! Ã‡ !"#$%& '$( )$*+!,-& Ãˆ STRENGTH AND TRADITION: HISTORY AND MEMORY OF THE GREEK GENOCIDE IN TURKEY AND ITS IMPACT ON CULTURE AND HERITAGE IN THE UNITED STATES b y Elenie Louvaris B.A. Florida Atlantic University, 2014 B.A. Florida Atlantic University, 2014 A thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Colorado in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts History Program 2018
! ii Â© 2018 ELENIE LOUVARIS ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
! iii This thesis for the Master of Arts degree by Elenie L ouvaris has been approved for the History Program b y Rebecca Hunt, Chair William Wagner Michael Kozakowski Date: May 12 , 2018
! iv Louvaris, Elenie (MA , History Program ) Ã‡ !./0Âµ1 203 )0456781Ãˆ Strength and Tradition: History and Memory of the Greek Genocide in Turkey and Its Impact on Culture and Heritage in the United States Thesis directed by Professor Rebecca Hunt Abstract From 1913 1924 the ethnic Greeks of Asia Minor were the victims of genocide perpetrated first by agents o f the failing Ottoman State, the rise of the Young Turks an finally Mustafa Kemal's Turkish Republic . This study analyzes the actions and effects of the Turks in three sections. The first chapter d efines genocide and ethnic cleansing , and gives a historiography of nationalism, the Greek G enocide and includes a brief historical context. The Second chapter contextualizes the atrocities committed in Asia Minor . This is done by first presenting how nati onalism transformed the Balkan Peninsula, and then showing how the Turks systematically dismantled Greek communities in Turkey through attacks . Using survivor testimonies from Nicomedia I show that t hese attacks were committed against the Greek Orthodox Church, clergy as well as women and children purposefully . Further, I endeavor to show that all of these actions were comm itted against Greeks in an effo rt to destroy their sense of identity, to sever community ties , and ultimately to remove them from Turkey . In the third and final chapter, I show how despite their efforts, the descendants of the victims of genocide have, in the United States , established institutions, societies, and organizations to perpetuate and preserve the unique culture and identity that the Turks tried so hard to destroy. The form and content of this abstract are approved. I recommend its publication. Approved: Rebecca Hunt
! v DEDICATION For my 930930, Helen Mavromatis. May the memories of our ancestors be eternal. -' 090:;.
! vi TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER I. INTRODU CT ION .. ............................................................. ............................. . . ....... ... ....... ... .... 1 Brief Historical Context ....... ... ....... ... ....... ... ........... .......... ................ ... ....... ... ....... ... ....... ... ....... ... ... 4 Historiography ... ....... ... ....... ... ....... ... ....... ... ....... ... ....... ...................................... ............................. 6 II. PATH TO GENOCIDE ............................ ....................................................... ....... ................. 31 Introduction ............................ ....................................................... ....... ................. ........ ....... ........ . 31 Contextualizing Genocide: Nationalism and Nation Building in the Balkans ....................... .... . 32 Nationalism and the Ottoman Empire, the Young Turks and Mustafa Kemal ............ ......... ....... 36 Nationalism and Greece ............................................................................................................ ... 45 Nationalism in the Nicomedia Region ............................................................................ ............. 49 Violence Agai nst Churches, Clergy, and the Faithful ............................................ .......... ........... 55 Violence Against Women and Children ............................................................................ .......... 62 I I I. RESILIANCE: PRESERVATION OF CULTURE, HERITAGE AND RELIGION IN THE UNITED STATES ........................................................................................................ ............ ... 71 The Church and Independent Societies ................................ ................................. ..... .................. 74 Traditional Dance and Music ................................ ................................. ..... .................. . ..... ... . ..... 79 Conclusions: Right to Remember ................................ ................................. ..... .................. . ..... .. 86 BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................... ... ...... 90
! 1 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION On June 23, 1920, Pavlos Balidis rose early, with the intention of calling all the men of the village Fulzaik to harvest their wheat crops. 1 As he stepped out of the door, he "heard [the] loud galloping of a cavalry going down the co bbles toned streets of the agora." 2 He peered down the street and saw " roughly 30 armed Turkish villagers on horsebackÃ‰[and] at the entrance to the market placeÃ‰ saw the regular army and the gendarmerie descending " from nearby villages. 3 Concerned, Balidis made his way to the coffee house in the center of town to find out what all the commotion was all about. By five o'clock in the evening, Balidis found himself , along with "300 other men and boys , " locked inside the church of St. George. 4 Once he realized that they were locked in, Balidis made his way to the edge of the crowd to peer through the cracks in the church doors . There he saw Kemalists "pouring petrol on the doors" Ã‘ within seconds, b oth the church and the rest of the buildings in the village were engulfed in flames. 5 Balidis , along with the other men inside the church , broke down the door amidst the flames that would soon consume them . O nce freed from the burning church the villagers attempted to flee , but were met by hand grenades being thrown and the unceasing "brrrrrrr" of bullets being discharged from all directions. In the chaos raging all around, Balidis fell into a ditch Ã‘ there he remained , crouched 1 Fulazik, modern day Fulacik, In the Nicomedia (modern day Izmit) Region of Turkey. 2 Kostas Faltaits, The Genocide of the Greeks in Turkey: Survivor Testimonies From The Nicomedia (Izmit) Massacres of 1920 1921 , ed. Ellene Phoufas Jousma and Aris Tsilfidis (River Vale, NJ, 2016), 43. The translation and publicati on of these primary sources are the first available in English. It is the only collection of first hand accounts, that I have found, that were conducted at the time that the genocide was occurring. Most other interviews or accounts were held many years lat er. For this reason, they will be my main source base in Chapter II. 3 Testimony of Pavlos Balidis, "Fulazik," in Faltaits , 43. 4 Testimony of Pavlos Balidis, "Fulazik," in Faltaits , 48. 5 Testimony of Pavlos Balidis, "Fulazik," in Faltaits , 48. The term "Kemalists" refers to either regular or irregular soldiers of the Turkish Republic, led by Mustafa " AtatÂŸrk" Kemal, who helped proliferate and establish the nationalist ideology that created modern Turkey. This will be discussed further in c oming sections.
! 2 in fear. After some time, when he heard " musical instruments being played , " he cautiously peered over the edge of the ditch . 6 Shocked, he saw a group of Turks dragging " Father Phillipos Ã‰ . with a rope that had been tied around his neck , " across the village. 7 All the while, the gunfire co ntinued Ã‰ and the " shouting and crying and the singing didn ' t stop either. " 8 Pavlos Balidis and many other ethnic Greeks in Turkey like him suffered similarly during the Genocide of Greeks in Turkey from 1914 1923. 9 While Baliadis' story is unique in his exp erience, sadly it is not unique in its brutality. Over the almost ten years of forced deportation, death mar ches, mass killings and torture by the Turks, approximately 1 1.5 million Pontic and Anatolian Greeks were killed. 10 11 6 Testimony of Pavlos Balidis, "Fulazik," in Faltaits , 50. 7 Testimony of Pavlos Balidis, "Fulazik," in Faltaits , 50. 8 Testimony of Pavlos Balidis, "Fulazik," in Faltaits , 50. 9 For the duration of this paper I will use "th e genocide of the Greeks" or "Greek Genocide" to refer to "the genocide of the Greeks in Turkey from 1914 1923." It should also be noted that the phrase "in Turkey" should be assumed to mean "in Turkey during the Genocide of the Greeks from 1914 1923." Add itionally, some sources cite the genocide as beginning as early as 1912 and ending sooner than 1923 Ã‘ I have chosen the date range of 1914 1923 as it is the date range endorsed by the International Association for Genocide Scholars. 10 Tessa Hofmann, "<=/72 >7/?0 @/ *7A: Cumulative Genocide The Massacres and Deportations of the Greek Population of the Ottoman Empire (1912 1923)," in The Genocide of the Ottoman Greeks: Studies in State Sponsored Campaign of Extermination of the Christians of Asia Minor, 1912 1 922 and Its Aftermath: History, Law, Memory (Aristide D. Caratzas, 2011), 109. 11 Map of Asia Minor and Pontos , Maps of Pontos and Pontic Region, http://www.angelfire.com/folk/pontian_net/ map.html , accessed March 2018.
! 3 By analyzing victim account s, such as Balidis ,' scholars can specifically analyze the experience of the Greek minority during the Greek Genocide. By looking more deeply into the various minority groups that were a part of this tragic historical event , including Armenians and Assyria ns in addition to Anatolian and Pontic Greeks , scholars can more accurately discuss the similarities and differences of their experience while also preserving a more complete memory of those who suffered at the hands of the Turks. Asia Minor and Anatolia are used interchangeably throughout this paper. They both refer to the westernmost region of modern Turkey that is bordered by the Black Sea to the north, the Mediterranean Sea to the south and the Aegean Sea to the West. Pontos or Pontus is a both a region and a distinct Greek sub culture in northern Asia Minor with villages in the mountains and coast bordering the Black Sea.
! 4 Brief Historical Conte xt The genocide of the Greeks in Turkey can be seen as the culmination of age old tensions between the Greeks and Turks dating back to the f all of the Byzantine and rise of the Ottoman Empire. As a result, Greece and Turkey found themselves on opposing sid es of a number of wars including: the First Balkan War (October 1912 May 1913), the Second Balkan War (June 1913), World War I and the Greek Turkish War (Asia Minor War, 1920 1922). By the time the Greeks entered WWI in 1917, persecutions of Ottoman non Mu slim populations (mostly Armenian and Greek) were already taking place. 12 Nationalist ideas were present in both Greece and the Ottoman Empire (later the Turkish Republic) and resulted in violence and persecutions of both ethnic Greeks , and to a smaller extent , M uslim Turks in Anatolia . In Greece, irredentist nationalist Elefterios Venizelos pushed for the reincorporation of lands deemed to be historically tied to ancient Greek civilizations. Simultaneously, in the declining Ottoman Empire the Young Turks led by the Three Pashas (Talaa t Pasha, Enver Pasha and Dejmal Pasha) established a nationalist poli cy of Turkification in order to create a core Muslim state that would remain loyal to the Turkish state and not outside forces Ã‘ like Greeks who if allowed to remain in the country would co ntinue to serve as indigenous resources for enemies of the Turkish republic." 13 The decision to become a homogenous Turkish Muslim country resulted in the removal and/or reduction of the Christian minority population. 14 12 John Mourelos, "The 1914 Persecutions of Greeks in the Ottoman Empire an d the First Attempt at an Exchange of Minorities between Greece and Turkey," in Hofmann, BjÂ¿rnlund, and Meichanetsidis, 113 Ã 36. 13 Norman M. Naimark, Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth Century Europe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 189. 14 UB ur Â†mit Â†ngÂšr, The Making of Modern Turkey: Nation and State in Eastern Anatolia, 1913 1950 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). For a more detailed explanation of both Greek and Turkish nationalism and relations, please refer to chapter 2.
! 5 Ultimately, this resulted in the genoc ide of Anatolian and Pontic Greeks as well as Armenians and Assyrians throughout the Turkish interior and Asia Minor. 15 The genocide of the Greeks should be understood as a culmination of events that ultimately resulted in atrocity, rather than as something that occu rred in a vacuum. It w a s the result of nationalist policies in both Greece and Turkey as well as a result of Western European interference in Balkan/South Eastern European politics and relations. Despite this, the atrocities perpetrated by the Turks agains t non Muslim Christian minorities is important to the understanding of the creation of a homogenous Turkey. It is for this reason that I utilize the primary source testimonies documented by Kostas Faltaits in order to show how Greek communities were disman tled in Asia Minor through attacks on their religious institutions, religious leaders, and on their women and children. Through this analysis I endeavor to show how Turks employed genocidal violence to force ethnic Greek disassociation of community and ide ntity to force them out of the country. Finally, in chapter three, I will show how despite the violence endured, Greeks of Asia Minor have preserved their unique culture and identity in the United States. 15 While Pontic Greeks are officially r ecognized as a group that suffered separately from Anatolian Greeks by IAGS, and have been/will be mentioned in this paper, I do not endeavor here to study them as a separate group . In the analysis of primary source material I will draw conclusions that are to ref lect on the destruction of religion/language/culture/heritage that Greeks, both Anatolian and Pontic, suffered. That being said, in the latter part of my argument when discussing preservation of culture and heritage in the U.S., I will use those dedicated specifically to Pontos as a reflection of Asia Minor as a whole.
! 6 Historiography As a newer topic that offers few scholarly works that pertain specifically to the Greek genocide, a widening of the scope was necessary to gain a better idea of what was and was not being discussed and why. For this reason the historiography of the Greek genocide encompasses works of scholars that study nationalism, genocide in general, the Arme n ian genocide, ethnic cleansing, and the Balkan Peninsula . In this br oader historiographic lens t he Greek genocide is very rarely discussed specifically. If it is, it is mentioned in passing and/or deemed an ethnic cleansing ( not a genoci de ) . This is largely due to the debate that continues between scholars on the aforementioned terminology, and because of the politici zed nature of the topic itself. For this reason in the few works t hat are dedicated to the Greek g enocide a significant por tion of each study first defines the Greek genocide as a genocide and not an ethnic cleansing before delving into other arguments . First, we must consider the trends and theories discussed in the scholarship of nationalism in order to begin to understand how populations of people that coexisted for centuries so quickly turn ed to crimes against humanity in the name their nation state . Broadly speaking , t he shift in loyaltie s from local to national happened due to the dissemination o f nationalist ideas and rhetoric over time . Nationalism , as a modern concept of state building , is considered by scholars like Muhammad Badiul Alam, to have begun with the French Revolution (1789). The se scholars maintain that when French King Louis XVI was decapitated all loyalties, despite class differences, were sworn to the na tional state rather than to the monarch y . 16 The ideals espoused in France were further developed and expressed in Germany during their unification and creation of the German nation. Thus , nationalism was able to increasingly gain "broad popular support" first in Europe , and eventually t hroughout the 16 Muhammad Badiul Alam, "Contemporary Ideas and Theories of Nationalism," The Indian Journal of Political Science 41, no. 3 (September 1980): 368.
! 7 world. 17 As nationalism spread it took on a variety of forms and is expresse d in a six fold classification referred to as the Hayes Formula. Carlton J. H. Hayes lists the following Ã‘ humanitarian nationalism, Jacobin nationalism, liberal nationalism, integral nationalism and economic nationalism Ã‘ as the six classifications. 18 As with many ideological concepts nationalism does not have one universally accepted definition, and there are a variety of types of nationalism that shape what indivi dual scholars deem nationalism to be. That being said and in the most general sense, Nationalism is the group consciousness that breeds a sentiment of unity, a feeling of oneness and likemindedness [ sic ] among themselves. It denotes a people's sense of co llective destiny through a common past and the vision of a common future. It gives each nation its own distinct personality different from all other nations of the world which also helps in creating a state of mind among the individuals that inspires their loyalty to the nation. 19 Rogers Brubraker extends the understanding of nationalism with his concept of "groupism." Groupism is explained as the tendency "to treat various categories of people as if they were internally homogenous, externally bounded groups, even unitary collective actors with common purposes; and to take ethnic and racial groups and nations as basic constituents of social life, chief protagonists of social conflicts and fundamental units of social analysis." 20 This theory of groupism has pers isted despite other research, such as that of Max Weber, that challenges the idea that humanity is separated into discrete races that are tightly bound and unchanging. 21 This challenge has led more recently to research which espouses the idea of groupness a s "a variable, not a constant" that varies both across and within "putative groups." 22 These chang es can occur 17 Badiul Alam, 368. 18 Badiul Alam, 369; Carlton J. H. Hayes, The Historical Evolution of Mode rn Nationalism (New York: R.R. Smith, 1931). 19 Badiul Alam, 373. 20 Rogers Brubaker, "Ethnicity, Race, and Nationalism," Annual Review of Sociology 35 (2009): 28. 21 Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 385 Ã 359; 922 Ã 26. 22 Brubaker, "Ethnicity, Race, and Nationalism," 28 Ã 30.
! 8 in different forms which include "reputational cascades" (Timur Kuran), "identity cascades" (David Laitin), and "language shifts" (Abram de Swann). 23 In the sam e vein, other scholars such as Brubaker and Laitin have examined, the methodical projects of group making such as "invention of tradition" which establishes new ideas of group identity by "representing them as [having] always already [been] there." 24 With t his in mind, nationalism can further be generally separated into two theories of nationalism, Perennialist or Modernist. Perennialists like Steven Grosby, "stress the continuities between modern nations and their pre modern" ancestors like the Hebrews, the Greeks and the Roman Empire. Modernists, like Umut Â…zkirimli, Ernest Gellner and Nicos Mouzelis, argue for a more "restrictive use of the term Ã”nation' as a category exclusive to modernity" and/or industrialization. 25 While perennialist theory makes poigna nt arguments for the connections between ancient and modern nations, it was not until the sixteenth and seventeenth century Western Europe that "modern nationalist states" and ideas began to take shape. 26 It was at this time that the state "absorbed the loy alties formerly given to the city, region, church, ruler or overlord," which in turn made it the "most 23 Brubaker, 31; Timur Kuran, "Ethnic Norms and Their Transformation through Reputational Cascades," Journal of Legal Studies 27 (1998): 623 Ã 59; David D. Laitin , Identitiy in Formation: The Russian Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); David D. Laitin, Nations, States, and Violence (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Abram de Swaan, "A Political Sociology of the World Language System," Language Problems and Language Planning 22, no. 1,2 (1998): 63 Ã 75, 109 Ã 28. Reputational cascades refers to a changing nationalist identification based on what the community members around them are doing, so as to avoid appearin g disloyal. Identity cascades builds off of Schelling's tipping model and denotes the rapid changes that can occur from or too different ethnic, national or linguistic groups. Finally, the idea of a language shift occurs when a particular language is deeme d a "hypercollective good" and thus increases the number of speakers to the point where other languages are cumulatively deserted and eventual extinction. 24 Brubaker, "Ethnicity, Race, and Nationalism," 32. 25 Umut Â…zkirimli and Steven Grosby , "Nationalism Theory Debate: The Antiquity of Nations?," Nations and Nationalism 13, no. 3 (2007): 523 Ã 24; SiniCa MaleCeviD, "Did Wars Make Nation States in the Balkans?: Nationalisms, Wars and States in the 19th and Early 20th Century South East Europe," Journal of Historical Sociology 25, no. 3 (September 2012): 300 Ã 307; Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983); Ernest Gellner, Nationalism (London: Pheonix, 1997). 26 Badiul Alam, "Contemporary Ideas and Theories of Nationalism," 368.
! 9 powerful political institution." 27 It is for this reason that within the mod ernist conception of nationalism that there are two resulting theories: integr ation theory and conflict theory. Integration theory of nationalism was initially argued by Max Weber and states that nationalism is the "process of bringing together culturally and socially discrete groups into a single territorial unit and the esta blishment of a national identity within that unit." 28 For the aforementioned process to occur, the society in question must be in the process of modernization so that group organization via increased social communication can occur and ultimately result in t he "erosion of primordial loyalties." 29 Differently, conflict theory (not to be confused with the conquest thesis) focuses on the divisions created within societies during modernization. As the process of modernization occurs conflict theory explains that " society becomes structurally differentiated andÃ‰groups areÃ‰organized along lines of social stratification" which can intensify community inequalities that already existed. 30 As these divisions intensify and particular groups feel that there is an "unaccepta ble level of inequality in the distribution of valued resources," nationalism emerges. 31 A prominent conception of the modernization theory comes from Ernest Gellner who identified nationalism and continuous economic growth as the two pillars of modernity. 32 Gellner explains that nationalism is linked to the structural changes that must occur as a society transitions from agrarian to industrial. Further, this transition results in a "modular man" that is "highly flexible" that can successfully navigate a "co nstantly changing social environment." 33 27 Badiul Alam, 368. 28 Max Weber, Nationalism and Social Communication (1953) , in Badiul Alam, 374. 29 Badiul Alam, 375. 30 Badiul Alam, 376. 31 Badiul Alam, 376. 32 MaleCeviD, "Did Wars Make Nation States in the Balkans?: Nationalisms, Wars and States in the 19th and Early 20th Century South East Europe," 305. 33 Male CeviD, 305 Ã 6.
