands of men, women, and children gathered in the square, these demonstrations finally gave the people a voice in Egyptian politics. Expressing their dissatisfaction with the regime, their halfhearted concessions, and the limited democracy they controlled, the public mounted such a significant challenge that the regime had no choice but to abdicate power initiating a period of transition. It is important to note that nowhere in the above story is there any reference to the Quran, to Allah, to Islam, or any other religious connotations. Politicized religion remained notably absent from the entire process. Even Abbas, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood made no mention of religion in addressing the crowds, which is indicative of its absence from the whole process. The people, united in opposition to the regime's undemocratic practices, demanded they be allowed a political voice, the chance to vote, and the ability to participate in a democratic government. 2 ''The Brothers Frontline. PBS, February 22,2011, http://www pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontl i ne/revol uti oni n-cairol 3

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Yet, while the protests themselves may have not exhibited the Muslim Brotherhood's typical shouts and banners proclaiming "Islam is the Solution," the role this group will play in the aftermath should not be underestimated. As the Brotherhood's founder Hasan al-Banna said, the period of transition is a dangerous one; a time when the future course of the nation will be determined. The Muslim Brotherhood, as the oldest Arab Islamic group and the strongest opposition force to the Mubarak government, now represents the most well-organized and practiced political group in Egypt. This position raises many important questions such as: In the upcoming transition to democracy what role will the Muslim Brotherhood play? Will the previous regime's rhetoric that they are a radical group finally be proven correct? Will the Brothers use democracy only one time to institute a theocratic regime in the vein of Saudi Arabia or Iran? Or, should the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood be seen as a force for democracy, a moderate organization that respects the will of the people and wants to be included in determining the future of the nation? These are all questions this study seeks to address. Yet, in order to answer these questions there is a need to delve further into the relationship between Islam and democracy as well as the history of the Muslim Brotherhood. This raises deeper, more fundamental questions about the compatibility of Islam and democracy and the role of moderate Islamic groups and the creation of democratic opposition under conditions of authoritarianism. Questions such as: Are Islam and democracy 4

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compatible and if so, how? Can moderate Islamic groups be a force for democracy in the Arab world? Are the Brothers actually a moderate force and if so, does the history of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood provide any insight into how they will act without the opposition label? Therefore, the real question which must be asked is: Can the Muslim Brotherhood be seen as a force for democracy in Egypt both prior to, and in the aftermath of, the 2011 revolution on the Nile? As the most well organized political group in Egypt, and with the recent formation of the Brotherhood's political wing, the Freedom and Justice Party, they will undoubtedly playa role in a new Egyptian government. The group is sure to gain seats in a new parliament, a parliament which will go on to write a new Egyptian constitution. The future of Egypt rests in the balance. Some politicians/policy makers perceive the presence of the Muslim Brotherhood as a threat to the security of the MEN A region. They see the group as a supporter of terrorism and a harbinger of a radical Islamic theocracy bent on subjecting the world to extreme interpretations of Islamic sharia law. Understanding the group then, is a task of vital importance. Critically analyzing the extent to which the Muslim Brotherhood represents a moderate opposition force delves into the group's political philosophy, their history, and motivations. Thus, it can also help determine the commitment of the organization to democratic principles. In short, a critical analysis of the Egyptian 5

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Muslim Brotherhood aids in establishing whether or not there is rea s on to fear their pursuit of political power. Egyptian culture is steeped in religion to be sure. The Mus lim Brotherhood as a religious organization, claims to repre s ent e s pecially the religious sector of society. What will be interesting in the interim, between Mubarak's resignation and the formation of a new government, is the extent to which the Brotherhood clarify their political goals and exhibit their commitment to the will of the people as a whole who, as the prote s ts in early 2011 clearly illustrate, desire democracy Looking into the history of the Muslim Brotherhood, as s e s sing their historical development, and the extent to which they have embraced democratic norms while making them compatible with their goal of an Islamic state provides a good indication of what to expect from the group in the future. This analy s is also raises question s about the unity of the group as recent incidents suggest a split along generational and ideological lines. While previous policy debates have reared their head amongst Brotherhood member s the current divi s ions are apt to become more prominent as the formation of political parties and groups i s far le ss constrained now than in the past. To reiterate al-Banna, the most dangerou s period is that of transition Transition not only for the nation, but for the Muslim Brotherhood as an organization as well. As both the state and the group move into uncharted territory, a critical examination of 6

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the Muslim Brotherhood's past provides insight into developments that will surely affect the future. This study is then extremely relevant in light of these recent developments. Prior scholarship addressed the history of the Muslim Brotherhood, in detail, while many studies proclaim that the Brothers represent a moderate Islamic group. This study seeks to further develop the idea that the Brotherhood represents a moderate Islamic group through the use of theoretical approaches developed by lillian Schwedler and Alfred C. Stepan. Schwedler's test of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis in Yemen and lordan provides a series of conditions by which one can ascertain the degree to which an Islamic group has moved toward a more moderate path. Her application of these conditions to groups in the Arab world allows for them to be easily applied to the case of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt through simple transference. Stepan's theory of relational opposition, developed in response to the weakening of authoritarian regimes after the collapse of the Soviet Union then, provides a foundation on which to assess the strength of the Muslim Brotherhood as an opposition movement. Taken in tandem, these two theoretical bases exemplify how the Muslim Brotherhood emerged as the single most organized and respected moderate opposition group under the authoritarian regime of Hosni Mubarak. Building on this theoretical foundation the Brotherhood can be seen as creating a strong basis for the future development of democracy, all the while interpreting 7

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democratic norms and practices through an Islamic lens. Thus, this study, unlike others which have come before it, seeks to explore the Muslim Brotherhood as a force for democracy and the implications this holds for the future of Egypt. In looking at the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt on the potential for democracy in that particular state, there needs to be an emphasis on how the group developed as a moderate political force and internalized democratic principles. I argue that through this development they began espousing democratic principles and posed a challenge to the regime. Thus, they evolved into an opposition movement which sought to undermine the authoritarian regime by influencing the power relations in the country and providing a base for democratic participation. Necessarily then, there should be an emphasis on this process which a longitudinal approach provides. Since this study focuses on how past event s have shaped the current situation, it needs to be contextualized and specified, hence, the historical method is appropriate. The method most suited to this investigation then is that of a historical process case study. One of the reasons for selecting this methodology is to avoid the pitfalls of previous work on the compatibility of Islam and democracy. 3 As Islam encompasses such a wide swath of the globe it is impossible to generalize about it as a whole as 3 These pitfalls, primarily those in the Orientalist tradition, will be discuss e d in detail in Ch a pter 1. 8

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orientalist scholars have attempted to do. A significant problem with a large sample in qualitative research, as Mahoney points out, "could be instability in the measurement of key variables across diverse contexts. Indeed, the very meaning of the units being analyzed .. may change across temporal and spatial contexts, thereby generating heterogeneity and unstable estimates of causal effects.,,4 By limiting the scope of research, this study is able to focus on a specific group to fully contextualize the subject's environment rectifying the problem of instability. Also, a historicaldescriptive case study allows for within-case analysis which can "suggest other specific evidence that should be present if the hypothesis is correct.") This proved to be especially true in this case as the research indicated that the Muslim Brotherhood would pursue a particular course of action when provided the chance to do so. These indications could then be compared to their actions following Mubarak's ouster and the opening of political space in Egypt. As Russell K. Shutt points out, the defining characteristic of historical qualitative research is the focus on the case as a whole the context and all the intricacies that make up that case.6 In order to effectively James Mahoney, Qualitative Methodology and Compara tive Politics ," ComparaTive P o liTical Studies 40, no 2 (2007): 129. 5 Ibid .. 132 6 Russell K Schutt II1I' estigating the Social World: The pro cess and Pra c ti ce of Resear ch, 6th cd. (California: Pine Forge Press 2009), 428. 9

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address the questions posed above, a case study appears to be the most effective method. The first chapter of this study then aims to elucidate a clear definition of democracy which can be utilized throughout as a means of providing a conceptual foundation for further discussion. It is of the utmost importance that a clear definition of democracy is achieved in order to assess the compatibility of Islam and democracy, for without such a definition, no understanding could be reached. Definitions are all so varied and stipulate such a wide array of conditions it would be near impossible to explore the idea that Islam and democracy can be seen as compatible without an exact set of conditions which an Islamic polity must fulfill in order to be considered democratic. Thus, Chapter 1 not only focuses on defining democracy, but also explores the compatibility of the Islamic religion and the necessary conditions for a democracy to flourish based on our definition. In doing so the chapter moves through an analysis of orientalist approaches to Islam and the stipulation that secularism is a requisite condition for democracy to emerge and/or succeed. Finally this chapter examines the reasons many in the Islamic world call for democracy and some potential problems which need to be overcome in order for an Islamic democracy to take root. Chapter 2 then turns to the history of the Muslim Brotherhood and the development of their ideological platform. As the oldest and most influential Arab 10

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Islamic organization of the 20th century, the history of the Brotherhood is a lengthy one. Rather than attempt to present a detailed and exhaustive account of the organization, this chapter examines three instances, or moments, which played the most significant role in the development of the Brother's ideology. These moments provide insight into both the history and the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood by focusing on the specific circumstances of three pivotal points in the group's history: the founding, their imprisonment under Nasser, and the cycle of relaxation and repression initiated under Anwar Sadat and carried on by Hosni Mubarak. In Chapters 3 and 4 the Muslim Brotherhood is examined as a moderate opposition force within Egypt. Drawing on the aforementioned theories of Schwedler and Stepan, these chapters seek to explore how the Brotherhood evolved into a moderate political opposition. Chapter 3, in continuing to look at the historical development of the Muslim Brotherhood does so with the aim of analyzing the Brotherhood's development into a significant opposition force particularly under Hosni Mubarak. During this time the Brotherhood sought to cement their stance as an Islamic political opposition group while mounting a sustained critique of the state and creating a viable democratic alternative to the Mubarak regime. Chapter 4 then examines the group's moderation to illustrate that, in many ways the Brothers can be seen as a force for democracy in Egypt, especially since the 1980s. Looking at how the organization has redefined the boundaries of what is acceptable within an Islamic 11

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worldview illustrates the difference between the Muslim Brotherhood and more radical groups, while also providing an enlightening discussion of their commitment to democratic principles. Taken together, the group's moderation and ability to solidify their position as an opposition force created a significant democratic challenge to the Mubarak government. Finally Chapter 5 focuses on the period after Mubarak relinquished power in 2011 providing with-in case evidence to support the proposition that the Muslim Brotherhood is indeed a force for democracy. This chapter explores: 1.) The extent to which the Brotherhood has continued to act as a moderate force in Egyptian politics; 2.) Their political performance in the absence of an opposition label; and 3.) Ongoing developments within the organization as the state continues on a path toward democracy. In looking at the wave of political developments that washed over Egypt after Mubarak left power, the statements of Muslim Brotherhood members, and the actions of the organization we are able to test the theory that the Muslim Brotherhood would remain a powerful advocate for democratic politics even in the absence of an authoritarian ruler and the opposition label. Finally, a concluding section will discuss the implications of this study and highlight important areas ripe for further research. It is the sincere hope of the author that this writing helps to demonstrate that there is little reason to fear the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood as some scholars and policymakers do. Rather than perpetuating the view that they are a terrorist 12

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organization which would seek to reinstate a medieval Caliphate and should therefore be excluded from any political discussion, this study sees the Muslim Brotherhood as a group the international community should engage in political discourse. While they have been connected with radical Islamic and violent extremist movements around the globe, these connections are tenuous at best. In reality the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is a moderate Islamic organization that has espoused a commitment to democracy for the past forty years, yet, they remain misunderstood. This paper seeks to discuss and clarify these misunderstandings, their opposition to terrorism, and their commitment to democracy. Especially today, in light of the recent events in Egypt and the Brotherhood's preeminence on the political scene, it is of the highest consequence that the Muslim Brotherhood is seen for what they are: a moderate Islamic organization that the international community will surely have to engage with in the years ahead. 13

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CHAPTER 2 DEMOCRACY DEFINED Definitions of democracy are almost as varied as the array of scholars who study the topic. This is particularly the case with regard to the compatibility of Islam and democracy. The lack of a clear definition hampers many studies in that it exposes them to criticism on the grounds that certain requisite conditions have not been sufficiently met in order to label a specific polity a democracy. Thus, defining what is meant by democracy is critical to any analysis of the subject. Doing so provides a foundation for the subsequent argument, focuses the discussion, and allows for a definitive judgment as to whether or not a specific polity meets the definitional standard. Again, definitions are varied, so the theorist must choose between subscribing to a minimalist or maximalist definition. Minimalist definitions are just that they stick to the very basics, the minimal qualifications to be considered a democracy; whereas maximalist definitions take on a series of more explicit requirements that must be fulfilled if a particular polity is to be considered democratic. Robert A. Dahl in his 1971 work Polyarchy provides a seminal maximalist definition encompassing eight necessary institutional guarantees including: freedom to form and join organizations, freedom of expression, right to vote, eligibility for public office, right of political leaders to compete for both support and votes, alternative sources of 14

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information, free and fair elections, and institutions that make governmental policies dependant on vote and preference .7 He po s its that total and absolute responsiveness of the government to the people is the ideal by which democracies can be judged and, if they fulfill all of these conditions all of the time, they can be considered a democracy. Yet, he recognizes that few, if any, governments fulfill all these conditions at all times, proposing instead that most existing democracies are in fact polyarchies which can be judged according to a theoretical scale only as more or less democratic. On the other hand, well known democratic scholar Seymour Martin Lipset, in a recent book coauthored with Jason M. Lakin, typifies the minimalist tradition defining democracy as: "An institutional arrangement in which all adult individuals have the power to vote, through free and fair competitive elections for their chief executive and nationallegislature.,,8 By emphasizing the competitive nature of elections this definition implies there should be choices among different groups and individuals, without specifying how many, and that they should represent a large majority of the population, but not necessarily everyone. Therefore the key elements of this definition can be reduced to competitiveness or contestation and inclusiveness. 7 Robert A. Dahl. P o lyar c hy: Participation and Oppo s irion (New York: Yale University Press, 1971). 3. 8 Seymour Martin Lip se t and Jason M. Lakin The Dem o craric Celliury (Norman: Univer s ity of Oklahoma Pre ss. 2004). 19. 15

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It is here a tie to Dahl can be found in that both Lipset and Dahl emphasi z e the necessity of public conte s tation and the right of the citizenry to participate. For Dahl if a society fulfills the s e two conditions it i s con s idered a polyarchy judged according to his ideal scale. For Lipset however, the pre s ence of these two key principles sufficiently addre ss e s whether or not a polity can be considered a democr a cy. He acknowledges that thi s definition is lacking in defining or protecting certain political and civil right s but s tates a reason for this. The whole point of democracy is to leave outcomes ... to the electoral process, thus rendering them uncertain, writes Lipset. "Any system that predetermines these outcomes is not democratic.,, 9 Thus, the specifics of how a democracy will appear are left to the constituent s within each individual polity. Lipset doe s recognize that operationali z ing this definition is accompanied by numerous challenges, predominantly, how to determine if an election i s competitive. He proposes three conditions that must be met in order for elections to be considered sufficiently competitive. First, there must be a chance the current power holder will lose Secondly, there must be a minimum of two candidates or groups competing for power which could realistically achieve success. Finally, Lipset states that the current 9 Ibid. 23. 16

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power holder and the loser would willingly relinquish their hold on power. 10 Stepan and Robertson, seeking to identify whether or not competitiveness is present, add that competition can be identified if the elections are determined to be fair and if the elects of the people fill positions of power in its wake rather than a non-elected group. I I Again, we see the emphasis on competition between several power centers and the importance of the transference of power. The seeming simplicity of Lipset' s definition, and the qualifications he places on it in regard to competitiveness, do however require some 'unpacking'. By stipulating that all adults have the right to vote in competitive elections his definition implies that accountability and representation are also key facets of democracy. Competitive elections between more than one individual or group allow people to express their consent and/or disapproval of the power holders' actions through a vote. Thus, with their vote they not only participate in the political process, but provide consent for the power holder and their policies, performance, and agenda. If the public becomes dissatisfied there is a mechanism, the vote, which allows for the peaceful removal of public support for an individual or group which must then relinquish their hold on power. It follows then that representation is a key component 10 ibid .. 22. 11 Alfred C. Stepan and Graeme B. Robertson, "Arab, Not Muslim Exccptionalism,"' Journal of Democracy 15, no. 4 (2004): 141. 17

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of democracy in that, by voting, people authorize an individual or group to represent them within a government or decision making body. At the same time, through voting, the people are able to hold them accountable for their actions by either consenting to their continued representation or casting a vote for someone else. Thus, as Urbinati and Warren write, "Representation serves to unify and connect citizens, while also pulling them out of the immediate present and projecting them into futureoriented perspectives .,,12 In other words, representation, while allowing citizens to express their consent and hold individuals accountable, posits a dialogue between what is and what ought to be based on the current performance of power holders and the challenges of competitors. 13 "When we vote, we do two things at once: We contribute to forming a government or opposition, and we seek representation of our d J: ,,14 positlons an prelerences. If all have the ability to participate in elections, as Lipset's definition states is required for democracy, everyone is involved in the process of formulating a representative body that will be responsive to the needs and demands of the people as long as competitive elections remain in place. This open definition of democracy avoids reducing democracy to a delineated set of institutions and characteristics while 12 Nadia Urbinati and M a rk E. Warren, "The Concept of Representation in Contemporary Democratic Theory," Annual Revi e w of Political Science II (2008): 401. 1 3 Ibid. 401-402 Ibid., 398. 18

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at the same time structuring the autonomy of the individual citizen in creating a polity based on their notion of what ought to be. The implications of this definition for this study are obvious. In assessing the compatibility of Islam and democracy, and the degree to which individuals, movements or groups advocate for both Islamization and democratization, Lipset's definition provides the minimal qualifications necessary that need be fulfilled in order to begin a discussion of how the two can be reconciled. With the foundation of Lipset's definition we can explore the ways in which Islamic groups, like the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, have found compatibility between Islam and democracy based on a broad definition more open to reinterpretation and invention. For the duration of this study then, the word democracy is understood with reference to Lipset's definition which emphasizes contestation and participation. Islam and Democracy He who says that democracy is disbelief, neither understands Islam, nor democracy. IS -Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi The topic of Islam and democracy has been the subject of a fierce debate in the academic community for the past quarter century with highly respected scholars taking positions either supporting their compatibility or entirely rejecting the idea that 15 AI-Qaradawi cited by Murad Hoffman. 'Democracy or Shuracracy." in John 1 Donohue and John L. Esposito, eds., Islam in TransiTion: Muslim PerspecTives. 2nd ed .. (New York: Oxford University Press. 2007).296. 19

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the two can coexist. While this study is not an analysis of the compatibility of Islam and democracy, a brief discussion of the topic provides insight into how and why groups such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood would call for democracy and how they would reconcile those calls with their primary goal of an Islamic state based on shari a law.16 This discussion entails exploring three subsections of the debate. First, it is necessary to explore the perception of Islam as a monolithic civilization that is assessed as such rather than broken into its component parts. In assessing the possibility of an Islamic democracy an examination of one of the most commonly cited and enduring reasons for the perceived incompatibility between the two, secularism, allows this study to address the primary problems that arise from the assumption that secularism is a necessary condition for the successful functioning of a democracy. Finally, the primary challenges of reconciling Islam and democracy will be explored through an analysis of recent scholarship from both the academic and Islamic perspectives with a particular emphasis on the implementation of sharia law. This focus on sharia is necessary due to the implementation of Islamic law as a signifier of an Islamic state. A state without shari a is merely a state, whereas a state based in the sharia is considered a true Islamic state. Thus, the implementation of sharia represents the primary goal of the vast majority of Islamic movements, 16 I have chosen to spell sharia in this way as this is how the Muslim Brotherhood chooses to spell it in the English language. At several points throughout this study it appears in different spellings within quotations so as to preserve the authenticity of the initial statement. 20

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including the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. In order to find areas of compatibility between democracy and Islam, sharia law must be able to ensure both competition and inclusion which, as Lipset stipulated, are necessary for democracy. A Monolithic Civilization There has been much debate over the compatibility of Islam and democracy, particularly after the "third wave" of democratization failed to significantly impact the Middle East. 17 Many scholars have preferred to place the blame for this lack of democratic development squarely on the shoulders of an Islamic civilizational entity rather than examine particular cases in their specific contexts. Edward Said's influential Orielltalism published in 1978 brought to light many of the biases in Western theoretical work. IS Still, some scholars referred to as orientalists, continued to advocate the complete incompatibility and the irreconcilable divide that separates Islam and democracy. Yet, there have also been those that advocate for the later contextual approach and have pushed back against this orientalist position. These two viewpoints, and the groups of scholars which subscribe to them, can be categorized as the proponents of orientalism and the dissenters which dispute these orientalist claims. 17 Third wave of democratization is a concept propagated by Samuel Huntington arguing that democracy has experienced three waves, the last of which began around 1974 and continued through the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 1 8 Edward Said Oriellta/ism (New York: Pantheon 1978). 21

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Proponents take the view that Islam, with its belief that religion should permeate every aspect of life and society, can never be reconciled with liberal democracy. Volpi defines orientalism as "an approach to Islam that tries to build a comprehensive and systematic picture of an Islamic civilization, with its own logic and system of values" and roots this tradition firmly in the positivist social sciences which attempts to discern the object of Islam for systematic study. 19 The most well known advocates of this view are those like Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington who assess all of Islam as one entity without breaking it into individual parts or taking countries, rather than a civilization, as the unit of analysis.2o Alfred Stepan summarizes their view writing: The lack of separation between religion and state is seen as stemming from the Prophet Mohammed's fusion of military and spiritual authority. The lack of space for democratic public opinion in making laws is seen as deriving from the Quran, in which God dictated to the Prophet Mohammed the content of fixed laws that a good Islamic polity must follow. The lack of inclusive citizenship is seen as originating in interpretations of the Quran that argue that the only true polity in Islam is the fused religious-political community of the Ummah, in which there is no legitimate space for other religions? 19 Frederic Volpi, "Political Islam in the Mediterranean: the view from democratization studies," Democratization 16, no. I (2009): 22. 10 See Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong?: The Clash bent'een Islam and Modernity in the Middle East (New York: Perennial, 2002) and Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995). 11 Alfred C. Stepan. "Religion, Democracy, and the Twin Tolerations." Journal of Democracy II, no. 4 (2000): 48. 22

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Other scholars, such as Patricia Crone and Daniel Pipes are all soundly criticized as "neo-orientalists" by Yahya Sadowski on the basis of essentialist assumptions that reduce a complex, diverse, and widespread religion to a set of essential characteristics which are seen as matter-of-factly inhospitable to the idea or principles of democracy.22 A debate over civil society in the late 1980s and early 90s typified their constantly changing approach in the eyes of Sadowski. Initially the Islamic world did not allow a flourishing civil society, seen as a prerequisite for the emergence of democratic tradition claimed the orientalists, yet when academics began to study the strength of Islamic civil society, the argument became that it was too powerful to allow democracy to emerge.2J The dissenters on the other hand point out that the orientalist view stems from two faulty assumptions. First, that "Muslims around the world share a common, relatively homogonous body of doctrine on a wide array of religious, social, and political matters., Secondly, that this doctrine is the sole, or at least the most prominent, factor in shaping Muslim behavior and perception. Most of the earlier 22 See Patricia Crone. Slaves on Horses: The Evolution oJthe Islamic Polity (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni versity Press, 1980) and Daniel Pipes, Slave Soldiers alld Islalll: The Genesis oj a Militat)' Systelll (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1981). 23 For a comprehensive discussion of this particular debate see: Yahya Sadowski, 'The New Orientalism and the Democracy Debate." Middle East Report no. 183 (1993). Yahya Sadowski, "Political Islam: Asking the Wrong Questions," Annual Re\'iell' oj Political Science 9 (2006) : 216 23

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works from orientalist scholars have these assumptions in common. As more recent works have built upon these foundational texts they symptomatically suffer from the same flawed assumptions. Sadowski, to combat these basic assumptions, points to the divide between Sunni and Shia Muslims, differing national versions of Islam, as well as differences between classes and urban and rural populations in their specific interpretations of the faith.25 Esposito and Voll also point to the variation that exists between specific groups which have vastly different interpretations of Islam along both religious and academic lines. "There is much disagreement and debate and the lines of argument parallel the lines of intellectual conflict elsewhere," they write. They go on to point out that these lines indicate more of a dialogue than a single ideology.26 Voll, in a separate writing, pushes back against the idea that Islam, as a religion, can be viewed as a civilization. Drawing on Wallerstein's world systems theory he systematically illustrates through an examination of the history of Islam why it does not fit within Wallerstein's interpretation. Islam, proposes Voll, should be characterized instead as an "intercivilizational entity," or what he goes on to define as a "community of discourse," linked together by common terminology and 2 5 Ibid 218. c 6 John L. Esposito and John O Vol1. "Islam and the West: Muslim Voices of Dialogue:' Millennium Journal of International Studies 29, no. :I (2000): 6\3-614. 24

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reference points "possessing boundaries, st ructures, coherence and rules of legitimation. ,,27 Alfred C. Stepan in turn puts forth a very convincing argument regarding the compatibility of Islam and democracy. Pointing out that there is a global population of around one billion Muslims, 435 million of which currently reside in democratic states he warns "we should beware of assuming that any religion's doctrine is univocally prodemocratic or antidemocratic.,,28 Stepan posits that there is a notable reliance on a unique set of conditions, such as those present when electoral democracy first arose, to predict whether or not democracy can emerge in a given polity. These "unique founding conditions" can be recreated or reformulated, he argues, based on the cultural resources available to a given society. Therefore, Islam may give rise to a version of democracy that satis fies the basic conditions of Lipset' s definition while it may appear far different from the typical Western liberal conception. Stepan then addresses the issue of secularism stating that "one of the major tasks of political and spiritual leaders who wish to revalue democratic norms in their own religious community will be to advance theologically convincing public 27 John O. Voll, Islam as a Special World-System ," Journal of World History 5 no .2 (1994): 217-220. 2 8 Alfred C. Stepan. Arguing Comparatil'e Politi cs (New York: Ox ford Univer s it y Pr ess. 2001), 236. Quote from Stepan. "Religion D e mocracy and the Twin Tolerations." 44 25

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arguments about the legitimate multivocality of their religion.,,29 In other words, religious leaders that seek to implement a democratic system will need to put forth arguments that express the compatibility between theological doctrine and the principles of democracy. As we will see (in Chapter 4), this is precisely what the leadership of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has attempted to do with Islamic concepts and democratic principles. This thesis takes the contextual approach of the dissenters in addressing the compatibility of Islam and democracy. Recent scholarship, from both western and Muslim religious scholars, has argued that there are many principles within Islam which can be interpreted as supportive of democracy. While this is no doubt true, it is also the case that these interpretations vary across the Muslim world and, as a result there can be no single model of Islamic democracy, just as there is no lone model of western democracy. "An Islamic democracy would not be a copy of the Westminster one, since the Arab-Islamic world knows its own unique forms of pluralism, confederation, civil soc iety, and distribution of power. .. ," writes, Murad Hofman. "After all, even in the West Westminster only exists in Westminster.,,3o Each society or culture would draw on their own specific cultural traditions and resources, their 19 Stepan, "Religion, Democracy, and the Twin Tolerations ," 45. 30 Murad Hoffman "De mocracy or Shuracracy, in Donohue and Esposito, eds., I s lam in Transition. 302. 26

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own interpretations, when crafting a democratic system. Thus, there would be a significant amount of variation across the Muslim world, just as there is in the West. What is important then, is to note that certain stipulations, such as secularism laid down in the Western liberal tradition, may not be necessary in the Muslim world. In fact, drawing from their cultural heritage, indi vidual Islamic polities may give rise to versions of democracy that not only challenge western conceptions but advance democratic theory. Removing the Veil: Secularism and Islamic Democracy One "truth" which the orientalist argument correctly identifies and makes abundantly clear is that there is no possible way to separate the spheres of religion and politics in Islam. This impossibility stems from the Prophet Mohammed's fusion of the military and religion, often cited as the primary reason that Islam and democracy are not compatible. Muslims and scholars alike make the argument that Islam represents a complete system, a total way of life, therefore, the separation of religion and politics is an absolute impossibility. How then does one reconcile secular democracy and Islam? As this section will illustrate, Islam proves to be anything but lacking in democratic principles. These principles allow for considerable overlap between Islam and democracy. Yet, as Stepan notes above, an attempted reconciliation will prove to be fruitless if it begins from the false assumption that democracy must be secular. The following discussion highlights the 27

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significant contributions of the debate over the necessity of secularism to democracy and emerging theories which attempt to remove the veil of secularism from democratic theory and account for the obvious influence of religion on politics. Daniel Philpott points out that the word secular is used in a myriad number of different ways. "The term is notoriously shifty, sometimes used descriptively, sometimes predictively, sometimes prescriptively, sometimes ideologically, sometimes implying hostility to religion, sometimes carrying a neutral or positive connotation.,,3l He goes on to distinguish nine separate conceptualizations of the term, two of which are of particular consequence to this analysis. The first is the conception which has come to be taken as a major requisite of democracy, one that promotes the differentiation between spheres of society, yet does not see religion's influence as on the decline.:n The second conceptualization, which he finds throughout political theory, is of the secular as a differentiation between spheres of society and religion that insinuates a progressive decline of the influence of religion on these societal spheres. This idea of the secular and its philosophical implications leads to the notion that as society progresses, the influence of religion on politics will remain in a state of decline. Religion's influence will continue to wane as religion 31 Daniel Philpot, "Has the Study of Global Politics Found Religion?" Annual Review of Political Science 12 (2009): 185. 32 Ibid., 190-191. 28

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declines overall within society or because of its suppression and continued separation from the realm of politics by political powers. Philpott proposes that historical events, beginning with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and including the development of the state system in the West which subordinated religion under the ruler, the Enlightenment, and the rise of nationalism, all helped to promote the idea that religion's influence was on the decline. This idea gained support and grew in influence as the world witnessed the French revolution, reaching its high point, as Timothy Samuel Shah argues, from the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 until the Six Day War between Israel and Egypt in 1967.33 As theorists are influenced by the context in which their theories are produced, the vast majority of political theory which emerged throughout this period came to reflect this conception of the secular. During this time even the Arab world adopted the idea that secular governments, modeled on Western institutions, should control the state. Egypt under Nasser from the 1950s into the 1970s was a highly secularized society based on nationalism and Arab unity rather than any overarching Islamic identity. Yet, by 1967, the world began to witness the global resurgence of religion. The Six Day War with Israel had a profound effect on the Arab world, greatly diminishing the hope and prestige of secular nationalists like Nasser in Egypt while encouraging a resurgence of Islam in a more overtly political form. As political Islam began its rise, the globe 33 Ibid .. 189. 29

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witnessed the reemergence of religion as an influential aspect of political decision making processes for both individuals and organizations. The Second Vatican Council (1962-65) brought forth a more politically active Catholic agenda. The United States saw the Christian Right emerge as a major political force, while Hindus in India and Buddhists across South and East Asia all began taking a more active role in politics.34 As the above events make abundantly clear, religion played and continues to fill a crucial role in society and therefore both national and international politics. Political theory which ignores the role of religion, or continues to promote the idea that modernity is somehow connected to the diminishing influence of religion, neglects a significant factor which indeed shapes human and institutional action. Philpott's di s cussion does two things: 1) It explains why orientalist thought had such a strong foundation initially and gave rise to the faulty assumptions which undergird recent scholarship and the incompatibility of Islam and democracy; and 2) Illustrates that with the resurgence of religion there is a need to craft a new understanding of the role of religion on politics This second contribution is particularly important in attempting to reconcile Islam and democracy. The acknowledgement that there needs to be a reassessment of secular thought has led to a slew of new theories that seek to explore the distinctiveness of each religion. In Ibid. 190-191. 30

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viewing each religion as distinct, with its own array of cultural resources and traditions, there can be a reassessment of the necessity of secularism for democracy to flourish in religious societies. While it may appear very different from the Western liberal/secular model, democracy then can be seen as compatible with Islam as long as it fulfills our definitional characteristics. As Volpi points out it has become "conceptually hazardous to equate democratization with secularization and westernization. Overcoming the Challenges Volpi's warning resonates throughout the Muslim world. "Some leaders of Islamic movements have spoken out against Western-style democracy and a parliamentary sys tem of government," write Esposito and Piscatori "Their negative reaction has often been part of the general rejection of European colonial influence, a defense of Islam against further dependence on the West rather than a wholesale rejection of democracy.,,36 Liberated from the Western idea that in order to achieve democracy you must first have a secular state, Muslims are granted the space to maneuver, to reconceptualize democracy in line with their specific cultural traditions. 35 Volpi, "Political Islam in the Mediterranean," 32. 36 John L. Espos ito and Jame s Piscatori "Democratization and Islam ," Middle EaST J Ollmal45, no. 3 (1991):434. 31

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One way to examine how Islam and democracy are specifically compatible is to move into what Frederic Volpi calls the "grey areas" of democracy in which there is a "partial convergence of Islamist and liberal-democratic political agendas." These areas "reflect upon the alternative political realities that Islamist movements are constructing, both ideologically and socially," and allow a specifically tailored version of democracy to emerge in each particular polity.37 The usefulness of Lipset's definition of democracy is again evident in the fact that he does not delineate necessary institutions but rather the main criteria for establishing a democratic polity. Thus, each polity retains the ability to adapt democracy to societal, cultural, and political specifications. These constructions then are framed by different staring points and basic assumptions such as those about religious law and the purpose of a state. Bruce K. Rutherford clearly points this out by comparing the view of the state in Western Liberal thought to Islamic conceptualizations. In the Western tradition the state is perceived as maintaining control over a vast amount of resources with the potential to very easily intrude upon individual rights so it must be constrained. In Islamic thought the state is a positive institution that acts in the best interest of the umma (community) through the principles of sharia thus bringing the community together and strengthening its morality, resolving disputes, and both preserving and spreading 37 Volpi. "Political Islam in the Mediterranean" 31-32. 32

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the faith. One of the preeminent modern Islamic scholars, Abu-L-' Ala' Mawdudi posits that the Islamic state is positive rather than negative in that the goal of the state is not only the prevention of exploitation but of "evolving and developing that wellbalanced system of justice which has been set forth by God ... ,,38 The relationship between the individual and the state then is one of cooperation, whereby both individuals and the state work together to develop pious citizens who ensure that the state continues to effectively direct society according to the tenets of Islam.39 Thus, as Rutherford writes, ... the metaphor for Islamic constitutionalism is a carefullymaintained path that directs state power toward the transformation of individual Muslims and the creation of a more pious community.,,4o Scholars, academic and Islamic both, point to several concepts within Islam that exemplify the compatibility of democracy and religion. First there is tawhid (Unity of God; no God but God) which illustrates the supremacy of God over all, yet also provides for equality before God. This concept provides the basis for Islamic governance which as such is the complete opposite of a secular democracy. In fact Mawdudi posits that as this is the basis of government, an Islamic state would be 38 Abu-L-'Ala' Mawdudi, "Political Theory of Islam ," in Donohue and Esposito eds., Islam in Transition, 266. 39 Bruce K. Rutherford, "What Do Egypt s Islamists Want ? Moderate Islam and the Rise ofIslamic Constitutionalism," Middle East }oumal60, no 4 (2006): 729-7:'0. -10 Ibid., 729. 33

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"described in English as a theocracy." He goes on to point out that "The theocracy built up by Islam is not ruled by any particular religious class but by the whole community of Muslims ... the entire Muslim population runs the state in accordance with the Book ... ".+1 God's absolute sovereignty therefore makes all humans equal before God and creates a barrier to the development of a hierarchical system of governance. "Thus, taw hid provides the conceptual and theological foundation for an active emphasis on equality within the political system.',.+2 Khilafah (Caliphate) refers to Islamic history in that the leader of the Muslim community was called the caliph and the system of government the caliphate.43 In the second half of the twentieth century the emphasis for the meaning of this term shifted from that of denoting a successor to mean a representative. Some sections of the Quran identify people as God's representatives on this earth. The emphasis on representation leads to the logical conclusion that God's authority of the caliphate is granted to the community as a whole. Again turning to Mawdudi, he stresses the interpretation of the term as viceregency rather than sovereignty. God is the only sovereign, he argues, and it was God that promised "the power to rule over the earth ... to the whole community of believers." Therefore, there can be no class -11 Mawdudi in John L. Esposito and John O. VolI, Islam alld Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996),23-24. -12 Esposito and Voll. Islam alld Democracy. 25. -13 Ibid." 23-24. 34

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divisions or privilege based on status gained through race, birth, or profession nor is there room for a dictator as his authority has been bestowed upon him by his fellow caliphs. Mawdudi also points out that there is no particular privilege granted to people on the basis of sex which also speaks to the equality of rights across genders.44 Again, this interpretation of the Quran promotes the idea of equality amongst people and that all are endowed with the authority to actively participate in governing themselves.45 Minorities are addressed by the commonly referenced Sura 256 in the Quran which states, "There shall be no compulsion in Religion.,,46 This is typically taken to mean that freedom of religion is a direct command from God and thus must be incorporated into any Islamic government. A major justification for allowing the freedom of religion is again presented by Mawdudi who posits that in Islam everyone will answer to God. Hence, all people are free to choose and follow their own path. The leader of an Islamic state, argues Mawdudi, must not interfere with an individual's selection or "he himself will be punished by God for this tyranny.,,47 Yet H Abu-L-'Ala' Mawdudi, "Political Theory of Islam." in Donohue and Esposito eds .. Islam in Transition, 268-270. -15 Ibid., 25-26. -16 As cited in Stepan, "Religion, Democracy and the Twin Tolerations," 48. -17 Abu-L-' Ala Mawdudi Political Theory of Islam:' in Donohue and Esposito eds. Islam ill Transition, 270. 35

