Analysts of Planning Programs Managing the Oran sport of
ARCHITECTURE'& PLANNING-- ^ AURARIA LIBRARY
Martha Rosenberg University of Colorado, Denver School of Design and Planning May 1985
ANALYSIS OF PLANNING PROGRAMS MANAGING THE TRANSPORT OF HAZARDOUS MATERIAL
Thesis Advisor: Professor Herbert Smith
Prepared by Martha Rosenberg
University of Colorado at Denver of Planning and Community Development
1100 Fourteenth Street, Denver, Colorado
! I j
I am especially grateful to Dr. James Baker, Ph.d, whose support and guidance was essential to the completion of this thesis and Jerome Olsen, Director of the Natural and Technological Hazardous Division of the Federal Emergency Management Agency for his support and providing the internship opportunity that was the catalyst to this project
I also appreciate the contributions of Dwayne Ebertowski, Director of Planning, FEMA and Bruce Smith, Emergency Response Planner, DODES for their sharing of knowledge and planning skills which were invaluable to me throughout this project.
I am also grateful to Lawrence Grieco for his editing skills and patience and to Lucy Brooke for her assistance with the word processor and providing typing support.
Table of Contents
I Introduction.........................1.1 - 1.4
II Role of the Federal, State and
Local Government Regulations........2.1 - 2.16
III Case Studies........................3.1 - 3.19
IV Value of Risk Assessment.............4.1 - 4.4
V Computer Assisted Tracking and
Modeling of Transporting
Hazardous Materials.................5.1 - 5.8
VI Analysis.............................6.1 - 6.5
VII Recommendations and Conclusions .... 7.1 - 7.9
Appendix A Program Material from
DOT and EPA..................A.l - A. 6
Appendix B Risk Assessment.............B.l - B.l
Appendix C State of Colorado...........C.l - C.15
Appendix D -- State of Utah..............D.l - D.9
Appendix E State of North Dakota......E.l - E.16
Appendix F Computer Database and
Tracking Materials...........F.l - F.10
ANALYSIS OF PLANNING PROGRAMS MANAGING THE TRANSPORT OF HAZARDOUS MATERIAL BY TRUCK
In the 1960s and 1970s, the nation turned its attention to the issue of environmental quality which resulted in significant changes in our governmental policies and in the way we conduct business. As a carryover of this concern, the 1980s focused its attention on the cleanup and control of hazardous materials and hazardous wastes. The relative sudden interest in this particular issue was literally ignited on a national level by the well known Three Mile Island event in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, in 1979. This event was perceived to threaten the future of an entire state with the possible meltdown of a nuclear reactor. The underlying significance of this event is whether we can maintain control of and plan for the events that are the biproduct of
technology. As stated in an article concerned with this dilemma:
"But last year's near meltdown at the Three Mile Island nuclear plant in Pennsylvania is indicative of widespread and
increasingly difficult problems of matching human performance and reliability with that of sophisticated machinery. As a rule, mistakes that do reach the public
consciousness are so disastrously out of tune with the expected technological harmony that even the most untrained ear can pick them up. These errors usually lead to events that are fatal, or
potentially so, to large numbers of people the TMI accident; the derailment of trains carrying passengers or toxic
chemicals; plane crashes that kill
hundreds, such as those in San Diego,
Chicago, and the Canary Islands ; the
inexplicable collision of an oi 1 tanker
with a Coast Guard cutter on a clear,
moonlit night in Tampa Bay." 
Major events such as those mentioned above have made cleanup and control of hazardous waste and materials a central issue in this country. In response, the nation has redirected considerable public money to address this problem. The most notable legislative action was the enacatment of CERCLA (Comprehensive Environmental Resource Compensation and Liability Act), or Superfund, which in 1980 allocated $1.6 billion for the cleanup of uncontrolled hazardous waste sites. CERCLA is implemented by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. The response and cleanup of uncontrolled hazardous waste sites and spills is indicative of a very large and complicated problem. In addition, identifying the sources of hazardous materials and wastes, securing and monitoring storage facilities, and overseeing transportation practices are some of the other areas of concern which are being addresses by all levels of government and the private sector. My objective in this thesis is to examine over-the-road transport of hazardouos materials from a planning perspective. The area of interest is the transporting of hazardous materials by truck. A more detailed description of this study problem will be discussed in the following section
The issue of interest is the transportation of hazardous materials by the trucking industry. I have excluded data on rail and air transport because the magnitude of those subject areas, are beyond the scope of this effort. In addition, the present mode of operation of the trucking industry is of more interest from a planning perspective, since it is the most difficult to monitor and is perhaps the highest risk area. Hazardous materials trucking operations also have a more direct impact on the public since the public and industry share the same corridors or travel routes with increasing frequency. In trucking, there is more flexibility in route selection (as compared to the fixed rail and air transport), which means more opportunity for conflict and more difficulty in establishing public policy. The nature of the problem should demand a higher level of cooperation between the public and private sector out of necessity although this is not always the case.
Hazardous materials transportation is an issue that affects the whole, that is it costs everyone something when things go wrong, e.g., lives, money, resources, etc. The intent of this thesis is to examine how successful or unsuccessful the programs are in three states to regulate and control transport of hazardous materials. This three-state comparison will demonstrate the similarities and differences in approaches and describe the strengths and weaknesses of the various programs. In addition, I will discuss new approaches discovered in my research as alternatives to these current programs.
Scope of the Problem
Every year large quantities of hazardous materials, e.g., chemicals, pesticides and radioactive materials, defined by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Transportation and other regulatory agencies (which will be discussed later in more detail), are being transported across the country by truck. In the event of an accident which results in the release of hazardous materials, the citizens of this country are threatened by loss of life, injury, environmental and property damage and disruption of their social and business functions. A secondary effect is to the health and welfare in either the long or short-term, of individuals associated with an event. For example, what the cumulative health effects might be that are suffered by an individual whose job it is to respond to hazardous materials spills.
Spills and releases of hazardous materials are on the increase. This is an indication that industry is either shipping more hazardous materials, or that the events are being reported more regularly (most probably both). It is estimated by the Chemical Manufacturers Association that there are five million tank truck shipments of hazardous materials each year . Complicating the number of events are two factors worth mentioning even though many other factors are important. The first is that generally people tend to move closer to major transportation corridors because of convenience, which increases the potential for an event to affect people directly. Second, our rapidly advancing technology is producing new chemicals at a tremendous rate, complicating our response task. Fortunately, the increased accessibility to computers by first responders will help to alleviate this problem.
When an event occurs, the threat to health and welfare of the public is usually significant enough to warrant the mobilization of very expensive and specialized resources. Once the event is under control, recovery is often hampered by prohibitive costs. These factors have contributed to the growing interest at all levels of government and in the private sector.
Role of the Federal, State, and Local Government Regulations
The responsibility of regulation, enforcement and emergency response for the transport of hazardous materials resides at all levels of government. The type of shipment, i.e., air, rail, vessel, truck, either interstate or intrastate has a significant influence in molding regulatory authority. The unique features associated with each type of carrier dictate the need to divide up authority, particularly at the federal level. Despite the division of responsibility, the regulatory process has been reported as difficult to manage and enforce and has, as a result, been continually revised. The continual updating and amending of the regulations has created problems for both enforcers and the enforcee. This section will attempt to describe the various authorities and outline regulations that are currently active in regulating the transport of hazardous materials by truck.
The regulations enacted by the Federal government act as the basis for deriving state and local regulations. This is particularly evident in regards to interstate commerce where a national level perspective is practical. The enactment of the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA) of 1974 overrides state and local authority "to protect the nation adequately against the risks to life and property which are inherent in the transportation of hazardous materials in commerce" . To assure consistency under HMTA, state and local laws are severly restricted (Public Law 93-633). The Materials Transportation Bureau (MTB) has regulations establishing procedures for issuing advisory "inconsistency rulings" in response to requests for such determinations (Appendix A-3-5).
History of Regulating Transportation of Hazardous Material
Apparently, the first law regulating the transportation of hazardous materials was passed by Congress in 1871. This law authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to issue safety regulations for the transportation of certain explosives, flamables, and acids on passenger-carrying vessels in navigable waters . This authority was delegated to the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). Eventually the USCG authority was expanded by their authorized adoption of the Interstate Commerce Commission's (ICC) regulations which classified hazardous materials and specified packaging and labeling requirements for containers.
The first law which would affect land carriers was passed in 1908. The ICC was authorized to establish safety standards for transporting explosives and other dangerous materials such as corrosives, flamables, etc.
In regards to land transportation, there was minimal progress until 1967, when the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) was created and all the agencies that were responsible for regulating transportation were consolidated into one department.
The Secretary of Transportation then established a Hazardous Materials Regulation Board (HMRB) to coordinate DOT's program in the various areas of transportation ( air, rail, highway, etc.) The intent was to coordinate the regulations and procedures that would be developed by DOT.
Recognizing the additional problems associated with hazardous materials, Congress directed the Secretary of Transportation under the Hazardous Materials Control Act of 1970 to evaluate the hazards involved and establish control systems that would provide technical advice to first responders and emergency response personnel. In 1973, DOT proposed to amend its authorizing statutes on hazardous materials. The proposed amendments would have vested all rulemaking
authority for hazardous materials safety in the Secretary, extended the rulemaking authority, and permitted the assessment of civil penalties for regulatory violations . The result of this proposal was the creation of a new law, the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA) of 1974. It authorized the Secretary of Transportation to issue regulations for all modes regarding the safe transport of hazardous materials in interstate commerce, and intrastate commerce that affects interstate commerce ,
In 1978, three separate federal hearings were held which centered on the issue of hazardous materials. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) considered the incident in Tennessee where 12 people were killed when a derailed tank car ruptured and ignited and in Florida where 88 people were injured and 8 were killed from chlorine gas escaping from a derailed car. The second hearing by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) investigated safety aspects of uninsulated pressure tank cars. The third, by the House Commerce Subcommittee on Transportation, investigated the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act of 1974 .
In addition to HMTA, the DOT's hazardous materials safety program regarding truck transportation is guided by the Dangerous Cargo Act of 1940, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act amendments of 1972, and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1979, and the Comprehensive Environmental Resource Compensation Liability Act of 1980. To carry out the administrative changes authorized by HMTA, the Secretary created the Materials Transportation Bureau (MTB) . With the exception of vessel transportation regulation promulgated by the USCG, the MTB is authorized to issue all hazardous materials safety regulations.
The DOT is designated as the lead agency governing the safety of transporting hazardous materials. In addition, there are other federal agencies that have responsibilities for the safe movement of hazardous materials from regulation to emergency response activities and cleanup (see Appendix A-l).
U.S. Enviromental Protection Agency
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is responsible for the promulgation of several federal regulations that have a significant impact on the transportation of hazardous materials by truck which are described as follows:
Clean Water Act of 1978, 311
The purpose of this act was to establish a means to clean up spills of hazardous substances into the nation's navigable waters. Not all discharges were considered harmful under this act, particularly if the discharge was in small quantities. EPA established a "reportable quantity" which is the quantity and concentration of a chemical that could be considered detrimental to the environment. HMTA incorporated EPA's list of hazardous substances into its Hazardous Materials Regulatory (HMR) program so that a package which exceeds the reportable quantitiy level is subject to DOT's regulations .
National Contingency Plan
This is the principal mechanism for implementing the cleanup authorities for both the Clean Water Act and CERCLA. This authority is extended to include transportation related incidents, but as mentioned before, CERCLA's application has been primarily directed at cleaning up abandoned waste dump sites. However, the NCP outlines the procedures for Odesignating the on-scene coordinater and the intergovernmental network which will participate in the response to the major incidents. The NCP also establishes guidelines for determining the appropriate nature and extent of federally supported response and for allocating funding available from Superfund . This authority is only evoked when local and state response capabilities are exceeded, which is usually not the case in many of the transportation related incidents.
The NCP also includes provisions for "remedial actions" (such as relocation of affected persons), in addition to the cleanup and response operations. This type of action would be by agreement with the state which would share in the cost of the action.
Comprehensive Enviromental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA)
Usually referred to as the Superfund Program, it establishes a system for notifying or reporting hazardous material releases from facilities including truck operations and provides funds for cleanup. The scope of authority includes releases on land, underground, and in the air, which has expanded the response role discussed in the Clean Water Act section. It also expands the response role discussed in the Clean Water Act to include several lists of materials developed under other authorities.
CERCLA incorporates liability standards that can be used either by a state or federal government to recoup monies from the fund or force responsible parties to pay for the cleanup of releases. Under the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, the truck industry is required to demonstrate financial responsibility.
Since its enactment, CERCLA has focused on mostly abandoned hazardous material sites where the evidence of a responsible party is not clearly defined. It has had a direct impact on other federal and state programs. It also has expanded the scope of emergency response authority .
Compensation and Libility of CERCLA
As mentioned, CERCLA has a mechanism for recouping money spent to respond to hazardous materials cleanup actions. The responsible parties that are identified are subject to joint and several (i.e. each liable party may be held liable for the full amount of damages and strict (i.e. without regard to fault) liability for response costs. In the event of a cleanup action on an area that has changed hands frequently over a long period of time, the result is usually a very complicated and costly legal investigation. The result is that the responsible party pays the price of cleanup and this acts hopefully to deter future spills. If a responsible party can not be identified, then both the federal and state governments incur the cost of cleanup through a cooperative agreement .
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976
RCRA's overall purpose as stated in 40 CFR 263 (Code of Federal Regulations) is to establish a national program to improve solid waste management which includes the control of hazardous waste, the promotion of resource conservation and recovery, and the establishment of environmentally sound solid waste disposal practices. For transporters of hazardous materials this has been translated to a "cradle to grave" manifest requirement system. Parts 262 and 263 of the regulations establish the responsibilities of generators and transporters of hazardous waste in the handling, transportation and management of that waste. These regulations include EPA's adoption of DOT's regulations concerning labeling, marking, placarding, using proper containers and reporting discharges. This adoption has also ensured consistency with the requirements and thus avoids duplication of effort. EPA retains its authority to enforce these regulations regardless of DOT's actions. RCRA does not apply to on site transportation of hazardous waste by generators or by owners or operators of the permitted facility.
