BEYOND “FORTRESS PACIFIC”
EXPLORING SUSTAINABLE MOBLIZATION IN GUAM
by
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Beyond Fortress Pacific: Exploring Social Movement in Guam

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ABSTRACT

In 2005, Washington announced plans for the relocation of 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to the U.S. colony of Guam by 2014. Many of Guam’s elite—political officers, businesses, and main media outlets—claim that realignment will reap several benefits, including economic revival, new employment opportunities, renovated infrastructure, increased security, and a more productive relationship with the United States. However, by increasing the population approximately 45%, the move has raised concerns of environmental and cultural risks, especially among the island’s indigenous community, the Chamoru. Despite these implications, anti-expansion resistance is present but not popular. In seeking to answer why resistance has not led to sustainable mobilization, this thesis will employ political process theory, finding that although the anti-expansion movement (AEM) is present, it has not galvanized sustainable mobilization because of the intersection of Guam’s structural (political ambiguity and economy) and cultural (the Liberation narrative) conditions.

The form and content of this abstract are approved. I recommend its publication.

Approved: Lucy Ware McGuffey
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

In the middle of Micronesia lies Fortress Pacific, an island of microscopic proportions (Bohane 2007). Yet despite its size, the island of Guam, as it is more commonly known, poses great significance to the United States by serving as the most strategic U.S. military installation as well as one of the largest nuclear weapons depots in the Pacific Ocean (Rogers 1988, 51). However, what many would consider a term of the past is an ongoing reality for the people of Guam: Guam is a colony of the United States (Naiman 2010, par.1-2, 5). As a colony, the island is subject to dramatic changes within the U.S. military base network (Davis 2011).

One of those dramatic changes occurred in 2005, when Washington announced plans for the relocation of 8,000 Marines in Okinawa to Guam by 2014 (Naiman 2010). Many of Guam’s elite—main media outlets, political officials, and businesses—claim that realignment will reap several benefits, including economic revival, new employment opportunities, renovated infrastructure, increased security, and a productive relationship with the United States (Viernes 2009, 106). However, by increasing the population approximately 45%, the move has raised economic, ecological, and cultural concerns, especially among the island’s indigenous community, the Chamoru (Naiman 2010, par. 6, 8). Despite these implications, anti-expansion resistance is present but not popular.

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1 The term elite is not employed as a pejorative term, but rather, according to social movement literature, refers to people/institutions that hold influential positions.

2 Since 1994, the Chamorro Language Commission refer to the Chamorro as Chamoru (Alexander 2011b, 2). Both terms apply to the indigenous peoples of Guam. However, within this paper, Chamoru will be used unless the original author specifically uses the term Chamorro.
seeking to answer why resistance has not led to sustainable mobilization, this thesis will employ political process theory, finding that although the *anti-expansion movement* (AEM)\(^3\) is present, it has not galvanized sustainable mobilization because of the intersection of Guam’s structural (political ambiguity and economy) and cultural (the Liberation narrative) conditions.

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\(^3\) Although more eloquent names for the indigenous resistance movement in Guam exist, the term *anti-expansion movement* is specifically used for this thesis.
CHAPTER II

“WHY GUAM?”

The island of Guam is the southernmost and largest island of the Mariana Island Chain, a string of islands in the middle of Micronesia (Aguon 2006b, 20). Hosting U.S. military installations such as Anderson Air Force Base, a U.S. naval base, and 35,000 military personnel and their dependents (Alexander 2011a, 7 and 2011b, 3-4), Guam has been deemed by the Pentagon as the “tip of the spear” (Paik 2010), a supposed accolade for providing a distinct U.S. military presence within the reach of China and North Korea. However, such depictions of the island ignore the fact that Guam is not simply a floating military base in the middle of the Pacific (Davis 2011, 7).

Still, the island’s political and social landscape beyond its military distinction is rarely discussed by political leaders in Washington. Insufficient discourse and research about Guam is not peculiar in scholarly analysis. Alexander (2011b, 19) argues that today “military bases have become normalized and the outside world remains conveniently uncurious as to what takes place on small and distant islands.” But as Bevacqua (2010) eloquently noted: “Guam is important precisely because its political existence evades the sharpest critical eyes” (33). Therefore, within this recent announcement for expansion are opportunities for inquiry today. What is the history of Guam, who are its people, and what are the implications behind the announcement for the U.S. military expansion?

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4 Yoshida 2010
History of Colonialism

Before delving into the anti-expansion movement, it is critical to examine the historical context within which the movement developed. To provide this context, a brief discussion on Guam’s colonial history is necessary.

Table 1: “Guam’s Seven Historical Eras”

<table>
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<th>Time Period</th>
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<td>2000 BC-1668</td>
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<td>1668-1898</td>
<td>Spanish Era</td>
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<tr>
<td>1898-1941</td>
<td>U.S. Naval Era</td>
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<tr>
<td>1941-1944</td>
<td>World War II/Japanese Era</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944-1950</td>
<td>Post-War Era</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-1970</td>
<td>Guamanian Era</td>
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<td>1970-Present</td>
<td>Contemporary Era</td>
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(Guampedia 2012)

Prior to becoming a U.S. territory, Guam was a Spanish colony for 200 years.\(^5\) Spanish rule was characterized by oppression, involuntary assimilation to Spanish customs and the Jesuit mission, and near eradication of the Chamoru people from European diseases (Quimby 2012, par. 3, under “warm welcome turns into sporadic

\(^5\) The time period of Spanish colonization is contested. According to Shuster (2010), Guam was under the rule of Spain for 217 years (par. 7, Spanish take Charge). However, other scholars argue that Spanish rule had begun long before 1668, noting that Magellan first invaded the island in 1521.
Alexander (2011b) explains that “the Chamorus put up strong resistance to colonization and forced baptism, but by the end of the 17th century, the combination of war and disease had decimated the population by between 80% and 90%” (Troutman 1998, 332 in 2011b, 11).

In 1898, after the Spanish-American War, Guam, along with Puerto Rico and the Philippines, was placed under the control of the U.S. naval administration (Alexander 2011b, 2-3). Like the Spanish who had colonized the island before them, the U.S. Navy acknowledged that obedience from the Chamoru could be potently enforced through what it believed to be benevolent but nonetheless involuntary assimilation. Therefore, according to Bevacqua (2010), educating the Chamoru was essential for the success of the U.S. colonial project because:

The idea that “Education is important,” forces an informing of absence, such as the prohibition, and thus lack, of Chamorror language in schools, the lack of anything Chamorro related in curriculum…lessons of Chamorro incompleteness, inadequacy, dirtiness, impossibility, invisibility, and nakedness (42).

In other words, U.S. naval education served to enforce the idea that the Chamoru were inadequate, inferior, and deficient. By inflicting a sense of inadequacy upon the Chamoru people, the U.S. Navy could fulfill its desire to create “a new people” in the Chamoru, a people “who would be productive, disciplined, educated, and sanitary” (Hattori 1995a, 1 in Alexander 2011b, 13). According to Anghie (2005), this type of education in colonial projects is “crucial” because it is “linked intimately with the task of normalization, of creating the universe against which the native will be found wanting and that will lead ultimately to reform desired by the native herself” (187).

However, it should be noted that subversive tactics were not uncommon during the naval administration as cases of early indigenous activism were evident almost
immediately after Guam became a U.S. possession (Hattori 1995a in Viernes 2009). Recognizing these efforts is important to the study of Guam’s colonial history because these efforts present a “stark contrast to the view that Chamorros are weak and have complied with the US colonial project in Guam” (Viernes 2009, 106). Resistance against the U.S. naval administration consisted mainly of Scott’s peasant resistance tactics, such as “‘foot dragging, dissimulation, desertion, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, [and] sabotage’” (Scott 1985, xvi in Viernes 2009, 105).

Eventually, these peasant resistance tactics evolved into more conventional modes of political activism. From 1901 to 1950, the people of Guam drafted petitions calling for the formation of a civilian government to replace the naval government (Hattori 1996, 58 in Viernes 2009, 105-106). However, both Congress and the U.S. Navy consistently disputed the petitions (Hattori 1996, 58 in Viernes 2009, 106). To legitimize their rule, the U.S. naval administration argued that it was its duty and obligation to shape the Chamorro into devoted Americans and attempted to expunge any component of Chamorro identity that did not align with the U.S. colonial agenda (Diaz 2001, 165; Hattori 1995a, 13 in Viernes 2009, 104-105). As a result, public life was restricted “‘within the confines of Navy-interpreted American patriotism’” (Underwood in Diaz 2001, 165).

**A Military Colony**

Although the island is no longer ruled by the U.S. naval administration, Guam’s colonial status is not a condition of the past. Currently, the island is a U.S. unincorporated territory. As an unincorporated territory to the United States, Guam’s political and legal
status is in “neocolonial limbo” (Rogers 1988). In other words, the island has neither complete sovereignty nor complete dependence in relation to the United States (Alexander 2011b, 8). Though the residents possess U.S. citizenship, the Constitution is not fully applicable to them, as they cannot vote in presidential elections nor do they have a voting representative in Congress (Bevacqua 2010 in Lai 2011, 12-13).

According to scholars, this politically ambiguous status works in the U.S. military’s favor, as the U.S. territory allows for military training and operations that would otherwise be challenged in host countries (Zielinski 2009, 3 in Davis 2011, 7). Lutz (2010) argues that “Guam, objectively, has the highest ratio of U.S. military spending and military hardware and land takings from indigenous populations of any place on earth” (Lutz 2010, par. 2 under “conclusion”). However, this status did not come about by accident. Due to the decolonization movements of the 50s and 60s, the U.S. Navy implemented a plan of action for island bases as a way to relieve concerns over the future of their continental bases (Vine 2009 in Lutz 2010, par. 1 under “conclusion). As a result, bases in Puerto Rico, Diego Garcia, Hawaii, and Guam were of strategic importance (Lutz 2010, par. 1 under “conclusion”).

Because bases are becoming problematic in politically sovereign locations and due to the success of anti-base protests in island base site such as Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and Okinawa, the U.S. military has been forced to transfer its activity to alternative places, such as Guam “that not only give global coverage, but also give the ability for operational unilaterism,” a term which Davis (2011) describes as “the ability of the military to strike quickly without any need for consultation with anyone—even the government of the territory from which they are launching the strike” (1-2 and 6-9). Thus, the
announcement for military expansion reveals that, due to Guam’s neocolonial status, the U.S. military’s intentions for the island, benevolent or not, remain basically unchallenged (Davis 2011, 7).

Currently, U.S. military presence on Guam mainly consists of the U.S. Naval Base on the eastern coast of the island (Apra Harbor) and Andersen Air Force Base in the northern coast (Yigo) (Figure 1). However, as Figure 1 demonstrates, the U.S. military occupies almost 30% of the island due to additional military facilities (Alexander 2011a, 7 and 2011b, 3-4; Lutz 2010; Yoshida 2010). In fact, all of the military facilities in Figure 1 remain on the island with the exception of the U.S. Naval Air Station in Agana, which was shut down in 1995 based on the decision of a BRAC commission (Pike 2011).
Likewise, many Chamoru serve in the military or have family members who serve (Kirk and Natividad 2010, par.3 under “Political and Economic Status”). According to Kirk and Natividad (2010), “there are three JROTC programs in the island’s public high schools, as well as an ROTC program at the University of Guam (par.3 under “Political and Economic Status”). Guam also holds one of the highest per capita enlistment rates in the US army (Bevacqua 2010).