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the most frequently cited terms are the Quranic concepts of shura (consultation), ijma (consensus), and ijtihad (interpretation or reasoning). Some thinkers go so far as to argue that because these principles are the same as those espoused by democracy, Islam is therefore inherently democratic. The concept of ijtihad holds particular relevance in light of tawhid in that, though God's laws are supreme over all there are instances where interpretation is allowed, even called for. The need for interpretation is clearly evident in situations where sharia gives a general tenant for behavior but does not address the complexity of today' s world. Many Islamic scholars have made the argument that in order to effectively address social evolution, the understanding of sharia also needs to evolve. Fathi Osman, an Egyptian born scholar, nicely summarizes this belief writing, "The Quran and Sunna provide the general laws, but the human mind is entrusted with the details and specifics for coping with the unceasing changes in human society." Incorporating the concept of shura (consultation), he continues saying, "Human beings know what may be beneficial and fair for a given time and place, and the more people involved in such collective thinking and discretion, the fewer mistakes made.,,48 Ijtihad then is one mechanism by which sharia can be made applicable to all aspects of life even in situations and societies which are far different than those at ,)8 Fathi Osman, "Shura and Democracy'-' in Donohue and Esposito, eds., Islam ill Transition, 290. 36

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the time of sharia's conception. Altaf Gauhar addressing the importance of ijtihad writes, "The faith is fresh, it is the Muslim mind which is befogged. The principles of Islam are dynamic, it is our approach which ha s become static. Let there be a fundamental rethinking to open avenues of exploration, innovation, a nd creativity.,,49 Rutherford surveyed the writings of four prominent and influential Egyptian constitutionalist thinker s (Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Tariq al-Bishri, Kamal Abu al-Majd, and Muhammed Salim al-'Awwa) in hi s 2006 analysis that attempts to discern what concepts Islamist s see as necessary to an Islamic government. His research concluded that these thinkers all "stress that shura is the guiding principle of Islamic governance," and believe that the Quran instructs both leaders, and the people, to consult on issues that are important to the community, particularly whenever the Quran and Sunna are unclear. 50 Sharia Law Sharia is often pointed to as the most significant challenge to I s lamic democracy. Sharia is divine law, given to the people from God, and thus representative of his will. Esposito and Mogahed define sharia as an I s lamic system Altaf Gauhar in Esposito a nd Voll, Islam and Democracy, 29. 50 Rutherford "What D o Eg y pt s Islamists Want?" 713. 37

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of principles that covers all facets of life.51 Ibrahim el-Houdaiby, former member of the Muslim Brotherhood and great grandson of the former lIlurshid (Supreme Guide), writes: Shariah literally means 'the way.' In an Islamic context, it means the authentic, orthodox Islamic way of living, which is based on the teaching of the Quran and the Sunnah. This way of life does not merely mean laws and regulation adopted and implemented by state institutions, but rather a comprehensive way of life.52 As such shari a presents a conflict between the legitimacy and authority of God and that of human beings in the area of representative government and the passing of law.53 Yet, even divine law requires direction by human intervention to address modern issues, so the question arises, how can a n Islamist party direct shari a law under a democratic system? One needs to keep in mind that Islam is beginning from a different place than did the West. Thus the cultural reference points will not always be the same but there is some correlation Rutherford points out that an Islamic state is not only defined by, but also restricted by law, applied to both the power holder and the citizenry, law which citizens have a role in creating. The sharia is a fundamental constraint on 51 John L. Esposito and Dalia Mogahed. "Who Will Speak for Islam," World P o li c y J o urnal (2008): 48. 52 Ibrahim el-Houdaiby Applying Shariah," ikhwanwe b.col1l, last modified 2007 http://ikhwanweb com/print.php?id=14143. 53 Husain Haqqani and Hillel Fradkin "Going Back to (he Origins ," JOllrnal o f D e mocra c y 19, no. 3 (2008): 16. 38

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state power," which Abu al-Majd argues "plays the same role in Islamic legal thought that natural law plays in the American constitutional tradition. It defines the purposes of state power and delineates it boundaries."s4 Thus sharia is seen as a positive thing, not as a barrier to democracy, rather a guarantee that the state clearly follows a set of goals and provides an environment for the people conducive to living out their faith. El-Houdaiby echoes this statement writing, ''The state's role in some cases is merely to present a healthy atmosphere ... the state should be responsible for creating a fear free atmosphere; one in which different ideas could be propagated not banned."S5 If the state does not meet these conditions, sharia provides the justification for changing power holders, placing the ultimate power with the people by granting them the right to dissent and remove a corrupt ruler from power though it does not stipulate a mechanism through which to do so.56 Esposito and Mogahed, reporting on six years of data, including over 50,000 interviews, gathered by the Gallup Organization in the Muslim world find that support for sharia law is strong, but also that there are variations in how people want it to be implemented. Some advocate only for laws that stem from and do not violate sharia, others wish simply to pay homage to it as a significant source of Islamic 5.\ Rutherford "What Do Egypt s lslamisls Want?" 712 55 d-Houdaihy, "Applying Shariah."' 56 See also Sadowski Political Islam," 229 39

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values, while some even proposed it should be combined with Western law. Again, this illustrates how heterogeneous the Islamic community is, but also depicts how strong an influence religion has on politics for a large majority of the population. Minorities advocated for a theocratic system, but democracy and rights such as freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and freedom of assembly overwhelmingly drew the most support as people proposed that they need not choose between Islam and democracy. Rather, people proposed Muslims could invent them anew, as coexistent elements of an Islamic political system with sharia as a source of law, but not the only one. 57 How are these views of an Islamic democracy consistent with el-Houdaiby's definition given earlier of sharia as a comprehensive way of life? He answers this question himself by examining how sharia is broken down into three branches, Akhlaq (ethics), 'ebadat (rituals), and mo'amalat (transactions). He goes on to state, "Ethics and rituals have nothing to do with regulations and political activity, and have nothing to do with the state." He explains these are religious branches which a government cannot implement but rather are regulated by personal choice. Houdaiby points out that an individual may do what he or she pleases as long as it does not harm society and therefore politics should not be involved. In regard to transactions, he sees it as the state's responsibility, as presented in sharia law, to uphold an ethical 57 Esposito and Mogahed, "Who Will Speak for Islam," 52 and 54. 40

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economic system that prohibits monopolies, enforces the zakat (a donation to the poor), and is part of the larger development of a moral and just society. Finally, he uses the influential scholar Qaradawi's argument that there are seven pillars oflslam as discerned from sharia. EI-Houdaiby then proposes that the state should have a role in four of the seven: human rights, justice for women, building a cooperative world, and the creation of an ethical nation. He believes the state could also playa role in developing the Muslim family, yet it should be substantially smaller than in the first four spheres, while the state's impact, if it has any at all, should be the most minimal in what he deems the "primarily preachable and religious" spheres.58 Other interpretations of sharia focus more on the primary principle of sharia as being to establish that which is 'good'. Proponents of this view posit that the primary goal of sharia is to establish justice, or that which is good, above all else. In order to do so sharia is seen as capable of integrating nonIslamic elements in order to promote justice and equality among the people. In doing so sharia is then made compatible with democracy including plural politics and the various human freedoms the Gallup survey indicated the Muslim world supports. As Ibn Qayim AI-Jawziyah, one of the main advocates of this view writes: Some Scholars categorise government into shari'ah (law) and siyasah (politics) in the same manner as they categorise deen (religion) into shari'ah 58 el-Houdaiby, "Applying Shariah." 41

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and haqiqah (reality) ... but all these categorizations are wrong. Politics, reality, methodology, and reasoning are all categorized into two classes: right and wrong. Shari'ah accepts and supports all that which is right and opposes and rejects that which is bad or corrupt. 59 Sharia then, is a system of law that regulates the conduct of the state and individuals. Through ijtihad, ijma, and shura it can be interpreted and applied based on a collective understanding and consultative decision making process. It prescribes rules for both state and individual conduct but also offers freedoms and protections to individuals from encroachment on personal matters by the state. As el-Houdaiby points out, if matters of religion are removed from the purview of the state, people are free to pursue their own faith, yet are still guaranteed a right to take part in the decision making process in matters that relate to the good of the whole community. In order to effectively implement sharia though, there is still the need for a state. The next section will address the reason that many Islamists see democracy as the best type of state available to accomplish the implementation of sharia. Why Democracy? The Gallup data utilized by Esposito and Mogahed revealed that the vast majority of Muslims want certain freedoms, such as freedom of speech and of the press, that they believe in democracy, and admire the western democratic system. It also revealed that the majority do not believe that democracy and religion must be 5 9 As cited by Muhammad Salim AI-Awa, "Political Pluralism From an Islamic Perspective in Donohue and Esposito, eds., Islalll ill TrallSitioll 284 42

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entirely segregated. For Muslims, "greater democratization does not mean secularization ... but a synthesis of greater freedoms and the recognition of religious values," wrote Esposito and Mogahed.6o The separation of politics from religion runs contrary to most Islamic thought as politics are connected to issues within the world and it is the duty of a devout Muslim to be an active participant in resolving the issues faced today through a reliance on their faith. Dr. Ahmad aI-Malt, a former deputy to the murshid of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt points out "politics is a part of Islam, because Islam is concerned with this world and the hereafter. Worldly issues must be addressed as a religious duty.,,61 Thus to participate in politics is to participate in a system of governance that should produce the most effective form of an Islamic society. Yet, as Muhammed Salim AI-Awa, a specialist in comparative and Islamic law, points out, at no point in either the Quran or the Sunnah is a system of government prescribed. Hence, Lipset's definition of democracy, along with the ambiguity of the Islamic religious texts on this issue, allow for the invention of new forms of government that can still fulfill the basic conditions of democracy. AI-Awa acknowledges however, that the Islamic texts do in fact stipulate several conditions 60 Esposito and Mogahed, "Who Will Speak for Islam," 51-54. 61 Sana Abed-Kotob. "The Accomodationists Speak: Goals and Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt," International Journal of Middle East Studies 27, no.3 (1995): 332. 43

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which must be met in an Islamic state. First, that the community is afforded the opportunity to choose a ruler. Second, that as freedom to choose is one of the fundamental values of Islam, political freedom is therefore simply a branch of this encompassing principle. Finally, three additional principles, equality before the law, "enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong", and the accountability of rulers as established by the actions of the Prophet, make up the remaining foundational constraints for a state as prescribed by the Holy AI-Qaradawi saw democracy as the best form of government for pursuing the goals of an Islamic state, yet qualified his belief by proposing that Islam should adopt only the best policies and practices of democracy and adapt them to Islamic principles .63 Fattah and Butterfield see Islamic modernists as advocating for democracy and democratic institutions because they are an efficient means of fulfilling the requirement of shura in Islamic polities. 64 The concept of shura or consultation is necessary for Muslims as it is an edict in the Quran. Rulers must consult with the governed in order for any s tate to be truly Islamic Thus, democratic institutions allow for this consultation, as well as for ijma (consensus) in the decision 62 Muhammed Salim AI-Awa, "Political Pluralism from an Islamic Perspective," in Donohue and Esposito, cds., Islam in Transition, 283-284. 63 Rutherford "What Do Egypt's Islamists Want?" 716. Moataz A. Fattah and Jim Butterfield "Muslim Cultural Entrepreneurs and the Democracy Debate. Critique: Critical Middl e Eastern Studies 15. no. I (2006) : 65. 44

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making process and in legitimating a power holder. The democratic system has mechanism s in place, such as voting, and decision making bodies such as parliaments, that ensure consultation is carried out and a consensus reached before a law is enacted. The people, through voting for representatives (as discussed earlier), authorize them to speak on their behalf and in doing so also participate in the process of shura fulfilling their duty as khilafah. The vote also ensures that the leader is responsive to the people as they have the ability to withdraw their support, thus ending the leaders hold on legitimate authority and providing a mechanism for the people to reject a ruler that has strayed from the path of Islam. Esposito and Voll also point out that in the time since colonialism the vast majority of Muslim s tates have incurred a reign of authoritarian dictators. These dictators came to power under the auspices of nationalism and secularism promising great changes and benefits to the popUlation After a significant period of time, as these promised benefits continuously failed to appear, the population began to feel disenchanted with the secular, authoritarian style. Hence, authoritarian regimes have been associated with the secular, nationalist past and a failure to develop. Opposition groups, primarily of an Islamist tinge thus began to advocate for increases in democracy as a way to challenge the authoritarian regimes and demand a return to Islam, seen as a remedy for the ills of following the secular nationalist course. The more Islamic democratization becomes it "loses its secular dimension s as it becomes 45 ---------------------------

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a popular, and more truly democratic movement," write Esposito and Voll. "In this way the pressures for democratization in the Islamic world reinforce and give added strength to the Islamic resurgence.,,65 Democratization then, in this sense, represents a path to a more religious and less secular state as a reaction to the failure of Western backed secular and typically authoritarian governments. Where Do We Go From Here? Even in light of the above discussion there are several questions that immediately spring to mind when discussing the possibility of an Islamic democracy. Most deal specifically with the potential actions of an Islamic government. Yet, that is precisely what they are potential actions. Even in the West there is no guarantee that parties which assume power will carry out their initial promises or that their actions will not vary greatly from their rhetoric. Haqqani and Fradkin point to the historical legacy of Islamist thought as a burden to future revision as there is a strong history and dependence on tradition which permeates Islam as a religion. They go on to pose many popular questions regarding Islamist group's commitment to democratic principles pointing out that, while the above does represent a revision of Islamic thought, most of this revision has taken place under the constrained conditions of authoritarian regimes. They therefore question whether or not it can be taken at face 65 Esposito and Voll Islam and Democracy, 16. 46

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value or is merely a form of posturing to ensure their continued survival under conditions of repression. 66 While we cannot sufficiently assuage all fears in regard to the actions of Islamic governments we can do two things. First, we can critically examine the argument or position of Islamic groups. As we have seen, the removal of secularism as a precondition for democracy encouraged the growth of new political theories by both Islamists and academics. Islamists, eager to highlight the Islamic traditions that are essentially democratic or which can be seen as hospitable to democratic institutions, have produced an astounding amount of writing on the compatibility of democracy and Islam. Each of these writings offers a unique perspective on areas of compatibility, proposals for how a state could be organized, and/or the combination of sharia and democratic law. These writings provide valuable models by which to assess a group's commitment to democratic principles in whether or not their conception echoes that of these other scholars or builds upon previous models. Thus, the scholars provide a discussion of areas to look at when analyzing an Islamic group and their proposed path forward. While Islamic writings, especially in case studies of distinct groups, are highly important, so are the new theories. The s e theories provide a theoretical foundation upon which a study of an Islamic group or groups can be constructed. Using the methods propo s ed in previous theoretical work the strength of an Islamic group's 66 Haqqani and Fradkin, "Going Back to the Origins," 16. 47

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commitment to democratic principles can be empirically tested based on established conditions that have been utilized in other areas of research or in assessing other groups. Thus stronger conclusions can be drawn based on previous experience. Secondly, we can examine the historical record of Islamic group's participation in elections to get a sense of how these groups have fared in elections or once they obtained power. Alfred C. Stepan provides a convincing rebuttal to the popular "one vote, one time" or "free-election trap" accusation leveled by many intellectuals critical of Islamist participation in democracy, Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington in particular. He finds that the 1996 election in Bangladesh yielded only three seats for the Islamic Party. Five elections in Pakistan saw the most popular Islamist party, the HI, initially succeed but then relinquish power, retaining only two seats by 1997. S.V.R Nasr concludes that the open nature of elections in Pakistan "encourages the flowering of diversity of Muslim political expression and prevents the reduction of the political discourse to revivalism versus secularism.,,67 In the case of Turkey, after an Islamist Prime Minister came to power in 1996 and was accused of violating Turkey's secular constitution, he resigned. In examining cases in Bangladesh, Turkey, and Pakistan, Stepan is able to refute the "one vote, one time" hypothesis writing, ... Huntington's implication that elections in 67 Nasr in Stepan, "Religion, Democracy. and the Twin Tolerations," 51. 48

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predominantly Islamic countries will lead to fundamentalist majorities who will use their electoral freedom to end democracy gets no support from our analysis of electoral and political behavior in the world's three largest Islamic countries.,,68 Here, Stepan provides just one illuminating example of how utilizing the historical record can in fact overturn some of the major challenges put to the idea of an Islamic democracy. The challenge in attempting to accomplish these two tasks is one of selection. While the Muslim world is rife with possibilities for exploring Islamic groups' compatibility with democracy, attempting to do so on a wide scale does not allow for the attention to detail or context that is necessary for a complete and thorough analysis. Thus, this study will attempt to analyze one particular group the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, due to their notoriety on the international level. They are well recognized as the first modern Islamic group and have had, without a doubt, the most profound impact on the Islamic movement of any organization in the Arab world in the 20th century As previoLlsly stated, the writings of the actors themselves are incredibly important to accomplishing our first task of critically examining their position. In addition to having a substantial history the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is also a prolific organization which makes available a wide array of 6 8 Stepan Religion Democracy and the Twin Tolerations ," 50-51. 49

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information through scholars and on their English language website ( www.ikhwanweb.com). There is also the challenge of selecting appropriate theories by which to test each unique group or organization as there are a veritable buffet from which to choose. Two newly emerging theories are of particular importance to this study's attempt to accomplish the critical task of assessing the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's commitment to democracy. First, we will look at Alfred C. Stepan's relational approach to opposition groups in authoritarian regimes. This theory proposes that, as an opposition group develops, it seeks to change five power relationships under an authoritarian regime through the execution of five specific tasks.69 Secondly, lillian Schwedler draws on the inclusion-moderation hypothesis to examine Islamic groups and the extent to which political inclusion pushes them in the direction of a more moderate path and can lead these groups to internalize democratic principles.70 Both of these theories can then be applied directly to the case of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in a qualitative case study to determine whether or not this specific group has experienced moderation and developed democratic positions through their opposition to the authoritarian regime in Egypt. 69 Stepan, Arguing Comparative Politics. 70 Jillian Schwcdkr. FaiTh ill ModernTioll: Islamist Parti es ill Jordall alld Yemell. (New York: Cambridge Univer s ity Pr ess, 2006). 50

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As for the second task, examining the historical record, being one of the oldest Islamic organizations, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood possesses a rich history which is helpful in tracing their development. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood also attracts a significant amount of academic attention, due to their status as an influential group, which has generated a considerable account of the organization's history. By examining the previous academic work on this group, in conjunction with important documents from within the organization, an in-depth analysis of their historical evolution and record with democracy can be achieved. This historical analysis then lends itself to both a historical and more current application of the above theories in that it provides instances of key ideological development and of historical evolution which can be used to establish the group's path toward moderation and development as a major oppositional force to the authoritarian Egyptian state. This first chapter provides an exploration of the definition of democracy provided by Lipset; an investigation into the primary areas of compatibility between democracy and Islam; an understanding of how new political theories have come to emerge that grant religion its due allowing for an assessment of its impact on the political process; and an awareness of the necessity of examining both the argument/position of an Islamic group and their historical record to achieve an understanding of that group's commitment to democracy. Equipped with these foundational tools, the rest of this study will attempt a critical examination of the 51

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Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's historical moderation and development as a democratic opposition. This examination then lends itself to an exploratory survey of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's goals and continued commitment to democracy, not as an opposition group but a major political player, in the aftermath of the 2011 Revolution on the Nile. 52

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CHAPTER 3 WAKING THE SLEEPERS History is who we are and why we are the way we are. -David McCullough One cannot claim to understand the present without first examining the past. History is what shapes us. It provides a frame of reference from which our current perceptions, ideologies, and actions emerge. This statement holds true for groups as well as individuals. As one of the oldest Islamic movements, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is no different. Some theorists have looked at this as a blessing. The lengthy history of the Brotherhood has given it time, to evolve, to grow. Others see it as a curse. The title of Alison Pargeter's 2010 work, The Muslim Brotherhood: The Burden of Tradition, implies that this history is something to be overcome, to be dealt with, in becoming a modern, moderate Islamist movement. This study takes the first view, that history is replete with instances from which to learn and that all are capable of growth and change. Thus, there is a real need to examine the history of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt to understand the degree to which the group has evolved. Rather than provide a comprehensive history of the organization this study emphasizes three instances, or 53

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periods, and explores their impact on the group's development.71 First, the founding in 1928 of the Muslim Brotherhood by Hassan al-Banna, provides a glimpse into the conditions which gave rise to the organization and under which their initial agenda developed. Second, an examination of the period of repression under Nasser illuminates how conflict and a more radical ideology developed from an organization in crisis. Finally, a brief account of the continuous cycle of relaxation and repression under both Sadat and Mubarak is insightful in so far as it helps to explain how the modern Brotherhood came to be viewed as a moderate organization and the largest opposition group to authoritarian rule in Egypt. It is important to note though, that while the organization developed, their mission remained the sa me. As the quote at the beginning of this chapter makes abundantly clear, the Muslim Brotherhood has always sought to "awaken the sleepers" to reinvigorate the spirit of Islam within society. Above all else, this single desire has directed the action of the Brotherhood since its inception. Laying the Foundation Many Muslims who are occupied by the affairs of the world and are distracted from worshiping and obeying God are like people who are fast asleep while a fire is coming closer to them and will devour them if they do not wake up. Among those sleepers are some people who are awake and watching the scene but are incapable of keeping the fire away from the sleepers. Thus duty 7 1 For an historical account of the Muslim Brotherhood to the I 960s see: Richard P. Mitchell The Society of the MlIslim Brothers (Oxford: Oxford Univer s ity Pre ss, 1969) 54

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requires them to awaken the sleepers so that they will realize the situation and move away from the fire ... -Mustafa Mashhur72 Beginning in the 1870s the British took a great interest in Egypt as the Suez Canal linked their colonial empire together. A vital passageway from the Mediterranean to British colonial possessions in Asia, the British were determined to increase their control over this most important asset. In 1875 they did just that, becoming the largest shareholder in the Suez Canal Company and further increasing their interest in controlling all of Egypt. By 1879, with French collusion, they began to consolidate their control over the Egyptian territory, suppressing rebellions that threatened their hold on Suez in 1882 and marching on to Cairo. Ruling Egypt as a veiled protectorate from 1882 until 1914, Egypt maintained some political control over their territory, yet the economy served primarily British interests. In order to consolidate British control over the territory they needed to construct a modern state "as an administrative realm" the integrity of which "was contingent upon the introduction of standardized legal codes capable of uniformly addressing issues that fell outside the purview of shari 'a."n Thus, the British introduced a system of secular law to Egypt as a 5,000 man occupation army backed their take-over of every 72 Mustafa MashhuL The Call to God in: Carrie Rosefsky Wickham. Mobilizing Islam: Religion. Actil'isl1l, and Political Change ill Egypt (New York: Columbia University Press. 2002), 144. 7 3 John Calvert Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radicalislalllism (New York: Coulmbia University Press. 20 I 0), 31. 55

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governmental ministry and department except for those concerning religion.74 In 1914, with the outbreak of World War I the British further entrenched themselves establishing full control over all of Egypt's political and economic institutions. By 1919 elite Egyptians inspired by the Wilsonian rhetoric of self-determination, and the general population increasingly dissatisfied with their position, began to rebel against British rule and Egypt's status as a protectorate. In 1922 with the support of Commissioner General Lord Allenby, Egypt received their independence. "Unfortunately he himself," writes Dietmar Rothermund on Allenby, "demonstrated only two years later that this independence was a sham," and put in place "draconian measures to restore 'law and order'" after the murder of the British Commander.75 This independence reserved to the British the right to secure the Suez Canal and their interests in the Egyptian state as well as the right to defend Egypt against foreign aggression until such a time as they saw fit.76 Outside of Egypt, with the end of World War I, the Ottoman Empire was dissolved. The Ottoman Empire had been the seat of the Caliphate, a governing body for Islam, so its dissolution held palticularly harsh ramifications for the Islamic n Ibid., 35. 75 Dietmar Rothermund. The Routledge Companion to DecolOllization (New York: Routledge, 2006), 11:\. 7 6 Calvert Sayyid QlIfb and the Origills of Radicalls/o/lli.\/II, 53. 56

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world. Having just witnessed what they perceived as the occupation of the Caliphate and its eventual destruction by the West, the Islamic world's criticism of Western policies and institutions increased. With the di sso lution of the Ottoman Empire came the creation of the Turkish nation which officially abolished the Caliphate. "Abolition of the Caliphate in 1924 by the newly established Turkish nation brought the caliphate issue to a head," as many leaders in the Muslim world vied for the title.77 For the Brotherhood's founder, Hassan al-Banna, these factors all played into his early education and political development. Greatly influenced by the 1919 revolt against the British and the subsequent occupation of his home town, he rapidly developed the view that the British represented a hegemonic power that needed to be resisted. He saw in their domination of Egypt both a political and cultural threat that would destroy Egyptian heritage and replace it with Western secular, modern values. As Rupe Simms writes, "British imperialism had ruined Egypt on a grand scale: the British way of life violated the teachings of the Quran the British forces destroyed the authority of the state, and the British capitalists subverted the viability of the economy.,,78 The impact of the dissolution of the Caliphate can clearly be seen in al-77 John L. Esposito, I slam and P o litics, 4th ed. (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1998),72. 78 Rupe Simms I s lam i s Our Politics : A Gramscian Analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood (19281953) ," Social Compass 49 no 4 (2002) : 570. 57

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Banna's letter to King Faruq of Egypt in 1947 entitled Towards the Light with his emphasis on Islamic unity and the call for practical and serious consideration concerning the departed Caliphate.,,79 Drawing on ideas previously expounded by Rashid Rida, these developments were a direct challenge to Islamic society and the root cause of economic, political, and social ill s loosed in Egypt by the British colonial power. "Convinced that only through a return to Islam (by following the Quran and Sunnah of the Prophet) could the Muslim world be awakened from its lethargy and decline" al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood (Jama 'at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimul1) in 1928.80 The Brotherhood focused on "reform from below," that is, reforming society by transforming individual s through education focused on social and moral iss ues and improving individual welfare. As Vidino writes, "AI-Bana's message called for the establishment of an Islamic state through Islamization from below, a s low process that saw the creation of a purely Islamic system of government as the natural consequence of the peaceful Islamization of the majority of the population. "s l Therefore the Brothers took it upon themselves to establish education and welfare 79 Hassan al-Banna, 'Towards the Light:' (1947), ikhwC/mveb.co/71, http://www.ikhwanw e b.comlarticle.php?id=802&ref= sea rch.php. 80 Esposito, Islam alld P o liti cs, 137. 8 1 Lorenzo Vidino Egyptian Crosscurrents." HSPllssue Brief 09 The Georg e Washington University Homeland Security P o licy In s titute 2 www.homelandsccurity.gwu.edu. 58

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------------------------projects such as hospitals, local schools, and social clubs that would help individual people, while at the same time spreading the Islamic message of the group through discussion as they provided necessary services to the population. As Leiken and Brooke wrote, "At its beginning the Brotherhood differed from earlier reformers by combining a profoundly Islamic ideology with modern grass-roots political .. ,,82 actiVIsm. Persecution And I have not surrendered my weapon If the armies of darkness encircle me, I believe that the sun will still rise I will avenge my Lord and my religion I will stand firm on my way to victory Or I shall return to the Paradise of God -Sayyid Qutb By the late 1930s the Muslim Brotherhood had developed a military wing, Nizam al-Khass, as did many organizations of the time period worldwide.83 From the time of their inception throughout the 1940s they committed numerous acts of violence, many directed against the British, which culminated in an associated member's 1948 assassination of Egyptian Prime Minister Nuqurashi. In retaliation for this attack in February 1949, not three months after the Prime Minister's death, 81 Robert S. Leiken and Steven Brooke. "The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood," Foreign Affairs 86, no.2 (2007): 108. 83 Both the Wafd Party and the Watanist (nationalist) party in Egypt had formed secr e t underground organizations prior to the creation of the secret apparatus by the Muslim Brotherhood S e e: Calvert. Sayyid Qllfb and th e Origin s ofRadicallslamisl1I, 119. 59

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Hassan al-Banna was killed by police forces and the Muslim Brotherhood incurred the wrath of the government. Al-Banna's death, as the founder and charismatic ideological leader of the Brotherhood, resulted in a fierce competition for power within the organization between the Nizam al-Khass and a more moderate faction. AI-Banna did not leave an appointed successor and this only increased both factions' claims to represent the true direction of the group. As Pargeter notes, "Whilst alBanna had struggled to contain the different elements within the Ikhwan, his charisma, as well as his having founded the movement, had enabled him to have some sort of authority over the organization."s4 Hassan el-Houdaiby, supported by the moderate faction, became the next murshid of the Brothers, although the Nizam believed he would acquiesce to their political aims. With no indisputable successor and little agreement on the future path the Brotherhood would pursue, a further development served to increase divisions already beginning to appear. In 1952 Gamal Abdel Nasser, a general in the Free Officers Coup, overthrew the government of Egypt and secured Egyptian independence. In the build up to the coup the Muslim Brotherhood officially sanctioned the actions of resistance fighters in the Canal Zone which continuously hampered British efforts to secure the canal. Just seven days before the Free Officers forced King Faruq into exile on July 26, Alison Pargeter. The Muslim BroTherhood: The Burden of Traditioll (London: Saqi Books, 2010), 31. 60

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members of the Free Officers met with members of the Muslim Brotherhood at the home of one, Sayyid Qutb, not officially a member of the Brotherhood at this point, but an intermediary between the two groups. The Officers requested the help of the Muslim Brotherhood in securing the streets of Cairo until they could successfully assume control, an offer which the Brothers readily accepted as they believed that, "under their influence, the Free Officers' movement would function as the vehicle of the Islamic resurgence.,,85 In the immediate aftermath of the successful coup both groups praised the other for their role. In one particular instance members of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Sayyid Qutb, still not officially a member, attended a lecture at the Free Officers' Club and the subsequent social gathering during which Nasser took to the podium and publicly commended the organization for their role while extending an offer of protection from personal enemies to Qutb.86 Yet by the end of 1952 relations between the two groups began to sour as the Brotherhood increasingly pushed the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) to establish an Islamic state while criticizing some of Nasser's political maneuvers. Qutb, who had initially taken a position within the government, resigned from this post and refused several ensuing offers to take up others. Officially joining the Muslim Brotherhood 8 5 Calvert, Sayyid QlIlb and the Origins of Radical /slamism, 180-181. 86 Ibid. 183. 61

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in 1953, Qutb's membership is viewed as a statement of solidarity with the I s lamic objectives of the group and an outward display of many Islamists' frustrations with the chosen path of the regime. As John Calvert writes, "Qutb saw the widening chasm between the RCC and the Brotherhood as presaging a political showdown, and he wanted to mark out clearly his position on the side of 'virtue' .,,87 By 1954 it became clear that Nasser had no intention of instituting sharia and thereby making Egypt an Islamic state as the Brotherhood thought he would. Thus, while the Brother's held high hopes as Nasser took power, by 1954 it was clear they desired two entirely different states in the wake of the coup. "Nasser's political dream was of pan-Arab socialism, modern, egalitarian, secular, and industrialized in which individual lives were dominated by the overwhelming presence of the welfare state," writes the Pulitzer Prize winning Lawrence Wright. "The I s lamists wanted to completely reshape society form the top down, imposing Islamic values on all aspects of life ... ,,88 Nasser's pursuit of a secular nationalist agenda anI y increased resentment and resistance by the Brothers which eventually prompted Nasser to view them as more of an obstacle to be overcome than an ally. In the aftermath of a Brotherhood member's attempt to assassinate Nasser and to clear the path for the full 87 Ibid" 186. 88 Lawrence Wright The Loomin g Tower: AI Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Vintage Books, 2007),32. 62

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implementation of his nationalist program, Nasser declared the Brotherhood illegal, disbanded the organization, and arrested the majority of its leaders and members. He did not stop at arrests, but rather sought to destroy the organizations ability to communicate by placing members in separate prisons across Egypt and enforcing strict travel restrictions so as to prevent anyone that fled the country from returning. This repression "resulted in a fallow period for the Brotherhood," writes Pargeter, "and the movement was effectively stymied during the second half of the 1950s and throughout the 1960s due to the fact that so many Ikhwani had been imprisoned."s9 The Brothers' wounds throbbed with fateful questions: How could those who stood shoulder to shoulder with us against the British and the king now set their dogs on us? Can those tormenting devout Muslims really be Muslims themselves? Sayyid Qutb ... produced an answer that would echo into the f 90 twentylrst century ... While in prison, the ideological confrontation between factions within the Brotherhood took shape. Sayyid Qutb, imprisoned along with most of the Brotherhood, began to develop an increasingly radical ideology. Prior to his time in prison Qutb's writings indicate that he subscribed to the idea, common within the Muslim Brotherhood, that politics would prove to be an effective mechanism through 89 Pargeter, The Muslim Brotherhood, 34. 90 Lcikcn and Brooke. "The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood:' 110. 63

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which change could be produced. 91 Yet by the 1930s the situation in Palestine and international support for the Jewish migration led him to believe that force, or direct action, as used by the "Zionist settlers," was the only language understood by the West. "The only language the modern world understands is the one used by the Jews, namely force.',92 During his time in prison, Qutb's position would continue to evolve, solidifying into an ideology which would present a significant challenge to both the state and the Muslim Brotherhood. The horrors experienced by Qutb and the rest of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt's prisons are illustrated in several telling examples and help to illuminate the context in which his writings took shape. During Qutb' s preliminary trial he raised his shirt for the court revealing the marks of the torture he endured just prior to being led into the courtroom saying, "Nasser has applied to us injail the principles of the revolution.,,93 John Calvert writes, "Guards suspended prisoners with their arms tied behind their heads, beat them with clubs, or subjected them to the viciousness of attack dogs," before going on to describe how the wails and despairing cries of prisoners could regularly be heard throughout the prison.94 At one time, subjected to 91 Calvert, Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radicallslamisl1l, 2. 92 Qutb in Calvert, Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radicallslal7lisl11, 122. 93 Calvert, Sayyid Qlltb and the Origins of Radicallslal7lislIl, 194. Ibid .. 197. 64

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hard labor, imprisoned Muslim Brothers learned of a plot by the guards to execute them after taking them to a stone quarry to work. Knowing this they refused to leave their beds. Twenty-one were shot dead in their cells.95 These experiences are what turned Qutb from advocating Islam as a way to ensure social justice, to a means of arguing the illegitimacy of the state. "Qutb' s analysis, unquestionably influenced by the horrors he witnessed in detention, is that the situation is so dire that Muslims cannot and should not wait.. .. Therefore the only solution lies in the concepts of takjlr d "h d ,,96 an jl a Qutb as a result of these experiences became dissatisfied with the slow pace of Islamization advocated by Supreme Guide Houdaiby, whom he initially supported, and by 1957-58 he began to develop a more radical ideology, advocating a far quicker approach to the Islamization of society. In prison he began to read about the idea of jahiliyya (ignorancethe period before the Prophet) which deeply impacted his thinking on society and the current regime. He proposed first, that Muslims are only accountable to God and the system of sharia, whereas worldly rulers merely usurped the sovereignty of God and concerned themselves with issues of the world rather than the divine. He then applied the idea of jahiliyya to these rulers and the entire world, 95 Ibid .. 202. 96 Vidino, "Egyptian Crosscurrents," 4. 65

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denouncing the modern age as devoid of Islam. Thus, Qutb created an urgent need for reform and the necessity of a "vanguard" of Islamists to create an Islamic world through jihad. Qutb spent much of his time in prison in the Liman al-Turra prison hospital, the center of a developing communication network to continue the ideological debate within the Brotherhood over a moderate or more radical approach. There he could discuss ideas which then spread as prisoners returned to other facilities or back into the larger prison population. Women also played a vital role in disseminating information beyond the prison walls. The Muslim Sisters would visit imprisoned members of the Brotherhood and communicate with others both on the outside and those held in other prisons.97 At the center of this new communication network stood Sayyid Qutb, a man whose beliefs and writings quickly gained a following particularly amongst the younger members of the Brotherhood. As his ideas energized the Brotherhood yet again, Nasser, feeling more comfortable in his leadership position after the Suez crisis, began to release Brothers with lesser sentences. The ideas of Qutb served to connect these newly released members beyond the prison walls who coalesced around the more radical approach to social and political reform. Barbara Zollner writing on Qutb notes, "His thought laid the 97 For a discussion see: Barbara Zollner, "Prision Talk: The Muslim Brotherhood's Internal Struggle During Gamal Abdel Nasser's Persecution. 1954 to 1971," International Journal of Middle East Studies 39 (2007): 411-433. 66

