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Equity and discretion : a case study of discipline in a public agency

Material Information

Title:
Equity and discretion : a case study of discipline in a public agency
Creator:
Rockwell, Steven Albert
Place of Publication:
Denver, CO
Publisher:
University of Colorado Denver
Publication Date:
Language:
English

Thesis/Dissertation Information

Degree:
Doctorate ( Doctor of public administration)
Degree Grantor:
University of Colorado Denver
Degree Divisions:
School of Public Affairs, CU Denver
Degree Disciplines:
Public administration
Committee Chair:
McConkie, Mark L.
Committee Members:
Burgess, Philip M.
Dunn, Robert J.

Notes

Abstract:
Dissertation directed by Mark L. McConkie Work in the area of discipline has suffered from a lack of rigorous investigation sensitive to the many subpopulations within the workforce. The research reported here examines equity in enforcement of work rules between various subpopulations gender, race/ethnic group, blue/white collar, high/low pay grade, military/civilian supervisor. Data were collected at the United States Air Force Academy. Participants included civilian and military supervisors and civilian nonsupervisors. Questionnaire data were obtained from a stratified random sampling of employees (n = 181) and supervisors (n = 49). Interviews were conducted among randomly selected personnel (n = 18), and selected individuals (n = 23) whose official duties directly interfaced with either the disciplinary program or the equal employment opportunity program. The research included data from a saturation sample of formal disciplinary actions (n = 85) taken during calendar years 1978 and 1979. A questionnaire pretest (n = 38) was administered, followed by an interview with each pretest respondent seeking suggested improvements in the administration technique, instructions, or the instrument itself. The research is unique in several aspects. Race and ethnicity data are explored separately. Previous studies have concentrated on Black and non-Black populations, whereas this study concentrates on the existing race and ethnic minority groups. In addition, previous studies have not included rigorous investigation of gender, military/civilian supervisory correlations, relationships between the race/ethnic group of the supervisor to that of the appellant, and external pressures on supervisory disciplinary discretion from higher management. The results indicate the research successfully identified: 1) divergent perceptions between subordinate and superior regarding work rule enforcement through discipline, 2) inconsistent disciplinary enforcement among pay system, gender, and skill level populations, 3) varied propensity for taking formal disciplinary actions between military and civilian supervisors, 4) improper pressure and influence exerted on first level supervisors' disciplinary discretion and authority, and 5) the strong relationship between the occurrence of formal disciplinary action taken by supervisors of the same gender or race/ethnic group as the employee receiving discipline. The findings of the research are consistent with previous research and descriptive literature. The study dramatically demonstrates the seriousness of disciplinary problems, the differing standards applied to blue collar and white collar employees, as well as between skilled and unskilled workers. Disciplinary consistency is a major issue. In addition, the ground work is laid for more indepth investigation of such contemporary issues as gender and ethnic group implications as well as the unique Department of Defense military/civilian relationships.

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University of Colorado Denver
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Auraria Library
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Copyright [name of copyright holder or Creator or Publisher as appropriate]. Permission granted to University of Colorado Denver to digitize and display this item for non-profit research and educational purposes. Any reuse of this item in excess of fair use or other copyright exemptions requires permission of the copyright holder.

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Full Text
EQUITY AND DISCRETION
A CASE STUDY OF DISCIPLINE IN A PUBLIC AGENCY
by
Steven Albert Rockwell
»
B.A., University of Southern Colorado, 1966 M.P.A., University of Colorado, 1978
A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Public Affairs of the University of Colorado in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Public Administration
1980


Copyright
1980
Steven Albert Rockwell


Table of Contents
Chapter Page
Dissertation Approval..................................... ix
Acknowledgements........................................... x
List of Tables............................................ xi
Abstract................................................ xxix
I Overview................................................... 1
Introduction......................................... 1
Background .......................................... 1
Discipline........................................... 2
Discipline at the USAF Academy....................... 3
Dissertation Format.................................. 4
Literature review............................... 4
Environment..................................... 5
Methodology..................................... 5
Results......................................... 5
Discussion conclusions, and
implications................................. 5
Appendices...................................... 6
Issues............................................... 6
II Relevant Literature........................................ 8
Introduction......................................... 8
Customary penalties.................................. 8
Overview............................................. 9
History of private sector discipline..........
History of public sector discipline................. 14
What necessitates a labor disciplinary
system?........................................... 19


iv
Chapter Page
Absenteeism............................... 20
Youth..................................... 20
Minorities................................ 21
Standards of performance....................... 23
Why work rules are violated.................... 25
Disciplinary philosophies and approaches. ... 28
Philosophies.............................. 28
Basic approaches.......................... 2 9
3udicial/Leg ilistic approach............. 29
Humanistic approach....................... 31
Variations ot basic approaches............ 32
Negative aspects of discipline.................... 34
Why positive motivation is difficult........... 3 8
Ways of eliminating unwanted behavior .... 39
Other approaches to dealing with discipline . . 41
Planning proper disciplinary approaches .... 44
Common disciplinary approaches.................... 46
Consistency.................................... 4 9
Summary........................................ 54
Conclusion........................................ 57
III Environment ......................................... 60
Introduction................................... 60
Background..................................... 61
Cadet life..................................... 6 2
Federal civilian working environment........... 63
USAFA civilian working environment............. 6 5


V
Chapter Page
Functions and role of the Civilian
Personnel Office............................ 68
Staffing Division........................ 68
Data Management Division................. 69
Training and Career Development Division. 70
Classification Division.................. 71
Equal employment Opportunity
Division.............................. 72
Labor and Employee Management
Division.............................. 74
Role of the Union............................. 74
Recent related studies........................ 75
Frustrations contributing to discipline
activity.................................... 76
Discretion/Power relationships at the
USAFA....................................... 77
Disciplinary process at USAFA................. 79
Conclusion.................................... 80
IV Methodology......................................... 82
Introduction.................................. 82
Overview...................................... 83
Stratification................................ 83
Random selection procedures................... 84
Pretest....................................... 86
Questionnaire administration.................. 87
Interviews.................................... 88


VJ
Chapter Page
Case study analysis................................ 89
V Results............................................. 92
Introduction....................................... 92
Hypothesis I....................................... 93
Overview...................................... 93
Data.......................................... 94
Discussion.................................... 96
Conclusion................................... 105
Hypothesis II........................................... 132
Overview..................................... 132
Data......................................... 133
Discussion................................... 136
Conclusion................................... 145
Hypothesis III.......................................... 193
Overview..................................... 193
Data......................................... 193
Discussion................................... 194
Conclusion................................... 197
Hypothesis IV........................................... 209
Overview..................................... 209
Data......................................... 209
Discussion................................... 212
Conclusion................................... 223
Hypothesis V............................................ 255
Overview..................................... 255
Data......................................... 256


vn
Chapter Page
Discussion.................................... 258
Conclusion ................................... 276
Hypothesis VI............................................ 332
Overview...................................... 332
Data.......................................... 333
Discussion.................................... 334
Conclusion ................................... 338
Hypothesis VII........................................... 354
Overview...................................... 354
Data.......................................... 355
Discussion.................................... 359
Conclusion.................................... 375
VI Discussion, Conclusions, and Implications................ 432
Introduction.................................. 432
Overview...................................... 432
Major findings and conclusions............ 4 34
Intrastrata disparity.................... 434
GS versus WG consistency................. 439
Civilian/Military consistency. ... 440
Super visor y/Nonsuper visor y
consistency........................... 441
Minor ity/Nonminority
consistency........................... 443
Organizational consistency .... 444
High grade/Low grade
consistency........................... 445


vm
Chapter Page
Supervisory discretion................... 446
Implications.................................. 448
Relationships between the literature
and this study.............................. 450
Future studies................................ 456
Appendices
Appendix A............................................... 460
Commonly used terms, acronyms,
and abbreviations................................ 461
Appendix B............................................... 467
Design.............................................. 468
Hypotheses.................................... 468
Methodology................................... 470
Data Display.................................. 473
Appendix C............................................... 481
Supervisory questionnaire................. 4 82
Appendix D............................................... 491
Employee questionnaire.................... 4 92
Appendix E............................................... 504
Union survey approval......................... 505
Appendix F............................................... 507
AF survey approval............................ 508
Bibliography..................................................... 509
Notes............................................................ 516
Vita............................................................. 523


This Dissertation for the Doctor of Public Administration Degree
by
Steven Albert Rockwell has been approved for the Graduate School of Public Affairs by
Date Au(Just 23 , 1980


ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Until this moment I had not considered how difficult it is to express the degree of appreciation I owe to so many supportive friends. Indeed, they are many and without their time, advice, encouragement, and much needed moral support this study could never have been completed.
I don't believe any student has ever demanded so much of an advisor's time and patience, and no advisor could have been more responsive than Dr. Mark McConkie. His counsel often went well into the night and occupied many, many weekends. My needs often took him from his family and I appreciate their patience and understanding.
The USAF Academy top management and the employees who participated in this study could not have been more cooperative. Two outstanding Academy faculty members were especially instrumental in this study: Lt. Colonel (Dr.) Bill Rosenbach provided invaluable advice on the questionnaire construction, and Lt. Colonel Val Tirman spent long hours teaching me SPSS.
Dr. Philip Burgess and Mr. Robert Dunn, of my committee, made themselves readily available with much appreciated academic and technical advice, as did Drs. Larry Keller, Floyd Mann, Tom Stewart, Mike March, and Jay Shafritz of the University of Colorado faculty.
A special note of sincere appreciation goes to Mildred Mitchell for the exceptional support in typing and retyping the reams of drafts and the final product, and to Gloria Cipoth, Willma Stewart, and Dick Rockwell for their typing, proofreading, and coding support.


List of Tables
Table Page
2.1 Survey of Federal Employer Perceptions .... 59
4.1 The Sampling Frame Stratified by
Occupational Category, Race/
Ethnic Group, and Gender ............................ 90
4.2 The Questionnaire Sample Stratified
by Occupational Category, Race/
Ethnic Group, and Gender ............................ 91
5.1 USAFA Population by Minority
Status and Gender................................... 110
5.2 WG/WL1-4.............................................. Ill
5.3 WG/WL 5 or Higher..................................... 112
5.4 WS W.................................................. 113
5.5 WS 5 or Higher........................................ 114
5.6 GS 1-6 (Nonsupervisory) .............................. 115
5.7 GS 7 or Higher (Nonsupervisory)....................... 116
5.8 GS 1 or Higher (Supervisory).......................... 117
5.9 Actual and Expected Formal Disciplinary
Actions by Occupational Group,
Ethnicity, and Gender............................... 118
5.10 Summary of Actual/Expected Formal
Actions by Gender, Minority Status,
and Supervisory Responsibility...................... 119
5.11 Relationship Between the Gender of the
Supervisor Taking Formal Disciplinary Action and the Race/Ethnic Group of the Appellant (Calendar Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979)................................. 120
5.12 Relationship Between the Gender of the
Supervisor Taking Formal Disciplinary Action and the Gender of the Appellant (Calendar Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979) ...............................
121


Table
5.13
5.14
. 5.15
5.16
5.17
5.18
5.19
5.20
5.21
Relationship Between the Gender of the Supervisor Taking Formal Disciplinary Action and the Type of Action Taken (Calendar Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979) Xll Page . . 122
Relationship Between the Race/Ethnic Group of the Supervisor Taking Formal Disciplinary Action and the Race/Ethnic Group of the Appellant (Calendar Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979) . . 123
Relationship Between the Race/Ethnic Group of the Supervisor Taking Formal Disciplinary Action and the Gender of the Appellant (Calendar Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979) . . 124
Relationship Between the Race/Ethnic Group of the Supervisor Taking Formal Disciplinary Action and the Type of Action Taken (Calendar Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979) . . 125
Grievances or Appeals Resulting From Disciplinary Actions Taken During Calendar Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979 . . 126
Grievances or Appeals Resulting From Disciplinary Actions Taken During Calendar Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979 . . 127
Grievances or Appeals Resulting From Disciplinary Actions Taken During Calendar Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979 . . 128
Disciplinary Actions Reversed (Cancelled) as a Result of Grievances or Appeals Filed During Calendar Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979 • • • . . 129
Disciplinary Actions Reversed (Cancelled) as a Result of Grievances or Appeals Filed During Calendar Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979 • • • . . 130


X1U
Table
5.22
5.23
5.24
5.25
5.26
5.27
5.28
5.29
5.30
5.31
5.32
5.33
5.34
Disciplinary Actions Reversed
(Cancelled) as a Result of Grievances or Appeals Filed During Calendar Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979 • •
Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on High or Low Grade Level of Employee ....
Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on High or Low Grade Level of Employee.................
Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on High or Low Grade Level of Employee ....
Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on High or Low Grade Level of Employee.................
Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on High or Low Grade Level of Employee.................
Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on High or Low Grade Level of Employee.................
Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on High or Low Grade Level of Employee.................
Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on High or Low Grade Level of Employee.................
Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on High or Low Grade Level of Employee.................
Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on High or Low Grade Level of Employee ....
Employee Attitude Regarding Magnitude of Penalty Deserved for High Versus Low Grade Employees ....................
Employee Attitude Regarding Magnitude of Penalty Deserved for High Versus Low Grade Employees ....................
Page
131
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159


XIV
Table 5.35 Employee Attitude Regarding Magnitude of Penalty Deserved for High Versus Low Grade Employees Page 160
5.36 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Gender .... 161
5.37 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Gender 162
5.38 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Gender 163
5.39 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Gender 164
5.40 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Gender 165
5.41 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Gender 166
5.42 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Gender 167
5.43 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Gender 168
5.44 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Gender 169
5.45 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Gender 170
5.46 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Gender 171
5.47 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee 172
5.48 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Gender 173


Table
5.49
5.50
5.51
5.52
5.53
5.54
5.55
5.56
5.57
5.58
5.59
5.60
5.61
xv
Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Gender
Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Gender
Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Gender
Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Pay System
Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Pay System
Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Pay System
Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Pay System
Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Pay System
Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Pay System
Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Pay System
Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Pay System
Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Pay System
Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Pay System
Page
174
175
176
177
178
179
180 181 182
183
184
185
186


XVI
Table 5.62 Perceived Consistency in Application of Work Rules Page . . 187
5.63 Perceived Consistency in Application of Work Rules . . 188
5.64 Perceived Consistency in Application of Work Rules . . 189
5.65 Perceived Consistency in Enforcement of Work Rules . . 190
5.66 Perceived Consistency in Enforcement of Work Rules . . 191
5.67 Perceived Consistency in Enforcement of Work Rules . . 192
5.68 Relationship Between the Civilian or Military Status of the Supervisor Taking Formal Disciplinary Action and the Race/Ethnic Group of the Appellant (Calendar Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979) . . 199
5.69 Relationship Between the Civilian or Military Status of the Supervisor Taking Formal Disciplinary Action and the Gender of the Appellant (Calendar Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979) . . 200
5.70 Relationship Between the Civilian or Military Status of the Supervisor Taking Formal Disciplinary Action and the Type of Action Taken (Calendar Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979) . . 201
5.71 Perceived Variation in the Propensity for Formal Discipline Dependent on the Military or Civilian Status of the Supervisor . . 202
5.72 Perceived Variation in the Propensity for Formal Discipline Dependent on the Military or Civilian Status of the Supervisor . . 203
5.73 Perceived Variation in the Propensity for Formal Discipline Dependent on the Military or Civilian Status of the Supervisor . . 204


xvu
Table Page
5.74 Perceived Variation in the Propensity
for Formal Discipline Dependent on the Military or Civilian Status of the Supervisor....................................... 205
5.75 Perceived Variation in the Propensity
for Formal Discipline Dependent on
the Military or Civilian Status of the
Supervisor....................................... 206
5.76 Perceived Variation in the Propensity
for Formal Discipline Dependent on
the Military or Civilian Status of the
Supervisor....................................... 207
5.77 Perceived Variation in the Propensity
for Formal Discipline Dependent on
the Military or Civilian Status of the
Supervisor........................................... 208
5.78 Relationship Between the Supervisory
or Nonsupervisory Status of the Appellant and the Race/Ethnic Group of the Appellant (Calendar
Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979)................ 22 7
5.79 Relationship Between the Supervisory
or Nonsupervisory Status of the Appellant and the Gender of the Appellant (Calendar Year 1978 and
Calendar Year 1979)................................ 228
5.80 Type of Formal Disciplinary Action
Taken Against Supervisory and Nonsupervisory Employees (Calendar Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979)............. 2 29
5-81 Perceived Consistency in Application
and Enforcement of Discipline Between Supervisory and Nonsupervisory Employees.......................... 230
5-82 Perceived Consistency in Application
and Enforcement of Discipline Between Supervisory and Nonsupervisory Employees........................ 231
5 • 83 Perceived Consistency in Application
and Enforcement of Discipline Between Supervisory and Nonsupervisory Employees........................ 232


XVU1
Table 5.84 Perceived Consistency in Application and Enforcement of Discipline Between Supervisory and Non-supervisory Employees Page ... 233
5.85 Perceived Consistency in Application and Enforcement of Discipline Between Supervisory and Non-supervisory Employees ... 234
5.86 Perceived Consistency in Application and Enforcement of Discipline Between Supervisory and Non-supervisory Employees ... 235
5.87 Perceived Consistency in Application and Enforcement of Discipline Between Supervisory and Non-supervisory Employees ... 236
5.88 Perceived Consistency in Application and Enforcement of Discipline Between Supervisory and Non-supervisory Employees ... 237
5.89 Perceived Consistency in Application and Enforcement of Discipline Between Supervisory and Non-supervisory Employees ... 238
5.90 Perceived Consistency in Application and Enforcement of Discipline Between Supervisory and Non-supervisory Employees ... 239
5.91 Perceived Variation in Disciplinary Penalty for the Same Offense ... 240
5.92 Perceived Variation in Disciplinary Penalty for the Same Offense ... 241
5.93 Perceived Variation in Disciplinary Penalty for the Same Offense ... 242
5.94 Perceived Variation in Disciplinary Penalty for the Same Offense ... 243
5.95 Perceived Variation in Disciplinary Penalty for the Same Offense ... 244
5.96 Perceived Variation in Disciplinary Penalty for the Same Offense . . . 245


Table
xix
Page
5.97 Perceived Variation in Disciplinary Penalty for the Same Offense. . . . . 246
5.98 Perceived Variation in Disciplinary Penalty for the Same Offense . . 247
5.99 Perceived Variation in Disciplinary Penalty for the Same Offense . . 248
5.100 Employee Attitude Regarding Magnitude of Penalty for Supervisory Employees, as Compared to Nonsupervisory Employees, for the Same Offense . . 249
5.101 Employee Attitude Regarding Magnitude of Penalty for Supervisory Employees, as Compared to Nonsupervisory Employees, for the Same Offense . . 250
5.102 Employee Attitude Regarding Magnitude of Penalty for Supervisory Employees, as Compared to Nonsupervisory Employees, for the Same Offense . . 251
5.103 Employee Attitude Regarding Magnitude of Penalty for Supervisory Employees, as Compared to Nonsupervisory Employees, for the Same Offense , . 252
5.104 Employee Attitude Regarding Magnitude of Penalty for Supervisory Employees, as Compared to Nonsupervisory Employees, for the Same Offense 253
5.105 Employee Attitude Regarding Magnitude of Penalty for Supervisory Employees, as Compared to Nonsupervisory Employees, for the Same Offense. 254
5.106 Perceived Fairness of USAFA Disciplinary Policy 279
5.107 Perceived Fairness of USAFA Disciplinary Policy 280
5.108 Perceived Fairness of USAFA Disciplinary Policy 281
5.109 Perceived Fairness of USAFA Disciplinary Policy 282
5.110 Perceived Fairness of USAFA Disciplinary Policy 283


XX
Table 5.111 Perceived Fairness of USAFA Disciplinary Policy Page . . 284
5.112 Perceived Fairness of USAFA Disciplinary Policy . . 285
5.113 Perceived Fairness of USAFA Disciplinary Policy . . 286
5.114 Perceived Fairness of USAFA Disciplinary Policy . . 287
5.115 Perceived Fairness in Treatment of Employees by USAFA Supervisors . . . . . . 288
5.116 Perceived Fairness in Treatment of Employees by USAFA Supervisors . ... . . . 289
5.117 Perceived Fairness in Treatment of Employees by USAFA Supervisors . . . . . . . 290
5.118 Employee Perception of the Existence of Supervisory Retaliation for Filing a Grievance . . 291
5.119 Employee Perception of the Existence of Supervisory Retaliation for Filing a Grievance , . 292
5.120 Employee Perception of the Existence of Supervisory Retaliation for Filing a Grievance . . 293
5.121 Perceived Fairness in Treatment of Employee by USAFA Supervisors , . 294
5.122 Perceived Fairness in Treatment of Employee by USAFA Supervisors 295
5.123 Perceived Fairness in Treatment of Employee by USAFA Supervisors 296
5.124 Employee Perception of the Consistency
of Disciplinary Penalties When Comparing Their Own Supervisor
to Other Supervisors............................. 297
5.125 Employee Perception of the Consistency
of Disciplinary Penalties When Comparing Their Own Supervisor to Other Supervisors............
298


XXI
Table
5.126
5.127
5.128
5.129
5.130
5.131
5.132
5.133
5.134
5.135
5.136
5.137
5.138
5.139
Page
Employee Perception of the Consistency of Disciplinary Penalties When Comparing Their Own Supervisor
to Other Supervisors............................ 2 99
Supervisors Perception of Their Own Strictness in Application of Work
Rules........................................... 300
Supervisors Perception of Their Own Strictness in Application of Work
Rules............................................... 301
Supervisors Perception of Their Own Strictness in Application of Work
Rules............................................... 302
Perceived Fairness of USAFA Disciplinary
Policy.............................................. 303
Perceived Fairness of USAFA Disciplinary
Policy.............................................. 304
Perceived Fairness of USAFA Disciplinary
Policy.............................................. 305
Employee Perception of Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based
on Race/Ethnic Group................................ 306
Employee Perception of Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based
on Race/Ethnic Group................................ 307
Employee Perception of Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based
on Race/Ethnic Group................................ 308
Employee Perception of Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based
on Race/Ethnic Group................................ 309
Employee Perception of Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based
on Race/Ethnic Group................................ 310
Employee Perception of Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based
on Race/Ethnic Group................................ 311
Employee Perception of Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based
on Race/Ethnic Group................................ 312


XXII
Table Page
5.140 Employee Perception of Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Race/Ethnic Group . . 313
5.141 Employee Perception of Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Race/Ethnic Group . . 314
5.142 Employee Perception of Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Race/Ethnic Group . . 315
5.143 Employee Perception of Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Race/Ethnic Group . . 316
5.144 Employee Perception of Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Race/Ethnic Group . . 317
5.145 Perceived Fairness in Treatment of Employees by USAFA Supervisors .... . . 318
5.146 Perceived Fairness in Treatment of Employees by USAFA Supervisors .... . . 319
5.147 Perceived Fairness in Treatment of Employees by USAFA Supervisors .... . . 320
5.148 Employee Perception of the Existence of Supervisory Retaliation for Filing a Grievance, Appeal, or EEO Complaint . . 321
5.149 Employee Perception of the Existence of Supervisory Retaliation for Filing a Grievance, Appeal, or EEO Complaint . . 322
5.150 Employee Perception of the Existence of Supervisory Retaliation for Filing a Grievance, Appeal, or EEO Complaint . . 323
5.151 Employee Perception of the Existence of Supervisory Retaliation for Filing a Grievance, Appeal, or EEO Complaint . . 324
5.152 Employee Perception Regarding Supervisory Attitude Toward a Previously Disciplined Employee . . 325


xxm
Table Page
5.153 Employee Perception Regarding Supervisory Attitude Toward a Previously Disciplined Employee . . 326
5.154 Employee Perception Regarding Supervisory Attitude Toward a Previously Disciplined Employee . . 327
5.155 Employee Perception of the Constructive Nature of the Present Disciplinary Process . . 328
5.156 Employee Perception of the Constructive Nature of the Present Disciplinary Process . . 329
5.157 Employee Perception of the Constructive Nature of the Present Disciplinary Process . . 330
5.158 Employee Perception of the Constructive Nature of the Present Disciplinary Process . . 331
5.159 Supervisors Personal Authority in Matters of Disciplinary Discretion • • • • . . 342
5.160 Supervisors Personal Authority in Matters of Disciplinary Discretion • • • • . . 343
5.161 Supervisors Personal Authority in Matters of Disciplinary Discretion • • • • . . 344
5.162 Employee Perception of Their Own Supervisors Disciplinary Authority • • • • , . . 345
5.163 Employee Perception of Their Own Supervisors Disciplinary Authority • • • • . . 346
5.164 Employee Perception of Their Own Supervisors Disciplinary Authority • • • ■ . . . 347
5.165 Perceived Limitations on Disciplinary Penalty Discretion , . . 348
5.166 Perceived Limitations on Disciplinary Penalty Discretion , . . 349
5.167 Perceived Limitations on Disciplinary Penalty Discretion , . . 350


XXIV
Table 5.168 Higher Level Management Pressure Influencing Disciplinary Discretion* • • • Page . . 351
5.169 Higher Level Management Pressure Influencing Disciplinary Discretion* • • • . . 352
5.170 Higher Level Management Pressure Influencing Disciplinary Discretion* • ■ • . . 353
5.171 Supervisors Perception of Personal Consistency in Application of Work Rules . . 379
5.172 Supervisors Perception of Personal Consistency in Application of Work Rules . . 380
5.173 Supervisors Perception of Personal Consistency in Application of Work Rules . . 381
5.174 Employee Perception of Supervisory Consistency in the Administration of Discipline . . 382
5.175 Employee Perception of Supervisory Consistency in the Administration of Discipline . . 383
5.176 Employee Perception of Supervisory Consistency in the Administration of Discipline . . 384
5.177 Employee Perception of Supervisory Consistency in the Administration of Discipline . . 385
5.178 Employee Perception of How Strict Their Own Supervisor is, in Comparison to Other Academy Supervisors, in Applying Disciplinary Penalties . . 386
5.179 Employee Perception of How Strict Their Own Supervisor is, in Comparison to Other Academy Supervisors, in Applying Disciplinary Penalties . . 387
5.180 Employee Perception of How Strict Their Own Supervisor is, in Comparison to Other Academy Supervisors, in Applying Disciplinary Penalties . . 388


XXV
Table Page
5.181 Supervisory Perception of Higher
Level Management Consistency
in Disciplinary Penalties...................... 38 9
5.182 Supervisory Perception of Higher
Level Management Consistency
in Disciplinary Penalties...................... 390
5.183 Supervisory Perception of Higher
Level Management Consistency
in Disciplinary Penalties...................... 391
5.184 Employee Perception of Personal
Supervisors' Consistency in the
Treatment of Co-workers........................ 392
5.185 Employee Perception of Personal
Supervisors' Consistency in the
Treatment of Co-workers............................ 393
5.186 Employee Perception of Personal
Supervisors' Consistency in the
Treatment of Co-workers............................ 394
5.18 7 Supervisory Perception of Consistency
in Penalty Administration...................... 395
5.188 Supervisory Perception of Consistency
in Penalty Administration.......................... 396
5.189 Supervisory Perception of Consistency
in Penalty Administration...................... 397
5.190 Employee Perception of Consistency
in Penalty Administration...................... 398
5.191 Employee Perception of Consistency
in Penalty Administration...................... 399
5.192 Employee Perception of Consistency
in Penalty Administration...................... 4 00
5.19 3 Perceived Consistency in Disciplinary
Treatment Based on Race/Etnnic
Group.......................................... 401
5.194 Perceived Consistency in Disciplinary
Treatment Based on Race/Ethnic
Group.............................................. 402
5.195 Perceived Consistency in Disciplinary
Treatment Based on Race/Ethnic
Group.......................................... 403


XXVI
Table Page
5.196 Supervisory Perception of Consistency
in Disciplinary Treatment Based
on Race/Ethnic Group......................... 4 04
5.197 Supervisory Perception of Consistency
in Disciplinary Treatment Based
on Race/Ethnic Group......................... 405
5.198 Supervisory Perception of Consistency
in Disciplinary Treatment Based
on Race/Ethnic Group......................... 406
5.199 Employee Perception of Supervisory
Favoritism................................... 407
5. 200 Employee Perception of Supervisory
Favoritism................................... 408
5.201 Employee Perception of Supervisory
Favoritism................................... 409
5.202 Employee Perception of Supervisory
Favoritism................................... 410
5.203 Employee Perception of Supervisory
Favoritism................................... 411
5.204 Employee Perception of Supervisory
Favoritism................................... 412
5.205 Supervisory Perception of Higher
Management Favoritism........................ 413
5.206 Supervisory Perception of Higher
Management Favoritism........................ 414
5.207 Supervisory Perception of Higher
Management Favoritism........................ 415
5.208 Supervisory Perception of Higner
Management Favoritism........................ 416
5.209 Supervisory Perception of Higner
Management Favoritism........................ 417
5.210 Supervisory Perception of Higher
Management Favoritism........................ 418
5.211 Supervisory Perception of Consistency
in Disciplinary Penalties When Comparing Themselves to Other
USAFA Supervisors............................ 419


xxvu
Table Page
5.212 Supervisory Perception of Consistency
in Disciplinary Penalties When Comparing Themselves to Other
USAFA Supervisors............................... 420
5.213 Supervisory Perception of Consistency
in Disciplinary Penalties When Comparing Themselves to Other
USAFA Supervisors................................... 421
5.214 Employee Perception Regarding
the Appropriateness of the Present Level of Disciplinary Penalty
Magnitude.......................................... 422
5.215 Employee Perception Regarding
the Appropriateness of the Present Level of Disciplinary Penalty
Magnitude........................................... 423
5.216 Employee Perception Regarding
the Appropriateness of the Present Level of Disciplinary Penalty
Magnitude........................................... 424
5.217 Employee Perception Regarding
the Appropriateness of the Present Level of Disciplinary Penalty
Magnitude........................................... 425
5.218 Employee Attitude Toward Progressive
Disciplinary Penalties.............................. 426
5.219 Employee Attitude Toward Progressive
Disciplinary Penalties.............................. 427
5. 220 Employee Attitude Toward Progressive
Disciplinary Penalties.............................. 428
5.221 Employee Attitude Toward Progressive
Disciplinary Penalties.............................. 429
5.222 Employee Attitude Toward Progressive
Disciplinary Penalties.............................. 430
5.223 Employee Attitude Toward Progressive
Disciplinary Penalties . . ......................... 431
B. 1 Pressures on Supervisor Influencing
Discretion.......................................... 474
B.2 Questionnaire Analysis: Demographic
Data..............................
475


xxvm
Table Page
B.3 Questionnaire Analysis: Disciplinary
History Data....................................... 476
B.4 Questionnaire Analysis: Disciplinary
System Data........................................ 477
B. 5 Question Matches (Supervisor to
Employee).......................................... 478
B. 6 Question Matches (Employee to
Supervisor)........................................ 479
B. 7 Interview Objectives (Both Random
and Select)........................................ 480


Rockwell, Steven Albert (D.P.A., Doctor of Public Administration)
Equity and Discretion — A Case Study of Discipline in a Public Agency
Dissertation directed by Mark L. McConkie
Work in the area of discipline has suffered from a lack of rigorous investigation sensitive to the many subpopulations within the workforce. The research reported here examines equity in enforcement of work rules between various subpopulations --gender, race/ethnic group, blue/white collar, high/low pay grade, military/civilian supervisor.
Data were collected at the United States Air Force Academy. Participants included civilian and military supervisors and civilian nonsupervisors. Questionnaire data were obtained from a stratified random sampling of employees (n = 181) and super visors (n = 49). Interviews were conducted among randomly selected personnel (n = 18), and selected individuals (n = 23) whose official duties directly interfaced with either the disciplinary program or the equal employment opportunity program. The research included data from a saturation sample of formal disciplinary actions (n = 85) taken during calendar years 1978 and 1979. A questionnaire pretest (n = 38) was administered, followed by an interview with each pretest respondent seeking suggested improvements in the administration technique, instructions, or the instrument itself.
The research is unique in several aspects. Race and ethnicity data are explored separately. Previous studies have concentrated on Black and non-Black populations, whereas this study concentrates on the existing race and ethnic minority groups. In addition, previous studies have not included rigorous investigation


of gender, military/civilian supervisory correlations, relationships between the race/ethnic group of the supervisor to that of the appellant, and external pressures on supervisory disciplinary discretion from higher management.
The results indicate the research successfully identified: 1) divergent perceptions between subordinate and superior regarding work rule enforcement through discipline, 2) inconsistent disciplinary enforcement among pay system, gender, and skill level populations, 3) varied propensity for taking formal disciplinary actions between military and civilian supervisors, improper pressure and influence exerted on first level supervisors' disciplinary discretion and authority, and 5) the strong relationship between the occurrence of formal disciplinary action taken by supervisors of the same gender or race/ethnic group as the employee receiving discipline.
The findings of the research are consistent with previous research and descriptive literature. The study dramatically demonstrates the seriousness of disciplinary problems, the differing standards applied to blue collar and white collar employees, as well as between skilled and unskilled workers. Disciplinary consistency is a major issue. In addition, the ground work is laid for more indepth investigation of such contemporary issues as gender and ethnic group implications as well as the unique Department of Defense military/civilian relationships.
This abstract is approved as to form and content. I recommend its publication.
Signed
Faculty


CHAPTER I
Overview
Introduction
The purpose of this study is to perform a comprehensive review of the employee disciplinary process at the United States Air Force Academy (USAFA). The results of this review will be utilized in developing an improvement action plan. Input for this study includes historical data obtained from case records as well as data on attitudes and perceptions of USAFA employees obtained through questionnaires and interviews.
Background
Human resource management, as with many other occupations, is confronted with rapid and drastic change. Federal personnel management, specifically, is being challenged on many fronts, necessitating a great deal of work. For example, promotion systems are being drastically revised. As a result, selection procedures and techniques such as interviewing, eligibility, rating and ranking, and performance appraisal systems, are being challenged in the courts regarding the validity of the "merit principle." 3ob classification principles are in a continual state of tuning and the computer has, in a dramatic way, become a dominant reality in the personnel management field. Intermixed with all these changes are the pressures of equity and fairness being pursued under Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO)
concepts.


The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (Public Law 95-45*0 directed the government to inaugurate large scale changes in the Federal personnel system. For example, the performance appraisal process, an integral part of the "merit promotion system," has been under fire for years. The performance appraisal system, which is a two-phase process evaluating both current performance and projected potential performance, is used as a key factor in determining who, among the candidates having the necessary experience qualifications for the job, would give the best performance if selected. Even though this factor is critical in the promotion process and the merit system, many Federal agencies have traditionally rated nonjob-related traits. These formats, to be useful, require constant change in order to overcome the continual and ever present inflation of ratings. This type of rating, designed to distinguish between the levels of performance of various employees, is increasingly less discriminating. In an attempt to solve this problem, the United States Air Force, through its Human Resource Laboratory at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, has undertaken a major project to improve the validity and reliability of performance ratings by emphasizing specific job related performance characteristics rather than traits in the appraisal process. In the new Air Force plan, two separate methods clearly distinguish between current and potential job performance. These and many other similiar changes will soon be evident in the entire Federal personnel system.
Discipline
In the area of discipline, the Civil Service Reform Act revised grievance and appeal rights to some degree. However, the


disciplinary program, as such, was left virtually intact. In todays environment, where change is commonplace, it is essential to look, in some detail, at the techniques, principles and even the merit of existing disciplinary concepts.
Violations of work rules occur, necessitating some type of formal disciplinary system, to the degree that discipline is a significant part of the management of human resources. Most organizations administer disciplinary actions through a progressive system that includes warning, reprimand, suspension, and discharge. Discipline, at every stage, is expensive. The employee may lose money and potential career advancement opportunities and management loses manhours and productivity in documenting, processing, and enforcing a disciplinary action. The ultimate disciplinary action, discharge — many times thought of as the "capital punishment" of the employment world — carries an expensive repiacement/retraining price tag for management.
There is no simple solution. Most disciplinary cases have two sides. Employees have an imposing task in trying to conform to the many expectations and work rules demanded in the present-day organizational environment. Management today, particularly in a large organization, has a difficult task in maintaining a productive work environment and in retaining sensitivity to principles such as fairness and equity.
Discipline At The USAF Academy
The purpose of this study is to review, evaluate and improve, where possible, the disciplinary program in existence at the United States Air Force Academy. To this end, this project seeks to identify problem areas for subsequent development of an


action program. Some employees, for instance, feel discipline is unequally applied. Racial minorities and low grade employees, they contend, are subject to more strict application of work rules than are others.
Such concerns accent the significance of this study for at least four reasons: (1) The USAF Academy initiates a large number of disciplinary actions. In doing so, the process can become routine in nature and consequently punitive rather than constructive. (2) The study of discipline at the USAFA is unique because of the size, federal sector restrictions, and military/civilian relationships at the USAF Academy. (3) The conclusions from this study, as well as the methods used should be applicable in other public sector settings. (4) The problems examined suggest discriminatory overtones in formal disciplinary actions. Moreover, the suspected inconsistent application of discretionary supervisory authority accentuates the importance of this study's findings, not only to those allegedly discriminated against, but also to the USAF and the Federal personnel system as a whole.
Dissertation Format
The study is laid out in the following general format:
Literature Review. An overview of employee discipline in both the public and private sectors is provided to acquaint the reader with such things as: (1) the historical background of employee discipline; (2) the conditions and causes that mandate a formal and fair disciplinary system; (3) the philosophical approaches and techniques of discipline; and (4) the most frequent contemporary methods of administering employee discipline. In so doing, the literature review shows how this study fills significant


voids now existing in the personnel literature.
Environment. The third chapter defines the work environment unique to this study. This includes an analysis and discussion of the workforce composition (i.e., skill levels, occupations, ethnic makeup), demographic data (i.e., summary of results from a recent quality of work life survey conducted on the USAF Academy which deals with such issues as job and career satisfaction, leadership competency and supervisory styles), and other factors impacting work life (e.g., union).
Methodology. The next chapter explains and defines the specific techniques used in the data-gathering process. For example, data were collected through the use of questionnaires, interviews, and analysis of completed disciplinary actions actually administered. The study involves a complex stratification of the workforce. The process used to identify random respondents, which are representative of the actual strata population, is discussed. In addition, the rationale for the nonrandom selection (some interviews) is provided.
Results. The hypotheses chosen for investigation in this study as well as the findings are discussed in Chapter V. Each hypothesis is presented as a separate and independent issue. In each case, after statement of the hypothesis, supplemental information is provided in an overview. This is followed in each instance by the data, discussion, conclusions, and tables germane to the hypothesis at hand.
Discussion, Conclusions, and Implications. The final chapter discusses the major findings in the study, integrates the findings with the literature review, and develops conclusions which


offer the reader areas open for further study. While the study itself deals with interactions within a civilian/military environment, the implications are that replication is possible and even required in any type of public or private personnel environment.
Appendices. Several relevant issues are discussed in the appendices from which the reader, without extensive exposure to employee discipline, will benefit. A preliminary review of the definitions of terms, research design, and the questionnaires provide the reader with advance insight into the specific problems being investigated and the instruments used in the data-gathering process.
Issues
While the specific hypotheses are stated in both Chapter V and Appendix B, an overview of the problems being investigated is beneficial prior to reviewing the literature.
Every large organization contains a variety of distinguishable strata within its workforce. These strata can vary considerably, depending on such things as geographic location and the type of work being done. Some of the commonly definable stratifications typically include race/ethnic group, age, gender, and occupational characteristics such as white or blue collar, skilled or unskilled, and so on.
The first issue investigated in this study was the mathematical distribution of disciplinary actions between the key stratifications at the USAF Academy. This was done to see if discipline was administered in a mathematical relationship to the stratification populations. The specific stratification definitions


are contained in Chapter V and Appendix B. Other issues investigated included the consistency in application and enforcement of work rules, variation in propensity for discipline from a military or civilian' supervisor, variations in disciplinary policy when supervisory employees are involved in a disciplinary offense, specific concerns of racial and ethnic minorities, and restrictions on supervisory authority and discretion.


CHAPTER II
Relevant Literature
Introduction
Discipline within a work environment starts with the adoption of work rules by management, as they apply to that environment, and proceeds to the indoctrination of employees to the work rules with an explanation of why they are considered important. The employee is then expected to comply with the rules, as a form of self-discipline, in order to retain his employment. Violation of the work rules by the employee is followed by the administration of disciplinary measures by management to maintain order within the workforce.
Customary Penalties
In order to understand the literature discussed in this chapter, we begin with a background note on disciplinary measures as practiced in both the public and private sectors. This is easiest done by beginning with the least severe and moving toward the more severe forms of discipline.
Counseling (also referred to as oral warning and oral admonishment) is generally used for first time minor offenses such as tardiness, loafing, carelessness in work practices, or delays in carrying out an order. This form of discipline is usually not made a part of the employee's formal work record.
Written reprimand is generally used for repeat offenses of the work rule violations mentioned above or more serious


violations of the employment agreement such as failing to report to work or shoddy workmanship. This form of discipline is usually included in the employee's formal work record, but only for some specified period, such as two years.
Suspension from duty (without pay) is used for repeat offenses, insubordination, drunkenness on duty, pilferage of low value items, and violation of safety rules which could affect either persons or property. This disciplinary action is normally a permanent part of the employee's formal work record.
Removal (or discharge) is the most severe form of discipline and is used in cases of fraud, major theft, fighting, and so on.
Other management actions may be taken as forms of discipline, such as reassignment to a less desirable job, or withholding pay increases or promotions, but these types of actions do not fall within the commonly defined definition of discipline. Overview
It is unfortunate that the term discipline carries a negative connotation and is often thought of in a narrow and punitive sense. "It should," rather, " be a constructive, positive force that enables people to work together harmoniously."^
The word "discipline" is derived from the word "disciple" meaning "follower." Good discipline within our management-employee relationship would imply an obedient, orderly, reliable, and trustworthy workforce with good followers. Black's definition demonstrates the positive form of discipline ideal in management-employee relations, observing that, in some settings,


. . . discipline means that everybody knows his job and each individual works cooperatively with the group to carry out orders. In such an organization, the members themselves enforce the rules of discipline, and penalties .ior breaching them seldom need to be imposed/
Most employees adhere to Black's definition; however, the few who
do not conform create an expensive, time-consuming management
problem which must be resolved. It is because of the few that
volumes of theories and solutions have been written and must be
investigated so that the many may continue to work in an
atmosphere of cooperation and harmony.
This chapter provides an overview of some of the significant
literature relating to labor or workforce discipline. While the focus
here is on the positive aspects of discipline, more often than not,
the literature will view discipline as negative and punitive. This is
because while management wants the disciplinary measures to be a
constructive means of changing employee behavior, employees
nonetheless view discipline as being negative.
A brief historical look at the background of discipline, both in
the public and private sectors, the conditions and causes that
mandate a formal disciplinary system, the philosophical approaches
and techniques of discipline, and the most frequent contemporary
methods of administering discipline will be explored to understand
the punitive and constructive forms of discipline. This background
is essential to investigating, analyzing, and developing a
contemporary system that is acceptable to management and
employees, and still meets organizational needs.
History of Private Sector Discipline
Conditions and approaches in the eighteenth and nineteenth


centuries were very different from our present, and hopefully,
more enlightened ones. In the colonial and post-colonial periods,
for instance, employers literally controlled the occupational
destinies of their employees. In addition, common law entitled the
master to administer severe corporal punishment and
insubordination — to illustrate the point — was punishable by fine
or flogging. This management right was available to employers and
administered without threat of recourse by the employees to court
action. Stessen notes that:
If inattention to duty was subject to such severe penalties at the discretion of the employer, worker violence against the master called for even more severe retribution. A worker in New England who "laid violent hands upon his master" was disciplined by having his tongue burned with a hot iron. Stealing from the employer was an offense which called for a range of penalties from whippings to long jail terms. Even in those days of harsh (by our current standards) punishments, however, the employer was not adverse to mixing mercy with justice when the penalty interfered with productivity. In New Haven, when an employee was caught setting fire to his employer's establishment, the court ruled that the culprit should continue to be employed but that he should wear a heavy lock on his leg for a period of four years. It was the employer who called upon the mercy of the court and asked that the punishment be rescinded because the worker could not turn out an adequate day's work with such an ironclad handicap. Public humilation was another form of penalty practiced in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. A female worker who disobeyed her master was required to stand on a barrel in the public square for a half hour each day for a week. Across her breast a sign bore the legend that she had been unruly to her employer.
The justification was that the worker deserved his submission because of his indolence and lack of initiative. The employer, it was held, was a superior being because he possessed the


virtues of honesty, diligence, hard work and of course, temperance.
The end of the nineteenth century brought change, and the courts began to look with a jaundiced eye on the practice of corporal punishment. Some concepts, such as an employer's right to discharge whomsoever he would, lingered on, and employees continued to be discharged with or without cause.
Such employer prerogatives and often insensitivities to
employee needs and rights contributed to a perfect birthing climate
for the unions' movement which became a powerful force by the
1870's. Up to this time, the employer had not had to face a
meaningful employer-employee relationship. In 1873, the National
Industrial Congress platform included some references to curbs and
limitations on employee firings. This turn of events was directly
confronted by employers. Indeed,
... in 1903, the National Association of Manfacturers found it strategic to incorporate into its proceedings a set of principles restating what had always been considered to be an obvious, unquestioned prerogative. The NAM went on record as a defender of the management power to discipline or discharge employees at will. By the same principle of freedom of action, it enunciated the worker's inalienable right to quit or leave his employer at any time without fear of penance or penalty.
Disturbing as this emerging notion may have been to employers of the day, the ethic that the worker deserved his fate and the employer earned his position through the process of survival of the fittest and natural selection continued to dominate the accepted tenants of labor relations. Unions were looked upon in management (and government circles as well) not as instruments to improve working conditions, wages and hours, but as weapons to institutionalize the worker's indifference, neglect and natural penchant for soldiering on the job (italics added;.**


The early 1900's brought further change. The idea that
employees might not be the sole source of problems began to
penetrate the management hierarchy. This attitude in large part is
attributable to the work of Frederick Taylor:
Frederick W. Taylor and his principles of ’’scientific management" began to change the concept of the divine superiority of managers.
His main idea was that workers were sources of untapped energy ready to do good work if properly trained and fairly treated. He argued that workers should be won over to scientific management by their supervisors. This required managers to abandon their prerogatives of instant dismissal and to substitute "just cause" as a standard of separation from the job. Thus scientific management became the first barrier to the common-law rig^t of the employer to fire for any or no cause/
In addition to scientific management, the 1920's saw the disappearance of the infamous "business tycoon." Competitive economic pressures were forcing the owner-operator out of business, and a new administrator began to appear, one who retained his job not because of ownership, but rather because of ability. These administrators found that by following scientific management principles and applying "just cause" standards in lieu of instant dismissal, the growing labor organization influence could be helpful in "getting the job done." Thus there are two significant influences shaping the attitudes of employers regarding discipline and discharge: the acceptance of the principles of scientific management and the influence of organized labor.
Another important step in the evolution of employee discipline was the introduction of arbitration in labor management disputes (circa 1920) as well as the collective bargaining mandate brought into existence by the National Industrial Recovery Act of


1933 and the National Labor Relations Act of 1935. Industry was now required by law to deal with employees in a fair and reasonable manner, utilizing, as it were, due process in the arena of managementemployee relations. As a consequence, the arbitration of discharge and disciplinary cases has become big business and remains so today. In fact, a recent private sector study showed that 26.4 percent of arbitration cases dealt with discipline or discharge/
History of Public Sector Discipline
It may be to the credit of President George Washington's basic honesty and high ideals that the Federal civil service system today still places importance on character, competence, and loyalty to the Constitution. Being politically astute, Washington paid deference to the geographical distribution of appointments, paying heed to recommendations of senators, congressmen, and governors. He recognized the needs of his beloved veterans and courteously denied appointments based on nepotism/ Of the 3,000 appointments made during this administration, there were about 17
g
removals for poor character or inefficiency. While the laws and statutes pertaining to appointments to civil service have seen many changes, reforms, and influences over the years, Washington's basic standards are still followed.
Political patronage and a spoils system were an integral part of early appointments to not only cabinet and policy level positions, but to lower level jobs as well. It is easy to see that job security and continuity of operation, as well as competence, in administration suffered. After the Civil War, however, continuity of administrative functions improved when comptrollers, auditors,


and chief clerks of departmental services in Washington as well as
minor clerks, scientific and technical personnel, and the officer
corps of the Army and Navy were permitted to retain their jobs
9
regardless of which party was in power.
The functions of personnel administration included maintaining employment records, supervising employee activities, assigning work, and indoctrinating new employees. All these tasks belonged to the chief clerks in each of the departments, both in Washington and in field offices. Training was unknown, promotions were few, and retirement policies nonexistent. Likewise, as in business, there was no legal protection against removals. Not until 1853 did Congress require "pass-examinations" for entrants into clerical offices. Each department was responsible for creating its own tests. Uniformity finally arrived in 1883 when the Pendleton Act established the Civil Service Commission.1^
Interesting aspects of this civil service reform which paralleled President Washington's thinking were: no more than two members of a family were eligible for public office, and the majority of the clerical offices in Washington were filled by apportionment among the states so that the civil servants would be representative of the nation as a whole in terms of geography, mobility, and ideals.11
Although the beginning of the merit system of public employment began with the Pendleton Act, it originally encompassed only about 10 percent of the civil servants. It was President Grover Cleveland who, with much opposition from both political foes and friends, moved the bulk of Federal employees from the spoils system into the merit system of the civil service


12
system created by the Pendleton Act.
The United States Civil Service Commission was created to
neutralize the effects of the spoils system upon the Federal service
by developing and administering entrance examinations,
recruitment of personnel, and investigation of potential employees.
It was not until an 1897 Executive Order by President McKinley,
which was strengthened in 1899, that rules for removal from
Federal government service began to be formulated. Employee
rights were protected to the extent that,
No removal shall be made from the competitive classified service except for just cause and for reasons given in writing; and the person sought to be removed shall have notice and be furnished a copy of such reasons, and be allowed a reasonable time j^Eor personally answering the same in writing.
Here we see where authority to remove an employee in the public sector becomes enclaved in a time-consuming bureaucratic process where the appointing authority is denied his concurrent authority to demote or dismiss. Unlike his private sector counterpart, who could remove an ineffective employee because the profit motive would not allow for inefficiency, the public sector manager was himself on trial. He had to defend and justify his proposed action to his superior who, if in agreement, would do likewise until the matter reached the secretary of the department.^
The argument for placing dismissal authority at a higher level was that it eliminated favoritism. There was little incentive to arbitrarily dismiss an employee unless the dismissing official also controlled the appointment of the successor.*5 The Pendleton Act did permit the Civil Service Commission to investigate if an


employee claimed the proper procedure was not followed. Otherwise, dismissal decisions remained with the department head.
Opponents, however, maintained that the time it took to remove an inefficient, lazy, or worthless employee created a problem for the immediate supervisor responsible for managing the inefficient employee while still trying to get the job done. Meanwhile, public funds, they maintained, were being wasted while intermediate supervisors studied the allegations before forwarding
. i 16
the case.
Civil service reformers were divided between an "open back
door" group, which believed that the responsible appointing officer
should have almost unrestricted power to dismiss, and the "closed
back door" proponents who believed that the central personnel
agency should have dismissal power with administrative officers
preferring the charge.^ Mosher and Kingsley are two for instance,
who believed that placing the authority for disciplinary action with
the department head in Washington "resulted in unnecessary delay. „18
• • •
Following private sector leadership in unionization, the American Federation of Labor began actively lobbying congress to remove the so-called "gag order" imposed by President Theodore Roosevelt, and continued by President Taft, which forbade federal employees from seeking to influence legislation in their own behalf, either individually or through associations. Until then (1912) Federal employees had no voice in their destinies since the Pendleton Act also forbade unionization. The Lloyd-LaFollette Act removed the gag order, allowed unionization, and assured protection of employees under the McKinley Executive Order on


removals.
It was during this same period, when the private sector was
feeling the influences of the Taylor school of "scientific
management," that the newly emerging Federal unions believed the
stop watch measures would be counter to their purpose. They
testified against these management techniques and in 1914
successfully obtained legislation which banned timed studies in
military agencies. It was not until the Korean conflict that most of
these restrictions were finally lifted and progressive work
measurement programs and engineering standards were introduced
into the Department of Defense. The unions were also successful
in delaying the introduction of new machinery, to some extent, in
20
establishments such as the Bureau of Engraving and Printing. These are but two examples of how the public sector lagged behind the more progressive private sector.
Another glaring example of private sector leadership, ironically mandated by Congress, was in the area of arbitration of disciplinary disputes. The private sector gave employees this right in the 1920's; public sector employees gained this right, in part, by President Kennedy's Executive Order 10988 (1962), and then only the less severe disciplinary measures, to include suspensions of less than 30 days, could be arbitrated. Full arbitration of all
disciplinary actions was not permitted until the passage of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (Public Law 95454).21
Likewise, basis for the differing degrees of disciplinary actions for infraction of work rules was inconsistent in application within and among Federal departments. This is now a negotiable item with unions. There is little written about discipline and


dealing with it in Federal sector literature. These managers are required to seek advice and procedures from the private sector and apply it within the scope of laws, orders and agency guidelines. For this reason, the following literature review, to include studies, is from the private sector.
What Necessitates a Labor Disciplinary System?
Why do some people not perform and what creates the need for a disciplinary system? While there are numerous approaches to answering this question, perhaps a look at history will provide some insight. We note first the powerful impact of the Protestant work ethic, which had origins in Medieval and Reformation religious teachings, and which taught that labor was among man's highest duty. Calvinism even viewed worldly wealth as evidence of Divine approval. Social Darwinism and laissez-faire liberalism mixed with
these religious beliefs created the powerful Protestant work
22
ethic. Similarily, discipline evolved from this historical perspective, and those unwilling to work learned to expect some form of punishment.
To return to the original question of why some people do not work as expected, we could assume they are not committed to this country's work ethic, or that they have negative feelings concerning leadership behavior, work environment, pay, culture, or technology. In short, perhaps the loss of individuality among the masses causes the poor work performance which is counter to the employer's need to employ a cohesive workforce. These team building concepts in the work environment are what we are concerned with here: the need for employee understanding of work rules and disciplinary processes with the understanding that the


rules are of mutual benefit.
Absenteeism. Illustrative of the significance of work rules is
the single issue of absenteeism. Kuzmits points out that:
Employee absenteeism ranks as one of the most burdensome of organizational ills.
Various studies suggest that the "average'1 employee takes from seven to twelve days of unscheduled absence per year. And the aggregate loss in wages and salary — to cite only one of the "costs" of absenteeism ~ has been 2§stimated at up to $20 billion per year/
While the issue of absenteeism appears to be relatively straight forward and easy to solve (i.e., no work — no pay), Luthans and Martinko illustrate how worker apathy could cause the problem to get even worse.
Absenteeism varies slightly with the type of industry but all types of organizations — manfacturing, hospitals, retail stores, and government agencies — are .. . experiencing the problem. The most publicized incidents of absenteeism are in the auto industry. It is common knowledge among consumers today that you don't buy an automobile that has been assembled on either a Friday or a Monday. The chance of getting a "lemon" is much greater because the auto was probably assembled by either part-time help or a department that was shorthanded. Workers don't come to work on Fridays or Mondays.
They take a long weekend. When one of the auto workers from the infamous Lordstown plant of General Motors was interviewed, he was asked, "Why do you only come to work four days a week?" His answer has significant implications for the absenteeism problem. He replie<^"I don't make enough bread in three days."
Youth. Some authors feel labor discipline seems to have a higher incidence in younger workers and suggest this could be attributable to the younger generation's rejection of the idea of unquestioning obedience. The logic of it all is straight forward:


youth are extremely mobile, and less dependent on a single given
employer. Skilled employees are in demand, and if things are not
to their liking, they move.
Other writers assert that to a considerable extent, young factory workers share the attitudes of the present generation of college students. Whether it is labeled youth rebellion, counter-culture or opposition to the establishment, both groups share the same motivation/
Minorities. The causes of nonconforming behavior which result in discipline are so complex and numerous, one could not hope to cover them all. In light of today's attitudes toward nondiscrimination and equity, however, one must look at who receives the disciplinary actions, whether they result from cultural background, and if disparities exist, how they can be corrected. As a result the Civil Rights Act of 1964, James Black asserts that industry now must absorb significant quantities of employees from non middle-class groups who have values and standards that differ from America's vast majority. These people lack the education, skills, self-discipline, and even, in some cases, the will to achieve success.
As if these deficiencies in themselves were not enough to overcome, disadvantaged minority citizens suffer from the irresponsibility of many of their leaders. These men preach hostility to the establishment and promise shortcuts to riches through the use of force -- by which, they say, they can exact recompense for past wrongs, perhaps even enabling their followers to establish a state within a state. Such proposals are impossible of attainment, but this does not lessen their appeal to people who have been stirred up emotionally and cannot be expected to welcome "nuts and bolts" programs based on hard work when their objectives can seemingly be won


by other and more exciting methods.
To take a person from such an environment and instill in him the attitudes and motivation that are necessary for accomplishment in organized industry is a monumental undertaking, especially when, like as not, such a person returns each day to a ghetto home where his associates have views and modes of living that are completely opposite from those of his fellow employees at the company. This is not to say that he cannot be trained to perform useful jobs or that it is impossible to teach him the worth of those standards that the middle class takes for granted. It does mean that industry cannot do the job alone, nor can it easily introduce large numbers of undisciplined, untrained people into an organization all at once without destroying the morale an<£g efficiency of the organization itself.
In his study at Ford Motor Company, Carl Gersuny substantiated many of Black's observations about Black workers. Gersuny also found Blacks incurred a disproportionate share of the penalties; there was, indeed, prejudice toward them from foremen and union representatives.^
The Gersuny study also notes that other variables relating to discipline warrant consideration. For example, where stringent discipline was required on nonautomated assembly lines, the incidence of nonconforming behavior was higher than in shops and departments where automation relieves supervisors of enforcing assembly production and worker compliance. Gersuny also found a consistent relationship in the types of employees receiving discipline. Notably, high seniority men incurred fewer penalties than low seniority men; skilled workers, fewer than nonskilled. Age, interestingly enough, was not a factor in the distribution of
penal ties.28


Gandz's study similarly, substantiates the finding that
grievance rates are higher among low-skilled, low-seniority
29
employees where employee-supervisory relationships are poor. Standards of Performance
One of the most frequently overlooked reasons for lack of discipline is the absence of specific standards of performance. The employee may not know or have had access to all the company rules or a clearcut explanation of the office and supervisor's expectations.
One of the basic rules of standards is that they must be known and understood by both workers and supervisors. It's too late to explain the rule or standard for the first time wh^j we start to discipline an employee/
Another frustrating and distressing reason for below standard
performance is conflicting and opposing standards. While one
standard or rule may be understood and applied, close inspection of
the many rules in existence in many environments may, in fact,
produce direct conflict. In other words, while meeting one
standard, an employee may be violating another. First,
... we tell a worker to work safely, always use an approved ladder, and not run. Then we get a hurry to meet a production standard and realize it can't be met this afternoon unless we get certain adjustments made up above the line, so we shove a box over and tell the employee to get on it and fix the problem — or to hurry down and get the ladder out of the store room.
We have competing standards, in other words. We know what will happen, of course. The clerk or the assembly worker will give in to the pressure, doing that job that involves the most reward a^ least punishment and letting the other go.
Another reason employees do not perform up to standard is


the lack of adequate, meaningful training. An employee cannot be
expected to appear on the job and, after a brief explanation,
completely perform the job and follow all the rules. New
employees, quick to please and uncomfortable in the new
environment, will often say they understand, when, in fact, they
are afraid to ask questions or appear dumb. It's easier and more
comfortable to figure it out on their own. Recognizing this
attitude in new employees, more innovative approaches to training
as a means of reducing discipline are needed.
Training is discipline in its highest form.
The object of all discipline is to educate the employee in the fundamental patterns of acceptable behavior and performance.
Employees should be taught that rules are made for their benefit, not to coerce them or set up a military regime.
Careful hiring procedures, adequate and effective training, good supervision, and job satisfaction will reduce discipline to a minimum.
Lack of feedback in the form of encouragement and
compliments, and ineffective employer-employee communications
can result in substandard performance. When employees get
appraised once a year, they cannot meaningfully relate to how they
are performing a given task on any given day.
There should be no surprises at appraisal time. The employees should be well enough informed along the way that they know just where they stand. The important thing is that they know how they are doing, and receive frequent feedback, reinforcement on what they do well, and whatever correction is needed. This allows the job to flow in an orderly fashion, instead of fluctuating up and down as often happens when anr^pl appraisals are the only form of feedback.
Incorrect reinforcement can support poor or inappropriate


performance. As shown in the discussion on conflicting standards, the employee may not know which rule to follow; when the employee is rewarded for getting the job done quickly (even though safety standards were violated) the speed of project completion is given priority over the standard of safety.
Another frequently overlooked cause of discipline is the
organization itself. Boncarosky points out that:
Some of the problems created by organizations include unsound and unnecessarily restrictive policies and regulations, and improper expectations.
Unsound and unnecessarily restrictive policies only invite violations by employees.
Policies and regulations should be clearly rela^d to the overall performance of the job/
Why Work Rules are Violated
Disciplinary actions are not, however, always attributable to management shortcomings. While management inconsistencies and shortcomings do account for some of the problems, there are still employees who will not or do not follow the rules. Most employees do not object to the existence of rules and regulations. They give order to the job environment. What they do object to is the format of discipline. In civil life, a policeman arrests, a jury tries, and a judge sentences. In employment life, the supervisor serves all three functions.
The percentage of workers, as with most personnel problems, who require formal disciplinary action is small. While some employees are openly defiant of rules and order, many times the causes are such things as illness, money problems, or worries at
home.


One study of ^,174 discharge cases showed that 62 A percent were for personal shortcomings of the employees themselves.
Underlying personal characteristics that came up most were carelessness, noncooperation, laziness, dishonesty, a lack of initiative, lateness, lack of effort. The foreman's job, as a result, js to help employees to be better adjusted.
Whatever the cause for substandard performance, definite
policies and procedures are essential to assure resolution of the
shortcomings. If the root of the problem is management, then
management must be able to identify the problems, react to needs,
and modify its attitudes or policies. If the problem is the
employee, as opposed to leadership, then management must correct
the problem through whatever means are equitable and fair —
formal discipline, if that is what is called for. It is important to
the welfare of both employees and management that adherence to
company rules be achieved and that an effective disciplinary policy
exist. The function of formal disciplinary actions should not and
cannot be to change what has already happened. It is to prevent
reoccurrence of the substandard behavior.
Modern industry requires that its personnel be not only technically competent to do the various jobs assigned to it, but capable of working in harness and harmony with other workers, willing to follow instructions and accept supervision. These quality are a part of their total productive value.
Still, disciplinary systems do fail. Reasons for failure are as numerous as the sheer count of supervisors. For example, Oberle feels one of the main reasons for system failure is the failure to take disciplinary actions when called for. He cites the reasons for failure to act as ranging


. . . from ignorance of the organizational rules and regulations to fear of formal grievances. Perhaps the most typical reason supervisors avoid disciplining employees is dislike of an unpleasant experience that can result in^loss of friendship with the employee/
Wohlking, however, sees the problem differently.
The two most widespread problems in the administration of discipline are, 1) a broad managerial failure to act promptly in dealing with discipline problems as they occur; or 2) overreaction \^hen a long overdue action is finally taken.
In sum, to reduce incidents of disciplinary actions, the literature overwhelmingly supports the need for clear, concise work rules which can be justified as being related to the work environment, established performance standards and expectations which do not conflict with one another, and an orientation and training program for new employees which clearly defines management expectations. In addition, the literature justifies the need for improved communiction between the supervisor and the employees to include frequent discussion and feedback on employee performance to include positive reinforcement when standards are being met and counselling and prompt corrective action in the form of discipline, if required, when standards are below acceptable levels. Management must be willing to objectively and critically review established work rules and develop standards and then train supervisors; it must then teach this to the employees and show consistency in enforcement. To achieve this aim, management requires an understanding of the basic disciplinary philosophies and approaches in resolving disciplinary problems.


Disciplinary Philosophies and Approaches
Modern management understands that positive discipline is achieved through positive leadership. The ultimate goal or result being sought is compliance with agency or company rules and reasonable output. To obtain positive results, or employee compliance with work rules, management must consider the basic philosophies and approaches available, and develop a system to be followed within the organization. The forthcoming discussion dealing with the philosophical and practiced approaches will be helpful to this end.
Philosophies. The philosophies of discipline rest on three basic schools of thought, each distinguished by value systems based upon the varied emphasis given to the needs of the organization as opposed to the needs of the individual employee. The three philosophies can be thought of as authoritarian, anarchic, and due process.
An authoritarian system of discipline considers the organization to be overpowering. An extreme example of this philosophy is the military in time of war. Judgment and execution are dispensed by the responsible authority, with no appeal other than personal and exceptional arrangements for review. Conduct is customary, understood, and rigidly fixed. All decisions are discretionary at the will of the superior.
If the rights of the individual take precedence over those of the organization, the anarchic philosophy prevails. Conduct of the subordinates is self-determined; the responsible authority either permits such action as a matter of policy or has insufficient power to compel contrary behavior. While this system is usually regarded as the antithesis of discipline, it actually may be one form of cooperative activity.


The due-process view is the intermediate philosophy which is based on a body of recognized rules and is administered under some form of judicial procedure. The key factor in this system is formality, where specific penalties for various acts of misbehavior are stated, and formal methods are followed in charging, investigating, proving and punishing. Channels of appeal are provided for the accused, and discipline is either in the hands of a third party or the final stage of appeal preserved for someone in a judicial position.
Basic Approaches. The newly promoted supervisor would be overwhelmed with the amount of literature and diversity of approaches to discipline. This section will present an overview of approaches to discipline, by first establishing the generally accepted outer parameters of approaches, with an illustrative example of each extreme, followed by a number of variations within the established parameters.
The extreme approaches taken to disciplinary problems can be roughly classified into two main categories: judicial/legalistic and humanistic.
3udicial/Legalistic Approach. Although modern managers
would have difficulty in disciplining a work force using a judicial
approach as the only method of maintaining discipline, there are
times when this approach is justified and called for.
The judicial approach is characterized by an attempt to determine the rightness or wrongness of an employee's action in a particular situation. If the worker was "wrong," the supervisor metes out the predetermined punishment. The emphasis is on the solution to the immediate problem rather than on the possible consequences of the decision. Getting the facts, screening out opinions, and finally weighing the evidence are important steps in the judicial
approach. ^0


Undoubtedly, the most extreme example of the
judicial/legalistic approach to discipline is what Martin refers to as
"summary discipline" or the immediate discharge of an employee.
He maintains that offenses such as theft, physically assaulting a
supervisor, and gross insubordination usually warrant immediate
41
discharge regardless of the employee's previous work record.
Summary discipline, or immediate dismissal, is used on a regular basis within the federal government during the probationary period (the first year of federal employment) on an even grander scale than described by Martin. Probationary employees can be and are terminated for even relatively minor breaches of established work rules. The Federal personnel system does not require a comprehensive review process for termination during the probationary period nor is the employee granted any extensive right of appeal to such discharge action.
The "slide rule approach," as addressed by Wohlking, provides
another example of the judicial/legalistic approach to discipline.
Whenever the subject of discipline is discussed, the exercise of judgment, with all of its intangible meanings, is stressed.
Because good judgment is something which is not acquired easily, some organizations attempt to eliminate judgments that a supervisor is required to exercise in disciplinary cases by developing a "slide rule" set of discipline policies. This means a quantitative approach to the discipline process.
"Slide rule" discipline has some of the qualities of progressive discipline, but because of its rigidities, it is not the same.
For example, discipline policy based on this concept might state, "the second time an employee is found smoking in the work area, he will be suspended for three days," or, "any employee having more than three


unexcused absences in a sixty day period will be suspended for one day."
Under a "slide rule" application of the latter policy, a supervisor would have no choice but to suspend an employee who had three unexcused absences in a sixty day period. If supervisors are following a progressive discipline approach, they decide whether there were extenuating circumstances in the situation before taking any disciplinary action. If they then decide upon an action, an assessment of the situation would then determine the severity of the discipline.
In effect, the "slide rule" approach sets very specific quantitative standards ab^t the consequences of a specific violation.
Humanistic Approach. Following the definitions provided by
Heckmann and Huneryager of the competing of approaches to
discipline, they define the humanistic approach as being
. . . characterized by an emphasis on problem-solving. The question of rightness or wrongness of behavior is subordinate to the question of "How can I encourage this worker to perform in a desirable manner?"
As in most problem solving, the supervisor's behavior is characterized by flexibility and adaptiveness, with the result that a variety of solutions may be followed on diff^^nt occasions in gaining the same objective.
Dicenza and Smith provide an example of the human relations
approach by suggesting that the supervisor's primary role should not
be one of imposing discipline, but rather should be one of creating
an atmosphere that fosters self-control of desired behavior.
The supportive approach to discipline assumes that each employee is a valuable individual making ^portant contributions to an organization.
They go on to say that,
The supervisor must assist his employees in conquering their problems in order that they can again make valuable contributions to their organizations.^


Variations of Basic Approaches. Within the bounds formed by
these polar opposites are countless variations. For example,
George Odiorne points out that modern discipline is forced to meet
a number of new requirements beyond simple punishment. Modern
values have led away from physical punishment, and the due-
process system has led to increased appeals and the concept that it
is more acceptable to allow many guilty to escape punishment
rather than to punish one innocent person. Odiorne's philosophy,
stretching beyond the old fashioned "eye for an eye" dogma,
encourages discipline by objectives and asserts that in today's
environment, enlightened management must adapt to changing
solutions to discipline. In speaking of the old fashioned forms of
discipline, Odiorne notes:
While it is entirely conceivable that such may have had some behavior-change objectives, over time such exacting kinds of punishments acquired a character quite apart from the behavior-change effect, and became an almost divinely inspired system of cause and effect, as jfe the crime itself produced the punishment.
While Maier and Danielson promote the use of the human relations approach, this concept cannot stand alone. It is the responsibility of the first line supervisor to enforce the rules of the company. While this can generally be achieved without resorting to formal disciplinary action, on occasion it is necessary to use the disciplinary power. In other words, a supervisor must deal with the problem employee, but need not invoke his disciplinary authority, if an informal resolution, such as a warning, will solve the problem. The act of disciplining is an unpleasant event. It would be much easier for the supervisor to turn his head and ignore the act or


substandard performance.
Definite policies and procedures for handling disciplinary matters are essential for insuring fair treatment of offenders. Each supervisor should be furnished with a written policy and a standardized procedure, including recommended penalties for specific infractions of the rules that may serve as a guide in determining what type of disciplinary action should be taken. While it is usually recommended that disciplinary action be handled on an impartial basis without regard for the specific circumstances involved, most individuals rebel against the imposition of inflexible rules. Rather than being forced into the rigid enforcement of rules and not being supported by management, supervisors will often "turn their heads" and fail to take any action on employee behavior that, according to the rule book, should be formally recognized and appropriately disciplined. In fact, this inaction on the part of supervisors, which has become commonp^e, is referred to as the indulgency pattern.
Formal discipline is a time-consuming and expensive process
from which few get pleasure. Torbert discusses one innovative
approach that meets the company's objectives and receives
employee support by allowing them to participate in making and
enforcing company rules. At the same time it is making discipline
a union responsibility. He found that when employees make and
enforce the rules their decisions are usually more severe than are
48
those imposed by most present-day management.
All of these approaches in viewing and dealing with the disciplining of employees who violate work rules refer to positive discipline or methods which will encourage a positive response from employees and not leave the employee with a negative attitude toward the job or organization. However, the employee's perspective of the disciplinary action must also be dealt with.


Negative Aspects of Discipline
Contemporary attitudes dictate the necessity of viewing and
acting in a positive, problem-solving, constructive way when
dealing with discipline. To a large degree, this is and must be
management’s attitude and approach; however, negative aspects of
discipline are usually present. Discharge is clearly viewed as a
negative act involving not only the employee, but also the
employee's family and probably the employee's future employment
opportunities. In this context, discipline is not constructive. What
management has conceded is that it has failed and cannot succeed
in establishing a healthy employee-employer relationship. Fear of
this type of negative action is sometimes the only deterrent.
Good does not derive from correcting the damage done — this is a loss, more or less.
It must come from a changed attitude toward the company's rules and regulations.
It is too bad that some employees are willing to obey rules only for fear of penalties. But if it is to their benefit to have jobs, and if fear keeps them on the "straight and narrow," the use of reasonable penalties is of benefit to the employees themselves. It must be remembered that to some degree, fear rules the lives of all of us. The wise man can get along with a minimum of fear; yet, he too recognizes that it acts as a spur in his activities.
This brief comment upon fear, upon which penalties essentially rest, is not intended as justification of irresponsible employment of it. The role of fear should be restricted; nevertheless, when its use is called for, executives should be trained to employ it intelligently. 9
Wheeler's writing reinforces the idea that discharge is not corrective and should be used "infrequently and only when corrective measures have failed or are useless because of the
nature of the offense."50


Connellan points out three methods of getting rid of
unwanted behavior: punishment, extinction, and enforcing desired
behaviors. He views punishment as:
... an act that follows a specific behavior with another act or event that is presumed to be punishing. If the initial behavior occurs less frequently, after this punishment, then the follow-up event or act was a punisher. If, however, the initial event or behavior is followed with a presumed punisher and the initial behavior does not change, the follow-up act is not a punisher.
In order to define something as a punisher, the follow-up event must be related to the initial behavior and must also result in a decrease in that behavior. If the behavior ease, then there has been no
Punishment is frequently used because it appears to work- -at
least in the short run. However, punishment can work against
management's intended purpose of effective discipline if the
employee does not view it as a means of correcting inappropriate
behavior. In this case, people can develop an immunity to
punishment just as they do to medication. Consequently,
individuals who are punished frequently become immune to
52
punishment and it ceases to affect their behavior.
Along the same lines, Luthans and Martinko, discussing punishment within organization behavior modification concepts, note:
does not de^f punishment/
The position of O. B. Mod. with respect to negative control of behavior is very reserved. Negative control has several undesirable side effects. First, it puts the supervisor and other management personnel in the position of being aversive stimuli for employees. It limits management's ability to serve as a reinforcer for appropriate


behavior since the employee may ascribe all contact with management as aversive. Secondly, punishing consequences are difficult to use effectively without jeopardizing the relations with the employees, union, and the public. Finally, and probably most important, the effect of punishment is often only temporary; it tends to suppress the behavior, not permanently change it. Absenteeism frequently up despite reprimands and
The effects of punishment wear off. With the last speeding ticket one probably drove more slowly for some period of time, but as time passed, the old habits likely returned, at least to some degree. In addition, punishment may eliminate more behavior than intended. By criticizing a specific suggestion as a dumb idea, we may effectively eliminate suggestions from that individual as he will not again want to risk the possibility of offering another dumb idea.
continuall^^rops
discipline/
Punishment is the supervisor's way of saying "don't do" and does not effectively teach the employee what to do. This negative incentive has more long-term undesirable effects than may be immediately recognized. For example:
1. Uncooperative and emotionally unstable individuals are most likely to be frustrated by the punishment, yet they are the very persons most likely to receive it.
2. Threat of punishment highlights what not to do, thus suggesting an action not previously considered by the individual so threatened. "Don't kill a child," is an instruction given to drivers who have neither the desire nor the intent to kill a child. On the other hand, a sign "School — Children Crossing" is a positive instruction and suggests the desired action. One company displayed


over the time clock a list of 22 different violations and the punishment that went with each. It is doubtful whether any employee could have thought of so many ways to cause trouble.
3. Punishment and the thought of being punished create a hostile state of mind, thereby setting up an unfavorable attitude. All things, events, and experiences occurring during this state of mind become associated with it. Employees who are punished for poor workmanship are prone to develop unfavorable attitudes toward the job. The reverse is true for reward.^
4. The threat of punishment creates fear and reduces the acceptance of ideas. Experimental evidence supports the belief that fear-arousing approaches designed to change behavior may effectively arouse fear but accomplish less change in behavior than a moderate and reasonable approach.^
Additionally, punishment tends to generate and call for excuses.
No one likes to be punished or told he or she is doing a poor job. We all try to blame other causes than ourselves for poor performance. Punishment tends to focus on past actions and forces employees to make excuses for past failures rather than corrections of the problem in
Moreover, as Rotoni points out:
Since punishment tends only to decrease the probability of an undesirable response, it may never result in the occurrence of desired behavior. Thus punishment is not nearly as effectiy^ in directing behavior as giving rewards is.
In short, because people tend to move toward positive incentives and away from negative incentives, there are two ways of influencing behavior; one associated with reward, the other with
concentratexin the future.


punishment.
Why Positive Motivation is difficult
If punishment has so little justification, why has it stood the
test of time so well? Here we must look to the human side of
supervisors and managers. One punishes not to train but to vent
anger. Supervisors and managers carry the sole responsibility for
meeting production deadlines, assuring quality control of products,
compiling reports, and many other tasks besides supervising the
employee. When something goes wrong or someone doesn't show up
for work, they become irritated. As a consequence, they have
neither the time nor the patience to make constructive responses.
At such times the use of positive methods is contrary to natural
58
tendencies and they are inclined to punish when frustrated.
A basic rule of supervision is not to criticize or embarrass an employee in front of others. An irritated, frustrated supervisor (teacher and parent too) will violate this rule. In short, persons are inclined to punish when frustrated.
The prevalent use of punishment is due also to the fact that the negative approach is simpler than the positive. One doesn't have to know how to improve a job in order to find fault with the way it is done.
Interpersonal skills should ideally be developed to the point
where one does not become irritated when things go wrongs first,
because one does not succeed in hiding irritations; and second,
because the attempt to hide them is bad for the person who tries,
and confusing to the person on the receiving end of the 59
relationship.