In the event of a discharge of hazardous waste during transportation, the transporter is directed under subpart C, Section 263.30, to take immediate action. This action includes whatever is considered appropriate whether they are legally permitted or not. In addition, they are directed to notify the National Response Center (see Appendix A-2) and to report the event in writing to the Office of Hazardous Materials Regulations, Materials Transportation Bureau, DOT. RCRA also directs the transporter to cleanup any hazardous waste discharge or take action as directed by a federal, state or local official . In summary, the RCRA regulations appear to place considerable responsibility on the transporter to act in an incident, whether the transporter is properly manifested or not.
U.S. Regulatory Commision (NRC)
Atomic Energy Act of 1954--
Through this law and subsequent amendments the NRC has the statutory responsibiltiy to regulate the possession, use, and transfer of radioactive materials within the United States. This responsibility duplicates that of DOT so in 1979 a Memorandum of Understanding was developed to define their respective roles and avoid duplication of effort. In this memorandum, DOT agreed to develop the safety standards for packages of radioactive materials which would not exceed the Type A limits for low specific activity radioactive materials. The NRC is responsible for the approval of package designs for fissile or other radioactive materials in quantities that exceed Type A limits. Type A packages are basically designed to withstand only the normal events of transportation. Type B packages are designed to withstand whatever might occur in a major accident. The NRC is also in charge of deciding the time, extent, and degree of security appropriate for high level radioactive material shipments .
Interstate Commerce Commision (ICC)
The ICC has had a limited role in regulating the transportation of hazardous materials since 1967, when Congress created DOT. The ICC requires carriers to publish rates for the transportation of hazardous materials. ICC also has the responsibility to protect the public against unlawful carrier practices and is required to investigate whether hazardous material carriers have provided safe and adequate service, equipment and facilites .
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
This board was created to investigate and report on the safety of hazardous materials which are transported by all modes. They also have the responsibility to evaluate the adequacy of safeguards and procedures that were developed for transporting hazardous materials. In addition they report on the performance of other government agencies charged with assuring the safe transport of these materials. Since it was formed in 1968, the NTSB has made numerous recommendations to DOT concerning regulations, safety analysis, inspection and enforcement, data and reporting requirements .
U.5. Coast Gaurd (USCG)
The USCG is primarily responsible for inspection and enforcement authority regarding transportation of hazardous materials by water. The Clean Water Act, which is administerd by EPA, has authorized the USCG to respond to releases of hazardous materials into surface waters that are a threat to public health and the environment .
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA)
Hazarous Materials Transportation Act of 1975 (HMTA)--
When Congress in 1967 consolidated all the agencies responsible for transportation safety, it was the first step in achieving a comprehensive, coordinated federal hazardous materials transportation program. Under HMTA, Congress authorized the Secretary of Transportation to issue uniform regulations for all types of transporters of hazardous materials in commerce. To carry out these administrative
directives the Secretary created the Materials Transportation Bureau (MTB) which became the lead agency in the program. MTB issued Hazardous Materials Regulations which are published in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). Specifically, MTB has adopted the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (49 CFR Parts 390 to 399) under HMTA authority. Under HMTA, MTB is authorized to use civil penalty and other enforcement tools .
Motor Carrier Act of 1980
MTB or the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety under Section 30 of this act is authorized to level minimum amount of liability insurance for a motor carrier in interstate commerce of $750,000; and for a carrier of hazardous substances, the minimum is $5 million. The Secretary of Transportation is also authorized to reduce these limits for two years after promulgation of regulations under this section if public safety is not adversely affected .
General Enforcement Authorities
The Department of Transportation hazardous materials program is designed to both prevent incidents from occuring and to reduce the severity of the incidents that do occur. They accomplish this by having an inspection program to determine whether industry is cprogram to further encourage compliance. Violators of the HMTA or any other regulation are subject to civil penalties of up to $10,000 for each violation and an additional $10,000 for each day the violation continues. In addition, a person who is prosecuted for willfully violating the law is subject to a crimminal fine of up to $25,000, imprisonment of up to five years, or both.Giving authority to administer penalties, HMTA, gives DOT authority to take immediate action when an imminent and serious hazard exists. For instance, if MTB determines that the transport of a hazardous material is unsafe to the public, it can go directly to federal court and obtain a judicial order to restrict the transportation .
As mentioned previously, DOT is involved in both insufficent inspection program. This inadequacy is partially responsible for the ineffectiveness of the program It becomes economically feasible for most of industry to pay the occassional penalties levied rather than to pay for the high cost of compliance. Penalties therefore have become part of the cost of doing business.
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
FEMA is the agency with the primary responsibility for coordinating the assistance given by the federal government to state and local government in the area of emergency response. FEMA's training and response planning efforts are authorized in 14 CFR 300 and the emergency response roles are described in 44 CFR 200 (20). FEMA is responsible for a wide range of activities that directly affect the planning for hazardous materials incidents. For instance, FEMA is responsible for supporting state and local governments in planning preparedness, mitigation, response and recovery efforts. FEMA is responsible for providing training and education to enhance the capability of federal, state and local emergency managers and responders. In addition, FEMA is involved in developing practical applications of research to lessen the damages that result from emergencies and disasters. These roles have direct applicability to the management of hazardous materials which will be discussed further in the recommendations .
New Federal Assistance Programs
The problems associated with monitoring and enforcing regulations of hazardous material commercial carriers has been given notice by both Federal and State agencies in an important new program. Recently, the FHWA authorized pursuant to Sections 401-404 of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 (Public Law 97-424), money to be made available to the states to address the problems of transporting hazardous materials. This new regulation, which will be described further became effective August 31, 1983. This program is referred to as the Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program (MCSAP).
Prior to this program, there were several pilot programs whose purpose was to determine the effectiveness of a coordinated approach to federal and state efforts to regulating carriers. The Motor Carrier Weighing and Inspection Demonstration Program (1979) consisted of a joint federal and state commercial carrier safety inspection program covering both interstate and intrastate commerce. The program consisted of motor vehicle equipment safety inspection, hazardous material transportation condition, minimum driver qualifications, and maximum hours of service. A second program developed by the DOT was called the Hazardous Materials Enforcement Development Program (SHMED), initiated in 1981. This program was designed to encourage the states to assume greater responsibility for hazardous materials transportation enforcement by providing technical and financial assistance. It also provides incentives for state adoption of federal regulations . The program will be phased out by 1987.
The success of these programs can be attributed to the creation of NCSAP which has inherently great potential for improving the present state of affairs. MCSAP's intention, like the previous programs described, is to improve the coordination between FHWA and the states but is not intended to duplicate or replace ongoing programs. Secondly, MCSAP aims to unify present programs in regard to the overlap of regulations.
In addition to providing guidance, MCSAP awards grant money to those states that can demonstrate program eligibility. The conditions for grant approval are outlined in Section 350.9. Briefly, grant approval is dependent on the submission of the state of a State Enforcement Plan (SEP), which designates a motor carrier safety agency and other legal authorities to administer the plan, dedicate funds for operation, and other functions outlined in the regulations. Grant approval is for a period of one year and is renewable each year.In the SEP, the state must also agree to adopt or assume responsibility for enforcing the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (49 CFR, Parts 386 and 388-399 with exceptions) and parts of the federal hazardous materials regulations (49 CFR, Parts 107, 171-173, 177 and 178) or compatible state rules. The state operation of the SEP is reviewed by the FHWA on a continuing basis. Grant money can be withdrawn if the SEP is not performing according to the FHWA standards.
State and Local Roles
In regard to regulating hazardous materials movement by highway, the states have considerable authority even though federal laws and regulations preempt the state and local governments. In order to promote national regulatory uniformity, many states have adopted Department of Transportation Hazardous Materials Regualtions, in part or fully depending on their individual resources or concerns. Of the states in our region, only North Dakota has not adopted the full spectrum of federal regulations.
State laws reflect and multiply the diversity found in federal regulations and also refer to hazardous materials, hazardous substances, hazardous wastes, and radioactive and/or nuclear materials. In the latter case, it is not uncommon for state law to distinguish between hazardous materials, hazardous waste and radioactive materials. In state law, radioactive materials specifically may be exempt from hazardous materials regulations and subject to their own. It is also not uncommon for states to have seperate hazardous materials and hazardous waste laws and regulations. State laws may have different permit and licensing requirements for any or all of the multiple categories of hazardous goods. There may be differences in cargo manifest requirements or in state restrictions that go beyond federal restrictions. Radioactive materials and explosives are more likely to be restricted from bridges, tunnels and toll roads than other hazardous materials. Many states exempt agricultural products such as fertilizers from their regulatory schemes .
In most state emergency response plans, the local authorities are designated as having the lead role with the state and federal agencies providing support by request. The particualr roles are specified by state and differ enough to make generalizations impractical.
Critique of Existing Regulatory Scheme
The Department of Transportation statistics show that the number of accidents from hazardous material incidents have steadily increased . In addition, the statistics when examined by the General Accounting Office were found to be inaccurate and incomplete . Since DOT relies on voluntary reporting by the transportation industry of accidents, it does not maintain a reliable record of the total number of accidents or related information on the kinds of materials being transported, volume, location of the firms involved or routes being used by industry. The Department of Transportation cannot determine the extent of the problem with any proven accuracy.
In additiion to the GAO study finding, the National Transportation Safety Board study found that there is widespread noncompliance with federal hazardous materials regulations , This was attributed inpart to the complexity and bulk of the regulations which make them difficult to understand. The DOT standards are specification standards outlining instructions for every facet of the shipping process,
i.e. design of containers, handling, labeling, storage, operating instructions, routing and parking restrictions. The more types of transport modes used and commodities transported the more complex compliance becomes. Many transporters and carriers have chosen not to comply with these regulations because of these factors.
The complexity and bulkiness of the regulations are also a problem for the enforcement officials. It is costly and labor intensive to support adequate staff to maintain an adequate enforcement program. Even if DOT could implement efficient standards it would not be able to enforce them because its resources are severly limited . As an example, in 1979 DOT employed only forty-nine full-time hazardous materials inspectors .
Because its resources are so severly restricted, DOT's regulations are practically unenforceable, and compliance is essentially voluntary. Since relatively few inspections are conducted they do not have a significant deterrent effect. Those transporters that are inspected and are found to have violated the regulations are not punished seriously, because DOT lacks the resources to prosecute them. Most enforcement actions brought by the agency result in dismissal or settlement.
"The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) studies 45 enforcement proceedings initiated by DOT between 1973 and 1978 for violation of the hazardous materials regulations. In 25, no action was taken.
Seven were settled for less than $1,000 and another five for between $1,000 and 3,500; in only one case was a fine above $3,500 imposed. The remaining cases were still pending when NTSB finished its study." 
In order to set safety standards in a regulatory scheme, an agency must be cognizant of industrial technologies, cost and effectiveness of taking certain precautions. The complexity of the materials being transported gives industry the advantage in having this information. The agencies reliance on information that industry supplies is problematic because industry can use its informational advantage to improperly influence the regulations adopted by DOT . It is expected that industry would try to influence DOT safety standards in regard to the design and construction standards and other economic considerations instead of safety.
In summary the present regulatory scheme is in need of an overhaul. It has evolved into a self regulating, unenforceable and mostly voluntary system. The problems of overlapping authorities, complexity, quantity, inadequate budget and staff and bureacratic reliance on industry's technological knowledge has contributed to its significant problems.
STATE OF COLORADO
Colorado is the most populated and industrialized state in the region and also the fastest growing. Predictably, there are more hazardous materials spills with a greater risk to lives, property and the environment. The mountainous terrain and delicate environmental conditions add another dimension to the problem of response. In a speech to the National Conference on Hazardous Materials Transporation in 1982, Mr. Cordell A. Smith stated it accurately as follows:
"Here in Colorado for as long as we have had roads, the mountains and heavy trucks are two things that haven't always cooperated in harmony with each other.
When we had truck crashes here, many have been spectacular not only because of the kinds of cargoes being carried but also because of the nature of this state's terrain. When a tanker truck tosses a load of flammable liquid down a mountainside, the result usually is more likely to wind up on the front page than a spill in more typical environments elsewhere." 
There is really no economic way to get around the mountains of Colorado. This added dimension to the complications of interstate and intrastate transportation has contributed to the state's incentive program and aggressive approach. For instance, Colorado was the first to establish a national training program for the handling and containment of hazardous materials called the Colorado Training Institute (CTI). The institute was the product of the Colorado Committee on Hazardous Materials established in 1973.
After eleven years of effort, Colorado is still trying to solve the problems of hazarodus materials spills. There have been significant efforts made in training, emergency response, planning and enforcement. Lagging behind, however, is the problem of hazardous material disposal which is slowed down in a significant quagmire of political and economic debate and controversy. Overall, Colorado is the regional leader in this effort. Information for this section was taken from interviews with personnel from government and quasi government organizations, and from materials received as a result of those interviews.
In the state of Colorado since 1981, the responsibility of responding to incidents was delegated to various authorities. Cities and counties were expected to designate their own response authorities; the fire departments and county sheriffs must act in unincorporated areas and private property owners are responsible for incidents occurring on their own property. The Colorado State Patrol was designated as responsible for emergency response on interstate highways.
To further illustrate the complexity of the hazardous materials emergency response situation in Colorado we need to look at the schema for response. At least 13 types of hazardous material accidents may require on the scene assistance in Colorado. Depending on whether the accident is by rail, truck or in the air, 10 agencies can be called for information and 10 for on-the-scene assistance. In eight of the 10 cases, there is an overlap; i.e., an agency called for information might also give on-the-scene assistance. But in 10 of the 13 accident types, again depending on the transportation mode, the information agencies do not coincide with the on-the-scene assistance agencies . This information is clearly illustrated in charts taken from the Colorado Training Institute which show the complexity of the network (see Appendix A).