! 10 This modular man is the product of industrialization which requires the migration of people into urban centers and creates a need for standardized communication. This need is provided for through state sponsored educ ational systems which in turn "fosters strong nationalist identifications" and becomes a "cornerstone of a sate's legitimacy." 34 Gellner continues to explain that in an industrial age culture becomes "high culture," and creates a horizontal cultural divide. This divide causes people to identify oneself not with a particular village or strata, but "first and foremost as members of distinct nations." 35 For Gellner, both state sponsored education and the merging of culture and state are byproducts of both nation alism and industrialization. 36 Different from the aforementioned theories, the Conquest Thesis first espoused by sociologists Ludwig Gumplowicz, Franz Oppenheimer, Gustav Ratzenhofer and later by Otto Hintze, Max Weber and others , emphasizes the role of v iolence in nation building rather than nationalism. 37 These scholars all made arguments that linked state making with organized violence, but it was Charles Tilly that made the connection between "war and state explicit." 38 Tilly's key point being that "st ate making and war making are mutually constitutive" because "war made the state, and the state made war." 39 Tilly goes so far as to say that "modern bureaucratic, centralized and territorialized nation states" are the result of "protracted warfare 34 MaleCeviD, 305 Ã 6. 35 MaleCeviD, 306. 36 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983); Ernest Gellner, Nationalism (London: Pheonix, 1997). 37 MaleCeviD, "Did Wars Make Nation States in the Balkans?: Nationalisms, Wars and States in the 19th and Early 20th Century South East Europe," 302. 38 MaleCeviD, 302. 39 MaleCeviD, 302; Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); Charles Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," in Bringing the State Back In , ed. P Evans, D Rueschemeye r, and T Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
! 11 and expe nsive military campaigns" Ã‘ not nationalism. 40 Tilly explains that by engaging in protracted warfare, a vicious cycle of tighter centralization of rule the expansion of the civil service, tax collecting agencies, exchequers, police forces and judicial system s. As state power grew it threatened the security of their statesÃ‰embarking on preventative wares thus perpetuating the vicious cycle whereby war making leads to the state building and state building leads to more war making. 41 While t aking into consideration t heories of nationalism , as well as the conquest thesis in understanding the complex nature of the Balkan Peninsula's diverse peoples it is also important to discuss trans border forms of nationhood and nationalism. Trans border forms of nationalism come in to play once states establish both communication and transportation infrastructure system that support and establish trans border ties between communities. The established infrastructure thus "encourage[s] diasporic and transnational modes of identificatio n and organization" prompting new ideas of self understanding. 42 Trans border forms of nationalism, multicultural forms of nationalism, national self understanding, diasporic forms of ethnicity, race, and nationhood are all results of the "diffusion and ins titutionalization of notions of human rightsÃ‰[and] multiculturalism" both of which limit models of "unitary and sovereign nation statehood" identities. 43 The importance of trans border nationalism is seen in the American descendants of diaspora from Turkey and/or Greece whom are able to claim both American, Greek and/or Turkey based on the internationally established infrastructures that allow for transnational identification. This trans nationalist identity which does exist in Greek Americans will be di scu ssed further in Chapter 3, however, at 40 MaleCeviD, "Did Wars Make Nation States in the Balkans?: Nationalisms, Wars and States in the 19th and Early 20th Century South East Europe," 302. 41 MaleCeviD, 302. 42 Brubaker, "Ethnic ity, Race, and Nationalism," 24. 43 Brubaker, 24. How these theories of nationalism relate to Greece and the Ottoman Empire/Turkish Republic will be discussed in depth in Chapter 2.
! 12 this point it is important to transition to a discussion of genocide and ethnic cleansing in order to give a more well rounded understanding of the socio political climate in the Balkan Peninsula and Turkey at the time. As an interdisciplinary fiel d, genocide studies offers a wide variety of scholarship explaining what genocide is. By applying field specific methodologies to particular cases of genocide, scholars attempt to "defineÃ‰an d bound" genocide conceptually to understand its causes and to pre vent it from occurring again. 44 The field of genocide studies did not exist until the 1930s when Raphael Lemkin, a scholar consumed with understanding why states killed their own citizens, coined the neologism "genocide." 45 A combination of Greek and Latin r oots, genocide means "the intentional destruction of national groups on the basis of their collective identity." 46 As result of international uproar concerning Nazi crimes, in 1948 genocide was defined and declared by the United Nations a "crime under inter national law" with the passing of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 47 Until the passing of the 1948 Convention the field of genocide studies did not exist; therefore, as a product of the twentieth centu ry genocides during this period are the most heavily studied by scholars . 48 Though much of genocide scholarship fo cuses on the same case studies its interdisciplinary nature has created diversity in the scholarship produced. 44 Adam Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction (New York: Routledge, 2006), 15. 45 Steven Leonard Jacobs, "Genocide of Others: Raphael Lemkin, The Genocide of the Greeks, the Hol ocaust, and the Present Moment," in The Genocide of the Ottoman Greeks: Studies in State Sponsored Campaign of Extermination of the Christians of Asia Minor, 1912 1922 and Its Aftermath: History, Law, Memory (Aristide D. Caratzas, 2011), 297 Ã 310. 46 Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction , 10. 47 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genoc ide.html, accessed September 13, 2017. 48 Particularly the Jewish Holocaust (1941 1945) and the Stalinist period in the USSR (1917 1953). Other commonly studied topics include the genocides of indigenous peoples, the Armenian genocide (1915 1923), Cambodi a and the Khmer Rouge (late 1960s 1970s), and the holocaust in Rwanda (1994).
! 13 The definition set out by the U N 1948 Convention defined what genocide is, what constitutes genocide, how to punish perpetrators of genocide and how to prevent genocide from happening in the future. The convention listed the following acts when "committed with intent to destroy, in who le or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group" as the criterion in Article 2 : a. ! Killing members of the group; b. ! Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; c. ! Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; d. ! Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; e. ! Forcibly transferring children out of the group to another group. Further, under Article III of the convention the UN considers the acts of: "genocide; conspiracy to commit genocide; direct and public incitement to commit genocide; attempt to commit genocide; [and] complicity in genocide," as punishable offensives under the 1948 convention . 49 As a result of its vague wording, most sc holars are in consensus that its definition is deficient, but there is little consensus on how it should be modified. 50 The deficient natu re of the UN's legal definition, is why much of genocide scholarship is first concerned with how genocide should be de fined and bound conceptually. The five main issues that scholars have with the UN definition of genocide are as follows: 1. "National, ethnical, racial or religious" groups were not defined, and has led to various interpretations. 2. The inclusion of "bod ily or mental harm" suggests that there needs not be any "mass killing," whic h is rare and hard to prosecute. 3. The UN's use of c ontroversial and ambiguous language in its definition has made it unlikely that genocides are declared as such. 4. The UN's de finition excludes political groups and their 49 United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, "Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide" (the United Nations), acc essed September 12, 2017, www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide.html. 50 Adam Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction (New York: Routledge, 2006), 13 Ã 14.
! 14 motivations as possible perpetrators of genocide. And finally, 5. Their definition makes v ague obligations to take action and does not spell out exactly how perpetrators are to be punished . The UN only lists "c ontracting parties" as responsible for prevention and punishment of genocide, but does not explain who that is. For these reason s , in addition to the UN's legal definition, during this study I have understood and defined genocide as the attempt (successful or unsuccessful) of the dominant/ruling group to destroy another "recognized, stable, and permanent group" designated as inferior, by the perpetrator due to racial, ethnic, religious and/ or political differences. 51 All of which aims to eliminate the social and cultural norms that bind members of the targeted community , and thus results in its dissolution. The term "ethnic cleansing" first came into use by the popular international media in the 1990s at the beginning of the war in Bosnia (1992). In its orig inal use, it referred to "the practices of mass killing, torture, rape and forcible confinement into labor camps." 52 Ethnic cleansing and genocide did not become distinct legal categorizations until the war crimes proceedings took place in The Hague. As a r esult of this ruling , scholars have debated whether ethnic cleansing is or is not separate from genocide. Scholars in favor of the term, like Andrew Bell Fialkof and Norman M. Naimark, explain ethnic cleansing as "the expulsion of an Ã”undesirable' populati on from a given territory due to religious or ethnic discrimination, political, strategic or ideological considerations, or a combination of these." 53 T he divergent point between the two sides is intentionality. S cholars in favor of the distinction claim th at in genocide the intent of the perpetrators is to kill while the intent in cases of ethnic cleansing is to remove. 54 51 John M Cox, To Kill a People: Genocide in The Twentieth Century , 2017, 11. 52 Veena Das, "C ollective Violence and the Shifting Categories of Communal Riots, Ethnic Cleansing and Genocide.," in The Historiography of Genocide , ed. Dan Stone (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 117. 53 Andrew Bell Fialkoff, "A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing, " Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (1993): 110, https://doi.org/10.2307/20045626. 54 Norman M. Naimark, Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth Century Europe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 3.
! 15 Scholars who find issue with the term ethnic cleansing first label it as a "perpetrator's term," arguing that genocide "privileges the p erspective of the victims and survivors . " 55 Further, the established genocidal framework is inclusive of all crimes of mass atrocity , and it is under this that ethni c cleansing should be addressed . As the difference between both genocide and ethnic cleansi ng is minute s cholars like Martin Shaw, have been quick to point out the flaws in defining ethnic cleansing as separate . Even scholars who argue for the distinction, such as Andrew Bel Fialkoff, concede that "cleansingÃ‰defies easy definition," and Norman M . Naimark admits that "ethnic cleansing bleeds into genocide." 56 If this is the case, and the distinction between ethnic cleansing and genocide are near indistinguishable, then why make the distinction at all. Those arguing for ethnic cleansing posit tha t as the goal of ethni c cleansing is simply to remove it can be done peaceful ly , and as such is different than genocide . Further, these instances of ethnic cleansing have le d genocide scholars to point out that peaceful ethnic cleansing/removal is historica lly improbable. The forced deportation /re moval of Greeks in Turkey is an excellent example of this. In the case of the Greeks, scholars like Mark Mazower and Erik SjÂšberg have deemed ethnic cleansing as a more appropriate term than genocide. This is largely due to the fact that during the early stages of deportation and expulsion, there were few "outright massacres." 57 While this may be the case it is important to note the varying typologies of genocide such as cumulative and retributive genocide that are applicable to the c ase of the Greeks . 58 According to 55 Martin Shaw, What Is Genocide? (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), 159. 56 Andrew Bell Fialkoff, "A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (1993): 110 Ã 21, h ttps://doi.org/10.2307/20045626; Naimark, Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth Century Europe , 3 Ã 4. 57 George N. Shirinian, ed., The Asia Minor Catastrophe and the Ottoman Greek Genocide: Essays on Asia Minor, Pontos, and Eastern Thrace, 1912 192 3 (The Asia Minor and Pontos Hellenic Research Center Inc., 2012), 39. 58 Racho Donef, "The Role of TeEkilÂ‰t I Mahsua (Special Organization)," in The Genocide of the Ottoman Greeks: Studies in State Sponsored Campaign of Extermination of the Christians of A sia Minor, 1912 1922 and Its Aftermath: History, Law, Memory (Aristide D. Caratzas, 2011), 179 Ã 94; Faltaits, The Genocide of the Greeks in Turkey .
! 16 Tessa Hofmann the genocide that occurred in Turkey at this time was unique and "must be described as cumulative state crime" that was conducted in phases , and with subsequently changing "crime scenes" across East Thrace and Asia Minor over a period of almost ten years. 59 The "cumulative" nature posited by Hofmann points to the building nature of policies which began slowly with socio political exclusion and dehumanization of Greeks and other minorities in the Ottoman Empire, building to "increased radicalization" of the Balkan Wars, and ultimately culminating in the "policies of violent persecution, deportations, large scale massacres, and population exchange from 1914 onward." 60 Hoffman suggests that as a cumulative genocide, Turks needed time to build up the policies that began as discrimination and ended in g enocide without interference from Greece. According to Hofmann, t he building nature of a cumulative genocide allowed for this. 61 Further, the cumulative nature of the Gre ek Genocide is shown in research by John Mourelos which discusses the first and failed attempt at population exchange between the Turks the Greeks in 1914. He explains how violence against Greeks in Asia Minor was able to occur for so long without internat ional intervention . Mourelos goes on to conclude that the failure of the negotiations had been planned from the beginning by the Turks. These negotiations were simply a "smokescreen behind which to cover the" continued removal of the Ottoman Greeks Genocide typologies are modified definitions of genocide which conceptually bind and defend unique instances /types of genocide. 59 Tessa Hofmann, "<=/72>7/?0 @/ *7A: Cumulative Genocide The Massacres and Deportations of the Greek Population of the Ottoman Empire (1912 1923)," in The Genocide of the Ottoman Greeks: Studies in State Sponsored Campaign of Extermination of the Christians of Asia Minor, 1912 1922 and Its Aftermath: History, Law, Memory (Aristide D. Caratzas, 2011), 39 Ã 112; "Prologue," in The Genocide of the Greeks in Turkey: Survivor Testimonies From The Nicomedia (Izmit) Massacres of 1920 1921 (River Vale, NJ, 2016). 60 Tes sa Hofmann, Matthias BjÂ¿rnlund, and Vasileios Meichanetsidis, The Genocide of the Ottoman Greeks: Studies on the State Sponsored Campaign of Extermination of the Christians of Asia Minor (1912 1922) and Its Aftermath: History, Law, Memory (New York: Aristi de D. Caratzas, 2011), 14. 61 Tessa Hofmann, "<=/72>7/?0 @/ *7A: Cumulative Genocide The Massacres and Deportations of the Greek Population of the Ottoman Empire (1912 1923)," in The Genocide of the Ottoman Greeks: Studies in State Sponsored Campaign of Extermination of the Christians of Asia Minor, 1912 1922 and Its Aftermath: History, Law, Memory (Aristide D. Caratzas, 2011), 39 Ã 112.
! 17 through "obstructionist tactics of the Turkish representatives" during negotiations, in addition to the continued persecutions with "unabated impe tus" against Greeks at the time . 62 The second typology, retributive genocide , originally coined by Vahakn N. Dadrian , is defined as "localized atrocities [used] as a form of meting out punishment to a segment of the minority, challenging or threatening the dominant group." 63 Helen Fein elaborates on Dadrian's explanation stating that cases of retributive genocide include cases "in which an elite of a dominant ethnic group destroys a significant part of another group which it fears will take its place as the dominant group." 64 The danger of this categorization of genocide is that it can be used to justify the violent action s of the perpetrators. Hofmann, BjÂ¿rnlund, and Meichanetsidis explain that within genocide studies, some scholars believe that the only genuine victims of genocide are those who are innocent . The construct of innocence, when applied to ethno religious min ority groups, can only be maintained by exhibiting loyalty to those in power "under all circumstances and [innocent victims must] abstain from any irredentist or separatist sentiments, movements, or violent actions, including even cases of self defense." 65 Hofmann, BjÂ¿rnlund, and Meichanetsidis explain the dangerous misconceptions that can occur if "the idea of genocide as reaction to provocative actsÃ‰the so called provocation thesis" or retributive genocide is applied to the perpetrators of genocide . They f irmly state that retributive justifications of genocide can never be applied to the perpetrators because; m assacres, death marches, compulsory labor under conditions that make survival of the laborers virtually impossible cannot be held against the victim groups real or alleged 62 John Mourelos, "The 1914 Persecutions of Greeks in the Ottoman Empire and the First Attempt at an Exchange of Minorities between Greece and Turkey," i n Hofmann, BjÂ¿rnlund, and Meichanetsidis, 113 Ã 36. 63 Vahakn N Dadrian, "A Typology of Genocide," Intrevmodsoc International Review of Modern Sociology 5, no. 2 (1975): 201 Ã 12. 64 Helen Fein, "Genocide and Other State Murders in the Twentieth Century" (Unite d States Holocaust Memorial Museum, October 24, 1995). 65 Hofmann, BjÂ¿rnlund, and Meichanetsidis, The Genocide of the Ottoman Greeks , 4 Ã 5.
! 18 political "disloyalty," their aspirations for autonomy or even separatism, or their attempted armed resistance against genocidal methods. 66 Therefore, despite the fact that the acts of the Greek minority against their Turkish perpet rators could be explained and ju stified as retributive genocide; to do so would justify the Turkish Republic's state sponsored denial and their continued refusal to take responsibility for the crimes committed against Christian minorities . Despite these me thods of categorization , the plight of the Greeks and the Assyrians is not as widely accepted as that of the Armenian s . Scholars attribute this to: 1. Availability of documentation and research in western languages, of which there is much on the Armenian g enocide; 2. The international push for recognition of the Armenian case has existed for decades, while movements of the Greeks and Assyrians are more recent and smaller; 3. The official narrative of the Turkish government attributes any loss of life in the name of "self defense during civil insurrection and wartime , " and as such the actions which occurred cannot be called geno cide; 4. Some suggest that as a treaty between the Greek and Turkish government was signed in 1922 agreeing to a population exchange, this somehow proves that Turkey had no genocidal intent against its Greek citizens, and further that if there was any mismanagement then the Greek government was just as responsible as the Turkish. At this juncture i t is important to note that the argument that there w as a "mutually signed agreement " assenting to the population exchange between Greece and Turkey ignores the fact that the government in Ankara declared their intent to remove all Greeks from Turkish soil Ã‘ prior to a legitimate agreement (Lausanne 1922) or method of exchang e/removal was ever discussed. 67 66 Hofmann, BjÂ¿rnlund, and Meichanetsidis, The Genocide of the Ottoman Greeks, 8 Ã 9. 67 George N. Shirinian, The Asia Min or Catastrophe and the Ottoman Greek Genocide: Essays on Asia Minor, Pontos, and Eastern Thrace, 1912 1923 , 37.