Ways of Eliminating Unwanted Behavior
Punishment must be used very carefully and as a last resort.
It must be consistent, fair, and timely. Even though it may be
temporarily effective, a punishment approach to discipline should
be viewed as an admission of defeat. If a penalty for violating a
rule is inflicted, it should be as a means of restoring the employee
to the discipline of the group. If dismissal is necessary, it should be
used as a means of maintaining good order and morale to the work 60
group.
Connellan suggests the use of extinction as a second method of getting rid of unwanted behavior. However, he believes it is deceptively simple and effective. "It is simply withholding or withdrawing reinforcement that was previously part of a job situation."^ "Office gossip" illustrates the concept of extinction. By firmly ignoring the gossip, it will, after initally increasing, go away. When a previously reinforced behavior is no longer reinforced, even occasionally, the behavior will eventually cease — or become "extinct."
Teachers often use extinction to control disruptive behavior
in the classroom. By ignoring the disruptive students (rather than
giving them extra attention in the form of frowns or comments),
teachers avoid rewarding the disruptive behavior; eventually the
62
students may try another type of behavior.
Connellan's third method of getting rid of unwanted behavior
is by reinforcing desired behavior. He explains that,
... for every undesired behavior we want to eliminate, there is usually, if not always, a desired behavior we want to increase. If we are able to reinforce the behavior that is


incompatible with the undesired behavior, we can increase the amount of desirable behavior and thereby degrease the amount of incompatible behavior.
This general idea is supported by Huberman in recommending the introduction of a Skinnerian reinforcement concept. He maintains that "as soon as the behavior starts to change in the desired direction ... let the worker know that the change is appreciated."*’**
Although this review is primarily concerned with formal disciplinary actions (or what amounts to punitive actions), discipline need be negative only to the extent that it is a last resort. Positive actions are available and will generally work. If management can sell employees on the value of a rule, the employees will most likely accept and obey the rule. By the same token, if management can convince the employees the unwanted behavior or substandard performance is undesirable, the chances are good that the behavior will be modified.
The grounds for formal disciplinary action are fairly well established. Most organizations have fairly clear cut rules involving formal disciplinary actions, including, in many cases, a standard table of penalties for various offenses.
Still, codified penalties or a standard table of penalties, has
fallen into disuse. Gersuny gives several reasons,
. . . including the fact that such systems failed to reduce the frequency of disciplinary cases. Also, arbitrators frequently found that such rigid sanctions violated the criterion of just cause and overly specific lists of rules made it difficult to punish behavior that was not spelled out in a particular rule. Another result of such rigid systems has been that


supervisors have avoided use of disciplinary powers in many cases^^vhere automatic dismissal was prescribed.
A disciplined organization requires teamwork that is responsive to management's direction. Management's aim should be to create a habit of responsiveness. When the frequency and intensity of orders increase, it is a good sign that discipline is deteriorating. Megginson feels that:
Disciplinary action should be taken by management only when it becomes
abundantly clear that subordinates are losing their habit of giving the appropriate response. Before trying to rebuild the habit, it is wise to ascertain whether the cause of the subordinate's complaint or disobedience is justified. In most instances, the same situation may have occurred frequently enough with the same individual to signal a trend in his behaving, for such actions are usually predictable.
Other Approaches to Dealing With Discipline
Innovative approaches to discipline continue to appear.
Dunlin points to increases in employee power in Wales and
Yugoslavia where employees have clearly defined roles where
alleged mismanagement exists:
The concept of appraising and disciplining their superiors is being tested in Wales, is common practice in Yugg^lavia, and may be feasible in other nations.
Our continent is not without some nontraditional ideas. John Huber man discusses an approach he and a Canadian plywood plant superintendent devised entailing four steps: a first disciplinary offense results in a casual reminder by the employee's supervisor; a second offense would call for another casual reminder by the immediate supervisor; a third offense results in a discussion with the shift foreman and department supervisor;


If a fourth incident occurs. . .the worker's foreman and the plant superintendent have a "final" discussion with him. They suggest that he take the rest of the shift off (without loss of pay), go home, and decide whether he can and will conform in the future. They inform him that yet another incident soon will regretfully lead to his termination, and they express hope that he will decide to conform. This conversation is also recorded in a letter (step four).
Should termination later ensue, few, if any, arbitrators would reverse the decision.
Continued good performance over several months, however, results in .a clearing of the record, one step at a time.
This general approach has been adopted by at least one major
company in the United States.
A couple of years ago, a Frito-Lay manufacturing plant was experiencing severe disciplinary problems. During the first nine months of the year, 58 employees out of a total work force of 210 had been fired for disciplinary reasons. The situation was intolerable and it was obvious that the continued use of the negative progressive discipline system would only make matters worse. A positive approach to discipline was mandatory.
Ten years earlier, in an article in the Harvard Business Review, Canadian Industrial Psychologist John Huber man had outlined a system he had developed for a small plywood mill. Huberman substituted "reminders" for warnings and replaced the traditional three-day layoff with a procedure which involved sending the employees home for the balance of their shift to decide whether they wanted to follow the rules or not.
Using Huberman's model, a positive discipline system was developed for the Frito-Lay plant. In a day-long training session all supervisors reviewed the plant's history with the traditional negative approach and were introduced to the positive discipline system. Both the trainer and the plant manager stressed the need for


change and supervisors practiced the procedures involved in each step. The positive discipline system was implemented the following day.
The result? The first nine months of the next year saw the number of di^plinary terminations reduced from 58 to 16.
Huberman's ideas, as expressed in his 1964 article, "Discipline
Without Punishment Lives," is best explained in Grote's graphic
depiction of the differences between positive discipline and
progressive discipline.
Positive Discipline
Step One: Oral Reminder
The supervisor calls the employee into the office, discusses the offense, reminds the employee of the importance of the rule, and expresses confidence that this will be the last time they will need to discuss it.
Step Two: Written Reminder
The supervisor calls the employee into the office and discusses the offense in a supportive but serious manner. After the meeting, the supervisor writes a memo to the employee which summarizes the conversation and confirms the employee's agreement to improve in the future.
Step Three: Decision-Making Leave
The supervisor calls the employee into the office, discusses the offense, then advises the employee that he or she is not to come to work the next day but they will be paid. The employee is to spend that day deciding whether to continue working for the organization and follow all the rules or not. And report the decision the following day.
Step Four: Termination
If the employee decides to continue working for the organization, and another disciplinary problem arises, the employee is terminated.


Progressive Discipline
Step One: Oral Warning
The supervisor calls the employee into the office, discusses the offense, and warns the employee not to repeat it.
Step Two: Written Warning
The supervisor writes a warning then calls the employee into the office. The employee is given the notice and they discuss the offense. The employee is warned that any future problems will lead to more severe disciplinary action.
Step Three: Disciplinary Layoff
The supervisor calls the employee into the office, discusses the offense, then advises the employee that he or she is being laid off without pay for a specific number of days.
The supervisor warns that any future problems will result in termination.
Step Four: Termination
The employee is terminated/®
Planning Proper Disciplinary Approaches
Effectively handling disciplinary situations pays dividends, as
noted by Shershin and Boxx:
When management handles disciplinary cases in a fair and thoughful manner, employees who are not directly affected will see that the company tries to play fair; their attitudes toward work and, ultimately, their productivity will be affected. Thus a well-developed disciplinary program that provides for the proper handling of a discharge is vital to union and nonunion firms alike.
Some of the major grounds for disciplinary action include:
incompetence (inability due to skill, experience or knowledge)
negligence (failure to perform independent of ability), and
misconduct (gambling, drinking, fighting, troublemaking,
dishonesty, violation of safety practices, etc.). These grounds exist


in numerous arbitration awards. The arbitrator considers whether the rule the employee violated was reasonable and if the employee clearly knows of its existence and is familiar with the rule. If the offense is a minor one, the discipline imposed should be progressive. Subsequent violations of the rule would be dealt with through increasingly severe penalties. Arbitrators generally agree the employee is entitled to reasonable warning that the specific type of behavior will not be tolerated. It is management's responsibility to produce substantiating evidence that the employee was familiar with the violated work rule. Management must not act on prejudice; there must be sufficient record of the substandard performance or misbehavior and the penalty imposed must be in line with the violation and with past practice or precedence. Other considerations might include the employee's past work record and the employee's attitude.
One of the least desirable tasks of a supervisor is the
administration of formal discipline.
The occasion for a reprimand is one for testing the caliber of supervision and is an opportunity for teaching. The primary objective is not punishment, but to change the worker's behavior and thinking in the direction of desired action and to insure that the behav^r leading to the reprimand is not repeated/
To ensure that formal disciplinary actions are neither hasty nor inappropriate, managers must take the time to gather the facts, set the stage properly so that they discipline in private and subdue any inclination to discipline in anger or ignore the employee's views. In addition, mature and effectual discipline compares the unacceptable behavior to an expected and mutually


agreeable performance standard or rule, not another employee or some subjective prejudice. At the same time both our experience and research are showing that disciplinary responses, like effective feedback, are specific, both as to what was wrong and as to what employees must do to improve. Finally, discipline must be timely, which generally means that it occurs as closely to the inappropriate behavior as possible. f
Common Disciplinary Approaches
The four types of formal disciplinary approaches most often used are counseling or oral warning, written reprimand, suspension from duty (with or without pay), and discharge or firing.
Other actions that may be considered disciplinary but which carry the negative, punitive inference, include such things as demotion, reassignment, shift change, withholding pay increases or withholding overtime opportunities. While these five items may be considered disciplinary, their use in many instances, is unique, to the organization, because actions such as demotion to another job or reassignment to another organization may not be constructive; the problem employee may, in many instances, just simply be relocated or pawned off to another supervisor. The new supervisor may well be confronted with similar problems in the immediate future since the employee may well have developed a negative attitude toward the organization.
Each of the four types of common formal disciplinary actions has a specific constructive purpose. For example, the counseling session or oral warning is intended to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the employee is aware of the work rule or substandard behavior. The warning is not placed in the employee's official


record, but can be used as substantiation in the event of further discipline. This type of action will correct the greatest number of problems and further disciplinary action is usually not required.
The written reprimand is a formal disciplinary action which is documented in the employee's employment record. It remains in the employee's record for a specified period of time; for this reason it can normally be challenged under the grievance procedure.
The suspension from duty, is the most serious disciplinary
action short of discharge. Suspensions may be from a fraction of a
day to several months, and normally result in the loss of pay for
that period. However, that is not always the case.
The Western Plywood Company of Canada, in its determination to eliminate the concept of punishment from its supervisors' administration of discipline, has gone to the extreme of continuing to pay employees who have been laid off for disciplinary offenses until they are returned to their jobs. The company says the purpose of the suspension is to give the employee time to consider the results of his behavior and to judge for himself whether he wants to be a member of the team and live by its rules. It adds that time off without loss of pay provides this opportunity.
Does it work? The company thinks so. An executive claims, "Every time an employee has been sent home without pay, a grievance has resulted. Under the new program, grievances seldom grow out of suspensions since no punishment is involved. The expense of grievance meetings was much greater than the cost of paying an employee for time off while he thought about his future with the company.
Discharge or removal from the job is often thought of as the capital punishment of employment because it is a last resort action having a long-term and potentially damaging affect on the employee's future. For this reason, removal represents the most


extreme form or penalty and should be used only when other
methods fail. To possibly avoid this final step, Cayer suggest
certain pre-employment precautions:
If selection and probationary employment periods are used effectively, removal should not have to be resorted to very often, but there are always some instances when it is necessary. Dismissal policies should be clearly stated and adhered to on an impartial basis. The rights of the employee to know the basis for removal should be scrupulously honored, and review should be available 7if the employee feels mistreated/
Sampling of federal sector negotiated grievance procedures shows they incorporate many basic principles common to the literature on disciplinary actions. Characteristically, these procedures include:
1. Written notice containing the specifics of the charge.
2. Promotion of the constructive principle by providing that minor offenses are not a permanent record.
3. Specific procedural requirements which include time limits for taking disciplinary actions and advice on appeal rights.
4. A "just cause" requirement.
5. Progressively more severe penalties for repeat
offenses.
These types of work rules are deemed reasonable by the fact that they are part of a negotiated agreement and agreed to in advance by both parties, the employer and the union. The question most often subject to arbitration is the extent of management proof in a specific case, and the reasonableness of the management action in light of extenuating circumstances in regard to the specific disciplinary action. As can be seen from this procedure,


the union is intricately involved as it plays a large role in disciplinary matters.
If good principles must prevail eventually, and the union will demand it, it would seem to be the wise thing for management to adopt such plans and practices before they are forced upon it by outsiders. When outsiders force changes, they take credit for them; yet, it is management which must make them work/**
The literature pertaining to disciplinary approaches is varied, but continually emphasizes the need for a consistent approach in administering discipline. Educating employees about the work rules and communicating both positive and negative comments to employees appear to be almost equally as important. Because consistency is such a strongly expressed concept in the discipline of workers, it is receiving further review in this Chapter.
Consistency
Consistency is so significant an issue that it warrants separate consideration. As indicated earlier, many conditions must be met to consummate a successful disciplinary action (reasonable rule, proper warning, etc.) but none appear as individually important as the issue of consistency in application of disciplinary policy. Belohlav and Popp consider consistency in disciplinary practice to be the final factor in discriminating between effective and ineffective organizations.
They found that effective organizations were consistent in applying discipline while ineffective organizations more often had a tendency to overlook infractions as they occurred/^
Inconsistencies and inequities do exist, as substantiated in a May 1979 survey of federal employees conducted by the Office of


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Personnel Management. The survey findings were based on 1^,000 questionnaires completed by current federal employees. Table 2.1 (at the end of this chapter) showcases important data from that survey dealing with employee perceptions of the treatment they receive.
The percentages in Table 2.1 reflect feelings in one area of equal employment opportunity. If the same feelings exist in the area of employee discipline, management has a problem. Inconsistent treatment of employees in any area of personnel management is perceived by employees as inconsistency in all areas. One instance of preferential or overly strict application of work rules toward one worker will brand the supervisor as being unfair or inconsistent. The use of written standards, understood by all employees and administered uniformly, is one way of eliminating negative employes perceptions.
There are clearly two schools of thought regarding the need for written disciplinary standards. Kuzmits feels very strongly that:
An organization's absence policy should include specific, written procedures for handling abuses of absence standards. These procedures should outline the types of absence behaviour warranting disciplinary action and what the disciplinary action is.
This position is further argued by Wohlking who feels that firm policies are a key ingredient to an effective disciplinary program and that these policies must be developed by management and uniformly applied by all supervisors. He adds that the single efforts of a supervisor acting alone are quite insufficient to make an organizational discipline program effective.


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On the other hand, Gersuny feels that the use of strictly
enforced codified penalties have fallen into disuse. Boncarosky believes that the definition of consistency is in itself inconsistent. He argues that the degree of discipline should be determined by the offense and that each case must be determined on its own merits.
In contrast, Elkouri and Elkouri, contemporary arbitrators themselves, point out:
It is generally accepted that enforcement of rules and assessment of discipline must be exercised in a consistent manner; all employees who engage in the same type of misconduct must be treated essentially the same unless a reasonable basis exists for variations in the assessment of punishment (such as different degrees of fault or mitigating or aggravating circumstances affecting ^me but not all of the employees).
Some authors do not distinguish between process and result.
For example, in the following excerpt, Tobin uses three terms that
can be interpreted in different circles to have very different
meanings. Tobin's use of the word "discriminatory" is used in a
non-civil rights context. In addition, Tobin distinguishes between
uniformity and consistency.
The employer's action must not be discriminatory. To penalize one employee more severely than another equally guilty employee is not allowable unless there cire mitigating circumstances. This does not mean, however, that there must be uniformity in the type of discipline imposed.
In fact, there can be selective discharge as long as the employer is consistent in its enforcement. Obviously, consistency is not the same as uniformity. An employer can be consistent, for example, by always considering the employee's past record and length of service when deciding the proper


discipline to be taken. Thus the fact that two employees guilty of the same offense are given different penalties does not mean the employer discriminated against one of them. Say, for example, that two employees have identical absentee records during the past twelve months — but one has only one year of service, and the other has twenty years of service with a good attendance record. In this case, the employer could impose different penalties without being discriminatory. But if management simply decides to make an example out of one employee when others are equally culpable charges of discrimination will normally stand. The employer's actions must not^e arbitrary or subject to whimsical change.
Some authors clearly feel that inconsistencies are acceptable
depending on the type of person employed or the occupational
differences of employees. For example, Weiss feels that creative
people are motivated in different ways and have special needs and
suggests that they should not necessarily be required to follow the
same rules as other employees. They are "often maligned because
they are unconventional" in "thinking or behavior." That, of course,
is what makes them unique, or special, and is therefore a strength.
". . . chronic tardiness," Weiss continues, is another "common
idiosyncrasy among creative people" but, he nonetheless concludes,
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"All these foibles are likely to cost you little or nothing."
In the same vein, the Unterbergers see discipline of
professional employees and nonprofessional employees as being
potentially very different.
While the excessive use of alcohol is treated quite similarly, the possession or even consumption of alcoholic beverages on the employer's premises is, generally, treated quite differently. For nonprofessional employees, consumption of alcohol often warrants immediate discharge or, at the least, quite severe discipline. Such


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discipline has been sustained frequently in arbitration.
The possession of alcohol on the employer's premises by professional employees, however, is rarely regarded as an infraction (except perhaps in some government offices where such possession is a violation of law).
For professionals, consuming alcohol when socializing with clients of visitors, and sometimes colleagues, is rarely the cause for any discipline stronger than mild warnings. However, solitary consumption — rather than consumption as part of a social activity — is likely to be viewed quite differently, probably as warranting a strong warning and even more severe discipline including discharge if repeated. Since there is often no difference in the actual amount of alcohol of alcohol consumed, the crucial distinction would appear to be a perceptual one in which the values governing professional behavior plays a large role. No such distinctions are ma(^ in relation to nonprofessional employees.
Consistency is the logic and the justification for the "slide 87
rule approach." In this vein, Wohlking and Martin are in
agreement that consistency in disciplining employees is necessary
to an effective organization. Wohlking notes that different
treatment of employees in two different departments within an
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organization will be carried by the "grapevine" to all concerned.
Martin further contends that a supervisor's failure to take
necessary disciplinary action signals employees that management
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condones unauthorized behavior."
Above we have seen a variety of attitudes, ideas, and opinions
regarding consistency. Perhaps one of the most valuable is that of
McGregor as discussed by Boncarosky. Consistent discipline is
compared to touching a hot stove.
When a person gets burned on a hot stove, that person doesn't blame the stove, but him or herself. Touching the stove involves four


elements: the consequence is immediate; if an individual touches a hot stove, he or she will be burnt. Second, since a hot stove gives off radiant heat and the color of the metal may change, individuals have been warned not to touch the stove. Next, the penalty for touching a hot stove is consistent; it always results in being burnt. Lastly, whoever touches the stove is burnt; the pen^jy is given in a nondiscrim inatory manner.
Summary
Attitudes and approaches are significantly different in the twentieth century than in earlier times. Clearly the nature of discipline in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was punishment. A number of forces such as unionism in the private sector and merit principles in the public sector contributed to the change process.
The twentieth century still finds discipline and disciplinary systems a necessity. This necessity can be attributed to a variety of considerations, such as leadership quality and style, changing values, advancing technology and mobility. In our highly complex society, with its large organizations, rules and standards are believed to be necessary in order to maintain competitiveness. Time has shown that where rules exist, they will be broken, confronting management with the dilemma of enforcing compliance or losing control.
Historically, disciplinary philosophies have fallen into three basic categories: the authoritarian system, where conduct is customary, understood, and rigidly fixed; the anarchic system where the conduct of subordinates is determined by the subordinates themselves (management either permits such a policy or has insufficient power to direct contrary behavior); and the due-


process system, which is administered in the judicial/legalistic style.
There are, of course, as many approaches to disciplinary
systems as there are writers on the subject. The approaches
encompass the full range of philosophies discussed above. A large
number of writers envision a disciplinary system as a fixed set of
steps and techniques designed to result in a more productive,
worthwhile employee. If these steps fail, the traditional final step
is discharge. Most contemporary authors prefer to speak of
discipline not in terms of punishment or punitive actions, but rather
in a progressive sense that will ultimately benefit both the
employee and the organization. The techniques for arriving at this
ultimate goal are numerous. The vast majority of authors see
implementation of disciplinary proceedings as a final step~a last
resort-coming only after everything else has failed. Still, there
are times when discipline is the only alternative:
. . . good supervisors will not avoid using discipline when a situation calls for it, but they will remember that such procedures are intended to correct a problem rather than punish an employee. When properly administered, disciplinary actions remain an effective supervisory tool and a means of solving current employee problems without causing new ones.
The federal government and its disciplinary policies, generally mandated by law or regulation, normally ascribe to the views of contemporary authors. That is, formal discipline is taken only after counselings and warnings, for minor disciplinary offenses. Notifications of disciplinary action are given in writing and specify the charges; minor offenses are not a permanent record against the employee, but rather are purged from the employee's


record after a period of satisfactory behavior. The federal system mandates, in one way or another, just cause for taking a disciplinary action and most disciplinary actions result in progressively more severe penalties for repeat occurrences.
Consistency is one of the most important yet one of the most difficult issues to be dealt with in meting out discipline. No two cases are the same; each case has its own extenuating circumstances and each case involves dissimilar human beings with their own special needs and priorities. Sullivan points out in this regard that,
Unfortunately, cases tend not to submit willingly to sure black or white
classification. They favor, instead, the gray domain, where frustration, uncertainly and surprise are the dominate landmarks.
The methods used to obtain satisfactory employee behavior in
the past have often been harsh, arbitrary, and inflexible. Most
rules were established to meet the whim of the employer.
Management today has retained the right to discipline but that
right is not without restriction. Almost without exception,
management must have cause and that cause is subject to some
third party review. Management must be able to defend its action.
The literature generally agrees that disciplinary action should be
reserved for those times when positive action does not work.
Force will often cause a person to change outwardly but not mentally and emotionally.
In fact, it sometimes results in "malicious obedience," whereby an aggrieved employee does exactly what he is told to do, even if he knows the order is faulty and will result in getting things fouled up. This is his way of getting even with his superior, as the latter will be blamed and it is difficult to blame the former who, in all innocence, can say he


did exactly what he was ordered to do.
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The management need exists for rules, policies and standards
of behavior. This need mandates a formal disciplinary policy for
the nonresponsive or nonconforming employee. Sometimes there is
no alternative but discharge. We must not forget that the
commodities we are dealing with are human beings, and that
. . . discipline is a tool of the supervisor, but that's all — just a tool, not a cure-all.
Good supervisors use it just like any other tool — to keep things running as smoothly as possible in the long haul.
Conclusion
The literature contains many concepts, ideas, and approaches. It is clear that the disciplinary techniques adopted by any given organization must be able to deal with the individual needs and problems unique to that organization. Many problems, such as absenteeism, are common to nearly all organizations yet as with any disciplinary situation the approach can vary. There is no one sure way to cure absenteeism. The important thing is to adopt a way that works within a specific organization. While the literature speaks in generalities it does not confront the specific problems undertaken in this study. For example, the literature does not deal with outside pressures exerted on a supervisor in making disciplinary determinations. While the magnitude of this issue is perhaps more significant in the federal than the nonfederal sector, it is clearly of sufficient importance to warrant investigation.
In addition, while the literature does contain some studies on the relationship of minorities to discipline, it is remiss in dealing
with discipline and the female worker. The literature appears biased toward disciplining the male worker. In today's working


environment, the female comprises a substantial portion of the workforce and is more frequently involved in what, not long ago, was considered nontraditional occupations. Further, this study proposes to recognize any possible differences in disciplinary standards between military and civilian supervisors of civilian employees. Any differences noted could be attributable to such things as the military lifestyle and the mandatory geographical rotations — military supervisors know they will only have to supervise a certain group for a given period of time. Finally, the literature is weak with regard to disciplinary systems for supervisory employees.


Table 2.1
Survey of Federal Employer Perceptions*
Worse The Same Much Better Total
Compared to older employees, younger employees are treated 8 75 17 100
Compared to other employees, handicapped persons are treated 3 78 19 100
Compared to male employees, female employees are treated 12 64 24 100
Compared to other employees, minority employees are treated 10 58 32 100
*"Preliminary findings released on employee attitude survey,” Federal News Clip Sheet, Special Edition (December 1979).
** All responses shown by percent. n=14,000


CHAPTER III
Environment
Introduction
The USAF Academy presents a somewhat unique environment for this study in that it has all the elements of a University and an Air Force installation. Its mission to train and educate future Air Force officers demands, educationally, a higher than average military staff and, in so many areas, a lower than average civilian workforce. That is to say, the military men and women must have exceptional bearing and knowledge as they establish the example the cadets follow. On the other hand, virtually all of the civilian workforce in direct contact with the cadets are in unskilled blue collar positions -- food service workers and custodians.
For the purpose of this study, it is important for the reader to be aware of the mission of the USAF Academy, the types of support roles the civilian employees fill and the opportunities and barriers they find in their own career advancement. This chapter will also discuss the role of the Civilian Personnel Office and its responsibilities to Academy management in such areas as hiring, classifying, promoting, disciplining, and discharging civilian employees and how this role is performed in its relationship with the employees' union. It will also discuss the interrelationships of the military-civilian environment, as well as the disciplinary procedures followed at the Academy.


Background
After its separation from the United States Army in 1946, when it was the Army Air Corp, visionary leaders in the United States Air Force began advocating a separate military academy for its airmen. Not until 1949, when Secretary of Defense James Forrestall appointed a board of outstanding educators, including Dwight D. Eisenhower, then President of Columbia University, and Robert L. Stearns, President of the University of Colorado, was the need for an academy to train Air Force officers established. This need was largely based on the inability to expand the facilities of the older service academies.
Congress authorized creation of the United States Air Force Academy (USAFA) in 1954 and the site near Colorado Springs, Colorado was selected by Harold E. Talbott, Secretary of the Air Force. The first Academy class entered in July 1955 at temporary facilities on Lowery Air Force Base in Denver, Colorado. Construction at the permanent location also began in 1955 and was sufficiently complete for the Cadet Wing to move into its permanent home in August 1958. Initial construction cost $142 million. The first class of 207 graduates was commissioned as second lieutenants in June 1959. Since that first class, 12,134 have been graduated from the Academy. The cadet strength is
approximately 4,000, of which approximately 12 percent are ethnic minorities, including Black, Hispanic, Asian, and American Indian.
In October 1975, President Gerald Ford signed legislation permitting women to enter the nation's military academies. They now comprise about 10 percent of the USAF Academy Cadet Wing


strength. The first class with women graduated in 1980.^
Cadets have some of the best academic facilities in the
nation. Academic requirements include 180 semester hours which
include a core curriculum of 153 hours plus a minimum of 27
elective hours in one of 23 academic majors. All graduate with a
bachelor of science degree and a commission as a second lieutenant
2
in the regular component of the United States Air Force.
The faculty is composed of over 500 members, primarily military officers. In most cases they possess professional military experience related to their academic experience. In ail cases, military faculty members hold at least a master's degree and more than one-fourth have earned doctorates. There are a small number of distinguished civilian professors who serve on one year faculty tours, a few foreign service officers from the Department of State, and a small number of allied country officers who teach in the
3
foreign language, history, and political science departments.
Cadet Life
Because of the large number of credits required to graduate, and because of the need to instill self-discipline, a cadet's life is highly regimented and structured. For example, they live by an honor code which states: " We will not lie, steal, or cheat, nor tolerate among us anyone who does." Cadets administer the honor code system themselves and are intensely proud of it. The honor code is the basis for the cadet disciplinary environment. A demerit system is used for violation of regulations with restriction to the dormitory for those accumulating too many demerits.


Federal Civilian Working Environment
The Federal government is the largest single employer in the United States. Employees in the Federal civilian workforce are United States citizens working in every state of the union and in foreign countries. The workforce population encompasses nonskilled laborers as well as professionals in science and education.
Most applicants for Federal positions apply through the Office of Personnel Management (the exceptions being those hired by the State Department, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Tennessee Valley Authority, and a few others). Selection for a Federal position is based on a "best qualified" ranking system with veterans and widows of veterans receiving priority consideration for appointment by receiving an additional five or ten points (disabled veterans and widows of veterans receive 10 points) added to their ranking or test scores. All Federal employees receive the same basic benefits, which include insurance, annual and sick leave, retirement, and an opportunity to receive incentive awards. Pay determinations differ depending on the type of skill or occupation of the employee.
The Federal government uses two basic pay systems. The first, the general schedule (GS), consists of employees commonly referred to as "white collar." Their pay system was established by public law (Title V, Chapter 51) and is based on a complex job classification system in which the duties and responsibilities are assigned one of the possible 18 general schedule grades. The pay for each of these grade levels is related to the national cost of


living index. Presidential intervention during the past few years, in an attempt to keep the cost of running the government down, has resulted in pay increases of only between five and seven percent. In addition, general schedule (GS) salaries may not exceed that of Presidential appointees.
The second type of Federal employment system is the wage grade system. Wage grade employees are further defined as wage grade (WG), wage leader (WL), and wage supervisors (WS). Wage grade employees, also known as "blue collar," include nonskilled through crafts and skilled. By law (Title V, Chapter 53), wage grade pay is based on locality wages for comparable jobs and wage adjustments are based on annual wage surveys in the local geographical area. For the most part, pay increases have occurred in close comparability with the local cost of living index. Nonskilled employees, such as custodians, laborers, and food service workers, often make twice the money of their civilian community counterparts because their salaries are computed in with the craft and skilled workers.
Within both the general schedule (GS) and the wage grade (WG, WL, and WS) systems, employees receive step increases at a periodic, predetermined time interval. General schedule employees have ten pay steps within a grade while wage grade employees have only five. Grades themselves are determined by the Federal classification system administered by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM).
Civilian employees are governed by a large mass of Federal regulations and laws which are captured in written form as the Federal Personnel Manual (FPM). The Office of Personnel


Management (OPM) issues the FPM to all agencies of the Federal government under its administrative control. Agencies, in turn, provide regulatory guidelines to their subordinate organizations. The quantity of rules and regulations which affects an employee is great, but rarely does an individual employee read this large volume of directives. They learn the rules and regulations early in their employment from orientation programs offered by the Civilian Personnel Office and from their supervisors. Ideally supervisors receive training by attending courses offered by OPM or the agency. Through this training they learn not only the rules and regulations that control or influence employment life, but also training in supervisory techniques — including, among other things, the necessity for uniform and consistent treatment of employees. Because of budgetary constraints and demands to use limited training funds for upgrading "state of the art" requirements, supervisory training often receives a low priority within many agencies.
USAFA Civilian Working Environment
The Department of the Air Force controls the budget, as well as the number of military and civilian authorized positions at the United States Air Force Academy. This means the Academy must expect its proportional share of budget cuts and reduced manning ceilings along with other Air Force commands and bases. The reduction of money and people does not, however, bring a corresponding reduction of mission responsibilities.
Within this context it should be mentioned that the number of civilian employees at the USAF Academy has been reduced from


over 2,500 in the early 1970's to 1,852 at the time of this study — a 26 percent reduction-in-force.
Civilian employees are assigned to every organizaion on the Academy and all interact with the assigned military population. With the exception of functions such as the civilian personnel office, fire department, food service workers, and janitors, all Academy organizations have a mix of military and civilian personnel performing like functions. In all cases, the position of the head of a organization is filled by an Air Force officer. Civilians provide support to the military leaders and there is no way a civilian at the Academy can "make it to the top."
Since the USAF Academy is a military environment which trains and educates future military leaders, the support functions provided by the civilian workforce are all-encompassing from unskilled to technical. For example, the waiters and waitresses who serve the ^,^00 cadets three meals a day are all civilians; however, the cooks, meatcutters, bakers, etc., who prepare the meals are both military and civilian.
In the academic area, all the instructors (except the few distinguished visiting professors mentioned earlier) are military, but the scientific laboratories and the clerical positions are filled by both military and civilians. Likewise, housekeeping functions, as needed at all Air Force bases, are performed by both military and civilian engineers, mechanics, plumbers, gardeners, masons, painters, electricians, etc.
There are some civilian occupations at the Academy unique to a normal Federal environment which are normally found at a


university; these include registrar personnel, laboratory technicians, sports information specialists, coaches, and trainers. For the most part, however, civilian employment is largely made up of occupations more traditional to an Air Force installation. For example, there are approximately 350 administrative, secretarial, and clerical civilian positions to keep the paperwork flowing; approximately 395 civilians feed the cadets; 114 janitors and another 240 blue collar craftsmen keep the Academy community operational.
The diversity of the civilian workforce, coupled with the placement of military officers in leadership positions, reduces promotion opportunities for the civilians. Many civilians have been at the Academy for much of its 25 years of operation. As these employees begin to retire, some promotional opportunities are becoming available. These opportunities, however, are mainly in the blue collar positions; white collar jobs are extremely competitive with the numerous highly qualified, well educated employees vying for the few higher graded jobs available.
Because of the limited promotional opportunities and because such a large number of unskilled jobs exist, turnover in the civilian workforce is high. It is not unusual to have secretaries with bachelor degrees or food service workers with extensive management skills competing for mid-level positions. Often these kinds of people will leave the Academy and the Colorado Springs area because they are unable to find positions commensurate with their qualifications or experience. Limited promotion opportunities combine with menial unskilled jobs to create a turnover rate at the


Academy of approximately 25 percent a year. To say that such a rate is not unusual evades the problem. Turnover, in and of itself, is expensive and generates inefficiencies.
Functions and Role of the Civilian Personnel Office
Recruiting for the vacant positions at the Academy is only one of the diversified functions performed by the Personnel staff. Under the supervision of a Director, the staff of 37 (which includes clerical personnel) is responsible for fulfilling statutory and regulatory requirements for equal employment opportunity and affirmative action programs, classification of positions and wage and salary administration, labor-management relations (including negotiating with the local union), and programs for merit promotion, incentive awards, employee benefits, employee career development, personnel data and records management. To perform these many functions, the Civilian Personnel Office is divided into six divisions. These are (1) the Staffing Division, (2) the Data Management Division, (3) the Training and Career Development Division, (*0 the Classification Division, (5) the Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Division, and (6) the Labor and Employee Management Division. All these divisions must interact with one another and with line functions on the Academy. In addition, the Director provides expertise to the Academy Superintendent (a Lieutenant General) on the impact of policy changes or programs affecting civilian employees.
Staffing Division. The most visible division, and the one which potential employees first encounter, is the Staffing Division. Besides placing external applicants, this division also handles


internal reassignments, prepares certificates of candidates qualified for promotion, and handles special recruitment programs. The Staffing Division is responsible for dealing with the impacts of employee placement when external actions, such as the closing of other Air Force bases or overall reductions-in-force, pressure the Academy. Because the Academy workforce has many overqualified, and thus underutilized employees, this Division administers locally developed programs to minimize this manpower misuse. Adding to this workload, the Staffing Division must comply with the recent guidelines required by Public Law 95-^54 (Civil Service Reform Act) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) which affect the recruitment and promotion of employees. Staffing specialists must validate both the supervisor's selection and interview procedures to assure fair and equal consideration was given all applicants, particularly minorities and women. The Division also administers a program for handicapped applicants, finding positions which are compatible with their skills and abilities and then encouraging supervisors to hire them on a probationary or trial basis. Impacting on all these functions is the preferential hiring of military veterans, particularly those who have retired with 20 or more years of military service. While these veterans offer much as civilian employees and are among the overqualified and underutilized employees mentioned earlier, once hired their employment has limited the opportunities of women and minorities to advance to higher graded duties because of the years of experience they bring to a job.
Data Management Division. Several years ago the Air Force


became a leader in the Federal government by computerizing large amounts of personnel data formerly maintained in individual folders and on record cards. Although the individual folders are still maintained, the computerized information is used in preparing reports, obtaining statistical data, and most recently to determine which employees are best qualified for promotion based on past experience, training, education, and performance appraisals. Although the initial effort to capture the data created an inordinate workload for the entire Personnel staff, the information is maintained and updated by the Data Management Division. This division is able to provide all other functions within Personnel with high quality products able to consider more data and variables than could ever have been done under the manual system. While the computer has improved the quality of information available to the management of the civilian workforce, many employees distrust what appears to be a more impersonal system which they see as replacing the human judgment previously used. These impressions are wrong. Judgement is very important. Time and use should eliminate most of these employee apprehensions.
Training and Career Development Division. The USAF Academy training budget is approximately $30,000 per year. These limited funds are used to pay for technical training for USAF Academy employees. This training is offered by government agencies and civilian institutions and colleges. It also pays for travel and per diem expenses of employees in training. Civilian employees are only authorized to receive job-related training at government expense. To the chagrin of many employees, neither


Full Text

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I. EQUITY AND DISCRETION ,A CASE STUDY OF DISCIPLINE IN A PUBLIC AGENCY by Steven Albert Rockwell ,..-. University of . Colorado, 1969 M.P.A., University of Colorado, 1978 A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Public Affairs of the University of Colorado in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Public Administrati on ' 1980

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Copyright @) 1980 Steven Albert Rockwell

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Chapter I II Table of Contents Dissertation Approval • Acknowledgements • • List of Tabl e s . . . . Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Overview • Introduction Background • • . . • • Discipline • • • • • . . . . . . . . . Discipline at the USAF Academy • • • Dissertation Format • Literature review • Environment Methodology Results • • • Discussion conclusions, and implications • . . . . . . . . . . Page ix X xi xxix 1 1 1 2 3 4 4 5 . 5 5 5 Appendices • • • . • • • • . • • 6 Issues . . . . . Relevant Literature Introduction • . . . . . . . . . 6 B B Customary penalties . • . • • • • • • • B Overview • • • • • • 9 History of pr ivate sector discipline • • • • 10 History of public sector discipline • • • What necessitates a labor disciplinary systetn? . . • . • • . • • • . . . . 14 19

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Chapter III Absenteeism • Youth • • . . . . . . . Minorities . . . . . . . . . . . . Standards of performance Why work rules are violated • iv Page 20 20 21 23 25 Disciplinary philosophies and approaches. • • • 2 8 Philosophies • • • • • • • • • • 2 8 Basic approaches • • • Judicial/Leg Llistic approach • Humanistic approach. • • • Variations of basic approaches Negative aspects of discipline Why positive motivation is difficult Ways of eliminating unwanted behavior • • Other approaches to dealing with discipline 29 29 31 32 34 38 39 41 Planning proper disciplinary approaches • • • • 4 4 Common disciplinary approaches • • • • • • 4 6 Consistency • Summary • • . . . . . . . Conclusion Environment . . . . . . . . Introduction • • Background • Cadet life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 54 57 60 60 61 62 Federal civilian working environment • • • • • 6 3 USAFA civilian working environment • 65

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Chapter IV Functions and role of the Civilian Personnel Of fice • Staffing Division • . . . . . . . . v Page 68 68 Data Management Division • • 6 9 Training and Career Development Division. 7 0 Classification Division • • • • Equal employment Opportunity Division • • • • • • • • Labor and Employee Management Division • Role of the Union Recent related studies • • • Frustrations contributing to discipline 71 72 74 74 75 activity • . • . • • • • • • • • • • 76 Discretion/Power relationships at the USAFA • • • • • • • • • • 77 Disciplinary process at USAF A • • • • • • • 7 9 Conclusion • • Methodology Introduction Overview Stratification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 82 82 83 83 Random selection procedures • • • • • • 84 Pretest • • • • • • • • • • • Questionnaire administration • • • Interviews • • • • • • • 86 87 88

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Chapter v Case study analysis • • . . . . . . . . . Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Introduction • . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hypothesis I • • . . . . . . . . . . . . Overview • • • . . . . . . . Data . . . . . . . . . . Discussion Conclusion • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hypothesis II . . . . . . . . . . . . . Overview • • • . . . . . . . . . . Data . . . . . . . . . . Discussion Conclusion Hypothesis Ill • • • Overview • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Data Discussion Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hypothesis IV • • • • • Overview • • • • • . . . . . . . . . . . Data . . . . . . . . . . Discussion Conclusion • • • • Hypothesis V • • • • • • Overview • • • • Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi Page 89 92 92 93 93 94 96 105 132 132 133 136 145 193 193 193 194 197 209 209 209 212 223 255 255 256

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Chapter VI Discussion. • Concl usio n Hypothesis VI • • • Overview Data Discussion Conclusion Hypothesis VII • • • Overview Data Discussion Conclusion Discussion, Conclusions, and Implications Introduction • • • • • Overview • • • Major findings and conclusions • Intrastrata disparity • • . . . GS versus WG consistency. Civilian/Military consistency. • Supervisory/Nonsupervisory consistency • • • Minority /Non minority . . vii Page 258 276 332 332 333 334 338 354 354 355 359 375 432 432 432 434 434 439 440 441 consistency • • • • • • • • • 4 4 3 Organizational consistency High grade/Low grade 444 consistency • • • • • • • • • 4 4 5

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Chapter Supervisory discretion 1m plica tions • • • • • • Relationships between the literature and this study Future studies • • Appendices Appendix A Commonly used terms, acronyms, and abbreviations • • • • Appendix B Design • . . . . . . . . . . . . Hypotheses Methodology • Data Display • • Appendix C • • • • • • • • . • • • Supervisory questionnaire Appendix D • • • • • • • • • Employee questionnaire • Appendix E • • • • • • • • • • • Union survey approval Appendix F AF survey approval Bibliography • Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . Vita • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii Page 446 448 450 456 460 461 467 468 468 470 473 481 482 491 492 504 505 507 508 509 516 523

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This Dissertation for the Doctor of P ublic Administration Degree by Ste ven Albert Rockwell has been approved for the Graduate School of Public Affairs by Date August 23, 1980

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Until this moment I had not considered how difficult it is to express the degree of appreciation I owe to so many supportive friends. Indeed, they are many and without their time, advice, encouragement, and much needed moral support this stud y could never have been completed. I don't believe any student has ever demanded so much of an advisor's time and patience, and no advisor could have been more responsive than Dr. Mark McConkie. His cou nsel often went well into the night and occupied many, many weekends. My needs often took him from his family and I appreciate their patience and understanding. The USAF Academy top management and the employees who participated in this study could not have been more cooperative. Two outstanding Academy faculty members were especially instrumental in this study: Lt. Colonel (Dr.) Bill Rosenbach provided inva luable advice on the questionnaire construction, and Lt. Colonel Val Tirman spent long hours teaching me SPSS. Dr . Philip Burgess and Mr. Robert Dunn, of my committee, made themselves readily available with much appreciated academic and technical advice, as did Drs. Larry Keller, Floyd Mann, Tom Stewart, Mike March, and Jay Shafritz of the University of Colorado faculty. A special note of sincere appreciation goes to Mildred Mitchell for the exceptional support in typing and retyping the reams of drafts and the final product, and to Gloria Cipoth, Willma Stewart, and Dick Rockwell for their typing, proofreading, and coding support.

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Table 2.1 4.1 4.2 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.10 5.11 5.12 List of Tables Survey of Feder a l Employer Perceptions The Sampling Frame Stratified by Occupational Category, Race/ Ethnic Group, and Gender • • • The Questionnaire Sample Stratified by Occupational Category, Race/ Ethnic Group, and Gender • • • USAFA Population by Minority Status and Gender • • • WG/WL 1 4 • • • • WG/WL 5 or Higher • ws 1-4 . . . . . WS 5 or Higher • • • • • • • • • GS 1-6 (Nonsupervisory) GS 7 or Higher (Nonsupervisory) GS 1 or Higher (Supervisory) • • • • • • • Actual and Expected Formal Disciplinary Actions by Occupational Group, Ethnicity, and Gender • • • • • • Summary of Actual/Expected Formal Actions by Gender, Minority Status, and Supervisory Responsibility • • • Relationship Between the Gender of the Supervisor Taking Formal Disciplinary Action and the Race/Ethnic Group of the Appeliant (Calendar Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979) • • • • • • • Relationship Between the Gender of the Supervisor Taking Formal Disciplinary Action and the Gender of the Appellant (Calendar Year 1978 and Calendar Year Page 59 90 91 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 1979) • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 121

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Table 5o13 5o14 . 5 o15 5o16 5o17 5o18 5o19 5.20 5o21 Relationship Between the Gender of the Supervisor Taking Formal Disciplinary Action and the Type of Action Taken (Calenda r Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979) • • • • • . • • • • • • . Relationship Between the Race/Ethnic Group of the Supervisor Taking Formal Disciplinary Action and the Race/Ethnic Group of the Appellant (Calendar Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979) o o o o Relationship Between the Race/Ethnic Group of the Supervisor Taking Formal Disciplinary Action and the Gender of the Appellant (Calendar Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979). o o o • o o Relationship Between the Race/Ethnic Group of the Supervisor Taking Formal Disciplinary Action and the Type of Action Taken (Calendar Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979) • • • • o o • Grievances or Appeals Resulting From Disciplinary Actions Taken During Calendar Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979 • • • Grievances or Appeals Resulting From Disciplinary Actions Taken During Calendar Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979 • • o • • • o o o o Grievances or Appeals Resulting From Disciplinary Actions Taken During Calendar Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979 • . • • • • o o . • • o • Disciplinary Actions Reversed (Cancelled) as a Result of Grievances or Appeals Filed During Calendar Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979 • • o Disciplinary Actions Reversed (Cancelled) as a Result of Grievances or Appeals Filed During Calendar Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979 • o o • xii Page 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130

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xiii Table Page 5.22 Disciplinary Actions Reversed (Cancelled) as a Result of Grievances or Appeals Filed During Calendar Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979 • . . . . . 131 5.23 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on High or Low 148 Grade Level of Employee . . . . . . 5.24 Perceived Disparity i n Disciplinary Treatment Based on High or Low 149 Grade Level of Employee • . . . . . . . . 5.25 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on High or Low Grade Level of Employee . . . . . . 150 5.26 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on High or Low Grade Level of Employee • . . . . . . . . 151 5.27 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on High or Low Grade Level of Employee . . . . . . . . . 152 5.28 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on High or Low 153 Grade Level of Employee • . . . . . . . . 5.29 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on High or Low 154 Grade Level of Employee • . . . . . . . . 5.30 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on High or Low 155 Grade Level of Employee • . . . . . . . . 5.31 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on High or Low 156 Grade Level of Employee • . . . . . . . . 5.32 Perceived Disparity in D isci plinary Treatment Based on High or Low 157 Grade Level of Employee . . . . 5.33 Employee Attitude Regarding Magnitude of Penalty Deserved for High Versus 158 Low Grade Employees . . . . . . . . . 5.34 Employee Attitude Regarding Magnitude of Penalty Deserved for High Versus 159 Low Grade Employees . . . . . . . . .

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Table 5.35 5.36 5.37 Employee Attitude Regarding Magnitude of Penalty Deserved for High Versus Low Grade Employees • • • • • • • • • • Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Gender • • • • Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Gender • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 5. 3 8 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee xiv Page 160 161 162 Gender • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 16 3 5.39 5.40 5.41 5.42 5.43 5.44 5.45 5.46 5.47 5.48 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Gender • • • • • • . • • • Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Gender . • • • • . • • • • Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Gender • • • • • • • . • • Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Gender • • • . • • • • • • Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Gender • • • . • • • . • • Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Gender • • • • • • • • • • Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Gender • • . • . • • • • • Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Gender • • . • • • . • . • Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Gender . . • • • • • • • Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Gender . • • . • • • • • • . . . . . . 164 . . . . . . 165 166 . . . . . . 167 . . . . . . 168 . . . . . . 169 . . . . . . 170 . . . . . . 171 . . . . . . 172 . . . . . . 173

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Table 5.49 5.50 5.51 5.52 5.53 5.54 5.55 5.56 5.57 5.58 5.59 5.60 5.61 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Gender. • . • • • • • • . Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Gender • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Gender • • • • • • • • • • • • • Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Pay System • • • • Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Pay System • • • • • • • • • Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Pay System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Pay System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Pay System • • Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Pay System . . Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Pay System . . . . Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Pay System . . . . . . . . . • Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Pay System . Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Pay System XV Page 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186

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x vi Table Perceived Consistency in Application Pa ge 5.62 of Work Rules . . . . . . . . . t . . . 1 8 7 5.63 Perceived Consistency in Application of Work Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188 5.64 Perceived Consistency in Application of Work Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189 5.65 Perceived Consistency in Enforcemen t of Work Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190 5.66 Perceived Consistency in Enforcement of Work Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 5.67 Perceived Consistency in Enforcement of Work Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192 5.68 Relationship Between the Civilian or Military Status of the Supervisor Taking Formal Disciplinary Action and the Race/Ethnic Group of the Appellant (Calendar Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979). . . . . . . . . . 1 9 9 5.69 Relationship Between the Civilian or Military Status of the Supervisor Taking Formal Disciplinary Action and the Gender of the Appellant (Calendar Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979) • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200 5.70 Relationship Between the Civilian or Military Status of the Supervisor Taking Formal Disciplinary Action and the Type of Action Taken (Calendar Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201 5.71 Perceived Variation in the Propensity for Formal Discipline Dependent on the Military or Civilian Status of the Superv isor • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202 5.72 Perceived Variation in the Propensity for Formal Discipline Dependent on the Military or Civilian Status of the Supervisor • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203 5.73 Perceived Variation in the Propensity for Formal Discipline Dependent on the Military or Civilian Status of the Supervisor • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204

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Table 5o74 5o75 5o76 5o77 5o78 5o79 5o80 5o81 5o82 5o83 Perceived Variation in the Propensity for Formal Discipline Dependent on the Military or Civilian Status of the Supervisor o o o o o o 0 0 o o Perceived Variation in the Propensity for Formal Discipline Dependent on the Military or Civilian Status of the Supervisor o o 0 o o 0 0 o o o Perceived Variation in the Propensity for Formal Discipline Dependent on the Military or Civilian Status of the Supervisor o o o o o o o o 0 o Perceived Variation in the Propensity for Formal Discipline Dependent on the Milita ry or Civilian Status of the Supervisor o o o o o o o o o o Relationship Between the Supervisory or Nonsupervis ry Status of the Appellant a n d the Race/Ethnic Group of the Appellant (Calendar Year 1978 an d Calendar Year 1979) 0 Relationship Between the Supervisory or Nonsupervisory Status of the Appellant an d the Gender of the Appellant (Calendar Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979) o o o o o o Type of For mal Disciplinary Action Taken Aga inst Supervisory and Nonsuperv iso ry Employees (Calendar Year 1978 an d Calendar Year 1979) o Perceived C onsistency in Application and Enforcement of Discipline Between Supe rvisory and Non superviso ry E mployees o o o o o Perceived Consistency in Application and Enforcement of Discipline Between Supe rvisory and Non Superviso ry E mployees o o o o o Perceived Consistency in Application and Enforcement of Discipline Between Supe rvisory and Non supervisory Employees o o o o o xvii Page 205 206 207 208 227 228 229 230 231 232

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xviii Table Page 5.84 Perceived Con sistency in Application and Enforcement of Discipline Betwe en Supervisory and Nonsupe rvisor y Employees . . . . . . . . 233 5.85 Perceived Consis tency in Application and Enforcement of Discipline Between Supervisory and Nonsupervisory Employees . . . . . . . . 234 5 .86 Perceived Consistency in Application and Enforcement of Discipline Between Supervisory and Non supervisory Employees . . . . . . . . . . 235 5.87 Perceived Consistency in Application and Enforcement of Disciplin e Between Supervisory and Non-supe rvisory Employees . . . . . . . . . . 236 5.88 Perceived Consistency in Application and Enforcement of Disciplin e Between Supervisory and Non-supervisory Employees . . . . . . . . 237 5.89 Perceived Consistency in Application and Enforcement of Disciplin e Between Supervisory and Nonsupervisory Employees . . . . . . . . . . 238 5.90 Perceived Consistency in Application and Enforcement of Discipli ne Between Supervisory and Non-supervisory Employees . . . . . . . . . . 239 5.91 Perceived Variation in Discipli nary Penalty for the Same Offense . . . . . . . 240 5.92 Perceived Variation in Discip linary Penalty for the Same Offense. . . . . . . . 241 5.93 Perceived Variation in Discip linary Penalty for the Same Offense. . . . . . . . 242 5.94 Perceived Variation i n Discip linary Penalty for the Same Offense. . . . . . . . 243 5 .95 Per ceived Variation in Discip linary Penalty for the Same Offense. . . . . . . . 244 5.96 Perceived Variation in Dis ciplinary Penalty for the Same Offense. . . . . . . . 245

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Table 5.97 5.98 5.99 5.100 5.101 5.102 5.103 5.104 5.105 5.106 5.107 5.108 5.109 5.110 Perceived Variation in Disciplinary Penalty for the Same Offense. • Perceived Variation in Disciplinary Penalty for the Same Offense. • Perceived Variat ion in Disciplinary Penalty for the Same-Offense. • Employee AttitudeRegarding Magnitude of Penalty for Supervisory Employees, as Compared to Nonsupe-rvisory Employees, for the Same Offense. • • • • • • Employee Attitude Regarding Magnitude of Penalty for Supervisory Employees, as Compared to Nonsupervisory Employe-es, for the Same Offense. • • • • • • Employee Attitude Regarding Magnitude of Penalty for Su ervisory Employees, as Compared to Nonsupe-rvisory Employe-es, for theSame Offense-. • • • • • • Employee Attitude Regarding Magnitude of Penalty for Supervisory Employees, as Compared to Nonsupervisory Employees, for the Same Offense. • • • • • • Employee Attitude Regarding Magnitude of Penalty for Supervisory Employees, as Compared to Nonsupervisory Employees , for the Same Offense. • • • • • • Employee Attitude Regarding Magnitude of Penalty for Supervisory Employees, as Compared to Nonsupervisory Employees, for theSame Offense-. • • • • • • • • Perceived Fairne-ss of USAF A Disciplinary xi" Page 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 Policy • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • 2 7 9 Perceive-d Fairness of USAF A Disciplinary Policy • • • • • • • • . • • • • . • • 2 8 0 Perceive-d Fairne-ss of USAF A Disciplinary Policy 281 Pe-rceived Fairness of USAFA Disciplinary Policy 282 Pe-rceived Fairness of USAF A Disciplinary Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 8 3

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XX Table Page 5.111 Perceived Fairness of USAF A Disciplinary Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284 5.112 Perceived Fairness of USAF A Disciplinary Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285 5.113 Perceived Fairness of USAF A Disciplinary Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286 5.114 Perceived Fairness of USAF A Disciplinary Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287 5.115 Perceived Fairness in Treatment of Employees by USAF A Supervisors . . . . . . 288 5 .116 Perceived Fairness in Treatment of Employees by USAF A Supervisors . . . . . . 289 5.117 Perceived Fairness in Treatment of Employees by USAF A Supervisors . . . . . . 290 5.118 Employee Perception of the Existence of Supervisory Retaliation for Filing a Grievance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291 5.119 Employee Perception of the Existence of Supervisory Retaliation for Filing a Grievance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292 5.120 Employee Perception of the Existence of Supervisory Retaliation for Filing a Grievance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293 5.121 Perceived Fairness in Treatment of Employee by USAF A Supervisors . . . . . . 294 5.122 Perceived Fairness in Treatment of Employee by USAF A Supervisors . . . . . . 295 5.123 Perceived Fairness in Treatment of Employee by USAF A Supervisors . . . . 296 5.124 Employee Perception of the Consistency of Disciplinary Penalties When Comparing Their Own Supervisor 297 to Other Supervisors • . . . . . . . . . . 5.125 Employee Perception of the Consistency of Disciplinary Penalties When Comparing Their Own Supervisor to Other Supervisors . . . . . . . . . . . 298

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xxi Tab l e Page 5.126 Employee Perception of the Consistency of Disciplinary Penalties When Comparing Their Own Supervisor to Other Supervisors • . . . . . . . . . . 299 5.127 S upervisors Perception of Their Own Strictness in Application of Work Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300 5.128 Supervisors Perception of Their Own Strictness in Application of Work Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301 5.129 Supervisors Perception of Their Own Strictness in Application of Work Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302 5.130 Perceived Fairness of USAF A Disciplinary Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303 5.131 Perceived Fairness of USAFA Disciplinary Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304 5.132 Perceived Fairness of USAF A Disciplinary Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305 5.133 Employee Perception of Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Race/Ethnic Group . . . . . . . . . . 306 5.134 Employee Perception of Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Race/Ethnic Group . . . . . . . . . . 307 5.135 Employee Perception of Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Race/Ethnic Group . . . . . . . . . . 308 5.136 Employee Perception of Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Race/Ethnic Group . . . . . . . . . . 309 5.137 Employee Perception of Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Race/Ethnic Group . . . . . . . . . . 310 5.138 Employee Perception of Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Race/Ethnic Group . . . . . . . . • . 311 5.139 Employee Perception of Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Race/Ethnic Group . . . . . . . . . . 312

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Table 5.140 5.141 5.142 5.143 5.144 5.145 5.146 5.147 5.148 5.149 5.150 5.151 5.152 Employee Perception of Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Race/Ethnic Group • • • • Employee Perception of Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Race/Ethnic Group • • • • • . • • Employee Perception of Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Race/Ethnic Group . • • • Employee Perception of Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Race/Ethnic Group • • • . Employee Perception of Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Race/Ethnic Group • • • Perceived Fairness in Treatment of Employees by USAF A Supervisors Perceived Fairness in Treatment of Employees by USAF A Supervisors Perceived Fairness in Treatment of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Employees by USAF A Supervisors • • • Employee Perception of the Existence of Supervisory Retaliation for Filing a Grievance, Appeal, or EEO Complaint • • • • • • • • • • Employee Perception of the Existence of Supervisory Retaliation for Filing a Grievance, Appeal, or EEO Complaint • • . • . • • • . . Employee Perception of the Existence of Supervisory Retaliation for Filing a Grievance, Appeal, or EEO Complaint • • . . . • • . • • Employee Perception of the Existence of Supervisory Retaliation for Filing a Grievance, Appeal, or EEO Complaint • . . • • • . • . • Employee Perception Regarding Supervisory Attitude Toward a Previously Disciplined Employee • • • . . . • • . . • • . . x xii Page 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325

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Table 5.153 5.154 5.155 5.156 5.157 5.158 5.159 5.160 5.161 5.162 5.163 5.164 5.165 5.166 5.167 Employee Perception Regarding Supervisory Attitude Toward a Previously Disciplined xxiii Page Employee • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • 3 2 6 Employee Perception Regarding Supervisory Attitude Toward a Previously Disciplined Employee • • . • • . • • • • • • Employee Perception of the Constructive Nature of the Present Disciplinary Process. . . . . . . . . . Employee Perception of the Constructive Nature of the Present Disciplinary Process. . . . Employee Perception of the Constructive Nature of the Present Disciplinary Process. . Employee Perception of the Constructive Nature of the Present Disciplinary Process • Supervisors Personal Authority in Matters of Disciplinary Discretion Supervisors Personal Authority in Matters of Disciplinary Discretion Supervisors Personal Authority in Matters of Disciplinary Discretion Employee Perception of Their Own Supervisors Disciplinary Authority Employee Perception of Their Own Supervisors Disciplinary Authority . . . . . . Employee Perception of Their Own Supervisors Disciplinary Authority • Perceived Limitations on Disciplinary Penalty Discretion • • • • • Perceived Limitations on Disciplinary Penalty Discretion • • • • • • Perceived Limitations on Disciplinary Penalty Discretion • • . • 327 328 329 330 331 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350

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xxiv Table Page 5.168 Higher Level Management Pressure Influencing Disciplinary Discretion . . . . . 351 5.169 Higher Level Management Influencing Disciplinary Discretion . . . . . 352 5 .170 Higher Level Management Pressure Influencing Disciplinary Discretion . . . . . 353 5.171 Supervisors Perception of Personal Consistency in Application of 379 Work Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 .172 Superviso r s Perception of Personal Consistency in Application of 380 Work Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.173 Supervisors Perception of Personal Consistency in Application of Work Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381 5 .174 Employee Perception of Supervisory Consistency in the Administration of Discipline . . . . . . . . . . . . . 382 5 .175 Employee Perception of Supervisory Consistency in the Administration of Discipline. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 383 5.176 Employee Perception of Supervisory Consistency in the Administration of Discipline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 384 5.177 Employee Perception of Supervisory Consistency in the Administration of Discipline. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 385 5 .178 Employee Perception of How Strict Their Own Supervisor is, in Comparison to Other Academy Supervisors, in Applying Disciplinary Penalties . . . . . . . 386 5 .179 Employee Perception of How Strict Their Own Supervisor is, in Comparison to Other Academy Supervisors, in Applying Disciplinary Penalties • . . . . . . 387 5.180 Employee Perception of How Strict Their Own Supervisor is, in Comparison to Other Academy Supervisors, in Applying Disciplinary Penalties • . . . . . . 388

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XXV T abl e Page 5.18 1 Supervisory Perception of Higher L e vel Management Consistency in Disciplinary Penalties • . . . . . . . . 389 5.182 Supervisory Perception of Hig her Level Management Consistency i n Disciplinary Penalties • . . . . . . 390 5.183 Supervisory Perception of Higher Level Management Consistency in Disciplinary Penalties . . . . . . . . . 391 5.184 Employee Perception of Personal Super vis ors' Consistency in the Treatment of Co-workers • . . . . . . . . 392 5.185 Employee Perception of Personal Supervisors' Consistency in the Treatment of Co-workers • . . . . . . . . 393 5.186 Employee Perception of Personal Supervisors' Consistency in the Treatment of Co-workers • . . . . . . 394 5.187 Supervisory Perception of Consistency in Penalty Administration • . . . . . . . . 395 5.188 Supervisory Perception of Consistency in Penalty Administration • . . . . . . . . 3 96 5.189 Supervisory Perception of Consistency in Penalty Administration • . . . . . . . . 3 9 7 5.190 Employee Perception of Consistency in Penalty Administration • . . . . . . . . 398 5.191 Employee Perception of Consistency in Penalty Administration • . . . . . . . . 399 5.192 Employee Perception of Consistency in Penalty Administration • . . . . . . . . 400 5.193 Perceived Consistency in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Race/Etnnic Group • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 0 1 5.194 Perceived Consistency in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Race/Ethnic Group • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 402 5.195 Perceived Consistency in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Race/Ethnic Group • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 403

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Table 5.196 5.197 5.198 5.199 5.200 5.201 5.202 5.203 5.204 5.205 5.206 5.207 5.208 5.209 5.210 5.211 Supervisory Perception of C o nsistency in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Race/Ethnic Group • • • • • • Supervisory Percep tion of Consistency in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Race/Ethnic Group • • • • • • Supervisory Perception of Consistency in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Race/Ethnic Group • • • • • • . . " . . . . . Employee Perception of Supervisory Favor it ism • • • • • • • • • . . . . . Employee Perception . of Supervisory Favoritism • • • • • • • • • Employe e Perception of Supervisory Favoritism • • • • • • • • • Employee Perception of Supervisory Favor it ism • • • • • • • • • Employee Perception of Supervisory Favoritism • • • • • • • • • Employee Perception of Supervisory Favoritism • • • • • • • • Supervisory Perception of Higher . . . . . Management Favoritism • • • • • • • • • Supervisory Perception of Higher Management Favoritism • • • Supervisory Perception of Higher Management Favoritism • • • Supervisory Perception of Higher Management Favoritism • • • Supervisory Perception of Higher Management Favoritism • • • Supervisory Perception of Higher Management Favoritism • • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Supervisory Perception of C onsistency in Disciplinary Penalties When Compa r ing Them selves to Other USAF A Supe r visors • • • • • • • • • • • xxvi Pa g e 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419

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T abl e 5.212 5.213 5. 214 5.215 5.216 5.217 5.218 5.219 5.220 5.221 5.222 5.223 B.1 B.2 Supervisory Perception of Consistency in D isciplinary Penalties When C omparing Themselves to Other USAF A Super v isors • • • • • • Sup ervisory Perception of C o nsist e ncy in Disciplinary Penalties When Comparing Themselve s to Other . . . . . USAF A Supervisors • • • • • • • • • • • Employee Perception .Regard in g the Appropriateness of the Present Level of Disciplinary Penalty Magnitude • • • . • • • • • Employee Perception Regarding the Appropriateness of the Present Level of Disciplinary Penalty Magnitude • • • • • • • • • Employee Perception Regarding the AppropriatenC'ss of the Present Level of Disciplinary Penalty Magnitude • • • . • • • • • Employee Perception Regarding the Appropriateness of the Present Level of Disciplinary Penalty Magnitude • . . . . • . • • . . . • • Employee Attitude Toward Progressive Disciplinary Penalties • • • • • • . • • . Employee Attitude Toward Progressive Disciplinary Penalties • • • • • • • • • • Employee Attitude Toward Progressive Disciplinary Penalties • • • • • • • • • • Employee Attitude Toward Progressive Disciplinary Penalties • • • • • • • • • • Employee Attitude Toward Progressive Disciplmary Penalties • • • • • . • • • • Employee Attitude Toward Progressive uisciplinary Penalties • • , . • • • • Pressures on Supervisor Influencing Discretion . • • . • • . • Questionnaire Analysis: Demographic Data . . . . . . xxvii Page 42 0 4 2 1 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 4 3 0 431 474 475

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Table B.3 B.4 B.5 B.6 B.7 Questionnaire Analysis: Disciplinary History Data • . • • • • • • Q uestionnaire Analysis: Disciplinary System Data • • • • • • . . . . . Question Matches ( Supervisor to Employe e) • • • • • • • . . . . . . . Question Matches (Employee to Supervisor) • • • • • . • • Interview Objectives (Both Random and Select) • • • • • • • • xxviii Page 476 477 478 479 480

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Rockwell, Steven Albert (D.P .A., Doctor of Public Administrati on) Equity and Discretion -A Case Study of Discipline in a Pu b li c Agency Dissertation directed by Mark L. McConkie Work in the area of discipline has suffered from a lack o f rigorous investigation sensitive to the many subpopulations within the work f orce. The research reported here examines equity in enforcement of work rules between various subpopulations gender, race/ethnic group, blue/white collar, high/low pay grade, m ilitary/civilian supervisor. Data were collected at the United States Air Force Academy. Participants included civilian and military supervisors and civilian nonsupervisors. Questionnaire data were obtained from a stratified random sampling of employees (n = 181) and supervisors (n = 49). Interviews were conducted among randomly selected personnel (n = 18), and selected individuals (n = 23) whose official duties directly interfaced with either the disciplinary program or the equal employment opportunity program. The research included data from a saturation sample of formal disciplinary actions (n = 85) taken during calendar years 1978 and 1979. A questionnaire pretest (n = 38) was administered, followed by an interview with each pretest respondent seeking suggested improvements in the administration technique, instructions, or the instrument itself. The research is unique in several aspects. Race and ethnicity data are explored separately. Previous studies have concentrated on Black and non-Black populations, whereas this study concentrates on the existing race and ethnic minority groups. In addition, previous studies have not included rigorous investigation

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of gender, military/civilian superviso r y correlati ons , r elationsh i ps between the race/ethnic grou p o f the s upervisor to that of the appellant, and external press ures o n supervisory disciplinary discretion from higher m a nagement. The results indic a t e t he research successfully identified: 1) divergent perceptions between subord inate and superior regarding work rule enforcement throug h d isci p line, 2) inconsistent disciplinary en forcem ent among pay s ystem, ge nder, and skill level populations, 3 ) vari e d pr ope nsity f o r t ak ing f o r mal d is ciplinary actions between m ilit ar y and civilian super v i sors, 4) i mproper pressure a n d influen c e e x e r t e d on first l evel s u pervisors ' d i sci plin a ry discreti o n and authority, and 5) the strong relat i onsh i p between the occurrence of formal disciplinary action taken b y supervis ors of the same gender or race/ethnic group as the employee receiving discipline. The findings of the research are consistent with previous research and descriptive literature. The study dramatically demonstrates the seriousness of disciplinary problems, the differing standards applied to blue collar and white collar employees, as well as between skilled and unskilled workers. Disciplinary consistency is a major issue. In addition, the ground work is laid for more indepth investigation of such contemporary issues as gender and ethnic group implications as well as the unique Department of Defense military/civilian relationships. This abstract is approved as to form and content. I recommend its publication. Signed L. 1140Faculty ember i n chargf!Oissertation XXX

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CHAPTER I Overview Introduction The purpose of this study is to perform a comprehensive review of the employee disciplinary process at the United States Air Force Academy (USAF A). The results of this review will be utilized in developing an improvement action plan. Input for this study includes historical data obtained from case records as well as data on attitudes and perceptions of USAF A employees obtained through questionnaires and interviews. Background Human resource management, as with many other occupations, is confronted with rapid and drastic change. Federal personnel management, specifically, is being challenged on many fronts, necessitating a great deal of work. For example, promotion systems are being drastically revised. As a result, selection procedures and techniques such as interviewing, eligibility, rating and ranking, and performance appraisal systems, are being challenged in the courts regarding the validity of the "mer it principle." Job classification principles are in a continual state of tuning and the computer has, in a dramatic way, become a dominant reality in the personnel management field. Intermixed with all these changes are the pressures of equity and fairness being pursued under Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) concepts.