The Announcement for Realignment

With such a distinct military presence already on the island, the question that then arises is: why the expansion? According to Yoshida (2010), “Guam’s political and economic leaders had been calling on Washington to send back the military” due to a “deep slump in the 1990s and the 2000s as a result of sluggish tourism and the post-cold war closure of a number of bases” (par. 2 under “Guam Opinions”). Furthermore, since 2002, the U.S. and Japan have deliberated the relocation of U.S. forces in Japan through the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), which eventually paved the way for the Alliance Transformation and Realignment Agreement (ATARA) in 2005 (Draft EIS in Yoshida 2010, par. 25). The point of these discussions was to “ameliorate longstanding frustrations among the local population [in Okinawa] and improve the local political support for the stable and enduring presence of the remaining U.S. forces” (Draft EIS in Yoshida 2010, par. 25. Brackets not in original quote).

However, Yoshida (2010) argues that the United States had planned to enhance the U.S. military presence in Guam long before it ever made arrangements with Japan (par. 22). Maintaining U.S. military presence in the Pacific has been crucial since the closure
of the U.S. naval base at Subic Bay, Philippines in 1992 (Yoshida 2010, par. 22). Brooke (2004) notes that “the Philippine Senate refused to extend the lease, and American memories of that remain sharp” (par. 8). Therefore, the ideal location for the U.S. military would be a place in which they are not only accepted, but more importantly, not easily removed (Brooke 2004, par. 8). However, the emphasis on an ideal location does not indicate that the U.S. military is intent on expanding in Guam simply because it has the power to do so:

_The military’s goal is to locate forces where those forces are wanted and welcomed by the host country_. Because these countries within the region [the Philippines, Australia, Korea, Singapore, and Thailand] have indicated their unwillingness and inability to host more U.S. forces on their lands, the U.S. military has shifted its focus to basing on U.S. sovereign soil. (Draft EIS in Yoshida 2010, par. 2 under “Why Guam?” Brackets not in original quote. Emphasis added).

In other words, the U.S. military is operating on the belief that the people of Guam openly welcome the expansion.

Nonetheless, since 2004, there has been increasing pressure from Okinawans to relocate U.S. forces due to various concerns stemming from pollution, noise, aircraft accidents, and crime within the Okinawan military base community (Yoshida 2010, par. 2). Therefore, in order to “maintain deterrence and capabilities while reducing burdens of local communities,” Japan and the United States made arrangements for the relocation of 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam by 2014 (Naiman 2010; Yoshida 2010, par. 2-4).

According to the “Guam Integrated Military Development Plan” and the “Guam Joint Military Master Plan,” several conditions were put forth regarding what would be considered an ideal location for realignment (Yoshida 2010, par. 3 under “Why Guam?”). According to the Draft EIS, all of these conditions were fulfilled through Guam, making
it “the only location for the realignment of forces” (Yoshida 2010, par. 3 under “Why Guam?”):

• “Position U.S. forces to defend the homeland including the U.S. Pacific territories”
• “Location within a timely response range”
• “Maintain regional stability, peace and security”
• “Maintain flexibility to respond to regional threats”
• “Provide powerful U.S. presence in the Pacific region”
• “Increase aircraft carrier presence in the Western Pacific”
• “Defend U.S., Japan, and other allies’ interests”
• “Provide capabilities that enhance global mobility to meet contingencies around the world”
• “Have a strong local command and control structure”

These conditions demonstrate the meticulous maintenance and planning behind the announcement for realignment. However, despite Guam fulfilling these requirements, the possibility of U.S. military expansion has raised both questions and concerns within the island. Such concerns have provided a platform for the anti-expansion movement in Guam.
CHAPTER III
CONCERNS ABOUT THE BUILD-UP

The announcement for expansion warrants analysis of the ways U.S. military bases impact the local community (Lutz 2010). This analysis is significant because, in addition to many positive attributes such as defense and economic support, U.S. military bases can produce substantially negative political, ecological, and cultural consequences (Yeo 2006, 36). Some of these effects include high rates of out-migration, land degradation, water depletion, road damage, rape and gender violence, in addition to the rejection of sovereignty, self-determination, and human rights (Alexander 2011a, 10-11 and 2011b, 3; Lutz 2010, par. 1, under “the externalized costs of bases”).

As a way of gauging the possible hazards of the expansion, there has been extensive research performed by the people of Guam, U.S. agencies, and the U.S. Navy (Lutz 2010, par. 1, under “the externalized costs of bases”). Although there are several concerns circulating around the expansion, this chapter will focus on the most cited concerns: funding, displacement, security, land, environment, international law, and the economy. Although not all anti-expansion activists stand behind each of these concerns, together these questions and concerns compose the platform of anti-expansion resistance on Guam.

Funding

For military expansion to occur, Guam will need considerable funding. The main concern with funding is the way in which it is broadcast to the people of Guam. Advocates of the expansion argue that increased federal funding will lead to “improved infrastructure…and expansions to water and power systems and roadways” (Viernes
However, closer analysis reveals that most of the funding coming from the U.S. and Japan will be relegated to the military bases on Guam.

In 2006, the U.S. and Japan came to a decision that approximately $10.3 billion would be necessary for “facilities and infrastructure development costs” (Japan Ministry of Defense in Yoshida 2010, par. 9). Due to increasing pressure from Okinawans that “relocation be realized rapidly,” Japan committed to fund $6.09 billion, or more than 60% of the expansion (Yoshida 2010, par. 9). However, despite what advocates broadcast, Japan and the U.S. military do not actually claim to deliver on any civilian projects (Aguon 2008, 126).

According to Yoshida (2010), “Japan’s contribution is being spent not only to design and build Marine Corps facilities but to subsidize infrastructure improvement at Andersen Air Force base and at a Naval base” (Ministry of Defense in Yoshida 2010, par. 4). The budget included a new fire station, military police station, barracks, restaurant, and gymnasium at Finegayan as well as a medical clinic and new facilities for the port operation unit headquarters at Apra Harbor (Yoshida 2010, par. 3 under “Guam Budget”). Therefore, as Japan’s Ministry of Defense claimed, funding is relegated to the military.

The original U.S. contribution of $4.18 billion was confined to the military as well. According to the FY2009 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress approved $180 million for developing military projects on Guam (Yoshida 2010, par. 1 and 3 under Guam Budget). In 2010, $734 million was approved to begin a series of expansion support (Yoshida 2010, par. 1 under Guam Budget). Finally, in 2011, approximately $566 million was proposed to Congress within the National Defense Authorization Act (Yoshida 2010,
par. 2 under “Guam Budget”). According to Yoshida (2010), the breakdown of funding within the proposal is clear.

![Funding from National Defense Authorization Act](image)

(Cagurangan 2010 in Yoshida 2010, par. 2 under “Guam Budget)

**Figure 2. Funding from National Defense Authorization Act**

As Figure 2 demonstrates, 75% of funding, or $426.8 million of the $566 million, will be allocated to the Navy “for marine aviation ramp improvements, Apra Harbor improvements and defense access road improvements.” Approximately, 12%, or $70 million, will be allocated for the Naval Hospital. The National Defense Act also authorized $50 million, or 9% of the budget “for Guam Strike Group operations and ramp upgrades, combat communications facilities, Red Horse engineering facilities and commando warrior barracks” at Anderson Air Force Base. Finally, the remaining 4% ($20 million) of the $566 million would go toward the Guam Army National Guard for “the combined support maintenance ship and the readiness center” (Cagurangan 2010 in Yoshida 2010, par. 2 under “Guam Budget”). Thus, although local officials may possess good intentions for supporting the build-up, it appears that most of the money will go toward improving Guam’s military bases (Aguon 2008, 126).
Displacement

In addition, the introduction of additional military, their dependents, and foreign workers to Guam is a significant concern because of the potential for further displacement of the indigenous community. According to the 2010 U.S. Census Bureau, only 37% of Guam’s population is Chamoru. In other words, the indigenous community of Guam makes up less than half of the island’s 170,000 people.6

This low representation of the Chamoru is a result of centuries of colonization. During Spanish rule, the introduction of European diseases greatly diminished the Chamoru population of 40,000 to fewer than 4,000 in less than 50 years (1668-1704) (Quimby 2012, par. 3 under “warm welcome turns into sporadic resistance”). Likewise, through a national security clearance program that remained effective until 1962, the U.S. military held exclusive control over “who came in and out” of Guam (Aguon 2006a, 20).

Furthermore, military deployment became typical in the 1950s after the Chamoru were granted citizenship, creating further displacement of the native population (TANJI 2012, 103). Therefore, according to Quimby (2012), the present Chamoru population is an amalgamation, a mixture of those who had incorporated culture from Spain, the Philippines, and America into their lives through “accommodation by appropriation” (par. 6 under ‘earlier encounters shaped by trade, not by conquest”).

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6 Roughly 25% of Guam’s population is Filipino, 10% are Caucasian, and the remaining percentage are comprised of Korean, Japanese, and Chinese. Therefore, when referencing the “people of Guam,” “Guamanians,” or the “residents of Guam” who support or resist the buildup, scholars are referring to the total population on the island, not just the Chamoru people.
Aguon (2006b) argues that such displacement not only weakened the Chamorro populace, but also left a harmful impact upon their identity by complicating the process of self-determination (49). This complication is manifested in the constant debate surrounding who qualifies as a Chamoru and who, therefore, is able to participate in self-determination plebiscites. Critics of Chamoru self-determination often emphasize the Chamoru people’s “impure” lineage as a way to delegitimize the indigenous community (Monnig 2007, 407 in Alexander 2011b, 12 and 15). Therefore, in order to “deserve” self-determination, the Chamoru are often called upon to ‘prove their authenticity,’ an act that, according to Monnig (2007), “has shaped their abilities to work through issues of importance such as language, land, immigration, and political status” (in Alexander 2011b, 15). Thus, although the Chamoru are already outnumbered, the possible increase in additional military members has raised concerns about the way an altered population will affect future politics.

**Land**

In addition to concerns of cultural displacement, the concern regarding the appropriation of more land plays a prominent role in discourse of the anti-expansion movement. Early announcements for the military expansion required an additional “2,000 acres of forest and recovery habitat for housing… and 1,090 acres of government and privately owned land for the construction of a firing range complex” (We are Pagat 2012). Currently, military installations occupy almost 30% of the island’s land for bases and other military facilities (Alexander 2011a, 7 and 2011b, 3-4).

Therefore, acquiring additional land on an island of only 212 square miles becomes increasingly problematic to anti-expansion expansionists. Military appropriation of
land is nothing new to the people of Guam. After World War II, significant portions of land were used for the U.S. military (Kirk and Natividad 2010, under “Political and Economic Status,” par. 2). Aguon (2006a) argues that “by the end of it [World War II], the U.S. had illegally taken control of 2/3 of our total real estate under the all-too-familiar guise of national security” (Aguon 2006a, 31).

However, analysis of military land appropriation on Guam demonstrates that indigenous land was not always taken for national security purposes, but sometimes for the explicit purpose of “recreational use,” such as parks and rec centers, for the military and their dependents (Hattori 1995b, 60 in Aguon 2006a, 32). This controversy is further complicated by U.S. claims that all land taken for military purposes has already been

(Joint Guam Program Office in Yoshida 2010)

**Figure 3. Map of Proposed Build-up**

However, analysis of military land appropriation on Guam demonstrates that indigenous land was not always taken for national security purposes, but sometimes for the explicit purpose of “recreational use,” such as parks and rec centers, for the military and their dependents (Hattori 1995b, 60 in Aguon 2006a, 32). This controversy is further complicated by U.S. claims that all land taken for military purposes has already been
compensated. However, Aguon (2006a) argues that ‘‘just compensation’ exists only in the empty imaginings of people who have yet to be seasoned by the realities of historical record” (32).

