

MASKING SUFFERING;
AN EXISTENTIAL GENEALOGY OF NIETZSCHE'S PERCEPTION OF LOVE

by

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Thesis directed by Associate Professor Omar Swartz

ABSTRACT

This thesis addresses the impact Nietzsche's desire for the love of others had on his philosophy. I conduct an existential genealogy of his perception of love from the ideal formed in childhood, along the path of experiments preformed throughout his philosophy. It is my contention that Nietzsche determined to change his perception of love following the disillusionment of what he had conceived to be his ideal, and that evidence for this can be found by analyzing his investigations of morality. From originally perceiving love as pure and unegoistic to redefining it as an act of egotism cloaked as virtuous, I posit that in his suffering Nietzsche continually struggled to assimilate the image of love he asserted in his work. With the use of his personal writings, I expose contradiction between his published contentions and private expressions and propose that he wore his philosophical perspectives as a mask, veiling the suffering experienced from battling his desire for love. Due to the existential crises Nietzsche underwent while contending with his desire, I argue that much of his anguish was self-induced. In his efforts to avoid the pain he associated with love, I reveal irony in Nietzsche's assertion that suffering should be embraced. My work concludes proposing that Nietzsche's final perception of love finds concurrence with his perception of suffering, ending with a "creative misreading" of Nietzsche's "Three Metamorphoses."

The form and content of this abstract are approved. I recommend its publication.

Approved: Omar Swartz

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER

I. INTRODUCTION

Introduction.....	1
Methodology.....	4
Review of Literature.....	7

II. EARLY LIFE AND WORKS

Formulating an Ideal of Love.....	10
Music, Poetry and Religion.....	11
Schopenhauer and Wagner.....	15
The Birth of Tragedy.....	20
Untimely Meditations.....	26

III. DISILLUSIONMENT AND MASKING SUFFERING

Human, All Too Human.....	34
The Dawn.....	50
The Gay Science.....	57
Thus Spoke Zarathustra.....	68

IV. CONCLUSION

Philosophy of the Future

Beyond Good and Evil.....	80
On the Genealogy of Morals.....	82
The Case of Wagner.....	83
Twilight of the Idols, The Antichrist, Nietzsche contra Wagner.....	84

Ecce Homo.....	86
Conclusion	
Considering Madness; Nietzsche’s Last Letters.....	97
Cosima; From Mother Figure to Heroine in Nietzsche’s Final Perception of Love.....	100
Experiences Prior to and Following Nietzsche’s Collapse.....	105
Musing “On the Three Metamorphoses”; Nietzsche’s Spirit Becoming a Child.....	108
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	111

ABBREVIATIONS

ATO	Antichrist, Twilight, Case of Wagner, Nietzsche contra Wagner
AI	Anxiety of Influence
BGE	Beyond Good and Evil
BT	The Birth of Tragedy
CP	Consolations of Philosophy
CIS	Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity
CN	Conversations with Nietzsche
DD	The Dawn/Daybreak
EH	Ecce Homo
GS	The Gay Science
GM	On the Genealogy of Morals
HH	Human all Too Human
LN	Living with Nietzsche
CL	Nietzsche: A Critical Life
NB	Nietzsche: A Philosophical Biography
NP	Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist
UL	Nietzsche Unpublished Letters
NW	Nietzsche's Women: Beyond the Whip
PB	Peacock and the Buffalo
PN	Poetry of Friedrich Nietzsche
SL	Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche
Z	Thus Spoke Zarathustra
TN	To Nietzsche: Dionysus, I Love You! Ariadne
UM	Untimely Meditations
WN	Wagner and Nietzsche
WS	What Nietzsche Really Said
WP	Will to Power

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

This work investigates the philosophies of Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche through the lens of his personal writings to demonstrate the affect his desire for the love others had on the formation of his ideas. My thesis provides an existential genealogy of Nietzsche's perception of love, tracing the development of his philosophies as he internally struggled with his desire for the love of others. I will argue that his ceaseless motivation to continue creating and publishing his works, beyond constant criticisms and financial difficulties, was greatly inspired by his intention to overcome his desire. I assert that the experimentation Nietzsche exhibited in his philosophical works regarding conceptions of love, such as separating it from other virtues he considered to be of value, reveal his efforts to shift his perspectives. In proclaiming that suffering is a necessary part of mankind's overcoming himself, I argue that Nietzsche wore his philosophies as a mask of self-confidence to conceal his own internal conflicts.

Through a chronological comparison of his philosophical works and personal writings, I will establish that Nietzsche's investigations into mankind's conceptions of suffering and morality were largely inspired by his objective to overcome desiring love. Nietzsche's difficulties, I contend, are revealed in the contradictions found between the notions he professed in his works and the behavior exhibited in his personal writings. In examining Nietzsche's person alongside the philosophies he professed, I intend to not only demonstrate the difficulties he faced while experiencing extreme existential crises, but to prove as well that his internal conflicts served in the formation of his concepts.

Nietzsche at times presented unexamined conjectures, rather than finely tuned philosophical theories, in his efforts to combat his desire. Walter Kaufmann, in his work *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, indicates, “it is true that Nietzsche often gave expression to opinions he had not questioned critically... [but that in] his writings... we must distinguish between the human and the all-too-human elements” (NP, p. 84). Continuing, Kaufmann explains that “Nietzsche’s writings contain many all-too-human judgments... but these are philosophically irrelevant; and *ad hominem* arguments against any philosopher on the basis of such statements seem trivial and hardly pertinent” (NP, p. 84). I concur with Kaufmann that expressing opinions not questioned critically does not diminish a philosopher’s discourses in its own right, for I argue that there is great relevance in Nietzsche’s process.

My disagreement with Kaufmann’s point lies in my contention that consideration of Nietzsche’s “all-too-human judgments” are not “philosophically irrelevant,” but rather provide a greater understanding of his works through a more exhaustive manner of investigation. I argue that Nietzsche’s process of attempting to overcome his desire for the love of others leads to a deeper understanding of his philosophies by offering insight into his shifting theories of love. Nietzsche’s decision to introduce some views without significant assessment demonstrates his conflicting emotional struggles, which I posit he underwent throughout the course of his life. It is not in topics such as government, education, or religion in which Nietzsche exhibits behaviors contradictory to his philosophies, but in matters of emotion. I maintain that Nietzsche’s reasoning for giving “expression to opinions he had not questioned critically,” as Kaufmann notes, was due to his endeavor to *create* his own *truths* by altering his personal *perspectives*. I posit that Nietzsche ventured to reinterpret love so as

to overcome the suffering it caused him, and I emphasize that this way of interpreting his life and works in no way diminishes his theories, as was Kaufmann's concern. On the contrary, I assert that his intention to overcome his desire for the love others through continual reevaluation of his philosophies made Nietzsche all the more prolific. It was his efforts in experimentation which brought new insights to mankind. Nietzsche's personal process added substantially to the brilliance of his philosophies, and accordingly the focus of this work is to demonstrate the relevance desiring love served in the formulation of his published works.

I contend that Nietzsche's ideal of love was formed in his childhood as a response to the early loss of his father. His ideal came to fruition in the man who would serve as his father figure, Richard Wagner, and found expression in his early works, *The Birth of Tragedy* and *Untimely Meditations*. As a direct response to experiencing the disillusionment of his love's ideal when breaking with Wagner, I posit Nietzsche began his investigations into morality. It is my contention that, suffering in his desire, Nietzsche endeavored to discredit love through its connection with morality. In demonstrating that love was not an unegoistic aspect of mankind, but rather a selfish act intent on possession, Nietzsche strove to overcome his desire. Though his investigations into morality aided him in redefining love, Nietzsche continually faced great difficulty in dissuading his emotional longing for others.

The struggles Nietzsche experienced are exposed by the contradictions revealed between his philosophies and his personal writings, such as condemning pity as detrimental to mankind's development while simultaneously calling for compassion from his friends. As Nietzsche professed his need for solitude he cried out to those he knew of his loneliness, and lamented in his poetry of the suffering life inflicted upon him. In recognition of his

hypocrisy, I argue Nietzsche furthered his efforts by intensifying his claims of the necessity of soul-wrenching suffering:

To those who are of any concern to me I wish suffering, desolation, sickness, ill-treatment, indignities—I wish that they should not remain unfamiliar with profound self-contempt, the torture of self-mistrust, the wretchedness of the vanquished: I have no pity for them, because I wish them the only thing that can prove today whether one is worth anything or not—that one endures (WP, 1887, p. 481).

In his attempt to maintain an appearance of confidence while struggling in his desire for the love others, I propose Nietzsche donned his philosophies as a mask, veiling his conflicting emotions with his work. Essentially, Nietzsche demonstrated the reality of his declaration that there are no absolute truths and that life is a process of becoming (HH, p. 13). Though his behaviors reveal the truth of his struggles, Nietzsche did contend with lifelong issues of ill health which increased his suffering. I will argue that much of his suffering was psychosomatic, directly relating to the loneliness he experienced in self-imposed isolation while battling his desire for love. I will argue that at the end of his productive life, Nietzsche removed his mask and reached out with his new perception of love in the final moments of his lucidity.

Methodology

Considering Nietzsche's endeavors in overcoming his desiring love through his philosophies, this thesis will take an approach inspired by Harold Bloom's work, *The Anxiety of Influence*. Bloom offers a new form of literary criticism involving the "creative misreading" of a text. Specifically, he addresses how the creational process of a poet hinges on and diverts from the poetry of his predecessors. Bloom's theory presents a method of interpretation which correlates to the intention of my thesis to move beyond Nietzsche's central philosophical themes to his underlying intentions to overcome desiring the love of

others. Establishing new interpretations are possible, Bloom explains, by recognizing that “the anxiety of influence *comes out of* a complex act of strong misreading, a creative interpretation,” which he calls, “poetic misprision” (AI, p. xxiii).

As misprision indicates an intentional misreading of an author’s work, creative misreading thus involves formulating a new interpretation by going beyond the boundaries of the text’s objective. Moving past an author’s original intentions serves in re-contextualizing his work with the purpose of forming a new perspective, and is with this intention that I approach deciphering Nietzsche’s philosophies, as I consider his emotional struggles when interpreting his theories. This process of forming a new perspective is precisely what I argue Nietzsche was endeavoring regarding his perception of love. Bloom himself credits Nietzsche’s “perspectivism” with inspiring the research which forms his work (AI, p. xxvi). In Nietzsche’s *Untimely Meditations*, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life,” he discusses the dominance of historical perspectives on current cultures. Bloom pinpoints this idea to highlight his point that there is pressure on writers to create something unique beyond that of their predecessors. The anxiety Bloom refers to comes from Nietzsche’s *Untimely Meditations*:

We moderns have nothing whatever of our own; only by replenishing and cramming ourselves with the ages, customs, arts, philosophies, religions, discoveries of others do we become anything worthy of notice, that is to say, walking encyclopaedias (UM, p.79).

Poetic misprision, Bloom explains, serves not only in a study of the life of the writer, but also as a new chapter in the “history of modern revisionism” (AI, pp. 7-8). Utilizing the method of a creative misreading presents the opportunity of an imaginative approach to a reexamination of Nietzsche’s philosophies. Concerning new interpretations of previously

established works, Richard Rorty discusses Bloom's theories in relation to the contingency of language. He explains:

The person who uses words as they have never before been used, is best able to appreciate her own contingency. For she can see...that her *language* is as contingent as her parents or her historical epoch... [and so] by her own sheer strength, she has broken out of one perspective, one metaphoric, into another (CIS, p. 28).

Through the performance of reevaluating prior thoughts, Rorty explains that a departure from continuity leads toward the creation of something new (CIS, p. 25). In this way, my work will connect with, and break away from, Nietzsche's direct focus on the implications of morality by highlighting his personal struggles with desiring love. Through a "creative misreading," my thesis will reinterpret the experimentation found in Nietzsche's philosophical works by considering his emotional confictions, thus exemplifying the interpretation Bloom refers to as "poetic misprision" (AI, p. xxiii). This creative misreading also offers the invention of what Rorty refers to as a new language through a unique interpretation of Nietzsche's life and works.

Bloom posits that "every poem is a misinterpretation of a parent poem. A poem is not an overcoming of anxiety, but is that anxiety" (AI, p. 93). This contention would ensue that my thesis is an anxiety derived from Nietzsche's original writings, but I assert that it rather serves to praise his work while finding my own interpretation through the inspiration received by his philosophies. Rorty offers a softer voice when elaborating on Bloom's theory, warmly declaring that writers are quite capable of creating new words with their own unique stories. He explains that, "the line between weakness and strength is thus the line between using language which is familiar and universal and producing language which, though initially unfamiliar and idiosyncratic, somehow makes tangible the blind impress all one's behaving bear" (CIS, pp. 28-9). When addressing Nietzsche in the same vein as Bloom,

Rorty suggests that what Nietzsche considers of great importance is the division from old to new ways of perceiving the world. He states that Nietzsche “thinks a human life triumphant just insofar as it escapes from inherited descriptions of the contingencies of its existence and finds new descriptions,” and that significance lies in “recreating all ‘it was’ into a ‘thus I willed it’” (CIS, p. 29).

Rorty explains that Bloom’s ultimate concern is that of willing something new out of the well-worn words of the past, and it is in this manner that my thesis embodies Bloom’s theory. In departing from the contingency of Nietzsche’s original intentions surrounding morality, my thesis performs a reevaluation of his theories by performing a creative misreading of his texts. By contrasting the assertions Nietzsche made in his works with the behaviors demonstrated in his letters, my thesis offers a new perspective of his doctrines. As Bloom eloquently expressed, “criticism is the art of knowing the hidden roads that go from poem to poem,” and in this way, my thesis offers a new understanding of Nietzsche’s philosophies through the shared, yet unseen passageways of his public works and private expressions (AI, p. 96).

Review of Literature

Framing a new interpretation of Nietzsche’s philosophical works in light of his letters and poetry requires biographical information as well as philosophical and literary analysis. With these requirements, my thesis relies heavily on six key sources. Foremost among them is Walter Kaufmann’s work, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*.

As a principal academic in the field of Nietzschean scholarship, Kaufmann’s work offers superb analysis of Nietzsche’s philosophies, detailed consideration of the connections between his different theories, and numerous examples of exceptional translations. Perhaps

most importantly, Kaufmann's expansive knowledge in these areas provides him with an intuitive understanding of Nietzsche's intentions with his works.

Though supplying much of the same historical information as Kaufmann, Rüdiger Safranski's, *Nietzsche: A Philosophical Biography*, and Ronald Hayman's, *Nietzsche: A Critical Life*, both offer a chronological approach to understanding Nietzsche's life and philosophies from unique perspectives. Safranski commonly presents a psychological examination whereas Hayman often offers more of a metaphorical perspective. Both authors provide distinctly different interpretations of Nietzsche's development throughout the course of his philosophical theories.

Carol Diethe's, *Nietzsche's Women: Beyond the Whip*, also offers opinions on the development of Nietzsche's perspectives based on personal history, but her focus on his association with women particularly benefits my thesis. Diethe's analysis of Nietzsche's relationship with the women in his adolescence, as well as the intellectual women with whom he mingled in his adult years, distinctly serves to assist in establishing origin and progression of his perception of love. When evaluating Nietzsche's emotional development, Philip Grundlehner's, *The Poetry of Friedrich Nietzsche*, is exceptional in its consideration of language and style. Grundlehner traces Nietzsche's lyrical inclinations from its origin in his youth to his last rhythmic expressions before his collapse, further offering comparative interpretations between his poems and his philosophies.

Regarding Nietzsche's letters, Christopher Middleton's, *Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche*, serves as my work's main source for his correspondences. Middleton's work additionally offers clarification regarding translation and background information. Sander L. Gilman's, *Conversations with Nietzsche: A Life in the Words of His Contemporaries*, also

supplies an important aspect of Nietzsche's personal history, but from the vantage point of those who knew him. Gilman's compilation of testimonials from acquaintances, close friends, journalists, authors, and even medical professionals offers a unique understanding of Nietzsche's life through the impressions others had of him.

These authors, and other minor sources, provide the groundwork needed for my thesis. This scholarly assistance supplies the material to examine Nietzsche's philosophies through the lens of his personal writings, allowing for a clear demonstration of the affect his desire for the love of others had on the formation of his theories.

CHAPTER II

EARLY LIFE AND WORKS

Formulating an Ideal of Love

Within the first five years of his life Nietzsche experienced profound love and suffering, having lost his only close companion, his father Karl Ludwig, and then his little brother, Ludwig Joseph, less than six months later (NB, 1849/50, pp. 351-2). Years later he wrote of how deeply these losses affected him: “The thought of being separated forever from my beloved father seized me, and I wept bitterly” (NB, 1858, p. 352). Recalling a dream he had of his deceased father carrying a small child into a tomb, Nietzsche wrote, “the day following this night, little Joseph suddenly fell ill with cramps and died... Our grief was overwhelming. My dream had come utterly true” (NB, 1858, p. 352). Experiencing love and suffering at such a young age, I contend, directly contributed to Nietzsche’s formation of an ideal of love as selfless and unconditional. Specifically, I argue that the early death of his father directly contributed to the formulation of his perception of love because the brevity of their close relationship intensified Nietzsche’s affections, leading his young mind to regard the love his father gave as ideal. Furthermore, I posit that the lack of affection Nietzsche received from his mother, Franziska, heightened his reverence for his father.

Franziska’s role as a mother, Diethe suggests, was hindered by the difficulties she faced in her own life. At the age of seventeen Franziska was rushed into marriage with Karl and moved into a house which included his mother and two sisters (NW, pp. 12, 15). Immediately upon joining the Nietzsche household, Diethe explains, Franziska was “relegated to a back living room and given the use of two bedrooms whilst her dominating mother-in-law, Erdmuthé... ruled the roost in the sunny rooms on the first floor” (NW, p.

12). Karl's allowing his mother to "patronize his young bride" caused his wife's position to be somewhere "between guest and servant," which Diethe argues frustrated Franziska's development and accounts for her "immature characteristics" (NW, p. 14). Moreover, upon her husband's death, Franziska felt she had no other choice but to uproot her children and move with his dominating family from Röcken to Naumburg due to the need of financial assistance, thus furthering her misery (NW, p. 14).

I concur with Diethe's assertion ultimately it was Franziska's unhappiness that affected her ability to give Nietzsche the affection he desperately needed after losing his father and little brother. Additionally, Diethe opposes the simplicity of assertions regarding Franziska's cold and harsh demeanor toward her children, suggesting rather that she was unfortunately the product and victim of "paternalistic influences" (NW, p. 3).

Diethe explains that Franziska was brought up with the strict pietism of her father, Pastor Oehler, who taught "a straightforward faith without too much theory" (NW p. 13). She indicates that "these principles were so ingrained in [Franziska] that her behavior struck the older women in the household as gauche," specifically in that, as a strict follower of Lutheranism, Nietzsche's grandmother, Erdmuthe, "did not accept the egalitarian principles implicit in the tenets of pietism" (NW pp. 12-13). Thus, in addition to losing his beloved father and little brother, as well as lacking affection from his mother, Nietzsche's unhappy childhood also consisted of confusions regarding the specifics of religious behavior.

Music, Poetry and Religion

God's authority was always present in Nietzsche's matriarchal household, regardless of the antagonism between his mother and his father's family. Grundlehner posits that Nietzsche's "rejection of orthodox religion" was always evident, but Paul Deussen, whom

Nietzsche met in 1859 when they were students at Schulpforta, recollected his friend's faith differently (PN, p. 19). Recalling their confirmation on Laetare Sunday, in 1861, Deussen described that they experienced a "holy, ecstatic mood" before and after confirmation: "We would have been quite ready to die immediately to be with Christ, and all our thoughts, feelings, and actions were irradiated with a superterrestrial joy" (CN, pp.10-11).

Deussen's contentions seem to find evidence in Nietzsche's early appreciation of music, as his sister Elisabeth recalled her brother's first attempts at composing, when he was only nine years old, came after hearing "Hallelujah from the *Messiah*" during Ascension Day in the Spring of 1854 (CN, p. 6). It becomes clear that this inspiration was really more about appreciation of music though, for when recalling the same period later in autobiographical fragments, Nietzsche noted, "since my ninth year, music was what attracted me most of all" (SL, 1868/9, p. 47). This admiration for music stems back to his earliest experiences, Hayman explains, for as crying as infant Nietzsche was always "responsive to his father's piano-playing" (CL, p. 17).

Music was often referenced in his poetry, which can be seen as early as 1858, when Nietzsche wrote of bird songs in connection with his father's grave (PB, p. 55). Additionally, when Nietzsche was a teenager, Dietrich Fischer-Dieskau explains in his work, *Wagner and Nietzsche*, he created a music club at school which required all participants to create and submit monthly musical compositions for collective criticism (WN, 1860, p. 2).

Though Deussen was not immediately aware, Nietzsche had begun to separate himself from religion long before their shared reading of David Friedrich Strauss' work, *The Life of Jesus* in 1864, to which Nietzsche's response was to conceive that such proclamations created "a serious consequence: if you give up Christ, you'll also have to give up God" (CN,

p. 21). Losing his father and little brother, I maintain, led Nietzsche to determine early in life that suffering was not excusable by the pretext of faith.

When he was nineteen, Nietzsche wrote to Elisabeth expressing his frustrations regarding faith and blindly following strict paths designated as truthful for the purpose of comfort:

Every true faith is indeed infallible; it performs what the believing person hopes to find in it, but it does not offer the least support for the establishing of an objective truth. Here the ways of men divide. If you want to achieve peace of mind and happiness, then have faith; if you want to be a disciple of truth, then search (SL, June 1865, p. 7).

Concerning faith and his emotional struggles, Nietzsche found expression in his poetry. Elisabeth explained that, when they were children, her brother's "basic trait of character was a certain melancholy, which expressed itself in his whole being," noting that he often isolated himself, focusing his attentions on literature and music (CWN, p. 5). At the age of ten Nietzsche had already compiled more than a dozen poems, and by thirteen, Grundlehner explains, he determined that poetry lacked objectivity and that his future writing should be limited to "strict attention to the truth, without poetry or verse adornment!" (PN, pp. 3-5). As an early example of Nietzsche's emotional conflicts, directly following this assertion he did exactly the opposite and wrote a reflective poem: "Life is a mirror / To perceive *ourselves* within it, this / I would like to call the highest thing / To which we can hope to strive!" (PN, p. 5).

Critiquing and separating his work into "three distinct periods," Grundlehner describes that, by the age of fourteen, the "scrutiny to which Nietzsche subjected his own poetry early in life is consistent with the implacable self-criticisms with which he continued to evaluate many of his subsequent writings" (PN, pp. 3-5). In addition to offering

concurrency with my assertion that Nietzsche contended with internal conflicts early in life, Grundlehner also indicates that this contradiction “continued to pervade Nietzsche’s poetry”:

On the one hand he distrusted the poetic impulse as a corruption of truth, yet on the other he felt a propensity to express himself in the very mode of discourse that he held most suspect (PN, p. 5).