Colorado Training Institute
The Colorado Training Institute (CTI) was formed in 1979 by the Colorado Committee on Hazardous Materials Safety which entered into a contract with DOT through the Colorado Division of Highway Safety . CTI depends mostly on volunteer instructors from both the public and private sector who have an interest in promoting the response capabilities of emergency responders. Courses conducted at the Institute include an awareness overview for firemen, highway patrol, civil defense personnel, ambulance crews and anyone involved with response to a hazardous materials incident; cargo tank inspection and commercial vehicle inspection classes, among others. Since its opening, CTI has trained approximately 1500 students from 45 states and has participated on an international level. In addition, CTI has "gone on the road," to reach out to those who cannot afford the travel expense of going to the Institute. This unique school provides a much needed service in upgrading the level of understanding needed by first responders, shippers, carriers, etc. in responding to hazardous materials events.
Recently, I attended a portion of the lecture series offered by CTI and interviewed Mr. William Carter, Division of Highway Safety with CTI. The class was attended mostly by firemen and police personnel from outside the region. The CTI instruction included an overview of the chemical and biological hazards which the students were likely to face while conducting their response activities to events. In addition, they received instruction on their legal liabilities involved with response actions. Both areas of instruction seemed imperative in regard to their position of responsibility.
In the interview with Mr. Carter, we discussed some of the strengths and weaknesses of the Colorado hazardous materials response network. The interview was very revealing, illustrating some of the problems that exist in the state emergency response network.
At present, cargo and vehicle inspections are being conducted by the State Patrol, the Port of Entry, the Department of Transportation, the Public Utility Commission and the city enforcement officials. Each of these entities has their own individual criteria for inspection. In addition to the CTI training, the State Patrol and the Fire Departments also conduct their own. Inconsistencies in enforcement add to the bureaucratic problems. The legal fines imposed by the federal inspection program, for example, are
significantly different from the fines levied by the state or local entities.
This fractured system of training and enforcement has contributed to the difficulty in maintaining cooperation between government officials, and has caused significant problems for industry. Inherent in this kind of system are the usual "turf battles" for funding when so many organizations are doing essentially the same things.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency was viewed as a major force in hazardous materials response but a minor participant in training participation, response to emergencies or promoting cooperation with industry. Their role was primarily that of enforcement. To be more effective they would need to change their approach considerably. The Department of Transportation on the other hand was viewed as having a more active role in being responsive to industry. Their program involved both interpretation of the regulations for industry and carrying out voluntary inspections prior to shipments (initiated at industries request).
Carriers were more inclined to seek federal assistance and adhere to the regulations if they could get direct help in interpreting those regulations at the outset, and be granted prior inspections. The volume and complexity of the regulations makes it extremely difficult for industry to comply without this kind of assistance and in realilty it does not occur very often.
Denver Office of Emergency Preparedness, Civil Defense Department
Information concerning the emergency response role of this office was taken from an interview with Dr. Christopher Adams, Emergency Preparedness Assistant. According to Dr. Adams, his office was primarily active in maintaining the communication network between the federal, state and local emergency responders. For instance, it acts as the liaison between the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Environmental Protection Agency and the State Highway Patrol. In addition, his office provides chemical information to first responders by maintaining its own library of information and also by contacting CHEMTREC or the actual manufacturers if necessary.
In the Denver-Metro area there are three vehicles equipped to respond to hazardous materials events, a situation which is good compared with other regions in Colorado. Dr. Adams is also working on developing a computer-assisted model to have the capability of assessing transportation corridor problem areas and predicting toxic plume dispersion patterns.
Dr. Adams commented on Denver-Metro area and its heightened interest in hazardous materials attributed to the new administration of Mayor Federico Pena. On the other hand, he sees the need for improvement in the federal level of involvement, particularly in the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
Colorado State Patrol
The Colorado State Patrol (CSP), according to the Colorado Hazardous Materials Spills and Releases Response Plan, is responsible for responding to hazardous materials spill events that occur on all Colorado highways including federal, state and county roads outside the municipal boundaries. The CSP has the following responsibilities:
1. Provide technical assistance by request.
2. Enforce the rules and regulations published by the Dept, of Regulatory Agencies concerning hazardous materials.
3. Provide communications support in coordination with the Colorado Division of Disaster Emergency Services (DODES).
4. Participate in an inter-agency, statewide assessment and review process, managed by DODES, by reporting hazardous materials conditions concerning highway safety over the states transportation network.
5. Conduct training for local and state personnel by managing the Colorado Training Institute (CTI) .
The State plan has essentially outlined and defined the role of the CSP operation since the program came into existence in 1973. The CSP is perhaps the most important public service unit in regards to responding to regulating and controlling hazardous materials in trucking operations. In an interview with Mr. Charles Heister, Hazardous Materials Coordinator, (see Appendix C-ll-15), I was able to see how the CSP currently operates with the DODES plan and document the patrols" perspective of their program.
In 1973, Heister was charged with initiating the hazardous materials program within the CSP and was the only state trooper to be involved in this particular effort. Between 1973 and 1979 hazardous materials training was conducted for all state troopers. In 1979, the Colorado Training Institute was opened and offered training to first responders related to hazardous materials events. Initially, the institute trained 60 troopers, 30 of which were distributed throughout the state, alloting about 5 to each district. These troopers were also trained to conduct truck safety inspections. By 1980, all new state troopers were given a basic orientation course on hazardous materials problems conducted by Heister. In 1983, the hazardous materials unit of the CSP was formalized and directed to conduct training and to inspect trucks.
There is a current shortage of safety equipment available to state troopers. Heister suggested that each district should have available a fully equipped safety truck since events can and do occur anywhere in the state (see Appendix C-3). The location of these events is not always within the proximity of adequate safety equipment and tan therefore cause some serious difficulties for the responders. In addition, all troopers should have available or carry Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus or SCBA equipment in order to protect themselves from the dangers of inhaling noxious fumes which are usually generated anytime there is a fire. A less expensive alternative, which is not as safe, would be to provide fitted face masks and air filter cartridges to troopers to afford some level of protection.
Another problem identified during the interview was the underutilization of the Port of Entry functions. Trucks are required to stop at the Port of Entry to pay fees. Until recently, the Port of Entry operations did not include conducting hazardous materials inspections or record-keeping of trucks carrying hazardous materials. The large number of trucks prohibited a practical method of including these activities. Recently, however, the Port of Entry received five inspectors from the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) to conduct truck inspections. In addition, Heister is extending his hazardous materials seminars to include Port of Entry personnel in order to train them to recognize hazardous materials problems (see Appendix C-16).
Division____of____Disaster and Emergency Services
Department of Public Safety, State of Colorado
The Division of Disaster Emergency Services (DODES) is the office responsible for developing the state emergency preparedness response plan. For this section, I reviewed the 1983 and 1984 plans and interviewed Jack Truby, the primary author of the plans.
Briefly, DODES is responsible for many key functions in regard to state level emergency responses and is detailed in Appendix C-17. This includes the coordination of efforts of other state agencies, training, exercise evaluation, public information, management in the event of a disaster, and development of a task force which will analyse, evaluate and recommend areas of improvement to the Governor on all elements of the state response system.
In addition, I interviewed Mr. Bruce Smith who is relatively new to DODES. His view of the problems in response to hazardous materials incidents coincided with other responders interviewed. The major problem is the lack of clear authority as to who is in charge. It is also not clear in some incidents who should be responding. A disaster incident would involve DODES, but an incident involving hazardous waste would be a Colorado Department of Health responsibility. In addition, there is some disagreement as to when the military becomes involved, i.e. civilian emergencies are not handled by the military except in special incidents. Smith also identified the lack of state funds as a problem in conducting enforcement and training.
Colorado Hazardous Materials Spills and Releases
In January 1984, the Colorado Division of Disasters Emergency Response Services (DODES) published their new emergency response plan. In the introductory remarks the plan describes the growing threat and increasing difficulty in effectively managing hazardous materials spills. The rapidly increasing costs of responding to spills and the need to therefore maximize industrial and government coordination efforts provides a clear justification for their approach. The introduction also provides the framework of the plan as follows:
"Systematic and timely application of responses and expertise can significantly reduce the costs of spills and releases of hazardous materials. Similarly, timely and effective response by concerned industrial manufacturers and shippers may be crucial. Systematic local effort and initiative will also facilitate state assistance when lifesaving and recovery need exceed local capabilities. Prompt and thorough local effort will also serve as an effective basis for the request of federal assistance."
This statement indicates that industry and all levels of government will be sought to take part in emergency response efforts when needed (Appendix C-l-2). Further on the plan states that Colorado hazards are increasing at a faster rate than government's capability for hazard reduction. The weak points involve insufficient funding for programs and equipment.
Currently, DODES is revising its emergency response plan and should have it published by October 1984. The draft plan indicates that DODES has made significant progress in defining more clearly the roles different agencies will have in response situations. Full responsibility for determining the level of danger and if state assistance is needed, is with the local jurisdiction, with the exception of accidents that occur on federal property and are therefore federal responsibility. In addition, the plan discusses the Governor's task force which was formed to look at such issues as emergency supplies and capability, transportation and fixed facilities problems.
Based on the interviews with emergency response officials, review of state plans, newspaper articles and an assortment of literature, it appears that there is a level of discontent and frustration regarding this subject area. The discontent is generated from several areas, involving lack of funds, supplies, training and data in a climate that is getting worse faster than it is getting better.
An examination of the statistics provided by the Department of Transportation (Appendix C-4) indicates that the number of spills are increasing steadily. The spills are distributed throughout the state, not necessarily in the most populated areas like Rio Blanco County (Appendix C-3), but are related to other activities, i.e., oil and gas leasing. The responses to these spills are primarily handled by the responsible parties (Appendix C-8), and not by the government emergency response system. A concerning high number are cleaned up by unknown parties indicating a high degree of inefficient record keeping and reporting (Appendix C-8). The majority of spills are related to the oil and gas industry as compared to a small percentage to other types of hazardous materials (Appendix C-4-10) which was 26% in 1983. Nearly half of the spills were caused by equipment failure indicating that an improved inspection program could improve this statistic considerably (Appendix C-5).
These statistics are indicative of the general conditions in the state. It is probable that these statistics are not accurate but are still useful in terms of planning and policy purposes. For instance, if oil and gas leasing is a predominant activity in a county which is also shown to have a high rate of spills, the county may consider levying leasing fees which would be used to support the emergency response programs. Inspection and enforcement programs could prioritize their efforts in high incidents areas by first concentrating on those industries that are primarily at fault. The Department of Transportation is currently using its data base tracking system to prioritize its inspection program so it is possible to set up a program like this for individual counties.
The review of the literature and the interviews indicate that emergency response is adequate only in the highly populated areas of the state, leaving rural areas to fend for themselves. Until such time as money can be made available either through county efforts or others, it would seem desirable that every effort be made to reduce the number of incidents which threaten rural areas. For a decrease in incidents to take place, improvement in enforcement, incentive programs for industry, transportation analysis and inspection of high incident areas should be implemented. The concern for cooperation and coordination within the state should focus on who can best accomplish these tasks in regard to present capability.
In Colorado, the Colorado State Patrol, the local fire departments and other local entities are the primary responders besides the responsible parties. In my opinion, if resources are limited it would seem practical to focus on how to improve the Colorado State Patrol capabilities to reduce incidents by enforcement, equipment, training and authority, and not advocate division of responsibility. Currently, the efforts to improve emergency response are moving toward a more divisional and complicated system. They shouldn't be.
The planning direction to improve responsiveness by improved inter-governmental cooperation is a sound and popular idea. It provides a large network willing to provide support to match the need. However, it also seems to generate a lot of frustration and has not proven its effectiveness. For Colorado, it may be more practical to consolidate authority, expertise, data systems, and the entire network in order to reduce the confusion and improve its capability.
STATE OF UTAH
Utah is similar to Colorado in that it is primarily a state with one major urban center, Salt Lake City. Utah is experiencing the pressures of growth as new industries migrate into the state and home industries expand and develop. This trend has steadily added to the problems of managing hazardous materials. Until recently, the bulk of the responsibility for management was handled by the Division of Comprehensive Emergency Management at the state level and the Utah Highway Patrol.
Most of the activity has been focused, predictably, on the Salt Lake City area, since it is where the bulk of the state's population resides and is the industrial center (Appendix D-l). The following description of the hazardous materials program was taken primarily from an interview with Mr. Loren Larsen, Division of Comprehensive Emergency Management and from materials received as a result of the interview.
Hazardous wastes and materials which are in the workplace, in transit, in reprocessing or in disposal sites (UCA, 26-14-6), are regulated by the Bureau of Hazardous Waste Management, Division of Environmental Health. According to a recent report, Utah hazardous wastes management regulations adhere to both state and federal statutory requirements. The department has received authority to administer the delegable parts of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's regulations and will seek authority for other parts as they are developed .
In a letter of understanding, the Department of Health and the Department of Transportation have delegated the regulation of hazardous wastes in transit to the Division of Safety, Department of Transportation (UCA, Title 63). The Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety has responsibility for all intrastate rail and motor carriers.
The major responsibility of responding to hazardous material events in the state of Utah is at the state and local level of government. It is recognized that the federal government and the private sector possess resources that could be useful to augment response capabilities but exactly what that involves is not addressed in the plan. Instead the plan involves the coordination and responsibilites at the state and local level only.
There are several departments within the state framework that are involved or have responsibilites with hazardous materials response activities. These include the Division of Comprehensive Emergency Management, Department of Transportation, the State Fire Marshall, Utah Highway Patrol, Department of Public Safety, Department of Health, Department of Agriculture, and the Department of Natural Resources. If solicited by the local government, the responsibility for identifying, isolating and coordinating clean up of all hazardous materials is shared with the Department of Health, Department of Natural Resources and the Department of Agriculture according to the state plan. Responsibility for the initial response and cleanup lies with the local jurisdiction.
