Citation
Masking suffering

Material Information

Title:
Masking suffering an existential genealogy of Nietzsche's perception of love
Creator:
Frisby, Monika ( author )
Language:
English
Physical Description:
1 electronic file (120 pages) : ;

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords:
Love ( lcsh )
Genre:
bibliography ( marcgt )
theses ( marcgt )
non-fiction ( marcgt )

Notes

Review:
This thesis addresses the impact Nietzsche’s desire for the love of others had on his philosophy. I conduct an existential genealogy of his perception of love from the ideal formed in childhood, along the path of experiments preformed throughout his philosophy. It is my contention that Nietzsche determined to change his perception of love following the disillusionment of what he had conceived to be his ideal, and that evidence for this can be found by analyzing his investigations of morality. From originally perceiving love as pure and unegoistic to redefining it as an act of egotism cloaked as virtuous, I posit that in his suffering Nietzsche continually struggled to assimilate the image of love he asserted in his work. With the use of his personal writings, I expose contradiction between his published contentions and private expressions and propose that he wore his philosophical perspectives as a mask, veiling the suffering experienced from battling his desire for love. Due to the existential crises Nietzsche underwent while contending with his desire, I argue that much of his anguish was self-induced. In his efforts to avoid the pain he associated with love, I reveal irony in Nietzsche’s assertion that suffering should be embraced. My work concludes proposing that Nietzsche’s final perception of love finds concurrence with his perception of suffering, ending with a “creative misreading” of Nietzsche’s “Three Metamorphoses.”
Thesis:
Thesis (M.H.)--University of Colorado Denver
Bibliography:
Includes bibliographical references.
System Details:
System requirements: Adobe Reader.
Statement of Responsibility:
by Monika Frisby.

Record Information

Source Institution:
University of Florida
Rights Management:
All applicable rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier:
994299832 ( OCLC )
ocn994299832

Downloads

This item has the following downloads:


Full Text
MASKING SUFFERING;
AN EXISTENTIAL GENEALOGY OF NIETZSCHES PERCEPTION OF LOVE
by
MONIKA FRISBY
A. A., Tallahassee Community College, 2008 B.A., Florida State University, 2011
A thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Colorado in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Humanities
2016


2016
MONIKA FRISBY ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
11


This thesis for the Master of Humanities degree by Monika Jeane Frisby
has been approved for the
Humanities & Social Science Program
by
Omar Swartz, Chair Margaret L. Woodhull Robert Metcalf
Date: December 17, 2016


Frisby, Monika (MH, Humanities and Social Science)
Masking Suffering; An Existential Genealogy of Nietzsches Perception of Love Thesis directed by Associate Professor Omar Swartz
ABSTRACT
This thesis addresses the impact Nietzsches desire for the love of others had on his philosophy. I conduct an existential genealogy of his perception of love from the ideal formed in childhood, along the path of experiments preformed throughout his philosophy. It is my contention that Nietzsche determined to change his perception of love following the disillusionment of what he had conceived to be his ideal, and that evidence for this can be found by analyzing his investigations of morality. From originally perceiving love as pure and unegoistic to redefining it as an act of egotism cloaked as virtuous, I posit that in his suffering Nietzsche continually struggled to assimilate the image of love he asserted in his work. With the use of his personal writings, I expose contradiction between his published contentions and private expressions and propose that he wore his philosophical perspectives as a mask, veiling the suffering experienced from battling his desire for love. Due to the existential crises Nietzsche underwent while contending with his desire, I aruge that much of his anguish was self-induced. In his efforts to avoid the pain he associated with love, I reveal irony in Nietzsches assertion that suffering should be embraced. My work concludes proposing that Nietzsches final perception of love finds concurrence with his perception of suffering, ending with a creative misreading of Nietzsches Three Metamorphoses.
The form and content of this abstract are approved. I recommend its publication.
Approved: Omar Swartz
IV


ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The successful completion of this work would not have been possible without the assistance of my parents, Dr. Elisabeth Stein, David and Merry Ann Frisby, who consistently supported me both personally and professionally. I would also like to acknowledge my dear friend, Joshua Howard, for his many hours of assistance and encouragement. Lastly, I would like to thank my major professor, Omar Swartz, for his unswerving support and patience with me through the completion of my Masters Thesis.
v


TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER
I. INTRODUCTION
Introduction..............................................1
Methodology...............................................4
Review of Literature......................................7
II. EARLY LIFE AND WORKS
Formulating an Ideal of Love.............................10
Music, Poetry and Religion...............................11
Schopenhauer and Wagner..................................15
The Birth of Tragedy.....................................20
Untimely Meditations.....................................26
III. DISILLUSIONMENT AND MASKING SUFFERING
Human, All Too Human.....................................34
The Dawn.................................................50
The Gay Science..........................................57
Thus Spoke Zarathustra...................................68
IV. CONCLUSION
Philosophy of the Future
Beyond Good and Evil...................................80
On the Genealogy of Morals.............................82
The Case of Wagner.....................................83
Twilight of the Idols, The Antichrist, Nietzsche contra Wagner........84
vi


Ecce Homo.....................................................86
Conclusion
Considering Madness; Nietzsches Last Letters............97
Cosima; From Mother Figure to Heroine in Nietzsches Final Perception of Love......................................100
Experiences Prior to and Following Nietzsches Collapse.105
Musing On the Three Metamorphoses; Nietzsches Spirit Becoming a Child........................................108
BIBLIOGRAPHY..............................................................111
vii


ABBREVIATIONS
ATO
AI
BGE
BT
CP
CIS
CN
DD
EH
GS
GM
HH
LN
CL
NB
NP
UL
NW
PB
PN
SL
Z
TN
UM
WN
ws
WP
Antichrist, Twilight, Case of Wagner, Nietzsche contra Wagner
Anxiety of Influence
Beyond Good and Evil
The Birth of Tragedy
Consolations of Philosophy
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity
Conversations with Nietzsche
The Dawn/Daybreak
Ecce Homo
The Gay Science
On the Genealogy of Morals
Human all Too Human
Living with Nietzsche
Nietzsche: A Critical Life
Nietzsche: A Philosophical Biography
Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist
Nietzsche Unpublished Letters
Nietzsches Women: Beyond the Whip
Peacock and the Buffalo
Poetry of Friedrich Nietzsche
Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche
Thus Spoke Zarathustra
To Nietzsche: Dionysus, I Love You! Ariadne
Untimely Meditations
Wagner and Nietzsche
What Nietzsche Really Said
Will to Power


CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Introduction
This work investigates the philosophies of Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche through the lens of his personal writings to demonstrate the affect his desire for the love others had on the formation of his ideas. My thesis provides an existential genealogy of Nietzsches perception of love, tracing the development of his philosophies as he internally struggled with his desire for the love of others. I will argue that his ceaseless motivation to continue creating and publishing his works, beyond constant criticisms and financial difficulties, was greatly inspired by his intention to overcome his desire. I assert that the experimentation Nietzsche exhibited in his philosophical works regarding conceptions of love, such as separating it from other virtues he considered to be of value, reveal his efforts to shift his perspectives. In proclaiming that suffering is a necessary part of mankinds overcoming himself, I argue that Nietzsche wore his philosophies as a mask of self-confidence to conceal his own internal conflictions.
Through a chronological comparison of his philosophical works and personal writings, I will establish that Nietzsches investigations into mankinds conceptions of suffering and morality were largely inspired by his objective to overcome desiring love. Nietzsches difficulties, I contend, are revealed in the contradictions found between the notions he professed in his works and the behavior exhibited in his personal writings. In examining Nietzsches person alongside the philosophies he professed, I intend to not only demonstrate the difficulties he faced while experiencing extreme existential crises, but to prove as well that his internal conflicts served in the formation of his concepts.
1


Nietzsche at times presented unexamined conjectures, rather than finely tuned philosophical theories, in his efforts to combat his desire. Walter Kaufmann, in his work Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, indicates, it is true that Nietzsche often gave expression to opinions he had not questioned critically... [but that in] his writings... we must distinguish between the human and the all-too-human elements (NP, p. 84). Continuing, Kaufmann explains that Nietzsches writings contain many all-too-human judgments... but these are philosophically irrelevant; and adhominem arguments against any philosopher on the basis of such statements seem trivial and hardly pertinent (NP, p. 84). I concur with Kaufmann that expressing opinions not questioned critically does not diminish a philosophers discourses in its own right, for I argue that there is great relevance in Nietzsches process.
My disagreement with Kaufmanns point lies in my contention that consideration of Nietzsches all-too-human judgments are not philosophically irrelevant, but rather provide a greater understanding of his works through a more exhaustive manner of investigation. I argue that Nietzsches process of attempting to overcome his desire for the love of others leads to a deeper understanding of his philosophies by offering insight into his shifting theories of love. Nietzsches decision to introduce some views without significant assessment demonstrates his conflicting emotional struggles, which I posit he underwent throughout the course of his life. It is not in topics such as government, education, or religion in which Nietzsche exhibits behaviors contradictory to his philosophies, but in matters of emotion. I maintain that Nietzsches reasoning for giving expression to opinions he had not questioned critically, as Kaufmann notes, was due to his endeavor to create his own truths by altering his personal perspectives. I posit that Nietzsche ventured to reinterpret love so as
2


to overcome the suffering it caused him, and I emphasize that this way of interpreting his life and works in no way diminishes his theories, as was Kaufmanns concern. On the contrary, I assert that his intention to overcome his desire for the love others through continual reevaluation of his philosophies made Nietzsche all t3he more prolific. It was his efforts in experimentation which brought new insights to mankind. Nietzsches personal process added substantially to the brilliance of his philosophies, and accordingly the focus of this work is to demonstrate the relevance desring love served in the formulation of his published works.
I contend that Nietzsches ideal of love was formed in his childhood as a response to the early loss of his father. His ideal came to fruition in the man who would serve as his father figure, Richard Wagner, and found expression in his early works, The Birth of Tragedy and Untimely Meditations. As a direct response to experiencing the disillusionment of his loves ideal when breaking with Wagner, I posit Nietzsche began his investigations into morality. It is my contention that, suffering in his desire, Nietzsche endeavored to discredit love through its connection with morality. In demonstrating that love was not an unegoistic aspect of mankind, but rather a selfish act intent on possession, Nietzsche strove to overcome his desire. Though his investigations into morality aided him in redefining love, Nietzsche continually faced great difficulty in dissuading his emotional longing for others.
The struggles Nietzsche experienced are exposed by the contradictions revealed between his philosophies and his personal writings, such as condemning pity as detrimental to mankinds development while simultaneously calling for compassion from his friends. As Nietzsche professed his need for solitude he cried out to those he knew of his loneliness, and lamented in his poetry of the suffering life inflicted upon him. In recognition of his
3


hypocrisy, I argue Nietzsche furthered his efforts by intensifying his claims of the necessity of soul-wrenching suffering:
To those who are of any concern to me I wish suffering, desolation, sickness, ill-treatment, indignitiesI wish that they should not remain unfamiliar with profound self-contempt, the torture of self-mistrust, the wretchedness of the vanquished: I have no pity for them, because I wish them the only thing that can prove today whether one is worth anything or notthat one endures (WP, 1887, p. 481).
In his attempt to maintain an appearance of confidence while struggling in his desire
for the love others, I propose Nietzsche donned his philosophies as a mask, veiling his
conflicting emotions with his work. Essentially, Nietzsche demonstrated the reality of his
declaration that there are no absolute truths and that life is a process of becoming (HH, p.
13). Though his behaviors reveal the truth of his struggles, Nietzsche did contend with
lifelong issues of ill health which increased his suffering. I will argue that much of his
suffering was psychosomatic, directly relating to the loneliness he experienced in self-
imposed isolation while battling his desire for love. I will argue that at the end of his
productive life, Nietzsche removed his mask and reached out with his new perception of love
in the final moments of his lucidity.
Methodology
Considering Nietzsches endeavors in overcoming his desring love through his philosophies, this thesis will take an approach inspired by Harold Blooms work, The Anxiety of Influence. Bloom offers a new form of literary criticism involving the creative misreading of a text. Specifically, he addresses how the creational process of a poet hinges on and diverts from the poetry of his predecessors. Blooms theory presents a method of interpretation which correlates to the intention of my thesis to move beyond Nietzsches central philosophical themes to his underlying intentions to overcome desiring the love of
4


others. Establishing new interpretations are possible, Bloom explains, by recognizing that the anxiety of influence comes out of a complex act of strong misreading, a creative interpretation, which he calls, poetic misprision (AI, p. xxiii).
As misprision indicates an intentional misreading of an authors work, creative misreading thus involves formulating a new interpretation by going beyond the boundaries of the texts objective. Moving past an authors original intentions serves in re-contextualizing his work with the purpose of forming a new perspective, and is with this intention that I approach deciphering Nietzsches philosophies, as I consider his emotional struggles when interpreting his theories. This process of forming a new perspective is precisely what I argue Nietzsche was endeavoring regarding his perception of love. Bloom himself credits Nietzsches perspectivism with inspiring the research which forms his work (AI, p. xxvi). In Nietzsches Untimely Meditations, On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life, he discusses the dominance of historical perspectives on current cultures. Bloom pinpoints this idea to highlight his point that there is pressure on writers to create something unique beyond that of their predecessors. The anxiety Bloom refers to comes from Nietzsches Untimely Meditations:
We moderns have nothing whatever of our own; only by replenishing and cramming ourselves with the ages, customs, arts, philosophies, religions, discoveries of others do we become anything worthy of notice, that is to say, walking encyclopaedias (UM, P-79).
Poetic misprision, Bloom explains, serves not only in a study of the life of the writer, but also as a new chapter in the history of modern revisionism (AI, pp. 7-8). Utilizing the method of a creative misreading presents the opportunity of an imaginative approach to a reexamination of Nietzsches philosophies. Concerning new interpretations of previously
5


established works, Richard Rorty discusses Blooms theories in relation to the contingency of language. He explains:
The person who uses words as they have never before been used, is best able to appreciate her own contingency. For she can see.. .that her language is as contingent as her parents or her historical epoch... [and so] by her own sheer strength, she has broken out of one perspective, one metaphoric, into another (CIS, p. 28).
Through the performance of reevaluating prior thoughts, Rorty explains that a
departure from continuity leads toward the creation of something new (CIS, p. 25). In this
way, my work will connect with, and break away from, Nietzsches direct focus on the
implications of morality by highlighting his personal struggles with desiring love. Through a
creative misreading, my thesis will reinterpret the experimentation found in Nietzsches
philosophical works by considering his emotional conflictions, thus exemplifying the
interpretation Bloom refers to as poetic misprision (AI, p. xxiii). This creative misreading
also offers the invention of what Rorty refers to as a new language through a unique
interpretation of Nietzsches life and works.
Bloom posits that every poem is a misinterpretation of a parent poem. A poem is not
an overcoming of anxiety, but is that anxiety (AI, p. 93). This contention would ensue that
my thesis is an anxiety derived from Nietzsches original writings, but I assert that it rather
serves to praise his work while finding my own interpretation through the inspiration
received by his philosophies. Rorty offers a softer voice when elaborating on Blooms
theory, warmly declaring that writers are quite capable of creating new words with their own
unique stories. He explains that, the line between weakness and strength is thus the line
between using language which is familiar and universal and producing language which,
though initially unfamiliar and idiosyncratic, somehow makes tangible the blind impress all
ones behaving bear (CIS, pp. 28-9). When addressing Nietzsche in the same vein as Bloom,
6


Rorty suggests that what Nietzsche considers of great importance is the division from old to new ways of perceiving the world. He states that Nietzsche thinks a human life triumphant just insofar as it escapes from inherited descriptions of the contingencies of its existence and finds new descriptions, and that significance lies in recreating all it was into a thus I willed it (CIS, p. 29).
Rorty explains that Blooms ultimate concern is that of willing something new out of the well-worn words of the past, and it is in this manner that my thesis embodies Blooms theory. In departing from the contingency of Nietzsches original intentions surrounding morality, my thesis performs a reevaluation of his theories by performing a creative misreading of his texts. By contrasting the assertions Nietzsche made in his works with the behaviors demonstrated in his letters, my thesis offers a new perspective of his doctrines. As Bloom eloquently expressed, criticism is the art of knowing the hidden roads that go from poem to poem, and in this way, my thesis offers a new understanding of Nietzsches philosophies through the shared, yet unseen passageways of his public works and private expressions (AI, p. 96).
Review of Literature
Framing a new interpretation of Nietzsches philosophical works in light of his letters and poetry requires biographical information as well as philosophical and literary analysis. With these requirements, my thesis relies heavily on six key sources. Foremost among them is Walter Kaufmanns work, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist.
As a principal academic in the field of Nietzschean scholarship, Kaufmanns work offers superb analysis of Nietzsches philosophies, detailed consideration of the connections between his different theories, and numerous examples of exceptional translations. Perhaps
7


most importantly, Kaufmanns expansive knowledge in these areas provides him with an intuitive understanding of Nietzsches intentions with his works.
Though supplying much of the same historical information as Kaufmann, Rudiger Safranskis, Nietzsche: A Philosophical Biography, and Ronald Haymans, Nietzsche: A Critical Life, both offer a chronological approach to understanding Nietzsches life and philosophies from unique perspectives. Safranski commonly presents a psychological examination whereas Hayman often offers more of a metaphorical perspective. Both authors provide distinctly different interpretations of Nietzsches development throughout the course of his philosophical theories.
Carol Diethes, Nietzsches Women: Beyond the Whip, also offers opinions on the development of Nietzsches perspectives based on personal history, but her focus on his association with women particularly benefits my thesis. Diethes analysis of Nietzsches relationship with the women in his adolescence, as well as the intellectual women with whom he mingled in his adult years, distinctly serves to assist in establishing origin and progression of his perception of love. When evaluating Nietzsches emotional development, Philip Grundlehners, The Poetry of Friedrich Nietzsche, is exceptional in its consideration of language and style. Grundlehner traces Nietzsches lyrical inclinations from its origin in his youth to his last rhythmic expressions before his collapse, further offering comparative interpretations between his poems and his philosophies.
Regarding Nietzsches letters, Christopher Middletons, Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche, serves as my works main source for his correspondences. Middletons work additionally offers clarification regarding translation and background information. Sander L. Gilmans, Conversations with Nietzsche: A Life in the Words of His Contemporaries, also
8


supplies an important aspect of Nietzsches personal history, but from the vantage point of those who knew him. Gilmans compilation of testimonials from acquaintances, close friends, journalists, authors, and even medical professionals offers a unique understanding of Nietzsches life through the impressions others had of him.
These authors, and other minor sources, provide the groundwork needed for my thesis. This scholarly assistance supplies the material to examine Nietzsches philosophies through the lens of his personal writings, allowing for a clear demonstration of the affect his desire for the love of others had on the formation of his theories.
9


CHAPTER II
EARLY LIFE AND WORKS Formulating an Ideal of Love
Within the first five years of his life Nietzsche experienced profound love and suffering, having lost his only close companion, his father Karl Ludwig, and then his little brother, Ludwig Joseph, less than six months later (NB, 1849/50, pp. 351-2). Years later he wrote of how deeply these losses affected him: The thought of being separated forever from my beloved father seized me, and I wept bitterly (NB, 1858, p. 352). Recalling a dream he had of his deceased father carrying a small child into a tomb, Nietzsche wrote, the day following this night, little Joseph suddenly fell ill with cramps and died... Our grief was overwhelming. My dream had come utterly true (NB, 1858, p. 352). Experiencing love and suffering at such a young age, I contend, directly contributed to Nietzsches formation of an ideal of love as selfless and unconditional. Specifically, I argue that the early death of his father directly contributed to the formulation of his perception of love because the brevity of their close relationship intensified Nietzsches affections, leading his young mind to regard the love his father gave as ideal. Furthermore, I posit that the lack of affection Nietzsche received from his mother, Franziska, heightened his reverence for his father.
Franziskas role as a mother, Diethe suggests, was hindered by the difficulties she faced in her own life. At the age of seventeen Franziska was rushed into marriage with Karl and moved into a house which included his mother and two sisters (NW, pp. 12, 15). Immediately upon joining the Nietzsche household, Diethe explains, Franziska was relegated to a back living room and given the use of two bedrooms whilst her dominating mother-in-law, Erdmuthe... ruled the roost in the sunny rooms on the first floor (NW, p.
10


12). Karls allowing his mother to patronize his young bride caused his wifes position to be somewhere between guest and servant, which Diethe argues frustrated Franziskas development and accounts for her immature characteristics (NW, p. 14). Moreover, upon her husbands death, Franziska felt she had no other choice but to uproot her children and move with his dominating family from Rocken to Naumburg due to the need of financial assistance, thus furthering her misery (NW, p. 14).
I concur with Diethes assertion ultimately it was Franziskas unhappiness that affected her ability to give Nietzsche the affection he desperately needed after losing his father and little brother. Additionally, Diethe opposes the simplicity of assertions regarding Franziskas cold and harsh demeanor toward her children, suggesting rather that she was unfortunately the product and victim of paternalistic influences (NW, p. 3).
Diethe explains that Franziska was brought up with the strict pietism of her father, Pastor Oehler, who taught a straightforward faith without too much theory (NW p. 13). She indicates that these principles were so ingrained in [Franziska] that her behavior struck the older women in the household as gauche, specifically in that, as a strict follower of Lutheranism, Nietzsches grandmother, Erdmuthe, did not accept the egalitarian principles implicit in the tenets of pietism (NW pp. 12-13). Thus, in addition to losing his beloved father and little brother, as well as lacking affection from his mother, Nietzsches unhappy childhood also consisted of conflictions regarding the specifics of religious behavior.
Music, Poetry and Religion
Gods authority was always present in Nietzsches matriarchal household, regardless of the antagonism between his mother and his fathers family. Grundlehner posits that Nietzsches rejection of orthodox religion was always evident, but Paul Deussen, whom
11


Nietzsche met in 1859 when they were students at Schulpforta, recollected his friends faith differently (PN, p. 19). Recalling their confirmation on Laetare Sunday, in 1861, Deussen described that they experienced a holy, ecstatic mood before and after confirmation: We would have been quite ready to die immediately to be with Christ, and all our thoughts, feelings, and actions were irradiated with a superterrestrial joy (CN, pp. 10-11).
Deussens contentions seem to find evidence in Nietzsches early appreciation of music, as his sister Elisabeth recalled her brothers first attempts at composing, when he was only nine years old, came after hearing Hallelujah from thq Messiah during Ascension Day in the Spring of 1854 (CN, p. 6). It becomes clear that this inspiration was really more about appreciation of music though, for when recalling the same period later in autobiographical fragments, Nietzsche noted, since my ninth year, music was what attracted me most of all (SL, 1868/9, p. 47). This admiration for music stems back to his earliest experiences, Hayman explains, for as crying as infant Nietzsche was always responsive to his fathers piano-playing (CL, p. 17).
Music was often referenced in his poetry, which can be seen as early as 1858, when Nietzsche wrote of bird songs in connection with his fathers grave (PB, p. 55). Additionally, when Nietzsche was a teenager, Dietrich Fischer-Dieskau explains in his work, Wagner and Nietzsche, he created a music club at school which required all participants to create and submit monthly musical compositions for collective criticism (WN, 1860, p. 2).
Though Deussen was not immediately aware, Nietzsche had begun to separate himself from religion long before their shared reading of David Friedrich Strauss work, The Life of Jesus in 1864, to which Nietzsches response was to conceive that such proclamations created a serious consequence: if you give up Christ, youll also have to give up God (CN,
12


p. 21). Losing his father and little brother, I maintain, led Nietzsche to determine early in life that suffering was not excusable by the pretext of faith.
When he was nineteen, Nietzsche wrote to Elisabeth expressing his frustrations regarding faith and blindly following strict paths designated as truthful for the purpose of comfort:
Every true faith is indeed infallible; it performs what the believing person hopes to find in it, but it does not offer the least support for the establishing of an objective truth. Here the ways of men divide. If you want to achieve peace of mind and happiness, then have faith; if you want to be a disciple of truth, then search (SL, June 1865, p. 7).
Concerning faith and his emotional struggles, Nietzsche found expression in his poetry. Elisabeth explained that, when they were children, her brothers basic trait of character was a certain melancholy, which expressed itself in his whole being, noting that he often isolated himself, focusing his attentions on literature and music (CWN, p. 5). At the age of ten Nietzsche had already complied more than a dozen poems, and by thirteen, Grundlehner explains, he determined that poetry lacked objectivity and that his future writing should be limited to strict attention to the truth, without poetry or verse adornment! (PN, pp. 3-5). As an early example of Nietzsches emotional conflictions, directly following this assertion he did exactly the opposite and wrote a reflective poem: Life is a mirror / To perceive ourselves within it, this / I would like to call the highest thing / To which we can hope to strive! (PN, p. 5).
Critiquing and separating his work into three distinct periods, Grundlehner describes that, by the age of fourteen, the scrutiny to which Nietzsche subjected his own poetry early in life is consistent with the implacable self-criticisms with which he continued to evaluate many of his subsequent writings (PN, pp. 3-5). In addition to offering
13


concurrence with my assertion that Nietzsche contended with internal conflictions early in life, Grundlehner also indicates that this contradiction continued to pervade Nietzsches poetry:
On the one hand he distrusted the poetic impulse as a corruption of truth, yet on the other he felt a propensity to express himself in the very mode of discourse that he held most suspect (PN, p. 5).
Grundlehners point clearly offers early evidence which corresponds to what I argue as Nietzsches later contradictions between his emotional conflictions and the perspectives expressed in his philosophical works, illustrating that these paradoxes were already in play at a young age.
In a poem entitled, Fled Are the Lovely Dreams, written a year before his and Deussens confirmation, Nietzsche not only expressed his suffering, but also his thoughts regarding his own formation of God:
I have never experienced / The joy and happiness of life. /1 look back sadly / Upon times that are long vanished. /1 do not know what I love /1 have neither peace nor rest. / I do not know what I believe / Or why Im still living... / Man is not a worthy image / Of God / From day to day more distorted / I form God / According to my rudimentary character. /I awoke from heavy dreams / Through a dull ringing (PN, 1860, pp. 16-17).
The pain Nietzsche experienced could not be stifled by faith, and so during his adolescence he began pondering the meaning behind his suffering, taking the first steps toward determining that God was mankinds creation. In 1865, a year after he and Deussen had pondered Strauss assertions, Nietzsche discovered Schopenhauers The World as Will and Representation in a used bookstore, and detailed in his diary the immense affect the philosophers perspectives had on him:
Here I saw a mirror in which I beheld the world, life, and the personal spirit in dreadful grandeur. Here I was stared at by the fully indifferent solar eye of art. Here I
14


saw disease and healing, exile and refuge, hell and heaven: the need to know myself, nay, gnaw myself asunder, took violent hold of me (WN, 1865, p. 23).
With this, Nietzsche had officially become a disciple of Schopenhauer, directly
influencing his perceptions of morality and suffering, as well as creating the foundation for a
relationship which would alter the course of his life and works.
Schopenhauer and Wagner
Schopenhauers philosophies not only offered Nietzsche new ways of conceiving morality and suffering, but as well denoted a shared love and endorsement of the arts. Specifically, Fischer-Dieskau indicates that Schopenhauer perceived music as a means of directly expressing the reality and form of things (WN, p. 24). Though music may not be able to convey any rational knowledge, Fischer-Dieskau explains, Schopenhauer contended that during the performance, all temporal, spatial, causal, and final needs are taken from us (WN, p. 24). Nietzsche discussed this particular experience often throughout the course of his philosophical works. In a letter to Carl von Gersdorff, whom Nietzsche met in 1861 when attending Schulpforta, written April 1866, he noted that the three things which most assisted him in relaxing were Schopenhauer, music and his solitary walks (SL, pp. 3, 12).
Like music and Schopenhauer, Nietzsches walks in nature were of great importance to him, and when writing Gersdorff he enthusiastically expressed, How different the lightning, the wind, the hail, free powers, without ethics! How fortunate, how strong they are, pure will, without obscurings from the intellect! (SL, p. 12). Nietzsche also mentioned the armed forces to Gersdorff: I have already accustomed myself to the military idea. Often I wanted to be lifted up and carried away from my monotonous work; I was greedy for the opposites, of excitement, of a tempestuous lust for life, of enthusiasm (SL, p. 11). A few years later Nietzsche did join the military and during his time in the Franco-Prussian War,
15


contracted dysentery, diphtheria, and sustained a major chest injury after falling from his horse (SL, 1870, pp. 32, 69). When he returned in the fall of 1870, Nietzsche met and established a lifelong friendship with the new professor of theology in Basel, Franz Overbeck (SL, p. 51).
Nietzsches admiration for music and Schopenhauer served as a connection to one of the most profound and transformative relationships of his life. Three years following his discovery of Schopenhauers work, he received an invitation to meet Wilhelm Richard Wagner (SL, 1868, p. 37). In Wagner Nietzsche found not only a fellow advocate of Schopenhauerian philosophy and a direct connection to a new, inclusive world of music, I contend he also perceived in the composer the realization of his ideal of love. Born just a few months before Karl Nietzsche, Wagner filled the position of father figure well, offering authority, dominance, and devotion. Nietzsches captivation had long been in place, as Kaufmann explains that Wagners Tristan had enchanted him long before their meeting, inspiring him to place the composer on the same level of genius as Schopenhauer and Goethe (NP, p. 30). Wagners opinion that Schopenhauer was the only philosopher to have understood the essence of music, Hayman explains, inspired Nietzsches affections all the more, and so the relationship between beloved master and disciple was formed (CL, p. 98).
Nietzsches relationship with Wagner placed him in a world which offered more than music and philosophy. The composer also introduced a host of friends who glorified Nietzsches talents, encouraged his writings and compositions, and supplied him with the attention and affection he had longed for since childhood. Kaufmann indicates that, [Nietzsches] days in the Wagners house in Tribschen were as close as he ever came to having a home in which he belonged and of which he could feel proud (NP, p. 34). In a
16


letter to Wagner written in May 1869, Nietzsche expressed his gratefulness to the composer for his profound friendship:
The best and loftiest moments of my life are associated with your name, and I know of only one other man, your great spiritual brother Arthur Schopenhauer, whom I regard with equal reverence... How many purely scientific problems have been gradually clarified for me by contemplating your personality, so solitary and of such remarkable presence (SL, pp. 53-4).
During these self-proclaimed loftiest moments of his life, Nietzsches excitement and cheerfulness were completely wrapped in Wagners guidance and governance of his life and thinking. Thoughts which possessed him during this point were inspired by Wagners own ideas, such as creating a community of great thinkers not unlike the composers original conception of Bayreuth. In December 1870, Nietzsche discussed this particular project in a letter to Erwin Rohde, whom he met in 1866, and requested that his friend read Wagners book on Beethoven, noting that it would give a good idea of what I desire of the future. Read it it is a revelation of the spirit in which we we! shall come to live (SL, pp. 3,74).
Though Nietzsche was dedicated to the abandonment of his career in Philology, an action stanchly insisted upon by Wagner, his movement was not as rapid as his master desired. Nietzsche was thus compelled to express his dedication to his surrogate father: Through the gray mist of philology, I am never far, my thoughts always circle around you... I ask only... that I may prove myself to be not unworthy of your inestimable interest and your firm encouragement (SL, May 1870, p. 66). Nietzsche did attempt to switch his position of professor of philology for the chair of philosophy, but was denied (SL, 1871, p. 76).
17


His dedication to Wagner, I argue, inspired a weakness in Nietzsche which would stir severe bitterness later in his life. Immersion into Wagners world induced a different kind of self-criticism in Nietzsche than that of his former efforts of self-analyzation, for he became reproachful of his personal musical compositions following harsh criticism from one of Wagners peers. Upon sending Hans von Biilow his composition, Manfred Meditation, the reply Nietzsche received was that his work was one of the most unedifying and antimusical compositions Biilow had ever received (WS, p. 31). Nietzsches response to this cruel and unkind belittlement was to thank Biilow for his criticism and humbly request that he not fault Wagners inspiration for his own failures:
So that is not music at all? This makes me quite happy; I need no longer concern myself with this... altogether odious way of passing my time.. .But I ask only one thing of youdo not make Tristan responsible for my sin (SL, October 1872, p. 107).
It is my contention that this letter reveals an important aspect of Nietzsches current
perspective of love, as his readiness to cower and allowance of anothers opinion to dictate
his musical ambitions, I posit, expose Nietzsches fear of losing Wagner, the fruition of his
ideal of love. Nietzsches act of weakness and readiness to condemn himself for the sake of
anothers love exhibits an aspect of his thinking which would later enrage him. Accordingly,
I assert that this early submissive behavior directly inspired Nietzsches later dissection of
morality with the intention to disavow love because of recognition of past weaknesses.
In consideration of Nietzsches response to the severe criticisms of his music,
Kathleen Higgins and Robert Solomon, in their work, What Nietzsche Really Said, suggest
that he may have feared Billows venting his hostility toward Wagner, who had run off with
the conductors wife, Cosima (WS, p. 31). This suggestion inspires reflection on
speculations regarding Nietzsches affections for Cosima. When Nietzsche first met Cosima
18


in the Tribschen household I propose that he perceived in her his first impression of the unegoistic love of a mother. Considering that, in his youth, Nietzsche only briefly experienced the love of his father while motherly love was ambiguous, I argue that when he attached his ideal of love to his father figure Wagner, he saw in Cosima a kind of motherly love. As Nietzsches relationship with Wagner changed and he began to perceive him differently, so too did he see Cosima in a new light, but this, along with opposing assertions from other scholars, will be addressed later in this work. Suffice it to say for now, any affections Nietzsche had for Cosima in no way hindered his dedication to his beloved master.
Nietzsches embracing of Wagners authority in his life and thinking are demonstrated clearly in his first major publication, The Birth of Tragedy. Kaufmann insists, for example, that the portion of this text which deals with Greek drama could probably never have been written without Wagners work (NP, p. 31). In the preface to the Cambridge addition of The Birth of Tragedy, it is noted that the text is directly influenced by Wagners writings on Beethoven and his Opera and Drama (BT-CAM, p. xxxiv). In a letter to Wagner, Nietzsche expressed gratitude and his intentions pertaining to The Birth of Tragedy, as it regarded the composer:
Every page you will find that I am only trying to thank you for everything you have given me... I feel proud that I have now marked myself out and that people will now always link my name with yours... the warmest thanks for your love (SL, p. 91).
The evidence of Wagners influence is overwhelming, and it is my contention that
this mastery was possible because of Nietzsches happiness in living within the ideal of love
he had conceived in the idolization of his father. The perceptions demonstrated in his early
works, I posit, were a result of his experiencing the love he had long desired from the father
figure he had found in Wagner.
19