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The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (Public Law 95-454) directed the government to inaugurate large scale changes in the Federal personnel system. For example, the performance appraisal process, an integral part of the "merit promotion system," has been under fire for years. The performance appraisal system, which is a two-phase process evaluating both current performance and projected potential performance, is used as a key factor in determining who, among the candidates having the necessary experience qualifications for the job, would give the best performance if selected. Even though this factor is critical in the promotion process and the merit system, many Federal agencies have traditionally rated nonjob-related traits. These formats, to be useful, require constant change in order to overcome the continual and ever present inflation of ratings. This type of rating, designed to distinguish between the levels of performance of various employees, is increasingly less discriminating. In an attempt to solve this problem, the United States Air Force, through its Human Resource Laboratory at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, has undertaken a major project to improve the validity and reliability of performance ratings by emphasizing specific job related performance characteristics rather than traits in the appraisal process. In the new Air Force plan, two separate methods clearly distinguish between current and potential job performance. These and many other similiar changes will soon be evident in the entire Federal personnel system. Discipline In the area of discipline, the Civil Service Reform Act revi sed grievance and appeal rights to some degree. However, the 2

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disciplinary program, as such, was left virtually intact. In todays environment, where change is commonplace, it is essential to look, in some detail, at the techniques, principles and even the merit of existing disciplinary concepts. Viola tions of work rules occur, necessitating some type of formal di sciplinary system, to the degree that discipline is a significant part of the management of human resources. Most organi zations administer disciplinary actions through a progressive system that includes warning, reprimand, suspension, and discharge. Discip line, at every stage, is expensive. The employee may lose money and potential career advancement opportunities and management loses manhours and productivity in documenting, processing, and enforcing a disciplinary action. The ultimate disciplinary action, discharge --many times thought of as the "capital punishment" of the employment world carries an expensive replacement/retraining price tag for management. There is no simple solution. Most disciplinary cases have two sides. Employees have an imposing task in trying to conform to the many expectations and work rules demanded in the present-day organizational environment. Management today, particularly in a large organization, has a difficult task in maintaining a productive work environment and in retaining sensitivity to principles such as fairness and equity. Discipline At The USAF Academy The purpose of this study is to review, evaluate and i mprove, where possible, the disciplinary program in existence at the United States Air Force Academy. To this end, this project seeks to identify problem areas for subsequent development of an 3

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action program. Some employees, for instance, feel discipline is unequally applied. Racial minorities and low grade employees, they contend, are subject to more strict application of work rules than are others. Such concerns accent the significance of this study for at least four reasons: (1) The USAF Academy initiates a large number of disciplinary actions. In doing so, the process can become routine in nature and consequently punitive rather than constructive. (2) The study of discipline at the USAF A is unique because of the size, federal sector restrictions, and military/civilian relationships at the USAF Academy. (3) The conclusions from this study, as well as the methods used should be applicable in other public sector settings. ( 4) The problems examined suggest discriminatory overtones in formal disciplinary actions. Moreover, the suspected inconsistent application of discretionary supervisory authority accentuates the importance of this study's findings, not only to those allegedly discriminated against, but also to the USAF and the Federal personnel system as a whole. Dissertation Format The study is laid out in the following general format: Literature Review. An overview of employee discipline in both the public and private sectors is provided to acquaint the reader with such things as: (1) the historical background of employee discipline; (2) the conditions and causes that mandate a formal and fair disciplinary system; (3) the philosophical approaches and techniques of discipline; and (4) the most frequent contemporary methods of administering employee discipline. In so doing, the literature review shows how this study fills significant 4

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voids now existing in the personnel literature. Environment. The third chapter defines the work environment unique to this study. This includes an analysis and discussion of the workforce composition (i.e., skill levels, occupations, ethnic makeup), dem ographic data (i.e., summary of results from a recent quality of work life survey conducted on the USAF Academy which deals with such issues as job and career satisfaction, leadership competency and supervisory styles), and other factors impacting work life (e.g., union). Methodology. The next chapter explains and defines the specific techniques used in the data-gathering process. For example, data were collected through the use of questionnaires, interviews, and analysis of completed disciplinary actions actually administered. The study involves a complex stratification of the workforce . The process used to identify random respondents, which are representative of the actual strata population, is discussed. In addition, the rationale for the nonrandom selection (some interviews) is provided. Results. The hypotheses chosen for investigation in this study as well as the findings are discussed in Chapter V. Each hypothesis is presented as a separate and independent issue. In each case, after statement of the hypothesis, supplemental information is provided in an overview. This is followed in each instance by the data, discussion, conclusions, and tables germane to the hypothesis at hand. Discussion, Conclusions, and Implications. The final chapter discusses the major findings in the study, integrates the findings with the literature review, and develops conclusions which 5

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offer the reader areas open for further study. While the study itself deals with interactions within a civilian/military environment, the implications are that replication is possible and even required in any type of public or private personnel environment. Appendices. Several relevant issues are discussed in the appendices from which the reader, without extensive exposure to employee discipline, will benefit. A preliminary review of the definitions of terms, research design, and the questionnaires provide the reader with advance insight into the specific problems being investigated and the instruments used in the data-gathering process. Issues While the specific hypotheses are stated in both Chapter V and Appendix B, an overview of the problems being investigated is beneficial prior to reviewing the literature. Every large organization contains a variety of distinguishable strata within its workforce. These strata can vary considerably, depending on such things as geographic location and the type of work being done . Some of the commonly definable stratifications typically include race/ethnic group, age, gender, and occupational characteristics such as white or blue collar, skilled or unskilled, and so on . The first issue investigated in this study was the mathematical distribution of disciplinary actions between the key stratifications at the USAF Academy. This was done to see if discipline was administered in a mathematical relationship to the stratification populations. The specific stratification definitions 6

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are contained in Chapter V and Appendix B. Other issues investigated included the consistency in application and enforcement of work rules, variation in propensity for discipline from a military or civilian' supervisor, variations in disciplinary policy when supervisory employees are involved in disciplinary offense, specific concerns of racial and ethnic minorities, and restrictions on supervisory authority and discretion. 7

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CHAPTER II Relevant Literature Introduction Discipline within a work environment starts with the adoption of work rules by management, as they apply to that environment, and proceeds to the indoctrination of employees to the work rules with an explanation of why they are considered important. The employee is then expected to comply with the rules, as a form of self-discipline, in order to retain his employment. Violation of the work rules by the employee is followed by the administration of disciplinary measures by management to maintain order within the workforce. Customary Penalties In order to understand the literature discussed in this chapter, we begin with a background note on disciplinary measures as practiced in both the public and private sectors. This is easiest done by beginning with the least severe and moving toward the more severe forms of discipline. Counseling (also referred to as oral warning and oral admonishment) is generally used for first time minor offenses such as tardiness, loafing, carelessness in work practices, or delays in carrying out an order. This form of discipline is usually not made a part of the employee's formal work record. Written reprimand is generally used for repeat offenses of the work rule violations mentioned above or more serious

PAGE 39

violations of the employment agreement such as failing to report to work or shoddy workmanship. This form of discipline is usually included ln the employee's form al work record, but only for some specified period, such as two years. Suspension from duty (without pay) is used for repeat offenses, insubordination, drunkenness on duty, pUferage of low value items, and violation of safety rules which could affect either persons or property. This disciplinary action is normally a permanent part of the employee's formal work record. Removal (or discharge) is the most severe form of discipline and is used in cases of fraud, major theft, fighting, and so on. Other management actions may be taken as forms of discipline, such as reassignment to a less desirable job, or withholding pay increases or promotions, but these types of actions do not fall within the commonly defined definition of discipline. Overview It is unfortunate that the term discipline carries a negative connotation and is often thought of in a narrow and punitive sense. "It should," rather, " be a constructive, positive force that enables people to work together harmoniously •1' l The word "discipline" is derived from the word "disciple" meaning "follower." Good discipline within our management employee relationship would imply an obedient, orderly, reliable, and trustworthy workforce with good followers. Black's definition demonstrates the positive form of discipline ideal in management employee relations, observing that, in some settings, 9

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••• discipline means that everybody knows his job and each individual works cooperatively with the group to carry out orders. In such an organization, the members themselves enforce the rules of discipline, and penalties tor breaching them seldom need to be imposed. Most employees adhere to Black's definition; however, the few who do not conform create an expensive, time-consuming management problem which must be resolved. It is because of the few that volumes of theories and solutions have been written and must be investigated so that the many may continue to work in an atmosphere of cooperation and harmo ny. This chapter provides an overview of some of the significant literature relating to labor or workforce discipline. While the focus here is on the positive aspects of discipline, more often than not, the literature will view discipline as negative and punitive. This is because while management wants the disciplinary measures to be a constructive means of changing employee behavior, employees nonetheless view discipline as being negati ve. A brief historical look at the background of discipline, both in the public and private sectors, the con ditions and causes that mandate a formal disciplinary system, the philosophical approaches and techniques of discipline, and the most frequent contemporary methods of administering discipline will be explored to understand the punitive and constructive forms of discipline. This background is essential to investigating, analyzing, and developing a contemporary system that is acceptable to management and employees, and still meets organizational needs. History of Private Sector Discipline Conditions and approaches in the eighteenth and nineteenth 10

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centuries were very different from our present, and hopefully, more enlightened ones. In the colonial and post-colonial periods, for instance, employers literally controlled the occupational destinies of their employees. In addition, common law entitled the master to administer severe corporal punishment and insubordination -to illustrate the point was punishable by fine or flogging. This management right was available to employers and administered without threat of recourse by the employees to court action. Stessen notes that: If inattention to duty was subject to such severe penalties at the discretion of the employer, worker violence against the master called for even more severe retribution. A worker in New England who "laid violent hands upon his master" was disciplined by having his tongue burned with a hot iron. Stealing from the employer was an offense which called for a range of penalties from whippings to long jail terms. Even in those days of harsh (by our current standards) punishments, however, the employer was not adverse to mixing mercy with justice when the penalty interfered with productivity. In New Haven, when an employee was caught setting fire to his employer's establishment, the court ruled that the culprit should continue to be employed but that he should wear a heavy lock on his leg for a period of four years. It was the employer who called upon the mercy of the court and asked that the punishment be rescinded because the worker could not turn out an adequate day's work with such an ironclad handicap. Public humilation was another form of penalty practiced in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. A female worker who disobeyed her master was required to stand on a barrel in the public square for a half hour each day for a week. Across her breast a sign bore the legend that she had been unruly to her employer. The justification was that the worker deserved his submission because of his indolence and lack of initiative. The employer, it was held, was a superior being because he possessed the 11

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virtues of honesty, hard work and of course, temperance. The end of the nineteenth century brought change, and the courts began to look with a jaundiced eye on the practice of corporal punishment. Some concepts, such as an employer's right to discharge whomsoever he would, lingered on, and employees continued to be discharged with or without Such employer prerogatives and often insensitivities to employee needs and rights contributed to a perfect birthing climate for the unions' movement which became a powerful force by the 1870's. Up to this time, the employer had not had to face a meaningful employer-employee r e l a tionship. In 1873, the National Industrial Congress platform included some references to curbs and limitations on employee firings. This turn of events was directly confronted by employers. Indeed, • • • in 1903, the National Association of Manfacturers found it strategic to incorporate into its proceedings a set of principles restating what had always been considered to be an obvious, unquestioned prerogative. The NAM went on record as a defender of the management power to discipline or discharge employees at will. By the same principle of freedom of action, it enunciated the worker's inalienable right to quit or leave his employer at any time without fear of penance or penalty. Disturbing as this emerging notion may have been to employers of the day, the ethic that the worker deserved his fate and the e mployer earned his position through the process of survival of the fittest and natural selection continued to dominate the accepted tenants of labor relations. Unions were looked upon in management (and government circles as well) not as instruments to improve working conditions, wages and hours, but as weapons to institutionalize the worker's indifference, neglect and natural penchant for soldiering on the job (italics added). 4 12

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The early 1900's brought further change. The idea that employees might not be the sole source of problems began to penetrate the management hierarchy. This attitude in large part is attributable to the work of Frederick Taylor: Frederick W. Taylor and his principles of "scientific management" began to change the concept of the divine superiority of managers. His main idea was that workers were sources of untapped energy ready to do good work if properly trained and fairly treated. He argued that workers should be won over to scientific management by their supervisors. This required managers to abandon their prerogatives of instant dismissal and to substitute "just cause" as a standard of separation from the job. Thus scientific management became the first barrier to the common-law of the employer to fire for any or no cause. In addition to scientific management, the 1920's saw the disappearance of the infamous "business tycoon." Competitive economic pressures were forcing the owner-operator out of business, and a new administrator began to appear, one who retained his job not because of ownership, but rather because of ability. These administrators found that by following scientific management principles and applying "just cause" standards in lieu of instant dismissal, the growing labor organization influence could be helpful in "getting the job done." Thus there are two significant influences shaping the attitudes of employers regarding discipline and discharge: the acceptance of the principles of scientific management and the influence of organized labor. Another important step in the evolution of employee discipline was the introduction of arbitration in labor management disputes (circa 1920) as well as the collective bargaining mandate brought into existence by the National Industrial Recovery Act of 13

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1933 and the National Labor Relations Act of 1935. Industry was now required by law to deal with employees in a fair and reason able manner, utilizing, as it were, due process in the arena of managementemployee relations. As a consequence, the arbitration of discharge and disciplinary cases has become big business and remains so today. In fact, a recent private sector study showed that 26.4 percent of arbitration cases dealt with discipline or discharge. 6 History of Public Sector Discipline It may be to the credit of President George Washington's basic honesty and high ideals that the Federal civil service system today still places importance on character, competence, and loyalty to the Constitution. Being politically astute, Washington paid deference to the geographical distribution of appointments, paying heed to recommendations of senators, congressmen, and governors. He recognized the needs of his beloved veterans and courteously denied appointments based on nepotism. 7 Of the 3,000 appointments made during this administration, there were about 17 removals for poor character or inefficiency. 8 While the laws and statutes pertaining to appointments to civil service have seen many changes, reforms, and influences over the years, Washington's basic standards are still followed. Political patronage and a spoils system were an integral part of early appointments to not only cabinet and policy level positions, but to lower level jobs as well. It is easy to see that job security and continuity of operation, as well as competence, in administration suffered. After the Civil War, however, continuity of administrative functions improved when comptrollers, auditors, 14

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and chief clerks of departmental services in Washington as well as minor clerks, scientific and technical personnel, and the officer corps of the Army and Navy were permitted to retain their jobs regardless of which party was in power. 9 The functions of personnel adm inistration included maintaining employment records, supervising employee activities, assigning work, and indoctrinating new employees. All these tasks belonged to the chief clerks in each of the departments, both in Washington and in field offices. Tr ainin g was unknown, promotions were few, and retirement policies nonexistent. Likewise, as in business, there was no legal protection against removals. Not until 1853 did Congress require "pass-examinations" for entrants into clerical offices. Each department was responsible for creating its own tests. Uniformity finally arrived in 1883 when the Pendleton Act established the Civil Service Commission.10 Interesting aspects of this civil service reform which paralleled President Washington's thinking were: no more than two members of a family were eligible for public office, and the majority of the clerical offices in Washington were filled by apportionment among the states so that the civil servants would be representative of the nation as a whole in terms of geography, mobility, and ideals.ll Although the beginning of the merit system of public employment began with the Pendleton Act, it originally encompassed only about 10 percent of the civil servants. It was President Grover Cleveland who, with much opposition from both political foes and friends, moved the bulk of Feder al employees from the spoils system into the merit system of the civil service 15

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12 system created by the Pendleton Act. . The United States Civil Service Commission was created to neutralize the effects of the spoils system upon the Federal service by developing and administering entrance examinations, recruitment of personnel, and investigation of potential employees. It was not until an 1897 Executive Order by President McKinley, which was strengthened in 1899, that rules for removal from Federal government service began to be formulated. Employee rights were protected to the extent that, No removal shall be made from the competitive classified service except for just cause and for reasons given in writing; and the person sought to be ren 0 ved shall have notice and be furnished a copy of such reasons, and be a rJor personally answermg the same m wntmg. Here we see where authority to remove an employee in the public sector becomes enclaved in a time-consuming bureaucratic process where the appointing authority is denied his concurrent authority to demote or dismiss. Unlike his private sector counterpart, who could remove an ineffective employee because the profit motive would not allow for inefficiency, the public sector manager was himself on trial. He had to defend and justify his proposed action to his superior who, if in agreement, would do likewise until the matter reached the secretary of the department.14 The argument for placing dismissal authority at a higher level was that it eliminated favoritism. There was little incentive to arbitrarily dismiss an employee unless the dismissing official also controlled the appointment of the successor •15 The Pendleton Act did permit the Civil Service Commission to investigate if an 16

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employee claimed the proper procedure was not followed. Otherwise, dismissal decisions remained with the department head. Opponents, however, maintained that the time it took to remove an inefficient, lazy, or worthless employee created a problem for the immediate supervisor responsible for managing the inefficient employee while still trying to get the job done. Meanwhile, public funds, they maintained, were being wasted while intermediate supervisors studied the allegations before forwarding the case}6 Civil service reformers were divided between an "open back door" group, which believed that the responsible appoint ing officer should have almost unrestricted power to dismiss, and the "closed back door" proponents who believed that the central personnel agency should have dismissal power with administrative officers preferring the charge.17 Mosher and Kingsley are two for instance, who believed that placing the authority for disciplinary action with the department head in Washington "resulted in unnecessary delay. 1118 ... Following private sector leadership in unionization, the American Federation of Labor began actively lobbying congress to remove the so-called "gag order" imposed by President Theodore Roosevelt, and continued by President Taft, which forbade federal employees from seeking to influence legislation in their own behalf, either individually or through associations. Until then (1912) Federal employees had no voice in their destinies since tne Pendleton Act also forbade unionization. The Lloyd-LaFollette Act removed the gag order, allowed unionization, and assured protection of employees under the McKinley Executive Order on 17

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19 remo vals. It was during this same period, when the private sector was feeling the influences of the Taylor school of "scientific management," that the newly emerging Federal unions believed the stop watch measures would be counter to their purpose. They testified against these management techniques and in 1914 successfully obtained legislation which banned timed studies in military agencies. It was not until the Korean conflict that most of these restrictions were finally lifted and progressive work measurement programs and engineering standards were introduced into the Depart ment of Defense. The unions were also successful in delaying the introduction of new machinery, to some extent, in establishments such as the Bureau of Engraving and Printing. 20 These are but two examples of how the public sector lagged behind the more progressive private sector. Another glaring example of private sector leadership, ironically mandated by Congress, was in the area of arbitration of disciplinary disputes. The private sector gave employees this right in the 1920's; public sector employees gained this right, in part, by President Kennedy's Executive Order 10988 (1962), and then only the less severe disciplinary measures, to include suspen sions of less than 30 days, could be arbitrated. Full arbitration of all discipli nary actions was not permitted until the passage of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (Public Law 95454).21 Likewise, basis for the differin g degrees of disciplinary actions for infraction of work rules was inconsistent in application within and among Federal departments. This is now a negotiable item with unions. There is little written about discipline and 18

PAGE 49

dealing with it in Federal sector literature. These managers are required to seek advice and procedures from the private sector and apply it within the scope of laws, orders and agency guidelines. For this reason, the following literature review, lo include studies, is from the private sector. What Necessitates a Labor Disciplinary System? Why do some people not perform and what creates the need for a disciplinary system? While there are numerous approaches to answering this question, perhaps a look at history will provide some insight. We note first the powerful impact of the Protestant work ethic, which had origins in Medieval and Reformation religious teachings, and which taught that labor was among man's highest duty. Calvinism even viewed worldly wealth as evidence of Divine approval. Social Darwinism and laissez-faire liberalism mixed with these religious beliefs created the powerful Protestant work ethic. 22 Similar il y, discipline evolved from this historical perspective, and those unwilling to work learned to expect some form of punishment. To return to the original question of why some people do not work as expected, we could assume they are not committed to this country's work ethic, or that they have negative feelings concerning leadership behavior, work environment, pay, culture, or technology. In short, perhaps the loss of individuality among the masses causes the poor work performance which is counter to the employer's need to employ a cohesive workforce. These team building concepts in the work environment are what we are concerned with here: the need for employee understanding of work rules and disciplinary processes with the understanding that the 19

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rules are of mutual benefit. Absenteeism. Ulustrative of the significance of work rules is the single issue of absenteeism. Kuzmits points out that: Employee absenteeism ranks as one of the most burdensome of organizational ills. Various studies suggest that the "average" employee takes from seven to twelve days of unscheduled absence per year. And the aggregate loss in wages and salary-to cite only one of the "costs" of absenteeism-has been at up to $20 billion per year . While the issue of absenteeism appears to be relatively straight forward and easy to solve (i.e., no work --no pay), Luthans and Martinko illustrate how worker apathy cou ld cause the problem to get even worse. Absenteeism varies slightl y with the type of industry but all types of organizations--manfacturing, hospitals, retail stores, and government agencies-are ••• experiencing the problem. The most publicized in cidents of absenteeism are in the auto industr y. It is common knowledge among cons umers today that you don't buy an automobil e that has been assembled on either a Friday or a Monday. The chance of getting a "lem on" is much greater because the auto was prob ably assembled by either part-time help or a department that was shorthanded. Workers don't come to work on Fridays or Mondays. They take a long weekend. When one of the auto workers from the infamous Lordst own plant of General Motors was interviewed, he was asked, "Why do you only come to work four days a week?" His answer has significant implications for the absenteeism problem. He replie44 "I don't make enough bread in three days." Youth. Some authors feel labor discipline seems to have a higher incidence in younger workers and suggest this could be attributable to the younger generation's rejection of the idea of unquestioning obedience. The logic of it all is straight forward: 20

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youth are extremely mobile, and less dependent on a single given employer. Skilled employees are in demand, and if thin gs are not to their liking, they move . Other writers assert that to a considerable extent, young factory workers share the attitudes of the present generation of college students. Whether it is labeled youth rebellion, counter-culture or opposition to the both groups share the same motivation. Minorities. The causes of nonconfor min g behavior which result in discipline are so complex and numerous, one could not hope to cover them all. In light of tod ay's attitudes toward nondiscrimination and equity, however, one must look at who receives the disciplinary actions, whether they result from cultural background, and if disparities exist, how they can be corrected. As a result the Civil Rights Act of 1964, James Black asserts that industry now must absorb significant quantities of employees from nonmiddle-class groups who have values and standards that differ from America's vast majority. These people lack the education, skills, self-discipline, and even, in some cases, the will to achieve success. As if these deficiencies in themselves were not enough to overcome, disadvantaged minority citizens suffer from the irresponsibility of many of their leaders. These men preach hostility to the establishment and promise shortcuts to riches through the use of force -by which, they say, they can exact recompense for past wrongs, perhaps even enabling their followers to establish a state within a state. Such proposals are impossible of attainment, but this does not lessen their appeal to people who have been stirred up emotionally anq cannot be expected to welcome "nuts and bolts" programs based on hard work when their objectives can seemingly be won 21

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by other and more exciting methods. To take a person from such an environment and instill in him the attitudes and motivation that are necessary for accomplishment in organized industry is a monumental undertaking, especially when, like as not, such a person returns each day to a ghetto home where his associates have views and modes of living that are completely opposite from those of his fellow employees at the company. This is not to say that he cannot be trained to perform useful jobs or that it is impossible to teach him the worth of those standards that the middle class takes for granted. It does mean that industry cannot do the job alone, nor can it easily introduce large numbers of undisciplined, untrained people into an organization all at once without destroying the morale an46 efficiency of the organization itself. In his study at Ford Motor Company, Carl Gersuny substantiated many of Black's observations about Black workers. Gersuny also found Blacks incurred a disproportionate share of the penalties; there was, indeed, prejudice toward them from foremen d . t• 27 an umon representa tves. The Gersuny study also notes that other variables relating to discipline warrant consideration. For example, where stringent discipline was required on nonautomated assembly lines, the incidence of nonconforming behavior was higher than in shops and departments where automation relieves supervisors of enforcing assembly production and worker compliance. Gersuny also found a consistent relationship in the types of employees receiving discipline. Notably, high seniority men incurred fewer penalties than low seniority men; skilled workers, fewer than nonskilled. Age, interestingly enough, was not a factor in the distribution of penal ties.28 22

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Gandz's study similarly, substantiates the finding that grievance rates are higher among low-skilled, low-seniority 1 h 1 . 1 . h' ' 29 emp oyees w ere emp oyee-superv1sory re at1ons 1ps are poor. Standards of Performance One of the most frequently overlooked reasons for lack of discipline is the absence of specific standards of performance. The employee may not know or have hacf access to all the company rules or a clearcut explanation of the office and supervisor's expectations. One of the basic rules of standards is that they must be known and understood by both workers and supervisors. It's too late to explain the rule or stand'lrd for the first time whEJb we start to discipline an employee. Another frustrating and distressing reason for below standard performance is conflicting and opposing standards. While one standard or rule may be understood and applied, close inspection of the many rules in existence in many environments may, in fact, produce direct conflict , In other words, while meeting one standard, an employee may be violating another. First, ••• we tell a worker to work safely, always use an approved ladder, and not run. Then we get a hurry to meet a production standard and realize it can't be met this afternoon unless we get certain adjustments made up above the line, so we shove a box over and tell the employee to get on it and fix the problem --or to hurry down and get the ladder out of the store room. We have competing standards, in other words. We know what will happen, of course. The clerk or the assembly worker will give in to the pressure, doing that job that involves the most reward a.l)p least punishment and letting the other go. Another reason employees do not perform up to standard is 23

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the lack of adequate, meaningful training. An employee cannot be expected to appear on the job and, after a brief explanation, completely perform the job and follow all the rules. New employees, quick to please and uncomfortable in the new environment, will often say they understand, when, in fact, they are afraid to ask questions or appear dumb. It's easier and more co mfortable to figure it out on their own. Recognizing this attitude in new employees, more innovative approaches to training as a means of reducing discipline are needed. Training is discipline in its highest form. The object of all discipline is to educate the employee in the fundamental patterns of acceptable behavior and performance. Employees should be taught that rules are made for their benefit, not to coerce them or set up a military regime. Careful hiring procedures, adequate and effective training, good supervision, and job will reduce discipline to a mm1mum. La ck of feedback in the form of encouragement and compli ments, and ineffective employer-employee communications can re sult in substandard performance. When employees get apprai se d once a year, they cannot meaningfully relate to how they are perf orming a given task on any given day. There should be no surprises at appraisal time. The employees should be well enough informed along the way that they know just where they stand. The important thing is that they know how they are doing, and receive frequent feedback, reinforcement on what they do well, and whatever correction is needed. This allows the job to flow in an orderly fashion, instead of fluctuating up and down as often happens when anrwl appraisals are the only form of feedback. Incorrect reinforcement can support poor or inappropriate 24

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performance. As shown in the discussion on conflicting standards, the employee may not know which rule to follow; when the employee is rewarded for getting the job don e quickly (even though safety standards were violated) the speed o f project completion is given priority over the standard of safety. Another frequently overlooked cau s e of discipline is the organization itself. Boncarosky points out that: Some of the problems created by organizations include unsound and unnecessarily restrictive policies and regulations, and improper expectations. Unsound and unnecessar i1 y restr ictive policies only invite violations by em ployees. Policies and regulations should be clearly to the overall perform ance of the JOb. Why Work Rules are Violated Disciplinary actions are not, however , always attributable to management shortcomings. While management inconsistenci es and shortcomings do account for some of the problems, there are still employees who will not or do not follow the rules. Most employees do not object to the existence of rules and regulations. They give order to the job environment. What they do object to is the format of discipline. In civil life, a policeman arrests, a jury tries, and a judge sentences. In employment life, the supervisor serves all three functions. The percentage of workers, as with most personnel problems, who require formal disciplinary action is small. While some employees are openly defiant of rules and order, many times the causes are such things as illness, money problems, or worries at home. 25

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One study of 4,174 discharge cases showe d that 62.4 percent were for persona l shortcomings of the employees themselves. Underlying personal characteristics that came up most were carelessness, noncooperation, lazi ness , dishonesty, a lack of initiative, lateness, lack of effort. The foreman's job, as a result, to help employees to be better adjusted. Whatever the cause for substandard performance, definite policies and procedures are essential to assure resolution of the shortcomings. If the root of the problem is management, then management must be able to identify the problems, react to needs, and modify its attitudes or policies. If the problem is the employee, as opposed to leadership, then management must correct the problem through whatever means are equitable and fair formal discipline, if that is what is called for. It is important to the welfare of both employees and management that adherence to company rules be achieved and that an effective disciplinary policy exist. The function of formal disciplinary actions should not and cannot be to change what has already happened . It is to prevent reoccurrence of the substandard behavior. Modern industry requires that its personnel be not only technically competent to do the various jobs assigned to it, but capable of working in harness and harmony with other workers, willing to follow instructions and accept supervision. These are a part of their total productive value. Still, disciplinary systems do fail. Reasons for failure are as numerous as the sheer count of supervisors. For example, Oberle feels one of the main reasons for system failure is the failure to take disciplinary actions when called for. He cites the reasons for failure to act as ranging 26

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••• from ignorance of the organizational rules and regulations to fear of forma l grievances. Perhaps the most typical reason supervisors avoid disciplining employees is dislike of an unpleasan t experience that can result in371oss of friendship with the employee. Wohlking, however, sees the problem differently. The two most widespread problems in the administration of discipline are, 1) a broad managerial failure to act promptly in dealing with discipline problems as they occur; or 2) overreaction a long overdue action is finally taken. In sum, to reduce incidents of disciplinary actions, the literature overwhelmingly supports t e need for clear, concise work rules which can be justified a s being related to. the work environment, established performance standards and expectations which do not conflict with one another, and an orientation and training program for new employees which clearly defines management expectations. In addition, the literature justifies the need for improved communiction between the supervisor and the employees to include frequent discussion and feedback on employee performance to include positive reinforcement when standards are being met and counselling and prompt corrective action in the form of discipline, if required, when standards are below acceptable levels. Management must be willing to objectively and critically review established work rules and develop standards and then train supervisors; it must then teach this to the employees and show consistency in enforcement. To achieve this aim, management requires an understanding of the basic disciplinary philosophies and approaches in resolving disciplinary problems. 27

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Disciplinary Philosophies and Approaches Modern management understands that positive discipline is achieved through positive leadership . The ultimate goal or result being sought is compliance with agen cy or company rules and reasonable output. To obtain positive results, or employee compliance with work rules, mana gement must consi der the basic philosophies and approac hes available, and develop a syst em to be followed within the organization. The forthcom ing discussion dealing with the philosophical and practiced appro aches will be helpful to this end. Philosophies . The philosophies of discipline rest on three basic schools of thought, each distinguished by value system s based upon the varied emphasis given to the needs of the organization as opposed to th e needs of the individual employee. The three philosophies can be thought of as authoritarian, anarchic, and due process. An authoritarian system of dis cipline considers the organization to be overpowering. An extreme exam ple of this philosophy is the military in tim e o f war. Judgment and execution are dispensed by the responsible authority, with no appeal other than personal and exceptional arrangements for review. Conduct is customary, understood, and rigidly fixed. All decisions are discretionary at the will of the superior. If the rights of the individ u al take precedence over those of the organization, the anarchic philosophy prevails. Conduct of the subordinates is self-determined; the responsible authority either permits such action as a matter of policy or has insufficient power to compel contrary behavior. While this system is usually regarded as the antithesis of discipline, it actually may be one form of cooperative activity. 28

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The due-process view is the intermediate philosophy which is based on a body of recognized rules and is administered under some form of judicial procedure. The key factor in this system is formality, where specific penalties for various acts of misbehavior are stated, and formal methods are followed in charging, investigating, proving and punishing. Channels of appeal are provided for the accused, and discipline is either in the hands of a third party or the final stage of appeal for someone in a judicial position. Basic Approaches. The newly promoted supervisor would be overwhelmed with the amount of literature and diversity of approaches to discipline. This section will present an overview of approaches to discipline, by first establishing the generally accepted outer parameters of approaches, with an illustrative example of each extreme, followed by a number of variations within the established parameters. The extreme approaches taken to disciplinary problems can be roughly classified into two main categories: judicial/legalistic and humanistic. Judicial/Legalistic Approach. Although modern managers would have difficulty in disciplining a work force using a judicial approach as the only method of maintaining discipline, there are times when this approach is justified and called for. The judicial approach is characterized by an attempt to determine the rightness or wrongness of an employee's action in a particular situation. If the worker was "wrong," the supervisor metes out the predetermi ned punishment. The emphasis is on the solution to the immediate problem rather than on the possible consequences of the decision . Getting the facts, screening out opinions, and finally weighing the evidence are important steps in the judicial approach. 40 29

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Undoubtedly, the most extreme example of the judicial/legalistic approach to discipline is what Martin refers to as "summary discipline" or the immediate discharge of an employee. He maintains that offenses such as theft, physically assaulting a supervisor, and gross insubordination usually warrant immediate discharge regardless of the employee's previous work record. 41 Summary discipline, or immediate dismissal, is used on a regular basis within the federal government during the probationary period (the first year of federal employment) on an even grander scale than described by Martin. Probationary employees can be and are terminated for even relatively m inor breaches of established work rules. The Federal personnel system does not require a comprehensive review process for termination during the probationary period nor is the employee granted any extensive right of appeal to such discharge action. The "slide rule approach," as addressed by Wohlking, provides another example of the judicial/legalistic approach to discipline. Whenever the subject of discipline is discussed, the exercise of judgment, with all of its intangible meanings, is stressed. Because good judgment is something which is not acquired easily, some organizations attempt to eliminate judgments that a supervisor is required to exercise in disciplinary cases by developing a "slide rule" set of discipline policies. This means a quantitative approach to the discipline process. "Sli de rule" discipline has some of the qualities of progressive discipline, but because of its rigidities, it is not the same. For example, discipline policy based on this concept might state, "the second time an employee is found smoking in the work area, he will be suspended for three days," or, "any employee having more than three 30

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unexcused absences in a sixty day period will be suspended for one day." Under a "slide rule" application of the latter policy, a supervisor would have no choice but to suspend an employee who had three unexcused absences in a sixty day period. If supervi so rs are following a progressive discipline approach, they decide whether there were extenuating circumstances in the situation before taking any disciplinary action. If they then decide upon an action, an assessment of the situation would then determine the severity of the discipline. In effect, the "slide rule" approach sets very specific quantitative standards abf?2't the consequences of a specific violation. Humanistic Approach. Following the definitions provided by Heckmann and Huneryager of the competing of approaches to discipline, they define the humanistic approach as being • • • characterized by an emphasis on problem-solving. The question of rightness or wrongness of behavior is subordinate to the question of "How can I encourage this worker to perform in a desirable manner?" As in most problem solving, the supervisor's behavior is characterized by flexibility and adaptiveness, with the result that a variety of solutions may be followed on diffEi(ynt occasions in gaining the same objective. Dicenza and Smith provide an example of the human relations approach by suggesting that the supervisor's primary role should not be one of imposing discipline, but rather should be one of creating an atmosphere that fosters self-control of desired behavior. The supportive approach to discipline assumes that each employee is a valuable individual 4IP port ant contribu tions to an orgamzatton. They go on to say that, The supervisor must assist his employees in conquering their problems in order that they can again make contributions to their organizations. 31

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Variations of Basic Approa ches. Within the bounds formed by these polar opposites are countless variations. For example, George Odiorne points out that modern discipline is forced to meet a number of new requirements beyond simple punishment. Modern values have led away from physical punishment, and the dueprocess system has led to increased appeals and the concept that it is more acceptable to allow many guilty to escape punishment rather than to punish one innocent person. Odiorne's philosophy, stretching beyond the old fashioned "eye for an eye" dogma, encourages discipline by objectives and asserts that in today's environment, enlightened management must adapt to changing solutions to discipline. In speaking of the old fashioned forms of discipline, Odiorne notes: While it is entirely conceivable that such may have had some behavior-change objectives, over time such exacting kinds of punishments acquired a character quite apart from the behavior-change effect, and became an almost divinely inspired system of cause and effect, as 4t the crime itself produced the punishment. While Maier and Danielson promote the use of the human relations approach, this concept cannot stand alone. It is the responsibility of the first line supervisor to enforce the rules of the company. While this can generally be achieved without resorting to formal disciplinary action, on occasion it is necessary to use the disciplinary power. In other words, a supervisor must deal with the problem employee, but need not invoke his disciplinary authority, if an informal resolution, such as a warning, will solve the problem. The act of disciplining is an unpleasant event. It would be much easier for the supervisor to turn his head and ignore the act or 32

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substandard performance. Definite poli cies and procedures for handling disciplinary matters are essential for insuring fai r treatment of offenders. Each supervisor should be f urnished with a written policy an d a standardized procedure, including r ecomme nded penalties for specific infractions of the rules that may serve as a guide in determining what type of disciplinary action should be taken. While it is usually recom mended that disciplinary action be handled on an impartial basis without regard for the specific circumstances involve d, most individuals rebel against the im position of inflexible rules. Rather than being forced into the rigid enforcement of rules and not being supported by management, supervisors will often "turn their heads " and fail to take any action on employee behavior that, according to the rule book, should be formally recognized and appropriately disciplined. In fact, this inac tion on the part of supervisors, which has be come commonp\rfe, is referred to as the indulg ency pattern. Formal discipline is a time-consuming and expensive process from which few get pleasure. Torbert discusses one innovative approach that meets the com pany's objectives and receives employee support by allowing them to participate in mak ing and enforcing company rules . At the same time it is making discipline a mion responsibility. He found that when employees make and enforce the rules their decisions are usually more severe than are those imposed by most present-day management. 48 All of these approaches in viewing and dealing with the disciplining of employees who violate work rules refer to positive discipline or methods which will encourage a positive response from employees and not leave the employee with a negative attitude toward the job or organization. However, the employee's perspective of the disciplinary action must also be dealt with. 33

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Negative Aspects of Discipline Contemporary attitudes dic tate the necessity of viewing and acting in a positive, problem -solvin g, constructive way w hen dealing with d isci pline . To a large degree, this is and m ust b e manage ment's attitude and app roach; h owever, negative aspects of discipline are usuall y present. Disch a r ge is clearly viewe d as a negative act involvin g not only the employee, but a lso the employe e ' s f amily and probab l y the emplo yee's future e mp loyment opportunities . In this conte xt, discipline i s not c onstructive . What management has conc eded is tha t it has f ailed and cannot succeed in establishi ng a healthy e mpl oy e e-employ e r r e lationship . Fear o f t h is type o f negative a c t i on i s sometimes the only deterrent. Good does n o t derive from correcting the damage done -this is a loss, more or less. It must come from a changed attitude toward the com p any's rules and regulations. It is too bad t hat some employees are willing to obey rules onl y for fear of penalties. But if it is to their benefit to have j obs, a nd if fear keeps the m on the "straigh t and narrow," the use of reasonable penalties is of benefit to the employees themse lves . It m\)st be remembered that to some degree, fear rules the lives of all of us. The wise man can get along with a minimum of fear; yet, he too recognizes that it acts as a spur in his activities. This brief comment upon fear, upo n w hich penalties essentially rest, is not intended as justification of irresponsible emplo yment of it. The role of .fear should be restricted; nevertheless, when . its use is calle d for, executives be trained to employ it intelligent! y. Wheeler's writing reinforces the idea that discharge is not corrective and should be used "infrequently and only when corrective measures have failed or are useless because of the nature of the offense."50 34

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Connellan points out three methods of getting rid of unwanted behavior: punishment, extinction, and enforcing desired behaviors. He views punishment as: ••• an act that follows a specific behavior with another act or event that is presumed to be punishing. If the initial behavior occurs less frequently, after this punishment, then the follow-up event or act was a punisher. If, however, the initial event or behavior is followed with a presumed punisher and the initial behavior does not change, the follow-up act is not a punisher. In order to define something as a punisher, the follow-up event must be related to the initial behavior and m us t also result in a decrease in that behavior. If the behavior does not de5fease, then there has been no punishment. Punishment is frequently used because it appears to work-at least in the short run. However, punishment can work against management's intended purpose of effective discipline if the employee does not view it as a means of correcting inappropriate behavior. In this case, people can develop an immunity to punishment just as they do to medication. Consequent! y, individuals who are punished frequently become immune to punishment and it ceases to affect their behavior. 52 Along the same lines, Luthans and Martinko, discussing punishment within organization behavior modification concepts, note: The position of 0. B. Mod. with respect to negative control of behavior is very reserved. Negative control has several undesirable side effects. First, it puts the supervisor and other management personnel in the position of being aversive stimuli for employees. It limits management's ability to serve as a reinforcer for appropriate 35

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behavior since the employee may ascribe all contact with management as aversive . Secondly, punishing consequences are difficult to use effectively without jeopardizing the relations with the employees, union, and the public. Finally, and probably most important, the effect of punishment is often only temporary; it tends to suppress the behavior, not permanently change it. Absenteeism frequently up despite reprimands and discipline. The effects of punishment wear off. With the last speeding ticket one probably drove more slowly for some period of time, but as time passed, the old habits likely returned, at least to some degree. In addition, punishment m ay eliminate more behavior than intended. By criticizing a sp eci fic .. u ggestion as a dumb idea, we may effectively eliminate suggestions from that individual as he will not again want to risk the possibility of offering another dumb idea. Punishment is the supervisor's way of saying "don't do" and does not effectively teach the employee what to do. This negative incentive has more long-term undesirable effects than may be immediately recognized. For example: 1. Uncooperative and emotionally unstable individuals are most likely to be frustrated by the punishment, yet they are the very persons most likely to receive it. 2. Threat of punishment highlights what not to do, thus suggesting an action not previously considered by the individu al so threatened. "Don't kill a child," is an instruction given to drivers who have neither the desire nor the intent to kill a child. On the other hand, a sign "School Children Crossing" is a positive instruction and suggests the desired action. One company displayed 36

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over the time clock a list of 22 different violations and the punishment that went with each. It is doubtful whether any empl o yee could have thought of so many ways to cause trouble. 3. Punishment and the thought of being punished create a hostile state of mind, thereby setting up an unfavorable attitude. All things, events, and experiences occurring during this state of mind become associated with it. Employees who are punished for poor work manship are prone to develop unfavo rable attitudes toward the job. The reverse is true for reward. 54 4. The threat of punishment creates fear and reduces the acceptance of ideas. Experimental evidence supports the belief that fear-arousing approaches designed to change behavior may effectively arouse fear but accomplish less change in behavior than 55 a moderate and reasonable approach. Additionally, punishment tends to generate and call for excuses. No one likes to be punished or told he or she is doing a poor job. We all try to blame other causes than ourselves for poor performance. Punishment tends to focus on past actions and forces employees to make excuses for past failures rather than concentrat;Efn corrections of the problem in the future. Moreover, as Rotoni points out: Since punishment tends only to decrease the probability of an undesirable response, it may never result in the occurrence of desired behavior. Thus punishment is not nearly as in directing behavior as giving rewa rds is. In short, because people tend to move toward positive incentives and away from negative incentives, there are two ways of influencing behavior; one associated with reward, the other with ' 37

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punishment. Why Positive Motivation is difficult If punishment has so little justification, why has it stood the test of time so well? Here we must look to the human side of supervisors and managers. One punishe s not to train but to vent anger. Supervisors and managers carry the sole responsibility for meeting production deadlines, assuring qualit y control of products, compiling reports, and many other tasks besides supervising the employee. When something goes wrong or someo ne doesn't show up for work, they become irritated. As a consequence, they have neither the time nor the patience to make constructive responses. At such times the use of positive methods is contrary to natural tendencies and they are inclined to punish when frustrated. 58 A basic rule of supervision is not to criticize or embarrass an employee in front of others. An irritated, frustrated supervisor (teacher and parent too) will violate this rule. In short, persons are inclined to punish when frustrated. The prevalent use of punishment is due also to the fact that the negative approach is simpler than the positive. One doesn't have to know how to improve a job in order to find fault with the way it is done. Interpersonal skills should ideaJJy be developed to the point where one does not become irritated when things go wrong: first, because one does not succeed in hiding irritations; and second, because the attempt to hide them is bad for the person who tries, and confusing to the person on the receiving end of the 1 . h " 59 re at10ns 1p. .38

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Ways of Eliminating Unwanted Behavior Punishment must be used very carefully and as a last resort. It must be consistent, fair, and timely. Even though it may be temporarily effective, a punishment approach to discipline should be viewed as an admission of defeat. If a penalty for violating a rule is inflicted, it should be as a means of restoring the employee to the discipline of the group. If dismissal is necessary, it should be used as a means of maintaining good order and morale to the work 60 group. Connellan suggests the use of extinction as a second method of getting rid of unwanted behavior. However, he believes it is deceptively simple and effective. "It is simply withholding or withdrawing reinforcement that was previously part of a job . . ,,61 situation. "Office gossip" illustrates the concept of extinction. By firmly ignoring the gossip, it will, after initally increasing, go away. When a previously reinforced behavior is no longer reinforced, even occasionally, the behavior will eventually cease --or become "extinct." Teachers often use extinction to control disruptive behavior in the classroom. By ignoring the disruptive students (rather than giving them extra attention in the form of frowns or comments), teachers avoid rewarding the disruptive behavior; eventually the students may try another type of behavior. 62 Connellan's third method of getting rid of unwanted behavior is by reinforcing desired behavior. He explains that, ••• for every undesired behavior we want to eliminate, there is usually, if not always, a desired behavior we want to increase. If we are able to reinforce the behavior that is 39

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incompatible with the undesired behavior, we can increase the amount of desirable behavior and thereby the amount of incompatible behavior. This general idea is supported by Huberman in recommending the introduction of a Skinner ian reinforcement concept. He maintains that "as soon as the behavior starts to change in the desired direction appreciated."64 let the worker know that the change is Although this review is primarily concerned with formal disciplinary actions (or wha t amounts to punitive actions), discipline need be negative only to the extent that it is a last resort. Positive actions are available and will generally work. If management can sell employees on the value of a rule, the employees will most likely accept and obey the rule. By the same token, if management can convince the employees the unwanted behavior or substandard performance is undesirable, the chances are good that the behavior will be modified. The grounds for formal disciplinary action are fairly well established. Most organizations have fairly clear cut rules involving formal disciplinary action s, including, in many cases, a standard table of penalties for various offenses. Still, codified penalties or a standard table of penalties, has fallen into disuse. Gersuny gives several reasons, ••. including the fact that such systems failed to reduce the frequency of disciplinary cases. Also, arbitrators frequently found that such rigid sanctions violated the criterion of just cause and overly specific lists of rules made it difficult to punish behavior that was not spelled out in a particular rule. Another result of such rigid systems has been that 40

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supervisors have avoided use of disciplinary powers in many cases6 ;Where automatic dismissal was prescribed. A disciplined organization requires teamwork that is responsive to management's direction. Management's aim should be to create a habit of responsiveness. When the frequency and intensity of orders increase, it is a good sign that discipline is deteriorating. Megginson feels that: Disciplinary action should be taken by management only when it becomes abundantly clear that subordinates are losing their habit of giving the appropriate response. Before trying to rebuild the habit, it is wise to ascertain whether the cause of the subordinate's complaint or disobedience is justified. In most instances, the same situation may have occurred frequently enough with the same individual to signal a trend in his for such actions are usually predictable. Other Approaches to Dealing With Discipline Innovative approaches to discipline continue to appear. Dunlin points to increases in employee power in Wales and Yugoslavia where employees have clearly defined roles where alleged mismanagement exists: The concept of appraising and disciplining their superiors is being tested in Wales, is common practice in Yugg,lavia, and may be feasible in other nations. Our continent is not without some nontraditional ideas. John Huberman discusses an approach he and a Canadian plywood plant superintendent devised entailing four steps: a first disciplinary offense results in a casual reminder by the employee's supervisor; a second offense would call fo r another casual reminder by the immediate supervisor; a third offense results in a discussion with the shift foreman and department supervisor; 41

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If a fourth incident occurs ••• the worker's foreman and the plant superintendent have a "final" discussion with him. They suggest that he take the rest of the shift off (without loss of pay), go home, and decide whether he can and will conform in the future. They inform him that yet another incident soon will regretfully lead to his termination, and they express hope that he will decide to conform. This conversation is also recorded in a letter (step four). Should termination later ensue, few, if any, arbitrators would reverse the decision. Continued good performance over several months, however, resu!ts i%f clearing of the record, one step at a This general approach has been adopted by at least one major company in the United States. A couple of years ago, a Frito-Lay manufacturing plant was experiencing severe disciplinary problems. During the first nine months of the year, 58 employees out of a total work force of 210 had been fired for disciplinary reasons. The situation was intolerable and it was obvious that the continued use of the negative progressive discipline system would only make matters worse. A positive approach to discipline was mandatory. Ten years earlier, in an article in the Harvard Business Review, Canadian Industrial Psychologist John Huberman had outlined a system he had developed for a small plywood mill. Huberman substituted "reminders" for warnings and replaced the traditional three-day layoff with a procedure which involved sending the employees home for the balance of their shift to decide whether they wanted to follow the rules or not. Using Huberman's model, a positive discipline system was developed for the Frito-Lay plant. In a day-long training session all supervisors reviewed the plant's history with the traditional negative approach and were introduced to the positive discipline system. Both the trainer and the plant manager stressed the need for 42

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change and supervisors practiced the procedures involved in each step. The r;;sitive disci'(fine . system was implemented t e foUowing y. The result? The first nine months of the next year saw the number of terminations reduced from 58 to 16. Huberman's ideas, as expressed in his 1964 article, "Discipline Without Punishment Lives," is best explained in Grote's graphic depiction of the differences between positive discipline and progressive discipline. Positive Discipline Step One: Oral Reminder The supervisor calls the employee into the office, discusses the offense, reminds the employee of the importance of the rule, and expresses confidence that this will be the last time they will need to discuss it. Step Two: Written Reminder The supervisor calls the employee into the office and discusses the offense in a supportive but serious manner. After the meeting, the supervisor writes a memo to the employee which summarizes the conversation and confirms the employee's agreement to improve in the future. Step Three: Decision-Making Leave The supervisor calls the employee into the office, discusses the offense, then advises the employee that he or she is not to come to work the next day but they will be paid. The employee is to spend that day deciding whether to continue working for the organization and follow all the rules or not. And report the decision the following day. Step Four: Termination If the employee decides to continue working for the organization, and another disciplinary problem arises, the employee is terminated. 43

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Progressive Discipline Step One: Oral Warning The supervisor calls the employee into the office, discusses the offense, and warns the employee not to repeat it. Step Two: Written Warning The supervisor writes a warning then calls the employee into the office. The employee is given the notice and they discuss the offense. The employee is warned that any future problems will lead to more severe disciplinary action. Step Three: Disciplinary Layoff The supervisor calls the employee into the office, discusses the offense, then advises the employee that he or she is being laid off without pay for a specific number of days. The supervisor warns that any future problems will result in termination. Step Four: Termination The employee is terminated. 70 Planning Proper Disciplinary Approaches Effectively handling disciplinary situations pays dividends, as noted by Shershin and Boxx: When management handles disciplinary cases in a fair and thoughful manner, employees who are not directly affected will see that the company tries to play fair; their attitudes toward work and, ultimately, their productivity will be affected. Thus a well developed disciplinary program that provides for the proper handling of a discharjie is vital to union and nonunion firms alike. Some of the major grounds for disciplinary action include: incompetence (inability due to skill, experience or knowledge) negligence (failure to perform independent of ability), and misconduct (gambling, drinking, fighting, troublemaking, dishonesty, violation of safety practices, etc.). These grounds exist 44

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in numerous arbitration awards. The arbitrator considers whether the rule the employee violated was reasonable and if the employee clearly knows of its existence and is familiar with the rule. If the offense is a minor one, the discipline imposed should be progressive. Subsequent violations of the rule would be dealt with through increasingly severe penalties. Arbitrators generally agree the employee is entitled to reasonable warning that the specific type of behavior will not be tolerated. It is management's responsibility to produce substantiating evidence that the employee was familiar with the violated work rule. Management must not act on prejudice; there must be sufficient record of the substandard performance or misbehavior and the penalty imposed must be in l _ ine with the violation and with past practice or precedence. Other considerations might include the employee's past work record and the employee's attitude. One of the least desirable tasks of a supervisor is the administration of formal discipline. The occasion for a reprimand is one for testing the caliber of supervision and is an opportunity for teaching. The primary objective is not punishment, but to change the worker's behavior and thinking in the direction of desired action and to insure that the behavj2r leading to the reprimand is not repeated. To ensure that formal disciplinary actions are neither hasty nor inappropriate, managers must take the time to gather the facts, set the stage properly so that they discipline in private and subdue any inclination to discipline in anger or ignore the employee's views. In addition, mature and effectual discipline compares the unacceptable behavior to an expected and mutually 45

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agreeable performance standard or rule, not another employee or some subjective prejudice. At the same time both our experience and research are showing that disciplinary responses, like effective feedback, are specific, both as to what was wrong and as to what employees must do to improve. Finally, discipline must be timely, which generally means that it occurs as closely to the inappropriate behavior as possible. I Common Disciplinary Approaches The four types of formal approaches most often used are counseling or oral warning, written reprimand, suspension from duty (with or without pay), and discharge or firing. Other actions that may be considered disciplinary but which the negative, punitive inference, include such things as demotion, reassignment, shift change, withholding pay increases or withholding overtime opportunities. While these five items may be considered disciplinary, their use in many instances, is unique, to the organization, because actions such as demotion to another job or reassignment to another organization may not be constructive; the problem employee may, in many instances, just simply be reloe
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record, but can be used as substantiation in the event of further discipline. This type of action will correct the greatest number of problems and further disciplinary action . is usually not required. The written reprimand is a formal disciplinary action which is documented in the employee's employment record. It remains in the employee's record for a specified period of time; for this reason . it can normally be challenged under the grievance procedure. The suspension from duty, is the most serious disciplinary action short of discharge. Suspensions may be from a fraction of a day to several months, and normally result in the loss of pay for that period. However, that is not always the case. The Western Plywood Company of Canada, in its determination to eliminate the concept of punishment from its supervisors' administration of discipline, has gone to the extreme of continuing to pay employees who have been laid off for disciplinary offenses until they are returned to their jobs. The company says the purpose of the suspension is to give the employee time to consider the results of his behavior and to judge for himself whether he wants to be a member of the team and live by its rules. It adds that time off without loss of pay provides this opportunity. Does it work? The company thinks so. An executive claims, "Every time an employee has been sent home without pay, a grievance has resulted. Under the new program, grievances seldom grow out of suspensions since no punishment is involved. The expense of grievance meetings was much greater than the cost of paying an employee for time off while he ;rought about his future with the company. Discharge or removal from the job is often thought of as the capital punishment of employment because it is a last resort action having a long-term and potentially damaging affect on the employee's future. For this reason, removal represents the most 47

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extreme form or penalty and should be used only when other methods faH.74 To possibly avoid this final step, Cayer suggest certain pre-employment precautions: H selection and probationary employment periods are used effectively, removal should not have to be resorted to very often, but there are always some instances when it is necessary. Dismissal policies should be clearly stated and adhered to on an impartial basis. The rights of the employee to know the basis for removal should be scrupulously honored, and review should be the employee feels mistreated. Sampling of federal sector negotiated grievance procedures shows they incorporate many basic principles common to the literature on disciplinary actions. Characteristically, these procedures include: 1. Written notice containing the specifics of the charge. 2. Promotion of the constructive principle by providing that minor offenses are not a permanent record • .3. Specific procedural requirements which include time limits for taking disciplinary actions and advice on appeal rights. 4. A "just cause" requirement. 5. Progressively more severe penalties for repeat offenses. These types of work rules are deemed reasonable by the fact that they are part of a negotiated agreement and agreed to in advance by both parties, the employer and the union. The question most often subject to arbitration is the extent of management proo.f in a specific case, and the reasonableness of the management action in light of extenuating circumstances in regard to the specific disciplinary action. As can be seen from this procedure, 48

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the union is intricately involved as it plays a large role jn disciplinary matters. If good principles must prevail eventually, and the ooion will demand it, it would seem to be the wise thing for management to adopt such plans and practices before they are forced upon it by outsiders. When outsiders force changes, they take credit for them; yet, it is management which must make them work. 76 The literature pertaining to disciplinary approaches is varied, but continually emphasizes the need for a consistent approach in administering discipline. Educating employees about the work rules and communicating both positive and negative comments to employees appear to be almost equally as important. Because consistency is such a strongly expressed concept in the discipline of workers, it is receiving further review in this Chapter. Consistency Consistency is so significant an issue that it warrants separate consideration. As indicated earlier, many conditions must be met to consummate a successful disciplinary action (reasonable rule, proper warning, etc.) but none appear as individually important as the issue of consistency in application of disciplinary policy. Belohlav and Popp consider consistency in disciplinary practice to be the final factor in discriminating between effective and ineffective organizations. They found that effective organizations were consistent in applying discipline while ineffective organizations more often had a tendency to overlook infractions as they occurred.77 Inconsistencies and inequities do exist, as substantiated in a May 1979 survey of federal employees conducted by the Office of 49

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Personnel Management. 78 The survey findings were based on f4,000 questionnaires completed by current federal employees. Table 2.1 (at the end of this chapter) showcases important data from that survey dealing with employee perceptions of the treatment they receive. The percentages in Table 2.1 reflect feelings in one area of equal employment opportunity. If the same feelings exist in the area of employee discipline, management has a problem. Inconsistent treatment of employees in any area of personnel management is perceived by employees as inconsistency in all areas. One instance of preferential or overly strict application of work rules toward one worker will brand the supervisor as being unfair or inconsistent. The use of written standards, understood by all employees and administered uniformly, is one way of eliminating negative employes perceptions. There are clearly two schools of thought regarding the need for written disciplinary standards. Kuzmits feels very strongly that: An organization's absence policy should include specific, written procedures for handling abuses of absence standards. These procedures should outline the types of absence behaviour warranting disciplinW action and what the disciplinary action is. This position is further argued by Wohlking who feels that firm policies are a key ingredient to an effective disciplinary program and that these policies must be developed by management and uniformly applied by all supervisors. He adds that the single efforts of a supervisor acting alone are quite insufficient to make . . 1 d' . 1' ff . 80 an orgamzat1ona lSClp me program e ect1ve. 50

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On the other hand, Gersuny81 feels that the use of strictly enforced codified penalties have fallen into disuse. Boncarosky believes that the definition of consistency is in itself inconsistent. He argues that the degree of discipline should be determined by the offense and that each case must be determined on its own . 82 ments. In contrast, Elkouri and Elkouri, contemporary arbitrators themselves, point out: It is generally accepted that enforcement of rules and assessment of discipline must be exercised in a consistent manner; all employees who engage in the same type of misconduct must be treated essentially the same lllless a reasonable basis exists for variations in the assessment of punishment (such as different degrees of fault or mitigating or aggravating circumstances affecting but not all of the employees). Some authors do not distinguish between process and result. For example, in the following excerpt, Tobin uses three terms that can be interpreted in different circles to have very different meanings. Tobin's use of the word "discriminatory" is used in a non-civil rights context. In addition, Tobin distinguishes between llliformity and consistency. The employer's action must not be discriminatory. To penalize one employee more severely than another equally guilty employee is not allowable unless there are mitigating circumstances. This does not mean, however, that there must be uniformity in the type of discipline imposed. In fact, there can be selective discharge as long as the employer is consistent in its enforcement. Obviously, consistency is not the same as uniformity. An employer can be consistent, for example, by always considering the employee's past record and length of service when deciding the proper 51

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discipline to be taken. Thus the fact that two employees guilty of the same offense are given different penalties does not mean the employer discriminated against one of them. Say, for example, that two employees have identical absentee records during the past twelve months-but one has only one year of service, and the other has twenty years of service with a good attendance record. In this case, the employer could impose different penalties without being discriminatory. But if management simply decides to make an example out of one employee when others are equally culpable charges of discrimination will normally stand. The employer's actions must notgqe arbitrary or subject to whimsical change. Some authors clearly feel that inconsistencies are acceptable depending on the type of person employed or the occupational differences of employees. For example, Weiss feels that creative people are motivated in different ways and have special needs and suggests that they should not necessarily be required to follow the same rules as other employees. They are "often maligned because they are unconventional" in "thinking or behavior." That, of course, is what makes them unique, or special, and is therefore a strength. " • • chronic tardiness," Weiss continues, is another "common idiosyncrasy among creative people" but, he nonetheless concludes, "All these foibles are likely to cost you little or nothing." 85 In the same vein, the Unterbergers see discipline of professional employees and nonprofessional employees as being I potentially _ very different. While the excessive use of alcohol is treated quite similarly, the possession or even consumption of alcoholic beverages on the employer's premises is, generally, treated quite differently. For nonprofessional employees, consumption of alcohol often warrants immediate discharge or, at the least, quite severe discipline. Such 52

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discipline has been sustained frequently in arbitration. The possession of alcohol on the employer ' s premises by professional employees, however, is rarely regarded as an infraction (except perhaps in some government offices where such possession is a violation of law). For professionals, consuming alcohol when socializing with clients of visitors, and sometimes colleagues, is rarely the cause for any discipline stronger than mild warnings. However, solitary consumption --rather than consumption as part of a social activity--is likely to be viewed quite differently, probably as warranting a strong warning and even more severe discipline including discharge if repeated. Since there is often no difference in the actual amount of alcohol of alcohol consumed, the crucial distinction would appear to be a perceptual one in which the values governing professional behavior plays a large role. No such distinctions are ma9f6 in relation to nonprofessional employees. Consistency is the logic and the justification for the "slide rule approach." 87 In this vein, Wohlking and Martin are in agreement that consistency in disciplining employees is necessary to an effective organization . Wohlking notes that different treatment of employees in two different departments within an organization will be carried by the "grapevine" to all concerned. 88 Mart i n further contends that a supervisor's failure to take necessary disciplinary action signals employees that management condones unauthorized behavior ."89 Above we have seen a variety of attitudes, ideas, and opinions r egarding cons istency. Perhaps one of the most valuable is that of McGrego r as discussed by Boncar o sky. Consistent discipline is c ompared to touching a hot stove. When a person gets burned on a hot stove, that person doesn't blame the stove, but him or herself . Touching the stove involves four 53

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Summary elements: the consequence is immediate; if an individual touches a hot stove, he or she will be burnt. Second, since a hot stove gives off radiant heat and the color of the metal may change, individuals have been warned not to touch the stove. Next, the penalty for touching a hot stove is consistent; it always results in being burnt. Lastly, whoever touches the stove is burnt; the is given in a nondiscriminatory manner. Attitudes and approaches are significantly different in the twentieth century than in times. Clearly the nature of discipline in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was punishment. A number of forces such as unionism in the private sector and merit principles in the public sector contributed to the change process. The twentieth century still finds discipline and disciplinary systems a necessity. This necessity can be attributed to a variety of considerations, such as leadership quality and style, changing values, advancing technology and mobility. In our highly complex society, with its large organizations, rules and standards are believed to be necessary in order to maintain competitiveness. Time has shown that where rules exist, they will be broken, confronting management with the dilemma of enforcing compliance or losing control. Historically, disciplinary philosophies have fallen into three basic categories: the authoritarian system, where conduct is customary, understood, and rigidly fixed; the anarchic system where the conduct of subordinates is determined by the subordinates themselves (management either permits such a policy or has insufficient power to direct contrary behavior); and the due54

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process system, which is administered in the judicial/legalistic style. There are, of course, as many approaches to disciplinary systems as there are writers on the subject. The approaches encompass the full range of philosophies discussed above. A large number of writers envision a disciplinary system as a fixed set of steps and techniques designed to result in a more productive, worthwhile employee. U these steps fail, the traditional final step is discharge. Most contemporary authors prefer to speak of discipline not in terms of punishment or punitive actions, but rather in a progressive sense that will ultimately benefit both the employee and the organization. The techniques for arriving at this ultimate goal are numerous. The vast majority of authors see implementation of disciplinary proceedings as a final step--a last resort--coming only after everything else has failed. Still, there are times when discipline is the only alternative: • • • good supervisors will not avoid using discipline when a situation calls for it, but they will remember that such procedures are intended to correct a problem rather than punish an employee. When properly administered, disciplinary actions remain an effective supervisory tool and a means of solvi.ng current eiJlployee problems without causmg new ones. The federal government and its disciplinary policies, generally mandated by law or regulation, normally ascribe to the views of contemporary authors. That is, formal discipline is taken only after counselings and warnings, for minor disciplinary offenses. Notifications of disciplinary action are given in writing and specify the charges; minor offenses are not a permanent record against the employee, but rather are purged from the employee's 55

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record after a period of satisfactory behavior. The federal system mandates, in one way or another, just cause for taking a disciplinary action and most disciplinary actions result in progressively more severe penalties for repeat occurrences. Consistency is one of the most important yet one of the most difficult issues to be dealt with in meting out discipline. No two cases are the same; each case has its own extenuating circumstances and each case involves dissimilar human beings with their owl') special needs and priorities. Sullivan points out in this regard that, Unfortunately, cases tend not to submit willingly to sure black or white classification. They favor, instead, the gray domain, where frustration, and surprise are the dominate landmarks. The methods used to obtain satisfactory employee behavior in the past have often been harsh, arbitrary, and inflexible. Most rules were established to meet the whim of the employer. Management today has retained the right to discipline but that right is not without restriction. Almost without exception, management must have cause and that cause is subject to some third party review. Management must be able to defend its action. The literature generally agrees that disciplinary action should be reserved for those times when positive action does not work. Force will often cause a person to change outwardly but not mentally and emotionally. In fact, it sometimes results in "maHcious obedience," whereby an aggrieved employee does exactly what he is told to do, even if he knows the order is faulty and will result in getting things fouled up. This is his way of getting even with his superior, as the latter will be blamed and it is difficult to blame the former who, in all innocence, can say he 56

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did exactly what he was ordered to do. 93 The management need exists for rules, policies and standards of behavior. This need mandates a formal disciplinary policy for the nonresponsive or nonconforming employee. Sometimes there is no alternative but discharge. We must not forget that the commodities we are dealing with are human beings, and that Conclusion • . • discipline is a tool of the supervisor, but that's all --just a tool, not a cure-all. Good supervisors use it just like any other tool--to keep things as smoothly as possible in the long haul. The literature contains many concepts, ideas, and approaches. It is clear that the disciplinary techniques adopted by any given organization must be able to deal with the individual needs and problems unique to that organization. Many problems, such as absenteeism, are common to nearly all organizations yet as with any disciplinary situation the approach can vary. There is no one sure way to cure absenteeism. The important thing is to adopt a way that works within a specific organization. While the literature speaks in generalities it does not confront the specific problems undertaken in this study. For example, the literature does not deal with outside pressures exerted on a supervisor in making disciplinary determinations. While the magnitude of this issue is perhaps more significant in the federal than the nonfederal sector, it is clearly of sufficient importance to warrant investigation. In addition, while the literature does contain some studies on the relationship of minorities to discipline, it is remiss in dealing with discipline and the female worker. The literature appears biased toward disciplining the male worker. In today's working 57

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environment, the female comprises a substantial portion of the workforce and is more frequently involved in what, not long ago, was considered nontraditional occupations. Further, this study proposes to recognize any possible differences in disciplinary standards between military and civilian supervisors of civilian employees. Any differences noted could be attributable to such things as the military lifestyle and the mandatory geographical rotations military supervisors know they will only have to supervise a certain group for a given period of time. Finally, the literature i s weak with regard to disciplinary systems for supervisor y employees. .58

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Table 2.1 Survey of Federal Employer Perceptions* Compared to older employees, younger employees are treated Compared to other employees, handicapped persons are treated Compared to male employees, female employees are treated Compared to other employees, minority employees are treated Worse 8 3 12 10 The Same 75 78 64 58 Much Better 17 19 24 32 Total** 100 100 100 100 *"Preliminary findings released on employee attitude survey, 1 ' Federal News Clip Sheet, Special Edition (December 1979). ** All responses shown by percent. n=l4,000

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CHAPTER III Environment Introduction The USAF Academy presents a somewhat unique environment for this study in that it has all the elements of a University and an Air Force installation. Its mission to train and educate future Air Force officers demands, educationally, a higher than average military staff and, in so many areas, a lower than average civilian workforce. That is to say, the military men and women must have exceptional bearing and knowledge as they establish the example the cadets follow. On the other hand, virtually all of the civilian workforce in direct contact with the cadets are in unskilled blue collar positions--food service workers and custodians. For the purpose of this study, it is important for the reader to be aware of the mission of the USAF Academy, the types of support roles the civilian employees fill and the opportunities and barriers they find in their own career advancement. This chapter will also discuss the role of the Civilian Personnel Office and its responsibilities to Academy management in such areas as hiring, classifying, promoting, disciplining, and discharging civilian employees and how this role is performed in its relationship with the employees' union . It will also discuss the interrelationships of the military-civilian environment, as well as the disciplinary procedures followed at the Academy.

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Background After its separation from the United States Army in 1946, when it was the Army Air Corp, visionary leaders in the United States Air Force began advocating a separate military academy for its airmen. Not ootil 1949, when Secretary of Defense James Forrestall appointed a board of outstanding educators, including Dwight D. Eisenhower, then President of Columbia University, and Robert L. Stearns, President of the University of Colorado, was the need for an academy to train Air Force officers established. This need was largely based on the inability to expand the facilities of the older service academies. Congress authorized creation of the United States Air Force Academy (USAFA) in 1954 and the site near Colorado Springs, Colorado was selected by Harold E. Talbott, Secretary of the Air Force. The first Academy class entered in July 1955 at temporary facilities on Lowery Air Force Base in Denver, Colorado. Construction at the permanent location also began in 1955 and was sufficiently complete for the Cadet Wing to move into its permanent home in August 1958. Initial construction cost $142 million. The first class of 207 graduates was commissioned as second lieutenants in June 1959. Since that first class, 12,134 have been graduated from the Academy. The cadet strength is approximately 4,000, of which approximately 12 percent are ethnic minorities, including Black, Hispanic, Asian, and American Indian. In October 1975, President Gerald Ford signed legislation permitting women to enter the nation's military academies. They now comprise about 10 percent of the USAF Academy Cadet Wing 61

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strength. The first class with women graduated in 1980. 1 Cadets have some of the best academic facilities in the nation. Academic requirements include 180 semester hours which include a . core curriculum of 153 hours plus a minimum of 27 elective hours in one of 23 academic majors. All graduate with a bachelor of science degree and a commission as a second lieutenant in the regular component of the United States Air Force. 2 The faculty is composed of over 500 members, primarily military officers. In most cases they possess professional military experience related to their academic experience. In all cases, military faculty members hold at least a master's degree and more than one-fourth have earned doctorates. There are a small number of distinguished civilian professors who serve on one year faculty tours, a few foreign service officers from the Department of State, and a small number of allied country officers who teach in the foreign language, history, and political science departments. 3 Cadet Life Because of the large number of credits required to graduate, and because of the need to instill self-discipline, a cadet's life is highly regimented and structured. For example, they live by an honor code which states: " We will not lie, steal, or cheat, nor tolerate among us anyone who does." Cadets administer the honor code system themselves and are intensely proud of it. The honor code is the basis for the cadet disciplinary environment. A demerit system is used for violation of regulations with restriction to the dormitory for those accumulating too many demerits. 62

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Federal Civilian Working Environment The Federal government is the largest single employer in the United States. Employees in the Federal civilian workforce are United States citizens working in every state of the union and in foreign countries. The workforce population encompasses nonskilled laborers as well as professionals in science and education. Most applicants for Federal positions apply through the Office of Personnel Managemellt (the exceptions being those hired by the State Department, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Tennessee Valley Authority, and a few others). Selection for a Federal position is based on a "best qualified" ranking system with veterans and widows of veterans receiving priority consideration for appointment by receiving an additional five or ten points (disabled veterans and widows of veterans receive 10 points) added to their ranking or test scores. All Federal employees receive the same basic benefits, which include insurance, annual and sick leave, retirement, and an opportunity to receive incentive awards. Pay determinations differ depending on the type of skill or occupation of the employee. The Federal government uses two basic pay systems. The first, the general schedule (GS), consists of employees commonly referred to as "white collar." Their pay system was established by public law (Title V, Chapter 51) and is based on a complex job classification system in which the duties and responsibilities are assigned one of the possible 18 general schedule grades. The pay for each of these grade levels is related to the national cost of 63

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living index. Presidential intervention during the past few years, in an attempt to keep the cost of running the government down, has resulted in pay increases of only between five and seven percent. In addition, general schedule (GS) salaries may not exceed that of Presidential appointees . The second type of Federal employment system is the wage grade system. Wage grade employees are further defined as wage grade (WG), wage leader (WL), and wage supervisors (WS). Wage grade employees, also known as "blue collar," include nonskilled through crafts and skilled. By law (Title V, Chapter 53), wage grade pay is based on locality wages for comparable jobs and wage adjustments are based on annual wage surveys in the local geographical area. For the most part, pay increases have occurred in close comparability with the local cost of living index. Nonskilled employees, such as custodians, laborers, and food service workers, often make twice the money of their civilian community counterparts because their salaries are computed in with the craft and skilled workers. Within both the general schedule (GS) and the wage grade (WG, WL, and WS) systems, employees receive step increases at a periodic, predetermined time interval. General schedule employees have ten pay steps within a grade while wage grade employees have only five. Grades themselves are determined by the Federal classification system administered by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). Civilian employees are governed by a large mass of Federal regulations and laws which are captured in written form as the Federal Personnel Manual (FPM). The Office of Personnel 64

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Management (OPM) issues the FPM to aU agencies of the Federal government 1.11der its administrative control. Agencies, in turn, provide regulatory guidelines to their subordinate organizations. The quantity of rules and regulations which affects an employee is great, but rarely does an individual employee read this large volume of directives. They learn the rules and regulations early in their employment from orientation programs offered by the Civilian Personnel Office and from their supervisors. Ideally supervisors receive training by attending courses offered by OPM or the agency. Through this training they learn not only the rules and regulations that control or influence employment life, but also training in supervisory techniques --including, among other things, the necessity for uniform and consistent treatment of employees. Because of budgetary constraints and demands to use limited training funds for upgrading "state of the art" requirements, supervisory training often receives a low priority within many agencies. USAF A Civilian Working Environment The Department of the Air Force controls the budget, as well as the number of military and civilian authorized positions at the United States Air Force Academy. This means the Academy must expect its proportional share of budget cuts and reduced manning ceilings along with other Air Force commands and bases. The reduction of money and people does not, however, bring a corresponding reduction of mission responsibilities. Within this context it should be mentioned that the number of civilian employees at the USAF Academy has been reduced from 6.5

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over 2,.500 in the early 1970's to 1,8.52 at the time of this study a 26 percent reduction-in-force. Civilian employees are assigned to every organizaion on the Academy and all interact with the assigned military population. With the exception of functions such as the civilian personnel office, fire department, food service workers, and janitors, all Academy organizations have a mix of military and civilian person nel performing like functions. In aU cases, the position of the head of a organization filled by an Air Force officer. Civilians provide support to the military leaders and there is no way a civilian at the Academy can "make it to the top." Since the USAF Academy is a military environment which trains and educates future military leaders, the support functions provided by the civilian workforce are aU-encompassing from unskilled to technical. For example, the waiters and waitresses who serve the 4,400 cadets three meals a day are all civilians; however, the cooks, meatcutters, bakers, etc., who prepare the meals are both military and civilian. In the academic area, aU the instructors (except the few distinguished visiting professors mentioned earlier) are military, but the scientific laboratories and the clerical positions are filled by both military and civilians. Likewise, housekeeping functions, as needed at all Air Force bases, are performed by both military and civilian engineers, plumbers, gardeners, masons, painters, electricians, etc. There are some civilian occupations at the Academy unique to a normal Federal environment which are normaUy found at a 66

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university; these include registrar personnel, laboratory technicians, sports information specialists, coaches, and trainers. For the most part, however, civilian employment is largely made up of occupations more traditional to an Air Force installation. For example, there are approximately 350 administrative, secretarial, and clerical civilian positions to keep the paperwork flowing; approximately 395 civilians feed the cadets; 114 janitors and another 240 blue collar craftsmen keep the Academy community operational. The diversity of the civilian workforce, coupled with the placement of military officers in leadership positions, reduces promotion opportunities for the civilians. Many civilians have been at the Academy for much of its 25 years of operation. As these employees begin to retire, some promotional opportunities are becoming available. These opportunities, however, are mainly in the blue collar positions; white collar jobs are extremely competitive with the numerous highly qualified, well educated employees vying for the few higher graded jobs available. Because of the limited promotional opportunities and because such a large number of unskilled jobs exist, turnover in the civilian workforce is high. It is not unusual to have secretaries with bachelor degrees or food service workers with extensive management skills competing for mid-level positions. Often these kinds of people will leave the Academy and the Colorado Springs area because they are unable to find positions commensurate with their qualifications or experience. Limited promotion opportunities combine with menial unskilled jobs to create a turnover rate at the '67

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Academy of approximately 25 percent a year. To say that such a rate is not ll'lUsual evades the problem. Turnover, in and of itself, . is expensive and generates inefficiencies. Functions and Role of the Civilian Personnel Office Recruiting for the vacant positions at the Academy is only one of the diversified functions performed by the Personnel staff. Under the supervision of a Director, the staff of 37 (which includes clerical personnel) is responsible for fulfilling statutory and regulatory requirements for equal employment opportmity and affirmative action programs, classification of positions and wage and salary administration, labor-management relations (including negotiating with the local union), and programs for merit promotion, incentive awards, employee benefits, employee career development, personnel data and records management. To perform these many functions, the Civilian Personnel Office is divided into six divisions. These are (1) the Staffing Division, (2) the Data Management Division, (3) the Training and Career Development Division, (4) the Classification Division, (5) the Equal Employment Opportt11ity (EEO) Division, and (6) the Labor and Employee Management Division. All these divisions must interact with one another and with line functions on the Academy. In addition, the Director provides expertise to the Academy Superintendent (a Lieutenant General) on the impact of policy changes or programs affecting civilian employees. Staffing Division. The most visible division, and the one which potential employees first encounter, is the Staffing Division. Besides placing external applicants, this division also handles 68

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internal reassignments, prepares certificates of candidates qualified for promotion, and handles special recruitment programs. The Staffing Division is responsible for dealing with the impacts of employee placement when external actions, such as the closing of other Air Force bases or overall reductions-in-force, pressure the Academy. Because the Academy workforce has many overqualified, and thus underutilized employees, this Division administers locally developed programs to minimize this manpower misuse. Adding to this workload, the Staffing Division must comply with the recent guidelines required by Public Law 95-454 (Civil Service Reform Act) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) which affect the recruitment and promotion of employees. Staffing specialists must validate both the supervisor's selection and interview procedures to assure fair and equal consideration was given all applicants, particularly minorities and women. The Division also administers a program for handicapped applicants, finding positions which are compatible with their skills and abilities and then encouraging supervisors to hire them on a probationary or trial basis. Impacting on all these functions is the preferential hiring of military veterans, particularly those who have retired with 20 or more years of military service. While these veterans offer much as civilian employees and are among the overqualified and under utilized employees mentioned earlier, once hired their employment has limited the opportunities of women and minorities to advance to higher graded duties because of the years of experience they bring to a job. Data Management Division. Several years ago the Air Force 69

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became a leader in the Federal government by computerizing large amounts of personnel data formerly maintained in individual folders and on record cards. Although the individual folders are still maintained, the computerized information is used in preparing reports, obtaining statistical data, and most recently to determine which employees are best qualified for promotion based on past experience, training, education, and performance appraisals. Although the initial effort to capture the data created an inordinate workload for the Personnel staff, the information is maintained and updated by the Data Managemen t Divis ion. This division is able to provide all other functions within Personnel with high quality products able to consider more data and variables than could ever have been done under the manual system. While the computer has improved the quality of information available to the management of the civilian workforce, many employees distrust what appears to be a more impersonal system which they see as replacing the human judgment previously used. These im pressions are wrong. Judgement is very important. Time and use should eliminate most of these employee apprehensions. Training and Career Development Division. The USAF Academy training budget is approximately $30,000 pe r year. These limited funds are used to pay for technical training for USAF Academy employees. This training is offered by government agencies and civilian institutions and colleges. It also pays for travel and per diem expenses of employees in training. Civilian employees are only authorized to receive job-related training at government expense. To the chagrin of many employees, neither 70

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training nor education to prepare them for higher graded or better paying jobs is permitted. Classification Division. Before a person can be hired, the Classification Division must document the duties of the position and, using classification standards provided by the Office of Personnel Management, determine the proper job title, classification or occupational series, grade, and consequently the salary. Normally, this would not be a very difficult or time consuming task, except that by law, the Classification Division must recertify the accuracy of all positions each year. Because of a situation known as "grade creep" (where individuals assume or are given greater responsibilities thus causing their positions to be upgraded), position management is an integral part of the classification of positions. Air Force headquarters, in trying to abate the "grade creep" problem (which directly causes increases in budgeting civilian pay), has attempted to place ceilings on the average grade of civilians. These ceilings create problems for the Classification Division in that individuals must be paid commensurate with their duties and responsibilities yet the grades of the positions must be held down because of budgetary limitations. All classification decisions made must be fully documented with detailed justification so that if an employee appeals the grade of his/her position, documentation must be available to the deciding authority (Headquarters USAF or OPM). In addition to the classification and position management 71

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responsibilities, the Classification Division is responsible for conducting locality wage surveys of those blue collar skills and crafts comparable to those performed by Academy employees. This annual survey, accomplished in cooperation with union representatives, is the basis for cost of living raises for blue collar employees. Equal Employment Opportunity Division . The staff role of the Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Division i ncludes three major functions: first, keeping the Superintendent and organizational heads advised of improvements or s h ortcomings of Affirmative Action goals; second, training supervisors in their role in promoting equal employment; and third, educating employees in procedures to follow in filing EEO complaints. To gain management involvement and familiarity with the EEO program, an EEO Committee composed of military and civilian personnel provides a framework for overseeing progress and problem areas and for making recommendations f or changes to the Superintendent . Four special emphasis subcommittees report to the EEO Committee, reflecting the concerns the subcommittee titles reflect (Federal Women, Hispanic, Black, and Upward Mobility). The Upward Mobility subcommittee is tasked with identifying vacant positions which can be downgraded to permit employees selected for the positions to advance in that career area. This program has provided opportuntities for the women and minority employees identified earlier as stymied in dead-end positions. All of the subcommittees have a manager who performs the committee duties on a part-time basis. All have full-time jobs 72

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at the Academy but are authorized to spend 25 percent of their duty time in the performance of these part-time duties. They are all members of the EEO Committee and all receive training through the EEO Officer and OPM. The filing of EEO complaints at the Academy has been fairly constant over the past four years. All complaints go through an informal step with an EEO Counselor who attempts an informal resolution. The EEO Counselor investigates about 80 complaints a year and over 90 percent of these are resolved at the informal level. In a review of the EEO cases processed at the USAF Academy over the past four years (1976-1979) 44 percent of the informal EEO complaints investigated were based on alleged discrimination in selection for promotion, and 18 percent for alleged harassment. The remaining 38 percent were divided among numerous categories such as racial, ethnic, and sexist slurs, less desirable work assignments, and the like. When an EEO complaint advances to the formal complaint stage, management as well as the complainant spend a lot of time and money in preparation for the hearing conducted by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). It is not unusual, because of the backlog of cases at EEOC, for a case to take more than a year for resolution. This unfortunate delay may place undue emotional stress on the employee who has filed a complaint and who often must continue working in the same environment that prompted the complaint. Similar tension rests on the shoulders of the supervisor accused of discriminating. While public Jaw (P.L. 92-261) has mandated the administrative resolution of an EEO complaint, Congress has not 73

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provided for the funds to hire sufficient examiners to resolve the complaint quickly. Labor and Employee Management Division. Several benefit programs offered to civilian employees are administered by the Labor and Employee Management Division. These include health and retirement benefits, as well as a drug and alcohol education program. The civilian performance award program, as well as the processing of Occupational Safety and Health (OSHA) claims are administered in this division. These duties comprise a comparatively small amount of time in view of the division's responsibility for assisting and counseling managers and supervisors in administering disciplinary actions and in representing management in the adjudicatory process on grievances filed by employees concerning formal disciplinary actions. In addition, this division provides the management spokesman during contract negotiations with the union and then provides supervisors and managers with training on the provisions of the contract. Violations of the contract, by any level of management, serve as a basis for the union to file unfair labor practice charges against the Academy, which this division also defends. While disciplinary actions are taken to encourage employees to behave positively and follow work rules, the disciplinary system administered at the Academy through the Labor and Employee Management Relations Division is clearly progressive, as opposed to the positive approach discussed in Chapter II. Role of the Union Local 1867, American Federation of Government Employees 74

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(AFGE), an affiliate of the AFL-CIO, has been an influence on the Academy since 1963 when employees voted in favor of having union representation. Membership in the ooion is strictly by the personal choice of all civilians not in supervisory, managerial or professional positions, or assigned to the technical staff of the Personnel Directorate. Union membership is largely composed of blue collar employees. The local union at the Academy is considered among the best in AFGE --in part because it has a full-time paid President and staff and a large number of stewards throughout the Academy. Because employees are entitled to union representation when being counseled for work rule infractions, the disciplinary process followed at the Academy is a part of the negotiated contract with the union and all employees entitled to union representation are bound by the negotiated grievance procedure in the contract. Recent Related Studies In July 1978 the Office of Civilian Personnel Operations, Headquarters USAF, with assistance from the Air Force Human Resource Laboratory, randomly selected 2,700 civilian, 900 military customers, (total n=353,103), and 1,000 Civilian Personnel Office employees (total n=3393) for a survey on the image of the Civilian Personnel Offices. The survey was restricted to Air Force bases in the continental United States. Sixty-five percent of the respondents suggested the overall quality of service provided by the Personnel Office staff at Air Force bases in the United States was high. Seventy five percent of the respondents considered the service satisfactory or higher, and 73 percent believed the staff showed a desire to help them. 4 75

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A second study dealing closer with perceptions of military and civilian personnel at the Academy was conducted by the Department of Behavioral Sciences in December 1978. The organizational climate survey, as it was called, was developed mainly to identify employee dissatisfactions with different aspects of work life on the Academy. In all cases, higher graded employees, both general schedule and wage grade, rated aspects of job satisfaction higher than did lower graded employees. For example, on a scale of 0 (low) to 6 (high), higher graded employees gave job satisfaction a 5.3 compared to a 4.6 by the lower graded. Utilization of employee skills received a 5 . 5 from higher grades 5 compared to a weak 3.8 from the lower graded employees. These data suggest that personal satisfaction and challenge is not being provided the lower graded employees. While this finding may not be atypical, the important point here is the specific findings in regard to USAF Academy employees. This factor will be discussed further below . Frustrations Contributing to Discipline Activity By reviewing the causes for disciplina ry actions at the Academy, we can better understand the general job dissatisfaction of lower graded employees . Every year for the past five years, the Academy has experienced a reduction in the number of authorized positions. Since the military members rotate (leave and arrive) on a four-year cycle, their reductions are achieved through a routine attrition process handled by Headquarters Air Force. When civilian employee spaces are identified for reduction, a procedure known as 76

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''reduction-in-force" (RIF) takes place. While every effort is made to place employees in vacant positions not affected by RIF, there have been occasions when emp loyee s have lost their jobs. The RIF is typically achieved by the principle of -last hired-first fired --except in the case of military veterans who go after nonveterans. This form of annual insecurity is matched only by the continuous possibility that an entire function will be identified for "contracting out," which is Congress' way of reducing Federal payroll costs. Other contributing factors to employee dissatisfactions and possibly to wor k rule violations include the many rules an employee must follow, more in some organizations than in others, as well as the complexity of rules. For example, an office employee may be 15 minutes late for work or take 15 minutes extra at lunch time and the supervisor will make a joke of it. An employee in the Cadet Dining Hall, which is by necessity on a strict time schedule where workload is divided evenly among assigned workers, would receive an oral admonishment or perhaps even a written reprimand for the same offense . Employees are aware of these inconsistencies among work areas and often complain of the number of unnecessary work rules. Add these frustrations to those the employee brings from home--for example, family problems relating to money, alcohol or drugs --and it is easy to see why frustrated employees will break work rules and receive disciplinary actions. Discretion/Power Relationships at the USAF A The supervisor has an equally frustrating problem in dealing with the performance of dissatisfied employees. Faced with the 77

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same job insecurities, the lack of promotional opportunities, family problems, the supervisor, in addition, is tasked with assuring the job gets done while at the same time enforcing the managementdirected work rules. Often, because the supervisor was the best worker he/she was promoted to the supervisory position with little or no knowledge of how to supervise. While some local training is provided, it is often difficult to apply theories to a specific employment problem. Moreover, theories seldom compensate for experience. Complicating the supervisory role is the mix of military and civilian employees with their lllique personnel programs, which include different disciplinary procedures-negotiated agreement ys. Uniform Code of Military Justice. It is understandable, therefore, why the 187 civilian supervisors and 93 military supervisors of both military and civilian employees have a difficult job. The decision to discipline or not to discipline is often strongly influenced toward the former by such outside influences as the legal office, civilian personnel office, the higher level supervisor, and even regulations from OPM. On the other hand, peers, subordinates and minority organizations often seek to influence supervisory judgment by discouraging discipline. Recently, for example, a minority group employee clearly disregarded a direct order. The supervisor was directed by the second level supervisor to issue the employee a written reprimand; however, a minority group leader assured the supervisor that if the reprimand was issued, a discrimination complaint would be filed. The employee was reprimanded and the supervisor has been accused of discrimination. 78

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Disciplinary Process at USAF A Employees not eligible for union membership (supervisors, professionals, and technical Personnel staff) are not governed by the negotiated grievance procedure but by the procedure outlined in an Air Force regulation. While the regulation is very similar, these may not seek representation by experienced union officials. They may, however, obtain representation from any other source, including co-workers. They have the same appeal rights. However, disciplinary decisions are just not grieved as frequentl y. The Academy philosophy concerning discipline inclines toward progressively harsher disciplinary action for each succeeding work rule violation. However, while this practice is strictly followed by some Academy organizations, other organizations rarely administer discipline to its employees. Academy management can generally expect an appeal of a disciplinary action from an employee belonging to the union. However, when the appeal reaches arbitration, management tends to win. Management has a high win record for two reasons. First, the arbitrator looks at past practice at the Academy to see that employees received like treatment for like rule infractions. Second, the arbitrator will review the progressive disciplinary policy agreed to by both the union and management and will sustain management's action based on the agreement to administer discipline progressively. While supervisors may and do consider extenuating circumstances before administering discipline, they also seek consistency in their treatment of employees. Quite often in their 79