In other words, rhetoric involving ‘just compensation,’ such as that found in the law of eminent domain, are simply irrelevant principles to Guam (Aguon 2006a, 32). According to Aguon (2006a), at the time that the United States took over substantial portions of Guam’s land, the people of Guam were not even “citizens of the State” and, therefore, could not be guaranteed reimbursement (32). Therefore, the law was inapplicable to the colonized Chamorro people after World War II, making the argument for eminent domain inapplicable to Guam as well (Aguon 2006a, 32). Such discussion of eminent domain is not used to argue that the U.S. military has never compensated for land taken, but rather to point out that the process of compensation is much more complex than often realized.

In addition to concerns regarding the amount of land taken, there has also been controversy regarding specific portions of land. Anti-expansion activists were extremely vocal about the military’s intentions to use Pagat, an ancient village and important site for the indigenous community in the northeast of Guam (Alexander 2011b, 5; Kirk and Natividad 2010, under “Draft Environmental Impact Statement,” par. 4; Davis 2011, 8). As Hattori noted, for the Chamoru people, “land is wealth…it’s always been very key about who you are, what’s your clan, where you live” (Warheit 2010). Therefore, for many members within the indigenous community, the meaning attached to their land goes beyond discussion of ‘just compensation.’
Security

Another significant concern for anti-expansion activists is Guam’s security. It should be noted that the expansion concerns more than the transfer of 8,000 Marines. According to Yoshida (2010) and Aguon (2008), in addition to the Marine transfer, Guam would have to accommodate six additional nuclear aircraft carriers, a Ballistic Missile Defense station, and a Global Strike Force (Yoshida 2010, par. 1 under “Why Guam?” and Aguon 2008, 125). Activists such as Aguon (2006b) are worried that continuing to militarize the island through expansion will only exacerbate U.S.-China and U.S.-North Korea relations, causing China and North Korea to further militarize in retaliation (69). Therefore by expanding, Aguon (2006b) argues that “we will all be in more danger than we were before” (69).

In addition, the expansion does not just involve concerns over traditional security, but human security as well. The potential for a rise in crime plays a significant role in activists’ issues with the build-up. Analyzing other foreign military bases, Aguon (2006b) argues that “more than 30,000 crimes were committed by U.S. military personnel against Korean civilians in a short span of twenty years (1967-1987)” (88). Based on the National Campaign to Eradicate Crime by U.S. Troops in Korea, many of these crimes involved rape and murder (Aguon 2006b, 88).

Furthermore, the source of these incoming military personnel contributes to the concerns with crime. When looking specifically at Okinawa, “more than 4,790 criminal charges have been brought against US military personnel during the 34 years since Okinawa reverted to Japan in 1972” (Aguon 2006b, 71). Wondering whether “the same troubles harassing the people of Okinawa” will be a reality for the people of Guam,
Aguon (2006b) questions why local officials welcome troops from the very base where reports of rape, assault, insobriety, and environmental contamination have been concerns for the people of Okinawa (31-32).

**Environment**

Studies reveal that there has already been significant impact upon the environment of Guam due to a history of U.S. military presence. In 1952, 5,000 drums of Agent Purple were stored on the island for the Korean War (Aguon 2006b, 26). In the 1960s, alarming levels of toxins were found at Anderson Air force Base (Aguon 2006b, 26). According to Aguon (2006b), Guam experienced nuclear fallout from more than ten of the bombs released onto Enewetak during nuclear testing of the Marshall Islands, located 1200 miles east of Guam (25).

Aguon (2006a) argues that Guam has yet to receive just compensation for these offenses (33). According to the Assessment of the Scientific Information for the Radiation Exposure Screening and Education Program of *The National Research Council of the National Academies of Science*:

*Guam did receive measurable fallout from the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons in the Pacific. Residents of Guam during that period should be eligible for compensation under RECA in a way similar to that of persons considered to be downwinders (footnote 35, in Aguon 2006a, 34).*

Despite these reports, scholars claim that Guam has not been compensated (Aguon 2006a, 34). Furthermore, despite the Guam Environmental Protection Agency finding carcinogenic substances infecting the water and the fish in Guam’s Apra Harbor and Cocos Lagoon, the areas have not been decontaminated (Aguon 2006b, 25). Based on
these cases of past negligence, activists such as Aguon have very little faith in the U.S. military’s environmental stewardship for future expansion.

Soon after the news of the expansion arrived, the Draft Environmental Impact Statement / Overseas Environmental Impact Statement: Guam and CNMI Military Relocation Relocating Marines from Okinawa, Visiting Aircraft Carrier Berthing, and Army Air and Missile Defense Task Force (Draft EIS) was published by the Joint Guam Program Office of the Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Pacific in November 2009. According to Yoshida (2010), the 8,000-to-10,000-page document discusses the environmental hazards the expansion could possibly bring upon the island (Yoshida 2010, par. 1 under “Why Guam?”). Many of these negative effects resonate with concerns over the expansion.

Furthermore, an evaluation released by the Environmental Protection Agency stated that the population increase from the expansion “will result in unsatisfactory impacts to Guam’s existing substandard drinking water and wastewater infrastructure which may result in significant adverse public health impacts” as well as “unacceptable impacts to 71 acres of high quality coral reef ecosystem in Apra Harbor” (Kirk and Natividad 2010, under “Shift in Leadership Stance,” par. 8). Because most of the supplies for redevelopment will have to be imported due to Guam’s inadequate industry, local residents could lose even more significant portions of the island’s land, water and other resources (Alexander 2011b, 5; Kirk and Natividad 2010, under “Draft Environmental Impact Statement,” par. 4; Davis 2011, 8).
International Law

The argument exhaustively used to deny the Chamoru the right to self-determination is that they are too incompetent to self-govern (Aguon 2006a, 29). This criticism is often derived from cases of inefficiency within the local government of Guam. According to a "Risk Assessment Report for United States Attorney's Offices District of Guam and District of the Northern Mariana Islands" conducted in 2001-2002, many local officials who had served during the administration of Governor Gutierrez were found guilty in federal court for cases of public corruption, involving nepotism, drug smuggling, and abuse of federal funding (Meissner 2002).

Advocates of expansion often declare that these highly-scandalized cases are just a few of many cases of corruption revealing Guam’s inability to self-govern. Although local corruption represents an indictment on the local government of Guam, anti-expansion scholars question whether enhanced military presence is truly the solution to accountable governance, and whether further reliance on federal funding will breed more inefficiency within the local government. More importantly, according to Aguon (2006a), the fact that the United States is disregarding international law is rarely considered a significant hindrance to true self-governance (29). Yet, as this section demonstrates, international law plays a significant role in discourse over the military expansion (Lutz 2010, par. 1 under “conclusion”).

Guam is one of sixteen remaining non-self-governing territories in the world. According to UN Resolution 1514 of 1960:

immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers
to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire (in Aguon 2006b, 48).

Therefore, Guam’s status as a non-self-governing territory signifies that the United States, “as a signatory of the United Nations Charter,” is obligated to promote and foster the conditions necessary for true self-government for the people of Guam (Aguon 2006a, 26 and 2006b, 48). Furthermore, UN Resolution 1514, also notes that self-determination is a right, not a principle (Aguon 2006a, 27). This “right to freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development” has never been exercised by the Chamoru. Therefore, regardless of the people of Guam’s U.S. citizenship, faithful military service, or activists’ consistent attempts to resist further expansion, in the end, Guam remains a colony and will continue to remain so as long as the “people have not historically chosen their most powerful leaders and have been told to background their own national identity in favor of that of the power which has ultimate rule” (Lutz 2010, par. 6).

As a result, scholars argue that enhancing the U.S. military presence contradicts the very principles that the U.S. military claims to protect (Davis 2011; Lutz 2010, par. 6). However, this serious concern is not at the forefront of discussion regarding the expansion. Rather, as the next section will explain, much more discourse is dedicated to the effect the expansion will have on the economy.

**Economy**

Despite all of these questions, Lutz (2010) notes that the central concern does not necessarily circulate around social or environmental risks of the expansion, but around the economy (par. 2, under “the externalized cost of bases”). Lutz (2010) argues that the
economy is the most discussed factor because Guam’s elites frame the expansion as an economic godsend (par. 2, under “the externalized cost of bases”). This framing is particularly potent when scholars consider the island’s present economic structure. Currently, a third of Guam’s population lives on food stamps and a quarter lives below the U.S. poverty level (Kirk and Natividad 2010, under “Political and Economic Status,” par. 3).

After the announcement, many of Guam’s elite claimed that great economic opportunity will accompany the build-up (Viernes 2009, 109-110). From job growth to an improved real estate market, several benefits of expansion have been broadcast to the people of Guam. However, a breakdown of these advantages, often touted by supporters of the expansion, reveals that the increase in jobs is either relegated to the military sector or primarily short-term (Lutz 2010, par. 4 under “externalized cost of bases”).

According to a 2007 Guam Employment Report, “while employment in manufacturing, transportation and public utilities and retail trade decreased, increases were seen for jobs in the service sector and public sector; with the construction sector experiencing the largest increase, that is, 1,450 jobs, or 35 per cent” for the year (Lutz 2010, par. 4 under “externalized cost of bases”). However, even the sector that experienced the largest increase raises concerns. Examining whether plans for development “will trickle down to the ordinary people of Guam,” Viernes (2009) argues that “while the influx of military personnel and their dependents will most certainly require the construction of new facilities and the improvement of Guam’s dilapidated infrastructure, local firms and local workers may not necessarily be hired to take on those projects” (110). Thus, Viernes (2009) argues that if history is any indicator, cheaper labor
from foreign countries will be employed instead (110). Furthermore, according to the report, jobs that would prevail the temporary upswing are more likely to center on the lower-wage industry of retail, which, according to Lutz (2010), would only contribute to the already harsh disparities between locals and the military (par. 4 under “externalized cost of bases”).

With such concerns, indigenous activists are questioning whether this short-term growth is truly beneficial, as it is often portrayed, or is rather a temporary solution to Guam’s inadequate economy and infrastructure (Aguon 2006b, 32). In fact, according to anti-expansion activists, part of the problem with the expansion is that it does not necessarily serve to cultivate a sustainable economy on Guam, but rather to preserve its dependence on the United States (Aguon 2006b, 42).

**Reasons for Resistance**

As questions and concerns regarding the build-up are raised, Guam’s anti-expansion activists attempt to analyze who the true recipients of the expansion will be (Aguon 2006b, 45; Lutz 2010 par. 4 under “externalized cost of bases”). Although not all anti-expansion activists stand behind each of these concerns, these issues are nonetheless the most cited points raised. By shedding light on the substantially negative political, ecological, and cultural effects expansion could have on the island, discourse of these concerns have provided a platform for anti-expansion movement in Guam.
CHAPTER IV

ANTI-EXPANSION MOVEMENT: PRESENT BUT NOT PROMINENT

After the Draft Environmental Impact Statement’s (EIS) assessment of the environmental hazards the military expansion could have on the island, resistance against the expansion began to take shape (Alexander 2011a, 16; Davis 2011, 8). The EIS’s inclusion of Pagat for the military build-up gained particular attention, creating controversy over the acquisition of more land and serving as a reminder of the extensive amount of indigenous land that had already been taken. Thus, once the results of the EIS were thrust toward the public, “a protest movement against the buildup surged” (Davis 2011, 8).

This surge of resistance was demonstrated through the presence of mobilization structures (Alexander 2011a, 16; Viernes 2009, 112-114). According to Johnston (2011), “mobilization structures are the organizational means by which people step outside of their daily routines and enter the streets to protest” (54). As a result, mobilization structures are comprised of civil society associations and organizations, as well as the resources necessary to sustain them (Johnston 2011, 52-54).