The Birth of Tragedy
Kaufmann asserts that Nietzsche frequently made unrealistic references to his father, whom he pictured as more wonderful than he had actually been, adding that he fastened on Wagner as a father substitute (NP, p. 33). Though vulnerable to Wagners influence, many of the perceptions presented in The Birth of Tragedy had long been part of Nietzsches thinking, for example the value he gave to music. Grundlehner notes that with this work, Nietzsche doubted the lyric as an effective medium of communication and because of this opted for music because of its ability to transcend language (PN, pp. 307-8). Unlike his childhood doubts regarding the ability to express truth in poetry, Nietzsche found that music was always a trusting medium: Quite generally, only music, placed beside the world, can give us an idea of what is meant by the justification of the world as an aesthetic phenomenon (BT, p. 141). The aesthetic phenomenon clearly offers purpose and meaning for mankinds anguish, Nietzsche proclaims, for how else could [the Greek] people, so sensitive, so vehement in [their] desires, so singularly capable of suffering, have endured existence? (BT, p. 43).
Safranski offers an example of where Nietzsche diverged from Wagners thought, citing the composers contention that art could serve in place of religion. Safranski states that, though Nietzsche was interested by the idea, it ultimately struck him as too pious, and he retreated from it in favor of an artistic approach to life. He sought enhancement of life in art, not redemption (NB, p. 89).
In a letter to Gersdorff written in April 1866, Nietzsche discussed the association of religion and redemption, and the philosophers use of masks in this regard:
If Christianity means Belief in an historical event or in an historical person, then I'll
have nothing to do with Christianity. But if it means simply the need for redemption,
20


then I can value it highly, and do not even object to its attempt to discipline philosophers, who are too few in comparison with the mass of those needing redemption though made of the same stuffyes, even if all those who practice philosophy were to be followers of Schopenhauer! But only too often there lurks behind the mask of the philosopher the lofty majesty of the will, which seeks to realize its own self-glorification (SL, pp. 12-13).
This letter indicates that less than five years before beginning The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche had conceived value in the concept of redemption, going so far as to discredit philosophers who all too often mask their egotistical assumptions of truth, denying mankinds need to be redeemed from his suffering. Nietzsche determined that part of the downfall in culture is found in the avoidance of contemplating suffering. The censuring of mankinds anguish, Nietzsche contends, can be traced back to the playwright Euripides. Whereas suffering was once seen as primordial and natural, Euripides slow withdrawal of the chorus and greater focus on comedies depleted Athenian performances, generating a death struggle of tragedy (BT, p. 76).
The new ideas of suggesting reason over passion and emotions within tragic production were to blame for mankinds shifting views of suffering. During an early time of rationality, it was not only the playwright Nietzsche faulted, as he asserted that even Euripides was, in a sense, only a mask: the deity that spoke through him was neither Dionysus nor Apollo, but an altogether newborn demon, called Socrates (BT, p. 82). As with his above letter, Nietzsche references a mask as shielding hidden egoistic attempts to determine truth without consideration of mankinds suffering in a chaotic world.
Though I agree with Safranskis assertion that, unlike Wagner, Nietzsche did not intend art as a replacement of religion, I disagree with his dismissal of Nietzsches intention regarding redemption, for it completely neglects the importance the term serves in Dionysian aspects. Nietzsche explains that in the oneness experienced through the loss of ego, which
21


took place within Dionysian festivals, redemption and days of transfiguration, were attained, and through this the destruction of the principium individuationis for the first time becomes an artistic phenomenon (BT, p. 40). Redemption does not represent saving mankind through art, as Safranski seems to suggest when discrediting the term, but rather, I argue, it represents mankinds regaining possession of his love for life by acknowledging the suffering aspects of existence.
There is necessity in mankinds understanding all aspects of life, not only logic, but also emotion; not simply joy, but likewise suffering, as well as recognizing both his oneness with nature and his individuation. Nietzsche offers two Greek gods as examples of the necessary unity of lifes diverse aspects. He associates the principium individuationis with the Greek God Apollo, through whose... joy and wisdom of illusion, together with its beauty, speak to us (BT, p. 36). Dionysus represents for Nietzsche, the collapse of this principle of individuation, for as the gods emotions awake, and... grow in intensity everything subjective vanishes into complete self-forgetfulness (BT, p. 36). It is the union of these aspects, represented by Apollo and Dionysus, which brings awareness to mankind through a greater comprehension of the duality within his existence.
There is necessity in illusion, and by use of Apollo, Nietzsche explains that the god shows us how necessary is the entire world of suffering, that by means of it the individual may be impelled to realize the redeeming vision (BT, p. 45). The art expressed through Apollonian illusion demonstrates that suffering does not need to exist in unmovable melancholy, but rather may be turned into beautiful creations. It is through his suffering that mankind regains possession of his love for life; he finds redemption through discovering value in lifes pleasures by acknowledging its binary aspect of pain. Mankinds suffering is
22


revealed to him by the Dionysian, for Nietzsche asserts that even the muses of the arts of illusion paled before an art that, in its intoxication, spoke the truth... Excess revealed itself as truth (BT, pp. 46-7).
Though truth resides in the universality of the Dionysian experience, Nietzsche
explains that if mankind existed purely in this state he would never know the re-echo of the
universalia ante rem (BT, p. 127). It is in reflection that mankind examines his experiences;
in his separation, he contemplates through reflection, and so the Apollonian is needed to
restore the almost shattered individual with the healing balm of blissful illusion (BT, p.
127). Nietzsche addresses the necessity of illusions in regards to recognizing the suffering of
others as well, for in the Dionysian there is no separation.
However powerfully pity affects us, it nevertheless saves us in a way from the primordial suffering of the world... [for] the Apollinian tears us out of the Dionysian universality and lets us find delight in individuals; it attaches our pity to them, and by means of them it satisfies our sense of beauty which longs for great and sublime forms (BT, p. 128).
Nietzsche explains that pity serves as part of mankinds individuation by separating the very attachment formed in the oneness of Dionysus, for in this separation he experiences pity for others by perceiving their suffering as distinct from his own. In a letter to Deussen in February 1870, Nietzsche discussed pity and mankinds separation, noting his and his friends limitations regarding people they could converse with on intellectual topics, which is why they required the solaces of art:
We do not wish to convert others to our way of thinking, because we feel the gulf between them and ourselves to be one established by nature. Pity becomes truly a familiar feeling to us. We grow more and more silent (SL, pp. 63-4).
Though the separation he described to Deussen was a deception, for Nietzsche asserts
that in sympathetic emotion, the Apollonian blinds mankind to the universality of the
23


Dionysian process, deluding him into the belief that he is seeing a single image of the world (BT, p. 128).
Nietzsche posits that there is a need of redemption from the ego, and the silencing of the individual will and desire (BT, p. 48). It is my contention that Nietzsches explanation of the Dionysian experience of loss of ego finds harmony with the selfless aspect of his ideal of love. Within the destruction of the individual, love is found; through the release of the ego mankind discovers his universality. Safranski explains that, when transcending the principium individuations, mankind steps beyond his confines to blend with nature... [and] emerges from his detachment to join with his fellow man in the orgiastic experience of love and the frenzy of the masses (NB, p. 67). Love is thus experienced through selflessness, as in his egoless state, mankind finds union with others within in the chaos of existence.
Consisting of both suffering and passionate emotions, love itself is chaotic, and in his insistence of the necessity of both Apollonian and Dionysian aspects, Nietzsche implies that love serves as a union of individual and universal sentiments. Nietzsche proclaims a need of Apollos egoistic art of illusions and Dionysus art of self-forgetfulness, which in its intoxication, spoke the truth. In the chaos of love, mankind experiences both selfish desire and selfless devotion; he experiences suffering in his love while also being redeemed by love within his suffering. Though he recognized loves duality early on, I argue that the idealized, selfless love Nietzsche imagined receiving from his father was so deeply engrained that he was unable to internalize his own theory prior to experiencing for himself the intensive binaries of pleasure and pain in love.
In his work, Living with Nietzsche: What the Great Immoralist Has to Teach Us, Robert Solomon asserts that, when proclaiming, Only as an aesthetic phenomenon is the
24


world justified, Nietzsche was talking about the passions and how we feel about life (LN,
p. 70-1). During the creation of his The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche was surrounded by love
and so felt happy in his life. He had high expectations regarding the publication of this work,
writing to his friend Gersdorff, in November 1871, that he had the greatest confidence that
the book will have tremendous sales, adding that the gentleman who does the vignette can
prepare himself for a modicum of immortality (SL, p. 83).
This was not the case though, for in October 1872, Nietzsche expressed his grief
surrounding his recent publication when writing Rohde: It is as if I had committed a crime;
people have kept quiet now for ten months, because all actually think they are beyond and
above my book... People half think I am off my head (SL, pp. 103-4). One such
acquaintance who did not respond upon receiving Nietzsches work, nor to his letters of
inquiry, was Friedrich Ritschl, whom he met in 1865 while studying philology at Leipzig
University (SL, p. 3). It was discovered later that Ritschl wrote in his journal that Nietzsches
book was rakish dissoluteness and that his letter was megalomania (SL, 1871/2, p. 93).
To his newly acquainted Wagnerian friend, Malwida von Meysenbug, Nietzsche
expressed that his Birth of Tragedy has made of me the most offensive philologist of the
present day, to defend whom could be a true marvel of courage, for everyone is of a mind to
condemn me (SL, November 1872, p. 108). A review by Ulrich von Wilamowitz-
Moellendorff, a young scholar of philology, was especially harsh when proclaiming
Nietzsches unscholarly inaccuracies and omissions (CL, p. 153). He further mocked
Nietzsches discussion of Dionysus within his text:
Let Mr. N keep his word, let him take up the thyrsus and move from India to Greece, but he should step down from the podium from which he is supposed to be teaching scholarship; let him gather tigers and panthers at his knees, but not Germanys young generation of philologists (NB, January 1883, p. 83).
25


Devastated by the criticisms of his work, Nietzsche found solace in Wagners love and wrote to him of his sorrows, expressing, To you, beloved master, I tell it because you should know all (SL, November 1872, p. 110). Nietzsche had become aware that a professor of philology at Bonn university had condemned his book as sheer nonsense, and that a student who had intended to attend Basel University exclaimed gratitude that he had not gone to a university in which Nietzsche was employed (SL, p. 110). Though humbly expressing his pain, Nietzsche also stated, I truly have the least right to be in any way despondent, for I live really in the midst of a solar system of loving friendship, consoling encouragement, and enlivening hopes (SL, p. 110).
Aside from lamenting the harmful reception his work had received, Nietzsche concluded his letter explaining that all is light and hope. I would have to be a very morose mole not to leap for joy on receiving such letters as yours (SL, November 1872, p. 110). His assertion that he had hope and light in his life despite the negativity his work received, I argue, illustrates the extent of Nietzsches happiness while living love. He could be cheerful beyond suffering bad reviews of his work because of feeling fulfilled emotionally by his relationship with Wagner, who initially appeared to offer Nietzsche the selfless and unrestricted love he believed to have received from his father.
Untimely Meditations
The attacks on Nietzsches Birth of Tragedy affected him deeply, but the support he had received from Wagner kept him positive. The light he perceived in his master was beginning to dim though, as Wagner was often angry with Nietzsches inability to consistently attend his beck and call. Unable to abide Wagners request to join him for
26


Christmas in 1872, Nietzsche hoped to make amends by visiting him in Bayreuth in April.
Nietzsches letter following the visit reveals that Wagner was not appeased by his efforts:
I know very well, dearest master, that such a visit cannot be a time of leisure for you... I wished so often to give at least the appearance of greater freedom and independence, but in vain. EnoughI ask that you take me simply as a pupil... with a very slow and not at all versatile mind. It is true that I grow more melancholy every day when I feel so strongly how much I would like to help you somehow (SL, April 1873, p. 118).
Though humble in the letter, Nietzsche too allotted room for himself by suggesting
that he be perceived as a pupil rather than a subject, though this too he conveyed with a meek
tone expressing inadequacy. Wagner was persistent in his efforts to have more of Nietzsches
attention, and during Christmas 1874, wrote to his disciple regarding the direction of his life:
I believe you ought to marry or compose an opera; either would be as good or as bad for you as the other. But I consider marriage better... We can be something to you; why do you scorn this so fervently? Gersdorff and the whole Basilicum can spare your time here... For goodness sakes! Marry a rich woman! Just why did Gersdorff have to be a male!... compose your opera, which will probably be bloody hard to perform.What the devil made you a pedagogue anyway? (WN, pp. 121-2).
Fischer-Dieskau explains that, prior to the letter, Wagner invited Nietzsche to move
in with him and Cosima, and that, with his letter, he demonstrated a thoughtful effort to
comfort his friend (WN, p. 122). Though I do not contend with Fischer-Dieskaus assertion
of Wagners intentions, the letter does reveal the composers passionate attention to
Nietzsche, as well as the agency he assumed in his life.
In a letter to Gersdorff, Nietzsche expressed that they both knew well that Wagners
nature tends to make him suspicious (SL, July 1874, p. 127). He further noted, I have
obligations toward myself, which are very hard to fulfill, with my health in such a fragile
state. Really, nobody should try forcing me to do anything (SL, p. 127). Nietzsches health
27


was in a fragile state, for he struggled so much with his eyesight that he often had to dictate his work (SL, p. 119).
Though assisted by Gersdorff, when writing Untimely Meditations, Nietzsche was so hindered by his vision he was driven to seek medical assistance (WN, p. 104). In May 1875, Nietzsche again sent apologies to Wagner, this time for missing his birthday: My wishes come limping and late; you must forgive me, beloved master. I mean by this the uncertainty and weakness of my physical state (SL, pp. 132-4). In June 1875, Nietzsche wrote to Gersdorff that his illness caused him to vomit for hours, brining on headaches which lasted for days; a month later he wrote again that he had gone to Steinabad to seek medical assistance, and by December 1875, wrote that he was so severely sick he believed himself to have brain damage (SL, pp. 132, 136).
There is no doubt that Nietzsche suffered greatly from physical ailments, but it is my contention that much of his illness was prompted by his own anguish. An example of Nietzsches sorrows manifesting his illness is found in his reaction of dismay over Heinrich Romundts decision to leave his profession in philology to become a Catholic priest.
Romundt and Nietzsche had been friends since their student days in Leipzig, and so when writing to Rohde in February 1875, Nietzsche expressed that their closeness made his friends choice so much more disturbing: I find it so incomprehensible that, right beside me, after eight years of intimacy, this ghost should have risen up... I have been wounded precisely in a matter of friendship (SL, p. 132).
The incident upset Nietzsche to such an extent that it followed with more than thirty-six hours of headaches and vomiting (SL, p. 132). Nietzsches illness being enflamed by his sorrows becomes more prominent in later years, for at this time he was still happy in love and
28


so happy in life. He wrote to Gersdorff of the constant joy of having found in Schopenhauer
and Wagner educators and that the glorious power of sharing joy was even more rare
and noble than the power of sharing suffering (SL, December 1875, p. 140). As he had in
his Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche posited the importance of illusions in his Untimely
Meditations, specifically associating it with love:
It is only in love, only when shaded by the illusion produced by love, that is to say in the unconditional faith in right and perfection, that man is creative. Anything that constrains a man to love less than unconditionally has severed the roots of his strength: he will... become dishonest (UM p. 95).
Nietzsche explains the importance of mankinds ability to possess unconditional love, asserting that this sentiment assists him in his creativity. His emphasis on the fault in anything less than unconditional love demonstrates that he felt it to hold such value that to be without it would result in loss of strength, causing dishonesty.
With Wagner, Nietzsche felt assured of love, though during the period of creating this work he began to discover issues between his and his masters perspectives. In his essay, Schopenhauer as educator, Nietzsche discussed diverging from previous conceptions when discussing the Schopenhauerian, man, who is open to conversion of his being, which it is the real meaning of life to lead up to (UM p. 152). The Schopenhauerian man speaks truths, disturbing those who perceive his words as cruelty, and so there is suffering in his deliverance of truths undesired. Regardless of his own anguish, the Schopenhauerian man offers himself up as the one to be despised, willing to sacrifice himself and his happiness for truth while fully aware of the suffering that must spring from his truthfulness (UM p. 153). (UM, p. 153).
Nietzsches Schopenhauer as educator in many ways reads as a foreshadowing of the suffering he would endure following his breakup with Wagner, as he would indeed be an
29


enemy to those he loves (UM p. 153). Nietzsche explains that, in recognition of his own eternal becoming, the Schopenhauerian man despises the measures and standards of life, and thus in his desire to realize everything, despises his happiness and unhappiness, vices and virtues alike: His strength lies in forgetting himself; and if he does think of himself he measures the distance between himself and his lofty goal (UM p. 155). Here Nietzsche combines his earlier Dionysian conception of self-forgetfulness with an Apollonian conception of individuation.
To realize the Schopenhauerian man, Nietzsche asserted, a fundamental idea... of culture is required, insofar as it sets for each one of us but one task: to promote the production of the philosopher, the artist and the saint within us and without us and thereby to work at the perfecting of nature (UM, p. 160). The philosopher and the artist are needed for self-enlightenment, Nietzsche explains, and the saint for his selflessness, for in him, the ego is completely melted... suffering is no longer felt as his own lifeor is hardly so felt but as a profound feeling of oneness and identity with all living things (UM, pp. 160-1). Considering the unegoistic nature of love, I suggest that the saints Dionysian aspect of egoless love and suffering finds relation to Nietzsches ideal of love through the shared expression of unconditional selflessness and devotion.
There are two thoughts Nietzsche expressed during this period which are especially relevant to his perception of love; one is found in his essay, Schopenhauer as Educator, published October 1874, and the other in a letter to Meysenbug, written in April 1876. Beginning with his philosophical work, below Nietzsche explains the experiences of unegoistic love, and mankinds thoughts of it in reflection:
There are moments and as it were bright sparks of the fire of love in whose light we
cease to understand the word I, there lies something beyond our being which at
30


these moments moves across into it, and we are thus possessed of a heartfelt longing for bridges between here and there. It is true that, as we usually are, we can contribute nothing to the production of the man of redemption: that is why we hate ourselves as we usually are, and it is this hatred which is the root of that pessimism... at some time or other we shall have to learn to hate something else, something more universal, and cease to hate our own individuality and its wretched limitations... in that elevated condition... we shall also love something else, something we are now unable to love. Only when... we ourselves have been taken into that exalted order of philosophers, artists and saints, shall we also be given a new goal for our love and hate (UM, p.
161).
Here Nietzsche begins to contemplate the reality of his ideal of love, for though he proclaims truth in the experience of ceas[ing] to understand the word I, he also talks of mankinds longing for bridges because of his inability to maintain existing beyond [his] being. Nietzsche offers hope within his pondering, explaining that, though mankind cannot currently assist in the production of the man of redemption, there will come a time when he cease[s] to hate [his] own individuality and loves what he was once unable to love.
It is my contention that, as Nietzsche began to withdraw from Wagner, he also began to consider the actuality of his ideal of love. Through the lens of his Schopenhauerian man, Nietzsche pondered the idea of sacrificing his own happiness, of being despised and an enemy to those he loves, contemplating whether such suffering was necessary in his search for truth.
Still perceiving love as valuable, Nietzsche expressed his desires and misgivings in a
letter to Meysenbug. Responding to her work, Memoiren einer Idealistin [Memories of an
Idealist], published in 1875, Nietzsche shared how it inspired him (SL, p. 142):
I read your book to the end... the mood of purity and love did not leave me... You walked before me as a higher self... and I measured my life against your example and asked myself about the many qualities I lack... How often I have wished... to ask you a question which can be answered only by a higher morality and being than I am!... What must a man do... all that you did, and absolutely nothing more! But most probably he will not be able to do so; he lacks the safely guiding instinct of love that is always ready to help. One of the highest themes, of which you have first given me
31


an inkling, is the theme of motherly love without the physical bond of mother and child; it is one of the most glorious revelations of caritas. Give me something of this love, meine hochverehrte Freundin, and look upon me as one who, as a son, needs such a mother, needs her so much! (SL, April 1876, pp. 142-3).
Of all the letters Nietzsche wrote, this one most clearly demonstrates the value and
significance he attributed to love, a perception he would later sternly disavow and diligently
deconstruct. In this letter Nietzsche questions his ability to love purely, comparing such love
to an instinct possessed only by mothers. He questions what he lacks, calling for assistance
from a higher morality than himself. Nietzsche asserts that motherly love is one of the
highest themes, lamenting having never known it, and asks his revered friend to look upon
him as a son, [who] needs such a mother... so much. In this letter Nietzsche calls for help,
not to incite pity as he would in later letters, but in an open and honest display of his feelings,
genuinely requesting love. Nietzsche again states the importance of love, regarding
mankinds development, in his essay on Schopenhauer:
It is hard to create in anyone this condition of intrepid self-knowledge because it is impossible to teach love; for it is love alone that can bestow on the soul, not only a clear, discriminating and self-contemptuous view of itself, but also the desire to look beyond itself and to seek with all its might for a higher self as yet still concealed from it (UM, pp. 162-3).
Once more Nietzsche appears to recall his Dionysian and Apollonian union, expressing that love offers a clear, discriminating and self-contemptuous view of itself as well as the desire to look beyond itself. Nietzsche again presents love as the unifier between individual ego and selfless oneness.
In his essay, Richard Wagner in Bayreuth, Nietzsche brings together music, nature and love, as he explains the importance of expressing feelings. He asserts that language is sick because of exhaustive attempts to encompass the realm of thought, which Nietzsche contends, entirely opposes its original intention, which was to express the realm of strong
32


feelings (UM, p. 214). Language is thus unable to perform its original function of enabling suffering mankind to come to an understanding with one another (UM, p. 214).
Nietzsche furthers that language has become a power which causes mankind to be seized by the madness of universal concepts when seeking to understand each other (UM, pp. 214-5). In mankinds inability to reveal himself because of existing under this constraint... of clear concepts, Nietzsche again offers music as a solution, uniting it with nature and love (UM, p. 215). He proclaims that music is a return to nature, while being at the same time the purification and transformation of nature adding that the pressing need for that return to nature arose in the souls of men filled with love, and in their art there sounds nature transformed in love (UM, p. 215).
Love and transformation are again addressed, but unlike his previous essay on Schopenhauer, Nietzsche here offers more than hope; he offers a solution such as he had in his Birth of Tragedy, in which he stated: Quite generally, only music, placed beside the world, can give us an idea of what is meant by the justification of the world as an aesthetic phenomenon (BT, p. 141). Nietzsche proclaims that language has failed mankind in expressing emotions; only music can offer the experience of transforming from an egoistic state to the primal unity found in nature, and love serves as the unification.
Fischer-Dieskau notes that the many crucial statements Nietzsche makes in his Untimely Meditations acquire a powerful meaning and indicate both a metamorphosis of thought and new goals. They run parallel with the change in his relationship with Wagner (WN, pp. 104-5). Nietzsches issues with Wagner were mounting, and he was quickly heading toward a break with his beloved master.
33


CHAPTER III
DISILLUSIONMENT AND MASKING SUFFERING Human, All Too Human
Higgins and Solomon contend that Nietzsche was increasingly disturbed by what he saw as Wagners willingness to compromise too much for the sake of theatrical effects (WS, p. 71). During work on his Untimely Meditations Nietzsche had already begun to distance himself from Wagner, denying his offer to move in with him and Cosima and complaining to Gersdorff that he had obligations of his own, beyond Wagners needs.
In August 1876, under the guise of illness, Nietzsche fled from Wagners Bayreuth festival and began work on Human, All Too Human (SL, p. 53). A month after his abrupt departure, Nietzsche wrote Wagner a letter discussing his leave of absence from the university, and his plans to visit Italy. When noting the misery his sickness had caused him, Nietzsche added, Do not think that I am morose; not sicknessesonly peoplecan put me in a bad mood (SL, September 1876, pp. 147-8).
Though Nietzsche intended to appear casual, it was evident that their friendship was coming to an end, and as it turned out, two months following this letter Nietzsche and Wagner met for the last time in Italy. During their visit Wager was in a considerably foul mood due to Bayreuths tremendous financial loss, which could have played a part in instigating their dispute; Middleton explains though, that what appalled Nietzsche was the religious tone of Wagners talk, which he saw as his simulating religiosity in an opportunistic way (SL, November 1876, pp. 149-50).
Following their quarrel, Nietzsche officially lost the loving relationship he had with his master and father figure. Though he had shown signs of pulling away, I suggest that
34


Nietzsche had not intended a complete departure from Wagner. His actions were more of a son distancing himself from a stifling father, and so the shock of their separation caused Nietzsche to not immediately comprehend his loss. The suffering Nietzsche experienced from losing Wager, I argue, drove him from contemplating his ideal of love to disavowing it entirely.
It was a difficult time of transition for Nietzsche, as he went from numerous friends and gatherings to isolation and loneliness. Lacking a supportive network, Nietzsches suffering his loss of love in solitude finds resemblance with what he endured as a child after losing his father. With an aged consciousness though, Nietzsches anguish served to kindle his determination of self-overcoming, which I contend, began with his intention to alter the way he perceived love.
In the introduction of Human, All Too Human, Richard Schacht notes that Nietzsches aim with this work was to employ various perspectival techniques... relevant to the understanding of what we have come to be and what we have it in us to become (HH, p. xvi). It was during this time of experimenting with perspectivism, I propose, that Nietzsche first donned his philosophical mask, intent on concealing his suffering while endeavoring to shift his perspectives. Nietzsches investigations of morality brought recognition of ideologies which form mankinds thinking, and I argue that he perceived in this awareness a recourse for overcoming the personal suffering he experienced from loves absence.
Nietzsches illness was heightened during this time, as his depression aggravated his disorders. Paul Ree, whom Nietzsche met in 1873, wrote often to his mother and sister to inform them of the treatments he was undergoing between 1876 and 1877 (SL, pp. 52, 155). In a letter to Meysenbug, Nietzsche himself associated his sickness with mental strains: My
35


very problematic thinking and writing have till now always made me ill; as long as I was really a scholar, I was healthy too (SL, July 1877, p. 161).
In his desolation, Nietzsche struggled in his attempts to change his perspectives, and often exhibited contradictions between the ideas he professed in his philosophies and the behaviors he exhibited in his personal writings. I argue that these contradictions stem from Nietzsches difficulty in deterring his desire for the love of others; he struggled between logos and pathos, as his emotions contended with the perspectives he endeavored to possess.
In his forlomness, Nietzsche began calling to his friends for reassurance. He wrote to Meysenbug confessing that his blackest thoughts inspired suicidal thoughts, pleading with her to remain what you have been, for I feel much more protected and sheltered; sometimes such a feeling of emptiness comes over me that I want to scream (SL, May 1877, p. 157). In a letter to Rohde, Nietzsche described becoming emotional when thinking of his friend and noted that one day psychologists will explain in the end that it is envy that makes me grudge you your happiness, or annoyance that someone has taken my friend away and is now keeping him hidden (SL, August 1877, p. 163).
In both letters Nietzsches tone suggests an intention to arouse sympathy, but his letter to Rohde additionally suggests guilt. Nietzsche not only presented his sadness as inspired by his friends inaccessibility, he also expressed irritation with Rohdes wife, that someone, who took his friend away. In the same letter Nietzsche again attempted to arouse guilt, declaring, I suddenly felt that you did not like my music, furthering that he played a song he thought Rohde liked, to the best of my ability, but that it was in a dark room, and nobody was listening (SL, p. 163). Indicating Rohdes inaccessibility again, Nietzsche
36


additionally hints at his friends lack of support, as he felt Rohde did not care for his music.
When recalling Nietzsches need for reassurance, Ida Overbeck stated that he always lacked self-certainty, and would often become confused and cast into internal dependence rather than freedom (CN, 1878/9, p. 108). She further announced, Nietzsche, the condemner of pity, was continually experimenting with it. He bred it even more into himself, in order to vivisect it, to discover it like Christianity, and then to disrecommend it to mankind CN, p. 108). In Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche exemplified his diversion from perspectives of pity; specifically regarding Schopenhauerian notions which posit recognition of mankinds morality by way of acts of compassion. In his current work Nietzsche presents pity as more injurious to him who offers it than by whom it is received.
In his section, On the History of the Moral Sensations, Nietzsche contended that pity illustrates not only a weakness of the individual seeking attention, but also a kind of power being enacted: In this feeling of superiority of which the manifestation of pity makes him conscious, the unfortunate man gains a sort of pleasure; in the conceit of his imagination he is still of sufficient importance to cause affliction in the world (HH, p. 39). By this assertion, it would appear that Nietzsches letters were more than a need for reassurance; they too served to prove that he was still of sufficient importance. In this work Nietzsche contends that the offering of pity serves as self-enjoyment, first as the pleasure of the emotion... and then, when it eventuates in action, as the pleasure of gratification in the exercise of power (HH, pp. 55-6). Therefore, Nietzsches behavior in his letters is an exercise of power, in which he exploited his friends ability to experience pity in his efforts to perceive his own relevance.
37


To make oneself a complete person, and in all that one does to have in view the highest good of this personthat gets us further than those pity-filled agitations and actions for the sake of others (HH, pp. 50-1). As Nietzsche called for compassion from his friends, he created division between self-love and love of others in his work. With the use of morality, in Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche begins to devalue love by presenting it as an act of ego, rather than of virtue. He offers examples of apparent selfless actions and explains that such conceptions stem from moral ideologies which cause internal conflictions:
Is it not clear that in all these instances man loves something of himself... more than
something else of himself... he thus divides his nature and sacrifices one part of it to
the other... The inclination for something (wish, impulse, desire) is present (HH, p.
42).
In presenting morality as a fracturing of mankinds self-perception, I posit that Nietzsche was considering his own a self-division regarding his desire for love, and in determining that the love of others was in fact egoism, he endeavored to devalue love so as to dissuade his own desire.
In a way reminiscent to Machiavellis The Prince, Nietzsche asserts in Man Alone with Himself, that mankind cannot be loved and honored at once because love desires while fear shuns. He who honors recognizes power, that is to say he fears it. Love, however, recognizes no power, nothing that separates, contrasts, ranks above and below (HH, p. 192). Nietzsche again devalues love by creating a division between it and power, associating the later with honor and nobleness.
In The Religious Life, Nietzsche quotes Georg Christoph Lichtenberg, a German professor of physics, in saying, It is impossible, as is commonly said, for us to feel for others; we feel only for ourselves... One loves neither father, nor mother, nor wife, nor child, one loves the pleasant sensations they produce in us (HH, p. 71). With Lichtenbergs
38


assertion, Nietzsche was doing more than simply demonstrating that love was not the selfless act it has been assumed to be; by using a mothers love for her child as an example, he endeavored to denounce entirely the purity and authority attributed to love.
Upon inspecting unegoistic actions, all meaning breaks apart, Nietzsche explains, for how should a man be able to do something that had no reference to himself... How could the ego act without the ego? (HH, p. 71). Following these rhetorical questions, Nietzsche asserts that even if such actions were possible it would require that the receiver of the unegoistic act were themselves egoistic enough to receive such sacrifices. Men of love and selfsacrifice would have to have an interest in the continuance of the loveless egoist incapable of self-sacrifice, and the highest morality would... have to downright compel the existence of immorality (HH, pp. 72).
In Woman and Child, Nietzsche declares that in every kind of womanly love there also appears something of motherly love, a statement that on its own implies that women wish to care take those they love, but when considered in the context of his other declarations, implies that, though she may offer care and comfort, it is only her ego which drives her (HH, p. 151). Nietzsche further proclaims that women selfishly begrudge the object of their loves ambitions because of being deprived of his attention. Wanting to possess him for themselves alone, Nietzsche explains, women resist only because of their vanity which hopes that a love-union with him will increase the amount they shine (HH, p. 153).
Nietzsche then indicates that the veneration of love women display is no more than acts of deception intended to enhance their power. This exaggerated evaluation of love has caused women to become entangled in their own net, Nietzsche asserts, resulting in their
39


being more deceived than men, and thus causing them to suffer more from the disillusionment (HH, p. 154).
Though being consist in using women to demonstrate the egoism in love, Nietzsche appeared to be unsure regarding the notion of marriage. Exhibiting conflictions, he at times requested assistance in finding a mate, at other times declared that it was not the right choice for him, and in one occasion proposed marriage after only a few days of introduction. Shortly after meeting Mathilde Trampedach in Geneva in April 1876, Nietzsche quickly sent her a proposal, expressing, I love you and I feel that you already belong to me (SL, p. 141). Trampedachs speedy decline inspired Nietzsche to immediately send an apology expressing, I suffered a great deal when I reflected on the cruel and violent way in which I behaved (UL, April 1876, p. 68).
A month following his rejection, Nietzsche wrote to Gersdorff claiming, I am not
getting married... I hate limitation and being tied into the whole civilized order of things so
much that there can hardly be a woman who would be of generous enough mind to follow
me (SL, May 1876, p. 141). Less than two months later Nietzsche sent a letter of
congratulations to Rohde for his recent engagement. In addition to noting concerns that he
would be deprived of time with his friend, as he had after Overbecks marriage, Nietzsche
again expressed reservations regarding marriage:
I should perhaps not follow you in taking this step. For you needed so badly a completely trusting soul, and you have found her and have found therewith yourself on a higher level. For me it is different... It does not seem to be all that necessary, except on rare days. Perhaps I have here a bad gap in myself. My desire and my need are differentI hardly know how to say it or explain it (SL, July 1876, pp. 145-6).
Nietzsches declaration that Rohde needed so badly a completely trusting soul who
in turn brought him to a higher level calls to mind his assertion in Untimely Meditations
40


that love assists a soul in looking beyond itself to seek with all its might for a higher self. Following this, his confession that he only rarely thought marriage necessary because of a gap in himself, due to his desires and needs differing, presents evidence of the emotional conflictions he was experiencing.
Because of Nietzsches ongoing health issues, friends such as Meysenbug were insistent that he be more active in seeking a wife who could take care of him. In April 1877 Nietzsche discussed such suggestions in a letter to his sister, noting that Meysenbug had concluded he required marriage with a suitable but necessarily affluent woman. Good but rich (SL, p. 156). In July Nietzsche wrote Meysenbug, declaring that, Until the autumn I now have the enjoyable task of winning a wife and then again in September, inquiring if she had found the fairy princess who shall free me from the pillar to which I am chained? (SL, 1877, pp. 160, 165).
In light of the fact that Nietzsche only appeared to consider marriage when discussing the prospect with female friends, whereas with his male friends he voiced strong misgivings, Diethes assertion that, On a subconscious level Nietzsche had no intention of marrying merits consideration (NW, p. 95). Diethe posits that evidence for Nietzsches lack of interest in marriage is found in his inclination to gravitate towards married women... preferably those with children, which she contends gave him a sense of security (NW, p. 30). Diethes argument is compelling, and I do not dispute it per se; but rather I suggest that this assertion only considers intentions presumed by his behaviors, rather than addressing the cause of his conflictions.
I propose that, what Diethe refers to as Nietzsches attraction to wedded mothers, is in fact his fascination with a love of which he was unfamiliar. Recalling his letter to
41