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efforts to treat all employees equally, and because of military management's authoritarian leadership style, individual circumstances may not always -receive full consideration. In short, a high management "win" record may not assure that each action is fair or that the disciplinary procedure is equitable. It simply confirms that the appellants in these cases were guilty as charged and the action taken was appropriate. It does not assure that all employees guilty of the same offense received comparable treatment. Conclusion The Air Force Academy's mission is to train future Air Force officers. Cadets are taught self-discipline and live by a code of honesty. Military members at the Academy are expected to set the example for the cadets and are encouraged to take part in cadet activities and to invite them to their homes when time permits. Civilian employees, on the other hand, are expected to work harmoniously with military members but are not an integrated part of military or cadet social life. Unlike the military personnel, civilian employees see the Academy as a place to work and not . as a way of life. Employment at the Academy offers civilians the same benefits and frustrations they would find at any Department of Defense installation in the country. For this reason, this study has a good deal of generalized application even though disciplinary procedures and their applications may differ. For the purposes of this study, to determine if the administration of disciplinary actions against the civilian workforce is equitable and if supervisors are permitted the necessary 80

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discretion in taking these actions without undue outside influences, it is important for the reader to have a feel for the military --civilian environment, the complexity of the disciplinary system which includes several appeal steps, and the varied occupations and skill levels of both the supervisors and employees which create ambiguity in the meaning of the words equity and discretion. While the author has not made comprehensive inquiry into the numbers of disciplinary actions taken against civilian employees at other military installations, communications with counterparts throughout government confirm that the Academy is very active in the disciplinary area. This activity provides the broad base necessary for meaningful findings when considered in conjunction with the minority perception of inequity. 81

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CHAPTER IV Methodology Introduction Studies on discipline have been conducted relating to occupational stratifications and ethnic relationships (Black, 1970; Gersuny, 1973; and Gandz, 1978). This study expands and refines certain aspects of investigations of occupational and ethnic issues. Previous studies of discipline have focused on the implications of race and seniority in a production environment, and the resultant grievance activity. This investigation explores additional aspects: (1) extraorganizational pressures and influences on first line supervisors to take formal disciplinary actions, (2) relationships between military and civilian supervisors of civilian employees, (3) perceptions of consistency in policy applications, (4) fairness of penalties imposed, (5) overall perceptions of the disciplinary system and (6) various implications when issues are approached by race, ethnic group, and gender. In addition, this study further stratifies the civilian workforce into mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories which include white collar supervisory, skilled (trades and crafts) and unskilled (laborer and nonapprentice) blue collar supervisory, skilled and unskilled white and blue collar nonsupervisory, with applicable racial, ethnic, and gender considerations. As in past studies, data sources here include analysis of completed disciplinary actions and

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responses to questionnaires and interviews. In addition, however, this study goes further by encompassing an elaborate stratification with the random selections based on these more occupationally specific categorizations. Finally, this study, unlike most earlier studies, includes selected interviews with special interest group leaders (both military and civilian) involved in the EEO and labor relations aspects of a disciplinary program. Overview Three distinct methods of data collection (case study analysis, questionnaires, and interviews) are used in this study. First, separate but complimentary questionnaires were developed for supervisory and nonsupervisory employees. Second, interviews were conducted on an individual basis with three separate categories of employees, (1) randomly selected supervisory employees, (2) randomly selected nons1..1pervisory employees, and (3) supervisory and nonsupervisory employees --both military and civilian specifically selected because of their responsibility and involvement with the EEO Committee or the disciplinary program. Finally, case study analysis consisting of a record search, was conducted on each formal disciplinary action taken during calender year (CY) 1978 and calender year (CY) 1979. Details of the collection process are outlined below. Stratification The USAF A workforce, at the time the random selections were made, was composed of 1,852 civilian employees (1,665 nonsupervisory and 187 supervisory). A stratified random sampling was developed. The workforce was stratified into seven mutually 83'

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exclusive and exhaustive groups by pay system and grade: (l) unskilled blue collar (WG/WL 1-4); (2) nontechnical and clerical nonsupervisory white collar (GS 1-6); (3) supervisors of unskilled blue collar (WS 1-4); (4) skilled blue collar {WG/WL 5 or higher); (5) technical and professional nonsupervisory white collar {GS 7 or higher); {6) all supervisory white collar (GS 1 or higher); and {7) supervisors of skilled blue collar (WS 5 or higher). Within these pay system and grade level stratifications the workforce was further stratified by gender and applicable minority group. At the USAF Academy the applicable minority groups are Black, Hispanic, Asian, and Ameri can Indian . All employees in categories exclusive of these groups are classified as "Other." Actual representation within the specified stratifications is shown at the conclusion of this chapter in Table 4.1. Random Selection Procedures A random sample of respondents was selected using the following procedure. Civilian personnel records are located in random order on a central computer disc. Each record has a six digit relative record number, or address, on the disc, which is used by the system to access a particular record for change during on line sessions. This address changes whenever a record is updated or when records are added or deleted. To preclude any possibility of selecting an inordinate number of records from a particular organization, the records were resequenced using the middle two digits of the relative record number. Since this number is constantly changing and has no relationship to the content of the records, a random sample was provided, as there was no possible way of knowing an individual's relative record number at the time 84

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the inquiry was run. Prior to any random selections the system was instructed to exclude selection of those civilian employees who would definitely be selected for interview (the EEO Committee, minority organization chairpersons, EEO counselors, EEO staff, and labor relations staff). Other considerations and decisions required prior to final sample selection, included a review of the actual populations within each of the strata. The focus was on providing an adequate representative sample of race, ethnic group, and gender respondents in each category from every strata. At the same time, the sample had to be small enough to be manageable. The final selections made coincide with the actual population in each stratum and category. Based on these considerations, the determination was made to select approximately 50 supervisory employees (actual selection included 53 or approximately 27 percent of the available 187 supervisors) and approximately 180 nonsupervisory employees (actual selection included 195 or approximately 11 percent of the available 1,665 nonsupervisory employees) for questionnaire administration. The larger actual selection in both of the above instances was due to rounding within the several stratifications. Actual sample selections, by stratification, are shown at the end of this chapter in Table 4.2. Following the random selection of questionnaire respondents, interview respondents --both nonsupervisory and supervisory personnel--were randomly selected using the same procedure. The respondents chosen for the questionnaire were excluded from selection along with the earlier exclusions and a new sample of 10 supervisory employees and 10 nonsupervisory employees was chosen. 85

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Following the selection of those to be interviewed, a pretest group was selected, again following the same procedure. A total of 10 supervisory and 28 nonsupervisory employees were chosen for the pretest exercise. Pretest The questionnaires used in this study were developed specifically for this research design. Faculty members of the University of Colorado at Denver, University of Colorado at Colorado Springs, and the United States Air Force Academy assisted in the format, design, and content. The actual questionnaires are reproduced in Appendices C and D. The questionnaires were assembled with the easy to answer questions at the beginning of the instrument. The more sensitive and perception-seeking questions are located toward the end. The disciplinary history questions were assembled in a logical order by asking first about the less severe disciplinary actions and progressing to the more serious. Caution was exercised in the assembly process to avoid establishing a response set. The potential questionnaire respondents possessed a variety of educational --third grade through PhD's --which required special care in selecting the terminology used in the final instruments. Review of the pretest questionnaires showed no excessive concentration of answers in areas other than where the lack of extreme variation was expected. Areas where small variation in the answers was anticipated included such things as expected retaliation for filing grievances, statements of innocence in those cases where a disciplinary action had been received, and feelings of 86

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inequity by those who had received formal disciplinary actions. After completing the questionnaires, the pretest respondents were interviewed and asked to identify and discuss questions in the instrument which were not clear or instructions or explanations that were incomplete or could be improved. Pretest respondents were also asked whether they had additional information which they could or would like to have provided, but did not have the opportlllity because of the limited answer selection available. The pretest respondents uniformly felt the questions were clear and understandable; they were familiar with the terminology used, and thought the questionnaire was comprehensive. A review of the questionnaires following their administration showed that portions of the written instructions needed to be amplified and emphasized verbally before respondents filled them out. These verbal explanations: (1) emphasized the importance of answering all questions, (2) noted that some questions required a write-in answer while others required a checkmark, number, or letter, and (3) indicated that many of the questions sought perceptions in areas where respondents might not have first hand knowledge or experience. Nonetheless, they were asked to respond as well as they could. Questionnaire Administration The questionnaires were administered in groups of up to 30 participants, isolated in facilities conducive to questionnaire completion. Both supervisory and nonsupervisory employees participated simultaneously. The time required to complete the questionnaire ranged from 15-30 minutes. Prior to administration the participants were assured of their 87

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anonymity. All participation was voluntary. After being advised of the voluntary nature of participation, one supervisory employee and five nonsupervisory employees chose not to participate. In addition to the one supervisory employee who refused to complete the questionnaire, three of the supervisors selected were not available. Thus, of the 53 supervisors originally selected, 49 (92 percent) returned usable data; of the 195 nonsupervisory employees surveyed, 181 (93 percent) returned usable data. Interviews The author conducted all interviews in a secluded environment where honesty and frankness were encouraged. The interview pattern for all respondents was the same (conforming to the interview objectives described in Table B.7). In addition to the specific data gathered, the interviews frequently allowed for indepth discussion of interviewees' attitudes and perceptions. All interviewees provided useful information and many seemed pleased to have the opportunity to share their observations and perceptions. From the random interviews with both the supervisory and nonsupervisory categories, an average of 9 out of 10 scheduled interviews were conducted, giving a 90 percent response rate. The 90 percent rate in both instances i s attributable to unavailibility of respondents, not refusal to participate. The select interview category fared even better. The entire EEO Committee, the EEO Counselor, the Assistant EEO Officer, the entire technical labor relations staff, and the local Union President were all interviewed giving a total of 23 (100 percent) responses in the select interview category. 88

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Case Study Analysis AU formal disciplinary actions taken against civilian employees in CY 1978 and CY 1979 were included in the data batch. All written reprimands, suspensions from duty, and disciplinary removals were analyzed. There were 85 total actions during this 24 month period. These actions were analyzed vis-a-vis race/ethnic/gender and included an indepth look at the quse of action, or the infraction that brought about the formal action. In addition, the disciplinary history previous disciplinary offenses --of the employee was analyzed. Data were also gathered on the race/ethnic/gender characteristics of the supervisor issuing the disciplinary action. The actions analyzed involved 69 different employees and 85 separate disciplinary cases. Of the 69 employees, 53 had only one formal disciplinary action in the two year period; 12 employees had two formal disciplinary actions; three employees had three formal disciplinary actions, and one employee incurred a fourth formal disciplinary offense, which resulted in discharge. 89

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TABLE 4.1 The Sampling Frame Stratified by Occupational Category, Race/Ethnic Group, and Gender* •• •••BLACK••• ----HISP---ASH N-•••AH IN!)----OTHER•-----TOTAL---CATEGORY • % • % ' X ' X ' % ' l Wli/WL 1-4 MALE: 48 D 11.32 141 034.67 8 D01.89 0 ODD .DO 191 045.05 394 092.92 fEMALE 1D D02.36 4 000.94 2 0 OD. 4 T 0 000 .oo 14 003.30 30 007.08 TOHL: 56 013.68 151 035.61 1 0 002.36 0 000 .oo 205 048.35 424 oz2 .e8••• liS 1-r. -MALE: 3 0 01. 31 10 004.37 1 003.44 0 ODD .oo 145 063.32 159 069.43 FEMALE 2 ODD.87 4 DOl. 15 1 OOD.44 0 ODD. 00 63 027.51 70 030.57 TlTAU 5 DD2.16 14 006.11 2 DOJ.87 0 ODO.OO 208 090. 83 229 D12.36*** GS 1 + ) MALE: 3 003.33 5 005.56 D ooo. 00 1 001 .11 r.o 066.67 69 076.67 FEll ALE 1 001.11 1 001.11 0 ooo.oo 0 003.00 19 021.11 21 023.33 TOTAL: 4 004.44 6 006.67 0 ooo.oo 1 001 .11 79 08 7. 78 90 004.86*** liS 5+ HALE: z 003.77 14 026.42 0 ooo. 00 0 000.00 37 069.81 53 too.oo FE '!ALE 0 ooo.oo 0 ooo.oo 0 ooo.oo 0 000.00 0 ooo. 00 0 ooo. 00 TlTU: 2 003.77 14 026.1t2 0 000.00 0 ooo.oo 37 069.81 53 002. 86*-** * Source: Appropriated fund workforce at the USAFA on 31, 1980 ** Other column: Includes all employees not listed in a specific minority column (Black, Hispanic, Asian, ***Indicated the percentage of the total workforce for each individual stratum or American Indian) \D 0

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91 Table 4.2 The Questionnaire Sample Stratified by Occupational Category, Race/Ethnic Group, and Gender* Black Hispanic Asian A mer. Indian Other** Total Male 5 16 0 21 WG/WL 1-4 48 Female 0 2 Male 2 2 0 12 GS 1-6 (Non supv) 65 Female 2 2 42 Male 2 6 0 0 4 ws 1 4 12 Female 0 0 0 0 0 Male 3 19 27 WG/WL 5 + 53 Female 0 0 0 Male 0 16 GS 7+ (Nonsupv) 29 Female 0 7 Male 0 16 GS 1+ (Supv) 26 Female 0 0 5 Male 4 0 0 10 ws 5+ 15 Female 0 0 0 0 0 -rr---54 --7 -r-163-2ii"8 *Source: Numbers in each stratification are representative of the actual USAFA populations (See Table 4.1). Sample selection made February 12, 1980. **Other category include s all sam ple sele ctees who are not Black, Hispantc, Asian, or American Indian . n (supervisory) = 53 n (nonsupervisory) = 195 n (male) = 169 n (female) = 79

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CHAPTER V Results Introduction The seven hypotheses examined in this research are all approached in similar format. Each major section begins with a restatement of the hypothesis, followed by a summary of the relevant factors applied in the confirmation/disconfirmation process. In each case the data are presented in narrative form followed by a discussion of the findings. Conclusions follow, and the tables appear at the end of each section. The majority of the data, as reflected in both the narrative and the tables, are reported two ways. First, each separate subpopulation (i.e., Black, Hispanic, male, female) is shown independently of the other subpopulations with the horizontal total of e.ach row equal to 100 percent. Secondly, the combined total for all respondents is shown under "margin total". In some cases actual occurrences are reported rather than percentages. The reporting method, in each case, is shown on the table. For purposes of this report, levels of significance of .05 or better are considered statistically significant. Some findings, however, are reported which do not attain this level. Nonetheless, the data captured are of conceptual value when considered in the light of personal experience and the theoretical contributions of the literature. Accordingly, they are reported because they too lend meaning to the research conclusions.

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Hypothesis I The actual occurrence of formal disciplinary actions is not mathematically proportionate to the actual population distribution with the strata used in this study. The stratifications used in analyzing this hypothesis are described below: (1) Wage Grade (WG) and Wage Leader (WL) 1-4 (2) General Schedule (GS) 1-6 (nonsupervisory) (3) Wage Supervisor (WS) 1-4 (4) Wage Grade (WG) and Wage Leader (WL) 5 or higher (5) General Schedule (GS) 7 or higher (nonsupervisory) (6) Wage Supervisor (WS) 5 or higher (7) General Schedule (GS) 1 or higher (supervisory) (8) Minority/Nonminority (Minority --Hispanic, Black, American Indian, Asian --either sex) (9) Male/Female (any race) Overview. Discussion of Hypothesis I requires a definition of the subpopulation distribution and the disciplinary activity, based on historical documentation, within each of the strata or subpopulations. Relevant data are presented in tables defining the mathematical proportion for each subpopulation, as compared with the actual occurrence of formal discipline within these same subpopulations. Corollary findings involving the propensity for action, gender versus gender and race/ethnic group versus race/ethnic group, as well as the propensity for a grievance and subsequent reversal of a formal disciplinary action are reported with the findings. Data sources for this hypothesis include case study analysis, employee questionnaire, and supervisory questionnaire. 93

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Data. A discussion of Hypothesis I is complicated by the fact that neither race/ethnic group nor gender are distributed uniformly among the strata. A review of Table 4.1 shows that 43.3 percent of all Black employees are located in the unskilled blue collar stratum (WG/WL 1-4); an additional 17.9 percent are located in the skilled blue collar stratum (WG 5 or higher); and 25.4 percent are employed in the low grade general schedule pay system. This leaves a total of 13.4 percent divided among the white collar (GS 7 or higher nonsupervisory) and all general schedule supervisory positions (GS 1 or higher supervisory). These latter categories actually comprise 22.5 percent of the workforce. A disproportionate representation is also evident in the Hispanic population: a full 36.6 percent of the population is in the WG/WL 1-4 stratum, while only 7.5 percent occupy GS 1-6 positions. The skilled trades and crafts (WG5 or higher) employ 42.1 percent of the Hispanic population, leaving 13.8 percent for the GS 7 or higher nonsupervisory, WS 1-4, WS 5 or higher, and GS 1 or higher supervisory strata. The Asian population is even more askew with 58.8 percent in the 1JG/W L 1 4 stratum and another 23.5 percent in the GS 1-6 stratum leaving only 17.7 percent for all other categories. Similar disparity exists in the gender stratum as demonstrated by the conspicious absence of females in all of the WG/WL/WS categories and the underrepresentation of males in the GS 1-6 stratum. Table 5.1 depicts the minority and gender population at the USAF Acade my both as a percentage of the total USAF Academy workforce and in actual numbers. The numbers shown capture the actual population on January 31, 1980. 94

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Tables 5.2 through 5.8 reflect the subpopulations within each strata defined in the hypothesis. Within this series of tables Section I documents the percentage of the subpopulation as a segment of the strata. For example, in Table 5 . 2 the WG/WL 1-4 stratum comprises 22.9 percent of the entire workforce. The percentages reflected in Section I show the representation of each subpopulation for this specific stratum, rather than as a percentage of the entire workforce . Section II illustrates the percentage of actual formal disciplinary as a percentage of all form al disciplinary actions at the USAF Academy. Section III illustrates the percentage of formal disciplinary action occurrences attributable to each subpopulation within the confines of the defined stratum. This same format is followed consistently throughout Tables 5.2 through 5.8. Tables 5.9 and 5.10 illustrate both data obtained from actual disciplinary case histories, the occurrence within each stratum and subpopulation, and a simple computation of the number of disciplinary actions "expected" in each stratum. "Expected" actions are based on the assumption that discipline is meted out uniformly among occupational, race, ethnic, and gender groups. Tables 5.11 through 5.13 show the relationship between the gender of the supervisor taking disciplinary action and the race/ethnic group, gender, and type of disciplinary action imposed. The tables report all formal disciplinary actions occurring in CY 1978 and CY 1979. Tables 5.14 through 5.16 illustrate the relationship between the race/ethnic group of the supervisor taking the formal disciplinary action and the race/ethnic group, gender, and type of 95

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disciplinary penalty imposed for each disciplinary occurrence during CY 1978 and CY 1979. Tables 5.17 through 5.19 document the grievances and appeals by race/ethnic group, gender, and supervisory/nonsupervisory status which were generated as a direct result of the disciplinary actions which occurred in CY 1978 and CY 1979. Tables 5.20 through 5.22 document the disciplinary actions canceled or reversed as a result of grievance and appeal decisions. Discussion. Table 5.2, Section I, describes the race, ethnicity, and gender of the populations in this unskilled, nonsupervisory blue collar stratum. As can be seen from Section I, the workforce is predominantly male with a disproportionate minority representation when compared to Table 5.1. This stratum represents 22.9 percent of the total workforce. Section II illustrates the occurrence of disciplinary actions during CY 1978 and CY 1979. Although this stratum consists of less than 23 percent of the workforce, 58.9 percent of the 85 formal disciplinary actions taken during CY 1978 and CY 1979 were taken against members of this stratum. Section III illustrates the actual breakout of the formal actions taken within this stratum. A total of 50 formal actions were taken against members of this stratum. By comparing Sections I and III of this table, it is evident that the occurrence of formal discipline does not match the subpopulation representation. Table 5.2 finds a markedly high percentage of overall actions against members of this stratum with further disparity in the subpopula tions. A matching mathematical relationship does not exist proportionately in the gender, Hispanic, or Other categories. Table 5.2 shows that the WG/WL 1-4 96

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occupational group receives more than twice as many disciplinary actions as would be expected by number alone and that, within this occupational group, Hispanics receive considerably more and nonminorities (the "Other" category) considerably less than might be expected. The next stratum considered is the skilled blue collar (WG/WL 5 or higher). Table 5.3, Section I, illustrates a tremendously disproportionate male population, also askew in minority balance in light of Table 5.1. This stratum comprises 24.3 percent of the total workforce. Section II shows the formal disciplinary actions taken roughly equal (22. 9 percent) to the workforce proportions. However, Section III clearly illustrates significant discrepancies in disciplinary actions taken in two categories. While Hispanics comprise 38.6 percent of the population of this stratum, only 10.5 percent of the 19 formal actions taken were against Hispanics while 84.2 percent of the formal actions were against members of the Other category. As evidenced in Section I, the Other category comprises 55.7 percent of the stratum's population. Table 5.3 shows that the actual actions taken against the stratum nearly aligns with what would be expected in overall numbers but, the Hispanic population actually receives only about one fourth of the expected actions, while the nonminorities (the "Other" category) receive one and one half times the expected number. The supervisors of unskilled blue collar employees constitute a small percentage of the entire workforce (2.4 percent). The WS 1-4 stratum is characterized in Table 5.4 Again, the extreme male predominance is evident --in this case, 100 percent. Section II reflects a disproportionately low occurrence of formal discipline 97

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(1.2 percent) as evidenced by the absence in all categories except Black. Only one formal action was taken in this stratum accounting for the 100 percent in the Black category as reflected in Section III. The small population of this stratum and the low disciplinary action occurrence does not provide sufficient data for a meaningful conclusion. Section I, Table 5.5, illustrates the stratum containing supervisors of skilled blue collar employees. The total absence of females is again evident. This stratum contains 2.9 percent of the total workforce and more roughly equates to the overall USAF Academy minority/nonminority balance in the Other category. The number of Hispanic supervisors is high while the other minorities are underrepresented. A comparison with Table 5.1 indicates a disproportionately low representation of Blacks. Section II reflects a low occurrence (1.2 percent) of formal disciplinary actions. Section III shows the one action taken in this stratum was against an Hispanic, accounting for the 100 percent in this category. Again, the small population of the stratum and the infrequent occurrence of formal discipline does not provide sufficient data for meaningful findings. Table 5.6 depicts the nonsupervisory GS 1-6 stratum. This category is predominately clerical and administrative. Section I categorizes the actual populations and illustrates a disproportionately high female representation (75.7 percent). The stratum comprises 30.3 percent of the total workforce. Reflection on Table 5.1 shows a disproportionately low representation of Hispanics and a disproportionately high representation in the Other category. Section II shows the infrequent occurrence (9.4 percent) 98

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of formal discipline, even though this stratum represents nearly one-third of the workforce. Section III evidences the disproportionately high occurrence of formal actions in the Black and Hispanic categories (although there was only one action in each category) and the corresponding low occurrences (six actions) in the Other category. Table 5.6 shows several imbalances from the expected numbers. The males received considerably more than the expected number of actions while the nonminorities (the "Other" category) received less than the expected number of actions. The 12.5 percent shown in Section III under Black and Hispanic represent only one formal action in each category. The expected number would have been one action for all minorities and an increase of three actions in the nonminority female category. The nonsupervisory technical and professional (GS 7 or higher) population with the disciplinary action occurrence figures are displayed in Table 5. 7. This stratum comprises 12.3 percent of the total workforce and is quite representative of the actual gender population. Section I, however, illustrates significant underrepresentation in all categories except the Asian and Other. Section II shows a low occurrence (5.9 percent) of formal discipline within the stratum. A total of five formal actions occurred. Section III depicts the actual occurrence, and shows 20 percent in the Black category and 80 percent in the Other category, with a disproportionately high occurrence in this stratum taken against females. Table 5.7 shows that less than one-third of the expected number of actions occurred against nonminority males while over twice the expected number of actions occurred against nonminority females. The minorities are underrepresented in this stratum (9.1 99

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percent). The one action taken represents over twice the expected value, but because of the underrepresentation cannot be conclusive. Table 5.8 denotes all white collar supervisory personnel (GS 1 or higher). Again, reflecting on Table 5.1, this stratum contains a rough gender balance, although Section I again denotes an imbalance in minority representation. This stratum comprises 4.9 percent of the total workforce and as shown in Section II, only 1.2 percent of the total disciplinary actions taken occurred here. The one action taken, as reflected in Section III, was against a male in the Other category. The low occurrence of formal discipline precludes meaningful findings regarding the expected versus actual occurrence numbers. The one action that was taken occurred in the high density population --the nonminority male category. However, only one-fourth of the expected actions occurred. Table 5.9 integrates the preceding tables by showing the actual formal disciplinary action occurrence on the left hand side of each column for each row. The parenthetical number contained on the right hand side of each column for each row reflects the "expected" share of formal disciplinary actions for each category. The expected share is based on actual population within each category, using a base of 85 formal disciplinary actions (the number of actions occurring during the period CY 1978 and CY 1979). This expected score does not imply, in the normative sense, that actions should have occurred in this ratio. It simply reflects the mathematically proportionate share, based strictly on actual population distribution, and confirms that actions do not, in fact, occur from stratum to stratum in proportion to the strata population. It is evident from Table 5.9 that a significant 100

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disproportionately high share of the actions occur in the WG/WL 1-4 stratum in the Black, Hispanic, and Other categories. In addition, a significantly low disparity exists in the nonsupervisory GS 1-6 category, with a slight disparity on the low side in all supervisory categories. It is also evident that a disproportionately high number of actions are taken against the Other category in the WG/WL 5 or higher stratum. Table 5.10 focuses on the more aggregated categories specified in the strata definitiQns. The same procedure used to generate the "expected" scores in Table 5.9 is used in Table 5.10. Table 5.10 clearly confirms the disparate distribution based on the strata definitions. There were 74 actual actions taken against males during the test period. Their proportionate share of actions (using a base of 85) would have been 59.7 formal actions. The correspondingly low occurrences of actual actions against females was 11, when the proportionate share would have been 25.3. Similarly, minorities actually received 38 formal actions while their mathematically proportionate share, in relation to actual population, was 26. Reference to Table 5.9 shows that this entire imbalance was created in the WG/WL 1-4 stratum. The same proportionate disparity exists in the supervisory/nonsupervisory category where an expected value would have equalled 8.6 actions against supervisors while, in fact, only 3 formal actions were ' issued. Several significant corollary findings emerge from the data. Tables 5.U and 5.12 show the relationship between the gender of the supervisor taking formal disciplinary action, and the race/ethnic group and gender of the appellant. Table 5.13 illustrates the level 101

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or type of punishment administered by male and female supervisors. The workforce consists of 280 supervisors of civilian employees. Males make up 88.6 percent of the supervisory workforce (n=249) while females occupy 11.4 percent of the supervisory positions (n=31). The margin total row in Tables 5.11 through 5.13 show that 92.9 percent of the formal disciplinary actions taken are initiated by male supervisors while the remaining 7.1 percent are generated by female supervisors. Table 5.11 shows the actions initiated by male supervisors occurred in all race/ethnic group categories where discipline occurred, while the actions taken by female supervisors were restricted to the Other and Hispanic categories. Table 5.12 describes the relation ship between the gender of supervisors taking formal disciplinary actions and the gender of appellants. As evidenced in this table, female supervisors took no actions against male subordinates Dut they took a full 54.5 percent of the actions against female employees. Table 5.13 describes the type of disciplinary action (reprimand, suspension, discharge) taken by male and female supervisors in each of the 85 disciplinary instances in CY 1978 and CY 1979. The actions taken by male supervisors were distributed through all types of penalties, while the female supervisors restricted their punishment to reprimands, except for one discharge action. The original design did not intend to establish a relationship between the race/ethnicity of the supervisor and the race/ethnicity and gender of the appellant nor of the race/ethnicity of the superv isor to the type of penalty administered. However, the data 102

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gathered provided this information and in the cases of race/ethnic group and gender of the appellant the findings are significant. Table 5.14 confirms that a disproportionately high number of actions are taken by minority supervisors with a correspondingly low number of actions taken by supervisors in the Other category. Specifically, Hispanic supervisors take a disparately high percentage of actions against other Hispanics and members of the Other category, while supervisors in the Other category take a disproportionately low percentage of actions against minority group members and a high percentage of actions against members of the Other category. Table 4.1 shows that over 68 percent of the WS 1-4 supervisors (these are the supervisors of the WG/WL 1-4 stratum) are minority. The imbalance in formal disciplinary actions taken in this stratum occurs against minorities. These actions are taken, in large part, by minority supervisors. This finding rules out the contention that a nonminority supervisor is more likely to discipline a minority employee. It does raise the possibility that minority supervisors are much harder on all employees and, minority employees in particular. Table 5.15 describes the relationship between the race/ethnic group of the supervisors taking formal disciplinary action and the gender of the appellants. This Table again confirms the disproportionately high number of actions taken by minority supervisors, and in addition, shows that a disproportionately high number of the actions taken against females are taken by members of the Other category. Table 5.16 documents the relationship between the race/ethnic group of the supervisors taking formal disciplinary 103

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action and the type of penalty imposed--reprimand, suspension, or discharge. The "margin total" row shows the percentage of disciplinary actions taken by each race/ethnic group supervisor. As evidenced in this table, the Black supervisors take a disproportionately low number of reprimands and discharge actions and a disproportionately high number of suspensions, a disprop rtionately high number of the reprimands came from Hispanic supervisors, whil e they are low in the areas of suspension and discharge. Supervis ors in the Other category are low in reprimands and disproport ionately high in suspension and discharge actions. Tables 5.17 through 5.19 show the grievance and appeals which evolved from the disciplinary actions taken during CY 1978 and CY 1979. The appellants are categorized by race/ethnic group, gender, and supervisory/nonsupervisory status. Table 5.17 shows that only 20 percent of the Blacks grieved actions against them while over 40 percent of the Hispanic and Other employees initiated grievances. In the same regard, Table 5.18 shows approximately one-third of the actions against males wt-re grieved, while over 80 percent of the female appellants grieved the actions against them. Table 5.19 shows that none of the supervisors who were disciplined grieved the action against them but over 40 percen t of the nonsupervisory employet-s initiated grievances. Tables 5.20 through 5.22 depict the disciplinary actions canceled or reversed as a result of grievance or appeal decisions. This series of tables illustrates the reversals by race/ethnic groug, gender, and supervisory/nonsup ervisor y status. The margin total reflects a high win rate for management (96.4 percent). A review 104

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of Table 5.20 shows the only race/ethnic category to have actions reversed is the Other category. Table 5.21 illustrates a disproportionately high number of reversals occurred in the female stratum as compared to the male stratum. Table 5.22 show that all reversals that did occur, fell in the nonsupervisory stratum. Conclusion. The WG/WL 1-4 (Table 5.2) stratum does not contain a proportional relationship in either the occurrence of formal disciplinary actions as a function of the entire USAF Academy population (22.9 percent of the population received 58.8 percent of the disciplinary actions) or the occurrence of formal discipline within the subpopulations (i.e., disparately high occurrence in the male and Hispanic categories and disparately low occurrence in the female, Asian, and Other categories). The WG/WL 5 or higher stratum (Table 5.3) shows a markedly high underrepresentation of females, accounting for the nonoccurrence of formal discipline against females in this category. In addition, the table reflects a very different trend than that described in the WG/WL 1-4 stratum. In this stratum, the Hispanic subpopulation receives a disparately low proportion of the formal actions and the Other subpopulation receives a very high percentage of the stratum's formal disciplinary actions. The WS 1 4 stratum (Table 5.4) shows a mathematical imbalance in both the overall actions taken and in the disparately high occurrence in the Black subpopulation and the disparately low occurren c e in the Other category. This stratum comprises a very small percentage of the overall workforce and mathematical representation would not be possible. The WS 5 or higher stratum (Table 5.5) shows the same types 105

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of imbalances evidenced in the WS 1-4 stratum with the same low percentage of workforce being a characteristic. The only action taken agains-t an Hispanic, accounting for the extreme mathematical imbalance. The GS l-6 (nonsupervisory) stratum (Table 5.6) contains a significant portion of the workforce but a disparately low occurrence of formal discipline in several subpopu1ations. As evidenced in Section I, the male subpopulation is underrepresented (24.2 percent), yet that categQry received 37.5 per cent of the formal disciplinary actions within the stratum. Likewise, disparities exist in the minority subpopulation, at least in pdrt attributable to the underrepresentation of rninoritit's within the stratum. Overall, the stratum c omprises 30.3 percent of the workforce, yet only 9.4 percent .:>f the forrnal o ccurred within this stratum. The GS 7 or higher stratum (Table 5.7) shows a near balan c e in the gender relationship (see T dblt' 5.1 for comparis on). The subpopulation imbalances occur iu the race/ethnic group subpopulations. This stratum shows a mathe1natical imbalance in the occurrences by gender, with d disproportionately high rate in the female subpopulation. In addition, the as .:1 whole, has received a disparately low mathematical purtion of the overall number of disciplinary actions. The GS I or higher (supervisory) stratwn (Table 'Us ) shows a slight imbalance in the gender subporulalwns dnd d sign1ficant disparity in the race/elhnic group In addition, the disciplinary action oc urrt"nce rate (1.2 percent) is lower than the segment of the population this stratlJin repr esents (1L9 percent). 106

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The low occurrence of actions account for the imbalance that does exist although the one action that was taken is in the high density subpopulation. In summary, the hypothesis is confirmed. Tables 5.9 and 5.10 clearly summarize and illustrate that the occurrence of formal discipline is not in proportion to the numbers in each subpopulation or stratum analyzed. It is evident that the WG/WL 1-4 stratum (lllskilled blue collar) receives a disparately high portion of the actions and the GS 1-6 stratum (white collar clerical and administrative) receives a disparately low portion. In addition, overall, the male, blue collar, and nonsupervisory subpopulations appear to receive more than their share of disciplinary actions, while the female, white collar, and supervisory subpopulations receive less. In concluding the corollary issues, the data (Tables 5.ll through 5.13) support the propensity for male supervisors to take action against any race/ethnic group and either gender, while female supervisors tend to restrict their actions to non minorities and females. Female supervisors would be expected to take 10 disciplinary actions, while in fact, they took only six. In addition while the penalties imposed by mate supervisors included all types (reprimand, suspension, and disharge) the penalties imposed by female supervisors were restricted to reprimands and one discharge. Male supervisors are more inclined to take action against any race/ethnic or gender category, and the penalties imposed by the male supervisor tend to be more severe than those imposed by female supervisors. The data (Tables 5.14 through 5.16) support a finding that 107

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minority supervisors initiate a disproportionately high number of formal disciplinary actions against minority males. The expected number of actions taken by minority supervisors is 26. They actually took 50 of the 85 total actions. Thirty of the 50 actions were against other minorities. It is apparent that the majority of actions taken against minority group members are taken by minority group supervisors. Specifically, Hispanic supervisors appear to be particularly harsh on the Hispanic and Other subpopulations while the Other . supervisory category seems to be particularly harsh on their own, with a disproportionately small number of actions taken against Hispanics. When the appellant's gender is a consideration the Other category supervisor takes a disproportionately high number of actions against nonminority females and a low number of actions against nonminority males. The Hispanic supervisor takes a disproportionately high number of actions against males and both Hispanic and Black supervisors take a low number of actions against females. In regard to the type of disciplinary action taken (Table 5.16) the Hispanic supervisor tends to issue a higher number of reprimands, the Black supervisor issues more suspensions and the Other category supervisor is disproprotionately high in suspensions and discharges. In summary minority supervisors take a disproportionately high number of formal disciplinary actions with the majority of those against minority males. The minority supervisor tends to use the reprimand more freely although with the present progressive disciplinary policy, repeat offenders are ultimately faced with discharge. In considering grievances and appeals resulting from 108

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disciplinary actions (Tables 5.17 through 5.19) the data support the conclusion that the Hispanic and Other categories tend to freely utilize the appellant procedure. Over 40 percent of the formal disciplinary actions in these categories were grieved or appealed while only 20 percent of the actions against Blacks were grieved or appealed. When considering gender in regard to the appellant process, over 80 percent of the actions against females were grieved while less than one third of the actions against males were grieved. The data in Table 5.19 confirm that employees tend not to grieve actions taken against themselves. The results of the grievances and appeals appear in Tables 5.20 through 5.22. The data confirm that the successful grievances, those which result in reversal of the disciplinary action, come from nonsupervisory nonminorities, and tend to be female. In summary, nonminority and Hispanic employees tend to use the grievance procedure most freely with this characteristic most prevelant in the nonminority female. In addition, the vast majority of disciplinary actions are sustained, although a significant portion of the reversals occurred in the nonminority female category. 109

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Table 5.1 USAFA Population by Minority Status and Gender All Minority Nonminority Black Hispanic Asian American Indian Other Male Female Percentage 30.6% 69.4 100.0% 7.2% 22.3 0.9 0.2 69.4 100.0% 70.3% 29.7 100.0% Source: USAF Academy computer-based personnel records on January 31, 1980 See Table 4.1 for populations by pay system stratifications n=l852 (total civilian population) Actual 567 1285 nn 134 413 17 3 1285 1852 1301 551 1m"" -0

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Section I Section II Section III Table 5.2 WG/WL 1-4 * Stratum Population at USAFA by Percent Black Hispanic Asian Am Ind Male 11.3 34.7 1.9 .0 Female 2.4 . 9 .5 .0 Total 13.7 35.6 2.4 .o Percent Total Disciplinary Actions Taken at USAFA ** Male 5.9 27.1 . 0 .o Female 1.2 .0 1.2 . 0 Total 7.1 27.1 1.2 .o Percent Disciplinary Actions within this Stratum Male Female Total 10.0 2.0 12.0 46.0 • 0 46.0 .0 2.0 2.0 .0 .o .o Other 45.0 3.3 48.3 23.5 . 0 23.5 40.0 .o 40.0 Source: 85 disciplinary actions taken during CY78 and CY79 * Percent of total workforce = 22.9 (n=424) ** 58.9 Percent of total actions (85) = 50 actions Total 92.9 7.1 lOO.O 56.5 2.4 58.9 96.0 4.0 100.0 ---

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Section I Section II Section III Male Female Total Table 5.3 WG/WL 5 or Higher * Stratum Population at USAFA by Percent Black 5.1 .2 5.3 Hispanic 38.6 .0 38.6 Asian .2 .0 • 2 Am Ind .2 • 0 .2 Percent Total Disciplinary Actions Taken at USAFA ** Male Female Total 1.2 • 0 1.2 2.4 .0 2.4 • 0 • 0 .0 .0 • 0 • 0 Percent Disciplinary Actions within this Stratum Male Female Total 5.3 • 0 5.3 10.5 .0 10.5 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 Other 54.8 .9 55.7 18.8 • 0 18.8 84.2 .o 84.2 Source: 85 disciplinary actions taken during CY78 and CY79 * Percent of total workforce = 24.3 (n=451) * * 22.4 Percent of total actions (85) = 19 actions Total 98.9 1.1 100.0 22.4 • 0 22.4 100.0 • 0 100.0 -tV

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Section I Section II Section III Table 5.4 ws 1-4 * Stratum Population at USAFA by Percent Black Hispanic Asian Am Ind Male 15.9 52.3 .0 .o Female .o . 0 . 0 • 0 Total 15.9 52.3 . 0 . 0 Percent Total Disciplinary Actions Taken at USAFA ** Male 1.2 .0 . 0 .0 Female .0 .0 .0 .o Total 1.2 .0 .0 .0 Percent Disciplinary Actions within this Stratum Male Female Total 100 • 0 100 • 0 • 0 .0 .0 .o • 0 • 0 • 0 • 0 Other 31.8 .o 31.8 .0 .0 .o .0 .o • 0 Source: 85 disciplinary actions taken during CY78 and CY79 * Percent of total workforce= 2.4 (n=44) ** 1.2 Percent of total actions (85) = 1 action Total 100.0 . 0 100. 0 1.2 . 0 1.2 100.0 .0 100.0 -

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Section I Section II Section III Male Female Total Table 5 . 5 WS 5 or Higher * Stratum Population at USAFA by Percent Black 3.8 • 0 3.8 Hispanic 26.4 .0 26.4 Asian • 0 • 0 .o Am Ind • 0 .o .0 Percent Total Disciplinary Actions Taken at USAFA ** Male Female Total . 0 .0 .0 1.2 .0 1.2 • 0 .0 .0 • 0 .0 • 0 Percent Disciplinary Actions within this Stratum Male Female Total .0 • 0 • 0 100 • 0 100 • 0 .o • 0 • 0 • 0 .0 Other 69.8 .0 69.8 .o • 0 • 0 .0 .0 • 0 Source: 85 disciplinary actions taken during CY78 and CY79 * Percent of total workforce = 2.9 (n=53) ** 1.2 Percent of total actions (85) = 1 action Total 100.0 .0 lOO.O 1.2 .0 1.2 100.0 • 0 100.0 -I="

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Section I Section II Section III Male Female Total Table 5.6 GS 1-6 (Nonsupervisory) * Stratum Population at USAFA by Percent Black 2.7 3.4 6.1 Hispanic 2.3 3.2 5.5 Asian .4 .4 .8 Am Ind . 0 .2 .2 Percent Total Disciplinary Actions Taken at USAFA ** Male Female Total 1.2 .0 1.2 .0 1.2 1.2 .0 .0 .0 • 0 • 0 • 0 Percent Disciplinary Actions within this Stratum Male Female Total 12.5 .0 12.5 • 0 12.5 12.5 • 0 • 0 .0 .0 • 0 .0 Other 18.9 68.6 87.5 2.4 4.7 7.1 25.0 50.0 75.0 Source: 85 disciplinary actions taken during CY78 and CY79 * Percent of total workforce = 30.3 (n=561) ** 9.5 Percent of total actions (85) = 8 actions Total 24.3 75.8 100.1 3.6 5.9 93 37.5 62.5 100.0 \JI

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Section I Section II Section III Male Female Total Table 5.7 GS 7 or Higher (Nonsupervisory) * Stratum Population at USAFA by Percent Black 1.3 .9 2.2 Hispanic 4.3 1.8 6.1 Asian .4 .4 .8 Am Ind .0 • 0 .o Percent Total Disciplinary Actions Taken at USAFA ** Male Female Total • 0 1.2 1.2 • 0 .0 .0 .o • 0 .0 • 0 .0 • 0 Percent Disciplinary Actions within this Stratum Male Female Total • 0 20.0 20.0 .0 .o .o • 0 • 0 .0 • 0 .0 .0 Other 63.3 27.5 90.8 1.2 3.5 4.7 20.0 60.0 80.0 Source: 85 disciplinary actions taken during CY78 and CY79 * Percent of total workforce = 12.3 (n=229) ** 5.9 percent of total actions (85) = 5 actions Total 69.3 30.6 99.9 1.2 4.7 5:9 20.0 80.0 100.0 -"'

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Section I Section II Section III Table 5.8 GS 1 or Higher (Supervisory) * Stratum Population at USAFA by Percent Black Hispanic Asian Am Ind Male 3.3 5.6 . 0 1.1 Female 1.1 1.1 .0 .o Total 4.4 6.7 .o 1.1 Percent Total Disciplinary Actions Taken at USAF A ** Male .0 .0 . 0 . 0 Female . 0 .o .0 .0 Total . 0 . 0 .0 .0 Percent Disciplinary Actions within this Stratum Male Female Total • 0 • 0 .0 .0 .0 • 0 .0 .o .o • 0 .o .0 Other 66.7 21.1 87.8 1.2 .0 1.2 100 • 0 100 Source: 85 disciplinary actions taken during CY78 and CY79 * Percent of total workforce = 4.9 (n=90) ** 1.2 Percent of total actions (85) = 1 action Total 76.7 23.3 100.0 1.2 .0 1:2" 100.0 .0 100.0

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Table 5.9 Actual and Expected Fonnal Disciplinary Actions by Occupational Group, Ethnicity, and 'Gender Black Hispanic Asian Am Ind Other Act Ex2 Act EXE Act ExE Act EXE Act . Exp Male 5 (2.2) 23 (6.8) 0 .4) 0 .0) 20 (8.8) WG/WL 1-4 Female ( . 5) 0 ( .2) .1) 0 . 0) 0 ( .6) Male ( 1.1) 2 (8.0) 0 .1) 0 .1) 16 (11.3) WG/WL 5+ Female 0 ( 1.1) 0 ( . 0) 0 . 0) 0 ( . 0) 0 .2) Male . 1 ) 0 ( 1 .1) 0 .0) 0 ( .0) 0 .6) 1-4 Female 0 . 0) 0 . 0) 0 .0) 0 ( . . 0) 0 .0) Male 0 . 1 ) .6) 0 .0) 0 ( . 0) 0 (1. 7) ws 5+ Female 0 . 0) 0 ( . 0) 0 . 0) 0 ( . 0) 0 ( .0) Male . 7) 0 ( .6) 0 .1) 0 ( .0) 2 (4.9) GS 1-6 (nons) Female 0 ( . 8) .8) 0 ( .1) 0 ( .1 ) 4 (17.7) Male 0 ( . 1 ) 0 . 5) 0 ( . 1 ) 0 . o) (6.7) GS 7+ (nons) Female ( .1) 0 .2) 0 ( .1) 0 ( . 0) 3 (2.9) Male 0 .1) 0 . 2) 0 .0) 0 ( .1) (2.8) GS 1+ (supv) Female O .1) 0 . 1 ) 0 .0) 0 .0) 0 ( .9) Act -Actual fonnal disciplinary actions -Exp -Expectation based on actual population and assumed 85 disciplinary actions 00 n=l852

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Section I Section II Section III Table 5.10 Summary of Actual/Expected Formal Actions by Gender, Minority Status, and Supervisory Responsibility* Group Actual PoEulation Actual Actions Expected Male 1,301 74 59.7 Female 551 11 25.3 Total 1,852 85 85.0 Minority 567 38 26.0 Nonminority 1,285 47 59.0 Total 1,852 85 85.0 Supervisory 187 3 8.6 Nonsupervisory 1,665 82 76.4 Total 1,852 85 85.0 * For more finite breakdown of occurrence see Table 5.9 ** Expected actions are based on proportional share related to actual population (assuming base level of 85 actions) Population n=l852 Actual actions taken n=85 Expected distribution n=85 ** \D

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Table 5.11 Relationship Between the Gender of the Supervisor Taking Formal Disciplinary Action and the Race/Ethnic Group of the Appellant (Calendar Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979) Gender of Supervisor* Race/Ethnic Group Male Female of Appellant (n=79) (n=6) Black (n=lO) 100.0% 0.0 Hispanic (n=27) 96.3% 3.7 American Indian (n=O) 0.0% 0.0 Asian (n=l) 100.0% 0.0 Other (n=47) 89.4% 10.6 Margin Total 92.9% 7.1% Source: 85 formal disciplinary actions taken during CY 78 and CY 79 Total (n=85) 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% * Total supervisors of civilian employees (n=280) male supervisors (n=249) female supervisors (n=31) p=.0695 I'V 0

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Table 5.12 Relationship Between the Gender of the Supervisor Taking Formal Disciplinary Action and the Gender of the Appellant (Calendar Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979) Gender of Appellant Male (n=74) Female (n=ll) Margin Total Gender of Supervisor* Male (n=79) 100.0% 45.5% 92.9% Female (n=G) 0.0 54.5 7.1% Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% Source: 85 formal disciplinary actions taken during CY 78 and CY 79 * Total supervisors of civilian employees (n=280) male supervisors (n=249) female supervisors (n=31) p=.OOOl N -

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Table 5.13 Relationship Between the Gender of the Supervisor Taking Formal Disciplinary Action and the Type of Action Taken (Calendar Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979) Gender of Supervisor* Disciplinary Action Taken Male Female Total (n=79) (n=6) (n=85) Reprimand (n=46) 89.1% 100.0% Suspension (n=l6) 100.0% 0.0 100.0% Discharge (n=23) 95.7% 4.3 100.0% Margin Total 92.9% 7.1% 100.0% Source: 85 formal disciplinary actions taken during CY 78 and CY 79 * Total supervisors of civilian employees (n=280) male supervisors (n=249) female supervisors (n=31) p=.l032 N N

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Table 5.14 Relationship Between the Race/Ethnic Group of the Supervisor Taking Formal Disciplinary Action and the Race/Ethnic Group of the Appellant (Calendar Year 1978 and Year 1979) Race/Ethnic Group of Supervisor* Race/Ethnic Group Black Hispanic American Indian Asian Other Total of Appellant** (n=l2) (n=37) (n=O) (n=O) (n=36) (n=85) Black (n=lO) 30.0% 30.0 0.0 0.0 40.0 100.0% Hispanic (n=27) 18.5% 66.7 0.0 0.0 14.8 100.0% American Indian (n=O) 0.0% 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0% Asian (n=l) 0.0% 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0% Other (n=47) 8.5% 31.9 0.0 0.0 59.6 100.0% Margin Total 14.1% 43.5% 0.0% 0.0% 42.4% 100.0% Source: 85 disciplinary actions taken during CY 78 and CY 79 * Total supervisors of civilian employees (n=280) civilian supervisors (n=l87) military supervisors (n=93) ** Total actions (n=85) 85 total formal actions were taken against 69 different individuals-some of whom were multiple offenders p=.0007 N ""'

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Table 5.15 Relationship Between the Race/Ethnic Group of the Supervisor Taking Formal Disciplinary Action and the Gender of the Appellant (Calendar Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979) Race/Ethnic Group of Supervisor* Gender of Appellant** Black Hispanic American Indian Asian Other (n=l2) (n=37) (n=O) (n=O) (n=36) Male (n=74) 14.9% 47.3 0.0 0.0 37.8 Female (n=ll) 9.1% 18.2 0.0 0.0 72.7 Margin Total 14.1% 43.5% 0.0% 0.0% 42.4% Source: 85 disciplinary actions taken during CY 78 and CY 79 Total (n=85) 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% * Total supervisors of civilian employees (n=280) civilian supervisors (n=l87) military supervisors (n=93) ** Total actions (n=85) SS total formal actions were taken against 69 different individuals--some of whom were multiple offenders p=.0264 N

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Table 5.16 Relationship Between the Race/Ethnic Group of the Supervisor Taking Formal Disciplinary Action and the Type of Action Taken (Calendar Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979) Race/Ethnic Group of Supervisor* Disciplinary Action Taken Black Hispanic American Indian Asian Other (n=l2) (n=37) (n=O) (n=O) (n=36) Reprimand (n=46) 13.0% 50.0 0.0 0.0 37.0 Suspension (n=l6) 18.8% 31.3 0.0 0.0 50.0 Discharge (n=23) 13.0% 39.1 0.0 0.0 47.8 Margin Total 14.1% 43.5% 0.0% 0.0% 42.4% Source: 85 disciplinary actions taken during CY 78 and CY 79 Total (n=85) 100.0% 100.1% 99.9% 100.0% * Total supervisors of civilian employees (n=280) civilian supervisors (n=l87) military supervisors (n=93) ** Total actions (n=85) 85 total formal actions were taken against 69 different individuals--some of whom were multiple offenders p=.2294 N ""'

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Table 5.17 Grievances or Appeals Resulting From Disciplinary Actions Taken During Calendar Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979 Appellant Black (n=lO) Hispanic (n=27) American Indian (n=O) Asian (n=l) Other (n=46) Margin Total Action Grieved 20.0% 44.4% 0.0% 0.0% 41.3% 39.3% Action Not Grieved 80.0 55.6 0.0 100.0 58. 1 60.7% 85 disciplinary actions taken during CY 78 and CY 79 Total 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% Source: n=84; 1 expired p=.l391 case deleted owing to missing data (appeal time limits had not at the time of data collection)

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Table 5.18 Grievances or Appeals Resulting From Disciplinary Actions Taken During Calendar Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979 Action Action Appellant Grieved Not Grieved Total Male (n=73) 32.9% 67.1 100.0% Female (n=ll) 81.8% 18.2 100.0% Margin Total 39.3% 60. 7% 100.0% 85 disciplinary actions taken during CY 78 and CY 79 Source: n=84; 1 expired p=.0008 case deleted owing to missing data (appeal time limits had not at time of data collection)

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Table 5.19 Grievances or Appeals Resulting From Disciplinary Actions Taken During Calendar Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979 Appellant Supervisor (n=2) Nonsupervisor (n=82) Margin Total Action Grieved 0.0% 40.2% 39.3% Action Not Grieved 100.0 59.8 60.7% Source: 85 disciplinary actions taken during CY 78 and CY 79 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% n=84; 1 case deleted owing to missing data (appeal time limits had not expired at the time of data collection) N 00

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Appellant Black (n=lO) Table 5.20 Disciplinary Actions Reversed (Cancelled) as a Result of Grievances or Appeals Filed During Calendar Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979 Action Action Reversed Sustained* 0.0% 100.0 Hispanic (n=27) 0.0% 100.0 American Indian (n=O) 0.0% 0.0 Asian (n=l) 0.0% 100.0 Other (n=46) 6.5% 93.5 Margin Total 3.6% 96.4% Source: 85 disciplinary actions taken during CY 78 and CY 79 Total 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% n=84; 1 case deleted owing to missing data (appeal time limits had not expired at the time of data collection) p=.0624 * Actions not grieved or appealed are counted as sustained -N \1:)

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Appellant Male (n=73) Table 5.21 Disciplinary Actions Reversed (Cancelled) as a Result of Grievances or Appeals Filed During Calendar Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979 Action Action Reversed Sustained* 1.4% 98.6 Female (n=ll) 18.2% 81.8 Margin Total 3.6% 96.4% Source: 85 disciplinary actions taken during CY 78 and CY 79 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% n=84; 1 case deleted owing to missing data (appeal time limits had not expired at the time of data collection) p=.0023 * Actions not grieved or appealed are counted as sustained 0

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Table 5.22 Disciplinary Actions Reversed (Cancelled) as a Result of Grievances or Appeals Filed During Calendar Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979 Appellant Supervisor (n=2) Nonsupervisor (n=82) Margin Total Action Reversed 0.0% 3.7% 3.6% Action Sustained* 100.0 96.3 96.4% Source: 85 disciplinary actions taken during CY 78 and CY 79 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% n=84: 1 case deleted owing to missing data (appeal time limits had not expired at the time of data collection) * Actions not grieved or appealed are counted as sustained \lo) -

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Hypothesis II Application and enforcement of the work rules thr9ugh formal disciplinary measures varies disproportionately within the strata defined in Hypothesis I. Those strata are: (1) Wage Grade (WG) and Wage Leader (WL) 1-4 (2) General Schedule (GS) 1-6 (nonsupervisory) (3) Wage Supervisor (WS) 1-4 (4) Wage Grade (WG) and Wage Leader (WL) 5 or higher (5) General Schedule (GS) 7 or higher (nonsupervisory) (6) Wage Supervisor (WS) 5 or higher (7) General Schedule (GS) 1 or higher (supervisory) (8) Minority/nonminority (minority-Hispanic, Black, American Indian, Asian -either sex) (9) Male/Female (any race) Overview. The examination of Hypothesis II involves the use of perception data. For the purpose of this study, application and enforcement is viewed as one process. In considering how and when the rules are applied, it is assumed that enforcement of violations of the work rules through formal disciplinary measures will be related to the strictness or laxity of the individual supervisor. In other words, if the supervisor is strict in applying the work rules, the penalties meted out for violation will be more severe than those penalties administered by the supervisor who is lax in applying the work rules. The data reported in this section were collected from supervisory questionnaires, employee questionnaires, and interviews. The analysis from all sources includes consideration of the respondents' race/ethnic group and gender. In addition, the 132

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supervisory questionnaire analysis includes consideration of the managerial level of the respondent; for example, whether the respondent is a first level, second level, or third or higher level supervisor. The employee questionnaire analysis considers the race or ethnic group of the respondent's immediate supervisor and the interview analysis incorporates the supervisory/nonsupervisory and civilian/military status of the respondent. . The data gathered explore perceived disparate disciplinary treatment in regard to of the stratum. The issues documented in this study include perceptions of disparity in the treatment of high versus low grade civilians, male versus female civilians, and blue collar (WG/WL) versus white collar (GS) employees. In addition, the nonsupervisory respondents (employee questionnaire) were asked for their perceptions of their supervisor's consistency in applying and enforcing work rules. Data. Tables 5.23 through 5.32 document the perceived disparity in the disciplinary treatment of high versus low grade civilian employees. Employees were asked, with a range of ordinal responses available, if the disciplinary policy were more harsh on low grade employees than it was on high grade. Tables 5.23 through 5.25 reflect the responses categorized by race/ethnic group and gender of the respondent, along with the race/ethnic group of the respondent's immediate supervisor. A similiar question was asked of supervisory employees with the results being documented by the race/ethnic group, gender and supervisory level of the respondent. The supervisory respondent replies are documented in Tables 5.26 through 5.28. The personal interviews presented the opportunity to pursue 133

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the same issue. The interview data are documented in Tables .5.29 through .5.32. The results of this process are documented with consideration given to the race/ethnic group, gender, supervisory/nonsupervisory, and civilian/military status of the respondent. As a corollary issue to the present perceptions regarding disciplinary treatment of high versus low grade employees, data were sought regarding the employee attitude toward a policy which would establish disparate penalties for high versus low grade employees. The results are documented in Tables .5.33 through .5.3.5, where consideration is given to the race/ethnic group and gender of the respondent along with the race/ethnic group of the respondent's supervisor. The issue of disparity in the application and enforcement of work rules with gender as the focal point is considered in Tables .5.36 through .5.51. The data are based on perceptions from the supervisory questionnaires, employee questionnaires, and interviews. Tables 5.36 through 5.38 display the employee responses to an ordinal question pertaining to equity in disciplinary treatment in light of gender. The responses are analyzed by race/ethnic group and gender of the respondent, as well as by the race/ethnic group of the respondent's immediate supervisor. Tables 5.39 through 5.41 display employee responses to a direct question on favored treatment because of gender. The responses are displayed by race/ethnic group and gender of the resi>ondent along with an analysis based on the race/ethnic group of the respondent's immediate supervisor. 134

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The data pertaining to disparate treatment, based on gender, gathered during the interviews are shown in Tables 5.42 through 5.49. This series of tables provides consideration for the respondents' race/ethnic group, gender, supervisory/nonsupervisory, and civilian/military status. The issue of disparity in the application and enforcement of work rules with pay system white collar (GS) versus blue collar (WG) as the focal point is examined in Tables 5.52 through 5.61. The data were gathered from . the employee questionnaires, supervisory questionnaires, and interviews. The employees were asked, with ordinal responses provided, if the application and enforcement of work rules were more lax when the employee was GS. The responses are documented by race/ethnic group and gender of the respondent, as well as the race/ethnic group of the respondent's supervisor in Tables 5.52 through 5.54. In the same light, the supervisory perceptions pertaining to disparity based on pay system are displayed in Tables 5.55 through 5.57. The considerations are race/ethnic group and gender of the respondent along with the respondent's supervisory level. The related data obtained through interview are displayed in Tables 5.58 through 5.61 with analysis considerations including the respondents' race/ethnic group, gender, supervisory/nonsupervisory and civilian/military status. The final considerations documented in regard to the application and enforcement i ssue are contained in Tables 5.62 through 5.67. The employees were asked if their own supervisors were: (1) consistent in applying work rules and, (2) if they perceive 135

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their supervisor to be strict in the application of those rules. The responses, in both instances, are considered with regard to the respondents' race/ethnic group and gender, along with the race/ethnic group of the respondents' immediate supervisor. Discussion. Turning first to the issue of perceived disparity based on high or low grade level, the data in Tables 5.23 through 5.25 support the finding that employees perceive the policy as discriminatory against low graded employees. The margin total row reflects that over 80 percent of the respondents perceive the policy to be more harsh on low grade employees at least sometimes. Close examination of Table 5.23 shows the minorities feel more strongly that such a disparity exists than does the Other category. When the same analysis is made by gender, the data show the male response to be heavier at the extreme ordinal values than those of the female. When consideration is given to the race/ethnic group of the respondents' supervisor, the data, as shown in Table 5.25, support a finding that few employees with Hispanic supervisors (9.1 percent) feel the disciplinary policy is never more harsh on low grade employees while significantly more employees with nonminority supervisors (20.8 percent) hold the same view. When a comparable issue was pursued with the supervisory employees (Tables 5.26 through 5.28) over 68 percent of the respondents perceive the policy to be equitable. When the focus is on race or ethnic group of the respondent, as in Table 5.26, a significant portion of the Black, Asian, and Other categories (40, 50, and 33.3 percent) perceive the policy as favoring high grade while only 18.2 percent of the Hispanic respondents hold the same view. 136

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When the supervisory responses are analyzed by gender, as displayed in Table 5.27, nearly twice the percentage of males . (32.6 percent), as opposed to females (16.7 percent), feel the policy is harder on low grade. Focusing on the supervisory level of the respondents (Table 5.28), it is clear that the first level supervisors and top management feel much more strongly that grade level is a determining factor in discipline than does the mid-level supervisor. When the high/low grade level issue was approached in the interview process the respondents overwhelmingly perceived the high grade employee to be favored. Table 5.29 shows 100 percent of the minority respondents see grade level as a discriminatory factor with only ll.l percent of the nonminorities perceiving equitable treatment. When this issue is considered by gender of the respondent, the few respondents who perceive equity are about equally divided between male and female. The same finding occurs when the consideration is supervisory/nonsupervisory (Table 5.31) or civilian/military (Table 5.32) status. In addition to these stated perceptions regarding the impact of high versus low grade on disciplinary treatment, employees were asked how they felt high grade employees should be disciplined with regard to their low grade counterparts. Tables 5.33 through 5.35 support the contention that grade level should not be a factor in the application and enforcement of work rules. Over 84 percent of the respondents feel high grade employees should receive the same penalty for the same offense as a low grade employee. The margin total row of Table 5.33 illustrates that 14.5 percent of the employees feel the penalty should be more severe for a high grade employee while no respondent feels the penalty should be less 137

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severe. It is interesting to note that the minority and nonminority responses to this question are nearly identical. In analyzing the same issue by gender (Table 5.34) an imbalance occurs. While the respondents still heavily support the same penalty for both categories, those who feel the penalty should be more severe for the high grade are divided very differently. The males clearly support a more severe penalty (17.4 percent) than the females (8.5 percent). A similiar imbalance occurs when the issue is analyzed by considering the group of the respondents' supervisors. Table 5.35 shows that 35.7 percent of the respondents with a Black supervisor feel the high grade employee should receive a more severe penalty while those with Hispanic and Other category supervisors are 12.5 percent and 13.0 percent respectively. In considering whether the disciplinary treatment varies because of the gender of the appellant, this study provides meaningful findings. Data were gathered in this regard from the employee questionnaires, supervisory questionnaires, and interviews. Tables 5.36 through 5.38 display employee perceptions of equity and disparity in disciplinary treatment for males and females who have committed the same offense. Table 5.36 analyzes the issue by race/ethnic group of the respondent. While a significant portion of the minority respondents feel equal treatment never occurs, only 4.5 percent of the Other category responded in this way. As indicated in the margin total row, 17.5 percent of the respondents perceive complete equity while 9.0 percent feel equity never occurs. Analysis of this same question by gender shows a gender bias. Table 5.37 documents that 12.3 percent of the males feel equity never occurs while this number is 138

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reduced to 3.7 percent for the female respondents. In considering the issue based on the race/ethnic group of the respondents' supervisor, Table 5.38 confirms a very different response than when considered by the race/ethnic group of the respondent. Over 27 percent of the Black respondents (Table 5.36) felt actions were always taken equally against men and women. Table 5.38 shows only 7.1 percent of the respondents with Black supervisors hold this view. Along the same line, only 8.3 percent of the Hispanics from Table 5.36 feel that actions are always taken equally but this attitude jumps to 23.7 percent in Table 5.38 for those employees with Hispanic supervisors. Tables 5.39 through 5.41 document employee perceptions as to which sex is favored. The margin total row reflects that over 50 percent of the respondents feel there is no difference. However, the remaining employees are not equally divided between male or female favoritism in that, over 36 percent perceive the female as favored. When the issue is analyzed by race/ethnic group of the respondent, Table 5.39, the minority employee responses clearly reflect a perception that the female is favored. The data show 41.7 percent of the Black respondents and 52.6 percent of the Hispanic respondents see the female as favored, while only 29.4 percent of the Other category holds the same view. When the issue is analyzed by gender, sex bias is evident. Again, over 50 percent of the respondents feel neither sex is favored but the remaining respondents have responded in a sex bias fashion. Only 6.2 percent of the male respondents view the male as favored while 43.4 percent see the female in a favored position. On the other hand, 26.8 percent of the females see the male as favored while 21.4 139

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percent of the females view the female as favored. When the issue is considered in light of the race/ethnic group of the respondents' supervisor (Table 5.41), the data support the conclusion that regardless of the race/ethnic group of the supervisor the female is perceived as being favored in those instances where there is a perceived difference in disciplinary treatment based on gender. The data gathered in the interview process supports the conclusions from the employee questionnaires: Tables 5.42 through 5.45 seek perceptions as to a favored gender and coincide with Tables 5.39 through 5.41. The interview data are analyzed by race/ethnic group, gender, supervisory/nonsupervisory and civilian/military status. Again, as reflected in the margin total row, over 50 percent of the respondents view no gender favoritism, but a startlingly high number, 44.2 percent, view the female as favored. This view is consistent when analyzed by race/ethnic group (Table 5.42) and supervisory/nonsupervisory status (Table 5.44). When analyzed by gender, Table 5.43, the sex bias is again evident. No male respondents see the male as favored but 57.1 percent view the female as favored. Conversely, 6.7 percent of the females view the male as favored while only 20.0 percent see themselves in a favored role. When the consideration is military or civilian status, the results are quite different. Table 5.45 shows over 80 percent of the military respondents feel neither sex is favored with the remainder viewing the female in a favored position. The civilian counterparts see neither sex favored 43.8 percent of the time and females favored 53.1 percent of the time. Tables 5.46 through 5.49 confirm the earlier findings. By an almost two to one margin, the interview respondents view the male 140

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as more likely to have disciplinary action taken against them. While Tables 5.46, 5.48, and 5.49 analysis by race/ethnic uoup, supervisory/nonsupervisory, and civilian/military status all show comparable results, the gender bias is evident when the issue is analyzed by gender (Table 5.47). In this case, 78.6 percent of the males view the male as more likely to receive formal discipline while only 43.8 percent of the females hold the same view. Tables 5.50 and 5.51 document supervisory employee responses to any perceived differences in propensity to discipline males and females. The supervisors responded, without exception, they would not distinguish in taking disciplinary action, based on gender. Tables 5.52 through 5.61 examine -the application and enforcement issue from the standpoint of pay system -GS versus WG. The data utilized in this analysis were gathered from the employee questionnaires, supervisory questionnaires and interviews. Tables 5.52 through 5.54 document responses, by race/ethnic group, gender and race/ethnic group of the respondents' supervisor, regarding perceptions of favored treatment for GS employees. The margin total row shows that less than 25 percent of the respondents feel there is never bias in favor of the GS employee. When examined by race/ethnic group of the respondent, Table 5.52, 30.0 percent of the Blacks and 30.6 percent of the Others feel there is never a difference. This response rate drops to 13.2 percent of the Hispanic respondents. Examination of the issue by gender (Table 5.53) finds 23.7 percent of the males and 26.9 percent of the females in the "never a difference" category. When consideration is given to the race/ethnic group of the respondents' supervisor, 141

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Table 5.54, the data show that only 10.8 percent of those employees with Hispanic supervisors view the GS employees in the "never favored" category. Tables 5.55 through 5.57 document supervisory perceptions of pay system disparity in the disciplinary policy. The supervisory responses are analyzed by race/ethnic group, gender, and supervisory level of the respondent. The margin total row shows a combined total of 83.3 percent of the respondents view the disciplinary policy as either the for both pay systems or at least no harder on WG employees. Table 5.55, analysis by race/ethnic group of the respondent, shows the respondents who feel the policy is harder on WG employees (16.7 percent) are about equally divided between minorities and nonminorities. The same trend follows when the data were analyzed by gender (Table 5.56). The data support a different finding when analyzed by level of supervisor. Table 5.57 shows that all respondents who feel the policy is harder on WG employees fall in the first level supervisory range. All of the second level and third level or higher supervisors perceive the policy as either no harder on WG or else about the same when compared to GS. The approach taken during the interview process was to seek out perceptions as to whether GS employees are more, less, or about as likely to have formal disciplinary action taken against them as WG employees. The responses, as shown in Tables 5.58 through 5.61, are analyzed by race/ethnic group, gender, supervisory/nonsupervisory, and civilian/military status. These responses are quite different from earlier data. The margin total row shows 77.3 percent of the respondents perceive 142

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the GS to be less likely, with only 18.2 percent viewing the probability as about the same. When considered by race/ethnic group of the respondent, all minority groups, except the Asian, responded very heavily in the "less likely" category. The exceptions to this include 25 percent of the Other category viewing the treatment as about the same and 3.6 percent and 25 percent of the Other and Black categories, respectively, viewing the GS as more likely to be the subject of formal discipline. When the issue is analyzed by gender, Table 5.59, 85.7 percent of the males perceive the GS as less likely with the remaining 14.3 percent seeing the likelihood of formal discipline as comparable. The female responses show 62.5 percent in the GS as less likely category while 12.5 percent see the GS as more likely. Twenty five percent of the female respondents feel the treatment is about the same. Table 5.60 supports the earlier interview data which suggests the majority (79.1 percent) view the GS as less likely although the nonsupervisory employees perceive more of a disparity than the supervisory employees . When the issue is analyzed by ' military/civilian status (Table 5.61), the findings are quite comparable -the only difference being that 3.1 percent of the civilians perceive the GS as more likely to be the recipient of formal disciplinary action. The last issue considered in this hypothesis is that of perceived consistency in applying work rules and perceived strictness in enforcement of those rules. Tables 5.62 through 5.67 record employee perceptions in these areas. The findings are analyzed by race/ethnic group, gender' and race/ethnic group of the respondents' supervisor. 143

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Tables 5.62 through 5.64 examine the issue of consistency in application of work rules. The margin total row shows 33.7 percent of the respondents perceive their supervisor as always consistent. At the other extreme, 8.6 percent of the respondents view their supervisor as never consistent. The remainder fall in the sometimes to nearly always consistent range. Table 5.62, analysis by race/ethnic group, shows considerably more minorities than nonminorities feel their supervisor is never consistent. When the issue is approached by gender (Table 5.63) the findings by sex are very comparable to those discussed under margin total. The data are different when considered by race/ethnic group of the respondents' supervisor. Table 5.64 shows that 14.3 percent of the respondents with a Black supervisor and 9.6 percent of the respondents with a nonminority supervisor feel their supervisor is never consistent while only 4.9 percent of the respondents with a Hispanic supervisor feel the same way. Tables 5.65 through 5.67 document employee responses regarding their supervisors strictness in applying rules. Table 5.65, which analyzes the data by race/ethnic group of the respondent, shows that minority employees perceive their supervisors as always strict to a much larger degree than do nonminority employees. When the issue is analyzed by gender the same results are apparent. Table 5.66 shows that while 31.1 percent of the males perceive their supervisors as always strict, only 17.2 percent of the females hold the same view. Table 5.67, which examines the data based on the race/ethnic group of the respondent's supervisor, shows that 14.3 percent of the 144

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respondents with a Black supervisor perceive their supervisor as never strict while 6.9 percent and 2.4 percent of the employees with nonminority and Hispanic supervisors, respectively, view their supervisors as never strict. When considering the always strict perception, the employees with minority supervisors dearly view their supervisors as more strict than the employees with supervisors in the Other category. Conclusion. Disparities in the application and enforcement of work rules is considered from the aspects of high versus low grade employees, differences based on gender, and differences attributable to pay system (GS versus WG). In addition, employee perceptions of their supervisors' consistency and strictness are examined. The findings will be summarized in each of these major areas prior to confirmation or disconfirmation of the hypothesis. The first issue to be considered was disparity in disciplinary treatment based on varied application and enforcement of work rules between the high grade strata (both GS and WG), and the low grade strata (both GS and WG). The data related to this aspect is displayed in Tables 5.23 through 5.35. The data support the conclusion that the treatment varies and this variance is, at least in part, attributable to the high/low grade factor. The statistically significant data contained in Tables 5.23 through 5.25 show that only 17 percent of the employees perceive consistent equity between the strata. Although not statistically significant the remaining data support the conclusion that treatment does vary, usually to the advantage of the high grade employee. The second issue examined was disparate application and enforcement based on gender. The male/female strata analysis are 145

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contained in Tables 5.36 through 5.51. The data support a conclusion that application and enforcement of work rules varies between genders. Both the employee questionnaires and interviews provided statistically significant results which not only confirm that disparities occur based on gender, but also, in those instances where favored treatment does occur, the female is the favored employee. The third issue considered was variation in application and enforcement based on white collar (GS) or blue collar (WG) status. The data again support a conclusion that disparities exist. The pay system data, contained in Tables 5.52 through 5.61, consistently show varied treatment attributable to the membership in the GS or WG strata. The employee questionnaires and the interviews provided statistically significant findings that confirm varied treatment with the GS employee the recipient of the favored treatment. The final issue examined was the employee perception of the consistency of their supervisors in applying work rules, along with their perception of their supervisors relative strictness. The data regarding these issues are contained in Tables 5.62 through 5.67. The data support the conclusion that minority supervisors fall in the "never consistent" category much more frequently than the nonminority supervisor. In addition, the data support the conclusion that minority supervisors have a much greater propensity to always apply the rules . strictly than do nonminority supervisors. While the data pertaining to consistency does not attain an acceptable level of statistical significance, the data pertaining to strictness in application of the rules (Tables 5.65 146

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through 5.67) are statistically significant. In summary, this study recognizes that the application and enforcement of work rules does vary disproportionately within the strata. The hypothesis is confirmed. The data do not confirm variance in each individual stratum. They were not each considered separately but rather were grouped to provide for more reasonable analysis. The high grade employee, regardless of pay system (GS or WG) or gender, is in a favored positon. The female, regardless of grade level or pay system and the GS employee, regardless of grade level or gender also find themselves in a favored category. The strata not discussed in this hypothesis, supervisory versus nonsupervisory and minority versus nonminority are examined in Hypothesis IV and Hypotheses V /VII respectively. 147

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Table 5.23 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on High or Low Grade Level of Employee Is the USAF Academy policy more harsh on low grade employees than it is on high grade? Respondent Never Sometimes Black (n=lO) 10.0% 40.0 Hispanic (n=35) 11.4% 42.9 American Indian (n=2) 0.0% 0.0 Asian (n=6) 16.7% 33.3 Other (n=lOO) 20.0% 57.0 Margin Total 17.0% 51.0% Source: Employee questionnaire (#9=race/ethnic n=l53; 28 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.OOOl Almost Always Always 20.0 30.0 25.7 20.0 0.0 100.0 16.7 33.3 14.0 9.0 17.0% 15.0% group and #34=perception) Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% ..a::-00

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Respondent Male (n=l05) Table 5.24 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on High or Low Grade Level of Employee Is the USAF Academy policy more harsh on low grade employees than it is on high grade? Never Sometimes Almost Always Always 18.1% 45.7 18.1 18.1 Female (n=49) 14.3% 65.3 14.3 6.1 Margin Total 16.9% 51.9% 16.9% Source: Employee questionnaire (#3=gender and #34=perception) n=l54; 27 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.0649 14.3% Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

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Table 5.25 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on High or Low Grade Level of Employee Race/Ethnic Group of Is the USAF Academy policy more harsh on low grade employees than it is on high grade? Almost Respondent's Supervisor Never Sometimes Always Always Black (n=l4) 14.3% 64.3 21.4 0.0 Hispanic (n=33) 9.1% 39.4 24.2 27.3 American Indian (n=2) 50.0% o.o 0.0 50.0 Asian (n=4) 0.0% 50.0 0.0 50.0 Other (n=lOl) 20.8% 54.5 14.9 9.9 Margin Total 17.5% 51.3% 16.9% 14.3% Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.1% 100.0% Source: Employee questionnaire (#13=race/ethnic group of supervisor and #34=perception) n=l54; 27 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.Oll9 VI 0

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Respondent Table 5.26 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on High or Low Grade Level of Employee Is the USAF Academy policy harder on low grade civilian employees than on high grade civilian employees? About Yes No the Same Black {n=5) 40.0% 0.0 60 . 0 Hispanic {n=ll) 18.2% 9.1 72.7 American Indian {n=O) 0.0% 0.0 0.0 Asian {n=2) 50.0% 0.0 50.0 Other {n=30) 33.3% 16.7 50.0 Margin Total 31.3% 12.5% 56.3% Total 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.1% Source: Supervisory questionnaire {#8=race/ethnic group and #36=perception) n=48; 1 case deleted owing to missing data p=.4522 ""' -

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Respondent Table 5.27 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on High or Low Grade Level of Employee Is the USAF Academy policy harder on low grade civilian employees than on high grade civilian employees? About Yes No the Same Male {n=43) 32.6% 14.0 5J.5 Female {n=6) 16.7% 0.0 83.3 Margin Total 30.6% 12.2% 57.1% Source: Supervisory questionnaire {#6=gender and #36=perception) n=49 p=.ll06 Total 100.1% 100.0% 99.9% ""' N

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Table 5.28 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on High or Low Grade Level of Employee Is the USAF Academy policy harder on low grade civilian employees than on high grade civilian employees? About Level of Supervisor Yes No the Same First level (n=39) 33.3% 12.8 53.8 Second level (n=8) 12.5% 12.5 75.0 Third level or higher (n=l) 100.0% 0.0 0.0 Margin Total 31.3% 12.5% 56.3% Total 99.9% 100.0% 100.0% 100.1% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#4=level of supervisor and #35=perception) n=48; 1 case deleted owing to missing data p=.2716

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Table 5.29 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on High or Low Grade Level of Employee Are high grade employees (more, less, about the same) as likely to have action taken against them as low grade employees? About Respondent More Less the Same Total Black (n=4) 0.0% 100.0 0.0 100.0% Hispanic (n=lO) 0.0% 100.0 0.0 100.0% American Indian (n=l) 0.0% 100.0 0.0 100.0% Asian (n=l) 0.0% 100.0 0.0 100.0% Other (n=27) 0.0% 88.9 11.1 100.0% Margin Total 0.0% 93.0% 7.0% 100.0% Source: Interviews n=43 p=.0917

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Table 5.30 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on High or Low Grade Level of Employee Are high grade employees (more, less, about the same) as likely to have action taken against them as low grade employees? About Respondent More Less the Same Total Male (n=28) 0.0% 92.9 7.1 100.0% Female (n=lS) 0.0% 93.3 6.7 100.0% Margin Total 0.0% 93.0% 7.0% 100.0% Source: Interviews n=43 p=.4774

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Table 5.31 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on High or Low Grade Level of Employee Are high grade employees (more, less, about the same) as likely to have action taken against them as low grade employees? Respondent Supervisor (n=25) Nonsupervisor (n=l8) Margin Total Source: Interviews n=43 p=.3795 More 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% Less 92.0 94.4 93.0% About the Same 5.6 7.0% Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