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groundwork for the regrouping of the Brothers outside the prison environment. .. It is not surprising then that el-Houdaiby and the leading circle did not object to Qutb's ideas because a restoration of the Brotherhood was in their interest.,,98 As the Brothers began to reorganize, a new group within the Brotherhood labeled Organization 1965, formed outside the prison walls based on Qutb's philosophy. This group eventually approached Qutb about becoming their spiritual leader, an offer he ultimately accepted. Qutb, still in prison, wrote Ma 'a lim fi alTariq (Milestones) presumably as a guide or instructions for members of this new group, offering a clear and emphatic rejection of the current state while advocating jihad as the most effective means of resistance and as an Islamic duty. Still, there was no objection from the moderate murshid Houdaiby to this more radical approach. While the extent to which this group advocated violence is not clear, there is a scholarly consensus that they most likely condoned the use of violence to achieve their objectives. A successful attempt to secure both funding and weapons from Saudi Arabian connections would seem to support this conclusion. The development of Organization 1965, uncovered by the state only months after Qutb's release from prison in 1965, led to a further wave of repression by the Nasser regime which again arrested and tried Qutb, eventually sentencing him to death. 'The time has come," 98 Zollner, "Prison Talk:' 417. 67

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said Qutb at the beginning of his trial, "for a Muslim to give his head in order to proclaim the birth of the Islamic movement." As he received his death sentence he proclaimed, "Thank God! I performed jihad for fifteen years until I earned this martyrdom." On August 29, 1966 Qutb achieved the status of a martyr after being hanged in the early morning hours.99 At this point, a debate within the Brotherhood began anew over the group's stance toward the state and the path they should take to achieve their goals as many Brothers found themselves back in prison. The divide that had already begun to appear widened into a chasm separating the radical Qutbists and the old guard, led by murshid Houdaiby. Houdaiby distanced himself from Organization 1965 which further infuriated members of that group as they felt betrayed by both the state initially and now by their own parent organization. The radicals then "adopted the idea of an irreconcilable division between Islam and jahiliyya, Muslim and kafir (nonbeliever) and fully embraced the concept of revolutionary Islamist activism as the true expression of religious duty," writes Zollner. )00 These radicals defined themselves as representatives of the true Islam Qutb s vanguard, in opposition to Houdaiby's organization emphatically rejecting the approach of working within the system. 99 As cited in Wright. The Lo o ming TOII'er, 36, 100 Zollner, Prison Talk ," 420, 68

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Houdaiby, in response to this developing radical trend, wrote Du 'at fa Qudat (Preachers not Judges), as an outline of the Muslim Brotherhood's moderate path and beliefs. While there is the argument that Houdaiby was not the author, and that the book is not a direct response to Qutb, it undoubtedly represents the more moderate approach of the Muslim Brotherhood under Houdaiby and a rejection of the more radical splinter groups arising out of Qutb' s vision. In it the author takes a position against takflr (unbelief) claiming only God can judge and that Islamic law is flexible and interpretable by people as they are endowed with reasoning from God. As long as the interpretation does not violate any Quranic principles it is a legitimate interpretation and open to debate or implementation. Thus, the moderate approach advocates working within the political system and within legal rulings laid down by the regime rather than a wholesale rejection of it.lol Tilmisani, assuming the position of Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood upon Houdaiby's death in 1973, downplayed the radical elements of Qutb's thought while drawing attention to his desire for an Islamic state and an increased role for religion. 'The Muslim Brothers either ignored Qutb or explained him away," writes Calvert, "preferring to focus on his solid contributions to Islamic thought rather than on his contributions to 101 Ibid .. 421-426. 69

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radicalism.,,]02 In a recent article in The Economist, the author stresses that since the Muslim Brotherhood emerged from prison in the 1970s they have "repeatedly and vehemently renounced the violence that Qutb espoused for political ends ... and also points out that, while the Brotherhood may still find inspiration in the memory of Qutb as an advocate for the cause of greater Islamization, this memory is not the same as adhering to a radical ideology. ]03 The editor of Du 'at La Qudat, eloquently summarized the conflict which occurred within the organization during these years and the patent rejection of developing radical ideologies and splinter groups by the Brotherhood. It was when the Brothers had to suffer in their prison cells and detention camps that some chose to pronounce unbelief on Muslims or to doubt the truth of their belief in Islam .... Master Hasan Isma'il al-Hudaybi, ... gave in response to the thesis [of takfir] a comprehensive answer, which shaped the path of the Muslim Brothers, determined their method, and laid down their mission. "We are preachers, but we are not judges .... ,,]04 Relaxation & Repression The third instance or phase that had a significant effect on the development of the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology can be referred to as the cycle of relaxation and repression. President Anwar Sadat came to power in 1970 and almost immediately 102 Calvert, Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radicallslamisl1l, 279-280. 103 "Which Way Now: The Muslim Brothers' New Leader," The Economist, January 23, 2010. 104 In Zollner, "Prison Talk," 411. 70

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became known as the "believer President" for the prayer marks on his forehead and Islamic rhetoric which he used to consolidate his position and in the wake of the 1973 victory over Israel in the Yom Kippur War. He continuously stressed the importance of Islam in all areas of life and could often be seen leaving Mosques after daily prayers. During the initial years of his reign many of the Muslim Brotherhood members that had been imprisoned under Nasser were released and more returned from exile. ... Sadat offered the Muslim Brothers a deal," says Wright. "In return for their support against the Nasserites and the leftists, he would allow them to preach and advocate, so long as they renounced violence.,,105 The Muslim Brotherhood, allowed to publish for the first time since the Nasser initiated repression, began publishing a magazine, al-Dawa, and embarked on a return to prominence within Egyptian social life while becoming increasingly involved in politics. Yet, as Sadat increased the public role of religion, the calls for sharia and an Islamic state returned. By 1977 Islamic groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood, began to express their frustration at the regime's reluctance to further Islamize society. That same year Sadat instituted his al-infitah, or open-door economic policy which resulted in economic hardship for many, further increasing resistance. Sadat simultaneously created outrage in the Islamic world due to Egypt's role in the Camp David Accords and a peace treaty with Israel. 105 Wright, The Looming Tower, 46-47. 71

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During this time the Islamic world was caught in the throes of an Islamic resurgence, typically labeled the rise of Political Islam. By 1975 the benefits promised by the secular nationalist regimes had failed to materialize and disenchantment had reached a fever pitch as the resurgence of Islam in its political form gave voice to this disappointment. 106 "Political Islam represented a direct challenge to the existing status quo" write Esposito and Voll. "This was a challenge to political systems, socio-economic institutions, and to their moral and intellectual foundations.,,107 In order to challenge these Western imports, the Brothers returned to what they had initially done, creating a system of social services that emphasized Islamic values. Through these networks they attracted large numbers of adherents either because of the ideology or simply because individuals needed the services the group provided. With this burgeoning support the Brother's could again begin their call for an Islamic society, even as they were attempting to Islamize from below. The Brotherhood was able to attract a large middle class following during this time as the infitah policies of Sadat mainly withdrew social services aimed at them and the lower classes. 'Umar al-Tilmisani, the new murshid of the Muslim Brotherhood reenergized the organization and attracted many university students (though not as 1 06 Sadowski, "Political Islam, 222. 107 Esposito and Voll Islam and the West,"' 615 72

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many as some more radical organizations) to it s cause through an active engagement in educational service s and on campuses acro s s the country. l O S After Sad a t' s relaxation of relation s with the Muslim Broth e rhood beginning in 1970 and the leadership of Tilims ani, the third Supreme Guide of the Brotherhood, the organization evolved into a moder a te group bent on pursuing their social agenda through existing in s titutions and s taying the moderate political cour s e. The Brother s, write s E s posito clearly opted for s ociopolitical change through a policy of moderation and graduation which accepted political pluralism a nd parliamentary democr acy, entering into alliances with s ecular political parties and organizations as well as acknowledging the right s of Coptic Christi a n s ."lo9 By 1979 Sad a t recognized that the Mu s lim Brotherhood repre s ented a legitimate challenge to his regime. He not e d tha t the organization re s embl e d "a state within a state," and as s uch had to be dealt with.IIO To do so Sadat decl a red the spheres of politic s a nd r e ligion separate and began a more stringent repr ess ion of the Muslim Brotherhood in an attempt to secur e his power and silence the call s for further social I s lamization. He, like tho s e before him again turned to the pri s ons as a way to eliminate oppo s ition arresting many of the Brotherhood's member s and 1 08 Pargeter, The Mu s lim Brothe rhood, 44. 1 09 John L. Esposito, The I s l a mi c Threat: Myth o r R ea lit y? 3rd cd (New York : Oxfo rd Univ e r s ity Pre s s 1999), 1 4 0 110 Can tori in E s po sito The Islami c Thr e at 2 45. 73

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outlawing all of their publications. This development resumed tensions within the Brotherhood over adopting a more radical approach. The decision by the Brotherhood's leadership to stay the course and continue down the moderate path initiated an exodus of the more radicalized members who left to form their own splinter groups, such as Ayman al-Zawahiri who would go on to lead the group extremist aI-Jihad before aligning with Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. As Wright points out, "Although their goals were similar to those of the mainstream Islamists in the Muslim Brotherhood, they had no intention of trying to work through politics to achieve them."\\\ In 1981 Sadat was assassinated by a member aI-Jihad, one of these splinter groups, and Mubarak rose to power. Immediately after assuming power Mubarak instituted a state of emergency law which would remain in place for 29 years. Under this law anyone the regime deemed a threat to the state or national security could be "arrested and imprisoned without warrant or trail" while the law also placed restrictions on the freedom to assemble and instituted curfews and restricted freedom of movement within the country. Anyone imprisoned under the law would not face trial or appeal the decision for six months and would only be released with III Wright, The Looming Tower, 50. 74

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presidential approval. 112 Yet, Mubarak relaxed the state's approach to religion, releasing many of the imprisoned Brothers and attempting to more specifically differentiate between extremist groups which posed a direct challenge to the state and more moderate religious groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Mubarak recognized the strength of the Brotherhood and tried to position the group as a supporter of the regime and an ally against extremism. The Brothers took advantage of this political opening to enter into elections, in which only parties could participate. They ran candidates in both 1984 and 1987 by forming alliances with the Wafd party, and the Labor and Liberal Parties respectively. The Brotherhood had debated forming a political party but decided against it in an effort to maintain their support base as a social organization working within the political system. I 1 3 In the 1980s the Brotherhood leadership emerged from their imprisonment. .. as a respectable opposition group that had demonstrated its ability to stand up to a pharaoh without resorting to terrorism. It had established its credentials as a moderate Islamic organization, publicly eschewing violence and working within the system. The Brotherhood's ideology and political strategy were thus transformed to incorporate parliamentary democracy and political pluralism. I 14 The success of the Muslim Brotherhood at the polls again signaled to an Egyptian leader that the Brotherhood represented a potential challenger to his sole 112 "Emergency Law," Carnegie Endowment for Internati onal Peace. carnegieendowm e nt.org, http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/20 1O/09/09/emergency-Iaw, (access ed 5112/2011). 113 Pargetcr, The MlIslim Brotherhood 45. Esposito Is/alii alld Delllo c racy 252-253. 75

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possession of power. To mitigate this challenge Mubarak first amalgamated the Brotherhood and extremist groups that had embarked on a terrorist campaign in the country attacking touri s t attractions and Copts. Then, following in the tradition of those before, Mubarak instituted a crackdown on extremists, of which the Brothers were now considered a part, and imprisoned members and leaders alike. Since then there has been a continual pattern of repression and relaxation whenever the political situation has called for it. For example in the early 1990s the Brother s, locked out of Egyptian politics, began to run in Professional organization elections and eventually came to control the most powerful syndicates in Egypt. Subsequently, Mubarak changed the rules governing the election process in these organizations and instituted governmental oversight thereby barring the Brothers from participating Thi s pattern can also be observed in both the 2000 and 2005 parliamentary elections and the immediate aftermath with the Brotherhood making significant gains (especially in 2005) followed by a period of harsh repression including arrests, harassment, and military tribunals. Concluding Thoughts These three instances illustrate the changes the Muslim Brotherhood endured over their lengthy history Their founding, arising in response to British imperialism and the import of Western institutions, helps to explain their resistance to Western institutions and their initial trepidation towards all things Western, including 76

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democracy and pluralism. Thus, their rejection of these things should be seen more as a rejection of Western hegemony and of foreign interference than of democracy. The second instance is arguably the most important in that it especially illuminates the group's stance toward violence. Not only does it show how vehemently the majority of the group rejected the use of violence to achieve political goals, it explains that members of the group who chose to advocate those views became upset with the Brotherhood for not supporting their pursuits. Thus, one of the major criticisms still leveled at the organization today, that it is a supporter of terrorism and violence, is debunked. However it is important to attach a caveat to that statement in that the Muslim Brotherhood does believe that violence is objectionable except in cases of occupation. In the case of Palestine then, as the Palestinian territories are perceived to be occupied by a Zionist force, the Muslim Brotherhood is supportive of defensive violence. Still, the discussion of Qutb illustrates a distinct break with the more radical elements within political Islam. The third instance helps to explain how the Brotherhood appears today. The link between them and the extremists, exaggerated by Mubarak to repress the organization, still hampers the organization today, while the strategy of relaxation and repression persisted until Mubarak's ouster in 2011. By opening political space in which the Brotherhood could participate, the regimes of Sadat and Mubarak allowed them to enter into politics. In order to do so, the Brotherhood had to reposition 77

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themselves as political actors, as well as a social organization, in order to maintain their support base while expanding their role By participating in the political system the Brothers came into contact with other organizations and modified their positions to appeal to a broader spectrum of the population. These three instances in the Muslim Brotherhood's ideological development have had a profound impact on the organization, their strategies, and their stance as an opposition group. Founded on opposition, their refusal to accept Western intrusion on the life of Egypt, has important implications for how they operate today. While they have explicitly stated multiple times that they are willing to open dialogue with foreign powers, they have also made quite clear their stance on Egypt as a sovereign political entity which is entitled to independence on pursuing polices that are in the nation's best interest. Therefore, while they are willing to communicate with others, they are not willing to sacrifice Egypt's interest to the interests of foreign powers. The split between the Qutubists and the more mainstream Muslim Brotherhood also illustrates the degree to which the group has refuted violence and accepted the moderate course. It was during this time that the path the Brotherhood would pursue became firmly implanted within the group's leadership; a path that espoused the pursuit of Islamization from below, a continuation of the founder Hassan al-Bana's vision for the organization and for Egypt. The third phase provided the stage on which this political and societal strategy would play out. In standing against both the 78

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Sadat and Mubarak regimes the Brothers gained important political experience, knowledge that would prove extremely useful in the long run, and refined their moderate position while multiple violent outbursts, such as the assassination of Sadat and the massacre of tourists by a radical Islamic organization at Luxor, reiterated just how counterproductive strategies of aggression proved to be. These developments contributed to the solidification of their position as a leading opposition movement within Egypt. These three instances are of the utmost importance when attempting to discern the goals and objectives of the Muslim Brotherhood today. The subsequent chapter will discuss in more detail the processes of moderation and relational opposition through which the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood both challenged the autocratic Mubarak regime and internalized the necessary principles to put forth a democratic al ternati ve. 79

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CHAPTER 4 RISING OPPOSITION ....... _-_ ... . __ ._-----April,2008_ Workers at one of Egypt's largest textile mills flooded toward the gates of the factory after a visit from the Prime Minister himself who thanked them for not going on strike and promised each worker an extra month's wages_ Yet, as one employee, electrician Masoud Hafez lamented, even with an extra month's pay (around $46 US) it would still be difficult to buy bread for his children_ As inflation in the country rose to over twelve percent in February 2008, Egyptian citizens increasingly relied on bread subsidized by the government: "But corruption and inefficiency still conspire to make the flat, round loaf, costing five piasters (one American cent), increasingly scarce_"))) In the two months prior to April, eleven people died as a result of gathering in increasingly long bread lines, leading to the President's use of the army to both bake and dispense additional bread_ With bread lines as the backdrop and the army baking and distributing loaves of bread, the Muslim Brotherhood, preparing to run candidates in the upcoming local council elections, faced severe governmental repression as a result of their success as an opposition force_ Several candidates suffered disqualification by the political regime which ignored the court's ruling to reinstate them. Others, over 800 others to be more 115 "Not by bread alo ne," The Economist April 12, 2008 80

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precise, were simply arrested. Of the initial 5,000 candidates the Muslim Brotherhood put forward in elections for over 52,000 seats, only twenty remained by April 8th the day of the elections. I 16 In the end the ruling party won over 90 percent of the 52,000 seats mentioned above in elections where they ran uncontested. This is just one instance which elucidates the repression the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood faced, especially in the run up to elections. It also highlights the hold on power the Mubarak regime had for over two decades. This election, coming only three years after the 2005 electoral success of the Brotherhood, meant that the Brothers represented the most significant opposition force to the Mubarak regime. If they had been allowed to run all 5,000 of their intended candidates they may well have secured that position politically, but with only twenty still around by election day the Brother's decided to boycott the election to protest the gross injustice perpetrated by the state. This excerpt provides us with a glimpse into the tactics used by the regime to repress any oppositional force. Yet, the Brotherhood's boycott of the election, as the most prominent opposition group, illustrates their skill at political maneuvering as well. By boycotting the election and publicizing their reasons for doing so arrests, scare tactics, a regime acting in defiance of court rulings the Brotherhood exposed these violations to the 116 Description of event based on report in the article "Not by bread alone," The Economist, April 12, 2008. 81

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public and the international community and in doing so increased the co s t s of repression faced by the regime We will s ee th at, a s Alfred C. Stepan argues this is but one of five crucial ta s ks an opposition movement seeks to accompli s h Stepan & Relational Opposition In the 1970 s the Egyptian political regime began what has been labeled in this s tudy as a cycle of relaxation and repression Pre s ident Anwar Sadat, in his search for political allies against the Nasserites and the Leftists relaxed restriction s against the Muslim Brotherhood and other political organizations creating a measure of political space in which they could maneuver. Toward the end of Sadat's rule he began to again repress the Muslim Brotherhood through the use of the coercive apparatus, arresting and trying many of its member s and leaders in military courts. When Mubarak came to power, in order to s tem the tide of radicalism and violent Islamist extremism, he again relaxed the political constraints placed on the Brothers to gain a moderate ally in the fight against the terrorists. Mubarak, at this time, saw the Brothers as a moderate group that could provide a voice to Islami s t political desires and therefore, cut off support for the more radical groups. The Brotherhood took advantage of this space and entered into the elections of 1984 and 1987 through alliances with establi s hed political parties and achieved significant success with members of the organization gaining seats in the national parliament. They began publishing new s paper s and magazines participated in local and national elections 82

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and secured a foothold in professional syndicates, university faculty clubs, and student groups. In doing so the Muslim Brotherhood undoubtedly established themselves as the best organized and most widespread opposition group to the regIme. Sheri Berman sees this situation as creating "a peculiar kind of stalemate in which the existing regime retains political power while ceding substantial control over the societal and cultural spheres to the revolutionary challenger. I 17 If this situation is viewed as a stalemate then what is the political function of the opposition? Is it to simply maintain their position as an opposition group with a limited amount of control over society and culture? Based on the original goals of the Muslim Brotherhood one would presume this control would represent a significant step toward the Islamization of society from below. The original goal of the Muslim Brotherhood centered on the creation of an Islamic state, based on sharia, and created through the gradual transformation of individuals into more devout and pious Muslims. Yet, if Berman's statement about a peculiar stalemate is correct and the Brotherhood achieved a measure of control and autonomy when it comes to their societal programs, why did they not extricate themselves from the increasingly complex game of politics? After all, it is in the realm of politics where the Brothers 117 Sheri Berman, "Islamism, Revolution, and Civil Society,"' Perspectives all P o liti c s I no.2 (2003): 258 83

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faced the most severe repression. As the example at the beginning of this section illustrates, in the build up to elections hundreds of Brothers had been arrested and imprisoned. If they achieved even a limited amount of control over culture and society then why did they not choose to focus solely on their primary task of Islamizing society? This section will argue that the answer lies in the Brotherhood's internalization of democratic principles. It is important to revisit the definition of democracy as "An institutional arrangement in which all adult individuals have the power to vote, through free and fair competitive elections, for their chief executive and national legislature." 1 18 While there are obvious differences between the Brotherhood's conception of democracy and the typical western liberal model, if we take Lipset's definition of democracy and analyze the statements and actions of the Muslim Brotherhood against it, the group clearly fulfills the main conditions necessary to be considered a democratic force. If we return to Berman's proposition then, that the situation between the Muslim Brotherhood and the state represented a type of stalemate, we should consider that the Muslim Brotherhood's internalization and support of democratic politics pushed them to continue to advocate for further reform both from below, and at the pinnacle of Egyptian political power. Alfred C. Stepan provides a conceptual framework through which we can analyze the Muslim Brotherhood as a political opposition movement and explore how 118 Lipset and Lakin, The Democratic Centllry, 19. 84

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their actions helped to alter the relationship between the opposition, supporters, and the regime itself. 1 19 Yet, before we delve into this discussion it is necessary to attach a disclaimer to this section. In light of the events of January and Febru a ry 2011 it is of the utmost importance to note that, while the Muslim Brotherhood clearly represents an opposition force, they must not be seen as the only one. Rather they were one group out of many that opposed the rule of Mubarak and prote ste d against the many injustices faced by the Egyptian people not least of which can be seen as the lack of democracy especially as it relates to the legislature and the office of president. That being said, examining their role in years prior to the overthrow of the Mubarak regime is necessary to understanding their attachment to democratic norms and principles and how they helped to erode s upport for the Mubarak regime. Again, this is not to say that the Brotherhood repre se nt s the only actor, rather, that as an opposition movement, they played a very significant role in the years prior to Mubarak's eviction from power, Stepan begin s by proposing that within any authoritarian polity there exist five core groups bound together by "relationships of domination.,,12o In order to understand how an opposition operates within an authoritarian polity it is necessary to begin with an examination of where the opposition stands in regard to the se other 119 Stepan, Arguing Comparative Politics. 158-166 120 Ibid., 160 85

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groups. The first group comprises the regime supporters, those loyal to the regime and who often hold a position of some power within it. These are the people that stand to benefit from a continuation of authoritarian rule and openly support the regime and its policies. Second there is the "coercive apparatus" (the police force, military, secret police, etc.) which enables the regime to continuously maintain power. Following this coercive apparatus are the passive supporters, active opponents, and finally the passive opponents. As Stepan sees it, "The task of the active democratic opposition is to change the relations among all the component parts of the authoritarian system in such a way as to weaken authoritarianism while simultaneously improving the conditions for In a situation where the regime's authority is eroding, Stepan proposes that the core supporters will fragment allowing a resurgence of a more active opposition and, unless this opposition poses a direct threat to the military establishment, or the coercive apparatus, their support for the regime will also begin to wane. As a result passive supporters will begin to move towards the passive opposition while those that do still support the regime will distance themselves from positions within it in order to preserve their political credentials. As this process unfolds the active opposition will again increase its activity and begin to experience a swelling of their ranks as 121 Ibid. 86

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previously passive opponents merge into their camp. "If it performs its multiple functions well," writes Stepan, "the active democratic opposition can exacerbate discord among the authoritarians, as well as prepare the indispensible foundations for d "P7 a emocratlc successor regIme. -While the argument can be made that any opposition movement seeks to alter the relationships existent under authoritarianism in this same way, if they do not provide a democratic alternative, one authoritarian system will be replaced by another. Thus, a key to our examination is establishing the democratic credentials of the Muslim Brotherhood. Five Functions of an Opposition Movement If the primary goal of an opposition movement is to challenge the regime and alter these so called relationships of domination how does the opposition accomplish this task? Stepan argues that the opposition must perform five functions to present an effective challenge to the regime while at the same time preparing a path for successful democratization. He begins by positing that the first task set before an opposition is to remain independent of the regime. 123 If the regime is able to co-opt the opposition then that opposition has ceased to exist as such while the regime has 122 Ibid .. 162. 123 Ibid. 87

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taken a step toward securing hegemonic power and eradicating any challenge to its authority. In remaining independent the opposition provides the public with an independent source of information that contests the regime. Lipset sees communication as one of the primary contributions of opposition writing, "Opposition actually serves as a communication mechanism, focusing attention on societal and governmental problems.,,124 If the opposition is able to remain independent of the regime they are able to enhance communication by providing dialogue that runs counter to official statements by the regime. In this way the opposition also seeks to provide those that are not represented in traditional political avenues with a source of representation; it publicizes itself as the voice of the voiceless. Nadia Urbinati and Mark E. Warren discuss this idea, labeling groups that seek to accomplish this task as "self-authorized representatives" comprised of unelected leaders that speak for groups that do not possess formal representation.125 They argue that when electoral politics fails to sufficiently represent the population, self-authorized representatives serve the crucial function of popularizing these unrepresented views, ideas, and criticisms. "The collectivities representatives seek to influence are increasingly diverse: not only governments and 124 Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited: 1993 Presidential Address," American Sociological Review 59, no. I (1994): 9. 125 Urbinati and Warren, 'The Concept of Representation," 403. 88

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power holders but also public discourse and culture ," they write. "Not only do they have the potential to compensate for electoral inflexibilities providing high levels of targeted, information-rich representation but they also function in areas where no electoral democracy exists.,,'26 Thus, in a way the Muslim Brotherhood serves a democratic representative function through disseminating the views of those typically barred from entering into the political system. Under the Mubarak regime, as the story at the beginning of this section makes plainly clear, the ruling partythe National Democratic Party (NOP) dominated elections and the representative bodies within Egypt by an overwhelming majority. The Muslim Brotherhood then filled the representational void created by the dispropOitionate results of elections that are clearly neither free nor fair. The Brotherhood then is an independent entity, separate from the regime, which has taken up the task of representing its members otherwise barred from participating in the political life of Egypt. If the opposition can successfully maintain its independence from the regime, Stepan argues, it must then focus its attention on increasing the ranks of the passive opposition. This function can be accomplished in two distinct ways: First, by contesting the legitimacy of the regime; and second by securing and insulating what he refers to as "zones of autonomy" or political parties, unions, and other institutions 126 Ibid .. 404. 89

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of civil society. 127 In order to accomplish the first task the opposition needs to develop a critique of the regime around which the population is able to unite. For the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, basic needs claims, such as bread and necessities proved to be the most effective avenue for arguing the legitimacy of the regime while providing them with a platform from which they could disseminate their message. Davut Ates argues that, beginning in the 1970s, infitah created new economic openings for members of the Muslim Brotherhood and their typically middle class ranks. As economic liberalization took hold, both private and foreign investment increased, credit was extended to Egypt following the Camp David Accords, and the private sector began to play an increasing role in the Egyptian economy. Ates sees this development as benefitting many within the Muslim Brotherhood as the organization typically maintained a predominantly middle class membership. He also points out that many of the Muslim Brotherhood leaders who fled the country under Nasser's persecution had developed successful business ventures in other countries and now, allowed to return brought a degree of wealth and investment to the country. "The policy of infitah and the interests of the middle-class members of the MB were complimentary and mutually supportive," writes Ates, creating an environment in 127 Stepan. Arguing Comparative Politics, 162 90

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which they began to establish businesses and social institutions.128 Samya Sa'id Imam in a study titled Who Owns Egypt?, argues that since the late 1980s eighteen families, eight of which are associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, have dominated the Egyptian economy, while around forty percent of all economic undertakings have been controlled by Muslim Brotherhood interests. 119 This statement illustrates the success experienced by the Muslim Brotherhood during infitah and the continued liberalization of the economy under Mubarak. Radical groups also began to emerge in this period, and in Ates' view, gained strength through the hardships that typically accompany economic liberalization. These radical groups appealed to the certain sectors of society and gained strength due to the perceived failure of the state to insulate its population against the stresses of a liberal and integrated world economy. DO Yet Ates mistakenly points to these economic successes as weakening the Muslim Brotherhood and increasing radicalism in society. While radicalism undoubtedly increased this should not be seen as a direct result of the Muslim Brotherhood's pursuit of economic gain nor as an indicator of the Brother's losing a support base. In many ways the organizations the Muslim 118 Davut Ates, "'Economic Liberalization and Changes in Fundamentalism: The Case of Egypt," Middle East Policy XII No.4 (2005): 137. 119 In Wickham, Mobilizillg Islam, 97. DO Ibid. 138 & 141. 91

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Brotherhood de v eloped during this time helped to provide a "safety net" against the hardships of economic openness faced by the lower-middle class. It is in this area, in the sphere of social services, that the Muslim Brotherhood was able to mount one of the most successful critiques of the regime. As Lipset points out, economic liberalization often leads to the creation, or further development, of a middle class which is typically thought of as the harbinger of opposition movements. 131 Thus, Ates misses the critical impact of economic liberalization in Egyptian politics by assuming that liberalization detracted from the Muslim Brotherhood's base of support and directly increased a radical element. It would be better to see the burgeoning middle-class within the Mu s lim Brotherhood as preparing the way for a strengthened opposition movement and creating an implicit critique of the regime by di s tributing social services normally under the purview of the s tate but which they failed to provide to those in need. Ates himself wrote, "Informal oper a tions are a way of compensating for the failure of the public s ector and central government to provide nece ssary goods and s ervices. 132 Thus, thi s economic opening, which Ates correctly argues had benefitted the Muslim 131 Seymour Martin Lipset, "Reflections on Capitalism Sociali s m and Dem oc racy," Journal of D emocracy 4 no 2 (1993) : 52. 132 Ales, "Economic Liberaliz atio n 140. 92

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Brotherhood, also laid the foundation for what would become their most powerful critique of the authoritarian regime of Mubarak. At the same time as the hardships associated with joining a global economy really began to take hold of the Egyptian population, the state, faced with a looming debt crisis began to withdraw from the social services sector. As the aggregate debt soa red to over 115 percent of GDP by 1988, public spending declined from the 1982 level of 63.5 percent of GDP to 4l.4 percent by 1989. m Then in the early 1990s, Egypt signed an agreement with the World Bank on economic reform. As anyone who has ever studied agreements made with international financial institutions can explain, these agreements are predicated on the acceptance by the debtor of numerous conditions such as s tructural adjustment programs, liberalized trade and financial policies, and privatization. Robert K. Schaeffer, in a seminal account on the intricacies of these agreements and the global debt crisis, notes that in order to repay the debt, governments typically sold off state assets, in other words, privatized their economies.134 Under Na sser the state had taken on responsibility for "eve rything from education and employment to health care and transportation subsidies," as Sheri 133 Wickham, Mobili zi n g I s lam, 41. Robert K Schaeffer, Understanding Globalizati o n : The Social Consequences of Political. Economic. and Em ironmental Change, 4th ed. (New York: Rowman & Litllefi e ld Publi s her s, INC. 2009), 93. For a mor e in-depth analysis of the global debl cri sis see Schaeffer Understanding Globalization, Chapter 4. 79-102 93

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Berman points out. 135 Therefore, when economic liberalization occurred and the state took on the structural adjustment programs of the international financial institutions to pay back their debt, many of these previously state controlled industries fell into the hands of private companies or investors. While this provided an instant source of revenue to the state, each sale represented a one-time occurrence forcing the government to find alternative ways of generating revenue streams. Governments did this, explains Schaeffer, "by increasing taxes and cutting public spending." He goes on to say, "The burden of tax increases and spending cuts typically fell on poor and middle-income tax payers," which is precisely what occurred in Egypt. 136 As Dina Shehata points out, "As state expenditures declined, public spending on social services including education, health care, transportation, and housing stagnated, and the quality of these services deteriorated.,,137 The decline of state services coupled with a massive population boom led to rising inflation and increasing poverty rates which continue to plague the country today. This population boom affected the majority of the Arab world but the numbers for Egypt are some of the most staggering. Jack A. Goldstone reports that since 1990 135 Berman, "Islamism, Revolution, and Civil Society," 260. 136 Schaeffer, Understanding Globalization, 93. 137 Dina Shehata, 'The Fall of the Pharaoh: How Hosni Mubarak's Reign Came to an End," Foreign Affairs 90, no. 3 (2011): 27. 94

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the population aged 15-29 in Egypt has grown by around 65 percent,138 while Dina Shehata states that more than one third of the population in Egypt lie s within this age range.139 Many of the s e youths are unemployed even after pursuing higher education. In fact, those with a college degree "are ten times as likely to have no job as those with only an elementary school education." 140 The Economist reported in 2008 that the average salary in Egypt is around $100 US per month, while 44 percent of Egyptians qualify as either poor or extremely poor and around 2.6 million people cannot cover the cost of basic food needs. "The fact is that most of Egypt's 75 million people struggle to get by ... ,,141 One reason for the extremely high unemployment rate of college graduates is rooted in the loosening of admission requirement s during the oil boom of the 1970s. To entice the youth to pursue higher education the government drastically increased the number of students admitted to public institutions and lowered the academic standards necessary to receive admission. At the same time students who graduated were guaranteed governmental employment. However as population growth 1 38 Jack A. Goldstone "Under s tanding the Revolution s of2011: Weakness and Re s ili e nce in Middle Eastern Autocracies ," F oreig n Affairs 90, no.:I (2011): 12. 1 39 Shehata, "The Fall of the Pharaoh," 28. Goldstone, "Understanding the Revolutions of 20 II," 12. "Willthe dam bur st') The Economist. September 13, 2008. 95

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exploded and the tide of graduates in need of government jobs steadily increased, the government neces s arily increased the placement period to around ten years. Thus many graduates faced the decision to wait for their eventual appointment or join the labor force in some more menial task. Economic problems coupled with the severe decline in the guaranteed jobs program increased resentment within this generation of recent graduates and in the words of Wickham, "contributed to the rise of a frustrated stratum of educated, underemployed youth 'available' for mobilization by opposition 14J groups." The Muslim Brotherhood, beginning in the 1980s, sought to fill the void created by the withdrawal of the state from important and necessary social services and in doing so found a niche from which they could launch a resounding attack on the regime. As Esposito and Voll argue, the organizations developed by the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1980s and the services they provided represented "an implicit critique of the government's inability or failure to provide adequate services, in particular for the non-elite sectors of society.,,14 3 Relying on their network of connections, established throughout their long history in Egyptian society, the Brothers harkened back to one of their original tactics, establishing organizations and Wickham, Mobili zing Islam, 12. W EsposilO and VoIl I s lam and Democracy. 178 96

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providing services to the middle and lower-middle class. As the numbers of this social sector increased, and the government retreated further from the soc ial programs they once supported, the Muslim Brotherhood entrenched itself as a provider of the necessary education, health, and financial services the state aimed only at the more elite classes. It is important to note here that, as Ates argues, economic liberali za tion helped the middle-class members of the Brotherhood, which in turn allowed the se members to establish civic organizations aimed at providing services to those that had not benefitted from economic openness and cemented the Brotherhood's rel a tionship with both the lower-middle and middle classes. As Gumuscu notes, these new organizations helped the middle class and in particular the Muslim Brotherhood, to firmly establish themselves as champions of political Islam.144 The Brother s sought to establish food banks, charities, schools, daycare centers, financial institutions, social clubs and networks, and employment agencies directed at those which the state neglected. Sadowski points out that many of the people that took advantage of these services relied on their efficiency as compared to the slow pace and ineffectiveness of 144 Sebnem Gumuscu "Class Status, and Party: The Changing Face of Political Islam in Turkey and Egypt." Comparative P o liti ca l Studies 43, no. 7 (2010): 840. 97

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their governmental counterparts, where they existed. 145 This attraction helped disseminate the Brotherhood's message to people who may otherwise not have been interested in their political or Islamic foundation. One individual noted the difference between Islamist groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood, and governmental services in Egypt stating: I can tell you that they are far better equipped, the staff is far more professional, the equipment is much more modern, than things you 'll find in the typically run-down government facilities. A perfect example of how the Islamists have responded to social needs with far greater alacrity than the regime was the earthquake in Cairo in 1992. The government was totally paralyzed ... for two days the regime did absolutely nothing, nothing at all. Within hours, though, the Islamists were on the streets with tents, with blankets, with food, with alternative housing.146 The majority of these services could be provided under the umbrella of a private mosque. During the early stages of infitah and the oil boom of the 1970s, the Muslim Brotherhood as well as other Islamic organizations, established private mosques throughout Egypt. These mosques received funding through donations and by establishing voluntary associations under their umbrella. These voluntary associations referred to as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), could use funds collected by mosques to establish social services for the benefit of the community. This allowed them to operate without governmental oversight which would have Sadowski, "Political Islam 226. Cited in Berman, Islamism, Revolution and Civil Society." 261. 98

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severely constrained their functionality. Operating as part of a religious organization warded off governmental interruption as the regime did not want to be seen as interfering with religion. Yet, these mosques were far more than simply places of religious worship. As Wickham points out, "Particularly in low income neighborhoods on the periphery of Cairo, where government services were scarce and networks of communal self-help were undeveloped, the local mosque and its satellite institutions often became the focal points of community sociallife.,,1-17 While the mosque served as an integral part of each community, it also provided a forum for Islamist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood to promote their message. For the Brothers these mosques served as an environment in which they could espouse their da 'w a (call to faith) and also interpret it in such a way as to make social change a prerogative of Islam. Wickham notes that many of the Islamist groups during this period began to react to what they saw as a lack of morality within society. This view had developed over an extended period of time amongst the middle and lower-middle class through the withdrawal of governmental services for them, increasing unemployment, and the belief that politics did not represent an effective outlet for their frustrations, all while wealth exploded above them. Many saw parties and politicians in a negative light, as only out for themselves, but were In Wickham Mohili:.illg islam 98. 99