Meysenbug, Nietzsche stated, One of the highest themes, of which you have first given me an inkling, is the theme of motherly love without the physical bond of mother and child. With his father and Wagner, Nietzsche understood love within the framework of their relationship, but having never known motherly love, he had no basis of comparison. In associating with the mothers encountered in his intellectual circles, I suggest Nietzsche gained an admiration for the pure love he imagined they possessed.
Diethes contention that there is a gulf between Nietzsches writing, where he... persuades himself to believe, finds semblance with my assertion regarding his emotional conflictions (NW, p. 95). Though he knew the suffering experienced in love, Nietzsche still struggled with his desires, and so in Man Alone with Himself, he asserted that desire becomes a demand to be loved, which is the greatest of all pieces of presumption (HH, p. 183). With this perspective, Nietzsche could denounce his desire for the love of others as no more than a consuming passion which became demanding under the false belief that it was reciprocal.
In Assorted Opinions and Maxims, Nietzsche discusses the Deception in love as relating to mankinds deceiving himself of his past so as to create a new personal image through love. He asserts that the assumed self-forgetfulness in love, and the merging of the ego in the other person, is nothing more than mankinds self-deception so that he may enjoy his egos new image, even though we may call it by that other persons name (HH, p. 224). To enact such deception, Nietzsche contends, is to perpetrate a robbery in the treasure-house of knowledge (HH, p. 224). Much of mankinds want of deception derives from his difficulty in regarding his character truthfully, Nietzsche asserts, addressing mankinds need
42


to stay in defense, rather than setting out to attack those of whom he assumed perpetrated acts of cruelties:
The real heroic deed and masterpiece of the good man lies not in his attacking the cause and continuing to love the person but in the much more difficult feat of defending his own cause without inflicting and desiring to inflict with bitter anguish the person attacked (HH, p. 227).
He follows in describing that the Bitterest error is a false representation of love, where we were convinced we were loved [when] we were in fact regarded only as a piece of household furniture and room decoration for the master of the house to exercise his vanity upon before his guests (HH, p. 229). In an obvious reference to Wagner, Nietzsche reveals his lingering pain, further noting that love can exist as an act of cruelness, in that it brings with it the cruel idea of killing the object of that love, because love dreads change more than it does destruction (HH, p. 279).
His misery is not to be ignored though, Nietzsche asserts, and so he suggests as a Recipe for the sufferer that, rather than turning away from his suffering, mankind should increase his burdens. When the sufferer at last thirsts for the river of Lethe and seeks ithe must become a hero if he is to be sure of finding it (HH, p. 298). In other words, mankind must suffer through the beacons of hell until reaching the level of a hero deserving to drink from the river of forgetfulness.
Self-forgetfulness calls to mind Nietzsches Schopenhauerian man, which finds resemblance with his conception of the Free Spirit in this work. In his section, Tokens of Higher and Lower Culture, Nietzsche describes that the free spirit has no love for things in their entirety, in all the breadth and prolixity of their convolutions, for he has no wish to get himself entangled with them (HH, p. 134). Entangled, assumedly, the way he conceived women to have become in their exaggerated evaluation of love.
43


Nietzsche explains that with the free spirit, There is in his way of living and thinking a refined heroism which disdains to offer itself to the veneration of the great masses... Whatever labyrinths he may stray through... he emerges into the open air (HH, p. 134). Nietzsches free spirit going silently through the world calls to mind the poem he sent to Rohde for his engagement. When examining Nietzsches poem, The Wanderer, Grundlehner proposes that the fact that his destination is uncertain is no cause for alarm but an indication of his adventuresome spirit (PN, p. 67). What I find especially relevant in the poem is that the wanderer stops in the midst of his journey to ponder a singing bird, and accuses him of being a distraction:
Ah bird what is it you have done? / Why detain my thought and foot, / Pouring sweet chagrin of the heart / Upon me, so that I must stop, / Must listen, to interpret well /... The bird stops singing and it speaks: / No, traveler, no! It is not you / My song salutes. /1 sing because the night is beautiful: / But you must always travel on / And never understand my song! / So get you gone, / And only when your step sounds far / Shall I begin my song again / As best I can. / Now fare thee well, poor traveling man (SL, July 1876, pp. 145-6).
Grundlehner interprets the poem as Rohde representing the bird that reproaches Nietzsche the wanderer, and that the verse is representative of Nietzsches fear that his friend would not be the reciprocal hand to aid him in his own isolation; additionally, Grundlehner suggests that this poem marks the first evidence of [Nietzsches] necessity to explore unknown paths (PN, p. 67). Though I concur with Grundlehners point that Nietzsche felt it necessary to search new avenues, my interpretation differs in that, through a creative misreading, I perceive the bird as love calling; the wanderer is denied loves song, as he is destined to always travel on / And never understand my song!
The wanderers experience of continually moving forward finds similarity with Nietzsches depiction, in Woman and Child, of the free spirit perceiving danger in
44


habituation. He explains that the free spirit despises everything enduring and definitive, so continually deconstructs himself, tearing threads from himself, from his own body and soul, even at the cost of great suffering, for he has to learn to love where he formerly hated, and the reverse (HH, p. 158). Nietzsche adds that, from all this it may be inferred whether he is created for a happy marriage (HH, p. 158).
Nietzsches free spirit again finds comparison with his Schopenhauerian man, who despises the measures and standards of life to the extent that he scorns equally his happiness and unhappiness, his vices and his virtues. Along these lines, in Man Alone with Himself, Nietzsche explains that mankind must break away from his previously held beliefs. We have to become traitors, be unfaithful, again and again abandon our ideals. We cannot advance from one period of our life into the next without passing through these pains of betrayal and then continuing to suffer them (HH, p. 199).
At the end of his section, On the History of the Moral Sensations, Nietzsche theorized that through personal examination, mankind will become aware that actions he once assumed to be moral were in fact condemnable. The realization will be painful, but such pains are birth-pangs, Nietzsche suggests: The butterfly wants to get out of its cocoon, it tears at it, it breaks it open: then it is blinded and confused by the unfamiliar light, the realm of freedom (HH, p. 58). I suggest that Nietzsche was himself emerging from the cocoon of his Wagnerian experience of love to the blindness incited by suffering heartbreak. He contended that birth-pangs were necessary, but I propose that here can be found the irony of Nietzsches assertions; as he called to the necessity of suffering he simultaneously attempted to shift his own perception so as to avoid loves pain.
45


Regarding false observations, Nietzsche asserts that only actions can be promised, not
feelings, for to promise eternal love is only to promise to perform the actions of love: In the
heads of our fellow men the appearance will remain that love is still the same and
unchanged One therefore promises the continuation of the appearance of love when one
swears to someone ever-enduring love without selfdeception (HH, p. 42). In that Nietzsche
had earlier noted that love dreads change more than it does destruction, I propose that,
feeling like he himself had been deceived, Nietzsche again attempted to devalue love by
insinuating that it was not present when it was assumed to be (HH, p. 279). Nietzsche
continues this point by making a comparison between love and justice, determining the more
valuable sentiment, such as he had with love and honor:
Why is love overestimated as compared with justice... is it not obviously the stupider of the two?... It is stupid and possesses a rich cornucopia; out of this it distributes its gifts... even when he does not deserve them, indeed does not even thank it for them.
It is as impartial as the rain (HH, pp. 44-5).
Love is now presented as impartial, which is why it fails when compared with justice. With this assertion, I argue Nietzsche reveals his contention that he was imprudent with his love for Wagner, as his lack of judgement caused him to fail in recognizing that the composer was not deserving. This sentiment is also found in Assorted Opinions and Maxims, as Nietzsche expressed, The apprentice loves the master differently from the way the master loves him (HH, p. 290).
Nietzsches issues with his once beloved master were in no way nearing conclusion.
In January of 1878 Wagner sent Nietzsche Parsifal, and in May Nietzsche replied with volume one of his Human All Too Human (SL, p. 153). Kaufmann posits that Wagners religiously saturated opus was an affront to Nietzsche because he saw Schopenhauers
46


foremost disciple writing the great Christian music drama; the Aeschylus celebrating the very
antithesis of all Greek ideals (NP, p. 37).
After receiving the opera, Nietzsche wrote to Reinhart von Seydlitz: Yesterday
Parsifal reached me, sent by Wagner... it is all too Christian, time-bound, limited; sheer
fantastic psychology (SL, January 1878, p. 166). During the same month, Nietzsche
expressed his thoughts while walking alone:
I was sick, more than sick, I was tiredtired because of my irresistible disappointment at everything that remains to inspire us modem men, at the ubiquitously squandered energy, labor, hope, youth, love; I was tired because of my disgust at all the idealistic lying and mollycoddling of the conscience (WN, January 1878, p. 160).
Sick from being disappointed that his love was squandered, tired and disgusted that
his efforts in love revealed idealistic lying and mollycoddling of the conscience, Nietzsche
was consumed and tormented with thoughts reflecting on suffering in love. In May Nietzsche
complained of Wagners behavior surrounding Human All Too Human, to Peter Gast
(Heinrich Koselitz), whom he had met when Gast attended his lectures in the winter of 1875:
[My book] has been practically banned by Bayreuth... the grand excommunication seems to have been pronounced against its author too. They are only trying to retain my friends while losing me... Wagner has failed to use a great opportunity for showing greatness of character. I must not let that disconcert me in my opinion either of him or of myself (SL, May 1878, pp. 52, 166-7).
Coinciding with his letter, Nietzsche asserted in Of First and Last Things, that he lived in an age of comparison which incites selecting out among the forms and customs of higher morality whose objective can only be the elimination of the lower moralities (HH, p. 24).
The little support Nietzsche received for his work was limited to such friends as Gast, Ree, and Jacob Burckhardt, a professor of history Nietzsche met when joining the faculty at
47


the University of Basel in 1869 (SL, May 1878, p. 166). Though receiving praise, such as Burckhardts referring to Human All Too Human, as a sovereign book, Middleton indicates that the release created an open rupture with Wagner and Wagnerites (SL, p. 153). Fischer-Dieskau asserts that Nietzsche not only offended the Bayreuth community with his work, but his own friends as well, proclaiming that even Rohde did not withhold his painful feelings (WN, p. 163).
When Nietzsche sent a copy of Human All Too Human, to Wagner and Cosima, he
included an inscription which Fischer-Dieskau asserts was an attempt to pretend that many
things in the book could be taken humorously (WN, p. 162):
To the Master and the Mistress / a cheerful greeting / from Friedrich Freemind in Basel, / blessed with a new child. / He desires that they with moved hearts / examine the child to see / whether it takes after the father, / who knows? even with a moustache... / it wants to be liked; / not by many... / for others it will be mockery and torment... may the Masters faithful eye gaze on it and bless it, / and may the wise grace of the Mistress / follow it for evermore (WN, pp. 162-3).
Contrary to Fischer-Dieskaus assertion, I maintain that the inscription itself intended
humor, not the contentions within the work. I argue that Nietzsche intended with this
inscription to present himself as being in good spirits, despite their separation. This is the
age of comparison! It is the source of its pride, Nietzsche proclaimed in Of First and Last
Things, and mankind should not fear his suffering:
Let us not be afraid of this suffering! Let us rather confront the task which the age sets us as boldly as we can: and then posterity will bless us for ita posterity that... will look back upon both species of culture as upon venerable antiques (HH, p. 24).
Considering that he expressed in a letter to Seydlitz that Wagner was an old,
unchanging man and though it was painful, in the service of truth one must be prepared to
bring any sacrifice, it is conceivable that Wagner represented the old culture of venerable
antiques to which Nietzsche referred (UL, June 1878, p. 75). It is clear that Nietzsche hoped
48


for a time in which he would not be dismissed for his new evaluations and insights, as he felt he had been in his relationship with Wagner.
In July 1878, two months after sending his work to the Wagners, Nietzsche wrote to Mathilde Maier, a friend he made during his Wagnerian days, that he had gotten over his distress by realizing its cause, which he noted becoming aware of after fleeing from the Bayreuth festival:
That metaphysical befogging of all that is true and simple, the pitting of reason against reason... this matched by a baroque art of overexcitement and glorified extravaganceI mean the art of Wagner; both these things finally made me more and more ill... I now live my aspiration to wisdom... whereas earlier I only revered and idolized the wise... Now I have shaken off what is extraneous to me: people, friends and enemies, habits, comforts, books; I live in solitude... until once more, ripened and complete as a philosopher of life (SL, pp. 167-8).
Though appearing poised in his assertions, Nietzsche was far from confident in himself and his life. His health was in such a state that by May 1879 he submitted his resignation from the University of Basel, which was officially accepted in June (SL, p. 169). In October he expressed to Gast, my solitude and my illness have accustomed me somewhat to the impudence of my writings. But others must do everything better, my life as well as my thought (SL, 1879, p. 170).
Nietzsche concludes Humans All Too Human, with a thought which conflicts with the behaviors he demonstrated in his letters: He who reduces to paper what he is suffering will be a melancholy author, a serious author, however, is one who tells us what he has suffered and why he is now reposing in joy (HH, p. 342). Nietzsche did limit expression of his suffering to his personal writings; with his later work, Ecce Homo, he would emulate what he here calls a serious author. In his following work Nietzsche furthers his argument regarding
49


the falsity found in the love of others, using morality to place love in the light of suspicion, danger, and an opponent to truth.
The Dawn
Continuing his investigations of morality in The Dawn, Nietzsches perception of love begins to appear more hazardous. His tone reveals an air of cynicism which differs from his prior works. Whereas he previously devalued love by placing it next to honor, associating the latter with power because of its correlation with fear, Nietzsche now asserts that love is dangerous and a hindrance to knowledge. In book four, Nietzsche explains that fear is more advantageous than love because fear questions and wishes not to be deceived, whereas love contains a secret impulse to see as much beauty as possible in the other... to deceive oneself here would be a joy and an advantage (DD pp. 156-7).
Another comparative difference in this work is Nietzsches divergent take on artists.
In his previous work, section Assorted Opinions and Maxims, Nietzsche discussed the artists discovery that a certain strength lies in coarseness... many kinds of weakness make a strong impression on.. .feelings, indicating that it is difficult to abstain from employing such a discovery (HH, p. 241). In Human All Too Human, Nietzsche inferred that such means of manipulation should not be used, whereas in this work he appears to glorify it.
In describing the escapism offered by the artist, Nietzsche explains that if mankind were in fact bound to his weaknesses as to a law he would greatly benefit from possessing the artists talent of exploiting his weaknesses (DD, pp. 135-6). He notes the faults within compositions by Beethoven, Mozart, and Wagner, explaining that in hearing the unappealing aspect of their music, the pleasing portions appear all the more splendid. Thus, by means of their weaknesses they have all produced in us a ravenous hunger for their virtues and a ten
50


times more sensitive palate for every drop of musical spirit, musical beauty, musical
goodness (DD, pp. 135-6). Nietzsche seems to commend such talents, explaining
specifically how the enterprise takes place and why it is so successful.
Nietzsches description of the artists ability to produces a ravenous hunger for their
virtues, presents mankind as having been denied goodness to such an extent that he
possesses a greedy need of it, thus developing a ten times more sensitive palate in his
deficiency. Perhaps Nietzsche was considering his own weaknesses in his desiring love as
serving to highlight the strength of his philosophies, though he did demonstrate the
destructive quality in such utilizations of weaknesses for the purpose of inciting emotional
responses. Again Nietzsche cites music as an example, noting in book four a connection
between love, weaknesses, and vulnerability by way of escapism:
Could the full happiness of love, which resides in unconditional trust, ever have been experienced by anyone who was not profoundly mistrustful, evil and embittered? For these enjoy in it the... exception in the state of their soul!... Unconditional trust makes one dumb... which is why such souls weighed down with happiness are usually more grateful to music than other and better people are... music is the only means they have of observing their extraordinary condition... taking of it a view informed with a kind of alienation and relief. Everyone who is in love thinks when he hears music: it is speaking of me, it is speaking in my stead, it knows everything (DD, p. 235).
Considering an earlier autobiographical fragment in which Nietzsche noted that his
philosophical seriousness made him partial to hard and evil consequences, a personal
reference to his own vulnerability in love is clear. (SL, 1868/9, p. 45). Nietzsches assertion
that unconditional trust makes one dumb illustrates his attempt to categorize love as a
weakness, and thus his desire for the love of others as irrational and misguided.
Nietzsche again addresses the artist in a way that suggests he considered himself
when describing that being an artist is not regulated to those who create externally, for
mankind plays the artist when he idolizes another. Mankind endeavors to justify himself in
51


his own eyes by elevating this person to an ideal, Nietzsche explains, and in the process he becomes an artist so as to have a good conscience (DD, p. 150). If he suffers from this, he suffers not from not knowing but from self-deception, from the pretense of not knowing (DD, p. 150).
I argue that here Nietzsche attempts to come to terms with his own idolization of Wagner. He attempts to perceive his fascination as misguided while also shaming himself for suffering in love when he should have been aware of his own deception. Further, I suggest that Nietzsche approached his weakness in love by conceiving it as a need for self-validation, and therefore he could imagine that his desire was a self-created illusion which could be overcome through awareness.
With The Dawn, Nietzsche strove to draw direct lines between mankinds perceptions of morality, suffering, and weaknesses, and I argue that with this dissection he intended to shift his own emotionally driven perspectives as well as offering mankind new ways of perceiving himself and the world which surrounds him. Kaufmann suggests that, Nietzsche celebrated the new vistas of his freedom in Dawn but I propose that a more accurate description would be that, through his suffering, Nietzsche [confronted] the new vistas of his freedom (NP, p. 65). With the break from Wagner and departure from the university, this was a time in which Nietzsches gaze took a stark, inward turn, as he addressed suffering through a more subjective lens.
During this time of introspection, I suggest Nietzsche found himself questioning whether sacrificing love for the sake of convictions was worth the cost. His letters reveal these conflictions, illustrating Nietzsches variation between attempting confidence and openly displaying self-doubt. These behaviors offer a clear indication of the emotional
52


conflictions he was dealing with, and also explains his need for reassurance concerning the choices he had made.
In a letter to Meysenbug, January 1880, Nietzsche wrote with an air of confidence,
commending his personal ability to maintain his principles, while also intending to provoke
sympathy by exclaiming the immense suffering his decisions had caused him:
Writing is for me one of the most forbidden fruits, yet I must write a letter to you, whom I love and respect like an elder sisterand it will probably be the last. For my lifes terrible and almost unremitting martyrdom makes me thirst for the end... As regards torment and self-denial, my life during these past years can match that of any ascetic of any time; nevertheless, I have wrung from these years much in the way of purification and burnishing of the souland I no longer need religion or art as a means to that end... You will notice that I am proud of this (SL, pp. 170-1).
Professing his convictions, Nietzsche stated that no pain has been, or should be, able
to make me bear false witness about life as I know it to be concluding that he knew Wagner
would abandon him the moment he saw the rift between our aspirations, signing the letter
as a young old man, who has no grievance against life, though he must still want it to end
(SL, p. 171).
Nietzsches letter to Meysenbug calls for attention to his plights as well as praise for his ability to trounce them, while also anticipating sympathy for his suffering. He referred to himself as a martyr longing for death, an ascetic for his self-denial, noted pride in no longer needing religion or art and proclaimed intuition regarding his convictions causing him to be abandoned. Though seeming much like a suffering artist tortured by his convictions, Nietzsches dramatics reveal his mental and emotional struggles. It was this inner crisis, I argue, which led him to call for compassion and praise in such a theatrical manner. Concluding his letter as he began it, with a depressed wish for death, further reveals his selfdoubt, insecurity and need of reassurance.
53


In July 1880, Nietzsche noted a reflection in a letter to Gast which clearly reveals his confliction: One ceases to love oneself aright when one ceases to give oneself exercise in loving others, wherefore the latter (the ceasing) is to be strongly advised against (from my own experience) (SL, p. 173). A month later when writing Gast again, his insecurities and emotional struggles are expressed even more apparently when he questioned, What good is it for me to be right in many respects? As though that could wipe this lost affection from my memory!... It strikes me as so foolish to insist on being right at the expense of love (NB, August 1880, p. 204).
Though struggling internally, Nietzsche was diligent in his intentions of shifting his
perspectives, and so continually attempted to appear confident and self-assured. When
writing Overbeck a few months later, Nietzsche spoke confidently regarding his solitude:
The dignity and the grace of an original and essentially solitary way of living and of knowing... Help me to hold on to this hiddenness... for a good long time I must live without people... I must, I repeat; have no fears on my account! (SL, November,
1880, pp. 173-5).
Nietzsches declaration that he wanted to remain hidden demonstrates his endeavors in personal overcoming, and in assuring Overbeck not to have fears on his account, I suggest Nietzsche was in fact attempting to pacify his own fears concerning his intentions to face his suffering alone.
Nietzsches work, I contend, enabled him to confront his fears and seek to better understand his desire and suffering by endeavoring to demonstrate that morality does not stem from inherit virtues but rather exists as the outcome of historical beliefs and practices. Safranski notes the physiological dimension in people who consider themselves moral, stating that Nietzsche brought light to this by revealing that it is the history of the body and culture that is acting within us (NB, p. 183).
54


Nietzsche opens The Dawn by presenting past perceptions of what constituted rectitude, explaining that moral behavior was once perceived in acts of cruelty. In book one, he offers a historical backdrop as to why mankind viewed cruelty as a virtue. Nietzsche explains that in the past it was imagined that the gods were refreshed and in festive mood when... offered the spectacle of cruelty, and that with this perception there came the idea that voluntary suffering, self-chosen torture, is meaningful and valuable (DD, p. 16). By means of the belief that voluntary suffering was a virtuous act, mankinds conception of self-inflicted suffering carried forth into future generations.
The notion of voluntary suffering finds relations with the concept of martyrdom, a term which denotes both extreme suffering for the purpose of a cause as well as embellished expressions of misery for the purpose of inciting pity. With this consideration, I recall Nietzsches letter to Meysenbug in which he exclaimed that the unremitting martyrdom of his life could match that of any ascetic of any time. Nietzsches behaviors and his assertions again demonstrate contradiction. Attempting to arouse sympathy in his letters while proclaiming opposition to such behaviors in his theorization, I maintain, reveals the donning of his mask. Hayman ponders whether Nietzsches writings were perhaps no more than a formulation of how he wanted to live, and to this speculation I respond with a resounding yes (CL, p. 231).
I maintain that indeed Nietzsche was formulating how he wanted to live within his works, and that his persistent efforts in presenting the perspectives he wished to possess demonstrate the veiling of his desire with his works. In book two, Nietzsche continues his assertion that love is an egoistic act, rather than moralistic behavior:
This one is hollow and wants to be full, that one is overfull and wants to be
emptiedboth go in search of an individual who will serve their purpose. And this
55


process, understood in its highest sense, is in both cases called by the same word: lovewhat? is love supposed to be something unegoistic? (DD, pp. 91-2).
With this aphorism Nietzsche attempts to demonstrate that whether argued as needing
to receive or needing to give, love still serves as an act of ego, indicating another crack in
preconceived notions of love. In book five, Nietzsche contends the importance of egoism. He
asserts that it would be a disservice if mankind were to flee from his ego, and to hate it, and
to live in others and for othersthat has hitherto, with as much thoughtlessness as self-
confidence, been called unegoistic and consequently good" (DD, p. 207).
Nietzsche himself though, was still very much concerned with the disapproval of
others, and so in June of 1881, he wrote to his sister Elisabeth that he would no longer share
his thoughts with her concerning his writing. You cannot carry my burden... I would like
you to be able to say with a clear conscious, I do not know my brothers latest views.
(People will certainly tell you that these views are immoral and shameless) (SL, p. 177).
Not only was Nietzsche anxious concerning harsh criticisms of his works; he was also
worried about how he was perceived by those for whom he cared. In the same month he
wrote to his sister, he also wrote to Overbeck expressing his concerns:
With forebodings I am thinking... of all the tests of fire and of cold to which persons dearest to me are being exposed by my frankness....I positively know no longer with what views I am pleasing people and with which I am causing injury (UL, June
1881, p. 80).
Though attempting to feel otherwise through his work, Nietzsche was still consumed with insecurities regarding his desire for love. In August 1881, just after the publication of The Dawn, Nietzsche wrote to Gast in a way which epitomizes the extent to which he was calling for pity:
If I had had to wait for exhortations, encouragements, consolations from outside, where would I be? What would I be? There were truly moments and whole periods in
56


my life (for example, the year 1878) in which I would have felt a strengthening word of approval... and precisely then everyone left me in the lurch, everyone on whom I thought I could rely and who could have done me the favor (SL, p. 178).
Of course he spoke otherwise in his work, for in book five, Nietzsche writes a
dialogue which disputes his intentions when writing to Gast:
A: But why this solitude? B: I am not at odds with anyone. But when I am alone I seem to see my friends in a clearer and fairer light than when I am with them; and when I loved and appreciated music the most, I lived far from it. It seems I need a distant perspective if I am to think well of things (DD, pp. 199-200).
Apprehensions concerning the thoughts others, conflictions with his desires, and
ceaseless illness filled Nietzsches life, but also led him to conceive the theories which
formed his works. In November 1881 Nietzsche could scarcely read, but by January of 1882
his sickness began to subside and he was feeling so well that he wrote fervently, completing
the first three books of the The Gay Science in a few short months (CL, p. 273).
The Gay Science
The turn in Nietzsches health in January 1882 was like a breath of fresh air offering a
more focused examination of self. With new vigor, Nietzsche endeavored to see the world
differently, but breaking old habits of mind can be difficult. In such contemplation Nietzsche
wrote to Gast: In regard to my thoughtsit is no problem for me to have them; but getting
rid of them when I want to do so is always infernally hard for me! (NB, January 1882, p.
222). Nietzsche began reexamining the demise of his and Wagners relationship and wrote to
his sister describing his realization of the affect his sorrows had on his health:
My Wagner mania certainly cost me dear. Has not this nerveshattering music ruined my health? And the disillusionment and leaving Wagnerwas not that putting my very life in danger? Have I not needed almost six years to recover from that pain?
(SL, February 1882, p. 180).
57


Nietzsche had in fact experienced a dramatic recovery from his sickness, and
Kaufmann identifies an important aspect regarding how his good health effected his thinking
The Gay Science... seemed to him to mark the consummation of his conquest of death. He had thought that he might die in 1880, at the age of thirty-six as his father had done; but now he felt that he had been restored to life and become capable of a new and halcyon gaiety (NP, p. 65).
The joy that Nietzsche was experiencing spilled over into his philosophical theories, as well as his stylistic format, for the importance Nietzsche gave to poetry became evident as he confidently presented an abundance of verse within this work. I contend that Nietzsches poetic talents are of vital significance when attempting to understand his philosophies, as he was both a stylist and a great thinker and I argue that his poetry serves to credit his philosophical works. Safranski concurs with my assertion, noting that the affinity with poetry is especially salient in view of Nietzsches talent, for poets can develop a language that expresses more than the usual commonplaces, and move away from the middle zones of socialized discourse (NB, p, 216). Safranskis assertion correlates with my methodology of a creative misreading, for recognition and consideration of Nietzsches poetic sensibilities serves in discovering a new interpretation of his works, as well as acknowledging the diversity and beauty of his talents.
In The Rules of Life, a poem written during the same time but not included in The Gay Science, Nietzsche expresses, The nobility of impulse / is cultivated advisedly: / For each kilo of love, / Take a gram of self-contempt (PB, 1882, p. 147). Nietzsche explains that, if mankind must abide his impulse to love, he should as well maintain slight personal distain so as not to lose himself entirely. In constant self-evaluation, Nietzsche carried forward conceptions of power and pity as well as offering new discussions on disciples and an eternally revolving existence is his current work.