The Utah State Highway Patrol is defined as the lead coordinator and communicator to the other responders. The plan calls for local response action to notify the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency during any situation in which accidental release of hazardous materials occurs and those responsible for the accident cannot properly respond. The plan also directs the local entity as responsible for restoring an accident site to normal. In addition, local government is directed to the state level offices of the Utah Highway Patrol, Department of Public Safety and the Division of Public Comprehensive Emergency Management if state or federal assistance is required.
According to Mr. Larsen, only his office, the State Highway Patrol, and the Fire Department were the main responders to most incidents. Similar to Colorado, the rural areas of the state were not well covered in terms of equipment and training for emergency response. Mr. Larsen was also concerned that the state did not maintain adequate records and wanted to be able to monitor what was going through the state and where it was going.
Utah has relatively a low number of reported hazardous materials spills when compared to other states like its neighbor Colorado; it reports about half the number (Appendix D-l and D-7). The distribution of the spills is predictably highest around the major population center of Salt Lake City. There are also rural counties like San Juan, Uintah, and Weber (Appendix D-l) that have higher than expected levels. Response activities to most of the spills is reported to be handled primarily by the responsible party, with local and state government entities handling a small percentage of the response (Appendix D-6).
A majority of the spills are from the oil and gas industries (Appendix D-3) which is either representative of the situation or indicates that these industries are more responsive to the reporting requirements. The high activity of oil and gas industries in some rural counties would account for the higher levels of incidents in those counties. The number of incidents since 1975 has not increased steadily, but can be considered more stable. This would indicate that either there is no increase in the number of trucks traveling through the state, or the enforcement and inspection program is working effectively to control the problem. It may also indicate that the reporting system is sharply inaccurate.
The interviews discussed previously, review of the state emergency response plan and the literature revealed that the state has limited resources dedicated to controlling the problem. The State Highway Patrol and the Division of Comprehensive Emergency Management, Department of Public Safety, are the two main governmental entities responding to incidents (Appendix D-8). However, the majority of the response and cleanup activity is handled by the responsible party (Appendix D-8), according to the statistics.
In Utah, the state and local entities dominate the response activities. This framework seems to work effectively in regards to implementation of the programs. This may also be the cause of the stability in the number of incidents reported. Improved enforcement, training and equipment allocations would go far in assisting this kind of effort.
STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
North Dakota is primarily a rural state with fewer industrial resources that would generate hazardous materials, fewer populatiion centers that would be affected by an event and predictably fewer recorded events. However, the relative smaller magnitude of the problem of responding to hazardous material events has not resulted in the state placing a low priority on this issue. My investigation of the states effort revealed a strong program. The following description of the current hazardous materials transportation program was taken primarily from an interview with Mr. Mike Voratchek, North Dakota State Highway Patrol, and supporting material I received as a result of the interview.
According to the North Dakota Hazardous Materials Emergency Response Plan, prepared in 1982, primary authority is granted to the Superintendent of the Highway Patrol to implement and coordinate hazardous materials response. The authority is outlined in Executive Order No. 1981-13 (Appendix E-15 and E-16). The Executive Order was based on the findings of a task force which was convened for the purposes of examining the transportation of hazardous materials in the state. The task force identified the lack of a single state agency, department or official currently responsible for the coordination of authority to address this problem.
The North Dakota Highway Patrol, as mentioned previously, was designed as the lead authority to coordinate and respond to hazardous material events. The position of Hazardous Material Coordinator was created by the Executive Order and Mr. Mike Voratchek was named to fill this position. Concurrently, the associated departments or agencies of the state were directed to cooperate with the Highway Patrol. The responsibilities are outlined in detail in the state emergency plan. Briefly, these other agencies and departments include the National Guard, the State Health Department, the State Disaster Emergency Services, the Fire Marshall, the State Radio Communications, and the Governor's Office.
Senate Bill No. 2166 (see Appendix E-12 and E-13), which was enacted to amend section 39-21-44 of the North Dakota Century Code, supports the State Legislative position to address the problems of transporting hazardous materials. This amendment attempts to mitigate some of the problems encountered by emergency personnel in responding to an event. It requires the transporter of hazardous materials to carry the proper identification on the vehicle so the cargo can be easily identified by first responders. Transporters are also directed to equip their vehicles with proper fire extinquishers. Lastly, it empowers the Superintendent of the Highway Patrol to adopt additional rules to regulate the transportation of hazardous materials which are consistent with the regulations of the U.S. Department of Transportation.
A second important addition to the State Legislation which resulted from Senate Bill 2166 is Title 32, Chapter 32-03 of the North Dakota Century Code, entitled "Damages and Compensatory Relief" (see Appendix E-14). Section 32-03-41 essentially grants immunity to individuals that assist in response to an event. The fear of liability deterred the public in many instances from responding to emergency situations when it could have made a significant difference in controlling the event and saving lives. This new legislation should also help to encourage the public to report their observations of hazardous material violations to the appropriate authorities without fear of litigation. This is particularly important to promoting compliance in a predominately rural area.
North Dakota Hazardous Material Emergency Response Plan
The purpose of the plan is to insure the ability of the State to respond to a hazardous materials event. As a guidance tool, it outlines the responsibilities of certain state agencies to support local governments in their response efforts in hazardous material releases. Local governments are designated as having the primary responsibility for planning, preparedness and reponse to events. The state jurisdictional role is described as a supplement to a local action when the event is beyond the capabilities of the local government and to make a determination of the proper course of action in a given event.
A hazardous material event can occur in any location within the state. The probability of many local governments to be equipped with specialized hazardous material response equipment is unlikely given the rural nature of most of the state and the economic limitations that occur in many sparsely populated regions. It is therefore of particular importance that a state level role be outlined for local utilization. It is perhaps only at the state level that money can be made presently available for this specialized kind of activity.
At first glance, the coordination section of the state plan appears fairly complex. It outlines the various agencies who will be responsible or play a role in a response action. For instance, each of the state agencies listed are given various responsibilities which are inherently complex. In addition, there are important federal and private agencies that can be contacted for assistance.
A closer analysis of the plan reveals its basic simplicity and therefore its usefulness in responding to remote areas in particular. The plan appears to place much of the burden of responsibility on the Highway Patrol as dictated in the state legislation. According to the plan, the Highway Patrol is not just the lead coordinator, but is also responsible for training and exercises, maintenance of hazardous materials resources, identification of released material, determination of the hazards involved, initiation of the alert, transport of the incident response team to the site, and other
responsibilities. The traditional role of the Highway Patrol has not been to provide technical expertise as the first responder.
The communication network needed to provide the Highway Patrol with the technical information is part of the basic structure of the plan. Hazard data on chemicals are received from CHEMTREC and from OHM-TADS. As first responder, the Highway Patrol is expected to make an assessment of the situation and then respond. This essentially means they need to have specialized training and have available specialized safety equipment. In the plan it specifically states: "The Highway Patrol Officer at the scene will provide an assessment of the situation including the type of emergency, state of container failure, if any, toxic cloud activity, and local emergency service forces on scene and their planned actions."  (See Appendix E-9 through E-ll.)
Lending support to the Highway Patrol, the plan identifies the State Hazardous Materials Incident Response team to be responsible for analyzing potential impacts and providing technical assistance. When they are alerted of an event they are directed to go immediately to a specified operations office, not to the scene of the event. The initial response, and possibly the most critical portion of any hazardous material event is the responsibility of the Highway Patrol.
Prior to the Senate Bill No. 2166, the State Environmental Emergency Response Plan did not place the degree of burden of responsibility on the Highway Patrol. Their role was more traditional in regards to providing police assistance, life saving measures, communications, controlling access to the area, etc. The actual "taking charge" actions had to wait for the arrival of local authorities. In a rural environment, this must have proven to be an inadequate procedure. There is the problem of locating the appropriate personnel in a timely manner and getting them to the scene. Also, without the training or equipment, the role of rescuer or life-saver could seriously be impaired by ignorance of the potential danger of the situation. The amendments in the 1982 plan focus the responsibility in those agencies or departments that are usually first on the scene, which is particularly important in a rural state.
North Dakota statistics show a predictable low number of incidents occuring in the state (Appendix E-l and E-5). The highest incident area is shown to be around Billings County which is a fairly densely populated area. There are also unexpected pockets of high incidents such as Renville and Dunn Counties which suggests industrial activity (Appendix E-l). The response to the spills are primarily handled by the responsible parties with state and local entities responding to a small percentage (Appendix E-6 and E-8). The majority of spills are related to the oil and gas industries (Appendix E-2 and E-4) and caused by equipment failure (Appendix E-3). A stronger enforcement and inspection program directed at the highest offenders would probably reduce these statistics significantly. The number of incidents since 1975 appear stable (Appendix E-7), which may be indicative of several things: a slow state growth rate, inaccurate reporting system, or an effective enforcement program.
As stated previously, the State Highway Patrol is the primary governmental response group and this is reflected in the regulations, plans and policies of the state. The simplicity of this system appears to be very effective Improvements in response capability and enforcement for the State Highway Patrol would help significantly in reducing the number of incidents. In addition, a means for the state to identify any major corridors that have a higher than average incident record would be useful for the State Highway Patrol effort.
Value of Risk Assessment
Every society has at some point had to decide how it ought to balance economic benefits and costs against possible harm or loss of life. Inherent in this kind of analysis is the fact that there are trade-offs in public policy decisions that place little value on human life, or the system would be unworkable. Instead, society has made available only a limited amount of resources to expend on safety or precautionary measures, indicating that the problem is not the dollar amount of human life but how to get the most protection for the least amount. It is generally accepted that risk assessment is one means of assisting decisionmakers in evaluating the risk of a hazardous activity.
Value of Risk Assessment
The transport of hazardous materials has always been surrounded with controversy over the issue of safety. Consequently, society has mandated the inspector, enforcer or regulator to reduce risks to society. Compared with other risks that society is willing to tolerate, accidents from hazardous material shipments are small. This relative insignificance has not yet entered into the public priority system. Instead we are faced with more and more regulations, driven by an impossible goal of attaining zero-risk. Our society has not yet included in this decision making spiral what the acceptable level of risk will be that we can afford to take.
"Judgements of safety are judements about the justifiability or unjustifiability of harm. The process of reasoning for ethical safety policy decisions should be dictated -- not by risk avoidance an impossible ideal but by comprehensive risk estimations and cost-risk -benefit evaluations. When these comparisons make it clear that a point of diminishing returns on allocations of money, time, and effort has been reached by comparison with other potential hazards in a society, then the product or process under scrutiny is 'safe enough'."  When a hazardous material transportation accident does occur which results in injury or loss of life, then it can be justified because it is unavoidable, if we assume there is always some level of risk.
Human beings by nature are willing to take risks to gain an intended benefit. A risk-benefit analysis is not a symmetrical relationship, where the benefit must be equal to the risk for the benefit to be pursued. Risk and benefit are usually inseparable. "The primary goal of hazard-management is to increase our ability to tolerate error and to take productive risks" . Some would argue that the risks far outweigh the benefits in regard to technological by-products like hazardous materials and therefore our society should not tolerate the existing conditions. This pessimistic notion neither accurate nor practical, because statistically the risks are not significant considering the number of events, and given the social incentive to pursue technological advancement inherent in our societal framework.
Lastly, the present realities of our social system present us with little to no choice.
"The transportation of hazardous materials is an essential activity in the twentieth century, one upon which all sectors of the economy are highly dependent. The transportation of these materials cannot be discontinued or their flow impeded to the extent that their use becomes prohibitive, without a return to a primitive civilization in which the hazards of life and health would far exceed the dangers inherent in their transportation." 
Risk Assessment and Methodology
Risk assessment is done in two separate activities: risk estimation and risk evaluation. Risk estimation entails (a) the acquisition and application of appropriate data to the estimation of the probabilities of occurrence of the possible deleterious consequences or losses that may result from a subject hazardous activity and (b) the combination of these probabilities and consequences or losses into an appropriate measure of the risk deriving from this activity . From this measurement a risk profile is developed which would illustrate the combination of losses weighed by their probabilities of occurrence. The risk evaluation activity consists of assessing the significance of the estimate risk with respect to its acceptability; the risks of alternatives to the subject hazardous activity; or the worth and cost of means for mitigating it to a lower level . The level of acceptable risk to society which will be tolerated has not been defined specifically because it is not really definable.
There are presently four different kinds of risk estimation methodology that have been developed which can be applied to hazardous materials transportation risk analysis. These are statistical inference, analytical-simulation modeling, subjective estimation of risk parameters and fault tree modeling. A detailed description of these models can be found in Appendix B. In addition to these methodologies, practitioners have also approached the evaluation of risk process by comparing the levels of risks to different alternatives. This includes trying to look at historical data and projecting this into the future while including the benefits accruing from these activities. A second method is alternative analysis, an approach that is commonly used in environmental impact studies for publicly funded projects. Lastly, a difficult to defend procedure is to try to express risk by economic terms which would place a value on human life.
Risk Assessment and Mitigation Measures
Mitigation measures are intended to reduce the risk of an occurrence of an incident or reduce the consequences if it should occur. They may be implemented by improvement of technology. One example is the redesign of containers to minimize potential hazardous material releases if subject to an accident. They can also be expressed in procedural changes through regulations like inspection procedure modifications.
Each mitigation measure considered should be weighed against the possibility of transferring the problems somewhere else. For instance, if a routing requirement is enforced, which would cause increased hazardous materials traffic to pass through another population center, this would displace the risk to somewhere else. This is a common occurrence in this area where risk is merely displaced and not gotten completely rid of.
In addition, mitigation measures are many times developed around inadequate data bases (illustrated previously). Not only is the data inaccurate, it is usually collected in a piecemeal manner which hinders our ability to demonstrate costs and benefits of a particular proposal as being beneficial to society as a whole. This adds to the probability that mitigation will transfer the problem.