! 19 As stated previous ly , the distinguishing factor between cleansing and genocide lies with proving intent, which can be exceedingly difficult by judicial standards. For scholars not convinced by Hofmann's definition of cumulat ive genocide , one only need look at Articles 2 and 3 of the UN Convention to see that the Armenian, Greek and Assyrian victims in Turkey, meet all listed criterion. 68 George N. Shirinian, poignantly points out that as genocide is both a scholarly and legal concept, and to "restrict historical enquiry to legal rules of evidence" would "impede historical justice." 69 As such, it is the responsibility of scholars to acknowledge and research all instances of g enocide which include the Greeks in Turkey . Jargon aside, both terms aim to define specific cr imes against humanity in an effort to prosecute the governments and people responsible for the atrocities. Legally, for an individual or state to be tried and convicted of the crime of genocide, prosecut ors must prove "intentionality." Veena Das point s out that in cases of crimes against humanity, including ethnic cleansing , even with an overwhelming amount of evidence Ã‘ one of two results is likely: 1. The large scale of the event leaves only a few people responsible and convicted; 2. There is a shift from p unishment to reconciliation. 70 Whether ethnic cleansing is wholly different, similar, or synonymous to genocide is up to the individual scholar to decide . Though it is important to consider the moral and educational implications that are associated with th e stud y of genocide. Lemkin said it best, as his studies continued the numbers of victims across history continued to multiply. It was then that he understood that "the function of memory is not only to register past events, but to stimulate human conscien ce...[nations] must 68 Articles II and III of the UN Convention on Genocide are listed and discussed in the section prior to this. 69 George N. Shirinian , 39 Ã 40. 70 Das, "Collective Violence and the Shifting Categories of Communal Riots, Ethnic Cleansing and Genocide.," 118. The wars in reference being World War I, the Balkan Wars, the Greek Turkish War
! 20 understand that an attack on one of them is an attack on all of them." 71 Thus, the "excessive exclusivity" used in the application of the term genocide because of fear of political/international backlash, hinders our ability to fully ana lyze the history of humanity. 72 The importance of community and collective memory will be discussed further in Chapter III, but it is important to note here that validation of memory is an important aspect of community building on a national and internation al scale. Aside from works debating genocide versus ethnic cleansing, i n the last ten years there has been an effort to broaden scholarship pertaining to the Greek Genocide in order to bring attention to this largely unknown historical event . Examples of t his are o rganizations like the Pontian Greek Society of Chicago (PGSC) and the Pan Pontian Federation of the USA and Canada (PPFUC) . Together they have held scholarly conferences to promote the study of and discussion about the Hellenic experience in Asia Minor, Pontus, and Eastern Thrace from the early twentieth century and after the " Great Catastrophe " of 1912 1913 . 73 Leading scholars who presented at these conferences such as Tessa Hofmann, Matthias BjÂ¿rnlund, and Harry J. Psomiades, have continued to pub lish in this field in an attempt to broaden the scholarship available to students and professionals alike. 74 The efforts of these genocide scholars paid off in 2011 and 2012 when two separate edited collections dedicated exclusively to the Genocide of the G reeks were published . 71 Raphael Lemkin quoted in George N. Shirinian, The Asia Minor C atastrophe and the Ottoman Greek Genocide, 40 41. 72 George N. Shirinian, The Asia Minor Catastrophe and the Ottoman Greek Genocide , 41. 73 George N. Shirinian, 9. Both academic conferences in question were held in Rosemont, IL on November 7, 2009 and was entitled "Academic Conference on the Asia Minor Catastrophe," while the November 6, 2010 conference was called "The Third Academic Conference on the Pontian and Anatolian Greek Genocide."George N. Shirinian, The Asia Minor Catastrophe and the Ottoman Gree k Genocide: Essays on Asia Minor, Pontos, and Eastern Thrace, 1912 1923 , 9.George N. Shirinian, 9. 74 Hofmann, BjÂ¿rnlund, and Meichanetsidis, The Genocide of the Ottoman Greeks .
! 21 The First, The Genocide of the Ottoman Greeks: Studies on the State Sponsored Campaign of Extermination of the Christians of Asia Minor (1912 1922 ) and Its Aftermath: History, Law, Memory, edited by Hofmann, BjÂ¿rnlund, and Vasileios Meichanetsidis looks largely at why and how the Greek Genocide took place with less focus on the experience of the victims themselves. 75 Scholars also discuss ed the conditions that Greeks were forced to endure during their forced removal, and even the impac t of international aid organizations on their survival Ã‘ though little is dedicated to the perspective of the Greeks. 76 The perspective of survivors is more present in the essays that focus on how to teach, remember, and interpret genocide based on available scholarship in addition to surviving photographs and memorials that are erected by survivors across refugee communities in Greece. 77 The second collection , edited by George N. Shirinian, The Asia Minor Catastrophe and the Ottoman Greek Genocide: Essays on Asia Minor, Pontos and Eastern Thrace, 1912 1923, was published by the Asia Minor and Pontos Hellenic Research Center (AMPHRC) , and is a product of the 2009 and 2010 conferences held by the PGSC and the PPFUC . 78 This collection of essays has works from man y leading scholars in the field such as Tessa Hofmann, Matthias BjÂ¿rnlund , Harry J. Psomiades , and Arm enian Genocide Scholar Tanner AkÂ am. The articles in the book offer similar studies to that of The Genocide of the Greeks . The collection edited by 75 John Mourelos, "The 1914 Persec utions of Greeks in the Ottoman Empire and the First Attempt at an Exchange of Minorities between Greece and Turkey," in Hofmann, BjÂ¿rnlund, and Meichanetsidis, 113 Ã 36. 76 Stavros T. Stavridis, "International Red Cross: A Mission to Nowhere," in Hofmann, Bj Â¿rnlund, and Meichanetsidis, 277 Ã 98; Harry J. Psomiades, "The American Near East Relief (NER) and the Megale Katastrophe in 1922," in Hofmann, BjÂ¿rnlund, and Meichanetsidis, 245 Ã 64. 77 Ronald Levitsky, "Teaching the Greek Genocide," in Hofmann, BjÂ¿rnlund, a nd Meichanetsidis , 341 Ã 50; Michel Bruneau and Kyriakos Papoulidis, "Remembering the Genocide of the Ã”Unforgettable Homelands:' The Erection of Commemorative Monuments in Greece by the Refugees of Asia Minor," in Hofmann, BjÂ¿rnlund, and Meichanetsidis , 351 Ã 70; Abraham Der Krikorian and Eugene Taylor, "Achieving Ever Greater Precision in Attestation and Attribution of Genocide Photogrpahs," in Hofmann, BjÂ¿rnlund, and Meichanetsidis , 389 Ã 434. 78 George N. Shirinian, The Asia Minor Catstrophe and the Ottoman Gre ek Genocide: Essays on Asia Minor, Pontos, and Eastern Thrace, 1912 1923 (Bloomingdale: The Asia Minor and Pontos Hellenic Research Center INC, 2012).
! 22 Shirin ian gives a political, social and historical background while also discussing a broad variety of topics including Turkish violations of international law, the Smyrna Catastrophe, lack of recognition internationally, as well as a discussion of refugee ident ity and memory in Greece. 79 Notably AkÂam's article discusses anti Greek measures of the Young Turks pre World War I as a prelude to the Armenian deportations that took place shortly after. 80 In this particular article AkÂam does not use the term genocide a single time in reference to either the Greeks or the Armenians , due to the fact that terms like ethnic cleansing or massacre are "less problematic term[s]" than genocide. 81 Despite these two books being the only edited collections that specifically address e d the plight of the Greeks they manage d to cover a wide range of subjects , and to lend weight the argument that continues to rage about the legitimacy of the claim of genocide. Helping in this claim, are a limited number of published and translated collec tions of witness and survivor accounts. Harry Tsirikinidis ' At Last We Uprooted Them, publishes a variety of translated documents from the French archives pertaining specifically to Greeks in 79 Van Coufoudakis, "From Lausanne (1923) to Cyprus (2009): Turkey's Violations of International Law and t he Destruction of Historic Hellenic Communities," in The Asia Minor Catastrophe and the Ottoman Greek Genocide: Essays on Asia Minor, Pontos, and Eastern Thrace, 1912 1913, ed. George N. Shirinian (Bloomingdale: The Asia Minor and Pontos Research Center IN C, 2012), 249 272; Matthias BjÂ¿rnlund, "The Persecution of Greeks and Armenians in Smyrna, 1914 1916: A Special Case in the Course of the Late Ottoman Genocides," in The Asia Minor Catastrophe and the Ottoman Greek Genocide, ed. George N. Shirinian (Bloomi ngdale: The Asia Minor and Pontos Research Center INC, 2012), 89 134; Constantine Hatzidimitriou, "The Destruction of Smyrna in 1922: American Sources and Turkish Responsibility," in The Asia Minor Catastrophe and the Ottoman Greek Genocide, ed. George N. Shirinian (Bloomingdale: The Asia Minor and Pontos Research Center INC, 2012), 155 28; Robert J. Pranger, "U.S. Policy in Recognizing the Genocides of Christian Minorities in the Late Ottoman Empire: Challenges and Opportunities," in The Asia Minor Catastr ophe and the Ottoman Greek Genocide, ed. George N. Shirinian (Bloomingdale: The Asia Minor and Pontos Research Center INC, 2012), 273 290; Alexander Kitroeff, "Asia Minor Refugees in Greece: A History of Identity and Memory, 1920s 1980s," in The Asia Minor Catastrophe and the Ottoman Greek Genocide, ed. George N. Shirinian (Bloomingdale: The Asia Minor and Pontos Research Center INC, 2012), 229 248. 80 Tanner AkÂam, "The Greek Deportations and Massacres of 1913 1914: A Trial Run for the Armenian Genocide," in The Asia Minor Catastrophe and the Ottoman Greek Genocide, ed. George N. Shirinian (Bloomingdale: The Asia Minor and Pontos Research Center INC, 2012), 69 88. 81 Tanner AkÂam, Young Turks' Crime (2012): 55, 97 quoted in Erik SjÂšberg, The Making of the Greek Genocide (New York: Berghahn, 2017), 36.
! 23 Pontos and Asia Minor . Most significantly, is The Genocide of th e Greeks in Turkey: Survivor Testimonies from the Nicomedia (Izmit) Massacres of 1920 1921 by Kostas Faltaits. This primary source offers interviews with survivors of the genocide while still in the process of removal, and as such, offers unparalleled insi ght into their experiences. 82 The Genocide of the Greeks in Turkey , was originally titled These are the Turks and released in 1921. Faltaits wrote this book in retaliation to a review by the Inter Allied Commission of Inquiry in May 1921 which was sent by A llied forces to assess claims of atrocities on behalf of both the Greeks and the Turks. Faltaits felt so strongly that the Commission's report was incomplete and biased that he took it upon himself to record the stories of survivors that he encountered in Nicomedia in order to more accurately portray who the Turks were , and the atrocities that they were responsible for. The testimonies he recorded occurred within the Nicomedia Region of Asia Minor and/ or were recounted to him there by refugees who fled there. Nicomedia was comprised of eighteen predominantly Greek villages and was surrounded by a large number of Turkish villages. This region is bordered by the Black Sea to the north, The Propontis (Sea of Marmara) and the Gulf of Nicomedia (Gulf of Izmit) to th e west and the Sangarius River (Saka rya River) to the South, with t he easternmost village being Karapelit. 83 Aside from edited collections, there are few scholarly monographs that specifically concern the plight of either the Anatolian or Pontian Greeks. RenÂŽe Hirschon's Heirs of the Greek Catastrophe: The Social Life of Asia Minor Refugee s in Piraeus , is one such volume. Hirschon takes an in depth ethnographic look at the social lives of the refugees who settled in Kokkinia, near Piraeus beginning in 1923. Hirschon endeavors to find out how/if the refugees 82 Kostas Faltaits, The Genocide of the Greeks in Turkey: Survivor Testimonies From The Nicomedia (Izmit) Massacres of 1920 1921 , ed. Ellene Phoufas Jousma and Aris Tsilfidis (River Vale, NJ, 2016). 83 Faltaits, The Genocide of the Greeks in Turkey: Survivor Testimonies From The Nicomedia (Izmit) Massacres of 1920 1921 .
! 24 assimilated into the communities around them while still maintaining their own unique identity. This book discusses the plight and process of removal of the Greeks from Turkey, in passing at best. Beginning her survey of events with the Treaty of SÂvres (1920) the author focuses less on t he violence leading up to and after the culminating events Smyrna . By choos ing to not label the events that le d to the displacement of the refugees in Kokkinia as neither genocide nor ethnic cleansing, it clear that her focus was on the lives of refugees p ost removal and nothing else. 84 Though there are few scholarly works, there are an ample number of monographs published by descendants of survivors and other professionals. The majority of these focus almost exclusively on the culminating events at Smyrna, as this is where the majority of English language primary sources come from. 85 Worth noting , are books like Not Even My Name, by Thea Halo, and The Holocaust of the Pontian Greeks, by Theodora Ioannidou. Halo takes the account of her mother and transposes it into a captivating narrative story that describes her peaceful and happy life in Anatolia, the devastation that followed upon forced removal, and her life in the United Sta tes. Ioannidou translates the accounts of eleven Pontic survivors' testimony from the original Pontic dialect into English narrative . While not strictly scholarly, these two books make an important contribution to the field by detailing the lives of Greeks in Anatolia at the time and discussing the tragedies they both witnessed and wer e a part of. Since the passing of the International Association of Geno cide Scholar's 2007 Resolution , scholars studying the Greek Genocide have begun the arduous process of attempting to understand why it has been largely ignored by their peers in the larger historiography of 84 RenÂŽe Hirschon, Heirs of the Greek Catastrophe: The Social Life of Asia Minor Refugees in Piraeus (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1998). 85 Majorie Housepian Dobkin, Smyrna 1922: The Destruction o f a City , 4th edition (New York, NY: Newmark Press, 1998); Christos Papoutsky, Ships of Mercy: The True Story of the Rescue of the Greeks, Smyrna, September 1922 (Portsmouth, N.H: Peter Randall Pub, 2008); Lydia Karagianis, Smoldering Smyrna (New York: Car lton Pr, 1996); Lou Urenekc, Smyrna, September 1922: The American Mission to Rescue Victims of the 20th Century's First Genocide (New York: Harper Collins, 2015)
! 25 genocide . Israel Charny, m ember and former president of the International Association of Genocide Scholars, points out that in many cases victim groups within genocides who often suffered alongside each other are loathe to acknowle dge that any group other than themselves suffered, or they do not want them explained as the same event. He further explains that in 2007 when the IAGS convened to pass the resolution acknowledging the Pontic Greeks, Anatolian Greeks, and Assyrians alongsi de Armenians Ã‘ scholars that had studied and included the Greek element of the Armenian g enocide in their studies Ã‘ objected to the resolution and delayed its passing for months . 86 As mentioned previously, the plight of the Greeks ranges from being mentioned in passing , ignored completely and /or is outright denied. The official Turkish version of historiography continues to d eny the occurrence of genocide, Greek, Armenian or otherwise completely. Their deportations are generally qualified as having been a nece ssary action to mitigate the threat of minority groups that had a history of "disloyalty" to the government. By resettling them out of combat zones and into other areas, the minority groups in question would cease to threaten national security. 87 Turkish de nial g enerally manifests in one of two ways (sometimes both) : 1. to find "scapegoats" fo r "security measures gone awry," saying " unscrupulous officia ls, Kurds, and common criminals " were at fault. 2. When accused, the 86 Israel W. Charny, "The Integrity and Courage to Recognize All the Victims of Genocide," in Ho fmann, BjÂ¿rnlund, and Meichanetsidis, 21 Ã 38; Michel Bruneau and Kyriakos Papoulidis, "Remembering the Genocide of the Ã”Unforgettable Homelands:' The Erection of Commemorative Monuments in Greece by the Refugees of Asia Minor," in Hofmann, BjÂ¿rnlund, and Me ichanetsidis, 351 Ã 70. 87 Erik SjÂšberg, The Making of the Greek Genocide: Contested Memories of the Ottoman Greek Catastrophe (New York: Berghahn Books, 2017), 32. While I have many reservations about a number of the conclusions drawn from SjÂšberg's work, e xplained later on, his research of historic events and summaries of the various fields and groups he seeks to analyze I have found well researched and succinct.
! 26 Turkish government responds "with sile nce, diplomatic efforts, and political pressure" when possible to maintain their position of innocence . 88 In The Balkans: A Short History , and Salonica: City of Ghosts Christians, Muslims and Jews 1430 1950, Mark Mazower understates the extent of the atroc ity committed by the Turks in their efforts to create a homogenous Turkey. 89 In both works the wo rd genocide is never used, favoring instead ethnic cleansing to de scribe the violence that occurred at the time . Only the Armenian minority is mentioned in pass ing, and only once in reference to the violence they were subject to. The Balkans, was published in 2000 , and so the exclusion of the Greek genocide can be explained as it had not yet been internationally recognized , but the Armenian g enocide was officiall y recognized by IAGS in 1997 . As such, its exclusion from Mazower's narrative seems out of place. I find it perplexing that Mazower spends the majority of his writing justifying the various rebellions and declarations of independence all over the Balkans a nd within the Ottoman Empire, but fails to acknowledge the extent of the violence perpetrated against Christian minority groups by the government they were rebelling against . 90 Further, in Salonika, Mazower explains the population exchange between Greece and Turkey as a legitimate leg al exchange as agreed upon by Elfteherios Venizelos and Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, ignoring that the genocid e was well underway before this, and that the agreement was a result of the influx of refugees that had been occurring. 91 Mazower is not unique in this point of view. As m entioned previously, some scholars prefer to discuss the plight of the Greeks in the context of ethnic cleansing rather than 88 Roger Smith, Eric Markuse n, and Robert Jay Lifton, "Professional Ethics and the Denial of Armenian Genocide," Holocaust and Genocide Studies 9, no. 1 (1995): 1 Ã 22. 89 Mark Mazower, The Balkans: A Short History (New York: The Modern Library, 2000); Mark Mazower, Salonica, City of Ghosts: Christians, Muslims, and Jews, 1430 1950 (New York: Vintage, 2006). 90 Mark Mazowe r, The Balkans: A Short History (New York: The Modern Library, 2000). 91 Mazower, Salonica, City of Ghosts .
! 27 genocide. 92 Though most commonly scholars include Greeks as a minority group that suffered during t he Armenian g enocide, and thus im ply that though some Greeks were killed by Turkey they were not singled out as the Armenians were . 93 The most recent example of this comes from Erik SjÂšberg 's The Making of the Greek Genocide: Contested Memories of the Ottoman Greek Catastrophe. Though SjÂšb erg claims that the purpose of his work is not to determine if "the violence against the Ottoman Greeks was genocidal or not , " his choice of language as well as the framing of his argument make it clear that the "notion of the Greek Genocide" exists only i n the "nati onal imagination of the Greeks " that has undergone a "redefinition of national experience" in recent years. 94 Despite this, SjÂšberg offers an in depth discussion of the politics surrounding the Greek Genocide and of the arguments both for and aga inst this designation. While he never outright denies that the crimes against the Greeks at the time constituted genocide, he continuously points to prominent Armenian scholars , like Taner AkÂam, who prefer the designation of ethnic cleansing. SjÂšberg prof fers that ultimately, legal designation as genocide or not is unimportant. What is important is that of moral culpability. Simply, the admission that a criminal act occurred is necessary in order for the cycle of action that allows for any national securit y concern to be met with violence or the restriction of civil liberties. 95 While this may be true, it does not negate the importance of labelin g genocidal events as such. Nor does it negate the importance convicting and prosecuting those responsible for gen ocidal crimes . Both of which are important in discouraging and preventing future genocide from occurring in that they set the precedent that such actions will not be tolerated and are punishable under international law. 92 Norman M. Naimark, Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth Century Europe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001). 93 John M Cox, To Kill a People: Genocide in The Twentieth Century , 201 7; Adam Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction (New York: Routledge, 2006). 94 SjÂšberg, The Making of the Greek Genocide , 1 Ã 8. 95 SjÂšberg, 236.
! 28 Genocide denial is considered by ma ny scholars to be the last phase of genocide , and can come in a variety of forms. Perpetrators can claim their actions were merely in self defense, that the deaths /violence in question were not intentional or that the violence was mutual and justified . 96 Th e motivation behind this can be for "self serving ideology, bigotry, intellectual confusion, careerism, identification with powerÃ‰[or] a particular conception of knowledge." 97 Some scholars exploit the ambiguity of the UN Genoc ide Convention using it as a b lack and white guideline to define what is or is not genocide. It begs the question if there can ever truly be a method of measurement, whether legal or historical, that can definitively and with no questions pass judgement. SjÂšberg credits a "shift in hi storical writing" that gives weight to witness testimonies of civilians rather than documents/accounts exclusively from heads of state, politicians or soldiers , and as a result has given nations the ability to reimagine their story of the past. 98 This point of view suggests by adding witness testimonies in to the larger historical narrative , and because it challenges state sponsored historiographies , they are somehow invalid . Witness testimonies or the perspective of civilians are equally important to account s of those in power. To exclude either form of evidence would result in an incom plete understanding of the past, and t o deem one as more or less reliable than the other is irresponsible. Some scholars put less weight in the testimonies of witnesses becaus e people's memories change and they may over/under state what occurred , but in general just as memories can be warped over time, so can the documents that inform histories . Documents can and have been proven false. Bias exists in all accounts of history an d in all forms of historic evidence , and 96 Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction , 352 Ã 53. 97 Smith, Markusen, and Lifton, "Professional Ethics and the Denial of A rmenian Genocide," 14. 98 SjÂšberg, The Making of the Greek Genocide: Contested Memories of the Ottoman Greek Catastrophe , 223.