Grundlehner’s point clearly offers early evidence which corresponds to what I argue as Nietzsche’s later contradictions between his emotional conflicts and the perspectives expressed in his philosophical works, illustrating that these paradoxes were already in play at a young age.

In a poem entitled, “Fled Are the Lovely Dreams,” written a year before his and Deussen’s confirmation, Nietzsche not only expressed his suffering, but also his thoughts regarding his own formation of God:

I have never experienced / The joy and happiness of life. / I look back sadly / Upon times that are long vanished. / I do not know what I love / I have neither peace nor rest. / I do not know what I believe / Or why I’m still living... / Man is not a worthy image / Of God / From day to day more distorted / I form God / According to my rudimentary character. / I awoke from heavy dreams / Through a dull ringing (PN, 1860, pp. 16-17).

The pain Nietzsche experienced could not be stifled by faith, and so during his adolescence he began pondering the meaning behind his suffering, taking the first steps toward determining that God was mankind’s creation. In 1865, a year after he and Deussen had pondered Strauss’ assertions, Nietzsche discovered Schopenhauer’s *The World as Will and Representation* in a used bookstore, and detailed in his diary the immense affect the philosopher’s perspectives had on him:

Here I saw a mirror in which I beheld the world, life, and the personal spirit in dreadful grandeur. Here I was stared at by the fully indifferent solar eye of art. Here I

saw disease and healing, exile and refuge, hell and heaven: the need to know myself, nay, gnaw myself asunder, took violent hold of me (WN, 1865, p. 23).

With this, Nietzsche had officially become a disciple of Schopenhauer, directly influencing his perceptions of morality and suffering, as well as creating the foundation for a relationship which would alter the course of his life and works.

Schopenhauer and Wagner

Schopenhauer's philosophies not only offered Nietzsche new ways of conceiving morality and suffering, but as well denoted a shared love and endorsement of the arts. Specifically, Fischer-Dieskau indicates that Schopenhauer perceived music as a means of directly expressing the "reality and form of things" (WN, p. 24). Though music "may not be able to convey any rational knowledge," Fischer-Dieskau explains, Schopenhauer contended that during the performance, "all temporal, spatial, causal, and final needs are taken from us" (WN, p. 24). Nietzsche discussed this particular experience often throughout the course of his philosophical works. In a letter to Carl von Gersdorff, whom Nietzsche met in 1861 when attending Schulpforta, written April 1866, he noted that the three things which most assisted him in relaxing were Schopenhauer, music and his solitary walks (SL, pp. 3, 12).

Like music and Schopenhauer, Nietzsche's walks in nature were of great importance to him, and when writing Gersdorff he enthusiastically expressed, "How different the lightning, the wind, the hail, free powers, without ethics! How fortunate, how strong they are, pure will, without obscurings from the intellect!" (SL, p. 12). Nietzsche also mentioned the armed forces to Gersdorff: "I have already accustomed myself to the military idea. Often I wanted to be lifted up and carried away from my monotonous work; I was greedy for the opposites, of excitement, of a tempestuous lust for life, of enthusiasm" (SL, p. 11). A few years later Nietzsche did join the military and during his time in the Franco-Prussian War,

contracted dysentery, diphtheria, and sustained a major chest injury after falling from his horse (SL, 1870, pp. 32, 69). When he returned in the fall of 1870, Nietzsche met and established a lifelong friendship with the new professor of theology in Basel, Franz Overbeck (SL, p. 51).

Nietzsche's admiration for music and Schopenhauer served as a connection to one of the most profound and transformative relationships of his life. Three years following his discovery of Schopenhauer's work, he received an invitation to meet Wilhelm Richard Wagner (SL, 1868, p. 37). In Wagner Nietzsche found not only a fellow advocate of Schopenhauerian philosophy and a direct connection to a new, inclusive world of music, I contend he also perceived in the composer the realization of his ideal of love. Born just a few months before Karl Nietzsche, Wagner filled the position of father figure well, offering authority, dominance, and devotion. Nietzsche's captivation had long been in place, as Kaufmann explains that Wagner's *Tristan* had enchanted him long before their meeting, inspiring him to place the composer on the same level of genius as Schopenhauer and Goethe (NP, p. 30). Wagner's opinion that Schopenhauer was "the only philosopher to have understood the essence of music," Hayman explains, inspired Nietzsche's affections all the more, and so the relationship between beloved master and disciple was formed (CL, p. 98).

Nietzsche's relationship with Wagner placed him in a world which offered more than music and philosophy. The composer also introduced a host of friends who glorified Nietzsche's talents, encouraged his writings and compositions, and supplied him with the attention and affection he had longed for since childhood. Kaufmann indicates that, "[Nietzsche's] days in the Wagner's house in Tribschen were as close as he ever came to having a home in which he belonged and of which he could feel proud" (NP, p. 34). In a

letter to Wagner written in May 1869, Nietzsche expressed his gratefulness to the composer for his profound friendship:

The best and loftiest moments of my life are associated with your name, and I know of only one other man, your great spiritual brother Arthur Schopenhauer, whom I regard with equal reverence... How many purely scientific problems have been gradually clarified for me by contemplating your personality, so solitary and of such remarkable presence (SL, pp. 53-4).

During these self-proclaimed loftiest moments of his life, Nietzsche's excitement and cheerfulness were completely wrapped in Wagner's guidance and governance of his life and thinking. Thoughts which possessed him during this point were inspired by Wagner's own ideas, such as creating a community of great thinkers not unlike the composer's original conception of Bayreuth. In December 1870, Nietzsche discussed this particular project in a letter to Erwin Rohde, whom he met in 1866, and requested that his friend read Wagner's book on Beethoven, noting that it would give "a good idea of what I desire of the future. Read it—it is a revelation of the spirit in which *we*— we!— shall come to live" (SL, pp. 3,74).

Though Nietzsche was dedicated to the abandonment of his career in Philology, an action staunchly insisted upon by Wagner, his movement was not as rapid as his master desired. Nietzsche was thus compelled to express his dedication to his surrogate father: "Through the gray mist of philology, I am never far, my thoughts always circle around you... I ask only... that I may prove myself to be not unworthy of your inestimable interest and your firm encouragement" (SL, May 1870, p. 66). Nietzsche did attempt to switch his position of professor of philology for the chair of philosophy, but was denied (SL, 1871, p. 76).

His dedication to Wagner, I argue, inspired a weakness in Nietzsche which would stir severe bitterness later in his life. Immersion into Wagner's world induced a different kind of self-criticism in Nietzsche than that of his former efforts of self-analyzation, for he became reproachful of his personal musical compositions following harsh criticism from one of Wagner's peers. Upon sending Hans von Bülow his composition, "Manfred Meditation," the reply Nietzsche received was that his work was one of "the most unedifying" and "anti-musical" compositions Bülow had ever received (WS, p. 31). Nietzsche's response to this cruel and unkind belittlement was to thank Bülow for his criticism and humbly request that he not fault Wagner's inspiration for his own failures:

So that is not music at all? This makes me quite happy; I need no longer concern myself with this... altogether odious way of passing my time... But I ask only one thing of you—do not make *Tristan* responsible for my sin (SL, October 1872, p. 107).

It is my contention that this letter reveals an important aspect of Nietzsche's current perspective of love, as his readiness to cower and allowance of another's opinion to dictate his musical ambitions, I posit, expose Nietzsche's fear of losing Wagner, the fruition of his ideal of love. Nietzsche's act of weakness and readiness to condemn himself for the sake of another's love exhibits an aspect of his thinking which would later enrage him. Accordingly, I assert that this early submissive behavior directly inspired Nietzsche's later dissection of morality with the intention to disavow love because of recognition of past weaknesses.

In consideration of Nietzsche's response to the severe criticisms of his music, Kathleen Higgins and Robert Solomon, in their work, *What Nietzsche Really Said*, suggest that he may have feared Bülow's "venting his hostility toward Wagner, who had run off with the conductor's wife, Cosima" (WS, p. 31). This suggestion inspires reflection on speculations regarding Nietzsche's affections for Cosima. When Nietzsche first met Cosima

in the Tribschen household I propose that he perceived in her his first impression of the unegoistic love of a mother. Considering that, in his youth, Nietzsche only briefly experienced the love of his father while motherly love was ambiguous, I argue that when he attached his ideal of love to his father figure Wagner, he saw in Cosima a kind of motherly love. As Nietzsche's relationship with Wagner changed and he began to perceive him differently, so too did he see Cosima in a new light, but this, along with opposing assertions from other scholars, will be addressed later in this work. Suffice it to say for now, any affections Nietzsche had for Cosima in no way hindered his dedication to his beloved master.

Nietzsche's embracing of Wagner's authority in his life and thinking are demonstrated clearly in his first major publication, *The Birth of Tragedy*. Kaufmann insists, for example, that the portion of this text which deals with "Greek drama could probably never have been written without Wagner's work" (NP, p. 31). In the preface to the Cambridge edition of *The Birth of Tragedy*, it is noted that the text is directly influenced by Wagner's writings on Beethoven and his *Opera and Drama* (BT-CAM, p. xxxiv). In a letter to Wagner, Nietzsche expressed gratitude and his intentions pertaining to *The Birth of Tragedy*, as it regarded the composer:

Every page you will find that I am only trying to thank you for everything you have given me...I feel proud that I have now marked myself out and that people will now always link my name with yours... the warmest thanks for your love (SL, p. 91).

The evidence of Wagner's influence is overwhelming, and it is my contention that this mastery was possible because of Nietzsche's happiness in living within the ideal of love he had conceived in the idolization of his father. The perceptions demonstrated in his early works, I posit, were a result of his experiencing the love he had long desired from the father figure he had found in Wagner.

The Birth of Tragedy

Kaufmann asserts that Nietzsche “frequently made unrealistic references to his father, whom he pictured as more wonderful than he had actually been,” adding that he “fastened on Wagner as a father substitute” (NP, p. 33). Though vulnerable to Wagner’s influence, many of the perceptions presented in *The Birth of Tragedy* had long been part of Nietzsche’s thinking, for example the value he gave to music. Grundlehner notes that with this work, “Nietzsche doubted the lyric as an effective medium of communication and because of this opted for music because of its ability to transcend language” (PN, pp. 307-8). Unlike his childhood doubts regarding the ability to express truth in poetry, Nietzsche found that music was always a trusting medium: “Quite generally, only music, placed beside the world, can give us an idea of what is meant by the justification of the world as an aesthetic phenomenon” (BT, p. 141). The aesthetic phenomenon clearly offers purpose and meaning for mankind’s anguish, Nietzsche proclaims, for “how else could [the Greek] people, so sensitive, so vehement in [their] desires, so singularly capable of *suffering*, have endured existence?” (BT, p. 43).

Safranski offers an example of where Nietzsche diverged from Wagner’s thought, citing the composer’s contention that art could serve in place of religion. Safranski states that, though Nietzsche was interested by the idea, it “ultimately struck him as too pious, and he retreated from it in favor of an artistic approach to life. He sought enhancement of life in art, not redemption” (NB, p. 89).

In a letter to Gersdorff written in April 1866, Nietzsche discussed the association of religion and redemption, and the philosophers’ use of masks in this regard:

If Christianity means ‘Belief in an historical event or in an historical person,’ then I’ll have nothing to do with Christianity. But if it means simply the need for redemption,

then I can value it highly, and do not even object to its attempt to discipline philosophers, who are too few in comparison with the mass of those needing redemption though made of the same stuff—yes, even if all those who practice philosophy were to be followers of Schopenhauer! But only too often there lurks behind the mask of the philosopher the lofty majesty of the ‘will,’ which seeks to realize its own self-glorification (SL, pp. 12-13).

This letter indicates that less than five years before beginning *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche had conceived value in the concept of redemption, going so far as to discredit philosophers who all too often mask their egotistical assumptions of truth, denying mankind’s need to be redeemed from his suffering. Nietzsche determined that part of the downfall in culture is found in the avoidance of contemplating suffering. The censuring of mankind’s anguish, Nietzsche contends, can be traced back to the playwright Euripides. Whereas suffering was once seen as primordial and natural, Euripides’ slow withdrawal of the chorus and greater focus on comedies depleted Athenian performances, generating a “death struggle of tragedy” (BT, p. 76).

The new ideas of suggesting reason over passion and emotions within tragic production were to blame for mankind’s shifting views of suffering. During an early time of rationality, it was not only the playwright Nietzsche faulted, as he asserted that even “Euripides was, in a sense, only a mask: the deity that spoke through him was neither Dionysus nor Apollo, but an altogether newborn demon, called *Socrates*” (BT, p. 82). As with his above letter, Nietzsche references a mask as shielding hidden egoistic attempts to determine truth without consideration of mankind’s suffering in a chaotic world.

Though I agree with Safranski’s assertion that, unlike Wagner, Nietzsche did not intend art as a replacement of religion, I disagree with his dismissal of Nietzsche’s intention regarding redemption, for it completely neglects the importance the term serves in Dionysian aspects. Nietzsche explains that in the oneness experienced through the loss of ego, which

took place within Dionysian festivals, “redemption and days of transfiguration,” were attained, and through this “the destruction of the *principium individuationis* for the first time becomes an artistic phenomenon” (BT, p. 40). Redemption does not represent saving mankind through art, as Safranski seems to suggest when discrediting the term, but rather, I argue, it represents mankind’s regaining possession of his love for life by acknowledging the suffering aspects of existence.

There is necessity in mankind’s understanding all aspects of life, not only logic, but also emotion; not simply joy, but likewise suffering, as well as recognizing both his oneness with nature and his individuation. Nietzsche offers two Greek gods as examples of the necessary unity of life’s diverse aspects. He associates the *principium individuationis* with the Greek God Apollo, “through whose... joy and wisdom of ‘illusion,’ together with its beauty, speak to us” (BT, p. 36). Dionysus represents for Nietzsche, the collapse of this principle of individuation, for as the god’s “emotions awake, and... grow in intensity everything subjective vanishes into complete self-forgetfulness” (BT, p. 36). It is the union of these aspects, represented by Apollo and Dionysus, which brings awareness to mankind through a greater comprehension of the duality within his existence.

There is necessity in illusion, and by use of Apollo, Nietzsche explains that the god “shows us how necessary is the entire world of suffering, that by means of it the individual may be impelled to realize the redeeming vision” (BT, p. 45). The art expressed through Apollonian illusion demonstrates that suffering does not need to exist in unmovable melancholy, but rather may be turned into beautiful creations. It is through his suffering that mankind regains possession of his love for life; he finds redemption through discovering value in life’s pleasures by acknowledging its binary aspect of pain. Mankind’s suffering is

“revealed to him by the Dionysian,” for Nietzsche asserts that even the “muses of the arts of ‘illusion’ paled before an art that, in its intoxication, spoke the truth... *Excess* revealed itself as truth” (BT, pp. 46-7).

Though truth resides in the universality of the Dionysian experience, Nietzsche explains that if mankind existed purely in this state he would never know the “re-echo of the *universalia ante rem*” (BT, p. 127). It is in reflection that mankind examines his experiences; in his separation, he contemplates through reflection, and so the Apollonian is needed to “restore the almost shattered individual with the healing balm of blissful illusion” (BT, p. 127). Nietzsche addresses the necessity of illusions in regards to recognizing the suffering of others as well, for in the Dionysian there is no separation.

However powerfully pity affects us, it nevertheless saves us in a way from the primordial suffering of the world... [for] the Apollinian tears us out of the Dionysian universality and lets us find delight in individuals; it attaches our pity to them, and by means of them it satisfies our sense of beauty which longs for great and sublime forms (BT, p. 128).

Nietzsche explains that pity serves as part of mankind’s individuation by separating the very attachment formed in the oneness of Dionysus, for in this separation he experiences pity for others by perceiving their suffering as distinct from his own. In a letter to Deussen in February 1870, Nietzsche discussed pity and mankind’s separation, noting his and his friend’s limitations regarding people they could converse with on intellectual topics, which is why they required the “solaces of art”:

We do not wish to convert others to our way of thinking, because we feel the gulf between them and ourselves to be one established by nature. Pity becomes truly a familiar feeling to us. We grow more and more silent (SL, pp. 63-4).

Though the separation he described to Deussen was a deception, for Nietzsche asserts that in “sympathetic emotion,” the Apollonian blinds mankind “to the universality of the

Dionysian process, deluding him into the belief that he is seeing a single image of the world” (BT, p. 128).

Nietzsche posits that there is a need of “redemption from the ‘ego,’ and the silencing of the individual will and desire” (BT, p. 48). It is my contention that Nietzsche’s explanation of the Dionysian experience of loss of ego finds harmony with the selfless aspect of his ideal of love. Within the destruction of the individual, love is found; through the release of the ego mankind discovers his universality. Safranski explains that, when transcending the *principium individuationis*, mankind “steps beyond his confines to blend with nature... [and] emerges from his detachment to join with his fellow man in the ‘orgiastic’ experience of love and the frenzy of the masses” (NB, p. 67). Love is thus experienced through selflessness, as in his egoless state, mankind finds union with others within in the chaos of existence.

Consisting of both suffering and passionate emotions, love itself is chaotic, and in his insistence of the necessity of both Apollonian and Dionysian aspects, Nietzsche implies that love serves as a union of individual and universal sentiments. Nietzsche proclaims a need of Apollo’s egoistic art of illusions and Dionysus’ art of self-forgetfulness, which “in its intoxication, spoke the truth.” In the chaos of love, mankind experiences both selfish desire and selfless devotion; he experiences suffering in his love while also being redeemed by love within his suffering. Though he recognized love’s duality early on, I argue that the idealized, selfless love Nietzsche imagined receiving from his father was so deeply engrained that he was unable to internalize his own theory prior to experiencing for himself the intensive binaries of pleasure and pain in love.

In his work, *Living with Nietzsche: What the Great “Immoralist” Has to Teach Us*, Robert Solomon asserts that, when proclaiming, “Only as an aesthetic phenomenon is the

world justified, Nietzsche was “talking about the passions and how we *feel* about life” (LN, p. 70-1). During the creation of his *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche was surrounded by love and so felt happy in his life. He had high expectations regarding the publication of this work, writing to his friend Gersdorff, in November 1871, that he had “the greatest confidence that the book will have tremendous sales,” adding that the “gentleman who does the vignette can prepare himself for a modicum of immortality” (SL, p. 83).

This was not the case though, for in October 1872, Nietzsche expressed his grief surrounding his recent publication when writing Rohde: “It is as if I had committed a crime; people have kept quiet now for ten months, because all actually think they are beyond and above my book... People half think I am off my head” (SL, pp. 103-4). One such acquaintance who did not respond upon receiving Nietzsche’s work, nor to his letters of inquiry, was Friedrich Ritschl, whom he met in 1865 while studying philology at Leipzig University (SL, p. 3). It was discovered later that Ritschl wrote in his journal that Nietzsche’s book was “rakish dissoluteness” and that his letter was “megalomania” (SL, 1871/2, p. 93).

To his newly acquainted Wagnerian friend, Malwida von Meysenbug, Nietzsche expressed that his “*Birth of Tragedy* has made of me the most offensive philologist of the present day, to defend whom could be a true marvel of courage, for everyone is of a mind to condemn me” (SL, November 1872, p. 108). A review by Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, a young scholar of philology, was especially harsh when proclaiming Nietzsche’s “unscholarly inaccuracies and omissions” (CL, p. 153). He further mocked Nietzsche’s discussion of Dionysus within his text:

Let Mr. N keep his word, let him take up the thyrsus and move from India to Greece, but he should step down from the podium from which he is supposed to be teaching scholarship; let him gather tigers and panthers at his knees, but not Germany’s young generation of philologists (NB, January 1883, p. 83).

Devastated by the criticisms of his work, Nietzsche found solace in Wagner's love and wrote to him of his sorrows, expressing, "To you, beloved master, I tell it because you should know all" (SL, November 1872, p. 110). Nietzsche had become aware that a professor of philology at Bonn university had condemned his book as "sheer nonsense," and that a student who had intended to attend Basel University exclaimed gratitude that he had not gone to a university in which Nietzsche was employed (SL, p. 110). Though humbly expressing his pain, Nietzsche also stated, "I truly have the least right to be in any way despondent, for I live really in the midst of a solar system of loving friendship, consoling encouragement, and enlivening hopes" (SL, p. 110).

Aside from lamenting the harmful reception his work had received, Nietzsche concluded his letter explaining that "all is light and hope. I would have to be a very morose mole not to leap for joy on receiving such letters as yours" (SL, November 1872, p. 110). His assertion that he had hope and light in his life despite the negativity his work received, I argue, illustrates the extent of Nietzsche's happiness while living love. He could be cheerful beyond suffering bad reviews of his work because of feeling fulfilled emotionally by his relationship with Wagner, who initially appeared to offer Nietzsche the selfless and unrestricted love he believed to have received from his father.

Untimely Meditations

The attacks on Nietzsche's *Birth of Tragedy* affected him deeply, but the support he had received from Wagner kept him positive. The light he perceived in his master was beginning to dim though, as Wagner was often angry with Nietzsche's inability to consistently attend his beck and call. Unable to abide Wagner's request to join him for

Christmas in 1872, Nietzsche hoped to make amends by visiting him in Bayreuth in April.

Nietzsche's letter following the visit reveals that Wagner was not appeased by his efforts:

I know very well, dearest master, that such a visit cannot be a time of leisure for you... I wished so often to give at least the appearance of greater freedom and independence, but in vain. Enough—I ask that you take me simply as a pupil... with a very slow and not at all versatile mind. It is true that I grow more melancholy every day when I feel so strongly how much I would like to help you somehow (SL, April 1873, p. 118).

Though humble in the letter, Nietzsche too allotted room for himself by suggesting that he be perceived as a pupil rather than a subject, though this too he conveyed with a meek tone expressing inadequacy. Wagner was persistent in his efforts to have more of Nietzsche's attention, and during Christmas 1874, wrote to his disciple regarding the direction of his life:

I believe you ought to marry or compose an opera; either would be as good or as bad for you as the other. But I consider marriage better... We can be something to you; why do you scorn this so fervently? Gersdorff and the whole Basilicum can spare your time here... For goodness' sakes! Marry a rich woman! Just why did Gersdorff have to be a male!... compose your opera, which will probably be bloody hard to perform.—What the devil made you a pedagogue anyway? (WN, pp. 121-2).

Fischer-Dieskau explains that, prior to the letter, Wagner invited Nietzsche to move in with him and Cosima, and that, with his letter, he demonstrated a thoughtful effort to comfort his friend (WN, p. 122). Though I do not contend with Fischer-Dieskau's assertion of Wagner's intentions, the letter does reveal the composer's passionate attention to Nietzsche, as well as the agency he assumed in his life.