Summary of Risk Assessment
Given that we can accept that risk is an inherent part of benefit, risk assessment is a logical extension of managing hazardous materials transportation. In order for risk assessment to be truly valid we need to improve our data bases and our general approach at evaluation, as well as our ability to characterize the costs and benefits.
Computer Assisted Tracking
and Modeling of Transporting Hazardous Materials
We are at the threshold of a new era, ushered in by the use of a exciting new tool, the computer. Though the industrial age and its by-products are the subject of this effort, the computer of the new era may be the most important key to solving the dynamics of managing transportation of hazardous materials, an industrial age phenomenon. Computer technology is at its infancy, and so this next section is not only a discussion of some of the computer-related assistance that is presently available but also its potential.
The computer era, better known as the 'Information Age', is directed at the retrieval, manipulation, and communication of information. The computer has and will continue to replace most traditional information systems. It can be considered the natural extension of a society that has become too massive and complex to operate efficiently without the assistance of this new technology.
The management of hazardous materials is a job that was made for a tool like a computer. If we consider the estimated 250 million tons of hazardous materials that are produced annually, it seems impractical that we would ever keep track of it all. The management of massive quantities of information and making it quickly and easily accessible is what computer technology is designed to do. This is not to suggest that computers can resolve all the problems of managing hazardous materials in transit. They cannot as yet clean up spills or protect the public from harm. They can, however, be used to effectively track what is being transported, analyze data, propose routing corridors, assist with coordination and communication efforts and other essential tasks.
This next section will briefly examine a few of the tracking systems, computer models to assist with managing hazardous materials releases, and predictive modeling for emergency response planning. Information for this section was obtained from personal interviews with personnel from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the U.S. Federal Mexico, and library research.
U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)
It is the legal mandate of the DOT to protect the health and welfare of the public and workers involved with handling and transportation of hazardous materials. The regulations to accomplish this are outlined in 49 CFR. These regulations are basically concerned with the safety and packaging of the hazardous materials and the effectiveness of the communication to the carrier and first responders on their identity. In order to comply with these regulations, specific steps must be taken by those that ship, carry or package hazardous materials. The job of tracking and enforcing the regulations is substantial; therefore a computer-assisted tracking system was developed to assist with the effort.
There are two levels of tracking systems presently operating at DOT, a regional level and a national level. The regional tracking system is designed to assist with the regional responsibilities. This involves maintaining a list of all the known motor carriers in their region; in Region 8 there are approximately 15,000. The system includes information on inspections, violations, accident rates, the kind of carriers and shipments, and other data (Appendix F-2 through F-9). With this information, the regional office can prioritize which transporters have been inspected and which need inspection. As mentioned, DOT has insufficient staff to adequately conduct the number of inspections that are needed so prioritizing their efforts is very useful.
In addition to this tracking system, a new data base was recently added, called the OET or Office of Enforcement and Transportation System (Appendex F-6 and F-7). It has the ability to sort tracking data geographically. The OET system can provide information on the type of carriers in a given area and routing information which has potential in the development of local emergency response plans.
The second level of tracking is maintained at the national headquarters office. A special security clearance provided by the DOT would be needed to obtain the full range of tracking information. In summary, this national tracking system maintains information on all reported hazardous material spills, the quantities, the responsible parties, shipment origin and destination, the monetary damage, the fatalities, and other data (Appendix F-3-5). This system also has the potential in regards to emergency response planning Using the 1983 data (Appendix F-10), I was able to identify the major carriers which reported the highest number of accidents in a statewide area. Directing an inspection and enforcement program using this kind of data could act to help reduce the number of accidents. The present priority system considers this factor in the inspection program but also emphasizes date of last inspection as an important weighing factor. Given that the staff available to conduct the inspections is very limited, considering the date of last inspection in the priority system may slow the effectiveness of the program.
During an interview with Mr. Bill Jensen, DOT, the accessibility of information to the regional offices was briefly discussed. National level information was not easily accessible to the regions, and therefore not utilized on a regular basis. In order to gain access to this information, DOT regional personnel had to obtain clearance. The regional office therefore provides an input function to the national tracking system. In the future this system should be improved as a two way exchange data system.
U.S. Enviromental Protection Agency
The Emergency Response Branch of the Environmental Services Division has the responsibility to track all the oil and hazardous material spills that are reported to EPA. This information is similar to the DOT records. It contains information on the place, date, responsible party, description of materials spilled and quantity, quantity that reached water and who responded (Appendix F-7). This information is directly related to EPA responsibilty to respond to hazardous material spills and to protect the nations water under the Clean Water Act. It differs from the DOT system in orientation, whose program is concerned with safety and damages.
In the EPA system, each spill event is assigned a case number which is useful in this type of tracking system. It is also indicative of EPA's role to follow-up a response to a case by conducting cleanup activities and sometimes enforcement actions. In a sense, the DOT and EPA tracking systems are duplicative in that they both record the same hazardous material spills. The practicality of combining these tracking systems, to reduce cost and improve coordination would seem worth pursuing.
Sandia National Laboratories Sandia 2: Revised Computer Code to Analyze Tranportation of Radioactive Materials--
Each year there are over two million packages containing radioactive materials transported with an average of 65 accidents reported to the Department of Transportation. The majority of these accidents involve suspected contamination rather than the actual release of radioactive materials. Despite the constantly increasing traffic flow of these materials, there have been no fatalities and no acute injuries reported . It does appear that in comparison to other hazardous materials being transported, the problem is miniscule. However, more risks have been devoted to these materials than to any other hazardous materials being shipped according to the National Transportation Safety Board .
The Sandia model was developed to assist in assessing the radiological impact of transporting hazardous materials. It combines meterological, demographic, health physics, transportation, packaging and material factors to obtain the expected annual radiological consequences when transporting radioactive material .
There are two principal computations performed by this model, the first assesses the radiological impact due to "incident free" transportation and the second assesses radiological impact of vehicular accidents. Transporting of radioactive packages takes on several forms. The package can be loaded on to a single transporter and taken directly to its destination or it can be transfered to other modes of transport and combined with other packages. A variety of handlers and storage facilities may be involved. The RADTRAN model allows the user one of 3 sections, the accident rate section, a traffic pattern section, and shipment information section. Each section considers the different weighing factors needed to determine the severity of an incident considering the expected annual release of each material in a population zone.
For the purposes of this effort, the model's ability to assess radiological impacts due to accidents is of interest rather than the incident free analysis. Radiological impact is evaluated in terms of level of consequences, probability of occurrence, and level of risk to health and economic conditions. Radiological events are subdivided further to assess the type of exposure, whether internal or external, and to consider environmental persistence. Radionuclides have particular properties which create unique scenarios not very applicable to many other forms of hazardous materials. However, the principals of assessing the expected numbers of chronic health effects from transportation accidents may have applicability to assessing other hazardous materials impacts.
CLEAR (Calculates Logical Evacuation and Response):
A generic transportation network model for the calculation of evacuation time estimates.
The CLEAR model was developed as an analytical tool for simulating an emergency evacuation following an accident at a nuclear power plant. However, the methodology is applicable to simulate evacuations following other types of events such as hazardous material spills. The CLEAR model has been designed to assess a fairly large geographic region. Specifically, the model uses site specific population information and transportation networks. It identifies a planning zone using a radius of about ten miles and subdivides the zone into smaller zones for evacuation times. The model also subdivides population into three groups, permanent residents, transients, and persons in special facilities. CLEAR uses a map display to be used to determine best evacuation routes given specific characteristics of each road segment. It also considers the time of day and adverse weather conditions to do its calculations. The model adheres to many of the basic axioms of traffic flow theory by including functions
that handle traffic flow. the conditions and consequences of
If applied to local jurisdictions, CLEAR could be
used very effectively in emergency preparedness planning and response to hazardous material spills. Population data, road conditions and weather conditions particular to a local environment could be input into this framework and scaled to a given emergency situation. Given the very rare occurrences of nuclear power emergencies, the model's usefullness would need to be tested under more frequent episodes. Since it does not incorporate the unique situation of radiation exposure into its main criteria, its applicability is very flexible. It's emphasis appears to be in determining population mobility which can be applied to most disaster events.
EESF (Exercise Evaluation and Simulation Facility): To compute estimates of evacuation travel time at Nuclear Power Stations --
EESF was developed for FEMA to assist with evacuation planning at nuclear power stations. It is equipped with a sophisticated transportation modeling program designed to graphically display the progress of an evacuation event. It also has the ability to plot the movement of a hazardous material gaseous plume released from a facility or the site of an accident. The combined picture could greatly enhance the ability of emergency response planners in developing plans and responding to events. This model can be applied to a wide spectrum of hazardous material events and could be very useful.
addition to other required labels.
The following section deals with some of the observed strengthens and weaknesses of the present system. Some of this was discussed prior to this section but was intended to address specific areas. In addition, alternative solutions and approaches to the problems that are faced will be discussed.
In the final analysis, there is a great deal being done to improve the response capability and enforcement of hazardous materials transportation. There are more rules and regulations, committees, organizations, conferences, training programs and tracking systems than ever before. The issue, then, is not whether federal, state or local regulations are likely to result in greater safety, for it is clear that 50 or 500 or 5000 solutions to the problems of hazardous materials transportation are no solution at all when viewed in the context of economic and social reality . The issue is not whether there are enough regulations in place to adequately protect the general public. One only has to look through the stack of Federal Regulations to be thoroughly impressed by their magnitude and complexity. The issue, rather, is whether it is possible to establish a national level program which would encompass the concerns of all involved and improve the safety of transporting hazardous materials.
In reviewing the three state cases, the statistics, and interviews, it is apparent that there is room for innovation and improvement in the present system. The system appears to be moving in a direction that is driven by frustration of the present condition to change out of necessity. For example, frustrated by the complexity of federal regulations and poor communications in the bureaucratic network, a local jurisdiction will frequently respond by enacting their own regulations. These regulations may or may not be consistent with federal or state regulations (which are viewed as inadequate) and can easily lead to conflict.
The local regulations usually add to the complexity of requirements by imposing such measures as traffic routing controls, curfews consistent with local rush hours, special warnings to local officials, special permits and a myriad of additional requirements. The trend could result in a crippling effect to the Nation's commerce. This scenario is more fact than fiction if we consider the following. Most trucking accidents are random geographically and therefore have been handled by local officials and/or the responsible party. As commerce expands and more hazardous materials are transported, the burden of responsibility will probably continue to fall on the local shoulders. It is therefore conceivable that industry will be facing the possibility of an increased complexity of requirements that locals will be inclined to impose. Even if this scenario is unrealistic, the trend is definitely towards more complexity in the system as a whole.
The problems associated with the safe transportation of hazardous materials are felt at all levels of government and in the private sector. In an attempt to identify the major problem areas and develop solutions, a National Conference is held annually bringing together the various representatives from federal, state, local and industrial associations. The results of these conferences are published in a report which is a useful indicator of the problem areas and the ideas for solving them. The following is a description of the general concerns that were identified in the 1982 conference which was sponsored by the National Conference of State Legislatures.
C ominun i c a t i on s
The lack of adequate communications either on the part of responders, government officials, or carriers is a common problem. It can be associated with a lack of adequate communication equipment, trained personnel or lack of interest. The conference identified inadequacies in communications between the different levels of government and between industry and government. It also identified the lack of interstate communication at the state level, particularly regarding procedures. The heart of the problem was seen to be the typical adversarial situation usually associated with government and the private sector, between state jurisdictions and between the different levels of government.
Training and Education
The conference sited several areas where general understanding of regulations and procedures were lacking. These areas involve manufacturers, and drivers. Generally, the problem stems from lack of and inadequate training, and lack of guidelines to be used in response to incidents. In addition, the judicial system was sited as lacking the proper level of awareness and rendering poor court decisions as a result.
In regards to the above comments, funding is the basis for implementation of training and education programs. The conference sited lack of federal, state and local government dollars as a major area of concern. This problem area stems from the fact that hazardous materials monitoring programs are not considered as a high priority. The other factor is simply a lack of ability to get funding for an adequate response program, which is typically the problem facing many local officials.
Compliance and Regulations
The above mentioned categories of problem areas all contributed to the poor compliance and enforcement record observed by conference members. Non-compliance to regulations can be also attributed to other factors. These were identified as a lack of adequate deterrents imposed by the judiciary system, and lack of adequate regulatory incentives that would in combination lead to a better industrial compliance record. In addition, government inability to fit the punishment with the crime was attributed to its tendency to penalize only for the purpose of raising revenues. The conference identified several areas of inconsistency in regulating carriers; by enforcement personnel in general and by the carriers interpretation of regulations. Lastly, the conference identified the problem of inadequate state and local personnel to enforce general traffic laws on the part of carriers.
The complex hazardous materials transportation regulations have caused a number of problems for all levels of government and the private sector. The conference members attributed the problems to several things. The first is the complexity inherent in having separate hazardous materials regulations by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. Department of Transportation and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Even though these agencies carefully coordinated their efforts to reduce anticipated confusion, there is still a considerable level of difficulty in sorting through and understanding the regulations.
In addition, the various regulations are continually being amended which makes maintaining a working knowledge of regulations very difficult for all sectors. The terminology used in the regulations also fails to identify appropriate roles for state and local government and industry, and fails to state the exact problems they solve. The regulations are also inadequate in regards to enforcing shipment that is transferred from one mode of transportation to another. Lastly, the federal government lacks an adequate tracking system to assess regulatory performance.
I have attempted to illustrate that the transport of hazardous materials by truck is a very complex and difficult managerial and planning problem. Finding effective solutions to these problems is a continual process involving much trial and error. The present recommendations are found in a variety of places,
i.e. the law, conferences, journals, etc. I have selected from a few of these areas that were of particular interest to me. I have selected to discuss the collective recommendations of the National Conference of Hazardous Materials and a few other selected perspectives of my own and other individuals whose ideas I believe are worth reitterating.