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resigned to the fact that there was little they could do to change it. Thus, the Islamist groups sought to highlight the Islamic emphasis on justice and fairness and give "v oice to the moral outrage felt by those .. who regarded themselve s as unjustly deprived of their due rewards ... ,,148 Groups like the Muslim Brotherhood then attracted people to their message as well as their services, and increasingly promoted the idea that all Muslims had a duty to reform society in line with Islamic principles. In doing so the Muslim Brotherhood created an alternative to the state; an Islamic sector which effectively replaced, rather than worked alongside, the state in providing many of the necessary services to the middle and lower-middle classes which the state had neglected. 149 In providing these services the Brotherhood wove itself even further into the fabric of Egyptian society. It launched a critique of the regime, established itself as a champion of political Islam, and gained a foundation from which it could espouse the principles of Islamism and the Islamic society it advocated. "Recognizing that the government's response to Brotherhood requests would be limited," writes Abed Kotob, "at lea s t the Brethren will have been heard by God and the People thereby gaining credit and a positive impression among the masses, while simultaneously Ibid., 161. Ibid., 118-175 100

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detracting from the popularity of the ruling party." 150 In taking into consideration the political and economic concerns of the majority of the population, as well as the religious goals of the organization, the Brothers effectively cha]]enged the regime on the issue of social services, thereby arguing the legitimacy of the regime: How can you claim to rule when you cannot even provide for your people? In doing so the Brothers developed an Islamic alternative to the state-sponsored hardships of economic reform, one that provided for the needs of the people and helped insulate them from the pain the regime had inflicted on Egyptian society. Esposito and Voll wrote that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt "created an alternative normative order." An order, they went on to say "which provides an ideological world view based on and legitimated by religion and an alternative social system of services that demonstrates the relevance and effectiveness of religion to social realities and problems.,,151 Let us return then to Stepan's assertion that in order to swe]] the ranks of the passive opposition, the active opposition, in this case the Muslim Brotherhood, must accomplish two specific tasks. The first, as illustrated above, is to contest the legitimacy of the regime. In creating an Islamic alternative to the state by mobilizing those that felt disi]]usioned due to the economic setbacks, rising unemployment, and a 1 5 0 Abed-Kotob, "The Accomadationists Speak," 331 1 5 1 Esposito and Vall. Is/am alld Democracy 191. 101

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lack of state responsiveness, and espousing the da 'wa as a Muslim's duty to reform society along Islamic lines, the Brotherhood mounted a critique of the regime and effectively challenged its legitimacy in the area of acting in the best interests of the people. The second task then is to secure the zones of autonomy against co-option by the regime. Stepan argues that the larger and more powerful these organizations become, the more effective they are in performing opposition functions such as contesting the regime's legitimacy. 152 Egypt has a long history of professional organizations, but for the majority of this history they were utilized by the regime to distribute the benefits that came from supporting the regime. This began to change under Sadat and continued as Mubarak assumed power in the 1980s. The Mubarak regime, as previously stated, faced the challenge of a growing faction of Islamic extremists upon assuming power in Egypt. In order to combat this trend the regime sought to sever radical group's ties to their support base through the inclusion of more moderate trends in Islamist thought, such as the Muslim Brotherhood. By ceding some participatory options to groups like the Muslim Brotherhood, particularly in the realm of professional associations, the Mubarak government opened the door for the Brothers to begin participating in electoral politics at a level the regime felt would not challenge its authority. 1 5 1 Stepan. Arguillg COlllparatil'e Politics 163. 102

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These developments, coming around the same time as the construction of an Islamic alternative really began to take hold created opportunities for those disaffected graduates within Egyptian society. M a ny of these graduates, having participated in student organizations while in school, graduated with a valuable knowledge of political maneuvering and found that as part of an organization like the Muslim Brotherhood they could effectively continue their participation through running in profe ss ional association elections. Abu l-Futuh expressed thi s opinion saying, "It is natural that people with opinion s want to participate in in s titutions, to have a role. After graduation such students looked for a place to continue their activities." He continues, "Given the restrictions on party activity, many of them turned to the professional associations." 153 By the early 1990s Egyptian profes s ional associations, open to any college graduate with a four or six year degree, boasted around two million members. Most graduates joined the s e organizations shortly after they left school as, in many sectors, membership served as a prerequisite for employment. As a result of the expansion of higher education in the 1970s and early 80s Wickham estimates that at lea s t half, but as many as two-thirds, of the members of these organizations were under the age of Abu-I-Fuluh in Wickham Mobili::Jn8 Is/alii 190 103

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35.154 Being the group that primarily faced the harsh realities of economic liberalization, thi s younger generation also repre se nted the primary proponent s of the emergent Islamist ideology. Thus, the Mu s lim Brotherhood, and other I s l a mic organizations, felt they could successfully ch a llenge for representation in the s e professional as s oci a ti o ns. No group wa s as s uccessful as the Mu s lim Brotherhood. Harni s ch and Mecham state that by th e mid 1990s the Brotherhood had obtained lead e r s hip positions in every m ajor association in Egypt while both Berman a nd Abed-Kotob point to their control of the doctors', engineers', pharmacists', and lawyers' s yndicates as their mo s t important achievem e nt s during this time. 155 In mo s t of these as sociations half the s eat s are up for election e v ery two years with a pre s ident elected every four, while the larger associations elect members to the board a s well. To illustrate the Muslim Brotherhood's succes s over time Wickham examined each election for the Doctor s Association from 1980-1990. During the fir s t election in which the Brotherhood competed for seat s, 1980 their candidates took a round 5 000 votes or forty percent and captured seven of 25 se at s In 1990 however, Brotherhood Wickham, Mobili;:ing I s l a m 181. 155 See Chris Harni s ch and Quinn Mecham, '"Democr a tic Ide o l o g y in Islamist Opp os iti o n ? Th e Mu s lim Brotherho o d's Civil St a te," Middle East ern Studi es 45 n o 2 (2009): 193, a nd B e rman I s l a mism Re v oluti o n a nd Ci vil Society,"' 261, and Ab e d K o t o b 'The Acc o mad ationists Sp eak." 3 29. 104

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candidates captured around 15,000 votes, or 7] percent of the total, gaining control of 20 of the 25 seats. Wickham goes on to note that in the Engineers' Association, Brotherhood candidates took all 46 seats which they contested out of the 50 total which were available in the 1991 election by a margin of around five votes to one.156 Running under the banner of "The Islamic Trend" or "The Islamic Voice" the Muslim Brotherhood captured people's desire for a more responsive leadership that would help to firstly understand, and secondly address, the problems people in Egypt faced. "We want honest people who are able to help us, provide us with services, and can be trusted not to steal," said one engineer interviewed after voting for Muslim Brotherhood candidates. Another voter stated that the Voice candidates more closely represent him while others expressed that only the Trend ran as a group saying, "either you elect them or you elect individuals." "I voted for the Islamic Trend," stated another, "they have given the association new life; before they entered the I d'd k h h .. ,,,157 I h e ectIOns, we 1 n t even now were t e aSSOCIatIOn was. n return, t e Brotherhood, once eJected, initiated a new kind of organization that paid attention to the problems of their members They focused public attention on problems such as low salaries and unemployment through surveys, public conferences, articles in their 156 Wickham, MobikJllg Islam 185-187. 157 Quotations taken from Wickham, Mobiking [slam 198-199. 105

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professional journals, and publications all-the-while attempting to provide their members with much needed services. These organizations sought to secure loans which helped members marry or invest in a bu s iness or home, provided furniture purchasing programs, allocated funds for further education courses while offering many through the organization as well, and supplied insurance to their members.158 Yet, in doing these things they realized the limitations of what they could achieve concluding that the state represented "the only institution capable of launching programs on the scale necessary to make a real impact.,,159 Thus, the Brotherhood again, found a way to critique and argue the legitimacy of the regime, while insulating the associations against co-option by the state The Brotherhood's elected officials in these profes s ional organizations gained a reputation for being critical of the regime and drawing attention to the problems facing the vast majority of the Egyptian population. They utilized their position in these syndicates to challenge the regime on issues such as poverty, unemployment, and the provision of social services, while also calling public attention to the fact that elections in these organizations were far more free and fair than their national counterpart s As Wickham surmised, "The victories of the Islamic Trend thus reflect the yawning gap 158 Wickham, Mobi/i::in g I s /am, 192. 159 Ibid 106

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between the country's dominant political culture and an emergent Islamist subculture marked by confidence in the efficacy of participation and the potential for meaningful reform under Islamic auspices.,,]60 The Mubarak regime's initial relaxation toward moderate Islamic groups created political space in which the Muslim Brotherhood could achieve the dual successes of arguing the state's legitimacy through the creation of an alternative Islamic sector and obtaining a prominent role in the Egyptian professional organizations. This relaxation can be attributed to Mubarak's need for allies against the more radical Islamist groups, to his perception that neither of these openings represented a challenge to his authority, and to the fact Mubarak believed these Islamic institutions helped alleviate pressure on the state. Yet, the Brotherhood's success did not go unnoticed. As the above discussion makes clear, the Brothers efficiently mobilized a disenchanted population and invested them in the reformation of Egyptian society as an Islamic duty. Politics took on a much more important role when the Brotherhood leveled the claim that the only institution capable of achieving a true social transformation was the state. Wickham points out that by mobilizing on the political periphery, on the outskirts of major cities and in professional organizations, the Brothers effectively created a base of support and involvement 160 Ibid .. 197. 107

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which they could channel toward the political center, or national parliamentary elections.161 Arm Hamzawy, a scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, echoes the importance of these local networks to political mobilization. "Religious actors were able to operate using the mosques, the schools and charity organizations," he writes. "So they created social trust, social capital, which can be easily translated into political capital in moments of upheaval or when elections take place.',161 Although slow to realize the importance of this base, once Mubarak recognized that the Brotherhood could effectively challenge his authority, and had indeed mounted a successful critique of his legitimacy, relaxation succumbed to repression and a crackdown ensued. Beginning in 1992, after the Brotherhood achieved a significant victory in the Lawyers' Association, the regime put forth a new law, Syndicate Law 100, which mandated that fifty percent of association members must vote in elections in order for them to be considered legal. If a fifty percent vote could not be achieved the first time, a second vote could take place, but if this vote failed to meet the necessary conditions the government would bring the association under the "guardianship" of the state to supervise the operations of the group, freezing their financial assets and 1 6 1 Ibid 118175 "[slamists and Democracy in the Middle East Voice of Am e rica Neil'S (March 14.2006). 108

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halting many of their political and social activities .1 63 In this way the government sought to not only exclude the Brotherhood from thi s political space but to co-opt the professional organizations and bring them under governmental s upervision. The regime also attempted to bring all the private mosque s under the control of the Religious Mini s try of the s tate, yet the s heer number of mosques and the cost to the state to operate each one presented a dire economic challenge to the regime. Thus, their incorporation of private mosques proceeded at a significantly slower pace than de s ired. The Brotherhood it self also faced wave after wave of arre s t and military trial, and saw many of its top leaders imprisoned for s upporting or belonging to a banned organi z ation and plotting again s t the state. A typic a l assessment of this period by academics sees it a s a severe setback for the Brothers, a time of retreat. Yet thi s account, while it is true that the Brotherhood did indeed withdraw some of their challenges, lost a significant amount of influence, and suffered from internal divisions, is overly simpli s tic in that it fails to take into account the organization s skillful political maneuvering. Proving to be adept political thinkers, the Brotherhood proceeded to use these crackdowns, this period of repression, to its advantage Stepan argue s that, if an opposition can remain independent of the regime and utilize the "zones of autonomy" to challenge the legitimacy of the regime and swell the ranks of the pas sive opposition their next task 1 63 Esposito, The I s /alllie Thr e at 101. 109

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is to make clear the social costs of the regime's policies. In publicizing the negative social costs associated with the regime, an opposition can direct attention onto the negative aspects of a regime and increase the political costs they endure to perpetuate their control. 164 The Brotherhood, being the most significant opposition, faced the most severe repression and used this against the regime to again challenge their authority and increase the cost of rule. With the passing of Syndicate Law 100 the Mubarak regime effectively neutralized future professional association elections and in many ways took over the supervision and direction of the professional associations in Egypt. Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood failed to fulfill one of the functions set forth by Stepan for opposition movements. Yet, the Brotherhood adroitly turned this around on the regime arguing that even a constrained political role presented too much of a challenge to the Mubarak government. They used their exclusion from these associations in future elections to illustrate the extremely closed political environment of Egypt and drew attention to the substantial gap between Mubarak's democratic rhetoric and the actual policies of his regime. In doing so they faced further repressive measures including arrests, torture, military trial, and long prison sentences. Again, the Brotherhood skillfully drew attention to the measures Mubarak had to use in order to preserve his power. Publicly haranguing the government for their 16-1 Stepan, Arguing Comparatil e Politics, 163. 110

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treatment of dis se nt the Brothers focused both domestic and international attention on the social and political costs of authoritarian rule while they became martyrs for the cause of democracy. In much the same way as Sayyid Qutb once used his trial and execution to draw attention to his radical version of Islam, the Brotherhood used the regime's crackdowns to illuminate the illegitimacy of a regime that could only maintain its power by forcefully crushing dissent. Particularly in the run up to elections, the regime resorted to mass arrests, voter intimidation, and military court decisions to diminish the chances for Brotherhood success. Before the 1995 elections the Mubarak government publicly confirmed that it saw no difference between the Muslim Brotherhood and the more radical Islamic organizations. The Egyptian Minister of the Interior linked the Brotherhood to the well known extremist groups, Islamic Jihad and al-Gama 'a al /s/amiyya, claiming they all belonged to the same organization. 165 Taking this view, the government portrayed it as their duty to ensure the safety and security of the people and the world by preventing a radical, terrorist organization from participating in politics in any way. The Brotherhood in response devoted an extensive amount of time, resources, and public statements to refuting this connection, especially in the wake of 9111, emphasizing their goals of peaceful and moderate social and political 165 Harnisch and Mecham, "Democratic Ideology, 193. 111

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reform. Mohamed EI Baradei, a respected opposition political figure, lent his voice to the Brotherhood's campaign in 2010 stating, "The Muslim Brotherhood are described as allies of Osama bin Laden total rubbish." 166 Still officially outlawed as an organization, the Brotherhood members could be arrested on charges of belonging to an illegal organization, terrorism, plotting to overthrow the government, and a number of others, all of which were employed at some time or another. It is important to note that the Mubarak government, reliant on external aid and support, particularly from the United States, had always been wary of inciting the ire of its supporters which in some ways makes it responsive to international pressure. Therefore, in instances where the regime may have desired the application of even more brutal methods of repression it typically refrained from doing so, allowing the Brotherhood to, in a sense, know what to expect. Arrest and trial in military courts often appeared to be the regimes preferred method of dealing with the Brotherhood, although in specific instances the regime resulted to more draconian measures. A document on the Muslim Brotherhood's English language website states that from 1994-1999 the group "passed by five hard years during which twenty thousand members were imprisoned, 125 leaders were tried before martial courts, and three of them faced martyrdom: one under torture, and two due to the bad 166 Interview with Mohamed EIBaradei on Democracy in Egypt." ikhwQ/lI\'eb.col1l, last modified 2010, hHp:llwww.ikhwanwcb.comlprint.php ? id=25479. 112

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health conditions in the jail.,,167 Facing repression, the Brothers publicized their treatment both domestically and internationally while at the same time discussing the moderate position of their group in comparison to the radical groups they had been aligned with by the Egyptian government. In doing so they increased the cost of rule for the Mubarak regime and drew attention to the dire state of affairs in Egypt. In a 1995 article in the International Herald Tribune, John Lancaster wrote, "The cost has been high in terms of abuses such as torture, extra-judicial killings, imprisonment without trial, and mass arrests." 168 Over the course of the 1995 election 51 Brotherhood candidates found themselves in prison along with thousands of Islamists. These actions drew outspoken criticism from the Egyptian Human Rights Organization. 169 In the wake of the elections 54 members of the Brotherhood were found guilty of "directing an illegal organization with plans to impede the law and constitution" citing a reported meeting at which those on trial determined to pursue further electoral gains in parliament and professional organizations. A report by Amnesty International decried the trials as an outrage to all observers, both 167 ;'Muslim Brotherhood and Democracy in Egypt. ikhwallH'eb.co/JI last modified June 6 2007 http://www.ikhwanweb.comlprint.php?id=808 16 8 In Esposito, The Islallli c Threat, 244. 169 Harnisch and Mecham. "Democratic Ideology." 193. 113

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domestic and international. 170 The fact that news reporters in the United States and respected human rights organizations could be found discussing the repression of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt illustrates the extent to which the world took notice. Again, in the 2000 parliamentary elections the Brotherhood candidates and supporters faced repression through arrest and intimidation at polling places known to support Brotherhood candidates. In the parliamentary elections of 2005 after a judicial ruling opened the door for more free and fair elections than Egypt had seen in some time the Brotherhood won 34 seats in the first round of balloting The regime took notice arresting over 1,300 members of the group by the third and final round. Remarkably the Muslim Brotherhood enjoyed their be s t performance in a national election gaining a total of 88 seats in the People's Assembly (lower house of parliament). 171 Following the success of 2005, in the 2007 elections for the Shura Council (upper house of parliament) the Brotherhood announced it would contest 19 of 88 total seats in an election sporting over 600 candidates. Following the announcement of their intention to participate the government arrested a t least one candidate and hundreds of their supporters again attracting the attention of human 1 70 Esposito, The Islami c Threat. 101-102. 1 7 1 Harnisch and Mecham. "Democra tic Ide ology," 193. 114

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rights organizations.l72 "There are multiple messages being sent by the regime through this crackdown, not only for the Ikhwan but for all liberal, secular, leftist forces in the country," said Said Sadek Amin, a professor at the American University in Cairo. "Look at the Ikhwan, who are suffering a great deal and imagine what would happen to you when you are in fact a smaller power compared to them."m While the regime issued a direct challenge to all political competitors through the repression of the Muslim Brotherhood, as the above quote suggests, the Brotherhood countered their propaganda by using the repression to illustrate the lengths to which the regime had to go in order to ensure they maintained power. In doing so they publicized the social costs of allowing the regime to remain in power to members of the passive opposition and helped to create a more broadly united oppositional front against Mubarak. Yet the regime persisted in its policies of repression, especially toward the Muslim Brotherhood, arresting over 800 members of the organization in the run up to local council elections in April 2008.174 Later that month 25 senior leaders of the Brotherhood, finally bringing to an end a trial that had lasted "well over a year," were 172 "Allegations of Irregularity, Apathy, and Violence Mark Egyptian Elections," Voice of America News (June II, 2007). 173 "Egypt's Renewed Crackdown on Islamic Opposition," Voice of America News (September 6, 2007). J7.l "Not by bread alone," The Economist. April 12,2008. 115

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convicted on unclear charges while the majority of their defense attorneys were not in the courtroom. Nicole Choueiry, a spokeswoman for Amnesty International who observed the trial stated: This is clearly a politically motivated trial and it has been from the outset, since the decision was made by the president of the country himself for these people to be tried before a military court. Now what we saw today leaves no doubt that the Egyptian authorities are keen on continuing their relentless campaign to undermine the main opposition group in the country.175 The widespread attention garnered by the state's repression of the Muslim Brotherhood, while it did disrupt the organization, also underestimated their political craft. Using the arrests and election irregularities as a tool, the Brotherhood widened the audience tuned into the abuses in Egypt. In doing so they attracted the attention of venerated human rights organizations such as Amnesty International as well as news agencies and reporters from around the world. This provided them an international platform from which they critiqued the regime on the notable gap between Mubarak' s democratic posturing and the harsh realities of Egyptian politics. Not only could they critique the regime, these critiques were then given the weight of international organizations and critics, lending a level of legitimacy to the Brotherhood's argument while detracting from the legitimacy possessed by the state. Thus, while there is little doubt that Mubarak's campaign of repression served to 175 "Egyptian Military Court Convicts 25 from Muslim Brotherhood, Acquits IS," Voice of America News (April 15,2008). 116

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force the Brotherhood from their role in professional organizations, it also allowed them to gain international exposure as a moderate organization bent on pursuing competitive politics in Egypt regardless of personal sacrifice. While many international observers poignantly commented on the Brotherhood's desire to establish an Islamic state replete with shari a law, the Brotherhood again took this as an opportunity to expand upon their position to an international audience. The skill at which the Brotherhood maneuvered during this period of time undoubtedly increased their profile within Egypt, but more importantly, it did so abroad. Harnisch and Mecham state that the repression which accompanied the Brotherhood's foray into electoral politics, at both the syndicate and national level, granted them the "profile of a political martyr" in the eyes of many Egyptians.176 In an interview, M. Zarea, the Director of the Human Rights Center for the Association of Prisoners, explained that while the Brotherhood is not repressed any more than other opposition groups in the country, "a 'false legend' surrounds the victimization of the Brotherhood, which leads people to perceive the group as the 'party of the people'." 177 The repression itself cannot be argued. Whether or not this repression occurred more frequently to the Muslim Brotherhood is up for debate 176 Harnisch and Mecham, "Democratic Ideology," 194. 177 Ibid., footnote 24, p.203-204. 117

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based on the mass mobilization of the group, their membership numbers as compared to other opposition groups, their high profile as the leading opposition group, and their stipulated ties to more radical organizations. Either way, what is notable is the fact that the Brotherhood has been able to cultivate a belief amongst the people that, even for those that did not agree in principle, they represented an opposition force that would criticize and challenge the regime without fear of retaliation. In presenting this image to the people they were able to increase the cost of political power for the regime and mobilize passive supporters of the regime to distance themselves from the state apparatus while generating new passive opposition and increasing the numbers of the active opposition. Mubarak's decision to link the Brotherhood with known terrorist organizations also played directly into the Brotherhood's hands. By increasing the cost of rule, Stepan proposes that the authoritarian regime will be "thrown on the defensive" and will then be "forced to justify their rule as a mere 'temporary exception' rendered 'indispensable' by the absences of a viable alternative.,,178 A definite tinge of defensiveness is apparent in Mubarak's repression of the Brotherhood post -1992 as the regime began to recognize the staunch political challenge the Brothers' involvement in the limited political openings posed to the 178 Stepan, Arguing Comparatil'e Politics, 163. 118

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state. By linking the group to terrorist organizations Mubarak attempted to create a logical reason for his continued monopoly of state power. If the Brotherhood truly did represent a terrorist organization, the security risk s of allowing them to participate in the political process far outweighed the costs to the regime. Yet, beyond Mubarak's words there is little to suggest that the Brothers are in fact linked to organizations like Islamic Jihad or al-gama 'a. His persecution served only to increase the Brotherhood's political capital amongst the people by positioning them as the most significant threat to the regime, as the primary opposition group. Additionally, by publicly attacking the Brotherhood, it appears that Mubarak provided them with an opportunity to demonstrate their commitment to non-violent, moderate reform. Rather than turning to a more radical path, the Brotherhood firmly stated their commitment to a moderate course and affirmed this position by running a limited number of candidates in elections for both the parliament and in professional organizations after 2000. Abu-l-Futuh stressed that even though the Brotherhood faced incessant repression from the Mubarak regime the group would continue to respect the rule of law established by the constitution. "What the Muslim Brotherhood suffered in the past years and our stand in the recent elections provide clear evidence that we prefer the public interest to self-interest," he said. "As much 119

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as we are interested in participating in political action, we care for the country's security and peace.,,179 Mubarak also attempted to justify his sole control of state power by pointing to the lack of education within the country. In a public address at Alexandria University in 1992 he said, "In our democracy we exploit the citizens' simplicity. We have a high rate of uneducated people. Because of this simplicity and the high rate of uneducated people, we can infuse very dangerous ideas into the people's minds," obviously referencing the Islamic groups. He continued, "Democracy can be soundly established when you have educated people, people who can read and write."IRO With this statement he again lent credibility to the Islamists in that educating people seemed a far higher priority for these organizations, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, than it did for the state. So, in some ways, the state legitimated the Brotherhood's social agenda while unintentionally positioning them as a force for democracy. As Mubarak continued to attempt a justification of his rule based on the lack of a viable alternative, the Brotherhood countered, citing their historical commitment to democratic principles in an Islamic state as a perfectly credible alternative to Mubarak's regime. To support this proposition they pointed to their pursuit of a 1 7 9 In Wickham, Mobili::Jng Islalll, 225. 1 8 0 In Wickham, Mobi/bllg Islam, 67. 120

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1moderate policy, their internal structure, the moderation of their views over the course of their history, participation in plural politics, and their commitment to the will of the people. Before attempting to completely analyze the Muslim Brotherhood as a democratic challenger to the Mubarak regime, or as an opposition paving the way for a democratic successor, it is necessary to explore their development as a moderate Islamic group. It is important to keep in mind that the Muslim Brotherhood is far more than simply a political organization. As we have seen they began as a social organization dedicated to restoring the place of Islam in Egyptian society in the face of the British colonial influence. Politics began as simply a means to an end. Yet, in pursuing that end the Brothers became a political organization in as much as they remained a social and religious one. This participation in the Egyptian political system, limited as it may have been, poses a question on which much scholarly work has focused in the past two decades, specifically: Does inclusion lead to moderation? Therefore, before we examine the Muslim Brotherhood's emergence as a democratic challenger to the Mubarak regime, we must first explore their participation in Egyptian politics and the extent to which they represent a moderate Islamic political VOIce. 121

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CHAPTER 5 THE MOVE TO MODERATION Over the past decade, if not longer, lillian Schwedler has been researching the proposition that there is a "participation/moderation tradeoff' in which opposition groups by participating in the political system as a result of opening political space, moderate their stance in order to gain a more substantial role. Focused primarily on Islamic parties under authoritarian regimes in Yemen and Jordan, the theoretical model which she developed can be applied to the case of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt without much modification. The similar political situations Islamist parties under an authoritarian regime that opens some amount of political space in an attempt to secure legitimacy and propagate the guise of democracy allows for the model, utilized by Schwedler in two particular polities, to be easily transplanted to the case of Egypt. Her work also raises several significant questions which, when posed to a certain group, can be used to judge the degree to which they have moderated their position on issues of particular relevance to democratic participation. Schwedler begins by defining moderation as "the movement from a relatively closed and rigid world view to one more open and tolerant of alternative perspectives." I 81 With this definition in mind the task then is to prove that inclusion 1 8 1 Schwedler, FaiTh ill Moderati on, 3. 122

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actually led to that moderation. She proposes that inclusion can cause a more moderate trend to emerge in that, to participate in the political system, especially in the limited political space allowed by an authoritarian regime, the newly included group will have to modify itself and fit within the rules governing political participation. Especially under an authoritarian regime, the rules that are set in place to govern the political openings are often strict and serve to severely constrain a group's independent actions. Thus, the group's behavior is limited by the specific requirements put in place by the regime. She writes, "Inclusion is seen as a mechanism for deflating radical opposition voices, promoting tolerance, and pluralism, and perhaps even advancing a democratization process .... the challenge is to channel dissenting voices and competing groups into state-controlled spaces of political contestation by providing opposition voices with immediate incentives and the promise of future political gains.,,]81 Thus, as the benefits of inclusion increase, so does moderation, as the opposition group has to modify their stance to play by the rules of the regime. A major focus of the group becomes maintaining their position and they are therefore more inclined to work with others and view certain kinds of contestation as more acceptable and politically beneficial than others. If a group that was previously excluded is allowed some measure of political space in which to operate, they begin 182 Ibid., 11. 123

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to see that space as more beneficial than being entirely excluded as they have a platform from which to disseminate their views and increase awareness. Prior to this opening, many opposition activities are considered illegal, as groups may be unable to publish or obtain legal status. By modifying their stance they gain these abilities, though they are always constrained by the regime. Why would a regime allow opposition voices? Schwedler proposes that as regimes face crises of legitimation, they often open some degree of political space in an attempt to appease the opposition. Thus, the regime retains the lion's share of power but is able to quash some of the main complaints against them by allowing political participation for opposing voices. While the newly opened political space is often highly controlled allowing the regime to maintain exclusive domination of the important power holding positions, this new space in which opposition groups can maneuver is a valuable asset for dissenting voices. Schwedler also precisely distinguishes between political "liberalization" and "democratization" in that the first entails an increase in political rights and civil liberties, whereas the later is an increase in political space and some measure of contestation. While increases in political space can create a more open environment in which groups can advocate for civil and political rights, the regime is still able to exert control over the opposition through new mechanisms of control. More "legal" means of control, rather than violence or a show of force alone, develop through which the regime can monitor and 124

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structure what the opposition groups advocate for. These new forms of control typically include measures such as defining how a group can apply for legal recognition, a process for how candidates are selected, the scope of publishable material, etc. Still, these political openings create and restructure political space. Schwedler writes, "Although the political elite may view this sort of inclusion strategy as a means of expanding (or at least maintaining) their power, the accompanying changes to political opportunity structures nevertheless create new space for political organization.,,183 Rules of exclusion and inclusion, such as those stipulating that only parties, not individuals, may participate, or there will be no religious parties, while potentially excluding some, ensures that opposition groups pursue creative avenues to political involvement. Alliances with recognized parties allow for Islamic opposition groups to circumvent both of the above restrictions, while also bringing them into close contact with other parties. In this way Schwedler sees the opposition groups as having to moderate their position to ensure their continued existence within the political sphere. They may also turn to professional associations to increase their involvement in organizations which may then support them in political contests. Again, their involvement and political exposure create space for increasing communication and exposure to multiple points of view. Thus, the opposition 183 Ibid., 37. 125

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groups, to ensure they retain a share of political power, must moderate their stance on particular issues as they become concerned with achieving and maintaining electoral success. She suggests, ... that while regimes are seeking to preserve their power by manipulating electoral processes, a range of political groups, including Islamists, are gaining experience in pluralist political practices." 1 8 4 The important question then is how can we judge moderation? Schwedler identifies three criteria, participation in elections, cooperation with rivals and other groups, and internal signs of moderation, by which their moderation can be analyzed.18S She fleshes out these criteria by positing that participation in elections can also be viewed as the extent to which the opposition groups participate within the constraints placed on the political space as determined by the regime. In regard to the second and third criterion, cooperation with rivals and internal moderation, Schwedler proposes that one needs to look at how groups redefine their own political boundaries. Boundaries are "distinctions made by political actors," she writes, "about what is possible, who are friends and adversaries and which of the available options are justifiable in terms of one's worldview.,,186 Thus, moderation is evidenced by a Jillian Schwedler, A Paradox of Democracy? Islamist participation in Elections ," Middle East Report no. 209 (1998): 28. 185 Jillian Schwedler, "Democratization, Inclusion and the Moderation of Islamist Parties ," D e l'el opl1lent 50 no I (2007): 57. 1 86 Schwedler, Faith ill M o d e ration 151. 126

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redrawing of these boundaries to include more perspectives which are justified by the core philosophy of the group and agreed upon by the consensus of the majority within 187 It. She also identifies what she refers to as "dimensions of change" as an indicator of the third criterion, signs of moderation, that specifically refer to the internal policies and operations of an opposition group. These dimensions encompass new alliances, working within a pluralist system, internal organization, group decision making practices, and a redefinition of the boundaries. 188 There is a significant amount of overlap between the third criterion and the other two, yet the focus of this third is on the internal reconciliation of democratic principles to the group's proclaimed Islamic agenda. She writes, "If an Islamist party struggles with how indeed, whether it can justify particular dimensions of democratic participation in terms of its broader ideological commitments, we can confidently say that it has evolved ideologically when internal policy commitments have shifted more toward inclusivity and tolerance of alternative views.,,189 Thus, Schwedler has provided the foundation upon which an analysis of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood can build. By examining the inclusion-moderation 187 Ibid .. 152. 188 Ibid .. 196-197. 189 Schwed1er. "Democratization," 60. 127

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hypothesis she provides one mechanism by which we can assess the extent of the Muslim Brotherhood's rhetoric and approach toward democracy. The three criteria, which she proposes provide a measure for moderation allow us to then a s sess the depth of commitment the Brotherhood has toward democracy. We can then determine whether or not they simply appear to be supporters of democracy, merely to further their agenda or genuinely support a reconciliation of Islam and democracy in Egypt. A Typology of Islamic Groups Building on Schwedler's analysis we can identify three areas and their respective indicators which allow us to assess the degree to which the Muslim Brotherhood has become a moderate and democratic organization The first is the group s participation in elections and their ability to "play by the rules" set down by the regime in a limited political environment. Secondly we can assess the degree to which the Muslim Brotherhood collaborates with other parties and cooperates with rivals to achieve their political aims. Finally and arguably the most important indicator, is the degree to which the Muslim Brotherhood s internal operations and boundaries (as defined by Schwedler above) have been redefined or redrawn. However, before we can examine the Muslim Brotherhood by these criteria it is necessary to under s tand what makes a moderate a moderate. What is the definition of a moderate Islami s t group as compared to an extremist ? Does the Muslim 128

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Brotherhood in fact represent a moderate strain of political Islam? Let us turn our attention to these questions before assessing the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood on Schwedler s criteria. The most useful way of addressing what makes a moderate a moderate is to separate distinct spheres of political Islam and assess the characteristics that groups or individuals have in common to develop a typology. Oliver Roy developed the most prominent typology of Islamic groups by studying the Mujahidin fighters in Afghanistan in the 1980s during the Soviet invasion and occupation. He categorized political Islam into three distinct groupings, traditionalists, fundamentalists, and Islamists. Traditionalists he saw as being primarily organized into tribes and accepting local authorities as the most powerful religious leaders. Fundamentalists differed in that they bowed to interpretations of the Quran by the Ulama, or community of religious scholars. These scholars have the final say on religious interpretation and must be highly educated in regard to religion and religious traditions. Finally there are Islamists, which Roy saw as emerging out of the fundamentalist tradition, but accepting that certain lay people can also interpret the faith and the political path of a nation. Their main goal rested with control of the state and the establishment of an Islamic society based on progress and religious 129

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adherence.190 In these terms the Muslim Brotherhood obviously falls into this third category, yet it is useful to draw on more recent works to further develop this typology. Moataz A. Fattah and Jim Butterfield have built on Roy's typology by looking at primarily Islamic intellectuals and academics and categorizing them based on distinct characteristics into traditionalist, modernist, or secularist categories. 191 This typology is useful in that it clearly defines the characteristics which are inherent to each group but also aptly recognizes that there is a group of secular Islamic scholars. In this typology modernists can be most clearly identified with Roy's Islamists but the division between them and the traditionalists is more clearly delineated. The major factor is again that lay people are able to interpret the path of the faith and the political system, although within clearly defined parameters set down by sharia. The most useful aspect of this typology is the clear delineation between traditionalists and modernists. Fattah and Butterfield propose that traditionalists seek a clearly Islamic government, inherently antithetical to democracy, whereas the modernists seek an Islamic democracy through a reconciliation of Islamic concepts and democratic principles. The traditionalists depend on strict adherence to the Islamic sacred texts 190 Roy as discussed in Sadowski, "Political Islam," 219-222. 191 Fallah and Butterfield, "Muslim Cultural Entrepreneurs," 49-78. 130

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and do not accept the idea of ijtihad, whereas modernists believe that the predominant principle in shari a is justice and therefore whatever achieves justice for people without violating the principles of shari a is open to interpretation. Thus for traditionalists, anything that is not addressed in the sacred texts is not open to debate and shura is to be left to only members of the Ulama. For modernists on the other hand, shura is obligatory and should include all Muslims and non-Muslims as Islam is concerned with worldly affairs and the Ulama are lacking knowledge in this area. Thus, democracy is representative of the best implementation of the principle of shura. These two groups also differ on perceptions of political participation and rights. Where the traditionalists would exclude all non-Muslims and see basic freedoms as the best argument against democracy as they are not given by God in the Quran but rather by people, modernists argue that all must be able to participate and rights are acceptable as long as they do not violate sharia. AI-Zawahiri, who broke away from the Brotherhood, has criticized the Muslim Brotherhood on this exact issue claiming that their support for working within a political system i s a rejection of Islam Fattah and Butterfield summarize these differences writing: Modernist Islamists, although they share with traditionalists their reading of Islam as a source of Islamic Ideology, differ fundamentally from them on their perception of alien ideals and institutions related to democracy. They accept new ideas, mechanisms and values insofar as they do not contradict what they understand as authentic and well-established shariah and Islamic tradition. Modernists find nothing in Islam's authentic sources that hinder them from 131

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communicating with and learning from non-Muslims ... To modernists, most aspects of democracy are compatible with Islam ... 192 Based on the above typologies it is clear there are apparent differences between trends in political Islam. Clearly the Muslim Brotherhood, as we will see, fits more in the vein of modernist thought than it does with the traditionalist camp. With this typology in mind, let us turn toward Schwedler's proposition that inclusion in the political process is the mechanism by which moderation can be furthered and the seeds of democracy sewn. Assessing Moderation Playing by the Rules Before analyzing Schwedler's first criterion, participation in elections within the regime's constraints, it is important to note the reasons a regime would open political space for the opposition. As Schwedler proposes it is a way for the regime to monitor and direct the challenges of an opposition group. It can also be a means of maintaining the regime's hold on power, channeling moderate voices into the political arena to detract from the support base of more radical organizations, while allowing the regime to use mechanisms other than force to control the opposition.193 Other scholars echo this assessment. Stepan argues that authoritarian regimes will 192 Ibid .. 74. 193 See Schwedler. Faith ill Moderation. II. 37, 39. 132