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Table 5.32 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on High or Low Grade Level of Employee Are high grade employees (more, less, about the same) as likely to have action taken against them as low grade employees? About Respondent More Less the Same Civilian (n=32) 0.0% 93.8 6.3 Military (n=ll) 0.0% 90.9 9.1 Margin Total 0.0% 93.0% 7.0% Source: Interviews n=43 p=.3763 Total 100.1% 100.0% 100.0%

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Respondent Table 5.33 Employee Attitude Regarding Magnitude of Penalty Deserved for High Versus Low Grade Employees Do you think high grade civilians should receive the (same, more severe, less severe) penalties for the same offense as lower grade employees? Less More Same Severe Severe Black (n=l2) 83.3% 0.0 16.7 Hispanic (n=37) 84.2% 0.0 15.8 American Indian (n=2) 100.0% 0.0 0.0 Asian (n=7) 100.0% 0.0 0.0 Other (n=ll4) 83.3% 1.8 14.9 Margin Total 84.4% 1.2% 14.5% Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.1% Source: Employee questionnaire (#9=race/ethnic group and #46=attitude) n=l72; 9 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.l850 -VI 00

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Respondent Table 5.34 Employee Attitude Regarding Magnitude of Penalty Deserved for High Versus Low Grade Employees Do you think high grade civilians should receive the (same, more severe, less severe) penalties for the same offense as lower grade employees? Less More Same Severe Severe Male (n=ll5) 81.7% 0.9 17.4 Female (n=59) 89.8% 1.7 8.5 Margin Total 84.5% 1.1% 14.4% Source: Employee questionnaire (#3=gender and #46=attitude) n=l74; 7 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.0667 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

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Table 5.35 Employee Attitude Regarding Magnitude of Penalty Deserved for High Versus Low Grade Employees Do you think high grade civilians should receive the (same, more severe, less severe) penalties for the same offense as lower grade employees? Race/Ethnic Group of Less More Respondent's Supervisor Same Severe Severe Black (n=l4) 64.3% o.o 35.7 Hispanic (n=40) 87.5% 0.0 12.5 American Indian (n=3) 100.0% 0.0 0.0 Asian (n=4) 100.0% 0.0 0.0 Other (n=ll5) 85.2% 1.7 13.0 Margin Total 84.7% 1.1% 14.2% Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 99.9% 100.0% Source: Employee questionnaire (#13=race/ethnic group of supervisor and #46= attitude) n=l76; 5 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.3191 -0

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Table 5.36 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Gender Respondent Black (n=ll) Hispanic (n=36) American Indian Asian (n=7) Other (n=llO) Margin Total Are disciplinary actions taken equally against men and women for the same offense? Almost Never Sometimes Always 18.2% 54.5 0.0 11.1% 63.9 16. 7 . (n=2) 100.0% 0.0 0.0 28.6% 14.3 28.6 4.5% 37.3 39.1 9.0% 42.8% 30.7% Always 27.3 8.3 0.0 28.6 19.1 17.5% Source: Employee questionnaire (#9=race/ethnic group and #48=perception) n=l66; 15 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.OOOl Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.1% 100.0% 100.0% -

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Table 5.37 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Gender Are disciplinary actions taken equally against men and women for the same offense? Respondent Male {n=ll4} Female {n=54} Margin Total Never 12.3% 3.7% 9.5% Sometimes 43.9 38.9 42.3% Source: Employee questionnaire {#3=gender and n=l68; 13 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.0784 Almost Always Always 25.4 18.4 42.6 14.8 31.0% 17.3% #48=perception} Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.1% 0\ N

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Table 5.38 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Gender Are disciplinary actions taken equally against men and women for the same offense? Race/Ethnic Group of Almost Respondent's Supervisor Never Sometimes Always Black (n=l4) 0.0% 57.1 35.7 Hispanic (n=38) 7.9% 42.1 26.3 American Indian (n=3) 33.3% 33.3 0.0 Asian (n=4) 50.0% 0.0 50.0 Other (n=l08) 8.3% 43.5 31.5 Margin Total 9.0% 43.1% 30.5% Always Total 7.1 99.9% 23.7 100.0% 33.3 99.9% o.o 100.0% 16.7 100.0% 17.4% 100.0% Source: Employee questionnaire (#13=race/ethnic group of supervisor and #48=perception) n=l67; 14 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.ll74

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Table 5.39 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Gender Which sex is favored? Respondent Male Female Neither Total Black (n=l2} 25.0% 41.7 33.3 100.0% Hispanic (n=38} 10.5% 52.6 36.8 99.9% American Indian (n=2} 0.0% 100.0 0.0 100.0% Asian (n=7} 0.0% 28.6 71.4 100.0% Other (n=l09} 12.8% 29.4 57.8 100.0% Margin Total 12.5% 36.3% 51.2% 100.0% Source: Employee questionnaire (#9=race/ethnic group and #49=perception} n=l68; 13 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.0393

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Table 5.40 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Gender Respondent Male (n=ll3) Female (n=56) Margin Total Which sex is favored? Male 6.2% 26.8% 13.0% Female 43.4 21.4 36.1% Neither 50.4 51.8 50.9% Source: Employee questionnaire (#3=gender and #49=perception) n=l69; 12 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.0002 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

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Table 5. 41 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Gender Which sex is favored? Race/Ethnic Group of Respondent's Supervisor Male Female Neither Total Black (n=l4) 14.3% 50.0 35.7 100.0% Hispanic (n=37) 8.1% 43.2 48.6 99.9% American Indian (n=3) 0.0% 33.3 •67. 7 100.0% Asian (n=4) 0.0% 25.0 75.0 100.0% Other (n=lll) 15.3% 32.4 52.3 100.0% Margin Total 13.0% 36.1% 50.9% 100.0% Source: Employee questionnaire (#13=race/ethnic group of supervisor and #49= perception) n=l69; 12 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.2760

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Table 5.42 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Gender Is one group favored? Respondent Male Female Neither Total Black (n=4) 0.0% 50.0 50.0 100.0% Hispanic (n=lO) 0.0% 70.0 30.0 100.0% American Indian (n=l) 100.0% 0.0 0.0 100.0% Asian (n=l) 0.0 0.0 '100.0 100.0% Other (n=27) 0.0% 37.0 63.0 100.0% Margin Total 2.3% 44.2% 53.5% 100.0% Source: Interviews n=43 p=.OOOl

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Table 5.43 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Gender Is one group favored? Respondent Male Female Neither Total Male (n=28) 0.0% 57.1 42.9 100.0% Female (n=l5) 6.7% 20.0 73.3 100.0% Margin Total 2.3% 44.2% 53.5% 100.0% Source: Interviews n=43 p=.OlOl -0\ 00

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Table 5.44 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Gender Respondent Supervisor (n=25) Nonsupervisor (n=l8) Margin Total Source: Interviews n=43 p=.2682 Is one group favored? Male Female 4.0% 40.0 0.0% 50.0 2.3% 44.2% Neither 56.0 50.0 53.5% Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

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Table 5.45 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Gender Is one group favored? Respondent Male Female Neither Total Civilian (n=32) 3.1% 53.1 43.8 100.0% Military (n=ll) 0.0% 18.2 81.8 100.0% Margin Total 2.3% 44.2% 53.5% 100.0% Source: Interviews n=43 p=.0217 ...., 0

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Table 5.46 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Gender Are males more likely to have action taken against them? Respondent No Yes Total Black (n=4) 50.0% 50.0 100.0% Hispanic (n=lO) 20.0% 80.0 100.0% American Indian (n=l) 0.0% 100.0 100.0% Asian (n=l) 0.0% 100.0 100.0% Other (n=27) 39.3% 60.7 100.0% Margin Total 34.1% 65.9% 100.0% Source: Interviews n=43 p=.l282 ....... -

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Table 5.47 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Gender Are males more likely to have action taken against them? Respondent No Yes Total Male (n=28) 21.4% 78.6 100.0% Female (n=l5) 56.3% 43.8 100.1% Margin Total 34.1% 65.9% 100.0% Source: Interviews n=43 p=.0026

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Table 5.48 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Gender Are males more likely to have action taken against them? Respondent Supervisor (n=25) Nonsupervisor (n=l8) Margin Total Source: Interviews n=43 p=.3220 No Yes 32.0% 68.0 38.9% 61.1 34.9% 65.1% Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

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Table 5.49 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Gender Are males more likely to have action taken against them? Respondent No Yes Total Civilian (n=32) 34.4% 65.6 100.0% Military (n=ll) 36.4% 63.6 100.0% Margin Total 34.9% 65.1% 100.0% Source: Interviews n=43 p=.4530

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Table 5.50 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Gender Would you be more prone to take a formal disciplinary action against: Male Female No Respondent Employee Employee Difference Total Black (n=5) 0.0% 0.0 100.0 100.0% Hispanic (n=ll) 0.0% 0.0 100.0 100.0% American Indian (n=O) 0.0% 0.0 0.0 0.0 Asian (n=2) 0.0% 0.0 100.0 100.0% Other (n=30) 0.0% 0.0 100.0 100.0% Margin Total 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#8=race/ethnic group and #2l=attitude) n=48; 1 case deleted owing to missing data

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Table 5.51 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Gender Would you be more prone to take a formal disciplinary action against: Male Female No Respondent Employee Employee Difference Male (n=43) 0.0% 0.0 100.0 Female (n=6) 0.0% 0.0 100.0 Margin Total 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#6=gender and #2l=attitude) n=49 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

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Table 5.52 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Pay System Are people with office jobs (GS) allowed to get away with more without a formal disciplinary action being taken than a blue collar (WG or WL)? Respondent Never Sometimes Black (n=lO) 30.0% 50.0 Hispanic (n=38) 13.2% 50.0 American Indian (n=2) 0.0% 0.0 Asian (n=7) 0.0% 85.7 Other (n=l08) 30.6% 57.4 Margin Total 24.8% 55.8% Source: Employee questionnaire (#9=race/ethnic n=l65; 16 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.OOOl Almost Always Always Total 10.0 10.0 100.0% 18.4 18.4 100.0% 0.0 100.0 100.0% 0.0 14.3 100.0% 10.2 1.9 100.1% 11.5% 7.9% 100.0% group and #50=perception)

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Table 5.53 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Pay System Are people with office jobs (GS) allowed to get away with more without a formal disciplinary action being taken than a blue collar (WG or WL)? Respondent Never Sometimes Male (n=ll4) 23.7% 50.9 Female (n=52) 26.9% 67.3 Margin Total 24.7% 56.0% Almost Always 14.0 5.8 11.4% Always 11.4 0.0 7.8% Source: Employee questionnaire (#3=gender and #50=perception) n=l66; 15 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.0062 Total 100.0% 100.0% 99.9% ...... 00

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Table 5.54 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Pay System Are people with office jobs (GS) allowed to get away with more without a formal disciplinary action being taken than a blue collar (WG or WL)? Race/Ethnic Group of Almost Respondent's Supervisor Never Sometimes Always Always Total Black (n=l4) 35.7% 50.0 14.3 0.0 100.0% Hispanic (n=37) 10.8% 56.8 21.6 10.8 100.0% American Indian (n=3) 0.0% 66.7 0.0 33.3 100.0% Asian (n=4) 25.0% 50.0 0.0 25.0 100.0% Other (n=l09) 28.4% 57.8 8.3 5.5 100.0% Margin Total 24.6% 56.9% 11.4% 7.2% 100.1% Source: Employee questionnaire (#13=race/ethnic group of supervisor and #50=percep tion) n=l67; 14 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.0235

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Table 5.55 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Pay System Is the USAF Academy disciplinary policy harder on blue collar (WG) than on office workers (GS)? About Respondent Yes No the Same Black (n=5) 20.0% 20.0 60.0 Hispanic (n=ll) 18.2% 9.1 72.7 American Indian (n=O) 0.0% 0.0 0.0 Asian (n=2) 0.0% 0.0 100.0 Other (n=30) 16.7% 23.3 60.0 Margin Total 16.7% 18.8% 64.6% Total 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.1% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#8=race/ethnic group and #35=perception) n=48; 1 case deleted owing to missing data p=.2181 -00 0

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Table 5.56 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Pay System Respondent Male (n=43) Female (n=6) Margin Total Is the USAF Academy disciplinary policy harder on blue collar (WG) than on office workers (GS)? Yes No 16.3% 20.9 16.7% o.o 16.3% 18.4% About the Same 62.8 83.3 65.3% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#6=gender and #35=perception) n=49 p=.2131 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 00 -

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Table 5.57 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based On Employee Pay System Is the USAF Academy disciplinary policy harder on blue collar (WG) than on office workers (GS)? About Level of Supervisor Yes No the Same First level (n=39) 20.5% 17.9 61.5 Second level (n=8) 0.0% 12.5 87.5 Third level or higher (n=l) 0.0% 100.0 0.0 Margin Total 16.7% 18.8% 64.4% Total 99.9% 100.0% 100.0% 99.9% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#4=level of supervisor and #35=perception) n=48; 1 case deleted owing to missing data p=.l413 -00 N

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Table 5.58 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Pay System Are GS (more, less, about the same) as likely to have formal disciplinary action taken against them as WG? About Respondent More Less the Same Black (n=4) 25.0% 75.0 0.0 Hispanic (n=lO) 0.0% 100.0 0.0 American Indian (n=l) 0.0% 100.0 0.0 Asian (n=l) 0.0% 0.0 100.0 Other (n=27) 3.6% 71.4 25.0 Margin Total 4.5% 77.3% 18.2% Source: Interviews n=43 p=.ll03 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 00

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Table 5.59 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Pay System Are GS (more, less, about the same) as likely to have formal disciplinary action taken against them as WG? About Respondent More Less the Same Male (n=28) 0.0% 85.7 14.3 Female (n=l5) 12.5% 62.5 25.0 Margin Total 4.5% 77.3% 18.2% Source: Interviews n=43 p=.0543 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 00

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Table 5.60 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Pay System Are GS (more, less, about the same) as likely to have formal disciplinary action taken against them as WG? Respondent Supervisor (n=25) Nonsupervisor (n=l8) Margin Total Source: Interviews n=43 p=.l543 More 0.0% 5.6% 2.3% Less 76.0 83.3 79.1% About the Same .24.0 11.1 18.6% Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 00 ""

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Table 5.61 Perceived Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Employee Pay System Are GS (more, less, about the same) as likely to have formal disciplinary action taken against them as WG? About Respondent More Less the Same Civilian (n=32} 3.1% 78.1 Military (n=ll} 0.0% 81.8 18.2 Margin Total 2.3% 79.1% 18.6% Source: Interviews n=43 p=.4143 Total 10'0. 0% 100.0% 100.0% 00

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Table 5.62 Perceived Consistency in Application of Work Rules Is your supervisor consistent in applying work rules? Respondent Never Black (n=l4) 14.3% Hispanic (n=40) 17.5% American Indian (n=2) 0.0% Asian (n=7) 14.3% Other (n=ll2) 4.5% Margin Total 8.6% Sometimes 28.6 22.5 0.0 14.3 24.1 23.4% Nearly Always 28.6 27.5 0.0 28.6 38.4 34.3% Always 28.6 32.5 100.0 42.9 33.0 33.7% Source: Employee questionnaire (#9=race/ethnic group and #27=perception) n=l75; 6 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.2448 Total 100.1% 100.0% 100.0% 100.1% 100.0% 100.0% 00 ......,

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Table 5.63 Perceived Consistency in Application of Work Rules Is your supervisor consistent in applying work rules? Nearly Respondent Never Sometimes Always Always Male (n=ll8) 6.8% 24.6 33.9 34.7 Female (n=58) 10.3% 24.1 34.5 31.0 Margin Total 8.0% 24.4% 34.1% 33.5% Source: Employee questionnaire (#3=gender and #27=perception) n=l76; 5 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.2476 Total 100.0% 99.9% 100.0% 00 00

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Table 5.64 Perceived Consistency in Application of Work Rules Is your supervisor consistent in applying work rules? Race/Ethnic Group of Nearly Respondent's Supervisor Never Sometimes Always Always Total Black (n=l4) 14.3% 28.6 28.6 28.6 100.1% Hispanic (n=41) 4.9% 22.0 34.1 39.0 100.0% American Indian (n=3) 0.0% 33.3 33.3 . 33.3 99.9% Asian (n=4) 0.0% 0.0 25.0 75.0 100.0% Other (n=ll5) 9.6% 26.1 33.9 30.4 100.0% Margin Total 8.5% 24.9% 33.3% 33.3% 100.0% Source: Employee questionnaire (#13=race/ethnic group of supervisor and #27=perception) n=l77; 4 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.0924 00 \D

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Table 5.65 Perceived Consistency in Enforcement of Work Rules Is your supervisor strict in applying rules? Respondent Never Sometimes Black (n=l4) 14.3% 28.6 Hispanic (n=40) 10.0% 40.0 American Indian (n=2) 0.0% 0.0 Asian (n=7) 0.0% 42.9 Other (n=ll3) 4.4% 37.2 Margin Total 6.3% 36.9% Source: Employee questionnaire (#9=race/ethnic n=l76; 5 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.Oll8 Nearly Always Always 21.4 35.7 10.0 40.0 0.0 100.0 14.3 42.9 39.8 18.6 30.1% 26.7% group and #26=perception) Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.1% 100.0% 100.0% \0 0

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Table 5.66 Perceived Consistency in Enforcement of Work Rules Is your supervisor strict in applying rules? Nearly Respondent Never Sometimes Always Always Male (n=ll9) 5.9% 34.5 28.6 31.1 Female (n=58) 6.9% 44.8 31.0 17.2 Margin Total 6.2% 37.9% 29.4% 26.6% Source: Employee questionnaire (#3=gender and #26=perception) n=l77; 4 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.0369 Total 100.1% 99.9% 100.1% "' -

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• Table 5.67 Perceived Consistency in Enforcement of Work Rules Is your supervisor strict in applying rules? Race/Ethnic Group of Nearly Respondent's Supervisor Never Sometimes Always Always Total Black (n=l4) 14.3% 28.6 28.6 28.6 100.1% Hispanic (n=41) 2.4% 29.3 24.4 43.9 100.0% American Indian (n=3) 0.0% 66.7 0.0 33.3 100.0% Asian (n=4) 0.0% 0.0 50.0 50.0 100.0% Other (n=ll6) 6.9% 43.1 31.9 18.1 100.0% Margin Total 6.2% 38.2% 29.8% 25.8% 100.0% Source: Employee questionnaire (#13=racejethnic group of supervisor and #26=perception) n=l78; 3 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.0045

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Hypothesis III Formal disciplinary measures are more likely to be taken by a civilian supervisor than a military supervisor. Overview. The third hypothesis seeks to discover whether the propensity among civilian supervisors of civilian employees to take formal disciplinary action is greater than the propensity for such actions among military supervisors. In testing the hypothesis firm data exist in the form of institutional records. In addition, employee perceptions were gathered from both questionnaires and interviews. There is a total of 280 supervisors of civilian employees at the USAF Academy. Of this total, 187 are civilians while 93 are in a military status. Data. Tables 5.68 through 5.77 document the relevant data for this hypothesis. The documentation of the data obtained from institutional records (actual case studies which occurred during CY 1978 and CY 1979) are contained in Tables 5.68 through 5.70 while the perception data obtained from the employee questionnaires and interviews are contained in Tables 5.71 through 5.77. The documentation of actual formal disciplinary occurrences is analyzed in Tables 5.68 through 5.70. These tables focus on the civilian or military status of the supervisors who administered formal disciplinary actions during CY 1978 and CY 1979. The data in this series of tables are analyzed by race/ethnic group of the appellant, gender of the appellant, and the type of formal discipline which was administered (reprimand, suspension, or discharge). Tables 5.71 through 5.73 show the results of employee perceptions when asked which category of supervisor civilian or 193

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military is most likely to take a formal disciplinary action against a civilian. The data are analyzed by race/ethnic group and gender of the respondent as well as by the race/ethnic group of the respondents' supervisor. The interviews offered the opportunity to address both civilian (n=32) and military (n=ll) respondents regarding this issue. Tables 5.74 through 5.77 provide the results of this process. The data are analyzed by race/ethnic group, gender, supervisory/nonsupervisory and civilian/military status. Discussion. The institutional data, based on actual occurrence from institution records as shown in Tables 5.68 through 5.70 confirm that the propensity for formal action is higher in the case of a civilian supervisor than it is in the case of a military supervisor of civilian employees. The margin total row shows that 78.8 percent of the actions taken during CY 1978 and CY 1979 were administered by civilian supervisors. Civilian supervisors compose about 66 percent of the supervisory staff those supervisors who supervise civilian employees. When the occurrences are analyzed by race/ethnic group of the appellant the data show that the actions administered by military supervisors approximate the percentage shown in the margin total row with regard to Hispanic appellants. The data also demonstrate that military supervisors took no actions against Black appellants and slightly more against the Other category (25.5 percent) than the margin total (21.2 percent). Table 5.69 analyzes the actions by gender of the appellant. The data demonstrate that 83.8 percent of the actions against males and 45.5 percent of the actions against females were 194

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administered by civilian supervisors, military supervisors took only 16.2 percent of the actions against males but well over half (54.5 percent) of the actions against females. Table 5.70 examines the type of action taken (reprimand, suspension, or discharge) by military and civilian supervisors. It is apparent from this table that military supervisors take a considerably lower proportion of discharge actions than civilian supervisors do. The civilian supervisor took 87.0 percent of the discharge actions taken while the military administered only 13 percent. Tables 5.71 through 5.73 examine employee perceptions of relative likelihood for discipline from a civilian and military supervisor. The data are analyzed by race/ethnic group and gender of the respondent, as well as by the race/ethnic group of the respondents' supervisor. The margin total row indicates that 55.2 percent of the respondents perceive no difference based on the civilian or military status of the supervisor. The remaining 44.8 percent is not divided equally. The data show that 24.4 percent perceive greater likelihood for formal discipline from civilian supervisors while only 20.3 percent hold that same view for military supervisors. When analyzed by gender (Table 5.72) the data show that 60.3 percent of the males perceive equity from either category. The remaining male respondents are about equally divided between military and civilian. When the female responses are examined the results are quite different. Only 43.1 percent of the females perceive equity and, in addition, they view the civilian supervisor as much more likely to take action (37 .9 percent) than the military 195

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(19.0 percent). When the issue is examined, based on the race/ethnic group of the respondents' supervisor, the results very nearly align with the margin total except for those respondents with Black supervisors. Those respondents with Black supervisors feel, to a much larger degree, that equity exists (71.4 percent). However, those who do not perceive comparable likelihood see the civilian supervisor as much more likely (21.4 percent) than the military supervisor (7 .1 percent) to take formal disciplinary action. The data provided from the interviews are very different than that discussed above. The margin total row shows only 7.0 percent of the respondents perceive equal likelihood while 55.8 percent see the civilian supervisor as more prone to take disciplinary action. ' The data from the interviews are shown in Tables 5.74 through 5.77. The results are examined with consideration for the race/ethnic group, gender, supervisory/nonsupervisory, and civilian/military status of the respondent. Table 5.74 examines the issue by race/ethnic group, and shows significantly different responses based on the respondents' race and ethnicity. In considering those respondents who don't perceive equity, the Blacks and Asians see the military as more likely to take action (reference back to Table 5.68 finds no actions actually taken by military supervisors against either Black or Asians). These respondents simply perceive the military more likely to take action. On the other hand, the Hispanics and American Indians perceive the civilian supervisor as much more prone to take action. The Other category is divided 55.8 percent "civilian more likely" and 40.7 percent "military more likely" with 196

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only 3.7 percent viewing the two categories as comparable. When the issue is analyzed by gender, Table 5.75, the results nearly equate to the margin totals. Both genders view the civilian supervisor as more likely to take action with a very small percentage perceiving equal likelihood. Table 5.76 examines the responses from a supervisory versus nonsupervisory aspect. The data show the supervisory employees are about equally divided between civilian and military. However, the nonsupervisory employees see things quite differently • . Only 5.6 percent perceive equal likelihood while 72.2 percent see the civilian supervisor as more likely to take formal action. Table 5.77 examines the issue based on the civilian/military status of the respondent. The results appear to show the bias of the repondent. The civilian supervisors perceive themselves as more likely to take action. The same is true of the military although, more military than civilians (18.2 percent and 3.1 percent respectively) perceive equal likelihood. Conclusion. Disparity in the propensity for formal disciplinary action between military supervisors and civilian supervisors exists. Thus, the hypothesis is confirmed. Results, which attain a statistically significant level, show that although military compose about 33 percent of the supervisory workforce, they took only 21.2 percent of the formal actions. The employee perceptions, though not as diverse, offer statistically significant findings that action is more likely from a civilian supervisor than from a military supervisor. Significantly diverse opinions exist when the issue is examined by gender. The interview data, again at a statistically significant level with regard 197

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to race/ethnic group, supervisory/nonsupervisory, and military/civilian status further confirm disparate propensity. The hypothesis is confirmed in total. The civilian supervisor of civilian employees is more likely, both in actual occurrence and perception, to take formal disciplinary action against a civilian subordinate than is a military supervisor against their civilian subordinates. 198

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Table 5.68 Relationship Between the Civilian or Military Status of the Supervisor Taking Formal Disciplinary Action and the Race/Ethnic Group of the Appellant (Calendar Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979) Race/Ethnic Group of Appellant Black (n=lO) Hispanic (n=27) American Indian (n=O) Asian (n=l) Other (n=47) Status of-Supervisor* Military (n=l8) 0.0% 22.2% 0.0% 0.0% 25.5% Civilian (n=67) 100.0 77.8 0.0 100.0 74.5 Total (n=85) 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% Margin Total 100.0% 21.2% 78.8% Source: 85 formal disciplinary actions taken during CY 78 and CY 79 * Total supervisors of civilian employees (n=280) civilian supervisors (n=l87) military supervisors (n=93) p=.0511

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Table 5.69 Relationship Between the Civilian or Military Status of the Supervisor Taking Formal Disciplinary Action and the Gender of the Appellant (Calendar Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979) Status of Supervisor* Gender of Appellant Military (n=l8) Civilian (n=67) Male (n=74) Female (n=ll) Margin Total 16.2% 54.5% 21.2% 83.8 45.5 78.8% Source: 85 formal disciplinary actions taken during CY 78 and CY 79 Total (n=85) 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% * Total supervisors of civilian employees (n=280) civilian supervisors (n=l87) military supervisors (n=93) p=.0017 N 0 0

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Table 5.70 Relationship Between the Civilian or Military Status of the Supervisor Taking Formal Disciplinary Action and the Type of Action Taken (Calendar Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979) Type of Action Reprimand (n=46) Suspension (n=l6) Discharge (n=23) Margin Total Status of Supervisor* Military (n=l8) 23.9% 25.0% 13.0% 21.2% Civilian (n=67) 76.1 75.0 87.0 78.8% Source: 85 formal dsiciplinary actions taken during CY 78 and CY 79 Total (n=85) 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% * Total supervisors of civilian employees (n=280) civilian supervisors (n=l87) military supervisors (n=93) p=.l698 N 0 -

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Table 5.71 Perceived Variation in the Propensity for Formal Discipline Dependent on the Military or Civilian Status of the Supervisor Respondent Black {n=l2) Hispanic (n=37) American Indian Asian (n=7) Other (n=ll4) Margin Total In your op1n1on, which type of supervisor is most likely to take a formal disciplinary action against a civilian employee? Civilian 33.3% 29.7% {n=2) 0.0% 28.6% 21.9% 24.4% Military 33.3 27.0 50.0 14.3 16.7 20.3% About the Same 33.3 43.2 50.0 57.1 61.4 55.2% Source: Employee questionnaire (#9=race/ethnic group and #52=perception) n=l72; 9 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.0256 Total 99.9% 99.9% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 99.9%

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Table 5.72 Perceived Variation in the Propensity for Formal Discipline Dependent on the Military or Civilian Status of the Supervisor Respondent Male (n=ll6) Female (n=58) Margin Total In your which type of supervisor is most likely to take a formal disciplinary action against a civilian employee? Civilian Military 18.1% 21.6 37.9% 19.0 24.7% 20.7% About the Same 60.3 43.1 54.6% Source: Employee questionnaire (#3=gender and #52=perception) n=l74; 7 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.0029 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% N 0 \N

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Table 5.73 Perceived Variation in the Propensity for Formal Discipline Dependent on the Military or Civilian.Status of the Supervisor In your opinion, which type of supervisor is most likely to take a formal disciplinary action against a civilian employee? Race/Ethnic Group of Respondent's Supervisor Black (n=l4) Hispanic (n=40) American Indian (n=3) Asian (n=4) Other (n=ll3) Margin Total Source: Employee questionnaire perception) n=l74; 7 cases deleted owing to p=.3029 Civilian 21.4% 20.0% 33.3% 25.0% 26.5% 24.7% (il3=race of missing data About Military the Same 7.1 71.4 25.0 55.0 33.3 33.3 25.0 50.0 18.6 54.9 19.5% 55.7% respondent's supervisor and Total 99.9% 100.0% 99.9% 100.0% 100.0% 99.9% #52=

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Table 5.74 Perceived Variation in the Propensity for Formal Discipline Dependent on the Military or Civilian Status of the Supervisor In your opinion, which type of supervisor is most likely to take a formal disciplinary action against a civilian employee? Respondent Black (n=4) Hispanic (n=lO) American Indian (n=l) Asian (n=l) Other (n=27) Margin Total Source: Interviews n=43 p=.Ol75 Civilian 0.0% 80.0% 100.0% 0.0 55.6% 55.8% About Military the Same 50.0 50.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 o.o 40.7 3.7 37.2% 7.0% Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% N 0 ""

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Table 5.75 Perceived Variation in the Propensity for Formal Discipline Dependent on the Military or Civilian Status of the Supervisor Respondent Male (n=28) Female (n=l5) Margin Total Source: Interviews n=43 p=.4095 In your opinion, which type of supervisor is most likely to take a formal disciplinary action against a civilian employee? Civilian Military 57.1% 35.7 53.3% 40.0 55.8% 37.2% About the Same 7.1 6.7 7.0% Total 99.9% 100.0% 100.0% N 0 (J\

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Table 5.76 Perceived Variation in the Propensity for Formal Discipline Dependent on the Military or Civilian Status of the Supervisor Supervisory Status of Respondent In your op1n1on, which type of supervisor is most likely to take a formal disciplinary action against a civilian employee? Civilian Military About the Same Supervisor (n=25) 44.0% 48.0 8.0 Nonsupervisor (n=l8) Margin Total Source: Interviews n=43 p=.0350 72.2% 55.8% 22.2 37.2% 5.6 7.0% Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% N 0

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Table 5.77 Perceived Variation in the Propensity for Formal Discipline Dependent on the Military or Civilian Status of the Supervisor Respondent Civilian (n=32) Military (n=ll) Margin Total Source: Interviews n=43 p=.Ol25 In your opinion, which type of supervisor is most likely to take a formal disciplinary action against a civilian employee? Civilian 65.6% 27.3% 55.8% Military 31.3 54.5 37.2% About the Same 3.1 18.2 7.0% Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% N 0 00

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Hypothesis IV Supervisors are not formally disciplined with the same frequency or severity for similiar offenses as are nonsupervisory employees. Overview. The hypothesis must be broken down into two distinct areas: 1) the "reach" of discipline as measured by the propensity for a supervisory employee to be formally disciplined and, 2) the degree or magnitude of the penalty, when the supervisor is disciplined, as compared to the nonsupervisory employee. The data sources for this hypothesis include analysis of formal disciplinary actions actually taken during CY 1978, and CY 1979, as well as perceptions recorded in the employee questionnaires, supervisory questionnaires and interviews. In addition, employee attitudes are examined regarding the deserved penalty, for the same offense, when comparing supervisory and nonsupervisory employees. The civilian workforce is composed of 187 supervisors and there are 1665 nonsupervisory civilian employees. The military supervisors of civilians are not included in this study, other than to provide data through the interview process. The military disciplinary system is separate and distinct from the civilian system. Data. To facilitate understanding, Hypothesis IV must be broken down into two distinct areas: 1) reach and, 2) magnitude. Reach refers to the likelihood of a supervisor being the target of formal discipline and magnitude refers to the level or type of 209

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formal punishment administered (reprimand, suspension, or discharge). Tables 5.78 through 5.105 document the relevant data for this hypothesis. The documentation of the data obtained from institutional records (actual case studies which occurred during CY 1978 and CY 1979) are contained in Tables 5.78 through 5.80 while the perception data from the employee questionnaires, supervisory questionnaires, and interviews are contained in Tables 5.81 through 5.99. Employee and supervisory attitudes regarding the magnitude of penalty that should be administered to a supervisory employee, when compared to a nonsupervisory employee, for committing like offenses, are documented in Tables 5.100 through 5.105. The data from the case study analysis are documented by race/ethnic group, gender, and type of action for both the supervisory and nonsupervisory appellants. The data from the employee questionnaires, supervisory questionnaires and interviews are documented by race/ethnic group and gender of the respondent. In addition, the employee questionnaire includes analysis by race/ethnic group of the respondents' supervisor; the supervisory questionnaire analysis examines the supervisory level of the respondent; and the interview includes analysis considering the supervisory/nonsupervisory and civilian/military status of the respondent. The documentation of actual disciplinary occurrences is documented in Tables 5.78 through 5.80. These tables focus on the supervisory or nonsupervisory status of the appellants who actually received formal disciplinary actions (reprimands, suspensions, or discharges) during CY 1978 and CY 1979. With the main focal point, 210

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supervisory or nonsupervisory status, the occurrences are analyzed by race/ethnic group of the appellant, as well as by gende.r of the appellant. In addition, the level or type of punishment administered is documented against supervisory or nonsupervisory status. Tables 5.81 through 5.83 display employee perceptions regarding the magnitude of discipline actually administered to a supervisory employee, as compared to that perceived for a nonsupervisory employe e guilty of a comparable work rule violation. The ord i nal answers are documented by race/ethnic group and gender of the respondent, as well as with consideration of the race and ethn icity of the respondent's supervisor. The same perception data are sought through the supervisory questionnaire and the results are documented in Tables 5.84 through 5.86. In this case however, the results are documented by race/ethnic group and gender of the respondent, along with the respondents' level of supervisory responsibility. The intervi ews sought data regarding the reach of the disciplinary process . Tables 5.87 through 5.90 document the results of asking respondents whether supervisory employees are more less, or just as likely to recei ve a formal disciplinary action as a nonsupervisory employee. The data are analyzed by race/ethnic group, gender, supervisory/nonsupervisory and civilian/military status. Tables 5.91 through 5.99 examine employee and supervisory perceptions of variation in disciplinary penalty for a specific work rule violation being late. The question asks the employee respondents to identify the specific penalty that would 1) be 211

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administered to them personally and, 2) be administered to a coworker for this same type of violation. Along the same line, supervisors are asked what level or type of disciplinary action they personally would receive for this identical offense. The employee questionnaire data are examined by race/ethnic group and gender of the respondent as well as consideration for the race/ethnic group of the respondents' supervisor. The supervisory results are reported with consideration for the race/ethnic group, gender, and level of supervisory responsibility of the r:espondent. The differences between supervisory and nonsupervisory attitudes as to the magnitude of the penalty that should be administered to a supervisory employee for a comparable disciplinary offense when compared to a nonsupervisory employee, are discussed in Tables 5.100 through 5.105. The employee responses are analyzed by race/ethnic group and gender of the respondent as well as consideration for the race/ethnic group of the respondent's supervisor. The supervisory responses are examined by race/ethnic group, gender, and level of supervisory responsibility of the respondent. Discussion. The institutional data, based on actual occurrence from institution records, as shown in Tables 5.78 through 5.80, confirm tremendous disparity in the actual occurrence of formal discipline when the consideration is supervisory or nonsupervisory status. The data show that of 85 formal disciplinary actions taken (reprimands, suspensions, and discharges) 83 were against nonsupervisory employees, while only 2 were against supervisors. Analysis of Table 5.78 shows that both actions taken against 212

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supervisory employees occurred against minorities-one Black and one Hispanic. the nonsupervisory disciplinary occurrences more closely align with the actual population distribution with 10.8 percent occurring against Black, 31.8 percent against Hispanics, 1.2 percent against Asians and 56.6 percent against nonminorities. When gender is a consideration, Table 5.79 the data show both actions against supervisory employees involved males. The nonsupervisory occurrence does not align with the gender population distribution either as 86.7 percent of this category occurred against males while only 13.3 percent occurred against females. Tables 5.80 shows a significant imbalance in the magnitude of penalties administered to supervisory and nonsupervisory employees. One of the supervisors received a suspension, and the other was discharged. No reprimands the least severe formal action, were administered to supervisors. On the other hand, 55.4 percent of the actions against nonsupervisory employees were reprimands while only 18.1 percent were suspensions. Discharge composed 26.5 percent of the formal actions against nonsupervisory employees. Tables 5.81 through 5.83 measure employee perceptions of the magnitude or type of penalty supervisors receive, compared to nonsupervisory employees . the margin total row shows that over 14 percent of the respondents believe that supervisors are not disciplined. Over 50 percent believe the same action would be taken i n either case . Over 24 percent feel the supervisor would recei ve less severe punishment while just over 8 percent feel the s upervisor would be punished more seve r ely. 213

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Table 5.81, which examines the issue based on race/ethnic group of the respondent, finds more minorities than nonminorities viewing the supervisor as receiving favored treatment, although nearly 50 percent in each category consider the treatment equitable. At the other extreme 16.7 percent of the Blacks feel the supervisor is the subject of more severe discipline than the nonsupervisory employee, while only 5.3 and 9.0 percent of the Hispanics and Other category, respectively, view the supervisor as subject to more severe discipline. Table 5.82 the same issue by the gender of the nonsupervisory respondent. The results find over 50 percent of the respondents of both genders view the treatment as similar. Slightly more females than males feel supervisors are not disciplined at all while slightly more males than females feel the supervisor is the subject of more severe discipline. When the issue is analyzed by race/ethnic group of the respondents' supervisor, Table 5.83, the data show that no respondents with Black, Asian or American Indian supervisors feel the supervisor is subject to more severe discipline. In addition, a large number of respondents with Black, Hispanic, and American Indian supervisors (35.7, 30.8 and 33.3 percent respectively) feel the supervisor is subjected to less severe penalties than do the respondents with nonminority supervisors (20.5 percent). Tables 5.84 through 5.86 display the results of supervisory responses to the same question. The results, as shown in the margin total row , show a dramatic shift in the extreme values, when compared to nonsupervisory responses. Only 2.1 percent of the supervisors feel the supervisor is exempt from discipline while 214 ' '

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over 33 percent feel the supervisor is the subject of more severe discipline than the nonsupervisory employee. As in the case of the nonsupervisory responses, over 50 percent of the respondents feel the same level of punishment is the practice. Table 5.84 examines the issue by race/ethnic group of the respondent. No minorities feel the supervisor is exempt from punishment, while only 3.3 percent of the Other category holds this view. A full 80 percent of the Black supervisors feel the punishment is equitable. This . falls to 53.3 percent in the Other category and 45.5 percent with Hispanic supervisors. None of the Blacks feel the supervisor is subject to less severe discipline although one of the two Asian respondents does hold this view. This perception falls to 13.3 percent for the nonminority supervisor and 9.1 percent in the case of the Hispanic supervisor. The second of the two Asian respondents feel that supervisors are subject to more severe discipline. This number falls to 45.5, 30.0 and 20.0 percent in the case of Hispanic, Other, and Black supervisors, respectively. When the supervisory data are examined by gender, Table 5.85, the results differ greatly from the nonsupervisory responses. All respondents who feel the supervisor is exempt from discipline are male (2.4 percent). A full 83.3 percent of the females view the penalties as comparable while only 47.6 percent of the males hold this perception. All of the respondents who feel the supervisor is subject to a less severe penalty are male (14.3 percent). Over twice as many males (35.7 percent) as females (16.7 percent) feel the supervisor is the target of more severe discipline. When the issue is examined by supervisory level, Table 5.86, the results show the 215

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lower level supervisor perceives the level or type of punishment comparable 55.3 percent of the time, less severe 13.2 percent of the time and more severe 28.9 percent of the time. The feeling of comparability drops to 37.5 percent with the second level supervisor but 50.0 percent view the supervisor as the subject of more severe discipline. The third level respondent views the supervisor as the subject of more severe penalties. The issue pursued in the interview process was slightly different; that being whether s . upervisors are more, less, or about as likely to have formal disciplinary action taken against them as nonsupervisory employees. The interview data are analyzed by race/ethnic group, gender, supervisory /nonsupervisory, and civilian/military status. As shown in Table 5.87, all Black, Asian, and American Indians interviewed feel the supervisor is less likely to have action taken against them. This drops to 80 percent when the Hispanics are considered individually with the remaining 20 percent viewing the likelihood as comparable. The Other category is the only group to reply in three response categories with 76.7 percent in the less likely, 25.0 percent in the same and 3.6 percent in the more likely category. Still, in all, the margin total row shows over 76 percent of the respondents view the supervisor as less likely to receive formal disciplinary action while only about 21 percent view the treatment as comparable. When the issue is considered by gender Table 5.88, the data show the respondents who feel supervisors are more likely to receive formal disciplinary action were male. In addition, about twice as many males as female see the treatment as comparable, 216

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with over 87 percent of the females viewing the supervisor as less likely to be the recipient of formal disciplinary action. Even the supervisory respondents, as shown in Table 5.89, overwhelmingly see the supervisor as less likely. While their responses are not as extreme as the nonsupervisory employees, a full 68 percent of the supervisors indicated that supervisors are less likely with only 28.0 percent considering the treatment comparable. When the civilian or military status of the respondent is considered, Table 5.90, the responses are more similar than the supervisory/nonsupervisory, although more military than civilians consider the treatment the same. The next question was designed to gather data on what employees and supervisors perceive would result from a specific minor disciplinary offense being late. In addition, the employees were asked to provide their perception of what would happen to a coworker guilty of the same offense; the goal being to evaluate perceived disciplinary consistency from the same supervisor. The data are contained in Tables 5.91 through 5.99 with the employee responses being analyzed by race/ethnic group, gender and race/ethnic group of the respondents' supervisor. The supervisory data are analyzed by race/ethnic group and gender of the respondent along with the respondents' level of supervisory responsibility. The margin total rows show that whether employees consider themselves or coworkers the views are quite comparable. In both cases about 25 percent indica ted nothing would happen as far as discipline, to either themselves or a coworker, while nearly . . 50 percent in both cases feel they would only be warned. Approximately 20 percent do not know what would happen to either 217

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themselves or a coworker for being late. The supervisors generally, as shown in the margin total row, hold slightly different perceptions of what would happen to them. For example, over 27 percent feel nothing would happen, over 60 percent feel they would be warned and only 6.3 percent do not know what action would be taken. In considering what would occur in their personal situations, if late, Table 5.91, which is analysis by race/ethnic group of the respondent, the data show significant differences between the individual minority groups as well as the Other category. While 21.4 percent of the Blacks do not know what action would be taken for being late, 42.9 percent feel they would be warned and another 21.4 percent feel no action would result. While 20.5 percent of the Hispanics feel nothing would result, 69.2 percent feel they would be warned and only 5.1 percent do not know what would occur. The American Indians and Asians responded heavily in the "don't know" and "warning" category with none of either group feeling they would be completely exempt from discipline. More nonminorities, 30.4 percent, than any other category feel no action would be taken. The data show 42.9 percent of the Other category feel they would be warned and 23.2 percent do not know what action would be taken. Table 5.92, analysis by gender, shows over twice as many females as males feel the tardiness would result in no action, while nearly twice as many males as females believe they would be warned. The data show 17.2 percent of the males do not know what action would be taken and this response climbs to 25.4 percent with the females. 218

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The results are quite startling with the focus on the race/ethnic group of the respondents' supervisors. Table 5.93 . shows over 50 percent of all employees with minority supervisors feel they would be warned while this number drops to 46.5 percent for those employees with nonminority supervisors. Also, more respondents with nonminority supervisors, than any other category, feel no action would result. The data show that over 21 percent of the respondents with Hispanic and Other category supervisors did not know what action would result. This number drops to 7.1 percent for those employees with Black supervisors and 0.0 percent for those respondents with American Indian and Asian supervisors. Table 5.94, analysis by race/ethnic group, looks at the consistency in discipline between coworkers -the disciplinary action that would be taken against a coworker for being late. It shows marked similarity to the analysis of Table 5.91 discussed earlier; more minorities than nonminorities feel their coworkers would be warned while more nonminorites feel no action would be taken. A significant number of Blacks and Other category employees do not know what action would be taken, with the number of Hispanics responding in this way sharply reduced. When gender is the focus, the responses are quite different as to what the employees believe would happen to themselves and what would happen to a coworker. In the case of coworkers, Table 5.95 shows males feel less strongly that no action would be taken against a coworker than they did about themselves while the opposite is true of females. A full 44.1 percent of the females feel no action would be taken against a peer for being late. With respect to the type discipline being a warning, nearly 60 percent of 219

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the males feel their coworker would be warned while only about 25 percent of the females hold this view. Over 18 percent of the males and 23 percent of the females feel they do not know what action would be taken against a coworker for being late. When consideration is given to the race/ethnic group of the respondents' supervisors, Table 5.96, over 21 percent of the respondents both with Hispanic and Other category supervisors, replied in the "don't know" category. This number drops to 14.3 percent for those employees with Black supervisors and 0.0 percent for those respondents with American Indian and Asian supervisors. Again, more employees with minority supervisors than nonminority supervisors feel a warning would be administered while fewer with minority than nonminority supervisors feel no action would be taken. Tables 5.97 through 5.99 display supervisory perceptions as to what would happen to them in the event they were late. The data are analyzed by race/ethnic group, gender, and supervisory level of responsibility of the respondent. The margin total row finds considerably fewer supervisors did not know what would happen to them than was the case with nonsupervisory employees. While approximately the same percentage of supervisory employees, as nonsupervisory employees, feel no action would be taken, a much higher percentage of supervisors feel they would be warned than did nonsupervisors. Table 5.97 which analyzes the data by race/ethnic group of the respondent, finds 20.0 percent of the Blacks did not know what would happen if they were late. This number drops to 9.1 percent in the case of Hispanics and 3.3 percent for the Other category. Only 220 ' ..

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9.1 percent of the Hispanic respondents feel no action would be taken. This number climbs to 20.0 percent, 33.3 percent, and 50.0 percent in the cases of Black, Other, and Asians Over 50 percent of all categories with respondents feel they would receive a warning. When the issue is analyzed by gender, Table 5.98, about twice as many male supervisors, as female supervisors, feel no action would be taken, and nearly four times as many female supervisors, as male supervisors, did not what action would result. Over 66 percent of the females feel they would be warned while this number drops to 58.1 percent of the male responses. In analyzing the issue by supervisory level, Table 5.99, the data show that all respondents who did not know what would happen are first level supervisors. In addition fewer first level than second level feel tardiness would result in a warning. The third level respondent feels that no action would be taken. Tables 5.100 through 5.102 seek employee attitudes as to the level or type of penalty that should be administered to a supervisory employee, when compared to a nonsupervisory employee. The data are analyzed by race/ethnic group and gender of the respondents, along with consideration for the race/ethnic group of the respondents' supervisor. The margin total row shows overwhelmingly that employees feel supervisors should be subject to the same type of punishment for comparable offenses as a nonsupervisory employee. However, about 20 percent of the employee respondents feel the supervisor should be subjected to more severe discipline while 2.3 percent believe the penalty should be less severe. 221

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' Table 5.100, which examines the data by race/ethnic group of the respondent, finds 75 percent or greater of the Blacks, American Indians, Asians, and Other category feel the penalty should be the same for supervisors and nonsupervisors. The data show 68.4 percent of the Hispanics hold this attitude while 26.3 percent feel the penalty should be more severe. Only 5.3 percent of the Hispanics and 1.8 percent of the Other category feel the penalty for supervisors, as compared to nonsupervisors, should be less severe. Table 5.101, which examines the same issue with the focus on the gender of the respondent, finds more females than males believe the penalty should be comparable. All respondents who indicated the penalty for supervisors should be less severe were male while 21.7 percent of the mal e s and only 15.3 percent of the females believe the penalty should be more severe. When the issue is examined w ith consideration for the race/ethnic group of the respondents' supervisors, Table 5.102, the data show that 7 5 percent or more of t he employees with Hispanic, American Indian, Asian and Other category supervisors believe that, regardless of supervisory/nonsup e rvisory status, the penalty should be comparable for comparable offenses. This number falls to 63.4 percent in the case of e mployees with Black supervisors, with a comensurate significant i nc rease in the number of this same category of employees who feel the pena lty for supervisors should be more severe. It is interesti ng to note that the only employees who feel the penal t y should be l e ss s eve r e are those with Hispanic (7 .5 percent) and non minority ( 0. 9 percent) supervisors. Tables 5.103 through 5.105 seek t he same information but, the data source are t he supervisor y quest i onnaire. The supervisory 222

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category bias is evident in the margin total row. Only 68.8 percent of the supervisors feel the penalty should be comparable for supervisory employees guilty of the same offense as a nonsupervisory employee, while .31 • .3 percent feel the penalty should be less severe for the supervisor. The data for this question are analyzed by race/ethnic group and gender of the respondent along with the level of the respondents' supervisory responsibility. Table 5.10.3 shows more Black and nonminority supervisors feel the penalties should be same while .36.4 percent of the Hispanic supervisors feel the penalty should be less severe. When the issue is examined by gender, Table 5.104, the data show 100 percent of the females feel the penalty should be the same while only 65.1 percent of the males hold this view. The remaining .34.9 percent of the males feel the penalty should be less severe for the supervisor. Table 5.105, analysis by supervisory level, contains some startling results. While 76.9 percent of the first level supervisors feel the penalties should be the same, this response falls to .37 .5 percent of the second level and 0.0 percent in the case of the third level supervisor. Accordingly, 62.5 percent of the second level and 100 percent of the third or higher level supervisors feel the penalty for supervisors should be less severe than for nonsupervisors guilty of the same offense. Conclusion. The data provide confirmation that supervisors are not formally disciplined with the same frequency or severity, for similar offenses, as nonsupervisory employees. Statistically significant results show that, although civilian supervisors compose 10 percent of the civilian workforce, they received only about 2 22.3

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percent of the disciplinary actions. In addition, there is significant disparity in what employees and supervisors believe to be the actual policy as well as what they believe the policy should be regarding severity of penalty. Specifically, the case study analysis data provide statistically significant support that supervisors receive a disproportionately small percentage of the formal disciplinary actions. In addition, the data show that those actions taken against supervisors were all taken against minority supervisors. This finding cannot be conclusive as the small number of formal actions taken cannot possibly provide for an equitable distribution and balance. Such is also the case regarding a finding that all actions against supervisors are taken against males. However, in considering the level of penalty administered, the data conclude the penalties are more severe against supervisory employees. This is substantiated by the fact that no repri mands occurred against supervisors and the actions that did occur were of the most severe types -a suspension and a discharge. In regard to the level or type of penalty that, a supervisor incurs, the data show that over 50 percent of both the supervisors and the employees feel the penalties administered are comparable. Significant differences occur in the responses of the remainder. While 14.2 percent of the nonsupervisory employees feel supervisors are not subjected to formal discipline, this number drops to 2.1 percent i n the case of supervisory respondents. While nearly 25 percent of the nonsupervisory employees feel the supervisor is subjected to less severe discipline, only 12.5 percent of the supervisory employees hold the same view. Conversely, while 224

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approximately one-third of the supervisors feel they are the target of more severe discipline than their nonsupervisory counterparts, only 8.3 percent of the nonsupervisors agree. The interview data, with the exception of 20 percent of the Hispanics and 25 percent of the Other category, feel the supervisor is less likely than the nonsupervisor to be the recipient of formal discipline. The only respondents to perceive the discipline to be more severe were 3.6 percent of the nonminorities. Employees perceive, to a large degree, that both they and their coworkers would receive comparable penalties, for a specific offense --tardiness. The data provide statistically significant support for the finding that while most employees believe that either no action would be taken or else they would be warned, an alarmingly high number (approximately 20 percent) did not know what would happen. The "warning" is dearly the predominate response, particularly in regard to minorities, while the predominate female response is "no discipline" as a result of tardiness. The number of supervisors who do not know what would happen if they were tardy is much smaller than among the nonsupervisory category. In addition, a larger number of supervisors than nonsupervisors perceive either "no discipline" or a "warning" for such an offense. Employee and supervisory attitudes as to what level or type of discipline the supervisor should incur, as compared to a nonsupervisory employee for a comparable offense show supervisory/nonsupervisory category bias. While both categories predominately feel the penalties should be the same, a significant disparity exists in that nearly all of the remaining nonsupervisory 225

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employees feel the penalty against a supervisor should be more severe while all the remaining supervisors feel the penalties against supervisors should be less severe. In summary, the hypothesis is confirmed. the data show that supervisors are not subjected to formal discipline with the same, frequency as nonsupervisory employees. This finding is not startling. One would expect the supervisor to be a model for the nonsupervisor. In addition, while the perception data show disparity in the type of punishment administered to supervisory, versus nonsupervisory employees, in favor of the supervisor, the data from the case study analysis provide support for the conclusion that supervisory employees overall are dealt with less frequently, but more severely than nonsupervisory employees. 226

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Appellant Table 5.78 Relationship Between the Supervisory or Nonsupervisory Status of the Appellant and the Race/Ethnic Group of the Appellant (Calendar Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979) Race/Ethnic Group Black Hispanic (n=lO) (n=27) of Appellant Am Ind (n=O) Asian (n=l) Other (n=46) Supervisor (n=2) 50.0% 50.0 0.0 (}.0 0.0 Non supervisor (n=83) 10.8% 31.3 0.0 1.2 56.6 Margin Total 11.8% 31.8% 0.0% 1. 2% 55.3% Total (n=85) 100.0% 99.9% 100.1% Source: 85 disciplinary actions taken during CY 78 and CY 79 Total employees -supervisory (n=l87) and nonsupervisory (n=l665) p=.0384 total n=l852

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Appellant Table 5.79 Relationship Between the Supervisory or Nonsupervisory Status of the Appellant and the Gender of the Appellant (Calendar Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979) Gender of Appellant Male (n=7 4) Female (n=ll) Supervisor (n=2) 100.0% 0.0 Nonsupervisor (n=83) 86.7% 13.3 Margin Total 87.1% 12.9% Source: 85 disciplinary actions taken during CY 78 and CY 79 Total employees -male (n=l301) and female (n=551) -total n=l852 p==.2917 Total (n=85) 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% N N 00

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Appellant Supervisor (n=2) Table 5.80 Type of Formal Disciplinary Action Taken Against Supervisory and Nonsupervisory Employees (Calendar Year 1978 and Calendar Year 1979) Type of Action Reprimand Suspension Discharge (n=46) (n=l6) (n=23) 0.0% 50.0 50.0 Nonsupervisor (n=83) 55.4% 18.1 26.5 Margin Total 54.1% 18.8% 27.1% Source: 85 disciplinary actions taken during CY 78 and CY 79 Total (n=85) 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% Total employees -supervisory (n=l87) and nonsupervisory (n=l665) -total n=l852 p=.0862

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Table 5.81 Perceived Consistency in Application and Enforcement of Discipline Between Supervisory and Nonsupervisory Employees Respondent Black {n=l2) Hispanic {n=37) American Indian Asian {n=7) Other {n=lll) Margin Total If a supervisor and a nonsupervisory employee break the same work rule, what will happen to the supervisor? Nothing/ Same as Supervisor Supervisor Supervisors are Non supervisory Receives Less Receives More Not Disciplined Employee Severe Action Severe Action 0.0% 50.0 33.3 16.7 27.0% 48.6 18.9 5.4 {n=2) 50.0% 50.0 0.0 o.o 28.6% 42.9 28.6 0.0 9.9% 55.9 25.2 9.0 14.2% 53.3% 24.3% 8.3% Source: Employee questionnaire {#9=race/ethnic group and #5l=perception) n=l69; 12 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.0957 Total 100.0% 99.9% 100.0% 100.1% 100.0% 100.1%

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Table 5.82 Perceived Consistency in Application and Enforcement of Discipline Between Superyisory and Nonsupervisory Employees If a supervisor and a nonsupervisory employee break the same work rule, what will happen to the supervisor? Nothing/ Same as Supervisor Respondent Supervisors are Nonsupervisory Receives Less Not Disciplined Employee Severe Action Male (n=ll4} 13.2% 54.4 23.7 Female (n=56} 16.1% 51.8 25.0 Margin Total 14.1% 53.5% 24.1% Source: Employee questionnaire ((#3=gender and #Sl=perception} n=l70; 11 cases deleted owing to missing data p.3561 Supervisor Receives More Severe Action 8.8 7.1 8.2% Total 100.1% 100.0% 99.9% N -

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Table 5.83 Perceived Consistency in Application and Enforcement of Discipline Between Supervisory and Nonsupervisory Employees Race/Ethnic Group of Respondent's Supervisor Black (n=l4) Hispanic (n=39) American Indian Asian (n=4) Other (n=ll2) Margin Total If a supervisor and a nonsupervisory employee break the same work rule, what will happen to the supervisor? Nothing/ Same as Supervisor Supervisor Supervisors are Nonsupervisory Receives Less Receives More Not Disciplined Employee Severe Action Severe Action 14.3% 50.0 35.7 0.0 15.4% 43.6 30.8 10.3 (n=3) 33.3% 33.3 33.3 0.0 0.0% 100.0 0.0 0.0 14.3% 55.4 20.5 9.8 14.5 52.9% 23.8% 8.7% Total 100.0% 100.1% 99.9% 100.0% 100.0% 99.9% Source: Employee questionnaire (#13=race/ethnic group of supervisor and #5l=perception) n=l72; 9 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.3153

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Respondent Table 5.84 Perceived Consistency in Application and Enforcement of Discipline Between Supervisory and Nonsupervisory Employees If a supervisor and a nonsupervisory employee break the same work rule, what do you think will happen to the supervisor? Nothing/ Same as Supervisor Supervisor Supervisors are Nonsupervisory Receives Less Receives More Not Disciplined Employee Severe Action Severe Action Black {n=5) 0.0% 80.0 0.0 20.0 Hispanic {n=ll) 0.0% 45.5 9.1 45.5 American Indian {n=O) 0.0% 0.0 0.0 0.0 Asian {n=2) 0.0% 0.0 50.0 50.0 Other {n=30) 3.3% 53.3 13.3 30.0 Margin Total 2.1% 52.1% 12.5 33.3 Source: Supervisory questionnaire {#8=race/ethnic group and #19=perception) n=48; 1 case deleted owing to missing data p=.2373 Total 100.0% 100.1% 0.0% 100.0% 99.9% 100.0%

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Respondent Male (n=42) Table 5.85 Perceived Consistency in Application and Enforcement of Discipline Between Supervisory and Nonsupervisory Employees If a supervisor and a nonsupervisory employee break the same work rule, what do you think will happen to the supervisor? Nothing/ Same as Supervisor Supervisor Supervisors are Nonsupervisory Receives Less .Receives More Not Disciplined Employee Severe Action Severe Action 2.4% 47.6 14.3 35.7 Female (n=6) 0.0% 83.3 0.0 16.7 Margin Total 2.1% 52.1% 12.5% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#6=gender and #19=perception) n=48; 1 case deleted owing to missing data p=.l045 33.3% Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

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Respondent First Level Table 5.86 Perceived Consistency in Application and Enforcement of Discipline Between Supervisory and Nonsupervisory Employees If a supervisor and a nonsupervisory employee break the same work rule, what do you think will happen to the supervisor? Nothing/ Same as Supervisor Supervisor Supervisors are Non supervisory Receives Less Receives More Not Disciplined Employee Severe Action Severe Action (n=38) 2.6% 55.3 13.2 28.9 Second Level (n=8) 0.0% 37.5 12.5 50.0 Third Level or Higher (n=l) 0.0% 0.0 0.0 100.0 Margin Total 2.1% 51.1% 12.8% 34.0% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#4=level of supervisor and #19=perception) n=47; 2 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.0436 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

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Table 5.87 Perceived Consistency in Application and Enforcement of Discipline Between Supervisory and Nonsupervisory Employees Are supervisors (more, less, about_the same) as likely to have action taken against them as nonsupervisory employees? About Respondent More Less the Same Black (n=4) 0.0% 100.0 0.0 Hispanic (n=lO) 0.0% 80.0 20.0 American Indian (n=l) 0.0% 100.0 0.0 Asian (n=l) 0.0% 100.0 0.0 Other (n=27) 3.6% 71.4 25.0 Margin Total 2.3% 76.7% 20.9% Source: Interviews n=43 p=.l048 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 99.9%

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Respondent Table 5.88 Perceived Consistency in Application and Enforcement of Discipline Between Supervisory and Nonsupervisory Employees Are supervisors (more, less, about the same) as likely to have action taken against them as nonsupervisory employees? About More Less the Same Male (n=28) 3.7% 70.4 25.9 Female (n=l5) 0.0% 87.5 12.5 Margin Total 2.3% 76.7% 20.9% Source: Interviews n=43 p=.l090 Total 100.0% 100.0% 99.9%

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Table 5.89 Perceived Consistency in Application and Enforcement of Discipline Between Supervisory and Nonsupervisory Employees Are supervisors (more, less, about the same) as likely to have action taken against them as nonsupervisory employees? Respondent More Supervisor (n=25) 4.0% Nonsupervisor (n=l7) 0.0% Margin Total 2.4% Source: Interviews n=42; 1 case deleted owing to missing data p=.0730 Less 68.0 88.2 76.2% About the Same 28.0 11.8 21.4% Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% N 00

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Table 5.90 Perceived Consistency in Application and Enforcement of Discipline Between Supervisory and Nonsupervisory Employees Are supervisors (more, less, about the same) as likely to action taken against them as Respondent More Civilian (n=31) 3.2% Military (n=ll) 0.0% Margin Totals 2.4% Source: Interviews n=42; 1 case deleted owing to missing data p=.3013 nonsupervisory employees? About Less the Same 77.4 19.4 72.7 27.3 76.2% 21.4% have Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

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Table 5.91 Perceived Variation in Disciplinary Penalty for the Same Offense If you were late what would happen to you? Oral Written Suspension Don't Respondent Nothing Warning Admonishment Reprimand From Fired Know Total Duty Black (n=l4} 21.4% 42.9 7.1 o.o 7.1 0.0 21.4 99.9% Hispanic (n=39} 20.5% 69.2 2.6 o.o 0.0 2.6 5.1 100.0% American Indian (n=2} 0.0% 50.0 0.0 o.o 0.0 0.0 50.0 100.0% Asian (n=7} 0.0% 57.1 14.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 28.6 100.0% Other (n=ll2} 30.4% 42.9 3.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 23.3 100.1% Margin Total 25.9% 49.4% 4.0% 0.0% 0.6% 0.6% 19.5% 100.0% Source: Employee questionnaire (#9=race/ethnic group and #15=perception} n=l74; 7 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.0476

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Table 5.92 Perceived Variation in Disciplinary Penalty for the Same Offense If you were late what would happen to you? Oral Written Suspension Respondent Nothing Warning Admonishment Reprimand From Fired Duty Male (n=ll6) 19.0% 58.6 3.4 0.0 0.9 0.9 Female (n=59) 39.0% 30.5 5.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 Margin Total 25.7% 49.1% 4.0% 0.0% 0.6% 0.6% Source: Employee questionnaire (#3=gender and #15=perception) n=l75; 6 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.Ol05 Don't Know 17.2 25.4 20.0% Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% N -

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Table 5.93 Perceived Variation in Disciplinary Penalty for the Same Offense If you were late what would happen to you? Race/Ethnic Group Oral Written Suspension Don't of Respondent's Nothing Warning Admonishment Reprimand From Fired Know Total Supervisor Duty Black {n=l4) 21.4% 50.0 14.3 0.0 7.1 0.0 7.1 99.9% Hispanic (n=42) 21.4% 54.8 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 21.4 100.0% American Indian (n=3) 0.0% 66.7 33.3 o.o o.o o.o o.o 100.0% Asian (n=4) 25.0% 75.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0% Other (n=114) 28.9% 46.5 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.9 21.1 100.0% Margin Total 26.0% 49.7% 4.0% 0.0% 0.6% 0.6% 19.2% 100.1% Source: Employee questionnaire (#13=race/ethnic group of supervisor and #15=perception) n=177; 4 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.0894 N 4::' N

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Table 5.94 Perceived Variation in Disciplinary Penalty for the Same Offense If one of your fellow workers was late for work, what would your supervisor do? Oral Written Suspension Respondent Nothing Warning Admonishment Reprimand From Duty Black {n=l4) 7.1% 50.0 7.1 o.o 0.0 Hispanic {n=39) 20.5% 66.7 2.6 0.0 0.0 American Indian {n=2) 0.0% 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Asian {n=7) 28.6% 57.1 14.3 0.0 o.o Other {n=ll3) 28.3% 40.7 7.1 0.0 0.0 Margin Total 24.6% 48.6% 6.3% 0.0% 0.0% Source: Employee questionnaire {#9=race/ethnic group and #17=perception) n=l75; 6 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.0438 Fired 7.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6% Don't Know Total 28.6 99.9% 10.3 100.1% 0.0 100.0% 0.0 100.0% 23.9 100.0% 20.0% 100.1%

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Table 5.95 Perceived Variation in Disciplinary Penalty for the Same Offense Respondent Male (n=ll7) Female (n=59) Margin Total If one of your fellow workers was late for work, what would your supervisor do? Oral Written Suspension Nothing Warning Admonishment Reprimand From Duty 14.5% 59.8 6.0 0.0 0.0 44.1% 25.4 6.8 0.0 0.0 24.4% 48.3% 6.3% 0.0% 0.0% Source: Employee questionnaire (#3=gender and #17=perception) n=l76; 5 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.OOOl Fired 0.9 o.o 0.6% Don't Know Total 18.8 100.0% 23.7 100.0% 20.5% 100.1%

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Table 5.96 Perceived Variation in Disciplinary Penalty for the Same Offense If one of your fellow workers was late for work, what would your supervisor do? Race/Ethnic Group Oral Written Suspension of Respondent's Nothing Warning Admonishment Reprimand From Supervisor Duty Black (n=l4) 21.4% 50.0 7.1 0.0 o.o Hispanic (n=42) 14.3% 54.8 9.5 0.0 o.o American Indian (n=3) 0.0% 66.7 33.3 0.0 0.0 Asian (n=4) 25.0% 75.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Other (n=ll5) 28.7% 45.2 4.3 o.o o.o Margin Total 24.2% 48.9% 6.2% 0.0% 0.0% Source: Employee questionnaire ( #13=race of respondent's supervisor and n=l78; 3 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.0991 Don't Fired Know Total 7.1 14.3 99.9% 0.0 21.4 100.0% 0.0 0.0 100.0% 0.0 o.o 100.0% 0.0 21.7 99.9% 0.6% 20.2% 100.1% #17=perception)

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Table 5.97 Perceived Variation in Disciplinary Penalty for the Same Offense If you were late what would happen to you? Oral Written Suspension Don't Respondent Nothing Warning Admonishment Reprimand From Fired Know Total Duty Black {n =5) 20.0% 60.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 100.0% Hispanic {n=ll) 9.1% 72.7 9.1 o.o 0.0 0.0 9.1 100.0% American Indian {n=O) 0.0% 0.0 0.0 0.0 o.o 0.0 0.0 0.0% Asian {n=2) 50.0% 50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0% Other {n=30) 33.3% 56.7 6.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.3 100.0% Margin Total 27.1% 60.4% 6.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 6.3% 100.1% Source: Supervisory questionnaire {#8=race/ethnic group and #27=perception) n=48; 1 case deleted owing to missing data p=.l424

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Table 5.98 Perceived Variation in Disciplinary Penalty for the Same Offense If you were late what would happen to you? Oral Written Suspension Don't Respondent Nothing Warning Admonishment Reprimand From Fired Know Total Duty Male (n=43) 30.2% 58.1 7.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.7 100.0% Female (n=6) 16.7% 66.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.7 100.1% Margin Total 28.6% 59.2% 6.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 6.1% 100.0% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#6=gender and #27=perception) n=49 p=.l364

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Table 5.99 Perceived Variation in Disciplinary Penalty for the Same Offense If you were late what would happen to you? Oral Written Suspension Don't Level of Supervisor Nothing Warning Admonishment Reprimand From Fired Know Total Duty First Level {n=39) . 28.2% 56.4 7.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.7 100.0% Second Level {n=8) 25.0 75.0 0.0 0.0 o.o 0.0 0.0 100.0% Third Level or Higher {n=l) 100.0% 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 o.o 100.0% Margin Total 29.2% 58.3% 6.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 6.3% 100.1% Source: Supervisory questionnaire {#4=level of supervisor and #27=perception) n=48; 1 case deleted owing to missing data p=.l382

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Table 5.100 Employee Attitude Regarding Magnitude of Penalty for Supervisory Employees, as Compared to Nonsupervisory Employees, for the Same Offense Do you think supervisors should receive the (same, more severe, less severe) penalties as nonsupervisory employees for the same offense? More Less Respondent Same Severe Severe Total Black (n=l2) 75.0% 25.0 0.0 100.0% Hispanic (n=38) 68.4% 26.3 5.3 100.0% American Indian (n=2} 100.0% 0.0 o.o 100.0% Asian (n=7} 85.7% 14.3 0.0 100.0% Other (n=ll4} 79.8% 18.4 1.8 100.0% Margin Total 77.5% 20.2% 2.3% 100.0% Source: Employee questionnaire (#9=race/ethnic group and #45=attitude) n=l73; 8 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.2210

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Table 5.101 Employee Attitude Regarding Magnitude of Penalty for Supervisory Employees, as Compared to Nonsupervisory Employees, for the Same Offense Do you think supervisors should receive the (same, more severe, less severe) penalties as nonsupervisory employees for the same offense? More Less Respondent Same Severe Severe Male (n=ll5) 74.8% 21.7 3. 5 Female (n=59) 84.7% 15.3 0.0 Margin Total 78.2% 19.5% 2.3% Source: Employee questionnaire (#3=gender and #45=attitude) n=l74; 7 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.0402 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% N ""' 0

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Table 5.102 Employee Attitude Regarding Magnitude of Penalty for Supervisory Employees, as Compared to Nonsupervisory Employees, for the Same Offense Do you think supervisors should receive the (same, more severe, less severe) penalties as nonsupervisory employees for the same offense? Race/Ethnic Group of More Less Respondent's Supervisor Same Severe Severe Total Black (n=l4) 64.3% 35.7 0.0 100.0% Hispanic (n=40) 75.0% 17.5 7.5 100.0% American Indian (n=3) 100.0% 0.0 0.0 100.0% Asian (n=4) 75.0% 25.0 0.0 100.0% Other (n=ll5) 80.0% 19.1 0.9 100.0% Margin Total 77.8% 19.9% 2.3% 100.0% Source: Employee questionnaire (#13=race/ethnic group of supervisor and #45= attitude) n=l76; 5 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.l536 N ""' -

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Table 5.103 Supervisory Attitude Regarding Magnitude of Penalty for Supervisory Employees, as Compared to Nonsupervisory Employees, for the Same Offense Do you think supervisors should receive the (same, more severe, less severe) penalties as nonsupervisory employees for the same offense? More Less Respondent Same Severe Severe Total Black (n=S) 80.0% 0.0 20.0 100.0% Hispanic (n=ll) 63.6% 0.0 36.4 100.0% American Indian {n=O) 0.0% 0.0 0.0 0.0% Asian (n=2) 0.0% 0.0 100.0 100.0% Other (n=30) .73.3% 0.0 26.7 100.0% Margin Total 68.8% 0.0% 31.3%'-. 100.1% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#8=race/ethnic group and #42=attitude) n=48; 1 case deleted owing to missing data p=.0596

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Table 5.104 Supervisory Attitude Regarding Magnitude of Penalty for Supervisory Employees, as Compared to Nonsupervisory Employees, for the Same Offense Do you think supervisors should receive the {same, more severe, less severe) penalties as nonsupervisory employees for the same offense? More Less Respondent Same Severe Severe Total Male (n=43) 65.1% 0.0 34.9 100.0% Female (n=6) 100.0% o.o 0.0 100.0% Margin Total 69.4% 0.0% 30.6% 100.0% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#6=gender and #42=attitude) n=49 p=.0428

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Table 5.105 Supervisory Attitude Regarding Magnitude of Penalty for Supervisory Employees, as Compared to Nonsupervisory Employees, for the Same Offense Do you think supervisors should receive the (same, more severe, less severe) penalties as nonsupervisory employees for the same offense? More Less Level of Supervisor Same Severe Severe Total First level (n=39) 76.9% 0.0 23.1 100.0% Second level (n=8) 37.5% 0.0 62.5 100.0% Third level or higher (n=l) 0.0% 0.0 100.0 100.0% Margin Total 68.8% 0.0% 31.3% 100.1% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#4=level of supervisor and #42=attitude) n=48; 1 case deleted owing to missing data p=.0036

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Hypothesis V Some employees, particularly minorities perceive the disciplinary process as inequitable and unjust. Overview. Words as complex and potentially diverse as "inequitable" and "unjust" require definition. The meanings I have attached, for purposes of this study, are quite simple. The hypothesis projects that some employees, particularly the racial and ethnic minorities, perceive the disciplinary process itself to show favoritism to nonminorities and that, therefore, the resultant actions are inequitable or unjust, due to the different treatment. The measures used to test this hypothesis are threefold. First, the perceived fairness of the policy itself is examined. Next, consideration is given to the fairness of the actions that are taken and supervisory treatment of subordinates. The third issue considered focuses on treatment of minorities, as compared to nonminorities. In addition to these issues, two corollary issues are examined. First, data are examined regarding perceptions of retaliation, and finally, employee perceptions regarding the constructive nature of the present disciplinary policy are examined. The data reported in this section were collected from employee questionnaires, supervisory questionnaires, and interviews. The analysis includes consideration of the respondents' race/ethnic group and gender in all cases. In addition, the employee questionnaire analysis provides consideration for the race/ethnic group of the respondents' supervisor and the supervisory questionnaire analysis provides for consideration based on the respondent's supervisory level of responsibility. The interview process provides data with consideration for the 255

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supervisory/nonsupervisory and civilian/military status of the respondent. Data. Tables 5.106 through 5.ll4 document the perceived fairness of the policy itself. The reported perception data were obtained for all three data sources employee and supervisory questionnaires as well as interviews. The responses are categorized by race/ethnic group and gender. In addition, the employee questionnaire responses provide consideration for the race/ethnic group of the respondent's supervisor; the supervisory questionnaire analysis provides for examination of the data by supervisory level of the respondent; and the interview data are examined with consideration for the civilian/military status of the respondent. Tables 5.ll5 through 5.129 examine perceived fairness of USAF Academy supervisors from several angles. First, both employees and supervisors are asked whether or not most USAF Academy supervisors treat their subordinates fairly. Next, employees are asked if their own supervisor is, or would be fair in administering discipline. In addition, the employees are asked if they feel other USAF Academy supervisors would administer similiar penalties for comparable disciplinary offenses when compared to their own super visor. Finally, the super visors are asked to evaluate their perception of their own strictness in applying work rules when compared to other USAF Academy supervisors. The data for this issue were collected from the employee and supervisory questionnaires. The analysis includes consideration by race/ethnic group and gender of the respondent as well as race/ethnic group of the respondent's supervisor in the case of the supervisory employees and level of supervisory responsibility 256

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in the case of supervisory employees. Tables 5.130 through 5.144 focus on perceptions of the disciplinary policy and disparate treatment based specifically on minority and nonminority considerations. Initially employees are asked to provide their perceptions of the discriminatory/nondiscriminatory nature of the disciplinary policy. Next, and in the same vein, employees are asked . for their perceptions regarding the consistency in disciplinary penalties when considering minority and nonminority employees. This data are supplemented by interview data which report responses regarding the propensity for disciplinary action with regard to minority/nonminority status. Finally, employees are asked for their perception of the propensity for both their supervisor and other USAF Academy supervisors to take action against minorities and not nonminorities for the same offense. The data for this issue were collected from the employee questionnaires and interviews. The data are analyzed by race/ethnic group and gender of the respondent. In addition, the employee questionnaire responses are analyzed with consideration for the race/ethnic group of the respondent's supervisor and the interview results provide for consideration of the civilian or military status of the respondent. The first corollary issue, perceived supervisory retaliation in reply to employees exercising their various appellant rights is examined by analyzing data provided in Tables 5.145 through 5.154. First, employees are asked, through the employee questionnaires, if they feel their supervisor would retaliate against them in the event they filed a grievance. Along the same line, interviewees were asked if they perceived retaliation against those employees who 257

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utilized the appellant process by way of supervisors applying work rules more strictly against those employees than they would against other employees. Finally, the employee questionnaire data provide insight as to whether or not employees perceive that once they have been in disciplinary trouble their supervisor would be "out to get them" from then on. The data sources utilized in examination of this . corollary issue include employee questionnaires and interview responses. In both cases the data are analyzed by race/ethnic group and gender. In addition, the employee questionnaire responses provide for analysis with consideration for the race/ethnic group of the respondent's supervisor, and the interview analysis includes consideration for the supervisory/nonsupervisory and civilian/military status of the respondent. The final issue receiving consideration under this hypothesis is an evaluation of the "constructive nature" of the present disciplinary process. In other words, do the disciplinary actions that are taken solve the problems they are intended to. The data for this issue were gathered through the interview process and the results are reflected in Tables 5.155 through 5.158. The data are analyzed with regard to the race/ethnic group, gender, supervisory/nonsupervisory and civilian/military status of the respondent. Discussion. The fairness of the USAF Academy disciplinary policy, without reference to a specific cause (i.e., race, gender) for feelings of unfairness, is examined in Tables 5.106 through 5.114. The data were gathered from employee questionnaires, supervisory questionnaires, and interviews. The margin total rows show 258

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significantly different results from these three data sources. Just over 7 percent of the employee respondents perceive the policy as never fair while over 18 percent see the policy as always fair. The ' remainder view the policy as sometimes to almost always fair. Only about 2 percent of the supervisors see the policy as never fair while over 20 percent view the policy as always fair. The interview respondents did not have the same type of ordinal question, but rather, were asked whether or not they perceived most of the actions that were taken to be fair. Nearly 91 percent of those interviewed perceive most actions administered as fair. When the issue of fairness, from the data gathered through the use of the employee questionnaire, is analyzed with consideration for the race/ethnic group of the respondent, the data show significant disparity between the minority and nonminority responses. The most predominate response for all categories is that the policy is "sometimes" fair. However, when the extreme responses are considered never fair or always fair -the data show many more minorities, than nonminorities, feel the policy is never fair, while the opposite is true in the always fair category. Specifically, 11.1 percent and 19.4 percent of the Blacks and Hispanics respectively, feel the policy is never fair while only 2.9 percent of the Other category hold this view. None of the American Indians or Asians responded in the never fair category. When the other extreme always fair is considered, the data show 33.3 percent of the American Indians and 25.2 percent of the Other category hold this perception with the Black responses falling to 0.0 percent and the Hispanics at only 2.8 percent. When the analysis is by gender, Table 5.107, the responses more closely 259