National Conference of Hazardous Materials
In the 1982 conference the participants were directed to develop solutions to improving the problem areas they had previously identified. The collective input of a representative body of those currently active in the field provides an important perspective to this effort.
However, the drawback to this method of information gathering and exchange of ideas, is that politically the participants may be inhibitied in voicing their true opinion in the presence of others. For instance, in matters that affect power or funding the collective consciousness will tend to be neutral in its recommendations rather than completely candid. This is not to suggest that the recommendations are non-workable, but only that more effective recommendations may need to be developed in a more independent environment. It is also this atmosphere of interaction of all levels of government and industry that has contributed to the coordination problems. A conference tends to mimic this relationship on a smaller scale, which would lean toward enforcing old channels instead of developing new ones.
It is my opinion that the problems are significant enough to warrant new channels of management. For the purpose of this effort, a summary of the conference recommendations will be presented. The conference, to reiterate, did provide a source of important information and therefore is included for the basis of comparison.
Government Emergency Response Capabilities
The participants of this conference identified the problem of nuclear roles for government and industry responders. The approach they recommended gave local government the lead in initial response with state and federal government agencies as backup and support. Industry also had a supportive role as a information source and provider of response teams. In addition, the participants identified a need for both local and State governments to develop plans that would clearly define the on-scene coordinator. The plans should also identify evacuation procedures, medical facilities and personnel, and emergency response goals according to priorities.
The need to have information such as risk analysis, types and frequencies of materials being transported through the state, and identification of support personnel and equipment available were identified. This information would be needed to develop emergency response plans. Computer assistance would be needed to pursue this recommendation, even though the money outlay would not be cost effective.
Education, Training, And Communication
The participants identified a need to disseminate information to all levels of government by newsletter and other publications. They thought that industry would be a good source of funding for this effort or possibly funding could come from volunteers.
Secondly, the participants recommended that information be classified to unify education, training, etc. They called for the establishment of regional training centers and national information data bases accessible to all levels. In addition, they identified the state and local governments to assume a primary role with the establishment of a Federal forum for the purpose of information exchange.
The basis for improvement appeared to be in unifying educational standards and a clearer delineation of responsibilities. This would hopefully facilitate more participation on the part of industry and improve governmental functions as well.
For industrial participation, the participants recommended that industry be more influential in encouraging cooperation by shippers, incorporate stronger self enforcement policies, improve violators feedback, and initiate self awareness programs.
Local Government actions that were recommended included a stronger enforcement of Federal regulations and local traffic laws, and improvement of a permit fee along with normal licensing fees to be used for hazardous materials enforcement.
State government actions include the adoption and enforcement of federal regulations, in addition to the inclusion of model long-arm statutes which is also useful to local governments. This long-arm statute enables states to prosecute companies beyond their borders but have shipments that pass through their state. In addition, it was recommended that state and local governments form enforcement teams and work closer together.
Federal government actions include assuming the lead responsibility for railroad regulations with assistance from the state. The federal government would also issue guidelines and assist in achieving uniformity in regard to all government regulations. Lastly, the participants recommended considering federal/state entities to require violators to pay insurance surcharges.
Most of the above activities need funding to operate. Potential funding sources were suggested which included State trust funds based on fines and penalties, insurance or taxes, government earmarked funds, industrial contributions or federally imposed fees on industry.
In order to reduce the needed funding, participants developed a few ideas which included centralized training, industry sponsorship and adoption of the Good Samaritan legislation.
The participants specifically focused on the Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations in their recommendations. Prior to the promulgation of these regulations it was recommended that DOT develop a more responsive national regulatory strategy, seek more public and private sector input, identify clearly what problems the regulations will address, and solicit more input from local governments.
In regard to actually writing the regulations it was recommended that they be simplified, incorporate performance standards, seek adoption of a nationally uniform manifest system and give state and local government the authority to determine fines and penalties for violations.
Once the regulations are adopted, it was recommended that training be conducted, guidelines useful to local entities be developed, and enforcement strategy be established which defines lead enforcer and that also includes funding.
The participants were not able to agree on whether DOT regulations should preclude state and local governments from adopting more stringent regulations.
This important conference provided many useful recommendations. It is apparent that in 1982 there were still a considerable number of perceived problems in the regulatory/enforcement network. The lines of authority were not clearly drawn in government and/or between government and industry. With this spectrum of interests represented, it was clear that no one entity was willing to take on the bulk of responsibility. In an independent framework, the recommendations may have taken another form. For the sake of comparison, it is interesting to record the collective consciousnes of those that are responsible. This conference is a basis from which we can look at other alternative approaches and to review the case studies.
Collectively, it appears that it was the consensus of these participants that the management of hazardous materials in transit be shared at all levels and that in essence it is business as usual but with more defined effort. If all these recommendations were immediately implemented, there would be an improvement in the present state of affairs. This approach, however, is probably the most politically sensitive but is not necessarily the best answer to a naturally imbalanced problem.
In a hazardous materials trucking accident, the first level of response is usually by the responsibile party and the highway patrol. Depending on the severity of the event a second level of response could be initiated and the fire department, hazardous material response team, the State Health Department, and other authorities could be notified.
In most events, the first level is all that takes place on scene with the other authorities possibly being notified later. The state cases revealed a majority of the events were handled by the responsible party. The majority of prevention efforts, i.e. enforcement procedures and safety inspections, are also performed by the highway patrol and industry. Even though the state and federal government are usually designated to manage the tracking, inspection and enforcement programs, these programs are usually understaffed and mostly out of touch with the bulk of the activity.
An approach to this situation, would be to designate the local/regional entities as the lead in all aspects of hazardous materials transportation. The danger to a system like this would be the possible complexity of too many individual restrictions on industry. It would be necessary to unify by law what is permissible, in the interest of industrial and commerical flow.
This approach differs from the local lead outlined in many of the State emergency response plans, because these plans also designate numerous other federal, state and private entities as having a level of responsibility. In most plans it is up to the local officials to request state, federal and private assistance. Lacking sufficient staff, equipment and expertise to adequately respond to an event, the decision is less of choice than out of necessity and this relation- ship is not always the optimum in
terms of efficiency. In the interest of recognizing what is actually taking place, a local/regional approach may have some merit.
Local/regional jurisdictions, in this scenario, would be totally responsible for maintaining the proper safety equipment and trained staff, manage the enforcement and inspection program, maintain a tracking and record system, prepare evacuation plans and routing systems, coordinate emergency response plans with community groups and local hospitals, and coordinate with industry on clean-up activity. The advantage would be that funding would be directed primarily at one level of government increasing the potential for adequate funding. Since the mass majority of events effect only local jurisdictions, a complete response and enforcement program at this level could be very effective.
The practicality of this approach would partly depend on the availability of a funding program which could effectively evaluate local programs and plans in a timely manner. For example, funding could be dependent on the submittal by local/regional entities of a plan to a federal or state agency, outlining their plans for managing the system.
Tracking and inspection programs could conceivably depend on a massive computer network enabling the connection of other jurisdictions to a single tracking and information system. This same computer network could also provide the impetus for creating a coherent management and enforcement system, rather than designating local authorities to take the lead in responding to hazardous material transportation events and request assistance when they are overcome. This alternative advocates taking steps to assure that the lead responsibility is funded properly and is a functional entity that can effectively perform.
City Plan Approach
Despite the best of plans by the authorities and experts in the field, in an emergency situation things can go wrong. One of the reasons for this is
the social response to situations is not always consistent with administrative procedures and strategies outlined in plans. As we learn more about responding to hazardous materials events and emergencies in general, an effective formula which includes paying attention to those other components will evolve.
There is also a tendency in social science research to treat the implementing agents public officials -as a kind of black box. Emergency planning offices, general purpose local government agencies, state and federal agencies are all lumped together into categorical definitions like the "planners" or the "authorities". That obscures the operational dynamics of planning and implementing responses to emergencies when many agencies are involved. More attention should be given to the complexities of the emergency planning process itself and the unique qualities of the different public institutions involved .
There is clear evidence, however, that the research based strategies prescribed by social scientists have real usefulness . This seems to suggest that emergency and contingency planning are different than other kinds of planning. Observation of plans-implementation has revealed those differences in several ways. Emergency planning effectiveness partly depends on an accurate assessment of the capabilities of the responding institutional entities and behavior responses that are difficult to predict but are essential to understand.
In order to gain an understanding of the philosophical orientation of hazardous materials emergency plans we need to direct our attention to the goals of the institutional framework outlined in the document. Elaborate coordination and jurisdictional responsibilities are clearly outlined in usually the beginning of the plan. If those goals merely encompass local and state compliance with large scale Federal administrative directives (as in the case of civil defense), then present arrangements may be no worse than any others.
If the goal is to nurture communities ability to respond effectively and adaptively then the efficiency of present institutional arrangements is in real doubt."  The strong military and civil defense influence that has become the foundation for emergency planning is evident in the goals of the plans reviewed. Generally, this kind of orientation does not take into account the nuts and bolts operation or concerns of the local level manager. At the local level, response still evolves around concerns such as how to extract a high level of cooperation from citizens such as in an evacuation, how to utilize and secure the resources from neighboring jurisdictions that are lacking in their own, and how to utilize the private sector resources.
These concerns are not "well served by hierarchial military command models which assume away or ignore all of the bridge-building and mutual learning truly necessary in practice."  This is not to imply that emergency response planning as it exists is ineffective because of it military emphasis. The military framework has contributed a high level of organization by which plans can be based and are easily tested and evaluated to improve their effectiveness. Improvement in the design can be perhaps found at another level, which would bring the planning aspects back to the plan.
The dangers from hazardous materials spills which result from trucking accidents is growing steadily. We are becoming more learned about response techniques, capability, preparedness, coordination and our ability to keep track of it all. The question is whether we are keeping up. the level of frustration and the disappointment on the part of the responsible government officials and the public indicates that maybe we are not doing well enough. It may be time to either change trains or change the track, if we will ever see some dramatic improvements.
A general course of action might include:
A re-evaluation of the actual risks being experienced by society, what are the real costs and benefits involved. In order to determine this we need to improve our record-keeping, perhaps by consolidating tracking systems, and expanding it to include all information that would help in risk assessment.
Once the risks are determined and evaluated, concentrate on the priority areas, ( which industries are contributing to the highest number of incidents, which factors are contributing to accidents i.e., driver or mechanical error, training, etc.) Develop a scheme to reduce the frequency of events in these high priority areas.
Simplify the emergency response system so that the funding to the lead responders is adequate in regards to equipment and training. Responsibility for planning, policy, development of regulations, tracking and administrative support could be delegated to federal and state entities. Limit the number of federal and state entities that local responders would have to deal with to reduce confusion and concentrate responsibilities. The larger the emergency response network the less responsive and ineffective it seems to become.
Development of incentive programs for industry to become more active in the entire process.
1. Joel Greenberg,"Human Error: The Stakes Are
Raised," Science News, 1980, p. 1.
2. Hazardous Materials Transportation Act of 1974, Public Law 93-633, 93rd Conress, H. R. 15223, Jan. 3, 1975.
3. J. L. Abbott, G. Bulanowski, B. Foster, and Jordan, Hazardous Materials Transportation, A
Legislator 's Guide, National Conference of State
Legislatures, State of Colorado, 1984, p. 13.
4. Ibid., P- 15.
5. Ibid., P- 15.
6. Austin R. Sennett, "Coping With the Nation's High Risk Cargo, Perspectives on Handling Hazardous Materials Incidents," Professional Safety, 1979, p. 28.
7. Ibid., P- 16.
8. Ibid., P- 6.
9. Ibid., P- 28-29.
10. Ibid., P- 59.
11. Ibid., P- 59.
12. Ibid., P- 7, 28.
13. Ibid., P- 29.
14. Ibid., P- 30.
15. Ibid., P- 30.
16. Ibid., P- 13-16.
17. Ibid., P- 13-16.
18. Ibid., P- 16.
19. Ibid., P- 13-25.
20. Ibid., p. 57-58.
21. Federal Emergency Management Agency, This is the Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1983.
22. Materials Transportation Bureau, Research and
Special Programs Administration, Toward a
Materials____Transportation Safety, Department of
Transportation, 1982, p. 20.
23. Abbott, p. 61-89.
24. U.S. Department of Transportation, "Summary of Hazardous Materials Incidents," Eighth Annual Report, 1977, p. 21.
25. U.S. General Accounting Office, Programs for
Ensuring the Safe Transportation of Hazardous
Materials Need Improvement, quoted by Bradley M. Marten in Harvard Environmental Law Review, 1980, p. 347.
26. National Transportation Safety Board, Special
Study: Non Compliance With Hazardous Materials Safety
Regulation, quoted by Bradley M. Marten in Harvard Environmental Law Review, 1979, p. 357.
27. Ibid., p. 357.
28. Ibid., p. 367
29. Marten, p. 367, footnote #160.
30. Ibid., p. 361.
31. Cordell A. Smith, "Introductory Remarks,"
Denver, Colorado, Sept. 1982, p. 1.
32. Abbott, p. 91.
33. Jack Truby, Hazardous Materials Spills and Releases Response Plan, Division of Disaster and Emergency Services, State of Colorado, 1984, p. 9.
34. Sue Lindsay, "The Spill Factor, State Patrol out to Check Toxic Spills," Rocky Mountain News, Denver, Colorado, August 5, 1984, p. 31.
35. Truby, p. 2.
36. Loren Larson, and Henry 0. Whitesides, Ph.D., "A Study of Hazardous Materials Problems, Capabilities and Needs in the State of Utah," 1983, p. 5.
37. Loren Larson, State of Utah Hazardous Materials
38. North Dakota Highway Patrol, State of North Dakota Hazardous Materials Transportation Emergency Response Plan, 1982, Reference #2.
39. Ibid., p. 7.
40. Philipson, Napendensky and Maxey, Hazardous
Transportation Safety Board, 1983, p. 57.
41. W. C. Clark, "Managing Technological Hazard: Needs and Opportunities," Institute of Behavioral Sciences, University of Colorado, 1977, p. 111-142.