Meaningful Mobilization Structures

Guam’s current mobilization structures display both local and international levels of interaction. Local alternative media, such as the weekly public radio program, “Beyond the Fence” hosted by University of Guam students allowed for candid conversations and pushback regarding the military build-up (Alexander 2011a, 16). Protests occurred along Marine Corps Drive (Viernes 2009, 112). Organizations founded in Guam, such as the
Chamoru Cultural Development and Research Institute, and Naison Chamoru consistently asserted the injustices of the expansion (Viernes 2009). In addition, the Chamoru have taken their resistance beyond the island and engaged in international discourse, such as at the 2006 UN Special Political and Decolonization Committee (Viernes 2009, 113-114). The Guåhan Indigenous Collective launched the online Peace and Justice for Guam Petition, which acquired signatures from on and off the island. Through International Peoples’ Coalition against Military Pollution, the National Asian Pacific American Women’s Forum, and Women against Militarism, trans-national alliances with anti-base activists in Puerto Rico, Hawaii, Okinawa, and South Korea have also played a role in the resistance (Alexander 2011a, 16; Davis 2011, 8; Viernes 2009, 114).

Such transnational alliances are significant because Guam’s experiences are often only comparable to other island bases, such as Puerto Rico (Vieques), Hawaii (Kaho’olawe, Makua Valley), Okinawa, and Diego Garcia (Lutz 2010, par. 1 under “conclusion”). Davis (2011) argues that, due to the success of anti-base protests on these island bases, the U.S. military has been forced to transfer their activity to alternative places, such as Guam (Davis 2011, 1-2 and 7-9). As a result, Guam stands as one of the last remaining military sites in the Asia-Pacific region (Davis 2011, 1-2). Due to this shift, local activists in Guam began forming alliances with anti-base activists in other island base sites (Davis 2011, 8). As a result, these alliances not only created opportunities for “sharing tactics, strategies, and support,” but also expanded the audience to which Guam’s activists could articulate their struggles (Alexander 2011a, 16; Davis 2011, 8-9). By sharing tactics and generating greater awareness, transnational alliances allowed members to defend each
other’s interests, which Johnston (2011) argues should sustain movement mobilization (Davis 2011, 8-9; Johnston 2011).

Failure to Galvanize Sustainable Mobilization

This analysis reveals that Guam’s meaningful mobilization structures are providing avenues for activists on Guam to articulate their opposition against the military expansion. More importantly, the structures indicate that anti-expansion resistance clearly resides on the island of Guam (Alexander 2011a, 16 and 2011b, 5; Viernes 2009, 112-114). However, despite the presence of these structures, the movement has not galvanized sufficient support to effect substantive change. In other words, the anti-expansion movement has not catalyzed sustainable mobilization.

Mobilization is often defined as an interest-based challenge to the state (Johnston 2011, 51-52). According to Johnston (2011), these challenges can encompass both institutional and non-institutional plans of action (51). Institutional plans of action involve political activities such as lobbying, petitioning, court contestation, party mobilization, pressure groups, recalls, and referenda (Johnston 2011, 51-52). In contrast, non-institutional plans of action deal specifically with protest campaigns, or politics on the street, characterized by “special kinds of performances such as marches, demonstrations, petitions” (16). Analysis of Guam’s mobilization structures reveals that both institutional and non-institutional plans of action characterize the anti-expansion movement.

However, in order for a movement to have sustainable mobilization, there must be sufficient support of these plans of action to effect substantive change. Yet when
examining the anti-expansion movement in Guam, scholars note that there is not sufficient support, and, as a result, there has not been substantive change. This thesis seeks to answer why such is the case, but first, it is necessary to clearly delineate *sufficient support* and *substantive change*.

**Sufficient Support**

When referring to sufficient support, this thesis is referring to not only the *number* of supporters (in proportion to the population), but also the *type* of supporters (institutional actors/elite) (Johnston 2011, 15). The anti-expansion movement in Guam is characterized by both an insufficient *number of supporters* and a lack of *elite allies*.

**Number of Supporters**

When analyzing the ‘number of supporters’ factor, a majority of the population of Guam do not support the anti-expansion resistance (Davis 2011, Lutz 2010, Robertson 2011, Aguon 2006). This lack of support could be based on the widespread notion that a majority of the population of Guam actually approve of the expansion. According to Robertson (2011), those in the anti-expansion resistance are the “vocal minority” while the majority who support the expansion are referred to as the “silent majority” or those “who see a great boost to the local economy as a direct result of the military buildup” (74). Thus, there are no hard data demonstrating the ratio of expansion advocates to expansion opponents. Regardless of whether a majority of the people of Guam actually approve of the expansion, both anti-expansion activists and expansion advocates acknowledge that the anti-expansion movement lacks sufficient support.
Elite Allies

The second factor that demonstrates a lack of sufficient support is based on the lack of support from institutional actors/elites. According to Viernes (2009), based on their influence on the island, Guam’s elite can be categorized into three roles: the media, businesses, and political officials. As discussed earlier, Guam’s elite openly state that realignment is beneficial to the island by claiming that it would usher in economic revival, new employment opportunities, better infrastructure, increased security, and a productive relationship with the United States (Viernes 2009, 106). It should be noted that Guam’s elite can merely be responding to what they perceive as the true desires of the people of Guam. Although not every form of media, successful business, or political official is or should be considered a threat to the anti-expansion movement, these three types have been the most vocal and will, therefore, be critiqued as unsupportive of the anti-expansion movement.

Media. In Guam, the dominant newspaper is the Pacific Daily News, which is owned by the U.S. publishing company Gannett Co. Inc. (Viernes 2009, 107). Therefore, due to its relationship with Gannett, it is possible that PDN is more likely to reflect a pro-expansion attitude by constantly headlining approval of U.S. policies, such as the military expansion (Viernes 2009, 104, 107). According to Viernes (2009, 107), such headlines include: “Relocation of Marines to Guam Could be a Good thing” (7 November 2005); “Let’s Follow Okinawa’s Example and Flourish with Marine Build-up” (15 August 2006); and “Military Buildup, Relocations Will Change Island, Hopefully for Better” (4 December 2006).
Likewise, *PDN’s* media bias was particularly problematic in the use of surveys. In 2006, *PDN* commissioned two surveys soliciting whether voters found the expansion beneficial or not (Viernes 2009, 107-109). The question in the survey read:

“There's been talk lately of Guam's population expanding by 30,000 people as a result of the military expansion plan for Guam. Do you think this will be a good thing for Guam, a bad thing for Guam, or haven't you thought much about this?”

The findings of the first survey revealed that 61% found the expansion a “good thing,” while 15% found it a “bad thing” (Dumat Ol Daleno 2006a in Viernes 2009). The second survey reveals a slight increase in support with 69% voting a “good thing,” and 10% a “bad thing” (Dumat Ol Daleno 2006b in Viernes 2009). Aside from the reductionist approval/disapproval format of the surveys, Viernes (2009) discusses how these polls that *PDN* conducted involved a small sample (less than 1%) of the island’s registered voters (109). Considering the fact that there were 55,311 registered voters in Guam in 2006, *PDN* headlines were misleading readers by “boasting these seemingly conclusive findings” (Viernes 2009, 109).

**Businesses.** Main media outlets are not the only ones commissioning surveys in Guam. According to a survey conducted in 2008 and financed by Guam’s Chamber of Commerce:

71 per cent of Guam residents supported an increase in the United States military presence, with nearly 80 per cent of the view that the increasing military presence would result in additional jobs and tax revenue; according to the poll, 60 per cent felt the additional Marines on the island would have a positive effect and would ultimately improve the island’s quality of life” (Lutz 2010, par. 3 under “the externalized cost of bases).

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7 Only 502 people were polled for the first survey (Viernes 2009, 109). During the second survey, only 500 people were polled (Viernes 2009, 109).
Support for the expansion is also demonstrated by institutions such as the First Hawaiian Bank, one of Guam’s leading financial institutions (Laney 2006, 4). Analyzing Guam’s major external drivers—tourism, the military, real estate, and construction—First Hawaiian Bank’s Economic Forecast (2006-2007) ambitiously broadcast that “an average of $1.5 billion per year will be pumped into the Guam Economy” (Laney 2006-2007, 9). However, even Dr. Laney, First Hawaiian Bank’s economic consultant and author of the forecast, acknowledged that many of the positive figures associated with the build-up are based on “assumptions”—whether that be the amount of funding actually provided to Guam, inflation, off-island labor, or Guam’s inadequate infrastructure (Laney 2006, 12). Still, the forecast concludes that the expansion will benefit the island’s employment rates, real estate, and residents (Laney 2006, 12).

**Political officials.** Finally, Guam’s political leaders play a substantial role in the anti-expansion movement. Viernes (2009, 109) discusses how some of the most important political officials voiced their view of the possible expansion, shortly after the announcement. For example, former Governor Felix P. Camacho, who had served during the time of the announcement, declared within his State of the Island Address that the expansion would be “the greatest economic boom our island has yet seen” (Limtiaco 2006 in Viernes 2009, 107).

Likewise, Guam Representative Bordallo proclaimed that “the increase in spending on Guam and the benefits associated with having more military personnel and their families promises to breathe new life and renewed strength into our economy” (Bordallo 2006 in Viernes 2009 (107). Mark Forbes, Speaker of the Twenty Eighth Guam Legislature, declared that “Guam remains enthusiastic, as it always has been, to do its
part to promote the National Defense and ensure the safety and security of all our people” at the regional hearing for the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (Limtiaco 2006a in Viernes 2009, 107).

Such vocal support for the expansion is significant because these political officials speak on behalf of the entire island (Viernes 2009, 108). However, it is important to note that not all of Guam’s elected officials, forms of media, and businesses have been unsupportive. Despite his support for the expansion, current Governor Calvo has, nonetheless, helped create opportunities for the anti-expansion movement by reconvening the Commission on Decolonization (Shuster 2010, par. 1 under “status questions unresolved”). As a result, two UN regional seminars and three Decolonization plenary sessions had representatives from Guam’s Commission on Decolonization not only present, but also testifying (Shuster 2010, par. 1 under “status questions resolved”).

Again, it can be argued that Guam’s elite are merely responding to what they perceive as the true desires of the people of Guam. However, whether the elite have persuaded the public to be supportive of the expansion, or the majority in Guam have persuaded the elite that the expansion is beneficial is not the point in this particular analysis. Clearly the two mutually reinforce each other. The point is that there is no large number of anti-expansion activists and a lack of elite allies. Therefore, the movement has not galvanized sufficient support.

**Substantive Change**

When referring to substantive change, this thesis is referring to the primary goal of the anti-expansion movement: preventing the expansion from taking place on the island. The U.S. has been responsive on some of the aspects concerning the expansion. In 2012, for
example, a *Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement* was conducted in response to some of the concerns of the original *Draft Environmental Impact Statement*. After the *DEIS* of 2009 discussed the environmental hazards the expansion could possibly bring upon the island (Yoshida 2010, par. 1 under “Why Guam?”), the Joint Guam Program Office (JGPO), which serves as a liaison between the U.S. Department of Defense and Guam’s local officials (Louis Berger Group, Inc. 2013), discussed how the *SEIS* would examine “the best operational, least environmentally damaging” options for the buildup (Carrera 2012, par. 4 under “fresh look needed”).

Some of the changes included the U.S. Navy analyzing alternative methods “to conduct live-fire training in a manner that would not impact access to Pagat,” an ancient village and important site for the indigenous community (SEIS 2012, par. 1 under “FAQ About the Project”). Furthermore, according to the *SEIS*, “the number of Marines to be relocated has been reduced from the originally planned 8,600 Marines and 9,000 family members, to a force of approximately 5,000 Marines and 1,300 family members on Guam” (SEIS 2012, par. 2 under “FAQ About the Project”). The *SEIS* also noted that “approximately two-thirds of the Marines relocated to Guam will be rotational with the remaining one-third permanent” (SEIS 2012, par. 2 under “FAQ About the Project”).