In a letter to Gersdorff, Nietzsche expressed that they both knew well that “Wagner's nature tends to make him *suspicious*” (SL, July 1874, p. 127). He further noted, “I have obligations toward myself, which are very hard to fulfill, with my health in such a fragile state. Really, nobody should try forcing me to do anything” (SL, p. 127). Nietzsche's health

was in “a fragile state,” for he struggled so much with his eyesight that he often had to dictate his work (SL, p. 119).

Though assisted by Gersdorff, when writing *Untimely Meditations*, Nietzsche was so hindered by his vision he was driven to seek medical assistance (WN, p. 104). In May 1875, Nietzsche again sent apologies to Wagner, this time for missing his birthday: “My wishes come limping and late; you must forgive me, beloved master. I mean by this the uncertainty and weakness of my physical state” (SL, pp. 132-4). In June 1875, Nietzsche wrote to Gersdorff that his illness caused him to vomit for hours, bringing on headaches which lasted for days; a month later he wrote again that he had gone to Steinabad to seek medical assistance, and by December 1875, wrote that he was so severely sick he believed himself to have brain damage (SL, pp. 132, 136).

There is no doubt that Nietzsche suffered greatly from physical ailments, but it is my contention that much of his illness was prompted by his own anguish. An example of Nietzsche’s sorrows manifesting his illness is found in his reaction of dismay over Heinrich Romundt’s decision to leave his profession in philology to become a Catholic priest. Romundt and Nietzsche had been friends since their student days in Leipzig, and so when writing to Rohde in February 1875, Nietzsche expressed that their closeness made his friend’s choice so much more disturbing: “I find it so incomprehensible that, right beside me, after eight years of intimacy, this ghost should have risen up... I have been wounded precisely in a matter of friendship” (SL, p. 132).

The incident upset Nietzsche to such an extent that it followed with more than thirty-six hours of headaches and vomiting (SL, p. 132). Nietzsche’s illness being enflamed by his sorrows becomes more prominent in later years, for at this time he was still happy in love and

so happy in life. He wrote to Gersdorff of “the constant joy of having found in Schopenhauer and Wagner educators” and that the “glorious power of *sharing joy*,” was “even more rare and noble than the power of sharing suffering” (SL, December 1875, p. 140). As he had in his *Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche posited the importance of illusions in his *Untimely Meditations*, specifically associating it with love:

It is only in love, only when shaded by the illusion produced by love, that is to say in the unconditional faith in right and perfection, that man is creative. Anything that constrains a man to love less than unconditionally has severed the roots of his strength: he will... become dishonest (UM p. 95).

Nietzsche explains the importance of mankind’s ability to possess unconditional love, asserting that this sentiment assists him in his creativity. His emphasis on the fault in anything less than unconditional love demonstrates that he felt it to hold such value that to be without it would result in loss of strength, causing dishonesty.

With Wagner, Nietzsche felt assured of love, though during the period of creating this work he began to discover issues between his and his master’s perspectives. In his essay, “Schopenhauer as educator,” Nietzsche discussed diverging from previous conceptions when discussing the Schopenhauerian, man, who is open to “conversion of his being, which it is the real meaning of life to lead up to” (UM p. 152). The Schopenhauerian man speaks truths, disturbing those who perceive his words as cruelty, and so there is suffering in his deliverance of truths undesired. Regardless of his own anguish, the Schopenhauerian man offers himself up as the one to be despised, willing to sacrifice himself and his happiness for truth while fully aware of the suffering that “must spring from his truthfulness” (UM p. 153). (UM, p. 153).

Nietzsche’s “Schopenhauer as educator” in many ways reads as a foreshadowing of the suffering he would endure following his breakup with Wagner, as he would indeed be an

enemy “to those he loves” (UM p. 153). Nietzsche explains that, in recognition of his own eternal becoming, the Schopenhauerian man despises the measures and standards of life, and thus in his desire to realize everything, despises his happiness and unhappiness, vices and virtues alike: “His strength lies in forgetting himself; and if he does think of himself he measures the distance between himself and his lofty goal” (UM p. 155). Here Nietzsche combines his earlier Dionysian conception of self-forgetfulness with an Apollonian conception of individuation.

To realize the Schopenhauerian man, Nietzsche asserted, a “fundamental idea... of *culture*” is required, “insofar as it sets for each one of us but one task: *to promote the production of the philosopher, the artist and the saint within us and without us and thereby to work at the perfecting of nature*” (UM, p. 160). The philosopher and the artist are needed for “self-enlightenment,” Nietzsche explains, and the saint for his selflessness, for in him, “the ego is completely melted... suffering is no longer felt as his own life—or is hardly so felt—but as a profound feeling of oneness and identity with all living things” (UM, pp. 160-1). Considering the unegoistic nature of love, I suggest that the saint’s Dionysian aspect of egoless love and suffering finds relation to Nietzsche’s ideal of love through the shared expression of unconditional selflessness and devotion.

There are two thoughts Nietzsche expressed during this period which are especially relevant to his perception of love; one is found in his essay, “Schopenhauer as Educator,” published October 1874, and the other in a letter to Meysenbug, written in April 1876. Beginning with his philosophical work, below Nietzsche explains the experiences of unegoistic love, and mankind’s thoughts of it in reflection:

There are moments and as it were bright sparks of the fire of love in whose light we cease to understand the word ‘I’, there lies something beyond our being which at

these moments moves across into it, and we are thus possessed of a heartfelt longing for bridges between here and there. It is true that, as we usually are, we can contribute nothing to the production of the man of redemption: that is why we hate ourselves as we usually are, and it is this hatred which is the root of that pessimism... at some time or other we shall have to learn to hate something else, something more universal, and cease to hate our own individuality and its wretched limitations... in that elevated condition... we shall also love something else, something we are now unable to love. Only when... we ourselves have been taken into that exalted order of philosophers, artists and saints, shall we also be given a new goal for our love and hate (UM, p. 161).

Here Nietzsche begins to contemplate the reality of his ideal of love, for though he proclaims truth in the experience of “ceas[ing] to understand the word ‘I,’” he also talks of mankind’s “longing for bridges” because of his inability to maintain existing “beyond [his] being.” Nietzsche offers hope within his pondering, explaining that, though mankind cannot currently assist in the “production of the man of redemption,” there will come a time when he “cease[s] to hate [his] own individuality” and loves what he was once unable to love.

It is my contention that, as Nietzsche began to withdraw from Wagner, he also began to consider the actuality of his ideal of love. Through the lens of his Schopenhauerian man, Nietzsche pondered the idea of sacrificing his own happiness, of being despised and an enemy to those he loves, contemplating whether such suffering was necessary in his search for truth.

Still perceiving love as valuable, Nietzsche expressed his desires and misgivings in a letter to Meysenbug. Responding to her work, “Memoiren einer Idealistin” [Memories of an Idealist], published in 1875, Nietzsche shared how it inspired him (SL, p. 142):

I read your book to the end... the mood of purity and love did not leave me... You walked before me as a higher self... and I measured my life against your example and asked myself about the many qualities I lack... How often I have wished... to ask you a question which can be answered only by a higher morality and being than I am!... What must a man do... all that you did, and absolutely nothing more! But most probably he will not be able to do so; he lacks the safely guiding instinct of love that is always ready to help. One of the highest themes, of which you have first given me

an inkling, is the theme of motherly love without the physical bond of mother and child; it is one of the most glorious revelations of caritas. Give me something of this love, *meine hochverehrte Freundin*, and look upon me as one who, as a son, needs such a mother, needs her so much! (SL, April 1876, pp. 142-3).

Of all the letters Nietzsche wrote, this one most clearly demonstrates the value and significance he attributed to love, a perception he would later sternly disavow and diligently deconstruct. In this letter Nietzsche questions his ability to love purely, comparing such love to an instinct possessed only by mothers. He questions what he lacks, calling for assistance from a “higher morality” than himself. Nietzsche asserts that motherly love is one of the “highest themes,” lamenting having never known it, and asks his revered friend to look upon him “as a son, [who] needs such a mother... so much.” In this letter Nietzsche calls for help, not to incite pity as he would in later letters, but in an open and honest display of his feelings, genuinely requesting love. Nietzsche again states the importance of love, regarding mankind’s development, in his essay on Schopenhauer:

It is hard to create in anyone this condition of intrepid self-knowledge because it is impossible to teach love; for it is love alone that can bestow on the soul, not only a clear, discriminating and self-contemptuous view of itself, but also the desire to look beyond itself and to seek with all its might for a higher self as yet still concealed from it (UM, pp. 162-3).

Once more Nietzsche appears to recall his Dionysian and Apollonian union, expressing that love offers a “clear, discriminating and self-contemptuous view of itself” as well as “the desire to look beyond itself.” Nietzsche again presents love as the unifier between individual ego and selfless oneness.

In his essay, “Richard Wagner in Bayreuth,” Nietzsche brings together music, nature and love, as he explains the importance of expressing feelings. He asserts that “*language* is sick” because of exhaustive attempts to “encompass the realm of thought,” which Nietzsche contends, entirely opposes its original intention, which was to express “the realm of strong

feelings” (UM, p. 214). Language is thus unable to perform its original function of enabling “suffering mankind to come to an understanding with one another” (UM, p. 214).

Nietzsche furthers that language has “become a power” which causes mankind to be “seized by the madness of universal concepts” when seeking to understand each other (UM, pp. 214-5). In mankind’s inability to reveal himself because of existing “under this constraint... of ‘clear concepts,’” Nietzsche again offers music as a solution, uniting it with nature and love (UM, p. 215). He proclaims that “music is a return to nature, while being at the same time the purification and transformation of nature” adding that the “pressing need for that return to nature arose in the souls of men filled with love, and *in their art there sounds nature transformed in love*” (UM, p. 215).

Love and transformation are again addressed, but unlike his previous essay on Schopenhauer, Nietzsche here offers more than hope; he offers a solution such as he had in his *Birth of Tragedy*, in which he stated: “Quite generally, only music, placed beside the world, can give us an idea of what is meant by the justification of the world as an aesthetic phenomenon” (BT, p. 141). Nietzsche proclaims that language has failed mankind in expressing emotions; only music can offer the experience of transforming from an egoistic state to the primal unity found in nature, and love serves as the unification.

Fischer-Dieskau notes that the many “crucial statements” Nietzsche makes in his *Untimely Meditations* “acquire a powerful meaning and indicate both a metamorphosis of thought and new goals. They run parallel with the change in his relationship with Wagner” (WN, pp. 104-5). Nietzsche’s issues with Wagner were mounting, and he was quickly heading toward a break with his beloved master.

CHAPTER III
DISILLUSIONMENT AND MASKING SUFFERING

Human, All Too Human

Higgins and Solomon contend that “Nietzsche was increasingly disturbed by what he saw as Wagner’s willingness to compromise too much for the sake of theatrical effects” (WS, p. 71). During work on his *Untimely Meditations* Nietzsche had already begun to distance himself from Wagner, denying his offer to move in with him and Cosima and complaining to Gersdorff that he had obligations of his own, beyond Wagner’s needs.

In August 1876, under the guise of illness, Nietzsche fled from Wagner’s Bayreuth festival and began work on *Human, All Too Human* (SL, p. 53). A month after his abrupt departure, Nietzsche wrote Wagner a letter discussing his leave of absence from the university, and his plans to visit Italy. When noting the misery his sickness had caused him, Nietzsche added, “Do not think that I am morose; not sicknesses—only people—can put me in a bad mood” (SL, September 1876, pp. 147-8).

Though Nietzsche intended to appear casual, it was evident that their friendship was coming to an end, and as it turned out, two months following this letter Nietzsche and Wagner met for the last time in Italy. During their visit Wagner was in a considerably foul mood due to Bayreuth’s tremendous financial loss, which could have played a part in instigating their dispute; Middleton explains though, that what appalled Nietzsche “was the religious tone of Wagner’s talk,” which he saw as his “simulating religiosity in an opportunistic way” (SL, November 1876, pp. 149-50).

Following their quarrel, Nietzsche officially lost the loving relationship he had with his master and father figure. Though he had shown signs of pulling away, I suggest that

Nietzsche had not intended a complete departure from Wagner. His actions were more of a son distancing himself from a stifling father, and so the shock of their separation caused Nietzsche to not immediately comprehend his loss. The suffering Nietzsche experienced from losing Wagner, I argue, drove him from contemplating his ideal of love to disavowing it entirely.

It was a difficult time of transition for Nietzsche, as he went from numerous friends and gatherings to isolation and loneliness. Lacking a supportive network, Nietzsche's suffering his loss of love in solitude finds resemblance with what he endured as a child after losing his father. With an aged consciousness though, Nietzsche's anguish served to kindle his determination of self-overcoming, which I contend, began with his intention to alter the way he perceived love.

In the introduction of *Human, All Too Human*, Richard Schacht notes that Nietzsche's aim with this work was to employ "various perspectival techniques... relevant to the understanding of what we have come to be and what we have it in us to become" (HH, p. xvi). It was during this time of experimenting with perspectivism, I propose, that Nietzsche first donned his philosophical mask, intent on concealing his suffering while endeavoring to shift his perspectives. Nietzsche's investigations of morality brought recognition of ideologies which form mankind's thinking, and I argue that he perceived in this awareness a recourse for overcoming the personal suffering he experienced from love's absence.

Nietzsche's illness was heightened during this time, as his depression aggravated his disorders. Paul Rée, whom Nietzsche met in 1873, wrote often to his mother and sister to inform them of the treatments he was undergoing between 1876 and 1877 (SL, pp. 52, 155). In a letter to Meysenbug, Nietzsche himself associated his sickness with mental strains: "My

very problematic thinking and writing have till now always made me ill; as long as I was really a scholar, I was healthy too” (SL, July 1877, p. 161).

In his desolation, Nietzsche struggled in his attempts to change his perspectives, and often exhibited contradictions between the ideas he professed in his philosophies and the behaviors he exhibited in his personal writings. I argue that these contradictions stem from Nietzsche’s difficulty in deterring his desire for the love of others; he struggled between logos and pathos, as his emotions contended with the perspectives he endeavored to possess.

In his forlornness, Nietzsche began calling to his friends for reassurance. He wrote to Meysenbug confessing that his “blackest thoughts” inspired suicidal thoughts, pleading with her to remain “what you have been, for I feel much more protected and sheltered; sometimes such a feeling of emptiness comes over me that I want to scream” (SL, May 1877, p. 157). In a letter to Rohde, Nietzsche described becoming emotional when thinking of his friend and noted that one day psychologists “will explain in the end that it is envy that makes me grudge you your happiness, or annoyance that someone has taken my friend away and is now keeping him hidden” (SL, August 1877, p. 163).

In both letters Nietzsche’s tone suggests an intention to arouse sympathy, but his letter to Rohde additionally suggests guilt. Nietzsche not only presented his sadness as inspired by his friend’s inaccessibility, he also expressed irritation with Rohde’s wife, “that someone,” who took his friend away. In the same letter Nietzsche again attempted to arouse guilt, declaring, “I suddenly felt that you did not like my music,” furthering that he played a song he thought Rohde liked, “to the best of my ability,” but that “it was in a dark room, and nobody was listening” (SL, p. 163). Indicating Rohde’s inaccessibility again, Nietzsche

additionally hints at his friend's lack of support, as he "felt" Rohde did not care for his music.

When recalling Nietzsche's need for reassurance, Ida Overbeck stated that he "always lacked self-certainty," and would often become "confused and cast into internal dependence rather than freedom" (CN, 1878/9, p. 108). She further announced, "Nietzsche, the condemner of pity, was continually experimenting with it. He bred it even more into himself, in order to vivisection it, to discover it like Christianity, and then to disrecommend it to mankind" (CN, p. 108). In *Human, All Too Human*, Nietzsche exemplified his diversion from perspectives of pity; specifically regarding Schopenhauerian notions which posit recognition of mankind's morality by way of acts of compassion. In his current work Nietzsche presents pity as more injurious to him who offers it than by whom it is received.

In his section, "On the History of the Moral Sensations," Nietzsche contended that pity illustrates not only a weakness of the individual seeking attention, but also a kind of power being enacted: "In this feeling of superiority of which the manifestation of pity makes him conscious, the unfortunate man gains a sort of pleasure; in the conceit of his imagination he is still of sufficient importance to cause affliction in the world" (HH, p. 39). By this assertion, it would appear that Nietzsche's letters were more than a need for reassurance; they too served to prove that he was "still of sufficient importance." In this work Nietzsche contends that the offering of pity serves as self-enjoyment, "first as the pleasure of the emotion... and then, when it eventuates in action, as the pleasure of gratification in the exercise of power" (HH, pp. 55-6). Therefore, Nietzsche's behavior in his letters is an "exercise of power," in which he exploited his friend's "ability to experience pity" in his efforts to perceive his own relevance.

“To make oneself a complete *person*, and in all that one does to have in view the *highest good* of this person—that gets us further than those pity-filled agitations and actions for the sake of others” (HH, pp. 50-1). As Nietzsche called for compassion from his friends, he created division between self-love and love of others in his work. With the use of morality, in *Human, All Too Human*, Nietzsche begins to devalue love by presenting it as an act of ego, rather than of virtue. He offers examples of apparent selfless actions and explains that such conceptions stem from moral ideologies which cause internal conflicts:

Is it not clear that in all these instances man loves *something of himself*... more than *something else of himself*... he thus *divides* his nature and sacrifices one part of it to the other... The *inclination for something* (wish, impulse, desire) is present (HH, p. 42).

In presenting morality as a fracturing of mankind’s self-perception, I posit that Nietzsche was considering his own a self-division regarding his desire for love, and in determining that the love of others was in fact egoism, he endeavored to devalue love so as to dissuade his own desire.

In a way reminiscent to Machiavelli’s *The Prince*, Nietzsche asserts in “Man Alone with Himself,” that mankind cannot be loved and honored at once because love desires while fear shuns. “He who honors recognizes power, that is to say he fears it. Love, however, recognizes no power, nothing that separates, contrasts, ranks above and below” (HH, p. 192). Nietzsche again devalues love by creating a division between it and power, associating the later with honor and nobleness.

In “The Religious Life,” Nietzsche quotes Georg Christoph Lichtenberg, a German professor of physics, in saying, “It is impossible, as is commonly said, for us to *feel* for others; we feel only for ourselves... One loves neither father, nor mother, nor wife, nor child, one loves the pleasant sensations they produce in us” (HH, p. 71). With Lichtenberg’s

assertion, Nietzsche was doing more than simply demonstrating that love was not the selfless act it has been assumed to be; by using a mother's love for her child as an example, he endeavored to denounce entirely the purity and authority attributed to love.

Upon inspecting "unegoistic actions," all meaning breaks apart, Nietzsche explains, for how "should a man be *able* to do something that had no reference to himself... How could the ego act without the ego?" (HH, p. 71). Following these rhetorical questions, Nietzsche asserts that even if such actions were possible it would require that the receiver of the unegoistic act were themselves egoistic enough to receive such sacrifices. "Men of love and self-sacrifice would have to have an interest in the continuance of the loveless egoist incapable of self-sacrifice, and the highest morality would... have to downright *compel* the existence of immorality" (HH, pp. 72).

In "Woman and Child," Nietzsche declares that in "every kind of womanly love there also appears something of motherly love," a statement that on its own implies that women wish to care take those they love, but when considered in the context of his other declarations, implies that, though she may offer care and comfort, it is only her ego which drives her (HH, p. 151). Nietzsche further proclaims that women selfishly begrudge the object of their love's ambitions because of being deprived of his attention. Wanting to possess him "for themselves alone," Nietzsche explains, women resist only because of their vanity which hopes "that a love-union with him will increase the amount *they* shine" (HH, p. 153).

Nietzsche then indicates that the veneration of love women display is no more than acts of deception intended to enhance their power. This "exaggerated evaluation of love" has caused women to become "entangled in their own net," Nietzsche asserts, resulting in their

being “more deceived than men,” and thus causing them to “suffer more from the disillusionment” (HH, p. 154).

Though being consist in using women to demonstrate the egoism in love, Nietzsche appeared to be unsure regarding the notion of marriage. Exhibiting conflictions, he at times requested assistance in finding a mate, at other times declared that it was not the right choice for him, and in one occasion proposed marriage after only a few days of introduction. Shortly after meeting Mathilde Trampedach in Geneva in April 1876, Nietzsche quickly sent her a proposal, expressing, “I love you and I feel that you already belong to me” (SL, p. 141). Trampedach’s speedy decline inspired Nietzsche to immediately send an apology expressing, “I suffered a great deal when I reflected on the cruel and violent way in which I behaved” (UL, April 1876, p. 68).

A month following his rejection, Nietzsche wrote to Gersdorff claiming, “I am not getting married... I hate limitation and being tied into the whole ‘civilized’ order of things so much that there can hardly be a woman who would be of generous enough mind to follow me” (SL, May 1876, p. 141). Less than two months later Nietzsche sent a letter of congratulations to Rohde for his recent engagement. In addition to noting concerns that he would be deprived of time with his friend, as he had after Overbeck’s marriage, Nietzsche again expressed reservations regarding marriage:

I should perhaps not follow you in taking this step. For you *needed* so badly a completely trusting soul, and you have found her and have found therewith *yourself* on a higher level. For me it is different... It does not seem to be all that necessary, except on rare days. Perhaps I have here a bad gap in myself. My desire and my need are different—I hardly know how to say it or explain it (SL, July 1876, pp. 145-6).

Nietzsche’s declaration that Rohde “*needed* so badly a completely trusting soul” who in turn brought him to “a higher level” calls to mind his assertion in *Untimely Meditations*

that love assists a soul in looking beyond itself to “seek with all its might for a higher self.” Following this, his confession that he only rarely thought marriage necessary because of a “gap” in himself, due to his desires and needs differing, presents evidence of the emotional conflicts he was experiencing.

Because of Nietzsche’s ongoing health issues, friends such as Meysenbug were insistent that he be more active in seeking a wife who could take care of him. In April 1877 Nietzsche discussed such suggestions in a letter to his sister, noting that Meysenbug had concluded he required “marriage with a suitable but necessarily affluent woman. ‘Good but rich’” (SL, p. 156). In July Nietzsche wrote Meysenbug, declaring that, “Until the autumn I now have the enjoyable task of winning a wife” and then again in September, inquiring if she had “found the fairy princess who shall free me from the pillar to which I am chained?” (SL, 1877, pp. 160, 165).

In light of the fact that Nietzsche only appeared to consider marriage when discussing the prospect with female friends, whereas with his male friends he voiced strong misgivings, Diethe’s assertion that, “On a subconscious level Nietzsche had no intention of marrying” merits consideration (NW, p. 95). Diethe posits that evidence for Nietzsche’s lack of interest in marriage is found in his inclination to “gravitate towards married women... preferably those with children,” which she contends gave him a sense of security (NW, p. 30). Diethe’s argument is compelling, and I do not dispute it per se; but rather I suggest that this assertion only considers intentions presumed by his behaviors, rather than addressing the cause of his conflicts.