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align with slightly more males at the extremes. The data show 7 • .5 percent of the males perceive the policy as never fair with 6.9 percent of the females holding this view. In addition, 20.6 percent of the males believe the policy to be always fair with this number I dropping to 14.0 percent in the case of female respondents. Table .5.108 provides consideration for the race/ethnic group of the respondents' supervisors. Although the numbers are consistently low in the never fair cate gory, marked differences occur in the always fair category. While .50.0 p er cent and 3.5. 7 percent of the respondents with American Indian and Black supervisors, respectively, feel the policy is always fair, this number drops to 1 7 • .5 percent, 14.3 percent, and 0.0 percent for those employees with n onminority, Hispanic, and Asian supervisors . Tables .5.109 through .5.1Jl provide the results of a similar q uestion posed to supervisory employees. The results are quite dif f erent. The data, analyzed by race/ethnic group, gender, and l eve l of respondents' supervisory responsibility, show in the margin total rows that approximately threefourths of the supervisory respondents view the policy as always or almost always fair. In addition, only about 2 percent of the respondents feel the policy is n e ve r fair. When the data are analyzed by race/ethnic group of the r espond ing supervisor the results are reasonably evenly distributed, except that no Bla c k supervisors feel the policy is always fair. It is interes tin g to note that, in di r e c t contrast to employee perception s, t he onl y respondents who feel the policy is never fair are n o nm i n or ities. In addit i on, 72. 7 percent of the Hispanic supervisors fee l the polic y i s al w a ys o r almost always fair, as 260

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contrasted with the earlier data which show only 31.4 percent of the employees with Hispanic supervisors hold the same perception. When the same issue is examined with consideration for gender, Table 5.110, the data show the female supervisor, to a much greater degree than the male 100.0 percent as compared to 69.7 percent feel the policy is always or almost always fair. The results displayed in Table 5.111 show distribution relatively near the margin total row numbers except that the extreme responses (never or always fair) are predominat e l y fi rs t level supervisors. Tables 5.112 through 5.114, the interview data, portray a slightly different approach to the issue. The respondents, in this case, were asked whether or not most actions taken are fair. The results are analyzed with consideration for the race/ethnic group, gender, and civilian/military status of the respondent. The margin total rows find approximately 91 percent of the respondents feel that most actions are fair. Table 5.112 shows the results of this issue, with consideration for the race/ethnic group, of the respondent. All of the respondents who feel that most of the actions taken are not fair are minority. Specifically 25. 0 percent of the Blacks, 20.0 percent of the Hispanics, and the one American Indian hold this view. Analysis of this issue with regard for gender (Table 5.113) find more males than females (92.9 percent as compared to 87.5 percent) perceiving most disciplinary actions as fair. When the issue is analyzed by civilian or military status (Table 5.114) the data show 100.0 percent of the military perceive the policy as fair with this numbe r dropping to 87. 5 percent in the case of civilians. The next is sue examined is t w o fold . First, data were 261

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gathered regarding perceived fairness of treatment by USAF Academy supervisors. Second, perceptions were gathered regarding intrasupervisory consistency in penalty administration and strictness of supervisors in applying work rules. The data source used included the employee and supervisory questionnaires. Tables 5.115 through 5.123 seek both employee and supervisory perceptions with regard for fairness of disciplinary treatment. The fairness concept is not defined. In other words, the questions seek only the perception of fairness without regard to factors such as race/ethnic group, gender, and so on. Table 5.ll5, which displays employee responses to fairness perceptions, examines the data with consideration for the race/ethnic group of the respondent. While overall nearly 60 percent of the respondents feel most USAF Academy supervisors are always or almost always fair, there are considerably fewer Blacks, Hispanics, and American Indians that hold this view than Asian and nonminority respondents. Specifically, only 25.0 percent of the Blacks, 35.9 percent of the Hispanics, and none of the American Indians feel USAF Academy supervisors are always or almost always fair while 71.5 percent of the Asians and 72.4 percent of the nonminorities hold the same view. When the issue is analyzed by gender, Table 5.ll6, no significant differences appear. The data show, however, that 67.9 percent of the females feel supervisors are always or almost always fair while only 56.5 percent of the males have the same perception. Table 5.117 provides further support for the data on this issue which was contained in earlier tables and findings. Specifically, 67.0 percent of the employees with nonminority supervisors, 66.6 percent of the 262

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employees with American Indian supervisors and 64.3 percent of the employees with Black supervisors feel that most supervisors always or almost always treat employees fairly. This number, in support of earlier findings, drops to 42 • .5 percent in the case of employees with Hispanic supervisors. When supervisory employees are asked a comparable question, whether or not most USAF Academy supervisors treat employees fairly, the results are again dramatically different from employee perceptions. The margin total row shows over 8 • .5 percent of the supervisory respondents perceive supervisors as always or almost always fair. Tables .5.118 through .5.120 display the supervisory responses with consideration for the race/ethnic group, gender, and level of respondents' supervisory responsibility. Table .5.118 confirms the supervisory perceptions that they, as a group, believe themselves to be fair in their treatment of subordinates. Specifically, 100.0 percent of the Black, 90.9 percent of the Hispanic, 50.0 percent of the Asian and 83.3 percent of the Other category of supervisors perceive themselves to be always or almost always fair in the treatment of subordinates. In considering the issue with regard to gender, Table 5.119, the data show more females (100.0 percent) than males (83.7 percent) perceive supervisors as treating employees, fairly. With regard to the respondents' supervisory level of responsibility, Table 5.120, the data show more first and third or higher level supervisors than second level supervisors perceive consistent fair treatment. Tables 5 .121 through 5 .123 seek employee perceptions regarding the fairness of their individual supervisor. Specifically, employees are asked whether they believe their supervisor is or 263

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would be, fair in administering discipline. The results are analyzed with regard the race/ethnic group and gender of the respondent, along with the race/ethnic group of the respondents' supervisor. Table 5.l21 shows nearly 81 percent of the respondents feel their supervisor is, or would be, fair. The data do show, however, that fewer minorities than nonminorities hold this perception. This data further support the results reported in Tables 5.106, 5.112, and 5.115 -minorites have less confidence in fairness than do nonminorities. Analysis of the issue by gender, Table 5.122, show a nearly identical response pattern for both males and females. Analysis of the issue with regard to the race/ethnic group of the respondents' supervisor, Table 5.123, finds slightly fewer employees with American Indian and Black supervisors feeling confident in the fairness of their own supervisor. Tables 5.124 through 5.126 display employee perceptions of how severely their supervisor, in comparison to other supervisors, administers discipline. The data are analyzed with regard to the respondents race/ethnic group and gender, along with consideration for the race/ethnic group of the respondents' supervisors. The margin total row shows that approximately 58 percent of the respondents feel most supervisors would take the same type of disciplinary action theirs would. Approximately 26 percent feel other supervisors would take more severe action than theirs and about 15 percent perceive other supervisors would take less severe action. Table 5.124 ,analysis by race/ethnic group of the respondent, finds no Blacks or American Indians feeling that other supervisors would take less severe action than their own. The data show, 264

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however, that 21.2 percent of the Hispanics, 14.8 percent of the Others, and 14.3 percent of the Asians feel other supervisors would take 'less severe action than their own. In other words, these portions of the Hispanic, Other and Asian populations feel their own supervisor is tougher on subordinates than other USAF Academy supervisors are on their subordinates. Analysis of the issue with regard to gender, Table 5.125, finds nearly identical responses for males and females with slightly more males (15.7 percent) than females (11.1 percent) holding a perception that other supervisors would be less severe than their own. Table 5.126, analysis with regard to the race/ethnic group of the respondents' supervisor, finds fewer employees with Black (7 .1 percent), Asian (0.0 percent), and Other category (14.5 percent) supervisors than with Hispanic (22.5 percent) and American Indian (33.3 percent) supervisors with the perception that other supervisors are less harsh or severe than their own. It should be noted that 64.3 percent of the employees with Black supervisors perceive other supervisors as more severe. Tables 5.127 through 5.129 seek supervisors' perceptions of their own strictness in the application of work rules. The findings are analyzed with regard to the supervisory respondents' race/ethnic group, gender, and level of supervisory responsibility. The margin total row shows that over 58 percent of the supervisors consider themselves comparable to other supervisors in strictness while nearly 30 percent consider themselves more strict. About 12 percent of the respondents feel they are less strict than other supervisors. Table 5.127, analysis by race/ethnic group of the respondent, 265

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shows disparate responses. While 33.3 percent of the Other category supervisors consider themselves to be more stri<;:t, this number drops to 27.3 percent in the case of Hispanics and 20.0 percent in the case of Blacks. The large disparity occurs in the case of supervisors who feel they are less strict. Only 10.0 percent of the nonminority and 9.1 percent of the Hispanic supervisors feel they are less strict. This number jumps to 40.0 percent in the case of Black supervisors . Analysis of the issue by ge . nder, Table 5.128, shows considerable disparity in responses. The data show 30.2 percent of the males consider themselves more strict while only 16.7 percent of the females hold this view. None of the females consider themselves less strict while 14.0 percent of the males place themselves in this category. Finally, 83.3 percent of the females feel they apply work rules about the same as other supervisors while only 55.8 percent of the males have this perception. Table 5.129, consideration based on the supervisory level of the respondent, shows first level supervisors as the only supervisors who perceive themselves to be less strict. The third level supervisor considers himself to be more strict along with 37.5 percent of the second level supervisors and 25.6 percent of the first level supervisors. Approximately 60 percent of the first and second level supervisors consider themselves about the same as other supervisors in the strictness with which they apply work rules. The next issue pursued examines perceived differences in disciplinary treatment and the disciplinary process based on race and ethnicity. The data used for this issue were gathered from employee questionnaires and interviews. Tables 5.130 through 5.132 seek employee perceptions 266

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regarding race/ethnic group discrimination present in the USAF Academy disciplinary policy. The responses are analyzed with regard for the race/ethnic group and gender of the respondent, as well as the race/ethnic group of the respondents' supervisor. Table 5.130, which analyzes the issue based on race/ethnic group of the respondent, shows the predominate answer to be such that discrimination never occurs. Over 50 percent of the American Indian, Asian, and nonminority responses occur in this category. lt should be noted that only 20.5 percent of the Hispanic and 0.0 percent of the Black respondents answered "never." The predominate Hispanic (61.5 percent) and Black (83.3 percent) response was "sometimes." In addition, a significant portion of the American Indian and Asian minority groups indicated that the disciplinary policy sometimes discriminates against minorities. The margin total row shows only 5.9 percent of the respondents perceive that the policy always or almost always discriminates. Table 5.131, analysis by gender, finds more females (64.8 percent) than males (46.2 percent) perceive that the policy discriminates. The data show the only respondents who perceive the policy always discriminates were male (5.1 percent). Table 5.132, analysis by race/ethnic group of the respondents' supervisor, finds over 50 percent of the respondents with Black, American Indian, and nonminority supervisors feel the policy never discriminates. However, 75 percent of the respondents with Asian and 48.8 percent of the respondents with Hispanic supervisors feel the policy discriminates "sometimes." The data show the remaining respondents answered "sometimes" less than 40 percent of the time. 267

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Tables .5.133 through .5.13.5 examine employee perceptions of the relative magnitude of penalties for minorities as compared to nonminorities. The data, as gathered from the employee questionnaire, provided respondents the opportmity to rank the magnitude of penalties in relation to minority/nonminority status. The margin total ro w shows over 64 percent of the respondents view the treatment as similiar while about 22 percent feel the nonminority receives less severe penalties. Only about 13 percent view the minority as the subject of more severe discipline. Table .5.133, analysis by race/ethnic group, finds 50 percent or more of all categories, except Black, view disciplinary treatment as comparable. This is still the predominate answer among the Blacks with 46.2 percent responding in this way. The respondents who believe minorities are the subject of more severe discipline are minority employees. Specifically, 30.8 percent, 33.3 percent, and 14.3 percent of the Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians, respectively, responded in this way while only 4.5 percent of the Other category view minorities as subject of more severe discipline. Meanwhile, 50 percent of the American Indians, 27 percent of the Others, and 23 percent of the Blacks feel that minorities are the subject of less severe discipline. This number falls to 10.3 percent in the case of Hispanics and 0.0 percent in the case of Asians. When the issue is analyzed by gender, Table 5.134, the data show more males (16.2 percent) than females (7 .1 percent) feel the minority is subject to more severe discipline, while more females (26.8 percent) than males (19.7 percent) feel the minority receives less severe discipline. Table .5.135, analysis with regard for the race/ethnic group of the respondents' supervisor, shows all groups responded 268

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over 60 percent of the time in the "about the same" category. The marked difference in responses appears in the perception that the minority is the subject of more severe disciplinary action. Only 7.1 percent and 7.5 percent of the employees with Black and Hispanic supervisors hold this view while 16.8 percent of the respondents with nonminority s u pervisors have this perception. Correspondingly, 28.6 percent and 27. 5 percent of the respondents with Black and Hispanic su pervisors feel the minority is subject to less severe treatment while only 21.2 percent of the employees with nonminority supervisors feel this way . Tables 5.136 through 5.138 examine whether or not actions are taken more readily against minorities than nonminorities. The data were gathered from interviews and are analyzed by race/ethnic group, gender, and civilian/military status. The margin row total shows 81.0 percent of the respondents feel actions are not taken more readily against minorities. Only 19.0 percent indicated they were more prone against minorities, and not a single interview respondent indicated a lack of awareness of the issue-don't know. Table 5.136 finds 25.0 percent of the Blacks and 30.0 percent of the Hispanics feel actions are taken more readily against minorities. This number drops to zero in the case of American Indians and Asians and 15.4 percent in the case of the Other category. When the issue is analyzed by gender, Table 5.137, the data show more males (22.2 percent) than females (13.3 percent) feel actions are taken more readily against minorities. Analysis by civilian/military status, Tab l e 5.138, finds 27 • . 3 percent of the military with the per ception that actions occur more readily against minorities than nonminorities, while only 16.1 percent of the 269

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civilians hold this view. Tables 5.139 through 5.144 examine data from the employee questionnaire in regard to two aligned issues. First, employees are asked if their own superviso r would take an action against a minority and not a nonminority for the same offense. Finally, the respondent is asked if supervisors, other than their own, take more severe disciplinary actions against minoriti es, than nonminorit ies , for the same offense. The data for both issues are examined by race/ethnic g roup, gender , and race/ethnic group of the respondents' supervisor. The margin total row shows ove r 76 percent of the respondents feel their own supervisor never discriminates but this number falls to about 44 percent when employees are asked about supervisors other than their own. Likewise, 16.1 percen t of the respondents feel their supervisor discriminates sometimes. This number jumps to about 47 percent when the reply focuses on supervisors other than the respo ndents'. Only 7.5 percent of the respondents feel their supervisor discriminates always or almost always. Only 8.4 percent view supervisors, other than their own, in the same categories. Table 5.139 analyzes employee responses about their own supervisor by the race/ethnic group of the respondent. The respondents who feel discrimination occurs are predominately minority although, the Black responses are not vastly different from the Other category. While 50.0 percent of the American Indians and 28.2 percent of the Hispanics feel their own supervisor would sometimes discipline a minority and not a nonminority for violation of the same work rule, this number drops to 14.3 percent in the case of Blacks, 12.5 percent in the case of nonminorities, and 270

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0.0 percent in the case of Asians. The data do show 7.1 percent, 12.8 percent, and 28.6 percent of the Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians, respectively, feel such discrimination occurs always or almost always. This number drops to 4.5 percent and 0.0 percent in the case of nonminorities and American Indians for the same responses. When the issue is examined by gender, Table 5.140, 91.2 percent of the females feel their own supervisor never discriminates while only 69.5 percent of the m ales hold the same view. Accordingly, 22.0 percent of the males feel their supervisor discriminates sometimes while only 3.5 percent of the females have this perception. Fina lly, 8.5 p ercent of the males and 5.3 percent of the females hold that discri mination always or almost always occurs. Table 5.141, analysis wit h regard for the race/ethnic group of the respondents ' supervisor, displays some startling results. The data show that 42.8 percen t of the respondents with Black supervisors, 34.1 percent of the respondents with Hispanic supervisors , and 25.0 percent of the respondents with Asian supervisors feel their own sup ervisor would discipline a minority and not discip line a nonminorit y for the same offense. Only 23.'2 percent of th e respon dents with nonminority supervisors have the same percepti o n. Tabl e 5.142, a nalysis by race/ethnic group of the respondent, finds 56.0 percent of the respo ndents with the perception that supervisor s , other than their o wn, take more severe disciplinary actions against minorities than they do against nonminorities. The data show B lacks and Hispanics feel particularily strong about this issue. Spe cifically, 76.9 percent of the Blacks and 81.6 percent of t he Hispa nics hold this view while 45. 3 per cent of the Other 271

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category responded in the same way. When the issue is examined by gender, Table .5.143, the male and female responses are virtually identical. Table .5.144, analysis with consideration for the race/ethnic group of the respondents' supervisor, finds a rough balance in responses although 1.5.4 percent of the respondents with Black supervisors and 15.8 percent of the respondents with Hispanic supervisors feel that supervisors, other than their own, always or almost always take more severe actions against minorities. This number drops to 7.2 percent in the case of respondents with nonminority supervisors. Data were gathered on two related corollary issues. The first examines employee perceptions of retaliation based on employee use of the appellant procedures. The data were gathered for this issue from employee questionnaires and interviews. The data, as contained in Tables 5.154, are analyzed by race/ethnic group and gender of the respondent. In addition, the data from the employee questionnaire are analyzed with regard for the race/ethnic group of the respondents' supervisor and the interview data are examined with consideration for the supervisory/nonsupervisory and civilian/military status of the respondent. The second issue examines the interview respondents' perception of the constructive nature of the present USAF Academy disciplinary policy. The data are examined with consideration for the race/ethnic group, gender, supervisory/nonsupervisory and civilian/military status of the respondent. The data relevant to this issue are contained in Tables 5.155 through 5.158. Tables 5.145 through 5.147 examine employee perceptions, by race/ethnic group, of whether or not their supervisor would 272

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retaliate if they filed a grievance. The margin total row shows over 55 percent of the respondents are ll'lsure. Over 30 percent of the remainder feel their supervisor would not retaliate while approximately 13 percent feel retaliation would occur. The data show more minorities than nonminorities feel retaliation would be the result of filing a grievance. This is particularly true among the Ameri can Indians (100.0 percent) and the Hispanics (23.7 percent). The data show 42.9 percent of the Asians and 32.5 percent of the Other category feel there would be no retaliation. This attitude drops to 26.3 and 25.0 percent for the Hispanics and Blacks. Analysis of this issue by gender, Table 5.146, finds very comparable answers. Sligh tly more females perceive both retaliation and no retaliation while more males are unsure of whether or not their supervisor would retaliate. Table 5.147, analysis with regard to the race/ethnic group of the respondents' supervisor, finds more employees with Asian (25.0 percent), Other (14.8 percent) and Hispanic (12.2 percent) supervisors who perceive retaliation than is the case for those employees with Black (7 .7 percent) and American Indian (0.0 percent) supervisors. Tables 5.148 through 5.151 display interview results as to whether or not supervisors retaliate by applying work rules more strictly against employees who have utilized the appellant procedures. The findings are examined with consideration for the race/ethnic group, gender, supervisory/nonsupervisory and civilian/military status of the respondent. The margin total row shows most respondents (about 56 percent) believe retaliation will occur in this way. Table 5.148, analysis by race/ethnic group, finds more 273

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Amierican Indians (100.0 percent), Asians (100.0 percent), and Hispanics (70.0 percent) with a perception of retaliation than is the case with Blacks (50.0 percent) and nonminorities (48.1 percent). Analysis by gender, Table 5.149, finds more females (62 • . 5 percent) than males (51.9 percent) confident that supervisors do retaliate. The supervisory bias is evident in Table 5.150 where only 48.0 percent of the supervisors acknowledge retaliation while 70.6 percent of the nonsupervisory employees hold this view. Table 5.151, analysis based on civilian/military status, finds slightly more civilians (58.1 percent) than military (54.5 percent) with the belief of retaliation in the form of more strict rule application for those employees who have utilized appellant procedures. The final issue pursued in regard to retaliation seeks employee perceptions as to whether or not once they have been in disciplinary trouble, their supervisor would be out to get them. The data, as contained in Tables 5.152 through 5.154, are analyzed by race/ethnic group and gender, as well as with regard for the race and ethnicity of the respondents' supervisor. The margin total row shows most employees (about 47 percent) perceive their supervisor would not be out to get them. A large number of employees, about 40 percent, do not know what their supervisor would do while about 12 percent feel their supervisor would be out to get them. Table 5.152, analysis by race/ethnic group, finds more minorities, except Blacks, than nonminorities who believe their supervisor would be out to get them once they had gotten into trouble. When the issue is analyzed by gender, Table 5.153, nearly identical replies were received from males (12.2 percent) and females (12.1 percent) that the supervisor would be out to get an 274

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employee who had been in disciplinary trouble. However, while 53.4 percent of the females believe this would not occur only 44.3 percent of the males hold the same view . Table 5.154, analysis with regard to the race/ethnic group of the respondents' supervisor, finds more employees with American Indian supervisors (33 • . 3 percent) than employees w ith Black (14.3 percent), Hispanic (10.0 percent), Asian (0.0 percent), or Other category (12.3 percent) supervisors who believ e their s upervisor would be out to get them once they got into di sciplinary trouble. The final coro llary issue considered in this hypothesis is whether or not the disciplinary pr ocess at the USAF Academy is constructive. In other word s, do the acti ons taken get the desired results. The data so urce for this i ssue was the interviews, and the results are displaye d in Tables 5.155 through 5.158. The interview data are displayed with consider ation for the race/ethnic group, gender, supervisor y/nonsuper v isory and civilian/military status of the respondent . The margin total row shows the vast majority of the respondents (72.1 percent) vie w the process as constructive. Analysis by race/ethnic g r oup, Table 5.155, finds the American Indi an r e s pondents h o l ding that the process is not constructive . Lesse r numbers o f Black (22.2 percent), Hispanic (30.0 percent), Asian (0.0 percent), and Other category (22.2 percent) have this perception. The responses by gender 1 Table 5.l56, are v irtually d uplicative. Ta ble 5.l57, analysis with regard for the supervisory /nonsupervisory status of the respondent, finds, as would be expected, more su pervisors (76.0 percent) than nonsupervisors (66. 7 percent) who believe the process is constructi ve . Analy sis with regard f o r the civilian/military status 275

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of the respondent finds considerably more civilians (75.0 percent) than military (63.6 percent) with the perception that most disciplinary actions taken actually solve what they are intended to solve. Conclusion. Perceptions of an inequitable and unjust disiplinary process, particularly among minorities, exist. The data show that only about half of the employees perceive the policy to be always or even almost always fair, and the vast majority of these respondents were nonminority. When consideration is given to the race/ethnic group of the respondents' supervisor, the data ,. single out the Hispanic supervisor. While respondents with every category of supervisor except Hispanic responded, . 50 percent of the time or better that the policy was always, or almost always, fair only 31.4 percent of the respondents with Hispanic supervisors responded in this fashion. In contrast to this, 72.7 percent of the Hispanic supervisors feel the policy is always or almost always fair. The minority perception of disparity is further confirmed in the interviews. While very few of the interview respondents feel actions that are taken are unfair, the respondents who do feel this way are, to the person, minority. Along the same line, while a majority of the employees feel most supervisors treat employees fairly, the dissenters, by well over two to one, are minority. In addition, the earlier view expressed regarding the Hispanic supervisor is further substantiated in Table 5.117. Over 60 percent of the employees with Black, American Indian and nonminority supervisors feel most supervisors treat employees fairly. This number drops to 42.5 percent in the case of employees with Hispanic supervisors. The data confirm this 276

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aspect of the hypothesis. Even though supervisors consider themselves, to a large degree, to be fair, employees, particularly minorities, perceive inequity. Regarding employees perceptions of how severely their supervisor, in comparison to other supervisors, administer discipline, the data confirm varied perceptions. Over 40 percent of the respondents feel their supervisor is either more or less severe, leaving less than 60 percent who perceive comparable treatment. In the same regard, the data confirm widely varied perceptions from supervisors when asked to compare the strictness of their application of work rules to other supervisors. The data do however coincide very closely with the employee perceptions. This inconsistency, in itself, provides confirmation of this aspect of the hypothesis. The disciplinary process, based on this nondescript, varied treatment makes the process inequitable. The next issue, which focuses on perceived disparity in the disciplinary process due to minority/nonminority status, finds most employees,without regard to race/ethnic group, feel this type of discrimination does not occur. When the issue is analyzed with regard to race/ethnic group, Table 5.130, the minorities predominately feel the policy does discriminate sometimes. This finding is further confirmed by Table 5.136. The data show a full 81 percent of the respondents do not perceive disciplinary actions as being taken more readily against minorities. However, the dissenters to this opinion are predominately minority. In addition, it is to note that more males than females perceive this type of discrimination. The data show most employees have a great deal of 277

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confidence that their own supervisor does not discriminate but again, the dissenters to this perception are predominately minority. There is significantly less confidence when employees are asked about supervisors other than their own. Regarding the cotollary issues, the data show few employees, although they are predominately minority, perceive retaliation for using the available appellant procedures. This finding is weakened by the large number of employees who do not know whether or not their supervisor would retaliate. The interview data show predominate responses in the "retaliation" category. Again, the feeling is held predominately by minority employees. The final issue regarding the constructive nature of the present disciplinary policy shows overwhelmingly the policy is perceived as solving the problems it is intended to solve. However, the results further confirm the point of minority dissent. In summary, the hypothesis is confirmed. The data provide significant support that a number of employees, particularly minorities, perceive the disciplinary process as inequitable and unjust, in accord with the definition provided for the purpose of this study. In other words, while the policy and process, overall, is considered appropriate, the employees who dissent are predominately minority. 278

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Table 5.106 Perceived Fairness of USAFA Disciplinary Policy Is the disciplinary policy at the USAF Academy fair? Respondent Never Sometimes Black (n=9) 11.1% 77.8 Hispanic (n=36) 19.4% 61.1 American Indian (n=2) 0.0% 100.0 Asian (n=6) 0.0% 50.0 Other (n=l03) 2.9% 32.0 Margin Total 7.1% 42.9% Source: Employee questionnaire (#9=race/ethnic n=l56; 25 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.0002 Almost Always Always 11.1 0.0 16.7 2.8 0.0 0.0 16.7 33.3 39.8 25.2 31.4% 18.6% group and #33=perception) Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 99.9% 100.0%

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Table 5.107 Perceived Fairness of USAFA Disciplinary Policy Is the disciplinary policy at the USAF Academy fair? Almost Respondent Never Sometimes Always Always Male (n=l07) 7.5% 47.7 24.3 20.6 Female (n=50) 6.0% 32.0 48.0 14.0 Margin Total 7.0% 42.7% 31.8% 18.5% Source: Employee questionnaire (#3=gender and #33=perception) n=l57; 24 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.0311 Total 100.1% 100.0% 100.0% N 00 0

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Table 5.108 Perceived Fairness of USAFA Disciplinary Policy Is the disciplinary policy at the USAF Academy fair? Race/Ethnic Group of Almost Respondent's Supervisor Never Sometimes Always Always Total Black (n=l4) 7.1% 28.6 28.6 35.7 100.0% Hispanic (n=35) 5.7% 62.9 17.1 14.3 100.0% American Indian (n=2) 0.0% 50.0 0.0 50.0 100.0% Asian (n=4) 0.0% 50.0 50.0 0.0 100.0% Other (n=l03) • 8.7% 35.9 37.9 17.5 100.0% Margin Total 7.6% 41.8% 32.3% 18.4% 100.1% Source: Employee questionnaire (#13=racejethnic group of supervisor and #33=perception) n=l58; 23 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.2357 N 00 -

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Table 5.109 Perceived Fairness of USAFA Disciplinary Policy Do you feel the disciplinary policy at the USAF Academy is fair? Almost Respondent Never Sometimes Always Always Total Black (n=5) 0.0% 40.0 60.0 0.0 100.0% Hispanic (n=ll) 0.0% 27.3 54.5 18.2 100.0% ' American Indian (n=O) 0.0% o.o 0.0 0.0 0.0% Asian (n=2) 0.0% 50.0 0.0 50.0 100.0% Other (n=30) 3.3% 20.0 53.3 23.3 99.9% Margin Total 2.1% 25.0% 52.1% 20.8% 100.0% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#8=race/ethnic group and #26=perception) n=48; 1 case deleted owing to missing data p=.2039 N 00 N

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Table 5.110 Perceived Fairness of USAFA Disciplinary Policy Do you feel the disciplinary policy at the USAF Academy is Almost Respondent Never Sometimes Always Always Male (n=43) 2.3% 27.9 48.8 20.9 Female (n=6) 0.0% o.o 66.7 33.3 Margin Total 2.0% 24.5% 51.0% 22.4% Source: Supervisory questionnaire {#6=gender and #26=perception) n=49 p=.0813 fair? Total 99.9% 100.0% 99.9%

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Table 5.111 Perceived Fairness of USAFA Disciplinary Policy Do you feel the disciplinary policy at the USAF Academy is fair? Almost Level of Supervisor Never Sometimes Always Always Total First level (n=39) 2.6% 23.1 48.7 25.6 100.0% Second level (n=B) 0.0% 25.0 62.5 12.5 100.0% Third level or higher (n=l) 0.0% 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0% Margin Total 2.1% 22.9% 52.1% 22.9% 100.0% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#4=level of supervisor and #26=perception) n=48; 1 case deleted owing to missing data p=.3538

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Table 5.112 Perceived Fairness of USAFA Disciplinary Policy Are most of the disciplinary actions that are taken fair? Respondent No Yes Total Black (n=4) 25.0% 75.0 100.0% Hispanic (n=lO) 20.0% 80.0 100.0% American Indian (n=l) 100.0% 0.0 100.0% Asian (n=l) 0.0% 100.0 100.0% Other (n=27) 0.0% 100.0 100.0% Margin Total 9.1% 90.9% 100.0% Source: Interviews n=43 p=.0019

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Table 5.113 Perceived Fairness of USAFA Disciplinary Policy Are most of the disciplinary actions that are taken fair? Respondent No Yes Total Mal e (n=28) 7.1% 92.9 100.0% Female (n=l5) 12.5% 87.5 100.0% Margin Total 9.1% 90.9% 100.0% Source: Interviews n=43 p=.2783

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Table 5.1.14 Perceived Fairness of USAFA Disciplinary Policy Are most of the disciplinary actions that are taken fair? Respondent No Yes Total Civilian (n=32) 12.5% 87.5 100.0% Military (n=ll) 0.0% 100.0 100.0% Margin Total 9.3% 90.7% 100.0% Source: Interviews n=43 p=.lll8 N 00 ......

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Table 5.115 Perceived Fairness in Treatment of Employees by USAFA Supervisors Do most supervisors at the USAF Academy treat their employees fairly (in regard to disciplinary actions)? Respondent Black (n=l2) Hispanic (n=39) American Indian (n=2) Asian (n=7) Other (n=l09) Margin Total Never Sometimes 0.0% 75.0 5.1% 59.0 50.0% 50.0 0.0% 28.6 2.8% 24.8 3.6% 36.7% Almost Always 16.7 25.6 0.0 42.9 49.5 40.8% Always 8.3 10.3 0.0 28.6 22.9 18.9% Source: Employee questionnaire (#9=race/ethnic group and #36=perception) n=l69; 12 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.OOOl Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.1% 100.0% 100.0% N 00 00

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Table 5.116 Perceived Fairness in Treatment of Employees by USAFA Supervisors Do most supervisors at the USAF Academy treat their employees fairly (in regard to disciplinary actions)? Almost Respondent Never Sometimes Always Always Male (n=ll7) 4.3% 39.3 36.8 19.7 Female (n=53) 1.9% 30.2 50.9 17.0 Margin Total 3.5% 36.5% 41.2% 18.8% Source: Employee questionnaire (#3=gender and #36=perception) n=l70; 11 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.l777 Total 100.1% 100.0% 100.0% N 00 \0

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Table 5.117 Perceived Fairness in Treatment of Employees by USAFA Supervisors Do most supervisors at the USAF Academy treat their employees fairly (in regard to disciplinary actions)? Race/Ethnic Group of Respondent's Supervisor Black (n=l4) Hispanic (n=40) American Indian (n=3) Asian (n=4) Other (n-109) Margin Total Never 0.0% 5.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.8% 2.9% Sometimes 35.7 52.5 33.3 50.0 30.3 36.5% Almost Always 42.9 22.5 33.3 50.0 47.7 41.2% Always 21.4 20.0 33.3 o.o 19.3 19.4% Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.1% 100.0% Source: Employee questionnaire (#13=race/ethnic group of supervisor and #36=perception) n=l70; 11 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.0908 N \0 0

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Table 5.118 Employee Perception of the Existence of Supervisory Retaliation for Filing a Grievance Respondent If you filed action would Black (n=l2) Hispanic (n=38) American Indian (n=2) Asian (n=7) Other (n=ll4) Margin Total a grievance because of a disciplinary your supervisor retaliate against you? Don't Yes No Know 16.7% 25.0 58.3 23.7% 26.3 50.0 100.0% 0.0 0.0 14.3% 42.9 42.9 8.8% 32.5 58.8 13.9% 30.6% 55.5% Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.1% 100.1% 100.0% Source: Employee questionnaire (#9=race/ethnic group and #38=perception) n=l73; 8 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.0073 N \0 -

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Respondent Table 5.119 Employee Perception of the Existence of Supervisory Retaliation for Filing a Grievance If you filed a grievance because of a disciplinary action would your supervisor retaliate against you? Yes No Don't Know Male (n=ll5) 12.2% 29.6 58.3 50.8 Female (n=59) 15.3% 33.9 Margin Total 13.2% 31.0% 55.7% Source: Employee questionnaire (#3=gender and #38=perception) n=l74; 7 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.l728 Total 100.1% 100.0% 99.9% N \D N

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Table 5.120 Employee Perception of the Existence of Supervisory Retaliation for Filing a Grievance If you filed a grievance because of a disciplinary action would your supervisor retaliate against you? Race/Ethnic Group of Don ' t Respondent's Supervisor Yes No Know Black (n=l3) 7.7% 30.8 61.5 Hispanic (n=41) 12.2% 34.1 53.7 American Indian (n=3) 0.0% 33.3 66.7 Asian (n=4) 25.0% 50.0 25.0 Other (n=ll5) 14.8% 28.7 56.5 Margin Total 13.6% 30.7% 55.7% Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% Source: Employee questionnaire (#13=race/ethnic group of supervisor and #38=perception) n=l76; 5 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.4324

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Table 5.121 Perceived Fairness in Treatment of Employee by USAFA Supervisors Do you think your supervisor is (or would be) fair in administering discipline? Respondent No Yes Total Black (n=l3) 23.1% 76.9 100.0% Hispanic (n=39) 20.5% 79.5 100.0% American Indian (n=2) 50.0% 50.0 100.0% Asian (n=7) 28.6% 71.4 100.0% Other (n=ll2) 17.0% 83.0 100.0% Margin Total 19.1% 80.9% 100.0% .. Source: Employee questionnaire (#9=race/ethnic group and #24=perception) n=l73; 8 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.0928

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Table 5.122 Perceived Fairness in Treatment of Employee by USAFA Supervisors Do you think your supervisor is (or would be) fair in administering discipline? Respondent Male (n=ll7) Female (n=58) Margin Total No 18.8% 19.0% 18.9% Yes 81.2 81.0 81.1% Source: Employee questionnaire (#3=gender and #24=perception) n=l75; 6 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.4897 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

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Table 5.123 Perceived Fairness in Treatment of Employee by USAFA Supervisors Do you think your supervisor is (or would be) fair in administering discipline? Race/Ethnic Group of Respondent's Supervisor Black (n=l4) Hispanic (n=40) American Indian (n=3) Asian (n=4) Other (n=ll4) Margin Total Source: Employee questionnaire #24=perception) n=l75; 6 cases deleted owing to p=.2662 No 28.6% 20.0% 33.3% 0.0% 17.5% 18.9% (#13=race/ethnic missing data Yes Total 71.4 100.0% 80.0 100.0% 66.7 100.0% 100.0 100.0% 82.5 100.0% 81.1% 100.0% group of supervisor and

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Table 5.124 Employee Perception of the Consistency of Disciplinary Penalties When Comparing Their Own Supervisor to Other Supervisors Do you feel other supervisors would take the (same, more severe, less severe) disciplinary action for an offense than yours would? More Less Respondent Same Severe Severe Total Black (n=l3) 69.2% 30.0 0.0 100.0% Hispanic (n=38) 52.6% 26.3 21.1 100.0% American Indian (n=2) 100.0% 0.0 0.0 100.0% Asian (n=7) 42.9% 42.9 14.3 100.1% Other (n=l08) 59.3% 25.9 14.8 100.0% Margin Total 58.3% 26.8% 14.9% 100.0% Source: Employee questionnaire (#9=race/ethnic group and #29=perception) n=l68; 13 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.3378

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Table 5.125 Employee Perception of the Consistency of Disciplinary When Comparing Their Own Supervisor to Other Supervisors Do you feel other supervisors would take the (same, more severe, less severe) disciplinary action for an offense than yours would? Respondent Male (n=ll5) Female (n=54) Margin Total Same 58.3% 59.3% 58.6% More Severe 26.1 29.6 27.2% Less Severe 15.7 11.1 14.2% Source: Employee questionnaire (#3=gender and #29=perception) n=l69; 12 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.3236 Total 100.1% 100.0% 100.0% N \D 00

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Table 5.126 Employee Perception of the Consistency of Disciplinary Penalties When Comparing Their Own Supervisor to Other Supervisors Do you feel other supervisors would take the {same, more severe, less severe) disciplinary action for an offense than yours would? Race/Ethnic Group of More Respondent's Supervisor Same Severe Black {n=l4) 28.6% 64.3 Hispanic {n=4 0) 62.5% 15.0 American Indian {n=3) 33.3% 33.3 Asian {n=3) 66.7% 33.3 Other {n=llO) 60.0% 25.5 Margin Total 57.6% 26.5% Source: Employee questionnaire {#13=race/ethnic perception) n=l70; 11 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.0531 Less Severe Total 7.1 100.0% 22.5 100.0% 33.3 99.9% 0.0 100.0% 14.5 100.0% 15.9% 100.0% group of supervisor and #29=

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Table 5.127 Supervisors Perception of Their Own Strictness in Application of Work Rules Do you feel you apply work rules (more strictly, less strictly, about the same) as other supervisors? More Less About Respondent Strict Strict the Same Total Black (n=5) 20.0% 40.0 40.0 100.0% Hispanic (n=ll) 27.3% 9.1 63.6 100.0% American Indian (n=O) 0.0% 0.0 0.0 0 .0% Asian (n=2) 0.0% 0.0 100.0 100.0% Other (n=30) 33.3% 10.0 56.7 100.0% Margin Total 29.2% 12.5% 58.3% 100.0% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#8=race/ethnic group and #20=perception) n=48; 1 case deleted owing to missing data p=.l829 0 0

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Table 5.128 Supervisors Perception of Their Own Strictness in Application of Work Rules Do you feel you apply work rules (more strictly, less strictly, about the same) as other supervisors? More Less About Respondent Strict Strict the Same Male (n=43) 30.2% 14.0 55.8 Female (n=6) 16.7% 0.0 83.3 Margin Total 28.6% 12.2% 59.2% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#6=gender and #20=perception) n=49 p=.l290 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0 -

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Table 5.129 Supervisors Perception of Their Own Strictness in Application of Work Rules Do you feel you apply work rules (more strictly, less strictly, about the same) as other supervisors? More Less About Level of Supervisor Strict Strict the Same First level (n=39) 25.6% 15.4 59.0 Second level (n=8) 37.5% 0.0 62.5 Third level or higher (n=l) 100.0% 0.0 0.0 Margin Total 29.2% 12.5% 58.3% Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#4=level of supervisor and #20=perception) n=48; 1 case deleted owing to missing data p=.l538 \,.,) 0 N

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Table 5.130 Perceived Fairness of USAFA Disciplinary Policy In your opinion, does the disciplinary policy at the USAF Academy discriminate against minorities? Respondent Never Sometimes Black (n=l2) 0.0% 83.3 Hispanic (n=39) 20.5% 61.5 American Indian (n=2) 50.0% 50.0 Asian (n=7) 57.1% 42.9 Other (n=llO) 68.2% 30.9 Margin Total 51.8% 42.4% Source: Employee questionnaire (#9=race/ethnic n=l70; 11 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.OOOl Almost Always Always 8.3 8.3 7.7 10.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 2.4% 3.5% group and #35=perception) Total 99.9% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.1%

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Table 5.131 Perceived Fairness of USAFA Disciplinary Policy In your opinion, does the disciplinary policy at the USAF Academy discriminate against minorities? Respondent Male (n=ll7) Female (n=54) Margin Total Never 46.2% 64.8% 52.0% Sometimes 47.0 33.3 42.7% Source: Employee questionnaire (#3=gender and n=l71; 10 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.0062 Almost Always Always 1.7 5.1 1.9 0.0 1.8% 3.5% t35=perception) Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

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Race/Ethnic Group Table 5.132 Perceived Fairness of USAFA Disciplinary Policy In your opinion, does the disciplinary policy at the USAF Academy discriminate against minorities? of Almost Respondent's Supervisor Never Sometimes Always Always Black (n=l4) 57.1% 35.7 7.1 0.0 Hispanic (n=41) 48.8% 48.8 0.0 2.4 American Indian (n=3) 66.7% 33.3 0.0 0.0 Asian (n=4) 25.0% 75.0 0.0 o.o Other (n=llO) 54.5% 39.1 2.7 3.6 Margin Total 52.9% 41.9% 2.3% 2.9% Total 99.9% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 99.9% 100.0% Source: Employee questionnaire (#13=race/ethnic group of supervisor and #35=perception) n=l72; 9 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.3713

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Table 5.133 Employee Perception of Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Race/Ethnic Group In your opinion, are the disciplinary actions taken against minorities (about the same, more severe, less severe) as would be taken against a nonminority? About More Less Respondent the Same Severe Severe Total Black (n=l3) 46.2% 30.8 23.1 100.1% Hispanic (n=39) 56.4% 33.3 10.3 100.0% American Indian (n=2) 50.0% 0.0 50.0 100.0% Asian (n=7) 85.7% 14.3 0.0 100.0% Other {n=lll) 68.5% 4.5 27.0 100.0% Margin Total 64.5% 13.4% 22.1% 100.0% Source: Employee questionnaire {#9=race/ethnic group and #3l=perception) n=l72; 9 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.0003

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Table 5.134 Employee Perception of Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Race/Ethnic Group In your opinion, are the disciplinary actions taken against minorities (about the same, more severe, less severe) as would be taken against a nonminority? About More Less Respondent the Same Severe Severe Total Male (n=ll7) 64.1% 16.2 19.7 100.0% Female (n=S6) 66.1% 7.1 26.8 100.0% Margin Total 64.7% 13.3% 22.0% 100.0% Source: Employee questionnaire (#3=gender and #3l=perception) n=l73; 8 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.l963

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Table 5.135 Employee Perception of Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Race/Ethnic Group In your opinion, are the disciplinary actions taken against minorities (about the same, more severe, less severe) as would be taken against a nonminority? Race/Ethnic Group of About More Less Respondent's Supervisor the Same Severe Severe Total Black (n=l4) 64.3% 7.1 28.6 100.0% Hispanic (n=40) 65.0% 7.5 27.5 100.0% American Indian (n=3) 100.0% 0.0 0.0 100.0% Asian (n=4) 100.0% 0.0 0.0 100.0% Other (n=ll3) 61.9% 16.8 21.2 99.9% Margin Total 64.4% 13.2% 22.4% 100.0% Source: Employee questionnaire (#13=race/ethnic group of supervisor and #3l=perception) n=l74; 7 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.l312 \N 0 00

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Table 5.136 Employee Perception of Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Race/Ethnic Group Are disciplinary actions taken more readily against minorities than they are against nonminorities? Don't Respondent No Yes Know Black (n=4) 75.0% 25.0 0.0 Hispanic (n=lO) 70.0% 30.0 o.o American Indian (n=l) 100.0% 0.0 o.o Asian (n=l) 100.0% 0.0 0.0 Other (n=26) 84.6% 15.4 0.0 Margin Total 81.0% 19.0% 0.0% Source: Interviews n=42; 1 case deleted owing to missing data p=.2894 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

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Table 5.137 Employee Perception of Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Race/Ethnic Group Are disciplinary actions taken more readily aga inst minorities than they are against nonminorities? Don't Respondent No Yes Kno w Male (n=27} 77.8% 22.2 0.0 Female (n=lS} 86.7% 13.3 0.0 Margin Total 81.0% 19.0% 0 . 0 % Source: Interviews n=42; 1 case deleted owing to missing data p=.2437 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% I.N -0

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Respondent Civilian Military Margin Total Table 5.138 Employee Perception of Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Race/Ethnic Group Are disciplinary actions taken more readily against minorities than they are against nonminorities? Don't No Yes Know (n=31) 83.9% 16.1 o.o (n=ll) 72.7% 27.3 0.0 81.0% 19.0% 0.0% Source: Interviews n=42: 1 case deleted owing to missing data p=.2122 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% -

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Table 5.139 Employee Perception of Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Race/Ethnic Group In your opinion, would your supervisor discipline a minority for breaking a work rule and not discipline a nonminority for breaking the same rule? Almost Respondent Never Sometimes Always Always Black (n=14) 78.6% 14.3 7.1 0.0 Hispanic (n=39) 59.0% 28.2 5.1 7.7 American Indian (n=2) 50.0% 50.0 0.0 0.0 Asian {n=7) 71.4% 0.0 0.0 28.6 Other (n=112) 83.0% 12.5 1.8 2.7 Margin Total 76.4% 16.1% 2.9% 4.6% Source: Employee questionnaire (#9=race/ethnic group and #19=perception) n=l74; 7 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.0121 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% N

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Table 5.140 Employee Perception of Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Race/Ethnic Group In your op1n1on, would your supervisor discipline a minority for breaking a work rule and not discipline a nonminority for breaking the same rule? Almost Respondent Never Sometimes Always Always Male (n=ll8) 69.5% 22.0 3.4 Female (n=57) 91.2% 3.5 1.8 Margin Total 76.6% 16.0% 2.9% Source: Employee questionnaire (#3=gender and #19=perception) n=l75; 6 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.0013 5.1 3.5 4.6% Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.1%

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Table 5.141 Employee Perception of Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Race/Ethnic Group In your opinion, would your supervisor discipline a minority for breaking a work rule and not discipline a nonminority for breaking the same rule? Race/Ethnic Group of Almost Respondent's Supervisor Never Sometimes Always Always Total Black (n=l4) 57.1% 28.6 7.1 7.1 99.9% Hispanic (n=41) 65.9% 24.4 2.4 7.3 100.0% American Indian (n=3) 100.0% o.o 0.0 0.0 100.0% Asian (n=4) 75.0% 25.0 0.0 0.0 100.0% Other (n=ll4) 82.5% 11.4 2.6 3.5 100.0% Margin Total 76.7% 15.9% 2.8% 4.5% 99.9% Source: Employee questionnaire (il3=racejethnic group of supervisor and #19=percep tion) n=l76; 5 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.Ol23

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Table 5.142 Employee Perception of Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Race/Ethnic Group In your opinion, do USAF Academy supervisors (other than your own) take more severe disciplinary actions against minorities than they would against nonminorities for the same offense? Respondent Never Sometimes Black (n=l3) 23.1% 69.2 Hispanic (n=38) 18.4% 57.9 American Indian (n=2) 50.0% 50.0 Asian (n=7) 57.1% 42.9 Other (n=l06) 54.7% 40.6 Margin Total 44.0% 47.0% Source: Employee questionnaire (#9=race/ethnic n=l66; 15 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.0003 Almost Always Always 7.7 0.0 7.9 15.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 o.o 3.8 0.9 4.8% 4.2% group and #30=perception) Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

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Table 5.143 Employee Perception of Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Race/Ethnic Group In your opinion, do USAF Academy supervisors (other than your own) take more severe disciplinary actions against minorities than they would against nonrn inorities for the same offense? Respondent Never Sometimes Male (n=ll4) 43.0% 47.4 Female (n=53) 47.2% 47.2 Margin Total 44.3% 47.3% Source: Employee questionnaire (#3=gender and n=l67; 14 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.l904 Almost Always Always 5.3 4.4 3.8 1.9 4.8% 3.6% #30=perception) Total 100.1% 100.1% 100.0%

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Table 5.144 Employee Perception of Disparity in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Race/Ethnic Group In your opinion, do USAF Academy supervisors (other than your own) take more severe disciplinary actions against minorities than they would against nonminorities for the same offense? Race/Ethnic Group of Almost Respondent's Supervisor Never Sometimes Always Always Black (n=l3) 46.2% 38.5 15.4 0.0 Hispanic (n=38) 31.6% 52.6 10.5 5.3 American Indian (n=3) 66.7% 33.3 0.0 0.0 Asian (n=4) 25.0% 75.0 0.0 0.0 Other (n=llO) 48.2% 44.5 2.7 4.5 Margin Total 44.0% 46.4% 5.4% 4.2% Total 100.1% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 99.9% 100.0% Source: Employee questionnaire (#13=race/ethnic group of supervisor and #30=perception) n=l68; 13 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.0790

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Table 5.145 Perceived Fairness in Treatment of Employees by USAFA Supervisors Do you feel most USAF Academy supervisors treat their employees fairly? Almost Respondent Never Sometimes Always Always Total Black (n=5} 0.0% 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0% Hispanic (n=ll} 0.0% 9.1 63.3 27.3 100.0% American Indian (n=O} 0.0% 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0% Asian (n=2} 0.0% 50.0 o.o 50.0 100.0% Other (n=30} 0.0% 16.7 70.0 13.3 100.0% Margin Total 0.0% 14.6% 68.8% 16.7% 100.1% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#8=race/ethnic group and #38=perception} n=48; 1 case deleted owing to missing data p=.2374 \,N 00

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Table 5.146 Perceived Fairness in Treatment of Employees by USAFA Supervisors Do you feel most USAF Academy supervisors treat their employees fairly? Almost Respondent Never Sometimes Always Always Male (n=43) 0.0% 16.3 65.1 18.6 Female (n=6) 0.0% 0.0 100.0 0.0 Margin Total 0.0% 14.3% 69.4% 16.3% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#6=gender and #38=perception) n=49 p=.2213 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

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Table 5.147 Perceived Fairness in Treatment of Employees by USAFA Supervisors Do you feel most USAF Academy supervisors treat their employees fairly? Almost Level of Supervisor Never Sometimes Always Always Total First level (n=39) 0.0% 12.8 74.4 12.8 100.0% Second level (n=8) 0.0% 25.0 50.0 25.0 100.0% Third level or higher (n=l) 0.0% 0.0 100. 0 0.0 100.0% Margin Total 0.0% 14.6% 70.8% 14.6% 100.0% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#4=level of supervisor and #38=perception) n=48; 1 case deleted owing to missing data p=.5000

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Table 5.148 Employee Perception of the Existence of Supervisory Retaliation for Filing a Grievance, Appeal, or EEO Complaint Do supervisors retaliate for filing grievances or appeals or EEO complaints by applying rules more strictly? Respondent No Ye s Total Black (n=4) 50.0% 50.0 100.0% Hispanic (n=lO) 30.0% 70.0 100.0% American Indian (n=l) 0.0% 100.0 100.0% Asian (n=l) 0.0% 100.0 100.0% Other (n=27) 51.9% 48.1 100.0% Margin Total 44.2% 55.8% 100.0% Source: Interviews n=43 p=.0928 N -

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Table 5.149 Employee Perception of the Existence of Supervisory Retaliation for Filing a Grievence, Appeal, or EEO Complaint Do supervisors retaliate for filing grievances or appeals or EEO complaints by applying rules more strictly? Respondent No Yes Total Male (n=28} 48.1% 51.9 100.0% Female (n=l5} 37.5% 62.5 100.0% Margin Total 44.2% 55.8% 100.0% Source: Interviews n=43 p=.2509 N N

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Table 5.150 Employee Perception of the Existence of Supervisory Retaliation for Filing a Grievance, Appeal, or EEO Complaint Do supervisors retaliate for filing grievances or appeals or EEO complaints by applying rules more strictly? Respondent No Supervisor (n=25) 52.0% Nonsupervisor (n=l7) 29.4% Margin Total 42.9% Source: Interviews n=42; 1 case deleted owing to missing data p=.0757 Yes 48.0 70.6 57.1% Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

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Table 5.151 Employee Perception of the Existence of Supervisory Retaliation for Filing a Grievance, Appeal, or EEO Complaint Do supervisors retaliate for filing grievances or appeals or EEO complaints by applying rules more strictly? Respondent No Yes Total Civilian (n=31) 41.9% 58.1 100.0% Military (n=ll) 45.5% 54.5 100.0% Margin Total 42.9% 57.1% 100.0% Source: Interviews n=42; 1 case deleted owing to missing data p=.4207

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Table 5.152 Employee Perception Regarding Supervisory Attitude Toward a Previously Disciplined Employee If you get in trouble once would your supervisor be out to get you from then on? Don't Respondent Yes No Know Black (n=l3} 0.0% 38.5 61.5 Hispanic (n=39} 20.5% 30.8 48.7 American Indian (n=l} 100.0% 0.0 0.0 Asian (n=7} 28.6% 42.9 28.6 Other (n=ll2) 8.9% 55.4 35.7 Margin Total 12.2% 47.7% 40.1% Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% -100 .1% 100.0% 100.0% Source: Employee questionnaire (#9=race/etnnic group and #40=perception) n=l72; 9 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.0087

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Table 5.153 Employee Perception Regarding Supervisory Attitude Toward a Previously Disciplined Employee If you get in trouble once would your supervisor be out to get you from then on? Don't Respondent Yes No Know Male (n=ll5) 12.2% 44.3 43.5 Female (n=58) 12.1% 53.4 34.5 Margin Total 12.1% 47.4% 40.5% Source: Employee questionnaire (#3=gender and #40=perception) n=l73; 8 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.l774 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

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Table 5.154 Employee Perception Regarding Supervisory Attitude Toward a Previously Disciplined Employee If you get in trouble once would your supervisor be out to get you from then on? Race/Ethnic Group of Respondent's Supervisor Black (n=l4) Hispanic (n=40) American Indian (n=3) Asian (n=3) Other (n=ll4) Margin Total Yes 14.3% 10.0% 33.3% 0.0% 12.3% 12.1% Don't No Know 35.7 50.0 47.5 42.5 33.3 33.3 100.0 0.0 48.2 39.5 47.7% 40.2% Total 100.0% 100.0% 99.9% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% Source: Employee questionnaire (#13=race/ethnic group of supervisor and #40= perception) n=l74; 7 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.3946

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Table 5.155 Employee Perceptiorrof the Constructive Nature of the Present Disciplinary Process Do most disciplinary actions solve the problem they are to (is our discipline really constructive)? Respondent Black (n=4) Hispanic (n=lO) American Indian (n=l) Asian (n=l) Other (n=27) Margin Total Source: Interviews n=43 p=.ll27 No 22.2% 30.0% 100.0% 0.0% 22.2% 27.9% Don't Yes Know 77.8 0.0 70.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 77.8 0.0 72.1% 0.0% Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

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Table 5.156 Employee Perception of the Constructive Nature of the Present Disciplinary Process Do most disciplinary actions solve the problem they are intended to (is our discipline really constructive)? Don't Respondent No Yes Know Male (n=28) 28.6% 71.4 0.0 Female (n=l5) 26.7% 73.3 0.0 Margin Total 27.9% 72.1% 0.0% Source: Interviews n=43 p=.4488 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

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Table 5.157 Employee Perception offue Constructive Nature of the Present Disciplinary Process Do most disciplinary actions solve the problem they are intended to (is our discipline really constructive)? Respondent Supervisor (n=25) Nonsupervisor (n=l8) Margin Total Source: Interviews n=43 p=.2529 No 24.0% 33.3% 27.9% Yes 76.0 66.7 72.1% Don't Know 0.0 0.0 0.0% Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

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Respondent Civilian Military Table 5.158 Employee Perception of the Constructive Nature of the Present Disciplinary Process Do most disciplinary actions solve the problem they are intended to (is our discipline really constructive)? Don't No Yes Kno w (n=32) 25.0% 75.0 0.0 (n=ll) 36.4% 63.6 0.0 Margin Total 27.9% 72.1% 0.0% Source: Interviews n=43 p=.2369 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

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Hypot he sis VI Supervisors, tasked with the responsibility of formal di s cipline, perceive their disciplinary authority restricted by specific outside forces such as higher management and o rganizations such as the Union. Overview. Hypothesis VI pr e sumes a significant number of i n dividuals or organizations are in a position to exert pressure or i nfluence over the disciplinar y decisions of supervisors -first, the decision whether or not to formally discipline and second, the decision regarding the magnitude of penalty if discipline is administered. In testing this hypothesis, data are utilized from the supervisory and employee questionnaires. Findings are limited to two of the most prominate potential influences. The first issue considered is the influence of higher management. Data regarding perceived decision authority were gathered from both supervisory and nonsupervisory employees. Second, data were gathered regarding the supervisors' perception of compulsion to take a specific type of disciplinary action (reprimand, suspension, discharge) for a specific offense . In other words, data were sought as to whether or not something, such as a table of penalties contained in a Union contract, mandated a specific type of penalty without proper consideration for the circumstances surrounding an alleged offense. As a corollary to the higher management influence issue, data were gathered from supervisors as to whether or not they had ever be en ordered to take a disciplinary action. The question was n onspecifi c as to where suc h an order could evolve from. For example, such an orde r could be originated from higher 332

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management or outside organizations such as the Civilian Personnel Office, the legal office, etc. Data. Tables 5.159 through 5.170 document the relevant data for this hypothesis. The data, o btained from both supervisory questionnaires and empl oye e questionnaires, are entirely perception data. The documentation of perceived final disciplinary decision authority is contained in Tables 5.159 through 5.164. In regard to this issue, supe rvisors were asked, Tables 5.159 through 5.161, whether they, their supervisor, or someone other than thei r supervisor makes the final decision as to what disciplinary action will be taken. In addition, employees were asked, Tables 5.162 through 5.164, whether their own supervisor has the authority to make disciplinary decisions or if those decisions are made by their supervisor's boss . The supervisory data are analyzed with regard to the race/ethnic group and gender of the respondent as well as the level of supervisory responsibility of the respondent. The nonsupervisory respondents' answers are analyzed with consideration for the race/ethnic group and gender of the resp ondent along with consideration for the race/ethnicity of the respondent' s supervisor. Data regarding perceived compulsion to take a specific penalty for a given offense, regardless of circumstances, are con tained in Tables 5.165 through 5.167. Supervisory employees were asked whether or not they felt compelled to take a given type of action for some specific offense --for example, always administer a written reprimand for absense without leave on the s econ d offense. The data for this issue are analyzed with 333

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consideration for the race/ethnic group, gender, and level of respondent's supervisory responsibility. The data pertaining to the corollary issue of whether or not the supervisory respondent has been ordered to take a disciplinary action against a subordinate, are displayed in Tables .5.168 through .5.170. The question is not specific as to the origin of any such order. The data are analyzed with regard to the race/ethnic group, gender, and respondents' level of supervisory responsibility. Discussion. Supervisors and em ployees hold slightly different perceptions of disciplinary decision authority. The margin total rows of Tables 5.159 through 5.161 show about 55 percent of the supervisory respondents perceive they possess final disciplinary decision authority. This number climbs when employees are asked about the disciplinary decision authority of their supervisor. Just o ver 63 percent of the nonsupervisory employees perceive their supervisor as the one to make disciplinary decisions. Table 5.159, analysis of the supervisory responses by race/ethnic group of the respondent, finds significantly more nonminority supervisors (66.7 percent) with the perception that they personally have final disciplinary decision authority than is the case with minority supervisors. This perception drops to 40.0 percent in the case of Black supervisors and 36.4 percent in the case of Hispanic supervisors. There were no American Indian respondents and neither of the two Asian respondents feel they possess the decision authority. The predominate minority supervisors' response is that their supervisor or someone other than their supervisor is actually the deciding official in disciplinary decisions. 334

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When the same issue is analyzed by gender, Table 5.160, the data show more females (66.7 percent) than males (53.5 percent) feel they possess disciplinary decision authority. It is interesting to note that no females perceive this authority in the hands of their supervisor, although 33.3 percent perceive the authority in the hands of someone other than their supervisor. On the other hand, 20.9 percent of the males feel their supervisor has this authority while 25.6 percent believ e the decision authority rests with someone other than their supervisor. Analysis of the issue by level of respondents' supervisory responsibility, Table 5.161, finds at least 50.0 percent of all levels of supervisors with the perception that they possess final disciplinary decision authority. The data show however, that more first level supervisors (56.4 percent) than second level supervisors (50.0) percent) hold this view. The third level respondent feels he possesses the final decision authority. More second level supervisors (25.0 percent) feel this authority rests with their supervisor than is the case with first level supervisors (17.9 percent). Approximately 25 percent of both the first and second level supervisors feel final disciplinary decisions come from someone other than themselves or their own supervisor. Where the authority issue is addressed by nonsupervisory employees, with regard to their own supervisor's authority, the responses are quite different. Table 5.162, analysis by race/ethnic group, the data show more Asians (71.4 percent) and nonminorities (68.5 percent) feel their supervisor makes disciplinary decisions than is the case with the Black, Hispanic, and American Indian r espondents. This same perception falls to 45.5 percent, 51.4 335

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percent, and 50.0 percent in the cases of the Black, Hispanic, and American Indian employees. All the remaining respondents in all categories indicated their supervisors' boss makes the disciplinary decisions. When the employee responses to this issue are analyzed by gender, Table 5.163, the data show more females (67.9 percent) than males (61.1 percent) feel their supervisor decides. Conversely, more males (38. 9 percent) than females (32.1 percent) perceive the decision authority rests with their supervisors' boss. Table 5.164 analysis with regard to the race/ethnic group of the respondent's supervisor, finds 60.0 percent of the employees with Hispanic supervisors, 66.7 percent of the employees with I American Indian supervisors and 70.6 percent of the employees with Other category supervisors feel their supervisor has the authority to decide on disciplinary actions. Only 28.6 percent of the employees with Black supervisors and 25.0 percent of the employees with Asian supervisors hold this same view. The second issue to be examined involves supervisory perceptions regarding a feeling of compulsion to take a specific penalty for a given offense, regardless of circumstances. For example, does the supervisor feel compelled to issue a written reprimand for a second offense of absence without leave. The data, as contained in Tables 5.165 through 5.167, are analyzed with regard to the race/ethnic group, gender, and respondents' level of supervisory responsibility. The data were obtained from the supervisory questionnaires. The margin total row shows over 40 percent of the respondents feel compelled to take a specific penalty for a given disciplinary offense. 336

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When the issue is examined with regard to the race/ethnic group of the respondent, Table 5.165, the data show considerably more nonminority supervisors than minority supervisors feel no such compulsion. A full 66.7 percent of the Other category hold this view with the numbers dropping to 40.0 percent, 36.4 percent, and 50.0 percent in the cases of Black, Hispanic, and Asian supervisors. When the issue is analyzed with regard to gender, Table 5.166, the data show more males (44.2 percent) than females (33.3 percent) feel compelled to take a specific action for a given offense. Analysis with regard to the respondents' level of supervisory responsibility, Table 5.167, finds only 50 percent of the second level supervisors do not feel compelled to take a specific action for a given offense. This perception climbs to 59.0 and 100.0 percent in the cases of first and third level supervisors. The corollary issue, whether or not a supervisory respondent has been ordered to take a disciplinary action against a subordinate, is discussed in Tables 5.168 through 5.170. The data, as gathered from the supervisory questionnaires, are examined with regard to the respondents' race/ethnic group, gender , and level of supervisory responsibility. The margin total row shows 25.0 percent of the respondents have received such an order. Analysis of the issue with regard to the respondent's race/ethnic group, Table 5.168, shows more minorities than nonminorities have received such an order. Specifically, 40.0 percent of the Black supervisors and 36.4 percent of the Hispanic supervisors have had such an experience, while this drops to 20.0 percent and 0 . 0 percent in the case of Other category and Asian 337

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supervisors. Analysis by gender, Table .5.169 shows more males (2.5.6 percent) than females (16.7 percnet) have been ordered to take action. In the same regard Table .5.170 shows more first level (23.1 percent) and se cond level (2.5.0 percent) supervisors have received an order to take a disciplinary action than have third level supe rvisors (0.0 percent). Conclusion. A significant number of supervisors, approximately 4.5 percent, feel they do not posse ss final disciplinary decision authority . This is particularly true of minority supervisors. The data confirm that only 40.0 percent of the Black supervisors, 36.4 percent of the Hispanic supervisors and none of the Asian supervisors perceive themselves as having the necessary authority to make final disciplinary decisions. In addition, the data show differences based on gender. Considerably fewer males, than females, perceive themselves to possess the decision authority. Finally, the data show the lowest perception figures fall, not through the first level supervisors as one would expect, but rather among the second level supervisors where only .50.0 percent perceive themselves as possessing the necessary decision authority. These findings are confirmed by employee perceptions. The employee data show only about 63 percent of the employees perceive their supervisor as having the necessary decision authority. Again, the minority employees feel less frequently that their supervisor has the necessary authority than does the nonminority employee. In addition, as with the supervisory re sponses, the data show female employees more frequently perceive their supervisor as having the necessary authority, than do 338

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male employees. A tremendous disparity exists when the race/ethnic group of the employee respondents' supervisor is considered. An extremely low number of employees with Black and Asian supervisors feel their supervisor has the required decision authority. This portion of the hypothesis is con firmed. Results, which attain a statistically significant level, substantiate a finding that a large number of supervisors perceive their disciplinary authority restricted by outside forces in this case, higher level management. In regard to the second part of the hypothesis, the results are just as conclusive. A significant number of supervisors, well over 40 percent, feel compelled to take a specific disciplinary action based on the offense committed. This is particularly true of minority supervisors where well over half acknowledge this compulsion. FIJrther, the data show the male is more prone to this compulsion than is the female. Finally, the second level supervisor, as in the first part of this hypothesis, appears to be the weakest link. In this case, .50.0 percent of the second level supervisors feel the offense dictates the type of penalty. This portion of the hypothesis is confirmed. Well over 40 percent of the supervisors feel the offense mandates the magnitude or type of penalty administered. The results, which attain a statistically significant level, show that supervisors, particularly minorities, are guided by outside forces, such as a table of penalties in a Union contract, in determining the magnitude or type of penalty to be administered. In regard to the corollary issue, the data show that 2.5.0 339

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percent of the supervisors have been ordered to take a disciplinary action against a subordinate employee. This type of order has been given to Black (40.0 percent) and Hispanic supervisors (36.4 percent) about twice as frequently as it has to the Other category supervisors (20.0 percent). This high overall occurrence, 25.0 percent, is inappropriate. The immediate supervisor is the one who is being paid to supervise, and such an order usurps power from the individual who is being paid to exercise that power. The results from the corollary issue further substantiate the hypothesis. The data show a significant number of supervisors have been ordered to take action, which coincides with the findings in the first part of this hypothesis --mainly that, the supervisory respondents do not possess final disciplinary decision authority. In summary, the hypothesis is confirmed. A significant number of supervisors are the subject of higher management pressures in regard to their disciplinary decisions. The same holds true in determining the magnitude or type of penalty to be administered. A large number of supervisors are subject to "act by the book", regardless of circumstances, rather than adopt truly constructive principles. The supervisor receives extra pay to lead and perform various supervisory functions. The data show a very large portion of the supervisory workforce has either forfeited this responsibility to higher management, or else higher management has taken this discretion away. The study show the two outside forces examined, higher management and a Union contract table of penalties, exert considerable influence. Further study is required to determine if 340

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and to what degree, other outside forces influence disciplinary decision authority. 341

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Table 5.159 Supervisors Personal Authority in Matters of Disciplinary Discretion In disciplinary situations, who makes the final decision about what disciplinary action will be taken? My Someone Other Than Respondent I do Supervisor Does My Supervisor or I Black (n=5) 40.0% 20.0 40.0 Hispanic (n=ll) 36.4% 36.4 27.3 American Indian (n=O) 0.0% 0.0 0.0 Asian (n=2) 0.0% 50.0 50.0 Other (n=30) 66.7% 10.0 23.3 Margin Total 54.2% 18.8% 27.1% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#8=race/ethnic and #24=perception) n=48; 1 case deleted owing to missing data p=.0316 Total 100.0% 100.1% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.1%

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Table 5.160 Supervisors Personal Authority Matters of Disciplinary Discretion In disciplinary situations, who makes the final decision about what disciplinary action will be taken? My Someone Other Respondent I do Supervisor Does My Supervisor Male (n=43) 53.5% 20.9 25.6 Female (n=6) 66.7% o.o 33.3 Margin Total 55.1% 18.4% 26.5% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#6=gender and #24=perception) n=49 p=.3930 Than or I Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

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Table 5.161 Supervisors Personal Authority in Matters of Disciplinary Discretion In disciplinary situations, who makes the final decision about what disciplinary action will be taken? My Someone Other Level of Supervisor I do Supervisor Does My Supervisor First level (n=39) 56.4% 17.9 25.6 Second level (n=8) 50.0% 25.0 25.0 Third level or higher (n=l) 100.0% 0.0 0.0 Margin Total 56.3% 18.8% 25.0% Than or I Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#4=level of supervisor and #24=perception) n=48: 1 case deleted owing to missing data p=.3744 Total 99.9% 100.0% 100.0% 100.1%

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Table 5.162 Employee Perception of Their Own Supervisors Di-sciplinary Authority Does your supervisor have the authority to decide what disciplinary penalty/action will be taken against you (OR DOES YOUR SUPERVISOR'S BOSS DECIDE)? Respondent Black (n=ll) Hispanic (n=37) American Indian (n=2) Asian (n=7) Other (n=lll) Margin Total My Supervisor Decides 45.5% 51.4% 50.0% 71.4% 68.5% 63.1% My Supervisor's Boss Decides 54.5 48.6 50.0 28.6 31.5 36.9% Source: Employee questionnaire (#9=race/ethnic group and #39=perception) n=l68; 13 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.0301 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

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Table 5.163 Employee Perception of Their Own Supervisors Disciplinary Authority Does your supervisor have the authority to decide what disciplinary penalty/action will be taken against you (OR DOES YOUR SUPERVISOR'S BOSS DECIDE)? Respondent Male (n=ll3) Female (n=56) Margin Total My Supervisor Decides 61.1% 67.9% 63.3% My Supervisor' s Boss Decides 38.9 32.1 36.7% Source: Employee questionnaire (#3=gender and #39=perception) n=l69; 12 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.l948 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

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Table 5.164 Employee Perception of Their Own Supervisors Disciplinary Authority Does your supervisor have the authority to decide what disciplinary penalty/action will be taken against you (OR DOES YOUR SUPERVISOR'S BOSS DECIDE)? Race/Ethnic Group of Respondent's Supervisor Black (n=l4) Hispanic (n=40) American Indian (n=3) Asian (n=4) Other (n=l09) Margin Total My Supervisor Decides 28.6% 60.0% 66.7% 25.0% 70.6% 63.5% My Supervisor's Boss Decides Total 71.4 100.0% 40.0 100.0% 33.3 100.0% 75.0 100.0% 29.4 100.0% 36.5% 100.0% Source: Employee questionnaire (#13=race/ethnic group of supervisor and #39=perception) n=l70; 11 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.OOll

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Table 5.165 Perceived Limitations on Disciplinary Penalty Discretion Do you feel compelled to take any given disciplinary action for some specific offense (i.e. always a written reprimand for absent without leave on the second offense)? Respondent No Yes Total Black (n=5) 40.0% 60.0 100.0% Hispanic (n=ll) 36.4% 63.6 100.0% American Indian (n=O) 0.0% 0.0 0.0% Asian (n=2) 50.0% 50.0 100.0% Other (n=30) 66.7% 100.0% Margin Total 56.3% 43.8% 100.1% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#B=race/ethnic group and #44=perception) n=48; 1 case deleted owing to missing data p=.0413

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Table 5.166 Perceived Limitations on Disciplinary Penalty Discretion Do you feel compelled to take any given disciplinary action for some specific offense (i.e. always a written reprimand for absent without leave on the second offense)? Respondent Male (n=43) Female (n=6) Margin Total No 55.8% 66.7% 57.1% Yes 44.2 33.3 42.9% Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#6=gender and #44=perception) n=49 p=.3092

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Level of First Table 5.167 Perceived Limitations on Disciplinary Penalty Discretion Do you feel compelled to take any given disciplinary action for some specific offense (i.e. always a written reprimand for absent without leave on the second offense)? Supervisor No Yes level (n=39) 59.0% 41.0 Second level (n=8) 50.0% 50.0 Third level or higher (n=l) 100.0% 0.0 Margin Total 58.3% 41.7% Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#4=level of supervisor and #44=perception) n=48; 1 case deleted owing to missing data p=.4509

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Table 5.168 Higher Level Management Pressure Influencing Disciplinary Discretion Have you ever been ordered to take a disciplinary action against one of your subordinate employees? Respondent No Ye s Black (n=5) 60.0% 40.0 Hispanic (n=ll) 63.6% 36.4 American Indian (n=O) 0.0% 0.0 Asian (n=2) 100.0% o.o Other (n=30) 80.0% 20.0 Margin Total 75.0% 25.0% Total 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#8=race/ethnic group and #45=perception) n=48; 1 case deleted owing to missing data p=.l959

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Table 5.169 Higher Level Management Pressure Influencing Disciplinary Discretion Have you ever been ordered to take a disciplinary action against one of your subordinate employees? Respondent Male (n=43) Female (n=6) Margin Total No 74.4% 83.3% 75.5% Yes 25.6 16.7 24.5% Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#6=gender and #45=perception) n=49 p=.3189

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Table 5.170 Higher Level Management Pressure Influencing Disciplinary Discretion Have you ever been ordered to take a disciplinary action against one of your subordinate employees? Level of Supervisor No Yes First level (n=39) 76.9% 23.1 Second level (n=S) 75.0% 25.0 Third level or higher (n=l) 100.0% 0.0 Margin Total 77.1% 22.9% Total 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#4=level of supervisor and #45=perception) n=48; 1 case deleted owing to missing data p=.4150

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Hypothesis VII Individua l employees (particularly minorities) perceive their sup ervisors as inconsistent in the specif ic penalty adm inistered f or an y give n offense. O verview. The seventh hypothesis seeks to discover whethe r or not employees view their supervi sor s as consistent in the a pplicat ion of disciplinar y policy. Speci fic ally, the iss ue is whethe r or not any given supervis o r administers the same type of penalt y (repriman d, suspension, discha r ge) to all subordina t es who are guilty o f a comparable offense. The ordinal data for this hypothesis were gathered through a variety of perception questions from the employee questionnaires, superv iso ry questionnaires, and interviews. The results are displayed in Tables 5.171 through 5 . 223. Responses from all three data sources are analyzed with regard to the race/ethnicity and gender of the respondents. In addition, the supervisory questionnaire responses are analyzed with regard to the respondents' level of supervisory responsibility; the employee questionnaire responses are analyzed with regard to the race/ethnic group of the respon dents' supervisor; and the interview responses are analyzed with regard to the respondents' supervisory /nonsupervisory and civilian/military status. The data for this hypothesis can best be examined by identifyin g three separate issues. First, Tables 5.171 through 5.192 focus on supervisory consistency, without regard to specific causes of any existing inconsistencies. For example, the questions are general in nature --respo ndents were asked if they, their supervisors, USAF Academy supervisors overall, etc., present a J.j4

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consistent disciplinary approach, as opposed to questions which would seek per ' ceptions of consistency with regard to race, ethnicity, gender, etc. Secondly, Tables 5.193 throug h 5.210 approac the issue of consistency with race/ethnic group as a specific factor. Both supervisory and nonsupervisory employees are questioned regarding their perceptions of their immediate supervisors' consistency in amon g races, as well as any favoritism perceptions based on minority/nonmino r ity status. Finally, data were gathered through the supervisory and employee questionnaires, as well as interviews, regarding penalty administration. Specifically, perceptions were obtained regarding consistency in the type of penalties administered as well as attitudes regarding a progressive penalty system for repeat offenders. This issue is covered in Tables 5.2ll through 5.223. Data. Tables 5.l71 through 5.192 document the relevant data for the first issue in this hypothesis consistency, regardless of strata, in disciplinary treatment. The data sources used to examine this issue include the supervisory questionnaires, employee questionnaires, and interviews. Tables 5.171 through 5.173 examine supervisors' perceptions of their own consistency in applying work rules. The data are examined with regard to the respondents' race/ethnic group, gender, and level of supervisory responsibility. Tables 5.l74 through 5.177 document the data obtained in the interview process from a related question. Are supervisors consistent in the administration of formal discipline? The responses are analyzed with consideration for the race/ethnic group, gender, super visor y I nonsuper visory status and 355

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civilian/military status of the respondent. The data in Tables 5.178 through 5.180 focus on whether or not employee questionnaire respondents perceive most USAF Academy supervisors would take the same disciplinary action as their supervisor for breaking any given work rule. The data are analyzed with regard to the race/ethnic group and gender of the respondent, as well as the race/ethnic group of the respondents' supervisor. Tables 5.181 through 5.183 document supervisory perceptions of their supervisors consistency in taking disciplinary actions. The data are analyzed with regard to the respondents' race/ethnic group, gender, and level of supervisory responsibility. Tables 5.184 through 5.186 seek employee perceptions of overall treatment by the respondents' supervisor. Specifically, employees are asked, with ordinal responses provided, whether or not their supervisor treats all subordinates alike. The results are analyzed with regard to the race/ethnic group and gender of the respondent, as well as the race/ethnic group of the respondents' supervisor. The data contained in Tables 5.187 through 5.189 document supervisory perceptions as to whether or not some employees (no specific stratum defined) get away with breaking work rules without being subjected to disciplinary action. In other words, do employees perceive that some peers can break rules, get caught, and be exempt from formal discipline even though they deserve it? The data are analyzed with consideration for the respondents' race/ethnic group, gender, and level of supervisory responsibility. The final data examined in regard to the first issue, Tables 5 .190 through 5.193 focus on employee perceptions of consistency in 356

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penalty administration for a specific offense. Specifically, employees were asked if they believe their supervisor would take the same action against any of the emplo yees in the section for the same off e nse being late. The data are analyzed with regard to the respondents' race/ethnic group and gender along with consideration for the race/ethnic group of the res pondents' supervis r . The second issue to be examined focuses on inconsistency in disciplinary treatment attributable to minority or non minorit y status. The data for this issue are contained in Tables 5.\93 through 5.210. The data sources utilized for this issue include both the supervisory and employee questionnaires. Tables 5.193 through 5.195 document employee responses as to whether or not their supervisor treats employees of different races inconsistently in regard to disciplinary actions. The data are analyzed with regard to the nonsupervisory employees' race/ethnic group and gender along with consideration based on the race/ethnic group of the respondents' supervisor. Tables 5.196 through 5.198 document supervisory perceptions of their own supervisor relating to consistency in disciplinary treatment with race/ethnic group as a factor. Specifically, supervisors were asked whether or not they believe their supervisor treats people of different races in different ways in regard to disciplinary actions. The responses are documented with regard to the respondents' race/ethnic group, gender, and level of supervisory responsibility. The next series of questions seek identical information from both nonsupervisory and supervisory employees. First, employees 357