! 29 it is the responsibility of scholars to extrapolate fact based on all available evidence. This is why the account of victims, interviewed in 1920 1921 by Kostas Faltaits during the process of removal from Nicomedia , which as of 2016 was made available in English , is so important and will be the primary source base of this study . 99 Genocide results in the loss of human life , communities, and culture. The ethnic Greeks in Turkey, are largely overlooked by scholars as legitimate victims of genocide . Instead, they favor more readily researchable topics offering a wider source base available in English , and which boast scores of scholarly research to build on . Because of the dearth source base , the Greek Genocide can and should be s tudied within the context of the larger Chri stian genocide that occurred in Turkey until more sources are available . Overall, the scholarship pertaining to the Greek Genocide is narrow, and is restricted by the debates that continue in its definition as a genocide and available source material. Available primary sources have come largely from either the Western European countries or from the United States and limit the arguments that can be made, and is lacking in first hand accounts of survivors. It is h ere that this study seeks to step in. In the second chapter b y utilizing a primary source base that is comprised of interviews from survivors on their way out of Turkey, this analysis is able to show the extent of Turkish violence against the Greeks at the time . Additionally, some scholarly articles look at the memory of the genocide in Greece and at the lives of refugees in Greece, but not elsewhere. It is for this reason, that in chapter three I look at the institutions and social groups in the United Sta tes that strive to preserve the heritage and memory of their ancestors. Therefore, by u tilizing the primary source testimonies documented by Kostas Faltaits I will first discuss how the Turks attempted to dismantle Greek communities in 99 Falt aits, The Genocide of the Greeks in Turkey .
! 30 Asia Minor via genoc idal violence in an effort to destroy the Greek ' s community ties and sense of identity to force them out of Turkey . Then , I will show how Greeks have preserved their unique culture and identity in the United States.
! 31 CHAPTER II PATH TO GENOCIDE Introduction: The relationship between the Greeks and the Turks has been long and complex. Their rivalry arguably began after the fall of the Byzanti ne Empire and the subsequent conquest of their former territories by the rising Ottoman Empire. After the loss of territory the Greeks espo used their "Âµ=95F1 36G0" (meh gal ee ee day a) , or big idea, through which nationalists called for reclamation of lands from the Turks. While regional borders changed, the populations within did not. The ethnic Greeks that lived in now Ottoman territory r emained where they were despite changing borders. The Ottoman government and its millet system allowed the Greeks, or rum millet, to flourish within the Ottoman economy despite their "separate but inferior" status. 100 Through this ruling style, ethnic Greeks were able to maintain their distinct cultural identity despite many no longer using the Greek language . For most their only connection to the physical country of Greece was th eir heritage and their religion, Greek Orthodox Christianity . 101 In order to better understand how the heterogeneous Ottoman Empire transformed into Mustafa Kemal's more homogeneous Turkish Republic in the mid twentieth century, we must first endeavor to understand the rise and role of nationalism in the Balkans and how it impacted both Greece and the Ottoman Empire. 100 George N. Shirinian, ed., The Asia Minor Catastrophe and the Ottoman Greek Genocide: Essays on Asia Minor, Pontos, and Eastern Thrace, 1912 1923 (The Asia Minor and Pontos Hellenic Research Center Inc., 2012), 12. 101 Helen Papanikolas, An Amulet of Greek Earth: Generations of Immigrant Folk Culture (Athens: Swallow PressH; Ohio University Press, 200 2).
! 32 Contex tualizing Genocide: Nationalism and Nation B uilding in the Balkans: As discussed in Chapter 1, scholars of modernist nationalism point to the French Revolution as the jumping off point for the nationalism that spread through Europe and created the modern nation states that exist today. Modern ist theory also explains that nation states are created only when nationalism in conjunction with industrialization or modernization of a society occurs. While this two part theory can be widely applied across Western European nations, it is not a per fect fit in the case of the Balkan states. In the Balkan states nationalism emerged from approximately 1804 1830, before there was any sign of industrialization in the region. 102 If we consider applying the conquest thesis, which points to violence and war m aking as a way for states to centralize and build power, we see that because of the "low organizational basis" and poor infrastructure "state building and warfare were fairly limited" in much of the nineteenth century Balkans. 103 Even once Balkan nations ga ined their political independence, economic development/industrial growth was not guaranteed. With no national banks in any Balkan state until the mid nineteenth century, and no "proper industrial base," exports from the region were dreadful. 104 The underdev elopment of these new nations is also evident in their lack of professional armies Ã‘ for example the Greek and Serbian wars of independence were fought by bandits, "foreign trained volunteersÃ‰and local notables." 105 By the end of the nineteenth and beginning o f the twentieth century the "small wars and weak [Balkan] states" that previously existed w ere radically transformed by "accelerated modernization and state building on the 102 MaleCeviD, "Did Wars Make Nation States in the Balkans?: Nationalisms, Wars and States in the 19th and Early 20th Century South East Europe," 307; Mark Mazower, The Balkans: A Short History (New York: The Modern Library, 2000), 14, 43. 103 MaleCeviD, "Did Wa rs Make Nation States in the Balkans?: Nationalisms, Wars and States in the 19th and Early 20th Century South East Europe," 308 309. 104 MaleCeviD, 309. 105 MaleCeviD, 309.
! 33 Western European model" and resulted in the "large scale protracted and highly destr uctive warfare" showcased in the First and Second Balkan Wars (1912 1913; 1913). 106 Unlike Western European where states ' prolonged warfare has been linked to successful long term state building, this was not the case in the Balkan states that remained infrast ructurally weak Ã‘ regardless of their winning/losing status post Balkan Wars. Which can be attributed to the weakness of nationalism in this part of the world at the time . 107 Some historians argue that the Balkans were a "breeding ground of nationality" and that with the fa ll of both the Ottoman and Hapsburg Empires there was an "awakening of nationalities." Others disagree and argue that nationalism was politically irrelevant in the Balkans for most of the nineteenth century due to a lack of a "cross class ideology" that advocated for a unified culture, and thus demanded living in a politically independent sovereign state. 108 It seems more likely that the latter is true, at least for the early part of the nineteenth century. Unlike the Western European states that emerged on the basis of "ancient national aspirations" and as a by product of "strong national movements," the "new political entities" that emerged in the Balkan region were an "unintended" by product of the declining Ottoman Empire. 109 These new Balkan states were subsequently run by rulers who attempted to gain power through an expanding "administrative strata" putting them in direct conflict with the much larger peasants classes. Conflicts over land between the "large scale peasantry and ever growing patrimonial bureaucrats" created highly polarized societies where most did not identify with their states. 110 Gellner points out that mass nationalism is impossible without "standardized languages, 106 MaleCeviD, 311. 107 MaleCeviD, 313 Ã 14. 108 MaleCeviD, 315. 109 MaleCeviD, 325. 110 MaleCeviD, 325.
! 34 sate sponsored educational systems or high literacy rates" all of which were not present in t he newly minted Balkan polities. 111 When nationalist rhetoric and ideology was finally disseminated and more widely accepte d in the region , during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it was embraced by the small number of "military establishmen t, political and cultural elites and bureaucrats and their families." 112 In other words, those that were educated and exposed to western European po litics, theories and discourse Ã‘ not the peasant majority who lived on the peripheries of these new nations. As stated above, the new Balkan states were the product of slow spreading nationalist ideals from the west, the decline of the Ottoman Empire and protracted warfare in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The breaking up of empires into stateli ke units can also be seen as the result of "the spread of a model of territorial statehood and state centered political economy from Western Europe." 113 This model of statehood is characterized by a strong center and the creation of immovable/unquestionable borders between the nation state and their neighbors. In relation to nationalism, borders are considered to be constructed around particular national groups in an attempt to further homogenize the peoples within them by giving a specific identity as espous ed by intellectuals and politicians. 114 Furthermore, as sovereign states exist only through the control of a specifically bounded area , and are legitimized by state sponsored h istories tying them to the land, this creates "cultures [that] are thought of as na turally integral and territorial" to the nation state. 115 "Historical rights" to territory are thus established and reinforced through nationalist ideologies that are spread through "media, school textbooks and 111 MaleCeviD, 325; Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983). 112 MaleCeviD, "Did Wars Make Nation States in the Balkans?: Nationalisms, Wars and States in the 19th and Early 20th Century South East Europe," 325; John Agnew, "No Borders, No Nations: Making Greece in MAcedonia," Annals of the Association of American Geogr aphers 97, no. 2 (June 2007): 404. 113 Agnew, "No Borders, No Nations: Making Greece in MAcedonia," 398. 114 Agnew, 400 Ã 401. 115 Agnew, 402.
! 35 lessons, and in everyday conversations" in order to firmly establish a "we" and a "they." 116 This was a common practice that occurred in the bordering/establishment of what would become the Turkish Republic and modern Greece. To understand the impact of nationalist rhetoric and sharp immovable borders establ ished, we must first understand how/why the Ottoman Empire transitioned from a heterogeneous empire with a policy of tolerance towards its non Muslim minorities to a policy seeking homogeneity through Turkification. 116 Agnew, 402 Ã 3.
! 36 Nationalism and the Ottoman Empir e, the Young Turks and Mustafa Kemal While imperfect in many ways, as a multi ethnic empire, the Ottomans were relatively tolerant of the various minority groups over which they ruled. Through the millet system, each religious community was able to preside over their own affairs, operate with relative independence apart from the central government, use their own language, develop religious/educational/cultural institutions, and even collect taxes for the state. Still Muslim Turks considered members of minor ity groups as "separate and inferior , " in comparison to themselves . 117 In 1826 the Ottoman Empire began a radical process of modernization under the "infidel sultan" Mahmut II. First, he disbanded the Janissaries (imperial army) and proceeded to eliminate re gional rivalries, curb religious class power, establish a French regimental military system and military schools. This period, the Tanzimat (reorganization) period, was officially broug ht into being with the GÂŸlhane R escipt (1839) and the Hatti HÂŸmayun ed ict (1856). Both of these documents established "equality of citizenship before the law for Muslim and non Muslim" alike, while maintaining the religious equality through the already established millet system. 118 Unfortunately, the policies of the Tanzimat p roved to only exacerbate the animosity between Muslims and non Muslims. The elite Muslim class, was increasingly impoverished despite holding prominent positions in the government and military; while the non Muslim communities made up of Greeks, Armenians and Jews emerged as a wealthy commercial class. This first 117 George N. Shirinian, ed., The Asia Minor Catastrophe and the Ottoman Greek Genocide: Essays on Asia Minor, Pontos, and Eastern Thrace, 1912 1923 (The Asia Minor a nd Pontos Hellenic Research Center Inc., 2012), 12. 118 Virginia H. Aksan, "Ottoman to Turk: Continuity and Change," International Journal 61, no. 1 (Winter /2006 2005): 20 Ã 21.
! 37 attempt at constitutionalism was short lived and ended when the Mehmet II was replaced with Sultan Abdulhamit II. 119 While the Tanzimat period and the rule of Mehmet II were considered to have been m odern and secular, Abdulhamit II's rule was decisively less so. Abdulhamit II suspended the constitution and sought to reinstate "the status and influence of the religious classes, and to reframe the empire as a Muslim caliphate." 120 During this period, the revolutionary Committee of Union and Progress (CUP or Young Turks) emerged among the officer class in Thessaloniki and gained momentum after the loss of Greece, Serbia, Bosnia and Bulgaria. Alarmed by the loss of territory and increasing European involveme nt led Muslims to call for "reform, constitutional liberties and imperial revival." 121 In an attempt to appease the CUP, Abdulhamit reinstated the constitution on July 23, 1908. 122 Despite this Abdulhamit was removed from power, exiled and replaced with his br other Reshad. Notwithstanding a counter revolution in Constantinople perpetrated by those loyal to the sultan, the CUP was able to squelch the "Hamidian sympathizers" who were subsequently replaced by "a more compliant government." 123 By 1909, with the sultan overth rown, the government was run by the CUP with the Three Pashas the helm Ã‘ Enver, Cemal and Talat. 124 The CUP originally sold itself as a having "values of cosmopolitan loyalty to the empire over the divisive power of nationalism," and stressed "common partici pation in a constitutional government" in the name of the people/the Ottoman nation. 125 This platform was widely 119 Aksan, 22 Ã 23. 120 Aksan, 23. 121 Mark Mazower, Salonica, City of Ghosts: Christians, Muslims, and Jews, 1430 1950 (New York: Vintage, 2006), 255. 122 Aksan, "Ottoman to Turk: Continuity and Change," 23. 123 Mazower, Salonica, City of Ghosts , 259 Ã 60. 124 Aksan, "Ottoman to Turk: Continuity and Change," 23. 125 Mazower, Salonica, City of Ghosts , 261 Ã 62.
! 38 supported by minorities who were interested in acquiring more rights under the constitution, and this was espoused during the CUP revolution. Despit e this early platform after the Balkan Wars , and the loss of land to newer nation states like Greece, the Young Turk politicians embarked on a "violent project of societal transformation" in order to guarantee the existence of a Turkish nation state moving forward. 126 Even before the onset of World War I the CUP "dreamt of building a strong, unite d society that was dominated by Ottoman Muslims." 127 The radical wing of the CUP, Turkish nationalists, believed that "coercion if not outright violence, could eventua lly help achieve their political vision for the future in ways that" diplomatic negotiations would not. 128 As stated above, the Balkan Wars served as a turning point that "traumatized" the Young Turks while it simultaneously "polarized relations among Ottoman po litical elites , " which only further pushed CUP leadership away from ideals of political pluralism within their borders. 129 Additionally, the emergence of new Balkan nation states made up of former Ottoman subjects that persecuted Ottoman Muslims only "confirmed suspicions [with]in the CUP that non Muslim and in particular non Turkis h Ottomans could not be trusted " and needed to be dealt with. 130 As time moved forward, the pluralist Ottomanist identity began to collapse and was replaced with the various nationalist ideologies that spread lar gely among the Christian minorities. 131 Similarly , ideas of Turkifikation and Turkishness that had been discussed within the CUP since it was first organized were popularized . But ideas of Turkish nationalism began to gain mom entum after CUP party conferences were held in Salonica (1910,1911) a nd Istanbul 126 UB ur Â†mit Â†ngÂšr, "Seeing like a Nation State: Young Turk Social Engeineering in Eastern Turkey, 1913 50," Journal of Genocide Research 10, no. 1 (June 2008): 16. 127 Â†ngÂšr, 20. 128 Â†ngÂšr, 20. 129 Â†ngÂšr, 20. 130 Â†ngÂšr, 20. 131 Mazower, Salonica, City of Ghosts , 263.
! 39 (1912, 1913). At these conferences CUP members officially pushed for reform in two ways: national education and national economy. The support of which resulted in a process of "political polarization" that intensified calls for "ethnic u nmixing " w ithin their borders. " 132 It was during this period that the now infamous phrase, "Turkey for the Turks" emerged. On January 23, 1913 the C UP officially seized power via coup with the intent of creating a nation state from the remains of the Ottoman Empire. Despite th e variety of languages, religions and cultures present, the CUP lead by Talat and Enver slowly began to introduce a campaign of Turkification across Ottoman society. 133 The two fold reform of national education and economy went into effect starting in 1914 w hen Muslim Turks replaced non Muslims in order to create a Turkish bourgeoise where Greeks and Armenians that dominated the commercial classes were replaced. B y 1915 a l anguage reform was passed which prohibited the use of any foreign languages other than Turki sh in all economic transactions , in an effort to further promote Muslim Turkish economic activity. 134 The attempts to supplant Muslim Turks into the commercial economy did not prove as successful as the CUP originally wanted, and so more "violent methods of Turkificatio n of the economy" were employed Ã‘ particularly along the Aegean littoral where most businesses were owned by Ottoman Greeks. 135 These more violent measures were executed by CUP emissaries such as Special Organization agents which causes an escalation from "boy cotts and expropriations" to "kidnappings and assassinations of Greek business men and community 132 Â†ngÂšr, "Seeing like a Nation State: Young Turk Social Engeineering in Eastern Turkey, 1913 50," 21. 133 Erol Â†lker, "Contextualizing Ã”Turkification': Nation Building in the Late Ottoman Empire, 1908 18," Nations and Nationalism 11, no. 4 (2005): 622. 134 Â† lker, 622. 135 Â†ngÂšr, "Seeing like a Nation State: Young Turk Social Engeine ering in Eastern Turkey, 1913 50," 23.
! 40 leaders, and even whole sale deportation of villages." 136 By the summer of 1914 this "terror campa ign" led many Ottoman Greeks to emigrate to Chios or Greece. T he final and arguably most important phase of Turkification were the "attempts at demographic and territorial nationalism" which sought to create a national Turkish core in Anatolia. 137 Turks claimed historical right to Anatolia, long before the rise of the CUP, and considered it the fatherland of all Turks. After the Balkan Wars and the loss of much of Macedonia, there was renewed focus on Anatolia as the "cradle of the empire and its Turkish stock." 138 Thus, the process of Turkifying Anatolia began first with boycotts against non Muslims and eventually relying heavily on settlement and forced migration policies. These more extreme policies were chosen in lieu of cultural assimilation because Greeks and Armenians were considered to have too "strong [of] nationa l consciousnesses;" and as such could not ever be considered loyal Ottomans. 139 After a successful population exchange of the Bulgarians in Thrace, the CUP looked to enact a similar policy with Greece in order to remove all Greeks living on the Aegean coast. A population exchange was first proposed by Turkey in May 1914, during which time the government began a "systematic persecution" of Greeks in the area so as to expedite the acceptance of the proposal in Greece. At the time, the Turks denied the persecuti ons of Greeks in Anatolia, and by the time the Greek government consented the Ottoman Empire had entered WWI effectively ending negotiations . 140 The beginning of the war did not end persecutions, 136 Â†ngÂšr, 24. 137 Â†lker, "Contextualizing Ã”Turkification': Nation Building in the Late Ottoman Empire, 1908 18," 622, 617. 138 Â†lker, 624. 139 Â†lker, 625. 140 John Mourelos, "The 1914 Persecutions of Greeks in the Ottoman Empire and the First Attempt at an Exchange of Minorities between Greece and Turkey," in The Genocide of the Ottoman Greeks: Studies in State Sponsored Campaign of Extermination of the Christians of Asia Minor, 1912 1922 and Its Aftermath: History, Law, Memory (Aristide D. Caratzas, 2011), 113 Ã 36; Â†lker, "Contextualizing Ã”Turkification': Nation Bu ilding in the Late Ottoman Empire, 1908 18," 625.
! 41 forced migrations or resettlements, they continued and a mass exodus of Christians from Anatolia began with WWI. Prior to the outbreak of WWI in 1914, the Interior Minister Talaat ordered that all Greeks be cleansed from settlements on the coast, and replaced with Muslim refugees from the Balkans or from the interio r or Turkey. 141 Later, in June 1915, according to German diplomatic correspondence, Talaat informed the German embassy of their intent to take "advantage of the World War in order to make a clean sweep of internal enemies Ã‘ the indigenous Christians Ã‘ without be ing hindered in doing so by diplomatic intervention from other countries." 142 The r emoval of the Greeks from Asia M inor was done in who ways. As early as July and August of 1914, adult males were conscripted into labor battalions or were forced to join the a mele taburlari, of the Ottoman army. Second, o nce the "intellectual elites of the Christian target groups had been destroyed," from 1915 1917 those remaining were deported. 143 Though the deportations in Nicomedia happened later, you will see that similar policies w ere employed. In the following sections , you will see that deportees were stripped of their personal belongings, separated from their family members, were frequently assaulted by members of chettes, and were routinely killed at will. 144 In 1915, a year after the beginning of WWI, the CUP passed a law to "regulate the relocations of the groups that were considered potential traitors" which simply served as a means to justify the deportations that were already occurring. 145 The first group to be expelled were the Armenians and the Greeks followed, though the law in question did not specifically name them. 141 Tessa Hofmann, "The Genocide against the Christians in the Late Ottoman Period, 1912 1922," in The Asia Minor Catastrophe, ed. George N. Shirinian (New York: The Asia Minor and Pontos Hellenic Research C enter INC, 2012), 49. 142 Hofmann, "The Genocide Against," 50. 143 Hofmann, "The Genocide Against," 51 52. 144 Hofmann, "The Genocide Against," 52 53; Faltaits, Genocide of the Greeks. 145 Â†lker, "Contextualizing Ã”Turkification': Nation Building in the Late Ottoman Empire, 1908 18," 626.