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minimally liberalize the political space in order to relieve pressure on the regime and preserve their long term interests such as the maintenance of a supreme position. The pressure can be from either internal opposition groups or from external forces such as the international community. Liberalization then is most often accompanied by a set of rules and restrictions which limit the degree to which the opposition can operate and preserve the power of the regime.194 As Volpi points out, .. these pseudo-democratic systems actively produce a political order that tries to look like a liberal democracy in order to make domestic and international gains, without actually trying to become one.,,195 Thus, they appear as if there have been real attempts at democratization, while in reality they represent limited democracies. Schwedler's argument about moderation though brings in a crucial point. Even if the regimes are instituting a substantially limited form of democracy they have helped to reshape the political space. By establishing restrictions on parties and constraints on the ability of opposition groups to participate, they have also effectively channeled opposition energy into finding creative ways around those barriers and paved the way for increased calls for democratization and further concessions on behalf of the regime. Thus, as Tamara Wittes, a Brookings Institute scholar, points out "When the choice is Stepan, Arguing Comparati v e Politics, 113. 195 Volpi "Political Islam in the Mediterranean. 30. 133

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between marginalization, existence as an illegal underground, or a legal existence constrained by the state, these groups have chosen to maintain their ability to speak to the broader public by accepting the basic rules laid down by the state." 196 It is here where the cycle of relaxation and repression becomes significant. While the Muslim Brotherhood was not a legally recognized organization within Egypt, it was in fact banned by the state, the recognition by both the Sadat and Mubarak regimes of their social influence created space in which the Brotherhood could operate. When the regime deemed that there was an advantage to working with the organization, such as Sadat did to increase his support against Nasserites and leftists, or as Mubarak did in combating the support base of extremist organizations, the Brotherhood was allowed to flourish. In fact both regimes allowed them, at one time or another, to publish while Mubarak's saw them compete in elections. Yet, when the regime felt that the Brothers held too much sway they would institute a period of repression typically involving mass arrests and military trials. Thus, while the Brothers remained an outlawed organization, they were granted a modicum of space in which to maneuver as the regime saw fit. Therefore, they have had to adhere to the rules and limitations laid down by the regime when attempting to participate in this political space. Beginning with Schwedler's proposition, that the extent to which 1% Tamara Coffman Willes, Freedom's U/lSteady March: America's Role in Building Arab Democracy (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2008), Ln. 134

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a group participates in elections according to the rules of the state can indicate moderation, we should then examine the Muslim Brotherhood's electoral history. Early in their history the Muslim Brotherhood resolved to contest elections. In 1941 at their sixth conference the Brothers agreed to field candidates in forthcoming parliamentary elections, doing so in both the 1941 and 1945 elections. While they did not win seats in either of the two elections, the policy of contesting elections had been sufficiently put in place by the founder Hassan al-Banna. Yet, from 1952 until the 1980s, the organization had either been prevented from fielding candidates or chosen to boycott elections.197 Beginning in 1984 though the Brothers returned to electoral politics winning twelve seats. They participated again in 1987, winning enough seats to comprise the primary opposition party, although they only held thirty seven out of a total of 360 seats. Both these instances of competing in the electoral process entailed that the Brotherhood form alliances in order to achieve the state mandated eight percent of the total vote in order to obtain their seats in Parliament.198 "When the Brotherhood first chose to participate in parliamentary elections," write Harnisch and Mecham, "the decision reflected the group's desire to 197 Esposito and Piscatori. "Democratization and Islam," 429-430. 198 Abed-Kotob, "The Accomadationists Speak,"' 328. 135

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achieve its political goal s through the process of normal Egyptian politics.,,199 While they boycotted the elections of 1990 in response to the state's non democratic rulings and procedures so did the majority of opposition movements as a means of expressing "growing dissatisfaction with the government." This was largely in response to the state's decision to only allow individuals, not parties to contest seats in national elections. 200 During this time the Brotherhood also challenged for seat s at the local level of politics and in professional association elections In the early 1990s the Brothers obtained a leading role in almost all of the major professional organizations in Egypt which allowed them to mobilize public support and disseminate their political message.201 They ran candidates in the 1992 local elections and that same year won two-thirds of the seats in the administrative assembly of the Lawyer's Association one of the oldest and most prominent of the syndicates." 202 Then in April of 1993 the Brotherhood won ten of fifteen seat s in elections for the faculty club of Zagazig University thereby gaining a position among the educated classes and a chance to 199 Harnisch and Mecham D e mocratic Ideol ogy ," 190. 200Quote in: Esposito and Piscatori "Democratization and Islam ," 430. See a l so: Harnisch and Mecham, "Democ ratic Ideology," 192, and Ab ed -Kolob, 'The Accomadalionists Speak," 328 201 H a rnisch and M ec ham D e mocratic Ideol ogy, 193 202 Abed-Kolob, The Accomad a tionists Speak ." 329. 136

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spread their message among intellectuals.203 In an illuminating example of how the regime sought to constrain the Brotherhood's success as an opposition party, in response to their increasing presence in professional associations the state passed Syndicate Law 100 which declared that a minimum of fifty percent of the members of an organization must vote in order for the results of those elections to stand.204 If that fifty percent margin was not met the regime could officially take control of that syndicate, its budget, and all of its activities therefore subjecting its continued operation to governmental oversight. Still, these victories and the evident commitment to work for change through legal avenues thrust the group to the forefront of a larger opposition to the state as we have seen. Jason Brownlee sees this time period, post -1987, when opposition in parliament increased to around twenty percent, the ranks of non-governmental organizations swelled, and debate and discussion increased within professional syndicates, as evidence of increasing political space.205 While the regime had begun to clamp down on the Muslim Brotherhood, this space allowed them to operate and spread their influence throughout the political, professional, and educational elective bodies. By 1995 the Brothers again challenged for seats in national parliamentary 203 Ibid. Ibid. 205 Jason Brownlee in Larry Diamond. Marc F. Plattner and Daniel Brumberg cds., Islam and Democracy ill the Middle East (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 50-51. 137

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elections although they faced a closing political environment. Their attempt to field candidates met with the arrests of at least fifty-one Brotherhood candidates and an increasing amount of state sponsored propaganda that linked the Brothers to more radical organizations. Again in the 2000 elections the government arrested at least twenty Muslim Brotherhood candidates for parliament and ordered the arrest of more than forty-six others, as well as for members of the candidates support staff and campaign organizations. Still the Brothers took seventeen seats. In the 2005 elections the Brothers gained thirty-two seats after the first round of voting with two more rounds still to come. Between the first and second round over 1,300 candidates and members of the Brotherhood found themselves imprisoned, yet, the Brotherhood still managed to secure a total of eighty-eight seats (out of a total of 454) by the end of the election. The 2005 victory represents their most substantial to date and allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to become the primary opposition in parliament. 206 Subsequent to these gains the state again took steps to ensure that they would retain power in future elections by amending the constitution to prohibit any political activity based on religion in 2007. On the Brotherhood's performance in parliament Wittes writes, "The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood ... has now had members in parliament for more than two decades and has developed a reputation for good 206 Harnisch and Mecham Democratic Ideology, 193 138

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---------------------------------------------------------------------------------constituent service, active use of the parliamentary process to challenge the regime and press forward social legislation, and a lack of corruption.,,207 The Muslim Brotherhood, as seen in a document released on its website in 2007, makes clear that the decision to participate in the electoral process and the political space allowed by the regime had a substantial impact on the organization. They state, "Among the most important experiences that took place in the 1980s were: The active participation of the Mu s lim Brotherhood in the parliamentary elections of 1984 and 1987 ... participation of the Muslim Brotherhood in the parliament. .. [and] the extensive activities of the Muslim Brotherhood in the important syndicates." This statement emphasizes the Muslim Brotherhood's electoral successes and demonstrates their commitment to political participation. They go on to state, "The accumulation of such experiences through two decades resulted in the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood reconsidered some of its basic principles related to democracy, and clarified its views concerning other issues.,,208 What then. can we see as the result of this participation? The Muslim Brotherhood's statement illustrates, to a large degree, Schwedler's proposition that through engagement with the political process, even if in limited openings, opposition 207 Wittes. Freedom's UI/s t eady March, 135. c O S "Muslim Brotherhood and Democracy in Eg y pt ," ikllll'allll' e b.c o m last modified June 7 2007 http : //www.ikhwanweb comlprint.php?id=808 139

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movements clarify their views and become invested in plural politics and democracy. It also provides a glimpse into the organizations investment in working within the system and the desire for further democratic reform. Armed with the justification that the founder, Hasan al-Banna, committed the group to working within the political system by participating in elections in 1941 and 1945, contemporary leaders can point to the Brotherhood's long standing commitment to engagement and to a precedent left by their founder. This alone helps to deflect criticism that the group should refrain from participating in politics if it claims to be a truly Islamic organization as the more traditionalist groups have leveled at the Brothers. Their commitment to democratic principles is also apparent in their continued participation within the constraints laid out by the regime. Their success undoubtedly led the regime to limit political space and change the constraints placed on participation, which again illustrates the point that regimes institute liberalization in order to more effectively monitor and restrict opposition through means other than force. Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood proved itself to be a substantial opposition group, one the regime attempted to combat through continuously changing policies. Their participation in elections served to bring them into contact with other groups and perspectives while allowing them to disseminate their message. Yet, when a message is challenged by those that do not share the same view, it is reflected upon, debated, and if need be altered. The next section will address how the Brotherhood's 140

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engagement in elections has brought them into contact with these alternative views and the effect they have had on the Brotherhood's position. Cooperation The second criterion by which Schwedler proposes we analyze a group's moderation is the extent to which they cooperate with political rivals and other groups in order to achieve their goals. As the statement from the Muslim Brotherhood in the last section illustrates, the group's participation in elections forced them to reconsider "some of the group's basic principles related to democracy. ,,209 Therefore, if this criterion depends on the redrawing of certain boundaries related to political participation, we need to assess the degree to which these boundaries have changed. In order to do so there is a need to understand how these boundaries were initially created. The Muslim Brotherhood's primary objective is the creation of an Islamic state. This concept though, has evolved since their founding in 1928 into more of an Islamic democracy than a theocracy, yet it remains at the forefront of their agenda. Thus, the Brother s advocate for the institution of shari a, albeit, not a rigid and strenuously structured version, but rather a malleable interpretation of the law which does not violate any of its core principles. They have made the argument that justice is the first priority of Islam and anything which provides justice, even if it is not 209 Ibid 141

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inherent to Islamic tradition, can be utilized in its pursuit as long as it is within the bounds of the main principles of sharia. The Brothers have come to see an Islamic state as a civil state with an Islamic reference point or a "civil state based on Sharia," as they state in their 2007 Electoral Programme. For them this means that an "Islamic state is necessarily a civil state. Civil rejects sacredness and clerical identity of state maintaining meanwhile its Islamic identity as Islam laid down the limits and rights.,,210 In order to create this state there is a need for a system of government in which the "ruler's authority is based on social contract between the ruler and the ruled ... and where "society should have mechanisms and regulations necessary to set up a rational rule based on justice and equality among all people without discrimination based on colour, gender, or faith.,,211 Dr. Rafik Habib, a Coptic intellectual with close ties to the Muslim Brotherhood and speaking on their behalf, argues that the organization: ... agrees that the general Islamic authority can't be primarily maintained unless we accomplish the mandate of the nation and its full right to choose its own rulers and representatives ... .It may be argued that the civil state is based on the foundations of the modern democracy and relies on pluralism and the f I f 117 peace u rotatIOn 0 power. -210 '"The Electoral Programme of the Muslim Brotherhood for Shura Council in 2007," ikhwallweb.com last modified June 6, 2007 http://www.ikhwanweb.comlprint.php?id=822 211 Ibid m Dr. Rafik Habib, "Understanding the riddle of the modern civil state:' ikhwalllreb.colll. last modified September 9,2009, http://www.ikhwanweb.comlprint.php?id=20968 142

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As Habib's statement indicates, the Brothers now advocate for the necessity of political parties, but that was not always the case. The founder, al-Bana, was extremely hostile to the notion of political parties. He saw it as yet another way for the West to divide and control the people, pitting them against one a nother rather than allowing them to unify against foreign intrusion. In Towards the Light, one of al Banna's mo s t famous writings, he called for reform, a principle goal of which was to put "An end to party rivalry, and directing the political forces of the nation into a unified front.,,21 3 The Brotherhood acknowledges this attitude, and their reconsideration of it, in a 2007 document released on their website They write, "As for the issue of parties al-Banna had a seve re viewpoint that was related to the nature of the political parties at th a t time. The Muslim Brotherhood reconsidered their viewpoint in 1994 in a famou s charter that admitted the plurality of parties.,,214 They reiterate the view that political parties are a right of the people in their version of a civil state explaining that in order to apply shura, which is a nece ss ity if individuals and the nation are to live in "ac cordance with Islamic Sharia," there must be "The freedom of e s tablishing political partie s through notification ... no administrative body 2 1 3 AI-Bana, Towards the Light. W "M uslim Bro therhood and D e m oc racy in Egyp t ," (2007). 143

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should have the right to interfere or prohibit or quell this right.,,215 Abd aI-Rahman, better known as the "blind sheikh" and currently in prison in the United States, issued a fatwa aimed at the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and what the more traditionalist movements saw as their abandonment of Islamic principles, proclaiming all political parties to be illegal and anti-Muslim. The Brothers immediately responded rejecting this decree while stressing their desire to continue to work through the political structure and within plural politics.216 Even in this brief discussion it is clear that the Brotherhood has evolved in a more moderate direction, advocating for democratic civil state framed on Islamic principles, such as shura and the principles of sharia. If we directly analyze their relationships with parties we can again see that the Brotherhood has embraced political plurality and cooperated with parties to participate in competitive politics. In the 1984 election, as only parties were allowed to compete in national elections, the Brothers joined with the Wafd party in order to run candidates.217 Again in 1987 the Muslim Brotherhood had to cooperate with 215 'The Electoral Programme," (2007). 216 Emmanuel Sivan in Diamond, Plattner, and Brumberg eds., Islam and Democracy in the Middle East. 23. m The Wafd Party first emerged as a nationalist movement after WWI and steadily became one of the most popular Egyptian political parties prior to its dissolution under Nasser. It reemerged as the New Wafd Party in early 1978 but struggled under Sadat until 1983 when it was relicensed by the Egyptian courts and again began contesting seats in the national parliament. It is considered a liberal leaning party. For comprehensive discussion of major leaders, policies. and their platform see: http://egyptelecticms.carnegieendowment.org/category/political-parties/new-wafd-party. 144

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other parties in order to field candidates. They comprised one third of the Triple Alliance (also referred to as the Islamic Alliance) with the Liberal Party and Socialist Labor Party making up the rest. The Brotherhood's collaboration with these diverse groups highlights the degree to which they had moderated their stance in order to participate in that cooperating with a socialist party is something even avowed liberal parties in the United States are hesitant to do. Once the electoral law was changed the Brothers began to run independent candidates. A debate ensued as to whether or not the Brothers should form their own political party which saw several members of the organization leave to form the Wasat Party in 1995 which was not recognized by the state in any of their several attempts to gain legal status until after Mubarak' s ouster in 2011. By 2007, as it became clear the Brotherhood would attempt to form their own political party the regime pushed through a constitutional amendment that made illegal any party with a religious reference. Article Five of the Egyptian constitution was amended to read "Citizens have the right to establish political parties according to the laws. It is not permitted to pursue any political activity or establish political parties on the basis of a religious authority, a religious foundation or discrimination on the grounds of gender or origin.,,218 218 Egyptian Constitution as cited in Kristen Stilt, Islam is the Solution: Constitutional Visions of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood," Texas Internati o nal Law l oumal46, no. 73 (2010): 80. 145

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In one of the most significant showings of cooperation with other group s the Muslim Brotherhood and nine other opposition parties formally committed themselves in a lO-point consensus statement relea sed in 1991. The ten agreed upon points include provisions regarding the ability to freely form political parties independent election supervision, limiting the president's term in office, freedom of religion, and freedom of the press. These ten points represent what all the signing groups saw as the basis for reform in the Egyptian political system.119 The Brothers them selves point to the significance of their alliances with other parties in order to run candidates in national elections. They write that one of the most important experience s the group has incurred was 'The alliance of the Mu s lim Brotherhood with some licensed parties such as AI-Wafd (1984), and Al-'Amal and AI-Ahrar (1987) ,,12 0 They also point out that in coming to power in profes s ional syndicates they have had to work closely with others and be hospitable to views different from their own. The extensive activities of the Muslim Brotherhood in the important syndicates through administering them, and its appreciation for the significance of participation without struggling with others ... was for them an exceedingly s ignificant experience that forced a recon s ideration of their position on certain issues. The evidence for their cooperation with others can be seen in their 219 Harnisch and M ec ham. D e mocratic Ideol og y 192. 2 2 0 "Muslim Bro t h e rhood and Democracy in Egypt," (2007). 146

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parliamentary record. Tarek Masoud examines the year 2006 in particular, as that is when the Brothers represented the primary opposition party after their 2005 electoral success. He notes that the members of the Brotherhood submitted a total of 244 motions, only a quarter of which were put forth by individual Muslim Brotherhood deputies. Three quarters then included members of parliament not aligned with the Brotherhood. They also issued twenty-five interpellations, or questions toward government authorities, on health issues, unemployment, and election fraud. Over the course of this whole period only one motion touched on the topic of religion with the aim of increasing religious education in public schools. Masoud writes, "In fact, the Brotherhood's representatives seem to have spent more time hammering away at the Mubarak government's Toshka desert reclamation plan than they did on anything to do with Islam.,,221 Thus, where once even the notion of political parties was outside the boundaries of Muslim Brotherhood ideology, they have come to play an incredibly prominent role in their political life. Initially rejecting the idea as all together incompatible with the spirit of unity in Islam, the Brotherhood now recognizes parties as a vehicle for individual expression and an integral part of a future Islamic democracy. Instead of working to dissuade the formation of political parties they 221 Tarek Masoud "Are Th ey Democrats? Does it Matter ?" J Ollrnal of Democra cy 19, no. :1(2008): 23 147

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actively pursue relationships with others and encourage their further development free from state interference. The modification of the boundaries in regard to working with other parties also gave rise to the issue of minorities such as Coptic Christians and women and their role in parties. The Brotherhood has typically accepted women as political actors, yet there has been some controversy over the positions they are able to hold in the party and in government (as we will discuss in the next section). The alliances with other parties, particularly the Triple Alliance in 1987 helped to moderate their s tance on these issues. Esposito and Voll write, 'The Islamic Alliance was inclusive rather than exclusive. It included Copts on its list of candidates, and in its 1989 program affirmed that 'brother Copts' in particular and people of the book in general have the same rights and obligations as Muslims.,,222 Therefore, through cooperation with other political parties and with individuals in the syndicates, the Brothers came to redraw the boundaries of what was acceptable within their worldview and justified this ideological shift with reference to their primary foundation, Islam. Internal Moderation & Changing Boundaries Internal moderation is arguably the most important criterion by which to assess the moderation of any political group. It is in the internal operations of an organization where the boundaries of what is deemed acceptable are initially 122 Esposito and Voll. Islam and Democracy, 181. 148

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established and can be restructured. The discussion of the Brotherhood's involvement with other political parties and competing voices highlights the degree to which these interactions and participation in the limited political space under the Sadat and Mubarak regimes redefined some of the boundaries of the organization. Yet there are three specific boundaries within this last criterion that allow for an ideal assessment of the groups moderation. Schwedler points to the internal procedures of a group, whether or not they are democratic, as a solid first indicator of moderation. As the Muslim Brotherhood reformer Abu! Futuah says, ajama 'a [group] that doesn't know democracy in its internal life is incapable of guaranteeing democracy outside of Thus the first area that must be assessed to gauge a group's moderation is the extent to which their internal procedures model certain democratic features. It is by looking at the internal workings of the Brotherhood that we can truly begin to understand whether or not their proclaimed support for democracy is mere lip-service or more genuine. Another area that must be evaluated is that of women's and minority rights. For many critics of the Brotherhood this is an area that is constantly referenced to illustrate their more fundamentalist nature. Yet when explored their view towards women and minority groups is, in large part, wholly consistent with democratic practice. The Brotherhood encourages dialogue amongst major religiolls groups, 223 Futuah in Pargeter. The Muslim Brorherhood 53. 149

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advocates freedom of religion, and the rights of Coptic Christians to join existing political parties or form their own with a distinct religious message. They encourage the participation of Copts in politics, have aligned with them (as previously discussed), and have worked to encourage protections from the state for Copts' religious freedom and protection against violence. The issue of women is one that the Brothers also work on. Their stance towards the participation of women has thoroughly evolved over the past several decades and they have run female MB candidates in national elections and have expressed the desire for more to become involved in the leadership structure of the group. While they do adhere to the belief that the primary responsibility of a woman is the family, in order to educate further generations rather than simply being confined to the home as with more traditional Salafi movements, they have also worked to develop and provide resources that make it easier for women to receive help with childcare and in seeking employment. Finally the group's position on violence is one of the strongest indicators of their internal moderation. The Muslim Brothers make no secret of the fact that in the past they possessed a violent arm of the organization. Sayyid Qutb's contribution to the group is also not overlooked. For many, the fact that the Brothers still reference Qutb's writings indicates a predilection toward violence, a continued link to groups such as aI-Jihad or al-Qaeda. For the Brotherhood, these references are in admiration of a devout and pious Muslim that worked to address the problems of his day. They 150

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have explicitly refuted the more radical ideas but respect his pursuit of further Islamic discovery. They draw on certain aspects of his writing to support their call for democracy, or political parties, yet they also make extremely clear that they are not advocates of political violence. There is again, one caveat to this discussion that involves the invasion, or occupation, of territories by foreign powers. In this case the group does believe that it is acceptable to exercise violent resistance. Thus in the case of Palestine, the Brothers do feel it is acceptable to use violence as a means to resist an occupying force (although there are divisions within the group over whether or not this is even an acceptable allowance). Internal Procedures If we begin with the Brotherhood s internal procedures, the best indicators we can use to establish to what degree their boundaries have changed are organization statements and published documents such as their party platforms. One of the most often repeated criticisms the Brotherhood faces relates to their use of religious slogans and ambiguous language when questioned about the group's stance on specific issues or policy proposals. In 2004 the Brotherhood released a document authored by Supreme Guide Akef discussing the principles that would guide reform 151

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within the Brotherhood.224 Criticism of the document revolved around precisely these points. In response the Muslim Brotherhood solicited the critique of Egyptian intellectuals including Copts, Leftists and university faculty who almost unanimously argued that the Brothers needed to be clear about the type of reform s they would institute and how. They also all stated that there needed to be s pecial attention paid to the iss ue of minority rights and citizenship.225 Perhaps the most illuminating attempt to accomplish this task is the release of the 2007 Draft Party Platform and the debate within the organization that followed. In the wake of their most successful foray into electoral politics in the 2005 national parliamentary elections the Muslim Brotherhood faced many questions from the public and from academic s alike. In an attempt to clarify their position on important issues and address these questions the Brotherhood drafted a Party Platform even though they had little chance of successfully forming a political party. The Brothers again attempted to deal with the criticism that they present generalized points without any real s ubstance. The 2007 Platform endeavored to clarify what policies the Brotherhood would like to enact and the changes they would institute if While thi s document is n ot available in English Kristen Stilt provides a good overview of it m ai n point s and arguments in "Islam is th e Solution: Con s titutional Visi o ns of the Egyptian Mus lim Brotherhood ," Texas Illternational Lall' JOllrnal46, no. 73 (2010). 225 "Views of Intellectuals Politicians Over Muslim Brotherhood Party Program:' ikhw(1nweb com last modified March 3, 2007, http://www ikhw a nweb.c o m/print .p hp lid=2l79. 152

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ever provided the chance. Two propositions within the platform prompted harsh criticism from the intellectual community, as well as from moderate political parties, women and Copts. The first proposition, only a few sentences in length, concerned the institution of an Ulama Council "to advise the legislative and executive branches in matters of religious law ... and that its word would be binding .. .in matters in which it felt the sharia rule at stake was definitive and not subject to divergent interpretations.,,226 In a second proposition the Platform made a clear decision to exclude both non-Muslims and women as candidates for high positions in state government such as president. Even certain members of the Brotherhood's leadership were taken aback by these two proposals which they hurriedly decried as being last minute additions that did not have the support of the whole organization. The insertion of these two clauses into the Brotherhood's platform instantaneously sparked a society wide debate yet, far more interesting to our discussion is the debate that followed within the organization. Brown and Hamzawy provide an extremely important discussion of the internal debate sparked by the Platform which helps to illustrate the inner-workings of the Muslim Brotherhood. As they point out, the Brothers typically keep debates within the organization, presenting only a single stance to the public. Although there have clearly been debates over 216 Nathan J. Brown and Amr Hamzawy, 'The Draft Party Platform of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood : F o ray into Political Integration or Retreat into Old Positions ? Carnegie Papers Middle East Series 89 (2008): 4 153

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certain issues prior to this platform, such as violence and the writings of Qutb, never have the Brothers so publicly aired their concerns and divisions. In an unusually public setting they "brought this current debate to the public media, airing their differences in the press, satellite and local broadcasting, and various Internet forums to an unprecedented degree," write Brown and Hamzawy. "The Brotherhood is currently speaking with several different voices, providing an unusual opportunity for observers and analysts to understand the different positions and orientations within the movement and even more of its mechanisms for making authoritative decisions.,,227 This debate revealed both a generational struggle, between the old guard and a new generation, as well as a theological debate between the more reform minded individuals and those of a more conservative view. Muhammad Habib, the First Deputy General Guide of the Brotherhood took on the task of defending the Platform whereas 'Abd al-Mun'im Abu al-Futuh spoke out against these two specific elements within it. Futuh stated that the Platform did not represent the whole of the Brotherhood and certain members that agreed with his assessment believed "that these elements had been introduced in an inappropriate manner, without the process of consultation and consensus building about which the 227 Ihid .. 6. 154

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Brotherhood normally boasts." 228 Habib addressed this issue proposing that murshid Akef had the platform developed by a committee which then submitted it to the Guidance Bureau, twice, after it was returned for revisions, at which point it was circulated amongst the national branches of the Brotherhood before being given to academics for their opinions and thoughts, and finally being made public. The reformers hit back saying that the process in fact only relied on a small percentage of the Brotherhood and therefore could not claim to represent the organization as a whole. Essam el-Erian (who recently assumed a leading position within the Brotherhood's political arm, the Freedom & Justice Party-FJPafter the 2011 Revolution), sided with the reformist group and hit out at the Platform saying that the Constitutional Court should be the only body able to interpret law as being in step with sharia and that "the Brotherhood must honor those clauses in the Egyptian Constitution mandating political equality regardless of religion and gender (and that no exception is justified for the presidency and premiership).,,22 9 Using the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of compatibility with Islam, the reformers argued that each member of Parliament has the ability to interpret sharia based on ijtihad and may supplement shari a in areas where it appeared deficient, such as building codes and 228 Ibid .. 7. 229 Ibid., 8. 155

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...... -........ .... ...... _--------------traffic laws.23o If a law passed that could be deemed unconstitutional based on Article 2 of the constitution which states "the principles of Islamic sharia are the main source of legislation," it falls to the Supreme Court to have the final say.231 As the internal debate raged on it became increasingly public through the use of the media to express each side's opinions. Many of the reformers in particular utilized notable Islamic scholars, such as al-Qaradawi, to express to the public why the positions of the Platform did not represent areas that should be considered sharia positions above interpretation. Qaradawi supported the position that sharia did not in fact prohibit women and Copts from holding office and that the courts could be charged with determining laws and their consistency with sharia. Thus the reformers received the support of one of the most notable religious scholars of the day. In the end, as a result of this public debate, the Brothers succumbed to the position of the reformists on the issue of the Ulama Council and have made clear that the Supreme Constitutional COUl1 has the authority to interpret the consistency of laws in relation to sharia. Yet, on the issue of women and Copts they took the position that they should be excluded from holding only the position of president with then General Guide Akef stating, "This is a legal interpretation, but there are other legal 230 Harnisch and Mecham, "Democratic Ideology," 197. 231 Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt in Stilt Islam is the Solution,-' 80. 156

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interpretations. It is for us, as members of the Brotherhood, to choose [the legal interpretation] but we do not bind others ... The ballot boxes will decide.,,232 The statement from Akef illustrates a moderated position in that the Brotherhood relinquished the claim on other high positions in the state government, such as prime minister, and also affirmed their support for competitive elections to determine the will of the people. The Brothers then, once again displayed that, through debate and interaction they could modify their boundaries to be more inclusive and tolerant of divergent opinion while also illustrating the belief that a democratic system, in which the people are able to choose their leaders, is compatible with their notion of Islam. This Platform represents a significant step for the Brotherhood as well. In response to prior criticisms, they solicited the input of leading intellectuals and attempted to develop a more complete and comprehensive proposal with this Platform. While still plagued by the use of general language and all encompassing slogans, necessary for broad support, it represented a more definite and policy laden statement than they had issued previously. Stilt proposes, through interviews with several Brotherhood members, that the Platform remaied imprecise due to the lack of legal scholars or lawyers on the committee which drafted the Platform, and also indicated their lack of experience when it came to developing policies that combine 232 Akef in Brown and Hamzawy, "The Draft Party Platform,"' 17. 157

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their ideas of Islam and a civil state. She goes on to examine the Platform though, for its substantive merit, which is clearly illustrated in the Brotherhood's respect for the Supreme Constitutional Court, Article 2 of the Constitution, and the idea of a ci vii state with an Islamic frame of reference. Stilt writes: The Platform repeatedly calls for a state where the three branches of government function with adequate separation from one another; where elections are free, fair, and supervised by independent monitoring bodies; and where candidates can run for office without state control over political party registration on the basis of the party's beliefs. These simple demands, essential to any liberal democratic society, reflect the Brotherhood's call for a society grounded by the rule of law.233 Thus, while the Brotherhood may not have specific policy prescriptions, these documents illustrate the fact that they were thinking about them. They struggled with issues as any political party would and the internal debates helped them to clarify their stance on specific aspects of their platforms thereby creating a clear vision of the reforms they wished to enact. Their solicitation of critiques from Copts politicians, and academics also illustrates the degree to which they are able and willing to work with other groups that may have conflicting visions to more effectively develop their own. Supreme Guide Akef, in a 2009 interview stated, on the internal debate, "There is always an opinion different from your opinion. Such an environment is a healthy environment. In the end, what the Brothers agree upon is what constitutes the policy of the Brotherhood, on the condition th a t it is not in contradiction with the laws of 233 Kri ste n Stilt Islam i s the Solution:' 104 158

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Islam." He goes on to speak about the criticism the group received from outside parties saying, ... we have benefitted greatly from listening carefully to the excellent opinions which we received on the party's program.,,234 Akef's words highlight the consensual decision making process within the Brotherhood and also their desire to listen to criticism and adapt their policies to best address the public's concerns, all while keeping in mind their guiding principle, Islam. If the 2007 Platform serves as an illustration of how the group has modified their boundaries with regard to certain positions, what are we to make of the criticism that it was developed without regard to the proper internal democratic procedures leveled by certain members of the Brotherhood? In order to address this question it is necessary to look at the structure of the Muslim Brotherhood to discern how this accusation arose and the typical nature of decision making within the group. Schwedler writes, "Internal party structures and practices may also offer insights into levels of democratic commitment.,,235 This statement is echoed by Wittes, who wrote, "Internal democracy is an excellent guide to a party's ability to participate in 116 ex ternal democracy. ,,-. m Interview with Mahdi Akef, "The Future of the Muslim Brotherhood," ikhwamran.com, last modified October 10 2009, hup: llwww.ikhwanweb comlprint.php?id=21321. m Schwedler, A Paradox of Democracy."' 28. 23b Wines Freedom's Unsteady March. 132. 159

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Richard P. Mitchell, in his seminal study of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood provides an excellent description of the bureaucratic structure of the organization. The Group is led by the General Guide (murshid) with a vice guide, deputy, secretariat, and secretary-general all hierarchically arranged below him. A Guidance Council and a Consultative Assembly also make up the General Headquarters of the organization which oversees the technical operations of the group. These operations are then subdivided into sections and committees, and a field apparatus in which individual members are organized into districts, then branches, and finally families.237 The consultative, or general assembly is so large that, as the Brotherhood reports, it is near impossible for it to convene, especially under the conditions of severe repression which it has faced through much of its history. Therefore, the Brothers adopted a Constituent Board to encompass the General Assembly and the Guidance Council which meets at least once a year to set the agenda for that year and elect new members. Any Brotherhood member that has been so for more than five consecutive years and is over the age of twenty-five can be nominated and elected to the Constituent Board by its current members. Dr. Mahmoun Hussein, Secretary-General of the Brotherhood states that the purpose of this group is to meet, debate, and vote on "crucial decisions first studied in towns, villages, cities, and administrative m Mitchell The S o ciety oJlhe Muslim Broth e rs, 164. 160

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offices.,,238 Within the Constituent Board there is a General Executive Bureau, consisting of twelve members elected to four year terms by members of the Constituent Board. The Constituent Board also elects members from within its ranks to become the deputy, general secretary, and treasurer. This Constituent Board also elects the General Guide, or the Chairman, "in the presence of no less than four-fifths of its members," while three fourths of them must vote for him.,,239 Former General Guide Mahdi Akef states that there is a new trend within the Brotherhood to limit this position to two six year terms, rather than serving for life as done previously. He then honored this precedent by stepping down in 2009.240 In a statement by the Brotherhood on this new development they write, "the decision reflected developments in the internal system of the group that permitted circulation of the chairman post, setting an example to the Egyptian political powers ... ,,2'\ J These groupings all make up the General Headquarter which is then subdivided into nineteen governorates, further divided into 300 districts and again into branches 138 "Mb holds fir s t Shura meeting after the revolution ikln\'Ql/l\'eb.com, last modified April 4, 2011, http://www.ikhwanw e b.comlprint.php?id=28465 139 "Muslim Brotherhood : Structure & Spread," ikhwI/ll\'eb.c oJ1/, last modified, June 6, 2007, http://www.ikhwanweb.comlprint.php?id=817. See also "Muslim Brotherhood and Democracy in Egypt." "The Future of (he Muslim Brotherhood." "Muslim Brotherhood : Structure & Spread." 161

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within each district. Each branch is orchestrated by a group of five officials elected by the whole of that branch s general assembly by secret ballot. One of these is then selected by the General headquarter to be the branch head who then makes up the district board of directors. "The branch is subordinate to its respective district and the district is subordinate to its respective administration bureau which in turn is subordinate to the general executive bureau.,,242 What all this illustrates is a heavy reliance on the rotation of power and the electoral process The Brotherhood has an internal voting system that allows members to elect individuals to the governing bodies of the organization. While all people do not vote in every election the branches are able to vote for their leaders who go on to represent them in the higher bodies. It is then these elects who vote members into higher authorities and eventually those authorities which elect the Chairman. Thus, in many respects, there is an element of democracy to the organization. Yet, it mllst also be noted, as Tarek Massound points out, that the electorate within the Brotherhood is limited, especially the higher up you go in the hierarchical structure .243 Each election is more limited than the previous when moving toward the top and relies only on an elite group of the educated and informed to elect the Chairman. Yet Akef's decision to step down, and the Brotherhood's Ibid. W Massoud Are They Democrals?" 22. 162

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statement concerning the rotation of power within the organization, illustrates the degree to which even these internal procedures have been changed within the past twenty years. The General Guide, previously elected for life, is now limited to only two six year terms. Four year term limits have also been imposed on members of the General Assembly and Chief Executive Bureau. These developments highlight the internal moderation that has been occurring within the Brotherhood for the past several decades, and the fact that it continues today. While their internal practices are not the same as democracy, they illustrate the group's understanding of electoral systems and should be seen as a significant sign that they would be willing to abide by the rules of plural democratic politics within a democratic Egypt. Women & Minority Groups The Brotherhood's stance toward women and minority groups, particularly Coptic Christians, is the second key area in determining the extent to which the group has redrawn the boundaries of what is acceptable based on their Islamic frame of reference. Lipset touches on the importance of ensuring everyone's ability to participate in a democratic system writing, "Democracy enables the citizenry to see the polity as including all societal elements ... The electorate becomes part of the legitimating structure." Therefore, he continues, quoting Metta Spencer, an "important concern is the protection of the rights of minorities from infringement by 163

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the majority.,,244 The major critique of the 2004 document the Muslim Brotherhood released to the public and which they submitted to major intellectuals, Islamic scholars, political scientists, lawyers, and opposition parties, revolved around the Muslim Brotherhood's notion of a civil state. In much of their writing, leaders of the Brotherhood advocate for the creation of a civil state with an Islamic reference. To many of those that critiqued the 2004 document this call represented a grand general principle with no definitive substance. They argued that in order for a civil state to flourish, minority rights needed to be clearly defined. In response, the Brotherhood put forth their 2007 Platform which attempted to delineate specific protections for minorities, specifically Copts and women, yet, also included the provision which created much of the fervor over the ability of Copts or women to hold the positions of president or prime minister. While the Brotherhood rescinded their prohibition on either running for these positions they maintained that they would not support a female or Coptic candidate for president as the president is seen as a spiritual and political leader whereas the office of prime minister is a purely political one. The prime minister position did not appear in this follow up statement, leading one to believe that the only position they determined had to be held by a Muslim was that of president. Thus, their stance was modified in this instance. Still, it is enlightening to Lipset. The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited : 10. 164