However, the supplemental study and reduction in servicemen has not completely alleviated concerns among the anti-expansion community. Although JGPO appears to be responsive to the environmental concerns of the buildup, Joe Ludovici, Executive Director of JGPO made it a point “to ensure the public knew that the military buildup is moving forward” (Carrera 2012, par. 1 under “No Pause”). The U.S. response after the
announcement for expansion is clear: despite the economic, environmental, and political concerns of the expansion that have been circulated in Guam, expansion will continue.

Therefore, the SIES demonstrates that the anti-expansion movement has not galvanized sufficient support to effect substantive change, and therefore lacks sustainable mobilization. This scenario of present but not prominent resistance has led scholars to explore the reasons for such an enigma. Do these low-levels of resistance signify that the majority of the people on Guam truly embrace military expansion? Or could there be a deeper explanation for the failure to galvanize?
CHAPTER V
EXPLANATIONS THROUGH SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORIES

Social movement literature might provide an answer to these critical questions. According to Pastor and Ortiz (2009), social movement theories are designed “to connect people, organizations, and social change into one unified understanding” of the principal factors that lead to mobilization. One predominant social movement theory is the political process model (Pastor and Ortiz 2009, 10-11).

Political Process Theory

According to political process theory, political opportunities lead to social movement by shifting the cost-benefit ratio (Pastor and Ortiz 2009, 11). Political opportunities include a range of factors that can either propagate or inhibit an issue, such as elite connection to the issue, freedom of the media to discuss the issue, or the amount of external pressures from global regimes to support the issue (see Figure 4). Johnston (2011) argues that the first set of political opportunities/threats—intensity of social control and the presence or absence of elite connection, elite reinforcement, and elite sympathy—is a reflection of the type of government within the state, and therefore, depend on how the state is constituted (Johnston 2011, 51-52). The second set of political opportunities/threats is based upon the level of policy implementation, freedom in the media, countermovement activity, and pressures from global regimes (Johnston 2011, 51-52). Therefore, these sets of political opportunities/threats are technically structures because they are institutional arrangements.

According to Johnston (2011), structural explanation for social movements refer to “‘hard’ institutional arrangements—meaning opportunities that compel action
straightforwardly and threats that constrain automatically—both requiring little interpretative creativity” (49). On the other hand, political process theory understands that political opportunities often undergo collective interpretation by movement members (Johnston 46-47). In other words, “to understand the reason for protest mobilization, the analyst must delve into collective processes of meaning making, culture, and discursive production” (Johnston 2011, 47).

Therefore, although these sets of political opportunities/threats are technically structures because they are institutional arrangements, “all elements of opportunities and threat need to be perceived as such” (Johnston 2011, 53). What makes political opportunities and threats cultural factors is the fact that political opportunities and threats must go through a framing process by which they are perceived as actual opportunities or threats (Johnston 2011, 53). This perception takes place through the process of collective action framing. According to Johnston (2011), the combination of these two elements can make for an exhaustive but nonetheless thorough examination of the causes of social movement mobilization (47). Thus, the advantage of political process theory is its consideration of both structural (hard) and cultural (soft) causes of social movement mobilization.

Because, unlike the contending theories, political process theory integrates state-centered and structuralist perspectives with interpretative and cultural practices to include elements of perception (Johnston 2011, 50-51 and 53), political process theory is often regarded as the predominant theory for the study of social movement mobilization (Caren 2007 and Johnston 2011, 50-51, 53, and 58). However, predominance in the field of political sociology does not necessarily grant political process theory’s applicability to all
cases. Therefore, it is essential to discuss why political process theory would provide a more thorough explanation for the anti-expansion movement’s failure to galvanize sustainable mobilization.

**Comparison to Other Social Movement Theories**

In comparison to other social movement theories, political process theory’s synthesis of structural and cultural explanations is particularly useful in Guam’s case, where there is already a presence of elements that should stimulate the anti-expansion movement. For example, according to deprivation and economic theory, poor economic conditions, such as those found in Guam should foster resistance. An analysis of Industrial Workers movements (Piven and Cloward 1979) as well as social movements in the 1960s reveals that these movements often operated and were formed in response to a similar backdrop of poor economic conditions. Therefore, according to this logic, the high unemployment rate, lack of economic opportunity, and class stratification in Guam should provide a pathway to successful mobilization. Yet, the presence of these economic conditions are not catalyzing sufficient support.

New social movement theory and framing theory would argue that, after the *DEIS*, the “issue-focused” communities founded upon a common identity against the expansion would provide opportunities for social movement. However, despite the presence of prominent “issue focused” communities, such as Women against Militarism, Guahan Indigenous Collective, or National Asian Pacific American Women’s Forum, Guam is not garnering enough support to effect substantive change.

Likewise, resource mobilization theory offers an insufficient explanation for why the anti-expansion movement lacks sufficient support. The presence of Guam’s mobilization
structures should fuel the movement “based on the logic that they increase the capacity of a movement to promote its message and have it heard” (Johnston 2011, 57). Although resource mobilization theory would argue that it is only the structures with resources that possess “a greater likelihood for success,” the theory still lacks an explanation for how mobilization structures are framed in the first place (Snow et. al 1986, 445 in Yeo 2006, 39).

Therefore, the problem with contending theories is that they rely too heavily on one issue to explain the failure to galvanize support. According to political process theory, in order to attain a “complete analysis of social movement mobilization,” it is necessary to examine cultural factors in addition to structural (Johnston 2011, 49). It is important to note that in the study of social movements, no precise partition exists between structural and cultural conditions (Johnston 2011, 49). Johnston (2011) accurately points out that “there is disagreement among structuralists over how far one must go regarding culture and interpretation, and among culturalists over whether thinking about social structures in objective terms is warranted at all” (49). Nonetheless, what political process theory demonstrates is that the answer to Guam’s lack of sustainable mobilization is multi-causal.

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8 According to Snow (et.al 1986), resource mobilization theory presupposes “the ubiquity and constancy of mobilization grievances,” sidestepping the way members interpret or frame injustices (in Yeo 2006, 39). Particularly in the case of the transnational organizations and alliances, framing is essential “to translate a particular grievance in a manner understood by actors not immediately affected by local base issues” (Yeo 2006, 38-39). If framing is not that important to resource mobilization theory, then how can the expansion be interpreted as an injustice in the first place?
Figure 4. Political Process Model

**Structural Factors**

Accelerated shifts in politics, economy, social life

Political Opportunities/Threats
Depend on level of:
1. Social Control
2. Elite Connections
3. Elite Sympathy
4. Elite Reinforcement
5. Policy implementation
6. Freedom in the media
7. Countermovement activity
8. Pressures from global regimes

**Cultural Factors**

(Johnston 2011, 52)

**Mobilization Structures**
1. Civil Society Organizations
2. Associations
3. Resources

**Current Culture; Climate of Opinion**

**Framing Process**
Perception of Political Opportunities/Threats through Collective Action Framing

**Contentious Political Mobilization**
Interest-based challenges
1. Non-institutional
2. Institutional

**Repertoires of Protest**
Specific tactics, design, and nature of the protest
According to this logic, if there is to be sufficient support to effect substantive change, the interplay of structural and cultural factors must make conditions more beneficial than costly to change the issue. From this perspective, this paper argues that the AEM has yet to galvanize sufficient support to effect substantive change because of the interplay of structural and cultural conditions in Guam.
CHAPTER VI

STRUCTURES THAT SUPPRESS

According to political process theory, shifts in the state’s political structure determine whether it is more beneficial or costly to resist political power based on “how venerable or vulnerable the political structure is to change” (Pastor and Ortiz 2009, 11-12). Based on this logic, one of the reasons the anti-expansion movement lacks sufficient support to effect substantive change is because Guam’s structures make it more costly then beneficial to resist the state (Johnston 2011, 51-52). As Chapter V noted, according to structural examinations of social movements, “interests and threats presented by the state are quite straightforward, and can be analytically treated as such” (Johnston 2011, 46).

In other words, structural factors are “hard”; they do not necessarily undergo the process of interpretation and framing that cultural factors do. They either “compel action straightforwardly” if beneficial or “constrain automatically” if too costly (Johnston 2011, 49). Therefore, for movement members, structural analysis involves less interpretation than cultural analysis when determining whether the cost-benefit ratio is in their favor. The following analysis demonstrates that Guam’s ambiguous political status and poor economic structure are key structural factors that straightforwardly prevent sustainable mobilization against the expansion.

Political Ambiguity

Before discussing the structural obstacles to sustainable mobilization, it is critical to note that many of Guam’s current political structures do create opportunities to galvanize sufficient support. According to Tilly (2006), unlike repressive regimes, democracies are
designed to be more open and receptive to the public (Breed 2013, 80; Johnston 2011). In Guam, the local government is a representative democracy, allowing opportunities for the public to persuade Guam’s decision-makers. However, what prevents sustainable mobilization is the island’s politically ambiguous status. As an unincorporated territory to the United States, Guam’s political and legal status is in neocolonial limbo (Rogers 1988). This status means that since 1898, the island has neither complete sovereignty nor complete dependence in relation to the United States (Alexander 2011b, 8). Such a status was created for the Insular Cases, a series of U.S. Supreme Court Cases that govern U.S. territories.

According to Burnett and Marshall (2001), “the Insular Cases…invented and developed the idea of unincorporated territorial status in order to enable the United States to acquire and govern its new ‘possessions’ without promising them either statehood or independence.” (Burnett and Marshall 2001 in Lai, 4-5). As a result, though the residents of Guam possess U.S. citizenship, the Constitution is not fully applicable to them, as they cannot vote in presidential elections nor do they have a voting representative in Congress (Bevacqua 2010 in Lai 2011, 12-13). Furthermore, for this particular case, due to Guam’s colonial status, the U.S. military’s intentions for the island, benevolent or not, remain basically unchallenged (Davis 2011, 7).

**Attempts to Change Ambiguity**

According to Hattori, Guam possesses a history of political activism that sought to challenge the island’s political ambiguity (Aguon 2006a, 28, footnote 18). In 1980, 1987, and 1997, the people of Guam sought to change the island’s political status, exercise self-
determination, and decolonize, respectively\textsuperscript{9} (Bradley 2000, 45-47). However, all attempts were rejected by Congress. Thus, change for the island seemed futile as more than a decade of “unsuccessful discussion with an uncooperative federal government” killed drafts proposing a Commonwealth status for Guam (Aguon 2006a, footnote 18, 28; Bradley 2000).\textsuperscript{10}

\textbf{Limited Institutional Infrastructure}

These efforts to challenge Guam’s political ambiguity are significant to discourse on the anti-expansion movement for two reasons. First, these efforts demonstrate that it was always the Chamoru people who originated change for political autonomy: the U.S. merely responded (Aguon 2006a, 30). However, although Chamoru activists have actively resisted and, therefore, gained certain concessions from the U.S. government, their efforts also demonstrate the “limited institutional infrastructure” Guam possesses to challenge their status if significant political decisions must be approved by the very power that wishes to preserve the status quo (Alexander 2011b, 8). The failure of the Commonwealth Act of 1987 and 1997 is a testament to these limitations. Therefore, true

\textsuperscript{9} The Commonwealth Act was prepared in 1987 (Aguon 2006a). It was then brought before Congressman Blaz in 1988, where it was subsequently neglected. When Underwood served as Congressman in 1993, the act was put forth again, this time with the significant tab of H.R. 1521, in reference to the year Magellan first came to the island, signaling Chamorro colonization (Diaz 2001, 168).