I propose that, what Diethe refers to as Nietzsche’s attraction to wedded mothers, is in fact his fascination with a love of which he was unfamiliar. Recalling his letter to

Meysenbug, Nietzsche stated, “One of the highest themes, of which you have first given me an inkling, is the theme of motherly love without the physical bond of mother and child.”

With his father and Wagner, Nietzsche understood love within the framework of their relationship, but having never known motherly love, he had no basis of comparison. In associating with the mothers encountered in his intellectual circles, I suggest Nietzsche gained an admiration for the pure love he imagined they possessed.

Diethelme’s contention that there is a “gulf between Nietzsche’s writing, where he... persuades himself to believe,” finds semblance with my assertion regarding his emotional confusions (NW, p. 95). Though he knew the suffering experienced in love, Nietzsche still struggled with his desires, and so in “Man Alone with Himself,” he asserted that desire becomes a demand to be loved, which is “the greatest of all pieces of presumption” (HH, p. 183). With this perspective, Nietzsche could denounce his desire for the love of others as no more than a consuming passion which became demanding under the false belief that it was reciprocal.

In “Assorted Opinions and Maxims,” Nietzsche discusses the *Deception in love* as relating to mankind’s deceiving himself of his past so as to create a new personal image through love. He asserts that the assumed “self-forgetfulness in love,” and “the merging of the ego in the other person,” is nothing more than mankind’s self-deception so that he may enjoy his “ego’s new image, even though we may call it by that other person’s name” (HH, p. 224). To enact such deception, Nietzsche contends, is to “perpetrate a robbery in the treasure-house of knowledge” (HH, p. 224). Much of mankind’s want of deception derives from his difficulty in regarding his character truthfully, Nietzsche asserts, addressing mankind’s need

to stay in defense, rather than setting out to attack those of whom he assumed perpetrated acts of cruelties:

The real heroic deed and masterpiece of the good man lies not in his attacking the cause and continuing to love the person but in the much more difficult feat of *defending* his *own* cause without inflicting and desiring to inflict with bitter anguish the person attacked (HH, p. 227).

He follows in describing that the *Bitterest error* is a false representation of love, where “we were convinced we were loved [when] we were in fact regarded only as a piece of household furniture and room decoration for the master of the house to exercise his vanity upon before his guests” (HH, p. 229). In an obvious reference to Wagner, Nietzsche reveals his lingering pain, further noting that love can exist as an act of cruelty, in that it “brings with it the cruel idea of killing the object of that love,” because “love dreads change more than it does destruction” (HH, p. 279).

His misery is not to be ignored though, Nietzsche asserts, and so he suggests as a *Recipe for the sufferer* that, rather than turning away from his suffering, mankind should increase his burdens. When “the sufferer at last thirsts for the river of Lethe and seeks it—he must become a hero if he is to be sure of finding it” (HH, p. 298). In other words, mankind must suffer through the beacons of hell until reaching the level of a hero deserving to drink from the river of forgetfulness.

Self-forgetfulness calls to mind Nietzsche’s Schopenhauerian man, which finds resemblance with his conception of the “Free Spirit” in this work. In his section, “Tokens of Higher and Lower Culture,” Nietzsche describes that the free spirit “has no love for things in their entirety, in all the breadth and prolixity of their convolutions, for he has no wish to get himself entangled with them” (HH, p. 134). Entangled, assumedly, the way he conceived women to have become in their “exaggerated evaluation of love.”

Nietzsche explains that with the free spirit, “There is in his way of living and thinking a *refined heroism* which disdains to offer itself to the veneration of the great masses... Whatever labyrinths he may stray through... he emerges into the open air” (HH, p. 134). Nietzsche’s free spirit going silently through the world calls to mind the poem he sent to Rohde for his engagement. When examining Nietzsche’s poem, “The Wanderer,” Grundlehner proposes that the “fact that his destination is uncertain is no cause for alarm but an indication of his adventuresome spirit” (PN, p. 67). What I find especially relevant in the poem is that the wanderer stops in the midst of his journey to ponder a singing bird, and accuses him of being a distraction:

‘Ah bird what is it you have done? / Why detain my thought and foot, / Pouring sweet chagrin of the heart / Upon me, so that I must stop, / Must listen, to interpret well /... The bird stops singing and it speaks: / ‘No, traveler, no! It is not you / My song salutes. / I sing because the night is beautiful: / But *you* must always travel on / And never understand my song! / So get you gone, / And only when your step sounds far / Shall I begin my song again / As best I can. / Now fare thee well, poor traveling man (SL, July 1876, pp. 145-6).

Grundlehner interprets the poem as Rohde representing the bird that reproaches Nietzsche the wanderer, and that the verse is representative of Nietzsche’s fear that his friend would not be the “reciprocal hand to aid him in his own isolation”; additionally, Grundlehner suggests that this poem “marks the first evidence of [Nietzsche’s] necessity to explore unknown paths” (PN, p. 67). Though I concur with Grundlehner’s point that Nietzsche felt it necessary to search new avenues, my interpretation differs in that, through a creative misreading, I perceive the bird as love calling; the wanderer is denied love’s song, as he is destined to “always travel on / And never understand my song!”

The wanderer’s experience of continually moving forward finds similarity with Nietzsche’s depiction, in “Woman and Child,” of the free spirit perceiving danger in

habituation. He explains that the free spirit despises “everything enduring and definitive,” so continually deconstructs himself, tearing “threads *from himself*, from his own body and soul,” even at the cost of great suffering, for he “has to learn to love where he formerly hated, and the reverse” (HH, p. 158). Nietzsche adds that, from “all this it may be inferred whether he is created for a happy marriage” (HH, p. 158).

Nietzsche’s free spirit again finds comparison with his Schopenhauerian man, who despises the measures and standards of life to the extent that he scorns equally his happiness and unhappiness, his vices and his virtues. Along these lines, in “Man Alone with Himself,” Nietzsche explains that mankind must break away from his previously held beliefs. “We *have* to become traitors, be unfaithful, again and again abandon our ideals. We cannot advance from one period of our life into the next without passing through these pains of betrayal and then continuing to suffer them” (HH, p. 199).

At the end of his section, “On the History of the Moral Sensations,” Nietzsche theorized that through personal examination, mankind will become aware that actions he once assumed to be moral were in fact condemnable. The realization will be painful, but “such pains are birth-pangs,” Nietzsche suggests: “The butterfly wants to get out of its cocoon, it tears at it, it breaks it open: then it is blinded and confused by the unfamiliar light, the realm of freedom” (HH, p. 58). I suggest that Nietzsche was himself emerging from the cocoon of his Wagnerian experience of love to the blindness incited by suffering heartbreak. He contended that birth-pangs were necessary, but I propose that here can be found the irony of Nietzsche’s assertions; as he called to the necessity of suffering he simultaneously attempted to shift his own perception so as to avoid love’s pain.

Regarding false observations, Nietzsche asserts that only actions can be promised, not feelings, for to promise eternal love is only to promise to perform the actions of love: “In the heads of our fellow men the appearance will remain that love is still the same and unchanged— One therefore promises the continuation of the appearance of love when one swears to someone ever-enduring love without selfdeception” (HH, p. 42). In that Nietzsche had earlier noted that “love dreads change more than it does destruction,” I propose that, feeling like he himself had been deceived, Nietzsche again attempted to devalue love by insinuating that it was not present when it was assumed to be (HH, p. 279). Nietzsche continues this point by making a comparison between love and justice, determining the more valuable sentiment, such as he had with love and honor:

Why is love overestimated as compared with justice... is it not obviously the stupider of the two?... It is stupid and possesses a rich cornucopia; out of this it distributes its gifts... even when he does not deserve them, indeed does not even thank it for them. It is as impartial as the rain (HH, pp. 44-5).

Love is now presented as impartial, which is why it fails when compared with justice. With this assertion, I argue Nietzsche reveals his contention that he was imprudent with his love for Wagner, as his lack of judgement caused him to fail in recognizing that the composer was not deserving. This sentiment is also found in “Assorted Opinions and Maxims,” as Nietzsche expressed, “The apprentice loves the master differently from the way the master loves him” (HH, p. 290).

Nietzsche’s issues with his once beloved master were in no way nearing conclusion. In January of 1878 Wagner sent Nietzsche *Parsifal*, and in May Nietzsche replied with volume one of his *Human All Too Human* (SL, p. 153). Kaufmann posits that Wagner’s religiously saturated opus was an affront to Nietzsche because he saw “Schopenhauer’s

foremost disciple writing the great Christian music drama; the Aeschylus celebrating the very antithesis of all Greek ideals” (NP, p. 37).

After receiving the opera, Nietzsche wrote to Reinhart von Seydlitz: “Yesterday *Parsifal* reached me, sent by Wagner... it is all too Christian, time-bound, limited; sheer fantastic psychology” (SL, January 1878, p. 166). During the same month, Nietzsche expressed his thoughts while walking alone:

I was sick, more than sick, I was *tired*—tired because of my irresistible disappointment at everything that remains to inspire us modern men, at the ubiquitously squandered energy, labor, hope, youth, love; I was tired because of my disgust at all the idealistic lying and mollycoddling of the conscience (WN, January 1878, p. 160).

Sick from being disappointed that his love was “squandered,” tired and disgusted that his efforts in love revealed “idealistic lying and mollycoddling of the conscience,” Nietzsche was consumed and tormented with thoughts reflecting on suffering in love. In May Nietzsche complained of Wagner’s behavior surrounding *Human All Too Human*, to Peter Gast (Heinrich Köselitz), whom he had met when Gast attended his lectures in the winter of 1875:

[My book] has been practically banned by Bayreuth... the grand excommunication seems to have been pronounced against its author too. They are only trying to retain my *friends* while losing me... Wagner has failed to use a great opportunity for showing greatness of character. I must not let that disconcert me in my opinion either of him or of myself (SL, May 1878, pp. 52, 166-7).

Coinciding with his letter, Nietzsche asserted in “Of First and Last Things,” that he lived in an age of comparison which incites “selecting out among the forms and customs of higher morality whose objective can only be the elimination of the lower moralities” (HH, p. 24).

The little support Nietzsche received for his work was limited to such friends as Gast, Rée, and Jacob Burckhardt, a professor of history Nietzsche met when joining the faculty at

the University of Basel in 1869 (SL, May 1878, p. 166). Though receiving praise, such as Burckhardt's referring to *Human All Too Human*, as a "sovereign book," Middleton indicates that the release created an "open rupture with Wagner and Wagnerites" (SL, p. 153). Fischer-Dieskau asserts that Nietzsche not only offended the Bayreuth community with his work, but his own friends as well, proclaiming that even Rohde "did not withhold his 'painful feelings'" (WN, p. 163).

When Nietzsche sent a copy of *Human All Too Human*, to Wagner and Cosima, he included an inscription which Fischer-Dieskau asserts was an attempt "to pretend that many things in the book could be taken humorously" (WN, p. 162):

To the Master and the Mistress / a cheerful greeting / from Friedrich Freemind in Basel, / blessed with a new child. / He desires that they with moved hearts / examine the child to see / whether it takes after the father, / who knows? —even with a moustache... / it wants to be liked; / not by many... / for others it will be mockery and torment... may the Master's faithful eye gaze on it and bless it, / and may the wise grace of the Mistress / follow it for evermore (WN, pp. 162-3).

Contrary to Fischer-Dieskau's assertion, I maintain that the inscription itself intended humor, not the contentions within the work. I argue that Nietzsche intended with this inscription to present himself as being in good spirits, despite their separation. "This is the age of comparison! It is the source of its pride," Nietzsche proclaimed in "Of First and Last Things," and mankind should not fear his suffering:

Let us not be afraid of this suffering! Let us rather confront the task which the age sets us as boldly as we can: and then posterity will bless us for it—a posterity that... will look back upon both species of culture as upon venerable antiques (HH, p. 24).

Considering that he expressed in a letter to Seydlitz that Wagner was "an *old*, unchanging man" and though it was painful, "in the service of truth one must be prepared to bring any sacrifice," it is conceivable that Wagner represented the old culture of "venerable antiques" to which Nietzsche referred (UL, June 1878, p. 75). It is clear that Nietzsche hoped

for a time in which he would not be dismissed for his new evaluations and insights, as he felt he had been in his relationship with Wagner.

In July 1878, two months after sending his work to the Wagners, Nietzsche wrote to Mathilde Maier, a friend he made during his Wagnerian days, that he had gotten over his distress by realizing its cause, which he noted becoming aware of after fleeing from the Bayreuth festival:

That metaphysical befogging of all that is true and simple, the pitting of reason *against* reason... this matched by a baroque art of overexcitement and glorified extravagance—I mean the art of Wagner; both these things finally made me more and more ill... I now *live* my aspiration to wisdom... whereas earlier I only revered and idolized the wise... Now I have shaken off what is extraneous to me: people, friends and enemies, habits, comforts, books; I live in solitude... until once more, ripened and complete as a philosopher of *life* (SL, pp. 167-8).

Though appearing poised in his assertions, Nietzsche was far from confident in himself and his life. His health was in such a state that by May 1879 he submitted his resignation from the University of Basel, which was officially accepted in June (SL, p. 169). In October he expressed to Gast, “my solitude and my illness have accustomed me somewhat to the impudence of my writings. But *others* must do *everything* better, my life as well as my *thought*” (SL, 1879, p. 170).

Nietzsche concludes *Humans All Too Human*, with a thought which conflicts with the behaviors he demonstrated in his letters: “He who reduces to paper what he is *suffering* will be a *melancholy* author, a *serious* author, however, is one who tells us what he *has suffered* and why he is now reposing in joy” (HH, p. 342). Nietzsche did limit expression of his suffering to his personal writings; with his later work, *Ecce Homo*, he would emulate what he here calls a *serious* author. In his following work Nietzsche furthers his argument regarding

the falsity found in the love of others, using morality to place love in the light of suspicion, danger, and an opponent to truth.

The Dawn

Continuing his investigations of morality in *The Dawn*, Nietzsche's perception of love begins to appear more hazardous. His tone reveals an air of cynicism which differs from his prior works. Whereas he previously devalued love by placing it next to honor, associating the latter with power because of its correlation with fear, Nietzsche now asserts that love is dangerous and a hindrance to knowledge. In book four, Nietzsche explains that fear is more advantageous than love because fear questions and wishes not to be deceived, whereas "love contains a secret impulse to see as much beauty as possible in the other... to deceive oneself here would be a joy and an advantage" (DD pp. 156-7).

Another comparative difference in this work is Nietzsche's divergent take on artists. In his previous work, section "Assorted Opinions and Maxims," Nietzsche discussed the artist's "discovery that a certain strength lies in *coarseness*... many kinds of *weakness* make a strong impression on...feelings," indicating that it is difficult to abstain from employing such a discovery (HH, p. 241). In *Human All Too Human*, Nietzsche inferred that such means of manipulation should not be used, whereas in this work he appears to glorify it.

In describing the escapism offered by the artist, Nietzsche explains that if mankind were in fact bound to his weaknesses as to a law he would greatly benefit from possessing the artist's talent of exploiting his weaknesses (DD, pp. 135-6). He notes the faults within compositions by Beethoven, Mozart, and Wagner, explaining that in hearing the unappealing aspect of their music, the pleasing portions appear all the more splendid. Thus, "by means of their weaknesses they have all produced in us a ravenous hunger for their virtues and a ten

times more sensitive palate for every drop of musical spirit, musical beauty, musical goodness” (DD, pp. 135-6). Nietzsche seems to commend such talents, explaining specifically how the enterprise takes place and why it is so successful.

Nietzsche’s description of the artist’s ability to produce a “ravenous hunger for their virtues,” presents mankind as having been denied goodness to such an extent that he possesses a greedy need of it, thus developing “a ten times more sensitive palate” in his deficiency. Perhaps Nietzsche was considering his own weaknesses in his desiring love as serving to highlight the strength of his philosophies, though he did demonstrate the destructive quality in such utilizations of weaknesses for the purpose of inciting emotional responses. Again Nietzsche cites music as an example, noting in book four a connection between love, weaknesses, and vulnerability by way of escapism:

Could the full happiness of love, which resides in *unconditional trust*, ever have been experienced by anyone who was not profoundly mistrustful, evil and embittered? For these enjoy in it the... *exception* in the state of their soul!... Unconditional trust makes one dumb... which is why such souls weighed down with happiness are usually more grateful to *music* than other and better people are... music is the only means they have of *observing* their extraordinary condition... taking of it a view informed with a kind of alienation and relief. Everyone who is in love thinks when he hears music: ‘it is speaking of me, it is speaking in my stead, *it knows everything*’ (DD, p. 235).

Considering an earlier autobiographical fragment in which Nietzsche noted that his “philosophical seriousness” made him partial to “hard and evil consequences,” a personal reference to his own vulnerability in love is clear. (SL, 1868/9, p. 45). Nietzsche’s assertion that “unconditional trust makes one dumb” illustrates his attempt to categorize love as a weakness, and thus his desire for the love of others as irrational and misguided.

Nietzsche again addresses the artist in a way that suggests he considered himself when describing that being an artist is not regulated to those who create externally, for mankind plays the artist when he idolizes another. Mankind endeavors to “justify himself in

his own eyes by elevating this person to an ideal,” Nietzsche explains, and “in the process he becomes an artist so as to have a good conscience” (DD, p. 150). If he suffers from this, “he suffers not from *not knowing* but from self-deception, from the pretense of not knowing” (DD, p. 150).

I argue that here Nietzsche attempts to come to terms with his own idolization of Wagner. He attempts to perceive his fascination as misguided while also shaming himself for suffering in love when he should have been aware of his own deception. Further, I suggest that Nietzsche approached his weakness in love by conceiving it as a need for self-validation, and therefore he could imagine that his desire was a self-created illusion which could be overcome through awareness.

With *The Dawn*, Nietzsche strove to draw direct lines between mankind’s perceptions of morality, suffering, and weaknesses, and I argue that with this dissection he intended to shift his own emotionally driven perspectives as well as offering mankind new ways of perceiving himself and the world which surrounds him. Kaufmann suggests that, “Nietzsche celebrated the new vistas of his freedom in *Dawn*,” but I propose that a more accurate description would be that, through his suffering, “Nietzsche [confronted] the new vistas of his freedom” (NP, p. 65). With the break from Wagner and departure from the university, this was a time in which Nietzsche’s gaze took a stark, inward turn, as he addressed suffering through a more subjective lens.

During this time of introspection, I suggest Nietzsche found himself questioning whether sacrificing love for the sake of convictions was worth the cost. His letters reveal these conflicts, illustrating Nietzsche’s variation between attempting confidence and openly displaying self-doubt. These behaviors offer a clear indication of the emotional

conflictions he was dealing with, and also explains his need for reassurance concerning the choices he had made.

In a letter to Meysenbug, January 1880, Nietzsche wrote with an air of confidence, commending his personal ability to maintain his principles, while also intending to provoke sympathy by exclaiming the immense suffering his decisions had caused him:

Writing is for me one of the most forbidden fruits, yet I must write a letter to you, whom I love and respect like an elder sister—and it will probably be the last. For my life's terrible and almost unremitting martyrdom makes me thirst for the end... As regards torment and self-denial, my life during these past years can match that of any ascetic of any time; nevertheless, I have wrung from these years much in the way of purification and burnishing of the soul—and I no longer need religion or art as a means to that end... You will notice that I am proud of this (SL, pp. 170-1).

Professing his convictions, Nietzsche stated that no “pain has been, or should be, able to make me bear false witness about life *as I know it to be*,” concluding that he knew Wagner would abandon him “the moment he saw the rift between our aspirations,” signing the letter as “a young old man, who has no grievance against life, though he must still want it to end” (SL, p. 171).

Nietzsche's letter to Meysenbug calls for attention to his plights as well as praise for his ability to trounce them, while also anticipating sympathy for his suffering. He referred to himself as a martyr longing for death, an ascetic for his self-denial, noted pride in no longer needing religion or art and proclaimed intuition regarding his convictions causing him to be abandoned. Though seeming much like a suffering artist tortured by his convictions, Nietzsche's dramatics reveal his mental and emotional struggles. It was this inner crisis, I argue, which led him to call for compassion and praise in such a theatrical manner. Concluding his letter as he began it, with a depressed wish for death, further reveals his self-doubt, insecurity and need of reassurance.

In July 1880, Nietzsche noted “a reflection” in a letter to Gast which clearly reveals his confliction: “One ceases to love oneself *aright* when one *ceases* to give oneself exercise in loving others, wherefore the latter (the ceasing) is to be strongly advised against (from my own experience)” (SL, p. 173). A month later when writing Gast again, his insecurities and emotional struggles are expressed even more apparently when he questioned, “What good is it for me to be right in many respects? As though that could wipe this lost affection from my memory!... It strikes me as so foolish to insist on being right at the expense of love” (NB, August 1880, p. 204).

Though struggling internally, Nietzsche was diligent in his intentions of shifting his perspectives, and so continually attempted to appear confident and self-assured. When writing Overbeck a few months later, Nietzsche spoke confidently regarding his solitude:

The *dignity* and the *grace* of an original and essentially solitary way of living and of knowing... Help me to hold on to this hiddenness... for a good long time I must live without people... I *must*, I repeat; have no fears on my account! (SL, November, 1880, pp. 173-5).

Nietzsche’s declaration that he wanted to remain hidden demonstrates his endeavors in personal overcoming, and in assuring Overbeck not to have fears on his account, I suggest Nietzsche was in fact attempting to pacify his own fears concerning his intentions to face his suffering alone.

Nietzsche’s work, I contend, enabled him to confront his fears and seek to better understand his desire and suffering by endeavoring to demonstrate that morality does not stem from inherit virtues but rather exists as the outcome of historical beliefs and practices. Safranski notes the “physiological dimension” in people who consider themselves moral, stating that Nietzsche brought light to this by revealing that it is the “history of the body and culture that is ‘acting’ within us” (NB, p. 183).

Nietzsche opens *The Dawn* by presenting past perceptions of what constituted rectitude, explaining that moral behavior was once perceived in acts of cruelty. In book one, he offers a historical backdrop as to why mankind viewed cruelty as a virtue. Nietzsche explains that in the past it was imagined that the gods were “refreshed and in festive mood when... offered the spectacle of cruelty,” and that with this perception there came “the idea that *voluntary suffering*, self-chosen torture, is meaningful and valuable” (DD, p. 16). By means of the belief that “voluntary suffering” was a virtuous act, mankind’s conception of self-inflicted suffering carried forth into future generations.