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further explore this issue historically to see how the boundaries have continuously shifted and been redefined. The founder, Hassan al-Banna, in his 1947 letter to King Farouk entitled Towards the Light, wrote: People think that adhering to Islam and making it the basis for regulating one's life, as well as the unity of different races of a nation, one of the strongest pillars of modernist revival, are incompatible with the existence of non Muslim minorities within the Islamic nation. However exactly the oppositie is true .. The wise and sanctified rules did not appear without containing clear and unambiguous injunctions concerning the protection of minorities ... .Islam sanctified the unity of mankind as a whole ... .It sanctified universal religious unity.245 This statement makes clear that within Islam there are specific provisions that seek to protect minority rights. Some of these are cited by al-Banna within this letter as he points to the unity of all People of the Book and principles of justice that appear throughout the Quran. While it is difficult to ascertain the precise meaning of al-Banna's statements, they do provide an early indicator of the desire of the Muslim Brotherhood to work with minority groups and people of different faiths. The most common interpretation of these statements revolves around the concept of dhimmi or protected status for non-Muslims This protected status has the effect of basically granting non-Muslims a form of second class citizenship under which they have the freedom to practice their religion yet they are excluded from AI-Bana, ''Towards the Light 15. 165

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many key aspects of democracy, such as the ability to form political parties or fully participate in electoral politics. This issue was seen in the Brotherhood's desire to exclude minorities from the presidency. As Esposito points out the concept of dhimllli as interpreted above would lead to "at best a limited democracy.,,246 However, in an attempt to address this problem Esposito notes that Muslim intellectuals have begun to reinterpret concepts such as hizb (party) and dhil1lmi with more inclusive connotations rather than the divisiveness which they originally conveyed. For the concept of dhimmi in particular, scholars have focused on its reference to a form of "covenant" between Muslims and non-Muslims while leaving the specificity of that content open to interpretation. Thus, through ijtihad the term can be taken as a guarantee of protection from exclusion based on religion in Muslim majority polities.247 Returning to the 2007 Platform then, the Brotherhood's statement that only Muslims may assume top governmental positions can be seen solely as the view of their organization. While this view eventually emerged in more moderate form, with former Supreme Guide Akef stating that anyone could run for these positions but the Brotherhood would not support a non-Muslim for president, overall, the 2007 Platform clearly supported the expansion of civil liberties to all Egyptians. Civil 2-16 Esposito, The Islamic Threat, 246. 2-17 Ibid .. 246-248. 166

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Liberties are a primary component of the Brotherhood's envisioned civil state They argue that membership in the state is to be based on citizenship, accorded to all Egyptians, regardless of religious affiliation. The Brotherhood argues that the term civil state "refers to a 'consultative, legal, and constitutional' state that achieves 'freedom, justice, and equality, with guarantees for civil liberties (i.e. freedom of speech, freedom of religion, equality for all citizens, etc.) commonly associated with liberal democracies," write Harnisch and Mecham with reference to interviews of key members.248 The Brotherhood constantly refers to this idea of a civil state, one in which equality is guaranteed for all Egyptians. Mohamed Saad el-Katatni, then the Brotherhood's media spokesman, stressed the group's commitment to this idea, and to religious freedom, stating that "Islamic law acknowledges and respects that Copts in an Islamic nation will follow their religion's laws and beliefs and are Egyptians and enjoy all the rights and duties as Muslim Egyptians.,,249 Since the 2005 success the Brotherhood experienced in the national parliamentary elections they have repeatedly attempted dialogue with Coptic leaders to assuage fears that Copts will be subject to strict Islamic law or face a second-class citizenship should the Brothers ever rise to power. In 2006 after attacks on Coptic Harnisch and Mecham, Democratic [deology 199 2.)9 "AI Katatni : MB First Called for Establishment of a Civil State," iklm'QI1\\'eb.colll last modified February 2 20 II, http://www ikhwanweb.com/print.php ljd=28065. 167

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churches in Alexandria the Muslim Brotherhood publicly denounced the attacks and backed the Copts in their attempt to secure further protections from the state and increased security to prevent future attacks?50 The Brothers have frequently attempted to clarify their stance toward Copts through publications, interviews, and speeches which specifically address this issue. In doing so a reliance on law as supervised by an independent judiciary, equality in rights and responsibilities, and citizenship regardless of race, gender, and religion, are commonly recurring themes which aim to illustrate the group's commitment to inclusive and cooperative democratic practices. In stressing these aspects of a civil state the Brotherhood also emphasizes the role of the constitution in both establishing and protecting the rights of all citizens. They regularly propose that as all Egyptians are subject to and bound by the Egyptian Constitution, the rights and principles established within must therefore also apply to all citizens. Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood espouses an inclusive version of citizenship available to all within Egypt stating that the Copts "are part of the fabric of the Egyptian society ... our partners in the homeland and destiny .... [and] are equal to their Muslim brothers in all rights and duties .. .',251 2:\0 Harnisch and Mecham "Democratic Ideology, 200 251 'The Electoral Programme 2007 ,.' 14. 168

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In regard to women, sc holarly interpretation i s again a significant catalyst for redrawing the boundaries of what is deemed acceptable within the Brotherhood. In a pamphlet distributed by the Brotherhood in 1936 there is an emphasis on finding "a solution for the problems of women, a solution that will allow her to progress .. by providing "quality education for female teachers, school pupils, students, and doctors" while developing female specific instructional programs.252 In al-Banna's Towards the Light (1947), there is a notable absence of any real di sc ussion regarding women but two statements, coming near the end of the letter put forth the social goal "to deal with 'the woman issue' In a way which will both elevate her position and provide her protection, in accordance with Islamic teachings ," while also stipulating that there need to be differences in the educational curriculum for boys and girls.253 These statements illustrate the minimal role granted to women in regard to politics but also acknowledge that the issue of women is of pivotal importance to social s tability. AI-Banna advocates "elevating her position" while at the same time s tating women should be protected. This issue of protection is one that s till pervades Brotherhood thinking today with former Supreme Guide Akef, stating in 2009, that women could assume leading political positions provided the ... political and 252 'The Muslim Brotherhood Toward the Light ," in Alfred J Andrea and Jame s H Overfield, eds., The HUll1all R ecord: Sources oj Global Hist o ry 6th Ed. (Boslon : Houghton -Mimin. 2009) 253 AI-Banna, "Towards the Li g ht ," 21. 169

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security waters are clean enough. ,,254 He goes on to state that "Women do not occupy a leading position at the Guidance Office because we wish to protect them. However, if a civilized regime existed, which respects the law and the citizens, then they are welcome to enter the Guidance Office.,,255 Heba Raouf Ezzat, an influential female Egyptian scholar recently echoed this argument while critiquing global programs aimed at increasing female participation in politics and empowering female candidates in the Middle East. Pointing to the corruption associated with politicians and the desire to avoid being saddled with the negative image of a politician, as well as the violence that typically erupts at polling places and the repressive measures adopted by regimes during elections or political demonstrations she wrote: "I claim that women are not actively engaged in politics because the political domain is not a safe and secure space for them .... Hence the process of empowering women has to go hand in hand with democratization and the dis-empowerment of the authoritarian regimes of the region.,,256 Thus, while she agrees that politics can be a risky undertaking for a woman she also proposes a solution, as did Akef, by stating that 254 "The Future of the Muslim Brotherhood." ikhwaml'eb.colll, last modified October 10, 2009, http://www.ikhwanweb.com!print.php?id=21321. 255 Ibid. 56 Heba RaoufEzzat. "On the Future of Women and Politics in the Arab World," in Donohue and Esposito cds. is/alii in Transition 188 170

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once a democratic government is established women should, and will, have the ability to participate in politics more freely. In these statements which discuss protecting women form the harsh actions of a repressive regime, there is a definite sense of moderation in that while al-Banna did not directly address these questions, Akef first acknowledges the need for a female contribution then states that they will be able to assume leading roles in both politics and within the Brotherhood. If we look at Islamic intellectual opinion of the role of women, those like al Qaradawi, who in Rutherford's opinion offer the most complete assessment of the topic, stress "that women have the same duties as men, and that they play an important role in the life of the community.,,257 AI-Banna's statement that the issue of women is arguably the most important social issue is echoed here in their role in the community; yet, it is also expanded to explicitly state that they have the same duties as men. Qaradawi believes women should be allowed to vote and hold office but he also insists that they still must play their traditional role as mothers. This view is reiterated by the Muslim Brotherhood in their party platforms and other documents addressing the role of women. In these documents the Brotherhood stress that women should be allowed to participate in politics but also that they have other social functions to carry out. Thus, it is the responsibility of the state to help create an 2 57 Rutherford "What do Egypt's Islamists Want?" 717. 171

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environment in which women can effectively carry out both her duties and participate in the life of the country. In the 2007 Electoral Programme for Shura Council the Brotherhood lays out how this should be done insisting that the state create "a favorable legislative atmosphere necessary for maintaining woman's right to strike a balance between her social duties and her work outside home including aspects related to motherhood and childhood care in society.,,258 The Brotherhood goes on to state that this can be accomplished through extending labor rights to women, improving literacy, guaranteeing protections in areas of work and transportation, establishing funds to help poor women, guaranteeing rights for divorced women, and increasing social awareness of problems women face.259 In the 2008 Municipal Election Platform the Muslim Brotherhood again emphasized the importance of creating an environment in which women could both effectively participate in society while fulfilling their family obligations through the creation of social services. "Studies proved," as stated in the Platform, "that affording public facilities in poor regions contributed to increasing women's chances to work full time and part time jobs.,,260 Thus, the Muslim 258 'The Electoral Programme 2007," 12. 259 Ibid 2 60 "Muslim Brotherhood 2008 Municipal Election Platform,"' iklnrallweb.col11 last modified March 2008, http://ikhwanweb.com/print/php?id::: 16257 172

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Brotherhood emphasized their belief that while women have an obligation to their family, the state has an obligation to ensure that they can successfully fulfill that obligation while also ensuring their ability to productively participate in society. This belief is evident in the following statement from a document released on their website: "Women have the full right to recei ve an education, to work, to occupy public positions, to vote, and to be candidates in the parliamentary elections and all other constitutional institutions. ,,261 Saying this is one thing, yet, the Brotherhood has also acted, running female candidates in parliamentary elections and including women in the group's membership. In their 2005 electoral program the Brotherhood emphasized the role of women in shaping future generations of Egyptians as an indicator of the necessity of equality between men and women. "Woman are half of the society and half of the nation, and they are responsible for raising and guiding all of the future generations of men and women and for planting in them strong principles and beliefs ... thus there shall be equality between men and women.,,262 Dr. Makarem EI Deri, a Brotherhood parliamentary candidate in 2005, believes that Egyptian women must participate in politics as it is only through participation that they can influence the future direction 261 Muslim Brotherhood and Democracy in Egypt. 2622005 Electoral Program in: H a rnisch and Mecham, "Democratic Ideology," 200. 173

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of the state. Thus it is both a religious and social duty to do so as women are charged with "raising and guiding future generations" they are therefore also obligated to guide the future direction of their country through participation in politics.263 It is clear then that the view toward women within the Muslim Brotherhood has moderated itself from a position of viewing women only as socially important to the need for equality between men and women in both the social and political realm. The statements and documents from the Muslim Brotherhood illustrate an increasing willingness to work for women's right s and the belief that the state has an obligation to help women fulfill both their role as mothers and as productive members of society. Violence The final criterion Schwedler proposes is a group's rejection of violence and commitment to peaceful promotion of their political aims. While this should be considered one of the most important aspects in judging whether or not a group fits the definition of a moderate organization it is not necessary to spend a great deal of time examining the Muslim Brotherhood's stance on this issue. It should be clear from the discussion of their history, in Chapter 2, that the split within the group after Qutb's execution in 1966 illustrates the Brotherhood's refutation of violent methods to achieve their political goals. Hudaiby's Preachers not Judges put forth a moderate 263Ib id 174

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path for the Brotherhood from which the more radical elements chose to distance themselves and form extremist organizations committed to the overthrow of the state by any means necessary, including violence. These extremist organizations have repeatedly been condemned by the Brotherhood for their use of violence, as have the violent acts their members have committed. One clear indicator of the Brotherhood's separation between these groups and their organization is a section on their English language webpage (www.ikhwanweb.com) under the tab MB vs. Qaeda. In this section the Brotherhood has collected articles and statements from members, Islamic intellectuals, and western academics, which reject violence and argue statements from al-Zawahiri, explain the goals and agenda of the Muslim Brotherhood as compared to those of al-Qaeda, and condemn terrorist attacks including 9/11, those on tourists in Cairo and Luxor, attacks on Copts, and the assassination of Benazir Bhutto Key to understanding the difference between the Muslim Brotherhood and the violent extremist groups is the interpretation of jihad each adheres to. While the extremists have by and large adopted the Qutbist definition of jihad as a sacred duty to wage a holy war against non-Muslims, the Muslim Brotherhood has taken the more moderate approach advocated by al-Banna. He once said, "One of the loftiest forms of jihad is to utter a word of truth in the presence of a tyrannical ruler.,,2 6 4 T. 1. AI-Bana in: Abed-Kol o b "The Accomadalioni s t s Speak," .B2. 175

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Winter, also known as Abdal Hakim Murad, a leading scholar on Muslim-Christian relations and Islamic ethics, defines jihad as "to strive or struggle," which is then applied in a strictly spiritual sense as the "struggle to lead a moral life" or in a violent sense to justify violence and armed attacks.265 The Muslim Brotherhood, since Qutb, has overwhelmingly understood jihad in this more spiritual sense in the vein of Preachers not Judges. Former l11urshid Umar alTilmisani, saw the Quran as speaking out against aggression and advocating justice toward non-Muslims taking jihad to be guidance toward those that did not believe. Many within the Brotherhood see the outbreak of violent Islamists as a result of the strict limits placed on political participation by the state. Ahmed Hasanein, a leader within the Brotherhood, believes that due to the restrictions placed on the Brotherhood they have been unable to correct the misperceptions of younger, more radical members of the group which then leave the organization and may commit acts of violence. "Violence at the hands of individual Islamists erupts not because of organizational doctrine, but because of the inability of the Brotherhood to control its followers," writes AbedKotob. Therefore, violence "occurs not at the directive of the Brotherhood, but as a result of government restrictions that leave legitimate channels of political action closed to 265 T. J. Winter, 'The Poverty of Fanaticism,"' in Donohue and Esposito, eds., Islam in Transition, 393. For an excellent discussion of the historical development of the term jihad and its multiple interpretations see Sherman Jackson, '"Jihad and the Modern World," in Donohue and Esposito, eds., Islam in Transition, 394-408. l76

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those with Islamist tendencies.,,266 Yet, as every leader since Hassan el-Houdaiby has done the Brotherhood continuously renounce s violence and stresses a peaceful and moderate approach to reform in the tradition of the founder Hasan al-Banna. Concluding Thoughts It should be clear then that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood represents a moderate Islamic organization which openly advocates for a democracy that fulfills the conditions set forth in Lipset's definition at the beginning of thi s study of contestation in elections and participation for all adults. The above di sc us s ion highlights their support for inclusive and competitive plural politics within a civil state based on Islam and sharia law. Schwedler's explication of the inclusion moderation hypothesi s defines areas of study which, when applied to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, reveal the degree to which their internal boundarie s have changed, the extent of their cooperation with other groups, and their commitment to the electoral process. These three areas are indispensible when attempting to ascertain whether or not the Muslim Brotherhood fits the bill of a moderate political force. Some scholars have argued that the Brotherhood, in comparison to all the other manifestations of political Islam, has always been a moderate organization. While for the most part this is a correct proposition it is enlightening to look at how 266 Abed-Katab Th e Accomadationists Speak," 333 177

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even the early positions of the Brotherhood, while moderate for the time, have continued to evolve in that direction over the course of their history. For Hassan al Banna, while Islam and democracy did not stand in direct contradiction to each other, sharia stood apart and required no particular form of state to enforce its laws. The founder never spoke of an Islamic democracy or the implementation of sharia under a democratic state.267 These ideas have all been modified, with the current Brotherhood advocating for the creation of a civil state with an Islamic reference. Their original economic policies, closely resembling socialism, have been modified to still include provisions regarding socioeconomic justice, but are emphasizing more and more, private property and privatization of the public sector. The one notable setback in the moderation of the Brotherhood should be seen as the political thought of Sayyid Qutb. Yet, Qutb can also be seen as an integral part of the process of moderation as his writings and ideas forced the Brotherhood to reassess their own and explicate a moderate path in contrast to this more radical approach. Along with his radical vein of thinking a moderate trend emerged to counter his ideas and beliefs directing the Brotherhood to return to its foundational principal of gradual reform through existing institutions, not the radical overthrow of the state. Therefore, even in instances where a strong trend toward more extreme measures emerged within the Brotherhood, the leadership countered these ideas with those which sought principles in line with a 267 Harnisch and Mecham, "Democratic Ideology," 194. 178

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more moderate approach. Harnisch and Mecham agree with the proposition that inclusion has been the primary moderating force within the group stating that the participatory strategy of the Brotherhood "triggered ideological development and [has] led to a significant shift in the organization's political ideology." They continue writing, "The Muslim Brotherhood toady ... openly professes its belief in democracy as the most appropriate political system for Egypt and sees itself as openly borrowing h d d d western concepts III ow It un erst an s emocracy.-Based on the above discussion then it is fair to say that the Muslim Brotherhood does indeed fit the definition of a moderate Islamic group. They competed for power thereby expending energy on maintaining levels of support and cooperating with rivals to present a unified oppositional front to the regime. They released documents and platforms to the public and benefitted from the criticism they received. They gained invaluable experience in plural politics through alliances and participation in competitive politics from the national to local and syndicate levels. These are all the necessary triggers of moderation for proponents of the participationmoderation hypothesis such as Schwedler. The critical experience with the political system garnered by the Muslim Brotherhood over the past forty years increasingly led the organization to affirm their commitment to democratic principles, defined for us by Lipset in Chapter 2, and pursue a moderate course. As Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, 268 Ibid. 179

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one of the leading scholars on the Muslim Brotherhood wrote, "Although the Brotherhood entered the political system in order to change it, it ended up being changed by the system.,,269 Their interaction with other political parties different voices within professional syndicates, and the criticism they received on the Platforms addressed to the public, all help to modify the ideological stance of the Muslim Brotherhood These developments in turn redefined the boundaries of acceptable behavior, with each redefinition finding its justification in an Islamic frame of reference continuously adapting to an ever changing social and political environment. Seymour Martin Lipset has repeatedly argued that conflict among groups within society, or between an opposition group and the regime promotes the development of tolerance. Looking at the historical relationship between Catholic and Protestant churches he argues that both groups sought the total destruction of their opposite. Yet, when they realized that destroying the opposing group would tear asunder the "fabric of society" a democratic ideology emerged based on the recognition of the other's right to exist as a means of securing their own existence.27o Lipset proposes that by advocating for the rights of opposition groups they in turn 169 Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, "The Muslim Brotherhood After Mubarak." Foreign Affairs (20 II). http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67 348lcarrie-ros efs k ywickham!themusl i m-brotherhood-after mubarak. 2 70 Lipset. The Social Requisites of Democracy Revi sited ," 4. 180

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legitimate themselves and create a foundation for democracy It is through conflict between the groups, and recognition of their opponent's right to exist that the opposition can in fact "form an alternative to the state and its control of society.,,271 When applied to the Muslim Brotherhood, their record of endorsing the rights of others to oppose both the state and the regime is clear. The divide within their ranks over the 2007 Party Platform illu s trates their commitment to the idea of tolerance and working on developing a consensus internally, while signing agreements with other political partie s and cooperating with them to participate in elections is an outward sign. The "Popular Movement for Change," an alliance in opposition to the office of president passing to Mubarak's son, is but one instance in which the Muslim Brotherhood collaborated with multiple parties, including the communist party, 20 March Movement and AI-Karama Movement Party, to oppose the regime's policies and generate significant public debate about the politics of succession.272 Many of the statements from the Brotherhood indicate a strong degree of support for the development of partie s unencumbered by the state apparatus, be m Ibid., 13. 272 Mohammed Zahid "The Egyptian nexus : the rise of Gamal Mubarak, the politics of succession and the challenges of the Muslim Brotherhood," The Journal of N o rth African STudies 15, no. 2 (20 I 0): 227. 181

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they Islamic, Coptic, secular, or otherwise affiliated.273 While there are obvious caveats to this statement, such as the rift that emerged between the alWas at party which broke away from the Brotherhood in the mid-1990s, the fact that at one time the Brothers completely rejected the notion of parties, a view which developed into their current promotion of a plural political system, indicates a high degree of moderation and genuine support for not only political parties but democracy more generally. Another aspect of the Muslim Brotherhood's democratic alternative deals with the issue of representation. As touched on earlier in this study, the issue of representation and accountability are necessary keys in order for participatory democracy to flourish. The Brotherhood has presented a distinct and unique way for many in Egypt to gain their first experience with electoral politics and a position which allows them to influence their community and society at large.274 The entrance of the Brotherhood into the limited political space in the early years of the Mubarak regime and their continued pal1icipation, even under conditions of severe repression, provided representation to its members and many within the community. As the discussion of the Brotherhood's role in the professional associations of Egypt 273 See: 'The Electoral Program of the Muslim Brotherhood for Shura Council in 2007," and "Muslim Brotherhood and Democracy in Egypt," (2007). Berman "Islamism Revolution and Civil Society, 262 182

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indicates, as does their performance in the national parliament, the Brotherhood did not seek to simply represent their members but the vast array of constituents in either their district association, or society in the case of the parliamentarians. A s such they remained accountable to these groups through the use of elections as a tool of consent or reproach. Yet, as an organization the Brotherhood represented the views of its members as a "self-authorized representative to borrow the language of Nadia Urbinati and Mark E. Warren. While the discussion of the internal workings of the Brotherhood does suggest that there is some electoral accountability, the members of the group also had the ability to freely join and participate within the organization or leave "producing market-like accountability.,,275 Many within the Brotherhood, particularly those of a more radical bent chose to leave when it affirmed its commitment to the moderate path set forth by the leaders and accepted by the vast majority of members. Similarly, the members that left to form the al-Wasat party also took advantage of this accountability mechanism and expressed their desire to pursue a more politically active path by forming a political party, a step the Brotherhood, at that time, did not believe to be worth pursuing. Clearly the Brotherhood attempted to represent the views of its members as elected officials. But, they also tried to serve as critics of the state once they achieved Urbinati and Warren ''The Concept of Repr ese ntation in democratic Theory,"' 404. 183 l ____

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these positions, directing attention to wider social problems affecting not just their members but many of the middle and lower-middle class residents of Egypt. In doing so the group depicted itself as a group of the people that would represent them, their needs and concerns, in a way the government had not. In regard to their internal practices, while Urbinati and Warren point out that studies in the area of selfauthorized representatives are lacking, they do propose that there are ways this form of representation can "contribute to democracy in ways that electoral representation cannot," through exposure to political participation in authoritarian contexts, a mobilizing ability, and market-style accountability mechanisms keeping the group in h' b h' b tune WIt Its mem ers Ip ase.It should become clear at this point why a discussion of the inclusionmoderation hypothesis is necessary to understanding the degree to which the Muslim Brotherhood has created a democratic alternative. The analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood's moderation, based on the conditions set forth by Schwedler, lend to a more complete exploration of the ways in which the group has not only taken a moderate path, but also created the foundation for a democratic challenge to the regime. In explicating their ever evolving views through Party Platforms, personal statements, interviews, and an increasingly public discourse, the Brotherhood has developed a firm commitment to democratic principles and consistently challenged Ibid., quote on 404. See 403 -4 05 for the full discu ss ion of self-authorized repre se ntatives. 184 l ______

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the regime on this basis. Emad EI-Din Shahin, in analyzing Brotherhood documents from 1994, the electoral program in 1995, the Reform Initiative of 2004, and the electoral program in 2006, supports the conclusion that the Brotherhood have committed themselves to the idea of a civil state with an Islamic reference, respect for democracy, pluralism, public freedoms, competitive elections, the sovereignty of the people, moderate methods of reform, and citizenship regardless of gender or religion as the primary "basis for rights and responsibilities.,,277 Alliances with other parties for democracy, and against the authoritarian nature of the regime, have created a unified front, a mass opposition to the regime. While the parties in agreement espouse very different views, the one commonality they all exhibit is a commitment to the will of the people, to the betterment of society, all agreeing that the political system which can best accommodate these desires is democracy. As defined by Lipset, democracy is: "An institutional arrangement in which all adult individuals have the power to vote, through free and fair competitive elections, for their chief executive and nationallegislature.,,278 Unpacked, as it were, in the second chapter of this study, it is clear that the Muslim Brotherhood indeed proposes that each condition set forth by this definition represents a means of 277 Emad El-Din Shahin Political Islam in Egypt," CEPS Working Document no. 266, Centre For European Policy Studi es (2007): 2. 178 Lipset and Lakin The Dem ocra tic Century 19. 185

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achieving the best system by which an Islamic state can be organized. The discussion of the group's moderation indicates their commitment to enfranchising every Egyptian citizen and the unfettered formation of political parties which would then compete for power in free and fair elections and rule based on the consent of the governed. The Brotherhood's parliamentary record and participation in professional associations highlights their ability to represent not only their members, but their constituents at large, a vast cross-section of Egyptian society. Yet, while this chapter has indeed provided a significant account of the groups moderation and the creation of a democratic alternative to the Mubarak regime, the only way to truly judge the extent of the Brotherhood's commitment to democracy is to examine their performance once they achieve some measure of political recognition. In the wake of the Mubarak government's collapse in February 2011 we now have the chance to do so. An understanding of the groups past is necessary to an exploration of their future pursuits. Their role as an opposition group unquestionably influenced their political experiences. No longer an opposition group, but a legitimate political party how will their goals and operations change? Their moderation over the past forty years and the espousal of democratic principles would suggest that their participation in an open political system would model their moderate political program. Yet, could this all have been rhetorical posturing, mere lip-service to democracy to enable their participation in an authoritarian polity? On 186

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January 1,2011, prior to what has been popularly titled the "Revolution on the Nile," Dr. Mohamed Morsey, a member of the Executive Bureau of the Muslim Brotherhood stated: "The group is not alone in its desire for reform, and leading to changes among the political forces aimed at reforming deteriorating conditions," going on to stress "that the group is an integral part of the fabric of Egyptian society designed to meet their demands for the desired political reform.,,179 Society has indeed demanded reform. The overwhelming masses that gathered on Tahrir Square from January 25 until Mubarak stepped down on February 12, 2011, clearly demonstrated that to the world. What remains to be seen is what kind of role the Muslim Brotherhood will play in the aftermath. Based on the analysis in this chapter we have an idea of what to expect. The next chapter will explore the recent developments in the wake of the Revolution on the Nile in an attempt to discern the true extent of the Brotherhood's commitment to the ideas espoused and developed over the course of their history as a moderate opposition while Egypt enters a new transitional phase. 2 7 9 Or. Morsey: MB Committed to Peaceful Reform It s Stance on Citizenship Very Clear ," iklmalllveb .colII, la s t modified January 1,2011, http://www.ikhwanweb.comlprint.php ? id=27840 187

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CHAPTER 6 FREEDOM IS THE SOLUTION November 2010: As Egypt embarked on a new round of parliamentary elections the Muslim Brotherhood again resolved to compete for seats in the national parliament. In elections which saw the addition of 64 seats allotted for female candidates and a total 5,120 candidates compete for only 508 seats, the Brothers had reason to be optimi s tic after their 2005 electoral success. Yet, the first round of voting saw the group win scant few seats amidst some of the most widespread corruption in Egyptian election history. By the second round of voting on December 5th both the Wafd party and the Muslim Brotherhood, the most significant opposition groups, withdrew their candidates to boycott the fraudulent procedures The Brotherhood went so far as to return the seats they had already won as E ssa m EI Erian, a prominent member of the organization, claimed that rather than "elections with a hint of fraud" these were "fraud with a hint of elections.,,28o Even as the Brotherhood condemned these fraudulent elections into December of that year, Tunisian youth, concerned with improving their economic prospects, began to revolt against the corrupt regime of Tunisian President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali. While Tunisia had arguably the best educational system, largest middle class, 280 Egypt: Revolution in Progress ," Empire AI-Jazecra English July 11. 20 II. 188

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and most well organized labor movement, more than fifty percent of the country's business elites were found to be personally related to Ben Ali according to a 2006 report from a US ambassador leaked by Wikileaks.281 Ben Ali, to ensure his advantaged position instituted policies which heavily restricted free expression and political party activity which a rapidly increasing youth population had long endured.282 When Mohamed Bouazizi, "the 26-year-old Tunisian fruit vendor who set himself on fire out of despair and frustration with the state's corruption and caprice," in a "desperate cry for justice and dignity," he also ignited within the population a desire for change.283 This desire quickly manifested itself in mass demonstrations which moved toward the capital joining with the labor movement in a spontaneous outpouring of frustration directed toward Ben Ali' s regime. As December 2010 became January 2011 the protestors gained in number and voice until, on January 14, Ben Ali resigned ending a 23 year monopoly on power. As Dina Shehata wrote, "The immediate trigger for the outbreak of protests in Egypt was the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia in mid-January which demonstrated that sustained and 281Lisa Anderson, "Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the Differences Between Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya," Foreigll Affairs 90, no.3 (20 II): 3 m According to Jack A. Goldstone the youth population in Tunisia aged 15-29 increased by 50 percent since 1990 and comprises 38 percent of the population. See Goldstone, "Understanding the Revolutions of201l," 12. 283 Michael Scott Doran. "The Heirs of Nasser: Who Will Benefit From the Second Arab Revolution?" Foreigll Affairs 90, nO.3 (2011): 25. 189

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broad-based popular mobilization can lead to political change, even in a police state such as Tunisia.,,284 While this may be overstating the importance of events in Tunisia, as unrest in Egypt had been gathering momentum for some time and significantly increased after the November elections, it did generate a "revolutionary spark" in much the same way as the Suez crisis of 1956.185 A spark which then captivated the imaginations of both people and movements, across the Arab world which finally felt their time had come. On top of the poverty and massive unemployment raking Egypt, the Jasmine Revolution and the fraudulent parliamentary elections only months before proved to be the catalyst for public demonstrations organized to take place on January 25, the Police Day holiday; dubbed a Day of Rage" by youthful organizers. Two organizations, The April 6th Movement and "We Are All Khalid Said" predominantly composed of young activists focused on drawing attention to the corruption of the regime and the economic problems the country continued to endure, utilized social media to generate an unthinkable showing of public outrage at the Mubarak regime. Both groups, having emerged as pages on the popular website Facebook to discuss the concerns and desires of the Egyptian people, had a working knowledge of how to Shehata, "The Fall of the Pharaoh," 26. 285 Doran "The Heirs of N asse r ," 17. 190

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utilize new methods of communication to increase awareness particularly among the younger generations. A News Group International study of social media use reported in April 2011, that by January 20, 2011 the call for the Day of Rage protest became the fourth most discussed topic across the Arab world. They also found that 3,306,947 Egypt-related posts/comments appeared on social media during the month of February while 88 percent of Arabic conversations in the first quarter of 2011 included political terms, an increase of 53 percent from the same quarter in 2010.286 The use of social media as an organizational tool demonstrates the initial impact of the younger generations on initiating and sustaining the protests directed at the Mubarak regime. As demonstrators flooded into Tahrir Square in Cairo and amassed in other cities across Egypt, such as Alexandria and Suez, a veritable sea of people swelled to untold proportions as Egyptian flags and cardboard placards rose above the crowds. As the numbers swelled and calls demanding the resignation of President Mubarak gained momentum it became clear to the world that the protest would continue for some time. Initially hesitant to throw the full support of the Muslim Brotherhood behind the protests, the group formally remained on the sidelines while the vast majority of their younger members, who had been in the square since the first day of "Arab Media Influence Report AMIR 20 II: Social Media and the Arab Spring:' News Group International. March 20 II. 191

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the demonstrations, continued to press the leadership to support the revolution. Finally on the third day of protests the group's leaders publicly declared their support for the revolt and began to take responsibility for organizing security checkpoints, serving food, and providing health services and blankets to the demonstrators. As violence broke out between the demonstrators and police, with police forces using gas and water cannons in attempts to disperse the crowds, the Brothers exhibiting their desire for the demonstrations to remain peaceful, actually protected pro-Mubarak supporters in Tahrir Square as some in the crowd turned on them, according to eyewitness reports.287 In the midst of these demonstrations PBS reporter Charles Sennott and Muhammad Abbas wandered through the masses in Tahrir Square. Abbas, a leader of the Muslim Brotherhood's youth wing, explained that this revolt had nothing to do with religion. It was an outpouring of public support for democracy; a popular uprising against the corruption of the Mubarak regime and the poor economic conditions which held the vast majority of Egyptians in their clutches. As the camera crew approached a group of protestors, one began rummaging in his pocket and quickly withdrew a copy of the Quran which he proceeded to hold upright in his outstretched arm directly in front of the camera. Almost immediately Abbas moved toward him saying, "Don't hold up the Quran. We should be holding Egyptian flags. 287 'The Brothers ," Frontlin e PBS February 22, 2011 192

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Open it. .. but not for the media.,,188 This scene can be interpreted in one of two ways. First, Abbas' statement can be taken as a sign that the Brotherhood did not want the media to see their true intentions, that they should present a different image to the world. Or, Abbas' response can be seen as illuminating the fact that the Brotherhood, while influenced by religion and publicly supportive of Islamic teachings, also recognized that religion is a matter of personal concern, while the ouster of Mubarak concerned the whole of the Egyptian people. The second seems the far more likely based on the previous chapters and the scholarly consensus that the Egyptian Revolution clearly represented a popular, not an Islamic, revolution. While Egyptian culture is no doubt imbued with religious undertones, the degree to which religious causes and slogans appeared in the outpouring of public anger at the Mubarak regime until his resignation on February 11 was almost nil. While the images of the masses participating in group prayers are unforgettable, the demonstrations made almost no appeal to Islam, but rather to democracy, to the ability to participate in the politics of their country with groups chanting "Go Now!" rather than "Islam is the solution!" as in the past. "Look at those involved in the uprisings, and it is clear that we are dealing with a post-Islamist generation," wrote Oliver Roy in the immediate aftermath of the revolution.189 He points out that the 288 Ibid. 289 Oliver Roy, '"This is not an Islamic revolution," New Statesmen 140, no. 5040 (2011): 24. 193

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protestors in Egypt are the same kinds of people that rose up against Amadinejad in Iran during the summer of 2009 positing that the new generations are better educated and have access to new technologies which allow them to communicate more efficiently than those before. Thus, this generation is religious, yet in a private way, or at least a more individualized way than previous generations. "Many of them are religious believers, but they keep their faith separate from their political demands. In this sense, the movement is 'secular'. ,,::!90 The Muslim Brotherhood recognized this fact, that society has changed, and while they still advocate for an Islamic state, their version of the state has come to emphasize the civil aspect stressing the importance of equality and the will of the people. In doing so, as the previous chapters illustrate, they have been able to participate in Egyptian political life and gain the political skill necessary to realize that the country needs solidarity rather than division now more than ever. Thus, the Brothers participated in the revolt not as its leaders but as supporters of the larger cause, the removal of Mubarak and increased democracy. By participating in this way the Brothers endeared themselves to the protestors in Tahrir. As incidents of violence against the protestors increased, so did reports that the Muslim Brotherhood protected them, bringing in blankets and food while spending nervous nights in the square shoulder to shoulder with other activists. 2 90 Ibid. 194

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"And all of a sudden the rhetoric changed," writes Lee Smith. "Now it was okay that the Muslim Brotherhood was there so long as they se rved the same objectives ... ,,291 Still, almost all the scholars that study the Arab World are united in the opinion that, while the revolt in Egypt encompassed a wide sector of society, including the Muslim Brotherhood, no single leader emerged to guide the course of the revolution. This serves as the single most important piece of evidence to indicate that the revolt did not rely on Islamic or religious posturing. As no s ingle leader or group took control of the direction of the revolt, the revolt itself could include every sector of Egyptian society, religious and secular. Shadi Hamid, a Brookings Institute scholar writes, Egypt' s was a leaderless movement consisting of angry, ordinary Egyptians who came not with ideologie s or partisanship but the s imple, overarching demand that President Mubarak s tep down.,,292 Serving the needs of the protestor s gathered in mass demonstrations across the country, the Muslim Brotherhood represented an organized force that put the full weight of their mobilizational expertise firmly in the camp of the more widespread opposition. 291 Lee Smith, "Will Th ey Be Devoured? The children of Egypt's revolution versus the military establishment in Cairo," The Weekly Standard 16, n o. 31 (20 I I). "9" Shadi Hamid 'The Struggle for Middle East Democracy," ikhll'unweb.com l ast modified April 4, 2011 http : //www.ikhw anweb.co mlprint.phpid=2846 8 195