In book one of Nietzsches Gay Science, he contends that love and avarice could be
the same instinct, continuing to devalue love by comparing it to extreme greed of want of
possession. He explains that there are those who have their loves possession, but fear the
loss of it, and those who desire to possess it and glorify the instinct as good (GS, p. 88).
Additionally, Nietzsche brings pity and love together when considering self-change:
Our love of our neighboris it not a lust for new possessions? And likewise our love of knowledge, of truth, and altogether any lust for what is new?... Our pleasure in ourselves tries to maintain itself by again and again changing something new into ourselves; that is what possession means... When we see somebody suffer, we like to exploit this opportunity to take possession of him; those who become his benefactors and pity him, for example, do this and call the lust for a new possession that he awakens in them love (GS, p. 88).
Nietzsche condemns love as want of possession but follows by explaining that this comes from wanting to change something new into ourselves. Nietzsche has always asserted the importance in mankinds change and becoming, his awakening to false claims of truth, so the aphorism seems contrary to the very soul of his philosophies. I suggest that in his renewed health, Nietzsche began to consider his pity-inciting behaviors and that the affections he received from others in response may in fact be actions of benefactors intent of exploiting his weakness when in a state of suffering.
In recognizing that his behaviors revealed his vulnerability, Nietzsche concerned himself with the thought that someone might exploit this opportunity to take possession of him, as I contend he endeavored to determine Wagner had done. After breaking with his father figure, Nietzsche attempted to discredit the genuineness of love, destroy the ideal he had conceived, and overcome his desire. In a way Nietzsches possession had been his suffering; changing something new into ourselves; that is what possession means.
59


Much of the experimentalism Nietzsche employs in his philosophies, I argue, was intended to assist in shifting his perspectives. In this way, many of the assertions he puts forth are based more on his own objectives than on thoroughly examined principles. I propose Nietzsches Misunderstood sufferer, found in book three, serves as an example of his efforts to find value in his experiences so as to shift his perception: Magnificent characters suffer very differently from what their admirers imagine.... They suffer most keenly... from their doubts about their own magnificencenot from the sacrifices and martyrdoms that their task demands from them (GS, p. 216).
Recalling his lamenting to Meysenbug of his martyrdom, Nietzsche clearly donned his mask in the above aphorism, illustrating his attempt to perceive his weakness of desiring love from a less self-condemning position; he endeavored to see his struggles as not being due to inabilities and personal faults, but rather from doubting his own powers and abilities.
In this same section Nietzsche offers the Greek god Prometheus as an example of a magnificent sufferer: As long as Prometheus feels pity for men and sacrifices himself for them, he is happy and great; but when he becomes envious of Zeus and the homage paid to him by mortals, then he suffers (GS, p. 216).
Considering that Nietzsche may have been imagining himself as Prometheus, sacrificing himself for mankind only to be unappreciated, offers another example of his conceiving weakness in love. His desire in itself required measures outside of his own will; it required participation of another to be brought to fruition. After giving mankind fire, suffering retribution from Zeus, and then witnessing mankind worship Zeus over him, Prometheus did not despise mankind for their lack of love, but rather suffered from the loss of their love.
60


Contemplating a different angle, Nietzsche ponders love and suffering Without vanity. When we are in love we wish that our defects might remain concealednot from vanity but to keep the beloved from suffering. Indeed, the lover would like to seem divine and this, too, not from vanity (GS, p. 218). The aphorism implies that love intends happiness through dishonesty, that mankind would hide his true self, not because of his own egotism, but with the intention of saving the beloved from suffering. Bearing in mind that Nietzsche previously condemned women for their vanity in wanting to possess the object of their love, his present assertion that love wishes to conceal imperfections so as to avoid causing suffering suggests a much softer reflection on self-deception.
I contend that this turn in perceiving love less cruelly was due to Nietzsches current state of mind following his renewed health and, most notably, his reevaluation of his and Wagners relationship. Nietzsche began to see his errors less harshly, and though maintaining a gram of self-contempt, I suggest he was coming to terms with his choices and beginning to experience happiness.
In his heightened mood and disposition, I argue Nietzsche began to see himself in a more positive light. Contemplating his disillusionment, recognizing his Wagner mania, and becoming aware of his calls for sympathy and reassurance, Nietzsche determined that he did not want to be a tormented soul in need of consolation, but rather a heroic conqueror of suffering. I suggest that Nietzsche was indeed experiencing a kind of Joyful Wisdom. Safranski concurs with my conjecture, explaining that in The Gay Science, Nietzsche did not wish to grant depression any power over him, and fought it off with euphoria evoked by sheer force of will (NB, p. 238). Throughout this work Nietzsche gallantly strove forward in
61


his development, attempting to understand his suffering through the lens of a warrior confident in his destination.
In book three Nietzsche discusses the dynamics of What makes one heroic, and asserts that to be heroic one must go out to meet at the same time ones highest suffering and ones highest hope (GS, p. 219). Nietzsche was endeavoring to perceive joy within his suffering by considering the bravery necessary in surviving his torturous experiences. When questioning Originality and stating that it is, To see something that has no name as yet and hence cannot be mentioned although it stares us all in the face, I propose Nietzsche was considering that his desire to be loved may not be as connected to moral ideologies as he had presumed under the weight of his suffering (GS, p. 218).
I do not suggest that Nietzsche was free from his self-contempt, nor that he had succeeded in shifting his perspectives and thus removed his mask. Rather I propose that there was a crack in the wall of his suffering and, absorbing the light shining through, he strove to move beyond his depression and focus instead on his joy.
When recalling Nietzsches self-perception in the early 1880s, Ida Overbeck noted that he was often very tormented, distrusted himself, and that following every publication, hoped to receive enthusiastic approbation... and to find followers and disciples (CN, pp.
112-13). His suffering and the views he had long held of himself were still alive, they were merely set to the side as he soaked in the euphoria of his happiness.
In this new place of optimism, Nietzsches hope for approbation did not derive from a need of reassurance, as Ida described it had earlier, but rather, in the light of his confidence, stemmed from an inclination to share ideas. As such, Nietzsche was very open and excited about the notion of a disciple. In the section, Joke, Cunning, and Revenge, Nietzsche
62


expresses his position on the role of a disciple, choosing a title which sums up his thoughts in two word, VademecumVadetecum [go with me, go with yourself]: Lured by my style and tendency, / you follow and come after me? / Follow your own self faithfully / take timeand thus you follow me (GS, p. 43). In a voice that foreshadows Zarathustra, Nietzsche wrote of how he did not want a disciple such as those attached to dogmatic religions. He wanted someone who would comprehend his thoughts and participate in dialogue.
Kaufmann posits that both Gast and Nietzsches sister Elisabeth played the role of failed disciple in Nietzsches life. He suggests that Gast offered Nietzsche unswerving devotion and complete faith in his greatness which even his sisterwhom he also occasionally called a disciplehad not been able to give him, but that Gast was not the kind of pupil Nietzsche wanted most (NP, p. 46). Kaufmann furthers his point by placing Gast and Elisabeth in the roles of Nietzsches Undesirable disciples: This one cannot say No, and that one says to everything: Half and Half... Gast applauds the master's every whim, while Elisabeth would like to blend half of his ideas with those of Wagner or Forsteror Hitler (NP, pp. 46-7).
Nietzsches ideal disciple would possess the ability to dispute his theories, for to debate his assertions required both comprehension and conviction, and he attributed immense importance to mankinds formulation of his own truth. With this type of disciple Nietzsche could have confidence in honesty and thus a relationship in which both parties benefit. Nietzsche had never known such a disciple, but there appeared one person who seemed capable of fulfilling the role; Lou Andreas-Salome. In March 1882, Nietzsche traveled to Sicily to stay with Meysenbug and there was introduced to Salome (SL, p. 154).
63


By all appearances she was precisely what Nietzsche had imagined in a disciple, for having studied philosophy and religion in Zurich, Salome was intelligent in addition to possessing wit and beauty (NB, p. 249). She was intriguing, and Safranski notes that she quickly became the center of the local social scene (NB, p. 249). Diethe describes that when meeting and conversing with Salome, Nietzsche was struck by having found a kindred spirit, that the two were so close in thought they finished each others sentences, and that this inspired hope that he had at last found a disciple (NW, pp. 50-1). Diethe further explains that having just formulated his conception of the Eternal Recurrence which, in Lous words, is only bearable if ones love for life outweighs it in proportion, Nietzsche imagined Salome as one who could make him love life and thus make the thought of Eternal Recurrence bearable (NW, p. 51).
The most cited passage concerning the Eternal Recurrence in The Gay Science is found in book four, where Nietzsche talks about The greatest weight. He presents a demon who threatens, this life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more (GS, p. 273). Excelsior is a much less discussed aphorism which references the Eternal Recurrence, and I suggest that it offers a much more in-depth understanding of the concept:
There is no longer any reason in what happens, no love in what will happen to you; no resting place is open any longer to your heart, where it only needs to find and no longer seek; you resist any ultimate peace; you will the eternal recurrence of war and peace: man of renunciation, all this you wish to renounce? Who will give you the strength for that? Nobody yet has had this strength! (GS, pp. 229-30).
In the notes of this work Kaufmann asserts that this section relates to a preceding one,
The Man of Renunciation. He maintains that Nietzsche was suggesting, that it is only in
order to fly higher that the man of renunciation sacrifices so much... what he gives up does
64


not strike him as a negation because it is really part of his soaring desire for the heights (GS, pp. 229). Considering Kaufmanns analysis, I propose examination of these aphorisms through the lens of Nietzsches perception of love.
When describing The Man of Renunciation, Nietzsche explains that he is satisfied with the impression he makes on us: he wants to conceal from us his desire, his pride, his intention to soar beyond us (GS, pp. 100-1). In Excelsior he proclaims that the difficulty for the Man of Renunciation is that there is no love in what will happen and that his heart only needs to find and no longer seek (GS, p. 229). To find implies awareness, that what is being looked for is already known, whereas to seek implies searching for something unknown. Therefore, a heart which needs to find suggests that it looks for a love it has known before and is currently lost. Furthermore, Nietzsches preceding lines convey that suffering is experienced in the desperate, continual search: no love in what will happen to you; no resting place is open any longer to your heart.
With this consideration, I suggest Nietzsches experience of the fruition of his ideal of love with Wagner, along with suffering the demise of their relationship, caused him to become acutely aware of what he had only temporarily possessed. Dreaming of love throughout his youth offered Nietzsche only the subtle pain of imagining what he did not have, but experiencing the fulfillment of his desire only to have it taken away inspired a much more profound suffering because of possessing the knowledge of what he lost.
Nietzsches suffering led him to conceal his desire while attempting to shift his perspective so as to no longer be pained in loves absence. He wanted to overcome his suffering so endeavored to convince himself that, rather than desiring the love of others, he did not care what they thought of him; his intention was to soar beyond us. This, I argue, is
65


what Nietzsche originally conceived with the Eternal Recurrence, but Salomes presence shifted his thoughts in a different direction.
During the summer of 1882, Nietzsche wrote to Overbeck: A mass of my vital secretes is involved in this new future... Also I am in a mood of fatalistic surrender to GodI call it amor fati, so much so, that I would rush into a lions jaws (SL, p. 184). Around the same time he wrote to Gast that Salome was as shrewd as an eagle and brave as a lion (SL, July 1882, p. 186). The same month he wrote to Salome: how happy I am, my beloved friend Lou, that I can now think of the two of us Everything is beginning, and yet everything is perfectly clear! Trust me! Let us trust one another! (SL, pp. 186, 188). Obviously smitten, Nietzsche was completely open and vulnerable, anxious and hopeful, and in many ways, much like the enthusiastic twenty-four-year-old just getting to know Wagner.
How much work was done on The Gay Science in the five months Nietzsche knew Salome before it was published in August 1882, is unknown, but I propose that his poem Lost His Head, in his Prelude in German Rhymes, calls an image of her to mind (SL, pp. 154-5). Why is she clever now and so refined? / On her account a mans out of his mind, / His head was good before he took this whirl: / He lost his witsto the aforesaid girl (GS, p. 63). By all accounts Nietzsche did lose his wits concerning Salome. Kaufmann explains that Nietzsche had found a person to whom he could speak of his innermost ideas, receiving not only intellectual understanding but a response based on Lous own experience (NP, p. 48).
After knowing her for less than two months, Nietzsche proposed marriage to Salome in May 1882 (SL, p. 154). After the denial of his proposal, he was still intent on maintaining a relationship with her, so was pleased when a plan was devised that she, Ree and himself
66


would travel and live together during the winter of 1882 and summer of 1883 (CL, p. 246). In June Nietzsche wrote Salome:
I connect such high hopes with our plans for living together that all necessary or accidental side-effects make little impression on me now; and whatever happens, we shall endure it together and throw the whole bag of troubles overboard every evening together, shall we not? (SL, 1882, p. 183).
Later that month Nietzsche tried but failed to meet Salome in Berlin, and in July he wrote her, I want to be lonely no longer, but to learn again to be a human being. Ah, here I have practically everything to learn! (SL, July 1882, pp. 184-5). Considering Nietzsches previous professions, in both his letters and his works, that he intended to maintain his solitude, this declaration to Salome demonstrates his significant act of opening himself back up to love.
Sadly, as with Wagner, the love Nietzsche believed he shared with Salome was an
illusion, and in August 1882, their relationship began its downfall. There was a dispute
between Nietzsches sister and Salome when they traveled together from the festival in
Bayreuth to visit him in Tautenburg, a dispute of which Kaufmann contends they were both
partially to blame (NP, p. 54). Nietzsche was quick to take sides with Salome, and when she
left Tautenburg, he wrote to her immediately:
I have spoken very little with my sister, but enough to send the new ghost that had arisen back into the void from which it came... my dear Lou, the old, heartfelt plea: become the being you are! First, one has the difficulty of emancipating oneself from ones chains; and, ultimately, one has to emancipate oneself from this emancipation too! Each of us has to suffer, though in greatly differing ways, from the chain sickness, even after he has broken the chains. In fond devotion to your destinyfor in you I love also my hopes (SL, August 1882, p. 191).
Nietzsches heartfelt plea comes from The Gay Science: What does your
conscious say?You shall become the person you are (GS, p. 219). Nietzsche shared
difficult experiences intending to offer encouragement while not crossing the line of
67


friendship, but in signing, in you I love also my hopes he as well expressed his love for Salome through his words of hope for the future. His experiences with Salome left a mark on Nietzsche, and like Wagner, she indirectly inspired the new direction he took with his work.
Thus Spoke Zarathustra
Nietzsches short friendship with Lou Andreas-Salome can be viewed as the third of his experiences of suffering in love, from losing his father and then his father substitute Wagner, to the current loss of his anticipated disciple, imagined wife and friend, Salome. Nietzsches dreams, his hopes for the future, even his optimism had become tangled in the web of his love for Salome. By Haymans description, Nietzsche had succumbed to the hope of having found his alter ego in Fraulein Salome (CL, p. 246). In September 1882, Nietzsche wrote Salome:
Yesterday afternoon I was happy; the sky was blue, the air was mild and clear, I was in the Rosenthal... I sat there for three hours... and wondered in all innocence and malice if I had any tendency to madness. In the end I said no (SL, pp. 192-3).
Recounting Nietzsches happiness during his time with Salome, Ida Overbeck
recounted that when describing his new relationship in the summer of 1882, he was... very
hopeful and confident in the fulfillment of his plans and his life (CW, p. 120). Though only
having known her from March until December of 1882, Nietzsche so anticipated Salome in
his life that, much like his relationship with Wagner, when their time ended abruptly he was
left completely bewildered.
Diethe speculates that Salomes lack of intimacy with Nietzsche was due to her overall distrust of men, which led to her preference for tripartite friendships with two men in which one man would always be left out and hurt, further noting that Nietzsche and Ree were merely the first of many such relationships (NW, pp. 54-5). Additionally, Diethe
68


contends that Salome received a kind of power from her behavior, that she appeared to have needed to set one man against another and that it was simply unfortunate for Nietzsche that he entered her life during the time she first began experimenting simultaneously with two men (NW, p. 57).
Salomes outlook surrounding what transpired between herself and Nietzsche is very different from most accounts. For example, she maintained that, though she was captivated by him, their conversations revived memories or unconscious feelings which she claimed would never have allowed her to become his disciple or follower (CN, p. 118). Salome also stated that when she and Ree were discussing winter travel plans Nietzsche invited himself, insisting on a trio, adding that even the place of our future stay was soon determined (CN, p. 116). Additionally, Salome emphasized that Nietzsches proposal, during which he had Ree act as his spokesman, caused immense distress, and added in apparent contradiction, Worriedly, we reflected on how this problem could best be settled without breaking up our trio (CN, p. 116).
Hayman discuss the falsity in many of Salomes claims, noting that she pretended not to remember whether she had kissed Nietzsche, though he later thanked her for the most enchanting dream of my life (CL, p. 246). Salome also stated that the famous picture of the three of them with a cart was also due to Nietzsches insistence, proclaiming that he occupied himself personally and zealously with the arrangements of details... even the kitsch of the lilac branch on the whip (CN, p. 117).
Salome also discussed an aspect of Nietzsches health, explaining that she found it interesting and strange that when it was just the two of them, Nietzsche could easily sit up and talk for hours (CN, p. 118). Considering the many examples of his anguish instigating his
69


sickness, I suggest Salomes note demonstrates that Nietzsches happiness had just as powerful an effect on his health as his suffering did.
Their last encounter was in Leipzig, November 1882. Diethe explains that Salome and Ree left Nietzsche without even bidding him goodbye, noting that feeling abandoned, Nietzsche became increasingly bitter (NW, p. 51). Salome claimed that she was not aware until after Nietzsches death that he harbored anger for her, stating that Ree had confiscated all of his letters (CN, p. 119). Regarding her book, Friedrich Nietzsche in his Works, Salome asserts that it was written while she was still full of naivete (CN, p. 119).
In November 1882, Nietzsche wrote to Salome and Ree in a pleading manner: From time to time we shall see each other again, shall we not? Do not forget that, from this year on, I have suddenly become poor in love and consequently very much in need of love (SL,
1882, p. 196). Shortly thereafter Nietzsche again reached out, this time writing directly to Salome:
Lou, dear heart, let there be a pure sky over us!... as far as everything else concerned Ill manage somehow... But solitary suffers terribly from any suspicion concerning the few people he loves... Forgive me! Dearest Lou, be what you must be (NP, November 1882, pp. 56-7).
Salomes claim to have had no knowledge of any letters Nietzsche wrote to her following Leipzig has been refuted by Kaufmann. He explains that she destroyed most of the letters Nietzsche sent her, but that notes he composed in response to something she had written him survived (NP, p. 58). In these drafts Nietzsche appears exasperated, expressing such things as But L, what kind of letters are you writing? That is how vengeful little school girls write... Do understand: I wish you would raise yourself up before me, not that you make yourself still smaller (NP, November 1882, p. 57).
70


In Nietzsches last letter to both Salome and Ree he reverted back to sympathy
provoking language, and once again discussed the idea of his death:
Do not be upset by the outbreaks of my megalomania or of my injured vanity and even if I should take my life because of some passion or other, there would not be much to grieve about... Consider me, the two of you, as a semilunatic with a sore head who has been totally bewildered by long solitude (SL, 1882, p. 198).
Focusing on personal faults and declaring that his self-imposed death would be no
loss, I argue, clearly illustrates Nietzsches intentions to incite pity by presenting himself as wretched and desperate. In early December Nietzsche wrote to a mutual friend of Rees and Salomes, Heinrich von Stein: What I desire most... is a high point from which I can see the tragic problem lying beneath me. I would like to take away from human existence some of its heartbreaking and cruel character (SL, 1882, p. 196-7). On Christmas day he wrote to Overbeck: Unless I discover the alchemical trick of turning thismuck into gold, I am
lost. .. My lack of confidence is now immenseeverything I hear makes me feel that people despise me (SL, 1882, pp. 198-9).
Nietzsches suffering in love again directly inspired his next work, and in the winter of 1882, he conceived the first part of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, and by the summer of 1883 he had completed the second part. Kaufmann describes Nietzsches emotions during this time succinctly, explaining that those months were among the loneliest and desperate periods in his life (NP, p. 53). In his dejected state, Nietzsche again found the means to grow the seeds of his suffering into a new creation which bore the name Zarathustra.
In April 1883, Nietzsche wrote to Gast, what an abundance of suffering life has unloaded upon me... from early childhood on. But I am a soldierand this soldier... did become the father of Zarathustra! This paternity was his hope (SL, p. 211). Ida Overbeck interpreted Nietzsches remarks of having fathered Zarathustra as stemming from his pain
71


and renunciation of not having a son claiming he had gotten the idea of creating the figure of a son artistically (CN, p. 120). Hayman, on the other hand, suggests Zarathustra served to prove that an imaginary son can be a match for the real girl who had defected (CL, p. 255).
I disagree with both Ida and Haymans observations, as I do not see Zarathustra as being inspired by either longing for an actual child or an attempt to appear confident, although the latter is a behavior previously exhibited. I suggest rather that, in suffering the loss of love again, Nietzsche created a persona. Though in many ways it resembles his Schopenhauerian man and Free Spirit, his new enlightened madman Zarathustra is distinguishable by coming through in a form which brings the image Nietzsche conceived to life.
As with his other works, when creating Thus Spoke Zarathustra Nietzsche wrote of the perspectives he intended to embody, but what makes this work different is that it is delivered by literary expression. All Nietzsches feelings were poured into a character meant to come alive in the mind as occurs in poetry. He let his emotions come through in his philosophies as he had never done before and this experience of creation, I argue, is why Zarathustra came into the world.
In the prologue, Zarathustra professes, What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not an end: what can be loved in man is that he is an overture and a going under (Z, p. 15). When discussing the egoless experience of love in Untimely Meditations, Nietzsche described the moment as, bright sparks of the fire of love in whose light we cease to understand the word I... something beyond our being... moves across into it, and we are... possessed of a... longing for bridges between here and there (UM, p. 161). As an object a
72


bridge serves to connect paths together, uniting what was once separated into one unified whole.
Previously Nietzsche perceived love as that which unifies through loss of individuality and, though mankind yearns for the experience of oneness, his pessimism keeps him separated (UM, p. 161). In this work I posit that Nietzsche presents mankind himself as the union between love and suffering, for Zarathustra shows that mankind must perceive his suffering as purposeful and love himself in what he becomes, loving what he was once unable to love.
Nietzsche stresses the importance of overture and going under in Zarathustras prologue (Z, p. 15). Kaufmann translates the term overture from Ubergang, though it is often translated as crossing over (Cambridge, Z, p. 7). Dr. Elisabeth Stein, German Adjunct Professor at Florida State University, indicates that Nietzsche uses Hiniiber to describe crossing over in numerous places throughout this text, confirming the accuracy of Kaufmanns choice to use overture to translate Ubergang.
Additionally, Kaufmanns translation takes Nietzsches lifelong love of music and his appreciation of heroics into consideration, for in the nineteenth century overture elevated from an operas prelude to an independent composition often heroically themed, for example, Beethovens overture, Egmont, based on Goethes heroic play.
Taking Kaufmanns translation into consideration, I suggest that Nietzsches intention in highlighting overture and going under was to emphasize the heroic nature required in overcoming as well as signifying the importance of mankinds individuality in serving his experiences of love and suffering. In perceiving his suffering as serving his growth, mankind may regard his pain with love because of the purpose it serves in his transformation. Like the
73


heroic actions of Egmont, mankinds sacrifices represent both the pain of his love and the importance of his suffering by way of the process of his overcoming.
As I have argued, Nietzsche fought against his desire for the love of others because of the suffering it caused him, and I have noted the irony that in his efforts he created much of the suffering he experienced. At this point in his development, I posit, Nietzsche endeavored to diminish the relevance of loving others by emphasizing self-love and asserting that mankind must love his suffering as a part of himself.
Safranski advances the theory that Nietzsches original organizational plan for Zarathustra was to outline the contours of an art of living and highlight everything that makes life worth living and loving (NB, p. 277). I concur, and add that Nietzsche intended to perceive that the art of living was not found in seeking fulfillment externally but in loving all that comprises the self.
Life is hard to bear; but do not act so tenderly! We are all of us fair beasts of burden, male and female asses. What do we have in common with the rosebud, which trembles because a drop of dew lies on it? True, we love life, not because we are used to living but because we are used to loving. There is always some madness in love. But there is also always some reason in madness (Z. p. 41).
Nietzsche expresses that there is indeed suffering in life, but so too is there joy; it is the hardships of life that make the pleasurable moments valuable. Suffering as well as love kindles lifes flame. Growth is painful; the rose trembles because a drop of dew lies on it, suffering under the weight of the water which gives it life. It is known that mankind rejoices in his existence because of his pleasures. Nietzsche points out that There is always some madness in love. But there is also always some reason in madness to demonstrate that what mankind finds pleasurable can also be painful. There is euphoria in love but there is also pain, there is madness (suffering) in love, but there is also reason in the madness of suffering.
74


In writing to Salome that he wondered in all innocence and malice if I had any tendency to madness, I propose Nietzsche was expressing his fear of suffering from love while endeavoring to justify suffering by determining purpose in his madness in love by way of its service in his growth. Zarathustra asks But why would you have your pride in the morning and your resignation in the evening? (Z, p. 41). Nietzsche recognized it is in maddening pain that growth occurs, suffering calls inwardly to be written in blood and aphorisms, while joy reaches outwardly to be maintained, like the reading idler lazily seeking guidance (Z, p. 41).
Though suffering is part of mankinds development, Nietzsche saw his desire for the
love of others as a weakness to be overcome, and I suggest his intention to perceive his
weakness as self-inflicted can be found in reinterpreting On the Afterwordly:
This god whom I created was man-made madness... only a poor specimen of man and ego... I overcame myself, the sufferer... I invented a brighter flame for myself. And behold, then this ghost fled from me... It was suffering and incapacity that created all afterworlds (Z, p. 31).
Nietzsche endeavored to perceive his ideal of love as man-made madness, conceived out of his inability to address his suffering from desiring love, and so determined that he needed to invent a new perspective, a brighter flame for himself, his Zarathustra. Having recognized his own pity-seeking behavior with his newly invented brighter flame, Nietzsche focused his attention on the fault in mankinds response to the sufferer.
In his sermon, On the Pitying, Zarathustra pronounces, Having seen the sufferer suffer, I was ashamed for the sake of his shame; and when I helped him, I transgressed grievously against his pride (Z, pp. 88-9). Rather than focusing on his own shame in being the sufferer who reached out, Nietzsche veiled his shame with his mask and fixated on the transgression of others. This displacement of his suffering, I contend again demonstrates
75


Nietzsches inability to embody the perspectives he presented in the image of his enlightened self.
Zarathustra continues, If you have a suffering friend, be a resting place for his
suffering, but a hard bed as it were, a field cot: thus you will profit him best (Z, p. 90).
Nietzsche pleaded for Ree and Salomes pity when he exclaimed, I have suddenly become
poor in love, but his calls were ignored, so he voiced his opposition, proclaiming it good to
aid the sufferer just enough that he may assist himself.
And if a friend does you evil, then say: I forgive you what you did to me; but that you have done it to yourself how could I forgive that? Thus speaks all great love: it overcomes even forgiveness and pity. One ought to hold on to ones heart; for if one lets it go, one soon loses control of the head too (Z, p. 90).
Nietzsche endeavored to raise himself by determining that he could forgive those who transgressed his love while also attempting to perceive that great love is love of self, as it overcomes even forgiveness and pity. Moreover, unlike the Man of Renunciation in Excelsior, whose heart... only needs to find and no longer seek, Zarathustra warns to hold on to ones heart or else one soon loses control of the head too. Nietzsche again proposes to deny desires so as to avoid the very suffering he claims to be vital to growth.
After completion of the first three parts Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche wrote in a letter to Rohde: With all the people I love: everything is over, it is the past, forbearance; we still meet... But the look in the eyes tells the truth: and this look tells me... Friend Nietzsche, you are completely alone now! (SL, February 1884, pp. 219-20). Through his philosophies, Nietzsche not only endeavored to find purpose for his suffering, he too used his work to shield himself by rationalizing his pain. He imagined through his Zarathustra that he could move beyond his burden: I have learned to walk: ever since, I let myself run. I have
76


learned to fly: ever since, I do not want to be pushed before moving along. Now I am light, now I fly, now I see myself beneath myself, now god dances through me (Z. p. 41).
A poem Nietzsche wrote during the same time as Thus Spoke Zarathustra, expresses clearly what I have argued as his emotional conflictions. In the poem, To Hafts, Nietzsche declares, You are all and nothing/... You always withdraw into yourself / You always fly out of your self- / You are the height of gloom, / You are all deep illusions (PB, 1884, p. 125). Nietzsche withdrew into his suffering, conceiving ways of perceiving differently, but I suggest he felt as though his suffering was all and nothing. He tried to be without his suffering and it found him in the height of [his] gloom and in his deep illusions. Unable to assimilate his philosophical creations, Nietzsche was left only with his mask.
Hayman states that the reader is caught in the cross-fire of Nietzsches battle against himself... [his] whole procede is evaluative, but, like a self-destroying machine, the teaching is constantly undoing itself (CL, p. 264). The section Hayman references is in On Self-Overcoming:
Life itself confided this secret to me: Behold, it said, I am that which must always overcome itself... I must be struggle and a becoming and an end and an opposition to ends... Whatever I create and however much I love itsoon I must oppose it and my love (Z, p. 115).
I agree with Haymans assertion that Nietzsche overturns the values he determines through the very process of proposing them, but I add that his system failed only in that he was unable to encompass the values he determined. He was indeed in a battle with himself.
Hayman continues, Wearing the Zarathustra mask, he believes himself to be telling the truth. The great danger of this method is that it becomes hard to retain firm artistic control (CL, p. 263). Again, I do not dispute Haymans contention per se, but propose that it was not as simple as Nietzsche believing himself to be truthful. I contend he was well aware
77


of his mask and not in danger of losing artistic control, but rather hoped that his philosophies would be his truth. Nietzsche endeavored to perceive the world through the lens of his philosophies; he wanted to live the values he proclaimed, not on the pages of his work, but in all aspects of his life.
In The Song of Melancholy, when Zarathustra steps outside of his cave the Magician takes his chance to speak to the group and he expresses that his melancholy devil, who is through and through an adversary of this Zarathustra.. .wants to show you his magic (Z, p. 296):
He himself sometimes seems to me like a beautiful mask of a saint, like a new strange
masquerade in which my evil spirit, the melancholy devil, enjoys himself. I love
Zarathustra, it often seems to me, for the sake of my evil spirit (Z, p. 297).
When the Magician first appears in this text he wore a mask in the sense that he put on a performance of acting pitifully with the intention of testing Zarathustras compassion.
He now compares Zarathustra to a beautiful mask of a saint, like a new strange masquerade. The Magician loves Zarathustra for the sake of [his] evil spirit, his melancholy devil, or as I propose, his suffering.
The melancholy devil likes to see the beautiful mask of a saint, the illusion of an egoless love, even though he knows he will be disillusioned. The Magician loves Zarathustra even though he compares him to a masquerade, deception of love enflames suffering, suffering anticipates growth. As was revealed in his previous work, in a way Nietzsches possession is his suffering. He defines possession as changing something new into ourselves, and the most influential element of affecting change in Nietzsches life was his suffering.
78


In May 1884, Nietzsche wrote to his sister lamentingly reflecting on his life. He
expressed being chastened by his relationships with people and also acknowledged
concealing himself because of feelings of alienation:
I have found until now, from earliest childhood, nobody who had the same need of heart and conscience as myself... that I have no such person is my misfortune... Almost all my human relationships have resulted from attacks of a feeling of isolation.... My mind is burdened with a thousand shaming memories of such weak moments... I always had to playact somewhat instead of refreshing myself in people... The feeling that there is about me something very remote and alien... Schopenhauer or Wagner or think up Zarathustrathese things are for me recreation but, above all, hiding places, behind which I can sit down again for a while. Do not therefore think me mad, my dear Lama (SL, p. 241).
In April 1884, the third part of Zarathustra was published and in February 1885 the forth part was printed privately (SL, pp. 203, 235). In his following text, Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche clarifies many of the thoughts he expressed in this work, but also begins to perceive that his philosophies would not be recognized and valued during his own life, but would be some time in the distant future.
79


CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION Philosophy of the Future
Beyond Good and Evil
Following Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche suffered emotional conflictions as he had before, and though endeavoring to shift his perspectives had yet to alleviate his desire for the love of others, changes in how he perceived when, and to what degree, his work would affect mankind did occur. It is my contention that Nietzsche began to conceive the Eternal Recurrence as expanding beyond his own existence. I suggest that while contending with desiring the love of others, Nietzsche developed his sense of self-love by perceiving his underappreciated work as serving the future.
When Nietzsche bemoaned publication difficulties in a letter to Overbeck, he attempted to console himself by stating, If a man draws up the sum of a deep and hidden life, as I have been doing, then the result is meant for the eyes and consciences of only the most select people (SL, March 1885 p. 239). Considering that his work would serve the future, Nietzsches own recurring moments became an important creation for mankind. Beyond Zarathustras difficulty of the Last Man, an Expanded Eternal Recurrence offered a postscript to the demons threat: This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more, [and whatever you create will determine your legacy; will you be immortally (GS, p. 273)
With a widened perspective of his existence, when writing Meysenbug, Nietzsche scoffed at his old self: It is the humor of my situation that I should be mistaken for the former Basel professor Dr. Friedrich Nietzsche. The devil take him! What has this fellow to
80


do with me! (SL, March 1885, p. 237). Unhappy with his past self, Nietzsche was no more pleased with his current self, as his self-inflicted solitude increased his suffering.
In Spring 1886, Nietzsche wrote to Overbeck that he was really more in hell than in my cave, adding that occasional contact with people is like a holiday for me, a redemption from me (SL, p.252). Though his philosophical conception signified self-love through acknowledgement of abilities, his own assertion could not dissuade Nietzsches desire for the love of others. While he continued his work, Nietzsche also continued to use it as a way to conceal his emotional conflictions.
In Beyond Good andEvd, commenced in Summer 1885 and completed by Fall 1886, Nietzsche discusses the use of masks within philosophy (SL, p. 204). In The Free Spirit, Nietzsche asserts:
Whatever is profound loves masks; what is most profound even hates image and parable... A concealed man who instinctively needs speech for silence... wants and sees to it that a mask of him roams in his place through the hearts and heads of his friends. And supposing he did not want it, he would still realize some day that in spite of that a mask of him is there (BGE, p. 50).
As Nietzsche has continually proclaimed perspectives he wished to possess in his works, he also consistently condemned personal weaknesses, as he does here in reproaching concealment, neglecting his own admitted hiddenness. In What is Noble, Nietzsche asks, Does one not write books precisely to conceal what one harbors? (BGE, p. 229). He then continues, Every philosophy also conceals a philosophy; every opinion is also a hideout, every word also a mask... Every profound thinker is more afraid of being understood than of being misunderstood (BGE, p. 229).
In a way Nietzsche was continually confessing his weaknesses, he just did it under the shield of his philosophical objectivism. In September 1886, Nietzsche wrote to
81


Meysenbug, I am sending these lines to Rome... It is called Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Future Philosophy... Let us assume that people will be allowed to read it in about the year 2000 (SL, p. 256).
On the Genealogy of Morals
Nietzsche began and completed his Genealogy of Morals, in 1887, and in the preface of the work, confidently asserted, it will be some time before my writings are readable (GM, p. 23). Nietzsche had determined that his task was to prepare his philosophies for the future, and though it was a factum of indescribable sadness, there was greatness in it (SL, August 1886, p. 254).
In the third essay of this work, Nietzsche states, The will to truth requires a critiquelet us thus define our own taskthe value of truth must for once be experimentally called into question (GM, p. 153). As he condemns pre-established notions of truth, I argue Nietzsche also condemned his own emotional truths, determining that established ideologies merited dissection whereas his desire for love should be stifled. He explained to Overbeck the pressure of his task, There is the hundredweight of this need pressing upon meto create a coherent structure of thought during the next few years (SL, March 1887, pp. 26-5)
In a poem written during his Genealogy, A proposal of lovewhen unfortunately the poet fell into a pit, Nietzsches verse triggers apprehension and anticipation of his task, and I suggest his hopes of self-love are revealed as well: . / Flying high, you see only in suspense! / Oh, Albatross bird, / Impulse makes me fly high, / I thought of you: / My tears flow,yes, I love you! (PB, 1887, pp. 223-5). A known metaphor for a psychological burden, the albatross flies above in Nietzsches poem, not as a burden, but as an unattainable desire the poet tearfully calls for from a pit.
82