! 42 The harsh measures used to "cleanse" Anatolia were not explicitly laid out by the government, but rather left up to the local leaders. Once these regions were cle ared, Muslim immigrants that were brought in from other regions (including outside of the empire) and settled into villages previously occupied by non Muslims. All of which was an effort to create a "Turkish national core" at the heart of its territory, An atolia. In 1918, the Ottoman Empire surrendered and the CUP dissolved itself Ã‘ though it continued to operate under other names. 146 Following this and the end of WWI the Treaty of Sevres (1919) was signed between the Ottoman rump state and the Entente. Sev re s was negotiated by Eleutherios Venizelos, the Prime Minister of Greece, which gave them control of the Turkish port city of Smyrna in order to protect the ethnic Greeks in the area while simultaneously fulfilling irredentist nationalist goals to rei ncorporate Asia Minor into Greece . While this Greek oc cupation was sanctioned by the A llies, and agreed upon by the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, both Greece and Turkey failed to ratify it into law. With assistance of former CUP leaders, Mustafa Kemal by s heer "force of personality and clever maneuvering, rallied Turks (Muslims) from all over Anatolia" to his Republican People's Party (RPP) and challenged the rump sultanate government in occupied Istanbul. 147 Under Mustafa Kemal, the RPP rejected this treaty and claimed that "the Anatolian Greeks on the Aegean and Pontic coasts supported the invading Hellenic Greek armies and their British sponsors," and as such needed to be removed from Turkey. 148 Believing that if allowed to remain the Greeks "would continue t o serve as indigenous resources for enemies of the Turkish republic." 149 The continued eastern 146 Aksan, "Ottoman to Turk: Continuity and Change," 24; Â†ngÂšr, "See ing like a Nation State: Young Turk Social Engineering in Eastern Turkey, 1913 50," 28. 147 Aksan, "Ottoman to Turk: Continuity and Change," 24; Â†ngÂšr, "Seeing like a Nation State: Young Turk Social Engineering in Eastern Turkey, 1913 50," 28. 148 Norman M. Naimark, Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth Century Europe (Cambridge, MA: Harva rd University Press, 2001), 189. 149 Naimark, 189.
! 43 advancement of the Greek Army in Asia Minor and persecutions of both Christian and Muslims in Asia minor ultimately led to the outbreak of the Greco Turkish War in 1920. The Turkish Republic was declared a nation state in its own right on October 29, 1923, and with the end of Ottoman Empire also ended ideas of pan Turkism and pan Islamism. These ideals were instead replaced by the notion that a "Turk" was "a citize n of the new Turkish republic, regardless of his etho religious identity." 150 The policies of national homogenization did not end with the dissolution of the CUP and rise of Kemal. Instead, Turkification was able to continue unabated and "untroubled by restr aints of any kind" due to national sovereignty within their borders and international support for policies of modernization which included policies of social engineering, and would ultimately lead to continued genocidal violence. 151 It was during this period of Turkification that the Treaty of Lausanne was signed the Greek Turkish convention of Lausanne on January 30, 1923 . Here both Greece and Turkey agreed to a mutual and obligatory population exchange between countries. Ottoman Greek Christians would be se nt to Greece, while Greek Muslims would be sent to Turkey. It is important to reiterate that this convention did not mark the beginning of forced removal or violence, both of which can be traced back to 1914. The ascent of Mustafa Kemal and the establishme nt of the Turkish Republic allowed Kemalists to draw clear borders around their nation state and within which republican educational institutions were used to espouse and embrace Turkishness as evidenced by the expression "how happy is he who can say he is a Tu rk." This "educational authoritarianism" also shows the new country's narrative which eliminated the Ottoman past while "extolling the great 150 Â†ngÂšr, "Seeing like a Nation State: Young Turk Social Engineering in Eastern Turkey, 1913 50," 29; Aksan, "Ottoman to Turk: Continuity and Change," 25. 151 Â†ngÂšr, "Seeing like a Nation State: Young Turk Social Engineering in Eastern Turkey, 1913 50," 29.
! 44 Turkish history, the 10 great Turkish civilizations, and even [espoused] a sun language theory, which posited that all languages had their original source in the Turkic family." 152 By the time the 1925 Seyh Ssaid rebellion took place, Ataturk (Kemal) and Kemalists were able to oust the remaining religious leaders and unionist (Ottoman) sympathizers. It was at this point that they were able to create a Turkish state that was considered to be modern, secular and as not parallel to Islam. It is this contested legacy that persists today. 153 152 Aksan, "Ottoman to Turk: Continuity and Change," 25. 153 Aksan, 25.
! 45 Nationalism and Greece While the Genocide of the Greeks took place in Turkey, it is important to understand the role that nationalism played in Gr eece in order to understand the inter state relations that took place, and the sometimes mutual violence that occurred. Greek nationalism began with the creation of the "Megale Idea" or "Great Idea" which first popularized by the revolutionary Regas Velestinles in the late eighteenth century. It refers to an irredentist concept that called for the "liberation and unification of all areas predominately settled by ethnic Greeks" into a unified nation state ma de up of all former territories in the Byzantine Empire, particularly the areas of Asia Minor and Constantinople. 154 Early Greek nationalists hoped to restore the glory of ancient Greece by unifying all of the Greeks that were scattered throughout the Balka n Peninsula, Macedonia, Thrace and Asia Minor. The small Greek state that gained independence in 1821 originally only had control of the southern part of what constitutes the state today. In order to achieve it irredentist goals Greek nationalists looked t o use a "fusion of ethnic and historical arguments to justify territorial expansion" and to gain land from the rump of the Ottoman Empire. 155 Greece was able to gain the support of Western European powers in their bid to expand their borders because many "pr oclaimed ancient Athenian ideals, Hellenism Ã”created an idealized ancient Greece as the birthplace of European spirit and western civilization." As such, despite the fact that Greece had "fallen f r o m its historic grace," with the help of European nations t heir "best values" could be revived once the "Ottoman yoke" was removed. 156 154 Tessa Hofmann, Matthias BjÂ¿rnlund, and Vasile ios Meichanetsidis, The Genocide of the Ottoman Greeks: Studies on the State Sponsored Campaign of Extermination of the Christians of Asia Minor (1912 1922) and Its Aftermath: History, Law, Memory (New York: Aristide D. Caratzas, 2011), 444. 155 Agnew, "No Borders, No Nations: Making Greece in Macedonia," 404. 156 Agnew, 408.
! 46 In order to expand the borders of Greece , nationalists had to prove historic right of territories beyond the presence of "Greeks" abroad. This was largely achieved by documenting , dating and preserving "ruins," and antique objects that predated the modern Greek state. The creation of an archaeological record in order to connect the past to the present was ultimately used to "establish political legitimacy" in claiming territories beyond the established borders. 157 Despite the presence of cultural hybrids present all throughout the territories which Greece wished to encompass, nationalist narratives were created to reinforce the legitimacy of their borders focused on "the image of Gree k ethnic homogeneity." 158 This "pure Greek" image was also further disseminated by a state sponsored Greek educational system. 159 The main text used in schools was History of the Greek Nation by Paparrigopoulos, and focused on proving "the existence of an uninterrupted continuity between the ancient Greeks, Byzantine Empire and modern Greeks" in order to bolster territorial claims (much as the Turks did as well). 160 One of the biggest proponents of irredentist policy was eventual prime minister Eleutherios Venizelos. As a part of t he victorious Entente in WWI, Greece led by Venizelos was able to negotiate through the Treaty of SÂvres (1920) for the reincorporation of Northern Epirus, Thrace, the islands of Imbros and Tenedos, but Constantinople, to the Greek State. 161 This treaty also gave Greece the control of the Turkish port city of Smyrna in order to protect the ethnic Greeks in the area. While this Greek oc cupation was sanctioned by the A llies, and agreed upon by the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, both Greece and Turkey failed to r atify it into law resulting in the outbreak of the Greco Turkish War (1919 1922) . Despite the treaty of SÂvres only 157 Agnew, 411. 158 Agnew, 412. 159 Agnew, 412. 160 MaleCeviD, "Did Wars Make Nation States in the Balkans?: Nationalisms, Wars and States in the 19th and Early 20th Century South East Europe," 321. 161 Hofmann, BjÂ¿rnlund, and Meichanetsidis, The Genocide of the Ottoman Greeks , 444.
! 47 sanctioning the Greek army's presence in Smyrna, forces continued to push east towards Ankara to crush Kemalist forces. Ultimately, the Hell enic Army was defeated in the battle at the Sakarya River, and pushed the Turkish National Assembly to select Mustafa Kemal as commander in chief, Field Marshal and Ghazi. 162 Once defeated, the Hellenic Army retreated back towards Izmir and the coast. As military dis cipline broke down and Turkish irregulars harassed their flanks, reports of violence perpetrated by the Hellenic Army surfaced. Notably, Arthur Toynbee "criticized the Hellenic Army for Ã”a ruthless warfare against the Turkish population.'" 163 A "deficit in t he research" pertaining to the conduct of Greek armed forces in Asia Minor from 1919 1922 has been noted by historians; though it is generally accepted that violence did occur on both sides (Greek and Turkish) . 164 What is impo rtant to note is that despite the violence perpetrated by Hellenic forces, the victims of the genocide in Turkey cannot be held responsible for the "real or alleged crimes of a third state." 165 Meaning, that regardless of the violence perpetrated by the Greek Army, their actions cannot be used to justify the violence against ethnic Greeks in the area. On October 25, 1920 the Greek King , Alexander , suddenly died from blood poisoning when his pet monkey bit him. 166 The death of King Alexander plus mounting tensions within Greece between the Royalists and Venizelists (Liberal Party), due to international conflicts, triggered a shift in political support . After the November 1920 elections, monarchists regained a majority in 162 Mazower, Salonica, City of Ghosts , 319. 163 Mazower, 320; Hofmann, BjÂ¿rnlund, and Meichanetsidis, The Genocide of the Ottoman Greeks , 8 Ã 9. 164 Hofmann, BjÂ¿rnlund, and Meichanetsidis, The Genocide of the Ottoman Greeks , 8. 165 Hofmann, BjÂ¿rnlund, and Meichanet sidis, 8. 166 Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica, Alexander, Encyclopedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Alexander king of Greece , Accessed March 2018.
! 48 parliament and recalled the former King, Constantine (Alexander's father). As a result of this, Elefterios Venizelos, the now former prime minister , left the country . 167 Venizelos ' abrupt departure led to a disengagement of the Allied forces , and a withdrawal of their military support from both Smyrna and the Greeks in Turkey. After this defeat the Greek government decided to withdraw all troops from Smyrna between August 26 and September 8, 1922. By August 31, 1922, Kemalist forces had set fire to the Christian quarters of Smyrna, and the systematic killing of Greeks continued unabated. It was not until the Greek Turkish convention of Lausanne on January 30, 1923 that both parties agreed to an obligatory po pulation exchange , and that the atrocities subsided. 168 Ad ditionally, after the Hellenic A rmy's defeat and retreat from the outskirts of Ankara, Greek irredentist policy was effectively abandoned and the government instead focused on the settling of hund reds of thousands of ethnic Greek refugees now within their borders. 167 Tessa H ofmann, Matthias BjÂ¿rnlund, and Vasileios Meichanetsidis, The Genocide of the Ottoman Greeks (New York: Aristide D. Caratzas, 2011), 435; Hofmann, BjÂ¿rnlund, and Meichanetsidis, The Genocide of the Ottoman Greeks , 435. 168 Hofmann, BjÂ¿rnlund, and Meichanetsidis, The Genocide of the Ottoman Greeks , 435 Ã 37.
! 49 Nationalism in the Nicomedia Region: As a part of the Ottoman Empire, the Greek subjects of Nicomedia (and Anatolia in general) lived in a society where "religion and aristocratic lin eage" not cultural differences determined your social in/exclusion. 169 This stratification of society along lines of religion was established by the rulers who used Islamic doctrine to rule over subjects using the "relatively segregated confessional communitie s Ã‘ millets." 170 Millets were run by high ranking members of the clergy that were responsible for handing legal matters within their community and as such had the legal system at their disposal. The Greek Orthodox Christians were part of the Rum millet, which was inclusive of all Orthodox Christians, not just Greeks. However, it was members of the Greek Orthodox clergy that held many high ranking positions. What is important to note in this society was the fluidity that existed in how people identified. Before the 1850s social mobility "implied acculturation into the ethnie" that was associated with the division of labor in which you partook. 171 As a result there was overlap between class and ethnic background. For example, labels such as "Serb," "Bulgar" or othe r "S l av" implied peasant status while joining the merchant class in town meant "becoming a Ã”Greek.'" 172 Further, until the mid nineteenth century Greek was considered to be the language of the upper middle Christian classes and led most of them to identify as Greek. This however is not indicative of a "willingness to support the establishment of an independent Greek state." 173 The concept of "Greekness" at the time was a "status category" one could claim via class mobility. 174 169 MaleCeviD, "Did Wars Make Nation States in the Balkans?: Nationalisms, Wars and States in the 19th and Early 20th Century South East Europe," 316. 170 MaleCeviD, 31 6. 171 MaleCeviD, 316. 172 MaleCeviD, 316. 173 MaleCeviD, 316. 174 MaleCeviD, 316; Agnew, "No Borders, No Nations: Making Greece in Macedonia," 405.
! 50 As established earlier, the spread o f nationalist ideas in the early nineteenth century Balkans was slow moving , and in reality was a "confused, unarticulated set of ideas shared by aÃ‰small number of, mostly upper middle class" that were interested in either reformation of or overthrowing Ott oman rule in order to establish a "Christian pan Balkan polity." 175 What is important to note is that the influential or wealthy Christians and clergy of the Orthodox Church in the Ottoman Empire were uninterested in the destruction of it as they enjoyed the ir political privilege and religious autonomy. 176 On the other hand, Christian peasants were more interested in simply surviving regardless of whether their "overlords" were Christian or Muslims, both of whom were equally "unbearable. 177 " Furthermore, even onc e the secular ideas of Enlightenment and Romanticism began to reach the Balkan region religious and cultural life continued to be subject to "religious and confessional worldviews." This meant that those that first began to rebel did so not along lines of nationalism but rather of "religious millenarianism" by way of a new Christian Kingdom. 178 The fluidity of ethnicity that characterized this region is exactly the reason that nationalization in the Balkans took a violent turn. This fluidity evident not on ly in ethnic identification, but also in shared social practices and linguistic hybridity. All of which "worked against the drawing of clear borderlines." 179 These fuzzy lines of distinction were thus combated by national activists who used violence to force local people to choose sides and thus led to the creation of modern ethnic identities. 180 Violence breeds violence, thus in using violence as a method to force ethnic associations it only makes sense that those whom were the subjects of 175 MaleCeviD, 317. 176 MaleCeviD, 317. 177 MaleCeviD, 317. 178 MaleCeviD, 318. 179 Agnew, "No Borders, No Nations: Making Greece in Macedonia," 405. 180 Agnew, 405.
! 51 violence at the hand s of Greek or Turkish nationalists would turn to similar tactics in seeking revenge or in establishing dominance of their particular community. As s tated previously, s cholars have determined that the removal of all Christian minorities in Turkey was larg ely due to a governmental push for a homogenous Muslim population Ã‘ for the creation of a "Turkey for the Turks." 181 This process was undertaken by the failing Ottoman Government in Constantinople, in conjunction with the rising nationalist government in Ankar a headed by Mustafa Kemal. While the overall policies that dictated the legality and general process of the removal of the Christian minorities came from the national government , the specific details of removal were left up to the regional administrators. Regional administrators such as kaymakam (district governor) or leaders of irregular gangs decided when particular towns were to be targeted and how they were to be destroyed. Thus, the strategies employed by the perpetrators varied widely. In the case of the Nicomedia Massacres, the two names referred to most often in the accounts relayed by Faltaits were Cemal of Nikaia and Giaour Ali. Ali, a lso known as the "H eathen," whose cruelty proceeded him throughout the region , and who was a professional murderer that received his commands directly from the Kemalist leaders. 182 181 UB ur Â†mit Â†ngÂšr, The Making of Modern Turkey: Nation and State in Eastern Anatolia, 1913 1950 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 182 "Prologue," in The Genocide of the Greeks in Turkey: Survivor Testimonies From The Nicomedia (Izmit) Massacres of 1920 1921 (River Vale, NJ, 2016), 22; 23.
! 52 183 The Massacres of Nicomedia were conducted by the aforementioned and other regional leaders under their command. In enlisting men like Ali, the Kemalist regime made it clear that they were not interested in a humane removal of the Greek Christian minority. While Kemalist leaders did have regular armed forces at their disposal , they also recruited and used violent irregular chettes ( gangs ) to remove Greeks . Additionally, various survivors intervi ewed by Faltaits reported Turkish peasants from villages surrounding Nicea, Kara Tepe, and Konzes, and came to partake in the sacking of the Greek towns . 184 The involvement of Turkish p easants was likely the result of jealousy and a deep seated desire for re venge against the Greeks which can be traced back to the late eighteenth/early nineteenth century . During this time the Turkish Muslim 183 Olan Wactor, Map of Nicomedia (Izmit) Region (The Genocide Research Center, n.d.), http://greek genocide.net/index.php/component/content/article?id=269:the genocide of the greeks in turkey. 184 Faltaits, The Ge nocide of the Greeks in Turkey: Survivor Testimonies From The Nicomedia (Izmit) Massacres of 1920 1921 , 59,66 67, 77, 93.
! 53 peasants failed to modernize in comparison to the Christian peasantry who continued to rise in socio economic status even tually becoming dominant players in the Ottoman economy despite their minority status. 185 Despite their inferior econom ic status a precarious status quo held because Turkish peasants enjoyed superior social status as Muslims. This initial division combined w ith the violence of both Balkan Wars and pressures of nationalists on both sides can help to explain why and how ordinary people did terrible things. If the peasants of surrounding villages were told to resent or blame the Greeks for all of their econom ic shortcomings, for the wars, for the violence raging in the region Ã‘ this would have been enough to push ordinary people to great violence. Due to the diverse ethnic groups that lived in relative harmony for centuries under the banner of the Ottoman Empir e the would be perpetrators of genocide had to first convince a particular group of their superior status as the "in group" or "the people." 186 This was done in a number of ways as discussed previously, but the slogan "Turkey for the Turks" is an example of nationalist propaganda created with the intent of othering. For when one group holds the "in group" title, all further groups are automatically deemed other and therefore as outside of their "universe of obligation , " as "less than fully human," as "infidel s" or " giaour s " (non believe r s ) . 187 Thus, by the Turkish government deeming Turkey only for Muslim Turks, all other ethnic and/or religious minorities were deemed "the enemyÃ‰ [that] must be eliminated " Ã‘ particularly Christians. 188 185 George N. Shirinian, The Asia Minor Catastrophe and the Ottoman Greek Genocide , 12 Ã 13. 186 Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction , 4; Frank Robert Chalk, Kurt Jonassohn, and Montreal Institute for Genocide Studies, The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990) , 28. 187 Helen Fein, "Genocide: A Sociological Perspective," in Genocide: An Anthropological Reader , ed. Alexander Laban Hinton (Malden: Bl ackwell Publishers, 2002), 74 Ã 90; Chalk, Jonassohn, and Montreal Institute for Genocide Studies, The Hisory and Sociology of Genocide, 28. 188 Fein, "Genocide: A Sociological Perspective," 74 90.