\textsuperscript{10} In 1997, during a hearing for the Guam Commonwealth Act and the Guam Judicial Empowerment Act, Deputy Secretary of the Department of Interior, John Garamendi, although stating his admiration for the initiative, objected to the conditions that Guam administer its own immigration and labor laws and that the indigenous people decide their own political status (Shuster 2010, par. 4 under “Ford approves Commonwealth but plan shelved”).

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self-government cannot be attained as long as Guam is bound by its politically ambiguous status, a status perpetuated by U.S. federal departments (Aguon 2006b, 48).

Despite attempts to challenge the structure, Guam’s political ambiguity has remained an obstacle to the Chamoru’s efforts to realize self-determination. Unlike in former U.S. possessions turned sovereign states, unrestrained military activity is easier in Guam because its current status as an unincorporated territory presents no institutionalized political ways to resist it (Lai 2011, 3). In other words, sovereign states like “The Philippines can say ‘no,’ but colonized Guam has no such option” (Davis 2011, 8). As a result, Guam’s ambiguous political status remains a key structural factor that prevents sustainable mobilization within the anti-expansion movement today.

**Poor Economic Structure**

Another structure of Guam that presents an obstacle to sustainable mobilization is its current economic structure. Currently, a third of Guam’s population lives on food stamps and a quarter lives below the U.S. poverty level (Kirk and Natividad 2010, under “Political and Economic Status,” par.3). Furthermore, Guam’s agricultural sector is extremely limited, due to the island’s coral reef composition as well as the loss of cultivable land and fishing grounds used for military bases and installations (Kirk and Natividad 2010, under “Political and Economic Status,” par. 2). As a result, the island rarely exports any products, but rather imports almost 90% of the island’s food (Kirk and Natividad 2010, under “Political and Economic Status,” par. 2).

According to Kirk and Natividad (2010), infrastructure is in dire circumstances as well (par. 6 under “Political and Economic Status”). The Guam Memorial Hospital, the only
public hospital on the island, only “operates at 100% capacity three weeks out of the month” while deficient water supply and disposal areas also plague the island (Kirk and Natividad 2010, par. 6 under “Political and Economic Status”). Likewise, Guam’s schools often have difficulties “meeting payroll” (Kirk and Natividad 2010, par. 6 under “Political and Economic Status”). Finally, Kirk and Natividad (2010) note that many government of Guam departments have been placed “under federal receivership, meaning that the federal government has hired an independent entity to take over certain functions of these agencies due to substandard conditions” (Kirk and Natividad 2010, par. 6 under “Political and Economic Status”). Therefore, Guam’s economy and infrastructure, although certainly not the most poverty-stricken in the Pacific, are in poor circumstances and significantly depend on U.S. federal funding.

However, Guam was not always so economically dependent on the United States. Kirk and Natividad (2010) argue that “prior to WWII, Guam was self-sufficient in agriculture, fishing, hunting, and husbandry. Nearly every family grew vegetables and produced meat; some specialized in fishing; and there was a viable copra industry” (under “Political and Economic Status,” par. 2). It was not until after the Second World War that approximately half of the island’s cultivable land and fishing grounds were used for military bases and installations (Kirk and Natividad 2010, under “Political and Economic Status,” par. 2). Additionally, before 1962, the Department of Defense established a national security clearance policy, a program that Aguon (2006a) argues “created a black hole of lost economic opportunities” by placing Guam’s migration under the administration of the US military, and therefore, deepening Guam’s reliance upon the United States (Aguon 2006a, 20).
Understanding the economic conditions of Guam is significant as increased dependence on the United States has left the island without a self-sustaining economy. As a result, the U.S. military has become a significant source of employment and resources for the people of Guam (Kirk and Natividad 2010, under “Political and Economic Status,” par. 3). Kirk and Natividad (2010) note that “the military is by far the major employer, with most families connected to someone serving in the military or employed to support military operations” (par. 3 under “Political and Economic Status”).

Furthermore, military employment remains high as a way to obtain the amenities offered to those already in U.S. military service (Kirk and Natividad 2010, par. 3 under “Political and Economic Status”). The authors report:

Military personnel have higher earning power than members of local communities; the military hospital and on-base schools have better facilities than the civilian hospital and public schools; water use by a larger military population is likely to result in shortages for local people; private military beaches deny local community access to their ancestral heritage (Kirk and Natividad 2010, under “One Guam, Two Guams,” par. 1-3).

As a result, young Chamorro soldiers view military services as “a guaranteed ticket off the island” or a way to provide for their loved ones (Aguon 2008, 136; Dodge 1991 in Camacho and Monnig 163).

**Limitations of Structural Explanation**

These structural constraints offer illumination as to why it appears more costly than beneficial to mobilize against the expansion. Many residents depend upon the U.S. military for their livelihood. Resisting the U.S. expansion would be resisting their provision. Likewise, despite consistent attempts to change the political structure, Guam still remains an unincorporated territory.
However, alone, these structural factors are still insufficient explanation. According to other social movement theories, such as deprivation and economic theory, poor economic conditions found in Guam should foster resistance as many successful social movements were set against a backdrop of poverty. Therefore, according to this logic, the high unemployment rate, lack of economic opportunity, and class stratification in Guam should provide a pathway to successful mobilization. Yet, the presence of these economic conditions are not catalyzing sufficient support. Furthermore, the question remains regarding what sustains Guam’s political ambiguity. Therefore, as Johnston (2011) notes, there is another deeper, more cultural factor that is preventing the spread of resistance.
CHAPTER VII

CONSEQUENCES OF A COLONIAL CULTURE

According to Johnston (2011), in addition to structure, cultural conditions must offer more benefit than cost if there is to be sustainable mobilization. When discussing cultural factors, this thesis is referring to “soft” arrangements that require interpretation and framing by members of a movement (Johnston 2011, 44). The interpretation of these arrangements are often influenced by cultural patterns. Johnston (2011) explains: “in broad terms, these can be thought of as favorable cultural environments and trends—intellectual, legal, or popular—which movements may draw upon and link with to enhance their support” (44). To demonstrate this argument, Johnston (2011) notes how Martin Luther King Jr. used Biblical passages of “Christian love and justice” to inform and enhance support for the civil rights movement (45). Therefore, King was able to frame the movement according to narratives familiar to Christian culture.

This framing process “expands McAdam’s idea of cognitive liberation by emphasizing how broad cultural influences play a role in shaping what movement ideas will have the greatest impact on public opinion” (Johnston 2011, 53). Thus, although movement leaders certainly have agency and can actively frame a movement, the main argument within collective action framing is that the community’s current culture strongly contribute to the framing of these opportunities or threats (Johnston 2011, 53). Framing then becomes collective action framing when the community is able to envision a better future because it no longer perceives the current structure as acceptable (Johnston 2011, 53).
Political process theory’s emphasis on collective action framing is a significant component of the cultural conditions necessary for sustainable mobilization, shedding light on why Guam has not effectively mobilized against the expansion. The people of Guam view the expansion as acceptable. In order for the people to view the expansion as unacceptable, they have to view it as a grievance or an injustice.

**The Liberation Narrative**

However, close analysis reveals that a deeper cultural factor prevents the expansion from being viewed as an injustice: the Liberation narrative. The Liberation narrative refers to the framing of Liberation Day, when the U.S. reclaimed the island of Guam from the Japanese during World War II. Therefore, there is a difference between the day and the narrative. Liberation Day is an event in Guam’s history. The Liberation narrative is the claim that the Chamoru nation is ‘indebted’ to the United States because of the event (Souder 1989 in Diaz 2001, 161; Tanji 2012, 99). In other words, because the U.S. ‘liberated’ Guam from Japanese occupation, the U.S. military has the right to expand on the island. **Therefore, the expansion is not viewed as an injustice but as an exercise of the U.S. military’s right, a right that should be supported by truly grateful Chamoru.**

At first, it might be questionable that a single event could be such a potent force against the anti-expansion movement. However, as Johnston (2011) demonstrates with the political process model, the cultural interpretation of events significantly impacts the way movements get framed (44). If the cultural climate does not align with a particular movement, it can be exceedingly difficult for movement leaders to harness support. Therefore, before discussing the effects the Liberation narrative has on the anti-expansion movement, it is important to discuss its evolution. This section will provide a brief
background on the events surrounding Liberation Day, how the event has been framed, and how it has justified greater militarization in postwar Guam and the announcement for expansion today.

**The U.S. Return: “An Answer to Prayer”**

In 1941, during World War II, Guam, along with other Micronesian islands in the Pacific, was invaded by Japan. Accounts of the occupation reveal bloodshed, starvation, and rape, among much of the suffering the Chamoru endured (Diaz 2001, 160). According to Diaz (2001), these acts of brutality, inflicted upon the Chamoru, only intensified by the time the U.S. prepared to attack Japanese forces (Diaz 2001, 160). Finally, on July 21st of 1944, after three years of brutal Japanese occupation, Guam was reunited with the United States. The U.S. return to the island was an act of significance in Guam’s history (Alexander 2011b, 13). According to historian Paul Carano (1973), the American return was “‘the answer to the Guamanians’ prayers . . .’” (in Diaz 2001, 160).

U.S. return was also accompanied with U.S. “‘k-rations like spam, corned beef, cheese, pork and beans . . . medicine, clothes . . . shelters,’” necessities that the Chamoru had been deprived of during their wartime experience (Souder 1989, 2 in Diaz 2001, 162). As a result, the coming of American forces was deeply venerated by Chamoru survivors (Souder 1989 in Diaz 2001, 160). With the haunting memories of the brutal Japanese occupation still fresh in their minds, survivors did not merely revere their “liberation,” they deified it (Souder in Diaz 2001, 161). Therefore, the treatment of Liberation Day stems from the claim that the identity of the Chamorro nation is intertwined with their ‘liberation’ (Souder in Diaz 2001, 161; Tanji 2012, 99). In other words, “‘survival became synonymous with American Military Forces’” (Souder in Diaz
2001, 161; Tanji 2012, 99). As a result, the tale of Guam’s liberation provided the construction necessary not only to instill American values, but also to bolster the backdrop of collective identity among the Chamorro (Tanji 2012, 102).

**A Convenient Framing**

After World War II, the survival of the Chamorro people during occupation was “politicized” and reframed as a U.S. value of patriotism in an attempt to make the Chamorro appear more “American than the Americans” (Diaz 2001, 166). However, the Liberation narrative was not entirely a U.S. construction. Arguing that at the time, it “was the only political language available to the Chamorros that could be heard and understood by the Americans,” many Chamoru activists actively embraced the narrative and employed devotion as a political tool in order to attain civil rights immediately following the war (Diaz 2001, 165):

While the war was laid to rest, the experience was put to other uses. In their search for political rights, the Chamorros hit upon an irrefutable argument for civil government. The Chamorros were patriotic. They survived the ordeal. They proved their loyalty. In fact, the Chamorros not only deserved political rights, the U.S. owed it to them. The war experience soon became a hammer to obtain political rights, and subsequently, to obtain federal funds (Underwood in Diaz 2001, 166).

An analysis of Chamoru activism directly following the war reveals that heralding the Liberation narrative was effective in granting the people political concessions, specifically citizenship and civil government to replace the naval administration, “two cherished institutions for which the Chamorro leadership aspired since the turn of the century” (Diaz 2001, 165). In 1949, the Chamorro protested in what became known as the Guam Congress Walkout (Aguon 2006a, 30). Due to these efforts, the Organic Act, which was signed in 1950, permitting “limited home rule” and U.S. citizenship to the
island’s residents (Aguon 2006a, 30 and Alexander 201b, 2). In 1970, two decades after the Organic Act, Guam finally elected its first governor (Aguon 2006a, 30).