In his intentions to compile his philosophical doctrines for the future, Nietzsche determined that his lonely solitude was still necessary, writing to Meysenbug, I feel condemned to my solitude and fortress... The unusual and difficult task which commands me to go on living commands me to avoid people and to bind myself to no one any more (SL, May 1887, pp. 265-7).
The Case of Wagner
Begun in April, The Case of Wagner was published in October 1888. In this work Nietzsche uses his once beloved master as an example of the failures in German music and culture, contrasting the earlier praise of the composers efforts in his first two major publications. No longer of the opinion that Wagners music could save culture from its decent into idolization, here Nietzsche determines that Wagner serves as an image of German idealism.
In section two of this work Nietzsche describes love as being translated back into
nature, explaining that love as fate, as fatality, cynical, innocent, cruel... is precisely what
makes it natureC (ATO, p. 236). Continuing that loves method is war, Nietzsche then
states that this perspective on love... is a rarity: it raises a work of art above thousands of
others (ATO, p. 236). This consideration of love, as amor fati, requires loving all aspects of
life beyond pleasure to pain, while ensuing love of self by focusing on the recurrence of
personal existence. It does not, however, define love; it simple gives it application.
In the same section, Nietzsche declares, artists are like everyone else, only worse
they misunderstand love. Wagner misunderstood it too:
Everyone thinks that people in love are selfless because they want to advance the interests of another person, often at their own expense. But in return, they want to possess that other person ... Even God is no exception here. He is far from thinking
83


what difference does it make to you if I love you? he becomes terrible if you do not
love him in return (ATO, p. 236).
The fact that Nietzsche discusses love so passionately in a book about Wagner reveals that he had not yet overcome his self-described Wagner mania. Furthermore, when calling to his earlier asserted notion that love was want of possession, Nietzsche presents the disillusionment of his love for Wagner much like Zarathustra did when he revealed that the god he created was man-made madness.
Twilight of the Idols, The Antichrist, Nietzsche contra Wagner
Safranski asserts that Nietzsches last works, specifically Twilight of the Idols and The Antichrist, no longer developed new ideas, but generalized or particularized familiar concepts, adding, In the process, the directorial and theatrical lavishness of the presentation is expanded. (NB, p. 305). Safranskis assertion is accurate, Nietzsche does repeat much of his earlier thoughts, particularly with Nietzsche contra Wagner, which entirety consists of past works Nietzsche compiled to emphasize his contentions against Wagner.
Considering Safranskis point, I suggest that Nietzsche rushed to create these last works to both ensure his self-proclaimed task and revolt against his still present desire for the love of others by attacking the manifestation of his ideal. With this action Nietzsche not only had further expression for his preferred perspectives, he also experienced the added bonus of receiving angry attention from Wagnerites. Better to be loved than hated, but better to be hated than ignored.
Twilight of the Idols and The Antichrist were begun in September as a joint effort for Nietzsches Transvaluation of Values, and Nietzsche contra Wagner commenced in November 1888. All three of these books were published when Nietzsche was no longer capable of appreciating his work in print. In July, he wrote to Meysenbug, I involuntarily
84


have no words for anyone, because I have less and less desire to allow anyone to see into the
difficulties of my existence. There is indeed a great emptiness around me (SL, 1888, p. 302).
In the middle of the summer in 1888 Nietzsche successfully completed his task of
documenting his philosophical expressions for mankind, but his attempts at self-love were
failing him as he continued to battle desiring love. In Twilight of the Idols he wrote:
Here the view is free. It can be loftiness of the soul when a philosopher is silent; it can be love when he contradicts himself; it can be a courtesy of the knower to tell a lie... it can also be greatness of soul not to be afraid in front of what is most unworthy (ATO, p. 220).
The opening line of this aphorism was inspired by Goethes Faust, from the scene in which Faust has transformed after his death to a higher self in heaven, and he states, Here the view is free (ATO, p. 220). I posit that here Nietzsche insinuates that the view seen by the higher self is free because, in an elevated state, love is recognized as existing in lifes contradictions, residing in places that from a lower elevation of thought, appears to be something else, something unworthy. Lies are okay and souls are not intimidated by presumed values. I suggest that Nietzsche conceives the silence between him and Wagner now that his father figure is gone.
In The Antichrist, Nietzsche speaks of love again as a deception: The force of illusion reaches a high point here, and so do the forces that sweeten and transfigure. People in love will tolerate more than they usually do, they will put up with anything (ATO, p. 20). The transfiguring effects from overcoming suffering are permitted, but in still discrediting love, Nietzsche asserts that, rather than beauty in transformation, love transfigures, causing self-negation and abuse.
Nietzsche contra Wagner was the last thing Nietzsche was working on before his collapse. Higgins and Solomon suggest that this reveals the importance he placed on [his]
85


relationship [with Wagner] throughout his productive life (if not beyond) (ATO, pp. 33-4). When compiling notes for this work, Nietzsches selection for this work from Beyond Good andEvd perfectly illustrates the accuracy of Higgins and Solomons assertion: Those who know hearts can guess how impoverished, helpless, presumptuous, and mistaken even the best and deepest love really is how much more likely it is to destroy than to rescue (ATO, p. 279). To assume that love can be mistaken suggests it possesses flaws and thus falsities, and so with his continued devaluation of love, Nietzsche maintained his war against his desires, determining to wear his mask of appearances indefinitely.
Ecce Homo
Unswerving in his desire to appear sure of himself, Nietzsches Ecce Homo is packed with self-glorification and proud declarations of his genius. With his autobiographical work, which he began on his forty-fourth birthday completed within a month, I argue Nietzsche intended to demonstrate to himself, and to the world, that he did not need reassurance or love from others (SL, 1888, p. 313). The self-congratulations in this work has led some scholars to question if Ecce Homo serves as evidence that Nietzsche had already begun to lose grasp of his sanity. For example, Hayman posits that if Nietzsches sickness were considered regarding this work, we could have no difficulty in explaining the extravagant self-praise (CL, p. 10). Higgins and Solomon, though, assert that what is interpreted as impending insanity... is much more convincingly understood as ironic, self-mocking genius (WS, p. 4). I propose that Nietzsche was coherent while creating Ecce Homo, but to greatly motivated to appear confident in himself and clear in his theories because of feeling the threatening effects of losing control of his conscious mind.
86


There is speculation as to the details of Nietzsches illness, specifically as it may have related to syphilis, but it is known that he experienced paralysis, and Gilman explains that a contemporary diagnosis for his condition would be dementia paralytica (CN, p. 221). Considering well known early warnings signs of both paralysis and dementia, I posit that Nietzsche was aware of his worsening condition and responded by heightening his resolve to appear triumphant in his lifes work.
The vanity in Ecce Homo, and some letters during this time, I contend reveals Nietzsches determination to present himself as an incarnation of his philosophies. I propose that Nietzsches drive to appear self-assured and confident in his solitude largely inspired his autobiography, and I suggest that the self-praise Hayman refers to was the mask Nietzsche had long used to conceal his emotional crisis and that at this point he determined to maintain his veil indefinitely.
When regarding Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Hayman asserts that Nietzsche needed a mask more than ever before, but, like an actor, found that with his features hidden he could reveal more of himself (CL, p. 256). Zarathustra was an important aspect in Nietzsches veiling his emotions and I concur that he needed his symbolic son to serve as his mask, but by way of a creative misreading, I disagree that it was at that time that Nietzsche needed a mask more than ever before (CL, p. 256). It was during his work on Ecce Homo, I argue, that Nietzsche felt the most need to conceal himself because of experiencing onset symptoms of dementia.
Nietzsches letters, which thus far have revealed his conflictions, at this time often resemble the tone he uses in his work. While writing Ecce Homo, Nietzsche wrote to Gast of his intentions with his text:
87


I talk about myself with all possible psychological cunning and gay detachmentI do not want to present myself to people as a prophet, savage beast, or moral horror... it will perhaps prevent people from confusing me with my anti-self (SL, October 1888, p. 320).
Middleton ascribes the translation of anti-self to Michael Hamburger, whom he quotes as stating that Nietzsches claiming absolute authority for himself and boasting of his ferocious predatory strength, merely testifies to the war between his self and his anti-self (SL, p. 320). Hamburgers assertion offers concurrence with my contention that Nietzsche struggled with internal conflictions. Furthering Hamburgers analysis through a creative misreading, I suggest that it was his emotional self Nietzsche veiled as a response to the self-negation he received from his anti-self, the part of him which initially inspired his concealment.
Just after completing Ecce Homo, Nietzsche wrote to Meta von Salis, whom he met in
Zurich in 1884, and when referencing Why I Am Destiny, stated that by the end the
reader is left sitting before me as a mere mask, mere feeling heart (SL, Nov. 1888, p.
324). In this section Nietzsche describes his role in the uncovering of Christian morality:
Everything that has hitherto been called truth has been recognized as the most harmful, insidious, and subterranean form of lie; the hole pretext of improving mankind, as the ruse for sucking the blood of life itself. Morality as vampirism (EH, pp. 333-4).
All the while Nietzsche was unmasking morality I maintain he was veiling himself. In a letter written to Gast in July 1880 he reveals such actions when expressing, I go on digging zealously in my moral mine, and sometimes seem to myself wholly subterranean (SL, p. 172). While he was endeavoring to awaken mankind to his ideological constraints, I argue Nietzsche was attempting to shroud the anguish and emotional turmoil he suffered from desiring the love of others, and I propose his mask symbolizes his own veiled lie, which
88


he preserved by the pretext of improving himself. Thus, with his Ecce Homo, it was in
fact Nietzsche himself who was left sitting before his work as a mere mask.
Making great efforts to conceal his weaknesses, Nietzsches work in morality offered
new perspectives for mankind, but as I have argued, his philosophical endeavors could not
assist in alleviating him of his emotional conflictions. He was becoming more estranged from
his friends, even losing his long time Wagnerian friend, Meysenbug. She had reached her
limit regarding Nietzsches stanch opinions of Wagner, and wrote him an angry letter
defending her now deceased friend over accusations made in The Case of Wagner (SL,
Octoberl888, p. 314). In response Nietzsche wrote:
These are not things on which I allow anyone to contradict me. I am, in questions of decadence, the supreme court of appeal on earth... Wagners knowledge of how to arouse faith (as you with your estimable innocence express it)... certainly required an act of genius, but a genius of mendacity. I myself have the honor to be the reversea genius of truth (SL, October 1888, p. 314).
Haymans earlier discussed point that Nietzsches Zarathustra mask made it hard to retain firm artistic control seems more appropriately applied here (CL, p. 263). Resolute in presenting an appearance of strength and confidence, Nietzsche pronounced himself as a server of truth, completely neglecting his significant assertion in Human, All Too Human, that there are no eternal facts, just as there are no absolute truths (HH, p. 13).
Nietzsche proclaimed in Why I Am So Wise, that when examining his life, you will rarely find traces, and actually only once, that anybody felt ill will toward mebut perhaps rather too many traces of good will (EH, p. 227). Having lost most of his friends, notably Rohde in addition to Meysenbug, it may be assumed that Nietzsche was aware of the falsity in claiming that only once someone felt ill will toward him (SL, p. 231). Additionally, in October Nietzsche wrote to Georg Brandes, whom he met in 1887, nobody
89


writes to me. I have spread helpless terror even among people who are near and dear to me (SL, 1888, pp. 278, 317). Nietzsche wrote Meysenbug one more time in November:
Just wait a little, verehrteste Freundinl I shall send you yet another proof that Nietzsche est toujours haissable [Nietzsche is always hateful]. Without any doubt, I have been unjust to you; but since I am suffering from a surfeit of righteousness this autumn, it was really salutary for me to do an injustice. The Immoralist (SL, 1888, p. 322).
Acknowledging that he had been unjust, Nietzsches only consolation for
Meysenbug was to claim that he had experienced such an abundance of righteousness that
it was helpful for him to do an injustice, concluding his play on moral sentiment by signing
the letter, The Immoralist. I suggest that this dispute was more difficult for Nietzsche than
the tone of this letter conveys, as the history of their correspondence reveals the closeness he
felt for her and the value he placed on their friendship. He had reached out to Meysenbug just
a few months earlier, crying to her of all the emptiness around (SL, July 1888, p. 302).
Nietzsches personal writings just a few months before Ecce Homo reveal the same
emotional strongholds he had long contended with. In the summer of 1888, Nietzsche wrote
The Brazen Silence in his notebook, and in this poem expressed, The world became
silent.... 11 listened with the ear of my curiosity... / I listen with the ears of my love (PB, p.
385). Earlier in the year, Nietzsche wrote to Overbeck:
The perpetual lack of a really refreshing and healing human love, the absurd isolation which it entails, making almost any residue of a connection with people merely something that wounds onethat is all very bad indeed and right only in itself, having the right to be necessary (SL, February 1888, p. 282).
Responding to this letter, Safranski suggests that Nietzsche considered himself a
monster in the captivity of people to whom he meant nothing (NB, p. 312). This observation
of Nietzsches emotional stance coincides with my analysis of his feeling unloved, but I add
that the above letter reveals the sadness he felt in perceiving that his only option, due to the
90


onslaught of his sickness, in dealing with his still present desire for love was that he had to intensify his declarations of confidence. Both public and private, Nietzsche determined that he must appear as though healing human love was completely unnecessary for him.
In his performance of confidence, Nietzsche offers gratitude in the preface of Ecce Homo: I buried my forty-fourth year today; I had the right to bury it... How could Ifail to be grateful to my whole lifel (EH, p. 221). He was fervently trying to embody his amor fati, focusing on such things as thanking Gast for sending a birthday card while still bemoaning that it was the only one he received (SL, p. 313). In Why I am so wise, Nietzsche again offers gratitude for his life, also evoking his father and the Eternal Recurrence by way of predestination: The good fortune of my existence... lies in its fatality: I am, to express it in the form of a riddle, already dead as my father, while as my mother I am still living and becoming old (EH, p. 222).
Nietzsches riddle of fatality clearly presents the predetermined metaphorical death he shared with his father and the literal long life he shared with his mother, but further interpretation is possible when going beyond the boundaries of his objective. Reflection on Nietzsches father originally inspiring his ideal of love while his mother stimulated feelings of loneliness, I propose that in his riddle his father can be seen to symbolize the death of love while his mother, the isolation of living without love.
In the same section Nietzsche remembers that at the age of thirty-six, as his fathers life went downward, mine, too, went downward (EH, p. 222). The disillusionment of his love was severe and complicated by an elevated sickness which required that he resign from teaching. The intensity of his illness in 1879, Nietzsche explains, stripped him of all his energy so that he existed at first like a shadow and then as a shadow; it was at this low
91


point, he adds, that he wrote The Wanderer and His Shadow (EH, p. 222). Considering the pain Nietzsche experienced during that time of love-less-ness, I propose interpreting the Shadow in his poem as a metaphor for love.
In suffering the loss of Wagner, Nietzsche rejected love, endeavoring to devalue and disempower it, but as I have argued, he still felt the pain of loves absence. In his poem, The Wanderer spurns love (his Shadow), but as it fades he misses it and calls love to return, Where are you? Where are you, but there is no reply (HH, p. 395). As with the Wanderer in his poem, Nietzsches attempts to dissuade his desire only inspired further longing. He wrote to Gast ten days before his birthday in 1879 regarding his experience while writing The Wanderer and His Shadow:
The manuscript which you received from St. Moritz was written at such a high and hard price that perhaps nobody would have written it if he could possibly have avoided doing so. Often I shudder to read it, especially the longer parts, because of the ugly memories it brings (SL, p. 169).
Proposing that all of Nietzsches works as similarly autobiographical, Solomon suggests that Ecce Homo is just the finale of a lifelong pursuit of self-constitution, not to mention self-congratulation (LN, p. 9). Solomon continues, asserting that Nietzsche was divided between the passionate self that emerges so evidently in his works and the painfully reserved self that he wore out in public (LN, p. 9). My contention that Nietzsche experienced self-division due to emotional conflictions finds concurrence with Solomons assertion, but by applying a creative misreading, I suggest rather that Nietzsches philosophical mask was what he wore in public while the painfully reserved self, condemned as weak for desiring love, was the part of himself that remained hidden.
The abundance of confidence in this work, and in some of his letters, I argue reveals Nietzsches efforts to appear as though he had overcome his suffering and that love of others
92


Full Text
xml version 1.0 encoding ISO-8859-1
DISS_submission publishing_option 0 embargo_code third_party_search Y
DISS_authorship
DISS_author type primary
DISS_name
DISS_surname Frisby
DISS_fname Monika
DISS_middle Jeane
DISS_suffix
DISS_affiliation University of Colorado at Denver
DISS_contact current
DISS_contact_effdt 11/30/2016
DISS_phone_fax P
DISS_cntry_cd 1
DISS_area_code 850
DISS_phone_num 9801971
DISS_phone_ext
DISS_address
DISS_addrline 3044 Cloudland Dr
DISS_city Tallahassee
DISS_st FL
DISS_pcode 32312
DISS_country US
DISS_email monikajeane@gmail.com
future
11/30/2016
1
850
9801971
3044 Cloudland Dr
Tallahassee
FL
32312
US
monikajeane@gmail.com
DISS_citizenship US
DISS_description page_count 120 masters external_id http:dissertations.umi.comucdenver:10782 apply_for_copyright no
DISS_title Masking Suffering; An Existential Genealogy of Nietzsche's Perception of Love
DISS_dates
DISS_comp_date 2017
DISS_accept_date 01/01/2016
DISS_degree M.H.
DISS_institution
DISS_inst_code 0765
DISS_inst_name University of Colorado Denver
DISS_inst_contact Humanities
DISS_processing_code N
DISS_advisor
Swartz
Omar
DISS_cmte_member
Woodhull
Margaret
Metcalf
Robert
DISS_categorization
DISS_category
DISS_cat_code 0422
DISS_cat_desc Philosophy
DISS_keyword Love, Nietzsche, Suffering
DISS_language en
DISS_content
DISS_abstract
DISS_para This thesis addresses the impact Nietzsche’s desire for the love of others had on his philosophy. I conduct an existential genealogy of his perception of love from the ideal formed in childhood, along the path of experiments preformed throughout his philosophy. It is my contention that Nietzsche determined to change his perception of love following the disillusionment of what he had conceived to be his ideal, and that evidence for this can be found by analyzing his investigations of morality. From originally perceiving love as pure and unegoistic to redefining it as an act of egotism cloaked as virtuous, I posit that in his suffering Nietzsche continually struggled to assimilate the image of love he asserted in his work. With the use of his personal writings, I expose contradiction between his published contentions and private expressions and propose that he wore his philosophical perspectives as a mask, veiling the suffering experienced from battling his desire for love. Due to the existential crises Nietzsche underwent while contending with his desire, I aruge that much of his anguish was self-induced. In his efforts to avoid the pain he associated with love, I reveal irony in Nietzsche’s assertion that suffering should be embraced. My work concludes proposing that Nietzsche’s final perception of love finds concurrence with his perception of suffering, ending with a “creative misreading” of Nietzsche’s “Three Metamorphoses.”
DISS_binary PDF Frisby_ucdenver_0765N_10782.pdf
DISS_restriction
DISS_repository
DISS_version 2011-11-08 15:37:33
DISS_agreement_decision_date 2016-11-30 18:14:56
DISS_acceptance 1
DISS_delayed_release
DISS_access_option



PAGE 1

MASKING SUFFERING; by MONIKA FRISBY A.A., Tallahassee Community College 2008 B.A ., Florida State University, 2011 A thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the Universi ty of Colorado in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Humanities 2016

PAGE 2

ii 2016 MONIKA FRISBY ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

PAGE 3

iii This thesis for the Master of Humanities degree by Monika Jeane Frisby has been approved for the Humanities & Social Science Program by Omar Swartz, Chair Margaret L. Woodhull Robert Metcalf Date: December 17 2016

PAGE 4

iv Frisby, Monika (MH, Humanities and Social Science ) tion of Love Thesis directed by Associate Professor Omar Swartz ABS T RACT for the love of others had on his philosophy I conduct an existential genealogy of his perception of love from the ideal formed in childhood, along the path of experiments prefo rmed throughout his philosophy It is my contention that Nietzsche determined to change his perception of love following the disillusionment of what he had conceived to be his ideal, and that evidence for this can be found by analyzing his investigations of morality. From originally perceiving love as pure and unegoistic to redefining it as an act of egotism cloaked as virtuous, I posit that in his suffering Nietzsche continually struggled to assimilate the ima ge of love he asserted in his work. With the use of his personal writings I expose contradiction between his published contentions and private expressions and propose that he wore his philosophical perspectives as a mask veiling the suffering experienced from battling his desire for love Due to the existential crises Nietzsche underwent whil e contending with his desire I aruge that m uch of his anguish was self induced In his efforts to avoid the pain he associated with love, I reveal irony in Nietzsche assertion tha t suffering should be embraced. My work concludes proposing that final perception of love finds concurrence with his perception of suffering ending Thr The form an d content of this abstract are approved. I recommend its publication. Approved: Omar Swartz

PAGE 5

v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The successful completion of this work would not have been possible without the assistance of my parents Dr. Elisabeth Stein, David and Merry Ann Fri sby, who consistently supported me both personally and professionally. I would also like to acknowledge my dear friend, Joshua Howard, for his many hours of assistance and encouragement Lastly, I would like to thank my major professor, Omar Swartz, fo r his unswerving support and patience with me through the completion of my Master s Thesis

PAGE 6

vi TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION Introduction ......................... ....................................... ..................... ............ 1 Methodology ......... .......................... ............................................................. 4 Review of Literature .................................................................................... 7 II. EARLY LIFE AND WORKS Formulating an Id eal of Love ................ ................. ..... ..............................10 Music, Poetry and Religion ................................. ...................... ................. 1 1 Schopenhauer and Wagner .................................................. .............. ....... 1 5 The Birth of Tragedy ...................... .................................................... ...... 20 Untimely Meditations .................................... ..... ....................................... 26 III. DISILLUSIONMENT AND MASK ING SUFFERING Human, All Too Human .............................................. ..............................3 4 The Dawn .................................................................. ............... .................. 50 The Gay Science .. ................ ............................................. ..... .................... 5 7 Thus Spoke Zarathustra ...................................... ................. ............... ....... 68 IV. CONCLUSION Philosophy of the Future Beyond Good and Evil ......................... ............ ............. ........ ............ 8 0 On the Genealogy of Morals .... ................. ............................... ... ......82 The Case of Wagner ..... ....................................... ..............................8 3 Twilight of the Idols, The Antichrist, Nietzsche contra Wagner .. .... 84

PAGE 7

vii Ecce Homo ........ ............................. .............................. .......... ....... ........ ..... 86 Conclusion Last L etters ........ .... ......... ..... ..... 9 7 Cosima; Perception of Love ...... ...................... .................. ............................100 ollapse .... .... .... 1 0 5 Becoming a C hild .............. .............................. ....................... ...... 1 08 BIBLIOGRAPHY ................ .......................... ........... ............. ................................... ....... 1 11

PAGE 8

viii ABBREVIATIONS A T O Antichrist Twilight Case of Wagner Nietzsche contra Wagner AI Anxiety of Influence BGE Beyond Good and Evil BT The Birth of Tragedy CP Consolations of Philosophy CIS Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity CN Conversations with Nietzsche DD The Dawn/Daybreak EH Ecce Homo GS The Gay Science GM On the Genealogy of Morals HH Human all Too Human LN Living with Nietzsche CL Nietzsche: A Critical Life NB Nietzsche: A Philosophical Biography NP Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist UL Nietzsche Unpublished Letters NW PB Peacock and the Buffalo PN Poetry of Friedrich Nietzsche SL Selected Letters of Friedrich N ietzsche Z Thus Spoke Zarathustra TN To Nietzsche : Dionysus, I Love You! Ariadne UM Untimely Meditations WN Wagner and Nietzsche W S What Nietzsche Really Said WP Will to Power

PAGE 9

1 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Introduction This work investigates the philosophies of Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche through the lens of his personal writing s to demonstrate the affect his desire for the love others had on the of love, tracing the development of his philosophies as he internally struggled with his desire for the love of others I will argue that his ceaseless motivation to continue creating and publishing his works, beyond constant criticisms and financial difficulties, was greatly inspired by his intention to overcome his desire. I assert that the experimentation Nietzsche exhibited in his philosophical works regarding conceptions of love, such as separating it from other virtues he considered to be of value, reveal his efforts to shift his perspectives. In proclaiming that suffering is a neces Nietzsche wore his philosophies as a mask of self confidence to conceal his own internal conflictions. Through a chronological comparison of his philosophical works and personal writings, I will estab suffering and morality were largely inspired by his objective to overcome desiring love. notions he professed in his works and the behavior exhibited in his personal writings. In demonstrate the difficulties he faced while experie ncing extreme existential crises but to prove as well that his internal conflicts served in the formation of his concepts.

PAGE 10

2 Nietzsche at times presented unexamined conjectures rather than finely tuned philosophical theories in his efforts to combat his desire. Walter Kaufmann, in his wor k Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist indicates, it is true that Nietzsche often must distinguish between the human and the all too (NP, p. 84). too human ad hominem arguments against any philosopher on the basis of such statements seem trivial and hardly p concur with Kaufmann that expressing opinions not questioned critically does not diminish a ocess. My disagreement with Kaufman n s point lies in my contention that consideration of too rather provide a greater understanding of his works through a more exhaustive manner of investigation. I argue that Nietzsch the love of others leads to a deeper understanding of his philosophies by offering insight into his assessment demonstrates his conflicting emotional struggles, which I posit he underwent throughout the course of his life. It is not in topics such as government, education, or religion in which Nietzsche exhibits behaviors contradict ory to his philosophies, but in m atters of create his own truths by alte ring his personal perspectives I posit that Nietzsche ventured to reinterpret love so as

PAGE 11

3 to overcome the suffering it caused him and I emphasize that t his way of interpreting his life assert that his intention to over come his desire for the love others through continual reevaluation of his philosophies made Nietzsche all t 3 he more prolific I t was his efforts in substanti ally to the brilliance of his philosophies, and accordingly the focus of this work is to demonstrate the relevance desring love served in the formulation of his published works I contend that was formed in his childhood as a resp onse to the early loss of his father His ideal came to fruition in the man who would serve as his father figure, Richard Wagner and found expression in his early works, The Birth of Tragedy and Untimely Meditations As a direct response to experiencing t he disillusionment of his ideal when breaking with Wagner, I posit Nietzsche began his investigations into morality. It is my contention that, suffering in his desire, Nietzsche endeavored to discredit love through its connection with morality. In d emonstrating that love was not an unegoistic aspect of mankind, but rather a selfish act intent on possession, Nietzsche st r ove to overcome his desire. Though his investigations into morality aided him in redefining love, Nietzsche continually faced great difficulty in dissuading his emotional longing for others. The struggles Nietzsche experienced are exposed by the contradictions revealed between his philosophies and his personal writings, such as condemning pity as detrimental ile simultaneously calling for compassion from his friends. As Nietzsche professed his need for solitude he cried out to those he knew of his loneliness, and lamented in his poetry of the suffering life inflicted upon him. In recognition of his

PAGE 12

4 hypocrisy, I argue Nietzsche furthered his efforts by intensifying his claims of the necessi ty of soul wrenching suffering : To those who are of any concern to me I wish suffering, desolation, sickness, ill treatment, indignities I wish that they should not remain unf amiliar with profound self contempt, the torture of self mistrust, the wretchedness of the vanquished: I have no pity for them, because I wish them the only thing that can prove today whether one is worth a nything or not that one endures (WP, 1887, p. 481) In his attempt to maintain an appearance of confidence while struggling in his desire for the love others I propose Nietzsche donned his philosophies as a mask, veiling his conflicting emotions with his work. Essentially Nietzsche demonstrated the rea lity of his declaration that there are no absolute truths and that life is a process of becoming (HH, p. 13). Though his behaviors reveal the truth of his struggles, Nietzsche did contend with lifelong issues of ill health which increased his suffering I will argue that much of his suffering was psychosomatic, directly relating to the loneliness he experienced in self imposed isolation while battling his desire for love. I will argue that at the end of his productive life, Nietzsche removed his mask and r eached out with his new perception of love in the final moments of his lucidity Methodology in overcoming his desring love through his The A nxiety of Influence ents a method of interpretation which correlates to the intention of my thesis to move central philosophical themes to his underlying intentions to overcome desiring the love of

PAGE 13

5 others Establishing new interpretations are possible, Bloo m explains, by recognizing that comes out of a complex act of strong misreading, a creative p. xxiii). As misprision indicates an intentional misreading of an creative misreading thus involves formulating a new interpretation by going beyond the boundaries of the contextualizing his work with the purpose of forming a new perspec tive, an d is with this intention that I approach deciphering philosophies, as I consider his emotional struggles when interpreting his theories This process of forming a new perspective is precisely what I argue Nietzsche was endeavoring regarding his perception of love. Bloom himself credit s with inspiring the research which forms his work (AI, p. xxvi). Untimely Meditations he discusses the dominance of h istorical perspectives on current cultures. Bloom pinpoints this idea to hig hlight his point that there is pressure on writers to create something unique bey ond that of their predecessors. The anxiety Bloom refers to comes from Untimely Meditat ions : We moderns have nothing whatever of our own; only by replenishing and cramming ourselves with the ages, customs, arts, philosophies, religions, discoveries of others do we become anything worthy of notice, that is to say, walking encyclopaedias (UM, p.79). Poetic misprision, Bloom explains, serves not only in a study of the life of the writer, 8). Utilizing the method of a creative misreading presents the opportunity of an imaginative approach to a Concerning new interpretations of previously

PAGE 14

6 language. He explains: The person who uses words as they have never before been used, is best able to language is as contingent [and so] by her own sheer strength, she has broken out of one perspectiv e, one metaphoric, into another (CIS, p. 28). Through the performance of reevaluating prior thoughts, Rorty explains that a departure from continuity leads toward the creation of something new (CIS, p. 25). In this way, my work will connect with, and break away implications of morality by highlighting his personal struggles with desiring love. Through a philosophical works by consideri ng his emotional conflictions, thus exemplifying the also offers the invention of what Rorty refers to as a new language through a unique interpretation of Nietz life and works. al writings, but I assert that it rather serves to praise his work while finding my own interpretation through the inspiration theory, warmly declaring that writers are q uite capable of creating new words with their own between using language which is familiar and universal and producing language which, though initially unfamiliar an d idiosyncratic, somehow makes tangible the blind impress all 9). When addressing Nietzsche in the same vein as Bloom,

PAGE 15

7 Rorty suggests that what Nietzsche considers of great importance is the division from old to new ways o just insofar as it escapes from inherited descriptions of the contingencies of its existence and the well theory. In departing from the conting entions surrounding morality my thesis performs a reevaluation of his theories by performing a creative misreading of his texts. By contrasting the assertions Nietzsche made in his works with the behaviors demonstrated in h is letters my thesis offers a new perspective of his doctrines. As way, my thesis offer s philosophies through the shared, yet unseen passageways of his public works and private expressions (AI, p. 96). Review of Literature and poetry requires biographical information as well as philosophical and literary analysis. With these requirements, my thesis relies heavily on six key sources. Foremost among them work Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist As a principal academic in the field of Nie between his different theories, and numerous examples of exceptional translations. Perhaps

PAGE 16

8 nsive knowledge in these areas provides him with an Though supplying much of the same historical information as Kaufmann, Rdiger Nietzsche: A Philosophical Biography and Ronal Nietzsche: A Critical Life philosophies from unique perspectives. Safranski commonly presents a psychological examination whereas Hayman often offers more of a metaphori cal perspective. Both authors provide development throughout the course of his philosophical theories also offers opinions on the development of Nietzs her focus on his association with women particularly benefits my relationship with the women in his adolescence, as well as the intellectual women with whom he mingl ed in his adult years, distinctly serves to assist in establishing origin and progression of his perception of love. The Poetry of Friedrich Nietzsche is exceptional in its considera tion of youth to his last rhythmic expressions before his collapse, further offering comparative interpretations between his poems and his philosophies. Regardin g Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche serves as my additionally offers clarification regarding translation and background information. Sander L. Conversations with Nietzsche: A Life in the Words of His Contemporaries also

PAGE 17

9 close friends, journalists, authors, and even medical professionals offers a unique understanding of These authors, and other minor sources, provide the groundwork needed for my thesis. This s cholarly assistance supplies through the lens of his personal writings, allowing for a clear demonstration of the affect his desire for the love of others had on the formation of his theories.