! 54 The events at Nicomedia show exactly how the Turks employed genocidal violence in an effort to destroy the Greek's community ties and sense of identity in order to create a homogeneous Turkish center in Anatolia. This forced relocation of ethnic Greeks ultimately resulted in genocide that was perpetrated by both regular and irregular Turkish forces as well as peasa nts from the surrounding areas. By attacking institutions and groups of people that were valued with in the communities compliance was guaranteed. In the following section th rough the analysis of attacks on religious institutions and clergy as well as attacks on women and children, the extent, brutality and effectiveness of removal policy via nationalist rhetoric can be seen.
! 55 Violence Against Churches, Clergy , and the Fa ithful Superiority of religion was used as a mechanism to destroy communities in different ways depending on the particular group in question. For example, Turkish peasants used religion to justify the crimes committed in the sacking of towns and villages. On the other hand, members of the Turkish regular army and state hired irregular gangs used religion to dehumanize the Greeks . The military and chetes employed torture tactics of gross violence that targeted men, women, children and the elderly alike in a n effort to break their spirt . Turkey's ultimate goal was to remove all Greeks from Anatolia. This can be seen in a secret order sent on May 14, 1914 from the Turkish Minis ter of Internal Affairs, Talaat. The memo states that all Greek residents on the Asi a Minor coast must "be forced to vacate their villages and to be set tledÃ‰in their determined places." S hould they refuse, he continues, "please give oral instructions to brother Muslims, for the purpose of forcing the Greeks, be every kind of actions, to b e expatriated voluntarily " (emphasis added) . 189 This order gave anyone operating in conjunction with the Turkish government, whether a regular soldier or a brigand, the latitude to remove G reeks in any way they deemed fit . Ultimately, this culminated in what we today know as genocidal violence. By attacking the Greek Orthodox Church, which was and continues to be central to Greek culture/life, Greeks were being hit in a more subtle way. By attacking the institution that w as at the center of their lives in te rms of culture, community, family, tradition, language Ã‘ Turks were attacking their identity as Greeks . By committing acts of sacrilege in churches, attacking communities on major feast days, humiliating/ mutilating clergy , disrespecting the dead, and through forced assimilation, Turks sought to dismantle the identity of the Greeks in 189 Talaat, "Secret Order of the Turkish Minister of Internal Affairs, Tala at, Dated 14th May, 1914," in At Last We Uprooted Them: The Genocide of Greeks of Pontos, Thrace and Asia Minor Through French Archives (Thessaloniki: Publishing House Kyriakidis Brothers s.a., n.d.), 107.
! 56 order to dissolve their communities in Asia Minor and to create a homogeneous Muslim T urkey . 190 To the religiously devout, ch urches and places of worship in general are considered to be safe places. Historically, they are where people seek political asylum, food, shelter, money, first aid and the list goes on. By specifically targeting their place of worship and turning it into a place of fear, death and destruction the Turks looked to break Greek faith , and thus their sprit to make them more willing to cooperate. This took a variety of forms changing in severity depending on the particular town or village. For example when the Turks entered Ortakioy at the end of March 1920 , their f irst order of business was to burn down "half the city" and the "great Church of Saint Nicholas." On the other hand, in Fulazik, 300 men and boys over the age of fourteen were gathered, locked and set on fire, in the Church of Saint George. Once locked ins ide the trapped men were forced to use sacred objects, like icons, to break through the doors to survive. In this case the Turks not only desecrated the church, but they forced the Greeks to take an active role in that desecration or die. 191 Other instances, such as in the case of the Church of Saint Constantine in Karasou, where approximately sixty men were gathered, were threatened and held at gun point while the Turk s shook them down for valuables/ cash. In his testimony Alexios Karaselidis recalled thinkin g, " Inside the church , we were in the hands of the Turks." The consi deratio ns here are interesting because as previously stated, before outbreak of violence, the church would have been a place to escape from the Turks, a safe haven . By internally admitting that the church in Karasou no longer belonged to him or his community, but rather to the Turks, we can see the beginning 190 Testimony of Pavlos Balidis, "Fulazik," in The Genocide of the Greeks in Turkey, ed. Kostas Faltaits (River Vale: Cosmos Publishing , 2016), 48 50; Testimony of Eleni Vafiadis, "Lefkes" in Faltaits, 84. 191 Testimony of Pavlos Balidis, "Fulazik , " in Faltaits, 49.
! 57 phases of disconnection of identity from place. This disconnection from place would only increase the more heinous the action. For exa mple, in Nicaea , men and women were gathered into the Church of the Holy Virgin, "and there they were literally butchered into pieces." At this poi nt when the home/communities of the Greeks were in imminent danger of complete destruction, and was no longer defensible, the will to survive overpowered the sense of identity and allegiance to the community ; so , they fled or attempted to . I say attempt here intentionally. Many Greeks realized early on what was happening in their towns and/or had heard news from surrounding to wns that had been attacked. So when Turks were spotted they would try to leave (sometimes immediately), but the Turks did not allow this. They woul d gather up the fleeing Greeks from the surrounding mountains or villages and either kill them on the spot or bring them back to their town for torture/slaughter/rape . 192 The Greek Orthodox f aith celebrates a wide variety of feast days honoring a number of things throughout the year. In the cases of some villages in Nicomedia, the Turks chose to inva de, attack or both on days of great significance to the church. For example in Lefkes the Turks invaded on the "eve of the Feast of the Apostles " in 1920. 193 Later, in March 1921, Kara Tepe was invaded on the "day of the Annunciation," and was subsequently b ombed. 194 In Karasou, the Turks tried to manipulate the religious Greeks by ringing the church bells on June 30 , the feast day of the Apostles, after they had already fled to the mountains. 195 Thankfully this tactic did not work, but it does shed light on the lengths that the Turks were willing to go in order to catch and slaughter the Greeks who were in hiding. Overall, the attacks on a day s of great 192 Testimony of Alexios Karaselidis, "The Exodus of Karasou , " in Faltaits, 108; Testimony of Stathis Lolosidis, "The Last Survivor of Nicaea , " in Faltaits, 60. 193 Testimony of Eleni Vafiadis, "Lefkes , " in Faltaits , 81. 194 Testimony of Dimitrios Giavridis, "Kara Tepe , " in Faltaits , 65. 195 Testimony of Alexios Ka raselidis, "The Exodus of Karasou , " in Faltaits , 111.
! 58 religious importance was incredibly sacrilegious. These actions showed not only the depth of their disrespect f or Christianity , but how superior they felt to the Greeks. This superiority complex can also be seen in the targeted attacks of the Turks on members of the clergy. As mentioned earlier, during the Ottoman Empire the various religious minorities had the ability to govern themselves via the millet system which allowed each community to have their own schools, languages, and leaders that enforced laws and collected taxes. Under the millet system of the Ottoman Empire it was the ecumenical patriarchate and m embers of the clergy who oversaw the Orthodox Christians at the time. During the genocide however, that's to say once the Turkish Republic emerged , the Orthodox clergy no longer had the same politica l clout that they once had. Despite this, clergy members were still considered to be leaders within the Greek communities; s o , when the Turks forced members of the clergy to "demand exorbitant taxes" from townspeople in Karasou, Turkey sought to leverage the trust that his p roverbial flock had in him as their re ligious leader . 196 Bad as it is to manipulate a community via its religious leader, i t is another thing entirely to publicly humiliate members of the clergy. The most extreme case is best recounted by Pavlos Balidis from Fulazik. He explained t hat Father Phi llipos was ordered by Kemal to round up men and boys fourteen and over and to have them meet in Church of Saint George just to "talk , " and so Up to 300 men and boys from the ages of fourteen years and upwards were gathered inside the church of Saint George . Crying and crossing themselves they relied on Father Phillipos to comfort them and to give them Holy Communion. However the Father had lost his voice and was unable to speak Ã‰[then t he Kemal of Karamusal entered the church and] He jumped onto the back of Father Phillipos who by now had a rope tied around his mouthÃ‰and proceeded to ride Father Phillipos like a horse out of the church pulling on the rope in the processÃ‰[he] fainted and fell to the ground and Kemal then cu t one of the Father's eyes outÃ‰ Later , d own near the little river named Tourali I saw Father Phillipos 196 Testimony of Alexios Karaselidis, "The Exodus of Karasou , " in Faltaits , 109.
! 59 lying in the grass, his beard removed from his face, the bridle still in his mouth, his clothes in tattersÃ‰ his throat cut, and only a flap of skin attaching his head to his body. 197 In othe r towns, priests and their entire families (including children and grandparents) w ere dragged into the streets where they were all publicly raped, murdered and dismembered. The Turks attacked the priest in Kara Tepe for trying to save the holy objects from inside a church before it burnt down; 198 in the Pringiponnisia seminary priests had their beards shaved of f by Turks and were conscripted. 199 In these example s, all of the priests were symbolically stripped, in one way or another of their pride, status and au thority over their communities. In Fulazik, Father Phillipos was literally ridden like a pack animal by the Kemal. He was dragged through the burning town, he likely was forced to watch the rape of women and children, and wh en the Turks grew tired of him his corpse was further mutilated before being tossed into a stream . This is extreme nationalism in action. The Turkish nationalist narrative had been so effective that not only were the Greeks considered to be other, but they were unworthy giaours . Accor ding to an internal memo from the French army, the Turks could be over heard claiming repeatedly that their " Prophet was wrong to allow freedoms to ChristiansÃ‰that was the cause of o u r misfortune. From now on we will obliterate anything that is Christian!" And so they did. 200 After the death of a loved one, each culture has a method for disposal of the body to show respect to them, to their family to their god Ã‘ or whatever the case may be. Greeks are no different. In the Orthodox Church after the death of a person, there is a church service to bless the body and the departed soul, and then a burial in a cemetery . The Turks on no occasion took 197 Testimony of Pavlos Balidis, "Fulazik , " in Faltaits , 46 51. 198 Testimony of Dimi trios Giavridis, "Kara Tepe , " in Faltaits , 66. 199 Ha rry Tsirkinidis, At Last We Uprooted Them: The Genocide of Greeks of Pontos, Thrace and Asia Minor through French Archives , trans. Stratos Mavrantonis (Thessaloniki: Kyriakidis Brother Publishing House, 1999), 90, 92. 200 Tsirkinidis, At Last We Uprooted Them, 90.
! 60 any care to dispose of or bury any of the thousands of Greeks t hat they murdered in Nicomedia. 201 The rotting bodies of dead Greeks were left i n the burnt remnants of houses, or they were thrown into rivers like the Sangarius near Ortakioy where the "water was still murky red" from the blood of the Greeks that were slaughtered. 202 The corpses that Turks left strewn throughou t the country side and mountains of Nicomedia usually did not get the chance to decay naturally. Gen erally before that could happen the Christians who were butchered "into pieces [up] to their navels" and/or that had their stomachs sliced open were str ewn a bout and were literally left to the dogs . 203 This happened in Lefkes and in Ortakioy. In Lefkes and Ortakioy the Turkish women could be seen and heard walking the streets of the destroyed town. 204 In Ortakioy specifically, women were laughing not only at the c arnage but also at the dogs eating the dismembered corpses. 205 More disturbing still in the mountains surrounding Ortakioy, Turkish peasants chased after the fleeing Greeks to hunt them with their dogs. In fact, there are accounts of the Greeks being hunted, like an imals, in Ortakioy, and Karasou sh owing that the policies of extreme nationalism had successfully dehumanized the Greeks to the point that they were no longer human but rather animal. 206 Perhaps the most blatant disrespect not only for the dead but for Christians in general was the use of crucifixion. 207 Historically crucifixion was the death sentence ascribed to criminals, but as most know it is the way in which Jesus, who according to the church was the son of god/ the holy spirit incarnate , was kille d . Christians use the symbol of the crucifix in their houses, 201 Faltaits , The Genocide of the Greeks in Turkey . 202 Testimony of Paraskevi Anastasiadou, "The Teacher of Ortakioy , " in Faltaits , 95. 203 Testimony of Benjamin Lazian, "Giaour Ali , " in Faltaits , 100. 204 Testimony of Eleni V afiadis, "Lefkes" in Faltaits, 86; Testimony of Paraskevi Anastasiadou, "The Teacher of Ortakioy," in Faltaits 95. 205 Testimony of Paraskevi Anastasiadou, "The Teacher of Ortakioy," in Faltaits , 95. 206 Testimony of Paraskevi Anastasiadou, "The Teacher of Ortakioy," in Faltaits , 93 Ã 95. 207 Dimitrios Giavridis, "Kara Tepe," in Faltaits, 69; Testimony of Alexios Karaselidis , " The Exodus of Karasou ," in Faltaits 115.
! 61 on icons, they wear it on chains around their neck to honor the sacrifice that God made for his children in allowing his son to die. It is for this reason that it is so disrespectful. The Turks did not choose this method of murder because "Barbara Evrenglou, an elderly lady of 85 years old" was too difficult to kill using a knife or a gun, and so she was left "still gasping, crucified and nailed outside the door of her house, and [with] her eyes hanging out" because it was easier. 208 No, Barbara was crucified, like her God was, to send a message to any surviving Christians that happened to see her nailed there. The message being that Christians were weaker, inferior, and that they did not belong in Turkey , and for any C hristians that they encountered this was the fate that awaited them . 208 Testimony of Dimitrios Giavridis, "Ka ra Tepe," in Faltaits , 69.
! 62 Violence Against Women and Children All Greeks at this time were forced to endure the heinous crimes committed against them and their communities. The attacks on e ach community generally followed the same pattern. Fir st, Turks would demand money, taxes , food or valuables in order to guarantee the safety of the Greeks. Then, Turkish soldiers of t he regular and irregular forces and Turkish peasants began "looting the homes" of Greeks. 209 They were forced to wat ch as Turks entered their homes pulled "men out by force, taking with them whatever they found." Turks went so far as to make "people remove their clothes and shoes" off their backs for them to take . 210 Then Greeks w atched as all of their "belongings were loaded onto thousands of mules and horses" and dragged off to Turkish villages . 211 Sometime in between the m onetary demands and the looting; the kidnapping, rape , killing and mutilation began with orders to " g o straigh t to their [Greek] villages Ã‘ women, children, whatever you find, kill it." 212 The more that the Greeks were pushed into the category of other by the Turkish government, Kemalist leadership, soldiers and peasants, the less human Greeks became. The more margin alized the Greeks became , t he less of a threat they posed especially as the genocide proceeded. With each successful attack and complete destruction of a number of town s the Turks felt more empowered in their act ions , and more confident in the violence com mitted against Greeks which lead them to become increasingly violent . Despite the earlier focus on members of the clergy, w omen were in no way excluded. They were often raped in front of their husbands and children, mutilated, taken for harems, sold to sl avery and/or killed. In Fulazik, Nicaea, Kara Tepe, Konzes, Lefkes and Ortakioy survivors 209 Testimony of Eleni Vafiadis, "Lefkes," in Faltaits , 83 89. 210 Testimony of Pavlos Balidis, "Fulazik," in Faltaits , 47. 211 Testimony of Pavlos Balidis, "Fulazik," in Faltaits , 47. 212 Testimony of Alexios Karaselidis, "The Exodus of Karasou," in Faltaits , 114.
! 63 reported the sounds of "musical instruments being played" 213 and hearing Turks "cro on[ing] grossly offensive songs " 214 while women were forced to remove all of their clot hes and dance naked for the soldiers who would sing and play the oud before they were tortured and killed. 215 Music was a constant in Turks town to town massacres. Survivors reported that they could hear "[with]i n the clamor" as bullets were being fired, and buildings were in flames, a "weeping that rose to the heavens, [and] the ouds of the Turks and their singing." 216 It would seem that despite all of the death a nd destruction surrounding them the Turks found time to enjoy themselves. W ithin what most surv ivors of these at rocities would later call "hell, " the Turks acted as if they were at a festival that should be enjoyed complete with dancers, music, singing and fineries. The dancers of course, were prisoners of war and were Greek women and children force d to dance naked for the entertainment of the Turks . 217 Additionally, t he fineries used during these celebrations were stolen. In many cases these objects (usually gold) were taken out of dead bodies that had either been cut open to the intestines, or dug ou t of the ashes of bodies to find things that had been swallowed by their victims. 218 Music can also be understood as a way to celebrate victory over the Greeks. The use of music in these orgy like settings is interesting in attempting to understand the moti vation of the Turks. Perhaps the music was a way to distract from what was actually happening around them. The music could have been used to transport the perpetrators to a euphoric place where they were surrounded with only fine things and an abundant amo unt of women at their disposal. Music could also have been used in order to help the atrocities move 213 Testimony of Pavlos Balidis, "Fulazik," in Faltaits , 50. 214 Testimony of Paraskevi Anastasiadou, "The Teacher of Ortakioy," in Faltaits , 92. 215 Testimony of Eleni Vafiadis, "Lefkes," in Faltaits , 86. 216 Testimony of Eleni Vafiadis, "Lefkes," in Faltaits , 86. 217 Testimony of Yiannis Valaris, "The Songs of Fulazik," in Faltaits , 55. 218 Testimony of Poimenarch Stephan Hovakimian, "The Armenians," in Faltaits , 105.
! 64 along. Equally important to consider is that quite possibly some of the Turks were sadistic and thus did enjoy committing these genocidal acts . In this cas e, by celebrating what they had achieved through violence the Turks were solidifying their success and victory over the dirty giaours that plagued Turkey . Victory seems out of place in discussing the wholesale massacre or genocide of a grou p of peop le. To the Turks, however, that is what it was, a victory over the infidel. A way for Turks to claim the dominance of the Islamic faith over Christianity, that they imagined they deserved due to nationalist rhetoric at the time . These actions were the phy sical manifestation of the Turkish people claiming the land based on the nationalist rhetoric which t old them they were entitled to. This entitlement therefore allowed them to be rid of the giaours who had squatted on their land for so long , by any means n ecessary . Their grossly overkill actions successfully dehumanized the Greeks by reducing their resolve to live, and by forcing women into impossible circumstances where their only concern was survival . To some Greek women and girls , a fate worse than deat h was the prospect of being "taken," married off, forced to bear children, or to be forcibly converted to Islam (or all of the above) . 219 Yet these were some of the choices that many, mostly girls, faced. Conversion to Islam, if offered at all, was offered a s a choice . 220 The other choice being death for the crime of being a giaour . This was the case in Lefkes where after surviving the initial waves of slaughter, the remaining Christians were told that "they had to become Turks if they wanted to survive. " 221 S o t hey became Turks by changing their names and wearing traditional Turkish garb, the women 219 Testimony of Paraskev i Anastasiadou, "The Teacher of Ortaioy," in Faltaits , 96. 220 Testimony of Eleni Vafiadis, "Lefkes," in Faltaits , 84; Testimony of Paraskevi Anastasiadou, "The Teacher of Ortakioy," in Faltaits 94 Ã 97. 221 Testimony of Eleni Vafiadis, "Lefkes," in Faltaits , 84.