The notion of voluntary suffering finds relations with the concept of martyrdom, a term which denotes both extreme suffering for the purpose of a cause as well as embellished expressions of misery for the purpose of inciting pity. With this consideration, I recall Nietzsche’s letter to Meysenbug in which he exclaimed that the “unremitting martyrdom” of his life could “match that of any ascetic of any time.” Nietzsche’s behaviors and his assertions again demonstrate contradiction. Attempting to arouse sympathy in his letters while proclaiming opposition to such behaviors in his theorization, I maintain, reveals the donning of his mask. Hayman ponders whether Nietzsche’s writings were “perhaps no more than a formulation of how he wanted to live,” and to this speculation I respond with a resounding yes (CL, p. 231).

I maintain that indeed Nietzsche was formulating how he wanted to live within his works, and that his persistent efforts in presenting the perspectives he wished to possess demonstrate the veiling of his desire with his works. In book two, Nietzsche continues his assertion that love is an egoistic act, rather than moralistic behavior:

This one is hollow and wants to be full, that one is overfull and wants to be emptied—both go in search of an individual who will serve their purpose. And this

process, understood in its highest sense, is in both cases called by the same word: love—what? is love supposed to be something unegoistic? (DD, pp. 91-2).

With this aphorism Nietzsche attempts to demonstrate that whether argued as needing to receive or needing to give, love still serves as an act of ego, indicating another crack in preconceived notions of love. In book five, Nietzsche contends the importance of egoism. He asserts that it would be a disservice if mankind were to flee from his ego, “and to hate it, and to live in others and for others—that has hitherto, with as much thoughtlessness as self-confidence, been called ‘*unegoistic*’ and consequently ‘*good*’” (DD, p. 207).

Nietzsche himself though, was still very much concerned with the disapproval of others, and so in June of 1881, he wrote to his sister Elisabeth that he would no longer share his thoughts with her concerning his writing. “You cannot carry my burden... I would like you to be able to say with a clear conscious, ‘I do not know my brother’s latest views.’ (People will certainly tell you that these views are immoral and ‘shameless’)” (SL, p. 177).

Not only was Nietzsche anxious concerning harsh criticisms of his works; he was also worried about how he was perceived by those for whom he cared. In the same month he wrote to his sister, he also wrote to Overbeck expressing his concerns:

With forebodings I am thinking... of all the tests of fire and of cold to which persons dearest to me are being exposed by my ‘frankness.’...I positively know no longer with what views I am pleasing people and with which I am causing injury (UL, June 1881, p. 80).

Though attempting to feel otherwise through his work, Nietzsche was still consumed with insecurities regarding his desire for love. In August 1881, just after the publication of *The Dawn*, Nietzsche wrote to Gast in a way which epitomizes the extent to which he was calling for pity:

If I had had to wait for exhortations, encouragements, consolations from outside, where would I be? What would I be? There were truly moments and whole periods in

my life (for example, the year 1878) in which I would have felt a strengthening word of approval... and precisely then everyone left me in the lurch, everyone on whom I thought I could rely and who could have done me the favor (SL, p. 178).

Of course he spoke otherwise in his work, for in book five, Nietzsche writes a dialogue which disputes his intentions when writing to Gast:

A: But why this solitude?— B: I am not at odds with anyone. But when I am alone I seem to see my friends in a clearer and fairer light than when I am with them; and when I loved and appreciated music the most, I lived far from it. It seems I need a distant perspective if I am to think well of things (DD, pp. 199-200).

Apprehensions concerning the thoughts others, conflicts with his desires, and ceaseless illness filled Nietzsche's life, but also led him to conceive the theories which formed his works. In November 1881 Nietzsche could scarcely read, but by January of 1882 his sickness began to subside and he was feeling so well that he wrote fervently, completing the first three books of the *The Gay Science* in a few short months (CL, p. 273).

The Gay Science

The turn in Nietzsche's health in January 1882 was like a breath of fresh air offering a more focused examination of self. With new vigor, Nietzsche endeavored to see the world differently, but breaking old habits of mind can be difficult. In such contemplation Nietzsche wrote to Gast: "In regard to my 'thoughts'—it is no problem for me to *have* them; but *getting rid of them* when I want to do so is always infernally hard for me!" (NB, January 1882, p. 222). Nietzsche began reexamining the demise of his and Wagner's relationship and wrote to his sister describing his realization of the affect his sorrows had on his health:

My Wagner mania certainly cost me dear. Has not this nerves-shattering music ruined my health? And the disillusionment and leaving Wagner—was not that putting my very life in danger? Have I not needed almost six years to recover from that pain? (SL, February 1882, p. 180).

Nietzsche had in fact experienced a dramatic recovery from his sickness, and Kaufmann identifies an important aspect regarding how his good health effected his thinking:

The Gay Science... seemed to him to mark the consummation of his conquest of death. He had thought that he might die in 1880, at the age of thirty-six as his father had done; but now he felt that he had been restored to life and become capable of a new and halcyon gaiety (NP, p. 65).

The joy that Nietzsche was experiencing spilled over into his philosophical theories, as well as his stylistic format, for the importance Nietzsche gave to poetry became evident as he confidently presented an abundance of verse within this work. I contend that Nietzsche's poetic talents are of vital significance when attempting to understand his philosophies, as he was both a stylist and a great thinker and I argue that his poetry serves to credit his philosophical works. Safranski concurs with my assertion, noting that the "affinity with poetry is especially salient in view of Nietzsche's talent," for poets can "develop a language that expresses more than the usual commonplaces, and move away from the middle zones of socialized discourse" (NB, p, 216). Safranski's assertion correlates with my methodology of a creative misreading, for recognition and consideration of Nietzsche's poetic sensibilities serves in discovering a new interpretation of his works, as well as acknowledging the diversity and beauty of his talents.

In "The Rules of Life," a poem written during the same time but not included in *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche expresses, "The nobility of impulse / is cultivated advisedly: / For each kilo of love, / Take a gram of self-contempt" (PB, 1882, p. 147). Nietzsche explains that, if mankind must abide his impulse to love, he should as well maintain slight personal distain so as not to lose himself entirely. In constant self-evaluation, Nietzsche carried forward conceptions of power and pity as well as offering new discussions on disciples and an eternally revolving existence is his current work.

In book one of Nietzsche's *Gay Science*, he contends that love and avarice could be the same instinct, continuing to devalue love by comparing it to extreme greed of want of possession. He explains that there are those who have their love's possession, but fear the loss of it, and those who desire to possess it and "glorify the instinct as 'good'" (GS, p. 88). Additionally, Nietzsche brings pity and love together when considering self-change:

Our love of our neighbor—is it not a lust for new *possessions*? And likewise our love of knowledge, of truth, and altogether any lust for what is new?... Our pleasure in ourselves tries to maintain itself by again and again changing something new *into ourselves*; that is what possession means... When we see somebody suffer, we like to exploit this opportunity to take possession of him; those who become his benefactors and pity him, for example, do this and call the lust for a new possession that he awakens in them 'love' (GS, p. 88).

Nietzsche condemns love as want of possession but follows by explaining that this comes from wanting to change "something new *into ourselves*." Nietzsche has always asserted the importance in mankind's change and becoming, his awakening to false claims of truth, so the aphorism seems contrary to the very soul of his philosophies. I suggest that in his renewed health, Nietzsche began to consider his pity-inciting behaviors and that the affections he received from others in response may in fact be actions of benefactors intent of exploiting his weakness when in a state of suffering.

In recognizing that his behaviors revealed his vulnerability, Nietzsche concerned himself with the thought that someone might "exploit this opportunity to take possession of him," as I contend he endeavored to determine Wagner had done. After breaking with his father figure, Nietzsche attempted to discredit the genuineness of love, destroy the ideal he had conceived, and overcome his desire. In a way Nietzsche's possession had been his suffering; "changing something new *into ourselves*; that is what possession means."

Much of the experimentalism Nietzsche employs in his philosophies, I argue, was intended to assist in shifting his perspectives. In this way, many of the assertions he puts forth are based more on his own objectives than on thoroughly examined principles. I propose Nietzsche's *Misunderstood sufferer*, found in book three, serves as an example of his efforts to find value in his experiences so as to shift his perception: "Magnificent characters suffer very differently from what their admirers imagine.... They suffer most keenly...from their doubts about their own magnificence—not from the sacrifices and martyrdoms that their task demands from them" (GS, p. 216).

Recalling his lamenting to Meysenbug of his martyrdom, Nietzsche clearly donned his mask in the above aphorism, illustrating his attempt to perceive his weakness of desiring love from a less self-condemning position; he endeavored to see his struggles as not being due to inabilities and personal faults, but rather from doubting his own powers and abilities. In this same section Nietzsche offers the Greek god Prometheus as an example of a magnificent sufferer: "As long as Prometheus feels pity for men and sacrifices himself for them, he is happy and great; but when he becomes envious of Zeus and the homage paid to him by mortals, then he suffers" (GS, p. 216).

Considering that Nietzsche may have been imagining himself as Prometheus, sacrificing himself for mankind only to be unappreciated, offers another example of his conceiving weakness in love. His desire in itself required measures outside of his own will; it required participation of another to be brought to fruition. After giving mankind fire, suffering retribution from Zeus, and then witnessing mankind worship Zeus over him, Prometheus did not despise mankind for their lack of love, but rather suffered from the loss of their love.

Contemplating a different angle, Nietzsche ponders love and suffering *Without vanity*: “When we are in love we wish that our defects might remain concealed—not from vanity but to keep the beloved from suffering. Indeed, the lover would like to seem divine—and this, too, not from vanity” (GS, p. 218). The aphorism implies that love intends happiness through dishonesty, that mankind would hide his true self, not because of his own egotism, but with the intention of saving the “beloved from suffering.” Bearing in mind that Nietzsche previously condemned women for their vanity in wanting to possess the object of their love, his present assertion that love wishes to conceal imperfections so as to avoid causing suffering suggests a much softer reflection on self-deception.

I contend that this turn in perceiving love less cruelly was due to Nietzsche’s current state of mind following his renewed health and, most notably, his reevaluation of his and Wagner’s relationship. Nietzsche began to see his errors less harshly, and though maintaining “a gram of self-contempt,” I suggest he was coming to terms with his choices and beginning to experience happiness.

In his heightened mood and disposition, I argue Nietzsche began to see himself in a more positive light. Contemplating his disillusionment, recognizing his “Wagner mania,” and becoming aware of his calls for sympathy and reassurance, Nietzsche determined that he did not want to be a tormented soul in need of consolation, but rather a heroic conqueror of suffering. I suggest that Nietzsche was indeed experiencing a kind of *Joyful Wisdom*. Safranski concurs with my conjecture, explaining that in *The Gay Science*, “Nietzsche did not wish to grant depression any power over him, and fought it off with euphoria evoked by sheer force of will” (NB, p. 238). Throughout this work Nietzsche gallantly strove forward in

his development, attempting to understand his suffering through the lens of a warrior confident in his destination.

In book three Nietzsche discusses the dynamics of *What makes one heroic*, and asserts that to be heroic one must go “out to meet at the same time one’s highest suffering and one’s highest hope” (GS, p. 219). Nietzsche was endeavoring to perceive joy within his suffering by considering the bravery necessary in surviving his torturous experiences. When questioning *Originality* and stating that it is, “To *see* something that has no name as yet and hence cannot be mentioned although it stares us all in the face,” I propose Nietzsche was considering that his desire to be loved may not be as connected to moral ideologies as he had presumed under the weight of his suffering (GS, p. 218).

I do not suggest that Nietzsche was free from his self-contempt, nor that he had succeeded in shifting his perspectives and thus removed his mask. Rather I propose that there was a crack in the wall of his suffering and, absorbing the light shining through, he strove to move beyond his depression and focus instead on his joy.

When recalling Nietzsche’s self-perception in the early 1880’s, Ida Overbeck noted that he was “often very tormented,” distrusted himself, and that following every publication, “hoped to receive enthusiastic approbation... and to find followers and disciples” (CN, pp. 112-13). His suffering and the views he had long held of himself were still alive, they were merely set to the side as he soaked in the euphoria of his happiness.

In this new place of optimism, Nietzsche’s hope for approbation did not derive from a need of reassurance, as Ida described it had earlier, but rather, in the light of his confidence, stemmed from an inclination to share ideas. As such, Nietzsche was very open and excited about the notion of a disciple. In the section, “Joke, Cunning, and Revenge,” Nietzsche

expresses his position on the role of a disciple, choosing a title which sums up his thoughts in two words, “*Vademecum—Vadetezum* [‘go with me, go with yourself’]: “Lured by my style and tendency, / you follow and come after me? / Follow your own self faithfully— / take time—and thus you follow me” (GS, p. 43). In a voice that foreshadows Zarathustra, Nietzsche wrote of how he did not want a disciple such as those attached to dogmatic religions. He wanted someone who would comprehend his thoughts and participate in dialogue.

Kaufmann posits that both Gast and Nietzsche’s sister Elisabeth played the role of failed disciple in Nietzsche’s life. He suggests that Gast offered Nietzsche “unswerving devotion and complete faith in his greatness which even his sister—whom he also occasionally called a ‘disciple’—had not been able to give him,” but that Gast “was not the kind of pupil Nietzsche wanted most” (NP, p. 46). Kaufmann furthers his point by placing Gast and Elisabeth in the roles of Nietzsche’s “Undesirable disciples”: “‘This one cannot say No, and that one says to everything: ‘Half and Half’ ... Gast applauds the master's every whim, while Elisabeth would like to blend half of his ideas with those of Wagner or Förster—or Hitler’” (NP, pp. 46-7).

Nietzsche’s ideal disciple would possess the ability to dispute his theories, for to debate his assertions required both comprehension and conviction, and he attributed immense importance to mankind’s formulation of his own truth. With this type of disciple Nietzsche could have confidence in honesty and thus a relationship in which both parties benefit. Nietzsche had never known such a disciple, but there appeared one person who seemed capable of fulfilling the role; Lou Andreas-Salomé. In March 1882, Nietzsche traveled to Sicily to stay with Meysenbug and there was introduced to Salomé (SL, p. 154).

By all appearances she was precisely what Nietzsche had imagined in a disciple, for having studied philosophy and religion in Zurich, Salomé was intelligent in addition to possessing wit and beauty (NB, p. 249). She was intriguing, and Safranski notes that she “quickly became the center of the local social scene” (NB, p. 249). Diethelme describes that when meeting and conversing with Salomé, Nietzsche was struck by “having found a kindred spirit,” that the two were so close in thought they finished each other’s sentences, and that this inspired hope that he had “at last found a disciple” (NW, pp. 50-1). Diethelme further explains that having just formulated his conception of the Eternal Recurrence which, “in Lou’s words, ‘is only bearable if one’s love for life outweighs it in proportion,’ Nietzsche imagined Salomé as one who “could make him love life” and thus “make the thought of Eternal Recurrence bearable” (NW, p. 51).

The most cited passage concerning the Eternal Recurrence in *The Gay Science* is found in book four, where Nietzsche talks about “The greatest weight.” He presents a demon who threatens, “this life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more” (GS, p. 273). “Excelsior” is a much less discussed aphorism which references the Eternal Recurrence, and I suggest that it offers a much more in-depth understanding of the concept:

There is no longer any reason in what happens, no love in what will happen to you; no resting place is open any longer to your heart, where it only needs to find and no longer seek; you resist any ultimate peace; you will the eternal recurrence of war and peace: man of renunciation, all this you wish to renounce? Who will give you the strength for that? Nobody yet has had this strength! (GS, pp. 229-30).

In the notes of this work Kaufmann asserts that this section relates to a preceding one, “The Man of Renunciation.” He maintains that Nietzsche was suggesting, that “it is only in order to fly higher that the man of renunciation sacrifices so much... what he gives up does

not strike him as a negation because it is really part of his soaring desire for the heights” (GS, pp. 229). Considering Kaufmann’s analysis, I propose examination of these aphorisms through the lens of Nietzsche’s perception of love.

When describing “The Man of Renunciation,” Nietzsche explains that he is “satisfied with the impression he makes on us: he wants to conceal from us his desire, his pride, his intention to soar *beyond* us” (GS, pp. 100-1). In “Excelsior” he proclaims that the difficulty for the Man of Renunciation is that there is “no love in what will happen” and that his heart “only needs to find and no longer seek” (GS, p. 229). To “find” implies awareness, that what is being looked for is already known, whereas to “seek” implies searching for something unknown. Therefore, a heart which “needs to find” suggests that it looks for a love it has known before and is currently lost. Furthermore, Nietzsche’s preceding lines convey that suffering is experienced in the desperate, continual search: “no love in what will happen to you; no resting place is open any longer to your heart.”

With this consideration, I suggest Nietzsche’s experience of the fruition of his ideal of love with Wagner, along with suffering the demise of their relationship, caused him to become acutely aware of what he had only temporarily possessed. Dreaming of love throughout his youth offered Nietzsche only the subtle pain of imagining what he did not have, but experiencing the fulfillment of his desire only to have it taken away inspired a much more profound suffering because of possessing the knowledge of what he lost.

Nietzsche’s suffering led him to conceal his desire while attempting to shift his perspective so as to no longer be pained in love’s absence. He wanted to overcome his suffering so endeavored to convince himself that, rather than desiring the love of others, he did not care what they thought of him; his intention was “to soar *beyond* us.” This, I argue, is

what Nietzsche originally conceived with the Eternal Recurrence, but Salomé's presence shifted his thoughts in a different direction.

During the summer of 1882, Nietzsche wrote to Overbeck: "A mass of my vital secretes is involved in this *new* future... Also I am in a mood of fatalistic 'surrender to God'—I call it *amor fati*, so much so, that I would rush into a lion's jaws" (SL, p. 184).

Around the same time he wrote to Gast that Salomé was "as shrewd as an eagle and brave as a lion" (SL, July 1882, p. 186). The same month he wrote to Salomé: "how happy I am, my beloved friend Lou, that I can now think of the two of us— 'Everything is beginning, and yet everything is perfectly clear!' Trust me! Let us trust one another!" (SL, pp. 186, 188).

Obviously smitten, Nietzsche was completely open and vulnerable, anxious and hopeful, and in many ways, much like the enthusiastic twenty-four-year-old just getting to know Wagner.

How much work was done on *The Gay Science* in the five months Nietzsche knew Salomé before it was published in August 1882, is unknown, but I propose that his poem "Lost His Head," in his "Prelude in German Rhymes," calls an image of her to mind (SL, pp. 154-5). "Why is she clever now and so refined? / On her account a man's out of his mind, / His head was good before he took this whirl: / He lost his wits—to the aforesaid girl" (GS, p. 63). By all accounts Nietzsche did lose his wits concerning Salomé. Kaufmann explains that Nietzsche "had found a person to whom he could speak of his innermost ideas, receiving not only intellectual understanding but a response based on Lou's own experience" (NP, p. 48).

After knowing her for less than two months, Nietzsche proposed marriage to Salomé in May 1882 (SL, p. 154). After the denial of his proposal, he was still intent on maintaining a relationship with her, so was pleased when a plan was devised that she, Rée and himself

would travel and live together during the winter of 1882 and summer of 1883 (CL, p. 246). In June Nietzsche wrote Salomé:

I connect such high hopes with our plans for living together that all necessary or accidental side-effects make little impression on me now; and *whatever* happens, we shall endure it together and throw the whole bag of troubles overboard every evening *together*, shall we not? (SL, 1882, p. 183).

Later that month Nietzsche tried but failed to meet Salomé in Berlin, and in July he wrote her, “I want to be lonely no longer, but to learn again to be a human being. Ah, here I have practically everything to learn!” (SL, July 1882, pp.184-5). Considering Nietzsche’s previous professions, in both his letters and his works, that he intended to maintain his solitude, this declaration to Salomé demonstrates his significant act of opening himself back up to love.

Sadly, as with Wagner, the love Nietzsche believed he shared with Salomé was an illusion, and in August 1882, their relationship began its downfall. There was a dispute between Nietzsche’s sister and Salomé when they traveled together from the festival in Bayreuth to visit him in Tautenburg, a dispute of which Kaufmann contends they were both partially to blame (NP, p. 54). Nietzsche was quick to take sides with Salomé, and when she left Tautenburg, he wrote to her immediately:

I have spoken very little with my sister, but enough to send the new ghost that had arisen back into the void from which it came... my dear Lou, the old, heartfelt plea: *become the being you are!* First, one has the difficulty of emancipating oneself from one’s chains; and, ultimately, one has to emancipate oneself from this emancipation too! Each of us has to suffer, though in greatly differing ways, from the chain sickness, even after he has broken the chains. In fond devotion to your destiny—for in you I love also *my hopes* (SL, August 1882, p. 191).

Nietzsche’s “heartfelt plea” comes from *The Gay Science*: “What does your conscious say?—“You shall become the person you are” (GS, p. 219). Nietzsche shared difficult experiences intending to offer encouragement while not crossing the line of

friendship, but in signing, “in you I love also *my hopes*,” he as well expressed his love for Salomé through his words of hope for the future. His experiences with Salomé left a mark on Nietzsche, and like Wagner, she indirectly inspired the new direction he took with his work.

Thus Spoke Zarathustra

Nietzsche’s short friendship with Lou Andreas-Salomé can be viewed as the third of his experiences of suffering in love, from losing his father and then his father substitute Wagner, to the current loss of his anticipated disciple, imagined wife and friend, Salomé. Nietzsche’s dreams, his hopes for the future, even his optimism had become tangled in the web of his love for Salomé. By Hayman’s description, Nietzsche “had succumbed to ‘the hope of having found *his alter ego* in Fräulein Salomé” (CL, p. 246). In September 1882, Nietzsche wrote Salomé:

Yesterday afternoon I was happy; the sky was blue, the air was mild and clear, I was in the Rosenthal... I sat there for three hours... and wondered in all innocence and malice if I had any tendency to madness. In the end I said *no* (SL, pp. 192-3).

Recounting Nietzsche’s happiness during his time with Salomé, Ida Overbeck recounted that when describing his “new relationship in the summer of 1882, he was... very hopeful and confident in the fulfillment of his plans and his life” (CW, p. 120). Though only having known her from March until December of 1882, Nietzsche so anticipated Salomé in his life that, much like his relationship with Wagner, when their time ended abruptly he was left completely bewildered.

Diethelme speculates that Salomé’s lack of intimacy with Nietzsche was due to her overall distrust of men, which led to “her preference for tripartite friendships with two men in which one man would always be left out and hurt,” further noting that Nietzsche and Rée were merely the first of many such relationships (NW, pp. 54-5). Additionally, Diethelme

contends that Salomé received a kind of power from her behavior, that she appeared to “have needed to set one man against another” and that it was simply unfortunate for Nietzsche that he entered her life during the time she first began experimenting “simultaneously with two men” (NW, p. 57).