PAGE 18

10 CHAPTER I I EA RLY LIFE AND WORKS Formulating an Ideal of Love Within the first five years of his life Nietzsche experienced profound love and suffering having lost his only close companion, his father Karl Ludwig, and then his little brother Ludwig Joseph, less than six months later (NB, 1849/50, pp. 351 2). Years later he wrote of how deeply these losses affected him he thought of being separated forever from had of his dece E xperiencing love and suff ering at such a young age I contend, ideal of love as selfless and unconditional. Specifically, I argue that the early death of his father directly contributed to the formulation of his perception of lov e because the brevity of their close relationship intensified affections, leading his young mind to regard the love his father gave as ideal Furthermore, I posit that the lack of affection Nietzsche received from his mother, Franziska, heighte ned his reverence for his father. Diethe suggests, was hindered by the difficulties she faced in her own life At the age of seventeen Franziska was rushed into marriage with Karl and moved into a house which included his moth er an d two sisters (NW, pp. 12, 15). Immediately upon joining the Nietzsche household, Diethe explains, Franziska was mother in

PAGE 19

11 12). be somewhere which Diethe argues frustrated Fran zi development and accounts for uproot her children and move with his dominating family from Rcken to Naumburg due to the need of financial assistance, thus furthering her misery (NW, p. 14). I concur with Diethe assertion ultimately it was unhappiness that affected her ability to give Nietzsche the affection he desperately needed after losing his father and little brother. Additionally, Diethe opposes the sim plicity of assertions regarding Franziska cold and harsh demeanor toward her children, suggesting rather that she was Diethe explains that Franziska was brought up with the st rict pietism of her father, She indicates specifically in that, as a strict follower of Lutheranism, 13). Thus in addition to losing his beloved father and little brother, a s well as lac king affection from his mother Nietzsche childhood also consisted of conflictions regarding the specifics of religious behavior. Music, Poetry and Religion gardless of the antagonism between his mother and his fat Grundlehner posits that sen, whom

PAGE 20

12 Nietzsche met in 1859 when they were students at Schulpforta, recollected his friend differently (PN, p. 19 ). Recalling their confirmation on Laetare Sunday, in 1861, Deussen holy, ecstatic mood We would have been quite ready to die immediately to be wi th Christ, and all our thoughts, 11). music, as his sister attempts at composing, when he was Messiah in the Spring of 1854 (CN, p. 6). It becomes clear that this inspiration was really more about appreciation of music though, for when recalling the same period later in autobiographical fragments, Nietzsche (SL, 1868/9, p. 47). This admiration for music stems back to his earliest experiences, Hayman explains, for as crying as infant Nietzsche was responsive to his fathe piano Music was often referenced in his poetry, which can be seen as early as 1858, when Nietzsche 55). Additionally, when Nietzsche was a teenager Dietrich Fischer Dieskau explains in his work, Wagner and Nietzsche he created a music club at school which required all participants to create and submit monthly musical composition s for collective critic ism (WN 1860, p. 2). Though Deussen was not immediately aware, Nietzsche had begun to separate himself from religion long before work The Life of Jesus in 1864, to which Nietzsche e that such proclamations

PAGE 21

13 p. 21). L osing his father and little brother I maintain led Nietzsche to determine early in life that suffering was not excusable by th e pretext of faith. When he was nineteen, Nietzsche wrote to Elisabeth expressing his frustrations regarding faith and blindly following strict paths designated as truthful for the purpose of comfort: Every true faith is indeed infallible; it performs wha t the believing person hopes to find in it, but it does not offer the least support for the establishing of an objective truth. Here the ways of men divide. If you want to achieve peace of mind and happiness, then have faith; if you want to be a disciple o f truth, then search (SL, June 1865, p. 7). Concerning faith and his emotional struggles, Nietzsche found expression in his poetry. Elisabeth explained character was a certain melancholy, which often isolated himself, focusing his att entions on literature and music (CWN, p. 5). At the age of ten Nietzsche had already complied more than a dozen poems, and by thirteen, Grundlehner explains, he d etermined that poetry lacked objectivity and that his future writing should pp. 3 5). irectly following this assertion he did exactly the opposite and wrot e a reflective poem : perceive ourselves within it, this / I would like to call the highest thing / To which we can C ree distinct periods describes that, by the age of fourteen the poetry early in life is consistent with the implacable self criticisms with which he continued to evaluate many of his subsequent p 3 5). In addition to offering

PAGE 22

14 concurrence with my assertion that Nietzsche contended with internal conflictions early in life, Grundlehner also indicates that this contradiction poetry O n the one hand he distrusted the poetic impulse as a corruption of truth, yet on the other he felt a propensity to express himself in the very mode of discourse that he held most suspect (PN, p. 5). clearly offers early evidence which corresponds to what I argue as his emotional conflictions and the perspectives expressed in his philosophical works illustrating that t hese paradoxes were already in play at a young age. also his thoughts regarding his own formation of God: I have never experienced / The joy and happiness of life. / I look back sadly / Upon times t hat are long vanished. / I do not know what I love / I have neither peace nor image / Of God / From day to day more distorted / I form God / According to my rudimentary c haracter. /I awoke from heavy dreams / Through a dull r inging (PN, 1860, pp. 16 17). The pain Nietzsche experienced could not be stifled by faith, and so during his adolescence he began ponder ing the meaning behind his suffering, taking the first steps to The World as Will and Representation in a used bookstore, and detailed in his diary the immense aff ect the Here I saw a mirror in which I beheld the world, life, and the personal spirit in dreadful grandeur. Here I was stared at by the fully indifferent solar eye of art. Here I

PAGE 23

15 saw disease and healing, exile and re fuge, hell and heaven: the need to know myself, nay, gnaw myself a sunder, took violent hold of me (WN, 1865, p. 23). With this, Nietzsche had officially become a disciple of Schopenhauer, directly influ encing his perceptions of morality and suffering, as well as creating the foundation for a r elationship which would alter the course of his life and works. Schopenhauer and Wagner not only offered Nietzsche new ways of conceiving morality and suffering, but as well denoted a share d love and endorsement of the arts. S pecifica lly Fischer Dieskau indicates that Schopenhauer perceived music as a means of directly expressing the reality and form of things (WN, p. 24). T hough music may not be able to convey any rational knowledge F ischer Dieskau explains, Schopenhauer contended that during the performance, (WN, p. 24). Nietzsche discussed this particular experience often throughout the course of his philosophical wor ks. In a letter to Carl von Gersdorff whom Nietzsche met in 1861 when attending Schulpforta written April 1866, he noted that the three things which most assisted him in relaxing were Schopenhauer, music and his solitary walks (SL, p p. 3, 12). Like music and Schopenhauer Nietzsche walks in nature were of great importance to him and when writing Gersdorff he enthusiastically expressed lightning, the wind, the hail, free powers, without ethics! How fortunate, how strong they are, pur wanted to b e lifted up and carried away fro m my monotonous work; I was gree dy for the years later Nietzsche did join the military and during his time in the Franco Prussian War,

PAGE 24

16 contracted dysentery, diphtheria, and sustained a major chest injury after falling from his horse (SL, 1870, pp. 32, 69). When he returned in the fall of 1870 Nietzsche met and established a lifelong friendship with the new professor of theology in Basel, Franz Overbeck (SL, p. 51). and Schopenhauer served as a connection to one of the most profound and transformative relationships of his life. Three years following his hard Wagner (SL, 1868, p. 37). In Wa gner Nietzsche found not only a fellow advocate of Schopenhauerian philosophy and a direct connection to a new, inclusive world of music, I contend he also perceived in the composer the realization of his ideal of love. Born just a few months before Karl N ietzsche, Wagner filled the position of father figure well, offering autho aptivation had long been in place as Tristan had enchanted him long before their meeting, inspiring him t o place the composer on the same level of genius as Schopenhauer and Goethe understood the essence of music Hayman explains, more, a nd so the relationship between beloved master and disciple was formed (CL, p. 98). ship with Wagner placed him in a world which offered more than music and philosophy. T he composer also introduced a host of friends who glorified Nietzsc the attention and affection he had longed for since childhood. Kaufmann indicates that, house in Tribschen were as close as he ever came to ha

PAGE 25

17 letter to Wagner written in May 1869, Nietzsche expressed his gratefulness to the composer for his profound friendship: The best and loftiest moments of my life are associ ated with your name, and I know of only one other man, your great spiritual brother Arthur Schopenhauer, whom I How many purely scientific problems have been gradually clarified for me by contemplating your personality, so soli tary and of such remarkable presence (SL, pp. 53 4). During these self thinking. Thoughts which po conception of Bayreuth. In December 1870, Nietzsche discussed this particular project in a letter to Erwin Rohde, whom he met in 1866, and requested that desire of the future. Read it it is a revelation of the spirit in which we we! p p. 3, 74) Though Nietzsche was dedicated to the abandonment of his career in Philology, an action stanchly insisted upon by Wagner, his movement was not as rapid as his master desired Nietzsche was thus compelled to express his dedication to his surrogate father : 66). Nietzsche did attempt to swi tch his position of professor of philology for the chair of philosophy, but was denied (SL, 1871, p. 76).

PAGE 26

18 His dedication to Wagner, I argue, inspired a weakness in Nietzsche which would stir d induced a different kind of self criticism in Nietzsche than that of his former efforts of self analyzation, for he became reproachful of his personal musical compositions following harsh criticism from one of anti compositions Blow had ever cruel and unkind belittlement was to th ank Blow for his criticism and humbly request that So that is not music at all? This makes me quite happy; I need no longer concern k only one thing of you do not make Tristan responsible for my sin (SL, October 1872, p. 107). It is my contention that this perspective of love as h s opinion to dictate his musical ambitions, I posit, expose of his which would later enrage him Accordingly I assert that this early submissive behavior directly later dissection of morality with the intention t o disavow love because of recognition of past weaknesses. s response to the severe criticisms of his music, Kathleen Higgins and Robert Solomon in their work, What Nietzsche Really Said suggest un off with Cosim osima. W hen Nietzsche first met Cosima

PAGE 27

19 in the Tribschen household I propose that he perceived in her his first impression of the unegoistic love of a mother. Considering that, in his youth, Nietzsche only briefly experienced the love of his father while motherly lo ve was ambiguous, I argue that when he attached his ideal of love to his father figure Wagner, he saw in Cosima a kind of motherly love. As N differently, so too did he see Cosima in a new light, but this, along with opposing assertions from other scholars, will be addressed later in this work. Suffice it to say for now, an y affections Nietzsche had for Cosima in no way hindered his dedication to his beloved master. demonstrated clearly in his first major publication, The Birth of Tragedy Kaufmann insi sts, Cambridge addition of The Birth of Tragedy it is noted that the text is directly influenced by his Opera and Drama (BT CAM, p. xxxiv). In a letter to Wagner, Nietzsche expressed gratitude and his intentions pertaining to The Birth of Tragedy as it regarded the composer: Every page you will find that I am only trying to thank you for everything you have he warmest thanks for your love (SL, p. 91). rwhelming, and it is my contention that in living within the ideal of love he had conceived in the idolization of his father. The perceptions demonstrated in his early works, I posit were a result of his experiencing the love he had long desired from the fathe r figure he had found in Wagner.

PAGE 28

20 The Birth of Tragedy whom he pictured as more wonderful than he had actu of the perceptions presented in The Birth of Tragedy thinking for example the value he gave to music. Grundlehner notes that with this work, opted for music because of 8). Unlike his childhood doubts regarding the ability to express truth in poetry, Nietzsche found that music wa s always a trusting medium: give us an idea of what is meant by the justification of the world as an aesthetic p. 141). The aest hetic phenomenon clearly offers purpose and meaning sensitive, so vehement in [their] desires, so singularly capable of suffering have endured existenc truck him as too pious, and he retreated from it in favor of an artistic approach to life. He sought enhancement of life in In a letter to Gersdorff written in April 1866, Nietzsche discussed the association of religion an Belief in an historical ev ent or in an historical person, then I'll have nothing to do with Christianity. But if it means simply the need for redemption,

PAGE 29

21 then I can va lue it highly, and do not even object to its attempt to discipline philosophers, who are too few in comparison with the mass of those needing redemption though made of the same stuff yes, even if all those who practice philosophy were to be followers of Sc hopenhauer! But only too often there lurks rea lize its own self glorification (SL, pp. 12 13). This letter indicates that less than five years before beginning The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche had conceived value in the concept of redemption, going so far as to discredit philosophers who all too often mask their egotistical assumptions of truth, denying at part of the downfall in culture is found in the avoidance of contemplating suffering. The censuring of Whereas suffering was once seen as primordial and natural, Euri the chorus and greater focus on comedies depleted Athenian performances, generating a The new ideas of suggesting reason over passion and emotions within tragic production were to blame for rationality, it was not only the playwright Nietzsche faulted, as he asserted that even Dionysus nor Apoll o, but an altogether newborn demon, called Socrates with his above letter, Nietzsche references a mask as shielding hidden egoistic attempts to determine truth Though I agree regarding redemption, for it completely neglects the importance the term serves in Dionysian aspects. Nietzsche explains that in the oneness experienced through the loss of ego, which

PAGE 30

22 principium individuationis f or the first time mankind through art, as Safranski seems to suggest when discrediting the term, but rather, I for life by acknowledging the suffering aspects of existence. also emotion; not simply joy, but likewise suffering, as well as recognizing both his oneness with nature and his individuation. Nietzsche offers two Greek gods as examples of the principium individuationis with bea everything subjective vanishes into complete self the union of these aspects, represented by Apollo and Dionysus, which bring s awareness to mankind through a greater comprehension of the duality within his existence. There is necessity in illusion, and by use of Apollo, Nietzsche explains that the god ows us how necessary is the entire world of suffering, that by means of it the individual through Apollonian illusion demonstrates that suffering does not need to exist in unmo vable melancholy, but rather may be turned into beautiful creations. It is through his suffering that mankind regains possession of his love for life; he finds redemption through discovering

PAGE 31

23 Excess revealed itself 7). Though tru th resides in the universality of the Dionysian experience, Nietzsche echo of the universalia ante rem s; in his separation, he contemplates through reflection, and so the Apollonian is needed to 127). Nietzsche addresses the necessity of illusions in regards to rec ognizing the suffering of others as well, for in the Dionysian there is no separation. However powerfully pity affects us, it nevertheless saves us in a way from the univ ersality and lets us find delight in individuals; it attaches our pity to them, and by means of them it satisfies our sense of beauty which lo ngs for great and sublime forms (BT, p. 128). ion by separating the very attachment formed in the oneness of Dionysus, for in this separation he experiences pity for others by perceiving their suffering as distinct from his own. In a letter to Deussen in February 1870, Nietzsche discussed pity and man We do not wish to convert others to our way of thinking, because we feel the gulf between them and ourselves to be one established by nature. Pity becomes truly a familiar feeling to us We grow more and more silent (SL, pp. 63 4). Though the separation he described to Deussen was a deception, for Nietzsche asserts

PAGE 32

24 (BT, p. 128). ilencing 48). It is my contention that of the Dionysian experience of loss of ego finds harmony with the selfless aspect of his ideal of love. Within the destruction of the individual, love is found; through the release of the ego mankind discovers his universality. Safranski explains that, when transcending the principium individuations emerges from his detachment to join with in his egoless state, mankind finds union with others within in the chaos of existence. Consisting of both suf fering and passionate emotions, love itself is chaotic, and in his insistence of the necessity of both Apollonian and Dionysian aspects, Nietzsche implies that love serves as a union of individual and universal sentiments. Nietzsche proclaims a need of Apo and selfless devotion; he experiences suffering in his love while also bein g redeemed by love within his suffering. selfless love Nietzsche imagined receiving from his father was so deeply engrained that he was unable to internalize his own theory prior to experiencing for himself the intensive binaries of pleasure and pain in love. In his work, Robert Solomon as Only as an aesthetic phenomenon is the

PAGE 33

25 world just ified, feel p. 70 1). During the creation of his The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche was surrounded by love and so felt happy in his life. He had high expectations regarding the publication of this work, the book will have tremendous sales the gentleman who does the vignette can This was not the case though, for in October 1872, Nietzsche expressed his grief surrounding his recent publication people have kept quiet now for ten months, because all actually think they are be yond and 4). One such acquaintance who did not respond upon inquiry, was Friedrich Ritschl whom he met in 1865 while studying philology at Le ipzig University (SL, p. 3) To his newly acquainted Wagnerian friend, Malwida von Meysenb ug, Nietzsche Birth of Tragedy has made of me the most offensive philologist of the present day, to defend whom could be a true marvel of courage, for everyone is of a mind to von Wilamowitz Moellendorff, a young scholar of philology, was especially harsh when proclaiming d, let him take up the thyrsus and move from India to Greece, but he should step down from the podium from which he is supposed to be teaching gene ration of philologists (NB, January 1883, p. 83).

PAGE 34

26 e had become aware that a professor student who had intended to attend Basel University exclaimed gratitude that he had not gone to a university in which Nietzsche was e mployed (SL, p. 110). Though humbly expressing live really in the midst of a solar system of loving friendship, consoling encouragement, and (SL, p. 110). A side from lamenting the harmful reception his work had received, Nietzsche concluded his letter explaining that ber 1872, p. 110). His assertion that he had hope and light in his life despite the negativity his work received, I argue, illustrates the extent of happiness while living love. He could be cheerful beyond suffering bad reviews of his work beca use of feeling fulfilled emotionally by his relationship with Wagner, who initially appeared to offer Nietzsche the selfless and unrestricted love he believed to have received from his father. Untimely Meditations Birth of Traged y affected him deeply, but the support he had received from Wagner kept him positive. The light he perceived in his master was consistently attend his beck and call. Unable to

PAGE 35

27 Christmas in 1872, Nietzsche hoped to make amends by visiting him in Bayreuth in April. I know very well, dearest master, th at such a visit cannot be a time of leisure for independence, but in vain. Enough very slow and not at all versatile mind. It is true that I grow more melancholy every day when I feel so strongly how much I would like to help you somehow (SL, April 1873, p. 118). Though humble in the letter, Nietzsche too allotted room for himself by suggesting that he be perceived as a pupil rathe r than a subject, though this too he conveyed with a meek attention, and during Christmas 1874, wrote to his disciple regarding the direction of his life: I believ e you ought to marry or compose an opera; either would be as good or as bad why do you scorn this so fervently? Gersdorff and the whole Basilicum can spare have to be a male!... compose your opera, which will probably be bloody hard to perform. What the dev il made you a pedagogue anyway? (WN, pp. 121 2). Fischer Dieskau explains that, prior to the letter, Wagner invited Nietzsche to move in with him and Cosima, and that, with his letter, he demonstrated a thoughtful effort to comfort his friend (WN, p. 122). Though I do not contend with Fischer Nietzsche, as well as the agency he assumed in his life. nature tends to make him suspicious obligations toward myself, which are very hard to fulfill, with my health in such a fragile

PAGE 36

28 for he struggled s o much with his eyesight that he often had to dictate his work (SL, p. 119). Though assisted by Gersdorff, when writing Untimely Meditations Nietzsche was so hindered by his vision he was driven to seek medical assistance (WN, p. 104). In May 1875, Nietzs come limping and late; you must forgive me, beloved master. I mean by this the uncertainty 4). In June 1875, Nietzsche wrote to Gersdorff that his illness caused him to vomit for hours brining on headaches which lasted for days; a month later he wrote again that he had gone to Steinabad to seek medical assistance, and by December 1875 wrote that he was so severely sick he beli eved himself to have brain damage (SL, pp. 132, 136). There is no doubt that Nietzsche suffered greatly from physical ailments, but it is my contention that much of his illness was prompted by his own anguish. An example of his illness is found in his reaction of dismay over Heinrich Romundt and Nietzsche had been friends since their student days in Leipzig, and so when writing to Rohde in Fe bruary 1875, Nietzsche expressed that their closeness made his so much more disturbing after eight years of intimacy, I have been wounded precisely in a The incident upset Nietzsche to such an extent that it followed with more than thirty sorrows becomes more prominent in later y ears, for at this time he was still happy in love and

PAGE 37

29 so happy in sharing joy even more rare and noble than the po his Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche posited the importance of illusions in his Untimely Meditations specifically associating it with love: It is only in love, only when shaded by the illusion produced by love, that is to say in the unconditional faith in right and perfection, that man is creative. Anything that constrains a man to love less than unconditionally has severed the roots of his stre (UM p. 95). Nietz sche explains the asserting that this sentiment assists him in his creativity. His emphasis on the fault in anything less than unconditional love demonstrates that he felt it to hold s uch value that to be without it w ould result in loss of strength, causing dishonesty. With Wagner, Nietzsche felt assured of love, though during the period of creating this S chopenhauer as educator when discussing the Schopenhauerian Schopenhauerian man sp eaks truths, disturbing those who perceive his words as cruelty, and so there is suffering in his deliverance of truths undesired. Regardless of his own anguish, the Schopenhauerian man offers himself up as the one to be despised, willing to sacrifice hims elf and his happiness for (UM, p. 153). Schopenhauer as educator the suffering he would endur e following h is breakup with Wagner, as he would indeed be an

PAGE 38

30 eternal becoming, the Schopenhauerian man despises the measures and standards of life, and thus in his desire to real ize everything, despises his happiness and unhappiness, vices and combines his earlier Dionysian conception of self forgetfulness with an Apollonian conception of individuation. To realize the Schopenhauerian culture : to promote the production of the philosopher, the artist and the saint within us and without us and thereby to work at the perfecting of nature or is hardly so felt 1). Considering the unegoistic nat egoless love and suffering expression of unconditional selflessness and devotion There are two thoughts Nietzsche expressed during t his period which are especially published October 1874, and the other in a letter to Meysenbug, written in April 1876. Beginning with his philosophical work, below N ietzsche explains the experiences of unegoistic love, and thoughts of it in reflection: There are moments and as it were bright sparks of the fire of love in whose light we hich at

PAGE 39

31 these moments moves across into it, and we are thus possessed of a heartfelt longing for bridges between here and there. It is true that, as we usually are, we can contribute nothing to the production of the man of redemption: that is why we hate o urselves as or other we shall have to learn to hate something else, something more universal, and cease to hate our own individuality and its wretched hat elevated we shall also love something else, something we are now unable to love. artists and saints, shall we also be given a new goal for our love and hate (UM p. 161). Here Nietzsche begins to contemplate the reality of his ideal of love, for though he s hope within his pondering, explaining that, though mankind cannot nd loves what he was once unable to love. It is my contention that, as Nietzsche began to withdraw from Wagner, he also began to consider the actuality of his ideal of love. Through the lens of his Schopenhauerian man, Nietzsche pondered the idea of sacri ficing his own happiness, of being despised and an enemy to those he loves, contemplating whether such suffering was necessary in his search for truth. Still perceiving love as valuable, Nietzsche expressed his desires and misgivings in a letter to Meysenb Idealist], published in 1875, Nietzsche shared how it inspired him (SL, p. 142): walked before me as a hi a question which can be answered only by a higher morality and being than I am!... did, and absolutely nothing more! But most probably he will not be able to do so; he lacks the safely guiding instinct of love that is always ready to help. One of the highest themes, of which you have first given me

PAGE 40

32 an inkling, is the theme of motherly l ove without the physical bond of mother and child; it is one of the most glorious revelations of caritas. Give me something of this love, meine hochverehrte Freundin and look upon me as one who, as a son, needs su ch a mother, needs her so much! (SL, April 1876, pp. 142 3). Of all the letters Nietzsche wrote, this one most clearly demonstrates the value and significance he attributed to love, a perception he would later sternly disavow and diligently deconstruct. In this letter Nietzsche questions his abil ity to love purely, comparing such love to an instinct possessed only by mothers He questions what he lacks, calling for assistance g never known it, and asks his revered friend to look upon not to incite pity as he would in later letters, but in an open and honest display of his feelings, genu inely requesting love. Nietzsche again states the importance of love, regarding It is hard to create in anyone this condition of intrepid self knowledge because it is impossible to teach love; for it is love alone that can bestow on the soul, not only a clear, discriminating and self contemptuous view of itself, but also the desire to look beyond itself and to seek with all its might for a higher self as yet still concealed from it (UM, pp. 162 3). Once more Nietzsche appears to recall his Dionysian and Apollonian union, again presents love as the unifier betw een individual ego and selfless oneness. language is

PAGE 41

33 pp. 214 the same for that return to nature arose in the souls of men filled with love, and in their art there sounds nature transformed in love Love and transformation are aga in addressed, but unlike his previous essay on Schopenhauer, Nietzsche here offers more than hope; he offers a solution such as he had in his Bir th of Tragedy in which he stated: world, can give us an idea o f what is meant by the justification of the world as an aesthetic expressing emotions; only music can offer the experience of transforming from an egoistic state to the prima l unity found in nature, and love serves as the unification. Fischer Untimely Meditations thought and new goals. They r (WN, pp. 104 heading toward a break with his beloved master

PAGE 42

34 CHAPTER II I DISILLUSIONMENT AND MASKING SUFFERING Human, All Too Human Higgins and p. 71). During work on his Untimely Meditations Nietzsche had already begun to distance himself from Wagner, denying his offer to move in with him and Cosima and complaining to fes tival and began work on Human, All Too Human (SL, p. 53). A month after his abrupt departure, Nietzsche wrote Wagner a letter discussing his leave of absence from the university, and his plans to visit Italy. W hen noting the misery his sickness had caused him, only people can put me 8). Though Nietzsche intended to appear casual, it was evident that their friendship was coming to an end, and as it tur ned out, two months following this letter Nietzsche and Wagner met for the last time in Italy. During their visit Wager was in a considerably foul instigating their dispute ; Middleton explains though, that what appalled Nietzsche he opportunistic way (SL, November 1876, pp. 149 50). Followin g their quarrel, Nietzs che officially lost th e loving relationship he had with his master and father figure. Though he had shown signs of pulling away, I suggest that

PAGE 43

35 Nietzsche had not intend ed a complete departure from Wagner. His actions were more of a son distancing himself from a stifling father, and so the shock of their separation caused Nietzsche to not immediately comprehend his loss. The suffering Nietzsche experienc ed from losing Wager, I argue, drove him from contemplating his ideal of love to disavowing it entirely. It was a difficult time of transition for Nietzsche, as he went from numerous friends suffering his loss of love in solitude finds resemblance with what he endured as a child after losing his f his determination of self overcoming, which I contend, began with his intention to alter the way he perceived love. In the introduction of Human, All Too Human Richard Schacht aim with this work was to employ relevant to the understanding (HH, p. xvi). It was during this time of experimenting with perspectivis m, I propose, that Nietzsche first donned his philosophical mask, intent on concealing his suffering while endeavoring to argue that he perceived in this awareness a recourse for overcoming the personal suffering he experienced disorders. Paul Re, whom Nietzsche met i n 1873, wrote often to his mother and sister to inform them of the treatments he was undergoing between 1876 and 1877 (SL, pp. 52, 155). In a letter to Meysenbug, Nietzsche himself

PAGE 44

36 very problematic thinking and writing have till now always made me ill; as long as I was In his desolation, Nietzsche struggled in his attempts to change his perspectives, and often exhibited contradictions between the ideas he professed in his philosophies and the behaviors he exhibited in his personal writings. I argue that these contradictions stem from the love of others ; he struggled between logos and pathos, as his emotions contended with the perspectives he endeavored to possess. In his forlornness, Nietzsche began calling to his friends for reassurance. He wrote to plead ing with her to a letter to Rohde, Nietzsche described becoming emotional when thinking of his f riend and you your happiness, or annoyance that someone has taken my friend away and is now In both letters Nietzs letter to Rohde additionally suggests guilt. Nietzsche not only presented his sadness as who took his friend away. In the same letter Nietzsche again attempted to arouse dark room, and

PAGE 45

37 music. ce, Ida Overbeck stated that he lacked self condemner of pity, was continually experimenting w ith it. He bred it even more into himself, in order to vivisect it, to discover it like Christianity, and then to disrecommend it to Human All Too Human Nietzsche exemplified his diversion from perspectives of pity; specifically regarding Schopenhauerian notions which posit recognition way of acts of compassion. In his current work Nietzsche presents pity as m ore injurious to him who offers it than by whom it is received. pity illustrates not only a weakness of the individual seeking attention, but also a kind of him conscious, the u nfortunate man gains a sort of pleasure; in the conceit of his imagination ; they too served to prove that he was In this work Nietzsche contends that the offering of pity serves as self ratification in the 6). Therefore, is an efforts to perceive his own relevance

PAGE 46

38 a complete person and in all that one does to have in view the highest good of this person that gets us further than those pity filled agitations and actions 1). As Nietzsche called for compassion from his friends, he c reated division between self love and love of others in his work. With the use of morality, in Human, All Too Human Nietzsche begins to devalue love by presenting it as an act of ego, rather than of virtue. He offers examples of apparent selfless actions and explains that such conceptions stem from moral ideologies whi ch cause internal conflictions: Is it not clear that in all these instances man loves something of himself something else of himself divides his nature and sacrifices on e part of it to inclination for something (wi sh, impulse, desire) is present (HH, p. 42). perception, I posit that Nietzsche was considering his own a self division regarding his desire for love and in determining that the love of others was in fact egoism, he endeavored to devalue love so as to dissuade his own desire The Prince Nietzsche asserts in e loved and honored at once because love desires while Nietzsche again deva lues love by creating a division between it and power, associating the later with honor and nobleness. for us to feel for

PAGE 47

39 assertion, Nietzsche was doing more than simply demonstr ating that love was not the selfless act it has been assumed to be; by endeavored to denounce entirely the purity and authority attributed to love. ks apart, Nietzsche explains, able Nietzsche asserts that even if such actions were possib le it would require that the receiver of and selfsacrifice would have to have an interest in the continuance of the loveless egoist incapable of self sacrifice, and compel the es that women wish to care take those they love, but when considered in the context of his other declarations, implies that, though she may offer care and comfort, it is only her ego which drives her (HH, p. 151). Nietzsche further proclaims that women sel fishly begrudge the union with him will incre ase the amount they 153). Nietzsche then indicates that the veneration of love women display is no more than

PAGE 48

40 Though being consist in using women to demonstrate the egoism in love, Nietzsche appeared to be unsure regarding the notion of marriage. Exhibiting conflictions, he at times requested assistance in finding a mate, at other times declared that it was not the right choice for him, and in one occasion proposed marriage after only a few days of introd uction. Shortly after meeting Mathilde Trampedach in Geneva in April 1876, Nietzsche quickly sent her a send an apology expressing, (UL, April 1876, p. 68). much that there can hardly be a woman who would be of generous enough mind to follow congratulations to Rohd e for his recent engagement. In addition to noting concerns that he again expressed reservations regarding marriage: I should perhaps not follow you in taking this st ep. For you needed so badly a completely trusting soul, and you have found her and have found therewith yourself except on rare days. Perhaps I have here a bad gap in mys elf. My desire and my need are different I hardly know how to say it or explain it (SL, July 1876, pp. 145 6). needed sertion in Untimely Meditations

PAGE 49

41 Following this, his confession that he only rarely thought marriage necessary because of a s and needs differing, presents evidence of the emotional conflictions he was experiencing. insistent that he be more active in seeking a wife who could take care of him. In Apri l 1877 Nietzsche discussed such suggestions in a letter to his sister, noting that Meysenbug had 1877, pp. 160, 165). In light of the fact that Nietzsche only appeared to consider marriage when discussing the prospect with female friends, whereas with his male friends he voiced strong misgivings, merits consi deration in marriage is found in argument is compelling, and I do not dispute it per se; but rather I suggest that this assertion only considers intentions presumed by his behaviors, rather than addressing the cause of his conflictions. I propose that, what Diethe refers to as Niet fact his fascination with a love of which he was unfamiliar. Recalling his letter to

PAGE 50

42 an inkling, is the theme of motherly With his father and Wagner, Nietzsche understood love within the framework of their relationship, but having never known motherly love, he had no basis of comparison. In associating with the mothers enco untered in his intellectual circles, I suggest Nietzsche gained an admiration for the pure love he imagined they possessed. h my assertion regarding his emotional conflictions (NW, p. 95). Though he knew the suffering experienced in love, Nietzsche still struggled with becomes a demand to be loved, which i 183). With this perspective, Nietzsche could denounce his desire for the love of others as no more than a consuming passion which became demanding under the false belief that it was reciprocal. Deception in love as relating to mankind deceiving himself of his past so as to create a new personal image the deception so that he may ry in the treasure difficulty in regarding his character truthfully, Nietzsche asserts, addressing

PAGE 51

43 to stay in defense, rather than setting out to attack t hose of whom he assumed perpetrated acts of cruelties: The real heroic deed and masterpiece of the good man lies not in his attacking the cause and continuing to love the person but in the much more difficult feat of defending his own cause without inflict ing and desiring to inflict with bit ter anguish the person attacked (HH, p. 227). He follows in describing that the Bitterest error is a false representation of love, [when] we were in fact regarded only as a piece o f household furniture and room decoration for the master of the house to exercise his vanity his lingering pain, further noting that love can exist as an act of crue His misery is not to be ignored though, Nietzsche asserts, and so he suggests as a Recipe for the sufferer that, rather than turning away from his suffering, mankind should he mankind must suffer through the beacons of hell until reaching the level of a hero deserving to drink from the river of forgetfulness. Self Schopenhauerian man, which finds resemblance with his e Spirit in this work. Higher and Low describes their entirety, in all the breadth and prolixity of their convolutions, for he has no wish to get himself enta

PAGE 52

44 a refined heroism which disd Rohde for his engag poem is t hat the wanderer stops in the midst of his journey to ponder a singing bird, and accuses him of being a distraction: chagrin of the heart / Upon me, so that I must stop, / salutes. / I sing because the night is beautiful: / But you must always travel on / And never understand my song! / So get you gone, / And only when your step sounds far / Shall I begin my song again / As best I can. / Now far e thee well, poor traveling man (SL, July 1876, pp. 145 6). Grundlehner interprets the poem as Rohde representing the bird that reproaches Nietzsche the wanderer, and unkno Though I concur with Grundlehner necessary to search new avenues, my interpretation differs in that through a creative misreading, g, as he is

PAGE 53

45 habituation. He ex from himself from his own body and hated, Schopenhauerian man, who despises the measures an d standards of life to the extent that he scorns equally his happiness have to become traitors, be unfaithful, again and again abandon our ideals. We cannot advance from one period of our life into the next without passing through these pains of betrayal and theorized that through personal examination, mankind will become aware that actions he once assumed to be moral were in fact condemnable. The realization will be painful, but cocoon, it tears at it, it breaks it open: then it is blinded and confused by the unfamiliar light, cocoon o f his Wagnerian experience of love to the blindness incited by suffering heartbreak. He contended that birth pangs were necessary, but I propose that here can be found the irony s assertions; as he called to the necessity of suffering he simul taneously attempted to shif t his own perception