! 65 covered their faces, and their youth were married according to the Quran. 222 If you were found to still have Christian leanings, like Yiangos was during a surprise searc h that revealed a small icon tucked away in his pocket , you were killed after you dug your own grave. 223 Often times the young girls who were taken from their families to be married off to Turk s w as agreed to for the sake of survival, and with the hope of a future escape . 224 Simply put , Greek women and girls did what was needed in order to surviv e despite the many atrocities they were forced to endure. In most villages the "young and beautiful women," the "prettiest young women," "the most beautiful girls," we re the first to be taken from their homes and families by Turkish regular and irregular soldiers for sex. 225 Some young women/girls were gathered up and taken to be part of a harem or if found to be too old, forced into slavery. 226 Other women, including chi ldren and the elderly , were not so lucky. According to Stathis Lolosidis in Nicaea beginning at dawn and lasting until noon "women Ã‘ starting with little girls of six years old to elderly women Ã‘ they would rape and then slaughterÃ‰and [then] they butchered and turned human flesh into tiny little pieces." 227 The mutilation and dismemberment o f the females after their rape is symbolic of their distaste for Greek Christians and their determination to rid Turkey of them. By attacking young women who are of child bear ing age they ensure that no more Greeks are born in Turkey, thus snuffing out the population there. Further by "slaughtering them and by torturing them heinously" the established their dominance as Turkish men over Greek men who were rendered useless in 222 Testimony of Eleni Vafiadis, "Lefkes," in Faltaits , 84. 223 Testimony of Eleni Vafiadis, "Lefkes," in Faltaits , 84. 224 Testimony of Par askevi Anastasiadou, "The Teacher of Ortakioy," in Faltaits , 94 Ã 97. 225 Testimony of Eleni Vafiadis, "Lefkes," in Faltaits , 87; Testimony of Christos Kalantzis, "Fountoukia," in Faltaits 73; Testimony of Stathis Lolosidis, "The Last Survivor of Nicaea," in Faltaits 59. 226 Testimony of Stathis Lolosidis, "The Last Survivor of Nicaea," in Faltaits, 59; Testimony of Paraskevi Anastasiadou, "The Teacher of Ortakioy," in Faltaits 95. 227 Testimony of Stathis Lolosidis, "The Last Survivor of Nicaea," in Faltaits , 63.
! 66 pr otecting their mothers, wives and children. 228 The rape and murder of elderly women served a similar purpose. By attacking the elders of families, the Turks sent the message that all aspects of Greek culture and tradition were null and void, their other stat us solidified. Community and cultural hierarchies were no longer valid as they were no longer considered human or a part of the in group that needed to be protected. Women at times attempted to appeal to the better nature of Turks begging for their mercy. In Lefkes, a young woman by the name of Rodanthe Paschalidis was overheard saying to a pair of Turks: "Ã”Don't ruin my life. I have no t yet lived enough in this world.'" 229 Her appeal to the Turk was met by a missed gun shot which prompted her to respond that she was "Ã”not a creature that you can just kill.'" 230 Her insubordination as a giaour was met by "another Turk stabb[ing] her with his knife " to silence her once and for all as if to prove that yes, she was a creature that could simply be killed. 231 The metho d used to silence Paschalidis , though it showed a disregard for Greek lives , was relatively subdued . Meaning that she was killed quickly and was not subjected to torture tactics before she was killed . She was stabbed, he r life ended , her voice silenced . I n other cases Greek women would beg "Ã”d on't kill us by torturing usÃ‰kill us quickly,'" but were not granted a clean and quick death . 232 In Lefkes, likely Paschalidis' friends and family , women were "toyed with" by the Turks. The Turks raped and then " would c ut out their nipples of their breasts passing them around and playing with them like a komboloi (worry beads), and then would kill the women by torturing them horribly." 233 This drawn out process of rape, 228 Testimony of Christos Kalantzis, "Fountoukia," in Faltaits , 73. 229 Testimony of Eleni Vafiadis, "Lefkes," in Faltaits , 85. 230 Testimony of Eleni Vafiadis, "Lefkes," in Faltaits , 85. 231 Testimony of Eleni Vafiadis, "Lef kes," in Faltaits , 85. 232 Testimony of Eleni Vafiadis, "Lefkes," in Faltaits , 86. 233 Testimony of Eleni Vafiadis, "Lefkes," in Faltaits , 86.
! 67 torture, murder and mutilation of Greek women was ano ther way to not only dehumanize them, but to declare their dominance as Muslim Turks and to break dow n Greek ties to Turkey. In their torture of Christians, Turks were reinforcing the idea that only they , the Muslim Turks, belonged in the country. By speci fically targeting women, they render Greeks incapable of reproduction and further underscoring their goal of ultimate annihilation of identity and culture. The Turkish attempts to render Greeks as insignificant and inferior beings that had no place in the new Turkey is incredibly clear in the instances where Greeks were forced to bear witness to the rape and murder of each other. The first night of the Turkish attacks in Fountokila, women and girls "the age of ten and over" were ra ped in front of their mot hers while " the young[er] ones [were forced to] hold candles to illuminate them." 234 This forced participation reinforced the inferiority of Greeks to the young children by making them an active participant in the torture of their mothers, sister s and friend s. The absolute control and perceived superiority of the Turks can further be seen in the case of Haralambos Sevastou, who was caught hiding in the mountains outside of Lefkes with his three daughters. Once caught, the Turks "cut off his two front legs to the knees and took out one of his eyes," rendering him physically incapacitated. Then, to further emphasize his forced subservience and unworthiness as a Greek, the Turks "placed his daughters in his lap, and beheaded them all [one by one] in this way." 235 H ere we see the implied and supposed superiority of the Turks based on the nati onalist propaganda at the time physically reinforced. It was not enough to simply kill Sevastou and his family to show their inferiority to the Turks. Sevastou first had to be se verely maimed , to the point where he could no longer protect his children, and he was then forc ed to watch as they were killed. Killed n ot just in front of him forcing him to bear witness, but physically on him. W ith no possible way to fight 234 Testimony of Christos Kalantzis, "Fountoukia," in Faltaits , 73. 235 Testimony of Eleni Va fiadis, "Lefkes," in Faltaits , 87.
! 68 back the Turks continued to crush the spirit or the Greeks and to eradicate not only thei r communities but their culture in Turkey. The deconstruction and obliteration of Greek communities was furthered by the killing of children. By first killing Greek women and then G reek children, Turks attempted to ensure that no aspect of Greek culture could continue . In some towns, the killing of children was relatively straight forward. For example i n Fulazik the children were buried alive and in Lefkes the Turks "smashed the chil dren's heads" in. 236 In the towns of Fulazik, Kara Tepe, Fountoukilia, Lefkes, Ortakioy and Karasou the killing of children was forced upon the Greeks themselves . While their towns were under attack, Greeks found themselves facing the choice of saving themse lves or saving their children. When Turks invaded towns Greeks attempted to flee , and hid in a number of places ranging from the mountains to the sewers. 237 Hordes of men, women and children fled from the violence of the Turks. Once in hiding small children and infants could be heard "crying from hunger." 238 Out of fear of "their criesÃ‰giving away their location," 239 Kalantzis explained that "we killed our children so they would not betray usÃ‰and thus bringing the Turks upon us." 240 How small children were killed d epended on the particular circumstances of the family. Some children were quite literally abandoned in bushes as families fled from their homes and towns that were up in flames and under attack. In Kara Tepe Dimitrios Giavridis explain s that he was initia lly separated from his family, but once the Turks had deserted the carcass of 236 Testimony of Yiannis Valaris, "The Songs of Fulazik," in Faltaits , 55; Testimony of Eleni Vafiadis, "Lefkes," in Faltaits 85. 237 Testimony of Christos Kalantzis, "Fountoukia," in Faltaits, 73; Testimony of Eleni Vafiadis, "Lefkes," in Faltaits , 85. 238 Testimony of Pavlos Balidis, "Fulazik," in Faltaits , 51. 239 Testimony of Alexios Karaselidis, "The Ex odus of Karasou," in Faltaits , 115. 240 Testimony of Christos Kalantzis, "Fountoukia," in Faltaits , 73.
! 69 Kara Tepe, he ventured to find those that had escaped into the surrounding area. As he descended from a ravine Giavridis, Heard crying and I saw my infant child thrown into some branches. I picked up the child and brought him to [a nearby town] Faktori where I found more people including my wife from whom I learned that she had thrown him away to save the other two older children. 241 Other small children were given opium to quie t them so they would not give away the location of those in hiding. But this opium was not always on hand, or it was not in large supply because in many cases " mothersÃ‰ gave them large doses of opium and thus killed" their children. 242 The choice placed befor e these women that of self preservation and safety of the community or the life of their child, could not have been an easy one and in some cases was beyond their control . Some mothers attempted to save the lives of their children for as long as they poss ibly could, but other community members that feared for their lives stepped in. Such was the case of Eleni Vafiadis from Lefkes who found herself and ten other Greeks hiding in the sewers under the town's toilets. Above them they could hear the sounds of s laughter , and the " cries of small children " being killed by the Turks. All the while, she clutched her infant to her hoping that they would not be found and that they would survive. But, after a few days In the sewers I was half conscious from the horrible odour. I had in my lap my baby which started to cry and the other women said: Ã”He will betray us with his cries.' Then one woman, Athena Hadzi, took my child from my lap, squeezed its neck tightly, strangled it, and then gave it back to me lifelessÃ‰We sta yed there five days and five nightsÃ‰[All the while] I had my dead child in my lap and I saw the worms starting to eat its little eyes. My body was completely numb. 243 The psychological effects of watching your child decay in your arms, as you yourself are s tarving and in fear for your life, can only be immense. As discussed later on, survivors of this 241 Testimony of Dimitrios Giavridis, "Kara Tepe," in Faltaits , 68 Ã 69. 242 Testimony of Paraskevi Anastasiadou, "Th e Teacher of Ortakioy," in Faltaits , 93. 243 Testimony of Eleni Vafiadis, "Lefkes," in Faltaits , 86 Ã 87.
! 70 Genocide did not speak of their experiences for many years, I can only imagine that it was at least partially a result of not wanting to relive such devastatin g experiences such as killing your child. I cannot say definitively that Turks intended for Greeks to kill their own offspring, but it must have come as a welcome discovery. Not only would it have been less for them to do, but it again forced Greeks into t he position of helping to destroy their communities and families. Further, by forcing them to take an active role in the expulsion of Greeks they underscored the inferiority of their lives and t he superiority of Turkish ones. T hus successfully dismantling Greek communities and ties to their homeland. In spite of all this, the Turks did not succeed in the erasure of the unique Greek culture and heritage that was present in Asia Minor. These traumas from torture, mutilation, rape, sacrilege and the many more not discussed here Ã‘ did cause the Greek communities in Asia Min or to dissolve completely, but did not break their will to survive . This can be seen in the extreme measures taken by Greeks in the Nicomedia region who willingly killed their child ren, were so ld off into slavery, sent to labor camps, to harems, hid in sewers, and much more. Their will to first survive, and second to bear witness through the retelling of their stories so t hat they would not be forgotten; is a testament to the strength of Greeks of Asia Minor. Further, their descendants ' will to preserve and perpetuate the memories of this atrocity as well as their dedication to t he preservation of their history in culture not only in Greece but also in the U.S. is a testament to their strength of character and culture.
! 71 CHAPTER III RESILIANCE: PRESERVATION OF CULTURE, HERITAGE AND RELIGION IN THE UNITED STATES The atrocities that the Greeks of Asia Minor were forced to endure during their expulsion from Turkey constituted a genocide. E ntire communities were destroyed, families were torn apart and all were displaced. Very few were allowed to stay in Turkey, but the majority were forced to settle in countries that were foreign to them. Despite this, these ethnic Greeks were able to retain elements of their unique culture and language to pass down to their children and grandchildren. In this chapter, I will explore the various institutions, societies and organizations that endeavor to preserve the culture and heritage of the Greeks from Asi a Minor. Refugees of the Greek Genocide typically settled in various cities/towns/villages on the peninsula of Greece, like Kokkinia outside of Piraeus. Immigrants in those communities sought to assimilate into Greek society while still maintaining their unique experience privately and within their own homes. 244 Once in Greece immigrants from Asia Minor faced discrimination from their fellow Greeks and were called karamalides or prosfiyes when recognized by their Turkish accent . 245 This was largely due to the fact that most of these refugees spoke Turkey more fluently than they did Greek, and in some cases spoke no Greek at all. 246 As a result, these "Anatolian Christians" or "Christians from the East" were considered to be second class citizens and not fully Gre ek . 247 Fortunately as time moved forward an d the next generation was born relations between ethnic Greeks from Turkey and Greeks from Greece began to smooth. Helen 244 RenÂŽe Hirschon, Heirs of the Greek Catastrophe: The Social Life of Asia Minor Refugees in Piraeus (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1998). 245 Helen Mavromatis, Family and Personal History, audio recording, April 3, 2017. Karamalides was slang to identify someone that was from Asia Minor/Turkey, while prosfiyes was a demeaning way of referring to a refugee. 246 Mazower, Saloni ca: City of Ghosts, 336 Ã 37. 247 Mavromatis, Family and Personal History; Mazower, Salonika: City of Ghosts, 337.
! 72 Mavromatis, born to Eromfili and Yiannis Avitoglou refugees from Tokat and Ankara, Turkey, rec ounts that My grandmother didn't speak any Greek, and my mother had an accentÃ‰she used to mix up the feminine and masculine. My father was better, the only thing he had an accent. And most of the people that they came from Turkey at that time, you could r ecognize them because of their accent, when they spoke GreekÃ‰there was a lot of discrimination at that time toward the refugees from the local GreeksÃ‰[but] to tell you the truth, me, as I was growing upÃ‰like twenty thirty years laterÃ‰I didn't feel muchÃ‰bet ween us kids, there wasn't any. 248 It was this new generation of Greek born, Turkish descendants that would immigrate to the United States in th e mid to late twentieth century in search of better opportunities. This immigration to the US lead them also to b ring the rich social culture and heritage of their homeland. 249 Much like victims of the Holocaust, survivors of the Greek Genocide did not talk about what they suffered at the hands of their oppressors , and i f th ey did recount their experience it was not u ntil much later. 250 For example, Thea Halo, who wrote a narrative of her mother's experience, discloses at the beginning of her book that she had no idea what her mother suffered until well into her adult life. 251 Some accounts were recorded by historic societ ies and organizations in Greece, but few exist in the U.S. and in English. Despite this, i n the U.S. descendants of survivors hold firm to their belief that "people must know what happened ," and "by not recognizing and remember ing those that suffered and t hose that died, their memories and sacrifices disappear." 252 In an effort to lift the silence of older generations, to preserve the 248 Mavromatis, Family and Personal History. 249 Theodore Saloutos, The Greeks in the United States (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Univ ersity Press, 1964), 1. 250 Mazower, "Homage to Salonika," 338. 251 Halo, Not Even My Name . 252 Sandy J Papadopoulos, Greek Genocide Survivor Descendants Interview, Transcript, March 4, 2018; George Palaidis, Greek Genocide Survivor Descendants Interview, Transcript, March 7, 2018.
! 73 memory of their ancestors and to educate nationally and internationally a number of organizations have been established. Once in the US Greek immigrants , in general, attempted to establish places where the cultural norms that they were accustomed to could flourish. Early immigrants established coffeehouses that served as a "recreation center," providing a place to socialize with other Greeks in the immediate or neighboring community. 253 As time went on, c hurches took on a more prominent role in preservation of culture and heritage by establishing programs and activities that encouraged "a special community spirit . " The church "spon sored schools, socia l events, [and] church programs " including Greek school and traditional dance. 254 253 Theodore Saloutos, The Greeks in the United States , 78. 254 Saloutos, 71.
! 74 The Church and Independent Societies The Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America was not established officially until 1922, up until then Greek Orthodox Chu rch es sprang up around the country. The first permeant community was founded in 1892 in New York City, at what is now the Archdiocesan Cathedral of the Holy Trinity. As of 2017 there are over 540 Parishes, 800 priests and approximately 1.5 million members of the Greek Orthodox Church in the U.S. 255 While the centrality of the church was discussed within the context of ethnic Gr eeks of Asia Minor specifically, it was and remains to be central to many Greek Americans. For many Greek immigrants the church was a place to gather among those who shared a common culture and heritage, and as a result became the channel through which Greek Americans began to preserve the Hellenic identity. 256 As such, Hellenism in the United States and the Greek Orthodox C hurch became intertwined. Together they " served as the cord that kept the immigrant attached to the mother countr y" and helped preserve the " faith and language" of his forefathers. 257 This was done thro ugh the establishment of Greek l a nguage schools. These programs which took place after school hours during the week, were offered by church communities in an effort to "perpetuate the modern Greek language" and to preserve the heritage and identity of children born of Greek parents in the U.S. 258 In addition to this, communit ies formed fraternal societies that are equally a part of Greek American community life as Greek language schools. These local topika, or societies, were numerous and varied based on the distinct make up of each Greek community. 259 255 About the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America , Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America, http://www.goarch.org/about , accessed March 2018. 256 Saloutos, The Greeks in the United States , 85 Ã 95. 257 Saloutos, 122. 258 Saloutos, 72 Ã 73. 259 Saloutos, 75.
! 75 Each Greek community in t he United States is made up of Greek Americans descended from all across Greece. D escendants of the Greek Genocide are from A sia Minor which includes Pontos. T he Pontic people come from villages in the Pontic Mountains that border the Black Sea in Asia Min or. They had a distinct language/dialect/culture , and for this reason they are distinguished as a separate group. This is reflected in the fact that there are topika dedicated to both Asia Minor and Pontos or just Pontos. Of the groups that identify as sp ecifically as Pontian societies, there are fifteen in the U.S. and Canada which are overseen by the Pan Pontian Federation of U.S.A. and Canada established in 1980. 260 Each organization's activity is determined by the volunteers in each community and as such their impact can vary. That being said, t he majority of the Pontian organizations are in the N ortheastern and Midwestern U S , with the highest concentrations of Pontic or Asia Minor descendants being in either New York or Chicago. As a result, t he largest and most active organizations are both based in Chicago. These organizations are the Pontian Greek Society of Chicago and the Asia Minor and Pontos Hellenic Research Center. The Pontian Greek Society of Chicago (formerly known as Xeniteas Pontian Societ y of Chicago) was founded in November of 1977 by Pontian Greek immigrants from Russia. Their founders were "determined to preserve the rich heritage that was passed down to them from their parents and grandparents, who were expelled from their homeland." T o achieve this they do a number of things, most importantly they â€¢ ! Collect, preserve and make use of historical documentation highlighting the Pontian Greek experience in Asia Minor and the Diaspora. â€¢ ! Organize lectures and conferences devoted to illuminating the history of our people and the fate of the Greeks of the Diaspora today. 260 Member Clubs, Efxinos Pontos, http://www.efxinospontos.org/panpontian.html , accessed March 10, 2018,.
! 76 â€¢ ! Prepare and distribute educational materials for secondary schools and colleges and provide speakers to educational and civic organizations on Pontian Greek and Asia Minor history. â€¢ ! Support the annual Day of Remembrance of the Pontian Greek Genocide and work to obtain proclamations, resolutions, and recognition of the genocide of Pontian Greeks from government entities. â€¢ ! Host social events, such as dinner dances, to renew and preserve our historical traditions and practices. 261 The challenge faced by descendants here in the U.S. is that there is not much material available in English. More challenging still, Gree ks from Pontos spoke the Pontian dialect and others from Asia Minor general ly spoke a dialect of Greek called Cappadocian Ã‘ both of which are almost extinct. 262 In an effort to make research and education easier the PGSC has published oral histories, Pontic poems, information on t raditional dance and histories in English. 263 By publish ing all of this information not only online, but by also distributing it to educational institutions the PGSC has taken an active role in the international effort to educate the public in order to get the Greek Genocide recognized . The most active and aca demic organization in the United States is the Asia Minor and Pontos Research Center, founded in 2011 as a 501 (c) non pro fit organization in Chicago. Their goal is to "document and disseminate information about the Greek communities of the later Ottoman e m pire and study the expulsion of the Greeks from their ancestral homelands in Asia Minor (or Anatolia), Eastern Thrace and Pontos." 264 This organization's focus on the multiple areas that were affected by the Genocide in Turkey is what makes them unique , as is their dedication to publication of all scholarship in the English language . Further, the AMP H RC 261 About the Pontian Greek Society , Pontian Greek Society of Chicago, http://www.pontiangreeks.org/about us/ , accessed March 2018. 262 The Pontian Dialect , Pontian Greek Society of Chicago, http://www.pontiangreeks.org/history/dialect , accessed March 2018. 263 History , Pontian Greek Society of Chicago, http://www.pontiangreeks.org/history , accesse d March 2018. 264 About us, Asia Minor and Pontos Hellenic Research Center, http://www.hellenicresearchcenter.org/about , accessed March 2018.