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Members of the Brotherhood made clear their desire for change in Egypt, along Islamic lines, yet they also stressed the importance of popular unity as the revolt continued. Mohamed Saad el-Katatni, the Brotherhood's media spokesman, claimed in the early days of February 2011, that "we have exerted great effort to unify the opposition without raising political slogans as it [the revolution] was exclusively shared by Muslims and Christians who joined hands," while stating that at no point did the Brothers seek to command the people.293 Continuing to reiterate the Brotherhood's earlier position, that a ci viI state would best serve Egypt and that all citizens of an Egyptian civil state would be equal under the constitution and the law, many members of the group spoke to media outlets to explain that there was little reason to fear their participation in politics after the revolution. On February 11, as Mubarak announced his resignation to the people, the chances for the Muslim Brotherhood, along with many other emerging parties to participate in politics, increased exponentially. The revolt began as a call for reform, a demonstration against corruption and the trying economic circumstances faced by the vast majority of the Egyptian population. However, President Hosni Mubarak's mulish approach to meeting the demands of the masses led them to call for his resignation. A joke by a political }93 "AI Katatni : MB First Called for Estahlishment of Civil State : ikhwallweb.c o m la s t modified February 2, 20 II, http://www ikhwanweb.com/print.php )id=28065. 196

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humorist in Egypt during the uprising clearly d e picts an intractable, oblivious president, which when told by his advisor s he may want to consider writing a farewell speech to the Egyptian people he replied, Why? Where are the people going?,,294 Yet, by the 11 of February, it seemed that the Egyptian Pre s ident finally got the message. A s he left office, ending a thirty year strangle-hold on s upreme political power in Egypt, a transitional government began to take shape. On the 13th of that month the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) suspended the Egyptian constitution and dissolved both hou s e s of parliament initiating a six-month transitional phase during which they would serve as the Egyptian authority. The SCAF then appointed a s even member con s tituti o nal committee to reform the constitution and pave the way to legality for the Muslim Brotherhood along with other groups and political parties having long endured the condition s of life governed by a declared state of emergency. Finally able to legally participate in politics one Brotherhood member a lawyer, found himself not only released from pri s on, but on the committee to reform the constitution of Egypt as appointed by th e SCAF. This committee decrea sed the term of office for pre s ident from six to four years and limited the president to two consecutive terms while strengthening judicial supervision over elections and lowering the conditions on candidacy for president. Egypt : Re v olution in Pr og re ss," Empire, AIJa zc e r a E ngli s h July 11, 2011 197

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The changes, approved by the Egyptian public in a free and fair election on March 19 with landmark participation numbers of around 41 percent voter turnout (out of 45 million eligible voters) represented for many Egyptians the first opportunity to experience democracy.295 NPR's Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson reported that "when you were there you'd see voters who say they'd never cast a ballot before,,,296 while Radio Free Europe spoke to an Egyptian news correspondent who observed that people at the polling stations around the country "are happy because for the first time they feel that there is transparency and that their vote will make a difference. ,,297 A Group Divided Yet, today, as authoritarian politics fade and new political space emerges, this democratic ideology alone is not binding the Brotherhood together as it once could. There is a consensus amongst those who study the Brotherhood that the conservative trend within the group has come to dominate the leadership positions while the reformists are being marginalized. This trend began with the election of Mohamed Badie to the position of Supreme Guide in rather unusual circumstances in 2010. 295 See "Egyptians Turn Out In Large Numbers To Vote On Constitutional Amendments," Radio Free Europe (March 19, 2011) and "Egyptian Voters Approve Constitutional Changes," V o ice of America News (March 20, 20 II). 296Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson and Steve Inskeep, "Voters Pass Historic Changes to Egypt's Constitution," NPR News (March 21. 20 II). 297 "Egyptians Turn Out In Large Numbers to Vote on Constitutional Amendments," Radio Free Europe (March 19, 2011) 198

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This conservative domination is also apparent in the new FJP as the three leaders, appointed by the Brotherhood, have all proven themselves to be extremely loyal to the group and its current leadership (although one, Essam el-Erian, adamantly spoke out with the reformists during the debate over the 2007 Platform). While the leadership is then dominated by the conservatives, the most politically ac tive element within the group seems to be the reformists. The reformist trend in the Muslim Brotherhood is dominated by the younger members of the organization yet, to draw distinct generational lines would be a mistake Carrie Rosefsky Wickham and Lorenzo Vidino both see divisions emerging within the Brotherhood. Wickham propose s that there are currently three major groups within the Brotherhood: the conservatives, pragmatic conservatives, and the reformers. The conservatives make up the majority within the Guidance Bureau, but also as a result of this position control much of the socialization of the new recruits and have therefore developed support amongst the younger recruits from rural areas. Vidino propose s that the majority of this group is composed of member s of the "first generation," tho se members that faced imprisonment under Nasser in the 1960s. Wickham's pragmati s ts, or Vidiono's "second generation," are the large s t se gment of the group and repre s ent the "mainstream wing in Wickham's words. These are the members who joined the Brotherhood in the 1970s as students and who spea k "the 199

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language of democracy and human rights," says Vidino.298 The majority of Brothers with prior parliamentary experience fall into this category of members who often espouse both religious conservatism and the value of participation. Wickham and Vidino both, see the leadership of the FJP, el-Erian, Morsi and al-Katatni, as members of this faction within the group. Finally, the reformists advocate a "progressive interpretation of Islam," and "appear to be the most involved in leading Egypt's popular uprising, while providing "inspiration for a new generation of Islamist democracy activists.,,299 Having come of age in a more global world where technological advances increasingly link the globe together and both the spread of information and communication occur at lightning pace this younger generation is influenced by new global developments far more rapidly than any before it. Also having lived through an explosion of radical Isalmism and the terroristic violence that accompanies some of the more extreme groups, such as the massacres at Luxor and the attacks of 9111, these activists have seen how strict adherence to a particular ideology can lead to major setbacks whereas tolerance and cooperation seem to more effectively advance a cause. Thus, for Vidino, this generation represents a segment of the Brotherhood not overly concerned with the rigid hierarchy of the old guard, but 298 Lorenzo Vidino "Egyptian Crosscurrents." 2011. 2 99 Wickham 'The Muslim Brotherhood After Mubarak, 2011. 200

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rather with forming coalitions with other groups as they have with the April 6 Movement. 300 This split between the reformists and the conservative leadership is best illustrated in several clashes over the group's involvement in the initial protests and how to proceed in the newly opened political space of Egypt. In the build up to the January 25 "Day of Rage," the younger members of the Muslim Brotherhood pushed the leadership to become involved, a position they did not want to take up immediately. Thus, the leaders decided that their members could participate but the organization as a whole would not. As it became increasingly clear that the protestors in Tahrir had made an impact and the crowds would not be dissipating any time soon, the leadership finally officially sanctioned the group's participation. During the protests, Egyptian Vice President Suleiman sought dialogue with opposition forces and met senior Brotherhood members creating uproar among the reformist generation as they felt the leadership had betrayed their cause. At the same time, the younger generation in Tahrir made it a point not to use Islamic slogans in their protest. Muhammad Abbas, the youth leader discussed earlier, points out that the youth "made a quantum leap" in showing the old guard that they can have a revolution without Islamic slogans. "We made radical changes to the strategy of the 300 Wickham, 'The Muslim Brotherhood After Mubarak," 2011, 3-4 and Lorenzo Vidino, "Egyptian Crosscurrents," 2011, 6-7. 201

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Brotherhood," he states. "For 18 days we stayed in the square without raising any Islamic banners. That never happened before .,,301 Nathan Brown reports that the younger generation "are less wedded to the idea of a political party," while many of them feel that "Brotherhood members should be free to join whichever party they want" and are critical of the group's decision that members should only support the FJP.302 The rigidity of the leadership is also exemplified in their withdrawal of the Brotherhood's youth from the Revolution Youth Council (YRC) in late May 2011, of which they had been a part since before the protests began in January. Ahram Online reported that the decision appeared to be a result of the youth's decision to participate in a demonstration without the approval of the leaders, while they also reported that the youth members do not plan to comply.303 "We will continue both our role in the YRC and as MB members," said Mohamed el-Qasas, a member of both.304 In a most telling example of the consequences of not adhering to leadership dictates, both the FJP and the Muslim Brotherhood determined not to run a candidate for president in 301 'The Brothers Frontline, PBS, February 22, 2011 302 Nathan 1. Brown, 'The Brotherhood's Coming Out Party," Carnegie Endowment For International Peace (2011), http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=fa=view&id=43230 2011. 303 "Dina Ezzat, "Egypt s Muslim Brotherhood battles against its youth," Am/1ln Online, May 28, 20 11, http://eng1ish.ahram.org.eg. Ekram Ibrahim "'Muslim Brotherhood leadership clamps down on group's youth." Ahram Online May 29 2011, htlp://cnglish.ahram.org.eg. 202

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the upcoming elections. So when Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, a leading reformist voice, announced his candidacy, he immediately found himself thrown out of the Brotherhood as many other leading reformists left the group in protest. The Brotherhood however views the discussion of a split between its youth and the leadership as a continuation of the security campaign against the Brotherhood initiated under the old regimes. In a statement released on their website in July 2011, the group claims that this tactic "proved to be the strongest and most successful of all" attacks on the group launched by the media in the post-revolution phase.305 They state that the reason members like Fotouh must be removed from the organization is to prevent the criticism of hypocrisy or 'flying all flags' to gain a majority as an organization by proclaiming support for all these distinct ideologies which is a "major contradiction." These opposing trends could also have the effect of creating further infighting within the group as battles over who truly represents the Brotherhood ensue as certain factions claim to represent a "better version" of the group leading to further "dispersal and fragmentation." 306 Thus, as the Brotherhood sees it, as certain factions diverge from the group's ideology and leave the organization, the group as a whole retains its ideology and maintains a sense of dynamism as it discovers new ideologies 305 "Future of the Muslim Brotherhood Debated," ikhwanweb.col7l, last modified July 7, 2011, http://www.ikhwanweb.com!print.php?id=28806. 3rJ6 Ibid. 203

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and either finds points of compatibility or justifies its stance in regard to that proffered by the new ideology. Either way it makes clear that the Muslim Brotherhood is not the monolithic organization it has been characterized as. Society, Religion, and Popular Support for the Brothers Both the dismantled NDP and the Muslim Brotherhood stood to gain substantially as the referendum passed, which in many ways explains the Brotherhood's push to get out the vote. With a yes vote framed as a religious duty by the Brothers, 14.1 million voters, or 77.2 percent approved of the new measures, whereas 4 million or 22.8 percent voted against them. The main argument against the referendum centered around timing. The younger groups, and many of the leaders of the January revolution, argued that the new measures unfairly advantaged the better organized remnants of the NDP and the Muslim Brotherhood who could more effectively mobilize support whereas new groups were just beginning the task of constructing a party. The Muslim Brotherhood, in an attempt to assuage the fears that they would dominate the new parliament and therefore have a significant influence on the language of the new constitution, set limits on their political participation and claimed that it was in the best interests of Egypt to quickly transition from a military state to a democratic government. Both sides, the supporters and the opposition, used religious slogans to support their position once again illustrating the deep influence of 204

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religion in Egypt. Ali Gomaa, the grand mufti of Egypt, touched on these issues in a New York Times editorial. Egypt is a deeply religious society, and it is inevitable that Islam will have a place in our democratic political order, he wrote. This, however, should not be a cause for alarm .... Egypt's religious tradition is anchored in a moderate, tolerant view ofIslam .... While religion cannot be completely separated from politics, we can ensure that it is not abused for political gain.,,307 This sentiment echoes many of the Muslim Brotherhood's statements, explored in the previous chapter and in the wake of the revolution. Yet, before we examine the political maneuverings of the Brotherhood, it is useful to clearly establish the extent to which religion does permeate Egyptian culture and the degree of public support for the Muslim Brotherhood. In the aftermath of the Egyptian revolution the Muslim Brotherhood took on a more active role than ever before. Drawing on previously established networks aimed at distributing social services to the middle-class and poor communities, the Brothers have increased their role as providers to engender the organization to religious and conservative communities especially in poorer areas of Egyptian cities. "It is only the Muslim Brotherhood that works here now," one observer is quoted as saying in the New York Times. This is the typical experience of residents in small 307 Ali Gomaa, In Egypt'sDemocracy, Room for Islam N e w York Times April 1.2011 http://www nytime s.co m 205

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rural communities on the outskirts of Cairo and the larger Egyptian cities. In the village of Kafr Shukr, located in the Egyptian agricultural heartland, chicken farmer Ayman Dahroug relays the situation saying, 'They are in Kafr Shukr every day. They set up tents with bread, cooking oil, dried fish. When they hear someone is sick, they bring medicines. They are at the level of the people. ,,308 Yet political support for the Brotherhood is far lower than support for their social agenda as many are wary of their political program despite the organization s very public attempts to placate their critics. A Pew Research Center study released in April 2011 found that three in four Egyptians hold a favorable view of the Muslim Brotherhood, with 37 percent expressing a "very favorable" view, while 38 percent take a "somewhat favorable" position.3 0 9 While these numbers indicate a fairly high degree of support for the organization, perhaps the more telling numbers are those directly addressing political support. The Pew survey reported that only 17 percent of the Egyptian public would like to see the Muslim Brotherhood lead a new government, lower than the 20 percent for the Wafd Party and about equal with the 16 percent for the AlGhad Party. "Those who express favorable opinions of the Muslim Brotherhood are not significantly more likely to support the group to lead the next government than 3 08 Robert F. Worth "Egypt's Next Crisis,"' New York Times, May 27, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com. 309 "Egyptians Embrac e Revolt Leaders Religious Parties and Military As Well," Pew R e search Center Global Alfitlldes Proj ec t April 25, 2011 14. 206

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they are to support other groupS.,,310 Loren zo Vidino reports similar findings from the Washington Ins titute for Near East Policy which found that only around 15 percent of respondents approved of the Muslim Brotherhood while its leaders received barely 1 % in a presidential straw vote.,,311 This is not to say that Egyptians do not desire some form of religious intonation in their new government. The Pew study states that 71 percent of Egyptians believe democracy to be "preferable to any other kind of government," an increase from 60 percent at the same time last year, while 54 percent believe that democracy is even more important than political stability. 312 Yet just as the 2007 Gallup Survey reported, Muslims do not feel that they need to choose between Islam and Democracy and overwhelmingly support some form of sharia. :m The Pew study indicates that 62 percent of Egyptians believe laws should strictly adhere to the Quran, "a view that is shared by majorities across demographic groups," while an additional 27 percent say the laws should be based on the principles and values of the Quran whereas only 5 percent say the Quran should have no influence.314 310 Ibid., 21 311 Vidino, "Egyptian Crosscurrents," 8. 3 1 2 Pew Research Cellfer Global Attitudes Project, 17-18 3 1 3 Esposito and Mogahed "Who Will Speak for I s lam'?" 52 Pew Resear c h Cel/ter Global Atritlldes Proje c t 20 207

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How then can the lack of political support for the Muslim Brotherhood be explained? In fact the explanation is quite simple As Robert Dahl wrote in 1971, Competition and inclusiveness bring about changes in the party sy s tem itself. The most drastic and visible changes occur. .. when a one-party hegemonic regime is rapidly replaced by a polyarchy: the hegemony of the single party suddenly gives way to two or more competing parties ... more effective at appealing to the middle class.,,315 Thus a s the political scene diversifies and new parties and groups emerge, society is gi ven the opportunity to choose among a veritable buffet of political groups and agendas. All Islamists will not side with the Brotherhood, just as all moderates will not side with the al-Wasat Party. As the diversity of parties available to the Egyptian people grows, those parties which previously represented a challenge to the regime have to focus on again mobilizing a s upport base as their supporters may find a new party which lies closer to their personal beliefs than either the Muslim Brotherhood or the New Wafd Party (the main two opposition parties under the Mubarak regime). The vote the Brotherhood used to take was basically a protest vote against the ruling NDP, says Abdul-Fattah, a young Egyptian activist who desires a secular democratic government. In the aftermath of the revolution he believes "other political movements ... will have a much better chance when they are 3 1 5 Dahl Polyar c hy 24 208

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given the same space the Brotherhood have been given on the streets.,,31 6 His statement illustrates both exactly how effective the Muslim Brotherhood were at becoming a moderate opposition force under the Mubarak regime, and the concerns of the newly emerging political parties on holding elections before they can mount an effective challenge to the Brothers. When given time to develop these new parties may attract members who previously supported the Muslim Brotherhood out of opposition to the regime rather than a firm commitment to any Islamic agenda. Therefore the lack of political support for the Brotherhood can be seen as a result of the exponential increase in Egyptian political parties. As many new parties have been created in the wake of the revolution, people are finding that they do not have to side with either the Wafd or the Muslim Brotherhood in opposition to the ruling government any longer. As the number of parties multiplies the Egyptian political landscape is becoming increasingly fragmented as the increase in parties leads to a redistribution of support. Where 100 percent of the support was once shared between three major parties or groups, that same amount of support is now divided amongst a vast array of political parties and groups seeking to become a party.317 316 "Muslim Brotherhood's grip on Alexandria's Poor Areas," BEC (March 3, 2011). 3 1 7To illustrate this point it is instructive to look at the formation of coalitions between parties In August 2011 there were three major coalitions comprised of multiple parties seeking to publish candidate lists for upcoming elections. In the Democratic Alliance alone the coalition in which the MB s Freedom and Justice Party participates there were 33 other parties also involved 209

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As a moderate group then, and drawing on our previous discussion of the development of a democratic ideology within the Brotherhood, have their actions "lived up" to the standards they set for themselves of inclusion, democracy, and Islamism? How have they attempted to maintain political support in the face of direct competition from newly emerging groups? Do these attempts indicate a firm commitment to their previously espoused democratic agenda? The previous chapters analyzed the development of the Muslim Brotherhood as a moderate oppositional force within Egyptian politics and society and in doing so looked at the ways in which the Muslim Brotherhood developed a democratic alternative to the state. The argument goes that as they moderated their stance and helped to unify the opposition, they internalized democratic principles and actually became a force for democracy. In the face of the disappearance of that which they opposed, namely Hosni Mubarak and his restrictive policies, is the Muslim Brotherhood still a force for democracy? The most useful way to answer this question today is to examine their political maneuverings subsequent to Mubarak's resignation and in the build up to the parliamentary elections sc heduled by the SCAF for November 2011. The Muslim Brotherhood's Civil State: A Democratic Alternative In March of 2011 AI-Jazeera English hosted a round table discussion to debate the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in the aftermath of the revolution. 210

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"Democracy as understood by Islamic movements, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, is to do with governance and accountability," asserted one of the panelists. "It's not to do with moral values because these derive from Islam.,,318 This statement clearly indicates the need for a minimalist definition of democracy when attempting to analyze Islamic groups and democracy or the compatibility of democracy and Islam. Lipset's definition, which emphasizes contestation and inclusion allows for an assessment of the democratic ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood on its own merits rather than as compared to western or liberal notions of democracy. As the panelist's quote illustrates, democracy is concerned with governance and accountability. Lipset's definition of democracy is as well: governance, by will of the people through competitive elections in which all have the opportunity to participate, and accountability, as the idea of representation is inherent within the definition. Everything else is left to the people to decide as Lipset stipulates it should be. Thus, when attempting to look at whether or not the Muslim Brotherhood have "lived up" to the standards they set for themselves and the degree to which they represent a democratic force, we should assess their ideology on the definitional stipulations provided by Lipset. If we look at the previous chapter then as establishing the foundations for the democratic alternative of the Muslim Brotherhood we can ascertain the core 3 1 8 The Brotherhood," Empire, AI-Jazeera English March 24. 2011. 211

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principles of their democratic ideology. It is clear that at the very heart of the Brotherhood's democratic ideology rests the idea of a civil state. Many prominent members within the Brotherhood and key documents, such as the Party Platforms, discuss the idea of an Islamic civil state based on reference to sharia. More recently, during the course of the revolution and in its immediate aftermath, the Brotherhood reiterated their belief in a civil state in public statements and political moves. In a statement released on the Brotherhood's English language website, Mohamed Saad el-Katatni explains that the group has an "Islamic comprehensive foundation" and therefore must concern itself with politics and government which it does by calling for "the establishment of a civil state in which the nation is the ultimate source of authority." He goes on to say that a state like Iran and a guardianship of religious scholars is "totally unacceptable" rather, the Supreme Constitutional Court should be the primary authority on law. : m Representing the Muslim Brotherhood at a press conference, Dr. Mohamed Morsy and Dr. Essam el-Erian again emphasized their concern with establishing a civil state. Morsy stated, ... the group's main concern is to work fully and cooperate with all political factions interested in Egypt's wellbeing ... A report on the press conference states that el-Erian "added Islam is based mainly on values which advocate freedom of speech, equality, justice and 319 "AI Katatni: MB First Called for Establishment of a Civil State," ikhwGl/web.c ol11, last modified, Feb 2, 2011, http://www .ikhwanweb.comlprint.php?id=28065 212

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cooperation regardless of colour, creed, sect or religion asserting that the group clearly calls for a civil state.',320 El Erian again, in an interview with Voice of America News on February 13, said, "We are calling for a civil state, moderate state, (and) a democratic s tate, equality, prosperity, justice for all and freedom for all citizens. All are Equal. Egypt is not Iran Egypt can build its own model of democracy according to its culture and Islamic preference." He goes on to emphasize that in order for all Egyptians to have a voice in the upcoming parliament there need to be free and fair elections in which the Mus lim Brotherhood does not achieve a majority within the newly elected parliament. "We are not targeting a majority in parliament. So the Egyptian people can decide not (the) Muslim Broth e rhood," said el-Erian The new Egypt. .. will be made by all Egyptians Mu s lims a nd Christians, liberals, socialists, n a tionalists and Islami s ts.,,32I It is interesting to note here the company el-Erian chooses to emphasize, in particular the socialists as they are typically seen as a totally secular party against any religious influence. Thi s seems to indicate a willingne ss within the Brotherhood to work with any group the people deem fit to elect. 320 MB: We call for a civil s t a te to serve all of Egypt ," ikh waml'eb.co m, last modifi ed, Feb. 2, 2 011, http://www ikhwanw e b.comlprint.php?id=27992 31 1 Muslim Broth erhood Spokesman: Eg y pt n ot Ir a n:' Voice ofAllleri ca NeH'S ( F e b 13,2011). 213

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Unpacking the Civil State Noting that the civil state is the foundation of the Muslim Brotherhood's democratic ideology, it is necessary to "unpack" their idea of a civil state. Returning yet again to Lipset's definition of democracy and the emphasis of contestation and participation, how does the Muslim Brotherhood's idea of a civil state fulfill these conditions? The above statements indicate three important areas on which this chapter will focus that indeed meet the conditions of contestation and participation. The first is pluralism as an indicator of contestation. Secondly, citizenship as espoused by the Muslim Brotherhood is indicative of participation as all citizens, regardless of religion, race, or gender, have a duty and a right to participate in the governance of an Islamic nation. Finally, the Brotherhood's emphasis on sharia law is framed as a means of maintaining the sovereignty of the people and protecting them from incursions by the government onto the rights of the people and their position of power. Pluralism. The first area, pluralism, fulfills the conditions for contestation in that multiple parties represent various factions or political groups. In representing these different perspectives each party or group competes with others for popular support or votes and contestation is clearly evident. In many ways it also serves a participatory function in that parties make representative claims for their members. Thus by adhering to the ideology of a specific group or by voting for its members, 214

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individual citizens participate in the political process. Katatni' s statement on the ultimate authority of the "nation" indicates that the Brothers see power as emanating from the people. The quote from el-Erian drives this point home when he proposes that all Egyptians will have a role in creating a new Egypt. Thus, el-Erian's reference to the multiple groups already existent within Egyptian political life is a reference to the competitive nature of democratic politics, yet also to the very democratic notion of consensus in that he proposes each will have a say in the construction of the new Egypt as a representative of the people in a new parliament. As the Muslim Brotherhood looks to ensure their competitiveness within the emergent political space in Egypt they, along with many other groups, have taken the step of forming a political party. On April 4, 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood held the first Shura meeting after the revolution to discuss their future agenda. This meeting, the first since 1995 during which murshid Akef was arrested by regime security forces, included a discussion of the formation of the political party and its independence from the main organization. It was here that the Brothers decided to formally submit papers for legal recognition of their political wing to the Judicial Committee, a step previously unthinkable under the Mubarak regime. "The Freedom and Justice party is a purely political party and its membership will be acceptable to a wide segment of the population ... said the party's deputy founder, Dr. Ahmed Diab in a statement on ikhwanweb.colTI. He went on to say that the party does not object to 215

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women or Copts in the cabinet, but does stipulate that the party will not support either for the position of president while he distanced the party from the idea of a guardianship of the scholars and endorsed free-market capitalism. E! The group will sponsor Muslim, Christian, and female candidates in upcoming elections according to Mahmoud Morsi, the head of the group, as he claimed it is not a religious or theocratic party. : m No longer running candidates under the popular slogan "Islam is the Solution the Brotherhood's political wing, the Freedom and Ju s tice Party, proclaims "Freedom is the Solution". It is important to note that the Egyptian Constitution, even after the committee appointed by the SCAF completed several reforms, left Article 5 intact which prohibits religious parties. The Brotherhood and the Freedom and Justice Party have both repeatedly stated that this article does not prevent the formation of the party as the FJP is not a religious party but one of a civil nature open to non-Muslims and that there is a significant amount of independence for the party from the organization. The civil nature of the party seems to be reflected in the composition of its founding members over ten percent of which are women (over 1,000 of the registered 9,000) while the vice chairman, Dr. Rafik Habib, is a well-known Coptic intellectual. Habib m Hussein Mahmoud, "MB's 'Freedom and Justice Papers Soon to Be Submitted ," ikhwanweb.colll, last modified April 4. 2011, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/print.php?id=28362 m "Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood Outlines Political Ambitions," Radio Fr ee Europe (May 1 2011). 216

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has since put forth the idea that Christians should also form political parties with a distinctly Christian frame of reference as long as it is based on a political platform as the Freedom and Justice Party is. "Freedom to think and define one s political views must be complete freedom," he says. "The important thing is that the party be based on a political program and that its membership be open to a11.,,324 This statement illustrates the need and support for pluralism in Egypt by the Muslim Brotherhood and their political arm. Habib goes on to emphasize the Islamic nature of Egyptian society and the potential for overlap between the conservative stance of the Freedom and Justice Party and Copts while stressing that the Brotherhood respects the will of the people and if a Copt or female candidate is elected president both the Brotherhood and the party "shall respect anyone the people elect and abide by the opinion of the people. ,,325 "The Founding Statement of the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP)," a document released on ikhwanweb.com, is perhaps even more enlightening than statements from organization and party members.326 Again the primary point of this statement is that Egypt should be a civil state with an Islamic frame of reference 32-1 Marwa Sabry, "Ash a rq AI-Awsat Talks to Freedom and Justice party VP Dr. Rafik Habib Asharq Al AI-nat, May 25, 2011, http:www.asharq-e.com. m Ibid. 3 2 6 "The Founding Statement of the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP)." ikhwallH'eb.c ol1l, last modified, June 6 2011 http://www ikhwanweb.com/print.php ? id=28662. 217

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based on shari a law. Yet, the document also confirms that the Orthodox Church should be allowed to operate freely and without persecution as freedom of religion is a primary concern of the party. The document discusses the building of strong state institutions and civil society to safeguard the will of the people and the need for creating solidarity amongst the Egyptian people. The Egyptian people should be the ones who draft the Egyptian Constitution, in a way that reflects the identity and will of the nation .. affirming the sovereignty of the people and national unity ... supports the equality of all people ... respect for pluralism ... the devolution of power and freedom of political parties, ensuring freedom of information and expression, freedom of belief and worship ... and ensuring the integrity of election.327 This founding document, while at times ambiguous when it comes to specific policy prescription s and centered around grand propositions with minimal procedural proposals, illuminates the platform of the Muslim Brotherhood. While the Brotherhood and the FJP stress the independence of the party from the organization, the two are indeed close bedfellows. Nathan J. Brown, a Carnegie Scholar and Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University, calls the Muslim Brotherhood a "helicopter parent" to the FJP. By placing three members of the Brotherhood's Guidance Bureau in charge of operations for the FJP, helping to develop the party platform, approving the FJP bylaws, and determining the extent of electoral participation in upcoming elections "to get the Ibid 218

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party off the ground," Brown believes the FJP could make for a tough partner in future democratic politics if they are bound in step with the Muslim Brotherhood.328 He argues that while this insular approach under conditions of authoritarianism helped the organization to thrive, under more open and free conditions of democracy the oversight of the parent organization may well leave the FJP hamstrung in the political process. It is also interesting to note that the Brotherhood's approach to economics in the FJP documents differ from their previously espoused positions. While their focus in the 1980s centered around creating a just order and support for the lower classes, the more recent party documents suggest that they no longer so strongly advocate for this alternative model but rather have adopted a more liberal position. They still discuss the ideas of economic justice and socioeconomic equality, yet they are framed mainly as against any form of monopoly or exploitation rather than as opposed to a capitalist order specifically. Oliver Roy sees this as beneficial for democracy as this "embourgeoisement" of the Brotherhood "pushes them towards reconciliation and compromise, and into alliances with other political forces. ,,329 Recently Khairat elShater, Deputy Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood met with 14 managers of foreign 328 Nathan J. Brown, 'The Muslim Brotherhood as Helicopter Parent," Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, carnegieendowment.org (2011), http://carnegieendowment.org/publicationslindex.cfm?fa=fa=view&id=44266. 329 Roy, 'This is not an Islamic revolution," 2011. 219

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institutional funds on an economic tour given by Egypt's largest publicly traded investment bank, EFG-Hermes Holding SAE. "We believe in a very, very big role for the private sector," said el-Shatar, who also stated that the Brothers want "to attract as much investment as possible." Wael Ziada, the head of research from EFG, reported that many of the managers "were positively surprised to find some of the ideas shared by the Brotherhood to be mostly capitalistic in nature.,,330 The platform of the FJP is a clear departure from the 2007 Platform of the Muslim Brotherhood in that the former promotes a social liberal economic system that advocates for redistribution of wealth but encourages investment, whereas the 2007 Platform remained firmly grounded in an Islamic economic system.33l This change can be seen as a move to gain international support from economists and investors seeking to invest in the new Egypt. As the Brotherhood and the FJP continue to develop and adjust to the changing conditions of Egyptian political life, both are evolving. The Executive Bureau of the Muslim Brotherhood met during the first week of June to again discuss the future direction of the organization. During this meeting they reportedly debated 330 Mariam Fam and Stanley Reed, "Egypt Brotherhood Courts Investors With Pro Business Stance," Bloomberg.com, July 8, 20 II, http://www.bloomberg.comlnews/20 11-07-07 legypt-s-brotherhood courts-investors-with-pro-business-stance.html. 331 Khalil AI-Anani, "Egypt's Freedom & Justice Party: to Be or Not to Be Independent," Arab Reform Bulletin, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, carnegieendowment.org, June 1,2011. 220

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how to ensure the independence of the FJP from the organization itself in both administrative and political decisions while the members appointed to the FJP formally resigned their positions in the Muslim Brotherhood to concentrate on the affairs of the FJP.331 While Brown raises important points about the need for the FJP to be independent of the organization, the political maneuverings of both the Muslim Brotherhood and the FJP illustrate a firm resolve to press the issue of democratic reform through the building of coalitions and alliances which place the sovereignty of the people and the urgent need for Egyptian unity above political victory. Still, the single best piece of evidence that seems to indicate that the Muslim Brotherhood and the FJP are in fact serious about helping Egypt to form a representative parliament is the formation of the Democratic Alliance for Egypt in June 2011. The alliance began with talks between the FJP and the Wafd party but eventually emerged as an agreement between thirteen Egyptian political parties to create a single candidate list on which each of the parties would be represented. Along with the FJP and the Wafd, influential parties such as AI-Ghad, EI Adl, EI Tagammu, EI Nasserist, EI Amal, EI Wasat, EI Nour, EI Karama, EI Tawheed EI Araby, and Masr EI Horreya agreed to the establishment of Egypt as a civil state with equal citizenship for all, governed by the rule of law. It is a telling piece of evidence m '"MB Executive Bureau discusses future agenda," ikhwamreb.com, last modified June 6, 2011, http://www.ikhwanweb.comlprint.php?id=2870 1. 221

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that the four parties the Pew Survey found to be the most competitive, the Muslim Brotherhood (now the FJP), EI Wafd, AI-Ghad, and EI Tagammu, which hold around 61 percent of the total popular support, are all included in this alliance.333 These are the parties that are expected to be the most competitive in forthcoming elections, yet they have joined with many smaller parties, sacrificing seats they could potentially have won in order to create a single list ensuring a representative parliament. This alliance, the result of collaborative efforts between the Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, Mohamed Badie, the FJP's Mohamed Morsy, and the leader of the Wafd Party, EI Sayed EI Badawy, represents an array of political actors who all agree that national unity should be the primary concern going forward and a proportional representation system, such as a candidate list, is the best way to achieve a diverse and representative parliament. "We want a parliament that represents the entire nation," said FJP leader Essam el-Erian, "with all its political tendencies and forces.,,334 Since the formation of this alliance the number of parties agreeing to participate in the single candidate list for parliamentary elections has swelled to 34 The FJP, by not only participating but forming this coalition, seems to support the idea that Egypt's new parliament must be democratic and representative of all 333 Pew Research C e nt e r Gl o bal Attitlldes Project 21. Yasmine Fathi "13 Parti e s unite to form National Coalition for Egypt Ahram Onlin e June 15, 20 II, http://engli s h ahra m org .eg. 222

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Egyptian voices in order to effectively create a new constitution which will guide Egypt forward in the years to come. As Dr. Nathan Brown pointed out in his April 2011 congressional testimony it is important to keep in mind that the Brotherhood itself is actually far more than a political group. It is rather a social group that has taken a political approach as one means of achieving the larger goal of social reform. Thus, the political involvement of the group differs from other political parties in that the primary goal of the Muslim Brotherhood is not to achieve political power as an end in itself, but rather as a means to further social reform. Thus, as an organization dedicated to social, educational, charitable and political projects it may not be as willing to invest a majority of its resources into competition for political power alone. It is also important to remember that the Brotherhood, as previously discussed, achieved a great deal of success under conditions of repression and in a severely constrained and limited political space. In a more open society, especially one with such a charged political atmosphere such as in Egypt currently, there is little reason to think that the Brotherhood could win a majority of seats in a new parliament even if they decided to run candidates for all the seats.335 335 Nathan J Brown. Statement to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Subcommittee on Terrorism, HUMNIT, Analysis and Counterintelligence The Muslim Brotherhood. Hearing, April 13. 20 II. http://carnegiecndowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&slllr_hilitc=Brotherhood+Muslim. 223

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Citizenship. This emphasis on the will of the people leads to a discussion of citizenship, another key component to the Brotherhood's idea of a civil state. Citizenship as representative of participation is the second definitional condition of democracy according to Lipset. Just as the notion of pluralism fulfills conditions for competitiveness, citizenship is required to meet the condition of participation. Rather than an exclusive version of citizenship, the Brotherhood, over the past thirty years, unremittingly put forth an inclusive version in which they came to explicitly state that all Egyptians, regardless of race, gender, or religion are considered Egyptian citizens and therefore have the right to participate in the political life of Egypt. The previous discussion of minorities and women illustrates the degree to which the Brotherhood's idea of citizenship is inclusive rather than exclusive. Through an extension of the vote to all citizens the Brothers advocate for increased participation in the political system, just as they previously framed political reform as the duty of all Muslims. As Lipset states all adult individuals must have the right to participate. The Brotherhood's proposed inclusivity in their conceptions of citizenship clearly meets this standard as evidenced in their statements regarding both citizenship and their proposed participation in the political future of Egypt. Most knowledgeable observers and scholars who have studied the political situation in Egypt have proposed there is little chance the Muslim Brotherhood could overwhelmingly sweep parliamentary elections in November. Yet, others have 224

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pointed to their vast organizational and mobilizational expertise claiming that these experiences and the rapidity of parliamentary elections greatly advantage the Brotherhood and could see them gain a majority in the new parliament. To assuage these fears and appease their critics the Brotherhood adopted a political strategy of alliance and coalition building while refusing to run a sponsored candidate for the office of President or contest over 30 percent of seats in the parliament. JJ6 This approach to political participation and the FJP's approach to citizenship indicate that the Brotherhood is content with having a say in the new parliament, but that they also want the Egyptian people to play the pivotal role with all groups and social sectors represented. As the January revolt gave way to February's revolution the Brotherhood began to emphasize their desire for the people to play the leading role in determining the future of Egypt. "We want freedom and justice, we want free elections, and for people to [be able] to choose whomever they want to choose," said Mohamed Morsi.337 The Brotherhood, witnessing the incredible power of the people gathered on Tahrir Square and across Egypt, reiterated their previous stance that the will of the people should be the determining factor in the future of Egypt. Just as they had done 336 "Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood Outlines Politi(al Ambitions," Radio Free Europe (May 1,2011). 337 "Muslim Brotherhood Spokesman Predicts End for Mubarak Regime," Voice of America News (Feb. 3. 20 II). 225