PAGE 54

46 Regarding false observations, Nietzsche asserts that only actions can be promised, not the heads of our fellow men the appearance will remain that love is still the same and unchanged One therefore promises the continuation of the appearance of love when one swears to someone ever etzsche feeling like he himself had been deceived, Nietzsche again attempted to devalue love by insinuating that it was not present when it was assumed to be (HH, p. 279). Nietzsche continues this point by making a comparison between love and justice, determining the more valuable sentiment, such as he had with love and honor: of the two?... It is stupid and possesses a rich cornucopia; out of this it distributes its It is as impartial as the rain (HH, pp. 44 5). Love is now presented as impartial, whic h is why it fails when compared with justice. With this assertion, I argue Nietzsche reveals his contention that he was imprudent with his love for Wagner, as his lack of judgement caused him to fail in recognizing that the composer was not deserving. This ion. In January of 1878 Wagner sent Nietzsche Parsifal and in May Nietzsche replied with volume one of his Human All Too Human s

PAGE 55

47 foremost disciple writing the great Christian music drama; the Aeschylus celebrating the very Parsifal reached me, sent by Wagner bound, limited; sheer expressed his thoughts while walking alone: I was sick, more than sick, I was tired tired because of my irresistible di sappointment at everything that remains to inspire us modern men, at the ubiquitously squandered energy, labor, hope, youth, love; I was tired because of my disgust at all the idealistic lying and mollycoddling of the conscience (WN, January 1878, p. 160). was consumed and tormented with thoughts reflecting on suffering in love. In May Nietzsche Human All Too Human to Peter Gast (Heinrich Kselitz), whom he had met when Gast attended his lectures in the winter of 1875: unication seems to have been pronounced against its author too. They are only trying to retain my friends while losing me... Wagner has failed to use a great opportunity for showing greatness of character. I must not let that disconcert me in my opi nion ei ther of him or of myself (SL, May 1878, pp. 52, 166 7). higher morality whose o 24). The little support Nietzsche received for his work was limited t o such friends as Gast, Re, and Jacob Burckhardt, a professor of history Nietzsche met when joining the faculty at

PAGE 56

48 t he University of Basel in 1869 (SL, May 1878, p. 166). Though receiving praise, such as to Human All Too Human 153). Fischer Dieskau asserts that Nietzsche not only offended the Bayreuth community with his work, but his own friends as well, proclaiming When Nietzsche sent a copy of Human All To o Human to Wagner and Cosima, he included an inscription which Fischer To the Master and the Mistress / a cheerful greeting / from Friedrich F reemind in Basel, / blessed with a new child. / He desires that they with moved hearts / examine the child to see / whether it takes after the father, / who knows? even with a and grace of the Mistress / follow it for evermore (WN, pp. 162 3). Contrary to Fischer humor, not the conten tions within the work. I argue that Nietzsche intended with this inscription to present himself as being in good spirits, despite their separation. Last Let us not be afraid of this suffering! Let us rather confront the task which the age sets us as boldly as we can: and then posterity will bless us for it will look back upon both species of cul ture as upon venerable antiques (HH, p. 24). old

PAGE 57

49 for a time in which he would not be dismissed for his new evaluations and insights, as he fe lt he had been in his relationship with Wagner. In July 1878, two months after sending his work to the Wagners, Nietzsche wrote to Mathilde Maier a friend he made during his Wagnerian days, that he had gotten over his distress by realizing its cause, whic h he noted becoming aware of after fleeing from the Bayreuth festival: That metaphysical befogging of all that is true and simple, the pitting of reason against extravagance I mean the a rt of Wagner; both these things finally made me more and live and enemies, habits, comforts, book and complete as a philosopher of life (SL, pp. 167 8). Though appearing poised in his assertions, Nietzsche was far from confident in himself and his life. His health wa s in such a state that by May 1879 he submitted his resignation from the University of Basel, which was officially accepted in June (SL, p. 169). to the impudence of my writings. But others must do everyth ing better, my life as well as my thought Nietzsche concludes Humans All Too Human with a thought which conflicts with the suffering will be a melancholy au thor, a serious author, however, is one who tells us what he has suffered suff ering to his personal writings; with his later work, Ecce Homo he would emulate what he he re calls a serious author. In his following work Nietzsche furthers his argument regarding

PAGE 58

50 the falsity found in the love of others, using morality to place love in the light of suspicion, danger, and an opponent to truth. The Dawn Continuing his in vestigat ions of morality in The Dawn of love begin s to appear more hazardous. His tone reveals an air of cynicism which differs from his prior works. Whereas he previously devalued love by placing it next to honor, associating the latter wi th power because of its correlation with fear, Nietzsche now asserts that love is dangerous and a hindrance to knowledge. In book four, Nietzsche explains that fear is more advantageous than love because fear questions and wishes not to be deceived, wherea 7). divergent take on artists. In his previous coarseness weakness make s uch a discovery (HH, p. 241). In Human All Too Human Nietzsche inferred that such means of manipulation should not be used, whereas in this work he appears to glorify it. In describing the escapism offered by the artist, Nietzsche explains that if mankind were in fact bound to his weaknesses as to a law he would greatly benefit from possessing 6). He notes the faults within compositions by Beethoven, Mozart, and Wagner, explaining that in hearin g the unappealing their weaknesses they have all produced in us a ravenous hunger for their virtues and a ten

PAGE 59

51 times more sensitive palate for every drop of musica l spirit, musical beauty, musical 6). Nietzsche seems to commend such talents, explaining specifically how the enterprise takes place and why it is so successful. s hunger for their deficiency. Perhaps Nietzsche was considering his own weaknesse s in his desiring love as serving to highlight the strength of his philosophies, though he did demonstrate the destructive quality in such utilizations of weaknesses for the purpose of inciting emotional responses. Again Nietzsche cites music as an example noting in book four a connection between love, weaknesses and vulnerability by way of escapism: Could the full happiness of love, which resides in unconditional trust ever have been experienced by anyone who was not profoundly mistrustful, evil and emb ittered? For exception in the state of their soul!... Unconditional trust makes grateful to music s they have of observing is speaking of me, it is speaking in my stead, it knows everything (DD, p. 2 35). Considering an earlier autobiographical fragment in which Nietzsche noted that his a personal reference to his own vulnerability in love is clear. (SL, 1868/9, p. 45). Niet weakness, and thus his desire for the love of others as irrational and misguided. Nietzsche again addresses the artist in a way that suggests he con sidered himself when describing that being an artist is not regulated to those who create externally, for

PAGE 60

52 suffers not from not knowing but from self deception, from the pretense (DD, p. 150). I argue that here Nietz sche attempts to come to terms with his own idolization of Wagner. He attempts to perceive his fascination as misguided while also shaming himself for suffering in love when he should have been aware of his own deception. Further, I suggest that Nietzsche approached his weakness in love by conceiving it as a need for self validation, and therefore he could imagine that his desire was a self created illusion which could be overcome through awareness. With The Dawn Nietzsche strove to draw direct lines betwe of morality, suffering, and weaknesses, and I argue that with this dissection he intended to shift his own emotionally driven perspectives as well as offering mankind new ways of perceiving himself and the world which surrounds him celebrated the new vistas of his freedom in Dawn from Wagner and departure from the university, through a more subjective lens. During this time of introspection, I suggest Nietzsche found himself questioning w hether sacrificing love for the sake of convictions was worth the cost. His letters reveal openly displaying self doubt. These behaviors offer a clear indication of th e emotional

PAGE 61

53 conflictions he was dealing with, and also explain s his need for reassurance concerning the choices he had made. In a letter to Meysenbug, January 1880, Nietzsche wrote with an air of confidence, commending his personal ability to maintain his principles, while also intending to provoke sympathy by exclaiming the immense suffering his decisions had caused him: Writing is for me one of the most forbidden fruits, yet I must write a letter to you, whom I love and respect like an elder sister and it will probably be the last. For my regards torment and self denial, my life during these past years can match that of any ascetic of any time; nevertheless, I have wrung from these years much in the way of purification and burnishing of the soul and I no longer need religion or art as a 1). or should be, able to make me bear false witness about life as I know it to be ing the letter (SL, p. 171). his ability to trounce them, while also anticipating sympathy for his suffering. He referred to himself as a ma rtyr longing for death, an ascetic for his self denial, noted pride in no longer needing religion or art and proclaimed intuition regarding his convictions causing him to be abandoned. Though seeming much like a suffering artist tortured by his convictions argue, which led him to call for compassion and praise in such a theatrical manner. Concluding his letter as he began it, with a depressed wish for death, furthe r reveals his self doubt, insecurity and need of reassurance.

PAGE 62

54 aright when one ceases to give oneself exercise in loving oth ers, wherefore the latter (the ceasing) is to be strongly advised against (from my emotional struggles are expressed even more apparently when ood is it for me to be right in many respects? As though that could wipe this lost affection from my August 1880, p. 204). Though struggling internally, Nietzsche was diligent in his intentions of shifting his perspectives, and so continually attempted to appear confident and self assured. When writing Overbeck a few months later, Nietzsche spoke confidently regarding his solitude: The dignity and the grace of an or iginal and essentially solitary way of living and of must I repea t; have no fears on my account! (SL, November, 1880, pp. 173 5). hat he wanted to remain hidden demonstrates his endeavors in personal overcoming and in assuring Overbeck not to have fears on his account, I suggest Nietzsche was in fact attempting to pacify his own fears concerning his intentions to face his suffering alone. I contend, enabled him to confront his fears and seek to better understand his desire and suffering by e ndeavoring to demonstrate that morality does not stem from inherit virtues but rather exists as the outcome of h istorical belie fs and practices

PAGE 63

55 Nie tzsche opens The Dawn by presenting past perceptions of what constituted rectitude, explaining that moral behavior was once perceived in acts of cruelty. In book one, he offers a historical backdrop as to why mankind viewed cruelty as a virtue. Nietzsche e that voluntary suffering self chosen torture, is meaningful and valuable self inflicted suffering carried forth into future generations. The notion of voluntary suffering finds relations with the concept of martyrdom, a term which denotes both extreme suffering for the purpose of a cause as well as embellished expressions of misery for the purpose of inciting pity. With this consideration, I recall assertions again demonstrate contradiction. Attempting to arouse sympathy in his letters while proclaiming opposition to such behaviors in his theorizatio n I maintain, reveals the donning of his mask. Hayman pond ers resounding yes (CL, p. 231). I maintain that indeed Nie tzsche was formulating how he wanted to live within his works, and that his persistent efforts in presenting the perspectives he wished to possess demonstrate the veiling of his desire with his works. In book two, Nietzsche continues his assertion that lov e is an egoistic act, rather than moralistic behavior: This one is hollow and wants to be full, that one is overfull and wants to be emptied both go in search of an individual who will serve their purpose. And this

PAGE 64

56 process, understood in its highest sense, is in both cases called by the same word: love what? is love suppos ed to be something unegoistic? (DD, pp. 91 2). With this aphorism Nietzsch e attempts to demonstrate that whether argued as needing to receive or needing to give, love still serves as an a ct of ego, indicating another crack in preconceived notions of love. In book five, Nietzsche contends the importance of egoism. He to live in others and for ot hers that has hitherto, with as much thoughtlessness as self confidence, been called Nietzsche himself though, was still very much concerned with the disapproval of others, and so in June of 1881, he wrot e to his sister Elisabeth that he would no longer share (People will certainly Not only was Nietzsche anxious concerning harsh criticisms of his works; he was also worried about how he was perceived by those for whom he cared. In the same month he wrote to his sist er, he also wrote to Overbeck expressing his concerns: with what views I am pleasing people and with which I am causing injury (UL, June 1881, p. 80). Though attempting to feel otherwise through his work, Nietzsche was still consumed with insecurities regarding his desire for love In August 1881, ju st after the publication of The Dawn Nietzsc he wrote to Gast in a way which epitomizes the extent to which he was calling for pity: If I had had to wait for exhortations, encouragements, consolations from outside, where would I be? What would I be? There were truly moments and whole periods in

PAGE 65

57 my li fe (for example, the year 1878) in which I would have felt a strengthening word thought I could rely and w ho could have done me the favor (SL, p. 178). Of course he spoke ot herwise in his work, for in book five, Nietzsche writes a dialogue which disputes his intentions when writing to Gast: A: But why this solitude? B: I am not at odds with anyone. But when I am alone I seem to see my friends in a clearer and fairer light th an when I am with them; and when I loved and appreciated music the most, I lived far from it. It seems I need a distant perspective if I am to think well of things (DD, pp. 199 200). Apprehensions concerning the thoughts others, conflictions with his desi res, and formed his works. In November 1881 Nietzsche could scarcely read, but by January of 1882 his sickness began to subside and he was feeling so well that he wr ote fervently, completing the first three books of the The Gay Science in a few short months (CL, p. 273). The Gay Science more focused examination of self. With new v igor, Nietzsche endeavored to see the world differently, but breaking old habits of mind can be difficult. In such contemplation Nietzsche it is no problem for me to have them; but getting rid of them when I want January 1882, p. his sister describing his realization of the affect his sorrows had on his health: My Wagner mania certainly cost me dear. Has not this nerveshattering music ruined my health? And the disillusionment and leaving Wagner was not that putting my very life in danger? Have I not needed almost six y ears to recover from that pain? (SL, February 1882, p. 180).

PAGE 66

58 Nietzsche had in fact experienced a dramatic recovery from his sickness, and Kaufmann identifies an important aspect regarding how his good health effected his thinking: The Gay Science death. He had thought that he might die in 1880, at the age of thirty six as his father had done; but now he felt that he had been restored to life and become capa ble of a new and halcyon gaiety (NP, p. 65). The joy that Nietzsche was experiencing spilled over into his philosophical theories, a s well as his stylistic format, for the importance Nietzsche gave to poetry became evide nt as he confidently presented an abundance of verse within this work. I contend that poetic talents are of vital significance when attempting to understand his phi losophies, as he was both a stylist and a great thinker and I argue that his poetry serves to credit his philosophical works. poetry is especially sal can that expresses more than the usual commonplaces, and move away from the middle zones of a cre ative misreading, for recognition and consideration of poetic sensibilities serves in discovering a new interpretation of his works, as well as acknowledging the diversity and beauty of his talents written during the same time but not included in The Gay Science each kilo of love, / Take a gram of self that, if mankind must abide his imp ulse to love, he should as well maintain slight personal distain so as not to lose himself entirely. In constant self evaluation, Nietzsche carried forward conceptions of power and pity as well as offering new discussions on disciples and an eternally revo lving existence is his current work

PAGE 67

59 In book one of Gay Science he contends that love and avarice could be the same instinct, continuing to devalue love by comparing it to extreme greed of want of possession. He explains that there are those w Additionally Nietzsche brings pity and love together when considering self change: Our love of our neighbor is i t not a lust for new possessions ? And likewise our love of knowledge, of truth, and altogether any lust for what is new?... Our pleasure in ourselves tries to maintain itself by again and again changing something new into ourselves ; that is what possession exploit this opportunity to take possession of him; those who become his benefactors and pity him, for example, do this and call the lust for a new possession that he (GS, p. 88). Niet zsche condemns love as want of possession but follows by explaining that this into ourselves Nietzsche has always truth so the aphorism seems contrary to the very soul of his philosophies. I suggest that in his renewed health, Nietzsche began to consider his pity inciting behaviors and that the affections he received from others in response may in fact be actions of benef actors intent of exploiting his weakness when in a state of suffering. In recognizing that his behaviors revealed his vulnerability, Nietzsche concerned contend he endeavored to determine Wagner had done. After breaking with his father figure, Nietzsche attempted to discredit the genuineness of love, destroy the ideal he s into ourselves

PAGE 68

60 Much of the experimentalism Nietzsche employs in his philosophies, I argue, was intended to assist in shifting his perspectives. In this way, many of the assertions he puts f orth are based more on his own objectives than on thoroughly examined principles. I Misunderstood sufferer found in book three, serves as an example of his efforts to find value in his experiences so as to shift his perception: icent characters their doubts about their own magnificence not from the sacrifices and martyrdoms that their Recalling his lamenti ng to Meysenbug of his martyrdom, Nietzsche clearly donned his mask in the above aphorism, illustrating his attempt to perceive his weakness of desiring love from a less self condemning position; he endeavored to see his struggles as not being due to inabi lities and personal faults but rather from doubting his own powers and abilities. In this same section Nietzsche offers the Greek god Prometheus as an example of a them, he is happy and great; but when he becomes envious of Zeus and the homage paid to Considering that Nietzsche may have been imagining himself as Prometheus, sacrificing himself for mankind only to be unap preciated, offers another example of his conceiving weakness in love. His desire in itself required measures outside of his own will; it required participation of another to be brought to fruition. After giving mankind fire, suffering retribution from Zeus and then witnessing mankind worship Zeus over him, Prometheus did not despise mankind for their lack of love, but rather suffered from the loss of their love.

PAGE 69

61 Contemplating a different angle, Nietzsche ponders love and suffering Without vanity : are in love we wish that our defects might remain concealed not from vanity but to keep the beloved from suffering. Indeed, the lover would like to seem divine happiness through dishonesty, that mankind would hide his true self, not because of his own Nietzsche previously condemned women for their vanity in wanting to possess the o bject of their love, his present assertion that love wishes to conceal imperfections so as to avoid causing suffering suggests a much softer reflection on self deception. I contend that this turn in nt state of mind following his renewed health and, most notably, his reevaluation of his and choices and beginning to experience happiness. In his heightened mood and disposition, I argue Nietzsche began to see himself in a becoming aware of his calls for s ympathy and reassurance, Nietzsche determined that he did not want to be a tormented soul in need of consolation, but rather a heroic conqueror of suffering. I suggest that Nietzsche was indeed experiencing a kind of Joyful Wisdom Safranski concurs with m y conjecture, explaining that in The Gay Science not wish to grant depression any power over him, and fought it off with euphoria evoked by strove forward in

PAGE 70

62 his de velopment, attempting to understand his suffering through the lens of a warrior confident in his destination. In book three Nietzsche discusses the dynamics of What makes one heroic and suffering by considering the bravery necessary in surviving his torturous experiences. When questioning Originality o see something that has no name as yet and considering that his desire to be love d may not be as connected to moral ideologies as he had presumed under the weight of his suffering (GS, p. 218). I do not suggest that Nietzsche was free from his self contempt, nor that he had succeeded in shifting his perspectives and thus removed his mask. Rather I propose that there was a crack in the wall of his suffering and, absorb ing the light shining through, he strove to move beyond his depression and focus instead on his joy. and that followi ng every publication, 112 13). His suffering and the views he had long held of himself were still alive, they were merely set to the side as he soaked in the euphoria of his happiness. need of reassurance, as Ida described it had earlier but rather, in the light of his confidence, stemmed from an inclination to share ideas. As such, Nietzsche was very open and excited

PAGE 71

63 expresses his position on the role of a disciple, choosing a title which s ums up his thoughts in two word, Vademecum Vadetecum and tendency, / you follow and come after me? / Follow your own self faithfully / take time Nietzsche wrote of how he did not wa nt a disciple such as those attached to dogmatic religions. He wanted someone who would comprehend his thoughts and participate in dialogue. devotion and complete faith in his greatness which even his sister whom he also kind of pupil Nietzsche wan whim, while E lisabeth would like to blend half of his ideas with those of Wagner or Frster 7). debate his assertions required both comprehension and convictio n, and he attributed immense could have confidence in honesty and thus a relationship in which both parties benefit. Nietzsche had never known such a disciple, but t here appeared one person who seemed capable of fulfilling the role; Lou Andreas Salom. In March 1882, Nietzsche traveled to Sicily to stay with Meysenbug and there was introduced to Salom (SL, p. 154).

PAGE 72

64 By all appearances she was precisely what Nietzsche had imagined in a disciple, for having studied philosophy and religion in Zurich, Salom was intelligent in addition to possessing wit and beauty (NB, p. 249). She was intriguing, and Safranski notes that she this inspired hope that he had 1). Diethe further imagined Salom The most cited passage concerning the Eternal Recurrence in The Gay Science is which references the Eternal Recurrence, and I suggest that it offers a much more in depth understanding of the concept: There is no longer any reason in what happens, no love in what will happen to you; no resting place is open any longer to your heart, where it only needs to find and no longer seek; you resist any ultimate peace; you will the eternal recurrence of war and peace: man of renunciation, all this you wish to renounce? Who will give you the strength for that? No body yet has had this strength! (GS, pp. 229 30). In the notes of this work Ka ufmann asserts that this section relates to a preceding one,

PAGE 73

65 not strike hi examination of these aphorisms through the lens of Nietzsche love. with the impression he makes on us: he wants to conceal from us his desire, his pride, his intention to soar beyond for the Man of Renunc un known. Therefore known before and is currently lost Furthermore, Nietzsche preceding lines convey that will happen to the fruition of his ideal of love with Wagner, along with suffering the demise of their relationship caused him to become acutely aware of what he had only temporarily possessed. Dreaming of love throughout his youth offered Nietzsche only the subtle pain of imagining what he did not have, but experiencing the fulfillment of his desire only to have it taken away inspired a mu ch more profound suffering because of possessing the knowledge of what he lost sufferin g so endeavored to convince himself that, rather than desiring the love of others, he beyond

PAGE 74

66 what Nietzsche originally conceived with the Eternal Recurrence, but Salom shifted his thoughts in a different direction. secretes is involved in this new I call it amor fati so mu beloved friend Lou, that I can now think of the two of us Obviously smitten, Nietzsche was completely open and vulnerable, anxious and hopeful, and in many ways, much like the enthusiastic twenty four year old just getting to know Wagner. How much work was done on The Gay Science in the five months Nietzsche knew Salom before it was published in August 1882, is unknown, but I propose that his poem 154 His head was good before he took this whirl: / He lost his wits to the aforesai 63). By all accounts Nietzsche did lose his wits concerning Salom. Kaufmann explains that only intellectual understanding but a response based on Lo After knowing her for less than two month s Nietzsche proposed marriage to Salom in May 1882 (SL, p. 154). After the denial of his proposal, he was still intent on maintaining a relationship with her, so was pleased when a plan was devised that she, Re and himself

PAGE 75

67 would travel and live together during the winter of 1882 and summer of 1883 (CL, p. 246). In June Nietzsche wrote Salom: I connect such high hopes with our plans for living together that all necessary or acciden tal side effects make little impression on me now; and whatever happens, we shall endure it together and throw the whole bag of troubles overboard every evening together shall we not? (SL, 1882, p. 183). Later that month Nietzsche tried but failed to mee t Salom in Berlin, and in July he previous professions, in both his let ters and his works, that he intended to maintain his solitude, this declaration to Salom demonstrates his significant act of opening himself back up to love. Sadly, as with Wagner, the love Nietzsche believed he shared with Salom was an illusion, and in August 1882, their relationship began its downfall. There was a dispute festival in Bayreuth to visit him in Tautenburg, a dispute of which Kaufmann contends they were both partiall y to blame (NP, p. 54). Nietzsche was quick to take sides with Salom and when she left Tautenburg, he wrote to her immediately: I have spoken very little with my sister, but enough to send the new ghost that had arisen back into the void from which it ca me... my dear Lou, the old, heartfelt plea: become the being you are! First, one has the difficulty of emancipating oneself from too! Each of us has to suffer, though in gr eatly differing ways, from the chain sickness, even after he has broken the chains. In fond devotion to your destiny for in you I love also my hopes (SL, August 1882, p. 191). The Gay Science r consci ous say? difficult experiences intending to offer encouragement while not crossing the line of

PAGE 76

68 my hopes as well expressed his love for Salom through his words of hope for the future. His experiences with Salom left a mark on Nietzsche, and like Wagner, she indirectly inspired the new direction he took with his work Thus Spoke Zarathustra S alom can be viewed as the third of his experiences of suffering in love, from losing his father and then his father substitute Wagner, to the current loss of his anticipated disciple, imagined wife and friend, Salom. future, even his optimism had become tangled in the hope of having found his alter Nietzsche wrote Salom: Yest erday afternoon I was happy; the sky was blue, the air was mild and clear, I was malice if I had any tendency to madness. In the end I said no (SL, pp. 192 3). Recounting Nie having known her from March until December of 1882, Nietzsche so anticipated Salom in his life that much like his relationship with Wagner, when their time ended abruptly he was left completely bewildered. che was due to her overall distrust of men further noting that Nietzsche and Re were merely the first of many such relationships (NW pp. 54 5). Additionally, Diethe

PAGE 77

69 he entered her life during the time s different from most accounts. For example, she maintained that, though she was captivated by him, the stated that when she and Re were discussing winter travel plans Nietzsche invited him self, ed in ap parent contradiction, Hayman discuss not to remember whether she had kissed Ni three of them with interesting and strange that when it was just the two of them, Nietzsche could easily sit up and talk for hours (CN, p. 118). Considering the many examples of his anguish instigating his

PAGE 78

70 powerful an effect on his health as his suffering did. Their last encounter was in Leipzig, November 1882. Diethe explains that Salom t she was not aware confiscated all of his letters (CN, p. 119). Regarding her book, Friedrich Nietzsche in his Works Salom asserts that time to time we shall see each other again, shall we not? Do not forget that, from this year on I have suddenly become poor in love and conseq 1882, p. 196). Shortly thereafter Nietzsche again reached out, this time writing directly to Salom: Lou, dear heart, let there be a pure sky over us!... as far as everything else concerned litary suffers terribly from any suspicion concerning must be (NP, November 1882, pp. 56 7). following Leipzig has been refuted by Kaufman n He explains that she destroyed most of the letters Nietzsche sent her, but that notes he composed in response to something she had written him survived (NP, p. 58). In these drafts Nietzsche appears exasperated, expressing such th raise yourself up before me, not that you

PAGE 79

71 ter to both Salom and Re he reverted back to sympathy provoking language, and once again discussed the idea of his death: and even if I should take my life because of some pas sion or other, there would not be head who has been tota lly bewildered by long solitude (SL, 1882, p. 198). Focusing on personal faults and declaring that his self imposed dea th would be no a high point from which I can see the tragic problem lying beneath me. I would like to take away from human existence some of its 7). On Christmas day he wrote to ical trick of turning this muck into gold, I am everything I hear makes me feel that people 9). of 1882, he conceived the first part of Thus Spoke Zarathustra and by the summer of 1883 this time succinctly perate periods in of his suffering into a new creation which bore the name Zarathustra life has early childhood on. But I am a soldier Zarathustra as stemmin

PAGE 80

72 claiming being inspired by either longing for an actual child or an attempt to appear confident, although the latter is a behavior previo usly exhibited. I suggest rather that, in suffering the loss of love again, Nietzsche created a persona. Though in many ways it resembles his Schopenhauerian man and Free Spirit, his new enlightened madman Zarathustra is distinguishable by coming through i n a form which brings the image Nietzsche conceived to life. As with his other works, when creating Thus Spoke Zarathustra Nietzsche wrote of the perspectives he intended to embody, but what makes this work different is that it is delivered by literary exp to come alive in the mind as occurs in poetry. He let his emotions come through in his philosophies as he had never done before and this experience of creation, I argue, is why Zarathustr a came into the world not an end: what can be loved in man is that he is an overture and a going under When discussing the egoless experience of love in U ntimely Meditations Nietzsche

PAGE 81

73 bridge serves to connect paths together, uniting what was once separated into one unified whole. Previously Nietzsche perceived love as that which unifies through loss of individuality and, though mankind yearns for t he experience of oneness, his pessimism keeps him separated (UM, p. 161). In this work I posit that Nietzsche presents mankind himself as the union between love and suffering, for Zarathustra shows that mankind must perceive his suffering as purposeful and love himself in what he becomes, loving what he was once unable to love. Nietzsche stresses the importance of overture and going under prologue (Z, p.15). Kaufmann translates the term overture often translat K overture to translate bergang Additionally, Kaufman n appreciation of heroics into consideration, for in the nineteenth century overture elevated e to an independent composition often heroically themed, for example, Egmont Taking Kaufman n in highlighting overture and going und er was to emphasize the heroic nature required in in serving his experiences of love and suffering. In perceiving his suffering as serving his growth mankind may regard his pain wi th love because of the purpose it serves in his transformation. Like the

PAGE 82

74 heroic actions of Egmont the pain of his love and the importance of his suffering by way of the process of his overcoming. As I have argued, Nietz sche fought against his desire for the love of others because of the suffering it caused him, and I have noted the irony that in his efforts he created much of the suffering he experienced. At this point in his development, I posit, Nietzsche endeavored to diminish the relevance of loving others by emphasizing self love and asserting that mankind must love his suffering as a part of himself. Zarathustra was to outline the conto urs of an art of living and highlight everything that to perceive that the art of living was not found in seeking fulfillment externally but in loving all that comp rises the self. Life is hard to bear; but do not act so tenderly! We are all of us fair beasts of burden, male and female asses. What do we have in common with the rosebud, which trembles because a drop of dew lies on it? True, we love life, not becau se we are used to living but because we are used to loving. There is always some madness in love. But there is als o always some reason in madness (Z. p. 41). Nietzsche expresses that there is indeed suffering in life, but so too is there joy; it is the ha rdships of life that make the pleasurable moments valuable. Suffering as well as love suffering under the weight of the water which gives it life. It is known th at mankind rejoices mankind finds pleasurable can also be painful. There i s euphoria in love but there is also pain, there is madness (suffering) in love, but there is also reason in the madness of suffering.

PAGE 83

75 e was expressing his fear of suffering from love while endeavoring to justify suffering by determining purpose in his madness in love by way of its service in his growth morning and your resignati seeking guidance (Z, p. 41). love of others as a weakness to be overcome, and I suggest his intention to perceive his weakness as self inflicted can be found in reinterpreting This god whom I created was man And behold, then this ghost fled ty that created all afterworlds (Z, p. 31). conceived out of his inability to address his suffer ing from desiring love and so determined for himself, his Zarathustra. Having recognize d his own pity seeking behavior suffer, I was ashamed for the sake of his shame; and when I helped him, I transgressed 9). Rather than focusing on his own shame in being the sufferer who reached out, Nietzsche veile d his shame with his mask and fixated on the transgression of others. This displacement of his suffering, I contend again demonstrates

PAGE 84

76 self. Zarathustra continues suffering, but a hard bed as it were, a field cot: thus you will profit him best (Z, p. 90). poor in love, aid the sufferer just enough that he may assist himself. you have done it to yourself how lets it go, one soon loses control of the head too (Z, p. 90). Nietzsche endeavored to raise himself by determining that he could forgive those who it proposes to deny desires so as to avoid the very suffering he claims to be vital to growth. After completion of the firs t three parts Thus Spoke Zarathustra Nietzsche wrote in a letter over it is the past, forbearance; we Nietzsche yo (SL, February 1884, pp. 219 20). Through his philosophies, Nietzsche not only endeavored to find purpose for his suffering, he too used his work to shield himself by rationalizing his pain. He imagined through his Zarathustra that he

PAGE 85

77 learned to fly: ever since, I do not want to be pushed before moving along. Now I am light, now I fly, now I see myself beneath myself, now god dances throu A poem Nietzsche wrote during the same time as Thus Spoke Zarathustra expresses clearly what I have argued as his emotional conflictions. In the poem, To Hafis Nietzsche rself / You always fly out of your self 125). Nietzsche withdrew into his suffering, conceiving ways of perceiving differently, but I to assimilate his philosophical creations, Nietzsche was left only with his mask. caught in the cross destroying machine, the teaching Hayman L ife that which must always overcome itself so on I must oppose it and my love (Z, p 115). through the very process of proposing them, but I add that his system failed only in that he was un able to encompass the values he determined. He was indeed in a bat tle with himself. the truth. The great danger of this method is that it becomes hard to retain firm artistic on per se, but propose that it was not as simple as Nietzsche believing himself to be truthful. I contend he was well aware

PAGE 86

78 philosophies would be his truth. Nietzsche end eavored to perceive the world through the lens of his philosophies; he wanted to live the values he proclaimed, not on the pages of his work, but in all aspects of his life. outside of his cave the Magici an takes his chance to spe ak to the group and he expresses wants (Z, p. 296): He himself sometimes seems to me like a beautiful mask of a saint, like a new strange masquerade in which my evil spirit, the melancholy devil, enjoys himself. I love Zarathustra, it often seems to me, for the sake of my evil spirit (Z, p. 297). When the Magician first appears in this text he wore a mask in the sense tha t he put on a performance of acting pitifully egoless love, even though he knows he will be disillusioned. The Magician loves Zarathustra even though h e compares him to a masquerade, deception of love enflames suffering, into ourselves d the most influential element of affecting change in life was his suffering.

PAGE 87

79 In May 1884, Nietzsche wrote to his sister lamentingly reflecting on his life. He expressed being chastened by his relationships with people and also acknowledged con cealing himself because of feelings of alienation: I have found until now, from earliest childhood, nobody who had the same need of Almost all my human relationships have resulted from attacks of a feeling of Schopenhauer or Wagner or think up Zarathustra these things are for me recreation but, above all, hiding places, behind which I can sit down again for a while. Do not there fore think me mad, my dear Lama (SL, p. 241). In April 1884, the third part of Za rathustra was published and in February 1885 the forth part was printed privately (SL, pp. 203, 235). In his following text, Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche clarifies many of the thoughts he expressed in this work, but also begins to perceive that his phil osophies would not be recognized and valued during his own life, but would be some time in the distant future.