42. Public Technology, Inc., Transportation of Hazardous Materials. A Report of the Transportation Task Force of the Urban Consortium for Technology Initiatives, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1980.
43. Philipson, p. 57.
44. Ibid., p. 57.
45. Paul Rothberg, Transportation of Hazardous Materials; Laws, Regulations and Policy, Issue Brief #1B76026, The Library of Congress Congressional Research Services Major Issue System, p. 5.
46. Ibid., p. 5.
47. John M. Taylor and Sharon L. Daniel, Radtran 11, Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico, June 1983.
48. M. P. Moeller, T. Urbanik, and A. E. Desrosiers, CLEAR-Calculates Logical Evacuation and Response: A
Generic_____Transportation Network Model for the
Calculation of Evacuation Time Estimates, Pacific Northwest Laboratories, 1982.
49. Stanley Hoffman, "Hazardous Materials
Transportation: A New Beginning," Union Carbide
Corp., speech on Sept. 21, 1982.
50. Jack D. Kartez, "Crisis Response Winter, 1984, p. 9.
51. Ibid., P- 10.
52. Ibid., P- 17.
53. Ibid., P- 17.
54. Abbott > P- 8.
1. Abbott, L.; Bulanowski, G.; Foster, B.; and Jordan, J.; Hazardous Materials Transportation A Legislator's Guide, National Conference of State Legislatures, February, 1984.
2. Abkowitz, Mark and Eiger, Amir; Assessing the Releases and Costs Associated with Truck Transport of Hazardous Wastes, pub. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
3. Abkowitz, M.; Eiger, A.; and Srinivasan, S.;
Estimating____the____Release Rates and Costs of
Transporting Hazardous Waste, Office of Solid Wastse, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, January, 1984.
4. Clark, W. C.; Managing Technological Hazards: Needs and Opportunities, Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado, 1977.
5. Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, Center for Policy Research, Comprehensive Emergency Management: A Governor's Guide, National Governor;s Association, Washington, DC, May, 1979.
6. Federal Emergency Management Agency; Guidance for Developing State and Local Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness for Transportation Accidents, FEMA Rep. -5, 1983.
7. Federal Emergency Management Agency; Exercise Evaluation and Simulation Facility Evacuation Model, Users Manual, FEMA Rep. -7, April 1984.
8. Federal Emergency Management Agency; National Radiological Emergency Preparedness/Response Plan for Commercial Nuclear Power Plant Accidents (Master Plan), Vol. 45, No. 248, Federal Register, 1980.
9. Federal Emergency Management Agency; Local Government Emergency Planning, pub. FEMA, CPG 1-8, 1979.
10. Fore, Johnson, Joy, and Peterson; U.S. Department of Transportation Programs Computerized Technigues, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 1984.
11. Frantz, Al; "Deadly Cargo," Professional Safety, 1979.
12. Garner, J. E.; Buller, E. ; Slocum, M. L., and Adams, C. R., Ph.D.; Prepared Response for the National Transportation Safety Board Hearing July 26 and 27, 1983, on Hazardous Materials Safety at the Railyards in Populated Areas, City and County of Denver, Colorado, 1983.
13. Greenberg, Joel; "Human Error: The Stakes Are Raised," Science News, Vol. 117, February, 1980.
14. Jordan, Julie and Wise, Donna; "Hazardous Materials Transportation: The Risks and the Realities," State Legislatures, State of Colorado, February, 1983.
15. Kartez, Jack D.; "Crisis Response Planning," Winter, 1984.
16. Kovacs, Kevin; "Transportation of Nuclear Material: The Public Challenge," The Rutger's Camden Law Journal, Vol. 11:63, 1979.
17. Larsen, Lorin; and Whitesides, Henry 0. Ph.D.; A Study of Hazardous Materials Problems, Capabilities, and Needs in the State of Utah, State Planning Coordination Office, State of Utah, January 1983.
18. Lennett, David J.; "Handling Hazardous Waste: An Unsolved Problem,: Environment, Vol. 22, No. 8, October, 1980.
19. Lindsay, Sue; "The Spill Factor: Peril: No Agency Is Keeping Track," The Rocky Mountain News, August 5, 1984 .
20. Lindsay, Sue; "The Spill Factor: State Patrol Out to Check Toxic Spills," The Rocky Mountain News, August 5, 1984.
21. Lindsay, Sue; "The Spill Factor: State at Mercy of Hazards in Transit," The Rocky Mountain News, August 5, 1984.
22. Marten, Bradley; "Regulation of the Transportation of Hazardous Materials: A Critique and a Proposal," Harvard Environmental Law Review, Vol. 5:345, 1981.
23. Materials Transportation Bureau, Research and Special Programs Administration; Eighth Annual Report on Hazardous Materials Transportation Annual Report, U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, DC, 1977.
24. Materials Transportation Bureau, Research and
Special Programs Administration; A Guide to the Federal Hazardous Materials Transportation Regulatory Program, U.S. Department of Transportation,
Washington, DC, January, 1983.
25. Materials Transportation Bureau, Research and Special Programs Administration; Guidelines for Selecting Preferred Highway Routes for Large Quantity Shipments of Radioacative Materials, U.S. Department of Transportation, June, 1981.
26. Materials Transportation Bureau; Toward a
Materials Transportation Safety, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1982.
27. McClure, James D.; Contribution to Emergency Response Planning Guidance Document Draft, Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico, 1980.
28. Millard, Steve; "The Other Alternative: Voluntary Action and the States," State Legislatures, State of Colorado, February, 1983.
29. North Dakota Highway Patrol, State of North Dakota Hazardous Materials Emergency Response Plan, pub. North Dakota Highway Patrol, July, 1982.
30. North Dakota State Department of Health, North Dakota Environmental Emergency Response Plan, State of North Dakota, October, 1981.
31. Philipson, Napendensky, and Maxay; Hazardous
Transportation Safety Board, 1983.
32. Price, S. L., and Schmidt, J. W.; "Voluntary
Compliance: Effective Prevention in Hazardous
Materials Transportation," Professional Safety, May, 1979.
33. Public Technology, Inc.; Urban Goods Movement, pub. U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, DC, January, 1980.
34. Public Technology, Inc.; Transportation of Hazardous Materials A Report of the Transportation Task Force of the Urban Consortium for Technology Initiatives, U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, DC, September, 1980.
A-l Emergency Response - DOT US Dept, of Transportation, Jan. 1983; A Guide to the Federal Hazardous Materials Transportation Program
A-2 Emergency Response and CHEMTREC - NRC Ibid.
A-3 Enforcement DOT and HMTA Ibid.
A-4 Enforcement DOT Ibid.
A-5 Enforcement DOT Ibid.
A-6 Oil and Hazardous Spill Report US Environmental Protection Agency, Denver, Colorado
CHAPTER XVII. EMERGENCY RESPONSE
Most of the responsibility for responding to hazardous materials incidents falls on local emergency personnel--fire, police, ambulance, and service restoration forces. DOT, through the USCG, does respond to releases of hazardous substances in the coastal zone under the authority of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act.
The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP), developed by EPA in conjunction with other Federal agencies on the National Response Team (NPT), outlines Federal responsibilities, organization, and procedures for response to discharges of oil into navigable waters and releases of hazardous substances into the environment. Within the NCP, the USCG is designated to act as the Federal On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) for the coastal zone, and EPA is designated as OSC for the inland zone. TheOSC generally will respond to major incidents, especially if there is a significant threat to the public health or welfare or the environment. In some incidents, the OSC may request a state or local agency to act in its behalf, and emergency response will be a local matter.
While DOT is not an on-scene responder to accidents, with the exception of USCG responsibilities under FWPCA and CERCLA, it does have a substantial responsibility to minimize the potential for accidents and to enhance emergency response through provision of readily available, accurate information. This is the objective underlying many of the more recent EOT initiatives, including hazard identification numbers, development of DOT'S Emergency Response Guidebook,
detailed training programs prepared under DOT contracts for police and fire officials responding to emergencies, and support for the National Response Center (NRC) and CHEMTREC (the Chemical Transportation Emergency Center maintained by the Chemical Manufacturers Association) as a coordinating body of information to assist responders.
The National Response Center (NRC) is the national communications center for activities related to response actions. A 2k-\ our toll-free number is maintained for receiving reports of discharges or releases. The NRC relays reports to the appropriate OSC, which, in turn, will, depending on local arrangements, notify the appropriate state and local authorities. The NRC also maintains a limited capability to provide technical information to on-scene personnel.
CHEMTREC, which can also be contacted through a toll-free number, can provide immediate advice and technical information on materials involved in a hazardous materials incident. More importantly, it initiates communication with other concerned parties, such as the shipper or manufacturer, to facilitate response through use of their expertise in handling the materials under emergency circumstances.
Since response to hazardous materials transportation accidents is but one element of a larger capability to respond to emergencies in general, the role of DOT is limited to one of providing technical resource support, leaving the broader Federal role to the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
CHAPTER XVIII. ENFORCEMENT
The Hazardous Materials Transportation Act provides several enforcement mechanisms--civil and criminal penalties, compliance orders, and imminent hazard orders. There is no licensing required under the HVTA and, accordingly, there are no license suspension or revocation proceedings that can be used as enforcement tools.
Civil penalties are the most common enforcement means in use under this statute. The statute declares that any person who knowingly commits an act that violates a regulation is liable for up to $10,000 per violation. For shippers and carriers, continuing violations may be punished by a maximum penalty of $10,000 per day. For container manufacturers, there is no provision for continuing violations. If a civil penalty is determined to be inappropriate, a compliance order is issued to the violator requiring specific actions to effect compliance. A hazardous facility order is issued to effect immediate corrective action in situations of imminent public hazard.
The hazardous materials enforcement program is conducted by five of DOT'S operating administrations. MTB is responsible for enforcement of regulations other than those applicable to a single mode of transportation, and thus places primary emphasis on enforcement of regulations for manufacturers, reconditioners, and retesters of DOT specification containers, and to multimodal shippers of hazardous materials. The other operating administrations--United States Coast Guard (USCG), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), and Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)--retain jurisdictional
responsibility for enforcement actions relating to transportation by water, air, highway, and rail. FHWA and FRA also exercise enforcement jurisdiction over manufacturers of bulk containers--tank trucks and tank cars.
In a civil penalty action, the case begins with an investigation by a POT inspector and the determination that certain of the hazardous materials regulations may have been violated. The inspector's report provides underlying support for a Notice of Probable Violation sent to the alleged violator. This notice advises the person or company of the alleged violation, the facts upon which the allegation is based, and of the right to discuss the matter informally with the agency or to have a formal on-the-record hearing before an administrative Jaw judge. At any time prior to referral of a proceeding to the courts for collection of a civil penalty, DOT may negotiate and settle the matter in a mutually-acceptable manner.
In determining the amount of a civil penalty, either informally or through a hearing, DOT must consider the nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity of the violation committed and, with respect to the person found to have committed such violation, the degree of culpability, any history of prior offenses, ability to pay, effect on ability to continue to do business, and such other matters as justice may require. To date, nearly every proceeding has resulted in a negotiated settlement. There are very few instances of hearings taking place or penalties not being paid once assessed by the Department.
In addition to the enforcement provisions of the HMTA, enforcement mechanisms related to spills of hazardous materials exist under the FWPCA and CERCLA. Section 311(bX 5) of the FWPCA and Section 103(b) of CERCLA provide for a criminal penalty of not more than $10,000 or one year imprisonment for
failure to notify the appropriate Federal agency as required by the applicable laws. Section 311(bX6) of the FWPCA provides for the assessment of a civil penalty of up to $5,000 for discharges of oil or designated hazardous substances into navigable waters.
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTS G OFFICE : 1983 0-381-428/3058
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1 H O O
OIL & HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES APII.I.S REPORTED TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY REGION VIII
Detailed description of Transportation Research Board,
Risk Assessment Modeling "Transportation of Hazardous
Materials: Toward a National
Strategy (Vol. 2) Special Report 197, Washington DC, 1983
statistical models currently requires highly, if not entirely, subjective postulations of what the changes in the given accident data would have been (and, it is presumed, would be in the inference for the future), if the mitigation had been in place during the period in which the data were acquired.
Third, even when basic-event data are not available, qualitative analyses of fault trees (employing, if desired, existing computer programs) can provide significant insights on accident-initiating event sequences (or "accident modes") that are potentially most important to system safety. This kind of analysis can proceed one step further with quantitative rankings of the relative importance of such modes if at least relative basic-event data can be provided, such as the relative likelihood of occurrence of one equipment's failure compared with that of another.
To gain these advantages, fault-tree modeling techniques need to be deepened (as with the digraph procedures) to better reflect accident dynamics, including human operator actions. Improved means are required for acquiring data on the probabilities of initiating events, equipment and human faults or failures, and control action time delays. Comprehensive testing, experimentation, and simulation programs will be needed for this.
Analytical and Simulation Modeling
Analytical and simulation modeling approaches to risk analysis begin with functional descriptions of the system under study. The operations of the system are then expressed in terms of appropriate performance parameters that express the functions and the interaction of the functions, systems components (human and equipment), and interfacing external factors. The conditions under which accidents and incidents occur, or when particular consequences arise, are associated with specific combinations of the values of these parameters. Their probabilities of occurrence and/or the effects of their occurrence are then assessed by means of probability or effects formulas (if analytical models) through numerical accumulations from repeated runs of system operation "scenarios* (in simulation models), or by combinations of both procedures.
The main problems with analytical models are the need for acceptable simplifying assumptions that the derivation of their formulations usually require and of the related departure of their modeled factors from direct physical significance. Simulations are better in these regards in that they usually tend to replicate real-world factors in a fairly recognizable way. However, to the extent that they avoid arbitrariness of their simplifications, their complexity and computational requirements increase. The need to repeat many runs of simulated operations in order to derive usable accident statistics (as in Monte Carlo simulations) exacerbates the computational requirements. Simulations are, therefore, expensive means for risk analysis (other than in specific and limited data development support roles).