Salomé’s outlook surrounding what transpired between herself and Nietzsche is very different from most accounts. For example, she maintained that, though she was captivated by him, their conversations “revived memories or unconscious feelings” which she claimed would never have allowed her “to become his disciple or follower” (CN, p. 118). Salomé also stated that when she and Rée were discussing winter travel plans Nietzsche invited himself, insisting on a trio, adding that “even the place of our future stay was soon determined” (CN, p. 116). Additionally, Salomé emphasized that Nietzsche’s proposal, during which he “had Rée act as his spokesman,” caused immense distress, and added in apparent contradiction, “Worriedly, we reflected on how this problem could best be settled without breaking up our trio” (CN, p. 116).

Hayman discuss the falsity in many of Salomé’s claims, noting that she “pretended not to remember whether she had kissed Nietzsche, though he later thanked her ‘for the most enchanting dream of my life’” (CL, p. 246). Salomé also stated that the famous picture of the three of them with a cart was also due to Nietzsche’s insistence, proclaiming that he “occupied himself personally and zealously with the arrangements of details... even the kitsch of the lilac branch on the whip” (CN, p. 117).

Salomé also discussed an aspect of Nietzsche’s health, explaining that she found it interesting and strange that when it was just the two of them, Nietzsche could easily sit up and talk for hours (CN, p. 118). Considering the many examples of his anguish instigating his

sickness, I suggest Salomé's note demonstrates that Nietzsche's happiness had just as powerful an effect on his health as his suffering did.

Their last encounter was in Leipzig, November 1882. Diethe explains that Salomé and Rée left Nietzsche without even bidding "him goodbye," noting that feeling abandoned, Nietzsche "became increasingly bitter" (NW, p. 51). Salomé claimed that she was not aware until after Nietzsche's death that he harbored anger for her, stating that Rée had confiscated all of his letters (CN, p. 119). Regarding her book, *Friedrich Nietzsche in his Works*, Salomé asserts that it was written while she was "still full of naiveté" (CN, p. 119).

In November 1882, Nietzsche wrote to Salomé and Rée in a pleading manner: "From time to time we shall see each other again, shall we not? Do not forget that, *from this year on*, I have suddenly become poor in love and consequently very much in need of love" (SL, 1882, p. 196). Shortly thereafter Nietzsche again reached out, this time writing directly to Salomé:

Lou, dear heart, let there be a pure sky over us!... as far as everything else concerned I'll manage somehow... But solitary suffers terribly from any suspicion concerning the few people he loves... Forgive me! Dearest Lou, be what you *must* be (NP, November 1882, pp. 56-7).

Salomé's claim to have had no knowledge of any letters Nietzsche wrote to her following Leipzig has been refuted by Kaufmann. He explains that she destroyed most of the letters Nietzsche sent her, but that notes he composed in response to something she had written him survived (NP, p. 58). In these drafts Nietzsche appears exasperated, expressing such things as "But L, what kind of letters are you writing? That is how vengeful little school girls write... Do understand: I wish you would *raise* yourself up before me, not that you make yourself still smaller" (NP, November 1882, p. 57).

In Nietzsche's last letter to both Salomé and Rée he reverted back to sympathy provoking language, and once again discussed the idea of his death:

Do not be upset by the outbreaks of my 'megalomania' or of my 'injured vanity'—and even if I should take my life because of some passion or other, there would not be much to grieve about... Consider me, the two of you, as a semilunatic with a sore head who has been totally bewildered by long solitude (SL, 1882, p. 198).

Focusing on personal faults and declaring that his self-imposed death would be no loss, I argue, clearly illustrates Nietzsche's intentions to incite pity by presenting himself as wretched and desperate. In early December Nietzsche wrote to a mutual friend of Rée's and Salomé's, Heinrich von Stein: "What I desire most... is a high point from which I can see the tragic problem lying *beneath* me. I would like to *take away* from human existence some of its heartbreaking and cruel character" (SL, 1882, p. 196-7). On Christmas day he wrote to Overbeck: "Unless I discover the alchemical trick of turning this—muck into gold, I am lost... My lack of confidence is now immense—everything I hear makes me feel that people despise me" (SL, 1882, pp. 198-9).

Nietzsche's suffering in love again directly inspired his next work, and in the winter of 1882, he conceived the first part of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, and by the summer of 1883 he had completed the second part. Kaufmann describes Nietzsche's emotions during this time succinctly, explaining that those months "were among the loneliest and desperate periods in his life" (NP, p. 53). In his dejected state, Nietzsche again found the means to grow the seeds of his suffering into a new creation which bore the name *Zarathustra*.

In April 1883, Nietzsche wrote to Gast, "what an abundance of suffering life has unloaded upon me... from *early* childhood on. But I am a soldier—and this soldier... did become the father of Zarathustra! This paternity was his hope" (SL, p. 211). Ida Overbeck interpreted Nietzsche's remarks of having fathered Zarathustra as stemming from his "pain

and renunciation of not having a son” claiming he “had gotten the idea of creating the figure of a son artistically” (CN, p. 120). Hayman, on the other hand, suggests Zarathustra served to “prove that an imaginary son can be a match for the real girl who had defected” (CL, p. 255).

I disagree with both Ida and Hayman’s observations, as I do not see Zarathustra as being inspired by either longing for an actual child or an attempt to appear confident, although the latter is a behavior previously exhibited. I suggest rather that, in suffering the loss of love again, Nietzsche created a persona. Though in many ways it resembles his Schopenhauerian man and Free Spirit, his new enlightened madman Zarathustra is distinguishable by coming through in a form which brings the image Nietzsche conceived to life.

As with his other works, when creating *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* Nietzsche wrote of the perspectives he intended to embody, but what makes this work different is that it is delivered by literary expression. All Nietzsche’s feelings were poured into a character meant to come alive in the mind as occurs in poetry. He let his emotions come through in his philosophies as he had never done before and this experience of creation, I argue, is why Zarathustra came into the world.

In the prologue, Zarathustra professes, “What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not an end: what can be loved in man is that he is an *overture* and a *going under*” (Z, p.15). When discussing the egoless experience of love in *Untimely Meditations*, Nietzsche described the moment as, “bright sparks of the fire of love in whose light we cease to understand the word ‘I’... something beyond our being... moves across into it, and we are... possessed of a... longing for bridges between here and there” (UM, p. 161). As an object a

bridge serves to connect paths together, uniting what was once separated into one unified whole.

Previously Nietzsche perceived love as that which unifies through loss of individuality and, though mankind yearns for the experience of oneness, his pessimism keeps him separated (UM, p. 161). In this work I posit that Nietzsche presents mankind himself as the union between love and suffering, for Zarathustra shows that mankind must perceive his suffering as purposeful and love himself in what he becomes, loving what he was once unable to love.

Nietzsche stresses the importance of *overture* and *going under* in Zarathustra's prologue (Z, p.15). Kaufmann translates the term *overture* from "Übergang," though it is often translated as "crossing over" (Cambridge, Z, p. 7). Dr. Elisabeth Stein, German Adjunct Professor at Florida State University, indicates that Nietzsche uses "Hinüber" to describe "crossing over" in numerous places throughout this text, confirming the accuracy of Kaufmann's choice to use *overture* to translate Übergang.

Additionally, Kaufmann's translation takes Nietzsche's lifelong love of music and his appreciation of heroics into consideration, for in the nineteenth century *overture* elevated from an opera's prelude to an independent composition often heroically themed, for example, Beethoven's overture, *Egmont*, based on Goethe's heroic play.

Taking Kaufmann's translation into consideration, I suggest that Nietzsche's intention in highlighting *overture* and *going under* was to emphasize the heroic nature required in overcoming as well as signifying the importance of mankind's individuality in serving his experiences of love and suffering. In perceiving his suffering as serving his growth, mankind may regard his pain with love because of the purpose it serves in his transformation. Like the

heroic actions of *Egmont*, mankind's sacrifices represent both the pain of his love and the importance of his suffering by way of the process of his overcoming.

As I have argued, Nietzsche fought against his desire for the love of others because of the suffering it caused him, and I have noted the irony that in his efforts he created much of the suffering he experienced. At this point in his development, I posit, Nietzsche endeavored to diminish the relevance of loving others by emphasizing self-love and asserting that mankind must love his suffering as a part of himself.

Safranski advances the theory that Nietzsche's "original organizational plan for *Zarathustra* was to outline the contours of an art of living and highlight everything that makes life worth living and loving" (NB, p. 277). I concur, and add that Nietzsche intended to perceive that the art of living was not found in seeking fulfillment externally but in loving all that comprises the self.

Life is hard to bear; but do not act so tenderly! We are all of us fair beasts of burden, male and female asses. What do we have in common with the rosebud, which trembles because a drop of dew lies on it? True, we love life, not because we are used to living but because we are used to loving. There is always some madness in love. But there is also always some reason in madness (Z. p. 41).

Nietzsche expresses that there is indeed suffering in life, but so too is there joy; it is the hardships of life that make the pleasurable moments valuable. Suffering as well as love kindles life's flame. Growth is painful; the rose "trembles because a drop of dew lies on it," suffering under the weight of the water which gives it life. It is known that mankind rejoices in his existence because of his pleasures. Nietzsche points out that "There is always some madness in love. But there is also always some reason in madness" to demonstrate that what mankind finds pleasurable can also be painful. There is euphoria in love but there is also pain, there is madness (suffering) in love, but there is also reason in the madness of suffering.

In writing to Salomé that he “wondered in all innocence and malice if I had any tendency to madness,” I propose Nietzsche was expressing his fear of suffering from love while endeavoring to justify suffering by determining purpose in his madness in love by way of its service in his growth. Zarathustra asks “But why would you have your pride in the morning and your resignation in the evening?” (Z, p. 41). Nietzsche recognized it is in maddening pain that growth occurs, suffering calls inwardly to be written in “blood and aphorisms,” while joy reaches outwardly to be maintained, like the “reading idler” lazily seeking guidance (Z, p. 41).

Though suffering is part of mankind’s development, Nietzsche saw his desire for the love of others as a weakness to be overcome, and I suggest his intention to perceive his weakness as self-inflicted can be found in reinterpreting “On the Afterwordly”:

This god whom I created was man-made madness... only a poor specimen of man and ego... I overcame myself, the sufferer... I invented a brighter flame for myself. And behold, then this ghost *fled* from me... It was suffering and incapacity that created all afterworlds (Z, p. 31).

Nietzsche endeavored to perceive his ideal of love as “man-made madness,” conceived out of his inability to address his suffering from desiring love, and so determined that he needed to invent a new perspective, “a brighter flame” for himself, his Zarathustra. Having recognized his own pity-seeking behavior with his newly invented “brighter flame,” Nietzsche focused his attention on the fault in mankind’s response to the sufferer.

In his sermon, “On the Pitying,” Zarathustra pronounces, “Having seen the sufferer suffer, I was ashamed for the sake of his shame; and when I helped him, I transgressed grievously against his pride” (Z, pp. 88-9). Rather than focusing on his own shame in being the sufferer who reached out, Nietzsche veiled his shame with his mask and fixated on the transgression of others. This displacement of his suffering, I contend again demonstrates

Nietzsche's inability to embody the perspectives he presented in the image of his enlightened self.

Zarathustra continues, "If you have a suffering friend, be a resting place for his suffering, but a hard bed as it were, a field cot: thus you will profit him best" (Z, p. 90).

Nietzsche pleaded for Rée and Salomé's pity when he exclaimed, "I have suddenly become poor in love," but his calls were ignored, so he voiced his opposition, proclaiming it good to aid the sufferer just enough that he may assist himself.

And if a friend does you evil, then say: 'I forgive you what you did to me; but that you have done it to *yourself*—how could I forgive that?' Thus speaks all great love: it overcomes even forgiveness and pity. One ought to hold on to one's heart; for if one lets it go, one soon loses control of the head too (Z, p. 90).

Nietzsche endeavored to raise himself by determining that he could forgive those who transgressed his love while also attempting to perceive that "great love" is love of self, as it "overcomes even forgiveness and pity." Moreover, unlike the Man of Renunciation in "Excelsior," whose "heart... only needs to find and no longer seek," Zarathustra warns to "hold on to one's heart" or else "one soon loses control of the head too." Nietzsche again proposes to deny desires so as to avoid the very suffering he claims to be vital to growth.

After completion of the first three parts *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche wrote in a letter to Rohde: "With all the people I love: everything is *over*, it is the past, forbearance; we still meet... But the look in the eyes tells the truth: and this look tells me... 'Friend Nietzsche, you are completely alone now!'" (SL, February 1884, pp. 219-20). Through his philosophies, Nietzsche not only endeavored to find purpose for his suffering, he too used his work to shield himself by rationalizing his pain. He imagined through his Zarathustra that he could move beyond his burden: "I have learned to walk: ever since, I let myself run. I have

learned to fly: ever since, I do not want to be pushed before moving along. Now I am light, now I fly, now I see myself beneath myself, now god dances through me” (Z. p. 41).

A poem Nietzsche wrote during the same time as *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, expresses clearly what I have argued as his emotional confusions. In the poem, *To Hafis*, Nietzsche declares, “You are all and nothing/... You always withdraw into yourself / You always fly out of your self – / You are the height of gloom, / You are all deep illusions” (PB, 1884, p. 125). Nietzsche withdrew into his suffering, conceiving ways of perceiving differently, but I suggest he felt as though his suffering was “all and nothing.” He tried to be without his suffering and it found him in the “height of [his] gloom” and in his “deep illusions.” Unable to assimilate his philosophical creations, Nietzsche was left only with his mask.

Hayman states that the “reader is caught in the cross-fire of Nietzsche’s battle against himself... [his] whole procédé is evaluative, but, like a self-destroying machine, the teaching is constantly undoing itself” (CL, p. 264). The section Hayman references is in “On Self-Overcoming”:

Life itself confided this secret to me: ‘Behold,’ it said, ‘I am *that which must always overcome itself*... I must be struggle and a becoming and an end and an opposition to ends... Whatever I create and however much I love it—soon I must oppose it and my love (Z, p. 115).

I agree with Hayman’s assertion that Nietzsche overturns the values he determines through the very process of proposing them, but I add that his system failed only in that he was unable to encompass the values he determined. He was indeed in a battle with himself.

Hayman continues, “Wearing the Zarathustra mask, he believes himself to be telling the truth. The great danger of this method is that it becomes hard to retain firm artistic control” (CL, p. 263). Again, I do not dispute Hayman’s contention per se, but propose that it was not as simple as Nietzsche believing himself to be truthful. I contend he was well aware

of his mask and not in danger of losing “artistic control,” but rather hoped that his philosophies would be his truth. Nietzsche endeavored to perceive the world through the lens of his philosophies; he wanted to live the values he proclaimed, not on the pages of his work, but in all aspects of his life.

In “The Song of Melancholy,” when Zarathustra steps outside of his cave the Magician takes his chance to speak to the group and he expresses that his “melancholy devil, who is through and through an adversary of this Zarathustra...*wants* to show you his magic” (Z, p. 296):

He himself sometimes seems to me like a beautiful mask of a saint, like a new strange masquerade in which my evil spirit, the melancholy devil, enjoys himself. I love Zarathustra, it often seems to me, for the sake of my evil spirit (Z, p. 297).

When the Magician first appears in this text he wore a mask in the sense that he put on a performance of acting pitifully with the intention of testing Zarathustra’s compassion. He now compares Zarathustra to “a beautiful mask of a saint, like a new strange masquerade.” The Magician loves Zarathustra “for the sake of [his] evil spirit,” his “melancholy devil,” or as I propose, his suffering.

The “melancholy devil” likes to see the beautiful “mask of a saint,” the illusion of an egoless love, even though he knows he will be disillusioned. The Magician loves Zarathustra even though he compares him to a masquerade, deception of love enflames suffering, suffering anticipates growth. As was revealed in his previous work, in a way Nietzsche’s possession is his suffering. He defines possession as “changing something new *into ourselves*,” and the most influential element of affecting change in Nietzsche’s life was his suffering.

In May 1884, Nietzsche wrote to his sister lamentingly reflecting on his life. He expressed being chastened by his relationships with people and also acknowledged concealing himself because of feelings of alienation:

I have found until now, from earliest childhood, *nobody* who had the same need of heart and conscience as myself... that I have no such person is my misfortune... Almost all my human relationships have resulted from attacks of a feeling of isolation.... My mind is burdened with a thousand shaming memories of such weak moments... I always had to playact somewhat instead of refreshing myself in people... The feeling that there is about me something very remote and alien... Schopenhauer or Wagner or think up Zarathustra—these things are for me recreation but, above all, hiding places, behind which I can sit down again for a while. Do not therefore think me mad, my dear Lama (SL, p. 241).

In April 1884, the third part of Zarathustra was published and in February 1885 the fourth part was printed privately (SL, pp. 203, 235). In his following text, *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche clarifies many of the thoughts he expressed in this work, but also begins to perceive that his philosophies would not be recognized and valued during his own life, but would be some time in the distant future.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

Philosophy of the Future

Beyond Good and Evil

Following *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche suffered emotional conflicts as he had before, and though endeavoring to shift his perspectives had yet to alleviate his desire for the love of others, changes in how he perceived when, and to what degree, his work would affect mankind did occur. It is my contention that Nietzsche began to conceive the Eternal Recurrence as expanding beyond his own existence. I suggest that while contending with desiring the love of others, Nietzsche developed his sense of self-love by perceiving his underappreciated work as serving the future.

When Nietzsche bemoaned publication difficulties in a letter to Overbeck, he attempted to console himself by stating, “If a man draws up the sum of a deep and hidden life, as I have been doing, then the result is meant for the eyes and consciences of only the most select people” (SL, March 1885 p. 239). Considering that his work would serve the future, Nietzsche’s own recurring moments became an important creation for mankind. Beyond Zarathustra’s difficulty of the Last Man, an Expanded Eternal Recurrence offered a postscript to the demon’s threat: “This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more, [and whatever you create will determine your legacy; will you be *immortal*?]” (GS, p. 273)

With a widened perspective of his existence, when writing Meysenbug, Nietzsche scoffed at his old self: “It is the humor of my situation that I should be mistaken for the former Basel professor Dr. Friedrich Nietzsche. The devil take him! What has this fellow to

do with me!” (SL, March 1885, p. 237). Unhappy with his past self, Nietzsche was no more pleased with his current self, as his self-inflicted solitude increased his suffering.

In Spring 1886, Nietzsche wrote to Overbeck that he was “really more in hell than in my cave,” adding that “occasional contact with people is like a holiday for me, a redemption from ‘me’” (SL, p.252). Though his philosophical conception signified self-love through acknowledgement of abilities, his own assertion could not dissuade Nietzsche’s desire for the love of others. While he continued his work, Nietzsche also continued to use it as a way to conceal his emotional conflicts.

In *Beyond Good and Evil*, commenced in Summer 1885 and completed by Fall 1886, Nietzsche discusses the use of masks within philosophy (SL, p. 204). In “The Free Spirit,” Nietzsche asserts:

Whatever is profound loves masks; what is most profound even hates image and parable... A concealed man who instinctively needs speech for silence... *wants* and sees to it that a mask of him roams in his place through the hearts and heads of his friends. And supposing he did not want it, he would still realize some day that in spite of that a mask of him is there (BGE, p. 50).

As Nietzsche has continually proclaimed perspectives he wished to possess in his works, he also consistently condemned personal weaknesses, as he does here in reproaching concealment, neglecting his own admitted hiddenness. In “What is Noble,” Nietzsche asks, “Does one not write books precisely to conceal what one harbors?” (BGE, p. 229). He then continues, “Every philosophy also *conceals* a philosophy; every opinion is also a hideout, every word also a mask... Every profound thinker is more afraid of being understood than of being misunderstood” (BGE, p. 229).

In a way Nietzsche was continually confessing his weaknesses, he just did it under the shield of his philosophical objectivism. In September 1886, Nietzsche wrote to

Meysenbug, “I am sending these lines to Rome... It is called *Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Future Philosophy*... Let us assume that people will be *allowed* to read it in about the year 2000” (SL, p. 256).

On the Genealogy of Morals

Nietzsche began and completed his *Genealogy of Morals*, in 1887, and in the preface of the work, confidently asserted, “it will be some time before my writings are ‘readable’” (GM, p. 23). Nietzsche had determined that his task was to prepare his philosophies for the future, and though it was “a *factum* of indescribable sadness,” there was greatness in it (SL, August 1886, p. 254).

In the third essay of this work, Nietzsche states, “The will to truth requires a critique—let us thus define our own task—the value of truth must for once be experimentally *called into question*” (GM, p. 153). As he condemns pre-established notions of truth, I argue Nietzsche also condemned his own emotional truths, determining that established ideologies merited dissection whereas his desire for love should be stifled. He explained to Overbeck the pressure of his task, “There is the hundredweight of this need pressing upon me—to create a coherent structure of thought during the next few years” (SL, March 1887, pp. 26-5)

In a poem written during his *Genealogy*, “A proposal of love—*when unfortunately the poet fell into a pit*,” Nietzsche’s verse triggers apprehension and anticipation of his task, and I suggest his hopes of self-love are revealed as well: “. . . / Flying high, you see only in suspense! / Oh, Albatross bird, / Impulse makes me fly high, / I thought of you: / My tears flow,—yes, I love you!” (PB, 1887, pp. 223-5). A known metaphor for a psychological burden, the albatross flies above in Nietzsche’s poem, not as a burden, but as an unattainable desire the poet tearfully calls for from a *pit*.

In his intentions to compile his philosophical doctrines for the future, Nietzsche determined that his lonely solitude was still necessary, writing to Meysenbug, “I feel *condemned* to my solitude and fortress... The unusual and difficult task which commands me to go on living commands me to avoid people and to bind myself to no one any more” (SL, May 1887, pp. 265-7).

The Case of Wagner

Begun in April, *The Case of Wagner* was published in October 1888. In this work Nietzsche uses his once beloved master as an example of the failures in German music and culture, contrasting the earlier praise of the composer’s efforts in his first two major publications. No longer of the opinion that Wagner’s music could save culture from its decent into idolization, here Nietzsche determines that Wagner serves as an image of German idealism.

In section two of this work Nietzsche describes love as being “translated back into *nature*,” explaining that “love as fate, as *fatality*, cynical, innocent, cruel... is precisely what makes it *nature!*” (ATO, p. 236). Continuing that love’s “method is war,” Nietzsche then states that this “perspective on love... is a rarity: it raises a work of art above thousands of others” (ATO, p. 236). This consideration of love, as *amor fati*, requires loving all aspects of life beyond pleasure to pain, while ensuing love of self by focusing on the recurrence of personal existence. It does not, however, define love; it simply gives it application.

In the same section, Nietzsche declares, “artists are like everyone else, only worse — they *misunderstand* love. Wagner misunderstood it too”:

Everyone thinks that people in love are selfless because they want to advance the interests of another person, often at their own expense. But in return, they want to *possess* that other person ... Even God is no exception here. He is far from thinking

‘what difference does it make to you if I love you?’ he becomes terrible if you do not love him in return (ATO, p. 236).