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were asked if they perceive their supervisor to have favorites (Tables 5.199 through 5.201). Next, they were asked (Tables 5.202 through 5.204) if the favored status has a minority/nonminorit y implica tion. The data for both questions are analyzed with regar d to the race/ethnic group and gender of the respondents along with consideration for the race/ethnic group of the respondents' supervisor. Duplicative questions were asked of supervisory respondents. The idea was to see if the supervisor y respondents perceive favoritism from their supervisors, and if so, whether or not the perception is attributable to minority or nonm inority status. The results are reflected in Tables 5.205 through 5.210 and are analyzed with regard to the respondents' race/ethnic group, gender, and level of supervisory responsibility. The final issue to receive con sideration in this hypothesis is related directly to the penalties that are administered. First, supervisors were asked to compare their disciplinary practices against other supervisors. Next, perceptions were gathered relating to the appropriateness of the types of penalties administered. Finally, both supervisory and nonsupervisory attitudes were gathered focusing on the concept of progressive penalties for repeat offenders. The data for this issue are reflected in Tables 5.211 through 5.223. The data sources used for this issue included both the supervisory and employee questionnaires, as well as interviews. Tables 5.211 through 5.213 document supervisory perceptions as to whether the disciplinary penalties they impose are more severe, less severe, or about the same as the penalties imposed by other supervisors for comparable offenses. The data are analyzed 358

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with regard to the respondents' race/ethnic group, gender, and level of supervisory responsibility. Next, the interviewees, were asked if the penalties that are custom arily administered at the USAF Academy are generally too severe, not severe enough or about right. The results, as contained in Tables 5.214 through 5.217, are analyzed with regard to the r espondents' race/ethnic group, gender, supe rvisory/nonsupervisory, and civilian/military status. Finally, both employees and supervisors were asked for their attitude regarding the concept of progressive disciplinary penalties. Specifically, should repeat offenders, employees who break the same rule several times, be dealt with more severely each time. The employee responses, Tables 5.218 through 5.220, are analyzed with regard to the race/ethnic group and gender of the respondent along with consideration for the race/ethnicity of the respondents' supervisor. The supervisory responses, Tables 5.221 through 5.223, are analyzed with regard to the respondents' race/ethnic group, gender, and level of supervisory responsibility. Discussion. Turning first to the issue of consistency in disciplinary treatment, regardless of strata occupied, the data in Tables 5.171 through 5.173 support a finding that supervisors, overall, perceive themselves consistent in the application of work rules. The margin total row shows nearly 96 percent of the respondents believe themselves to always or almost always be consistent in application. When the issue is analyzed with regard to the respondents' race/ethnic group the data show all res pondents falling outside of the always, or almost always, consistent categories are minority. Specifically, 20.0 percent of the Black 359

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respondents and 9.1 percent of the Hispanic respondents view themselves as consistent to a lesser degree -"sometimes." When the issue is analyzed with consideration for gender, Table 5.172, the data show all respondents in the "sometimes" consistent category were male. Further, analysis with regard to respondents' level of supervisory responsibility, Table 5.173, finds all respondents in the "sometimes" consistent category were first level supervisors. The data confirm that the sup ervisors who perceive themselves as inconsistent fall in the first supervisory level: they are either Black or Hispanic and they are, without exception, male. When the data source used are the interviews, Tables 5.174 through 5.177, the results are quite different. The interviewees were asked simply whether or not supervisors are consistent in the administration of formal discipline. The margin total row shows only about 52 percent of the respondents perceive consistency. When the data are analyzed with regard to the race/ethnic group of the respondent, Table 5.174, it is obvious the responses have race and ethnicity implications. Neither the American Indian nor the Asian respondents perceive consistency. In addition, only 40.0 percent of the Hispanics and 50.0 percent of the Blacks perceive consistency. A full 60.7 percent of the nonminorities perceive consistent administration of formal discipline. Analysis of the issue with regard for gender, Table 5.175 find slightly more males (53.6 percent) than females (50.0 percent) with a positive perception of . consistency. When supervisory/nonsupervisory status is considered, Table 5.176, considerably more supervisors (56.0 percent) perceive consistency than do nonsupervisors (44.4 percent). This finding aligns with the data contained in Tables 5.171 360

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through 5.173. Finally, when the focus is on civilian/military status of the respondents, Table 5.177, the data find considerably more military who perceive consistency (72.7 percent) than is the case with civilian respondents (43.7 percent). The data would then support a finding that those who perceive inconsistency tend to be the nonsupervisory civilian minorities. The data in Tables 5.178 through 5.180 reflect employee perceptions of whether or not other supervisors would take the same disciplinary action for violation of a work rule that their supervisor would. The margin total shows over 50 percent of the respondents "don't know." Of those who do know, approximately 36 percent feel other supervisors would not take the same action as their supervisor while only about 12 percent perceive consistency. When the issue is examined with consideration for the respondents' race/ethnic group, Table 5.178, no clear pattern is evident. There are slightly more Hispanics, who perceive consistency than any other category. Conversely, there are more American Indians and Asians who perceive disciplinary inconsistency. Analysis by gender, Table 5.179, finds slightly more males (13.9 percent) than females (10.3 percent) who perceive consistency. Finally, when the issue is analyzed with regard to the race/ethnic group of the respondents' supervisor, the data show more employees with American Indian supervisors (25.0 percent) perceive consistency than is true in the case of employees with Black (14.3 percent), Hispanic (15.4 percent), Asian (0.0 percent) and Other (11.4 percent) category supervisors. The data support a finding that while most employees are unable to compare the disciplinary policy of their supervisor against other supervisors, the 361

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majority of those who did compare perceive inconsistency. This perception of inconsistency does not appear to have race/ethnic group or gender implications. Next supervisors were asked if they believed their supervisor would take comparable action against any subordinate. The results are documented in Tables 5.181 through 5.183. Ordinal choice r esponses were provided. The margin total row finds over 81 percent of the respondents perceive their superviso r as always or almost always consistent. The data also show approximately 2 percent perceive the supervisor as ne ver consistent with about 16 percent holding that their supervisor is consistent only "sometimes." Examination of the data with regard to the respondents' race/ethnic group, Table 5.181, find the only respondents in the "never" consistent to be Hispanic. Specifically. 9.1 percent of the Hispanics view their supervisor as never taking comparable action against all subo r dinates. In addition, the respondents who feel their supervisor would take comparable action only sometimes, are very heavily minority. Specifically, 20.0 percent of the Blacks, 27.3 percent of the Hispanics and 50.0 percent of the Asians hold this view while only 10.0 percent of the Other category responded in this way. Analysis with regard to gender, Table 5.182, finds all respondents in the "never" consistent or "sometimes" consistent categories were male. All females perceive their supervisors would always or almost always take comparable actions against all subordinate employees. Table 5.183 examines the issue based on the respondents' level of supervisory responsibility. The data show that while the third level supervisor feels comparable disciplinary 362

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actions would always or almost always occur against all subordinates, this number falls to 87.5 percent in the case of second level supervisors and, 82.1 percent in the case of first level superv isors. The data support the finding that lower level supervisors who are male minority have less confidence in their own sup ervisors' cons istency than do other categories. The next issue seeks employee perceptions of supervisory consistency in employee treatment. Specifically, Ta bles 5.184 through 5.186 document employee responses as to whether or not their supervisors treat all subordinates alike. The question provided ordinal response choices. The margin total row shows approximately 78 percent of the respondents always, or at least most of the time, perceive similar treatment for all their co-workers. When the analysis focuses on race/ethnic group, Table 5.184, the data show many more Black (91.7 percent) and Other category (84.0 percent) employees perceive similar treatment always, or most of the time, than is the case with the other minorities. Specifically, only 64.1 percent of the Hispanics and 71.5 percent of the Asians hold this view, while none of the American Indians answered in either of these categories. Analysis by gender, Table 5.185, finds more females (83.1 percent) than males (76.6 percent) who perceive similar treatment always, or at least most of the time, for all coworkers in their section. Table 5.186, analysis with regard for the race/ethnic group of the respondents' supervisor, shows that more employees with nonminority (80.9 percent), Black (78.6 percent) and Asian (75.0 percent) supervisors perceive comparable treatment of coworkers always, or at least most of the 363

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time, than is the case with employees who have Hispanic or American Indian supervisors. This same comparison falls to 70.0 percent in the case of employees with Hispanic supervisors and 66.6 percent in the case of employees with American Indian supervisors. Tables 5.187 through 5.189 examine supervisory perceptions as to whether or not, with an ordinal response choice available, some employees get away with bre aking work rules, even after being caught, while other emp loyees are disciplined for a similar infraction. The margin total row finds over 83 percent perceive this occurs sometimes. In addi tion, 10.4 percent of the res pondents feel this never occurs, 6.3 percent feel it almost alway occurs, and no employee perceives this always happens. Table 5.187, analysis by race/ethnic group, shows that all employees who perceive other employees get away with violating the rules and no discip linary action taken are minority. Specifically, 20.0 percent of the Blacks, 9.1 percent of the Hispanics and, 50.0 percent of the Asians answered in this way. On the other hand, the only respondents to say such incidents never occur were Asian (50.0 percent) and nonminority (13.3 percent). All the respondents indicated that some employees get away with breaking rules sometimes. Analysis of the issue with regard for gender, Table 5.188, finds all female responses in the "somet imes" category . On the other hand, ll.6 percent of the males feel employees never get away with breaking rules without disciplinary action and 7.9 percent of the males feel some employees almost always get away with rule violations. Analysis with regard for the respondents' level of supervisory responsibility, Table 5.189, finds both first and second level supervisors in the 364 . '

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"never" and "almost always" response categories. The third level respondent indicated such incidents occur sometimes. The final item considered under this first is sue seeks employees perceptions as to whether or not their supervisor would take the same action against any coworker in the section for being late. The results are documented in Tables 5.190 through 5.192. The margin total row finds over 75 percent of the respondents perceive similar penalties always, or at least almost always occur. Analysis base d on race/ethnic group, Table 5.190, finds considerably more Black (84.6 percent) and Other category (79.3 percent) employees believe the same action will always or almost always be taken against a coworker for being late than is the case with the other minorities. Specifically, only 64.3 percent of the Hispanics, 70.5 percent of the Asians, and none of the American Indians hold this view. When the issue is examined based on gender, Table 5.191, the results show no marked difference. While 75.0 percent of the males perceive like treatment for coworkers guilty of being late, 77.2 percent of the females hold the same view. When the issue is examined with regard to the race/ethnic group of the respondents' supervisor, Table 5.192, the data show little variance. Between 66.6 and 77.8 percent of the respondents, regardless of the race/ethnic group of their supervisor, feel comparable actions would always or almost always be taken by their supervisor against any employee guilty of being late. The next major issue to be examined focuses on consistency in disciplinary treatment with race/ethnic group a specific consideration. In other words, are either minority or nonminority employees in a favored position? The data, gathered from both 365

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supervisory and employee questionnaires, are reflected in Tables 5.193 through 5.210. Tables 5.193 through 5.195 document employees' perceptions of how their supervisors treat people of different races in regard to disciplinary actions. The margin total row shows that about 67 percent of the respondent s feel their supervisor never treats employees of different races in different ways. However, about 7 percent of the respondents feel different treatment always occurs. The remain in g employees feel different treatment occurs sometimes or almost always. Table 5.193, analysis with regard to the respondents' race/ethnic group, shows fewer minorities (Black, 38.5 percent; Hispanic, 59.5 percent; American Indian 0.0 percent; Asian, 42.9 percent) perceive different treatment never occurs than is the case with nonminorities (75.7 percent). In addition, while only 1.8 percent of the Other category feel different treatment always occurs, this same view is held by 23.1 percent of the Blacks, 8.1 percent of the Hispanics, 50.0 percent of the American Indians, and 42.9 percent of the Asians. Consideration by gender, Table 5.194, finds considerably more females (76.8 percent) than males (61.7 percent) who believe treatment between races is never different. Approximately 7 percent of each gender feel the treatment is always different. Examination with regard to the race/ethnic group of the respondents' supervisor, Table 5.195, finds more employees with nonminority supervisors (75.5 percent) who feel the treatment is never different than is the case for employees with minority supervisors. Specifically, only 42.9 percent, 54.8 percent 50.0 percent and 66.7 percent, of the employees with Black, 366

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Hispanic, Asian, and American Indian supervisors, respectively, feel their supervisor never treats employees of different races in different ways with regard to disciplinary actions. Conversely, 25.0 percent of the employees with Asian supervisors, and 14.3 percent of the employee s with Hispanic supervisors feel the treatment is always different. Only 4 . 5 percent of the employees with nonminority super visor s hold this view and no employees with Black or American Indi an supervi sors feel accordingly. This series of data confirm that more nonminority employees and employees, regardless of race or ethnicity, with nonminority supervisors, feel their supervisor never treats people of different races in different ways with regard to disciplinary actions. Conversely, more minority employees, as well as employees with minority supervisors, feel the treatment is always different. Tables 5.196 through 5.198 document supervisory responses to the identical issue. The margin total row percentages differ from employee responses. More supervisors, over 77 percent, feel their supervisor never treats people of different races differently while fewer supervisors, about 2 percent, feel the treatment is always different. Table 5.196 documents that all categories of supervisors, except Hispanic, (54.5 percent) are of the opinion, over 80 percent of the time, that their supervisor never treats employees of different races differently in regard to disciplinary actions. It is noteworthy that the only respondents to indicate the treatment is always different were nonminority (3.3 percent). When the issue is examined by gender, Table 5.197, the res ults show 100 percent of the females feel the treatment is neve r different. All dissenters to 367

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this attitude were male. Table 5.198, consideration with regard to the respondents' level of supervisory responsibility, finds 82.1 percent of the first level and the third level supervisor feel the treatment is never different. This number falls to 62.5 percent in the case of second level supervisors. All respondents, who feel the treatment is always different, were first level supervisors (2.6 percent). The data from this series of tables confirm that considerably more supervisors have confidence in equitable treatment from their supervisor than is the case with nonsupervisory employees and their supervisor. In addition, while fewer Hispanic supervisors, than other categories, feel disparity never exists, this trait is common through all supervisory employees. Tables 5.199 through 5.210 must be considered in close conjunction with each other. Tables 5.199 through 5.201 and 5.205 through 5.207 document employee and supervisory responses as to whether or not the respondents perceive their supervisor to have favorites. Tables 5.202 through 5.204 and 5.208 through 5.210 show employee and supervisory responses regarding perceptions of race or ethnicity implications to any favoritism. The margin total rows find considerably more nonsupervisory employees, about 35 percent, than supervisory employees, about 18 percent, perceive favoritism exists. In addition, the nonsupervisory employees perceive the favorites to be nonminority over 16 percent of the time while the supervisory employees hold the same view only about 6 percent of the time. Finally, nonsupervisory employees feel the favorites are minority only about 3 percent of the time while this attitude climbs to just over 4 percent in the 368

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case of supervisory employees. Table 5.199, analysis by race/ethnic group shows 100.0 percent of the American Indians and 55.0 percent of the Hispanics feel their supervisors have favorites and only 28.6 percent of the remaining categories have the same perception. Analysis by gender, Table 5.200 shows very similar response patterns for both males and females. Similarly, analysis with regard to the race/ethnic group of the respondents' supervisor finds all responses within less than 7 percent of the figures in the margin total row. When nonsupervisory employees are asked if there are minority/nonminority implications to the favoritism perceptions, Table 5.202, analysis by race/ethnic group, shows more minorities than nonminorities perceive the favorites to be nonminority. The reverse is not true. Only 2.7 percent of the Other category perceive the favorites to be minority. When the issue is examined by gender, Table 5.203, the data show over twice as many females (24.6 percent) as males (12.1 percent) perceive the favorites to be nonminority. No females perceive the favorites to be minority with this number climbing to 4.3 percent in the case of male respondents. Consideration w ith regard to the race/ethnic group of the respondents' supervisor, Table 5.204, finds more nonminorities (21.7 percent) and American Indians (33.3 percent) who feel the favorites are nonm i nority than in the case of Blacks (0.0 percent) Hispanics (5.1 percent) or Asians (0.0 percent). However, more Blacks (14.3 per c e nt) and Hispanics (5.1 percent) feel the favorites are minority than do the American Indians (0.0 percent), Asians (0.0 percent), or Other categories (1.7 percent ). Table 5.205 analysis of supe r visory responses by 369

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race/ethnic group, finds more Black (40.0 percent) and Hispanic supervisors (27 .3 percent) perceive favoritism, than is the case with Asian (0.0 percent) or nonminorities (13.3 percent). Analysis by gender, Table .5.206 finds all respondents who perceive favoritism are male (20.9 percent). In addition, Table 5.207 shows that only first level (17 .9 percent) and second level (25.0 percent) supervisors perceive favoritism. When supervisory employees were asked if minority/nonminority implications exist with the favoritism perceptions, the data show as mentioned earlier, different results than from nonsupervisory employees. Table 5.208, analysis by race/ethnic group, shows only Hispanic (18.2 percent) and Other category (3.3 percent) supervisors perceive nonminority favorites. Likewise, only Hispanics (9.1 percent) and Other category (3.3 percent) supervisors perceive the favorites to be minority. None of the remaining minority categories perceive favorites with either minority or nonminority implications. Analysis by gender, Table 5.209, finds all respondents who perceive minority/nonminority implication were male. All female respondents perceive no favoritism. Analysis with regard to the respondents' level of supervisory responsibility, Table 5.210, shows that 2.6 percent of the first level supervisors feel minorities are favored while 7.9 percent of the same group feel the nonminorities are favored. With regard to second level supervisors, 12.5 percent feel minorities are favored while none see nonminorities as favored. The third level respondent does not perceive any favoritism. The data from Tables 5.199 through 5.210 confirm more nonsupervisory employees than supervisory employees perceive 370

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favoritism exists. In addition, the nonsupervisory employees tend to believe the nonminorities are in the favored category while the supervisory employees are about equally divided between minority and nonminority in their perceptions of favoritism. Clearly, more males than females, both supervisory and nonsupervisory, perceive favoritism. The final major issue to be examined this hypothesis focuses on penalty administration. The data were gathered from both employee and supervisory questionnaires, as well as interviews. The results are documented in Tables 5.211 through 5.223. Tables 5.211 through 5.213 document supervisory perceptions as to whether they feel they, themselves, would take more severe, less severe, or similar disciplinary penalties for comparable offenses, when compared to other USAF Academy supervisors. The margin total row shows over 72 percent of the respondents feel they would take about the same action. The remainder are about equally divided between more and less severe. Nearly 15 percent feel they would be more severe while almost 13 percent believe they would be less severe. Table 5.211, analysis by race/ethnic group, shows a larger number of Black (20.0 percent) and Hispanic (18.2 percent) supervisors perceive themselves to be more severe than do the nonminorities (13.8 percent) or the Asians (0.0 percent). On the other hand, 50.0 percent of the Asians, 13.8 percent of the Other category and, 9.1 percent of the Hispanics perceive themselves to be less severe than other supervisors. No Black supervisors place themselves in the less severe category. When the issue is analyzed 371

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by gender, Table 5.212, the data show all females place themselves in the "same" category, while 16.7 percent of the males feel they would be more severe and 14.3 percent believe they would be less severe. Analysis with regard to the respondents' level of supervisory responsibility, Table 5.213, finds all respondents who believe themselves to be more severe (17.0 percent) are first level supervisors. However, 12.8 percent of the first level and 14.3 percent of the second level supervisors regard themselves as less severe. The third level respondent feels the action he would take is comparable to what other USAF Academy supervisors would take. Interviewees were asked if they feel the penalties administered are too severe, not severe enough, or about right. The results are documented in Tables 5.214 through 5.217. The margin total row finds over 55 percent feel the penalties are about right. However, nearly 26 percent feel the penalties are not severe enough while only about 19 percent feel the penalties are too severe. Table 5.214, analysis by race/ethnic group, finds more minorities (Blacks, 25.0 percent; Hispanic, 40.0 percent; American Indian, 100.0 percent) than non minorities (Other, 7.4 percent) who feel the penalties are too severe. Conversely, 29.6 percent of the Other category feel the penalties are not severe enough. This number drops to 25.0 percent and 20.0 percent in the cases of Blacks and Hispanics. Analysis by gender, Table 5.215, finds no radical disparity in male and female responses. However, more males (28.6 percent) than females (20.0 percent) feel the penalties are not severe enough slightly more females (20.0 percent) than males (17 .9 percent) feel the penalties are too severe. Analysis 372

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with regard to the supervisory/nonsupervisory status of the respondent, Table 5.216, documents a tendency toward the reverse of what would be expected. While 20.0 percent of the supervisors feel penalties are too severe, this number drops to 16.7 percent in the case of nonsupervisors. Likewise, 27.8 percent of the nonsupervisors feel the penalties are not severe enough while only 24.0 percent of the supervisors hold this view. Analysis with regard to civilian/military status, Table 5.217, finds 21.9 percent of the civilians feel penalties are too severe while only 9.1 percent of the military agree. The number of civilians and military who feel penalties are not severe enough are roughly equivalent (25.0 percent and 27.3 percent). The data from this source confirm most employees, regardless of stratum, feel the penalties administered are about right, although more respondents feel the penalties are not severe enough than feel the penalties are too severe. More minorities than nonminorities feel the penalties are too severe. Likewise, more than twice as many civilians as military view penalties as too severe. Tables 5.218 through 5.223 document employee and supervisory responses to a question regarding attitude toward a progressive penalty disciplinary system. The respondents in both categories were asked if they feel employees who break the same rule several times should be dealt with more severly each time. The margin total row shows significant differences in the supervisory and nonsupervisory responses. While approximately 85 percent of the nonsupervisory respondents feel the penalty should be more severe each time, this number drops to about 71 percent in 373

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the supervisory responses. Accordingly, many more supervisors, about 29 percent, feel this should "not necessarily" be the result, while only about 13 percent of the nonsupervisors responded in the "not necessarily" category. The only responses to indicate that repeat offenses should not result in more severe action were in the nonsupervisory category (1.7 percent). Table 5.218, analysis by race/ethnic group, finds 100.0 percent of the Asian and 91.7 percent of the Black employee respondents feel the repeater offender should be dealt with more severely each time. This number drops to 84.2 percent, 84.1 percent, and 50.0 percent in the case of Hispanics, Other category, and American Indians. Only 5.3 percent of the Hispanics and 0.9 percent of the nonminorities feel repeat offenses should not result in more severe penalties. Analysis by gender, Table 5.219, shows a near balance of males {85.1 percent) and females {84.7 percent) who feel a more severe penalty each time is proper. All respondents who believe a more severe penalty is improper, were male (2.6 percent). Analysis with regard to the race/ethnic group of the respondents supervisor, Table 5.220 shows fewer employees with Black supervisors {64.3 percent) than any other category support progressive penalties. All the remaining categories are 85 percent or higher. Supervisory responses, analyzed by race/ethnic group, find more Asians {100.0 percent) and Hispanics {81.8 percent) supporting progressive penalties than is the case with the Black {60.0 percent) and nonminority {66.7 percent) supervisors. Analysis by gender, Table 5.222, finds 74.4 percent of the males support progressive penalties while only 50.0 percent of the females answered in that category. Analysis based on the respondents' level of supervisory 374

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responsibility, Table 5.223, shows more second level supervisors (87 .5 percent) support progressive penalties than first level supervisors (69.2 percent). The third level respondent indicated the penalty should "not necessarily" be more severe. The data confirm that, while most supervisory and nonsupervisory employees support progressive penalties, more supervisors feel progression should not necessarily be the result. Considerably fewer female than male supervisors blindly support progressive penalties. Large numbers of nonsupervisory employees of both genders support progression. The fact that more supervisors, than nonsupervisors responded in the "not necessarily" category lends support to a finding that supervisors are more inclined toward a rehabilitative and constructive disciplinary process. Conclusion. The conclusion can best be approached from the same aspects considered in the discussion section. First, are supervisors consistent? Second, is minority or nonminority status a factor in consistency? Finally, are penalties which are administered consistent across the USAF Academy? Directly related to this final issue is the question: " what is the attitude toward the use of progressive penalties for repeat offenders?" The data support the conclusion that inconsistency exists. A significant number of employees, approximately 48 percent in the case of the interviews (Tables 5.174 through 5.177), feel that supervisors are i nconsistent in the administration of formal discipline. The finding is further confirmed by the fact that over 50 percent of the employee questionnaire respondents do not know what other supervisors do as far as discipline. However, 375

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approximately 36 percent of the respondents to this question (Tables 5.178 through 5.180) feel actions would not be the same. It should be pointed out that supervisors perceive, over 95 percent of the time, they are always or almost always consistent. Both minority and male supervisors perceive themselves to be less consistent than do the other categories. Additionally, supervisors have a great deal of confidence in higher management. They feel over 81 percent of the time that their own supervisors are always or almost always consistent. Finally, only minority supervisors perceive that employees "get away" with disciplinary offenses always or almost always without incurring a disciplinary action. Returning to employee perceptions, the data, with the exception of the interview findings cited earlier, support the conclusion that most employees perceive their individual supervisors as being consistent. This is not to say that intrasupervisory actions are consistent. When employees were questioned about their own supervisor, the data confirm that about 78 percent of the employees feel their supervisor treats subordinates alike always, or at least most of the time. This conclusion is further substantiated by the data which show that approximately, 76 percent of the employees think their supervisor would take the same action against any subordinate for being late. This data does not provide the specific penalty that would be administered . Consequently, a value judgment cannot be made regarding intrasupervisory consistency in the specific penalty administered. The data do support a finding that individual employees generally perceive consistency from their supervisor. This portion of the hypothesis is confirmed in part. While 376

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statistically significant data show the vast majority of supervisors and employees perceive their supervisors to be consistent in the administration of discipline it must be noted that this portion of the hypothesis contains minority/nonminority implications. The minorities, as demonstrated in Tables 5.174, 5.178, 5.181, 5.184, and 5.190 have generally less confidence in the consistency of their own supervisor than non minorities. In regard to the second issue examined in this hypothesis, the data show just over 16 percent of the nonsupervisory respondents feel their supervisor treats different races always, or almost alwa ys, in regard to discipline. Supervisors hold that same view about higher management only about 9 percent of the time. Approximately 35 percent of the nonsupervisory employees and 19 percent of the supervisory employees perceive favoritism. However, less than 20 percent of the nonsupervisors and about 10 percent of the supervisors see minority or nonminority status as a factor in the favoritism. This portion of the hypothesis is confirmed. Statistically significant data is evident which confirms that a significant portion of the minority population perceive disparity in disciplinary treatment based on minority or nonminority status. Specifically, Table 5.193 shows minority employees, except Hispanics, have a lack of confidence in consistent treatment. In addition, Table 5.199 confirms that minorities, particularly Hispanics and American Indians, perceive favoritism. This tendency, according to the data in Table 5.202, favors nonminorities. The data in Table 5.208, while much less conclusive, finds a number of Hispanics relating the favoritism to minority and nonminority status. 377

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With regard to the final issue in this hypothesis, the data confirm that the majority of the supervisors perceive intrasupervisory consistency. Further, the majority of the interviewees consider the penalties that are administered to be appropriate. In addition, the vast majority of the supervisors and employees support the present policy of progressive penalties for repeat offenders. It should be noted that about 20 percent of the Black and Hispanic supervisors believe other supervisors take more severe actions than they do (Table 5.2ll). Finally, a higher portion of the minorities, in general, believe the penalties now administered are too severe. This portion of the htt>othesis is confirmed. While the statistically significant data show general satisfaction with the penalties, the minority data show less confidence in the process than the nonminority data. Specifically, Table 5.214 dearly demonstrates a minority perception of "too severe" in regard to the penalties administered. In summary, the hypothesis is confirmed in part. While the majority of the employees have confidence in their supervisors, this confidence is evident to a lesser degree with minority employees. The individual employee, without regard to race/ethnic group generally has confidence in consistency, and from this aspect, the hypothesis is disconfirmed. When race/ethnic group is a factor, the confidence, although still significant, does decrease. 378

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Table 5.171 Supervisors Perception of Personal Consistency in Application of Work Rules Are you consistent in applying the work rules? Almost Respondent Never Sometimes Always Always Total Black (n=S) 0.0% 20.0 40.0 40.0 100.0% Hispanic (n=ll) 0.0% 9.1 27.3 63.6 100.0% American Indian (n=O) 0.0% 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0% Asian (n=2) 0.0% o.o 0.0 100.0 100.0% Other (n=30) 0.0% 0.0 60.0 40.0 100.0% Margin Total 0.0% 4.2% 47.9% 47.9% 100.0% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#8=race/ethnic group and #33=perception) n=48; 1 case deleted owing to missing data p=.l223

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Table 5.172 Supervisors Perception of Personal Consistency in Application of Work Rules Are you consistent in applying the work rules? Almost Respondent Never Sometimes Always Always Male (n=43) 0.0% 4.7 51.2 44.2 Female (n=6) 0.0% o.o 33.3 66.7 Margin Total 0.0% 4.1% 49.0% 46.9% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#6=gender and #33=perception) n=49 p=.l421 Total 100.1% 100.0% 100.0% 00 0

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Table 5.173 Supervisors Perception of Personal Consistency in Application of Work Rules Are you consistent in applying the work rules? Almost Level of Supervisor Never Sometimes Always Always Total First level (n=39) 0.0% 5.1 48.7 46.2 100.0% Second level (n=8) 0.0% 0.0 50.0 50.0 100.0% Third level or higher (n=l) 0.0% 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0% Margin Total 0.0% 4.2% 47.9% 47.9% 100.0% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#4=level of supervisor and #33=perception) n=48; 1 case deleted owing to missing data p=.l897 \,.) 00 -

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Table 5.174 Employee Perception of Supervisory Consistency in the Administration of Discipline Are supervisors consistent in the administration of formal discipline? Respondent No Yes Total Black (n=4) 50.0% 50.0 100.0% Hispanic (n=lO) 60.0% 40.0 100.0% American Indian (n=l) 100.0% o.o 100.0% Asian (n=l) 100.0% 0.0 100.0% Other (n=27) 39.3% 60.7 100.0% Margin Total 47.7% 52.3% 100.0% Source: Interviews n=43 p=.0493

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Table 5.175 Employee Perception of Supervisory Consistency in the Administration of Discipline Are supervisors consistent in the administration of formal discipline? Respondent No Yes Total Male (n=28} 46.4% 53.6 100.0% Female (n=l4} 50.0% 50.0 100.0% Margin Total 47.7% 52.3% 100.0% Source: Interviews n=42; 1 case deleted owing to missing data p=.4108

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Table 5.176 Employee Perception of Supervisory Consistency in the Administration of Discipline Are supervisors consistent in the administration of formal discipline? Respondent Supervisor (n=25) Nonsupervisor (n=l8) Margin Total Source: Interviews n=43 p=.2299 No 44.0% 55.6% 48.8% Yes 56.0 44.4 51.2% Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

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Table 5.177 Employee Perception of Supervisory Consistency in the Administration of Discipline Are supervisors consistent in the administration of formal discipline? Respondent No Yes Total Civilian (n=32} 56.3% 43.7 100.0% Military (n=ll) 27.3% 72.7 100.0% Margin Total 48.8% 51.2% 100.0% Source: Interviews n=43 p=.0506

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Table 5.178 Employee Perception of How Strict Their Own Supervisor is, in Comparison to Other Academy Supervisors, in Applying Disciplinary Penalties Do you think most supervisors on the USAF Academy take the same disciplinary action for breaking a work rule that your supervisor would? Don't Respondent Yes No Know Total Black (n=l3) 7.7% 38.5 53.8 100.0% Hispanic (n=39) 17.9% 33.3 48.7 99.9% American Indian (n=2) 0.0% 100.0 0.0 100.0% Asian (n=7) 14.3% 42.9 42.9 100.1% Other (n=lll) 10.8% 35.1 54.1 100.0% Margin Total 12.2% 36.0% 51.7% 99.9% Source: Employee questionnaire (#9=race/ethnic group and #28=perception) n=l72; 9 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.l799

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Table 5.179 Employee Perception of How Strict Their Own Supervisor is, in Comparison to Other Academy Supervisors, in Applying Disciplinary Penalties Do you think most supervisors on the USAF Academy take the same disciplinary action for breaking a work rule that your supervisor would? Don't Respondent Yes No Know Male (n=ll5) 13.9% 34.8 51.3 Female (n=58) 10.3% 36.2 53.4 Margin Total 12.7% 35.3% 52.0% Source: Employee questionnaire (#3=gender and #28=perception) n=l73; 8 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.3028 Total 100.0% 99.9% 100.0%

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Table 5.180 Employee Perception of How Strict Their Own Supervisor is, in Comparison to Other Academy Supervisors, in Applying Disciplinary Penalties Do you think most supervisors on the USAF Academy take the same disciplinary action for breaking a work rule that your supervisor would? Race/Ethnic Group of Don't Respondent's Supervisor Yes No Know Total Black (n=l4) 14.3% 28.6 57.1 100.0% Hispanic (n=39) 15.4% 33.3 51.3 100.0% American Indian (n=3) 0.0% 66.7 33.3 100.0% Asian (n=4) 25.0% 50.0 25.0 100.0% Other (n=ll4) 11.4% 36.8 51.8 100.0% Margin Total 12.6% 36.2% 51.1% 99.9% Source: Employee questionnaire (#13=race of respondent's supervisor and #28= perception) n=l74; 7 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.2180 w 00 00

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Table 5.181 Supervisory Perception of Higher Level Management Consistency in Disciplinary Penalties In your opinion, would your supervisor take the same disciplinary action against any subordinate employee for the same offense? Respondent Black {n=5) Hispanic {n=ll) American Indian {n=O) Asian {n=2) Other {n=30) Margin Total Never Sometimes 0.0% 20.0 9.1% 27.3 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 50.0 0.0% 10.0 2.1% 16.7% Almost Always Always 60.0 20.0 18.2 45.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 36.7 53.3 33.3% 47.9% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#8=race/ethnic group and #28=perception) n=48; 1 case deleted owing to missing data p=.0645 Total 100.0% 100.1% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

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Table 5.182 Supervisory Perception of Higher Level Management Consistency in Disciplinary Penalties In your opinion, would your supervisor take the same disciplinary action against any subordinate employee for the same offense? Almost Respondent Never Sometimes Always Always Male (n=43) 2.3% 18.6 34.9 44.2 Female (n=6) 0.0% 0.0 33.3 66.7 Margin Total 2.0% 16.3% 34.7% 46.9% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#6=gender and #28=perception) n=49 p=.0993 Total 100.0% 100.0% 99.9%

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Table 5.183 Supervisory Perception of Higher Level Management Consistency in Disciplinary Penalties In your opinion, would your supervisor take the same disciplinary action against any subordinate employee for the same offense? Almost Level of Supervisor Never Sometimes Always Always First level (n=39) 2.6% 15.4 43.6 Second level (n=8) 0.0% 12.5 12.5 75.0 Third level or higher (n=l) 0.0% 0.0 100.0 0.0 Margin Total 2.1% 14.6% 35.4% 47.9% Total 100.1% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#4=level of supervisor and #28=perception) n=48; 1 case deleted owing to missing data p=.l376

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Table 5.184 Employee Perception of Personal Supervisors' Consistency in the Treatment of Co-workers Does your supervisor treat all employees in your section alike? Most of Respondent Never Sometimes the Time Always Black (n=l2) 0.0% 8.3 41.7 50.0 Hispanic (n=39) 15.4% 20.5 38.5 25.6 American Indian (n=2) 50.0% 50.0 0.0 0.0 Asian (n=7) 14.3% 14.3 28.6 42.9 Other (n=ll3) 3.5 12.4 45.1 38.9 Margin Total 6.9% 14.5% 42.2% 36.4% Source: Employee questionnaire (#9=race/ethnic group and #12=perception) n=l73; 8 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.0284 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.1% 99.9% 100.0%

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Table 5.185 Employee Perception of Personal Supervisors' Consistency in the Treatment of Co-workers Does your supervisor treat all employees in your section alike? Most of Respondent Never Sometimes the Time Male (n=ll5) 7.0% 16.5 40.9 Female (n=59) 5.1% 11.9 45.8 Margin Total 6.3% 14.9% 42.5% Source: Employee questionnaire (#3=gender and #12=perception) n=l74; 7 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.2371 Always 35.7 37.3 36.2% Total 100.1% 100.1% 99.9%

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Table 5.186 Employee Perception of Personal Supervisors' Consistency in the Treatment of Co-workers Does your supervisor treat all employees in your section alike? Race/Ethnic Group of Most of Respondent's Supervisor Never Sometimes the Time Always Black (n=l4) 7.1% 14.3 50.0 28.6 Hispanic (n=40) 5.0% 25.0 25.0 45.0 American Indian (n=3) 33.3% 0.0 33.3 33.3 Asian (n=4) 0.0% 25.0 0.0 75.0 Other (n=ll5) 7.0% 12.2 48.7 32.2 Margin Total 6.8% 15.3% 42.0% 35.8% Total 100.0% 100.0% 99.9% 100.0% 100.1% 99.9% Source: Employee questionnaire (#13=race/ethnic group of supervisor and #12=perception) n=l76; 5 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.l621

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Table 5.187 Supervisory Perception of Consistency in Penalty Administration Do you feel that some employees get away with breaking the work rules (no disciplinary action is taken) when they have been caught and deserve a disciplinary action? Almost Respondent Never Sometimes Always Always Black (n=S) 0.0% 80.0 20.0 0.0 Hispanic (n=ll) 0.0% 90.9 9.1 0.0 American Indian (n=O) 0.0% 0.0 0.0 0.0 Asian (n=2) 50.0% 0.0 50.0 0.0 Other (n=30) 13.3% 86.7 0.0 0.0 Margin Total 10.4% 83.3% 6.3% 0.0% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#8=race/ethnic group and #39=perception) n=48; 1 case deleted owing to missing data p=.Oll9 Total 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

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Table 5.188 Supervisory Perception of Consistency in Penalty Administration Do you feel that some employees get away with breaking the work rules (no disciplinary action is taken) when they have been caught and deserve a disciplinary action? Respondent Male (n=43) Female (n=6) Margin Total Never 11.6% 0.0% 10.2% Sometimes 81.4 100.0 83.7% Almost Always 7.0 0.0 6.1% Always 0.0 0.0 0.0% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#6=gender and #39=perception) n=49 p=.3879 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

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Level of First Table 5.189 Supervisory Perception of Consistency in Penalty Administration Do you feel that some employees get away with breaking the work rules (no disciplinary action is taken) when they have been caught and deserve a disciplinary action? Almost Supervisor Never Sometimes Always Always level (n=39) 10.3% 84.6 5.l 0.0 Second level (n=8) 12.5% 75.0 12.5 0.0 Third level or higher (n=l) 0.0% 100.0 o.o 0.0 Margin Total 10.4% 83.3% 6.3% 0.0% Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#4=level of supervisor and #.39=perception) n=48; 1 case deleted owing to missing data p=.3725

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Table 5.190 Employee Perception of Consistency in Penalty Administration Would your supervisor take the same action against any employee in your section for being late? Nearly Respondent Never Sometimes Always Always Black (n=l3) 0.0% 15.4 15.4 69.2 Hispanic (n=39) 12.8% 17.9 30.8 38.5 American Indian (n=2) 50.0% 50.0 0.0 0.0 Asian (n=7) 14.3% 14.3 28.6 42.9 Other (n=lll) 3.6% 17.1 24.3 55.0 Margin Total 6.4% 17.4% 25.0% 51.2% Source: Employee questionnaire (#9=race/ethnic group and #18=perception) n=l72; 9 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.0372 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.1% 100.0% 100.0%

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Table 5.191 Employee Perception of Consistency in Penalty Administration Respondent Male (n=ll6) Would your supervisor take the same action against any employee in your section for being late? Nearly Never Sometimes Always A lways 8.6% 16.4 27.6 47.4 Female (n=57) 3.5% 19.3 21.1 56.1 Margin Total 6.9% 17.3% 25.4% 50.3% Source: Employee questionnaire (#3=gender and #18=perception) n=l73; 8 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.l518 Total 100.0% 100.0% 99.9%

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Table 5.192 Employee Perception of Consistency in Penalty Administration Would your supervisor take the same action against any employee in your section being late? Race/Ethnic Group of Nearly Respondent's Supervisor Never Sometimes Always Always Black (n=l4) 0.0% 28.6 21.4 50.0 Hispanic (n=41) 9.8% 17.1 24.4 48.8 American Indian (n=3) 33.3% o.o 33.3 33.3 Asian (n=4) 0.0% 25.0 0.0 75.0 Other (n=ll3) 5.3% 16.8 27.4 50.4 Margin Total 6.3% 17.7% 25.7% 50.3% Total 100.0% 100.1% 99.9% 100.0% 99.9% 100.0% Source: Employee questionnaire (#13=racejethnic group of supervisor and #18=perception) n=l75; 6 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.3722 4::' 0 0

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Table 5.193 Perceived Consistency in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Race/Ethnic Group Does your supervisor treat people of different races in different ways in regard to disciplinary actions? Nearly Respondent Never Sometimes Always Always Black (n=l3) 38.5% 15.4 23.1 23.1 Hispanic (n=37) 59.5% 29.7 2.7 8.1 American Indian (n=2) 0.0% 50.0 0.0 50.0 Asian (n=7) 42.9% 0.0 14.3 42.9 Other (n=lll) 75.7% 12.6 9.9 1.8 Margin Total 67.1% 16.5% 9.4% 7.1% Source: Employee questionnaire (#9=race/ethnic group and #14=perception) n=l70; 11 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.OOOl Total 100.1% 100.0% 100.0% 100.1% 100.0% 100.1% 0 -

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Table 5.194 Perceived Consistency in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Race/Ethnic Group Respondent Male (n=ll5) Does your supervisor treat people of different races in different ways in regard to disciplinary actions? Never Sometimes 61.7% 20.0 Nearly Always Always Female (n=56) 76.8% 10.7 11.3 5.4 7.0 7.1 Margin Total 66.7% 17.0% 9.4% Source: Employee questionnaire (#3=gender and #14=perception) n=l71; 10 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.0371 7.0% Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.1%

PAGE 433

Table 5.195 Perceived Consistency in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Race/Ethnic Group Does your supervisor treat people of different races in different ways in regard to disciplinary actions? Race/Ethnic Group of Nearly Respondent's Supervisor Never Sometimes Always Always Total Black (n=l4) 42.9% 35.7 21.4 0.0 100;0% Hispanic (n=42) 54.8% 23.8 7.1 14.3 100.0% American Indian (n=3) 66.7% 0.0 33.3 0.0 100.0% Asian (n=4) 50.0% 25.0 0.0 25.0 100.0% Other (n=llO) 75.5% 11.8 8.2 4.5 100.0% Margin Total 67.1% 16.8% 9.2% 6.9% 100.0% Source: Employee questionnaire (#13=race/ethnic group of supervisor and #14=perception) n=l73; 8 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.0013

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Table 5.196 Supervisory Perception of Consistency in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Race/Ethnic Group Do you feel your supervisor treats people of different races in different ways in regard to disciplinary actions? Almost Respondent Never Sometimes Always Always Black (n=5) 80.0% 20.0 o.o 0.0 Hispanic (n=ll) 54.5% 36.4 9.1 0.0 American Indian (n=O) 0.0% 0.0 0.0 0.0 Asian (n=2) 100.0% 0.0 0.0 0.0 Other (n=30) 83.3% 6.7 6.7 3.3 Margin Total 77.1% 14.6% 6.3% 2.1% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#8=race/ethnic group and #23=perception) n=48; 1 case deleted owing to missing data p=.2446 Total 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.1%

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Respondent Table 5.197 Supervisory Perception of Consistency in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Race/Ethnic Group Do you feel your supervisor treats people of different races in different ways in regard to disciplinary actions? Almost Never Sometimes Always Always Male (n=6) 74.4% 16.3 7.0 2.3 Female (n=43) 100.0% 0.0 0.0 0.0 Margin Total 77.6% 14.3% 6.1% 2.0% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#6=gender and #23=perception) n=49 p=.0835 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

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Table 5.198 Supervisory Perception of Consistency in Disciplinary Treatment Based on Race/Ethnic Group Do you feel your supervisor treats people of different races in different ways in regard to disciplinary actions? Almost Level of Supervisor Never Sometimes Always Always First level (n=39) 82.1% 12.8 2.6 2.6 Second level (n-8) 62.5% 12.5 25.0 0.0 Third level or higher (n=l) 100.0% 0.0 0.0 o.o Margin Total 79.2% 12.5% 6.3% 2.1% Total 100.1% 100.0% 100.0% 100.1% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#4=level of supervisor and #23=perception) n=48; 1 case deleted owing to missing data p=.l445

PAGE 437

Table 5.199 Employee Perception of Supervisory Favoritism Does your supervisor appear to have favorites? Respondent No Yes Total Black {n=l4) 71.4% 28.6 100.0% Hispanic {n=40) 45.0% 55.0 100.0% American Indian {n=2) 0.0% 100.0 100.0% Asian {n=7) 71.4% 28.6 100.0% Other {n=ll2) 71.4% 28.6 100.0% Margin Total 64.6% 35.4% 100.0% Source: Employee questionnaire {#9=race/ethnic group and #20=perception) n=l75; 6 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.Ol09

PAGE 438

Table 5.200 Employee Perception of Supervisory Favoritism Does your supervisor appear to have favorites? Respondent No Yes Male (n=ll8) 62.7% 37.3 Female (n=58) 69.0% 31.0 Margin Total 64.8% 35.2% Source: Employee questionnaire (#3=gender and #20=perception) n=l76; 5 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.2078 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% -4::' 0 00

PAGE 439

Table 5.201 Employee Perception of Supervisory Favoritism Does your supervisor appear to have favorities? Race/Ethnic Group of Respondent's Supervisor Black (n=l4) Hispanic (n=41) American Indian (n=3) Asian (n=4) Other (n=ll5) Margin Total No 57.1% 61.0% 66.7% 75.0% 65.2% 63.8% Yes 42.9 39.0 33.3 25.0 34.8 36.2% Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% Source: Employee questionnaire and #20=perception) {#13=race/ethnic group of supervisor n=l77; 4 cases deleted owing to p=.3211 missing data

PAGE 440

Table 5.202 Employee Perception of Supervisory Favoritism Are the favorites? Both Minorities No Respondent Minority Nonminority and Nonminorities Favorites Total Black (n=l4} Hispanic (n=38} American Indian (n=2} Asian (n=7} Other (n=ll2} Margin Total 0.0% 2.6% 50.0% 0.0% 2.7% 2.9% 21.4 23.7 0.0 28.6 12.5 16.2% 14.3 26.3 50.0 0.0 15.2 17.3% 64.3 47.4 0.0 71.4 69.6 63.6% Source: Employee questionnaire (#9=race/ethnic group and #2l=perception) n=l73; 8 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.0063 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0

PAGE 441

Table 5.203 Employee Perception of Supervisory Favoritism Are the favorites? Both Minorities Respondent Minority Nonminority and Nonminorities Male (n=ll6) 4.3% 12.1 22.4 Female (n=57) 0.0% 24.6 7.0 Margin Total 2.9% 16.2% 17.3% Source: Employee questionnaire (#3=gender and #2l=perception) n=l73; 8 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.0086 No Favorites 61.2 68.4 63.6% Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% -

PAGE 442

Table 5.204 Employee Perception of Supervisory Favoritism Are the favorites? Ra ce/Ethnic Group of Respondent's Supervisor Black (n=l4) Hispanic (n=39) American Indian (n=3) Asian (n=4) Other (n=ll5) Margin Total Minority Nonminority 14.3% 5.1% 0.0% 0.0% 1.7% 3.4% 0.0 5.1 33.3 0.0 21.7 16.0% Source: Employee questionnaire (#13=racejethnic n=l75; 6 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.Ol33 Both Minorities and Nonminorities 35.7 30.8 0.0 25.0 11.3 17.7% group of supervisor No Favorites Total 50.0 100.0% 59.0 100.0% 66.7 100.0% 75.0 100.0% 65.2 99.9% 62.9% 100.0% and #2l=perception)

PAGE 443

Table 5.205 Supervisory Perception of Higher Management Favoritism Does your supervisor appear to have favorites? Respondent No Yes Total Black (n=5) 60.0% 40.0 100.0% Hispanic (n=ll) 72.7% 27.3 100.0% American Indian (n=O) 0.0% 0.0 0.0% Asian (n=2) 100.0% 0.0 100.0% Other {n=30) 86.7% 13.3 100.0% Margin Total 81.3% 18.8% 100.1% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#8=race/ethnic group and #29=perception) n=48; 1 case deleted owing to missing data p=.l252

PAGE 444

Table 5.206 Supervisory Perception of Higher Management Favoritism Does your supervisor appear to have favorites? Respondent Male (n=43) Female (n=6) Margin Total No 79.1% 100.0% 81.6% Yes 20.9 0.0 18.4% Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#6=gender and #29=perception) n=49 p=.l098

PAGE 445

Table 5.207 Supervisory Perception of Higher Management Favoritism Does your supervisor appear to have favorites? Level of Supervisor No Yes First level (n=39) 82.1% 17.9 100.0% Second level (n=8) 75.0% 25.0 100.0% Third level or higher (n=l) 100.0% o.o 100.0% Margin Total 81.3% 18.8% 100.1% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#4=level of supervisor and #29=perception) n=48; 1 case deleted owing to missing data p=.4000

PAGE 446

Table 5.208 Supervisory Perception of Higher Management Favoritism Are the favorites? Both Minority No Respondent Minority Nonminority and Nonminority Favorites Black (n=S) 0.0% 0.0 20.0 80.0 Hispanic (n=ll) 9.1% 18.2 o.o 72.7 American Indian (n=O) 0.0% o.o o.o 0.0 Asian (n=2) 0.0% 0.0 o.o 100.0 Other (n=30) 3.3% 3.3 6.7 86.7 Margin Total 4.2% 6.3% 6.3% 83.3% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#8=race/ethnic group and #30=perception) n=48; 1 case deleted owing to missing data p=.2827 Total 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.1%

PAGE 447

Table 5.209 Supervisory Perception of Higher Management Favoritism Are the favorites? Both Minority Respondent Minority Nonminority and Nonminority Male (n=42) 4.8% 7.1 7.1 Female (n=6) 0.0% 0.0 0 . 0 Margin Total 4.2% 6.3% 6.3% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#6=gender and #30=perception) n=48; 1 case deleted owing to missing data p=.l244 No Favorites 81.0 100.0 83.3% Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.1%

PAGE 448

Table 5.210 Supervisory Perception of Higher Management Favoritism Are the favorites? Both Minority No Level of Supervisor Minority Nonminority and Nonminority Favorites First level {n=38) 2.6% 7.9 5.3 84.2 Second level {n=8) 12.5% 0.0 12.5 75.0 Third level or higher {n=l) 0.0% 0.0 0.0 100.0 Margin Total 4.3% 6.4% 6.4% 83.0% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#4=level of supervisor and #30=perception) n=47; 2 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.3326 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.1% 00

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Table 5.211 Supervisory Perception of Consistency in Disciplinary Penalties When Comparing Themselves to Other USAFA Supervisors Would other supervisors on the USAF Academy take the (same, more severe, less severe) disciplinary action you do for any given offense? More Less Respondent Same Severe Severe Total Black (n=5) 80.0% 20.0 o.o 100.0% Hispanic (n=ll) 72.7% 18.2 9.1 100.0% American Indian (n=O) 0.0% o.o 0.0 0.0% Asian (n=2) 50.0% 0.0 50.0 100.0% Other (n=29) 72.4% 13.8 13.8 100.0% Margin Total 72.3% 14.9% 12.8% 100.0% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#8=race/ethnic group and #34=perception) n=47; 2 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.3196

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Table 5.212 Supervisory Perception of Consistency in Disciplinary Penalties When Comparing Themselves to Other USAFA Supervisors Would other supervisors on the USAF Academy take the (same, more severe, less severe) disciplinary action you do for any given offense? More Less Respondent Same Severe Severe Male (n=42) 69.0% 16.7 14.3 Female (n=6) 100.0% 0.0 0.0 Margin Total 72.9% 14.6% 12.5% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#6=gender and #34=perception) n=48; 1 case deleted owing to missing data p=.0594 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% -&:=' N 0

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Table 5.213 Supervisory Perception of Consistency in Disciplinary Penalties When Comparing Themselves to Other USAFA Supervisors Would other supervisors on the USAF Academy take the (same, more severe, less severe) disciplinary action you do for any given offense? More Less Level of Supervisor Same Severe Severe Total First level (n=39) 69.2% 17.9 12.8 99.9% Second level (n=7) 85.7% 0.0 14.3 100.0% Third level or higher (n=l) 100.0% 0.0 0.0 100.0% Margin Total 72.3% 14.9% 12.8% 100.0% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#4=level of supervisor and #34=perception) n=47; 2 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.l794

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Table 5.214 Employee Perception Regarding the Appropriateness of the Present Level of Disciplinary Penalty Magnitude Are the penalties? Too About Not Severe Respondent Severe Right Enough Black (n=4) 25.0% 50.0 25.0 Hispanic (n=lO) 40.0% 40.0 20.0 American Indian (n=l) 100.0% 0.0 0.0 Asian (n=l) 0.0% 100.0 0.0 Other (n=27) 7.4% 63.0 29.6 Margin Total 18.6% 55.8% 25.6% Source: Interviews n=43 p=.0327 Total 100.0% 100.0% . 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

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Table 5.215 Employee Perception Regarding the Appropriateness of the Present Level of Disciplinary Penalty Magnitude Respondent Male (n=28} Female (n=l5} Margin Total Source: Interviews n=43 p=.3044 Are Too Severe 17.9% 20.0% 18.6% the penalties? About Not Severe Right Enough 53.6 28.6 60.0 20.0 55.8% 25.6% Total 100.1% 100.0% 100.0%

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Table 5.216 Employee Perception Regarding the Appropriateness of the Present Level of Disciplinary Penalty Magnitude Respondent Supervisor (n=25) Nonsupervisor (n=l8) Margin Total Source: Interviews n=43 p=.3657 Are the penalties? Too Severe 20.0% 16.7% 18.6% About Right 56.0 55.6 55.8% Not Severe Enough 24.0 27.8 25.6% Total 100.0% 100.1% 100.0%

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Respondent Civilian Military Margin Total Table 5.217 Employee Perception Regarding the Appropriateness of the Present Level of Disciplinary Penalty Magnitude Are the penalties? Too About Not Severe Severe Right Enough (n=32) 21.9% 53.1 25.0 (n=ll) 9.1% 63.6 27.3 18.6% 55.8% 25.6% Source: Interviews n=43 p=.2630 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

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Table 5.218 Employee Attitude Toward Progressive Disciplinary Penalties Do you think employees who break the same work rule several times should be dealt with more severely each time? Respondent Black (n=l2) Hispanic (n=38) American Indian Asian (n=7) Other (n=ll3) Margin Total Yes 91.7% 84.2% (n=2) 50.0% 100.0% 84.1% 84.9% No 0.0 5.3 0.0 0.0 0.9 1.7% Not Necessarily 8.3 10.5 50.0 0.0 15.0 13.4% Source: Employee questionnaire (#9=racejethnic group and #44=attitude) n=l72; 9 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.2863 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

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Table 5.219 Employee Attitude Toward Progressive Disciplinary Penalties Do you think employees who break the same work rule several times should be dealt with more severely each time? Not Respondent Yes No Necessarily Male (n=ll4) 85.1% 2.6 12.3 Female (n=59) 84.7% o.o 15.3 Margin Total 85.0% 1.7% 13.3% Source: Employee questionnaire (#3=gender and #44=attitude) n=l73; 8 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.3822 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

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Table 5.220 Employee Attitude Toward Progressive Disciplinary Penalties Do you think employees who break the same work rule several times should be dealt with more severely each time? Race/Ethnic Group of Respondent's Supervisor Black (n=l4} Hispanic (n=40} American Indian (n=3} Asian (n=4} Other (n=ll4} Margin Total Yes 64.3% 87.5% 100.0% 100.0% 85.1% 84.6% Not No Necessarily 7.1 28.6 0.0 12.5 o.o 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6 12.3 2.3% 13.1% Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% Source: Employee questionnaire (#13=race/ethnic group of supervisor and #44= attitude} n=l75; 6 cases deleted owing to missing data p=.3379

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Table 5.221 Supervisory Attitude Toward Progressive Disciplinary Penalties Do you think employees who break the same work rule several times should be dealt with more severely each time? Not Respondent Yes No Necessarily Black (n=S) 60.0% 0.0 40.0 Hispanic (n=ll) 81.8% 0.0 18.2 American Indian (n=O) 0.0% 0.0 0.0 Asian (n=2) 100.0% 0.0 o.o Other (n=30) 66.7% 0.0 33.3 Margin Total 70.8% 0.0% 29.2% Total 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#8=race/ethnic group and #4l=attitude) n=48; 1 case deleted owing to missing data p=.2167

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Table 5.222 Supervisory Attitude Toward Progressive Disciplinary Penalties Do you think employees who break the same work rule several times should be dealt with more severely each time? Not Respondent Yes No Necessarily Male {n=4 3) 74.4% 0.0 25.6 Female {n=6) 50.0% 0.0 50.0 Margin Total 71.4% 0.0% 28.6% Source: Supervisory questionnaire {#6=gender and #4l=attitude) n=49 p=.l098 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

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Table 5.223 Employee Attitude Toward Progressive Disciplinary Penalties Do you think employees who break the same work rule several times should be dealt with more severely each time? Not Level of Supervisor Yes No Necessarily First level (n=39) 69.2% 0.0 30.8 Second level (n=8) 87.5% 0.0 12.5 Third level or higher (n=l) 0.0% 0.0 100.0 Margin Total 70.8% 0.0% 29.2% Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% Source: Supervisory questionnaire (#4=level of supervisor and #4l=attitude) n=48; 1 case deleted owing to missing data p=.l693

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CHAPTER VI Discussion, Conclusions, and Implications Introduction This Chapter discusses and integrates the results of this resear ch, as discussed in Chapter V, with the literature discussed in Chapter II. In addition, the implic ations are considered by identifying techniques that can be used in the immediate future to improve the program as well as areas needing further study before conclusions can be finalized. The Chapter begins with a general overview of the problem and methodology followed by a summary of m ajor findings and conclusions. It then generalizes to other settings, considers the implications for the USAF Academy, and then integrates the results of this study with the available literature and other knowledge. The study concludes with thoughts ' and t.manswered questions ger mane to future study and research. Overview. Every large organ ization contains a variety of distin g uish able strata within its workforce. The federal government is perhaps the best example of such a diverse workforce. The strata characteristics can vary considerably, depending upon such things as geographic location and the type of work being done. Some of the commonly definable, and frequently used, stratifications would include race/ethnicity, age, gender, and occu pation al characteristics such as white or blue collar, skilled or unski ll ed, and the like. This study takes a slice of the federal government,

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specifically the USAF Academy, with its unique race, ethnicity, and gender characteristics, and examines the discipline process, investigating both actual cases and employee perceptions. The strata used in this study include race/ethnic group, gender, white collar versus blue collar (GS versus WG), high grade versus low grade, not ll\common stratifications. However, the study goes on to provide consideration for the supervisory/nonsupervisory and civilian/military status of respondents. In addition, data from supervisory respondents are examined with attention toward the level of supervisory responsibility of the individual respondent; the nonsupervisor data are examined with regard to the race/ethnic group of the respondents' supervisor. Several issues are specifically investigated in this study. Initially the study examines the mathematical distribution of formal disciplinary actions that have been administered. The purpose of this portion of the investigation was to determine if disciplinary actions are administered uniformly among the key stratifications at the USAF Academy. Other issues investigated included the consistency, between strata, in the application and enforcement of work rules. In addition, the study examines variations in the propensity for formal discipline from a civilian or military supervisor and variations in disciplinary policy when supervisory, as opposed to nonsupervisory, employees are involved. Finally, specific disciplinary concerns of racial and ethnic minorities were explored as were restrictions or restraints on supervisory authority and discretion. The data utilized in the study were gathered from separate and distinguishable sources. First, instances where discipline had 433

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been administered during CY 1978 and CY 1979 . were documented and examined. The results, referred to as case studies, provide saturation data of actual occurrences. Next, separate, but related questionnaires were administered to supervisory and nonsupervisory employees. The data gathered from this source are mainly perceptual data. Finally, interviews were conducted with both civilian and military personnel. The interview process provided the opportl.D'lity for indepth discussion of perceptions and attitudes. The participants in the study were selected through a variety of processes. First, the case studies were based on a saturation sample of all formal disciplinary actions administered during CY 1978 and CY 1979. Secondly, employee and supervisory questionnaire respondents were randomly chosen from the stratifications utilized in this investigation. In other words, the respondents are representative of the actual strata populations. Finally, interview respondents were selected in two ways: 1) a select group containing the members of the USAF Academy Equal Employment Opportunity Committee and, 2) other individuals directly involved in the EEO and disciplinary processes at the Academy. In addition, a random sample of civilian and military were selected and interviewed. Major Findings and Conclusions Intrastrata Disparity. This research demonstrates that among civilian personnel at the USAF Academy disciplinary actions are not uniformly administered. This is not necessarily unexpected nor is it a prima facia case for discrimination against any particular stratum or strata. For example, the vast majority of disciplinary actions at the USAF A occur in the unskilled blue collar stratum 434

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(WG/WL 1-4), a stratum populated by individuals of lower educational levels than the rest of the workforce. Turnover is high, suggesting a lack of commitment to both the organization and the dull, mundane work that is assigned. The high turnover makes the selection of replacements 50 routine that perhaps laxity has set in. Candidates' backgrounds and employment histories are not comprehensively investigated before hiring. In checking with both employees and management, it was found the work rules are explained to new employees, yet a disproportionate share of employees in the WG/WL 1-4 stratum are disciplined usually for minor offenses of clearcut and well established rules. A review of the 85 formal disciplinary cases used in the case study analysis finds the most common offenses include violation of policies pertaining to absence, tardiness, fighting, and theft of low value items all policies that receive extensive elaboration during new employee orientation. Interestingly, while this stratum is overrepresented with minority employees and minority supervisors, a disproportionately high number of disciplinary actions are taken against this group. At the same time, however, the data in Chapter V have established that the disproportionately high number of actions taken against minorities are, in large part, taken by minority supervisors. The data also indicate that even though rule violations are frequent, the rules are still perceived as fair; in addition, interview results clearly establish that the rules themselves are perceived as both fair and reasonable. This suggests a possible conclusion-for most disciplinary actions, the problem centers around a negligence and lack of commitment on the part of the employee, not in 435

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improprietous rules. As discussed below, however, this possible conclusion, when viewed in light of the findings on the consistency of application and of rule enforcement, suggests the across-theboard rules may not specifically be appropriate in every environment. Still, it seems clear that management, to solve an expensive and recurring disciplinary problem, must improve the selection procedures and provide the incentives necessary to develop a workforce with commitment to the organization. The skilled blue collar stratum (WG 5 or higher) on the other hand, is quite different from the low grade blue collar situation. Although this stratum has a high minority representation, the disciplinary activity is centered around the nonminority employee. The turnover, expectedly, is low, suggesting employees have greater commitment to the organization. While the causes of discipline such as absenteeism, theft, and fighting common to the low grade blue collar worker appear in this stratum, a review of the case studies finds the disciplinary offenses more diverse including such things as insubordination, violation of safety rules , and poor workmanship. In looking at the overall nonsupervisory blue collar workforce (WG/WL 1-4 and WG/WL 5 and higher), one must conclude that discrimination based on race/ethnic group does not exist. While the data show some disparities exist, the two strata clearly present divergent findings. Specifically, disproportionate disciplinary action occurred among the low grade employees --actions in large part initiated by minority supervisors. Low grade Hispanic and nonminority employees were the recipients of the vigorous disciplinary activity. On the other hand, a high rate of formal 436

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disciplinary actions occurred among the high grade, blue collar nonminorities. These actions were initiated by both minority and nonminority supervisors. This imbalance could be subject to two possible explanations: 1) nonminority supervisors are reluctant to take disciplinary action against minority employees, or 2) the supervisors are being consistent and the proper offenders, nonminorities in this case, are being disciplined. The findings in the blue collar strata, unfortunately, are inconclusive with regard to gender due to the underrepresentation of females in both categories. Understanding of the nonsupervisory GS 1-6 is more difficult to achieve due to the smaller number of disciplinary actions taken. The conclusions of Chapter V substantiate the fact that management is not always consistent in applying work rules between the WG and GS pay systems. The two pay systems, as far as work rules are concerned, have a great deal in common -the major difference is in the work environment (shop versus office with the inherently different work practices, time pressures, lunch practices, and the like), accounting for the varied emphasis in application. While certainly not attempting to justify the difference in the enforcement and application of work rules, the organizational needs do vary between the two environments. The blue collar or shop environment many times involves a crew which must work together to accomplish the task. The difficulty comes, for example, when an employee possessing a certain skill or ability is late or absent. This absence may well impact the entire crew's productivity. On the other hand, the GS employee works primarily as an individual. Tardiness, while it may cause inconvenience, does 437

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not generally disrupt the work process to the same degree. The employees in this stratum are mainly clerical and administrative workers. .If the typist is absent, the void can be filled by another typist. In comparison to the low grade blue collar, the GS 1-6 employees are, to a much larger degree, more stable. A large portion of this has been at the USAF Academy for a significant period of time and will probably remain llltil retirement. This stability encourages the necessary commitment to the organization. This lends support to a conclusion that application and enforcement inconsistencies do exist with particular regard to this stratum. The employees know what they can get away with an act accordingly. The male underrepresentation prohibits conclusive findings regarding their employment attitudes. However, the data in Table 5.9 clearly show a disparately high occurrrence of actions involving males when compared to females, in this stratum, suggesting females receive favored treatment in regard to formal discipline. The high grade GS employee grouping, while made up of a small portion of the entire workforce, is subject, as expected, to a low occurrence of formal disciplinary actions. The reasons are much the same as those discussed for the low grade GS employee. The workforce is quite stable and well established. The same issue of inconsistent application and enforcement must be considered. In addition , the office environment mentioned earlier is certainly a factor. The pressures on the employee are of a different nature involving less reliance on coworkers. The supervisory employees overall receive a very small number of disciplinary actions. This characteristic is clearly 438

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related to the fact that most supervisory positions are filled with senior employees who have come up through the ranks, many times at the USAF Academy. These employees have a demonstrated commitment to both the organization and to the quality of work produced. These employees, by the very fact that they have advanced to the supervisory level, have shown their commitment organizational standards and mores. By virtue of having risen up through the ranks, they have learned the "rules of the game" and are well socialized into the appropriate and acceptable behaviors at the USAF Academy. In other words, these employees had largely good work histories before being promoted to supervisory status, and there is no reason to expect that overall positive characteristic to degenerate. In short, while the hypothesis was confirmed, disparities do exist. Motivation for working can account for the variations -unskilled blue collar workers doing routine labor do not possess the same interest or commitment as the white collar professional or administrative personnel who find commitment in the challenge their positions offer. GS versus WG Consistency. In considering the issue of consistent application and enforcement between the strata, one must consider many of the points made previously in this and earlier chapters. The data show that disparities in application and enforcement do exist. The female employee (predominately in the GS pay system) and the GS employee receive favored treatment in regard to formal discipline. The logic of the gender disparity is not supportable. While the work environment and the workforce stability, as discussed above, provide reason, these, in themselves, 439

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do not justify the differences. The data clearly demonstrate the perception that consistent treatment is desired. conclude that formal work rules should be accommodate the different work environments One must modified to and varied organizational needs. The logic discussed above, in regard to the low grade employee, is sound. The necessarily more restrictive environment, common to the blue collar family, mandates constant application of the work rule most frequently violated (absence from duty) due to the interruption of the entire work process. The confirmation of consistent enforcement and application regarding minority/nonminority and supervisory/nonsupervisory employees decreases the implications and magnitude of the overall problem. Improvement actions can focus on the gender and pay system discrepancies, with attention directed at rule modification. Civilian/Military Consistency. In regard to the military versus civilian supervisor, the results are conclusive. Civilian supervisors of civilian employees are more prone to take formal disciplinary actions than military supervisors of civilian employees, a fact which returns us to the issue of consistent disciplinary application and enforcement. The employee with a military supervisor is less likely to be subjected, through discipline, to the same standards. This apparently disparate treatment raises the issue of "why"? As discussed earlier in this chapter, a significant portion of the civilian workforce is geographically stable. Civilian supervisors have at least two major motivations to confront disciplinary problems as they arise: 1) The geographic stability generally means the problem will not just move. Both the supervisor and the employee intend to remain. The supervisor must 440

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either solve the problem or be prepared to put up with it indefinitely. 2) The civilian supervisor, by the very fact of civilian status, is a great deal more familiar with civilian rules, and is subject to the same rules and standards. On the other hand, the military supervisor is subject to frequent relocation . If the military supervisor can put up with the problem during his tenure, someone else will inherit the problem. This logic is certainly not to infer that the military superv isor is inferior. Disciplinary actions and the adverse action process constitute a very time-consuming process. Actions initiated by one superviso r and continued by the replacement are very confusing and subject to a high rate of reversal. The military supervisor is just as apt to be competent -the culprit is the system. In this same regard, the military and civilian personnel systems are both very complex and very different. The military supervisor seems to possess a great deal more understanding of the system that applies directly to him -the military system. The extensive appeal rights and extreme notice periods, common to the civilian system, are unique. In conclusion then, increased attention must be directed at simplifying and bringing the two systems more closely in line. Unfortunately, the trend is clearly in the opposite direction. New rules, necessitated by legislation such as the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, are rapidly increasing the complexity of the civilian personnel system. This means the immediate direction must focus on improved training and overall increased knowledge by the military supervisor of civilian employees. Supervisory/No nsupervisory Consistency. With regard to supervisory versus nonsupervisory discipline, two separate issues 441

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were investigated: 1) the comparative liability for formal discipline between the two groups; 2) the equity of penalties between the groups for comparable offenses. The case study data show the supervisor is less likely to get a formal disciplinary action taken against him and the magnitude of the penalty will be more severe than the expected magnitude for a nonsupervisory employee. The data on employee perceptions show disparity in the type of punishment administered in favor of the supervisory employee. As Chapter V suggests, the propensity for formal discipline can be viewed in two different ways. First, as noted above, it would be expected that the supervisory employee would not have as many disciplinary actions taken against him for a number of reasons: an historically good employment record probably was instrumental in his promotion to supervisor; he is under pressure to set a good example for subordinates, and he is probably more geographically bound than the nonsupervisory employee. Secondly, when the supervisor is guilty of a breach of conduct, the data suggest he is less likely to be penalized, even if caught violating a rule, than is the nonsupervisory employee. In regard to the magnitude of penalty, the findings are inconclusive. The data are clear as to the opinion of both supervisory and nonsupervisory employees that supervisors should be subject to at least the same penalty (the data show the majority opted for the same penalty with many of the remaining feeling the penalty for a supervisor should be more severe few felt the penalty should be less severe). The actual occurrence of disciplinary actions, however, does not provide adequate insight to be decisive. However, the available data indicate the supervisory 442

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employee is in a favored position. For whatever reason, he is less likely to receive a formal disciplinary action. The system in use provides for progressively severe penalt ies for repeat disciplinary offenses. H the supervisor, as substantiated in the research, is less likely to be disciplined, the system itself would dictate a lower magnitude of penalty due to its progressive nature. It seems reasonable then, that man agement must exercise increa sed caution in the disposition of offenses by supervisory emplo yee s. Nonsupervisory employees perceive disparity. If a given wor k rule applies to both categories, the penalty imposed should be comparable. Dealing with this matter requires higher level manag ement awareness, as it is higher level management that discip lines supervisory employees. This awareness must include a knowl edge of what action is being taken against nonsupervisory employ ees for comparable offenses, as well as the applicable past practices. Again, consistency is an essential ingredient to success. Minority/ Nonminority Consistency. When viewing the perceptions of minorities on the issue of equity in the disciplinary process, this di scussion is most meaningful in light of the findings of Hypothesis V which deals with perceptions of consistency relating to minority/nonminority status. The data substantiate the conclusion that the system itself is equitable. The actions taken have merit and generally are warranted if viewed alone in light of the work rule. Minorities are not subject to more severe discipline becau se they are minorities-the problem is one of consistency. This issue must be approached in two ways: 1) individual superv isory consist ency with all subordinates and, 2) inter /intraor ganiza tional supervisory consistency. On both counts, 443

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the findings are less than desirable. While many of the respondents view their supervisors as consistent a dangerously high number do not. In other words, while the actions taken are warranted, the conclusion must be reached that some employees who commit offenses will be subjected to formal discipline, while the supervisor may not discipline other employees for the 5ame offense. The data strongly indicate this bias is not a function of race/ethnic group co nsideration, but may well have gen der implications. Regarding the race/ethnic group issue, the vast majority see no difference in treatment between minority and nonminority employees, although a signi ficant portion feel that nonminorit ies, if indeed there is a diffe rence, are favored. The inc onsist ency then, with the exce ption of the gender impli cations, is nondescript. This leaves the feelin g that the inconsiste ncy, by any given supervisor, is based on interper sonal favoritism that is indepe ndent of race or ethnic group consi derations. Organi zational Consis tency. The inter /intraorganizational inconsistency is just as diff icult to deal with. This concept is complicated by the fact, a s discussed earli er in this Chapter, that different work en vir onments, by the simple nature of the work to be accomplish ed, place different value leve ls on the var ious work rules. While the data are not conclusive, so und conjecture suggest that interor ganizational consistency is worse than intraorganizati ona l. This con clusion is based on the fact that any given major organization is accomplishing related work and a given work environ ment (shop or office) is predo minate. This would mandate a somewhat highe r level of consist ency than one would project for the USAF Aca demy as a whole. For example, the 444

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predominately white collar organizations do not place the same level of importance on punctuality as would the pr _ edominately blue collar organizations and the predominately blue collar organizations would not place as much importance on dress standards or writing ability as would the predominately white collar organizations. High Grade/Low Grade Consistency. In regard to the perceived high versus low gra de incons istencies, the findings clearly substantiate disparity . The justificati on, if there is one, is based on the same line of reasoning discussed with the apparent differences inherent in the two pay systems , GS and WG. The point remains, however, that the rules are the same for high grade and low grade employees, just as they are for GS or WG. If the varied environments warrant inconsistencies in application and enforcement then different rules are warranted. It is not reasonable to have rules that apply to all, but are enforced differently. To conclude then, action to improve consistency seems imperative. The rules now in existence are directed at all employees. The application and enforcement of specific rules vary with the individual supervisor as well as within the organization and between organizations. The needs and priorities of organizations differ . Improvement is needed and can be accomplished by increased knowledge of the existing rules with a serious eye at adapting the rules to meet the needs of the organization. This is much more easily said than done. The present system of rules is already extremely complex. There are certainly implications for unions and for interaction with the unions in the 445

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mere expectation of a variety of treatments for the different categories. Without due caution, the situation would not improve but rather would or could be viewed as legislating favored treatment for select groups of employees. The central issue consistency still remains and must be dealt with through education of supervisors. If the rule applies across the board, then the application and enforcement must be consistent. It is unjustifiable that the I.J'liversal rule applies only to select groups of employees. Supervisory Discretion. The final issue to be discussed here involves the outside pressure a supervisor is subjected to in making a disciplinary decision. The findings are conclusive. Supervisory discretion is clearly subject to outside pressure. In gathering data for this issue, it was suggested that any or all of a large number of outside individuals or organizations could potentially impact supervisory disciplinary decisions. For example, advice and counsel are traditionally provided from the civilian personnel office and the legal office. Outside organizations were not found to be a factor, but one individual -the supervisor of the supervisor making the disciplinary decision clearly is influential. All categories of supervisors, high and low grade WS, as well as GS, feel they are subjected to excessive, undue, and inappropriate pressure from their bosses as well as higher management within the chain of command. In addition, the low grade WS supervisors do not feel they possess adequate authority to successfully deal with a disciplinary situation. Finally, supervisors feel their discretion is limited by outside forces, in this case rules or a Union contract. The higher level involvement and pressure creates a 446

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significant morale and procedural problem. Disciplinary decisions are subject to reconsideration through a grievance procedure (a negotiated procedure for bargaining unit employees, and an agency procedure for nonunit employees). Both procedures call for reconsideration to be accomplished by higher level supervisors in the employee's chain of command. The merit of this procedure lies in the unbiased review by these same supervisors. If they have, either directly or indirectly, pressured, influenced, or directed a disciplinary decision, they can hardly be expected to provide an unbiased reconsideration decision. It should be noted that the grievance procedures call for disqualification of deciding officials, in those cases where they have had involvement prior to the raising of the issue through the grievance procedure. The data substantiate frequent and significant involvement, yet the number of supervisors and managers who disqualify themselves from any given case is negligible. In concluding this issue, positive management action is called for by properly indoctrinating supervisors in the full range of their responsibility and then permitting them to use their discretion. Supervisors at all levels receive extra pay for the supervisory responsibilities. Clearly, one of these responsibilities is maintaining discipline of subordinates. Management is again called upon to act; it must insure subordinate supervisors possess the necessary authority, and are not subjected to pressures which diminish discretion. If higher management must get involved in a disciplinary decision, it must disqualify itself from the reconsideration process. 447

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Implications The implications emerging from this study are not restricted to the USAF Academy. Rather, they range from specific applica tion to the USAF Academy, through the Department of Air Force and the Department of Defense, to human resource management in general. The findings lniquely applicable to the USAF Academy include those which focus on the LD'lique problems and environment (university and air force base combined) and the l.D'lcharacteristic occupational distribution which apply only to the research site. For example, few, if any, organizations combine the type of eating facility which services the cadets, the massive grounds and maintenance staff, the large administrative staff, the characteristic military occupations, the education and athletic functions, and the diverse professional staff. The range of education and skills, as mentioned before, are nearly exhaustive. The heavy population in the l.D'lskilled occupations and the limited advancement and promotional opportunities create a higher than normal level of frustration. As shown in the mathe matical comparisons of disciplinary occurrence in Chapter V, this unskilled area, the group most subject to these frustrations, is where the formal disciplinary activity occurs. The mission of the USAF Academy creates the existing imbalance in skilled and unskilled requirements; for example, the job categories of waiter, laborer, and custodian comprise nearly one quarter of the entire civilian workforce. The solution then, is to work to improve within these restrictions --improve the jobs themselves, improve the placement procedures with the goal of obtaining individuals more suited to the 448

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types of work available, and adapt the rules to the actual needs of the organization. The implications for the Department of Air Force and the Department of Defense are equally straightforward both must focus on the negative aspects of the wide variations in the two personnel systems. The systems vary, by necessity, in man y w ays, yet the findings of this re search call for increased knowle dge and improved skill s from the military in dealing with civilia ns. The personnel systems will never match, but they can knit mor e clos ely together, ma king the decre ased numbe r of differences easier to deal with. While th is project considers only discipli ne and investigates only the civilian disciplinary process, it nonetheless dramatizes the need for both systems to be reviewed with the goal of becom ing compatible wher e advantageous. For e xample , discipline is only one aspect of the personnel system. If the two systems are going to be made mor e compatible the entire scope of rules need review, meaning that th e appraisal proces s, . the trainin g and absence policies, the job classif ication system, the benefits an d insurance packages, the underutili zation concepts, procedures for complaint resolution, the personne l record systems, the transfer policy, and so on all need revie w. Increased si milarity would provide increased effectiveness in dealing with this significant portion of the Air Force population. One implication of this research to human resources manage ment in general is to suggest that all managers take another look at the disciplinary process. Some of the le aders of special interest groups at the USAF Academy, for insta nce, clearly perceive the disciplinary proces s as disc rimi natory against 449