! 77 works in conjunction with both Armenian and Jewish scholars in order to understand the framework within which the Greek Genocide occurs and is studied. AMP H R C is also the organization which, in conjunction with the Pan Pontian Association of the USA and Canada, hosted the three academic conferences from 2008 2010 (these were the basis of Shirinian's publication in 2012 ) . Additionally, they have hosted two inte rnational academic conferences in May 2013 and 2015 . The AMPHRC provides invalu able information to the English speaking researcher. They have archive and an online searchable research library, they have a selected list of secondary sources and links to pri mary source newspaper articles. They even have teaching guides available for high school and elementary age students. The recent establishment of the research library was done in an effort to "attract the world's leading scholars ," as is the organization o f national and international academic research conferences. 265 The research and publications that are sponsored AMPHRC and other organizations are pushing to make more information available in English to make sure that more academic research can be published , and to aid in the international recognition of the Greek Genocide. While this type of pres ervation and study is important equally important is the preservation of cultural practices such as traditional dance. In the following section a survey of importa nt organizations pertaining to both Asia Minor and Pontos are represented. It would seem from the survey provided here, that they are the only organizations in the United States, this is not the case. This is only a snapshot of hundreds of organizations th at exist across the U.S. are represent immigrant communities from across Greece including but not limited to Crete, Greeks of Egypt, Macedonia and Thrace. While all members of these various associations identify themselves as Greeks first, they also second arily 265 Home, Asia Minor and Pontos Hellenic Research Center, http://www.hellenicresearchcenter.org , accessed March 2018.
! 78 identify as Cretan/Thracian/Macedonian. In fact, many would first identify themselves in the opposite way Ã‘ for example Cretan first and then Greek. This is representative of the distinct local cultures that pertain to specific regions in Greece. Furth er, it should be noted that while many of these organizations operate out of Greek Orthodox Churches, not all Greeks are Christians. Some are Jewish or even Muslim, but share the same culture and language based on where their families are from. For example , the Macedonian and Thracian Region there are still remnants of the hybrid heterogenous culture mixing (discussed in chapter 2) evident in the hybrid language that traditional songs are sung, and the presence of identical dances across Greece's northern s hared borders. Ultimately, the organizations discussed above and the dances that will be discussed in the following section should be viewed as a way to understand the nature of Asia Minor Greek cultural preservation in the U.S., but not as a comprehensive survey of all existing organizations.
! 79 Traditional Dance and Music Traditional Greek Folk Dance is a cultural practice that can be traced back to before Christianity and through modern times . Mosaic murals depicting dance scenes can be found in ancient ruins across Greece and is a testament to the centrality of dance to their culture. After the adoption of C hristianity by the Greek people dance continued to be a part of community life, and was common at social gatherings such as weddings, baptisms, fune rals and more . There are a few references to dance , as a means of worship , in the bible mainly in the book of Psalms. Psalms 30: 11 states that "for me my mourning [has turned] into dancing," and later in Psalm s 150:4 Christians are prompted to "praise him with the timbrel and danceÃ‰with stringed instruments and organs." 266 Traditional dance became especially active during the Ottoman occupation from the fifteenth century to the beginning of the nineteenth century, as a way to maintain their unique Hellenic c ulture and identity. 267 In an effort to better understand the significance of traditional Greek dance, an analysis of the dance of Zolongo as well as the styling and symbolism of dances from Pontos will serve as a case study of the all dances that are native to Asia Minor and Greece . To the Greeks, traditional dance was more than a simple activity done for enjoyment, it was a way to express their emotions, whatever they were. An example of this, is the now famous stand taken by the women of the village Souli , Epirus in 1804. At the time the Turks were spreading throughout the peninsula, and Souli knew that they would be invaded. The women of the town decided that in order to avoid slavery and shame, hand in hand with their children formed a circle and began d ancing around the precipice singing a sad farewell song. When the leader of the circle reached the brink of the precipice she separated herself from the rest and fell to 266 King James Bible , 10th ed. (Lisle, IL: Project Gutenberg, 1992). 267 Solon Michaelides, "Greek Song Dance," Journal of the Interntional Folk Music Council 8 (1956): 38.
! 80 her death; then followed, after each verse, the second, the third until all [women and children] had perished. 268 The "Dance of Zolongo , " as it is now commonly known, has come to represent the struggle of freedom that the Greeks endured during the occupation of the Ottoman Empire and the Turks. The practice of traditional dance then became " a kind of cultural knowledge and performance, as a language of communication, embodied speech and embodied memories" of the various regions and villages of Hellenic origin 269 . . All Greek dances are performed in a semi circle either holding ha nds or shoulde rs. Pontic dances though performed this way today, originally were done in a closed circle. There was no beginning or end of the line and served as a "symbol of bonding and union" that united the whole community from children to elderly. 270 Pontic dances als o reveal the effects of Turkish violence, as many of them are "militant in style, especially towards Eastern Pontos and the coastline." According to dance instructor and Pontic descendant Paul Calzada there are an estimated 10,000 traditional dances in Gre ece, with over 4,000 of those being unique to particula r villages and regions. Pontos is estimated to have had approximately 3,500 dances of their own Ã‘ many of which are lost today due to the genocide. Today, around 100 Pontic dances have been recovered, wi th the last ten being discovered by Nikos Zournadzidis in his travels to the area. 271 As stated previously, dances from Pontos are danced in a circle which is similar to how dances from the varying regions in Greece are performed. While many Pontic dances a re 268 Michaelides, 38. 269 Philia Issari, "Greek American Ethnic Identity, Cultural Experience and the Ã”Embodied Language' of Dance: Implications for Counseling," International Journal for the Adva ncement of Counselling 33, no. 4 (December 2011): 254. 270 Philia Issari, "Greek American Ethnic Identity," International Journal for the Advancement of Counselling 33, no. 4 (December 2011): 261. 271 Paul Calzada, Greek Genocide Survivor Descendants Interview, Transcript, January 17, 2018.
! 81 performed in closed c ircle, some are performed in a semi circle, or a straight line. In many Greek dances where the societies were "more open [and] individualistic," the leader is able to perform special figoures or variations at the front of the line t o show off to the community . 272 This was not/is not the case in Pontic dances. In dances from this region there is no lead dancer, no protagonistÃ‰everyone participates as an equal. The disciplined group of dancersÃ‰moves as oneÃ‰Each Pontian bears the same bu rden of responsibilityÃ‰A wrong step by the third dancer or a slight hesitation by the sixth would immediately mar the overall effect. The Pontian's attitude to dance is the same as their attitude to everyday life, where the entire village is responsible fo r the community's survival. No one follows, and no one leads. 273 In effect, Pontian dances show the interconnectedness of community members and its importance as a "ritual of soc ial reproduction and sustenance . " 274 Their dances also worked to visually embody and thus preserve the Pontic community's memory and history. The same holds true for the organizations here in the U.S. that are dedicated to the preservatio n of Pontian memory and history. By teaching each new generation the lyrics and dances of Greek an d Pontic culture, descendants are honoring the memory of the ancestors who survived such great tragedy. As each move is deliberate a nd representative of something, dancers are physically embodying the memories and emotions that the dances were created to e xpress. In the United States, the effort to main tain traditional Greek dancing began as soon as immigr ants arrived. In the beginning churches performed and taught a handful of dances that were common all across Greece such as the Kalamatiano, Zembehiko an d Hasaposeviko . I ndependent organizati ons, like Pontic societies, focused on teaching and learning dances from the regions that they trying to preserve . In essence , Macedonian societies learned and performed 272 Marianna Koromila, The Greeks and The Black Sea: From the Bronze Age to the Early 20th Century (Athens: Panorama Cultural Society, 2002), 247. 273 Koromila, 247. 274 Issari, "Greek American Ethnic Identity, Cultural Experience and the Ã”Embodied Language' of Dance: Implication s for Counseling," 255.
! 82 dances from Macedonia, Cretan soci eties from the island of Crete, and Pontic societies from the region of Pontos. By the end of the 1970s a group of Greek Orthodox Christians in California piloted the idea of a Greek dance competition where groups could showcase and present what they learned . The first two competitions, now known as the Greek Orthodox Folk Dance and Choral Festival, took place in 1976 and 1978 in the Metropolis of San Francisco. After its initial success , FDF was officially chartered in February of 1979 and has taken place every year in California, drawing over one thousand dancers, instructors, musicians and spectators from abroad . 275 FDF is one of two major traditional Greek dance compe titions in the U.S.; the s e cond being the Hellenic Dance F estival (HDF) . FDF's mission is to "promote , encourage and perpetuate Greek heritage and culture" in the forms of folk dance, folk art, music and language 276 HDF takes place on the east coast in the Metropolis of Atlanta, and was established in 2000. Similar to FDF, HDF looks to "bring Orthodox famil ies together through dance, music and fellowship to perpetuate our rich Hellenic Orthodox Tradition" in order to "maintain our identity as Hellenes" and to "develop awareness and appreciationÃ‰through dance and music." 277 Both competitions aim to preserve the rich traditional dance and music of Greece . This becomes even more evident based on the criterion used to judge groups . Rather than being judged based on synchronizat ion or innovation of choreography groups are judged on authenticity. They are judged on h ow authentic and accurate their performance is compared to the village /region they are representing. Essentially, groups are not competing against each other, they are competing 275 Mission Statement, Greek Orthodox Folk Dance and Choral Festival, http://www.yourfdf.org/pages/mission statement/ , accessed March 2018. 276 Mission Statement, Greek Or thodox Folk Dance and Choral Festival, http://www.yourfdf.org/pages/mission statement/ , accessed March 2018. 277 Mission and Values , Hellenic Dance Festival, https://www.hellenicdancefestival.com/mission and values/ , accessed March 2018.
! 83 against the villages themselves. 278 Dance groups in the U.S. perform suites from all across Greece, but many groups choose to perform dances from the regions in northern Greece and what are now other Balkan nations. For example, dances from Thrace (north eastern Greece) are very similar to dances that can be found across the border in Bulgaria and Turkey, because of the fluid nature of these culture prior to the creation of modern borders . In these competitions d ances from Pontos are commonly performed by communities with large Pontic populations or with societies that sponsor them. Po ntic dances are highly complex to perform and are known as war like dances that represent their culture and struggle. As such, to watch a performance of Pontic dances can be an extremely evocative and emotional experience. The most popular Pontic dances a re those that are war like in nature. All dances from this region are performed using two instruments; the Pontic lyra and the daouli (pictured below) . The lyra (left image) is a long and rectangular string instrument that is played on the musician ' s knee and with a bow, while the daouli (right image) is a large circular drum that is strapped to the shoulder. 279 278 Mission and Values , Hellenic Dance Festival, https://www.helle nicdancefestival.com/mission and values/ , accessed March 2018. 279 Christos Bairaktaris playing lyra in traditional dress, from the collection of Domna Samiou, ca. 1940s, accessed March 2018, http://www.karalahana.com/2015/10/25/well known pontian kemence players videos from greece/ ;
! 84 When played together these instruments pr oduce a heavy and warlike sound that is reflective of the region's struggle against Turkey in the ninete enth and twentieth centuries . The heavy and steady drum beat is reminiscent of war drums pl ayed when marching into battle while the high pitched upbeat rhythm of lyra emulates the chaotic nature of it. One of the oldest and most popular dances that embodie s this is called the Serra or Lazikon. This ancient war dance is still danced today in Pontos and is known as Horon or Horonu. 280 This challenging a nd dramatic dance was analyzed by P. Mouzenidis in the "Pontiaki Estia" periodical in 1956. Mouzenidis conte nds that the dance has three distinct parts depicting the stages Pontians as a community endured during the attacks of the Turks. In the first part dancers hold hands and raise their arms above their heads expressing a "mood of joy," this gradually fades into the second part where the dancers expression turns to one of "unease and the dancers' bodies [begin to] increase intensity their hands moving rhythmically forward and then backward." 281 The chaotic nature of the second part is meant to imitate "an GreekReporter.com, Untitled , GreeksNet, December 2017, accessed March 2018, http://greeksnet.com/index.php/en/top news en/177 13 2 1 . 280 Greek stamp "Story of Pontos," ca. 1985, PontosWorld, https://www.pontosworld.com/ind ex.php/music/dances/586 the serra . 281 Mission and Values , Hellenic Dance Festival, https://www.hellenicdancefestival.com/mission and values/ , accessed March 2018.
! 85 inju red fighter [that is] trying to cling to life and to wi n." As the body is leaning over dancers make "small energetic and sudden movements [to] show [that] the wounded fighter is trying to surviv e." Finally, in the third phase "redemption arrives" and is de picted as the dancers once h unched over body "gains strength andÃ‰begins to jump up with his legs spread wide apart." The dancer's body then becomes "erect like a column and his head is held up with pride." 282 Thus displaying for all to see the struggle and t riumph of the Pontic people in their battle to survive persecution and preserve their culture. 282 Mouzenidis, P. D ances The Serra, PontosWord, https://www.pontosworld.com/index.php/music/dances/586 the serra , accessed March 2018.
! 86 Conclusions: Right to Remember Those who survived the Genocide of the Greeks, like the survivors of the Armenian Genocide and later the Holocaust, often seek to forget and commonly did not speak of the atrocities they both witnessed and endured , for many years . Survivors often seek to forget simply because it is painful to remember, or in other cases "because they are convinced that no one will listen respectfu lly to their stories" and so they work on moving forward and building new lives. 283 This coupled with the continued denial by both the Turkish Government and scholars who either deny or prefer the label ethnic cleansing serves to suffocate remembrance. This denial not only silences the voice of victims but sends the message that crimes against humanity bear no real consequence and so does not help prevent future atrocities but invites them to recur. 284 Forgetting can be combatted by survivors and descendants de manding the right to remember. In Greece this has taken the form of monuments that are "rooted in the notion of identity" and dedicated to the "lost homelands" of their ancestors. 285 These monuments represent not only the "right to remember," but also the "d uty of remembrance , " which ensures that t he memory of the atroc ities endured and the "heroism" of the victims who died , lives on . 286 All victims of oppression or violence must have the right to remember in order to heal and move forward. The denial of genoci de withdraws a victim's right to remember, and declares experience of the oppressed as invalid, not worthy of remembrance, recognition or discussion. The right to remember their tragic pasts helps victims assimilate to their new communities while also , hel ping them to heal and move forward. When the w ider community is actively aware of 283 Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction , 350. 284 Jones, 356. 285 Michel Bruneau and Kyriakos Papoulidis, "Remembering the Genocide of the Ã”Unforgettable Homelands:' The Erection of Commemorative Monuments in Greece by the Refugees of Asia Minor," in The Genocide of the Ottoman Greeks: Studies in State Sponsored Campaign of Extermination of the Christians of Asia Minor, 1912 1922 and Its Aftermath: History, Law, Memory (Aristide D. Caratzas, 2011), 351. 286 Bruneau and Papoulidis, 352.
! 87 and involved in remembering , forgetting is not possible and as such validates the experiences of victims. Here in the U.S. preservation of memory/remembrance is distinctly di fferent than in Greece. Most of the Greeks of Asia Minor and Pontos that were survivors of the Genocide first immigrated to Greece, Russia or other European nations -it was their children who moved to the U.S. While there is more information available spec ifically pertaining to the Greek and Pontic Genocide in Greece, internationally there is less available in the English language , and as such has stagnated its research and recognition. As organizations like the AMPHRC begin to amass translated resources an d publish scholarly sources, the right to remember in the U.S. has started to gain traction. This however is reflective only of acknowledgement of those outside the Greek community. As shown in this paper, survivors have utilized the Greek Orthodox church and independent organizations to perpetuate and preserve the rich culture of their ancestors in Asia Minor and Pontos. Through preservation and performance of traditional dance, music and the teaching of differing dialects, survivors ensure that their fam ilies and communities do not forget what was endured by their ancestors at the hands of the Turks. The collective memory, the memory of a group of people, of the Asia Minor and Pontic Greeks in America profoundly effect s on how they experience the world ar ound them . Their c ollective memory or the ir internal systems of belief, shape how they view and understand the world. It has had an impact on how they define and understand history , and how they fit into the broader national collective memory. By acknowled ging their history and all they as a people were forced to endure, we can come to a c ommon understanding of the past that encourages healing and prevents such atrocities as this from occurring again.
! 88 Truthfully, reading, rereading and analyzing the survivo r testimonies and accounts of all the atrocities that occurred in Nicomedia was mentally, emotionally and even physically taxing. As such, I commend the many genocide scholars across all disciplines that have dedicated much of their lives to telling the st ories of survivors . Their research and advocacy in both national and international theaters has assisted in the fight for recognition of victims so that atrocities such as this do not happen again. Despite all of the terrible things documented by Kostas Fa ltaits in his interviews with survivors, I did find heartening snippets throughout. I've come to think of them as moments of faith . For example, in Ortakioy, a group of young girls were tied to the back of Giaour Ali's horse and dragged to the outskirts of town where he planned to kill them. Paraskevi Anastasiadou explained , that as soon as Ali raised his rif le at the girls "GodÃ‰made his horse excited and it started stomping around in circles," so he spared all fifteen of them. Anastasiadou survived both Al i, and later escaped from a Turkish brigand who had taken her . Anastasiadou remembers her mom reminding her that it is "God who protects us," through this , she found the strength survive by any means necessary. 287 Finally, t his analysis would not have been possible if it were not for the Greeks of Asia Minor who found the strength to survive and to reestablish their lives in Greece where they were relocated. While I have looked exclusively at the accounts of those in Nicomedia, their experience was not uniqu e. This is a small snippet of the genocidal violence that was being committed against all Christian minorities including Anatolian and Pontic Greeks, Armenians and Assyrians all over Turkey from 1914 1923 . Surviving victims of this genocide of Anatolian a nd Pontic Greek descent settled gene rally in either Greece or Russia, and i t was the next generation, the children of the survivors, 287 Faltaits, The Genocide of the Greeks, 94 Ã 95.
! 89 the descendants, who immigrated to the United States. With their immigration, resilience and determination came the establi shment of Orthodox churches, societies and organizations dedicated to preserving the culture, heritage and memory of their ancestors from Asia Minor and Pontos. I am a second generation Greek American, and a third generation descendant of the Greek Genoci de. It was my ancestors who were forced to flee the only country that they had ever known and to reestablish their lives in a foreign country Ã‘ Greece. My grandparents then chose to immigrate to North America in 1964. My grandmother was a part of the Asia Mi nor descendants who chose to reestablish elements of their communities and to preserve their culture and heritage here in the U.S., recognizing the importance of doing so. When I was ten years old, my grandmother, Helen Mavromatis , who was interviewed for this paper, took me to see Thea Halo (author of Not Even My Name) speak, she made sure to tell me about how our family had suffered long before I could ever understand what she was talking about. Then, once I finally understood the weight of what our ances tors went through, she stood by and guided me. I would love to say that my grandmother was the only Greek, Asia Minor descendant that did this, but she was and is not. I offer you the story of my journey in an effort to illustrate what descendants of the G reek Genocide have passed down to their children and grandchildren. All i n an effort to make sure that first we, the descendants remember, and second, that we do not allow the world to forget Ã‘ with the hope that the world may never see such an atrocity agai n.
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