Analytical models have been applied primarily in assessments of normal operations, incident occurrences, and post-accident effects and consequences, especially in the marine mode. Simulations have been used, but without great success, for estimating marine-mode accident probabilities. It is not believed that analytical-simulation modeling of accident occurrences is worth further consideration.
When all else falls, an approach to augmenting sparse data in developing statistical inference and
estimates of other forms of model parameters is that of subjective estimation by panels of experts. These experts are assumed to be sufficiently familiar with the detailed circumstances of operations similar to those of interest that they can meaningfully extrapolate their experience to new conditions, employing only their individual judgments in combination with those of the other experts HI
Two approaches can be considered in applying this process in hazardous materials transportation risk analysis. The first is exemplified by a "Delphi" procedure that was carried out in developing risk parameter estimates for hydrogen sulfide transport as extrapolations from general experience with the material and from a "baseline" set of specific experience data for a more common hazardous material, propane.
The second is typified by an attempt that was made to estimate oil tanker spill risks. It developed numerical estimates from rankings of the likelihoods of possible causative events as these rankings derived from the experience of a team of experts on oil spills (since oil spills and their circumstances were not so rare as to require some basis for comparison with experience with another material).
Subjective estimation is perceived as inherently a relatively low confidence risk analysis methodology. However, this perception may be at least in part a result of the general lack of appreciation of the perhaps more subtle but sometimes just as significant subjective elements of the other possible methodologies. This has been evidenced to some extent in the preceding discussions of these methodologies. To improve the subjective estimation process may therefore be a worthwhile endeavor, even if less formal procedures than Delphi are considered. The objective of this improvement effort would be to enhance the selection, control, and input information development of expert panels.
Estimation Considerations of Consequences and Losses
In risk evaluation one generally is concerned with determining both the probability of an event occurring and the consequences of that event. However, there are situations when determining only one of these factors is necessary. Determining the most probable cause of an undesired event and its associated probability of occurrence in some cases is more important than understanding in detail the consequences if the event occurred. An example of this is the evaluation of an innovative method of transportation such as a "ground-effects" machine or a new concept for a rail-train system. There are other circumstances when understanding the details of the consequences of an undesired event is of prime importance. This is often the case when there is a potential for severe impact on the public in terms of majority property damage and injuries.
The determination of the losses resulting from an accident consists of several steps: (1) Generally, the material leaves the container; (2) the material disperses into the environment (if flammable, it may be ignited immediately on emerging from its container or it might find an ignition source at some time and distance from its origin); (3) exceptions to steps 1 and 2 are the small class of materials where ignition can occur spontaneously within the container and the case where external events such as fires from hot boxes can cause a reaction in the cccsnodity in the car; and (4) depending on the characteristics of the material being released, there may be damaging effects, or the potential for losses, due to fires, explosions, toxic effects on people and vegetation, contamination of ground water, etc.
inferences to be aade. Thus, the record of accidents with liquid natural gas'(LNG) tankers, with no significant entries and a relatively Halted exposure, Is expanded by use of the record for oil tankers aodified subjectively in various ways to reflect the differences between oil tanker and LNG tanker operations. Mith soaevhat greater refine-aent, a record for a given hazardous aaterial transported in a particular container in a particular aode is extended by incorporating all accidents-lncidents for other sisterials that eaploy the saae container and aodeit being agreed that as far as the occurrence (per shipment, alle, etc.) of an accident or incident is concerned, the aaterial aakes no difference. Lastly, a most coanon use of the 'surrogate* approach is the application of the nationwide nodal accident statistics, on a per aile basis, to inferences of the probabilities of accident occurrences on particular routes for which adequate route specific accident records do not exist. Clearly, this neglects the potentially significant differences in the physical and environmental characteristics of specific routes from nationwide averages of these conditions.
Another problem area in statistical inference is the even nore fundamental one of the 'stationarity* of the process giving rise to the accidents or incidents. That is, it must be assumed that the past record also represents the future (or it is understood h
Finally, while not an explicit element of a risk analysis, multivariate statistical analyses of a file of coded accident reports has the potential to be an important means for identifying those hazards, or 'causes*, whose associated risks may be significant and worthy of analysis. Univariate trend analyses are already carried out by all modal agencies in DOT. These identify apparently important single-factor accident causes. Adequate data samples are needed so that multivariate analyses of the interactions of several factors recorded in accident reports could also be conducted by using regression analysis, analysis of variance, or contingency table analysis methods.
Overcoming fully the problems that have been noted and others that could also be brought forward
(2) f* not possible. But the situation for the user could be improved by, first, making the uncertainties that the inference procedure gives rise to as explicit as possible so that the user can incorporate them in his or her decision process. Second, steps for improving the accident-incident and exposure recordkeeping procedures should be defined comprehensively, and carried out. This may require regulatory as well as data acquisition and management system design changes. Finally, methodological enhancements are needed that respond to the weaknesses in the various assumptions made in the quantitative developments of the inferences, including the assumptions of stationarity and independence.
This approach synthesizes the possible sequences of
events initiated by the activation of some hazard and culminating in particular deleterious consequences to people (operating personnel, neighboring public, etc.), property, or the environment. Its application requires that all aignificant consequences will have been tracked back through all possible event sequences to their initiating basic events. 1b realize the full power of fault-tree modeling, the probabilities of occurrence of the initiating events and all related action initiations (e.g., a successful or unsuccessful activation,of a corrective action) need to be estimated with adequate precision, and the magnitude of the consequences accurately predicted. If these requirements are met, a series of combinatorial probability calculations results in assessments of the probabilities of occurrence of specified consequences with given magnitudes, i.e., the risks deriving from the hazards under analysis.
The principal difficulties with the fault-tree procedures are the uncertainty that all significant event sequences have been considered and the acquisition of sufficiently precise data necessary for predicting, with reasonable accuracy, the initiating and related action event probabilities. These difficulties are central to the controversies on the application of logic tree methods in nuclear power plants and other fixed-facility risk assessments and their generally complete failure in transportation accident probability determinations. Because there are so many possible kinds of accidents and because interactions of possible accident causal factors exist in the dynamic operations environment of transportation systems, descriptions in terms suitable for probability analysis of all important sequences of events culminating in transportation accidents are not able to be meaningfully accomplished. However, fault trees, in particular, have been effectively applied to post-accident events analysismost notably in analyses of nuclear material container failure under accident stressesand to mishandling and normal operations Incidents.
Despite these severe difficulties, some potential has lately appeared for the application to transportation problems of computer-based fault-tree synthesis and analysis methods (based on 'digraphs*) that have very recently been developed for nuclear and chemical processing plants.
Certainly, if fault-tree methods can be applied to transportation accident occurrence modeling, at least three important advantages not provided by statistical inference methods would accrue. First, the input data-acquisition problem would be changed from that of obtaining meaningful samples of accidents for all sets of conditions of interest at the system level to that of obtaining only basic-event data, such as on the failure of specific equipments or procedures. It is, of course, recognized that basic event probability data generally still require statistical methods (and perhaps some subjectivity) to develop properly. Nhat is emphasized here is that large enough sample sizes, even for different sets of conditions, are clearly much more easily and correctly developed for basic events than for actual accident occurrences. while certainly not trivial, this problem is at least possible to be solved with appropriate reoordkeeping systems, experimentation, simulation, and testing.
Second, fault trees conveniently lend themselves to the evaluation of the effectiveness of given mitigating measures. Any such measurer, should be able to be assessed through the changes that they would Induce in the original fault tree describing the accident occurrence that it is intended to prevent or decrease its probability. The evaluation of the effectiveness of mitigating measures by using
vents would then not need to be considered. A
chronic exposure risk snalysis eight begin with a given effect (as s chronically present concentration of a carcinogenic material) and eight also incorporate a tere for the probability that some number of individuals will be exposed to it. A sabotage risk analysis would assume a given sabotage attempt occurs and derive a risk profile conditional on this, and so on.
Risk Evaluation and Character of Risk Assessment Applications
The role of risk evaluation has been noted. It is concerned with considerations of the significance of an estimated risk with respect to acceptability and, perhaps, of ways to eitigate the risk where this is deemed desirable. These considerations relate to a set of possible kinds of applications of risk assessment, which may perhaps be usefully defined in terms of the questions below:
1. How safe is a particular hazardous activity?
2. How does this safety compare with the safety of other activities?
3. How much additional safety could be attained for a given cost, through som set of alternative modifications?
4. Bow much would it cost to attain some required level of safety, through some set of alternative modifications?
5. Which would be the safest means of accomplishing a given objective (e.g., transport of a given amount of a given material in a year over alternative routes or by alternative modes or by alternative shipment sizes)?
6. How much added risk would be imposed on some other activity due to a modification or alternative that decreases the risk in a given activity (e.g., energy from coal instead of nuclear will cause more rail-crossing accidents, more coal miner deaths and illnesses, etc.)?
7. Is the estimated (perceived?) risk 'acceptable*? What are ways of appraising this central sociopolitical issue?
It will become increasingly evident that these questions underlie the philosophical issues in the use of risk assessment and the objectives of the applicable risk assessment methodologies that will be discussed in the remainder of thiB paper.
Techniques Applicable to Several Phases of Risk Estimation
Pour general types of risk estimation methodologies have so far evolved and been applied to hazardous materials transportation risk analysis. The four
methodologies are statistical inference, fault-tree modeling, analytical-simulation modeling, and subjective estimation of risk parameters. (Subjective estimation is also potentially useful in the development of inputs for the first three methodologies.)
The discussion of the four methodologies is oriented around their utility in the several phases of a transportation risk analysis: (a) estimation of the probability of occurrence of an accident and/ or incident, (b) determination of the nature and probabilities of occurrence of possible effects (hazardous material tank rupture, spill and fire, explosion, etc.), (c) determination of the possible consequences, and (d) determination of the possible losses that derive from these effects (e.g., number of public fatalities, injuries, property damage, worker injuries, etc.).
Procedures related, but not necessarily identical, to the basic risk estimation procedure are also needed to identify and analyze (or predict) the effectiveness of possible risk sdtigation measures.
Finally, it is to be noted that sabotage risks are not amenable to complete risk analyses due to the fundamental inability to predict occurrence probabilities. Bowever, system vulnerability and
consequence assessments can be made.
Accident-Incident Occurrence Probability Estimation
The applicability of the four methodologies to this initial phase or risk estimation is discussed in this section. Data and methodological problems,
their implications to uncertainties of concern to the user, and possible approaches to improvements are noted in particular.
The most regularly employed procedure for estimating accident of incident occurrence probabilities is .that of statistical inference. Bowever, it is
directly usable only if an adequate accident-incident data base exists, with significant sample sizes at the various levels of the specific hazardous conditions of concern. Also, it has to be able to be assumed that the past record satisfactorily represents (or can be modified so as to represent) what the future will hold.
In its basic fora, the methodology of statistical inference assumea that a system's accidents or incidents occur Independently and with constant probabilities and develops estimates of these probabilities. The past record of such accidents and incidents then provides the frequency of their occurrences over the record period and, for instance, the frequency per year that is then extrapolated to future years. For example, if the frequency per
shipment, per mile, or per ton mile is desired, the exposure* in terms of the number of shipments, miles, or ton miles that were accumulated during the record period must also be known or estimated. The result is then an inference of the future probability of occurrence of an accident or incident per shipment, for instance, given as the ratio of the frequency of accidents or incidents to the frequency of shipments. A confidence interval for the in-
ferred probability can also be established.
A number of Important problems arise in this superficially simple process, however. First, the estimation of the exposure requires that records are kept and accessible on shipments of the hazardous material. Such records are not generally available. Thus, estimates must usually be made by employing samples of shipment data, often of uncertain accuracy or even validity, with liberal judgmental Interpretation.
Second, adequate data for a meaningful statistical Inference may also not exist on the accident-incident occurrences. This is always the case for the rare, catastrophic events that are usually of greatest Interest. If the record of exposure (e.g., number of shipments) is great qnough, it may be possible to nevertheless estimate credible upper bounds on the probabilities of such events, but these are often too conservative (that is, too large) to support practical decisionmaking on the control of future shipments with just as large or larger rates of exposure.
Instead of generating such upper bounds on the probabilities of accident-incident occurrence, it is sometimes attempted to establish a surrogate* sample of recorded data larger than the real one of interest and sufficiently large to permit direct
C-l Hazardous Materials Incident Notification and Information Flow Truby, Jack; Hazardous Materials Spills and Releases Response Plan Colorado Disaster Emergency Operations Plan, 1984
C-2 CTI Emergency Response Charts Abbott, Bulanowski, Foster, Jordan 1984, p. 115; Hazardous Materials Transportation, A Legislator's Guide
C-3 Colorado 1983 Number of Spills and Releases by County "Statistical Analysis of Oil Dis-charqes and Hazardous Substances Releases Reported to EPA Reqion VIII Durinq 1983,"EPA, Denver, CO
C-4 Colorado Spill Statistics 1975-1983 Ibid.
C-5 Colorado 1983 Materials Spilled, Spill Sources, and Causes of Spills Ibid.
C-6 Colorado 1983 Oil Spills and Oil Into Water Spills Ibid.
C-l Colorado 1983 Hazardous Material Spills Ibid.
C-8 Colorado 1983 Spills Reported By, Spills Cleaned Up By, and Personnel On Scene Ibid.
Colorado 1983 Total Spills by County, Spill Statistics 1975-1983,
Materials Spilled, Spill Sources, and Causes of Spills
Oil Spills and Oil Into Ibid.
Water Spills, Hazardous Material Spills, Spills Reported By, Spills Cleaned Up By and Personnel On Scene
Letter regarding Dept, of Highways, State Patrol,
Hazardous Material Denver, CO
Memorandum from Ibid.
V. Martinez, State
Traffic Accident Report Ibid.
Colorado State Patrol - Ibid.
(II); Hazardous Materials Support Team,
Goals and Objectives