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in the syndicates in the early 1990s, the Brotherhood listened to the people and attempted to meet their demands. As Mubarak left office and the SCAF took control of Egypt in the interim period, the Brotherhood released a statement stressing the importance of unity and the establishment of a democratic state in the best interest of all Egyptians. The Brotherhood "envisions the establishment of a democratic, civil state that draws on universal measures of freedom and justice, with central Islamic values serving all Egyptians regardless of color creed, political trend or religion," said the statement. 338 In order to promote the unity of the Egyptian people the Brotherhood decided at this time not to field a candidate for president. EI-Erian stressed that in order to achieve a consensus amongst the Egyptian people the Brotherhood did not feel that they should propose a candidate for president proclaiming "It's time for solidarity!,,339 Shortly after the referendum vote on March 19, the Brotherhood again stressed the need for cooperation between political voices in the country, calling on all groups to "respect the will and choice of the people" in another statement on their website. "Egypt is in urgent need for the political forces to cooperate with one another in order to achieve the people's demands ... because we are now entering a m David D. Kirkpatrick and J David Goodman, "Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt to Be Political Party," New York Times. Feb. 15, 2011, http://www nytimes.com 339 Ibid 226

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new phase in which Egyptians are going to decide on the shape of their new state for decades to come.,,340 Recognizing the seeming importance of this monumental moment in Egyptian political history, the Brotherhood stressed that Egyptians would be the deciding force. While there are doubts about how the Brotherhood defines Egyptians (in-state, expatriates, etc.), the previous chapter makes clear they advocate for inclusivity rather than an exclusive Muslim-only version of citizenship. Throughout the months following Mubarak's abdication the Brotherhood, and the leaders of the newly formed FJP, repeatedly attempted to empha s ize that Egypt in their view is open to all Egyptians regardless of class, race, gender, or religion. Official statements television appearances on al-Jazeera English and the BBC, and interviews with print journalists, were used to promote the platform of the Brotherhood and, after its formation the FJP -which then became the main political actor. In each of these statements or interviews the speaker emphasized the importance of the BrotherhoodIFJP not gaining a majority in parliament so as the new government could be representative of the whole of Egypt, not only the Muslim Brotherhood. 'The Egyptian people are wise enough to have a balanced parliament," said Essam el-Erian, one of three MB Executive Bureau members that left to organize the FJP. "The Muslim Brotherhood is not targeting at all a majority in the new "MB Statement on Referendum Outcome:' ikhIl"QIlWeb. col1l, last modified March 3 20 II, http://www.ikhwanwcb.com/print.php?id::028266. 227

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incoming parliament., 341 Mohamed Morsi another former Executive Bureau member in charge of the FJP said, "We want to engage in a dialogue not a monologue. The Brotherhood does not seek to control the parliament. .. We want a strong parliament. with different political forces." Morsi went on to address the Coptic issue saying, "We want everyone to be reassured ... that we want to see our Christian brothers elected in parliament. .. We don't want one group to control parliament neither the Brotherhood nor anyone else.,,342 Rule of Law. While the both the Freedom and Justice Party and the Muslim Brotherhood continuously reference a democratic civil state, there are scant few references to religion or Islam in much of their political posturing. Yet, the rule of law is consistently put forth as the primary means of organizing and governing both the political system and society more generally. When the rule of law is viewed through the lens of an Islamic organization such as the Muslim Brotherhood, as Chapter 2 made clear, the law that is continually discussed is a derivative of sharia. For the Muslim Brotherhood sharia represents the true indicator of an Islamic state. A state founded on anything but sharia law is not an Islamic, but rather a secular, state. 111 "Could Muslim Brotherhood Take Over Egypt'? Voice of America News (May 24 2011). Brotherhood says woo't force Islamic law 00 Egypt: Iott:r\'iew. Ahram On lill e. May 30. 2011. hllp://eoglish.ahram org.eg 228

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For the Brotherhood the idea of a secular state runs contrary to every principle they have espoused over the length of their history. While their definition of sharia as the rule of law has undoubtedly become more moderate through their interaction with other political forces and their evolution into a moderate opposition group under the conditions of authoritarianism, the Brotherhood still sees sharia as a necessary part of any eventual state. This sentiment alone does not contradict the feeling of the majority of Egyptians according to the Global Attitudes Project study conducted by the Pew Research Center in the months immediately following the revolution. Again, the study found that 62 percent of Egyptians want laws that follow the Quran with an additional 27 percent believing that laws should be based on, and not strictly follow, the Quran. 343 This attitude is also consistent with the proposition that the vast majority of the Arab world and Egyptian society in particular, do not see any contradiction between democracy and Islam. Thus, for the Muslim Brotherhood and the FJP, while they have made very few political references to religion or Islam in the wake of Mubarak's resignation, their emphasis on the rule of law implies that sharia will be an implicit part of their program going forward. It is important then to analyze their position on sharia and how they foresee its implementation within the Egyptian political system and the implications this has for Egyptian society. m Pew Research Center Global Attitudes Project. 20. 229

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The Brotherhood's emphasis on sharia as the legal basis for the political and social system in Egypt can already be found in Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution which states "the principles of Islamic Sharia are the main source of legislation.,,344 Under Mubarak the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) took on the task of interpreting Egyptian laws passed by the legislature as constitutional by focusing on "Article Two as a 'negative criterion' to mean that no legislation may violate the rules of Islamic law that are definite in terms of both their authenticity and meaning.,,345 Thus, the role of defining Islamic law within the state fell to the SCc. In the Muslim Brotherhood's 2007 platform the group stood by the SCC as the primary interpreter of Islamic law (after the debate regarding a council of scholars had been resolved with the Brotherhood officially rejecting any form of guardianship), a position they continue to advocate today. As Dina Shehata, a senior researcher at the Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo points out, "In Egypt, sharia is already an integral part of our legal system and it is already an integral part of our constitution .... Already most Egyptians are quite religiously conservative, our family law is based on the sharia so there isn't much more to do .... For 99 percent of Egyptians, nothing would change." She goes on to say that even the Muslim 3 -l-l Egyptian Constitution in Stilt, "Islam is the Solution 80. Still. "Islam is the Solution," 81. 230

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-----------------------------Brotherhood does not want to move away from this current formulation where a civil code and shari a are integrated to where "a kind of balance" exists between the two. 346 Secretary General of the FJP, Mohamed Saad el-Katatni in a July 26 meeting with AmI' Mousa, former member of the Arab League and Egyptian presidential hopeful, stated that 70 percent of the current constitution is acceptable to the Egyptian people "while only 30 percent of it need[s] to be changed through dialogue among all social and political segments.,,347 For the Brotherhood, and by default the FJP, sharia then is the scaffolding which holds the Egyptian political system together and enshrines the aforementioned principles of contestation and participation into both the constitution and the Egyptian political system. It is here where the typology of Islamic groups is helpful in understanding the Muslim Brotherhood's interpretation of sharia. Recall the classification of the Brotherhood as a modernist group under Fattah and Butterfield's typology, defined by an openness to interpretation, or ijtihad, and the inclusivity of their interpretation of sllllra. For the modernists, justice is the key principle of sharia. Thus, anything which achieves justice that does not violate the "definite" principles of sharia is deemed acceptable as participation in the political process is a key aspect of shura. Dina Shehata interviewed by Toni Johnson, "Islam and Politics in Egypt," COllncil Oil Foreign Relations, Feb. 24, 2011. "Arm Mousa Visits Freedom and Justice Party," iklnra/nreh.com, July 26. 2011, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/pri nt. php?id=2 8872 231

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For the modernists then, democracy is the best, most efficient system under which an Islamic state can flourish. It is also instructive to return to the argument put forward in the first chapter of this study regarding how sharia and democracy have been found compatible by Islamic scholars throughout the Muslim world as many of these debates and the principles they gave rise to provide the foundation for the argument of the Muslim Brotherhood that sharia provides a solid foundation on which a state should be constructed. The Brotherhood, and now the FJP, brought this argument to life in the months following the revolution. Prior even to Mubarak's ouster, leading members of the Muslim Brotherhood put forth their interpretation of Islamic law as a principle foundation in a new civil state which protects minorities and guarantees their rights and the right of the masses to demonstrate against a ruler. Mohamed Saad el-Katatni, then a media spokesman for the Brotherhood before his appointment to the FJP leadership stated that "in fact Islamic law acknowledges and respects that Copts in an Islamic nation will follow their religion's laws and beliefs and are Egyptians and enjoy all the rights and duties as Muslim Egyptians.,,34 8 The founding statement of the FJP also includes a provision regarding the necessity of maintaining the current Article 2 stipulation in the constitution which asserts that sharia is the principle m "AI Kat a tni: MB First Called for Establi shment of a Civil State:' ikhwal1web. co m. F e b. 2, 2011. http://www ikh wan we b.co nllprinl. php ?id==28065. 232 I I

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source of legislation. In doing so, the FJP's support for the previous position of both shari a within the state and the role of the SCC in interpreting shari a is reiterated. This same provision includes a discussion of how shari a protects the rights of minorities. "Sharia is the best method to ensure the reformation of the condition of our society that will lead it to happiness and progress," says the FJP, "as well as guaranteeing the rights of our fellow Christians and their freedom of belief and worship according to their laws and rules in addition to safeguarding their litigation through Christian laws and rules in their private affairs.,,349 It is apparent that the Muslim Brotherhood and the FJP see sharia, as interpreted and applied by the sec, as integral aspects of a new democratic Egyptian civil state. For them shraia is a way of safeguarding the rights of minorities as justice is the primary concern of both Islam and sharia. As their platforms and public statements from the past thirty years indicate, the Brotherhood is concerned with including everyone in the political process as citizens of Egypt. Thus, while Islamic phrasing and terms such as sharia are not spread throughout their public documents or statements released in the time since Mubarak left office, their emphasis on the rule of law can be seen as a call for sharia, but not in a radical or fundamentalist way. 'The Founding of the and Justice Party (FJP)," ikhll'Gmreb .co lll la s t modified June 6 20 II, hllp://www ikhwallwcb.com/print.php ? id=28662 233

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After all, the moderation of the Brotherhood in the past decades has dramatically influenced and helped develop their democratic ideology today. Concluding Thoughts If we have learned nothing else from their political maneuvers in the last forty years we should at least recognize that the Muslim Brotherhood has proven itself to be willing and able to adapt to changing political environments. They have shown themselves to be a moderate political force, adept at playing the role of an opposition group under conditions of authoritarianism, while also expressing a strong desire to participate under conditions of democracy. Their conception of democracy is neither wholly foreign to any western liberal notion of the subject, nor a carbon copy. Rather it is a specified version born of the unique cultural resources of the Egyptian, Arab, and Islamic traditions. That said, it undoubtedly fulfills the minimal conditions set forth by Lipset to be considered such. The Brotherhood makes no secret of their desire for free and fair elections and the peaceful rotation of power. While some political analysts and Middle East scholars still doubt the strength of their commitment to equal rights for Copts and women, the statements and documents analyzed throughout this study seem to indicate that the group strongly believes that all Egyptians, regardless of race, religion, or gender, should be allowed to participate in the political process. If we return to the discussion of Islam and democracy in the first chapter which brought up the subject of Islam ensuring rights for minorities, this 234

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--------------------interpretation of the concept is seen in every political platform and internal debate of the Brotherhood over the past several decades. Their development as a moderate opposition force most assuredly continues to influence their actions as the opposition label is removed seen in their rigidity, their hierarchy, and their internal affairs, necessary developments to function under an authoritarian regime. Yet, their history as a moderate political force and their attempts to adhere to the democratic rules of a new political game, have surely earned them a spot at the table in a new government. While their history is instructive in attempting to discern their future actions, only time will truly tell how strong the Muslim Brotherhood's commitment to democracy really is. 235

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--. -------------------------------------------------------------------CHAPTER 7 TOW ARDS THE LIGHT: THE BROTHERHOOD AND THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN EGYPT In the early days of March 2011, less than one month after Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak had been ousted from power by the Egyptian people a group of young Egyptian Mu s lim Brothers gathered around a small table in a bu st ling s hop in Cairo. They were dis cu ss ing how an Egypti a n democracy would take s hape, what it would look like, and the political role Islami sts would play in the new Egyptian government. The young men condemned Iran a nd Saudi Arabia as terrible things in front of BBC televi s ion cameras before prai s ing both Turkey and Malaysia as "s hining examples" for the Egy ptian people to emulate. Speaking directly to the camera, and through it to the Western world, one young man voiced the opinion of the group, evidenced by their heads nodding along as he spoke, saying "You cannot judge us until you give us a chance. We I s lamis t s need a chance.,,35o Three quarter s of the Egyptian population or 77 percent believe that Mubarak's ouster was a good thing for their country according to a P ew Research Center study conducted two months after hi s removal. Nine out of ten hold a n "unfavorable view" of the former president a nd the primary concern of the population 350 "Muslim Broth e rhood' s Grip on Alexandria's P oor Areas." BBe (March 3.2011) 236

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seems to be securing a transition to a democratic government. 351 The Muslim Brotherhood desperately wants to playa role in this transition but have come under attack in the past for espousing a media friendly version of their desires while secretly harboring a hidden agenda. "The Muslim Brotherhood claims they are in love with democracy now because they have realized that anybody who opposes democracy will lose all legitimacy," says Moheb Zaki. A senior advisor at the Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies, "Zaki argues that in order to attain power the Muslim Brotherhood lies about its commitment to democracy.,,352 Yet for every analyst who believes this "hidden agenda" theory, there are those who push back against it as I have done throughout this study. One reason for this supposed "double speak" suggests Alison Pargeter, is the organization's development under strict conditions of authoritarianism where they had to keep their agenda slightly obscured to avoid prison and persecution.353 While this is indeed a plausible ex planation it seems more likely that the Brotherhood is not doing it with any malicious or subversive intent, but rather because when it comes to certain issues, they have yet to achieve a consensus on their position. Nathan Brown testified to a US House subcommittee that "Where the Brotherhood's position is less than clear, it is generally 351 Pew Research Center Global Attitl/des Project. 8. 3 52 Harnisch and Mecham Democratic Ideology." 196. 353 Pargcter, ''The Muslim Brotherhood ." 9. 237

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not because the movement is hiding its position; the problem is generally that the movement has not made up its mind.,,354 Brown acknowledges that Brotherhood leaders may change their presentation of their position depending on the audience, as do all politicians, but do so "less than others and show less reticence about expressing views that the listener does not want to hear.,,:m Some observers, such as Magdi Khalil the editor of the Egyptian Weekly Watani International, believe that if the Brotherhood assumes any measure of power it could have severely negative consequences for the whole of Egypt. In assessing their political record he finds that they would propose a strict Islamist state supporting this conclusion by pointing to their parliamentary record of targeting general freedoms, their "ironclad control" of Egyptian organizations and syndicates, their undemocratic internal structure, and their attempts to dominate in their political alliances while never condemning violence.356 As I have shown throughout this thesis these concerns are largely unfounded, many directly challenge the available evidence, and all stem from Khalil's faulty assumption that "it is almost impossible to assume that Islamist parties would accept the values of a democratic and liberal 354 Nathan Brown, "Testimony to the House." m Ibid., 4. 356 Magdi Khalil. "Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood and Political Power: Would Democracy Survive')" Middle East Rel'iea' of International Affairs 10, No. 1(2006).44-52. 238

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society since those are, in fact, in total contradiction with their own proclaimed values.',357 If we can move past this surface evaluation of the incompatibility of democracy and Islam and focus instead on areas of compatibility, as the Brothers have done, it becomes increasingly clear that the two can in fact be reconciled and a unique version of Islamic democracy can not only emerge but appeal to Islamists and democratic activists alike. Essam el-Erian, former media spokesman for the Muslim Brotherhood and now one of the leading figures in their political arm, the Freedom and Justice Party, explains the Brotherhood's view of democracy saying: Democracy is democracy. Women and the men, Christians and the Muslims, all have political rights and duties. They are citizens in a state of law, in a state [that has] a rotation of power, independent elections, [a] free and fair judiciary system ... we must respect that the people know their way The power of the people cannot be challenged at al1.358 This statement is in line with everything the Muslim Brotherhood, and the FJP, since their founding, have said to date on how they both understand democracy and would like to see the new government of Egypt established and operationalized. First off this statement goes right to the heart of the issue of democracy what is it? As we have seen, democracy is more than just democracy. It is a complex idea which can be understood in a variety of different ways. Yet, when it is reduced to the 3 57 Ibid .. 51 358 "Egypt: Revolution in Progress," Empire AI-Jazeera English, July 14,2011. 239

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principles of contestation and inclusion, as Lipset has done, it becomes a far less daunting proposition to find areas of compatibility between Islam and its theoretical core. I argue in Chapter 2 that these areas are in large part due to a reconceptualization of both democracy and Islam which finds ideas inherent to both and interprets them in distinct ways based on the available cultural resources. Islam has a tradition of justice, and as discussed in Chapter 2 and again in Chapter 6, the primary goal of sharia is to ensure justice for all. In order to effectively ensure sharia though democracy becomes necessary which then also institutes the principles of shura and ijma. Thus, democracy and Islam both are reinterpreted in the tradition of ijtihad and take a unique and specific form that is not all that far removed from Western conceptions of democracy, although it may appear foreign at first glance. While Chapter 3 provides a brief glimpse into the history of the Muslim Brotherhood as an organization, it plays the integral role of establishing a foundation on which the subsequent analysis can build. In exploring the roots of the organization we can see that questions of equality and representation have always been at the forefront of the Brotherhood's thinking. Even al-Banna thought it necessary to address the "women question," while later regime repression forced the Brotherhood into representative roles which brought them into contact with a wide array of political elements and arenas. This political participation led not only to their development as one of the primary, if not the primary, opposition force to the 240

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Mubarak regime as we saw in Chapter 4, but also to their moderation. Chapter 5 builds on the idea of the inclusion/moderation hypothesis and critically examines how, through their opposition to the regime, the Brotherhood insinuated itself in the political life of Egypt which then forced them to modify their position on specific issues and develop a more moderate Islamic stance than many other groups. Specific elements of el-Erian' s statement have been discussed throughout the chapters of this thesis. Where he begins with a definition of democracy, so have I, though his is far less specified than that put forth in this study. Turning his attention to the issue of representation and equality he reiterates that in any state all individuals have "rights and duties" which must be respected. The Brotherhood has repeatedly espoused the principles of equality between genders and religions, as we have seen, and continues to do so today. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 all include discussions of how they have interpreted Islam as a means of securing minority rights to participation, while all include statements from the Brotherhood which address the issue of equal rights. Beyond that, the Muslim Brotherhood emphasizes its idea of a civil state, a state which is open to all though pluralism and participation, and based upon the rule of law (sharia) and the supremacy of the Supreme Constitutional Court to interpret that law, just as el-Erian does above. Most importantly though, both in the above statement and in the Muslim Brotherhood more generally there is a consensus to consistently defer in important 241

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decisions to the will of the people. Yes they have their opinions and, in many ways, are very open and forthcoming when questioned about them; and yes sometimes they may contradict the will of the people. Yet, in every instance where this is a possibility, the Brotherhood has not only recognized that they may be in a minority stating that they will respect the will of the people, they say that the people have every right to their own, differing opinion. This is most clearly exemplified in the debate over Copts and women holding the office of president. While the Brotherhood has said they will not support either for this office, they do not wish to restrict them from running, or winning, if that is the will of the people. Still, there are debates within the Muslim Brotherhood, mostly between the reformists and the old guard, on how to go about transitioning from an authoritarian state to a democratic one. EI-Erian, representing the old guard in this instance said in a debate with former member Ibrahim el-Houdaiby, a member of the younger reformist generation in Egypt, "We are going through a transitional period. This transition cannot be dramatic, it cannot be radical. It must depend on a national consensus to pass the country on from a dictatorship to a democratic system." El Houdaiby responded saying, "It's a revolution! There's a difference between reform and revolution ... The very transition from a dictatorship to a democracy is a radical 242

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change.,,359 This exchange illustrates the difference of opinion that divides not only members within the Muslim Brotherhood, but also the older generation within Egypt from the younger. This divide is but one of the areas we should continue to watch in the years ahead for it is here where the future of the Muslim Brotherhood, and perhaps Egypt, will be decided. As the younger, more reform minded generation, inspired by their success in the face of an authoritarian dictator like Mubarak, continues to rise up and challenge the old guard within the Brotherhood, or politicians more generally within Egypt, the old guard may be forced to modify their positions to placate these young critics setting the organization, or the state, on a more liberal course. With much of the old guard within the Brotherhood being precisely that, members of an aging generation, leadership changes are imminent within the next several years. Depending on how the tides sway many of the reform minded leaders may assume leadership positions within the Brotherhood and could play an incredibly significant role in charting the organizations course into the future. While this may be mere speculation for the moment, it is not such to say that the Muslim Brotherhood will indeed play an influential role in the formation of a new government in Egypt. As they are perhaps the most well organized, and one of the most experienced, political actors within Egypt they will most assuredly win a substantial number of seats in upcoming parliamentary elections even if they run on 3 5q "What"s Next for Egypt's Islamists'" The Cafe AI-Jazeera English, July 25.2011. 243

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unified candidate lists with other parties under the Democratic Alliance banner. As the parliament will be charged with writing the new Egyptian constitution, the Brotherhood will be in a position to impact the founding document of the state So, what if they win? What are some of the most probable outcomes if the Brotherhood wins power in a new Egypt? What should we expect? First, we should not expect the Muslim Brotherhood to dominate upcoming elections. To support this position I have repeatedly pointed to their self-proclaimed desire to only contest around a third of the available seats as well as their participation in the Democratic Alliance, with two of their largest competitors and 31 other parties, to create a candidate list which will ensure a diversity of voices are elected. The Brothers have also expressly stated they will not run a candidate for president in these elections while asking one member, who decided to run for this office, to leave the organization which he has since done. But even if they were to win a majority, Tarek Masoud points out that there are enough other political actors to effectively prevent the Brotherhood from implementing any agenda against the will of the people. He writes, "An MB victory in Egypt would not mean that all other social forces from the military to businessmen to workers would suddenly disappear, leaving the Islamists free to do as they pleased.,,360 Rather, these forces 360 Masoud, "Are They Democrats')" 21. 244

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would constrain the power of the ruling group limiting their ability to implement an entirely Islamic agenda. Ali Gomma, the grand mufti of Egypt, echoes this sentiment pointing out that even within the Islamist camp there is a tremendous diversity of opinion, so much so that no single group would be able to monopolize the Islamist vote making a comprehensive victory for any single Islamist group near impossible.361 In fact this competition between the various Islamic groups may force the groups to adopt more moderate or liberal positions as happened to the Brotherhood over the course of their political involvement as we have seen. "Over time, other parties," writes Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, "including others with an Islamist orientation may provide the Brotherhood with some healthy competition and an impetus to further reform. ,,362 A second reason the Brotherhood would not target a majority in the new government has to do with the current economic situation in Egypt. For the Brothers, inheriting a delicate economic situation as the majority party in a new government, rather than a member of a coalition, leaves them open to criticism if the situation is not remedied. Improved economic conditions represent the single most important issue for Egyptians according to the Pew survey with 82 percent of people responding 361 Gamma, "In Egypt s Democracy Room for Islam." 3 b2 Wickham "The Muslim Brotherhood After Mubarak," 5. 245

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that it needs to be dealt with immediately.363 Even in the wake of praise and congratulations from the World Bank and IMF after Egypt further opened their economy in 2004 and improved the investment climate, reduced tax rates, saw an increase in foreign direct investment, exports, and tourism revenues, as well as opening space for the private sector and lower budget deficits "40 percent of the country still lives on less than $2 a day.,,3 6 4 The stakes are far too high for the Brotherhood to assume unilateral control over thi s economic situation. The Brotherhood also realizes that a simple political blunder could cost Egypt a tremendous amount of foreign aid. 'They remember the outcry that followed Islamist electoral victories in Algeria in 1991 and the Palestinian territories in 2006 and know that a great deal is at stake hundreds of millions of dollars of Western assistance, loans from international financial institutions, and trade and investment," writes Shadi Hamid, the Director of Research at the Brookings Doha Center. 365 Thus the Brotherhood is more likely to assume a position as part of a coalition, rather than as the stand alone majority power holder, in Egypt as a new government is formed and attempts to outline Egypt's path into the future 363 Pew Research Cent e r Global Attitudes Project, 19. Smith, "Will They Be Devoured?" 365 Shadi Hamid 'The Rise of the Islarnists : How Isl a mists Will Change Politics and Vice Versa," Foreign Affair s 90. no 3 (2 0 II): 44. 246

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Along with avoiding sole responsibility for the economic situation in Egypt, the Brothers realize that foreign policy is another area they may want to avoid, at least for the time being Thus the Israel question may not be answered with the certainty that many observers foresee. Whenever there is talk of an Islamist group coming to power in the Middle E as t the question of how they will react to Israel is invariably raised. Leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, as Leiken and Brooke found in 2007, all proclaimed a willingness to recognize the Jewish state jf the leaders of Hamas did so in the future while then murshid Akef claimed that the only conflict existed between Zionists and Muslims, not Muslims and Other observers, such as Brown, believe that the Brotherhood's leaders recognize that war is not in the best interest of the people and instead would like to preserve the treaty while renegotiating specific aspects, in particular the demilitarization of Sinai and certain economic propositions. Muhammad Abbas, who we met in Chapter 6, when asked about the treaty with Israel said it was not for him to decide. He says the Brotherhood is responsible to the people, especially if the group was to gain power, and as such should acquiesce to the demands of the people. If the people want to keep the treaty, 366 Leiken and Brooke "The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood." 116. 3 0 7 Brown Testimony to the House .. 10. 247

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it stays, if not, it goes.368 His expressed willingness to defer to the people of Egypt on issues such as the treaty with Israel echoes the Brotherhood's continual espousals of abiding by the will of the people. Still, we can expect the Brotherhood itself to be wary of becoming overly involved in foreign policy concerns in the building phase of a new Egyptian government. "Islamists," writes Shadi Hamid, "are well aware that getting tied up in controversial foreign policy efforts would cause the international community to withdraw support from the new democracies, thus undermining the prospects for successful transition. ,,369 Yet there could also be some significant foreign policy benefits for other nations if the Brotherhood gains power. It is no secret that the Brotherhood remains in the midst of a long standing feud with more radical terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda. Ayman al-Zawahiri, long time deputy of Osama bin Laden, in his book The Bitter Harvest heavily criticized the Brotherhood on the grounds that they participate in politics and reject violence.37o "If the Brotherhood gains influence in a new Egyptian government, as seems likely, the organization will carry this feud with it," writes Daniel Byman, a professor at Georgetown University and research director 368 'The Brothers, Frontline, PBS, February 22, 20 II. 369 Hamid, "The Rise of the Islamists," 44. 170 According to Daniel Byman 'Terrorism After the Revolution: How Secular Upri s ing Could Help (or Hurt) Jihadists ," For e i gll Affairs 90, no. 3 (2011): 51. 248

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for the Brookings Institute And becau se many jiha di s ts grew out of its rank s, the Brotherhood knows the jihadist community well and can effectively weed out the most dangerou s figures.,,371 The United State s made clear their intention to work with all democratic forces within Egypt when in late May 2011, Pre s ident Barak Ob ama stated that the US would engage "all who embrace genuine and inclusive democracy.,,372 Thu s if the Brotherhood does legitimately achieve a measure of power in the new Egypt, the United State s ha s already sig naled their willingness to recognize them as part of the political system. While Secretary of State Hillary Clinton trumpeted a policy decision to engage in dialogue with the Muslim Brotherhood, an announcement later clarified by a State Department spokeswoman who s tated that the US has had a relationship with the Mu s lim Brotherhood for some time, it i s so mewhat odd that the US felt the need to expres s their willingness to engage with the group. The United States should be focused on building relationship s with Egypt rather than with a si ngle group or party. "The lesson that the past few months should have taught u s sa id Nathan Brown in hi s House subcommittee te s timony, "is th a t basing ... r e lationships on s pecific individuals is mortgaging long-term intere s t s for 371 Ibid. 5 2. 372 Ellen Bark, "The Egypt Test ," The Week l y Standard 16, no.35 (2011). 249

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short-term convenience.,,373 If the Brotherhood indeed becomes a legitimate representative of the Egyptian people by winning seats in upcoming elections, which seems most likely, and is a part of a legitimate government, the US should indeed engage the members of the Brotherhood, but as they would engage any government official with interests unique to their own state and at times in direct competition with those of the US. While the analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood as a moderate Islamic political force presented here is drawn from a large and well founded body of scholarly work as well as Brotherhood statements, platforms, interviews, and past actions, there are two predominant critiques that can be leveled against it. First, as I am not a fluent speaker of the Arabic language I have had to rely heavily on material translated into English by third parties. In doing so some of the original meaning may have been lost. This also means that I have depended upon the Brotherhood's own English language website (www.ikhwanweb.com) for a great deal of primary source material. Yet, in order to remedy this problem I have also utilized the work of many of the most prominent and notable scholars who have both extensively researched and written on the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Their translations of specific documents and Arabic language sources have proven invaluable in compensating for my inability to translate the documents myself. m Brown, "Testimony to the House." 14. 250

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Second and perhaps most importantly, is the fact that my analysis rests largely on the argument that Islam and shari a can be reinterpreted through ijtihad While the flexibility of shari a and Islam lends to their ability to find areas of compatibility with democratic theory, that same flexibility also opens them up to reinterpretation so as to make them compatible with alternate understandings. "The flexible understanding of sharia favored by Qaradawi," and the Muslim Brotherhood is open to interpretation, says Steven A. Cook, "but this elasticity is inherently risky .... these theorists protean notions can just as easily serve authoritarian policies as liberal ones.,,374 Perhaps the best example of this flexibility is the difference between the Muslim Brotherhood and the more hard-line Salafi groups. Salaf is interpreted as predecessor; therefore followers of the Salafist trend advocate a return to the Islam of the first three centuries after its inception. As Paul Marshall repOlted in the May 16 issue of The Weekly Standard, since the Egyptian revolution violent acts committed by members of these Salafi groups have increased dramatically. Marshall writes: On March 20, in Qena, Salafists, including an off-duty policeman accused a Copt named Ayman Mitri of renting an apartment to a prostitute cut off one of his ears, mutilated his other ear, and slashed his neck. The attackers then informed the Rolice that they had carried out the punishment required by Islamic law.3 5 Steven A. Cook. "Adrift on the Nile: The Limits of Opposition in Egypt," Forei g n Affairs 88, no. 2 (2009): 124. 175 Paul Marshall "Egypt's Other Extremcists: While the Muslim Brotherhood gets all the ink the Salafists go on a rampage Th e Weekly STalldard 16, no. 33 (2011). 251

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From March 20 through the 28 reports surfaced of Salafists surrounding Coptic churches to stop services or construction projects, attacking liquor stores, demanding all coffee shops be closed, and destroying shops. On March 30 a Muslim man, employed at a museum in Cairo, was killed by a Salafist coworker for not praying in the correct way or at the right time. Salafists are also increasingly targeting Sufi shrines and mosques, destroying them for housing venerations of saints, which they believe is against Islam. Historically the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis have opposed one another and, in the aftermath of these attacks, the condemnation of Salafist actions by the MB seems to indicate that this trend will continue. Sheikh Qaradawi, a staunch supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood, released an article available on the Brotherhood's website exploring the difference between the Salafis and the Brotherhood.376 He states, ''The groups which have been based on jihad, such as the jihadi or Salafi jihadi groups have been established against the Muslim Brotherhood ... Such groups have carried out some acts of violence and we say to them that such things are not helpful, and the only things to be gained from them are detention, suffering, and victimization.',377 He reiterated this stance on April 3 7 6 Yusuf AI-Qaradawi. "Differences Between the Muslim Brotherhood and Hard-Line Salafi Groups ikhwumreb.col1l last modi tied January I. 20 II, http://www ikhwanweb com/print.php?id=27723 m Ibid., 3. 252

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4, 2011 reportedly saying that "Salafists demands [sic] are both stagnant and extreme, adhering to literal interpretations of the Quran and tradition," before going on to praise the Brotherhood's desire for a "civil state based on the religious teachings of Islam offering equality and freedom to all regardless of political trends, religion, colour or creed .,37 8 In the immediate aftermath of these attacks the Brotherhood released a statement saying "[The] Muslim Brotherhood represents moderate Islam, the Was at party offers a more progressive interpretation of the religion and the Salafi movements take another way altogether.,,379 The Brotherhood also relea se d several statements decrying the actions of the Salafists directly saying that they were threatening the "revolution's greatest achievements. ,,380 Thus while the concepts employed by the Brotherhood and Islamic scholars such as Qaradawi are open to interpretation and could potentially be u se d for authoritarian ends it seems highly unlikely that the Brotherhood would be the group to do so. In fact, their rejection of the Salafi interpretation and the condemnation of their actions by the Brotherhood, insinuates th a t the Brothers do in fact believe that Copts must be allowed to freely and openly practice their religion. Thi s then serves m "Qaradawi Compares MB and Salafists Outlo ok o n Politics," ikh\('GIlWeb.col11, l as t m od ified April 4, 2011, hllp://www.ikhwanweb.com/print.php ?id =28341. m "Religion in the Wake of the Revolution," ikhwGnw eb.col11, last modified April 4, 2011, http://www.ikhwanweb .co mlprint.php)id=28359 .180 Khaled Hamza. "Actions b y Salafi Groups Threaten the Revolution s Great es t Achievements ," iklnralHl'eb .co lll. la s t m odified April 4, 2011 http://www.ikhwanweb.com/print.php ? id=2 8334. 253

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as a significant piece of evidence to support the proposition that the Brotherhood supports the freedom of religion within Egypt. Perhaps the most telling piece of evidence though will be to watch how staunchly the Brotherhood defends the rights of Copts and minority religious groups against less overt threats of violence from Islamists in the time ahead. While these two areas do present a challenge to the analysis presented in this thesis, it is not significant enough to overlook its substantive points. What is clear is that definitions of democracy can no longer be limited to a Western theoretical understanding but must be reconceptualized based on specified versions born of unique cultural characteristics. As Esposito and Vall wrote in 1996, "In the global environment of the present, narrow and parochial understandings of concepts as important as democracy are dangerous and limiting."J81 Throughout this study several important areas of compatibility between Islam and democracy have been explored, but that is not to say that understandings should be limited solely to these areas. Further investigation into areas of compatibility between grand religions and specified cultural resources is perhaps one of the most pressing challenges to scholars of this generation. This is an area ripe for further study which will prove to be invaluable to enriching the amount and nature of democratic literature available. 381 Esposito and Voll I s lam alld Delilocracy, 14. 254

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As for Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood in particular, they should be given the opportunity to develop their unique conception of democracy as they progress through the transitional phase from authoritarianism to a new Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood has proven itself to be a highly motivated and politically adept organization, moderate in its interpretation of the Islamic faith, and willing to work for a democratic Egypt. While it is necessary to be wary of any prescient descriptions of their future engagement in Egyptian politics, I would argue that by understanding their past, their motivations and moderation, their commitment to participation as one of many political groups, we can say with confidence that, at the very least, they have earned the right to be included in the political process going forward. In exploring the Brotherhood's development and past actions it becomes apparent that the Brothers will not only be a significant actor in determining the future of Egyptian politics, but that they can be seen as a force for democracy. It is my hope that this study will contribute to the debate over the direction a new Egypt will take and the role the Muslim Brotherhood will play in its development. The title of former murshid el-Houdaiby's book, Preachers Not Judges, published to quiet the debate between the moderate faction of the Muslim Brotherhood and the supporters of Sayyid Qutb, can easily be applied to this situation today and is seen in the words of that young Brother who asked for a chance before being judged. The West has long preached the gospel of democracy across the 255

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Middle East, and now, through the Arab Spring of 2011, the people are attempting to make democracy their own; albeit, in a unique way that does not necessarily adhere to all the conditions set forth in the Western gospel. The West must accept that people are now inspired, that they are reaching out to grasp democracy and develop it based on the unique cultural resources of Islam and the Arab world. The West should continue to preach, they should lead, drawing on their early experiences with democratic governance, and guide, through their strong and established institutions; but, they must not immediately, become judges. 256

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APPENDIX A : TRANSLA nON OF TERMS Akhlaq -ethics da'vva -religious outreach/invitation to God dhimmi -the protected status of non-Muslims; a covenant between Muslims and non Muslims 'ebadat -rituals al-Gama'a al-lslamiyya or al-Gama a -The Islamic Group, a radical Islamic organization hizb -party ijma -consensus ijtihad -independent interpretation al-infitah or illfitah -the economic open door policy of Sadat jahiliyya -ignorance or the time before the Prophet jama 'a -group jama 'at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimull or lkhwan -Society of the Muslim Brothers, Muslim Brotherhood jihad -to strive or to struggle kafir -nonbeliever khilafah-Caliphate 257

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marja 'iyya Islamic frame of reference mo 'amalat transactions murshid supreme guide of the Muslim Brotherhood Nizam al-Klzass or Nizam military arm of the Muslim Brotherhood sharia Islamic law shurah consultation SUl111a -sayings and acts of the Prophet takfir the act of pronouncing unbelief on a Muslim, declaring one a kafir tawhid Unity of God; no God but God Ulama the learned, or scholars, of Islam umma community Wilayat al Fitqih guardianship of the scholars zakat -a donation to the poor from the better off) 258

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