Therefore, by operating within the logic of the narrative, the Chamoru were granted political concessions. According to the narrative, it was not the endurance of the Chamorro people that granted their citizenship and self-government, but rather their faithfulness to the American flag during occupation that helped them attain “political progress” (Diaz 2001, 165). However, this use of the narrative eventually came with a price. As Carano (1973) notes, Liberation Day became the “‘glorious event’” whose price in lives lost had purchased freedom and later American claims of exclusive rights to the region” (in Diaz 2001, 161) In other words, since then, the United States has rationalized increased militarization in Guam through the argument of entitlement: “we fought there so we deserve to occupy that territory” (Alexander 2011a, 8).

**Militarization Justified**

Ironically, the Liberation narrative, therefore, paved the pathway for increased militarization on the island. According to feminist scholar Cynthia Enloe, militarization is defined as

> a step-by-step process by which a person or a thing gradually comes to be controlled by the military or comes to depend for its well-being on militaristic ideas. The more militarization transforms an individual or a society, the more that individual or society comes to imagine military needs and militaristic presumptions to be not only valuable but also normal (Enloe 2000, 3, as cited by Lai 2011, 12).

As Enloe (2000) notes, militarization is not merely the presence of military bases in one’s community; it is the community’s complete social and economic dependence on the military. It is the idea that the military should take priority over other elements of society.
Upon analyzing the island, Lutz (2010) notes that today “Guam’s militarization is objectively more extreme in its concentration than that found virtually anywhere else on earth” (par. 1 under “conclusion”). This militarization is demonstrated by the significant portions of land used for the U.S. military after World War II (Kirk and Natividad 2010, under “Political and Economic Status,” par. 2). Aguon (2006a) argues that “by the end of it [World War II], the U.S. had illegally taken control of 2/3 of our total real estate under the all-too-familiar guise of national security” (Aguon 2006a, 31 brackets not in original quote).

According to the logic of the Liberation narrative, the U.S. is entitled to claim indigenous land because it “liberated” the land in the first place. As a result, the preferences of the U.S. military on the island are justified and normalized. As Robert Underwood asserts, although Guam’s military fences prevent public access to indigenous land, the fences in Guam are seen as normal, not invasive (Camacho and Monnig 2010, 159 in Verschoor 2011, 49). As a result, because of the fences’ design to ward off residents, many Chamorro men wish they could enlist in the military to enter those spaces (Camacho and Monnig 2010, 159 in Verschoor 2011, 49). Such a perspective is a testament to the power of the Liberation narrative.

Understanding the Liberation narrative within Guam is crucial as it sheds light on why Guam currently lacks a deeper, more developed nationalistic culture found in spaces with similar experiences, such as the foreign military bases of Japan or South Korea. According to Tanji (2012), in Guam, “in a society where the boundaries between the occupier (military) and the occupied (people) are inextricable blurred,” crimes against the local population such as rape or gender violence “are treated as mundane social issues:
they are not at the forefront of Chamorro concerns related to the US military buildup” (111-112). These issues are not necessarily at the forefront because they “not politicized in a way that overwrites the dominant narrative of patriotic support of the US military and its war activities” (Tanji 2012, 111-112).

The Liberation narrative also sheds light on Chamorro military enlistment following the war. According to Souder (1989), after the Liberation, “there was an overwhelming desire to show gratitude. . . Chamorros were willing to pay whatever price was asked” (Souder 1989 in Diaz, 161). Underwood argues that “this ‘rabid patriotism’ was shaped by an intensive prewar naval rule that permitted Chamorro identity and peoplehood to be expressed only in terms favorable to America” (in Diaz 2001, 164). However, according to Camacho and Monnig (2010), there was no promise of respect or economic benefit for the Chamorro before the war (157). In fact, the highest, and only, status attained for a Chamorro serviceman was that of a mess attendant (Camacho and Monnig 2010, 157). It was, therefore, after the experiences of Liberation Day that more Chamorro men enlisted.

This military enlistment stems from the “obligation to ‘give chenchule,’” for what the United States has done for the people of Guam (2010, 157 in Tanji 2012, 104). According to Camacho and Monnig (2010), chenchule is “a form of labor based on reciprocal relations” (157). Therefore, chenchule is not merely grounded in the principles of gratitude and reverence; it is an exchange, an offering to recompense. Thus, this culture of reciprocity, of military service as an expression of patriotic loyalty to Uncle Sam, sheds light on Chamorro service following World War II (Camacho and Monnig 2010, 157 in Tanji 2012, 104; Diaz 2001). Although there is more of an economic motivation for joining the military today, Camacho and Monnig’s (2010) explanation for military
enlistment continues in the present despite the fact that very few survivors of the occupation are living today.

**Effects on the Anti-Expansion Movement**

The Liberation narrative justifies the military expansion the same way it has justified postwar militarization on the island. In a sense, the U.S. military expansion on Guam is nothing new. It is merely an extension of previous militarization efforts. Nonetheless, the narrative is vigorously maintained (Diaz 2001). Today, Guam’s political leaders such as Representative Bordallo and former Speaker of Guam Legislature Mark Forbes refer to the 1944 U.S. liberation of Guam when discussing future military expansion to elicit Chamorro patriotism and promote the image of the U.S. as protector (Viernes 2009, 108). Viernes (2009) argues that such references are strategic in that they link the expansion with what is expected from the Chamoru: patriotic devotion (108).

As a result, anti-expansion efforts are interpreted and framed as unpatriotic, ungrateful, and radical. As Alexander (2011b) argues, successful mobilization is challenging then because opposing the proposed military build-up entails serious questioning about the meaning of citizenship on, and for, Guam…Opposing militarization and the build-up thus requires people to question who they are, what their life choices have meant, and ‘how they remember themselves to be (19).

How the Chamoru people remember themselves is therefore an important part of the anti-expansion movement. According to Viernes (2009), “younger generations of Chamorros who are disconnected from the occupation experience and who have been exposed to university courses where colonialism, globalization, and self-determination are common themes of critical discussion are increasingly ambivalent about their role as
Uncle Sam’s patriots” (114). However, Liberation Day has been “canonized” in the politics of public commemoration – from the annual celebration of parades, carnivals, barbeques, and days off from school to the annual printing of survivor’s wartime experiences in the Pacific Daily News (Diaz 2001, 158). Despite the fact that there is a “steadily decreasing number of survivors” of the occupation, Diaz (2001) notes that the memories of Liberation Day are just as fresh in the minds of contemporary Chamorro society due to the deliberate depictions of the occupation and the Liberation experience by political officials and the media (Diaz 2001, 155-156 and 176).

Scholars disagree to the extent of America’s benevolence in returning to the island. Some, such as Diaz (2001), argue that “there is overwhelming evidence that America’s return had more to do with military strategy than some altruistic desire to free the Chamorros from enemy occupation” (Diaz 2001, 157). Others note that the brutality of the Japanese occupation accentuates the U.S. return as an act of benevolence in and of itself. However, regardless of whether America’s return was well-intentioned or purely strategic, it is important for scholars to note that the acknowledgment of Guam’s “liberation” is not what necessarily hinders sustainable mobilization against the expansion.

Rather, what hinders sustainable mobilization is employment of the event as a justification for the military buildup. Therefore, the celebration of America’s return is not inherently problematic. Disregarding the racist and paternalistic rule of the U.S. naval administration prior to Japanese occupation is problematic. The fact that Guam was never truly “free” prior to occupation or during post-war rule is problematic. The immediate military take-over of more indigenous land after World War II is problematic. Therefore,
the Liberation narrative is problematic not for what it celebrates, but for what it ignores in Guam’s past and what it implies for Guam’s future.
CHAPTER VIII
OPPORTUNITIES FOR A MORE SUSTAINABLE MOVEMENT

Although the case of Guam illustrates that indigenous resistance has always and continues to exist, political process theory reveals that structural and cultural conditions have prevented sustainable mobilization against the expansion. However, a mere analysis of these conditions is ultimately ineffective if no alternative solutions are provided. The references to Guam’s indigenous activists throughout this analysis demonstrate that they clearly understand the structural and cultural obstacles facing them.

However, political process theory offers more than a mere reinforcement of the challenges anti-expansion activists are facing. It analyzes why these challenges are present and how the perception of structural and cultural conditions perpetuate them. By demonstrating why these structural and cultural factors have persisted in Guam, political process theory moves beyond mere identification of resistance challenges and offers a pathway to cultivate alternative solutions for a more sustainable economy and livelihood. Unlike “hard” structural arrangements, cultural conditions depend upon the interpretation of the community. If the expansion is framed as an injustice, the opportunities for a more sustainable movement increase. The predicament is getting the majority of the people of Guam to frame the expansion as an injustice as well.

Frame Alignment

Frame alignment provides useful insight into possible solutions for this predicament. According to Johnston (2011), frame alignment is often employed by movements to “make their frames more attractive and persuasive” (80). This section will focus on two particular types of frame alignment that can be applied to Guam’s anti-expansion
movement: frame amplification and frame bridging. Frame amplification is defined as "the clarification and invigoration of an interpretive frame that bears on a particular issue, problem, or set of events" (Snow et. al 1986, 469 in Yeo 2006, 40). In other words, it is a reframing or re-appropriating of significant events. Similarly, frame bridging is “the linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue” (Snow et. al 1986, 467 in Yeo 2006, 39). Deeper analysis of these two types reveal that frame amplification would be beneficial in bringing unity to the Chamoru people while frame bridging can help unify the island’s anti-expansion movement.

Frame Amplification

Frame amplification can help unify the Chamoru by reanalyzing and reframing important historical events. As Chapter VII discusses, one of the most significant events in Guam’s history is Liberation Day. However, the Liberation Narrative has been used as a tool by build-up supporters to delegitimize the voices of anti-expansion activists by deeming them ungrateful and unpatriotic. More importantly, by focusing on the U.S’s. return, the Liberation Narrative de-emphasizes the agency of Chamorro survivors during World War II. However, just as Martin Luther King, Jr. re-appropriated Biblical passages of “Christian love and justice” that were once used as an argument for slavery, the Chamorro people can reframe the Liberation Narrative.

Diaz’s (2001) work reveals that the Chamorro have already attempted to do so by reframing the way Liberation Day is celebrated on the island. Under Governor Ricardo Bordallo’s term in the 1970s and 80s, the celebration of Liberation Day was changed to “Fiestan Guam.” According to Diaz (2001), this relabeling was done to ‘‘celebrate
Chamorro survival and triumph over hardship, instead of Chamorro indebtedness to the U.S., which liberation implied” (Diaz 2001, 162). Likewise, in 1993, during Governor Joseph Ada’s administration, Liberation Day was themed as “Commonwealth is Liberation” (Diaz 2001, 168). Thus, some Chamorro activists have attempted to reframe the annual holiday by emphasizing Chamoru agency and arguing that there were unexpressed intentions behind the American return: that the US coming back to Guam was an act of defending a strategic location, not necessarily benevolent deliverance (Diaz 2001, 157-162). However, these attempts have remained in what Diaz (2001) refers to as the “subaltern” because they are drowned out by the elites’ carefully constructed commemoration of the holiday each year.

Nonetheless, this reframing is imperative for uniting the declining number of Chamoru people because it reiterates Chamoru endurance in a war for which they were not even responsible (Underwood in Diaz 2001, 166). By focusing and honoring Chamoru experiences, World War II becomes less about the United States versus Japan, and more about the Chamoru’s courage, perseverance, and fortitude (Underwood in Diaz 2001, 166). Guam and the United States have always been affiliated through war: introduced through the Spanish American War and reunited through World War II (Diaz 2001, Notes 1: 176). The Liberation narrative only serves to reinforce this affiliation. Furthermore, the very dates that signify the beginning and end of World War II for the people of Guam are based upon the Japanese attack and Japanese surrender (Tanji 2012, 176). These dates attempt to separate the enemy from the hero (Tanji 2012, 176).