PAGE 88

80 CHAPTER IV CONCLUSION Philosophy of the Future Beyond Good and Evil Following Thus Spoke Zarathustra Nietzsche suffered emotional conflictions as he had before and though endeavoring to shift his perspectives had yet to alleviate his desire for the love of others changes in how he perceived when, and to what degree, his work would affect mankind did occur. It is my contention that Nietzsche beg an to conceive the Eternal Recurrence as expanding beyond his own existence. I suggest that while contending with desiring the love of others, Nietzsche develop ed his sense of self love by perceiving his underappreciated work as serving the future. When Ni etzsche bemoaned publication difficulties in a letter to Overbeck, he life, as I have been doing, then the result is meant for the eyes and consciences of only the mos n important creation for mankind. an Expanded Eternal Recurrence offered a to live once mo re and innumerable times more, [ and whatever you create will determine your legacy; will you be immortal ? (GS, p. 273) With a widened perspe ctive of his existence, when writing Meysenbug, Nietzsche scoffed at his old self : former Basel professor Dr. Friedrich Nietzsche. The devil take him! What has this fellow to

PAGE 89

81 SL, March 1885, p. 237). Unhappy with his past self, Nietzsche was no more pleased with his current self, as his self inflicted solitude increased his suffering. philosophical conception signified self love through acknowledgement of abilities, his own assertion e for the love of others W hile he continued his work, Nietzsche also continued to use it as a way to conceal his emotional conflictions. In Beyond Good and Evil commenced in Summer 1885 and completed by Fall 1886, Nietzsche discusses the use of masks wit Nietzsche asserts: Whatever is profound loves masks; what is most profound even hates image and wants and sees to it that a mask of him roams in his place through the hearts and heads of his friends. And supposing he did not want it, he would still realize some day that in spite of that a mask of him is there (BGE, p. 50). As Nietzsche has continually proclaimed perspectives he wished to possess in his works, he also consistently condemned personal weaknesses, as he does here in reproaching t one harbor hen conceals a philosophy; every opinion is also a hideout, In a way Niet zsche was continually confessing his weaknesses, he just did it under the shield of his philosophical objectivism. In September 1886, Nietzsche wrote to

PAGE 90

82 Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Future Ph ilosophy allowed to read it in about the On the Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche began and completed his Genealogy of Morals in 1887, and in the preface of the work, confidently asserted, (GM, p. 23). Nietzsche had determined that his task was to prepare his philosophies for the factum August 1886, p. 254). I critique let us thus define our own task the value of truth must for once be experimentally called into question established notions of truth, I argue Nietzsche also condemned his own emotional truths, determining that established ideologies merited dissection whereas his desire for love should be stifled. He explained to Overbeck d pressing upon me to 5) In a poem written during his Genealogy when unfortunately the poet fell into a pit sion and anticipation of his task, and I suggest his hopes of self love are revealed as well suspense! / Oh, Albatross bird, / Impulse makes me fly high, / I thought of you: / My tears flow, 7, pp. 223 5). A known metaphor for a psychological bur not as a burden, but as an unattainable desire the poet tearfully calls for from a pit

PAGE 91

83 In his intentions to compile his philosophical doctrines for the future, Nietzsche condemned to go on living commands me to avoid people and to bind mys May 1887, pp. 265 7). The Case of Wagner Begun in April, The Case of Wagner was published in October 1888. In this work Nietzsche uses his once beloved master as an example of the failures in German music and culture, contrast decent into idolization, here Nietzsche determines that Wagner serves as an image of German ideal ism. In section two of nature fatality makes it nature A TO A TO p. 236). This consideration of love, as amor fati requires loving all aspects of life beyond pleasure to pain, while ensuing lo ve of self by focusing on the recurrence of personal existence. It does not, however, define love; it simple gives it application they misunderstand love. Wagner misund Everyone thinks that people in love are selfless because they want to advance the interests of another person, often at their own expense. But in return, they want to possess that other person ... Even God is no exception here. He is far f rom thinking

PAGE 92

84 love hi m in return ( A TO p. 236). The fact that Nietzsche discusses love so passionately in a book about Wagner reveals that he had not yet overcome his s elf to his earlier asserted notion that love was want of possession, Nietzsche presents the disillusionment of his love for Wagner much like Zarathustra did when he revealed that the an Twilight of the Idols, The Antichrist, Nietzsche contra Wagner specifically Twilight of the Idols and The Antichrist r his earlier thoughts, particularly with Nietzsche contra Wagner which entirety consists of past work s Nietzsche compiled to emphasize his contentions against Wagner. works to both ensure his self proclaimed task and revolt against hi s still present desire for the love of others by attacking the manifestation of his ideal. With this action Nietzsche not only had further expression for his preferred perspectives, he also experienced the added bonus of receiving angry attention from Wagn erites. Better to be loved than hated, but better to be hated than ignored. Twilight of the Idols and The A ntichrist were begun in September as a joint effort for Transvaluation of Values and Nietzsche contra Wagner commenced in November 1888. All three of these books were published when Nietzsche was no longer

PAGE 93

85 have no words for anyone, because I have less and less desire to allow anyone to see into the difficulties of my existence. There is indeed a great emptiness In the middle of the summer in 1888 Nietzsche successfully completed his task of documenting his philosophical expressions for mankind, but his attempts at self love were failing him as he continued to battle desiring love. In Twilight of the Idols he wrote: Here the view is free It can be loftiness of the soul when a philosopher is silent; it can be love when he contradicts himself; it can be a courtesy of the knower to tell a what is most unworthy ( A TO p. 220). Faust from the scene in which Faust has transformed after his death to a h Here the view is free A TO p. 220 ). I posit that here Nietzsche insinuates that the view seen by the higher self is free because, in an elevated state, love is recognized as existing in contradiction s residin g in places that from a lower elevation of thought, appears to be something else, something unworthy Lies are okay and souls are not intimidated by presumed values. I suggest that Nietzsche conceives the silence between him and Wagner now that his father figure is gone. In The A ntichrist illusion reaches a high point here, and so do the forces that sweeten and transfigure People in love will tolerate more than they usually do, they will put up A TO p. 20). The transfiguring effects from overcoming suffering are permitted, but in still discrediting love Nietzsche asserts that, rather than beauty in tr ansformation, love transfigures, causing self negation and abuse Nietzsche cont ra Wagner was the last thing Nietzsche was working on before his [his]

PAGE 94

86 relationship [with Wagner] throughout his productive life (if not beyond) ( A TO pp. 33 4). When com for this work from Beyond Good and Evil know hearts can guess how impoverished, helpless, presumptuous, and mistaken even th e best and deepest love really is how much more likely it is to destroy A TO p. 279). To assume that love can be mistaken suggests it possesses flaws and thus falsities, and so with his continued devaluation of love, Nietzsche maintained his war against his desires, determining to wear his mask of appearances indefinitely. Ecce Homo Unswerving in his desire to appear sure of himself, Ecce Homo is packed with self glorification and pro ud declarations of his genius. With h is auto biographical work which he began on his forty fo u rth birthday completed within a month, I argue Nietzsche intended to demonstrate to himself, and to the world, that he did not need reassurance or love from others (SL, 1888 p. 313). The self congratulatio ns in this work has led some scholars to question if Ecce Homo serves as evidence that Nietzsche had already begun to lose grasp of his sanity. ifficulty in explaining the extravagant self I propose that Nietzsche was coherent while creating Ecce Homo but to greatly motivated to appear confident in himself and clear in his theories because of feeling the threatening effects of losing control of his conscious mind.

PAGE 95

87 There is speculation as to the details of Nietzsch related to syphilis, but it is known that he experienced paralysis, and Gilman explains that a Considering well known early warni ngs signs of both paralysis and dementia, I posit that Nietzsche was aware of his worsening condition and responded by heightening his resolve to The vanity in Ecce Homo and some letters during this time, I contend re veals assured and confident in his solitude largely inspired hi s autobiography, and I suggest that t refers to was the mask Nietzsche had long used to conceal his emotional crisis and that at this point he determined to maintain his veil indefinitely. When r egarding Thus Spoke Zarathustra mask more than ever before but, like an actor, found that with his features hidden he could veiling his emotions and I concur that he needed his symbolic son to serve as his mask, but by way o f a creative misreading, ed a mask more than ever before (CL, p. 256). It was during his work on Ecce Homo I argue, that Nietzsche felt the most need to conceal himself because of experiencing onset symptoms of dementia. resemble the tone he uses in his work. While writing Ecce Homo Nietzsche wrote to Gast of his intentions with his text:

PAGE 96

88 I talk about myself with I it will perhaps prevent people from confusing me with my anti self (SL, October 1888, p. 320). Middleton ascrib ferocious predatory strength, merely testifies to the war between his self and his anti (S struggled with internal conflictions. Furthering analysis through a creative misreading Nietzsche veiled as a res ponse to the self negation he received from self the part of him which initially inspired his concealment Just after completing Ecce Homo Nietzsche wrote to Meta von Salis, whom he met in Zurich in 1884, and w Everything that has hitherto been call mankind, as the ruse for sucking the blood of life itself. Morality as vampirism (EH, pp. 333 4). All the while Nietzsche was unma sking morality I maintain he was veiling himself. In a letter written to Gast in July 1880 he reveals such actions when expressing (SL, p. 172). While he was en deavoring to awaken mankind to his ideological constraints, I argue Nietzsche was attempting to shroud the anguish and emotional turmoil he suffered from desiring the love of others and I propose his mask symbolize s his own veiled lie, which

PAGE 97

89 he preserved Thus, with his Ecce Homo it was in fact new perspectiv es for mankind, but as I have argue d his philosophical endeavors could not assist in alleviating him of his emotional conflictions. He was becoming more estranged from his friends, even losing his long time Wagnerian friend, Meysenbug. She had reached her defending her now deceased friend over accusations made in The Case of Wagner (SL, October1888, p. 314). In response Nietzsche wrote: These are not things on which I allo w anyone to contradict me. I am, in questions of dcadence act of genius, but a genius of mendacity I myself have the honor to be the reverse a genius of truth (SL, October 1888, p. 314). y applied here (CL, p. 26 3). R esolute in presenting an appearance of strength and confidence, Nietzsche pronounced himself as a server of truth, completely neglecting his significant assertion in Human, All Too Human will rarely find traces, and actually only once, that anybody felt ill will toward me but perhaps rather too many traces of good ving lost most of his friends, notably Rohde in addition to Meysenbug it may be assumed that Nietzsche was aware of the Additionally, in October Nietzsche wrote to Georg B

PAGE 98

90 (SL, 1888, pp. 278, 317). Nietzsche wrote Meysenbug one more time in November: Just wait a little, verehrteste Freundin I shall send you yet another proof that ]. Without any doubt, I have been unjust to you; but since I am suffering from a surfeit of righteousness this autumn, it was really salutary for me to do a n in justice. The Immoralist (SL, 1888, p. 322). unjust consolation for Meysenbug concluding his play on moral sentiment by signing the tone of this letter conveys, as the history of their correspondence reveals the closeness he felt for her and the value he placed on their friendship. He had reached out to Meysenbug just a few months earlier crying to her of all the emptiness (SL, July 1888, p. 302). personal writings just a few months before Ecce Homo reveal the same e motional strongholds he had long contended with. In the summer of 1888, Nietzsche wrote became si of my curiosity with the ears of my l ove 385 ). Earlier in the year, Nietzsche wrote to Overbeck: The perpetual lack of a really refreshing and healing human love the absurd isolation which it entails, making almost any residue of a connection with people merely something that wounds one that is all very bad indeed and right only in itself, h aving the right to be necessary (SL, February 1888, p. 282). Responding to this letter, Safranski suggests that monster in the captivity of people to whom he meant ut I add that the above letter reveals the sadness he felt in perceiving that his only option, due to the

PAGE 99

91 onslaught of his sickness in dealing with his still present desire for love was that he had to intensify his declarations of confidence. Both public and private, Nietzsche determined that he must healing human love In his per formance of confidence, Nietzsche offers gratitude in the preface of Ecce Homo fourth year today; I had the right How could I fail to be grateful to my whole life He was fervently trying to embody his amor fa ti focusing on such things as thanking Gast for sending a birthday card while still bemoaning that it was the only one he received (SL, p. 313). I Nietzsche again offers gratitude for his life also evoking his father and the Eternal Recurrence by way of the form of a riddle, already dead as my father, while as my mother I am still living and riddle of fatality clearly presents the predetermined metaphorical death he shared with his father and the literal long life he shared with his mother, but further interpretation is possible when going beyond the boundaries of his objective Reflection on Nietzsche father originally inspiring his ideal of love while his mother stimulated feelings of loneliness, I propose that in his riddle his father can be seen to sy mbolize the death of love while his mother the isolation of living without love. In the same sec tion Nietzsche remembers that at the age of thirty The disillusionment of his love was severe and complicated by an elevated sickness which required that he resign from teach ing. The intensity of his illness in 1879, Nietzsche explains, stripped him of all his energy so as it was at this low

PAGE 100

92 point, he adds that he wrote The Wanderer and His Shadow (EH, p. 222). Con sidering the pain Nietzsche experienced during that time of love less ness I propose interpreting t he Shadow in his poem as a metaphor for l ove. In s uffering the loss of Wagner, Nietzsche rejected love, endeavoring to devalue and disempower it, but as I his poem, The Wanderer spurns love (his Shadow) but as it fades he misses it and calls love to return, As with the Wanderer in hi s poem, attempts t o dissuade his desire only inspired further longing He wrote to Gast ten days before his birthday in 1879 regarding his experience while writing The Wanderer and His Shadow : The manuscript which you received from St. Moritz w as written at such a high and hard price that perhaps nobody would have written it if he could possibly have avoided doing so. Often I shudder to read it, especially the longer parts, because of the ugly memories it brings (SL, p. 169). Proposing that all suggests that Ecce Homo constitution, not to mention self asserting that Nietzsche was divided bet experienced self a ssertion, but by applying a creative misreading, I suggest rather philosophical mask was what he wore in public while the condemned as weak for desiring love, was the part of himself that remained hidden. The abu ndance of confidence in this work, and in some of his letters, I argue reveals h he had overcome his suffering and that love of others

PAGE 101

93 meant nothing to him because of his tremendous self love. A n example of his philoso phical masking can be found i where Nietzsche proclaims I feel no curiosity at all about review of my books, especially in ne wspapers, should be (EH, p. 262). There are numerous examples which illustrate t hat Nietzsche often exhibited both curiosity and concern regarding reviews of his work, but presuming he intended to have only just overcome such interests, there are a few recent examples to cite. In October 1888 us about your Kunstwart Der Fall Wagner in the German journal (SL, 1888, p. 320). A month later he Der Fall Wagner day issue of Der Bund ; Herr Kselitz, in Der Kunstwart from Paris I am told that an article in the Nouvelle Revue is As they have before, his letters again reveal the differences between the image Nietzsche presented in his works and the concealed self revealed in his letters. He exposed thus his concern for the opinions of other s when gloating to Overbeck newspapers and a French literary magazine. Nietzsche maintained his mask, determined to present to the world the image of himself as he had always intended to be. His determination to appear self assured even led Nietzsche to speak out against his friends in the same secti on part of the contents, my so and find some progress in the greater cheerfulness of the to

PAGE 102

94 Case of Wagner : worthwhile to study Furthermore material intended for t his section found in the Appendix shows that bec a worried about me and calls hi a man of knowledge must not only love his enemies, he Contrary to Overbeck, Nietzsche spoke highly of Wagn er, the man who had caused him to suffer so much he exclaimed to his sister he required 1882, p. 180). When speaking of Wagner and war in the same section, Nietzsche states that an of good will, sometimes even of gratitude. I honor, I distinguish 3). He also declares ). Moreover, Nietzsche proclaims uffering, 1). of their destructive relationship was widely known, I suggest, offers additional evidence of his intentions to appear self confident. When discussing his suffering concerning the creational process of his work, in the section Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche announces ing

PAGE 103

95 this event followed the festival in Bayreuth, where the 4). Though praising Wagner in this work, Nietzsche manages to circle his suffering back around to his once b eloved master and father figure. related to the need for deadening the feeling of de solation and hunger by means of a narcotic art 7). In proposing that he loved Wagner against his instinct, Nietzsche implies that he knew the fault in his id eal of love and so did not need to experience th e suffering of disillusionment; but in existing in the absence of his ideal everything else appear ed as a narcotic knowledge Sa of any ugly motive for turning against his formerly revered friend has utterly misunderstood The Birth of Tragedy that the text was propose that there is another such event found within Ecce Homo In Christmas 1888, Nietzsche wrote a letter to Overbeck that in Ecce Homo there was I cann The poem, which I suggest symbolizes Wagner, was originally intended for Nietzsche contra

PAGE 104

96 Wagner losing control following his c I suggest Nietzsche was recalling where the body was floated down a canal in a Gondola, when he proceeds his poem Gondolas lights, and music / drunken it swam out into the twilight. / My soul, a stringed instrument, / sang to itself, invisibly touched, / a secret gondola song, / quivering with iridescent happiness. / Did anyone listen to it? (EH, p. 252). When analyzing t he poem, Grundlehner asserts the once more relegated to loneliness (PN, p. 304). Recalling Nietzsche Untimely Meditations in which he explained, The bridge represents a co nnection to love, whether it be a bridge to a pure, egoless love such as the saint inspires, or a bridge leading to self conjured an image of standing on a bridge, h e still possessing love for his once beloved master, he felt that Kaufman n contends that in Ecce Homo true contend that what Nietzsche had always loved is the same as

PAGE 105

97 that of which he always possessed, his suffering and that in imagining himself watching which clarity of his vi sion was to be short lived. In the preface of Ecce Homo Kaufman n [he] recovered sufficient lucidity to dispatch a few mad but strangely beautiful letters and then darkness closed in and extinguished passion and argue, Nietzsche still possessed moments of lucidity in between flashes of de mentia. It is my contention that it was in the last weeks of his mental control that love finally shifted. Conclusion Co etters Many scholars aside from Kaufmann have asserted that etters just before his collapse expose his mental decline. F or example, Middleton notes that a phrase in written December 31, 1888, could be indication that he had your card came, what was strained from his condition during this time, and agree that some of his expressions inspire doubts of lucidity, but I suggest that signif icance can be found in these last letters beyond apparent symptoms of madness.

PAGE 106

98 One of the letter s most often cited as evidence of insanity, particularly as it inspired Overbeck to take measures regarding his care, was written to Burckhardt Janu ary 6, 1889. Nietzsche begins God; but I have not ventured to carry my private egoism so far as to omit creating the world Taking this statement in the contex endeavored to destroy moral assumptions. By comparing his earlier professorship with his life as a philosophical author, Niet zsche suggests that while his choice offered him the power of creation it came with heavy responsibilities and burdens. Nietzsche continues, comically comparing his letters to that of worldwide entertainment publications when f the great feuilletonist of the grande monde then further adds venture to say that I am also Lesseps... I wanted to give my Parisians, whom I love, a new idea that of a decent criminal. I am also Chambige also a decent criminal (SL, p. 347). I do not suspect that Nietzsche was actually intending to identify himself as either of the recently convicted murderers, Prado or Chambige, nor the French diplomat, Ferdinand de Lesseps. I suggest rathe r that in addition to simply being facetious, Nietzsche was playing on He himself had person al experience in being condemned: has one Antichrist

PAGE 107

99 Moreover Nietzsche could have been calling to earlier notions su ch the madman found in The Gay Science called We have killed him comfort ourselves, the murderers of all murderers?... Must we ourselves not become gods simply to appear worthy of it? (GS, p. 181). Though Nietzsche was facing bouts of mental instability, as victims of dementia and paralysis experience, I propose that there was still depth and meaning in the thoughts he shared Continuing t he letter: The unpleasant thing, and one that nags my modesty, is that at root every name in history is I; also as regards the children I have brought into the world, it is a case of gdom of out of God (SL, p. 347 8). It is easily discerned that Nietzsche places himself in the position of God here, specifically when considering this lat t er section of his letter in the context of his opening statement discussed ab ove The is his contemplation of individuality also come out at root every name in history is I proposed ; t he principium individuationis breaks down, sufficient reason is lost and existence ( BT, p. 36). With this consideration, the possibility that possibility arises that Nietzsche was wrong in his love is superfluous control an d reason are gone and his previously conceived notion of the oneness experienced in Dionysian festivals more accurately relays ; love, like nature, binding individuals together

PAGE 108

100 tion of L ove After concluding his letter to Burckhardt, Nietzsche added a few random notes, one rest This note, along with the letter Nietzsche wrote t o Cosima has been used as evidence of h i s li felong love for her, but I propose that his feelings were not always romantic and only developed during this late turn in his life. It is my contention that when Nietzsche met Cosima her relevance was only that of being the wife of the man he idolized Had Nietzsche in fact had a romantic fascination for Cosima early on then his time in Tribschen would have been torturous because of being constantly confronted with unfulfilled desires rather than the self procla imed happiest moments of his life (EH, p. 247). It was after his perception of Wagner changed, I argue that shifted to being that of a romantic nature governing image of Ariadnean being; twenty years later in Turin pp. 32 3). causing resentment of as a father

PAGE 109

101 confess his feelings; any indulgence or marriage was as thoroughly out of the question as if In light of the Wagne foot psychologists who ha 4). Though my contention differs from a Freudian analysis because of its focus on shifting perceptions, it does find congruence regarding the mother figure When asserting the thoughts on marriage, I demonstrated that his attraction to wedded mothers was due to his interest in a love unknown to him. Having been denied motherly love in his youth, I argued that when conceiving an ideal of love Nietzsche worked from known experiences with his father, a point relevant to Considering that Nietzsche was ambiguo us to motherly love in his youth, I propose that upon attaching his ideal of love to Wagner as a father figure, Nietzsche saw in Cosima a kind of motherly love. He greatly valued this love, as was seen when Nietzsche declared that 3). and circumstantially his perception of Cosima changed as well. Kaufmann asserts that The Case of Wagner :

PAGE 110

102 The female impoverishes hers elf for the sake of the master, she becomes touching, sh his r obber! He robs us of our young men, he even steals our women and drags them into his cave... Oh, this old Minotaur! What h e has cost us already! Every year a train of the most beautiful young men and women are led into his labyrinth for him to devour ( ATO, p. 258 ). It was during this time of reproaching Wagner, in the summer of 1888, that I suggest d Cosima took a sharp turn. As Wagner went from beloved master and father figure to deserter and monster, I propose Cosima was elevated from mother figure to tragic heroine. Following his collapse in January of 1889, Nietzsche wrote a simple, yet revealing Ariadne in his Dionysus Dithyrambs (SL, p. 346). It was in this late stage of his life, I argue, that Cosima became for Nietzsche what Podach described as ttering symbol of the woman of his that its origin is found in the fourth part of Thus Spoke Zarathustra spoken by the Magician when he attempts to test Zarathustra by inciting his compassion. Grundlehner calls attention emotional display is not at first directed specifically to the unknown god [but] rather, it The voice experiencing the existential crisis in the poem is the Magician, but by using en character and author inspiring both subjective, empathetic analysis as well as objective, sympathetic analysis In the original poem the Magician cries out in agony me / Delighted by suffering, thou wered because the god inflicting suffering is the

PAGE 111

103 Dionysus Dithyrambs ; he clarifies tha t two significant changes to the poem are that of entrance of Dionysus at the end (PN, p. 227). Aside from the importance of the inclusion of Dionysus and Ariadne to the poem, shifting the gender in German language is substantial, Stein affirms, as it directly affects the meaning and tone of the work. such things as the negativity of pity to that of submitting to his desire for the love of others The original poem, particularly when considering it in the overall context of the text itse lf intend s to convey the erroneous action of both calling for and responding to pity. The changes to the poem, I argue, shifts the message from false cries to meaningful summoning. I propose that the poem represent s conversi on his perception of love. Additionally, the existential crisis originally experienced by the as well as pronouncing his new love for Cosima when naming her Ariadne inspired the significant changes made to his original verse The story of Ariadne, daughter of King Minos, describes her aiding Theseus in defeating the Labyrinth and the Minotaur after which Th eseus abandons her on an island, Dionysius appears and he and Ariadne fall in love. When Nietzsche changed the voice from the Magician to Ariadne, he transformed a trickster into a heroine, and I propose that Dionysius appearance te arrival to the call of love, slipping in at the

PAGE 112

104 last moments through the doors of his epilogue. It is my contention that the changes made to the poem final call to love, presented as the image of Dionysus appearing in response. At the end of the poem, when With pain Nietzsche follows with his epilogue : A bolt of lightning. Dionysus becomes visible in emerald beauty Diony sus: / Be clever, Ariadne! / You have small ears, you have my ears! / put a clever word into them! / Does not one first have to hate oneself if one is to love oneself? / I am your labyrinth (PN, pp. 219, 227). In the position of love returning her call, Dionysus recaps the importance of suffering to Ariadne because of knowledge gained from experience while also implying that he is always with her because he is I am your labyrinth In this statement, I argue, Nietzsche reveals his dis covery that love and suffering are connected; two parts of one whole. In being one with suffering, l ove is not the imagined pure ideal Nietzsche originally conceived nor is it the constant suffering he assumed while endeavoring to combat his desire by way of self induced solitude. It is my contention that it was at this point perception shifted from that of seeing love as an igniter of suffering to that of being one part of a whole. S uffering and love became synonymous holistic, parts of one u nified whole In Ecce Homo the love of others puts forth in the light would be Ariadne. Who besides me knows what Ariad It is my contention that Ariadne symbolizes love; she represents embracing suf fering and calling out for love, and in giving Co sima her name, she as well becomes the last image of love Nietzsche conceived when reaching the end of his long tragedy.

PAGE 113

105 coherently perform in his own tragedy quickly began to diminish the month before his collapse in Turin, January 3, 1889; following the event his physical and ment al state was such that he was officially required to relinquish control of his life to others B, p. 241). On January 8, 1889 Overbeck arrived in Turin to collect Nietzsche, and after depositing him at the Basel Psychiatric Clinic, wrote a detailed account to Gast on January no, who stated collapse, which Podach describes as follows: cabs are parked, a tired old horse being beaten by a brutal cabman. Compassion seizes him. Sobbing and protectively he flings his arms around the neck of the tormented animal. He collapses (SL, 1889, p. 350). [Nietzsche] adding his philosophy stemmed from he noted involved th 351). Safranski notes that

PAGE 114

106 described having seen Nietzsche dancing naked in his room, which she discovered while peeping through the keyhole of his apartment (NB, p. 309). Overbeck explained to Gast lly Nietzsche slept for most of the trip back, though when he woke he often sang so ngs, one of 2). the clinic in Basel to take him to the Psychiatric Clinic in Jena on January 17, Middleton notes that At the medical clinic in Jena, Sascha Simchowitz, observed Nietzsche while attending the lectu res of Otto Binswanger, in January 1889 (CN, p. 223). While publicly conversing with the professor, Nietzsche spoke of many things, ranging from his own professorship to his health issues and even his life in Turin, but Simchowitz specifically indicated th works only ng that Nietzsche had When Deussen saw Nietzsche for the first time since his collapse in April 1889 he stated that his friend did not recognize him (CN, p. 225). Nietzsche remained mostly quiet,

PAGE 115

107 such things as locomotives coming his mother, between 1889 and 1890, while he himself was a student at Jena University ; he had a similar impression Nie demeanor stating that he removed him from the clinic in Jena and brought him home to Naumburg so as to care for him herself (SL, p. 353). A Berlin journalist, u sing the pseudonym Sophus, reported that when he saw Nietzsche with his mother When Gast visited Nietzsche eight months after Deussen, in January of 1890, he expressed, [Nietzsche] recognized me immediately, embraced and kissed me, was highly delighted to see me, and gave his hand repeatedly as if u I almost had the impression that his mental disturbance consists of no more than a heightening of the humorous antics he used to put on fo r an intimate circle of horrible though this is as if Nietzsche were merely feigning madness, as if he were glad f or it to have ended in this way (CL, p. 341). ghastly 341). Regarding suppositions of self imposed madness, Hayman calls atte ntion to Nietzsche

PAGE 116

108 The passage d Hayman refers to is found in book one of The Dawn in which Nietzsc he asserts, almost everywhere it was madness which prepared the wa y for the new trumpet of a thus making him All superior men who were irresistibly drawn to throw off the yoke of any kind of moralit y and to frame new laws had, if they were not actually mad no alternative but to make themselves or pretend to be mad (DD, p p. 1 3 4). basically the same across multiple cultures ; it involves In reviewing of the se methods can be found to have been performed at some point in his life. they were to inspire belief and first and foremost, as always, their own belief in continually endeavored to believe in himself and his purpose, and though he avoided the pain of love, he voluntarily accepted much of the suffering in his life for sake of his growth. It is impossible to determine whether Nietzsche pondered himself as a madman while in his dark ened mental place but Middleton indicates that by early 1894, his condition had escalated to the point that he was no longer able to leave t he house, and that by 1895, there were ka

PAGE 117

109 t love ring of truth: evidently, he had penetrated so deeply into the secret of existen ce that he lost his mind in the process (NB, p. 317). Following this line of thought as well as considering es his Zarathustra set forth. In Book One of Thus Spoke Zarathustra of the spirit I tell you: how the spirit becomes a camel, and the camel a lion, and the lion, camel can be seen in his life with Wagner, as before Nietzsche metamorphosed, his spirit becoming would conquer his freedom and be master in his own dese facing established values, confronting setting that freedom from his love may become hi decade, Nietzsche came to an end in which he lost control and it was then that he remembered what the child can do that that lion cannot:

PAGE 118

110 The child is innocence and forgetting, a new beginning, a game, a s elf propelled who had been lost to the w orld now conquers his own world (Z, p. 27). As an age d sick man with the dependency of a child, Nietzsche received the motherly lov e from Franziska he had longed for in his youth Unable to herself when she was a young mother at the age of a grandmother Franziska nurtured her adult son in his illness. She offered Nietzsche unending loving affection calming his fits with music as his father had claimed him until his death on August 25, 1900 (SL, p. 353). As the lion, Nietzsche spent much of his life att empting He intended to overcome his desire by altering how he perceived love ; he experimented with his theory of P erspectivism focusing on the importance of self criticism and self love. All of this gave Nietzsche greater insight into himself and mankind, but could not dissu ade his desiring the love of others. In his last scribed words he reveals his new perception of love by altering an earlier poem to include Dionysus answer ing T hese final thoughts ng, calling to mind Zarathustra always some madness in love. But there is als o always some reason in madness H aving spent much of his life contending with his emotional longing for the love of others in the last moments of h is lucidity I suggest Nietzsche achived the new beginning of the child; that he conqured his own world by determining that t here is always suffering in love, but there is also always love in suffering.

PAGE 119

111 BIBLIOGRAPHY Bloom, Harold. The Anxiety of Influence ; a Theory of Poetry Oxford University Press 1997 New York Print. Botton, Alain De. The Consolations of Philosophy Vintage 2000 New York. Print. Crawford, Claudia. To Nietzsche: Dionysus, I Love You! Ariadne Sta te University of New York Press, 19 95. New York Print. Diethe, Carol. Nietzsche's Women: Beyond the Whip Berlin: W. De Gruyter, 1996. New York. Print. Fischer Dieskau, Dietrich. Wagner and Nietzsche Seabury Press 1976 New York Print. Gilman, Sander L. Conversations with Nietzsche: A Life in the Words of His Contemporaries Oxford University Press 1987 New York. Print. Grundlehner, Philip. The Poetry of Friedrich Nietzsche Oxford University Press 1986 New York Print. Hayman, Ronald. Nietzsche, A Critical Life Penguin Books 1982. New York Print. Kaufmann, Walter. Nietzsche, Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist Princeton University Press 1974. New Jersey. Print. Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm. Nietzsche Unpublished Letters Philosophical Library, 1959. New York. Print. Ni etzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, Aaron Ridley, and Judith Norman. The Anti Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings Cambridge University Press 2005. Cambridge Print. Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, and Christopher Middleton. Selected Lette rs of Friedrich Nietzsche Hackett Publishing Company 1996 Indianapolis Print. Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, and James Luchte. The Peacock and the Buffalo: The Poetry of Nietzsche Bloomsbury Academic 2010 London. Print. Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm and R. J. Hollingdale. Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality Cambridge University Press 2006 Cambridge. Print. Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, and R. J. Hollingdale. Untimely Meditations Cambridge University Press 2007. Cambridge. Print.

PAGE 120

112 Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, and Walter Arnold. Kaufmann. Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future Vintage, 1989. New York Print. Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, and Walter Arnold. Kaufmann. The Birth of Tragedy Vintage Books 1967. N ew York Print. Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, and Walter Arnold. Kaufmann. Ecce Homo Vintage, 1989. New York Print. Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, and Walter Arnold. Kaufmann. The Gay Science Vintage, 1974 New York Print. Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhel m, and Walter Arnold. Kaufmann. On t he Genealogy of Morals Vintage, 1989. New York Print. Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, and Walter Arnold. Kaufmann. Thus Spoke Zartathustra Viking Press, 1966. New York Print Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, and Walter Arnold. Kaufmann. Will to Power Vintage, 1968 New York Print. Nietzsche, Friedrich, and Reginald John Hollingdale. Human, All Too Human Cambridge University Press 1996 Cambridge. Print. Rorty, Richard. Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity Cambridge University Press 1989. Cambridge. Print. Safranski, R diger. Nietzsche: A Philosophical Biography W. W. Norton & Company 2003 New York. Print. Solomon, Robert C. Living with Nietzsche: What the Great "immoralist" Has to Teach Us Oxford University P ress 2006. Oxford Print. Solomon, Robert C and Kathleen Marie. Higgins. What Nietzsche Really Said Schocken, 2001 New York. Print.