The fact that Nietzsche discusses love so passionately in a book about Wagner reveals that he had not yet overcome his self-described “Wagner mania.” Furthermore, when calling to his earlier asserted notion that love was want of possession, Nietzsche presents the disillusionment of his love for Wagner much like Zarathustra did when he revealed that the god he “created was man-made madness.”

Twilight of the Idols, The Antichrist, Nietzsche contra Wagner

Safranski asserts that Nietzsche’s last works, specifically *Twilight of the Idols* and *The Antichrist*, “no longer developed new ideas, but generalized or particularized familiar concepts,” adding, “In the process, the directorial and theatrical lavishness of the presentation is expanded.” (NB, p. 305). Safranski’s assertion is accurate, Nietzsche does repeat much of his earlier thoughts, particularly with *Nietzsche contra Wagner*, which entirety consists of past works Nietzsche compiled to emphasize his contentions against Wagner.

Considering Safranski’s point, I suggest that Nietzsche rushed to create these last works to both ensure his self-proclaimed task and revolt against his still present desire for the love of others by attacking the manifestation of his ideal. With this action Nietzsche not only had further expression for his preferred perspectives, he also experienced the added bonus of receiving angry attention from Wagnerites. Better to be loved than hated, but better to be hated than ignored.

Twilight of the Idols and *The Antichrist* were begun in September as a joint effort for Nietzsche’s *Transvaluation of Values*, and *Nietzsche contra Wagner* commenced in November 1888. All three of these books were published when Nietzsche was no longer capable of appreciating his work in print. In July, he wrote to Meysenbug, “I involuntarily

have no words for anyone, because I have less and less desire to allow anyone to see into the difficulties of my existence. There is indeed a great *emptiness* around me” (SL, 1888, p. 302).

In the middle of the summer in 1888 Nietzsche successfully completed his task of documenting his philosophical expressions for mankind, but his attempts at self-love were failing him as he continued to battle desiring love. In *Twilight of the Idols* he wrote:

Here the view is free. —It can be loftiness of the soul when a philosopher is silent; it can be love when he contradicts himself; it can be a courtesy of the knower to tell a lie... it can also be greatness of soul not to be afraid in front of *what is most unworthy* (ATO, p. 220).

The opening line of this aphorism was inspired by Goethe’s *Faust*, from the scene in which Faust has transformed after his death to a higher self in heaven, and he states, “*Here the view is free*” (ATO, p. 220). I posit that here Nietzsche insinuates that the view seen by the higher self is free because, in an elevated state, love is recognized as existing in life’s contradictions, residing in places that from a lower elevation of thought, appears to be something else, something unworthy. Lies are okay and souls are not intimidated by presumed values. I suggest that Nietzsche conceives the silence between him and Wagner now that his father figure is gone.

In *The Antichrist*, Nietzsche speaks of love again as a deception: “The force of illusion reaches a high point here, and so do the forces that sweeten and *transfigure*. People in love will tolerate more than they usually do, they will put up with anything” (ATO, p. 20). The transfiguring effects from overcoming suffering are permitted, but in still discrediting love, Nietzsche asserts that, rather than beauty in transformation, love transfigures, causing self-negation and abuse.

Nietzsche contra Wagner was the last thing Nietzsche was working on before his collapse. Higgins and Solomon suggest that this reveals the “importance he placed on [his]

relationship [with Wagner] throughout his productive life (if not beyond)” (ATO, pp. 33-4). When compiling notes for this work, Nietzsche’s selection for this work from *Beyond Good and Evil* perfectly illustrates the accuracy of Higgins and Solomon’s assertion: “Those who know hearts can guess how impoverished, helpless, presumptuous, and mistaken even the best and deepest love really is —how much more likely it is to *destroy* than to *rescue*” (ATO, p. 279). To assume that love can be mistaken suggests it possesses flaws and thus falsities, and so with his continued devaluation of love, Nietzsche maintained his war against his desires, determining to wear his mask of appearances indefinitely.

Ecce Homo

Unswerving in his desire to appear sure of himself, Nietzsche’s *Ecce Homo* is packed with self-glorification and proud declarations of his genius. With his autobiographical work, which he began on his forty-fourth birthday completed within a month, I argue Nietzsche intended to demonstrate to himself, and to the world, that he did not need reassurance or love from others (SL, 1888, p. 313). The self-congratulations in this work has led some scholars to question if *Ecce Homo* serves as evidence that Nietzsche had already begun to lose grasp of his sanity. For example, Hayman posits that if Nietzsche’s sickness were considered regarding this work, “we could have no difficulty in explaining the extravagant self-praise” (CL, p. 10). Higgins and Solomon, though, assert that “what is interpreted as impending insanity... is much more convincingly understood as ironic, self-mocking genius” (WS, p. 4). I propose that Nietzsche was coherent while creating *Ecce Homo*, but to greatly motivated to appear confident in himself and clear in his theories because of feeling the threatening effects of losing control of his conscious mind.

There is speculation as to the details of Nietzsche's illness, specifically as it may have related to syphilis, but it is known that he experienced paralysis, and Gilman explains that a contemporary diagnosis for his condition would be "dementia paralytica" (CN, p. 221). Considering well known early warnings signs of both paralysis and dementia, I posit that Nietzsche was aware of his worsening condition and responded by heightening his resolve to appear triumphant in his life's work.

The vanity in *Ecce Homo*, and some letters during this time, I contend reveals Nietzsche's determination to present himself as an incarnation of his philosophies. I propose that Nietzsche's drive to appear self-assured and confident in his solitude largely inspired his autobiography, and I suggest that the "self-praise" Hayman refers to was the mask Nietzsche had long used to conceal his emotional crisis and that at this point he determined to maintain his veil indefinitely.

When regarding *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Hayman asserts that Nietzsche "needed a mask more than ever before, but, like an actor, found that with his features hidden he could reveal more of himself" (CL, p. 256). Zarathustra was an important aspect in Nietzsche's veiling his emotions and I concur that he needed his symbolic son to serve as his mask, but by way of a creative misreading, I disagree that it was at that time that Nietzsche "needed a mask more than ever before" (CL, p. 256). It was during his work on *Ecce Homo*, I argue, that Nietzsche felt the most need to conceal himself because of experiencing onset symptoms of dementia.

Nietzsche's letters, which thus far have revealed his confictions, at this time often resemble the tone he uses in his work. While writing *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche wrote to Gast of his intentions with his text:

I talk about myself with all possible psychological ‘cunning’ and gay detachment—I do not want to present myself to people as a prophet, savage beast, or moral horror... it will perhaps prevent people from confusing me with my anti-self (SL, October 1888, p. 320).

Middleton ascribes the translation of “anti-self” to Michael Hamburger, whom he quotes as stating that Nietzsche’s “claiming absolute authority for himself and boasting of his ferocious predatory strength, merely testifies to the war between his self and his anti-self” (SL, p. 320). Hamburger’s assertion offers concurrence with my contention that Nietzsche struggled with internal conflicts. Furthering Hamburger’s analysis through a creative misreading, I suggest that it was his emotional “self” Nietzsche veiled as a response to the self-negation he received from his “anti-self,” the part of him which initially inspired his concealment.

Just after completing *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche wrote to Meta von Salis, whom he met in Zurich in 1884, and when referencing “Why I Am Destiny,” stated that by the end “the reader is left sitting before me as a mere ‘mask,’ mere ‘feeling heart’” (SL, Nov. 1888, p. 324). In this section Nietzsche describes his role in the “uncovering of Christian morality”:

Everything that has hitherto been called ‘truth’ has been recognized as the most harmful, insidious, and subterranean form of lie; the hole pretext of ‘improving’ mankind, as the ruse for sucking the blood of life itself. Morality as vampirism (EH, pp. 333-4).

All the while Nietzsche was unmasking morality I maintain he was veiling himself. In a letter written to Gast in July 1880 he reveals such actions when expressing, “I go on digging zealously in my moral mine, and sometimes seem to myself wholly subterranean” (SL, p. 172). While he was endeavoring to awaken mankind to his ideological constraints, I argue Nietzsche was attempting to shroud the anguish and emotional turmoil he suffered from desiring the love of others, and I propose his mask symbolizes his own veiled lie, which

he preserved by the “pretext of ‘improving’” himself. Thus, with his *Ecce Homo*, it was in fact Nietzsche himself who was left sitting before his work “as a mere ‘mask.’”

Making great efforts to conceal his weaknesses, Nietzsche’s work in morality offered new perspectives for mankind, but as I have argued, his philosophical endeavors could not assist in alleviating him of his emotional conflictions. He was becoming more estranged from his friends, even losing his long time Wagnerian friend, Meysenbug. She had reached her limit regarding Nietzsche’s stanch opinions of Wagner, and wrote him an angry letter defending her now deceased friend over accusations made in *The Case of Wagner* (SL, October 1888, p. 314). In response Nietzsche wrote:

These are not things on which I allow anyone to contradict me. I am, in questions of *décadence*, the supreme court of appeal on earth... Wagner’s knowledge of how to arouse faith (as you with your estimable innocence express it)... certainly required an act of genius, but a genius of *mendacity*. . . I myself have the honor to be the reverse—a genius of *truth* (SL, October 1888, p. 314).

Hayman’s earlier discussed point that Nietzsche’s “Zarathustra mask” made it “hard to retain firm artistic control” seems more appropriately applied here (CL, p. 263). Resolute in presenting an appearance of strength and confidence, Nietzsche pronounced himself as a server of truth, completely neglecting his significant assertion in *Human, All Too Human*, that “there are no eternal facts, just as there are no absolute truths” (HH, p. 13).

Nietzsche proclaimed in “Why I Am So Wise,” that when examining his life, “you will rarely find traces, and actually only once, that anybody felt ill will toward me—but perhaps rather too many traces of *good will*” (EH, p. 227). Having lost most of his friends, notably Rohde in addition to Meysenbug, it may be assumed that Nietzsche was aware of the falsity in claiming that only once someone “felt ill will toward” him (SL, p. 231).

Additionally, in October Nietzsche wrote to Georg Brandes, whom he met in 1887, “nobody

writes to me. I have spread helpless terror even among people who are near and dear to me” (SL, 1888, pp. 278, 317). Nietzsche wrote Meysenbug one more time in November:

Just wait a little, *verehrteste Freundin!* I shall send you yet another proof that ‘Nietzsche est toujours haissable’ [Nietzsche is always hateful]. Without any doubt, I have been *unjust* to you; but since I am suffering from a surfeit of righteousness this autumn, it was really salutary for me to do an injustice. . . The Immoralist (SL, 1888, p. 322).

Acknowledging that he had “been *unjust*,” Nietzsche’s only consolation for Meysenbug was to claim that he had experienced such an abundance of “righteousness” that it was helpful for him to “do an injustice,” concluding his play on moral sentiment by signing the letter, “The Immoralist.” I suggest that this dispute was more difficult for Nietzsche than the tone of this letter conveys, as the history of their correspondence reveals the closeness he felt for her and the value he placed on their friendship. He had reached out to Meysenbug just a few months earlier, crying to her of all the “*emptiness* around” (SL, July 1888, p. 302).

Nietzsche’s personal writings just a few months before *Ecce Homo* reveal the same emotional strongholds he had long contended with. In the summer of 1888, Nietzsche wrote “The Brazen Silence” in his notebook, and in this poem expressed, “The world became silent.... / I listened with the ear of my *curiosity*... / I listen with the ears of my *love*” (PB, p. 385). Earlier in the year, Nietzsche wrote to Overbeck:

The perpetual lack of a really refreshing and *healing human love*, the absurd isolation which it entails, making almost any residue of a connection with people merely something that wounds one—that is all very bad indeed and right only in itself, having the right to be necessary (SL, February 1888, p. 282).

Responding to this letter, Safranski suggests that Nietzsche “considered himself a monster in the captivity of people to whom he meant nothing” (NB, p. 312). This observation of Nietzsche’s emotional stance coincides with my analysis of his feeling unloved, but I add that the above letter reveals the sadness he felt in perceiving that his only option, due to the

onslaught of his sickness, in dealing with his still present desire for love was that he had to intensify his declarations of confidence. Both public and private, Nietzsche determined that he must appear as though “*healing human love*” was completely unnecessary for him.

In his performance of confidence, Nietzsche offers gratitude in the preface of *Ecce Homo*: “I buried my forty-fourth year today; I had the *right* to bury it... *How could I fail to be grateful to my whole life?*” (EH, p. 221). He was fervently trying to embody his *amor fati*, focusing on such things as thanking Gast for sending a birthday card while still bemoaning that it was the only one he received (SL, p. 313). In “Why I am so wise,” Nietzsche again offers gratitude for his life, also evoking his father and the Eternal Recurrence by way of predestination: “The good fortune of my existence... lies in its fatality: I am, to express it in the form of a riddle, already dead as my father, while as my mother I am still living and becoming old” (EH, p. 222).

Nietzsche’s riddle of fatality clearly presents the predetermined metaphorical death he shared with his father and the literal long life he shared with his mother, but further interpretation is possible when going beyond the boundaries of his objective. Reflection on Nietzsche’s father originally inspiring his ideal of love while his mother stimulated feelings of loneliness, I propose that in his riddle his father can be seen to symbolize the death of love while his mother, the isolation of living without love.

In the same section Nietzsche remembers that at the age of thirty-six, as his father’s “life went downward, mine, too, went downward” (EH, p. 222). The disillusionment of his love was severe and complicated by an elevated sickness which required that he resign from teaching. The intensity of his illness in 1879, Nietzsche explains, stripped him of all his energy so that he existed at first “like a shadow” and then “*as a shadow*”; it was at this low

point, he adds, that he wrote *The Wanderer and His Shadow* (EH, p. 222). Considering the pain Nietzsche experienced during that time of love-less-ness, I propose interpreting the Shadow in his poem as a metaphor for love.

In suffering the loss of Wagner, Nietzsche rejected love, endeavoring to devalue and disempower it, but as I have argued, he still felt the pain of love's absence. In his poem, *The Wanderer* spurns love (his Shadow), but as it fades he misses it and calls love to return, "Where are you? Where are you," but there is no reply (HH, p. 395). As with the Wanderer in his poem, Nietzsche's attempts to dissuade his desire only inspired further longing. He wrote to Gast ten days before his birthday in 1879 regarding his experience while writing *The Wanderer and His Shadow*:

The manuscript which you received from St. Moritz was written at such a high and hard price that perhaps nobody would have written it if he could possibly have avoided doing so. Often I shudder to read it, especially the longer parts, because of the ugly memories it brings (SL, p. 169).

Proposing that all of Nietzsche's works as similarly autobiographical, Solomon suggests that *Ecce Homo* is "just the finale of a lifelong pursuit of self-constitution, not to mention self-congratulation" (LN, p. 9). Solomon continues, asserting that Nietzsche was divided between the "passionate self that emerges so evidently in his works and the painfully reserved self that he wore out in public" (LN, p. 9). My contention that Nietzsche experienced self-division due to emotional conflicts finds concurrence with Solomon's assertion, but by applying a creative misreading, I suggest rather that Nietzsche's philosophical mask was what he wore in public while the "painfully reserved self," condemned as weak for desiring love, was the part of himself that remained hidden.

The abundance of confidence in this work, and in some of his letters, I argue reveals Nietzsche's efforts to appear as though he had overcome his suffering and that love of others

meant nothing to him because of his tremendous self-love. An example of his philosophical masking can be found in “Why I Write Such Good Books,” where Nietzsche proclaims “That I feel no curiosity at all about review of my books, especially in newspapers, should be forgiven me” (EH, p. 262). There are numerous examples which illustrate that Nietzsche often exhibited both curiosity and concern regarding reviews of his work, but presuming he intended to have only just overcome such interests, there are a few recent examples to cite.

In October 1888, Nietzsche wrote to Gast, “I am very curious about your *Kunstwart* philanthropy,” referring to his review *Der Fall Wagner* in the German journal (SL, 1888, p. 320). A month later he boasted to Overbeck of the “acts of homage for my *Der Fall Wagner*”: “Herr Spitteler expressed his rapture in the Thursday issue of *Der Bund*; Herr Köselitz, in *Der Kunstwart* from Paris I am told that an article in the *Nouvelle Revue* is forthcoming” (SL, p. 322).

As they have before, his letters again reveal the differences between the image Nietzsche presented in his works and the concealed self revealed in his letters. He exposed his “curiosity,” and thus his concern for the opinions of other’s when gloating to Overbeck about reviews, which were “especially in newspapers,” as he noted two different German newspapers and a French literary magazine. Nietzsche maintained his mask, determined to present to the world the image of himself as he had always intended to be.

His determination to appear self-assured even led Nietzsche to speak out against his friends in the same section regarding their involvement with his work: “Those who want no part of the contents, my so-called friends, for example, become ‘impersonal’: they congratulate me for having got ‘that far’ again—and find some progress in the greater cheerfulness of the tone” (EH, p. 264). Nietzsche’s disdain is also found in his section, “The

Case of Wagner”: “I tell every one of my friends to his face that he has never considered it worthwhile to *study* any of my writings” (EH, p. 324).

Furthermore, material intended for this section found in the Appendix shows that Nietzsche was willing to cite one of his closest friends as an example: “Overbeck dried up, became sour, subject to his wife... but he shows how his is full of good will toward me and worried about me and calls himself my ‘indulgent friend’” (EH, p. 341). Of course, Nietzsche does say in “Why I am so wise,” a man of knowledge “must not only love his enemies, he must also be able to hate his friends” (EH, p. 220). Contrary to Overbeck, Nietzsche spoke highly of Wagner, the man who had caused him to suffer so much he exclaimed to his sister he required “almost six years to recover from pain” (SL, 1882, p. 180).

When speaking of Wagner and war in the same section, Nietzsche states that an “attack is in my case a proof of good will, sometimes even of gratitude. I honor, I distinguish by associating my name with that of a cause or a person” (EH, pp. 231-3). He also declares that, “the first contact with Wagner was also the first deep breath of my life” and that he would “let go cheap the whole rest of my human relationships” for his “intimate relationship with Richard Wagner” (EH, p. 247). Moreover, Nietzsche proclaims, “I call Wagner the great benefactor of my life” and that he and Wagner are connected by their profound suffering, which “will link our names again and again, eternally” (EH, pp. 250-1).

Nietzsche’s choice to proclaim publicly his appreciation for Wagner when the details of their destructive relationship was widely known, I suggest, offers additional evidence of his intentions to appear self-confident. When discussing his suffering concerning the creational process of his work, in the section “Human, All Too Human,” Nietzsche announces that he experienced a “monument of a crisis;” his spirit became free in taking

“possession of itself,” and that this event followed the festival in Bayreuth, where the “Wagnerian had become master over Wagner” (EH, pp. 283-4). Though praising Wagner in this work, Nietzsche manages to circle his suffering back around to his once beloved master and father figure.

Additionally, Nietzsche mentions that the only excuse he “offered Wagner was a fatalistic telegram,” explaining that an “activity chosen in defiance of one’s instincts... is related to the need for *deadening* the feeling of desolation and hunger by means of a narcotic art—for example Wagnerian art” (EH, pp. 286-7). In proposing that he loved Wagner against his instinct, Nietzsche implies that he knew the fault in his ideal of love and so did not need to experience the suffering of disillusionment; but in existing in the absence of his ideal, everything else appeared as a narcotic, covering up the loveless “feeling of desolation and hunger.” In this way it was a lot like the Magician’s “melancholy devil,” who defied his knowledge and choose instead a “strange masquerade.”

Salis spoke of Nietzsche’s love of Wagner, noting that when she heard negative comments regarding his suffering over Wagner, she made sure to proclaim “how much love had preceded this suffering” (CN, p. 208). Salis further states, “Whoever suspects Nietzsche of any ugly motive for turning against his formerly revered friend has utterly misunderstood him” (CN, p. 208). Nietzsche stated in the section, “The Birth of Tragedy,” that the text was “an event in the life of Wagner” (EH, p. 270). I propose that there is another such event found within *Ecce Homo*, the poem “Gondola Song” or “Venice.”

In Christmas 1888, Nietzsche wrote a letter to Overbeck that in *Ecce Homo* there was a “dithyramb of boundless invention—I cannot think of it without sobbing” (SL, p. 338). The poem, which I suggest symbolizes Wagner, was originally intended for *Nietzsche contra*

Wagner, Kaufmann explains, but following Nietzsche's approving and editing the work, then losing control following his collapse, "the editors included it... with the corrections Nietzsche had made in the proofs" (NP, p. 426).

I suggest Nietzsche was recalling Wagner's funeral in Venice, where the composer's body was floated down a canal in a Gondola, when he proceeds his poem in "Why I am So Clever," declaring, "When I seek another word for music, I always find only the word Venice. I do not know how to distinguish between tears and music":

*At the bridge I stood / lately in the brown night. / From afar came a song: / ...
Gondolas, lights, and music— / drunken it swam out into the twilight. / My soul, a
stringed instrument, / sang to itself, invisibly touched, / a secret gondola song, /
quivering with iridescent happiness. / —Did anyone listen to it? (EH, p. 252).*

When analyzing the poem, Grundlehner asserts the speaker's "inability to sustain...illusive bridges between things which are eternally apart," which is why the "poet is once more relegated to loneliness" (PN, p. 304). Recalling Nietzsche's *Untimely Meditations*, in which he explained, "There are moments and as it were bright sparks of the fire of love in whose light we cease to understand the word 'I'... and we are thus possessed of a heartfelt longing for bridges between here and there" (UM, p. 161).

The bridge represents a connection to love, whether it be a bridge to a pure, egoless love such as the saint inspires, or a bridge leading to self-love, individuality and a "sacred 'No'" as Zarathustra taught. I propose that as Nietzsche conjured an image of standing on a bridge, he imagined the Gondola carrying away Wagner's remains and, still possessing love for his once beloved master, he felt that his "*soul... sang to itself... a secret gondola song.*" Kaufmann contends that in *Ecce Homo*, "Nietzsche assumes that we must recognize our true self before we can realize it" and that the "most revealing question is: 'What have you really loved till now?'" (NP, p. 159). I contend that what Nietzsche had always loved is the same as

that of which he always possessed, his suffering, and that in imagining himself watching Wagner's body floating beneath him, he began to recognize the beauty of suffering in love by pondering love's death.

Nietzsche's perception of love was at last beginning to shift, but it came at a time in which clarity of his vision was to be short lived. In the preface of *Ecce Homo*, Kaufmann notes that, following Nietzsche's collapse, "[he] recovered sufficient lucidity to dispatch a few mad but strangely beautiful letters—and then darkness closed in and extinguished passion and intelligence. He suffered and thought no more. He had burnt himself out" (EH, p. 202). The days leading up to the "mad but strangely beautiful letters," and for a while after, I argue, Nietzsche still possessed moments of lucidity in between flashes of dementia. It is my contention that it was in the last weeks of his mental control that Nietzsche's perception of love finally shifted.