However, by reframing Liberation Day, the focus on Chamorro agency eradicates the enemy/savior dichotomy. If these dichotomies are deemphasized and the persistence of
the Chamorro people given more priority, then much of the “indebtedness” and “obligation” attached to July 21st is deemphasized as well, making it easier for expansion to be viewed as an injustice rather than an act of devotion. Therefore, frame amplification can be a useful tool for sustainable mobilization against the expansion in Guam.

**Frame Bridging**

The second type of frame alignment anti-expansion activists should utilize is frame bridging. Examining the anti-base movements in South Korea provides particularly useful insight. In Yeo’s (2006) analysis, both locally-concentrated and nationally-concentrated anti-base campaigns were taking place throughout the 90s and early millennium. Whereas local campaigns analyzed the effects of bases on local farmers’ land and wellbeing, national campaigns framed their grievances on the base’s denial of abstract principles such as sovereignty and peace (Yeo 2006, 37-39).

According to Yeo (2006), this disunity in purpose was creating “tension” for movement activists. Yeo’s (2006) argument was that, “effective mobilization in [South Korea’s] anti-base movements requires striking a balance between the movement’s focus on local and national issues regarding U.S. military bases” (35). In other words, to be a sustainable movement, it was necessary for the two campaigns to bridge their injustice frames.

Therefore, in South Korea, movement leaders bridged or combined local and national grievances into one coherent frame by connecting the “abstract concept of peace” with the “local resident’s livelihood” (Yeo 2006, 40). Yeo (2006) argued that frame bridging was necessary because both campaigns needed each other to continue. National or more
abstract frames have the ability to draw in more supporters because under a frame like sovereignty or peace, “theoretically all citizens have a stake” (39). At the same time, Yeo (2006) notes that national campaigns are “usually less effective in mobilizing the unorganized who may not find any personal stake in investing time and resources toward an abstract cause” (39). Therefore, local campaigns, which tend to be more focused on concrete issue directly affecting the community are needed to ground the anti-base movement. As a result, frame bridging created solidarity in South Korea’s divided movement.

Based on this thesis’s research, there are two identifiable types of anti-expansion activists, depending upon their framing of injustices. One is anti-base, in which advocacy for complete military withdrawal in Guam stems from a negative view of militarism, association with the United States, or both (Aguon 2006a, 2006b). The other is pro-base, in which opposition to the expansion does not necessarily translate as seeking a complete removal of the U.S. military from the island (Tanji 2012). Nonetheless, this section will discuss both types of anti-expansion activists to see how they are shaping resistance efforts.

Anti-Base

In Guam, there is a presence of indigenous activists that call for the complete removal of the U.S. military from the island. For example. Aguon (2006b) argues that in order to truly persevere as a people, the Chamoru Nation must “actively encourage the withdrawal of the exaggerated US military presence from all—not some—of our communities” (27). This advocacy for complete withdrawal stems from the claim that Guam’s colonial status is directly tied to the U.S. military presence (Tanji 2012). Furthermore, associating with
and assimilating to the United States debases Chamorro pride and integrity (Aguon 2006b, 101).

Therefore, activists such as Aguon (2006b) and Bevacqua (2010), do not believe that identifying with the American way of life is the path to true self-government and self-determination (114-115). The glorification of consumerism, globalization, and individualism in American culture prevents the Chamorro from truly developing as a people (Aguon 2006b, 114-115). As a result, American ideology must be actively contested (Aguon 2006b, 114-115). Still, these activists note the difference between the Chamorro struggle for self-determination and anti-American propaganda, arguing that it is not America that is to be considered the enemy, but rather, “its insatiable, imperial appetite—its military industrial complex endangering the entire planet” (Aguon 2006b, 114-115).

By building solidarity with other anti-base activists through transnational organizations such as the National Asian Pacific American Women’s Forum, Women against Militarism, and the International Peoples’ Coalition against Military Pollution, anti-base activists in Guam frame their injustices at the national level. In other words, their grievances are targeted at more abstract concepts such as peace and security (Yeo 2006, 39). At the same time, the focus of the anti-base movement is local as it also analyzes the harmful consequences (discussed in Chapter III) that the expansion could potentially inflict upon the local community (Yeo 2006). Therefore, the complete removal of military bases on Guam stems from past consequences and future effects that U.S. military presence has incurred on the Chamoru people’s environment, economy, and security.
Pro-Base

The other type of activist is pro-base. According to these activists, to critique the military presence in Guam is not to completely negate it. Rather, pro-base activists note that negative consequences can accompany military bases and seek to have these consequences fairly mitigated. In Guam’s case, the most substantial consequence is the denial of the indigenous community’s right to self-determination.

A prominent example of this type of activist is the ‘Chamorro Warrior for decolonization,’ defined as a man who has served or continues to serve in the military yet openly engages in indigenous activism (Tanji 2012, 104). According to Tanji (2012), “the goal of Chamoru activism, couched in the language of warrior masculinity, is no particular challenge to US militarism in general, but emphasizes, rather, the Chamorro people’s control and right to determine their terms of engagement with it” (105). Thus, although the ‘Chamorro Warrior for decolonization’ is more discerning and analytical than one who unabashedly devotes himself to the U.S., he is not necessarily against the military uniform itself (Tanji 2012, 105). Furthermore, the ‘Chamorro Warrior’ that resists the buildup views the anti-expansion movement as an opportunity for the acknowledgment of Chamoru rights (Tanji 2012, 111).

According to Tanji (2012), the ‘Chamorro Warrior’ “feels no personal contradiction” because his military experiences directly inform and qualify his activism (104-105). For example, Benevente, who had served in the U.S. Army yet is also an indigenous rights activist argues that he “could never be confused” about these two positions but rather finds the two harmonious (Camacho and Monnig 2010, 147). Upon serving overseas, Chamoru soldiers realized that the country they served so faithfully to help
advance ideals of democracy was the same country that colonized and continues to colonize their homeland (Camacho and Monnig 2010, 164 and 167).

This “convoluted, but not contradictory” phenomenon sheds light on how Chamoru nationalism can be constructed from both a devotion to and opposition against the United States (Tanji 2012, 113). These activists are fighting for self-determination based upon the rights they believe they hold as Americans (Camacho and Monnig, 164). Therefore, for these activists, the focus on their anti-expansion movement is not necessarily local injustices but more nationalist or abstract issues: the fact that the United States is disregarding the voice of its own U.S. citizens (Yeo 2006, 39). Although pro-base activists may acknowledge local grievances against military bases, ultimately their movement is framed within the context of attaining American rights and liberties. To them, Chamorro resistance completely aligns with American ideals, for “the quest for Chamorro determination is not about being ‘anti-American’…it is American to dissent, it is part of being ‘American’” (Camacho and Monnig 2010, 168 in Tanji 2012, 105).

Therefore, anti-base activists argue that the anti-expansion movement should signify the withdrawal of the U.S. military presence, and possibly, the withdrawal of association with the United States. Pro-base activists view that the expansion infringes upon the Chamoru right to self-determination, but do not feel that service in the U.S. military contradicts their resistance. Acknowledgment of both campaigns does not mean that there are solid boundaries between the two as these two types of activists do not necessarily view each other as threats. Both are against the expansion. However, each campaign holds a different response.
As political process theory demonstrated, in addition to structural constraints, part of the explanation for the lack of sustainable mobilization is that the expansion is not framed as an injustice. Lack of mobilization, however, is compounded within the anti-expansion movement because the injustice frames vary according to the two campaigns. By building solidarity with other anti-base activists through transnational organizations such as the National Asian Pacific American Women’s Forum, Women against Militarism, and the International Peoples’ Coalition against Military Pollution, anti-military activists in Guam frame their injustices at the national level. In other words, their grievances are targeted at more abstract concepts such as peace and security (Yeo 2006, 39).

At the same time, the focus of the anti-base movement is local as it also analyzes the harmful consequences (discussed in Chapter I) that the expansion could potentially inflict upon the local community (Yeo 2006). Therefore, the complete removal of military bases on Guam stems from past consequences and future effects that U.S. military presence has incurred and will incur on Guam’s environment, land, and economy. On the other hand, although pro-base activists may acknowledge local grievances against military bases, ultimately their movement is framed within the context of attaining American rights and liberties.

Following the example of anti-base activists in South Korea could be a useful tool for the anti-expansion resistance in Guam. Both campaigns already agree that the expansion is an injustice. The one factor linking their otherwise unconnected frames is the view that the expansion blatantly denies the Chamorro people’s right to self-determination. Therefore, the common factor between the two is the realization that a U.S. military increasingly dependent on territories reveals “a painfully obvious political irony”: “The
Although many anti-base scholars would argue that it is precisely Guam’s deeply militaristic culture that prevents residents from viewing the expansion as an injustice in the first place, as this thesis discusses, there is clearly a presence of pro-military activists who speak out against further militarization without the indigenous community’s consent. Therefore, the problem in Guam’s lack of mobilization is not necessarily the military. The problem is the framing of the military as ultimate priority, a problem stemming from the Liberation narrative.

It is undoubtedly essential for anti-expansion activists to critique the U.S. military for its often overlooked effects on the environment, land, and security. However, attempts to generalize an entire population of military servicemen and women as “attack dogs…trained at any instant to unleash aggression” (Aguon 2006b, 74) disregards an entire group of Guam’s activists (pro-base activists). Furthermore, it generates discourse that is divisive and harmful for fostering healthy relations between activists in Guam. Chamoru military members are being denied the right to self-determination as well.

Likewise, rather than frame their struggle within the context of American rights, anti-expansion activists should instead frame their struggle through the international rights discourse of self-determination (Diaz 2001, 167). It is essential that the resistance acknowledge that having autonomy and being less dependent on federal funding will...
ultimately yield to a more sustainable economy and future for all residents in Guam. If “agency, visibility, and voice” (Bevacqua 2010) can only be attained through military service, as is often demonstrated in Guam, then what hope is there for future generations on the island? There must be other options for empowerment outside the U.S. military.

**Beyond “Fortress Pacific”**

By bridging the rather abstract concept of self-determination with a local emphasis on the livelihood of local residents, the anti-expansion movement could potentially move beyond a binary of anti-base/pro-base. As Aguon (2006b) acknowledges, “our disunity is our truer transgression” (Aguon 2006b, 114-115). Pragmatically, a broad-based coalition is necessary for the success of the movement. With such a small population, it is important that the people of Guam be united in the anti-expansion movement. As Audre Lorde (1984) stated so eloquently “without community there is no liberation,” (in Aguon 2006b). If anti-expansion activists are united, they can more adequately address “hard” or more structural arrangements.

As Aguon (2006b) states, “being right is not enough to bring about social change” (37). Therefore, if Chamoru resistance is to be truly “redemptive,” it must be focused on the principles of nonviolence, humility, and kindness (Aguon 2006a, 55 and 73).

For the Chamoru people,

True freedom will come to us when our destiny is fully in our hands. Since the beginning of governmental systems of Guahan, the people of the land have never been allowed to decide the fate of their land. This right is recognized in all of the surrounding islands, but when we stand up for our rights as Chamorros, we are frequently derided. We believe that the right of Guam’s destiny belongs to those who have been historically denied their political status and rights here. Until the Chamorro right to self-determination on Guahan is recognized and practiced,
Thus, scholars in the mainland United States and the international community should be made aware that “Fortress Pacific” is not simply an “anchored aircraft carrier,” devoid of cultural history, human rights, and indigenous agency (Davis 2011, 7). It is occupied by human beings with their own community, culture, and political aspirations. The Chamoru are not just waiting for their self-determination: they are actively pursuing it. By embracing this message, anti-expansion activists can challenge the structural and cultural restraints placed against them and, slowly but steadily, build a more empowering, sustainable future beyond “Fortress Pacific.”
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