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minorities. The findings do substantiate disparate treatment of groups (i.e., low grade, blue collar) but they do not substantiate discrimination against minorities. Nonetheless, the perception that discrimination exists still persists. The process of convincing these groups of the equity of the system, both in application and enforcement, will not occur overnight, nor will a project such as this, by itself, provide a total. solution. Human resource managers must find ways to: 1) provide consistency within the set or sets of rules, and 2) seek involvement of the influential power centers and demonstrate the merit and equity of the policy through res ults . Obviously, these factors must exist before they can be displayed. In the end, if different standards are to be applied to different strata, management must recognize these variations, bring them out in the open, and then see that the "real rules" are applied consistently. The problems that are generated appear to come from the knowledge that the rule exists and was intended for all, but it is, in fact, enforced only sporatically. All groups receive some sort of favored treatment, but the favored treatment that is recognized, identified, and remembered, is that which applies to the other group. Relationships Between the Literature and this Study. In comparing this research by authoritative sources and past studies, it appears that the employees of the USAF Academy compare closely to those in the private sector. Kusmits's 1 study found that employee absenteeism ranks as one of management's largest burdens. This finding is substantiated in this study, in that absenteeism is one of the main causes of 450

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formal disciplinary action at the USAF Academy. This is caused by worker apathy or lack of commitment to the organization and parallels the study at a General Motors plant conducted by Luthans and Martink o. 2 Black 3 points out that there is great difficulty teaching middle class work ethics to minorities from ghetto backgrounds. There is no indication that the minorities at the USAF Academy co m e from this type of backgroun d, but there are strong indications that the lower graded, blue collar minorities (who have received a mathematical disproportionately large number of the disciplinary actions during the past two years) do not accept the work ethic of those minority supervisors who ha ve been in the workforce and who are administering the disciplinary actions. It is as though the minority group supervisors are using discipline as a means of constructive correction of negative behavior --a finding quite to the contrary of Gersuny's 4 work with the Ford Motor Company, wherein he conclu ded that foremen and union prejudice against Black workers was the reason for their disproportionately high share of penalties. Gersuny's study, however, does point to some similarities to the USAF Academy's worker profile. For example, both studies show a consistent relationship in the types of employees receiving discipline. High seniority (grade) employees incurred fewe r penalties than lower seniority (grade) employees; skilled workers were disciplined fewer times than nonskilled. Gersuny found that age was not a factor in the distribution of penalties, and for this reason it was not used as a variable in the USAF Academy stud y. Martin Broadwel1 5 has pointed out that the absence of 451

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specific standards of performance with but "once-a-year performance appraisals" contribute to a lack of employeesupervisory communication and thus an increase in disciplinary actions. At the USAF Academy, performance standards are prepared by the supervisor when an employee's work performance is substandard and some type of corrective action is contemplated, or when an employee's performance so exceeds his peers, that he will be nominated for a performance award. Likewise, supervisors are on ly required by regulation to apprise employees of their performance during the annual appraisal period. Adequate, meaningful training, according to Heckmann and Huneryager, 6 goes hand-in hand with careful hiring procedures and is necessary to reduce discipline to a minimum. At the USAF Academy, new employees are provided information on benefits such as annual and sick leave accrual and pay dates, but the indoctrination on work hours, rules and facilities are provided by the supervisor along with the requirement to read Air Force regulations dealing with standards of conduct, security, and safety. These regulations, of course, deal in generalities and it is the supervisor's responsibility to interpret their meaning to the immediate work environment. As mentioned earlier, especially in the case of lower grade blue collar hiring practices, more comprehensive preemployment investigation is required. Within the military/civilian work environment at the USAF Academy we can find many of the philosophical approaches to discipline discussed by Megginson 7 in current use. A most obvious example of the authoritarian system, for example, is in the military training of cadets in their preparation 452

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for commissioning as Air Force officers. For the most part this discipline is administered by upper class (senior) cadets and training officers. It is not applied, however, in the academic environment. While the anarchic philosophy, whereby individual rights take precedence over those of the organization, is not prevalent in any activity at the Academy, there is reason to believe that as a form of cooperative management, some supervisors employ it. This implication could be made from the fact that some Academy activities never take disciplinary actions although dissention among employees is high and is a frequent area of intervention by emp l oyee management specialists. T he most consistently followed philosophy, and that which is foll owe d by government agencies most consistently, is due process. The U SAF Academy employs a body of rules which are ad min istered by established procedures and include a formal method o f charging, investigating, proving, and disciplining. The pro cess is complete with appeal procedures and third party review. This phil os ophy is followed with a progressive approach for repeat of f e nders and can and does ultimately result in discharge of an employee. There are also elements of a disciplinary approach w hich mea ns immediate suspension and rapid dischar ge of employees who are involved in severe acts of violence or malicious destruction of property and rapid discharge for relatively minor offenses by em ployees serving the one-year probationary period. While it would be easy to argue that disciplinary actions taken by Aca demy supervisors are intended to be positive ways of solving probl ems, one must admit that discipline is conceived by employees a s negative this is especially true when supervisors 453

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are not consistent in administering discipline either within any organization or among all organizations . The findings in this study have substantiated this fact. The disciplinary process is made up of many facets which must be in harmony in the overall disciplinary policy. For example, inconsistency, according to Behohlav and Popp 8 , is the basis of any ineffective organization. Kuzmits 9 believes specific written acceptable procedures should be followed with an explanation of the disciplinary action to expect if the procedures violated. On the other hand, Gersuny10 maintains that codified penalties are ineffective and, like Boncarosky11 concludes that each case must be determined on its own merit. As evidenced in Chapter II, there are a variety of possible approaches to disciplinary policy. The selection of the approach to be used within any given organization requires careful analysis of what technique will work best for the organization, as well as a clear understanding by the employees subject to the policy of its implications and consequences. Argument has been made for inconsistency in applying rules among white and blue collar workers in the instance of tardiness or absenteeism. In all instances, however, consistency among like groups is necessary to maintain the discipline of the group. One consideration which carries strong weight is the rationale followed by arbitrators when disciplinary actions reach a hearing stage. In this rega r d Elkouri and Elkouri12 point out that all employees engaged in the same type of misconduct must be treated essentially the same unless there are mitigating circumstances. While there is strong support in the literature of the profession for the concept of consistency in administering 454

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discipline, no advice is furnished as to how, within reason, to train or encourage supervisors to be consistent. We can, therefore, understand why outside influences often interject themselves in a supervisor's decision to discipline and why the strongest influence, as shown in this study, is usually a higher level supervisor or manager. In the context of consistency, another factor comes into play. No two disciplinary situations are identical. Human judgement is involved. Consistency for the sake of consistency may be the wrong standard to apply. In the case of a supervisor who should be disciplined, the literature is weak. Should the supervisor receive more severe disciplinary action since he has not only broken a work rule but has set a poor example for his subordinates and violated a very special trust? Or, as is often the case, should the supervisor's long and faithful service mitigate to reduce the penalty? Perhaps he should be treated like any other employee and receive the same action, regardless of his poor example and long service. This study indicates employees feel the penalty should be at least as severe, and while disciplinary actions against supervisors are minimal in this study, management must nevertheless consider the impact on the workforce when it does occur. The unchecked supervisor creates dissention and the supervisor subjected to formal discipline does not receive the same respect from subordinates. The literature does not address differences in work environments as they relate to work rules. In fact, those studies addressed dealt only with blue collar employees. If the same strict application of consistent work rules are not necessary in all work areas (shop versus office) cannot the rules be adapted based on the 455

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importance of the rules to the work area? It appears that this approach must be considered in light of the strata of the work population at the USAF Academy. Ac cordi ngly, there is little guidance from the professional literature in the area of the supervisor in this case military -who either does not understand or does not apply work rules consistently. If he knows he will not supervise civilians at his next assignment, is there a realistic hope of reaching the desired level and encouraging his cooperatio n in the disciplinary process? Future Studies This research project, as with other similiar projects, answers some questions, but in doing so creates new questions and begs further investigation. The areas ripe for further study are innumerable. For example, an established acceptable range of penalties for any given discip linary offense is commonplace. While these lists are not usua lly in tended to be all inclusive, they are normally comprehensive enough that through the use of judgment, an equitable penalty can be determined (equitable in that the seriousness of the offen se relates to the magnitude of the penalty). Most disciplinary pro cesses call for num erous considerations and judgments to be made before deciding on a specific penalty such as a reprimand, a suspension from duty, or discharge. One issue that has not been investigated to the degree warranted is the rationale and justification for establishin g a given range of penalties. For example, is the theft of a $25.00 item more serious than the theft of a $1.00 item? Is the only issue "theft" or is the value of the stolen property critical to the magnitude of the penalty what are the dollar values that increase the seriousness? 456

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Is leaving work early theft? While that is not the same as taking home a company pen, it does have a dollar value attached. What is the relationship of different types of offenses to the magnitude of penalties imposed? For example, is failing to follow an order more .. or less serious than fighting? The examination need in this area includes evaluation of society's standards for various offenses. What the organization might see as a very serious infraction might well be perceived by the employee, or the supervisor with disciplinary authority, as a minor offense. While gathering data for this project it became evident that significantly different levels of importance are attached to various rules or standards by employees and supervisors. The data from this study generates a multitude of specific questions that may or may not have generalizability. The data at the USAF Academy indicate minority supervisors are more severe in the administration of discipline. While they appear to be more strict with all employees, this is particularly true when the offender is minority. The question begging examination is this characteristic unique to the USAF Academy or is this phenomena common. In the same light, the data show females are reluctant to discipline male subordinates at the USAF Academy. Is this attributable to insecurity or is the female a better manager with a diminished need for formal discipline? The data in this study show females grieve disciplinary actions more freely than males. Most disciplinary actions that are rever sed fall in the nonminority female category. Additional research is required to substantiate whether or not this characteristic is unique to the USAF Academy. 457

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Further, while significant research has been done in the area of discipline involving unskilled blue collar workers, additional examination is necessary in regard to other strata high versus low grade, male versus female, white versus blue collar, and supervisory versus nonsupervisory, just to name a few. The data from this study show conclusively that disparity exists. A number of factors warrant consideration. For example, considerat io n must be given to whether or not high grade or GS have a better acceptance of work rules, the role of a higher education leve l, and the like. Extensive research is required to develop the civilian/military relationship. Several questions, critical to the disciplinar y process surface immediately. Do the civilian and military systems provi de substantially different guidance? Do military superviso rs receiv e different training which results in different motivations? What is the true impact of the transient nature of the military supervisor ? Firm data would provide the insight necessary to improve the disciplinary process. Many questions evolve when one considers the factors of discipline between supervisory and nonsupervisory employees. Should supervisors be subject to more severe discipline? Are supervisors watched more or less closely in regard to possible disciplinary offenses? How does an organization correct inaccurate perceptions of supervisory/nonsupervisory inequity? In this study the perceived disparity clearly has an impact on the nonsupervisors' attitude and morale. Finally, what persons or organizations should be involved in the supervisor's determinations regarding disciplinary actions. This 458

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study looks at the impact of higher management. This only scratches the surface. Organizations such as the legal staff, personnel office," peers, subordinates, and so on must have some impact. This impact should be measured and the appropriateness of these influences examined and evaluated. The organizations' policy must coincide with these pressures. Employee discipline is a real and expensive fact. The magnitude of' the proble m an d the costs associated, such as appellant proceedings, r ehir ing an d retraining replacements, justify further extensive research. While the formal disciplinary process is clearly a necessity, its use constit utes a loss to all. 459

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APPENDIX A

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Commonly Used Terms, Acronyms, and Abbreviations Absenteeism -not being in the appointed place at the appointed time. Absence without leave (AWOL) absent without prior approval. Adverse Action a personnel action considered unfavorable to an employee. Includes discharge, suspension, furlough without pay, and reduction of compensation. AFR (Air Force Regulation) rules applicable to Air Force employees. Appeal -written request by an employee for reconsideration of a decision to take adverse action against the employee. Arbitration -the process of settling disputes by the parties calling upon an impartial person for a decision where the parties have agreed in advance to abide by the result. Bargaining Unit -those employees or jobs included under coverage by a recognized union. BEC (Black Employment Committee) a subcommittee of the Equal Employment Opportunity Committee focusing on Black interests. CCPO Central Civilian Personnel Office. Civilian nonmilitary members of the Federal government . Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) (P.L. 95-454)-a law providing a major reorganization of Federal personnel and labor relations abolished the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and established the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). Constructive Discipline an action taken by management to correct an employee's deficiencies in performance or conduct; includes oral admonishments, reprimands, suspensions, and removals/ discharge. Contract -A written agreement concerning work rules and procedures between a recognized labor organization and management. Counseling an informal discussion designed to correct employee deficiencies without penalizing the employee. 461

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CPO (Civilian Personnel Office ) -same as CCPO. CY -calendar year. Discharge -permanent removal of an employee from employment with the agency. Discrimination -any act or failure to act that is based in whole or in part on a person's race, color, religion, sex, age, marital status, handicapping conditions, political affiliation, or national origin. Due Process -the steps involved in assuring complete and impartial review of a management action. EEO Equal Employment Opportunity EEOC Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. An organization tasked with investigation and adjudication of EEO issues. Enlisted -military personnel who have not been commissioned as officers. I Employee Organization-any lawful association, labor organization, federation, council, or brotherhood having as a primary purpose the improvement of working conditions among federal employees and employees of private organization. Employee Relations -the field of personnel management between the supervisor and individual employee. Exclusive Recognition -the right accorded by an agency to a labor organization to be the sole representative of a group of employees in an appropriate bargaining unit for the purpose of representing those employees with management. Federal Sector public sector restricted to the Federal level. FEORP (Federal Equal Opportunity Recruitment Program) -an EEO program designed to solve underrepresentation of minorities and women. FLRA (Federal Labor Relations Authority) an agency tasked with independent responsibilities involving the Federal labor relations program. FMCS (Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service) an agency tasked with impartial resolution of negotiation disputes. 462

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FPM (Federal Personnel Manual) -the official OPM publication containing personnel regulations and instructions to Federal agencies. FSIP (Federal Service Impasse Panel) -an agency with final adjudicatory powers for the r esolution of negotiation impasses. FWP (Federal Women's Program) a subcommittee of the Equal Employment Opportunity Committee focusing on women's interests. FY fiscal year (1 October 30 September) GS (General Schedule) commonly referred to as white collar wor kers a pay system established by the Classification Act of 1949 as amended. Grievances -a request by an employee or a group of employees acting as individuals, for personal relief in a matter of concern or dissatisfaction which is subject to the control of agency management. Hearing -the presentation of evidence (oral and written) concerning an appeal or grievance. HEP (Hispanic Employment Program) a subcommittee of the Equal Employment Opportunity Committee focusing on Hispanic interests. JAG (Judge Advocate General) -name used to identify military legal staff. Just Cause -sufficient basis for taking an adverse action/used frequently in connection with disciplinary action. Labor Managemen t Relations a general term referring to the formal dealings and agreements between employees or labor organizations and management. L WOP (Leave Without Pay) excused absence from duty without compensation. Manager person tasked with decision authority generally supervisory. 463

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Merit system based on competitive principles recognizing personal merit. Military -officer and enlisted personnel within the Department of Defense. Minority -racial or ethnic groups; for purposes of this study, Hispanic, Black, Asian and American Indian. MSPB (Merit System Protection Board ) agency responsible for adjudication of adverse actions and EEO issues not covered under other procedures; i,e., union contract or EEOC. Negotiation -the act o f bargaining with the intent of reaching mutual agreement. NIRA National Industry Recovery Act. NLRA National Labor Relations Act. NLRBNational Labor Relations Board. Nonunit employees not included under the definition of an exclusive representative. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) -the designation of the central personnel agency of the Federal government. Prior to OPM was US Civil Service Commission. Oral Admonishment an interview between a supervisor and an employee. The least formal and least severe disciplinary action. Past Practice a labor relations term indicating previous activities that have been accepted by both parties. P. L.Public Law. P. L. 95-454-Civil Service Reform Act. Precedence-similar actions that have occurred previously. Privacy Act -a public law protecting employee privacy as well as granting entitlement to certain information. 464

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Progressive Discipline -a disciplinary system providing for increased severity in penalty for repetitive disciplinary offenses. Public Sector government ( any level ); i.e., local, state, Federal. Regulations rules applicable to the Federal Sector. Reduction in Force separation of an employee because of such things as Jack of funds or reduced manning ceilings. Removal discharge or separation of an employee from employment based upon personal misconduct. Reprimand -A formal Jetter of official censure; a more severe disciplinary action than an oral admonishment but less severe than a suspension from duty. Special Interest Group nonminority protected group; i.e., women or handicapped. SPSS -Statistical Package for the Social Sciences. Steward a union official authorized to represent bargaining unit employees in grievances or complaints. Sufficient Cause normally used in conjunction with just cause in regard to disciplinary action. Supervisor an individual having the authority to hire, direct, assign, promote, reward, transfer, furlough, layoff, recall, suspend, discipline or remove employees, to adjust their grievances, or to effectively recommend such action. Suspension -a disciplinary action placing an employee in a non-pay, non-duty status. Trades and Crafts common terminology for blue collar occupations. Unit abbreviation for bargaining unit (see above). Unskilledlabor positions requiring no specialized training. USC United States Code. 465

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USAF United States Air Force • USAF A United States Air Force Academy. Unfair Labor Practice violation of specific practices as contained in Section 7116 of P.L. 95-454. WG (Wage Grade) hourly workers commonly referred to as blue collar. WL (Wage Leader)-a lead worker of WG employees. WS (Wage Supervisor)a supervisor of WG and WL employees. 466

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APPENDIX B

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Design Hypotheses The seven hypotheses included in this study focus on the disciplinary process at a Federal agency. Several of the issues are interrelated. The issues are grounded in existing problems and perceived attitudes at the USAF Academy. Hypothesis I. The actual occurrence of formal disciplinary actions is not mathematically proportionate to the actual population distribution within the strata used in this study. The stratifications used are described below. The actual strata populations are shown in Table 4.1. (1) Wage Grade {WG) and Wage Leader {WL) 1-4 {2) General Schedule {GS) 1-6 {nonsupervisory) (3) Wage Supervisor (WS) 1-4 (4) Wage Grade {WG) and Wage Leader (WL) 5 or higher (5) General Schedule {GS) 7 or higher {nonsupervisory) {6) Wage Supervisor {WS) 5 or higher (7) General Schedule (GS) 1 or higher {supervisory) {8) Minority/Nonminority (Minority Hispanic, Black, American Indian, Asian-either sex) {9) Male/Female {any race) Hypothesis I is tested through analysis of historical disciplinary records for calendar years (CY) 1978 and 1979. Hypothesis II. Application and enforcement of the work rules through formal disciplinary measures varies disproportionately within the stratum defined in Hypothesis I above. The flexibilities and inflexibilities of work rules from one 468

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work unit to another are discussed in Chapter III (Environment). Hypothesis II is tested through integration of the data collected in the empl oyee questionnaires, supervisory questionnaires, random interviews , and select interviews. Hypothesis III. Formal disciplinary measures are more likely to be taken by a civilian supervisor than by a military supervisor. Hypothesis III is tested through integration of the data c olle cted in employee questionnaires, supervisory questionnaires, r andom interviews, and select interviews. Hypothesis IV. Supervisors are not formally disciplined with the same frequency or severity for similar offenses as are nonsupervisory employees. Hypothesis IV is tested through intergration of the data collected in historical case study analyses, employee questionnaires, supervisory questionnaires, random interviews, and select interviews. Hypothesis V. Some employees, particularly minorities, perceive the disciplinary process as inequitable and unfair. Hypothesis V is tested through integration of the data collected in employee questionnaires , supervisory questionnaires, random interviews, and select interviews. Hypothesis VI. Supervisors, tasked with the responsibility of formal discipline, perceive their disciplinary authority restricted by specific outside forces such as higher management, and organizations such as the union. Table B.l at the end of this appendix illustrates the potential outside influences at the USAF Academy. Prior to replication of this study the investigator should 469

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consider the apparent influences in that en'lironment, and modify the questionnaires accordingly. Hypo t hesis VI is tested through integration of data coJJected in supervisory questionnaires, random interviews with supervisors, and select interviews with supervisors. Hypothesis VII. Individual employees (particularly minorities) perceive their supervisors as inconsistent in the specific penalty administered for any given offense. Hypothesis VII is tested through integration of the data coJJected in employee questionnaires, random interviews with employees, select interviews with employees, and historical case study analyses. Methodology Three data-gathering methods are used in the study. Data were gathered through case studies, random employee and supervisory questionnaires, and random and nonrandom interviews. Case Study. The case study analyses (approximately 80 cases) are conducted for calendar years (CY) 1978 and 1979. It includes a content analysis of completed formalized actions in both an individual and situational context. The data-gathering format uses the foJJowing information: (1) demographic information including sex, race, years at the USAF Academy, years of federal service, pay system, grade, employing organization; and (2) disciplinary history including type of action being analyzed (reprimand, suspension, discharge), date of action being analyzed, cause of action (e.g., AWOL, theft), previous disciplinary history, and whether the action was sustained or reversed. 470

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Questionnaire. stratified random measurements. The questionnaires, administered to a sample, use both nominal and ordinal The questionnaires were pretested for content validity on a sample drawn from the Civilian Personnel Office staff and selected employees and supervisors. When the initial random selection was made, replacements were provided to account for, (1) employees and supervisors unavailable, (2) employees and supervisors used in the pretest, and (3) employees and supervisors in the select interview group (see interviews below). Because surveys were administered during work time, a high response rate (up to 7 5 percent) was anticipated. Respondents to the questionnaire are anonymous. The questionnaire was administered in groups of 25 to 30 individuals. Prior to completing the questionnaire, the subjects were advised of their rights under the Privacy Act of 1974 (Public Law 93 579) and the importance of complete and honest answers. The local union president agreed to attend the employee data-gathering meetings. His attendance was sought to reinforce the importance of the study, underscore the importance of accurate replies, and assist in positively developing the necessary trust of the respondents. The questionnaire required less than 30 minutes to complete and was administered in conference facilities at the subjects' worksites. Data were gathered from both supervisory and nonsupervisory personnel to provide a comparison of the perceptions of the two groups on how they, (1) perceive the system, (2) perceive outside 471

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influences, and (3) perceive fairness and interactions. Questionnaire analysis information such as the location of various categories of information within the questionnaires, and questio n matches are contained in Tables B.2 B.6 at the conclusion of this appendix. The questionnaires utilized are contained as Appendices C and D. Interviews. The interview data (both random and select) were gathered in privacy through a one-on-one technique at the subjects' worksites. The interviews, conducted subsequent to the questionnaire administration, focused on specific issues where case study and questionnaire data reflect real or perceived problems. Because the interviews were conducted during work time, a high percentage of interview completion was anticipated and occurred. (1) Random Interviews. Subjects were selected from a stratified random sample. The strata, as defined in Hypothesis I, seeks both individual and situational data enabling statistical analysis at both nominal and ordinal levels of measurement. Once the initial random sample was drawn, replacements were provided to account for (a) employees and supervisors unavailable, (b) employees and supervisors used in pretest, and (c) employees and supervisors in the select interview group. The interviews were conducted on an informal structured basis. (2) Select Interviews. Structured interviews were conducted with selected employees and supervisors involved in both the Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) and disciplinary programs, including (a) members of the Equal Employment Opportunity Committee, (b) the Assistant Equal Employment 472

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Opportunity Officer, (c) the Equal Employment Opportunity Counselor, (d) the local Union President, (e) the Chief, L.abor & Employee Relations Division, and (f) the staff labor relations specialist s. The format followed in conducting the interviews is shown in Table B.7 at the conclusion of this appendix. Variai>les . The three data gathering processes used (case study, questionnaire, interview) contain both demographic and environmental variables. {1) Demographic Variables. Variables such as sex and race are critical to this study if it is to examine potential disciplinary disparities in relation to environmental variables. (2) Environmental Variables. Environmental variables, such as the amount of pressure in the decision process, or the discretionary application of disciplinary procedures, are critical to this study if it is to demonstrate a relationship between these variables and the actual execution of formal disciplinary actions. Data Oisplay fhe data were most easily and effectively organized through the use of tables. The results of the case study, questionnaire, and interview inquiries are all compatiable with the tabulation method and readily result in ease of understanding for the reader. This method results in a large number of tables. However, the tables are similiar in structure and can readily be used in cross comparison. 473

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Table B.l Pressures on Supervisor Influencing Discretion 474 Boss **Personnel Office Peers 1 Labor & Employee Relations Staff A • Boss l l I b. .I. I I I Equal Employment . 1 Ar 1trators Staff l (Hearing) Subordinate Employees Supervisor Office of (Peers in same Taking Personnel organization under Disciplinary Management the Action (Hearing) Nonsupervisory / EEO Commission Employees not under supervisor Minority Organizations Black Employment Committee Hispanic Employment Committee Federal Women's Committee *Procedural and merit considerations. **Procedural, merit and precedence considerations.

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475 Table B.2 *Questionnaire Analysis: Demographic Data Issue **Employee Questionnaire **Supervisory Questionnaire ***Sex ***Race Years at USAF Academy Years of federal Service ***Pay system and grade level Employing organization at USAF A Previous supervisory experience Subordinates that are minority/nonminority Subordinates that are male/female Race of respondent's supervisor Race of coworkers 3 9 4 5 6 1 7 N/A N/A 13 16 6 8 10 4 9 1 5 12 13 22 *Purpose of questionnaire analysis is to identify source of demographic data. **Columns identify specific question number. ***Actual USAFA population was analyzed and stratified by: (1) grade level and pay system, (2) sex, (3) race. The random sample was then selected to coincide with this stratification.

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476 Table B.3 *Questionnaire Analysis: Disciplinary History Data Issue **Employee Questionnaire Been fired from any job Received disciplinary action at USAFA Oral Admonishment Reprimand Suspension Taken disciplinary action against subordinates Causes of disciplinary action 10 11 32 37 N/A lld 32c 37c **Super visory Quest:ionnaire 15 16,18 17 *Analysis of actual reprimands, suspensions and discharges was gathered (time period -1 January 1978 through 31 December 1979}. The sources for this input included questionnaires, interviews, and historical case records. **Columns identify specific question numbers.

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477 Table B.4 *Questionnaire Analysis: Disciplinary System Data Issue System Inequities Race Sex G rade/pay system Favoritism Other Perceptions of system Range of Punishment & Discretion **Employee Questionnaire 14,19,21,30, 31,35 48,49 34 , 46,50 ,51 12,20,21 18,23,32h,33, 37g,38,40,44, 45,52 llc,llg,llh, lli,llj,l5, 16,17,24,26, 27,28,29,36, 38,40,47 llc,lle,llf, llg,l5,17,18, 19,23,24,25, 26,27,28,29, 32c,32f,32g, 32h,33,36,37d, 37g,37h,37i, 39,42,43,44, 45,46,48,50, 51,52,53 **Supervisory Questionnaire 46 23,30,32 21 19,35,36,42 29,31 28,34,38 19,20,25,26,27, 33,39,41,44,47 19,20,21,24,27, 33,34,35,36,37, 40,43,44,45,46, 47 *Purpose of this section is to identify sources seeking attitude and perception data. **Columns identify specific question numbers.

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478 Table B.S *Question Matches (Supervisor to Employee) Supervi ory Employee Supervisory Employee Questionnaire Questionnaire Questionnaire Questionnaire 1 1 25 N/A 2 2 26 36 3 N/A 27 15 4 N/A 28 N/A 5 N/A 29 20 6 3 30 21 7 7 31 N/A 8 9 32 N/A 9 6 33 N/A 10 4 34 29 11 8 35 50 12 N/A 36 34 13 N/A 37 N/A 14 5 38 36 15 10 39 N/A 16 N/A 40 N/A 17 N/A 41 44 18 N/A 42 N/A 19 N/A 43 43 20 N/A 44 N/A 21 N/A 45 N/A 22 13 46 N/A 23 14 47 N/A 24 N/A *Columns show question numbers in supervisory questionnaire that match or seek identical information from employee questionnaire.

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479 Table B.6 *Question Matches (Employee to Supervisor) Employee Supervisory Employee Supervisory Questionnaire Questionnaire Questionnaire Questionnaire 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 1 2 6 10 14 9 7 11 8 15 N/A N/A 22 23 27 N/A N/A N/A N/A 29 30 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 so 51 52 53 N/A 34 N/A N/A N/A 26 36 N/A 38 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 43 41 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 35 N/A N/A N/A *Columns show question numbers in employee questionnaire that match or seek identical information from supervisory questionnaire.

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Table B.7 *Interview Objectives {Both Random and Select) A. Demographic Data: Sex Race Years at USAF Academy Years of federal service Pay system and grade Employing organization Supervisory experience Work Environment Minority/Nonminority {numerical relationship) Male/Female (numerical relationship) B. Disciplinary History: Ever fired from job Disciplinary actions Taken against subordinates Received as employee Causes of any actions involved in C. Disciplinary System Data: Perceptions of system classified with regard to: Sex Race Military/Civilian relationship Grade/Pay system Favoritism Organizational environment Consistency Pressures Range of punishments Need for strictness Past practice and precedence Inequities/Disparities *The interviews were administered by the author. 480 Interview respondents did not complete a questionnaire. Select interview respondents were removed from the random selection pool prior to the random selection process. Random interview selections were made prior to random questionnaire selections and respondents selected for the random interview were excluded from the questionnaire selection pool.

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APPENDIX C

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REPLY T O DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATE S A I R FORCE ACADEMY USAF ACADEMY, COLORADO 80640 ATTN OF: DPC 1 February 1980 suBJEcT: Supervisory Questionnaire To: Questionnaire Participant 1 . This sur vey is being conducted t o learn mor e about the perceptions and attitudes regardin g the fairn ess and equity o f the USAF Academy discip linary policy. In add ition to you and a number of your co-workers completing this que stionnjiire, other USAF Academy employees will be interviewed on the sam e sUbjects. The survey results will be used in co mpilin g recommendations on needed training and policy modifications regarding d isci plin e at the Academy. All participants selected to complete this quest ionnaire hav e been selected at random. The questionnaire will take about 30 minute s to complete and participation is voluntary. The questionnaire seeks information a bout both your background and attitudes. The individual administering this que stio nnair e is available to answer any questions you might have. Your individual res ponses to all questions will be kept confidential. 2. Instructions: a. Please answer all questions in order. Do not skip around . b. Check only one answer for each question unle ss the question instructs you to do otherwise . Some questions contain specific instructions, such as, 'write in the proper number,' or 'check as many bloc ks as appropriate.' c . Please answer ALL quest i ons. If you do not find the exact answer that fits your case, check the ans we r that comes closest. d. Some questions are asked pertaining to minorities. For purposes of this questionnaire, minorities are Blacks, Hispa nics, Asia ns, and American Ind ians -either sex. Women are not considered a minority . e. Remember , the answers you give will be kept con fident ial. If this study is to be beneficial , i t i s important the information be as accurate as possible. We are depending on you to be completely honest in answerin g the questi ons. This is not a test. There are n o right o r wrong answer s . 3. Thank you very much for your cooperation. STEVEN A . ROCKWELL Director of Civilian Personnel 482 "MAN'S FLIGHT THROUGH LIFE IS SUSTAINED BY THE POWER OF HIS KNOWLEDGE"

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PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT In accordance with paragraph 30, AFR 1235, Air Force Privacy Act Program, the following information about this survey is provided: a. AUTHORITY. 10 U S C, 8012, Secretary of the Air Force: Powers and Duties, De legation by. b. PRINCIPAL PURPOSE. This survey is being conducted to determine what changes can or need to be made to improve the USAF Academy employee disciplinary system. c. ROUTINE USE. The survey data will be compiled and reviewed by the Director of Civilian Personnel and DPC management. The results will be provided to the USAFA EEO Committee, USAF A management, and utilized in a dissertation pertaining to the USAFA disciplinary program. d. Participation in this survey is entirely voluntary. e. No adverse action of any kind may be taken against any individual who elects not to participate in any or all of this survey. 483

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SUPERVISORY QUESTIONNAIRE The personal information requested in the first few questions is information needed for validation and analysis of the subsequent data. You will not be identified through c ompletion of this questionnaire and your indivi d ual response will be kep t completely anonymous. 1. The first 2 letters of the office symbol where you work ? --2. Length of time in present job _years __ months? 3. What is the number of civilians that you supervise ____ ? 4. What level of supervisor are you? 1st level 2nd level = 3rd level or higher 5. How many years have you been a supervisor ___ ? 6. Your sex is: male female 7. Have y ou held supervisory jobs prior to your p resent job? _yes 8. 9. no What race/ethnic group are you? _Hispanic Am. Indian Other What is your present pay system and grade? WS-GSMilitary__ _ Black Asian 10. How many years have you been employed at the United States Air Force Academy __ ? 11. Are you retired military? _yes no 12. How many of your subordinate employees are: __ minority __ nonminority 13. How many of your subordinate employees are: male female 484

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14. How many years of Federal Service do you have __ ? 15. Have you ever been fired from any job? _yes no 16. ANSWER THIS QUESTION ONL Y IF YOU ARE CIVILIAN Have you ever received a disciplinary action while employed at the USAF Academy? (IF MORE THAN ONE WRITE IN PROPER NUMBER RATHER THAN MARKING AN X ) oral admonishment == written reprimand __ suspension from duty __ none ( IF NONE . SKIP . TO QUESTION 17 ) 16a. How many years ago was the disciplinary action __ ? 16b. When the action was taken against you, were you: . _ supervisory _ nonsuperv1sory 17. Have you ever taken disciplinary action(s) against any of your subordinate employees? ( IF MORE THAN ONE WRITE IN THE PROPER NUMBERS-YOUR BEST GUESS--IN EACH CATEGORY) oral admonishments ==written reprimands __ suspensions from duty __ fired the employee __ none (IF NONE SKIP TO QUESTION 18) 17a. How many of the actions cited above have been within the last two years? ( WRITE IN THE PROPER NUMBERS) oral admonishments == written reprimands __ suspensions from duty __ fired the employee none 17b. Were any of the disciplinary actions you took within the last two years grieved? _yes no 17c. In how many cases grieved did the employee win? ( THE DISCIPLINARY ACTION WAS CANCELED: WRITE IN THE NUMBERS IN EACH CATEGORY) oral admonishments ==written reprimands __ suspension from duty __ fired the employee none 485

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18. Do 1you know of any other supervisors that have had disciplinary action taken against them? _ / yes no 19. If a supervisor and a nonsupervisory employee break the same workrule, what do you think will happen to that supervisor? _ nothing/ don't take actions against supervisors both the supervisor and the nonsupervisor will have the -same action taken against them the nonsupervisor will receive a more severe disciplinary action _ the nonsupervisor will receive a less severe disciplinary action 20 . Do yo u feel yo u apply wo r k r ules: more strictly than other supervisors -less strictly than other supervisors -about the same as other supervisors 21. Would you be more prone to take a formal disciplinary action against : male employee female employee no difference 22. Is y o ur superv i sor: Blac k Asian Other _Hispanic Am. Indian 23 . Do you feel your supervisor treats people of different races in different way s i n regard to disciplinary actions? • som etimes alm os t never =always 24 . In disciplinary s ituations, who makes the final decision about what disciplinar y action will be taken? I make the decision -My superv isor makes that decision =Someone other than my supervisor or I make that decision 2 5. I am able to obtain the technical assistance I need to process a formal discip linary action: _yes no 2 6 . Do you feel the dis ci plinary policy at the USAF Academy is fair? never sometimes -almost alw ays =always 486

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27. If you were late to work what would happen to you? _nothing _warning oral admonishment written reprimand _ suspension from duty fired don't know 28. In your opinion, would your supervisor take the same disciplinary action against any subordinate employee for the same offense? never sometimes -almost always always 29. Does your supervisor appear to hav e favorites? yes . no 3 0. Are the favorites: _minority nonminority both minority and nonminority no favorites 3 1. Do you have favorites among y our subordinate employees? _ yes no 3 2. Are your best workers generally: _minority nonminority no difference 3 3. Are you consistent in applying the workrules? never sometimes -almost always =always 34. Would other supervisors on the USAF Academy take the same disciplinary action you do for any give n offense? _most would take the same disci plinary action _ most would take more s evere disci plinary action _ most would take less severe disciplinary action 35. Is the USAF Academy dis ci plinary policy harder on blue collar (WG) than on office workers (GS)? _yes n o a bout the same 487

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36. Is the USAF Academy disciplinary policy harder on low grade civilian employees than on high grade civilian employees? _yes no about the same 37. Do you feel the USAF Academy policy is flexible as to the disciplinary penalty that can be administered for any given offense? (CHECK AS MANY BLOCKS AS YOU FEEL ARE APPROPRIATE ) _some regulation or the union contract directs what action must be taken _ my supervisor tells me what action to take _subordinate employees tell me what action to take the union tells me what action to take fellow supervisors tell me what action to take -the personnel office tells me what action to take =the legal office tells me what action to take the EEO staff tells me what action to take = I decide myself what action to take 38. Do you feel that most USAF Academy supervisors treat their employees fairly? never sometimes -almost always = always 39. Do you feel that some employees get away with breaking the workrules ( no disciplinary action is taken ) when they have been caught and deserve a disciplinary action? never sometimes -almost always = always 40. Put the following potential disciplinary situation in rank order. (/11 BESIDE THE SITU A TIQN MOST UPSETTING TO YOU AND SO ON UNTIL 116-THE LEAST UPSETTING TO YOU • USE EACH NUMBER ONLY ONE TIME) 30 minutes late to work with no excuse ==an employee who does not come to work one entire day and has not requested leave ( the employee has no previous offenses) __ theft of government property worth about $5.00 . __ drinking while on duty __ an employee who refuses to follow an order you gave (no previous offenses ) __ an employee who strikes a fellow worker while on duty 41. Do you think that employees who break the same workrule several times should be dealt with more severely each time? _ yes no =not necessarily 488

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42. Do you think supervisors should receive the same disciplinary penalties as nonsupervisor for the same offense? _same penalty _less severe penalty _ more 6evere penalty 43. The following series of questions will describe potential disciplinary situations at work. Read each situation very carefully and then mark the letter ( according to the following description ) which you feel would be the most fair disciplinary action for both the employee and management. There is no right or wrong answers to these questions. The idea is to describe the penalty that you think would be fair. mark "A" if you thi nk no action is fair mark "B" if yo u think a counseling is fair mark "C" if y ou think oral admonishment is fair mark "D" i f you think wr itten reprimand is fair mark "E" if you think a suspension from duty is fair mark "F" i f you think the employee should be fired an employee who has never been late to work is 30 -minutes late _ ._an employee who shows up for work drunk _ an employee steals government property worth about $5.00 _ an employee steals government property worth $20.00 or more _ an employee does not come to work one whole day and does not have approved leave _ same situtation as above but the employee did the same thing about two months ago _ an employee gets mad and hits a fellow worker _ an employee goes to sleep on duty _an employee who refuses an order from the supervisor _ same as above but the employee did the same thing about two months ago _ an employee gets hurt after violating a safety rule _ _ an employee who uses foul language to a fellow worker or the supervisor 44 . Do you feel compelled to take any given disciplinary action for some specific offense (i.e. always a written reprimand for absent without leave on t h e second offense )? _yes no 45. H a ve you ever been ordered to take a disciplinary action against on e o f y ou r s ubord inate employees? _ yes no 489

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46. Do you feel that across the USAF Academy ( CHECK AS MANY BLOCKS AS YOU FEEL APPROPRIATE ): sometimes disciplinary actions are not taken because the -offender is a minority sometimes disciplinary actions are not taken because the -offender is female _ too many disciplinary actions are taken _ too few disciplinary actions are taken more disciplinary actions are taken against minority members than nonminority members _ the supervisor is not allowed enough discretion in deciding what disciplinary action is to be taken _ the supervisor is allowed too much discretion in deciding what disciplinary action is to be taken 47. Indicate where the pressure, on you as a supervisor comes (or where you believe it would come ) when you want to take a formal disciplinary action against one of your subordinate employees for breaking a workrule. ( CHECK AS MANY BLOCKS AS YOU FEEL WOULD BE APPROPRIATE) your supervisor -other supervisors in your chain of command = legal office civilian personnel office EEO staff =subordinate employees in your organization _minority organizations (i.e. Black Employment Committee, Hispanic Employment Committee, Federal Women's Committee, etc.) 490

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APPENDIX D

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REPLY TO DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY USAF ACADEMY, COLORADO 80640 ATTN OF: DPC 1 February 1980 . sueJEcT: Employee Questionnaire To: Questionnaire Participant 1 . This survey is being conducted to learn more about the perceptions and attitudes regarding the fairness and equity of the USAF Academy disciplinary policy. In addition to you and a number of your co-workers completing this questionnaire, other USAF Academy employees will be interviewed on the same subjects. The survey results will be used in compiling recommendations on needed training and policy modifications regarding discipline at the Academy. All participants selected to complete this questionnaire have been selected at random. The questionnaire will take about 30 minutes to complete and participation . is voluntary. The questionnaire seeks information about both your background and attitudes. The individual administering this questionnaire is available to answer any questions you might have. Your individual responses to all questions will be kept confidential. 2. Instructions: a. Please answer all questions in order: Do not skip around. b. Check only one answer for each question unless the question instructs you to do otherwise. Some questions contain specific instructions, such as, 'write in the proper number,' or 'check as many blocks as appropriate.' c. Please answer ALL questions. lf you do not find the exact answer that fits your case, check the answer that comes closest. d. Some questions are asked pertaining to minorities. For purposes of this questionnaire, minorities are Blacks, Hispanics, Asians, and American Indians -either sex. Women are not considered a minority. e. Remember, the answers you give will be kept confidential. If this study is to be beneficial, it is important the information be as accurate as possible. We are depending on you to be completely honest in answering the questions. This is not a test. There are no right or wrong answers. 3. Thank you very much for your cooperation. STEVEN A. ROCKWELL Director of Civilian Personnel "MAN'S FLIGHT THROUGH LIFE IS SUSTAINED BY THE POWER OF HIS KNOWLEDGE" 492

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PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT In accordance with paragraph 30, AFR 1235, Air Force Privacy Act Program, the following information about this survey is provided: a. AUTHORITY. 10 U S C, 8012, Secretary of the Air Force: Powers and Duties, De legation by. b. PRINCIPAL PURPOSE. This survey is being conducted to determine what changes can or need to be made to improve the USAF Academy employee disciplinary system. c. ROUTINE USE. The survey data will be compiled and reviewed by the Director of Civilian Personnel and DPC management. The results will be provided to the USAF A EEO Committee, USAF A management, and utilized in a dissertation pertaining to the USAF A disciplinary program. d. Participation in this survey is entirely voluntary. e. No adverse action of any kind may be taken against any individual who elects not to participate in any or all of this survey. 493

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EMPLOYEE QUESTIONNAIRE The personal information requested in the first few questions is information needed for validation and analysis of the subsequent data. You will not be identified through completion of this questionnaire and your individual response will be kept completely anonymous. 1. The first two letters of the office symbol where you work ? ---2. Length of time in present job _years _months? 3. male female 4. How many years have you been employed at the United States Air Force Academy __ ? 5. How many years federal service do you have __ ? 6. What is your present: _pay system _grade 7. Have you ever held a supervisory job? _yes no 8. Are you retired military? _yes no 9. What is your race/ethnic group? Hispanic -Black Other 10. Have you ever been fired from any job? _yes no Asian Am. Indian 11. Have you ever received an oral admonishment while working for the federal government? yes -no (IF NO SKIP TO QUESTION 12 ) lla. Was the oral admonishment received while you were working at the USAF Academy? _yes no 11 b. How long has it been since you received the last oral admonishment: __ years, __ months? 494

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llc. Do you think you deserved the last oral admonishment you received? _I fully deserved it I kind of deserved it I deserved less severe action I deserved more severe action I did not deserve it at all lld. What was the reason for the last admonishment? ( IF MORE THAN ONE THEN WRITE IN THE PROPER NUMBERS) _absent without leave, not following the proper leave procedure, tardy, or leaving the job without permission _ failing to follow an order from the supervisor or insubordination _threatening a fellow employee or the supervisor errors in your work = reporting for work under the influence of alcohol _ drinking while on duty _ loafing while on duty indebtedness other lle. Did you actually break the workrule you were accused of breaking? _yes no llf. Did your supervisor ask for your side of the story before giving you the last oral admonishment? _ yes no llg. Have others in your section broken the same rule and not gotten an oral admonishment? _yes no don't know llh. Did you file a grievance over the last oral admonishment? yes -no (IF NO SKIP TO QUESTION 12 ) lli. Did you win the grievance (was the oral admonishment removed from your record)? _yes no llj. Was the time and effort you spent on the grievance worth it? fully worth it kind of worth it not worth it at all 495

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12. Does your supervisor treat all employee in your section alike? never sometimes most of the time =always 13. Is your supervisor: Black = Hispanic Other Am. Indian Asian 14. Does your supervisor treat people of different races in different ways in regard to disciplinary actions? never sometimes nearly always = always 15. If you were late to work what would happen to you? _nothing _ your supervisor would warn you oral admonishment =written reprimand suspension from duty fired from job -don't know 16. List the number of people in your section that are: Am. Indian --Hispanic --Black Asian Other 17. If one of your fellow workers was late for work, what would your supervisor do? _nothing warn them = give them an oral admonishment _ issue a wr itten reprim and _ suspend them from duty fire them don't know 18. Would your supervisor take the same action against any employee i n your section for being late? never sometimes nearly always =always 496

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19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. In your opmion, would your supervisor discipline a minority for breaking a rule and not discipline a nonminority for breaking the same rule? never sometimes =nearly always _always Does your supervisor appear to have favorites? _yes no Are the favorites: _ _ n?nmmorities _ bpth minorities and nonminorities no favorites , Is your supervisor: c J vilian lilitary Does your supervisor treat the military in your section (in regard to disciplinary actions ) differently than the civilians? never I . sometimes I nearly always -always Do y h u think your supervisor is ( or would be ) fair in admif)ister ing discipline? _yes n0 25. If yo broke a workrule, but had a good reason, would your supervisor consider that? nbver I . sometimes -nearly always =al ways 26. Is your supervisor strict in applying workrules? never sometimes nearly always =always 27. Is your supervisor consistent in applying workrules? never sometimes = ncrarly always always I I 497

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28. Do you think most supervisors on the USAF Academy take the same disciplinary action for breaking a workrule that you r supervisor would? _ yes no don't know 29. Do you feel other supervisors would take: __ the same disciplinary action for an offense than yours wou ld a more severe disciplinary action for an offense than yours would a less severe disciplinary action for an offense than yo urs would 30. In your opinion, do USAF Academy supervisors ( other than your own ) take more severe disciplinary actions against minorities than they would against nonminorities for the same offense? never sometimes =nearly always _always 31. In your opinion, are the disciplinary actions taken against minorities: about the same ( for the same offense ) as for non minorities more severe ( for the same offense ) than it would be for a nonminority less severe ( for the same offense ) than it would be for a nonminority 32. Have you ever received a written reprimand while working at the USAF Academy? yes no ( IF NO SKIP TO QUESTION 33 ) 32a. Was the written reprimand within the last two years? yes -no (IF NO SKIP TO QUESTION 33) 32b. Had you ever received any other disciplinary action before you received the written reprimand ( i.e. oral admonishment)? _yes no 498

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32c. What was the reason for the last written reprimand? (IF YOU HAVE RECEIVED MORE THAN ONE REPRIMAND, WRITE IN THE NUMBER IN EACH CA TE. GOR Y RATHER THAN AN X ) _absent without leave, not following the proper leave procedure, tardy, leaving the job site without permission _ failing to follow an order from your supervisor _ fighting or threatening a fellow employee or your supervisor theft -errors in your work = reporting for work drunk _ sleeping while on duty indebtedness other 32d. Did you file a grievance over the last reprimand? yes =no {IF NO SKIP TO QUESTION 33 ) 32e. Did you win the grievance ( was the reprimand removed from your record )? _yes no 32f. Were you guilty of breaking the rule that resulted in the reprimand? _yes no 32g. Did your supervisor listen to your side of the story before giving you the last reprimand? _yes no 32h. Have others in your section broken the same rule and not gotten a reprimand? never sometimes -almost always =always 33. Is the disciplinary policy at the USAF Academy fair? never sometimes -almost always =always 34. Is the USAF Academy policy more harsh on low grade employees than it is on high grade? never sometimes -almost always always 499

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35. In your opmton, does the disciplinary policy at the USAF Academy discriminate against minorities? never sometimes = almost always _ always 36. Do most supervisors at the USAF Academy treat their employees fairly (in regard to disciplinary actions)? never sometimes -almost always 37. Have you ever been suspended from duty while employed at the USAF Academy? _yes _no (IF NO SKIP TO QUESTION 38) 37a. Was the suspension from duty within the last 2 years? _yes _no (IF NO SKIP TO QUESTION 38) 37b. Have you had other disciplinary actions prior to the suspension? (WRITE IN PROPER NUMBER OF EACH.) oral admonishment written reprimand _other suspensions _no previous disciplmary actions against me 37 c. What was the reason for the suspension from duty? (IF MORE THAN ONE SUSPENSION, FILL IN THE PROPER NUMBER RATHER THAN AN X). _absent without leave, not following the proper leave procedure, tardy, leaving the job site without permission _failing to follow an order from your supervisor _fighting theft reporting for duty drunk _drinking while on duty _sleeping while on duty other 37d. Did your supervisor listen to your side of the story before suspending you? _yes no 37e. Did you win the grievance (WAS THE SUSPENSION REMOVED FROM YOUR RECORD)? _ yes no 500

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37f. Did you grieve the last suspension? yes no (IF NO SKIP TO QUESTION 38) 37g. Do you know of any other USAF Academy employees who did the same thing you did and did not get suspended? _yes no 37h . Did the other employees get caught by the supervisor or did someone report them? _yes _no (IF NO SKIP TO QUESTION 38) 37i. What happened to them? _nothing oral admonishment =written reprimand suspension from duty -fired -don't know 38. If you filed a grievance because of a disciplinary action would your supervisor retaliate against you? _yes no -don't know 39. Does your supervisor have the authority to decide what disciplinary penalty I action will be taken against you (OR DOES YOUR . SUPERVISOR'S BOSS DECIDE)? _my supervisor would decide _my superv i sor's boss would decide 40. If you get in trouble once would your supervisor be out to get you from then on? _yes no -don't know 41. Is your job more difficult if your coworkers fail to show up for work when they are supposed to? no more difficult -a little more difficult -a 1ot more difficult 42. Does i t upset you when your coworkers do not come to work when they are supposed to? sort of upsets me =upsets me a little does not make any difference -upsets me a lot 501

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43. The following series of questions will describe potential disciplinary situations at work. Read each situation very carefully and then mark the letter (ACCORDING TO THE FOLLOWING DESCRIPTION) which you feel would be the most fair disciplinary action for both the employee and management. There are no right or wrong answers to these questions. The idea is to describe the penalty that you think would be fair. mark "A" if you think no action is fair mark "B" if you think a counseling is fair mark "C" if you think oral admonishment is fair mark "D" if you think written reprimand is fair mark "E" if you think a suspension from duty is fair mark "F" if you think the employee should be fired _an employee is 30 minutes late to work (EMPLOYEE HAS NOT DONE THIS BEFORE) _an employee shows up for work drunk _an employee steals government property worth about $5.00 _an employee steals government property worth about $20.00 or more an employee who does not come to work 1 whole day and -does not have approved leave (EMPLOYEE HAS NEVER DONE THIS BEFORE) _same situation as previous question but the employee did the same thing 2 months ago _an employee gets mad and hits a fellow worker _an employee goes to sleep at work an employee refuses to follow an order from the -supervisor (EMPLOYEE HAS NEVER DONE THIS BEFORE) _same as previous question and the employee did the same thing about 2 months ago _an employee gets hurt after violating a safety rule _an employee uses foul language to a fellow worker or the supervisor 44. Do you think employees who break the same workrule several times should be dealt with more severely each time? __yes no -not necessar i1 y 45. Do you think supervisors should receive the same, more severe, or less severe penalties as non-supervisory employees for the same offense? _same penalty _more severe penalty _less severe penalty 46. Do you think high grade civilians should receive the same, more severe, or less severe penalties for the same offense as lower grade employees? same penalty -less severe penalty =more severe penalty 502

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47. Do you believe the higher levels of management would reverse (cancel) a disciplinary action against you if they felt the action was unfair? never sometimes -almost always always 48. Are disciplinary actions taken equally against men and women f or the same offense? never sometimes -almost always always 49. Which sex is favored? male -female -neither 50. Are people with office jobs (GS) allowed to get away with more without a formal disciplinary action being taken than a blue collar (WG or WL)? never sometimes -almost always always 51. If a supervisor and a nonsupervisory employee break the same workrule , what will happen to the supervisor? _ nothing/never take disciplinary actions against supervisors _both the supervisor and nonsupervisor will have the same disciplinary action taken against them _the nonsupervisor will oe disciplined more severely _the nonsupervisor will be disciplined less severely 52. In you r opinion, which type of supervisor is most likely to take a formal disciplinary action against a civilian employee? civil i an military -about the same 53. Who or i g inates disciplinary actions (MARK AS MANY BLOCKS AS APPROPRIATE) _ your supervisor _ legal office _ high level management (ABOVE YOUR SUPERVISOR) Ci vilian Personnel Off ice Office o f Pe rs onnel Management _ Equal Employment Opportunity Office You 503

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APPENDIX E

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REPLY TO DEPARTMENT OF THE A I R FORCE HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY USAF ACADEMY, COLORADO 80840 ATTN OF: DPC s usJECT: Bargaining Unit Employee Survey To: Mr. Albert C. Derby President, Local 1867 American Federation of Government Employees (AFL-CIO) J. As discussed earlier, l wiU be conducting a study on the disciplinary program here at the United States Air Force Academy. The study will involve administering questionnaires to approximately 200 bargaining unit employees. The employees chosen to complete the questionnaires will be selected using random methods designed to assure quantitative representation reflective of the pay system, grade level, sex, and minority posture here at the Academy. The questionnaire will be administered on duty time beginning in early February 1980. l expect to have groups of 20 or more employees at each session and I seek your personal assistance in administering the questionnaire. l have enclosed a copy of the questionnaire for your information. I will get with you at a later date so we can work out the specific dates and times for administration. In addition to the questionnaire, l anticipate personally interviewing approximately 20 bargaining unit employees on the same type issues contained in the questionnaire. This interview will be conducted on a one-to-one (myself and the interviewee) basis, and I expect to conduct the interviews during February and March 1980. 2. The data gathered from the bargaining unit employees will be integrated with similar data collected from management officials, EEO officials, and the Labor and Employee Relations staff to provide for an indepth analysis of the entire civilian disciplinary program here at the USAF Academy. STEVEN A. ROCKWELL Director of Civilian Personnel I Atch Employee Questionnaire "MAN'S FLIGHT THROUGH LIFE IS SUSTAINED BY THE POWER OF HIS KNOWLEDGE" 505

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AFL-CIO LOCAL 1867 U. s. Air Force Aeadell)' 1939 S . El Paso Col o rado Springs , CO 80906 Mr. Steven A . Rockwell Director of Civilian Personnel USAF Academy CO 80840 Dear Mr. Rockwell Albert C. Derby President As discussed, I will be happy to assist you in the questionnaire administration process. Upon completion of the study, I would like very much to sit down with you and discuss, in detail, the findings. Sincerely President, Local 1867 AFGE (AFL-CIO) TO DO FOR ALL THAT WHICH NONE CAN 00 FOR HIMSELF 506 louise I. Tru j ill o SecretaryTreasure r

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APPENDIX F

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TO ATTN 0,. MPK E DEPARTMENT Of' THE A I R FORCE HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FOR C E WASHINGTON, O . C . 20330 .u..,•c• Survey (Your Ltr, 19 Dec 79) 2 8 D E C 1979 TO R O OSAFA / D P 1. Your survey instrument has been reviewed by AF/MPKE, MPKU and MPKO. No objections to its use were made. Accordingly, the survey is approved. 2 . Should additional information be desired, please contact the undersigned, autovon 225-9106. FOR CHIEF OF STAFF o.._ --UJ_.:s;:-ELKIN Acting Chief, Employee Relations Division Directorate of Civilian Personnel 508

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Bibliography Avins, Alfred. Penalties for Misconduct on the Job. Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1972. Alexander, Arthur M. "Controlling Absenteeism: What Can Be Done?" Public Personnel Review , 30, No. 2 (Apri11969). Baer , Walter E. Discipline and Discharge Under the Labor Agreement. American Management Assoication, New York, 1972. Bailey, Kenneth D. Methods of Social Research. New York: The Free Press, 1978. Belohla v , James A., and Popp, Paul 0. "Making Employee Discipline Work." The Personnel Administrator, 23, No. 3 (March 1978), 22-24. Bittel, Lester R. What Every Supervisor Should Know, 2nd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1968. Black, James Menzies. Positive Discipline. American Management Association, Inc., 1970. Boncarosky, Leon D. "Guidelines to Corrective Discipline." Personnel Journal. 58, No. 10 (October 1979), 698-702. Boyd, Bradford B. Management-Minded Supervision. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968. Broadwell, Martin M. The Practice of Supervising: Making Experience Pay. Reading, Mass: Addision-Wesley Pub. Co., 1977. Cahn, Frances T. Federal Employees in War and Peace: Selection, Placement, and Removal. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1949. Calhoon, Richard P. Managing Personnel. New York: Harper and Row, 1963. Campbell, Donald T. and Julian C. Stanley. Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs of Research. Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Co., 1963. Carpenter, William Seal. The Unfinished Business of Civil Service Reform. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press., 1952. Cayer, N. Joseph. Public Personnel Administration in the United States. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975.

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Chruden, Herbert J. and Sherman, Arthur W. Jr. Personnel Management. 3rd ed. Cincinatti: South-West Pub. Co., 1968. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. Public Law 95-454. October 13, 1978. Cone, William F. Supervising Employees Effectively. Reading, Mass.: Addision-Wesley Pub. Co., 1974. Connellan, Thomas K. How to Improve Human Performance: Behaviorism in Business and Industry. New York: Harper and Row, Pub., nd. Coulson, Robert. Labor Arbitration What You Need to Know. New York, NY: American Arbitration Association, 1973. Cowan, John. The Self-Reliant Manager. New York: AMACOM, 1977. Crane, Donald P. Personnel Management: A Situational Approach. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Pub. Co., 1974. Discenza, Richard and Smith, Howard L. "What's New In Discipline: A Supportive Approach." Supervisory Management, 23, No. 9 (September 1978), 14-19. Dunlin, Donald. "Through the Looking Glass." Management Review, 63, No. 4 (Apri11974), 58-60. Eitington, Julius E. "Senority and Employee-Management Relations." Public Personnel Review, 13, No.1 (January 1952). Elkouri, Frank and Edna. How Arbitration Works. 3rd ed. Washington, D.C., Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 1976. Employee-Management Cooperation in the Federal Service. Executive Order 10988. January 17, 1962. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. Public Law 92-261. March 24, 1972. Fish, Carl R. The Civil Service and the Patronage. New York: Longmanns, Green and Co., 1905. Fleishman, Edwin A. and Bass, Alan R. Studies in Personnel and Industrial Psychology. Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1974. Flemming, Arthur S. "Personnel Goals for the Federal Service." Public Personnel Review, 7, No.1 (January , 1946), 1-7. Fo urnies, Ferdinand F. Coaching for Improved Work Performance. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1978. 510

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Gandz, Jeffrey. Employee Grievances: Incidence and Patterns of Resolution. Proceedings of the Thirty-First Annual Meeting, Industrial Relations Research Association. 29-31 August 1978. Chicago, 1979. George, Claude S. Jr. Supervision in Action. Reston, Va.: Reston Pub . Co., 1977. Gersuny, Carl. Punishment and Redress in a Modern Factory. Lexington, Mass: D.C. Heath and Company, 1973. Gervasi, Frank. Big Government: The Meaning and Purpose of the Hoover Comm ission Report. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1949. Gilbertson, Henry S. Personnel Policies and Unionism: The Human Factors in Industry. Boston: Ginn and Co., 1950. Grote, Richard C. "Postive Discipline: Keeping Employees in Line Without Punishment." Training HRD, 14, No. 10 (October 1977), 42-44. Gulick, Luther and Urwick, L., eds. Administration. New York: Administration, 1937. Papers on the Science of Institute of Public Heckmann, I. L. and Huneryager, S. G. Management of the Personnel Function. Columbus: Charles E. Merrill Books, Inc., 1962. HQ USAF Report "Image Study: A Report on the Civilian Personnel Administration Survey." Randolph AFB, Texas, September, 1979. Huberman, John. "Discipline Without Punishment Lives!" Harvard Business 53, No. 4 (July-August 1975), 6-8. Jaffe, Louis L. "The Right to Judicial Review." Public Administration and Policy: Selected Essays. ed. Peter Woll. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966. Janis, I. L. and Feshbach, S. "Effects of Fear-Arousing Communications." Journal of Abnormal Social Psychology, 48 (1953), pp. 7892. Jefferies, Chris L. "Public Administration and the Military." Public Administration Review, 37, No. 4 (July I August 1977), 321-333. Jucius. Michael J. Personnel Management. 6th ed. Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1967. Kammerer, Gladys M. Impact of War on Federal Personnel Administration 1939-1945. Lexington, Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 1951. 511

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Kindall, Alva F. Personnel Administration Principles and Cases. Homewood, 111.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1961. Kuzmits, Frank E. "Managing Absenteeism," Personnel, 54, No. 3 (May-June 1977), 73-76. LaborManagement Relations in the Federal Service . Executive Order ll491. October 29, 1969. Luth ans, Fred and Martinko, Mark. "An Organizational Behavior Modification Analysis of Absentee ism ." Human Resource Mana gement, 15, No. 3 (Fall, 1976), 11-18 . Maier, Norm an, R. F. Psychology in Industrial Organizations, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1973. Martin, Ric hard G. "Five Pr inciples of Corrective Disciplinary Action." Supervisory Management, 23, No. 1 (January 1978), 24-28. Megginson, Leon C. Personnel: A Behavioral Approach to Administration. Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1967. Meriam , Lewis. Public Personnel Problems From the Standpoint of the Operating Officer Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1938. Mitchell, James M. "Building a Productive Civilian Work Force in the Department of Defense." Public Personnel Review, 15, No. 1 (January, 19 54), 7-16. Mosher, Frederick C. Democracy and the Public Service. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968. Mosher, Frederick C., ed. American Public Administration: Past, Present, Future. University of Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1975. Mosher, William E., J. Donald Kingsley, and 0. Glenn Stahl. Public Personnel Administration. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1936. Mosher , William E. and J. Donald Kingsley. Public Personnel Administration. Revised ed. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1941. Nigro, Felix A. Public Administration Readings and Documents. New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1951. Oberle, Rodney L. "Administering Disciplinary Actions." Pe rs onnel Journal, 57, No. 1 (January 1978), 29-31. Odio rne, George S. Personne l Administration by Objectives. Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc. , 1971. 512

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Office of Personnel Management. Federal News Clip Sheet. "Preliminary Findings Released on Employee Attitude Survey." Washington D.C.: Special Edition, December 1979. Powell, Norman John. Personnel Administration in Government. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1956. Presthus, Robert. Public Administration. New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1975. Proceedings of a Seminar Conducted by the Public Employee Relations Center. The Crisis in Pu blic Employee Relations in the Decade of the Seventies, February 25-27, 1970. Richard J. Murp hy. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 1970. Reed, L. " Firing a Federal Employc:>e: The Impossible Dread." The Washington Monthly, 9 (July/ August 1977), 15-25. -Report of a Special Task Force to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. Work in America. Cambridge, Mass. The MIT Press, 1973. Riecken, Henry W. and Robert F. Boruch. Social Experimentation. New York: Academic Press, Inc, 1974. Robinson, John P ., Jerrold G. Rusk and Kendra B. Head. Measures of Political Attitudes. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1968. Robinson, John P., Robert Athanasiou and Kendra B. Head. Measures of Occupational Attitudes and Occupational Characteristics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1969. Rosenbach, William E., and Organizational Climate.: December, 1978. Taylor, Robert L. USAF Academy, "USAF A Colorado, Rotundi, Thomas Jr. "Behavior Modification on the Job." Supervisory Management, 21, No. 2 (February 1976), 22-28. Rowat, Donald C. Basic Issues in Public Administration. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1961. Shershin, Michael J. Jr. and Boxx, W. Randy. "Due Process in Discipline and Dismissal." Supervisory Management, 21, No. 11 (Novc:>mber 1976), 2-9. Smith, Darrell H. The United States Civil Service Commission. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1974. Stahl, 0. Glenn. Public Personnel Administration, 5th ed. New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1962. 513

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Stanley, David T. "What Are Unions Doing to Merit Systems:" Public Personnel Review, 31, No.1 (April, 1970), 108-113. Stessin, Lawrence. Employee Discip li ne. Washington: BNA Incorporated, 1960. Stoner, James A. F. Management. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: PrenticeHall, Inc., 1 978. S ull i van, Dennis M . "E m ployee Dis cipli ne: Beware The 'Comp an y Position'." Perso nnel Journal, 53, N o. 9 (September 1974), 692-695. Super in tendent, U SAF Ac ademy, Colo rado an d A pprop riated F u nd U ni t , Local 1867 American Federation of Government E plo)"ees, AFL-CIO , Memorandum of Agreement Between, December 6, 1978. Thompson, Claude Edward. Personnel Management fo r Supervisors. N e w York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1948. o b in, J ohn E. "H ow Arbitrators Decide to Reject or Uphold an Employee Discharge." Supervisory Management, 21, No. 6 (January 1976), 2023. Torbert, Frances. Personnel Management in Small Companies. Los Angeles: Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, 1959. Torpey, Willi am G. Publi c Personnel Management. Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1953. United States Air Force Regulation. Discipline and Adverse Actions, AFR 40-750. August 10, 1979. United States Civil Service Commission, Fifteenth Report. Washington, D.C. 1898. Unterberger, Irene and S. Herbert. ":Disciplining Professional Employees.: Industrial Relations, 17, No. 3 (October 1978), 353-359. USAF Academy Fact Sheet "Air Force Academy." February, 1979. USAF Academy FAct Sheet "Facts and Statistics about the U.S. Air Force Academy." USAF Academy, Col orado. March, 1979. V a n Riper, Paul P. History of the United States Civil Service. Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson and Co., 1958. Vaughn, Robert G. The Spoiled Syste m : A Call F or Civil Service Reform. N ew Y ork : Charterhouse, 1 975 . 514

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Weiss, Bernard. "How to Manage the 'Creative' Person." Management Review, 63, No. 12 (December 1974), 37-40. Weiss, Carol H . Evaluation Research. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1972. Weiss, Car ol H. Evaluat i ng Action P ro grams. Boston: Allyn and Bacon inc. 1972. Wheeler , Hoyt N . "Punishment Theor y and Industrial Discipline . " Indust rial Relations , 15, No. 2 (May 1976), 235-243. White, Leonard D. Government Career Service. Chicago: University of C hicago Press , 1935. White, Le onard D. "Personne l Administ ration in the Seventh Decade. " Public Personnel Review, 1, No. 1 (April, 1940), 1-9. White, Le onard D . Research in Public Personnel Administration . Washington D.C.: Committee on Public Administration, 1942. White, Leo nard D. Introduction to the Study of Public Administration. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1954. illoughby, W .F. Principles of Public Administration. Baltimore: The Lord Baltimore Press, 1927. W il merding, Lucius Jr. Government by Merit. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1935. Wohlking, Wallace. "Effective Discipline in Employee Relations." Personnel Journal, 54, No. 9 (September 1975), 489-500. Woll, Peter, ed. Public Administration and Policy. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1966. 515

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Notes Chapter II 1 James Menzies Black, Positi ve Discipline (American Management Association Inc., 1970), p. 27. 2 Black, p. 27. 3Lawrence Stessin, Employee Discipline (Washington: BNA Inc., 1960), pp. 2 3. 4stessin , p. 4 . 5 Leon C. M egginson, Personne l: A Behavioral A roach to A m inistration (Homewood, Ill.: Richar d D. Irw i n, Inc., 1967 , p. 565. 6 Leon D. Boncarosky, "Guidelines to Corrective Personnel Journal, Vol. 58, No. 10 (October 1979), p. 698. 7 Paul P. Van Riper, History of the United States Civil Service (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson and Co., 1958), pp. 18-19. 8carl R. Fish, The Civil Service and the Patrona e (New York: Longmanns, Green and Co., 1905 , p. 13. 9van Riper, p. 51. 10van Riper, p. 52. 11van Riper, p. 101. 12van Riper, p. 133. 13united States Civil Service Commission, Fifteenth Report (Washington, D. C.: 1898), p. 51. 14w. F. Willoughby, Princi les of Public Administration (Baltimore: The Lord Baltimore Press, 1927 , p. 324. 15Lucius Wilmerding, Jr., Government by Merit (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1935), p. 225. 16Lewis Meriam, Public Personnel Problems From the Standpoint of the Operating Officer (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institute, 1938), pp. 247-248. 17 Meriam, p. 245. 18william E. Mosher and J. Donald Kingsley, Public Personnel Administration (New York : Harper and Brothers Pub., 1941), p. 398.

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19wi11iam Seal Carpenter, The Unfinished Business of Civil Service Reform (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1952), p. 59. 20van Riper, pp. 217-218. 21Proceedings of a Seminar Conducted by the Public Employee Relations Center, The Crisis in Public Em lo ee Relations in the Decade of the Seventies Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 1970), p. 3. 22Report of a Special Task Force to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Work in America (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1973), p. 1. 23Frank E . Kuzmits , "Managing A bse nteeism , " Personnel, Vol 54 , No. 3 (May-June 1977), p. 73. 24Fred Luthans and Mark Martinko, "An Organizational Behavior Modification Analysis of Absenteeism," Human Resource Management, Vol 15, No. 3 (Fall 1976), p. 11. 25carl Gersuny, Punishment and Redress in a Modern Factory (Lexington, Mass: D.C. Heath and Co . , 1973), p. 3. 26 Black, p. 24. 27 . Gersuny, p. 80. 28 Gersuny, p. 80. 29Jeffrey Gandz, "Employee Grievances: Incidence and Patterns of Resolution," Industrial Relations Research Association Series Proceedin s of the Thirt -First Annual Meetin , August 2931, 1978 Chicago, p. 168. 31 Broadwell, pp. 123-124. 321. L. Heckmann and S. G. Huneryager, Management of the Personnel Function (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill Books, Inc., 1962), p. 429. 33 Broadwell, p. 125. 34 Boncarosky, p. 699. 35Lester R. Bittel, What Every Supervisor Should Know, 2nd e d . (New York: McGraw Hill Book Co . , 1968), p. 213. 36Henry S . Gilbe r t s on, Personnel Policies and Unionism: The Human Factors in Industry (Boston: Gin &. Co., 1950), pp. 34-35-. -517

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37 Rodney L. Oberle, "Administering Disciplinary Actions," Personnel Journal, Vol. 57, No. 1 (January 1978), p. 29. 38wallace Wohlking, "Effective Discipline in Employee Relations," Personnel Journal, Vol. 54, No. 9 (September 1975), p. 500. 39Megginson, pp. 565-566. 40 Heckmann and Huneryager, p. 433. 41Richard G. Martin, "Five Principles of Corrective Disciplinary Action," Supervisory Management, Vol. 23, No. 1 (January 1978), p. 24. 42Wohlking, p. 491. 43 Heckmann and Huneryager, p. 433. 44Richard Discenza and Howard L. Smith, "What's New in Discipline: A Supportive Approach," Supervisory Management, Vol. 23, No. 9 (September 1978), p. 17. 45mscenza and Smith, p. 17. 47 Herbert J. Chruden and Arthur W. Sherman, Jr., Personnel Management, 3rd ed. (Cincinnati: South-Western Pub. Co., 1968), p. 474. 48Frances Torbert, Personnel Management in Small Companies (Los Angeles: Institute of Industrial Relations, Univ. of California, • 49 Michael J. Jucius, Personnel Management, 6th ed. (Homewood: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1967), p. 500. 50 Hoyt N. Wheeler, "Punishment Theory and Industrial Discipline," Industrial Relations, Vol. 15, No. 2 (May 1976), p. 238. 51Thomas K. Connellan, How to Improve Human Performance: Behav iorism in Business and Industry (New York: Harper & Row Pub., nd), pp. 145-144. 52 Connellan, p. 146. 53Luthans and Martinko, pp. 16-17. 54Norman R. F. Maier, Psychology in Industrial Organizations (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1973), p. 340. 551. L. Janis and S. Feshbach, "Effects of Fear-Arousing Communications," Journal of Abnormal Social Psychology, Vol. 48 (1953), pp. 78-92. 518

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56 Connellan, p. 146. 57 Thomas Rotondi, Jr., "Behavior Modification on the Job," Supervisory Management, Vol 21, No. 2 (February 1976), p. 23. 58 Maier, p. 341. 59 Maier, p. 341. 60 Black, pp. 54-55. 61 Connellan, P. 148. 62James A. F. Stoner, Management (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1978), p. 424. 63 Connellan, p. 151. 64John Huberman, "Discipline Without Punishment Lives," Harvard Business Review, Vol. 53, No. 4 (July-August 1975) p. 8. 65 Gersuny, p. 20. 66Megginson, p. 571. 67 Donald Dunlin, "Through the Looking Glass," Management Review, Vol. 63, No. 4 (August 197 5), p. 58. 68 Huberman, p. 7. 69Richard C. Grote, "Positive Discipline: Keeping Employees in Line Without Punishment," Training HRD, Vol. 14, No. 10 (October 1977), pp. 43-44. 70 Grote, p. 42. 71Michael J. Shershin, Jr. and W. Randy Boxx, "Due Process in Discipline and Dismissal," Supervisory Management, Vol. 21, No. 11 (November 1976), p. 9. 72 Claude Edward Thompson, Personnel Management for Supervisors (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1948), p. 56. 73 Black, p. 55. 74 N. Joseph Cayer, Public Personnel Administration in the United States (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975), p. 87. 75 Cayer, p. 87. 76Jucius, pp. 502-503. 519

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77 James A. Behohlav and Paul 0. Popp, "Making Employee Discipline Work," The Personnel Administrator, Vol. 23, No. 3 (March 1978) p. 24. 78"Preliminary Findings Released on Employee Attitude Survey," Federal News Clip Sheet, Special Edition '(December 1979). 79Kuzmits, p. 76. 80wohlking, p. 489. 81 Gersuny, p. 20. 82 Boncarosky, p. 720. 83Frank and Edna Asper Elkouri, How Arbitration Works (Washington, D.C.: The Bureau on National Affairs Inc., 1 973), pp. 643644. 84John E. Tobin, "How Arbitrators Decide to Reject or Uphold an Employee Discharge," Supervisory Management, Vol. 21, No. 6 (January 1976), p. 21. 85Bernard Weiss, "How to Manage the 'Creative' Person," Management Review, Vol. 63, No. 12 (December 1974), p. 40. 86Irene and S. Herbert Unterberger, "Disciplining Professional Employees," .;;;;In..;_;d;;_;;u;..;;.s..;.;tr;..;;i.;;;;al;;..._R;;..;.;;..e;;.;:la;;_;;t.;..io;;..;.n=s, Vol. 17, No. 3 (October 1978), pp. 355-356. 87 Wohlking, p. 491. 88wohlking, p. 490. 89 Martin, p. 26. 90 Boncarosky, p. 701. 91 Oberle, p. 31. 92Dennis M. Sullivan, "Employee Discipline: Beware the 'Company Position'," Personnel Journal, Vol. 53, No. 9 (September 1974), p. 694-695. 93Megginson, p. 564. 94Broadwell, p. 134. Chapter III 1Fact Sheet on Air Force Academy (Colorado: USAF A Directorate of Information, February, 1979), p p. 1-3. 520

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2Fact Sheet on Facts and Statistics about the U.S. Air Force Academy (Colorado: USAFA Directorate of Information, March, 1979), p. 2. 3 Fact Sheet, February 1979, pp. 3-4. 4 See report on "Image Study: Personnel Administration Survey." Texas, S eptember, 1979), p. ii. A Report on the Civilian (HQ USAF,. Randolph AFB, 5 william E. Rosenbach and Robert L. Taylor, "USAFA Organizational Climate" (Colorado: USAF Academy, December, 1978). Chapter VI 1Frank E. Kuzmits, "Managing Absenteeism," Personnel, Vol 54, No. 3 (May-June 1977), p.73. 2Fred Luthans and Mark Martinko, "An Organizational Behavior Modification Analysis of Absenteeism," Human Resource Management, Vo115, No.3 (Fa111976), p. 11. 3James Menzies Black, Positive Discipline (American Management Association Inc, 1970), p. 27. 4carl Gersuny, Punishment and Redress in a Modern Factor (Lexington , Mass: D.C. Heath and Company, 1973, p. 3. 5 Martin M. Broadwell, The Practice of Supervising: Making Ex erience Pa (Menlo Park, CA.: Addision-Wesley Publishing Co., 1977 ' p. 123. 6 I. L. Heckmann and S. G. Personnel Function (Columbus: 1962), p. 429. Huneryager, Management of the Charles E. Merrill Books, Inc., 7 Leon C. Megginson, Personnel: A Behavioral A roach to Administration (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1967 , pp. 565-566. 8James A. Behohlav and Paul 0. Popp, "Making Employee Discipline Work," The Personnel Administrator, Vol 23, No. 3 (March 1978) p. 24. 9Kuzmits, p. 76. 10 Gersuny, p. 20. 11Leon D . Boncarosky, "Guidelines to Corrective Discipline," Personnel Journal, Vol 58, No. 10 (Octobe r 1979), p. 698. 521

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12 Frank and Edna Asper Elkouri, How Arbitration Works (Washington, D.C.: The Bureau of National Affairs Inc., 1973), pp. 643-644. 522

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EDUCATION VITA Steven A. Rockwell Colorado Springs, Colorado September 2, 1941 University of Colorado Denver Campus Graduate School of Public Affairs Completed Course Work : --All scheduled classwork (December 1979) --Qualifying Examination (Novembe r 1979) -Major examination (August 1979) --Minor examination (August 1979) University of Colorado-Colorado Springs Campus MPAMay 1978 Graduate School of Public Affairs Emphasis: Human Resource Management University of Southern Colorado BA June 1966 Emphasis: Social Science EXPERIENCE Director of Civilian Personnel USAF Academy March 1979 to Present Chief, Labor & Employee Relations USAF Academy April 1973 to March 1979 Personnel Management Specialist USAF Academy December 1970 to April 1973 Employee Relations Specialist US Army June 1967 to December 1970 Communications Consultant Mountain Bell Telephone September 1966 to June 1967 X-Ray Technologist Penrose Hospital January 1960 to September 196 6 523