Conclusion

Considering Madness; Nietzsche's Last Letters

Many scholars aside from Kaufmann have asserted that Nietzsche's letters just before his collapse expose his mental decline. For example, Middleton notes that a phrase in Nietzsche's letter to Gast, written December 31, 1888, could be indication that he had already "gone out of his mind": "Ah, friend! What a moment! When your card came, *what* was I doing. . . It was the famous Rubicon" (SL, p. 344). I recognize that Nietzsche's mind was strained from his condition during this time, and agree that some of his expressions inspire doubts of lucidity, but I suggest that significance can be found in these last letters beyond apparent symptoms of madness.

One of the letters most often cited as evidence of Nietzsche's insanity, particularly as it inspired Overbeck to take measures regarding his care, was written to Burckhardt January 6, 1889. Nietzsche begins the letter: "Actually I would much rather be a Basel professor than God; but I have not ventured to carry my private egoism so far as to omit creating the world on his account" (SL, p. 346).

Taking this statement in the context of his contentions with morality, "creating the world on [God's] account" suggests humor in the irony that Nietzsche consistency endeavored to destroy moral assumptions. By comparing his earlier professorship with his life as a philosophical author, Nietzsche suggests that, while his choice offered him the power of creation, it came with heavy responsibilities and burdens.

Nietzsche continues, comically comparing his letters to that of worldwide entertainment publications when saying he played "the part of the great *feuilletonist* of the *grande monde*," noting that he was "in close contact with Figaro," a French newspaper, and then further adds that he has "two bad jokes" to offer:

Do not take the Prado case seriously. I am Prado, I am also Prado's father, I venture to say that I am also Lesseps... I wanted to give my Parisians, whom I love, a new idea—that of a decent criminal. I am also Chambige—also a decent criminal (SL, p. 347).

I do not suspect that Nietzsche was actually intending to identify himself as either of the recently convicted murderers, Prado or Chambige, nor the French diplomat, Ferdinand de Lesseps. I suggest rather that, in addition to simply being facetious, Nietzsche was playing on the notion of a "decent criminal." He himself had personal experience in being condemned: "Do you want to know a new name for me? The language of the church *has* one—I am... the *Antichrist*. Let us not forget how to laugh!" (SL, March 1883, p. 211).

Moreover, Nietzsche could have been calling to earlier notions, such the madman found in *The Gay Science*, when conceiving a “decent criminal.” This madman called himself and all mankind criminals: “Whiter is God?... *We have killed him...* How shall we comfort ourselves, the murderers of all murderers?... Must we ourselves not become gods simply to appear worthy of it? (GS, p. 181).

Though Nietzsche was facing bouts of mental instability, as victims of dementia and paralysis experience, I propose that there was still depth and meaning in the thoughts he shared. Continuing the letter:

The unpleasant thing, and one that nags my modesty, is that at root every name in history is I; also as regards the children I have brought into the world, it is a case of my considering with some distrust whether all of those who enter the ‘Kingdom of God’ do not also come *out* of God (SL, p. 347-8).

It is easily discerned that Nietzsche places himself in the position of God here, specifically when considering this latter section of his letter in the context of his opening statement discussed above. The importance to be found in Nietzsche’s reflection, I argue, is his contemplation of individuality. If “all of those who enter the ‘Kingdom of God’ do not also come *out* of God,” and “at root every name in history is I,” then Nietzsche’s “children,” his life’s works, would not be his own but rather part of a world will, such as Schopenhauer proposed; the *principium individuationis* breaks down, sufficient reason is lost and Schopenhauer’s “boatman” no longer calmly contemplates his personal existence (BT, p. 36). With this consideration, the possibility that possibility arises that Nietzsche was wrong in his steadfast determination to devalue love through stressing individuality. If “every name in history is I,” then self-love is superfluous, control and reason are gone and his previously conceived notion of the oneness experienced in Dionysian festivals more accurately relays love’s truth; love, like nature, binding individuals together.

Cosima; From Mother Figure to Heroine in Nietzsche's Final Perception of Love

After concluding his letter to Burckhardt, Nietzsche added a few random notes, one of which expressed, "The *rest* is for Frau Cosima... Ariadne... From time to time we practice magic" (SL, p. 348). This note, along with the letter Nietzsche wrote to Cosima, has been used as evidence of his lifelong love for her, but I propose that his feelings were not always romantic and only developed during this late turn in his life.

It is my contention that when Nietzsche met Cosima her relevance was only that of being the wife of the man he idolized. Had Nietzsche in fact had a romantic fascination for Cosima early on, then his time in Tribschen would have been torturous because of being constantly confronted with unfulfilled desires rather than the self-proclaimed happiest moments of his life (EH, p. 247). It was after his perception of Wagner changed, I argue, that Nietzsche's perception of Cosima shifted to being that of a romantic nature.

Erich Friedrich Podach asserts that "in Tribschen, Cosima becomes... the governing image of Ariadnean being; twenty years later—in Turin—he... sends a last lover's greeting to his heroine" (SL, p. 346). Kaufmann contends that Cosima was for Nietzsche "the first woman of stature with whom he came into close contact," and that he "never outgrew her fascination" (NP, p. 32). In Nietzsche's "late notes and poems she appears as Ariadne," Kaufmann explains, "while he increasingly identifies himself with Dionysus... claiming that Wagner really was not Dionysian but only 'romantic'" (NP, pp. 32-3).

Kaufmann further considers Nietzsche's childhood when asserting that he felt "condemned to live in a fatherless household, alone with five women," causing resentment of his mother and longing for his father (NP, p. 33). As he "fastened on Wagner as a father substitute," Kaufmann contend, "Nietzsche loved Cosima impermissibly without daring to

confess his feelings; any indulgence or marriage was as thoroughly out of the question as if she had been his own mother” (NP, p. 34).

In light of the Wagner’s position as substitute father in Nietzsche’s life, Kaufmann mentions, “One might add that he belatedly experienced Oedipal feelings,” including in the footnotes, “Nietzsche’s Oedipal feeling for Cosima seems to have eluded the many psychologists who have examined Nietzsche’s life and loves” (NP, pp. 33-4). Though my contention differs from a Freudian analysis because of its focus on shifting perceptions, it does find congruence regarding the mother figure.

When asserting the inadequacy of Diethe’s argument regarding Nietzsche’s thoughts on marriage, I demonstrated that his attraction to wedded mothers was due to his interest in a love unknown to him. Having been denied motherly love in his youth, I argued that when conceiving an ideal of love, Nietzsche worked from known experiences with his father, a point relevant to Kaufmann’s assessment of Nietzsche’s “unrealistic references to his father, whom he pictured as more wonderful than he had actually been” (NP, p. 33).

Considering that Nietzsche was ambivalent to motherly love in his youth, I propose that upon attaching his ideal of love to Wagner as a father figure, Nietzsche saw in Cosima a kind of motherly love. He greatly valued this love, as was seen when Nietzsche declared that “one of the highest themes... is... the theme of motherly love” to Meysenbug, requesting that she give him “something of this love” (SL, April 1876, pp. 142-3).

In his efforts to devalue love, I suggest Nietzsche’s perceptions of Wagner shifted, and circumstantially his perception of Cosima changed as well. Kaufmann asserts that Nietzsche’s postscript in *The Case of Wagner* was “undoubtedly referring to Cosima” (NP, p. 34). In this afterthought, Nietzsche announces Wagner’s selfishness as it concerns women:

The female impoverishes herself for the sake of the master, she becomes touching, she stands naked in front of him... his cause triumphs in her sign... Oh, this old robber! He robs us of our young men, he even steals our women and drags them into his cave... Oh, this old Minotaur! What he has cost us already! Every year a train of the most beautiful young men and women are led into his labyrinth for him to devour (ATO, p. 258).

It was during this time of reproaching Wagner, in the summer of 1888, that I suggest Nietzsche's feelings toward Cosima took a sharp turn. As Wagner went from beloved master and father figure to deserter and monster, I propose Cosima was elevated from mother figure to tragic heroine. Following his collapse in January of 1889, Nietzsche wrote a simple, yet revealing note to Cosima, "Ariadne, I love you. Dionysus," thus pronouncing her as the Ariadne in his *Dionysus Dithyrambs* (SL, p. 346). It was in this late stage of his life, I argue, that Cosima became for Nietzsche what Podach described as "the glittering symbol of the woman of his heart's desire... the governing image of Ariadnean... his heroine" (SL, p. 346).

When interpreting Nietzsche's poem, "Lament of Ariadne," it is important to note that its origin is found in the fourth part of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, spoken by the Magician when he attempts to test Zarathustra by inciting his compassion. Grundlehner calls attention to an internal conflict occurring during this exchange. He explains that the "speaker's emotional display is not at first directed specifically to the unknown god [but] rather, it depicts an existential crisis that precedes any such relationship" (PN, p. 220).

The voice experiencing the existential crisis in the poem is the Magician, but by using the term "speaker," Grundlehner creates space between character and author, inspiring both subjective, empathetic analysis, as well as objective, sympathetic analysis. In the original poem the Magician cries out in agony, "Why torture *me*, / Delighted by suffering, thou unknown god?," but his calls go unanswered because the god inflicting suffering is the Magician's "man-made madness" (Z, pp. 31, 253).

Grundlehner explains that four years after creating the “Magician’s Song,” Nietzsche revised it “for inclusion in his ‘Dionysus-Dithyramb’”; he clarifies that two significant changes to the poem are that of retitling the work to “Lament of Ariadne,” thus altering “the masculine to the feminine,” and attaching “an epilogue to the poem,” which includes the entrance of Dionysus at the end (PN, p. 227). Aside from the importance of the inclusion of Dionysus and Ariadne to the poem, shifting the gender in German language is substantial, Stein affirms, as it directly affects the meaning and tone of the work.

I argue that the changes made from the “Magician’s Song” to the “Lament of Ariadne” reveal Nietzsche’s shift from focusing on such things as the negativity of pity to that of submitting to his desire for the love of others. The original poem, particularly when considering it in the overall context of the text itself, intends to convey the erroneous action of both calling for and responding to pity. The changes to the poem, I argue, shifts the message from false cries to meaningful summoning. I propose that the poem’s transformation represents both Cosima’s conversion in Nietzsche’s mind, as well as signifying the shift in his perception of love. Additionally, the existential crisis originally experienced by the Magician, I suggest came to represent Nietzsche’s battling his desire for love, and that this, as well as pronouncing his new love for Cosima when naming her Ariadne, inspired the significant changes made to his original verse.

The story of Ariadne, daughter of King Minos, describes her aiding Theseus in defeating the Labyrinth and the Minotaur, after which Theseus abandons her on an island, Dionysius appears and he and Ariadne fall in love. When Nietzsche changed the voice from the Magician to Ariadne, he transformed a trickster into a heroine, and I propose that Dionysius’ appearance represents Nietzsche’s late arrival to the call of love, slipping in at the

last moments through the doors of his epilogue. It is my contention that the changes made to the poem symbolize Nietzsche's final call to love, presented as the image of Dionysus appearing in response. At the end of the poem, when Ariadne cries out, "come back! / *With* all your tortures! /... O come back, / my unknown god! my *pain!* / my last happiness!,"

Nietzsche follows with his epilogue:

A bolt of lightning. Dionysus becomes visible in emerald beauty. Dionysus: / Be clever, Ariadne! / You have small ears, you have my ears! / put a clever word into them!— / Does not one first have to hate oneself if one is to love oneself? / I am your labyrinth (PN, pp. 219, 227).

In the position of love returning her call, Dionysus recaps the importance of suffering to Ariadne because of knowledge gained from experience while also implying that he is always with her because he is part of everything, "*I am your labyrinth.*" In this statement, I argue, Nietzsche reveals his discovery that love and suffering are connected; two parts of one whole. In being one with suffering, love is not the imagined pure ideal Nietzsche originally conceived, nor is it the constant suffering he assumed while endeavoring to combat his desire by way of self-induced solitude. It is my contention that it was at this point Nietzsche's perception shifted from that of seeing love as an igniter of suffering to that of being one part of a whole. Suffering and love became synonymous, holistic, parts of one unified whole.

In *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche addresses Zarathustra's lamenting his desire for the love of others in the "Night Song," and puts forth, "The answer to such a dithyramb of solar solitude in the light would be Ariadne. —Who besides me knows what Ariadne is!" (EH, p. 308). It is my contention that Ariadne symbolizes love; she represents embracing suffering and calling out for love, and in giving Cosima her name, she as well becomes the last image of love Nietzsche conceived when reaching the end of his long tragedy.

Experiences Prior to and Following Nietzsche's Collapse

Nietzsche's ability to coherently perform in his own tragedy quickly began to diminish the month before his collapse in Turin, January 3, 1889; following the event his physical and mental state was such that he was officially required to relinquish control of his life to others (SL, 1888, p. 344). Safranski proposes, "In the end, it was perhaps [Nietzsche's] breakdown that offered him a way out of the house of mirrors of his theories" (NB, p. 241).

On January 8, 1889 Overbeck arrived in Turin to collect Nietzsche, and after depositing him at the Basel Psychiatric Clinic, wrote a detailed account to Gast on January 15. He spoke of the letter he received from Nietzsche's landlord, Davide Fino, who stated that Nietzsche "had gone out of his mind" (SL, p. 349). Fino's letter followed Nietzsche's collapse, which Podach describes as follows:

On January 3, as [Nietzsche] is leaving his house, he sees... where the horsedrawn cabs are parked, a tired old horse being beaten by a brutal cabman. Compassion seizes him. Sobbing and protectively he flings his arms around the neck of the tormented animal. He collapses (SL, 1889, p. 350).

Podach further contends Karl Strecker's claim, published in 1913, that "the incident with the horse occurred 'several days' before the collapse" (SL, p. 350). After speaking with Fino, Strecker's himself claimed the incident with the "old cabbie-nag... overpowered [Nietzsche]" adding, "Was it not always so with Nietzsche that his philosophy stemmed from most violent struggles against what was most deeply rooted in his self?" (CN, p. 218).

Overbeck arrived the day after Nietzsche's collapse, and explained to Gast, "The affair became a public scandal," which he noted involved the police and risked Nietzsche's "being committed to a private insane asylum" (SL, p. 350). In between fits of excitement, Overbeck said that Nietzsche was "always lucid as regards me and all other persons, but completely in the dark about himself" (SL, p. 351). Safranski notes that Fino's wife

described having seen Nietzsche dancing naked in his room, which she discovered while peeping through the keyhole of his apartment (NB, p. 309).

Overbeck explained to Gast that at times Nietzsche would speak “wonderfully clairvoyant, and unspeakably horrible things... punctuated, as it were, on the piano, whereupon more convulsions and outbursts would follow” (SL, p. 351). Drugged by chloral, Nietzsche slept for most of the trip back, though when he woke he often sang songs, one of which Overbeck stated was “the wonderfully beautiful gondola song” (SL, pp. 351-2).

When Nietzsche’s mother Franziska, with the help of an assistant, withdrew him from the clinic in Basel to take him to the Psychiatric Clinic in Jena on January 17, Middleton notes that he erupted in “a fit of rage against [her],” causing Franziska to travel the rest of the way in “a different compartment” (SL, p. 353).

At the medical clinic in Jena, Sascha Simchowicz, observed Nietzsche while attending the lectures of Otto Binswanger, in January 1889 (CN, p. 223). While publicly conversing with the professor, Nietzsche spoke of many things, ranging from his own professorship to his health issues and even his life in Turin, but Simchowicz specifically indicated that he “did not say a word about his activities as a writer” (CN, pp. 223-4). Having read Nietzsche’s works only after observing him, Simchowicz expressed that he would always remember “the image of the man in his room cruelly tormented by his desire,” adding that Nietzsche had become “mythical: the incomparable face contorted with Laocoöntic pain, his gaze glowing with affliction” (CN, p. 225).

When Deussen saw Nietzsche for the first time since his collapse in April 1889, he stated that his friend did not recognize him (CN, p. 225). Nietzsche remained mostly quiet, and from watching his behaviors, Deussen determined that his “interests were again those of

a child,” noting that he was fascinated with such things as a “drummer-boy... and the locomotives coming and going” (CN, p. 226).

Carl Albrecht Bernoulli, Overbeck’s friend and author, recalled seeing Nietzsche and his mother, between 1889 and 1890, while he himself was a student at Jena University; he had a similar impression to Deussen’s when witnessing Nietzsche’s demeanor, stating that he “followed [Franziska] like a child” (SL, p. 353). On May 13, 1890, Nietzsche’s mother removed him from the clinic in Jena and brought him home to Naumburg so as to care for him herself (SL, p. 353). A Berlin journalist, using the pseudonym Sophus, reported that when he saw Nietzsche with his mother in 1892, he appeared “unreceptive to his surroundings,” kept busy playing with “dolls and other toys,” and when he would act out in “states of excitement,” “His mother best [knew] how to calm him” (CN, p. 233).

When Gast visited Nietzsche eight months after Deussen, in January of 1890, he expressed, “[Nietzsche] recognized me immediately, embraced and kissed me, was highly delighted to see me, and gave his hand repeatedly as if unable to believe I was really there” (CL, p. 341). Explaining that Nietzsche “did not look very ill,” Gast confessed:

I almost had the impression that his mental disturbance consists of no more than a heightening of the humorous antics he used to put on for an intimate circle of friends... it seemed—horrible though this is—as if Nietzsche were merely feigning madness, as if he were glad for it to have ended in this way (CL, p. 341).

In February of 1890, Overbeck had a similar impression. “I cannot escape the ghastly suspicion... that his madness is simulated. This impression can be explained only by the experiences I have had of Nietzsche’s self-concealments, of his spiritual masks” (CL, p. 341). Regarding suppositions of self-imposed madness, Hayman calls attention to Nietzsche discussions of “ancient Greeks who feigned madness or prayed for delirium” (CL, p. 341).

The passage d Hayman refers to is found in book one of *The Dawn*, in which Nietzsche asserts, “almost everywhere it was madness which prepared the way for the new idea,” as the behavior “seemed to mark the madman as the mask and speaking-trumpet of a divinity,” thus making him “the prophet and martyr of his idea”:

All superior men who were irresistibly drawn to throw off the yoke of any kind of morality and to frame new laws had, *if they were not actually mad*, no alternative but to make themselves or pretend to be mad (DD, pp. 13-4).

Regarding how to “make oneself mad,” Nietzsche describes that the method is basically the same across multiple cultures; it involves “senseless fasting, perpetual sexual abstinence, going into the desert or ascending a mountain... and thinking of nothing at all except what might bring on an ecstasy and mental disorder” (DD, p. 14). In reviewing Nietzsche’s history, all of these methods can be found to have been performed at some point in his life. Addressing voluntary suffering in the same book, Nietzsche proclaims, “those spiritual leaders of the peoples... in addition to madness, also had need of voluntary torture if they were to inspire belief—and first and foremost, as always, their own belief in themselves!” (DD, p. 17). If there was one constant in Nietzsche’s life it was that he continually endeavored to believe in himself and his purpose, and though he avoided the pain of love, he voluntarily accepted much of the suffering in his life for sake of his growth.

Musing “On the Three Metamorphoses”; Nietzsche’s Spirit Becoming a Child

It is impossible to determine whether Nietzsche pondered himself as a madman while in his darkened mental place, but Middleton indicates that by early 1894, his condition had escalated to the point that he was no longer able to leave the house, and that by 1895, there were obvious “signs of physical paralysis” (SL, p. 353). During this time Franziska periodically documented what Nietzsche said, titling her notes, “Sayings of my good sick

son” (CN, p. 235). Some of her transcripts from, February 13, 1895, share Nietzsche expressing, “I am no longer a child. I loved someone very much, myself... I did not love Friedrich Nietzsche at all... I didn’t love anyone not even one person” (CN, p. 235).

Safranski suggests that Nietzsche’s “grand finale of insanity lent his work an eerie ring of truth: evidently, he had penetrated so deeply into the secret of existence that he lost his mind in the process (NB, p. 317). Following this line of thought as well as considering reports of Nietzsche’s appearing childlike after his collapse, I propose musing “On the Three Metamorphoses” and pondering his life through the stages his Zarathustra set forth.

In Book One of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche wrote, “Of three metamorphoses of the spirit I tell you: how the spirit becomes a camel, and the camel a lion, and the lion, finally, a child” (Z, p. 25). Nietzsche’s spirit as camel can be seen in his life with Wagner, as he knelt down to the whims of others, “wanting to be well loaded,” humbling himself when criticized for his creations (Z, p. 26). He then left Wagner, “parting from [their] cause when it triumph[ed],” climbing “high mountains” and suffering for the “sake of truth,” before speeding “into the desert” of his solitude (Z, p. 26).

In his “loneliest desert” Nietzsche metamorphosed, his spirit becoming a “lion who would conquer his freedom and be master in his own desert,” facing established values, confronting “Thou shalt,” and setting forth his “sacred ‘No’” (Z, pp. 26-7). “He once loved ‘thou shalt’ as most sacred: now he must find illusion and caprice even in the most sacred, that freedom from his love may become his prey” (Z, p. 27). Attacking his love for over a decade, Nietzsche came to an end in which he lost control and it was then that he remembered what the child can do that that lion cannot:

The child is innocence and forgetting, a new beginning, a game, a self-propelled wheel, a first movement, a sacred 'Yes'... the spirit now wills his own will, and he who had been lost to the world now conquers his own world (Z, p. 27).

As an aged, sick man with the dependency of a child, Nietzsche received the motherly love from Franziska he had longed for in his youth. Unable to herself when she was a young mother, at the age of a grandmother Franziska nurtured her adult son in his illness. She offered Nietzsche unending loving affection, calming his fits with music as his father had done when he was a boy. Franziska died in April of 1897 and Nietzsche's sister Elisabeth claimed him until his death on August 25, 1900 (SL, p. 353).

As the lion, Nietzsche spent much of his life attempting "freedom from his love." He intended to overcome his desire by altering how he perceived love; he experimented with his theory of Perspectivism, focusing on the importance of self-criticism and self-love. All of this gave Nietzsche greater insight into himself and mankind, but could not dissuade his desiring the love of others. In his last scribed words he reveals his new perception of love by altering an earlier poem to include Dionysus answering love's call. These final thoughts reveal Nietzsche's perception of love as being one with suffering, calling to mind Zarathustra's declaration that there is "always some madness in love. But there is also always some reason in madness." Having spent much of his life contending with his emotional longing for the love of others, in the last moments of his lucidity I suggest Nietzsche achieved the new beginning of the child; that he conquered "his own world" by determining that there is always suffering in love, but there is also always love in suffering.

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